Tsering Shakya Bhutan India China

A video circulating on social media shows Indian and Chinese soldiers armed with
cell phones jostling each other on a barren landscape high up on the mountainous
borders where Bhutan and China meet. The Indian press has covered the incident
with hyper-nationalistic fervour, much of it recalling the humiliating defeat of the
1962 war, which started with the supposed Indian discovery of Chinese road-
building in another sparsely-habited corner of the Himalayas. Since then India, not
wishing to be blindsided, keeps an observant eye on every pebble that is turned in
the Himalayan border regions. Meanwhile, the incident has hardly been reported in
the Chinese media, and its usually nationalistic social media is silent. The
hypersensitivity in India and the lack of coverage in China illustrates the relative
importance placed on the issue by each side.
For Indian politicians and the public, the current situation is portrayed in terms of
encirclement by China and Beijing’s designs on India. However, for the small
Himalayan states and border regions, it’s not China which makes them nervous but
India. The tiny Himalayan state of Bhutan, which seems to have become one of the
favourite destinations of royals and is often portrayed as the happiest place in the
world, is now caught in the middle between two giants of Asia.
Much of the India press reporting is alarmist, with colourful descriptions of the
disputed narrow valley as India's "Chicken Neck" and a "dagger" pointing to India,
stressing China's strategic intentions. In reality, the issue does not have much to do
with the border. The border between Bhutan and Tibet (which is the area within
China that abuts Bhutan) has never been cartographically demarcated. Before the
Chinese annexation of Tibet, the nomads living on the plateau moved freely across
these areas. In the 1950’s, China negotiated and settled most of its land borders, but
never completed discussions with Bhutan, because India insisted on the right to
negotiate on behalf of Bhutan, which the Chinese side refused to accept: it maintains
that the border with Bhutan can only be settled by direct negotiation with Bhutan.
Eventually India had to relent to China's demand and allow the two sides to
negotiate directly. Since 1984, the two sides have held 24 rounds of talks, and the
detailed content of the talks has been kept secret, with both parties restricting
themselves to diplomatic platitudes. The time it has taken to reach an agreement is
an indication that there is major disagreement.
India’s acceptance of direct Bhutan–China negotiations is based on acute

observation of China's past strategy in territorial negotiation with smaller states
such as Pakistan, Nepal and Burma, who are not seen as a threat to China security.
In such cases, China has adopted a benevolent position and conceded to the smaller
parties’ demands. But it has taken a tough stand with Bhutan, a tiny state that can
no way be seen as a threat to China, and no settlement has been reached. Many in
Bhutan see that failure as due to misguidance from New Delhi.
For China, the settlement of territorial claims with Bhutan is of no strategic or
economic concern. China stands on the crest of the Himalayas and has highly
developed infrastructure, giving it the dominant position. Bhutan and China
identified seven disputed areas, most of which are of no great significance to China,
and which it is willing to concede to Bhutanese claims. But Bhutan’s claims are
historically flimsy, and China has been able to present a huge amount of Tibetan
historical land records from the past government of the Dalai Lama to show these
territories were under the jurisdiction of Lhasa, which of course it claims as part of
its territory.
In 1996, after the 10th round of talks, it appeared that Bhutan and China had
reached an understanding that China would concede to Bhutan’s claims in the
northern sector of the border, while Bhutan accepted China’s claims to the south.
When, 15 months later, the two sides met for the 11th round of meetings, there was
much expectation that an agreement would be signed. However, to China’s surprise,
Bhutan revised its claims in the south and asserted a claim to larger territory than
before, leading the talks to break down. China suspected the new claims were based
on India’s urging and began to take a tougher stand. When the Bhutanese called for
consideration for the needs of a small state, the Chinese side reportedly replied, “a
nation which shares its border with 25 other countries cannot afford to be generous
with one particular neighbour”.
One area of dispute where China is not willing to make a concession concerns the
narrow valley which the Tibetans call Dromo. During the Dalai Lama’s rule in Tibet
the area was administered from Phari Dzong, clearly within Tibet, and was divided
into Upper and Lower Dromo. This narrow valley was one of the important trade
routes between India and Tibet and the hamlet of Dromo was the staging post for all
goods entering and leaving Tibet. It was such an important route that the area has
four different names according to different nations using it - for British India it was
the Chumbi Valley, for Newar merchants from Nepal it was known as Sher zingma,
and the Chinese called it Yatung, now written as Yadong. Apart from trade, the area
was dominated by two monasteries, Dungkar, a Buddhist monastery, under the
control of Dromo Geshe Rinpoche and Pumo Gon, a Bonpo Monastery under Lama
Kyimsar Rinpoche.
For Indian media the narrow valley has become the “dagger” pointing at India. The
strip divides the Indian state of Sikkim from Bhutan. The dispute is not above the
surrounding region, Dromo County, but an area known as Drok Lam or “Nomads’
Path,” about 600 sq km in size, about the same as Toronto. Here, Bhutan’s claim is
not without foundation: although until 1913 the Drok Lam was under the control of
the Tibetan government in Lhasa, an enclave in Drok Lam was granted to Kazi
Ugyen Dorje, one of the most important and acute political figures in Bhutan, who
served as the intermediary between British India and Tibet. In 1911, when the 13th
Dalai Lama fled the advancing Qing (Manchu) army and sought refuge in Kalimpong,
he was hosted by Ugyen Dorje at Bhutan House, who covered the costs of his and his
retinues’ stay in India. However, the area granted was an enclave, not the entire 600
sq km. Bhutan’s over-assertion of its claim, as suspected by China and many in
Bhutan, may be due to the urging of New Delhi, which sees the narrow strip of the
valley as essential for the defence of Sikkim and beyond.
This was tantamount to India sabotaging the agreement between Bhutan and China.
The increasing Indian sabre-rattling in the media, amid claims of defending Bhutan
from Chinese encroachment, may be good for arousing nationalistic sentiment, but
they are not finding echoes in Bhutan, where anti-Indian sentiments are rising.
Bhutan sees no advantage in being tough with China. In fact, China has conceded to
Bhutan many of Bhutan’s territorial demands. The narrow valley in Drok Lam,
which is uninhibited and was mostly pastureland, is of no strategic or economic
interest to Bhutan. But both China and India know it is vital for India’s strategic
interest.
Bhutan is now caught between the two rising giants of Asia. While the Bhutanese
don’t fear invasion from the north, there is a real possibility of an increasing Indian
presence in Bhutan that will undermine the nation’s sovereignty. Bhutan is the only
surviving Tibetan Buddhist kingdom in the 21st century, and its leaders have been
astute in preserving its independence, with the transition from absolute monarchy
to democracy yielding remarkable success. As its history has shown, Bhutan can
fully handle its own affairs.

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A video circulating on social media shows Indian and Chinese soldiers armed with

India’s acceptance of direct Bhutan–China negotiations is based on acute

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