On extent of the right to self-organization

a) Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Hanjin Shipyard v. BLR, G.R. No. 211145,

October 14, 2015, 772 SCRA 613

Facts: On February 16, 2010, Samahan, through its authorized representative, Alfie
F. Alipio, filed an application for registration of its name “Samahan ng Mga
Manggagawa sa Hanjin Shipyard” with the DOLE. Attached to the application were
the list of names of the association’s officers and members, signatures of the
attendees of the February 7, 2010 meeting, copies of their Constitution and By-Laws.
The association had a total of 120 members. Eventually, DOLE-Pampanga issued
the corresponding certificate of registration in favor of the Samahan.

On March 15, 2010, Hanjin filed a petition with DOLE-Pampanga praying for the
cancellation of registration of Samahan’s association on the ground that its members
did not fall under any of the types of workers enumerated in the second sentence of
Article 243 (now 249).

HANJIN’S contentions- Only ambulant, intermittent, itinerant, rural workers,

self-employed, and those without definite employers may form a workers’
association. It further posited that 1/3 of the members of the association had definite
employers and the continued existence and registration of the association would
prejudice the company’s goodwill. Also, Samahan committed a misrepresentation in
connection with the list of members and/or voters who took part in the ratification of
their constitution and by-laws.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Samahan cannot form a workers’ association of

employees in Hanjin and instead should have formed a union, hence their
registration should be cancelled.

RULING: NO. Samahan can form a workers’ association and its registration should
have not been cancelled.

The right to choose whether to form or join a union or workers’ association belongs to
workers themselves. The right to form or join in a labor organization necessarily
includes the right to refuse or refrain from exercising the said right. Also inherent in
the right to self-organization is the right to choose whether to form a union for
purposes of collective bargaining or a workers’ association for purposes of providing
mutual aid and protection.

More often than not, the right to self-organization connotes unionism. Workers,
however, can also form and join a workers’ association as well as labor management
councils (LMC). Expressed in the highest law of the land is the right of all workers to
self-organization. Section 3, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution states: Section 3.
The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities
for all. It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to
strike in accordance with law.
On who may exercise the right to self-organization

b) Alliance of Nationalist and Genuine Labor Org. v. Samahan ng mga

Manggagawang Nagkakaisa sa Manila Bay Spinning Mills, G.R. No. 118562, July
5, 1996, 258 SCRA 371

FACTS:

Petitioner ANGLO is a duly registered labor organization while respondent Union is

its affiliate. In representation of SAMANA BAY, ANGLO entered and concluded a
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with Manila Bay Spinning Mills and J.P.
Coats Manila Bay, Inc. (the corporations).

The Executive Committee of SAMANA BAY decided to disaffiliate from ANGLO in

view of the latter’s dereliction of its duty to promote and advance the welfare of
SAMANA BAY and the alleged cases of corruption involving the federation officers.
Said disaffiliation was unanimously confirmed by the members of SAMANA BAY.

A petition to stop remittance of federation dues to ANGLO was filed by SAMANA BAY
with the BLR.The corporations, despite having been furnished copies of the union
resolution relating to said disaffiliation, refused to honor the same.

ANGLO counteracted by unseating all officers and board members of SAMANA BAY
and appointing in their stead, a new set of officers who were duly recognized by the
corporations. Disaffiliation as void considering that a CBA is still existing and the
freedom period has not yet set in

ISSUE: Whether or not the disaffiliation was valid

HELD: YES

All employees enjoy the right to self-organization and to form and join labor
organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining. This is a
fundamental right of labor and derives its existence from the Constitution. In
interpreting the protection to labor and social justice provisions of the Constitution
and the labor laws, rules or regulations, we have always adopted the liberal approach
which favors the exercise of labor rights.

This Court is not ready to bend this principle to yield to a mere procedural defect, to
wit: failure to observe certain procedural requirements for a valid disaffiliation.
Non-compliance with the procedure on disaffiliation, being premised on purely
technical grounds cannot rise above the fundamental right of self- organization.

On the right of supervisory employees to self-organization

c) Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corp. v. Torres, G.R. No. 98050, March 17,
1994, 231 SCRA 335

Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation (PHILPHOS); Petitioner;

 Assails the decision of the Secretary of Labor of August 7, 1990; affirming the order
of the
Mediator-Arbiter of March 28, 1990 which directed the immediate conduct of a
certification election among the supervisory, professional or technical, and
confidential employees of the petitioner corporation.
Philphos Movement for Progress, Inc. (PMPI); Respondent;
On July 7, 1989 filed with the Department of Labor and Employment a petition for
certification election among the supervisory employees of the petitioner. The petition
for certification election filed by PMPI was not opposed by PHILPHOS. PHILPHOS,
submitted a position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter that its management welcomed
the creation of a supervisory employees’ union provided the necessary requisite of
law were properly observed.

Petitioner prayed for the exclusion of its superintendents and professional/technical

employees from the PMPI supervisory union. Mediator-Arbiter Rodolfo S. Milado,
issued an order directing and holding of a certification election among the
supervisory employees of petitioner, excluding therefrom the superintendents and the
professional and technical employees.

PMPI filed an amended petition with the Mediator-Arbiter that the

professional/technical and confidential employees of PHILPHOS be included as
members. The petition was affirmed by the Mediator-Arbiter, and Secretary of Labor
through Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma.

Under the Labor Code, Article 212, Supervisory employee defined – “(s)upervisory
employees are those who, in the interest of the employer, effectively recommend
such managerial actions if the exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or
clerical in nature but requires the use of independent judgement.”

Personnel records showed that there are 125 supervisors and 271
professional/technical
employees, where 150, of the 271employees, are being supervised

Issue: Whether or not the professional/technical and confidential employees may

validly join PMPI union which is composed of supervisors?

Ruling: No, because under the Labor Code of the Philippines the
professional/technical employees of petitioner are classified as Rank and File
employees. However, confidential employees are included in the supervisory union.
The petitioner showed no proof or compelling reason to exclude them.

Supervisors have the right to form their own union or labor organization. What the
law prohibits is a union whose membership comprises of supervisors merging with
the rank and file employees because this is where conflict of interests may arise in
the areas of discipline, collective bargaining and strikes. The professional/technical
employees of petitioner therefore may join the existing rank and file union, or form a
union separate and distinct from the existing union organized by the rank and file
employees of the same company.

On the right of confidential employees, criteria

d) Tunay na Pagkakisa ng Manggagawa sa Asia Brewery v. Asia Brewery, Inc.,
G.R. No. 162025, August 3, 2010, 626 SCRA 376

FACTS:

1) Respondent ABI entered into a CBA with Bisig at Lakas ng mga Manggagawa
sa Asia-Independent (BLMA-INDEPENDENT), the exclusive bargaining
representative of ABI’s rank-and-file employees.

2) Article I of the CBA defined the scope of the bargaining unit, as follows: The
UNION shall not represent or accept for membership employees outside the
scope of the bargaining unit herein defined.

Section 2. Bargaining Unit. The bargaining unit shall be comprised of all regular
rank-and-file daily-paid employees of the COMPANY. However, the following
jobs/positions as herein defined shall be excluded from the bargaining unit, to wit:

xxx

Confidential and Executive Secretaries

xxx

Purchasing and Quality Control Staff.

3) The CBA expressly excluded Confidential and Executive Secretaries from the
rank-and-file bargaining unit, for which reason ABI seeks their disaffiliation from
petitioner. ABI’s management stopped deducting union dues from 81 employees,
believing that their membership in BLMA-INDEPENDENT violated the CBA. 18 of
these affected employees are QA Sampling Inspectors/Inspectresses and Machine
Gauge Technician (checkers) who formed part of the Quality Control Staff. The rest
are secretaries/clerks directly under their respective division managers.

4) Petitioner, however, maintains that except for those who had been promoted to
monthly paid positions, the other secretaries/clerks are deemed included among the
rank-and-file employees of ABI. BLMA-INDEPENDENT claimed that ABI’s actions
restrained the employees’ right to self-organization.

ISSUE: WON the checkers and secretaries/clerks of respondent company are

rank-and-file employees who are eligible to join the Union of the rank-and-file
employees.
RULING: YES. The checkers and secretaries/clerks of respondent company are
rank-and-file employees who are eligible to join the Union of the rank-and-file
employees.

Although Article 245 of the Labor Code limits the ineligibility to join, form and assist
any labor organization to managerial employees, jurisprudence has extended this
prohibition to confidential employees or those who by reason of their positions or
nature of work are required to assist or act in a fiduciary manner to managerial
employees and hence, are likewise privy to sensitive and highly confidential records.
Confidential employees are thus excluded from the rank-and-file bargaining unit. The
rationale for their separate category and disqualification to join any labor organization
is similar to the inhibition for managerial employees because if allowed to be affiliated
with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty in view of evident conflict
of interests and the Union can also become company-denominated with the
presence of managerial employees in the Union membership. Having access to
confidential information, confidential employees may also become the source of
undue advantage. Said employees may act as a spy or spies of either party to a
collective bargaining agreement.

Confidential employees are defined as those who:

1) assist or act in a confidential capacity,

2) to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies in the

field of labor relations.

The two (2) criteria are cumulative, and both must be met if an employee is to be
considered a confidential employee that is, the confidential relationship must exist
between the employee and his supervisor, and the supervisor must handle the
prescribed responsibilities relating to labor relations. The exclusion from bargaining
units of employees who, in the normal course of their duties, become aware of
management policies relating to labor relations is a principal objective sought to be
accomplished by the confidential employee rule.

A perusal of the job descriptions of these secretaries/clerks reveals that their

assigned duties and responsibilities involve routine activities of recording and
monitoring, and other paper works for their respective departments while secretarial
tasks such as receiving telephone calls and filing of office correspondence appear to
have been commonly imposed as additional duties. Respondent failed to indicate
who among these numerous secretaries/clerks have access to confidential data
relating to management policies that could give rise to potential conflict of interest
with their Union membership. It is not even farfetched that the job category may exist
only on paper since they are all daily-paid workers. With respect to the Sampling
 Inspectors/Inspectresses and the Gauge Machine Technician, the job descriptions of
these checkers showed that they perform routine and mechanical tasks preparatory
to the delivery of the finished products. No evidence was presented by the
respondent to prove that these daily-paid checkers actually form part of the
company’s Quality Control Staff who as such were exposed to sensitive, vital and
confidential information about [company’s] products or have knowledge of mixtures of
the products, their defects, and even their formulas which are considered trade
secrets.

On mixed membership in a labor organization

e) Samahang Manggagawa sa Charter Chemical Solidarity of Unions in the

Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (SMCC-Super) v. Charter Chemical
and Coating Corporation, G.R. No. 169717, March 16, 2011, 645 SCRA 538

FACTS:

1. Petitioner Union filed a petition for certification election among the regular
rank-and-file employees of respondent Company with the Mediation Arbitration Unit
of DOLE-NCR

2. Respondent company filed an Answer with Motion to Dismiss on the ground that
petitioner union is not a legitimate labor organization because of (1) failure to comply
with the documentation requirements set by law, and (2) the inclusion of supervisory
employees within petitioner union

3. Med-Arbiter Falconitin: dismissed petition for certification election

- Petitioner union is not a legitimate labor organization because the Charter

Certificate, “Sama-samang Pahayag ng Pagsapi at Authorization,” and “Listahan ng
mga Dumalo sa Pangkalahatang Pulong at mga Sumang-ayon at Nagratipika sa
Saligang Batas” were not executed under oath and certified by the union secretary
and attested to by the union president; thus, fatally defective

- the list of membership of petitioner union consisted of 12 batchman, mill

operator and leadman who performed supervisory functions thus prohibited from
joining union to represent rank-and-file employees of company

- not being a legitimate labor organization, petitioner union has no right to file a
petition for certification election for the purpose of collective bargaining

4. DOLE: in favor of respondent company dismissing petitioner union’s appeal

because it is filed out of time

5. On MR, DOLE reversed its earlier ruling: no certification election was previously
conducted in favor of company; however, the prior certification was denied by
Med-Arbiter and, on appeal, was dismissed by DOLE for being filed out of time.
 ISSUE: Whether or not the mixture of rank-and-file and supervisory employees
in petitioner union nullifies its legal personality as a legitimate labor
organization

RULING:

NO. R.A. No. 6715 omitted specifying the exact effect of any violation of the
prohibition (on the co-mingling of supervisory and rank-and-file employees) would
bring about on the legitimacy of a labor organization.

It should be emphasized that the petitions for certification election involved in Toyota
and Dunlop were filed on November 26, 1992 and September 15, 1995, respectively;
hence, the 1989 Rules was applied in both cases.

But then, on June 21, 1997, the 1989 Amended Omnibus Rules was further
amended by Department Order No. 9, series of 1997 (1997 Amended Omnibus
Rules). Specifically, the requirement under Sec. 2(c) of the 1989 Amended Omnibus
Rules – that the petition for certification election indicate that the bargaining unit of
rank-and-file employees has not been mingled with supervisory employees – was
removed. Instead, what the 1997 Amended Omnibus Rules requires is a plain
description of the bargaining unit

The Court abandoned the view in Toyota and Dunlop and reverted to its
pronouncement in Lopez that while there is a prohibition against the mingling of
supervisory and rank-and-file employees in one labor organization, the Labor Code
does not provide for the effects thereof. Thus, the Court held that after a labor
organization has been registered, it may exercise all the rights and privileges of a
legitimate labor organization. Any mingling between supervisory and rank-and-file
employees in its membership cannot affect its legitimacy for that is not among the
grounds for cancellation of its registration, unless such mingling was brought about
by misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under Article 239 of the Labor Code.

On right to union membership

f) Basa v. FOITAF, G.R. No. 27113, November 19, 1974, 61 SCRA 93

SABINA BASA, BONIFACIO BASA, BONIFACIO CABALHIN and PRIMlTIVO

GALLARDO vs. FEDERACION OBRERA DE LA INDUSTRIA TABAQUERA Y OTROS
TRABAJADORES DE FILIPINAS (FOITAF) and LA DICHA LA PAZ Y BUEN VIAJE
CIGAR AND CIGARETTE FACTORY, defendants. FEDERACION OBRERA DE LA
INDUSTRIA TABAQUERA Y OTROS TRABAJADORES DE FILIPINAS (FOITAF)
G.R. No. L-27113. November 19, 1974.

FACTS:

The plaintiffs-appellees Sabina Basa, Bonifacio Basa, Bonifacio Cabalhin and Primitivo
Gallardo, who are members of "Iglesia ni Cristo", have been employed with the defendant
company, La Dicha La Paz y Buen Viaje Cigar and Cigarette Factory, since 1949, 1952,
1960 and 1957, respectively, and were therefore employees of that company on April 21,
1961, when the collective bargaining contract between the company and the defendant
union, Federacion Obrera de la Industria Tabaquera y Otros Trabajadores de Filipinas
(FOITAF) was executed.

The plaintiffs-appellees were members in good standing of the labor union until August 28,
1964, when they formally resigned from the Union invoking their constitutional right to
freedom of religion, the free exercise of which exempts them from being compelled to join
any labor organization, when such is contrary to their religious beliefs and convictions, as
provided by Republic Act No. 3350, which became a law on June 18, 1961.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Republic Act No. 3350 is violative of the fundamental charter, as it infringes
on the constitutional bar against a law respecting an establishment of religion or a religious
test for the exercise of civil and political rights.

HELD: No. Republic Act No. 3350 classifies employees and workers, as to the effect and
coverage of union shop security agreements, into those who by reason of their religious
beliefs and convictions cannot sign up with a labor union, and those whose religion does not
prohibit membership in labor unions. The classification rests on real or substantial, not
merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. There is such real distinction in the beliefs,
feelings and sentiments of employees. Employees do not believe in the same religious faith
and different religions differ in their dogmas and canons. Religious beliefs, manifestations
and practices, though they are found in all places, and in all times, take so many varied
forms as to be almost beyond imagination. There are many views that comprise the broad
spectrum of religious beliefs among the people. There are diverse manners in which beliefs,
equally paramount in the lives of their possessors, may be articulated. Today the country is
far more heterogenous in religion than before, differences in religion do exist, and these
differences are important and should not be ignored. Republic Act No. 3350 exempts them
from joining any labor organization, when such is contrary to their religious beliefs and
convictions.

On disaffiliation from labor union

g) Philippine Labor Alliance Council (PLAC) v. BLR, G.R. No. 41288, January 31,
1977, 75 SCRA 162

It is indisputable that the present controversy would not have arisen if there were no
mass disaffiliation from petitioning Union. Such a phenomenon is nothing new in the
Philippine labor movement. Nor is it open to any legal objection. It is implicit in the
freedom of association explicitly ordained by the Constitution. There is then the
 incontrovertible right of any individual to join an organization of his choice. That
option belongs to him. A workingman is not to be denied that liberty. He may be, as
a matter of fact, more in need of it if the institution of collective bargaining as an
aspect of industrial democracy is to succeed. No obstacle that may possible thwart
the desirable objective of militancy in labor's struggle for better terms and conditions
is then to be placed on his way. Once the fact of disaffiliation has been demonstrated
beyond doubt, as in this case, a certification election is the most expeditious way of
determining which labor organization is to be the exclusive bargaining representative.
It is as simple as that.

On determination of a bargaining unit

h) San Miguel Corporation v. Laguesma, G.R. No. 100485, September 21, 1994,
236 SCRA 595

FACTS:

On October 5, 1990, petitioner union filed before the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) a Petition for District Certification or Certification Election
among the supervisors and exempt employees of the SMC Magnolia Poultry
Products Plants of Cabuyao, San Fernando and Otis.

Med-Arbiter Danilo L. Reynante issued an Order ordering the conduct of certification

among the supervisors and exempt employees of the SMC Magnolia Poultry
Products Plants of Cabuyao, San Fernando and Otis as one bargaining unit.

San Miguel Corporation filed a Notice of Appeal with Memorandum on Appeal,

pointing out, among others, the Med-Arbiters error in grouping together all three (3)
separate plants, Otis, Cabuyao and San Fernando, into one bargaining unit, and in
including supervisory levels 3 and above whose positions are confidential in nature.

Respondent, Undersecretary Laguesma, granted respondent companys Appeal and

ordered the remand of the case to the Med-Arbiter of origin for determination of the
true classification of each of the employees sought to be included in the appropriate
bargaining unit and directed the conduct of separate certification elections among
the supervisors ranked as supervisory levels 1 to 4 (S1 to S4) and the exempt
employees in each of the three plants at Cabuyao, San Fernando and Otis.

ISSUE: If they are not confidential employees, do the employees of the three plants
constitute an appropriate single bargaining unit?

RULING:
 YES, it can be a single bargaining unit.

An appropriate bargaining unit may be defined as a group of employees of a given

employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, which the
collective interest of all the employees, consistent with equity to the employer,
indicate to be best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under
the collective bargaining provisions of the law.

A unit to be appropriate must effect a grouping of employees who have substantial,

mutual interests in wages, hours, working conditions and other subjects of collective
bargaining.

It is readily seen that the employees in the instant case have community or mutuality
of interest, which is the standard in determining the proper constituency of a
collective bargaining unit. It is undisputed that they all belong to the Magnolia Poultry
Division of San Miguel Corporation. This means that, although they belong to three
different plants, they perform work of the same nature, receive the same wages and
compensation, and most importantly, share a common stake in concerted activities.

On effect of CBA exclusion of groups of employees from the bargaining unit to future
inclusion

i) Dela Salle University v. Dela Salle University Employees Association, G.R. No.
109002, April 12, 2000, 330 SCRA 363

The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the express exclusion of the
computer operators and discipline officers from the bargaining unit of rank-and-file
employees in the 1986 collective bargaining agreement does not bar any
re-negotiation for the future inclusion of the said employees in the bargaining unit.
During the freedom period, the parties may not only renew the existing collective
bargaining agreement but may also propose and discuss modifications or
amendments thereto. With regard to the alleged confidential nature of the said
employees' functions, after a careful consideration of the pleadings filed before this
Court, we rule that the said computer operators and discipline officers are not
confidential employees. As carefully examined by the Solicitor General, the service
record of a computer operator reveals that his duties are basically clerical and
non-confidential in nature. As to the discipline officers, we agree with the voluntary
arbitrator that based on the nature of their duties, they are not confidential employees
and should therefore be included in the bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees.

On certification election

j) National Federation of Labor v. The Secretary of Labor, G.R. No. 104556,

March 19, 1998, 287 SCRA 599
First. Petitioner contends that certification election is the sole concern of the employees and
the employer is a mere bystander. The only instance wherein the employer may actively
participate is when it files a petition for certification election under Art. 258 of the Labor Code
because it is requested to bargain collectively. Petitioner says that this is not the case here
and so the DOLE should not have given due course to private respondent's petition for
annulment of the results of the certification election.

In his resolution of August 29, 1991, the Secretary of Labor said he was reversing his earlier
resolution because "workers of Hijo Plantation, Inc. have deluged this Office with their
letter-appeal, either made singly or collectively expressing their wish to have a new
certification election conducted" and that as a result "the firm position we held regarding the
integrity of the electoral exercise had been somewhat eroded by this recent declaration of
the workers, now speaking in their sovereign capacity."

It is clear from this, that what the DOLE Secretary considered in reversing its earlier rulings
was not the petition of the employer but the letter-appeals that the employees sent to his
office denouncing the irregularities committed during the August 20, 1989 certification
election. The petition of private respondent was simply the occasion for the employees to
voice their protests against the election. Private respondent HPI attached to its
Supplemental Appeal filed on September 5, 1989 the affidavits and appeals of more or less
784 employees who claimed that they had been disfranchised, as a result of which they
were not able to cast their votes at the August 20, 1989 election. It was the protests of
employees which moved the DOLE to reconsider its previous resolution of February 14,
1991, upholding the election.

Nor is it improper for private respondent to show interest in the conduct of the election.
Private respondent is the employer. The manner in which the election was held could make
the difference between industrial strife and industrial harmony in the company. What an
employer is prohibited from doing is to interfere with the conduct of the certification election
for the purpose of influencing its outcome. But certainly an employer has an abiding interest
in seeing to it that the election is clean, peaceful, orderly and credible.

On grounds for dismissal of a petition for certification election

k) Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Samma-Lakas sa Industriya ng

Kapatirang Haligi ng Alyansa (Samma-Likha) v. Samma Corporation, G.R. No.
167141, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 211

SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA SAMMA-LAKAS SA INDUSTRIYA NG

KAPATIRANG HALIGI NG ALYANSA (SAMMA-LIKHA), Petitioner,

vs.

SAMMA CORPORATION, Respondent.

FACTS: Petitioner Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Samma– Lakas sa Industriya

ng Kapatirang Haligi ng Alyansa (SAMMA-LIKHA) filed a petition for certification
election on July 24, 2001 in the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE),
Regional Office IV.4 It claimed that: (1) it was a local chapter of the LIKHA
Federation, a legitimate labor organization registered with the DOLE; (2) it sought to
represent all the rank-and-file employees of respondent Samma Corporation; (3)
there was no other legitimate labor organization representing these rank-and-file
employees; (4) respondent was not a party to any collective bargaining agreement
and (5) no certification or consent election had been conducted within the employer
unit for the last 12 months prior to the filing of the petition.

Respondent moved for the dismissal of the petition arguing that (1) LIKHA Federation
failed to establish its legal personality; (2) petitioner failed to prove its existence as a
local chapter; (3) it failed to attach the certificate of non-forum shopping and (4)
it had a prohibited mixture of supervisory and rank-and-file employees.

Med-arbiter ordered the dismissal. , Acting Secretary Manuel G. Imson, treating the
motion for reconsideration as an appeal, rendered a decision reversing the order of
the med-arbiter. He ruled that the legal personality of a union cannot be collaterally
attacked but may only be questioned in an independent petition for cancellation of
registration. Thus, he directed the holding of a certification election among the
rank-and-file employees of respondent, subject to the usual pre-election conference
and inclusion-exclusion proceedings. CA reversed. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: whether a certificate for non-forum shopping is required in a petition for

certification election

Ruling:

The requirement for a certificate of non-forum shopping refers to complaints,

counter-claims, cross-claims, petitions or applications where contending parties
litigate their respective positions regarding the claim for relief of the complainant,
claimant, petitioner or applicant. A certification proceeding, even though initiated
by a “petition,” is not a litigation but an investigation of a non-adversarial and
fact-finding character.

Such proceedings are not predicated upon an allegation of misconduct requiring

relief, but, rather, are merely of an inquisitorial nature. The Board’s functions are
not judicial in nature, but are merely of an investigative character. The object of the
proceedings is not the decision of any alleged commission of wrongs nor asserted
deprivation of rights but is merely the determination of proper bargaining units and
the ascertainment of the will and choice of the employees in respect of the selection
of a bargaining representative. The determination of the proceedings does not entail
the entry of remedial orders to redress rights, but culminates solely in an official
designation of bargaining units and an affirmation of the employees’ expressed
choice of bargaining agent.
 Under the omnibus rules implementing the Labor Code as amended by D.O. No.
9,22 it is supposed to be filed in the Regional Office which has jurisdiction over the
principal office of the employer or where the bargaining unit is principally situated.23
The rules further provide that where two or more petitions involving the same
bargaining unit are filed in one Regional Office, the same shall be automatically
consolidated.24 Hence, the filing of multiple suits and the possibility of conflicting
decisions will rarely happen in this proceeding and, if it does, will be easy to discover.

On contract-bar rule

l) Samahang Manggagawa sa Permex v. Secretary of Labor, G.R. No. 107792,

March 2, 1998, 286 SCRA 692

FACTS:

On January 15, 1991, a certification election was conducted among employees of

respondentPermex Producer and Exporter Corporation (hereafter referred to as
Permex Producer). The results ofthe elections were as follows:

National Federation of Labor (NFL) – 235, No Union – 466, Spoiled Ballots – 18,
Marked Ballots – 9, Challenged Ballots – 7

However, some employees of Permex Producer formed a labor organization known

as the Samahang Manggagawa sa Permex (SMP) which they registered with the
Department of Labor and Employment onMarch 11, 1991.

The union later affiliated with the Philippine Integrated Industries Labor Union
(PIILU).On August 16, 1991, Samahang Manggagawa sa Permex-Philippine
Integrated Industries Labor Union(SMP-PIILU), wrote the respondent company
requesting recognition as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of
employees at the Permex Producer.

On October 19, 1991 Permex Producer recognized SMP-PIILU and, on December 1,

entered into a collective bargaining agreement with it.

The CBA was ratified between December 9 and 10, 1991 by the majority of the rank
and file employees of Permex Producer. On December 13, 1991, it was certified by
the DOLE On February 25, 1992, respondent NFL filed a petition for certification
election, but it was dismissed by the Med-Arbiter in an order on August 20, 1992.
Respondent NFL then appealed the order to the Secretary of Labor and
Employment. On October 8, 1992, the Secretary of Labor, through Undersecretary
Bienvenido Laguesma, set aside the order of the Med-Arbiter and ordered a
certification election to be conducted among the rank and file employees at the
Permex Producer
 ISSUE: WON the order of the Public Respondent of the conduct of certification
election valid.

HELD: Yes, the challenged decision and order of the respondent Secretary of Labor
are AFFIRMED.

Certification election is the most effective and the most democratic way of
determining which labor organization can truly represent the working force in the
appropriate bargaining unit of a company. But it is not enough that a union has the
support of the majority of the employees. It is equally important that everyone in the
bargaining unit be given the opportunity to express himself

The Contract Bar Rule is not applicable in this case. The purpose of the rule is to
ensure stability in the relationships of the workers and the management by
preventing frequent modifications of any collective bargaining agreement earlier
entered into by them in good faith and for the stipulated original period. The petitioner
entered into a CBA with Permex Producer when its status as exclusive bargaining
agent of the employees had not been established yet.

On certification year bar rule

m) Kaisahan ng Manggagawang Pilipino v. Trajano, G.R. No. 75810, September

9, 1991, 201 SCRA 453

FACTS
In 1981, by virtue of a BLR Resolution, the National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU)
was declared the exclusive bargaining representative of all rank-and-file employees of
Viron Garments (VIRON). In 1985, More than four years later, another union, the Kaisahan
ng Manggagawang Pilipino ( KAMPIL Katipunan), filed with the BLR a petition for
certification election among VIRON employees. The petition allegedly counted with the
support of more than thirty percent (30%) of VIRON workers. NAFLU opposed the petition.
The Med-Arbiter ordered that a certification election be held, after ascertaining that
KAMPIL had complied with all the requirements of law and that since NAFLU’s certification
in 1981, no CBA was executed.

NAFLU contended that at the time the petition for certification election was filed, it was in
process of collective bargaining with VIRON; that there was in fact a deadlock in the
negotiations which had prompted it to file a notice of strike; and that these circumstances
constituted a bar to the petition for election in accordance with Section 3, Rule V, Book V of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.

BLR director Trajano set aside the Med-Arbiter's Order and dismissed KAMPIL's
petition for certification election. The delay in the negotiations was attributed to the
exhaustion of all legal remedies in the representation question twice initiated in the company
before the filing of the present petition, as well as to the management who had been
resisting the representations of NAFLU in collective bargaining. It also considered the fact
that NAFLU underwent a strike to bring management to the negotiation table
.
ISSUE: WON KAMPIL's petition for certification election is barred.
RULING: No. The prohibition imposed by law on the holding of a certification election
"within one year from the date of issuance of declaration of a final certification election result'
— in this case, from the date of the Resolution declaring
NAFLU the exclusive bargaining representative — can have no application here. That
one-year period — known as the "certification year" during which the certified union is
required to negotiate with the employer, and certification election is prohibited —
has long since expired.

Prior to the filing of the petition for election, there was no bargaining deadlock which was
submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had become the subject of a valid notice of strike or
lockout. There are assertions by NAFLU that its attempts to bring VIRON to the negotiation
table had been unsuccessful because of the latter's recalcitrance and unfulfilled promises to
bargain collectively, but there is no proof that it had taken any action to legally coerce VIRON
to comply with its statutory duty to bargain collectively. It could have charged VIRON with
unfair labor practice; but it did not. It could have gone on a legitimate strike in protest against
VIRON's refusal to bargain collectively and compel it to do so; but it did not. There are
assertions by NAFLU, too, that its attempts to bargain
collectively had been delayed by continuing challenges to the resolution pronouncing it the
sole bargaining representative in VIRON; but there is no adequate substantiation thereof, or
of how it did in fact prevent initiation of the bargaining process between it and VIRON.

The fact is that from the time that NAFLU was proclaimed the exclusive bargaining
representative until the time KAMPIL filed its petition for certification election, no CBA
was ever executed, and no deadlock
ever arose from negotiations between NAFLU and VIRON resulting in conciliation
proceedings or the filing of a valid strike notice.

VIRON adverts to a strike declared by NAFLU for its [VIRON] refusal to bargain and for
violation of terms and conditions of employment, and to another strike staged in connection
with a claim of violation of said agreement,.
However, these activities took place after KAMPIL initiated the certification election case,
and it was grave abuse of
discretion to have regarded them as precluding the holding of the certification election
prayed for.

On bargaining deadlock bar rule

n) Capitol Medical Center Alliance of Concerned Employees-Unified Filipino

Service Workers v. Laguesma, G.R. No. 118915, February 4, 1997, 267 SCRA 503

FACTS:

Respondent union filed petition for certification election. The Med-Arbiter granted the petition
for certification election. Respondent Capitol Medical Center (CMC) appealed to the Office of
the Secretary. But the Order granting the certification election was affirmned.

On December 9, 1992, elections were held with respondent union garnering 204 votes, 168
in favor of no union and 8 spoiled ballots out of a total of 380 votes cast. Med-Arbiter issued
an Order certifying respondent union as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of
the rank and file employees at CMC.

Respondent CMC again appealed to the Office of the Secretary of Labor the result of the
election, it was denied. MR also denied. Respondent CMC’s contention was the supposed
pendency of its petition for cancellation of respondent union’s certificate of registration. In the
said case, the Med-Arbiter therein issued an Order which declared respondent union’s
certificate of registration as null and void. However, this order was reversed on appeal by the
Officer-in-Charge of the BLR in her Order. The said Order dismissed CMC’s motion for
cancellation of the certificate of registration of respondent union and declared that it was not
only a bona fide affiliate or local of a federation, but a duly registered union as well.

Respondent union, after being declared as the certified bargaining agent of the rank-and-file
employees of respondent CMC, presented proposals for the negotiation of a CBA. However,
CMC contended that CBA negotiations should be suspended in view of the Order declaring
the registration of respondent union as null and void. In spite of the refusal of respondent
CMC, respondent union still persisted in its demand for CBA negotiations, claiming that it
has already been declared as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file
employees of the hospital.

Due to respondent CMC’s refusal to bargain collectively, respondent union filed a notice of
strike and later staged a strike on April 15, 1993. The case was certified to the NLRC for
compulsory arbitration.

It is at this point that petitioner union, on March 24, 1994, filed a petition for certification
election among the regular rank-and-file employees of the Capitol Medical Center Inc. It
alleged in its petition that: 1) three hundred thirty one (331) out of the four hundred (400)
total rank-and-file employees of respondent CMC signed a petition to conduct a certification
election; and 2) that the said employees are withdrawing their authorization for the said
union to represent them as they have joined and formed the union Capitol Medical Center
Alliance of Concerned Employees (CMC-ACE). They also alleged that a certification election
can now be conducted as more that 12 months have lapsed since the last certification
election was held.

Respondent union opposed the petition and moved for its dismissal. It contended that it is
the certified bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of the Hospital, which was
confirmed by the Secretary of DOLE and by this Court. It also alleged that it was not
negligent in asserting its right as the certified bargaining agent for it continuously demanded
the negotiation of a CBA with the hospital despite the latter’s avoidance to bargain
collectively.

May 12, 1994, Med-Arbiter Brigida Fadrigon, issued an Order granting the petition for
certification election among the rank and file employees. On appeal by respondent union,
the public respondent Laguesma reversed and favored the respondent union. Hence this
petition.
ISSUE: Was there a bargaining deadlock between CMC and respondent union.

RULING:

While it is true that one year had lapsed since the time of declaration of a final certification
result, and that there is no collective bargaining deadlock, public respondent did not commit
grave abuse of discretion when it ruled in respondent union’s favor since the delay in the
forging of the CBA could not be attributed to the fault of the latter.

After respondent union was certified as the bargaining agent of CMC, it invited the employer
hospital to the bargaining table by submitting its economic proposal for a CBA. However,
CMC refused to negotiate with respondent union and instead challenged the latter’s legal
personality through a petition for cancellation of the certificate of registration which
eventually reached this Court. The decision affirming the legal status of respondent union
should have left CMC with no other recourse but to bargain collectively; but still it did not.
Respondent union was left with no other recourse but to file notice of strike against CMC for
unfair labor practice with the NCMB. This eventually led to a strike.

A “deadlock” is the counteraction of things producing entire stoppage; There is a deadlock

when there is a complete blocking or stoppage resulting from the action of equal and
opposed forces. The word is synonymous with the word impasse, which presupposes
reasonable effort at good faith bargaining which, despite noble intentions, does not conclude
in agreement between the parties.

Although there is no “deadlock” in its strict sense as there is no “counteraction” of forces

present in this case nor “reasonable effort at good faith bargaining,” such can be attributed to
CMC’s fault as the bargaining proposals of respondent union were never answered by CMC.
In fact, what happened in this case is worse than a bargaining deadlock for CMC employed
all legal means to block the certification of respondent union as the bargaining agent of the
rank-and-file; and use it as its leverage for its failure to bargain with respondent union. We
can only conclude that CMC was unwilling to negotiate and reach an agreement with
respondent union. CMC has not at any instance shown willingness to discuss the economic
proposals given by respondent union.

It is only just and equitable that the circumstances in this case should be considered as
similar in nature to a “bargaining deadlock” when no certification election could be held. This
is also to make sure that no floodgates will be opened for the circumvention of the law by
unscrupulous employers to prevent any certified bargaining agent from negotiating a CBA.
Thus, Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the Implement Rules should be interpreted liberally so as
to include a circumstance, e.g. where a CBA could not be concluded due to the failure of one
party to willingly perform its duty to bargain collectively.
On double majority rule

o) Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Pacific Plastic v. Laguesma, G.R. No. 111245,

January 31, 1997, 267 SCRA 303

First. The certification election held on October 6, 1992 is valid. Art. 256 of the Labor
Code provides that in order to have a valid election, at least a majority of all eligible
voters in the unit must have cast their votes.

The certification election results show that more than a majority, i.e., 62 out of a total
of 98 eligible voters included in the list of employees obtained from the SSS, cast
their votes. The certification election results show that more than a majority obtained
from the SSS, cast their votes. Hence, the legal requirement for a valid election was
met.

The bone of contention actually concerns the propriety of utilizing the list of
employees furnished by the SSS as basis for determining the total number of eligible
voters in the bargaining unit. Petitioner claims that, according to the Implementing
Rules, the basis for the list of eligible voters should have been the payroll three (3)
months preceding the filing of the petition for certification election and that if this was
done the 62 votes cast would be short of the majority because, instead of only 98
employees as shown in the SSS list, there were actually 130 as alleged in MNMPP’s
petition for certification election.

On eligible voters

p) Yokohama Tire Philippines, Inc. v. Yokohama Employees Union, G.R. No.

159553, December 10, 2007, 539 SCRA 556

Section 5. Qualification of voters; inclusion-exclusion. - . . . An employee who has been

dismissed from work but has contested the legality of the dismissal in a forum of appropriate
jurisdiction at the time of the issuance of the order for the conduct of a certification election
shall be considered a qualified voter, unless his/her dismissal was declared valid in a final
judgment at the time of the conduct of the certification election.chanrobles virtual law library

xxx

Thus, we find no reversible error on the part of the DOLE Acting Secretary and the Court of
Appeals in ordering the appreciation of the votes of the dismissed employees.

On casting of votes, etc.

 q) Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) v. BLR, G.R. No. 43760,
August 21, 1976, 72 SCRA 396

Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions vs Bureau of Labor Relations

G.R. No. L-43760
August 21, 2976
FACTS:
In a certification held in 1976, respondent union (National Federation of Free Labor unions)
won against the petitioner union by 429 votes as against the latter with only 414 votes. The
petitioner filed a complaint against the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) for it
acted on grave abuse of discretion when it did not count the 17 spoiled ballots. It also
contends that the BLR Director failed to observe the ruling in
the case of Allied Workers Asso vs Court of Industrial Relations.
However, the BLR Director stated that the ruling in the aforementioned case cannot be
applied for it arose during the Industrial Peace Act. The legislation I no longer in force and
was already superseded by the present Labor Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the BLR Direct or acted on grave abuse of discretion when he didn’t
include the spoiled ballots in the counting of votes?
RULING:
The principle that the contemporaneous construction of a statute by the executive officers of
the government, whose duty it is to execute it, is entitled to great respect, and should
ordinarily control the construction of the statute by the courts, is so firmly embedded in our
jurisprudence that no authorities need be cited to support it." 18 There was a paraphrase by
Justice Malcolm of such a pronouncement in Molina v. Rafferty," 19 a 1918 decision: "Courts
will and should respect the contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by the
executive officers whose duty it is to enforce it, and unless such interpretation is clearly
erroneous will ordinarily be controlled thereby." Since then, such a doctrine has been
reiterated in numerous decisions. As was emphasized by Chief Justice Castro, "the
construction placed by the office charged with implementing and enforcing the provisions of
a Code should he given controlling weight.

On challenging votes, protest

r) Philippine Fruits and Vegetables Industries, Inc. v. Torres, G.R. No. 92391,
July 3, 1992, 211 SCRA 95

For it is to be noted that the formal protest of petitioner PFVII was filed beyond the
reglementary period. A close reading of Sections 3 and 4, Rule VI, Book V of the
Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, which read as follows:

Sec. 3. Representation officer may rule on any-on-the-spot questions. — The

Representation officer may rule on any on-the-spot question arising from the conduct of the
election. The interested party may however, file a protest with the representation officer
before the close of the proceedings.

Protests not so raised are deemed waived. Such protest shall be contained in the minutes of
the proceedings. (Emphasis supplied)

Sec. 4. Protest to be decided in twenty (20) working days. — Where the protest is formalized
before the med-arbiter with five (5) days after the close of the election proceedings, the
med-arbiter shall decide the same within twenty (20) working days from the date of
formalization. If not formalized within the prescribed period, the protest shall be deemed
dropped. The decision may be appealed to the Bureau in the same manner and on the same
grounds as provided under Rule V. (Emphasis supplied)

would readily yield, as a matter of procedure, the following requirements in order that a
protest filed thereunder would prosper, to wit:

(1) The protest must be filed with the representation officer and made of record in the
minutes of the proceedings before the close of election proceedings, and

(2) The protest must be formalized before the Med-Arbiter within five (5) days after the close
of the election proceedings.

On consent election

s) Algire v. De Mesa, G.R. No. 97622, October 19, 1994, 237 SCRA 647

To resolve the issue of union representation at the Universal Robina Textile plant, what was
agreed to be held at the company's premises and which became the root of this controversy,
was a consent election, not a certification election.

It is unmistakable that the election held on November 15, 1990 was a consent election and
not a certification election. It was an agreed one, the purpose being merely to determine the
issue of majority representation of all the workers in the appropriate collective bargaining
unit. It is a separate and distinct process and has nothing to do with the import and effort of a
certification election. The ruling of DOLE's representative in that election that the questioned
ballot is spoiled is not based on any legal provision or rule justifying or requiring such action
by such officer but simply in pursuance of the intent of the parties, expressed in the written
instructions contained in the ballot, which is to prohibit unauthorized markings thereon other
than a check or a cross, obviously intended to identify the votes in order to preserve the
sanctity of the ballot, which is in fact the objective of the contending parties.

If indeed petitioner's group had any opposition to the representation officer's ruling that the
questioned ballot was spoiled, it should have done so seasonably during the canvass of
votes. Its failure or inaction to assail such ballot's validity shall be deemed a waiver of any
defect or irregularity arising from said election. Moreover, petitioners even question at this
stage the clear instruction to mark a check or cross opposite the same of the candidate's
group, arguing that such instruction was not clear, as two checks "may be interpreted that a
voter may vote for Lino Algire but not with (sic) his officers or vice-versa,"notwithstanding the
fact that a pre-election conference had already been held where no such question was
raised.

On difference between certification election and consent election

t) Warren Manufacturing Workers Union (WMWU) v. BLR, G.R. No. 76185, March
30,1988, 159 SCRA 387
Facts:

PACIWU files a petition for certification election and WMWU filed a motion to dismiss said
application.To resolve the issue of the union representation the parties have agreed to the
holding of a consent election among the rank and file employees.It is clearly understood that
the certified union in the said projected election shall respect and administer the existing
CBA until it expires on July 31, 1986.

Result of Consent Election: PACIWU – 94 and WMWU – 193;

Thereafter, on June 5, 1986, PACIWU filed a petition for certification election which was
followed by the petition for the same purposes by Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Warren Mfg.
Corp.-Alliance of Nationalist and Genuine Labor Organizations (ANGLO).Said petitions was
opposed by the Company on the grounds that neither petition has 30% support and that both
are barred by the one (1) year no certification election rule and the principle of the contract
Bar Rule as there exist a duly ratified CBA.

Med-Arbiter, Ministry of Labor and Employment ordered the holding of a certification election
within 20days.The Company and WMWU filed separate motions which dismissed for lack of
merit. Hence, this petitions.

Issues:

The holding of a certification election at the bargaining unit is patently premature and illegal.
(Sec. 3, Rule V, IRR of Labor Code – the one year no certification election rule from
declaration of final certification result.

Held:

The contention is untenable. The root of this controversy was a consent election and not a
certification election. As correctly distinguished, a consent election is an agreed one, its
purpose being merely to determine the issue of majority representation of all the workers in
the appropriate collective bargaining unit while a certification election is aimed at determining
the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the employees in an appropriate bargaining
unit for the purpose of collective bargaining. From the very nature of consent election, it is a
separate and distinct process and has nothing to do with the import and effect of a
certification election. Neither does it shorten the terms of an existing CBA nor entitle the
participants thereof to immediately renegotiate an existing CBA although it does not preclude
the workers from exercising their right to choose their sole and exclusive bargaining
representative after the expiration of the sixty (60) day freedom period.

It is, therefore, unmistakable that the election thus held on August 25, 1985 was not for the
purpose of determining which labor union should be the bargaining representative in the
negotiation for a collective contract, there being an existing collective bargaining agreement
yet to expire on July 31, 1986; but only to determine which labor union shag administer the
said existing contract.