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Five protocols that aren't getting hacked? What is it that interest them inside the minds
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success? Listen to waves in the podcast presented by Walter Jennings. Find us on
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Participant #1:
Beijing is preparing for a big gathering on Sunday. The top brass of the Chinese
Communist Party will meet amid the scarlet carpets and the towering marble columns
of the Great Hall of the People on Tiananmen Square for the 20th Party Congress. The
meetings, held every five years, have been used to stage orderly transfers of power
between generations of leaders. But this Congress may be marked by a break in
convention. Xi Jinping is expected to secure an unprecedented third term. During his
decadelong reign, he's amassed more power and wielded it more ruthlessly than any
leader since Mao Xi Jung. His purged rivals stripped citizens of their individual rights
and he's trying to reshape the world order from within. As sea's power grows, so does
China's ambition.

Participant #1:
This is the economist asks I'm Anne Mikhailvoy, and this week we're asking, where
will Xi Jinping take China next? Understanding what the man at the top thinks has
never been more important. My guest Kevin Rogers spent many years trying to do
just that. He was Australia's Prime Minister from 2007 to 2010 and again in 2013. He
met See several times during his political career when they converse in Mandarin.
Since leaving politics, Mr Rudd has become an authority on all things sea as president
of the Asia Society and through his scholarship, he's just earned a PhD from Oxford.
On the Chinese leaders worldview. Kevin Rudd. Welcome to the Economist asks
Good to be on The Economist podcast, and I hope I can answer some of the questions
you ask. Now. The 20th Chinese Communist Party congress starts in Beijing on
Sunday, October 16. There's little doubt that Xi will secure a third five year term as
party chief. The Congress is also setting the direction for policy and for politics in the
next few years. So what do you think SI's vision is now for China? And is it sticking
with where he's been so far or outlining a new direction here? Well, you're right. Xi
Jinping will be comfortably reappointed, I would hazard a guess by about 2368 votes
to zero. So it'll be a narrow win for the General Secretary. The big question is, will
anything change in critical areas like the economy and foreign security policy? On the
economy in the last five years, Xi Jinping has doubled down in the direction of the
Marxist left, abandoning parts of Deng Xiaoping's earlier economic development
model. The big question we have, therefore, is, given the impact that's had on
declining economic growth, will he course correct? The evidence to date suggests he
won't. It will either be of two things, in my judgment, muddling through that is a bit
of a prize for everybody, or a doubling down further towards the ideological left. But I
don't see a return to the market orientation as it was before. The second point is just
on foreign policy. The congresses for 20 years now have said that China is
experiencing a period of strategic opportunity. That's ideological code language for no
major wars on the horizon. We can focus on the economy and expanding our foreign
policy influence. I suspect that expression will change in some way as China begins to
respond to its analysis of a worsening external strategic environment. That's really
fascinating and also a bit worrying, and we'll come back to that shortly, I think, just to
find out a bit more about the way you see his philosophy. It has this clunky title of Xi
Jinping thought on socialism with Chinese characteristics for a New Era. There is
speculation that that's going to be shortened officially to Xi Jinping thought. How
significant would that be? Or even the idea that that is talked about in his case, within
the strange ecosystem of the Chinese Communist Party and the ideological
metaphysics on which it's constructed. These sorts of formulations actually matter
because they infer a hierarchy in the various bodies of thought which have contributed
to socialism in China over the years. Only Mazdong's body of thought is called
thought. It's called Mazdong Thought or Mazdong Sisya. If Xi Jinping's descriptor
about his own personal ideological cocktail gets shortened to Xi Jinping Thought, he's
elevated to Mao in terms of parallel status in the Communist pantheon. I was scared to
ask you that, and I wondered if it's true. And I know that outsiders often make that
link to Mao, but you genuinely believe in these cases he would possibly be thinking
that way. And it's something of a risk, isn't it, given the status of Mao in, as you put it,
the metaphysics and also in the system itself? Well, right now it's certainly in the last
several years, xi Jinping has reperiorized Chinese revolutionary history. What he's
done is condensed post 49 history effectively into three periods. The Mausodong
period through until 76, when China stood up. The Dung Xiaoping period from 77
through until Xi's appointment in 2012 is the period when China became prosperous.
And now we're in the Xi Jinping period when China now becomes powerful. And
that's why he calls it the new era. If he elevates his body of thought to a status parallel
to Mao, he's starting to squeeze out the Dang Xiaoping period as well. And so there'll
be two dominant figures in Chinese revolutionary history, mao Zedong and Xi
Jinping. And how much does that ideology and that selfconfidence putting himself
front and center of the system, and that in a country that has waxed and waned about
personality cults. How much do you think is driving what actually happens, as
opposed to simply putting him on a particular pedestal. Well, my argument, having
read most of the stuff now that Xi Jinping has had attributed to his name, and I
wouldn't recommend that to anybody listening to this podcast because it's enough to
drive a man to drink. But if you do it, it's quite plain that Xi Jinping is an ideological
believer. He is a Marxist Leninist, almost fundamentalist, and whereas for the 35 year
period which elapsed between the rise of Dung through until 2012, ideology was
pushed to one side and became a convenient piece of political camouflage across the
top of an increasingly rambunctious and right as Chinese state capitalist economy. The
bottom line is, with Xi Jinping, ideology is back. His Marxism Leninism matters and
has become a new, as it were, communication device for highlevel changes in China's
strategic and macro policy direction. You first met Zi in 1986 when he was Mayor of
Tianan and you were a junior official in the Australian Embassy. What was your first
impression? What stood out about him to you? Well, way back then, I had frankly no
idea that he was the son of a then Polypero member, Xi Jung xian and his father was
then active in Dung's Polypiro and his father having been earlier purged by Mao both
during the Cultural Revolution and back in the 60s as well. All I can recall at that
initial meeting was here was a young aspiring Communist Party vice mayor of the city
of Shaman and I thought to myself, he was relatively young to hold that position. You
met him again later in 2010. By then you were Australian Prime Minister, so lots of
things had changed for both of you. How did you find him then and what did you talk
about? We met in Canberra. I had him round to the Prime Minister's residence, called
the Lodge for a very long one on one in the middle of a Canberra winter, over a fire
with a few glasses of Australian red. He was already Vice President of the country and
was already irreparent. And that's why I spent a lot of time with him. We chatted away
in Chinese, but primarily about Chinese history and party history. We talked about the
modernization of the Party, we talked about future directions for the Party. What do I
recall from that most of all? He was the first Chinese leader I'd ever sat down with
who didn't use a note. He simply extemporated about everything. That's probably
because you were dealing out the Australian red. Probably lost his notes by then. I
hope so. That's why we deal it out in large quantities. It's actually quite good. Better
than the French equivalents and considerably less expensive. Kevin Brodford. The
Australian wine industry. It's almost a foregone conclusion, as I mentioned at the top
of our conversation, that he will be reappointed as leader. There's no sign of direct
challenge in the Party. But how secure do you think he is under the surface and does
he face any political opposition at this stage? The honest answer is not really. He's
certainly the subject of criticism from a range of people. For example, over his
overreach on foreign policy in extending too much of a helping hand to Vladimir
Putin, given how badly the Ukraine has turned out. There's a lot of criticism of him in
terms of the mismanagement of the economy by lurching too far to the Marxist left,
added to the implementation of zero covert slowing China's economic growth rate
hugely. But these threads of criticism have yet to coalesce in any meaningful form
through a political figure or groups of figures which would be of substantive impact in
politburo politics. And we should bear in mind this xi Jinping is a master
machiavellian. He has conducted at least three major purges of substantive figures
who he believed were potential opponents. And he's had a rolling ten year
anticorruption campaign which has, in effect, constituted a reign of terror for
everyone else in the system, so that if you were misbehaving politically, you could be
had in terms of an allegation of corruption. But I go back to the core point policy
critiques. Either foreign policy economy still has shown no sign of coalescing around
an organized group or individual capable of challenging him in a substantive way.
What we need to look out for on that front is, does the economy really go through the
floor in the future? And secondly, if Vladimir Putin was to fall through his own palace
coup and be removed from office, either physically or politically, this would have
deep ramifications within the Chinese system. Not enough to unseat Xi Jinping, but it
would be quite destabilizing of his leadership. You've said that the fundamental
weakness for Xi is the economy. It's his Achilles healing, in your words. How likely is
it that he will correct the course of the economy? And indeed, does he know how to
do that? Or are there also factors, notwithstanding the strong state control in China
that are outside his control here? Well, we should understand why he's taken the
economy to the Marxist left five years ago. And by the way, that was signaled in the
first instance in the 19th Party Congress report ideologically, there was a formulation
which said that we are in a new period warranting greater party and state intervention
in the market than before. Secondly, the reason he's done it, having expressed it
ideologically, is that he's deeply nervous about the private sector in China ultimately
surpassing the Chinese Communist Party in terms of its long term political influence.
And so there's a method to the madness here, which is we need to keep the billionaire
class under control. Thirdly, he also faces a reduced growth consequence of this
political decision. I think it's very difficult for him to walk away from the political and
ideological logic of what he did five years ago. He may try to muddle through, keep
the existing formulations in place ideologically, then tell the new premier and the Vice
Premier is responsible for the economy, go and fix it. But frankly, that gives them
very limited parameters within which to operate. You've also noted that C is publicly
rejecting the idea of being in strategic competition with the US. Because it goes
against his guiding thought that the relationship should not be governed by conflict or
confrontation, and let's talk of mutual respect, winwin, etc. But in reality, competition
is growing between the two powers. So what would Push See to change his
ideological framework on the US? And if we accept that this competition does exist,
what does he take away from that? This is complex and I think we need to see it
within two time frames. Let's call it the long term, by which I mean starting in the
2030s. This process of strategic competition in reality, however they choose to
describe it, will continue, grow, become more intense, because Xi Jinping has already
determined the prize. That is when he announced in 2012 that China by 2049 would
achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. That's ideological and nationalist
code language for becoming the preeminent regional and global power. My own
judgment is Xi Jinping may use the Party congress to place the Party on a longterm
national security footing by changing this language about this period of strategic
opportunity that China has had for the last ten years, which means no big wars on the
horizon. He may change that to put the Party on notice that there are large challenges
coming down the railway tracks towards him. But at a tactical level, for the immediate
couple of years, he may well have still an interest in taking the temperature down.
And the reason for that is that Stabilizing relationship might be useful. Because right
now he doesn't want a war by accident over Taiwan because there's still too great a
risk he might lose it. And so therefore there is a tactical shortterm interest in
stabilizing this relationship while China prepares longterm for what they do see, in my
judgment, to be an inevitable confrontation with the United States over Taiwan in the
in that range of possibilities. About a flashpoint for U. S. China relations in Taiwan. If
I understand you correctly, you do think that war could break out. You've got a book
out called The Avoidable War. So how does the scenario get avoided if it is possible to
do so, given that you seem to think that it's a matter of perhaps a slower path, not a
path away from military conflict. The danger for the 2020s is not war by design, but
war by accident. Neither side wants a war in the 2020s over Taiwan because neither
side currently believes that they have a preponderance of force. And in China's case,
they're concerned about the financial and economic impact of sanctions against them.
So what the Chinese are seeking to do is to improve their military, financial, and
economic position over the next several years to be in a much more robust and
commanding position militarily and economically in. The burden of my book on the
avoidable war is how do you reduce the risk of conflict by accident during the 2020s.
But there's too much metal flying around every day of the week. There are aircraft
being intercepted, there are ships at sea with a risk of collision, each of which could
trigger an incident and, given nationalism, be escalated into something much worse,
as history warns us. For the 2030s, it's a different challenge, because I believe Xi
Jinping does want to return Taiwan, if necessary by force, to Chinese sovereignty
while he's still in command of the show. And that means that the only way to prevent
it from happening in the 2030s is not through guardrails that I recommend for the here
and now. It's through effective American, allied and Taiwanese deterrence built up in
the meantime to make the political risk still too great for Xi Jinping to move against
Taiwan in the 2030s. Let's look at the US. Response to seaism at the moment. What
do you make of the newsworthy story of the week on that front? Is President Biden's
toughing on exports, on semiconductors, et cetera? Is this clamping down of that kind
of cooperation with China likely to affect sea? And how do you think he's going to
respond? As I indicated before, I would not be surprised if the Party Congress report
contains new language in it about China's external strategic environment being much
more adverse, much sharper, much more confrontational than in the past. And these
are not just idle reflections out of Xi's Pen the night before the Congress. These are
deliberated on by the think tanks and the advisory institutions for months and
sometimes years before as they pour over their analysis of what they think the United
States and its allies are up to. So the change in ideological formulation on China's
external strategic environment matters because if it is a solid and clear cut change,
without wishing to be too dramatic about it, what I'd say is it begins to put China, the
system, on notice that they are moving towards some type of war footing for the
2030s. Sounds like you don't like the Biden policy very much. Well, on the Biden
policy, they are seeking, through their own national China strategy, to effect longterm
deterrence for the 2030s, which is for the United States to remain ahead in one of the
three principal categories of power technological power, as well as broad economic
power, as well as military power. Because that and their logic for the 2030s, which I
understand is necessary for effective deterrence, come then. But of course, each action
has its own equal and opposite reaction. And all I'm saying is the accumulation of
what the United States has done since HR. McMaster, the national security adviser
under Trump in late 2017 designated China as a strategic competitor. The five years of
emerging bipartisan US strategy is likely to produce a change in China's formal
strategic doctrine. A question that's often on my mind is to what extent the outside
world could influence China. It sounds like you believe that it does. Yes, I do. And it's
not simply being a romanticist for a different age. It's because China is run by a group
of Marxist Leninists who are deeply focused on a calculation of material power. And
therefore, when the Chinese system calculates American military, economic and
technological power, they have systemologies which do that, then they roll in the
cumulative impact of American alliances, both in Asia and Europe, particularly
around aggregate US foreign policy influence and aggregate economic power with
European and global sanctions, for example, against Russia over Ukraine. What we
do, the capabilities we have in the rest of the world, and the extent to which it's
organized through a pan Allied strategy does matter. Of course. The principle
determinant is Chinese power and a leader determined to change the status quo. And
that Xi Jinping. You've spent so many years studying Xi and his thoughts. What is it
that you feel like you still don't know about him and would like to find out? In the
work I've done recently on Xi Jinping, I described him ideologically as a Marxist
Leninist nationalist. And of course, if you know the history of Marxism Leninism, it's
supposed to be internationalist rather than nationalist. But I think the nationalism bit
goes to the Chinese tradition, and it also speaks to a party still in need of
accumulating new layers of legitimacy, particularly if China's economic growth rate
begins to slow over time. What I've seen quite clearly in the first ten years is a Marxist
Leninist narrative unfolding domestically, with real policy shifts on the ground in
politics, political control, and in the economy at large. What I'd like to know is how
much work is now underway with Xi Jinping applying Marxist Lenin's principles to
the evolution of a new international order if it was to be anchored in Chinese
geostrategic power. That is, I think, a huge question for the research and analytical
community to give us some light and insight on Kevin Rudd, thank you very much
indeed for joining us. Good to be with you, and do let us know what you think. What
do you wish you knew about what Xi Jinping thinks? Write to us at podcasted
Economist.com or you can tweet us at The Economist. And to understand more about
how Xero is to become the most powerful man in China and the world, you must
listen to our new podcast series, The Prince. Over eight episodes, my colleague Su
Lin Wong charts C's ascension to the top. You'll find it wherever you get your
podcasts. And if you're already a dedicated Prince listener, you'll be thrilled to know
that Sullen will be back next week with a new bonus episode do keep an ear out for
that. And as the CCP's Congress gets underway, our China team will be raising the
curtain on the event. Read their analysis and an indepth special report on the world
China wants on our website. But as I always remind you, the only way to enjoy the
full range of our journalism is to become a subscriber. We have a special introductory
offer for our [email protected]. Podcast offer. The link is in the show notes.
My producer is Alyssia Burrell. The bookings producer is Melanie Starling condoner.
And the executive producer is Hannah Mourinho. I'm Anne McElvoy. And in London.
This is the Economist.

Participant #1:
Waves in the cinema. This one will eventually become just right. Why are there so
many D Five protocols that aren't getting passed? What is it that interests them? Get
inside the minds of the industry's top leaders in fintech and Web Three and learn the
code to their success. Listen to Waves in the cinema. The podcast presented by Walter
Jennings. Find us on Spotify, Apple Podcasts or wherever you get your podcast.