People v. Quijada - 259 SCRA 191

People v.
Quijada – 259 SCRA 191
FACTS:
 Accused-appellant Daniel Quijada appeals from the decision of (RTC) of Bohol in

convicting him of the two offenses separately charged in two informations. (viz., murder
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and illegal possession of firearm in its
aggravated from under P.D. No. 1866)
 The appeal was originally assigned to the Third Division of the Court but was later
referred to the Court en banc in view of the problematical issue of whether to
sustain the trial court's judgment in conformity with the doctrine laid down in
various jurisprudence or to modify the judgment and convict the appellant only of
illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form pursuant to People vs. Barros.
 After a lengthy deliberation thereon, the Court en banc arrived at the conclusion
that the rule laid down in Tac-an, reiterated in Tiozon, Caling, Jumamoy, Deunida,
Tiongco, Fernandez, and Somooc is the better rule, for it applies the laws concerned
according to their letter and spirit, thereby steering this Court away from a dangerous
course which could have irretrievably led it to an inexcusable breach of the doctrine of
separation of powers through judicial legislation.
 However, according to Mr. Justice Regalado it offends the constitutional bar against
double jeopardy under the "same-evidence test”
ISSUE: Whether or not there is double jeopardy.
RULING:NO.
First, the issue of double jeopardy is not raised in this case. Second, the so-called "same-
evidence" test is not a conclusive, much less exclusive, test in double jeopardy cases of the first
category under the Double Jeopardy Clause which is covered by Section 21, Article III of the
Constitution.
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a
bar to another prosecution for the same act.
Note that the first category speaks of the same offense. The second refers to the same act.
This was explicitly distinguished in Yap vs. Lutero, from where People vs. Relova quotes the
following:
The first sentence ordains that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense." (emphasis in the original) The second sentence of said clause
provides that "if an act is punishable by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal
under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act." Thus, the
first sentence prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense whereas,
the second contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act.
Elsewise stated, where the offenses charged are penalized either by different sections of the same
statute or by different statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of offenses charged.
The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available only where an identity as
shown to exist between the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged. The question of
identity or lack of identity of offenses is addressed by examining the essential elements of each
of the two offenses charged, as such elements are set out in the respective legislative definitions
of the offenses involved. For undeniably, the elements of illegal possession of firearm in its
aggravated form are different from the elements of homicide or murder, let alone the fact
that these crimes are defined and penalized under different laws and the former is malum
prohibitum, while both the latter are mala in se. Hence, the fear that the majority's
construction of the subject provision would violate the constitutional bar against double
jeopardy is unfounded.
___________________
ADDITIONAL INFO
same-evidence test" - There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to support a
conviction for one offense would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other.
Doctrine laid down in various jurisprudence:
Tac-an and Tiozon- If an accused is prosecuted for homicide or murder and for aggravated
illegal possession of firearm, they at the same time laid down the rule that these are separate
offenses, with the first punished under the Revised Penal Code and the second under a special
law; hence, the constitutional bar against double jeopardy will not apply.
In Caling, we explicitly opined that a person charged with aggravated illegal possession of
firearm under the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 can also be separately charged
with and convicted of homicide or murder under the Revised Penal Code and punished
accordingly.
In Jumamoy, we reiterated Caling and amplified the rationale on why an accused who kills
another with an unlicensed firearm can be prosecuted and punished for the two separate offenses
of violation of the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 and for homicide or murder
under the Revised Penal Code.
In Deunida, in discussing the propriety of the Government's action in withdrawing an

information for murder and pursuing only the information for "Qualified Illegal Possession of
Firearm,"
In Somooc, the offense charged by the Information is clear enough from the terms of that
document, although both the Information and the decision of the trial court used the term "Illegal
Possession of Firearm with Homicide," a phrase which has sometimes been supposed to connote
a "complex crime" as used in the Revised Penal Code. Such nomenclature is, however, as we
have ruled in People vs. Caling, a misnomer since there is no complex crime of illegal possession
of firearm with homicide.

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People v.

Quijada – 259 SCRA 191

 Accused-appellant Daniel Quijada appeals from the decision of (RTC) of Bohol in

ISSUE: Whether or not there is double jeopardy.

Doctrine laid down in various jurisprudence:

In Deunida, in discussing the propriety of the Government's action in withdrawing an

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