TC 50 (Respondent)

RGNUL INTRA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2021
TC-50
On submission before
THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT OF INDICUS
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. ___/2021
UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION
In the matter of:
SATASHA SABAR
(PETITIONER)
V.
UNION OF INDICUS
(RESPONDENT)
MEMORANDUM for RESPONDENT
Page | i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................. iii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ....................................................................................................... iv
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ......................................................................................... vii
STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................................ viii
ISSUES RAISED........................................................................................................................... x
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ................................................................................................. xi
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ....................................................................................................... 1
I. THAT SEDITION CAN BE DETERMINED ON THE BASIS OF THE CONTENT OF THE LANGUAGE
USED TO CAUSE DISAFFECTION, HATRED OR CONTEMPT .......................................................... 1
A. §124A punishes the expressions that raise disaffection towards the duly elected
government ............................................................................................................................. 1
1. The provision provides primary importance to the intention of the offender which
can be construed through the language of the expression................................................... 2
2. The provision punishes the expression that incite the people to disobey the law
passed by the duly elected government .............................................................................. 3
B. §124A punishes the expressions where there exists a proximity between the
expression made and the anticipated danger ........................................................................ 4
II. THAT SEDITION CAN BE DETERMINED INSOFAR AS SEDITIOUS SPEECH TENDED TO INCITE
PUBLIC DISORDER ....................................................................................................................... 5
A. Sedition includes acts that incites or have a tendency to incite public disorder ....... 5
B. To establish guilt under §124A there is required a proximal connection between the
speech and subsequent public disorder ................................................................................. 8
C. The requirement of a sanction by the State Government for prosecution reduces the
scope of misuse ....................................................................................................................... 9
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III. THAT THE READING OF §124A IN KEDAR NATH IS CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID AND DOES
NOT IMPERMISSIBLY RESTRICT THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION GUARANTEED
UNDER ARTICLE 19 ................................................................................................................... 10
A. The restrictions imposed by §124A are reasonable, just and fair ............................ 10
B. The pronouncement does not have a “chilling effect” on free speech .................... 12
PRAYER ..................................................................................................................................... xiii
Page | ii
TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS
ABBREVIATION EXPANSION
¶ Paragraph
§ Section
AC Appeal Cases
AIR All India Reporter
All Allahabad
Bom Bombay
Cal Calcutta
CB (NS) Common Bench Reports (New Series)
Cox CC EW Cox’s Criminal Law Cases
DLT Delhi Law Times
DRJ Delhi Reported Journal
FC Federal Court
J&K Jammu & Kashmir
KE/Ker Kerala
LR Law Reporter
MANU Manupatra
Ms. Miss
Nag Nagpur
NCT National Capital Territory
PC Privy Council
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
SCR Supreme Court Reporter
US United States
Page | iii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES OF INDIAN JURISDICTION
Advocate Manuel PJ v State, 2012 (4) Ker LT 708 8

AK Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27 5
Ambalal D. Bhat v. State of Gujarat, (1972) 3 SCC 525 7
Amish Devgan v. Union of India, (2021) 1 SCC 1 8
Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1970 SC 1228 5
Arun Jaitley v. State of UP, 2015 SCC OnLine All 9413 8, 9
Arvinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 2018 SCC OnLine P&H 762 6
Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, (1995) 3 SCC 214 6, 11
Bhagwati Shukla v. Provincial Government, AIR 1947 Nag 1 5
Bilal Ahmed v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1997 SC 3438 3, 12
Binayak Sen v. State of Chhattisgarh 2011 (266) ELT 193 6
Brij Bhushan v. State of Delhi, AIR 1950 SC 129 6
Central Prison v. Ram Manohar Lohia, AIR 1960 SC 633 7
Common Cause v. Union of India, (2016) 15 SCC 269 9
Emperor v. Bal Gangadhar Tilak, 1908 SCC OnLine Bom 48 4
Hardik Bharatbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, 2016 SCC OnLine Guj 824 6
Indra Das v. State of Assam, (2011) 3 SCC 380 10
Kanhaiya Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2016) 227 DLT 612 6, 12
Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955 2, 4, 10
King-Emperor v. Sadashiv Narayan Bhalerao, AIR 1947 PC 82 3, 4, 5
National Bank v. Surendra Prasad Sinha, 1992 AIR 1815 8
Nazir Khan v. State of Delhi, AIR 2003 SC 4427 7, 12
Niharendu Dutt v. Emperor AIR 1942 SC 22 5
O. Sivadasan v. The New India Assurance Co. Ltd., 2011 SCCOnline Ker 3972 7
OK Ghosh v. EX Joseph, AIR 1963 SC 812 7
Pankaj Butalia v. Central Board of Film Certification, (2015) 221 DLT 29 5
Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate, (1998) 5 SCC 749 8
Page | iv
PS Meherhomji v. KT Vijaykumar, (2015) 1 SCC 749 8

Queen Empress v. Amba Prasad, ILR (1897) 20 All 55 2
Queen Empress v. Jogendra Chunder Bose, (1891) ILR 19 Cal 35 3, 5
Queen Empress v. Ramchandra Narayan, ILR (1898) 22 Bom 152 1, 2
Queen-Empress v. Bal Gangadhar Tilak, (1897) ILR 22 Bom 112 2, 3, 5
Queen-Empress v. Luxman (1899) 2 Bom. LR 286 1, 2, 5
Raghubir Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1987 SC 149 1, 6
Ramesh v. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 775 7
S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram, (1989) 2 SCC 574 10
Sanskar Marathe v. State of Maharashtra, 2015 Cri LJ 3561 1, 4, 9
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, AIR 2015 SC 1523 4, 7, 10
VA Pugalenthi v. State, Crl. OP No. 21463 of 2017 6
Vinod Dua v. Union of India, 2021 SCCOnline SC 414 4
Virendra v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 896 4, 10
VK Jawali v. State of Mysore, 1966 AIR SC 1387 10
Zakir Hussain v. Ladakh, 2021 SCC OnLine J&K 64 8
CASES OF FOREIGN JURISDICTION
Charles T. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S 47 [1919] 3, 7

Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S 418 [1911] 4, 12
Ionides v. Universal Marine Insurance Co., (1863) 14 CB (NS) 259 7
Jacob Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 [1919] 3
Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 [1907] 3
R v. Burns, 16 Cox CC 361 7
R v. Sullivan (1868) 11 Cox CC 44 7
Synder v. Phelp, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) 4
STATUTES
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 5

Indian Penal Code, 1860 4
Page | v
The Constitution of India, 1950 12
BOOKS
GAUTAM BHATIA, OFFEND, SHOCK, OR DISTURB 83-101 (Oxford University Press 2
ed., 2016)
HM SEERVAI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA 718 (2010) 11
JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 298 3
(1883)
MP JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 639 (8th ed., 2019) 14
V.N. SHUKLA, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 135 (M.P. Singh, 2008) 12
RESEARCH ARTICLES
Akshay Anurag & Dibya Behera, Section 124-A IPC — Where to Draw the Line, 11
SCC OnLine Blog OpEd 17 (2017)
Ankit Singh, Revisiting the Law of Sedition in India: A Critical Study in the Light 11
of the JNU Fiasco, 7 RMLNLUJ 112 (2015)
Laurence W. Maher, Dissent, Disloyalty and Disaffection: Australia's Last Cold 2
War Sedition Case, 16 ADELAIDE L. REV. 1 (1994)
Laurence W. Maher, The Use and Abuse of Sedition, 14 SYD. L. REV. 287 (1992) 2
Modechai Kremnitzer & Khalid Ghanayim, Incitement, Not Sedition in FREEDOM 2
OF SPEECH AND INCITEMENT AGAINST DEMOCRACY 147, 197 (David Kretzmer &
Francine Hazen eds., 2000)
Nivedita Saksena & Siddhartha Srivastava, An analysis of the modern offence of 3
Sedition, 7 NUJS L. REV. 121, 134 (2014)
OTHER DOCUMENTS
LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA, HATE SPEECH – 267TH REPORT (2017) 2

LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA, Sedition (Consultation Paper), 2017 9
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
With reference to the circumstances that have been presented in the instant case, the Respondent
humbly submits to the jurisdiction invoked by the Petitioner before the Supreme Court of
Indicus.
Page | vii
STATEMENT OF FACTS
BACKDROP
The Central Government of Indicus passed the Citizenship (Amendment) Act in 2021 which was
met with huge public backlash from the Bawali speaking individuals of the nation. This
amendment also faced tough opposition from various parts of NCT of Belli, i.e., the Capital of
Indicus with protestors alleging that the same was violative of Article 14.
VIOLENCE AND ARSON IN BELLI
The aforementioned dharnas, sloganeering and road-blocks were initiated by Ms. Satasha Sabar
(“Petitioner”) and her organization Citizens for Equal Citizenship. Through WhatsApp groups
and various speeches in the NCT of Belli, the Petitioner very strongly spoke out against the
divisive nature of the Amendment. On the 15th of January, 2021, a group led by Mr. Indi
Bhushan Singh carried out protests in support of the Amendment which resulted in bloodshed
and arson along with more than 50 deaths across the capital city.
PRESENT SCENARIO
The District Court as well as the High Court convicted the Petitioner for her speeches and overall
involvement in the protests under §§124A, 120B and 153A of the Penal Code. Therefore, the
present Writ Petition was filed under Article 32 of the Constitution for the Supreme Court to
examine the constitutionality of §124A. In furtherance of the same, this Hon’ble Court has
constituted a 5-judge bench to decide the said Petition.
TIMELINE OF EVENTS
Date Event
1947 Indicus gains freedom from the colonial rule of
Pax Britannica and underwent partition to
create two independent States, i.e., the State of
Indicus and the Republic of Bawalistan.
1950 Indicus attains the status of ‘republic’ by
adopting its Constitution.
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1951 The first census of both independent

Bawalistan and Indicus is conducted, revealing
the following information:
Indi speakers: 56% and 15% of the population
in Indicus and Bawalistan respectively;
Inquilabi speakers: 24% and 10% of the
population in Indicus and Bawalistan
respectively; Bawali speakers: 2% and 75% of
the population in Indicus and Bawalistan
respectively; Yrdu speakers: 14% of Indicus’
population; Cucci, Zucchi and Dodo speakers:
4% of Indicus’ population.
1955 Indicus enacts its Citizenship Act.
1956 Bawalistan becomes a Republic and declares
Bawali as its official language.
2021 The census in Bawalistan provides information
regarding breakup of population (by language)
as 95% Bawali speakers and 5% Indi &
Inquilabi speakers.
2021 The Government of Indicus enacts the
Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2021 causing
widespread protests led by the Petitioner across
the NCT of Belli.
15th of January, 2021 A group led by Indi Bhushan Singh in support
of the aforesaid Amendment resulted in
bloodshed, arson, loss of life due to conflicts
with the Belli Police. Immediately a case
against the Petitioner was registered and
subsequently sustained by the District and
High Courts under §§124A, 120B and 153A.
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ISSUES RAISED
I.
WHETHER SEDITION CAN BE DETERMINED ONLY ON THE BASIS OF THE CONTENT OF LANGUAGE
USED TO CAUSE DISAFFECTION, HATRED OR CONTEMPT?
II.
WHETHER SEDITION CAN BE DETERMINED ONLY IN SO FAR AS SEDITIOUS SPEECH TENDED TO INCITE
PUBLIC DISORDER?
III.
WHETHER KEDAR NATH SINGH RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA LIMITS THE
INTERPRETATION OF SEDITION TO PUBLIC DISORDER CAUSING SPEECH, THUS MAKING IT EASY FOR
§124A TO BE INVOKED AGAINST ALL DISSENTERS AND SUPPRESS FREE SPEECH GUARANTEED
UNDER ARTICLE 19.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I. THAT SEDITION CAN BE DETERMINED ON THE BASIS OF THE CONTENT OF THE
LANGUAGE USED TO CAUSE DISAFFECTION, HATRED OR CONTEMPT
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that ‘disaffection’ makes the people indisposed
to obey or support the laws of the realm. The restriction imposed by the provision on speeches
bringing the government into hatred or contempt is distinct from the mere criticism or ridicule
covered under the provisions of the Constitution. There is no need to show the actual harm but to
demonstrate that the person intended to create disposition in the minds of the other to defy the
government and such intention can be deduced through the words of the accused. Additionally,
such an offence is not necessarily accompanied by, or lead to, open violence but consist in the
display of dissatisfaction with the existing Government. Based on the aforementioned arguments,
it can concluded that Sedition, under §124A, can be determined only on the basis of the context
of the language used to cause disaffection.
PUBLIC DISORDER?
It is submitted before this Hon’ble Court that Sedition under §124A means ‘disloyalty in action’.
To establish culpability under §124A it is of quintessential importance to prove that the speech
given by the accused incited or tended to incite public disorder. In addition to this, it is necessary
that there should exist a proximal connection between the speech and the subsequent disorder. It
is further submitted that there exist sufficient checks and balances in the system to prevent the
law from being misused by the Government. §196 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
categorically mentions that sanction of the State Government is necessary to prosecute a person
under §124A. Hence, it is submitted that the incitement of violence or the tendency to incite
violence forms the gist of the offence of Sedition.
III. THAT THE READING OF §124A IN KEDAR NATH IS CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID AND DOES
NOT IMPERMISSIBLY RESTRICT THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION
GUARANTEED UNDER ARTICLE 19
Page | xi
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the reading of law adopted in Kedar Nath
Singh v. State of Bihar cannot be termed as having an unreasonable impact on the freedom of
speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a). It should be noted that the Executive
has a duty to ensure that the enjoyment of certain individuals’ Fundamental Rights does not
encroach upon the exercise of said rights by other individuals. It is for the same reason that the
judiciary has time and again placed reliance on the verdict while ascertaining such issues to
ensure that the proper application of substantive law is made and there occurs no miscarriage of
justice. It is therefore humbly submitted that the presence of reasonability acts as an antithesis to
the alleged “chilling effect” of §124A on dissent.
Page | xii
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
I. THAT SEDITION CAN BE DETERMINED ON THE BASIS OF THE CONTENT OF THE LANGUAGE
USED TO CAUSE DISAFFECTION, HATRED OR CONTEMPT
¶1. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that in order to penalise someone under
§124A, the words, signs or representations that have been used must bring the government
(Central or State) into hatred or contempt or must be an incitement to violence. 1 The law
does not take into account the offence of sedition merely because of the existence of the
feeling of hatred or contempt but when the inner feelings of hatred or contempt excites
disaffection against the state.2
¶2. Additionally, ‘disaffection’ makes the people indisposed to obey or support the laws of the
realm, and promotes discontent and public disorder.3 Sedition can be determined only on the
basis of the content of the language used to cause disaffection, hatred or contempt because,
firstly, §124A punishes the expressions that raise disaffection towards the duly elected
government [A] and secondly, §124A punishes the expressions where there exists a
proximity between the expression made and the anticipated danger. [B]
A. §124A punishes the expressions that raise disaffection towards the duly elected
government
¶3. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that it is the duty of every citizen is to
support the government established by law.4 The restriction imposed by the provision on
speeches bringing the government into hatred or contempt is distinct from the mere criticism
or ridicule covered under Article 19(2).5 §124A punishes the expressions that raise
disaffection towards the duly elected government because, firstly, the provision punishes the
expression that incite the people to disobey the law passed by the duly elected government;
1
Sanskar Marathe v. State of Maharashtra, 2015 Cri LJ 3561.
2
Raghubir Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1987 SC 149.
3
Queen Empress v. Ramchandra Narayan, ILR (1898) 22 Bom 152.
4
Queen-Empress v. Luxman (1899) 2 Bom. LR 286.
5
Sagolsem Indramani Singh v. State of Manipur, AIR 1955 Man. 9.
Page | 1
and secondly, the provision only punishes the expression that threaten the existence of the
government established by law.
1. The provision provides primary importance to the intention of the offender which can be
construed through the language of the expression
¶4. The intention of the offender is of primary importance and the same can be construed
through the words of the accused.6 The intention can be deduced from a “fair and impartial
consideration of what was spoken or written” and if the intention of the accused was to excite
feelings of disaffection towards the government, it could be considered a seditious act. 7
Additionally, in the Kedar Nath8 judgement, the Chief Justice ruled that in interpreting an
enactment, not only the literal meaning of the words used is to be seen but the antecedent
history of the legislation, its purpose and the mischief it seeks to supress are to be taken into
consideration.
¶5. It is further stated ‘Disaffection’ is a feeling which secretly seeks to alienate the people and
prepossesses the minds of the people with avowed or secret animosity towards the
Government.9 There is no need to show the actual harm but to demonstrate that the person
intended to create disposition in the minds of the other to defy or disobey the government
established by law in India.10
¶6. Simply put, the expression being complained of must be such as to satisfy reasonable men
that incitement of violence is the intention of the expression,11 even though the actual
violence hasn’t taken place. The rationale for the criminalisation of seditious acts is that it
fosters “an environment and psychological climate conducive to criminal activity” even
though it may not incite a specific offence.12 This was well explained in Jogendra Chunder
Bose13 case, where it was stated that:
6
Queen-Empress v. Bal Gangadhar Tilak & Keshav Mahadev Bal, (1897) ILR 22 Bom 112.
7
Queen Empress v. Amba Prasad, ILR (1897) 20 All 55.
8
Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955.
9
Queen-Empress v. Luxman (1899) 2 Bom. L.R. 286.
10
GAUTAM BHATIA, OFFEND, SHOCK, OR DISTURB 83-101 (Oxford University Press ed., 2016); Laurence W. Maher,
The Use and Abuse of Sedition, 14 SYD. L. REV. 287 (1992); Laurence W. Maher, Dissent, Disloyalty and
Disaffection: Australia's Last Cold War Sedition Case, 16 ADELAIDE L. REV. 1 (1994).
11
Niharendu Dutt Majumdar v. King Emperor, AIR 1942 FC 22.
12
Modechai Kremnitzer & Khalid Ghanayim, Incitement, Not Sedition in FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND INCITEMENT
AGAINST DEMOCRACY 147, 197 (David Kretzmer & Francine Hazen eds., 2000).
13
Queen Empress v. Jogendra Chunder Bose, (1891) ILR 19 Cal 35.
Page | 2
It is sufficient for the purposes of the section that the words used are
calculated to excite feelings of ill-will against the Government, and to hold
it up to the hatred and contempt of the people, and that they were used
with an intention to create such feeling
¶7. In the instant case, the Petitioner was highly involved in raising proactive slogans against the
duly elected government and played a pivotal role in raising protests against the amendment
in the Citizenship Act made by the government. Thus, through her calls for protests, the
speech made in such protests and other such activities, the Petitioner incited the people to
disobey the law passed by the duly elected government.
2. The provision punishes the expression that incite the people to disobey the law passed by the
duly elected government
¶8. The Law Commission, while elaborating on the offence of Sedition, has stated that to qualify
as sedition, the impugned expression must threaten the sovereignty and integrity of India and
the security of the State.14 The continued existence of the Government established by law is
an essential condition of the stability of the State15 and an attempt to produce hatred towards
the Government as established by law qualifies as Sedition.16 The Courts have stated that
‘disaffection’ means exciting political discontent17 and equivalent in an attempt to produce
hatred towards the Government as established by law.18
¶9. The offence of Sedition is committed at the instance of exciting or attempting to incite a
feeling of ill-will towards the government.19 The Sadashiv case reinforced the Strachey
understanding of sedition in the Tilak20 case; the offence was in exciting bad feelings towards
the government, and not solely in inciting any kind of disturbance. Such an offence is not
necessarily accompanied by, or lead to, open violence but consist in the display of
14
LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA, HATE SPEECH – 267TH REPORT (2017).
15
16
17
18
Queen Empress v. Amba Prasad, ILR (1897) 20 All 55.
19
King-Emperor Vs. Sadashiv Narayan Bhalerao, AIR 1947 PC 82.
20
Queen-Empress v. Bal Gangadhar Tilak & Keshav Mahadev Bal, (1897) ILR 22 Bom 112.
Page | 3
dissatisfaction with the existing Government.21 Therefore, sedition is an offence against the
State and punishes an act intended to subvert the government established by law.22
¶10. If a person uses either spoken or written words calculated to create in the minds of the
persons to whom they are addressed a disposition not to obey lawful authority of the
government, and if he does so with the intention of creating such a disposition in his hearers
or readers, he will be guilty of the offence of attempting to excite disaffection within the
meaning of the provision.23 Therefore, any expression which threatens the Government
established by law can be charged under §124A.24
¶11. In the instant case, by initiating protests against the amendment, spreading false
information regarding the ‘genocide of Bawali speakers’ by the State, threatening a
‘bloodbath’ in case the act is not withdrawn and finally, raising proactive slogans against the
duly elected government clearly threaten the government established by law in the State of
Indicus.25
B. §124A punishes the expressions where there exists a proximity between the expression
made and the anticipated danger
¶12. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the initial test applied to speech in
America that criticized the government (especially during war) was the “bad tendency” test
which permitted restriction of freedom of speech by government if it was believed that the
form of speech had a tendency to incite or cause illegal activity.26 Developing the same, the
principle of proximate nexus was first held in the US case of Charles T. Schenck27 whereby
the Court stated that the anticipated danger from the expression should not be remote,
conjectural or far-fetched and should have proximate and direct nexus with the expression.
¶13. The Supreme Court of India upheld the same principle and stated that regardless of the
degree of derogation and insult, a certain degree of proximity needed to exist between the
21
JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 298 (1883).
22
Nivedita Saksena & Siddhartha Srivastava, An analysis of the modern offence of Sedition, 7 NUJS L. REV. 121,
134 (2014).
23
24
Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1997 SC 3438.
25
¶4, Moot Proposition.
26
Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907); Jacob Abrams, et al. v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
27
Charles T. Schenck v. United States, 249 US 47 [1919].
Page | 4
utterance and the potentiality of public disorder or the incitement of violence. 28 Such a direct
proximity between the speech made by the Petitioner and the riots in Belli is present in the
instant case.
¶14. Additionally, a restriction as under this provision, in order to be held as a reasonable
restriction, should not be far-fetched, hypothetical, problematic or too remote in the chain of
its relation with the anticipated danger.29 The restriction in question must have a proximate
relation with the object sought to be achieved, must be proportionate and must not be
‘remote, arbitrary or fanciful’.30
¶15. In the instant case, the restriction on speech imposed by §124A has a direct relation with
the object sought to be achieved by the aforesaid, which is the prevention of creation of
disaffection or contempt against the Government. Based on the before mentioned arguments,
the Petitioner can be held liable for Sedition.
PUBLIC DISORDER
¶16. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that to fasten liability under §124A of
the Code, the speech delivered by the accused should have incited public disorder or tended
to incite public disorder.31 However, there are some material considerations which should be
kept in mind while determining culpability. The Respondent seeks to submit a three-fold
argument in this regard - firstly, Sedition includes acts that incites or have a tendency to
incite public disorder, secondly, there exists proximal connection between the speech and
subsequent public disorder, and lastly the requirement of a Sanction by the State Government
for prosecution reduces the scope of misuse.
A. Sedition includes acts that incites or have a tendency to incite public disorder
28
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, AIR 2015 SC 1523; Virendra v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 896.
29
Rex v. Basudeo, AIR 1950 FC 67.
30
Ramji Lal Modi v. State of UP, AIR 1957 SC 620.
31
Page | 5
¶17. A speech is a powerful tool as it can stir people to action, move them to tears of both joy
and sorrow, and inflict great pain. Hence, it is to be delivered rightfully.32 It is humbly
submitted that the speech made by the Petitioner is punishable by virtue of §124A of the
Code. To establish the offence of sedition, it is of quintessential importance that the speech
or expression so made should be intended or have a tendency to disrupt public order or public
peace by resorting to violence.33 It is only when there exists a pernicious tendency or
intention to disrupt the lives of the general public, will §124A will be applicable.34 In
essence, liability under the said provision can be fastened if the acts done by the accused
incited or tended to incite public disorder.
¶18. It is submitted that in the name of freedom of speech and expression, the protection is not
extended to the ones who utter words that may have all the effect of force. 35 Even though
policy criticism without inciting disaffection and public violence is outside the ambit of
§124A of the Code,36 there are certain observations made by various courts which have to be
considered.37 Even if the accused intended to incite disturbances through his speech or bring
disaffection to the Government, the same will be covered under §124A of the Code.38
Disaffection in judicial terms means ‘absence of affection’ and is made penal when it is of an
extreme nature.39 In the instant case at hand, the speeches and acts of the Petitioner
advertently led to riots and arson in the capital of Belli which resulted in the death of 53
citizens and injury to 100 others in just a matter of two days.
¶19. Liberty in order to be effectively possessed should be regulated and controlled by the
State.40 To fasten criminal liability under §124A and to regulate liberty of an individual, the
speech should be read as a whole, and undue regard should not be paid to any particular
sentence or phrase.41 Where the purpose of the speech was that the Government and the law
32
Synder v. Phelp, 562 U.S. 443 (2011).
33
Vinod Dua v. Union of India, 2021 SCCOnline SC 414.
34
Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955; King-Emperor v. Sadashiv Narayan Bhalerao, AIR 1947
PC 82.
35
Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S 418 [1911].
36
Emperor v. Bal Gangadhar Tilak, 1908 SCC OnLine Bom 48; Sanskar Marathe v. State of Maharashtra, 2015 Cri
LJ 3561.
37
Emperor v. Bal Gangadhar Tilak, 1908 SCC OnLine Bom 48.
38
Queen-Empress v. Bal Gangadhar Tilak, (1897) ILR 22 Bom 112; King-Emperor v. Sadashiv Narayan Bhalerao,
AIR 1947 PC 82.
39
40
AK Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27.
41
Pankaj Butalia v. Central Board of Film Certification, (2015) 221 DLT 29.
Page | 6
will be ceased to be obeyed42, there was no respect felt any longer for them and anarchy was
likely to follow, in these cases liability can be fastened.43 In the instant case, there were
dharnas and roadblocks after the petitioner initiated the calls for protests.
¶20. In addition to this, the satellite township of Powai was blockaded and the movement of
goods was also obstructed, thereby, hindering the functioning of the Government and leading
to anarchy. Thus, the acts of the Petitioner led to anarchy and a state of lawlessness and
should be considered an act of sedition under §124A of the Code.44
¶21. The Supreme Court of India has reiterated the need to contextualize the form of
expression before restricting it. Similar acts can affect public order in different manner in
different context. Stressing on the importance of context, the apex Court in the case of Arun
Ghosh v. State of West Bengal,45 held that before limiting any speech the following question
must be asked: Does [the speech] lead to disturbance of the current of life of the community
so as to amount to a disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual
leaving the tranquility of the society undisturbed? In the instant case, not only the public
order has been disturbed but also 53 citizens have died and 100 injured. This has already
been discussed in the previous averment, the contents of which though relied upon herein are
not being repeated for the sake of brevity.
¶22. Social Media plays an important role in today’s fast paced society. In the instant case, the
Petitioner also engaged on incitement on social media wherein she used WhatsApp groups to
raise crowds and made ‘provocative slogans’ on social media.46 The Petitioner might argue
that casual raising of slogans is not sedition as was held by the Balwant Singh case.47
However, the Courts have held that reliance on the Balwant Singh case, in cases where the
slogans have been made on social media, is not helpful for the cause of the Petitioners.48 The
main reason given for this was that Social Media directly accessible all over the World
simultaneously, and not just in a limited crowded place, such as the one in which the Slogans
were shouted by the Appellants in the Balwant Singh case.49
42
Bhagwati Shukla v. Provincial Government, AIR 1947 Nag 1.
43
Niharendu Dutt v. Emperor AIR 1942 SC 22.
44
Queen-Empress v. Luxman (1899) 2 Bom. LR 286.
45
Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1970 SC 1228.
46
¶ 4, Moot Proposition.
47
Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, (1995) 3 SCC 214.
48
Arvinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 2018 SCC OnLine P&H 762.
49
Arvinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 2018 SCC OnLine P&H 762.
Page | 7
¶23. Even if the Petitioner argues that these posts were not personally written by her, it is
submitted that to hold a person guilty of sedition, it is not necessary that the person himself
be an author of seditious material, under this provision, even circulation of such material can
be penalised.50 Calling out people to demonstrate or agitate against the Government prima
facie constitutes sedition.51 Hence, considering the abovementioned pronouncements it is
submitted that the Petitioner should be held liable for inciting people against the Government
using Social Media.
B. To establish guilt under §124A there is required a proximal connection between the
speech and subsequent public disorder
¶24. The offence of sedition is the resultant of the balancing of two contending forces:
namely, freedom and security.52 There should exist a proximal connection between the
speech made by the accused while exercising her freedom and the public disorder so caused.
It is submitted before this Hon’ble Court that there exists a proximal connection between the
Petitioner’s speech and the riots and arson in the national capital of Belli. Sedition is a rather
comprehensive term which aims to punish all the acts aimed at disturbing the tranquillity of
the State, 53 and lead ignorant persons to endeavour to subvert the Government.54 For the
offence of sedition to be committed under §124A of the Code, there should exist a certain
degree of proximity between the utterance and the prospects and potentiality of public
disorder.55 This condition was added as a layer of protection for the accused by a series of
judicial pronouncements.56
¶25. The danger of disruption of public order so anticipated should not be remote, conjectural
or farfetched. There should be a direct and proximate nexus of the speech with the danger of
public disorder and should be inherently dangerous to public interest. In essence, the
50
Raghubir Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1987 SC 149; Binayak Sen v. State of Chhattisgarh 2011 (266) ELT 193;
Kanhaiya Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2016) 227 DLT 612.
51
VA Pugalenthi v. State, Crl. OP No. 21463 of 2017.
52
Hardik Bharatbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, 2016 SCC OnLine Guj 824.
53
Brij Bhushan v. State of Delhi, AIR 1950 SC 129.
54
R v. Burns, 16 Cox CC 361; R v. Sullivan (1868) 11 Cox CC 44; Nazir Khan v. State of Delhi, AIR 2003 SC
4427.
55
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, AIR 2015 SC 1523; Central Prison v. Ram Manohar Lohia, AIR 1960 SC 633;
56
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, AIR 2015 SC 1523; Central Prison v. Ram Manohar Lohia, AIR 1960 SC 633;
Page | 8
expression or speech so made should be inseparably locked up with the action that is
contemplated, more like a "spark in a powder keg".57 The connection should be direct and not
remote58 and fanciful.59
¶26. In the instant case at hand, the call for protests against the Citizenship (Amendment) Act,
2021 were initiated by the Petitioner.60 It was in pursuance of this call there were riots and
arson in the national capital of Belli in which 53 people died and another 100 injured. The
speech given by the Petitioner is related to the riots and arson which was also accepted by the
High Court.61 Hence, there is a direct and proximate connection between the utterance of the
Petitioner and the public disorder which is not remote and fanciful.
¶27. It is further submitted that there exists causation that will link the speech of the Petitioner
with the riots and arson. The relation of causation is a matter that cannot be often distinctly
ascertained, but if in the ordinary course of events, the one antecedent is constantly followed
by other then they may be taken to stand in common parlance, in relation of cause and
effect.62
¶28. The proximate cause is defined as an action that leads to an unbroken chain of events
ending in someone suffering loss.63 The cause and effect relationship may be established by
leading evidence showing the relationship between the "speech" and the resultant "public
disorder".64 In the instant case, the High Court has already found the existence of a
connection between the Petitioner’s speech and the riots in the national capital of Belli.65
Hence, it is most respectfully submitted that there is a proximate cause as well as causation
that links the speech of the petitioner with the disturbance of public order.
C. The requirement of a sanction by the State Government for prosecution reduces the
scope of misuse
57
Central Prison v. Ram Manohar Lohia, AIR 1960 SC 633.
58
Ramesh v. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 775.
59
OK Ghosh v. EX Joseph, AIR 1963 SC 812.
60
¶ 4, Moot Proposition.
61
No. 12, Clarifications.
62
Ionides v. Universal Marine Insurance Co., (1863) 14 CB (NS) 259.
63
Ambalal D. Bhat v. State of Gujarat, (1972) 3 SCC 525; O. Sivadasan v. The New India Assurance Co. Ltd., 2011
SCCOnline Ker 3972.
64
Amish Devgan v. Union of India, (2021) 1 SCC 1.
65
No. 12, Clarifications.
Page | 9
¶29. From a bare reading of §196(1), it transpires that the offences punishable under §124A
and §153A of the Penal Code cannot be taken cognizance of by any Court except with
previous sanction of the Central Government or of the State Government. It is a settled
principle of law that even a registration of First Information Report, which has culminated
into filing of the Final Police Report without previous sanction from the competent authority
is sheer abuse of the process of law and a case arising out of such an abuse of process is
liable to be set aside.66
¶30. §124A is an offence against the State and should be used cautiously as it has grave
consequences. Any exercise of power by the Court should be preceded with a due application
of mind67 which in cases of sedition is a sanction from the State Government. The judicial
process should not be an instrument of oppression or needless harassment.68 The mandatory
requirement imposed by §196(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure not only keeps the
Government and the Judicial organs in check but also adds a layer of protection for the
person accused of offences under §124A and §153A of the Penal Code, hence reducing the
scope of misuse. If no sanction is obtained, the proceedings will be held unsustainable.69
III. THAT THE READING OF §124A IN KEDAR NATH IS CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID AND DOES NOT
IMPERMISSIBLY RESTRICT THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION GUARANTEED
UNDER ARTICLE 19
¶31. It is important to note that the constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of speech, expression
and dissent are not absolute in nature and may be made subject to certain restraints for
ensuring that the exercise of fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) does not
encroach upon the peaceful enjoyment of other individuals’ fundamental rights.70 Firstly, the
restrictions imposed by §124A are reasonable, just and fair [A] and lastly, the
pronouncement does not have a “chilling effect” on free speech and lastly, [B].
A. The restrictions imposed by §124A are reasonable, just and fair
66
Zakir Hussain v. Ladakh, 2021 SCC OnLine J&K 64.
67
PS Meherhomji v. KT Vijaykumar, (2015) 1 SCC 749; Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate, (1998) 5
SCC 749.
68
National Bank v. Surendra Prasad Sinha, 1992 AIR 1815.
69
Arun Jaitley v. State of UP, 2015 SCC OnLine All 9413; Advocate Manuel PJ v. State, 2012 (4) Ker LT 708.
70
AK Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27.
Page | 10
¶32. Law should be scrutinized from the view point of reasonableness.71 It is humbly
submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the restrictions imposed by §124A are just, fair and
reasonable within the meaning of Articles 14, 19 and 21. The Supreme Court in Common
Cause v. Union of India very clearly noted that while arresting individuals for the offence of
sedition, the police authorities are required to adhere to the principles and guidelines posited
by Kedar Nath.72 The major takeaway from the aforesaid is that the Kedar Nath judgement
has been used as a pedestal for judging all issues relating to §124A owing to its sheer fair,
just and reasonable interpretation of public order and more specifically of disturbance to the
same.73
¶33. Since the crucial requirement for a conviction under §124A as per Kedar Nath is the
pernicious tendency of creating actual public disorder,74 the same standard was applied by
the Bombay High Court to grant bail to cartoonist Aseem Trivedi. It opined that criticism,
however strong, must have been intended to cause public disorder and be a threat to the
security of the State for it to be punishable under §124A.75 A similar stance was taken by the
Allahabad High Court in Arun Jaitley v. State of UP while quashing proceedings against the
applicant. It held that only such strong words and criticism which result in an attempt to
subvert the Government through unlawful means or cause at least some disorder in public
may be brought within the purview of §124A.76
¶34. It should be noted that the judiciary has on various occasions attempted to ensure that the
benchmark laid down by the Supreme Court is not diluted owing to improper application of
§124A.77 The Supreme Court in S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram observed that for a fair
and just application of laws punishing disturbance of public order, the impugned expression
must have a proximate nexus to the actual violence or any other form of disorder. 78 This
implies that the Apex Court has taken into consideration the principle of how exactly should
71
Dr. N.B Khare v. The State of Delhi, 1950 SCR 519.
72
Common Cause v. Union of India, (2016) 15 SCC 269.
73
LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA, Sedition (Consultation Paper), 2017.
74
Gurjatinder Pal Singh v. State of Punjab, (2009) 3 RCR (Cri) 224.
75
Sanskar Marathe v. State of Maharashtra, 2015 Cri LJ 3561.
76
Arun Jaitley v. State of UP, 2015 SCC OnLine All 9413.
77
HM SEERVAI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA 718 (2010).
78
S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram, (1989) 2 SCC 574.
Page | 11
the provision of §124A be enforced by reinforcing its position as a reasonable restriction

within the meaning of Article 19(2).79
¶35. Various Supreme Court pronouncements have attempted to ensure a fair and reasonable
application of §124A as put forward by Kedar Nath by holding that only inciting enmity or
feelings of hatred between different sections of the society,80 or insulting the religious
sentiments of a certain class of citizens with a malicious mens rea of inciting public disorder
may be brought within the ambit of §124A.81 The Supreme Court however cautioned that
mere criticism of governmental institutions or any of their policies should not be treated as
seditious within the meaning of the aforementioned provision and any restriction of the same
would be a direct contravention of the ruling in Kedar Nath.82
¶36. Therefore, it is humbly submitted that the provision of §124A and the Supreme Court’s
stance in Kedar Nath is only intended to ensure that advocacy does not reach a stage where
the same causes public disorder, adverse effects on national integrity and the State’s security
as well as unfavourable foreign relations.83 The Supreme Court’s aim behind reading down
§124A Kedar Nath was to make sure that it fell within the umbrella of reasonable restrictions
provided under Article 19(2) and the said position has been ratified by various judicial
pronouncements over the course of time and subsequent constitutional evolution.84
B. The pronouncement does not have a “chilling effect” on free speech
¶37. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the Supreme Court’s stance in
Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar does not result in an unreasonable shackle upon the
freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a).85 It is essential to
understand the extent of restriction posited by the provision in question and is therefore
reproduced herein:
Whoever, by words, either spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible
representation, or otherwise, brings or attempts to bring into hatred or
79
Brij Bhushan v. State of Delhi, AIR 1950 SC 129.
80
Virendra v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 896.
81
Indra Das v. State of Assam, (2011) 3 SCC 380.
82
VK Jawali v. State of Mysore, 1966 AIR SC 1387.
83
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, AIR 2015 SC 1523.
84
V.N. SHUKLA, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 135 (M.P. Singh, 2008).
85
AIR 1962 SC 955.
Page | 12
contempt, or excites or attempts to excite disaffection towards, the

Government established by law in shall be punished with [imprisonment
for life], to which fine may be added, or with imprisonment which may
extend to three years, to which fine may be added, or with fine.
[Explanation 1.- The expression “disaffection” includes disloyalty and all
feelings of enmity.86 Explanation 2.- Comments expressing disapprobation
of the measures of the Government with a view to obtain their alteration
by lawful means, without exciting or attempting to excite hatred, contempt
or disaffection, do not constitute an offence under this section.87
Explanation 3.- Comments expressing disapprobation of the
admin-istrative or other action of the Government without exciting or
attempting to excite hatred, contempt or disaffection, do not constitute an
offence under this section.]88
¶38. As per the Supreme Court in Kedar Nath, the provision of §124A is an embodiment of
the reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2)89 and is meant to ensure that the fundamental
rights bestowed upon individuals is not misused.90 Therefore, it is humbly submitted that the
provision of §124A as interpreted in Kedar Nath is merely a safeguard in the interests of
public order and should not be construed as a psychological barrier against dissent and
criticism of the Government.
¶39. It is humbly submitted that a certain restriction, if found constitutional within the
meaning of Article 19(2), cannot be termed as having a “chilling effect” on speech and the
same was observed in Debi Soren v. State.91 The Court held that the restrictions on freedom
of speech and expression which were imposed by §124A are reasonable and cannot be
simply done away with owing to the same being introduced during the colonial era. While
considering the provision’s application due consideration towards its Explanations is
required. To strengthen the same, it should be noted when two interpretations can be given to
86
Nivedita Saksena & Siddhartha Srivastava, An analysis of the modern offence of Sedition, 7 NUJS L. REV. 121
(2014).
87
Advocate Manuel PJ v. State, 2012 (4) Ker LT 708.
88
PEN. CODE, 1860, §124A .
89
INDIA CONST., 1950, Art. 19(2).
90
Akshay Anurag & Dibya Behera, Section 124-A IPC — Where to Draw the Line, SCC OnLine Blog OpEd 17
(2017).
91
Debi Soren v. State, AIR 1954 Pat 254.
Page | 13
the words of an existing law, the Court should accept that interpretation which is in favour of
constitutionality rather than an interpretation which will make the law unconstitutional.92
¶40. The Supreme Court in Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab while overturning the
convictions against the appellants very clearly noted that any words, either spoken or written,
can be brought within the fray of impermissible seditious activity only if they have a
tendency to incite violence and disturb public tranquility.93 This is in essence a reiteration of
the position that was adopted in Kedar Nath of how §124A is valid to the extent that it
penalizes acts/words intended to cause violence.94
¶41. This particular understanding of the impugned provision was upheld by the Supreme
Court in Nazir Khan v. State of Delhi. Herein sedition was described as disloyalty in action
and all such practices intended to excite discontent or dissatisfaction, to create public
disturbance or disorder, to cause civil war or bring the Sovereign/Government into hatred.95
As has been stated time and again, the words intended to censure and criticize any actions
taken by the governmental agencies through lawful means cannot be punished under
§124A.96 This is exactly what is put forward by Kedar Nath as well and therefore cannot be
termed repugnant to settled constitutional principles.
¶42. The principle underlying the judicial stance of the Supreme Court in Kedar Nath may
very well be understood through the opinion of Justice Holmes in Gompers v. Bucks Stove &
Range Co.97 Herein he stated that in the name of freedom of speech and expression, it should
be ensured that the said protection is not extended to the ones who utter words that may have
all the effect of force.98
¶43. While granting bail to Kanhaiya Kumar, the Delhi High Court very categorically held
that while exercising the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article
19(1)(a), an individual should remember the Fundamental Duties which form the other side
of the same coin.99 This, in essence, means that the presence of a sedition law as well as its
92
Bowman v. Secular Society, [1917] AC 406; R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 628.
93
Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, (1995) 3 SCC 214.
94
Ankit Singh, Revisiting the Law of Sedition in India: A Critical Study in the Light of the JNU Fiasco, 7
RMLNLUJ 112 (2015).
95
Nazir Khan v. State of Delhi, AIR 2003 SC 4427.
96
Bilal Ahmed v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1997 SC 3438.
97
Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S 418 [1911].
98
MP JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 639 (8th ed., 2019).
99
Kanhaiya Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2016) 227 DLT 612.
Page | 14
interpretation in Kedar Nath is intended to ensure that the citizens construe their rights and
duties in a manner which is harmonious for the functioning of the Constitution as a whole.100
¶44. The Code of Criminal Procedure under §196 clearly provides for a requirement of
Central or State Government sanction to take cognizance in a matter dealing with sedition.101
Therefore, it is humbly submitted that to term the Kedar Nath verdict as having a “chilling
effect” on free speech would be incorrect since the combined effect of judicial guidelines and
procedural law is intended to ensure that the substantive part of §124A is applied efficiently.
100
Hardik Patel v. State of Gujarat, 2015 SCC OnLine Guj 2086.
101
CODE CRIM. PROC., 1973, §196.
Page | 15
PRAYER
Wherefore, in the light of the facts stated, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it is most
humbly prayed and implored before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indicus, that it may be
graciously pleased to adjudge and declare that:
1. sedition can be determined on the basis of the content of the language used to cause
disaffection, hatred or contempt;
2. sedition can be determined insofar as seditious speech tended to incite public disorder;
3. the reading of §124A in Kedar Nath is constitutionally valid and does not impermissibly
restrict the Freedom of Speech and Expression guaranteed under Article 19.
Also, pass any other order that it may deem fit in the favour of the RESPONDENT to meet the ends
of equity, justice and good conscience.
For this act of kindness, the Respondent shall duty bound forever pray.
Place: s/d
Dated: Counsels on behalf of the Respondent
Page | xiii

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RGNUL INTRA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2021

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. ___/2021

UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION

In the matter of:

MEMORANDUM for RESPONDENT

TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................. iii

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ....................................................................................................... iv

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ......................................................................................... vii

STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................................ viii

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ................................................................................................. xi

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ....................................................................................................... 1

UNDER ARTICLE 19 ................................................................................................................... 10

PRAYER ..................................................................................................................................... xiii

CASES OF INDIAN JURISDICTION

Advocate Manuel PJ v State, 2012 (4) Ker LT 708 8

PS Meherhomji v. KT Vijaykumar, (2015) 1 SCC 749 8

CASES OF FOREIGN JURISDICTION

Charles T. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S 47 [1919] 3, 7

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 5

The Constitution of India, 1950 12

LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA, HATE SPEECH – 267TH REPORT (2017) 2

VIOLENCE AND ARSON IN BELLI

1951 The first census of both independent

I. THAT SEDITION CAN BE DETERMINED ON THE BASIS OF THE CONTENT OF THE

LANGUAGE USED TO CAUSE DISAFFECTION, HATRED OR CONTEMPT

A. The restrictions imposed by §124A are reasonable, just and fair

the provision of §124A be enforced by reinforcing its position as a reasonable restriction

B. The pronouncement does not have a “chilling effect” on free speech

contempt, or excites or attempts to excite disaffection towards, the

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