BVSMUNVI – UNSC STUDY GUIDE

AGNEDA: “Kurdish Advance Towards Independence”

UNSC:

The Security Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of

international peace and security. It has 15 Members, and each Member
has one vote. Under the Charter of the United Nations, all Member
States are obligated to comply with Council decisions.

The Security Council takes the lead in determining the existence of a

threat to the peace or act of aggression. It calls upon the parties to a
dispute to settle it by peaceful means and recommends methods of
adjustment or terms of settlement. In some cases, the Security Council
can resort to imposing sanctions or even authorize the use of force to
maintain or restore international peace and security.

Background Information:

August 10, 1920: treaty of Sevres dissolves Ottoman Empire and

proposes the creation of an autonomous state, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk;
turkey’s new leader rejects Sevres.

1923: Treaty of Lausanne, negotiated with the new Turkish

government, omits any reference to a Kurdish homeland. The Kurds are
displaced throughout Turkey, Syria, Iran, and Iraq, where they
repeatedly revolt against the respective authorities

1946: Republic of Mahabad is established by the Kurds in Iran, which

comes under soviet control during WW2, after the soviets withdraw in
December 1946, Iran reoccupies Mahabad

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In the same year Mustafa Barzani, father of Kurdish nationalism,

creates the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iraq, it was later renamed
Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), it remains the dominant Kurdish party
until now.

1961: Barzini launches a Kurdish rebellion, due to the unfulfilled

promises of autonomy under the rule of Iraqi Prime Minister Abd al-
Karim Qasim.

1962: 120,000 Kurds are stripped of citizenship in Syria.

1970: Iraq’s Baath party which came in power in 1968, details plan for
Kurdish autonomy

1973: Hafez al-Assad, the Syrian leader establishes a so-called Arab belt
along the border with Turkey, a move which displaces Syrian Kurds thus
weakening Kurdish dominance of resource rich areas

1974: Abdullah Ocalan founds the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK ) as a

Marxist organization with the aim of establishing an independent
Kurdistan in Turkey’s southeast. The Baathist governments' plans for
Kurdish autonomy are not implemented and fighting resumes in 1974.

1975: After the autonomy agreement collapses, Iraqi Kurds, supported

by Iran and United States, revolt against the Baathist regime. While the
Baathist regime aims to consolidate government control over the oil-
rich regions in the country’s north, thus displacing hundreds of
thousands of Kurds and replacing them with southern and central Iraq

In Algiers, Saddam Hussein recognizes Iranian sovereignty in exchange

for Iran to stop assisting Iraqi Kurds. At Iran requests the US, which had

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been funding Kurds since 1972, also stopped. The rebellion soon
collapsed Iraqi Kurds soon divide after it, Jalal Talabani breaks apart
from KDP and forms Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and he also
denounces Barzani.

1979: Masoud Barzani take on the presidency of the Kurdistan

Democratic Party of Iraq after the death of his father, Mustafa. Kurds
are initially supportive of the January 1979 Islamic Revolution, but they
rebel against the ne w regime when their demands go unmet.
Khomeini declares a holy war against the Kurds on August 18. A military
campaign to exert control over Kurdish regions results in hundreds of
deaths, systematic arrests, and the banning of the Kurdistan
Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI).

1980-1988: Iraq arms and enlists Iranian Kurds, while Iraqi Kurds rebel
against Baghdad with Iranian support.

1988: Saddam Hussein carries out the al-Anfal campaign from February
to September, also known as the Kurdish genocide, in which an
estimated of 50,000 to 180,000 Iraqi Kurds are killed, and many are
displaced.

1991: After Iraqi forces are defeated by U.S.-led forces and leave
Kuwait, Saddam Hussein cracks down on rebelling Iraqi Kurds. More
than one million Kurds flee to Turkey and Iran and hundreds of
thousands of others are internally displaced, triggering a humanitarian
catastrophe. In response, a U.S.-led coalition carries out Operation
Provide Comfort t and the subsequent Operation Northern Watch,
supplying humanitarian aid and enforcing a no-fly zone over Iraqi

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Kurdistan, allowing the Kurds to return. With the erosion of the central
government’s hold on the north, Iraqi Kurds gain de facto autonomy.

1992: first Kurdish regional Government is elected and National

Assembly.

1994-1998: The PUK, led by Talabani, and the KDP, led by Barzini fight a
civil war. In 1996, Barzini appeals to Saddam Hussein for assistance as
the PUK receives support from Iran. The conflict ends with the US-
brokered Washington Peace Agreement on September 17, 1996.

1999:Occalen, who finds refugee under Hafez al-Assad’s protection in

Syria in 1980,Under military pressure in 1998 Turkey, Syria sign the
Adana agreement which stops them from supporting PKK,and Ocalan
fless.Ocalan is arrested in 1999 in Nairobi by Turkish forces helped by
the US.

2003:U.S. forces invade Iraq, toppling Saddam Hussein. Kurds play a

central role in drafting the interimIraqi constitution, which recognizes
the autonomy of the KRG within the new federal system. Talabani is
named the first Kurdish president of Iraq. Working toward EU
membership, Turkey introduces legislative and constitutional reforms
that expand Kurdish political and cultural rights, such as permitting the
use of the Kurdish language in national television broadcasts. Kurdish
Democratic Party (PYD) is founded in Syria.

2004: Syrian Kurds take to the streets in Qamishl i after Syrian forces
open fire on a procession mourning nine Kurdish youths who died in
a brawl between Arabs and Kurds at a soccer match.

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The Party for a free life in Kurdistan (PJAK) is formed, which claims to
have three thousand fighters, takes up arms against the Iranian state.

2011: President Bashar al-Assad of Syria issue Decree 49, which grants
citizenships to Kurds, this action aims to gain Kurdish support and curb
uprising.

Turkey strengthens ties and energy cooperation with Iraqi Kurds

following the US withdrawal from Iraq. In April 2011, Erdogan becomes
the first Prime minister to visit Iraqi Kurdistan.

2012: Turkish governments and jailed PKK leader start negotiations to

bring an end to the three decade conflict, which has killed an estimated
of 40,000 people

2013: Kurds Declare Autonomy in Northern Syria

The KRG began to directly export energy, thus generating revenue,

which sparks fear in US and Iraq, that they might be able to gather
enough resources to achieve independence. Turkey is one of the major
Buyers of KRG’s oil. Baghdad responds by blocking 17 % share of federal
revenue, leading to a crisis in the Kurdish region.

2014: Iraqi national forces and the KRG’s peshmerga buckle in the face
of Islamic State advances. However, in June, the peshmerga take
control of the long-disputed, oil-rich city of Kirkuk. Islamic state attacks
Kobai, which is controlled by PYD. The PYD is assisted by US airstrikes in
defending the strategically placed town.

2015: Syrian Kurds consolidate territory by capturing Tel Abyad, which

was a transit point for the Islamic state capital, Raqqa.

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Turkey joins the fight against Islamic state and began bombing the
group’s positions in Syria.

2016: After years of supporting Syrian rebels, Turkey intervenes directly

in northern Syria, backing Arab fighters against the Islamic State. The
Turkish deployment of troops and advisors halts a Kurdish advance
west of the Euphrates River and creates a complex front line that
includes the two opposing U.S. allies and Russia- and Iran-backed forces
loyal to the Assad regime.

2017: US arms Syrian Kurds as it prepares to seize Raqqa, this move

angers Turkey as Turkey had tried and failed to take the lead in the
proxy war to capture Raqqa.

A referendum is hosted by regional authorities, in which an

overwhelming number of Kurds chose independence. Iraq’s
government rejects attempts to break up state. The central
government refuses talks, and instead threatens to isolate the region,
as do Iran and Turkey.

2018: Turkish troops capture Afrin, a city in northern Syria, previously

held by YPG forces.

2019: SDF fighters take control of areas around Baghouz, the last
populated area held by the Islamic state, declaring their victory over
them. US announces removal of troops from northern Syria, However
this allows Turkey to launch an offensive against SDF.SDF moves in
Syria where the Russian troops enter to support the region. The US
places sanctions on Turkey, pressurizing it to stop the advance.

Iraq reaction to an Independent Kurdistan

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Iraq’s central government has opposed Kurdish autonomy and

independence for years, leading to significant political tensions
between the Kurds and the Arab-led government in Baghdad. There is a
fundamental conflict of interest between the central government and
the KRG:

Baghdad sees Kurdish autonomy and independence as undermining its

power and sovereignty, while the KRG’s quest for independence makes
any Iraqi involvement in Kurdish affairs unwanted. This irreconcilable
difference underscores the contentious political disputes between Erbil
and Baghdad and has defined Baghdad-Kurdish relations for a century.
Though Iraq’s central government has maintained its opposition to
Kurdish independence, how Baghdad would react to the establishment
of a sovereign Kurdistan depends largely on the manner in which
independence occurs. Baghdad would see a unilateral declaration of
Kurdish independence as a purposeful effort to undermine the central
government’s authority, and react in a hostile manner

Baghdad also would oppose KRG independence gained through the

collapse of the Iraqi state, but the central government’s levers of power
to punish the Kurds would be limited. Kurdish independence resulting
from a negotiated separation would be the most beneficial to both
Baghdad and Erbil, but the possibility of this hypothetical scenario
becoming a reality requires a drastic change in the central
government’s calculus as to what is in Iraq’s national interests. Erbil
must consider several factors when deliberating the costs and benefits
of becoming independent in the near future. Establishing a sovereign
nation is difficult and would be even more challenging if the Kurds
faced opposition from the rest of Iraq.

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Mitigating the adverse consequences and blowback would be a primary

concern. Because of this, the Kurds are most likely to seek a separation
from Iraq through a negotiated settlement or by fleeing a collapsing or
failed state. The discussion presented here focused mainly on
Baghdad’s possible responses to Kurdish independence and the impact
this would have on the Kurds; however, other factors, such as Tehran
and Ankara’s support or opposition to independence, would also
influence how Baghdad and the

Kurds behave in any scenario. The perception of, and reaction to, the
emergence of a sovereign Kurdistan cannot be looked at solely in the
context of Iraq. Regional dynamics will inevitably be a factor. While
Baghdad has a significant stake in Kurdish independence, the interplay
between Baghdad, Ankara, and Tehran’s interests complicates how the
separation of the KRG from the rest of Iraq could play out.

Turkey reaction to an independent Kurdistan

Turkey has gained immensely from its close bilateral relationship with
the KRG, which advances both entities’ political, economic, and security
interests. While Ankara appears satisfied with the status quo and its
trajectory of fostering even more robust political and economic ties in
the future, Kurdish independence would generate even greater
strategic benefits for Turkey. As a result, Turkey is likely to support the
KRG’s transition to a sovereign state—particularly if it pursues
independence gradually (so as not to upset the existing apple cart) or if
it breaks from Baghdad so as to insulate itself from increasing violence
and political turmoil in central and southern Iraq.

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Turkey’s interests in the KRG would likely lead it to recognize even an

abrupt declaration of independence by Kurdish leaders, though Ankara
would have to engage in delicate diplomacy to mitigate Baghdad’s
resentment and prevent Turkish firms’ exclusion from the Iraqi market.
To date, Turkey has reaped a range of benefits from a decade of
increasingly close ties to the Kurdistan Region. Oil imports, trade, and
investment by Turkish companies contribute to the Turkish economy, in
large part by increasing the supplies of energy needed to fuel its rapid
economic growth; make Turkey more energy independent by
diversifying its supplies of oil and gas; and increase Erbil’s economic
dependence on Ankara

Turkey’s economic importance to the KRG in turn increases its political

influence, which enables it to pressure Erbil to prevent PKK activities on
its soil, to undermine the dominance of PKK-aligned Kurdish groups in
Syria by supporting other Syrian Kurds, and to refrain from promoting
Kurdish nationalist sentiment that could upset Turkey’s domestic
Kurdish peace process. Turkish security assistance to the Kurdish
peshmerga has enhanced the KRG’s ability to keep ISIL at bay, thereby
enhancing stability and security in its territory and perhaps encouraging
ISIL to seek territory and targets farther afield from the Turkish border.
An independent Kurdish state may enable Turkey to advance its
interests in ways that are not possible—or are at least more
complicated—under the status quo.

Currently, Turkey’s ability to develop energy infrastructure in the KRG,

sign oil contracts with Erbil, and provide military assistance to the
peshmerga are complicated by the need to assuage Baghdad’s
concerns that such steps will deprive the federal government of

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income, undermine its claim to energy resources, and promote the

breakup of the country. Since Turkey wants to remain on relatively
good terms with Baghdad as well—particularly so Turkish companies
can continue to engage in oil development deals in the southern part of
the country—Ankara cannot be as proactive as it might otherwise like
to be in its relations with Erbil. Moreover, other countries that seek to
maintain Iraq’s territorial integrity—most notably the united States—
pressure Turkey to refrain from taking steps that promote or facilitate
Kurdish separatism. If the KRG became an independent sovereign state,
it would largely be able to resist such pressures and to project its power
more effectively.

Turkey would no longer have to moderate its activities in the KRG out
of fear that they would inspire retaliation from Iraq, as the KRG would
already have broken from Baghdad. A sovereign Kurdistan would
presumably develop close direct relations with the United States and a
range of other countries, thereby enabling Turkey to enhance its ties
with a neighboring state without drawing international condemnation.
After Kurdish independence, Erbil and Baghdad would no longer be
squabbling over revenue sharing or ownership of hydrocarbon
resources. Kurdistan, as a sovereign state, would be able to claim firm
ownership of the resources lying under its sovereign territory, and it
would be able to develop them and sign export contracts without
interference from Baghdad. (Independence may even give Erbil the
upper hand in its energy diplomacy with Baghdad; instead of arguing
about revenue sharing, an independent Kurdistan could conceivably
charge transit fees for Iraqi oil and gas exports that Turkey’s Reaction
to an Independent Kurdistan passes through pipelines on Kurdish
territory.) The even stronger ties that could exist between Turkey and

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an independent Kurdistan would enhance Ankara’s political influence in

Erbil while generating significant economic returns. Greater political
influence would strengthen Turkey’s ability to make demands on Erbil
that serve its domestic and security interests.

Turkey could press an independent Kurdistan more aggressively to rein

in the PKK and marginalize the Syrian PYD. Turkey could provide more
comprehensive military training and materiel to Kurdish peshmerga for
the purposes of fighting ISIL, securing energy infrastructure, and
preventing civil unrest from spilling across its new international border
with Iraq—all without having to worry about reactions from Baghdad,
Washington, and other governments concerned that direct military aid
to the Kurds could contribute to Iraq’s fragmentation. If necessary (and
if requested to do so by Erbil), Turkey could even deploy troops to an
independent Kurdistan to provide military training or to bolster the
country’s defenses against ISIL—steps it could not take as long as the
KRG remains part of Iraq; the Iraqi government—dominated by Shi’a
and influenced heavily by Tehran—would not invite Sunni Turkish
troops to enter Iraqi soil.

By becoming the most significant partner of an independent Kurdistan,

Ankara would also be better positioned to push back against Iran’s
efforts to make economic and political inroads in the Kurdistan Region.
By breaking from Baghdad, Erbil will have already freed itself from
interference from the Iraqi central government, which is itself
influenced by Tehran. Although Iran is likely to maintain considerable
connections to the eastern part of a new Kurdish state, by the time the
KRG might pursue independence, Erbil will have already oriented itself
firmly toward Turkey. A shift in Ankara’s policies toward Turkish Kurds,

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insecurity in Iraq, tensions with the Iranian-influenced government in

Baghdad, and a decade of gradually increasing political and economic
ties to the KRG have given Turkey a strong stake in the KRG’s viability,
which would be enhanced by its emergence as a sovereign state.
Although the means by which Erbil pursues independence may affect
Turkey’s near-term response, Turkey would be likely to welcome its
new neighbor with open arms.

Iranian reaction to an independent Kurdistan

Iranian officials have made clear their opposition to an independent

Kurdistan, but they are unlikely to actively oppose a new Kurdish state
on Iran’s borders in an overly forceful manner. A desire to counter
Turkish, U.S., and Israeli influence over Erbil coupled with the economic
opportunities provided by having a landlocked neighbor in need of an
outlet for its exports will serve as factors mitigating potentially reflexive
Iranian opposition.

The reaction of Iranian Kurds to an independent Kurdistan in northern

Iran may be a decisive factor in shaping Tehran’s policies. In relation to
Kurdish independence, the best scenario for the KRG would be Erbil’s
announcement of independence at the end of drawn-out discussions
with Baghdad. The lack of strategic surprise would increase the chance
that Iranian pragmatists would have a say in Tehran’s strategy, leading
to an approach prizing diplomacy with the KRG in addition to economic
development of Iran’s Kurdish regions, as opposed to further
militarization of Kurdish inhabited areas.

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The manner in which Erbil declares independence is important because

of the impact it would have on Iran’s threat perception, which is
colored in large part by its preconceptions regarding its own Kurdish
population. An abrupt, destabilizing partitioning of Iraq or a Barzani-led
state claiming the mantle of pan-Kurdish nationalism would make any
Iranian Kurdish celebration of Erbil’s independence seem all the more
threatening—despite the fact that the level of affinity toward a new
Erbil government likely would vary by location within Iran as well as
political ideology. Harsh crackdowns on the celebrations could intensify
Kurdish nationalism at a time when Iran’s Kurdish youths are focusing
much of their political activities on broader civil society, rather than
ethnic issues. In an increasingly securitized atmosphere, the currently
weak foreign-based Iranian Kurdish political parties could regain their
strength, perhaps even intensifying their militias’ resistance against the
state.

Ultimately, in treating its Kurdish population as a persistent security

threat, Iran could bring about the very conditions it seeks to prevent.
The successful implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action nuclear deal between Iran and the P5+1 (United States, Russia,
China, United Kingdom, France, and Germany) could have lasting
implications for the entire Middle East. An Iran relieved of sanctions
will be free to intensify its investments in a new Kurdish state, likely
focusing on the energy industry as well as construction of a rail network
to further integrate the two economies. In the event that the nuclear
agreement falls apart, hard-liners in Iran likely will succeed in sidelining
pragmatists in Tehran, decreasing the chance that Iranian Kurdish
grievances will be addressed.

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Question of Statehood

The Kurds have made gaining independence their primary goal

,however that would be just an initial steps, we need to consider that it
would technically be a new dilemma in the unstable middle east, plus
the Kurds would need to learn that establishing a stable prosperous
state is far more complicated than proclaiming its existence.

The question of Statehood will be of paramount importance through

the course of any discussions, as there is no positivist international law
that allows one to make a judgment to any criteria for statehood.

With this being the case, it falls to the notion of customary

international law. Customary international law is defined as being the
body of international law where states feel a sense of legal obligation
through a general and consistent application of a practice by states.
‘General’ is often defined when the practice is used by many states. The
Montevideo Convention restates the customary international law, and
to an extent codifies legal norms already present within the context of
a state being a state. The Convention was signed by a majority of North
and South American States, that highlights the rights and duties of a
state, all the states that have signed the treaty are former colonies and
wish to make a restatement on customary international law. The
Convention states the following qualifications are required for a state
to be considered a state:

a permanent population

a defined territory

a government; and

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the capacity to enter into relations with other states

However, while this Convention codifies the rights and duties of states
it is not signed by states outside the American continent. In light of that
material fact, these should be considered customary international law
rather that black letter law. However, there is another right established
as a norm of international law is the right to self-determination.9 the
right can be found within the UN Charter, but is not explicitly described.
Specifically, what the limits of this right are – for example the freedom
of speech –it is not absolute and subject to reasonable restriction. In
this example, one cannot protest loudly at night in front of someone’s
home. The General Assembly attempted the following definition: “All
peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they
freely determine their political status.”

This was then reaffirmed as being applicable international law by the

International Court of Justice when it held “self-determination requires
a free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples concerned.”
This right can come into conflict with the above, in that a local
government of an area that wishes to succeed is not able to enter into
relations with other states as that is considered the competence of a
central government. Considering this, one may interpret that a
geographical area so long as it has a permanent population that desires
to become its own state must become its own state in order to be in
compliance with international law norms.” In this respect one may
consider UNSC resolutions 688 and 2470 for precedents.

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Bibliography

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7. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2019-02-12/kurdish-
awakenin g

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kurds-trump-invasion-question s

9.http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-
analysis/view/implications-of-turkeys-war-against-th e -pike

10. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/analyst-both-pkk-and-akp-
want-hdp-to-be-weakened-.asp x

? PageID=238&NID=88554&NewsCatID=338

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11.http://www.juancole.com/2010/08/kurdish-general-again-
insubordinate-angles-for-us-to-rem a in-in-iraq.html

12.http://pdki.org/english/yearly-human-rights-report-956-kurds-
imprisoned-and-206-were-killed or-injured-by-Iran

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