Communists and the National Question in Scotland and Iceland, c. 1930 to c.

1940
Author(s): Ragnheiđur Kristjánsdóttir
Source: The Historical Journal, Vol. 45, No. 3 (Sep., 2002), pp. 601-618
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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TheHistoricalJournal,45, 3 (2002), pp. 6oi-6I8 ? 2002 Cambridge University Press
DOI: Io. Io7/SooI 8246Xo200256X Printed in the United Kingdom

COMMUNISTS AND THE NATIONAL

QUESTION IN SCOTLAND AND
ICELAND, c. 1930 TO c. 1940*
RAGNHEIDUR KRISTJANSDOTTIR
Universityof Iceland

ABSTRACT. In the period between i935 and I939, the internationalcommunistmovementurged

communistparties to strike a morenationalisticnote in theirpropaganda.In Scotlandthis was met by
what may seem as a surprising reluctance to move away from strict communist adherence to
internationalism,and towardsa morenationalisticapproachto Scottishpolitics. This article aims at
understandinghow the interplaybetweenthe internationaland nationalpolitical contextsresultedin
this reluctance. It considers, in particular, the extent to which the national identity of Scottish
communists influencedtheir approach to the national question. It places the ideas of Scottish
communistsin the contextof Marxist-Leninist doctrine,and considershow thesewere adaptedinto the
nationalpolitical context.As afurther aid in determiningwhichfactors were at work when Scottish
communiststackled the national question,the attitude of Scottish communistsis comparedwith that
of theirfellow communistsin Iceland. By broadeningtheperspectivein this way, it is argued, we can
makesense of theparadox that it was indeedinternationalcommunismthat eventuallyturnedScottish
communistsinto nationalists.

I
Ever since Marx and Engels declared in their Manifestothat the development
of capitalism would strip the proletarian 'of every trace of national character',1
the nature of the relationship between the worker and the nation has been one
of the main problems both of working-classpolitics and working-classhistory.
Why did the prediction of Marx and Engels not come true? Why was the
development of an international revolutionary working-class consciousness
constantly delayed? Why did the nationalist flag continue to appeal to the
workers and how could and should Marxists respond?2
* I am
grateful for the comments and assistance of Eugenio F. Biagini, Gu6mundur
Halfdanarson, Guomundur J6nsson, Skili Sigurdsson, and J6n Olafsson. Furthermore, I would
like to thank the anonymous readers of thisjournal, the organizers and audience of the Graduate
Seminar in British History at Cambridge (spring 2001), and the Icelandic Research Council.
1 R.
Tucker, ed., The Marx-Engelsreader(New York and London, 1978 edn), p. 482.
2
For an overview of the debate between Marxist politicians and theoristssee e.g. H. B. Davis,
Towarda Marxist theoryof nationalism(New York and London, 1978); E. Nimni, Marxismand
nationalism:theoreticaloriginsof a political crisis (London and Concord, MA, I99I), as well as
T. Nairn's Thebreak-up of Britain: crisisandneo-nationalism
(London, 198I). A good overview of the
problem within working-class historiography is to be found in I. Katznelson, 'Working-class
formation: constructing cases and comparisons', in I. Katznelson and A. R. Zolberg, eds.,
601

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602 RAGNHEIDUR KRISTJANSDOTTIR
An interesting example of the way in which workers tackled the national
problem is to be found in the history of British working-class politics. During
the period between 1935 and 1939, the international communist movement
reconsidered its position towards nationalism and nationalist movements. One
effect of this re-evaluation was that Scottish communists decided to celebrate
May Day 1938 with patriotic pride, allegedly dressed in kilts.3 On that day
communists staged a march carrying banners depicting not only Bruce,
Wallace and Burns, Robert Owen and Keir Hardie, Lenin, Stalin, and Marx,
but also - to quote the unsympathetic commentator of the Scottish socialist
paper Forward- such 'well known members of the proletariat' as Walter Scott,
Robert Louis Stevenson, and Adam Smith.4 This patriotic pride was indicative
of a change in the party's attitude towards the Scots as a nation. It provides a
stark contrast with the words of the Scottish communist Robert McLennan,
who wrote in 1932 that any attempt at harnessing Scottish national sentiments
was fascist and reactionary, bound to reduce British working-class solidarity
and halt the advance of the revolution.5
What we have here, then, are two conflicting ways of looking at Scottish
national identity. On the one hand we find an attempt to combine communist
rhetoric and ideology with Scottish national sentiment and Scottish cultural, if
not political, traditions; a somewhat belated response to Dimitrov's call for a
Popular Front against fascism. On the other hand we find a complete rejection
of any such attempts on the grounds that harnessing Scottish nationalist
aspirations would diminish British, as well as international, working-class
solidarity. As we shall see, this latter stance, i.e. the emphasis on inter-
nationalism and rejection of Scottish nationalism, was more typical of Scottish
communists between the wars, and it appears that it was with considerable
reluctance that they opened up their movement to nationalist ideas and tactics.
In order to understand this reluctance, we need to consider the context in
which Scottish communists, and their party, the Communist Party of Great
Britain (CPGB), developed their anti-nationalist outlook, and the context in
which this outlook was re-evaluated. We need, in other words, to find a way to
understand the interplay between the national political context and the
international communist movement that resulted in what may seem as a
surprising reluctance to move away from strict communist adherence to
internationalism towards a more nationalistic approach to Scottish politics.

centurypatternsin westernEuropeand the UnitedStates (Princeton,

formation. nineteenth
Working-class
I986), pp. 3-41.
3 According to Christopher Harvie they 'paraded in tartan'. See his No gods andprecious
few
heroes:Scotlandsince 19i4 (Edinburgh, I993 edn), p. ioi. The Gallacher Memorial Library at
Glasgow Caledonian University Library (GML) holds a picture of the pageant, in which there is
no sign of tartan. The pageant was, however, staged throughout Scotland in 1938, and the picture
need not be from Glasgow.
4 Forward,7 May I938; Programme of thepageantof Scottishhistory(Glasgow, 1938).
5 R. Review,4 (1932), pp. 505- 0.
McLennan, 'The national question and Scotland', Communist

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 COMMUNISTS AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION 603
In the past few years, observers of British communism have written
Communist party history more in tune with what Perry Anderson called for in
1985 when he commented that 'no history of a communist party is finally
intelligible unless it is constantly related to the national balance of forces of
which the party is only one moment, and which forms the context in which it
must operate'.6 Thus, interest in 'the vagaries of the party line' and the party's
Soviet connections has been replaced by an increased interest in more nuanced
questions concerning the political, cultural, and social aspects of the history of
British communism.7 The outcome has been a story of a party whose leaders
'rarely questioned Moscow's general authority', but at the same time a party
that was deeply rooted in its native labour movement, and in many respects
insular rather than international in outlook.8 It appears, then, that the CPGB
did to some extent adapt to the national political context, but the question to
be asked here is whether this applied to the party's approach to Scottish
nationalism.
This particular aspect of the CPGB's history has not been explored before.
The legendaryJohn Maclean and his plans for a Scottish Socialist Republic -
which ran contrary to the position of the CPGB - have received considerable
attention during the last few decades. There has been, however, much less
interest in the disposition of the communists.9The party's opposition to colonial
rule has been accounted for in various works on British communism,10but
its attitude towards Celtic separatist movements has hardly been mentioned."1
The party's decision to support the idea of self-government for Scotland is
noted in a number of studies but never explored in detail.

6
P. Anderson, 'Communist party history', in R. Samuel, ed., People'shistoryandsocialisttheory
(London, 1981), p. 148.
7 K. Morgan, 'Introduction', in G. Andrews, N. Fishman, and K. Morgan, eds., Openingthe
books:essayson thesocialandculturalhistoryof Britishcommunism (London, I995), pp. 2-3.
8 K. Morgan, 'Harry Pollitt, the British Communist party and international communism', in
T. Saarela and K. Rentola, eds., Communism: nationalandinternational (Helsinki, i998), pp. 41-59.
For a recent review essay on writings on the CPGB's history see J. McIlroy, 'The British
Communist party: from World War to Cold War', LabourHistoryReview,63 (1998), pp. 357-63.
9 As Ripley and McHugh have explained, the great interest in Maclean can be traced to the
interest in the Red Clydeside, as well as to the increased impetus of political nationalism in
Scotland in the past decades. Maclean has been a source of inspiration for socialists seeking a
Marxist approach to Scottish nationalism. See B.J. Ripley and J. McHugh, John Maclean
(Manchester, I989), p. i. By the same token, we might explain the lack of interest in the CPGB
position by the fact that their position is not an ideal source for such an inspiration.
10 See N. Branson, Historyof the Communist Party of GreatBritain,1927-i941 (London, 1985),
pp. 58-60, I39;J. Callaghan, 'Communists and the colonies: anti-imperialismbetween the wars',
in Andrews, Fishman, and Morgan, eds., Opening,pp. 4-22.
11 But see W.Thompson, Thegoodoldcause:Britishcommunism, I92--1g99 (London, 1992), P. i68.
Thompson claims that the CPGB had, on the basis of the Leninist principle of self-determination,
' always favoured self-determinationfor Scotland and Wales, not excluding the right to separation,
while making it clear that it would argue against the exercise of that right, on grounds of economic
integration and labour movement solidarity'. As we shall see, this was the position of the party after
the adoption of the Popular Front. Until then, the party had rejected self-determination.

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604 RAGNHEIDUR KRISTJANSDOTTIR
The very few referencesto the party's position towards Scottish nationalism
are primarily to be found within the large corpus of works concerned with
Scottish nationalism.12None of these, however, offer a detailed considerationof
how Scottish nationalism affected the way in which communists interpreted
the communist ideology. The question is complex and takes in the ongoing
debate about the nature of Scottish nationalism, national sentiment, and
national identity, but for the present purposesit will be useful to keep in mind
some of the specifics of Scottish nationalism as these have been formulated in
recent studies. This includes, for example, 'the significance of Scotland's
missing nationalism', 'the dual identity of Scottishness and Britishness',13as
well as the 'entente between emotive nationalism and effective unionism'
which - in the words of Christopher Harvie - 'gelded' the development of
political nationalism.14
No conclusions, however, about the effects of the domestic political context
or the nature of Scottish nationalism can be drawn without an evaluation of the
Comintern's stand on nationalism, and a consideration of how its position
could be implemented. This complicates the issue since lack of historical
research makes it difficult to ascertain the typical reaction to nationalism by
non-ruling European communist parties. The nationalism of ruling communist
parties has been relatively well accounted for,15and recent events in Eastern
Europe have revived interest in the history of nationalism in the area, before,
during, and after communism.16 Meanwhile, communist policy towards
nationalism in the capitalist West has not received sufficient attention.17
To get a clearer view of how Scottish communists could have interpreted the
Comintern line, the following analysis includes a comparison with another
case. This is the approach of Icelandic communists to the national question. It
is true that the cases are in some respectsdifferent. While Scottish communists
12 The most extensive account is in M. Keating and D. Bleiman, LabourandScottishnationalism
(London and Basingstoke, 1979), pp. 120-5. See also: J. Brand, The nationalmovement in Scotland
(London, 1978), p. 229; Harvie, Gods,pp. lo0-2; and W. Knox, 'Introduction: a social and
political analysis of Scottish labour leadership between two world wars', in W. Knox, ed., Scottish
labourleaders,19i8-i939: a biographical dictionary(Edinburgh, I984), p. 45.
13 G. Morton, 'What if? The significance of Scotland's missing nationalism in the nineteenth
century', in D. Broun, R. J. Finlay, and M. Lynch, eds., Imageandidentity:themakingandre-making
of Scotlandthroughtheages (Edinburgh, I998), pp. 157-76, esp. p. I62.
14 C. Harvie, Scotland andnationalism:Scottishsocietyandpolitics1707 tothepresent(London and New
York, I998 edn), p. 22.
15 R. Pipes, Theformationof theSovietUnion: communism andnationalism,Igi7-i923 (Cambridge,
MA, 1954); W. Connor, Thenationalquestion theoryandstrategy(Princeton, 1984);
in Marxist-Leninist
R. Conquest, ed., The last empire:nationalityandtheSovietfuture(Stanford, I986).
16 See e.g. B. Fowkes, Thedisintegration of theSovietUnion:a studyin theriseandtriumphof nationalism
(Basingstoke, I997); G. Hosking and R. Service, eds., Russian nationalismpast and present
(Basingstoke, 1997).
17 For two of
very few exceptions see A. Guiso, 'Tra regionismo e nazione: la questione del
separatismo nella politica del PCI in Sicilia, I943-1947', Richerchedi storiapolitica, 2 (1999),
pp. 3-26, and M. Lazar, 'The French Communist party between nation and internationalism',
in Saarela and Rentola, eds., Communism, pp. 41-59. Neither study includes an analysis of the
Comintern position on Sicilian separatism and French nationalism respectively.

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 COMMUNISTS AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION 605
were organized in a marginal party operating within the highly industrialized
and multi-ethnic British state, the Icelandic party was relatively strong, acting
within a newly independent and in many respects economically under-
developed nation-state.18But both Scottish and Icelandic communists tackled
the same problem. How should they implement the Comintern's line on
nationalism? At the outset Scottish and Icelandic communists found different
answers to this question. Unlike their Scottish counterparts, Icelandic
communists decided that in Iceland Comintern's position permitted them to
forge a link between nationalist and internationalist arguments.
The difference between the Scottish and Icelandic cases - both as regards
the national context and the different approaches to the national
question- raises the following questions: Does the difference between the
Scottish and the Icelandic cases indicate that the Comintern line could be
interpreted in different ways according to the circumstancesin each country?
And if this is the case, were these different circumstances that allowed for
different interpretations carefully described by the Comintern, or could
individual parties interpret it so as best to fit local circumstances?Did they, in
other words, have a relatively free playing field when approaching the national
question? Comparing the Icelandic and Scottish cases thus opens up further
possibilities for determining which factors were at work when Scottish
communists tackled the national question.

II
Internationalism has for long been an integral part of the ideology of
revolutionary political movements. The Marxist tradition inherited this strand
from the French Jacobins who attempted to export their revolution to 'free'
their neighbours from oppression.19While Marx and Engels did perhaps not
call for the elimination of national differences,they maintained that the spread
of capitalism and the alienation of the working class would give rise to universal
class structures, transcending and eroding local and ethnic particulars.
Marxist theory opposes nationalism as a political force on these grounds,
claiming that it constructsbarriersthat obstruct the development of a universal
class-consciousness.According to most nationalist dogma, nationalism goes
beyond class interests, unifying people from all walks of life in one
community - the nation. It implies that the duty of the nation's members 'to
the polity which encompasses and representsthe ... nation overrides all other
18 For an overview of the
development of the communist movement in Iceland seeJ. Olafsson,
Kowrufelagar: Islenskirsds'alistarog Sovetrzkin,1920-I960 (Reykjavik, i999) and PI. Whitehead,
d Islandi, 1921r-934 (Reykjavik, i979). For the economic development of
Kommuinistahreyfingin
Iceland in the period see G. J6nsson, Hagvdxturog iOnvo6ing:Proun landsframlei6slu a Islandi,
I870-I945 (Reykjavik, 1999). For a general overview of Icelandic history see: G. Karlsson, Iceland's
11ooyears: thehistoryof a marginalsociety(Reykjavik, 2001).
19 See e.g. I. Hont, 'The permanent crisis of a divided mankind:
"contemporary crisis of the
nation state" in historical perspective', Political Studies, 42 (i994), p. 223.

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606 RAGNHEIDUR KRISTJANSDOTTIR

public obligations'.20 The nationalist argument is thus 'predicated on the

assumption that the most fundamental divisions of humankind are the many
vertical cleavages that divide people into ethnonational groups', writes Walker
Connor, while Marxism 'rests upon the conviction that the most fundamental
human divisions are horizontal class distinctions that cut across national
groupings'.21
In practice, however, Marxism did from the outset take account of the
revolutionary potential of nationalist struggles. Marx and Engels described the
nation as an ephemeral historical phenomenon, particular to the capitalist
stage of history. Thus a particular nationalist movement could be 'progressive'
or 'reactionary', all depending on the stage of social and economic de-
velopment of the respective population group. As Terry Eagleton has
explained, nationalism is, according to the Marxist view, a stage through
which it is necessary to go in order to reach the classless and nationless society
on the 'other side'.22 Thus nationalist movements may be progressive at a
feudal or semi-feudal stage, but reactionary in developed capitalist societies.
For this reason traditional Marxism favours support of' progressive' nationalist
movements, while communists should themselves in all cases remain unaffected
by nationalism.23
It was Lenin who defined the Bolshevik and Comintern position towards
nationalism.24 His theses on the 'national and colonial question' were adopted
at the second congress in I920. The general point of departure was a Marxist
opposition to nationalism as an ideology that created a false sense of equality.
Communists were to inform the proletariat of this bourgeois deception and at
the same time to stress that imperialist competition ruled out the possibility of
national freedom under capitalism. A genuine equality of nations was only
possible under the Soviet system as was evident by the living example. The

20 sinceI78o: programme,
E. J. Hobsbawm, Nationsandnationalism myth,reality(Cambridge, I992
21 Connor, National,
edn), p. 9. p. 5.
22 T.
Eagleton, 'Nationalism: irony and commitment', in S. Deane, ed., Nationalism,colonialism
andliterature(Minneapolis, I990), pp. 23-39.
23 This is a
simplified description of Marx's and Engels's views. For a compilation of their
writings on nationalist movements and colonialism, see K. Marx and F. Engels, Colonialism
(London, 1960). For an analysis of their views see R. Szporluk, Communism andnationalism:Karl
Marx versusFriedrichList (Oxford, 1988). For a more appreciative account see E. Benner, Really
existingnationalisms:a post-communist viewfromMarxandEngels(Oxford, 1995).
24 Stalin's influence in developing this theory seems to have been secondary to Lenin's. Stalin
wrote a thesis on the national and colonial question in 19I3 (J. Stalin, 'Marxism and the national
question', inJ. Stalin, Works(I3 vols., Moscow, 1952-5), II, pp. 300o--8), possibly commissioned
by Lenin, and was appointed commissar for nationality affairs in the first Soviet government.
Stalin's ideas, however, have been seen as theoretically inferior to Lenin's and it was Lenin who
drafted and presented the Comintern thesis on the national and colonial question adopted at the
second congress of the Comintern. See respectively: E. Nimni, Marxismandnationalism:theoretical
originsof a politicalcrisis (London and Condord, MA, I991), pp. 90--; J. Degras, The communist
1919-1943: documents
international, (3 vols., London, 1956-65), I, p. I38. For an analysis of Stalin's
view see M. Matossian, 'Two Marxist approaches to nationalism', SlavicandEast European Review,
6 ( I957), PP. 489-500-

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 COMMUNISTS AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION 607
Comintern encouraged communists, however, to make exceptions to this
general rule of opposing nationalism, given the right conditions. The national
question was to be approached by precisely analysing the circumstances in
each country. In accordance with Lenin's notion of the importance of colonial
struggles, communists were to support national liberation movements in
oppressed and dependent countries as well as in backward (i.e. 'feudal' or
'semi-feudal') countries or countries that had not completed their 'bourgeois
revolution5.25
III
The CPGB supported national liberation movements in the colonies on the
traditional Comintern grounds, and emphasized, in particular, linking up with
and promoting colonial liberation movements in the British Empire.26But in
the United Kingdom communists viewed nationalism as a progressiveforce in
Ireland only. Marx and Engels had been in favour of Irish liberation on the
grounds that Ireland was still a 'semi-feudal' or 'backward' country.27And in
accordance with Comintern directives,28the party supported the republican
cause on the grounds that the Irish people and the Irish economy were
oppressed by British imperialism, both in Northern Ireland and in the Irish
Free State.29 Furthermore, it seems that, apart from any Marxist-Leninist
theory on the issue, supporting the republican cause was a practical necessity
for communists. For while the communist movement was very weak in
Ireland30- as was indeed the labour movement in general - communists had
considerable influence within the republican movement.31
25
Degras, International,I, pp. I 39-40. The sixth Comintern congress in 1928 discussed nationalist
struggles in colonial and semi-colonial countries and adopted theses 'on the revolutionary
movement in Colonial and Semi-Colonial Countries'. These endorsed the theses introduced by
Lenin at the second congress, but included a more detailed analysis of the revolutionary situation
in countries such as China and India. See Degras, International, II, pp. 526-48.
26 R. P. Arnot, Twentyyears:thepolicyof theCommunist Partyof GreatBritainfromitsfoundationJuly
3Ist, 1920 (London, 1940), pp. 58-9. For a contemporary view see 'Indian Comrade', 'The anti-
imperialist struggle in Britain', Communist Review,6 (I934), pp. I13-16, and G. Safarov, 'The
theory of the national and colonial revolution', Communist Review, 4 (1932), pp. 279-9I, esp.
pp. 288-91. Cf. Callaghan, 'Communists'.
27
Connor, National, pp. 13, 15-I7, 19, and passim.
28
Degras, International, i, pp. 139, 142; n, pp. 28, 171, 265; II, p. 229.
29
See statement of the Secretariat of the Revolutionary Workers's Groups of Ireland in
'Ireland's fight against British imperialist aggression', CommunistReview,4 (1 932), pp. 387-90. See
also 'I.R.A.', 'Ireland: the writing on the wall', Discussion,3 (1938), pp. 22-3, and E. Rickwood,
'Stalin on the national question', Left Review,2 (1936), pp. 746-8.
30 At a Central Committee (CC) meeting of the CPGB in I938 it was suggested that the
Communist party in Ireland be liquidated. Thus it had been correctly observed that the
communist movement in Ireland was so weak that the chances of achieving any influence through
a separate organization were next to none. Minutes of CC meeting 1-2 July 1938. Manchester,
National Museum of Labour History (NMLH), CPBG C.I. No. 8 (Microfilm).
31 M. Milotte, Communism in modernIreland:thepursuitof theworkers'republicsinceI916 (Dublin,
1985), p. 5 and passim. For relations between Irish nationalists (esp. James Conolly) and
communists in Scotland see W. Gallacher, The rollingof the thunder(London, 1966), pp. 53-5;
W. Gallacher, The last memoirsof WilliamGallacher(London, 1966), pp. 17I-2.

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608 RAGNHEIDUR KRISTJANSDOTTIR
In Scotland the situation was different. Since the founding of the CPGB in
1920, communists (including Lenin) had stressed the importance of a unified
communist movement in Britain,32 as well as pan-British trade unions.33
Furthermore, the party had from the outset been hostile towards Scottish
nationalism,34even though it does not seem to have clearly stated its position
towards the nationalist movement in Scotland before the early I930s.
It was not until the Communist Reviewpublished three articles on the issue in
1932 and 1933 that we have evidence of communist interest in nationalism.
Two of these, written by the Scottish communists Robert McLennan and
William Gallacher, set to warn against the danger of the increasing 'Fascist
demagogy of the Scottish Nationalists'.35This is interesting, considering the
fact that nationalism was hardly a potent force in Scotland at this time.
Political nationalism was, it is true, appearing on the political arena for the first
time with the founding of a handful of nationalist organizations in the I92os,
and subsequently the Scottish National party in I934. Their emergence,
however, does not reflect a great upsurge of nationalist sentiment, for these
parties were marginal, at least if judged by their electoral performance. Some
scholarshave even seen their emergence at this time as an indication of reduced
interest in political nationalism as the Labour party and the declining Liberal
party had lost their interest in Home Rule.36Furthermore, the fact that there
had from the late nineteenth century been a strong link between Scottish
nationalism and radicalism makes the communist claim that the movement
was 'fascist' and 'reactionary' sound somewhat unconvincing. It might
therefore be argued that this concern with the upsurge of fascist nationalism
was rather an echo of the Comintern's analysis of the general trend in Europe
than a statement based on an objective study of the development of nationalism
in Scotland.37
The third Communist Reviewarticle on Scottish nationalism was, however,
more in tune with Scottish circumstances, and presented an inclination
32 H.
Pelling, TheBritishCommunist (London, 1958), pp. 6-12; according
party:a historicalprofile
to the Scottish communist leader and later communist MP William Gallacher, Lenin commissioned
him to leave the second Comintern congress in 1920 to prevent the formation of a separate
Communist party in Scotland. Gallacher, Rolling,pp.I6--25.
33
Keating and Bleiman, Labour,p. 98.
34 See for
example the following paragraph of the document on the national question in
Scotland, presented at the Political Bureau (PB) meeting in Jan. 1938: 'The attitude of the Party
in the past to this question of Scottish Nationalism was a denial that Scotland was a Nation, a
denial of there being any Nationalist Question, and the dismissalof the argument by assertingthat
the whole National Agitation was an artificiallyfostered thing designed simply to providejobs for
certain middle class people.' See: 'Scottish nationalism', Appendix to minutes of PB meeting
28 Jan. 1938, NMLH, CPGB C.I. Nos. I7-22 (Microfilm). See also H. McShane and J. Smith,
HarryMcShane:no mean fighter (London, 1978), pp. 224-6, and CPGB, Scottish DP, 'Notes on
the national question in Scotland', Oct. 1948, GML, CP collection [uncatologued].
35 W. CommunistReview, 4 The
Gallacher, 'The Dumbarton by-election', (I932), pp. 231-2.
36
other was McLennan's article, 'National'. E.g. Keating and Bleiman, Labour,p. 117.
37 For an overview of the
development of the link between Scottish radicalism and nationalism
see Keating and Bleiman, Labour,pp.27--31.

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 COMMUNISTS AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION 609
towards accepting nationalistic arguments. It was written by Helen Crawfurd,
apparently in response to the previously mentioned article by McLennan. It is
interesting to compare the views of these two party members, for even though
they do not explicitly referto the Comintern theses on the national and colonial
question, they representconflicting views as to the way in which the communist
doctrine could be interpreted.
McLennan's article was, as noted above, written to warn against the danger
of the 'Fascist methods of Scottish nationalists'. By maintaining that Scotland
was not receiving its fair share from the union and by claiming that people of
all political opinions should unite around the demand for an independent
Scottish parliament he feared that the nationalists might attract some working-
class support. This potential danger called for a consideration of whether
communists could support the nationalist cause. McLennan claimed that the
following factors had to be determined: first, whether Scotland had a distinct
economy and a bourgeois democratic movement, both of which were being
hindered and suppressed by another nation; second, whether it met the
nationalist requirement of having a definite national culture; and third,
whether the Scots had their own separate language.38
As to whether Scotland had a separate and oppressed economy, McLennan
refuted the nationalist claim that Scotland was not receiving its fair share of the
British economy. While it might be true, he said, that Scotland was
disproportionately affected by the Great Depression, this was due to the fact
that Scotland, more than other parts of Britain, depended on heavy industry,
and that this sector of the economy was experiencing severe difficulties
throughout the kingdom. Furthermore,he claimed that the language criterion
did hardly apply to Scotland; despite artificial attempts to stimulate the use of
the Gaelic language, it was for all practical purposes dead. He did not,
however, deny the fact that there was a separate and valuable national culture
in Scotland, but dismissed that as irrelevant to the national question as this
culture would be under constant threat until 'capitalism and its decadent jazz
culture' had been swept away. So, according to McLennan, there was no
national question in Scotland, and all attempts to create a nationalist
movement were 'reactionary'.39
Helen Crawfurd'sarticle was published in the Communist Reviewin February
I933. It questioned the claim, central to McLennan's argument, that Scotland
was not an oppressed nation, and contended that Scotland's economic
problems could to some extent be blamed on disadvantages resulting from the
union with England. This had become apparent during the current period of
38
This set of questions seems to be grounded on an amalgamation of the traditional
Marxist-Leninist criterion for which nationalist movements should be supported and Stalin's
definition of a nation, which is often referredto in the CPGB literature on the national and colonial
question. Stalin's definition goes as follows: 'A nation is a historically constituted, stable
community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, economic life, and psychological
makeup, manifested in a common culture.' Stalin, 'Marxism', p. 307.
39 McLennan, 'National'.

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6Io RAGNHEIDUR KRISTJANSDOTTIR

'capitalist decline'. The English industrialists, 'by their overwhelming

preponderance at Westminster', had taken advantage of their favourable
position, and placed 'Scottish industry' and the Scottish people in general in a
'less advantageous position'. Supporting her argument with a wide range of
figures and examples, Crawfurd explained that English industries enjoyed far
more government subsidies than industries north of the border. At the same
time, Scotland did not receive its fair share of the revenue for social services.
The rate of unemployment was higher in Scotland than in England, yet its
proportion of the amount allocated for relief of unemployment did not take
account of that fact. Similarly, claimed Crawfurd, public grants to libraries,
universities, and hospitals were proportionally lower in Scotland than in
England and Wales. These facts explained the increasing impetus of the
nationalist movement in Scotland. Thus even though some elements within the
nationalist movement could be viewed as having fascist tendencies, it would be
wrong to dismiss it as being altogether reactionary. It was important for
communists to analyse carefully its economic content and cause. She hoped
that the discussion on the nationalist movement would be extended, and that
as soon as possible the position of the party would be made clear.40
Crawfurd then concluded her article by pointing out that in his State and
RevolutionLenin had mentioned that Engels had recognized that the national
question had not been fully overcome in England (viz. the United Kingdom),
and therefore that the establishment of a Federal Republic of the four nations
of the Kingdom would be a 'progressive' step.41 While she did not explicitly
suggest that the party should lend support to the idea of Home Rule for
Scotland, it should be clear from the context that this was what she hoped for.
By claiming that Scotland was oppressed by England, and that the advantages
of a federalist system in the United Kingdom had been pointed out by Lenin
himself, she was providing what she saw as the theoretical equipment needed
to justify such a position.
The party did not accept Crawfurd's argument. The editor's note at the
head of her article is revealing. It stated that it had been printed despite its
inadequacy in analysing the 'class forces' in Scotland. The national question
was addressed in the next issue of the CommunistReview, where there was a brief
discussion of whether or not communists should try to counteract increased
support for Scottish nationalists by paying attention to the economic problems
of the crofters.42 Furthermore, it was noted that the party had underestimated

40 H. Crawfurd, 'The Scottish national movement', Communist Review,5 (I933), PP. 84-7.
41 Lenin's statement is to be found in a chapter in which he aims at stressingthe importance of
centralism. He argues that Engels, like Marx, had regarded the federal republic as an obstacle to
development, except in particular cases, such as in that of England. See V. I. Lenin, Thestateand
revolution,trans. Robert Service (London, 1992), pp. 64--5. While Lenin did not admit to any
disagreement with Engels, this view can hardly be taken as representing his position. The
Comintern line, which was originally laid out by Lenin, was to support the independence of
Ireland only. For references to the Comintern stance on Ireland, see n. 28 above.
42 'Scottish nationalism: a letter and
reply', Communist Review,5 (1933), p. 299.

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 COMMUNISTS AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION bII

the 'fascist' tendencies reflected in increasing intoleration for Irish workers,43

but no attempt was made at responding to Crawfurd'sargument. The party's
stance remained unaltered; in Scotland there were no grounds for making an
exception to the general rule of opposing nationalist movements.

IV
Icelandic communists chose a different approach to the national question. In
its early years, the Icelandic communist movement declared its opposition
towards some of the main elements of the nationalist myth. They stated that
they would aim at exposing the ' nationalist clamour' of the bourgeoisparties,44
and we have some examples of such attempts. In 1930, for example, they
actively opposed the celebration of the thousand years anniversary of the
medieval assembly Althingi. While the bulk of the nation celebrated the
grandeur of what the British visitor Lord Newton called 'the grandmother of
parliaments', communists denounced it as having constituted one of the most
dangerous forms of aristocratic rule known in the history of mankind.45
But while Icelandic communists rejected elements of the 'bourgeois national
identity', they were never hostile towards Icelandic nationalism in general. On
the contrary they did from the outset try to link communist and nationalist
arguments. A general effort of this sort is manifest in the style and language of
the party literature, for example in frequent references to the deeds of those
Icelanders that had fought against foreign dominance and disturbance. In a
pamphlet issued by a small provincial branch of the party in 1933 it was thus
stated that communists were assured that the 'labouring masses' of this
province were still as eager fighters for freedom as their peasant ancestors that
had successfully driven away 'usurious English merchants' some centuries
ago.46More specifically, however, Icelandic communistsforged a link between
communist and nationalist arguments by claiming that Iceland had a
nationalist cause worthy of communist support. And they supported their
claim with an argument that Scottish communists had rejected, namely that
Iceland was a victim of English, or rather British, capitalism.
Until the end of the First World War, the main - if not only- subject of
Icelandic politics was its relations with Denmark. Even after Iceland became
a sovereign state in I918 and after the emergence of class politics with the
founding of the Social Democratic Labour party in 1916, nationalistic
arguments of one kind or another dominated Iceland's political discourse.
43 P. Montgomery, 'The problem of the Irish in Scotland', CommunistReview, 5 (1933),
pp. 296-8.
44
See Hva6 vill Komministaflokkur
Islands?(Reykjavik, 193I), p. 50; 'Dj6draXkni',RauoiFdninn,
I (1924), p. 4.
45 E. Olgeirsson, 'Hvers er a6 minnast?', Rettur,15 (1930), p. 125. See also R. Kristjansd6ttir,
'1930 - r fagna6ar? Um afsto6u kommunista til Alpingishati6arinnar', in Kvennasldoir:rit til
heibursSigrfii Th. Erlendsddttur (Reykjavik, 2001), pp. 430-40.
sagnfraeoingi
46
Kotungur, I (I933), p. I .

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6I2 RAGNHEIDUR KRISTJANSDOTTIR

From the mid-nineteenth century, fighting for autonomy of the Icelandic

polity had been 'considered a sacred duty',47 and so it remained until the final
step in Iceland's 'peaceful secession' from Denmark48 was taken with the
founding of the Republic of Iceland in I944. Indeed, such is the potency of
Icelandic nationalism that it has to the present day been the most important
point of reference in Icelandic politics.49 Therefore it is not, perhaps, surprising
that the pair of young Icelandic communists that attended the second
Comintern congress in 1920 felt convinced that Lenin's theses on the national
and colonial question furnished an amalgamation of nationalist and in-
ternationalist arguments.50
Given the political circumstances in Iceland it is understandable that they
were inclined to interpret Lenin's theses in this way, even though it is not
evident how that could have been done. As the Executive Committee of the
Comintern pointed out in 193I, presumably perplexed by the political
programme of the Icelandic party, Iceland was not a Danish colony. It had
been a sovereign state since I918, even though the Danish king remained its
head of state until I944. Thus, when Iceland's constitutional status was
considered, it was difficult to maintain that Iceland was under Danish
oppression. Nor was Iceland, according to communist analysis, a 'backward'
nation. It was, again according to the Comintern executive, a capitalist
country, albeit a small one.51
But Iceland's constitutional status and the nation's state of development
were not the decisive factors when considering how to approach the national
and colonial question in Iceland. To Icelandic communists, like their Scottish
counterparts such as McLennan and Crawfurd, and indeed communist
commentators on Ireland, the key question was whether or not their nation was
economically oppressed by another nation. In the first political programme of
the Communist party of Iceland, published just after its foundation in I930,
this view is clearly stated. According to the programme, Iceland was at the
highest stage of capitalist development. This stage was characterized by the
preponderance of finance capital, and at the moment it was British financial
capital that was by far the most influential in Iceland. This meant that the
nation's status was similar to that of any other colony or semi-colony.52 And the
fact that Iceland was most dependent on British capital, a prominent party
47 G. Halfdanarson, 'Social distinctions and national unity: on politics of nationalism in
Ideas,2I (I995), p. 766.
nineteenth-century Iceland', Historyof European
48 See G. Halfdanarson, 'Iceland: a peaceful secession', ScandinavianJournalof History,25
(2000), pp. 87-I00.
49 See e.g. G. Halfdanarson, Islenskapjoriki5 - uppruniog endimdrk (Reykjavik, 200 I), p. 216.
50 This was the case according to the memoirs of a third communist, Einar Olgeirsson. See Einar
Olgeirsson and J6n Gudnason, Islandi skuggaheimsvaldastefnunnar (Reykjavik, i980), p. 24.
51 Executive Committee of the Comintern International to the Communist party of Iceland,
3 Mar. 1931, Moscow, RossijskijTsentr Kharenija I Izutsjenija Dokumentov Novejshej Istorii
(Russian Centre for the Preservation and Study of Records of Modern History), Comintern
Archive, 495-I8-897, 14-23. The same view is to be found in the party's first political programme:
Hvaa vill, p. 2. 52 Ibid., pp. 2-13.

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 COMMUNISTS AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION 613
member explained to the Comintern executive in 1932, meant that communists
could not state that the Danes were the nation's primary enemy. It was much
more important for the Icelandic people to turn their attention towards their
main source of exploitation, British imperialism.53

V
It is interesting that for both Scottish and Icelandic communists the key
question when determining their approach to the national question was
whether or not their nation was economically exploited. Moreover, it is
interesting that in both cases English capitalistswere the alleged exploiters.But
why did the Scots and the Icelanders find different answers to this same
question?
It is safe to rule out the possibility that this was due to the fact that the
respective answers were simply a reflection of reality. Even though Iceland's
somewhat backward economy was indeed very much dependent on British
capital and trade relations,54Scotland's dependence on England must, by all
standards, have been far greater. And the fact that, following the Great
Depression, Scotland's economic and social conditions had declined in relation
to the rest of Britain55further suggests that it was not the economic conditions
per se that defined the way Icelandic and Scottish communists chose to answer
the 'national and colonial question'.
In both cases pragmatism seems to have been a decisive factor when
communists decided whether or not to forge a link between the nationalist and
internationalist ideology. The social and political circumstances in Scotland
suggested that playing the nationalist card would not be effective. As the
socialistJohn Maclean - inspired by Conolly's approach to Irish politics - had
experienced in his unsuccessful crusade for a Scottish Socialist Republic,
nationalism was not a potent force in Scotland.56
Unlike Icelandic communists, who had been interested in the national
question from the outset, their Scottish comrades only became interested in
Scottish nationalism in 1932 and 1933. They showed concern with the upsurge
of fascist nationalism in Scotland at the same time as the international
movement became concerned with the rise of fascism on the European
continent. As I have already suggested, this is hardly an indication of a general
53 Arn6r Hannibalsson, Moskvulinan:Komministaflokkur Islandsog Komintern.
HallddrLaxnessog
Sovetr'kin (Reykjavik, I999), p. 89.
54 This increased and after the First World War. See: S6lrdn B.
dependency during Jensd6ttir,
Anglo-Icelandic relationsduringtheFirst WorldWar (New York, 1986). For figures on increased trade
between Iceland and Britain see Tolfrraoihandbdk: statisticalabstractof Iceland(Reykjavik, I984),
p. I24, and Alit og tilligurskipulagsnefndar
atvinnumdla(Reykjavik, I936), pp. 48-55.
55 For descriptions and comments on this relative decline see
e.g.: T. C. Smout, A centuryof the
Scottishpeople,i83o-i950 (London, 1986), pp. I 14- 8, and E. F. Biagini, 'Review article: Britannic
social histories- continuity and change', Continuityandchange,I2 (I997), pp. 297-9.
56 For the ideas
ofJohn Maclean, see D. Howell, A lostleft: threestudiesin socialismandnationalism
(Manchester, 1986), Ripley and McHugh, Maclean.

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614 RAGNHEIDUR KRISTJANSDOTTIR
enthusiasm to adapt the communist rhetoric to the national political context,
for neither does there seem to have been a great upsurge of nationalism in
Scotland at this time, nor does the nationalist movement seem to have had
fascist tendencies.
This seems to indicate that Scottish communists were both pragmatic and
dogmatic in the sense of strictly adhering to communist rhetoric. But the way
in which Scottish communists responded to Moscow's call for a Popular Front
against fascism suggests that their anti-nationalism was neither purely
pragmatic nor entirely dogmatic. For if that were the case, how could we
explain the fact that Scottish communists were clearly reluctant to adopt the
'nationalist' agenda called for by the international movement on the one hand,
and the party centre in London on the other. In other words: if they were
merely pragmatic and dependent on communist rhetoric, why would they not
change their stance if that was what both the party centre and Moscow thought
appropriate?
The Popular Front provided the British party with a basis for a new
approach to British politics, and thus it entered what has often been regarded
as its most fruitfulperiod.57Immediately following events in Germany in 1933,
communist parties were urged to abandon their sectarianismand to approach
social democratic parties with proposals for anti-fascist coalitions.58 The
Popular Front strategy had been fully developed two years later, when
Dimitrov introduced it at the last Comintern congress in I935.59 Included in
this new strategy for a common democratic front against fascism, communists
were told, should be an effort to strike a more nationalistic note in communist
propaganda. In order to counteract the fascist appeal to the masses by
nationalistic demagogy Dimitrov urged communists to instruct the working
classesof their past, and to link up the present struggle with past revolutionary
traditions.60
Dimitrov's somewhat perplexing challenge was accepted by the British
party,61which set out to explain how the origins of the contemporary struggle
between 'progressive' and 'reactionary' forces could be traced throughout
British history.62 This new patriotism found various expressions, but most
notably in a seriesof historicalpageants, like the one staged in Glasgow in 1938.
57 See for instance, R. Samuel, 'The lost world of British communism', New Left Review,154
(1985), p. 31, and K. Morgan, Againstfascismandwar: rupturesandcontinuitiesin Britishcommunist
politics, I935g-94I (Manchester, 1989), p. 21.
58 The British party promptly responded by approaching the Labour party, which rejected the
proposal of co-operation. Branson, History,p. I I 2.
59 See G. Dimitrov, Selectedspeechesandarticles(London, 1951), pp. 39-146.
60
Ibid., pp. 99-100.
61 For the CPGB's
Popular Front tactics see e.g. Morgan, Against,pp. 33-55; It canbedone:report
Partyof GreatBritain.Battersea,May 29-3I, I937 (London,
oJ thefourteenthcongressof the Communist
[1937]).
62 For the English case seeJ. Lindsay, England,myEngland(London, 1939). Also: T. Bramley,
'Our Propaganda', Discussion,2 (1937), pp. 6-8, and H. Lee, 'Communists are striving to carry
on the best traditions of the British nation', Discussion,2 (1937), PP. 5-6.

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 COMMUNISTS AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION 615
The first of these was the 'March of English History' arranged by the London
District Committee in September I936.63 This march, which apparently
attracted over 800 new recruits to the party, became a model that other
districtswere urged to follow.64Some were sceptical of this new approach, as for
example Cecil Day Lewis, who found it difficult to accept historic figures such
as Cromwell into the ranks of the 'progressive fighters'.65 But while adopting
this new patriotismseemed complicated to some communistsin England, it was
even more so in Scotland, as it called for a reconsideration of the party's
attitude towards the Scottish national movement.
As it turned out the Scottish District Party (the Scottish section of the CPGB,
hereafter the Scottish DP) and the party centre in London disagreed on this
issue. The question was whether or not the Popular Front should be
implemented by lending support to the nationalist cause in Scotland. The Left
Reviewaddressedthe issue in I936. Again the question was posed in connection
with a consideration of the economic situation in Scotland. As the editor
explained, it had been decided to publish a special issue of thejournal to discuss
what 'all sections of opinion' sensed as concomitant decline of Scottish culture,
industries,and agriculture. It was important, he claimed, to reach consensuson
how to advance the well-being of the Scottish people,66and to considerwhether
or not a reconciliation of the nationalist and socialist view was possible. If, in
other words, the nationalist movement could be understood to be progressive.67
A consensus was not, however, reached in this issue of the Left Review.The
nationalist contributor, the writer Neil Gunn, claimed that, since Scottish
culture was in essence much more radical and progressivethan English culture,
it should be natural for Scots of the proletarian persuasion to support the
nationalist cause.68The argument of the communist contributor,Jimmy Barke,
went in the opposite direction. He argued that the wishes of the nationalists
would be fulfilled under socialism. Scotland did indeed have a rich and
valuable cultural tradition, which was preservedin the heritage of the workers
and peasants, but there could be no true development of Scottish national
culture under capitalism. The nationalists should ally themselves with the
communists.69
The party centre in London, however, wanted a more conciliatory approach
towards the national movement in Scotland. Concerned about the party's
failure to respond to the particular problems facing Scotland, it felt that more

63
The London District Party published a programme for the march: Themarchof Englishhistory
(London, 1936).
64 D. Edwards, 'Forms of
propaganda', Discussion,2 (I937), pp. 8-9; minutes of PB meeting
I2 Nov. 1937, NMLH, C.I. No. I6 (Microfilm); 'Report of the Central Committee on the work of
the Communist party since the thirteenth congress', in It canbe done,pp. 163-4, 25I.
65 'Lewis
Day', 'England expects ....', Discussion,I (1936), p. 26.
66 'Editorial - national
liberties', Left Review,2 (1936), p. 602.
67 'Editorial',
Left Review,2 (1936), p. 729.
68 N. M. Gunn, 'Scotland a nation', Left Review,2
69
(1936), pp. 735-8.
J. Barke, 'The Scottish national question', Left Review,2 (I936), pp. 739-44.

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6I6 RAGNHEIDUR KRISTJANSDOTTIR
drastic actions were needed. It criticized the Scottish DP for leaving the issue
to the nationalists.70 The Scottish DP was urged to formulate a special plan of
action for Scotland, following examples given in Lancashire and Wales.
Furthermore, the party centre in London commanded that the Scottish DP
prepared 'a statement on the National question in Scotland'.71 But it was with
reluctance and considerable delay that the Scottish DP responded to this call
from the party centre in London.72 Finally in January 1938 the Political
Bureau in London received a document on the Scottish National question, in
which it was accepted that the party would adopt elements of the nationalist
agenda.73
Following this it was decided that Scottish communists would adopt the
main elements of the Liberal-Labour line of Home Rule for Scotland.74 And
furthermore, that they should ally themselves with the Scottish National party
to prepare an all-party campaign for Home Rule.75

VI
It was primarily (if not only) for propaganda purposes and due to pressure
from the party centre in London that Scottish communists decided to adopt
their 'nationalist' agenda. As a party member made clear in a speech
addressed to the Scottish DP conference in I942, it was an effort to extend the
party's influence outside the industrial belt on the Clydeside.76 And despite the
70 Minutes of PB meeting 13 Nov. 1936, NMLH, CPGB C.I. No. I6 (Microfilm).
71 Minutes of PB meeting 27 Nov. 1936, NMLH, CPGB C.I. No. I6 (Microfilm); minutes of CC
meeting io Sept. I937, NMLH, CPGB C.I. No. 8 (Microfilm). See also William Rust's comment
at the CPGB party congressin May 1937, It canhe done,p. I65, and minutes of PB meeting, 29 Oct.
1937, NMLH, CPGB C.I. No. i6 (Microfilm).
72 For a detailed account of the communications between the
party centre in London and the
Scottish DP see my: 'Nation before class? The Communist Party of Great Britain and the Scottish
question 1935-I939' (MPhil thesis, Cambridge, I998), esp. ch. 2.
73 'Scottish nationalism', Appendix to minutes of PB meeting 28Jan. 1938, NMLH, CPGB C.I.
No. 17 (Microfilm). The document was written and introduced by Aitken Ferguson. It is worth
noting in this connection that Welsh communistsseem to have shown more interest in approaching
the Welsh nationalist movement. They had already taken steps in this direction in early 1937. The
national question formed the main discussion at a meeting of the newly formed North Wales
District Party in late Jan. 1937, which proclaimed its support for the special needs of the Welsh
people and its commitment to the Welsh language and native culture. See Daily Worker,4 Feb.
I937. At a meeting in the South Wales District a month later, Idris Cox, South Wales organizer
of the party, declared that the party would be prepared to co-operate with the Welsh Nationalist
party in campaigns against the national government. See Daily Worker, 23 Feb. 1937. In March the
South Wales DP staged a 'Communist march of history'. See Daily Worker,20 Mar. 1937. For a
discussion of whether or not supporting the nationalist cause in Wales was in accordance to the
general aim of communists, see J. R. Williams, 'The Welsh national movement: its aims and
political significance', Discussion,3, 2 (1938), pp. 29-32.
74 Minutes of PB meeting, 28 Jan. I938, NMLH, CPGB C.I. No. 17 (Microfilm); cf.
Ragnheibur Kristjansdottir,'Nation'.
75 The convention never took place, for a few weeks before it was to take place war broke out
in Europe. McShane and Smith, Fighter,p. 226. Cf. Harvie, Gods,pp. 0II-2.
76 CPGB, Scottish District Conference Report, Oct. I942, NMLH, CP/LOC/SCOT/I/2. In
1937, over 1,200 of the 2,315 members of the party were from the Clydeside industrial belt (i.e.

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 COMMUNISTS AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION 617
turnaround in 1938, their reluctance seems to have been persistent. In a
resolution of the Scottish District Congressin I939, the DP stressed that party
members needed to overcome their 'unsympathetic approach to nationalist
aspirations of the Scottish people'.77
But while Scottish communists were reluctant to adopt political nationalism,
this did not necessarily imply that they had a weak sense of Scottish national
identity. Even the firmest opponents of taking up nationalist policies, like
Robert McLennan in I932 and Jimmy Barke in 1936, stated that there was
indeed a separate and distinct culture in Scotland, valuable and worthy of
preservation. While Scottish communists were members of the international
and British communist movement, they were also Scots. This was perhaps
never as symbolically expressed as when, on 25 of January 1937, the Scottish
members of the International Brigade organized a Burns' night in Spain. At
least three of them were dressed in kilts of some kind, as they moved a toast to
Burns' Immortal Memory and sang 'Auld Lang Syne' as well as the
'Internationale .78
At the same time they rejected Scottish nationalism, unlike their Icelandic
comrades who, during the Popular Front, became ever more passionate
nationalists and successfully positioned themselves at the centre of the
nationalist discourse.79 In this sense there was a considerable difference
between the Icelandic responseto the Popular Front and the Scottish one. Just
as there had been a difference between the Scottish and Icelandic approach to
nationalism before.
If we look at these responses in the respective national contexts we could
nevertheless paint a different picture. One of the peculiarities of Scottish
nationalism, it has been argued, is that, despite a strong sense of national
identity, the Scots were- at least until the late twentieth
century - disinterested in political nationalism.80Following this we can argue
that it was indeed the communists' Scottishness that prevented them from
opening up their movement to nationalistic tactics and arguments. The
comparison between Iceland and Scotland indicates that communists could
adapt the Comintern theses to local circumstances, even before the advent of

Glasgow and adjacent towns, as well as Lanarkshire). Other areas with over a hundred members
were: Fifeshire (305), Aberdeen ( 43), Dundee (205), and Edinburgh (I9I ). It is notable that only
about 55 per cent of the party members were employed. In Lanarkshirethe figure was 45 per cent.
CPBG, Scottish DPC, Scottish Report (written in preparation for the Scottish District Congress
planned for 4-5 Sept. 1937), GML, CP collection.
77 Resolution of Scottish District Congress, 26 Feb. 1939, NMLH,
78 CP/LOC/SCOT/i/i i.
Daily Worker,8 Feb. I937.
79 I discuss this issue in an
unpublished paper: Ragnheiour Kristjansd6ttir, 'Nationalism and
communism/socialism in Iceland 1920-1944', presented at the Nineteenth International Congress
of Historical Sciences, Oslo, Aug. 2000.
80 D. N. McIver, 'The paradox of nationalism in Scotland', in C. H.
Williams, ed., National
separatism(Cardiff, 1982), p. 106. Cf. nn. 13 and 14 above.

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618 RAGNHEIDUR KRISTJANSD6TTIR
the Popular Front. The political context in Scotland was such, however, that
beating the nationalist drum was not a feasible option, at least not as feasible
as in Iceland. Moreover, the national identity of Scottish communists most
probably made it difficult for them to make sense of such tactics.
This seems to leave us with a double paradox. First is the paradox that the
national identity of Scottish communists prevented them from adopting
nationalistic tactics. Second is the paradox that, despite their reluctance during
the Popular Front, their obedience to international communism eventually
turned them into nationalists of sorts.

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