REPORTERS: ANGELICA PANELO & EUGENE REYES

MYANMAR: The Challenging Transition from Military to Democratic Government

7.1 Historical Background and Current Political Challenges:

● The Republic of the Union of Myanmar, formerly Burma, has 135 officially recognized ethnic groups.
Myanmar's ethnic minorities such as the Kachin, Kayah (Karenni), Karen, Chin, Mon, Rohingya, and Shan
make up 30–40% of the population and live primarily in the peripheral states.

● Ethnic conflicts helped create a "praetorian state" in which the Burmese military (Tatmadaw)
dominates politics, the economy, and society. The military began disengaging from politics in 2011.

● Bagan Dynasty, started in 1044, is called Burma's "Golden Age." Burman language, culture, and
Theravada Buddhism expanded over its 250-year hegemony. The Kingdom dissolved in 1300 after
internal strife and Mongol invasion in the late 13th century.

● The British seized Upper Burma after three Anglo-Burmese Wars between 1824 and 1885, and Burma
became a province of British India in 1886. In 1923, a so-called diarchy was founded, leaving some topics
to a Burman ministerial administration responsible to a census-suffrage legislature. Burma was invaded
by Japan in 1942.

● Direct British administration was established only in Ministerial Burma, and the number of British
officials remained relatively low, leaving most subaltern posts to "Asian" officials from diverse areas of
the British Empire.

● In 1931, ethnic Burmans controlled more than 50% of government employment in Lower Burma, while
the British recruited ethnic minorities for the colonial army (Steinberg 2010, p. 29). Bamars lived in
communities and worked in traditional industries.

● Before 1900, Burmese were independent farmers with a good level of life.

● During World War II, Japanese soldiers seized Burma and nurtured nationalist aspirations among
ethnic minorities. Japanese military occupation turned Burmans against them. Aung San and the AFPFL
declared war on Japan in 1945.

● A party member killed Aung San in July 1947.

● Weak civil institutions Tatmadaw factionalism forced Premier U Nu to appoint Ne Win interim PM in
1958. U Nu's intention to declare Buddhism the national religion in 1960 prompted ethnic rebellions.

● The military was administered until 1974 by a council and the Buddhist Socialist Program Party.

● In 1988, inflation, petrol and food shortages, and the demonetization of minor currencies sparked a
popular insurrection. Ne Win resigned as BSPP leader despite being the government's eminence grise .
On August 8 ("8-8-88 Uprising"), Burmese cities, notably Rangoon (now Yangon), had coordinated
protests.

● In a decade, the junta grew the Tatmadaw to almost 400,000. Regional army commanders assumed
subnational state duties. The junta, renamed the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in 1997,
abandoned the socialist planned economy in favor of military-dominated rentier capitalism and signed
ceasefire agreements with many ethnic rebel groups that guaranteed both parties a share of the
earnings from local resources in rebel-controlled territories.

● SPDC's transition strategy was disclosed in 2003. A constitutional assembly appointed in 2008
developed a new constitution adopted in a manipulated referendum. Myanmar's shift to electoral
authoritarianism was completed by the 2010 elections and President Thein Sein's 2011 cabinet (Huang
2013; Dressel and Bünte 2014).
● Aung San Suu Kyi, legalizing political parties, and freeing political prisoners followed. Government
loosened speech, assembly, and association restrictions. The NLD won 255 of 330 Lower House seats
and 135 Upper House seats in November 2015. Parliament elected Aung San's confidant Htin Kyaw
Union as president of March 15, 2016.

7.2 Constitutional History:

● SLORC suspended the 1974 communist constitution in 1988. Three constitutional characteristics were
undemocratic (cf. Croissant 2016). First, the treaty's authoring assembly lacked "upstream legitimacy."
SLORC's 1993 national convocation included 107 1990-elected deputies. The NLD departed the
monastery in 1996, and the process started in 2004. Myoe 2007:4) 1088 delegates, 13 elected, none
from NLD, attended the constitutional convention (Myoe 2007). The military dominated internal
decision-making, which lacked "process legitimacy." The Junta imposed 104 rules and penalized
constitutional criticism (Williams 2009). 2008 proposed constitution resembled 1993 SLORC proposal
(Jones 2014). Third, the process lacked "downstream legitimacy": notwithstanding a vote in May 2008,
many local and international observers attributed 98% participation and 92% support to manipulation
(Seekins 2009; Than 2009).

● The 2008 Constitution establishes and distributes institutions. After 448 clauses, rights and
responsibilities are mentioned. Article 11-48 calls the union a "genuine, disciplined multiparty
democracy" (Art. 6d).

● This chapter splits the Union into seven zones and states and grants the Tatmadaw parliamentary
representation, autonomy, and prerogatives. Article 20(f) declares the military guarantor of the
constitution, national integrity, and sovereignty. This guarantees a market economy and prohibits
nationalization and demonetization. Articles 49-56 concern state government. Chapters 3–6 cover the
basic principles and functioning of state bodies, including the president, two vice presidents, the
cabinet, and the National Defense and Security Council (Art. 57-73), a bicameral national parliament,
regional parliaments, and the court system, including the Constitutional Tribunal (Art. 199-292). Chapter
7 defines the Tatmadaw's political function (Art. 337-344) while Chapter 8 outlines civil liberties, duties,
and economic and social rights (Art. 345-390). At first glance, the constitution gives a wide range of
substantive rights, but most are limited by present legislation, so their fulfillment looks almost entirely
dependent on parliament's discretion (Nardi 2014). The constitution recognizes Buddhism, Christianity,
Islam, Hinduism, and animism as established religions (Art. 361-2) and outlaws "religious enmity" and
"religious abuse" (Art. 364). Chapters 9 and 10 handle parliamentary elections and political parties (Art.
404-409). Chapters 11 and 12 detail the president's emergency declaration power (Art. 410-432) and
modification process (Art. 433-436). Chapters 13-15 control state emblems and closures (437-457).

● The 2008 Constitution is rooted in 1947 and 1974. Constitutional rights and Buddhism are discussed.
The 1947 Constitution inspired the return to a bicameral legislature, indirect election of the president by
the Union parliament, and central government appointment of regional governments. The 1974
Constitution split Burma into seven regions and states (Zhu 2009). Market economy, multiparty system,
and equal representation of all 14 states and regions in the Upper House are improvements.

● (Art. 9a, 141). States can't secede like in 1947. 1947 Constitution, Articles 201-202 First time in
Burma's history, regions and states elect legislators and a Constitutional Tribunal is established (Art. 40).

● Constitutional modifications need 75% of both Assembly of the Union chambers, giving the military a
de facto veto. Referendums are needed to replace the president, National and Defense Security Council,
and amendment rules.

● The constitution is pro-military. It's a "military constitution" meant to enforce law, gain international
credibility, and limit government authority (Croissant 2016). It inhibits the democratic system,
"something military dictators do to protect their personal and economic interests after leaving office"
(Negretto 2013). Constitutionally, Tatmadaw is the fourth government branch. It sets its own budget
and handles military affairs independently of the president and parliament.
● It chooses defense, home, and border ministers. It may veto presidential, legislative, and judicial
security, defense, and military decisions. Tatmadaw officers are immune from prosecution for conduct
committed before 2011 (Art. 445). The military has a fourth of the Union parliament's seats and 14 state
and regional legislatures. Changes need military approval. Tatmadaw's commander-in-chief chooses and
fires military MPs, ministers of defense, home, and border affairs, and subnational border security
ministers (Art. 232). He commands all military, paramilitary, and border troops, certifies government
nominations, and may overrule military court verdicts (Art. 343). If the president announces a state of
emergency, all legislative and executive powers pass to the military commander-in-chief (Art. 40, 149).
The 11-member NDSC must approve a state of emergency and designate the commander-in-chief, giving
the Tatmadaw veto authority (Art. 201).

7.3 System of Government:

● Myanmar is a presidential unitary state. President has executive power. The Union Assembly's Upper
and Lower Houses are legislative. 14 ethnic states have selected chief ministers and unicameral
legislatures. Judiciary is apart from government. Aung San Suu Kyi became a state councilor in April
2016, allowing her to contact ministries, agencies, and other organizations and people formally.

7.3.1 Head of State Government:

● Presidents head state and government. The 2008 Constitution eliminated the prime minister office,
however some analysts relate the 2016 state counselor role to a prime minister.

● Two others are vice presidents. Restrictive eligibility requirements. Only members of the Union
Parliament who are at least 46 years old, have lived in Myanmar for 20 years, and know its political,
administrative, economic, and military matters may run.

● He may also obtain Constitutional Tribunal interpretations and abstract judicial review. He or she
selects diplomats and senior administrators, but not high-ranking military men. The president has no
additional military power.

● The president runs the cabinet. In March 2016, the first NLD-led cabinet included 20 ministers and a
presidential minister.

● Parliament must approve presidential decrees and may override vetoes by majority vote. NDSC and
Tatmadaw commander-in-chief engage in government.

7.3.2 Legislature:

● Myanmar's Assembly of the Union (Pyidaungsu Hluttaw) has a House of Nationalities and a House of
Representatives (Pyithu Hluttaw). Regional and state legislatures also have 5-year terms. MPs can't hold
other government or elected positions. Each state and area elects 12 Upper House members; the
military gets 56.

● 110 House members are military appointees. Tatmadaw's commander-in-chief picks 166 MPs. Since
2011, the army commander has frequently changed military MPs. Regional parliament sizes vary from
20 to 143. 25% of elected seats are military.

● Lower and Upper Houses are equal in Myanmar. Lower House vetoes or amendments can't be
overridden unilaterally. If the two chambers disagree, they meet together. Except for constitutional
revisions, all decisions are by simple majority. President signs the measure once it passes both
chambers.

● Security and Defence Committee members are military. Elect representatives if "required". 18
committees stand (April 2016).
● Myanmar's legislature is a strong institution that confronts the president and other state institutions.
In August 2012, the Upper House moved to impeach the Constitutional Tribunal, with USDP and NLD
civilian legislators' support.

● Most NLD lawmakers lack parliamentary experience. USDP MPs in the first elected Union parliament
sometimes worked with opponents.

● Several investigations have highlighted Myanmar's parliamentary processes and legislators' behavior.
In 2012–2015, cross-party alliances boosted parliament's position against the government

7.4 Legal and Judicial System:

● Myanmar's legal system mixes traditional, English, and post-1947 law. British pre-independence India
law included common and statute law (Crouch and Lindsey 2014). Under parliamentary democracy from
1947 to 1962, India had a Supreme Court, High Court, and provincial courts schooled in Anglo-Indian
law. The military formed Special Courts after the 1962 coup. 1974's Constitution socialistized the court.
Despite improvements, Myanmar's judiciary remained beholden to the executive branch.

● Judicial corruption and office abuse are endemic since the 1960s. Myanmar's low Rule of Law
Indicator and Corruption Perception Index ratings indicate its weak rule of law and significant public
corruption

● Slow advances are made. The new constitution authorizes the Supreme Court to enforce fundamental
rights, notwithstanding the courts' minimal influence thus far. More political activists are persecuted
than incarcerated or murdered.

●The 2008 Constitution reformed the country's civilian courts, with the Supreme Court on top. It
controls 14 high courts, 67 district courts, and 324 township courts.

● Marriage courts and village chiefs (headmen) have quasi-judicial authority. The constitution created a
split, common-law judicial review system. The Supreme Court considers administrative matters involving
constitutional rights, while the Constitutional Tribunal has review authority.

● The 2008 Constitution guarantees public trials, a chance to defend, and an appeal. Executive authority
weakens judicial independence. The president nominates the chief justice and 7-11 Supreme Court
justices, and parliament may only delay approval if the candidate has qualifications.

● Myanmar's first constitution was passed in 2008. The nine-member Constitutional Tribunal evaluates
and resolves constitutional issues between the Union government, states, regions, and self-governed
territories.

● Union president, parliamentary speakers each suggest a third of Tribunal judges to parliament.
Legislators may only reject unsuitable candidates. Five-year terms for Constitutional Court justices. First
bench (2011–2012) elected by USDP, military MPs, and ethnic minority parties. After nine judges
resigned in 2012, the NLD-dominated parliament picked a third.

● Government or parliament may impeach judges. Depending on how the process begins, a legislative
chamber may act if two-thirds of members accept allegations of high treason, constitutional violation,
misconduct, or loss of office qualification.

● The Tribunal evaluates national, state/regional, and self-administered area law. The Tribunal has
displayed political independence and overturned presidential decisions and decrees. In 2012, the
government asked the Supreme Court whether parliament may require ministers to attend all
committee sessions.

● Even though impeachment was legally feasible, politicians missed the fact that parliament cannot
override Constitutional Tribunal verdicts.
7.5 Electoral System and Elections:

● "Ministerial Burma" held its first Legislative Council elections in November 1922. 1947 brought
suffrage. 1951-1960 saw multiparty elections for the Chamber of Deputies. AFPFL prevailed throughout
this period. Elections were free and fair despite administrative and security concerns (Steinberg 2010).
Only Buddhist Socialist Program Party candidates may run under the 1974 Constitution. The military
junta approved free elections in 1990, but SLORC wouldn't let the new parliament assemble. 2008
Constitution created multiparty Union parliament, regional, and state assemblies. The last Pyithu
Hluttaw elections were held in November 2015 amid worries about voter registration and uncontrolled
party financing. 2015 elections earned the second-highest quality score among seven Southeast Asian
countries (54.07 compared to an average of 50.59). In January 2016, village tracts and urban wards were
voted nationally.

● 2008 Constitution established electoral system. Article 392 excludes Buddhist sangha members from
voting. 25-year-old natural-born nationals who've resided in Myanmar for 10 years may run. Before the
2012 by-election, a rule that would have prevented convicted felons from joining political parties was
removed (Taylor 2012). Candidates might be independent or party-affiliated (Kudo 2011; The Burma
Fund 2011). General Administrative Department oversees local elections, while Union Election
Commission (UEC) manages voter registration and national, state, and regional elections (GAD). The UEC
may call byelections if a legislator joins the administration. Candidates may file electoral complaints, but
it costs money (Oo 2014). All national and subnational legislatures employ plurality-rule single-member
districts.

● 2010 saw implementation of Myanmar's 2008 constitution. The NLD and other opposition parties
boycotted. The military-backed USDP ran for Union, state, and regional legislatures. The political playing
field was slanted in favor of the USDP, which won a landslide (Kudo 2011; Englehart 2012).

● After Aung San Suu Kyi's release from house arrest, the NLD ran in 2012 by-elections. The USDP was
preferred, although other parties could campaign freely and utilize official media (Than 2014). NLD won
41 seats, USDP one. NLD wins in seats with large military and civil service populations demonstrate
support from government-aligned groups. 2015's election strengthened the NLD. 887 of 1150 seats
were won. USDP won 117 seats. NLD won a majority (including 25% of military seats) in seven regional
and three state legislatures. Shan State's USDP-led coalition won (Dinmore and Guyitt 2015). Totalitarian
elections are uncertain. It gave the opposition a chance to challenge post-2008 government institutions
aimed to sustain civilian military dominance. voter registration, election administration, etc.

7.6 Parties and Party System:

● After 1945, AFPFL ruled Burma and after combining in March 1945, the AFPFL won elections in 1947,
1951, and 1956. The party's power monopoly mirrored its popularity among Bamars, notwithstanding
factional issues. The party divided into the military-backed "Stable AFPFL" and Prime Minister U Nu's
"Clean AFPFL" before the 1960 elections.

● After 2008's Constitution, political parties reemerged in Myanmar. Art. 39 of the constitution
prescribes a multiparty system for the Union, but parties can be banned for "treasonous" activities,
abusing religion for political purposes, or "receiving and expending financial, material, and other
assistance from a foreign government, a religious association, or a foreign person".

● Myanmar's party system has been divided since the 1950s. First, center-periphery; second, pro-
military vs. pro-democracy. Union parliament vote trends and state and regional party alliances cross
block boundaries.

● Pro-military parties NUP and USDP. After the 1990 elections, SLORC abolished the NUP as a BSPP
affiliate. In 2010, pre-1988 officials reestablished the NUP, although it gained no seats in 2015. In 2010,
the military junta picked USDP candidates.
● Ethnic and regional parties dominate. Nationalist Brotherhood Federation helps ethnic groupings
coordinate actions and stances.

● Third category: small parties, NLD, and NDF, which separated from NLD in 2010. This group contests
Bamar-dominated areas.

● The NLD was created in 1988 by reform-minded soldiers, politicians, and democracy activists. In 1990,
Aung San Suu Kyi's party won 80% of parliamentary seats.

● After combining in March 1945, the AFPFL won elections in 1947, 1951, and 1956. The party's power
monopoly mirrored its popularity among Bamars, notwithstanding factional issues. The party divided
into the military-backed "Stable AFPFL" and Prime Minister U Nu's "Clean AFPFL" before the 1960
elections.

7.7 State Administration:

● Myanmar is a centralized unitary state. There are two levels of government: central and
regional/state. States have predominantly ethnic minorities, whereas areas are mostly Bamar. Under
the 2008 Constitution, state and regional administrations consist of a partly elected unicameral
parliament (hluttaw), a chief minister-led executive, and state or regional judicial institutions. The
hluttaw has two elected members per township, "national race" representatives, and appointed military
representatives. The president chooses the chief minister from elected or unelected hluttaw members.
The commander-in-chief nominates the state or regional minister for border and security (Nixon et al.
2013, v).

● Below states and regions are 325 townships and 67 districts in Shan State. These are national
administration pillars (Saw and Arnold 2014). Townships include village tracts and municipal quarters.

● The General Administration Department (GAD) of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA) promotes
ministry coordination and communication and links Naypyitaw to 16,000 wards and village tracts. The
GAD supports Naypyidaw's administration. It manages Myanmar's public administrative structures. The
GAD is the civil service for regions and states. Local governments supervise civil workers, while the
MOHA manages their personnel. They are answerable to both local governments and the MOHA. Local
governments have less duties than the federal government. Local governments lack human resources,
bureaucratic, and budgetary capacity (Saw and Arnold 2014).

● Myanmar's population statistics is incorrect and debated, however various states and areas have
vastly varying populations. Socioeconomic development and armed conflict differ greatly.

● The constitution outlines subnational governments' policy areas. The defined duties exclude health,
education, energy, mining, and forestry (Nixon et al. 2013). Territorial entities lack financial resources,
and the federal government taxes all significant income sources. With an inadequate system of national
transfer payments, fewer than 5% of government spending is subnational (Nixon et al., 2013). High
political, administrative, and fiscal centralization contrasts with inadequate administrative, fiscal, and
infrastructure capacity (Englehart 2005).

● Government revenues are low. Total revenues (excluding SOE transfers) as a percentage of GDP grew
from 5.6 (2009) to 9.3 (2014–15), although it's still the lowest in Southeast Asia (OECD 2014).

7.8 Civil-Military Relations:

● Burma/Myanmar is a "praetorian state" with minimal political institutionalization, strong political

● The Tatmadaw's capacity to undertake a top-down change in which it carved out political autonomy,
policy prerogatives, and veto privileges contrasts with past military administrations in Southeast Asia
and other areas. Military dictatorships are unstable and short-lived because they lack organizational
ability to rule and keep power and are prone to intramilitary disputes.

● Three things enabled Tatmadaw escape military regime instability. First, Myanmar's military control
was a "corporate coup": Key military elites backed the 1962 coup and the 1988 SLORC, and the military
junta comprised all Tatmadaw agencies and power groupings. Both the Revolutionary Council and
SLORC were made up of Ne Win loyalists. The ensuing "hierarchical military regimes" (Linz and Stepan
1996) institutionalized power-sharing agreements amongst multiple military partial elites, ensuring no
group could undermine the military government's power base inside the military-as-institution. This
prevented countercoups.

● Second, after 1962, the military administration created mass groups like the BSPP and, after 1988, the
USDA/USDP, underlining the military's leadership on the "Burmese route to socialism" and the battle to
protect the country against separatist insurgencies in the periphery.

● After the "8-8-88 Uprising," the Tatmadaw recalculated its legitimization approach. It gave up any
socialist claims of revolutionizing society for a short term of a military transitional government by the
SLORC/SPDC with the proclaimed purpose of building a "disciplined democracy

● After the 1990 elections, the military tried to improve its relations with the wider population through
the Union Solidarity and Development Association, which played a key role in political indoctrination,
the creation of paramilitary units, and the repression of political. The regime's propaganda portrayed
the military as the sole dependable national institution.

● Third, the various military administrations succeeded to ease the tensions between the military-in-
government and the military-as-institution. Geddes contends that a military with an unbroken chain of
command and institutional autonomy prefers institution survival above regime survival.

● Because political control creates military rivalry, "military regimes hold the germ of their own
downfall". Latent factional rivalry in the Tatmadaw was always defused before it threatened military
cohesion or regime survival.

● The junta used counterstrategies to maintain the military's cohesion.

● Prior to 2004, the military junta also relied on DDSI to monitor military units. However, conflicts
between military intelligence and other military services led to a purge of the clique around Khin Nyunt,
the chief of military intelligence, and the installation of a new intelligence service, the Military Affairs
Security Service.

● Families and retirees had access to welfare, health, and education services, as well as food and rare
items. About 4% of the population, or 2 million individuals, get these benefits.

7.9 Political Culture, Civil Society, and Media System:

● Neither the World Values Survey nor the Asia Barometer Survey offers detailed information on
Myanmar's political beliefs, values, and reasons (see Welsh and Huang 2016 for early ABS findings).
Indirect measures like as the frequency of protests, political performance statistics, and election results
imply that large portions of the population do not recognize the military's claim to political leadership.
The NLD's landslide wins in 1990 and 2015 demonstrate the Tatmadaw has failed to persuade the
populace that military-controlled democratic institutions are best for Myanmar's society. Weak support
for the military dictatorship doesn't mean support for democracy.

● Public comprehension of government structures and processes is poor, according to the Asia
Foundation's 2014 evaluation of Myanmar. More than 80% of respondents can't name any sections of
government, and most don't know how crucial jobs are picked or appointed, including parliament,
president of the Union, and state or regional chief minister.

● Bamar majority regions are more optimistic than ethnic states (Asia Foundation 2014). As in other
Southeast Asian countries, people admire democracy but know nothing about it. 37% of Burmese think
equality is vital to democracy, while less than a quarter name process, freedom, or effective
administration. 75% oppose horizontal responsibility (Welsh and Huang 2016). Poor social trust, divisive
politics (Asia Foundation 2014).

● Myanmar's civil society evolved from Buddhist and Christian grassroots social service delivery. Such
groups offered governmental services in conflict zones (ADB 2015). Precolonial Burma had self-help
networks. Some of these self-organizing communities still exist or have evolved (Kramer 2011).
"Modern" civil society originated in colonial times as voluntary organizations communicating and
organizing social interests, ideals, and demands independently from the state (Hewison and Nyein 200).
Buddhist groups like YMBA and student groups were political civil society pioneers (Steinberg 1999;
Hlaing 2004; Hewison and Nyein 2009). Christian groups gained popularity among ethnic minorities and
helped establish the Karen National Association in 1881. (Kramer 2011; Taylor 2009, p. 156). Early in the
20th century, British India generated charity organizations, interest groups, labor unions, and cultural or
civic organisations (Steinberg 2001; Kramer 2011).

● Burma had a thriving civil society compared to many Southeast Asian countries, but the 1962 military
regime repressed political opposition and associational pluralism. The military destroyed or pressured
existing organizations to join BSPP front groups. Buddhist monasteries and monks (sangha) were obliged
to register. The military planted spies in monasteries and paid for sangha approval (Smith 1991;
Matthews 1993; Hlaing 2004; Kramer 2011). Government never dominated nonprofits. Christian-led and
community-based organisations may provide apolitical aid (Seekins 2005; Lorch 2006). Some pre-
authoritarian organizations, such as UBCCI and All-Burma Young Monks' Association, were permitted by
the military (Hlaing 2004; Kramer 2011). Students, instructors, and lecturers organized clandestine
discussion groups to spread opposition literature and political beliefs (Hlaing 2004).

● Despite repression, including a rigorous command structure and informant monitoring, there were
demonstrations against military authority throughout the years, with the greatest explosions in 1988
and 2007. (Schock 2005; Chenoweth and Stephan 2013). Civil society activists were kidnapped,
assassinated, and imprisoned after the 1988 rebellion, preventing opposition. SLORC replaced BSPP with
USDA. USDA conscripted 12% of the population and crushed opposition (ICG 2001; Hlaing 2004). The
junta implemented additional controls to monitor Myanmar's 300,000 Buddhist monks' admission,
education, and behavior (Matthews 1993; Lorch 2006). NGOs may offer social services in communities if
local military commanders allow them, but all other operations need a license (Lidauer 2012). Despite
these limitations, Myanmar had over 200,000 community-based service providers and 300 local NGOs
by 2000. (South 2009; McCarthy 2012).

● After 2008's Cyclone Nargis, several new organisations formed without official registration (Lidauer
2012).

● Since 2008, Myanmar's transition from military to democratic rule has rekindled civil society activity
(Lidauer 2012). Domestic civil society is increasingly networked with foreign organisations. Recent
improvements authorized independent labor unions, enhanced freedom of assembly and association,
removed censorship, and formed a national human rights commission and press council. Pluralist media
permits critical reporting (Wagstaff 2010; Holliday 2013). Radio is Myanmar's most popular source of
information, although just 22.4% have internet access (Internet World Stats 2017). Information Ministry
and Tatmadaw supervise radio and TV, yet international radio is popular (Wagstaff 2010).

● Myanmar's World Press Freedom Index ranking rose from 171 to 131 in 2017. Myanmar's press
freedom ranking rose from 193rd to 161st. (2015)

● Legal and informal constraints hinder the growth of civil society organisations. Hundreds of Burmese
exiles have returned after the government pushed dissidents to return and deleted 2,000 names from its
blacklist. This led to disputes between "politically" oriented exiles and domestic activists about how to
engage with the military-dominated regime (Kramer 2011). Organizations have leveraged expanded
political and media freedoms to push nationalist or racist agendas that harm the country's Muslim
minority (Lee 2016). Since 2012, Buddhist organizations have helped form the "969 movement,"3 an
extremist group accused of coordinating anti-Islamic protests and escalating tensions in northern
Rakhine State (ICG 2013; Than 2014). The movement's original name was considered illegal, and it
championed four controversial rules imposed in 2015. Interfaith marriage, monogamy, and religious
conversion were outlawed (McCarthy 2016).

7.10 Outlook:

● Postcolonial Burma's political development has been hampered by center–periphery tensions and the
lack of solid civilian political systems. Failure to incorporate ethnic minorities into postcolonial
nationstates has led to intrastate confrontations between the state and ethnic rebel groups. Sixty years
of intrastate conflict have contributed to a weak state that lacks the monopoly on force in some areas
and whose administrative structures barely reach beyond central Myanmar and into the ethnic states'
peripheral territories (Dukalskis 2009; Englehart 2005; Yhome 2011; Nilsen 2013). The second concern is
the interaction between the military, society, and politics. Civilian institutions' incapacity to integrate
ethnic minorities and peripheral insurgencies led to military involvement and Tatmadaw authority. The
military's aggressive state-building tactic has destroyed civilian state institutions, interethnic trust, and
center-periphery ties.

● Weak public infrastructure, acute poverty, and regime benefactors exploiting Myanmar's natural
riches will obstruct a transition to constitutional democracy. The country's political system is less
oppressive and gives more freedom for political parties, civil society, the media, and ethnic minorities
than ever before. Myanmar is far from completing its "first transition" from an authoritarian to a
democratically elected administration and will not confront the "second transition" to a cemented
democratic system soon. Considering the Tatmadaw's economic strength and autonomy, its
cohesiveness, its control over the most powerful ministries (Home Affairs, Border Affairs, and Military
Affairs), and the fact that the constitution is designed to be impossible to change without the military's
approval, it is unrealistic to expect the new NLD-led government to control its military. Myanmar's
political liberalization threatens political stability and interethnic harmony. First, new representational
institutions' subversive effects. The 2008 Constitution enshrines military political prerogatives and
autonomy but restricts generals' authority. In a clash between civilian and military regime elites or the
government and the opposition, overstepping these new limits might be expensive and undermine the
political revolution.

● Tatmadaw leaders must also curb centrifugal tendencies. The government formerly subdued regional
leaders and preserved armed forces cohesion. There are latent conflicts between patronage networks
and senior officers and the ranks since the latter never appropriated the country's economic wealth
(Englehart 2012, p. 675). Co-opting most rebel organizations has destroyed shared opponents that
formerly united the military (Williams 2011). In addition, ceasefire agreements have sparked the
formation of rentier economies in border regions (Jones, 2013), but have done nothing to reduce
tensions between the center and the periphery or ethnic minorities' problems (Englehart 2005). Political
liberalization and institutionalization of political contestation have generated ethno-nationalist,
xenophobic, and violent organizations and led to sectarian bloodshed, as shown in widespread violence
against the country's Muslim minority.

Source: Croissant, Aurel & Lorenz, Philip. (2018). Conclusions: Comparing Governments and Political
Institutions in Southeast Asia. 10.1007/978-3-319-68182-5_13.