G.R. No.

123045 November 16, 1999

DEMETRIO R. TECSON, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

FACTS:

This petition for review on certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeks to nullify the
Decision dated June 30, 1995 and the Resolution dated December 20, 1995 of the Sandiganbayan,
First Division, in Criminal Case No. 18273. Petitioner was found guilty of violating Section 3[c] of
R.A. No. 3019, in the assailed decision which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Demetrio Tecson y Robles guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime defined in Section 3[c] of Republic Act 3019 and charged in the
Information. Accordingly, the Court imposes upon him the penalty of imprisonment of
SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) MONTH, and perpetual disqualification from public
office. No civil indemnity is awarded for the reason that Tecson and Mrs. Salvacion
D. Luzana entered into a compromise agreement waiving his/her claims against the
other.

So Ordered.  1

Petitioner was, at the time of the commission of the offense charged in the Information, the Municipal
Mayor of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur.

Private complainant before the Sandiganbayan, Mrs. Salvacion Luzana, is a resident of Poblacion,
Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur. She is a neighbor of the petitioner. She claims to be a housewife who
occasionally dabbles in farming. 2

The antecedent facts, which gave rise to the instant case, were synthesized by the Sandiganbayan
as follows:

In the last week of September 1989, upon the offer of Tecson, he and Mrs. Luzana
agreed to engage in an investment business. They would sell tickets at P100.00
each which after 30 days would earn P200.00 or more. She would buy appliances
and cosmetics at a discount, with the use of the proceeds of the sales of tickets, and
resell them. No other details were disclosed on how the business would operate, and
Tecson does not appear to have contributed any monetary consideration to the
capital. On September 27, 1989, they began selling tickets.

Tecson also acted as agent selling tickets. He got on that day early in the morning
two booklets of tickets, for which he signed the covers of the booklets to
acknowledge receipt. Before noon of the same day he returned after having already
sold 40 tickets in the amount of P4,000.00, bringing with him a Mayor's Permit in the
 name of Mrs. Luzana for their business called "LD Assurance Privileges." He asked
for a cash advance of P4,000.00 which he would use during the fiesta on September
29, 1989, and he would not release the Mayor's Permit unless the cash advance was
given him. Mrs. Luzana reluctantly acceded, saying that it was not the due date yet,
so he was getting the cash advances on his share. Tecson signed for the cash
advance.

On October 3, 1989, Mrs. Luzana secured a Business Permit in accordance with the
instructions of Tecson. The permit was in her name but the same was for the
operation of "Prosperidad Investment and Sub-Dealership," the new name of the
business. In the session of the Sangguniang Bayan of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur
on October 17, 1989 presided over by Tecson, Resolution No. 100 was passed
revoking the business permit at the instance of the Provincial Director of the
Department of Trade and Industry.  3

With the revocation of her business permit, private complainant below filed an administrative case
against petitioner, for violation of Section 3 [c], R.A. No. 3019 and Section 60 of B.P. Blg. 337 (then
Local Government Code) with the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG). The
complaint was docketed as Adm. Case No. SP-90-01 and referred to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of Agusan del Sur for appropriate action.

Not content with having instituted administrative proceedings, private complainant below also filed a
civil case against petitioner for damages with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, of Prosperidad,
Agusan del Sur. This action was docketed as Civil Case No. 716.

A complaint was likewise filed with the Ombudsman for violation of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known
as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." This complaint was docketed as OMB Case No. 3-8-
02919. It was subsequently referred to the Sandiganbayan, which took jurisdiction. The Information
filed on October 28, 1992 reads:

That on or about September 23, 1989, in the Municipality of Prosperidad, Province of

Agusan del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, a public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of
Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur, while in the performance of his administrative and
official functions and committing the offense in relation to his office, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally request and receive for his benefit the
amount of P4,000.00, for and in consideration of the issuance of a permit to operate
an investment business, in favor of one Salvacion Luzana, a person for whom the
accused has in fact received and obtained a mayor's permit or license.

Contrary to law. 4

On July 29, 1991, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur dismissed the administrative
case.

On October 28, 1991, a compromise agreement was reached between the litigants in Civil Case No.
716. The trial court approved the same on December 6, 1991.

On November 3, 1992, the Sandiganbayan issued an order for petitioner's arrest. He was
immediately apprehended, but after posting a property bond on December 2, 1992, was released on
provisional liberty.
On February 23, 1993, Tecson was arraigned with the assistance of counsel de parte. He entered a
plea of "not guilty." Trial then proceeded on the merits.

On June 30, 1995, the Sandiganbayan, First Division rendered the assailed decision convicting
appellant of violating R.A. No. 3019. Petitioner seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration. The
respondent court denied the same in its resolution dated December 20, 1995.

Hence, this instant petition. Petitioner contends that:

THE RESPONDENT COURT/SANDIGANBAYAN (1ST DIVISION) GRAVELY

ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION —

A- IN RULING UNREASONABLY THAT THE GUILT

OF THE ACCUSED HAD BEEN PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT DESPITE THE CLEAR AND
CONVINCING TESTIMONY OF THE NBI EXPERT
SHOWING THAT THE DOCUMENTS PRESENTED
BY COMPLAINANTS AND SUBJECTED FOR
EXAMINATION BY NBI ARE DIFFERENT FROM
THE HANDWRITING OF THE ACCUSED, AND
THEREFORE FABRICATED.

B- IN PROCEEDING WITH THE TRIAL AND

CONVICTION DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF
JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL RENDERED BY THE
SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN EXONERATING
THE ACCUSED.

C- IN IGNORING THE DOCTRINE OF RES

JUDICATA AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY.  5

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan exonerating the accused serves
as a bar by prior judgment to the decision of the Sandiganbayan;

(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the Constitutional right of the accused against double
jeopardy; and

(3) Whether or not the guilt of the petitioner was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling :

no. Having been exonerated by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur in the
administrative case, he now submits the same is res judicata and thus bars the Sandiganbayan from
hearing his case.
Petitioner's theory has no leg to stand on. First, it must be pointed out that res judicata is a doctrine
of civil law.   It thus has no bearing in the criminal proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. Second, it
7

is a basic principle of the law on public officers that a public official or employee is under a three-fold
responsibility for violation of duty or for a wrongful act or omission. This simply means that a public
officer may be held civilly, criminally, and administratively liable for a wrongful doing. Thus, if such
violation or wrongful act results in damages to an individual, the public officer may be
held civilly liable to reimburse the injured party. If the law violated attaches a penal sanction, the
erring officer may be punished criminally. Finally, such violation may also lead to suspension,
removal from office, or other administrative sanctions. This administrative liability is separate and
distinct from the penal and civil liabilities. Thus, the dismissal of an administrative case does not
necessarily bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts, which were the
subject of the administrative complaint.   We conclude, therefore, that the decision of the
8

Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur exonerating petitioner in Administrative Case No. SP
90-01 is no bar to the criminal prosecution before the Sandiganbayan.

As to the amicable settlement in Civil Case No. 716 with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, of
Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur, it is settled that a complaint for misconduct, malfeasance or
misfeasance against a public officer or employee cannot just be withdrawn at any time by the
complainant. This is because there is a need to maintain the faith and confidence of the people in
the government and its agencies and instrumentalities.   The inescapable conclusion, therefore, is
9

that the order of the trial court dismissing Civil Case No. 716 did not bar the proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan.

2. NO. petitioner contends that being tried before the Sandiganbayan violated his constitutional
protection against double jeopardy since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur had
already cleared him of all charges.

Art. III, Section 21 of the Constitution provides:

No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an
act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.

Double jeopardy attaches only: (1) upon a valid indictment; (2) before a competent court; (3) after
arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered; and (5) when the defendant was acquitted or
convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused.   None of the foregoing applies to the hearings conducted by the Sangguniang
10

Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur in Adm. Case No. SP 90-01. It must be stressed that the said
proceedings were not criminal, but administrative in nature. Hence, double jeopardy will not lie.

3. NO. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts   and the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are
12

conclusive upon the Supreme Court. The exceptions are: (1) where the conclusion is a finding
grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjectures; (2) where the inference made is
manifestly mistaken; (3) where there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) where the judgment is based
on misapprehension of facts, and the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are premised on the
absence of evidence and are contradicted by evidence on record.   We have meticulously
13

scrutinized the records of this case and find that petitioner has shown no cause for this Court to
apply any of the foregoing exceptions. We find that the evidence on record amply supports the
findings and conclusions of the respondent court.
Petitioner's assault on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses is unavailing. It is a time-tested
doctrine that the trial court's assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight and
is even conclusive and binding upon appellate courts.   The Supreme Court will not interfere with the
14

trial court's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, absent any indication or showing that the
trial court has overlooked some material facts or has gravely abused its discretion.   Absent a
15

showing that the prosecution witnesses were actuated by any improper motive, their testimony is
entitled to full faith and
credit.   Recourse to the records shows that no error of law or abuse of discretion was committed by
16

the respondent court when it gave credence to the positive testimony of the prosecution's witnesses
as opposed to petitioner's bare denials. Denial, like alibi, is a weak defense, which becomes even
weaker in the face of positive testimony by prosecution witnesses.   Denial is a self-serving negative
17

evidence that cannot be given greater weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testified
on affirmative matters.   Time-tested is the rule that between the positive assertions of prosecution
18

witnesses and the negative averments of the accused, the former indisputably deserves more
credence and is entitled to greater evidentiary weight.  1

Given these circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the doctrine of falsus in uno, falsus in

omnibus will be unavailing. The maxim is a rule of evidence. In affirming a rebuttable
presumption of fact, the trier of facts, must consider all the evidence, other than that found to
be false and it is his duty to give effect to so much of it, if any, as found to be true.   The rule
21

is merely permissive and not mandatory.   It does not relieve the trier of facts from passing
22

on credibility of the whole testimony or evidence presented or excuse him from weighing the
whole of the testimony or evidence.   In the instant case, the records show that the
23

Sandiganbayan, as the trier of facts, considered the entirety of the evidence against
appellant and the latter's conviction was not based solely on the genuineness of the
signatures testified to by the NBI expert. The elements of the offense charged having been
proven beyond reasonable doubt, petitioner's conviction must therefore stand.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 18273 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.