CTC Sentinel 102022

RIGOROUS || JUNE/JULY
OBJECTIVE · RELEVANT ·· RIGOROUS OCTOBER 2022

2018· ·VOLUME
VOLUME15,
11,ISSUE
ISSUE10
6
FEATURE
FEATURE ARTICLE
ARTICLE A VIEW FROM COMMENTARY
THE CT FOXHOLE
FEATURE
Houthi
The Command
Jihadi Threat A Pragmatic Strategy
LTC(R) Bryan Price
and
to Control
Indonesia
to Counter Domestic
Political Violence
Michael Knights, Adnan al-Gabarni, Former Director,
and Casey Coombs Brian Michael
Combating Jenkins
Terrorism Center
Kirsten E. Schulze
FEATURE ARTICLE
Editor in Chief
1 The Houthi Jihad Council: Command and Control in ‘the Other Hezbollah’
Michael Knights, Adnan al-Gabarni, and Casey Coombs Paul Cruickshank
Managing Editor
FEATURE COMMENTARY
Kristina Hummel
24 Feature Commentary: Elements of a Pragmatic Strategy to Counter Domestic
Political Violence
EDITORIAL BOARD
Brian Michael Jenkins
Colonel Suzanne Nielsen, Ph.D.
INTERVIEW Department Head

Dept. of Social Sciences (West Point)
45 A View from the CT Foxhole: Air Vice-Marshal Sean Corbett
Nakissa Jahanbani, Eugene Lee, and Don Rassler Lieutenant Colonel Sean Morrow
Director, CTC
Brian Dodwell
Executive Director, CTC
With a truce in Yemen that had lasted six months elapsing in early October,
Don Rassler
there is concern that Yemen will once again be plunged into civil war and
that the Tehran-allied Houthi militants will once again threaten Saudi Director of Strategic Initiatives, CTC
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates with drones and ballistic missiles. In this month’s feature
article, Michael Knights, Adnan al-Gabarni, and Casey Coombs provide a “fuller understanding of
CONTACT
the Houthi political-military leadership, its core motivations, and the nature and extent of Iranian
and Lebanese Hezbollah influence within the movement.” Their study argues that “the Houthi Combating Terrorism Center
movement is now more centralized and cohesive than ever, in part due to close mentoring from U.S. Military Academy
Lebanese Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.” They conclude that “the Houthi
607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall
Jihad Council is emerging as a remarkable partner for Iran and the Houthi-Iran relationship and
should no longer be viewed as a relationship of necessity, but rather a strong, deep-rooted alliance West Point, NY 10996
that is underpinned by tight ideological affinity and geopolitical alignment. The emergence of a Phone: (845) 938-8495
‘southern Hezbollah’ is arguably now a fact on the ground.”
Email: [email protected]
In this month’s feature commentary, Brian Michael Jenkins thinks through what elements are
necessary for a pragmatic and non-partisan strategy to counter domestic political violence. He Web: www.ctc.westpoint.edu/ctc-sentinel/
writes that “Americans appear to reside in separate cultural and political camps. Increasing threats
against public officials and displays of public hostility have prompted growing apprehension of future
SUBMISSIONS
political violence. It is in this fragile and fraught environment that any efforts to contain politically
motivated violence will have to operate.” He stresses that it is important to recognize “the limits of The CTC Sentinel welcomes submissions.
what law enforcement can do while addressing the greater challenge of national reconciliation.” Contact us at [email protected].
Our interview is with Air Vice-Marshal Sean Corbett, the founder and CEO of IntSight Global,
a management consultancy within the intelligence and security sector with a focus on open-source
The views expressed in this report are
intelligence. During his 30-year service in the Royal Air Force, Air Vice-Marshal Corbett worked in
key leadership roles, including as Chief of U.K. Intelligence in Afghanistan and was the first non-U.S. those of the authors and not of the U.S.
Deputy Director of a major U.S. intelligence agency in serving in Washington, D.C., at the Defense Military Academy, the Department of the
Intelligence Agency (DIA). Army, or any other agency of the U.S.
Paul Cruickshank, Editor in Chief
Government.
Cover: A fighter loyal to Yemen’s Houthi

rebels is pictured on October 8, 2022, in
Sana’a, Yemen, under a portrait of the
Houthi rebels’ leader Abdalmalik al-Huthi.
(Mohammed Huwais/AFP via Getty Images)
OCTOBER 2022 CTC SENTINEL 1
The Houthi Jihad Council: Command and Control

in ‘the Other Hezbollah’
By Michael Knights, Adnan al-Gabarni, and Casey Coombs
2021.3 Some Houthi leaders remained covered by older sanctions4b

A fragile U.N.-brokered ceasefire between the Houthis (and additional Houthi military leaders continue to be added to
and their military opponents in Yemen’s Presidential U.S. sanctions lists) for posing a “threat to the peace, security, or
Leadership Council (PLC) held from April to October stability of Yemen.”5
2022 but has now lapsed. The Houthis hold the key to A fragile U.N.-brokered ceasefire between the Houthis and their
an enduring ceasefire in Yemen, and can threaten the military opponents in Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council
(PLC)6 held from April to October 2022 but has (at the time of
stability of Red Sea shipping lanes and the security of
writing) lapsed,7 c and the path to long-term conflict resolution
the United States and its partners in the Middle East. All
remains unclear. As a rebel force now in control of much of the
these considerations necessitate a fuller understanding Yemeni state, the Houthis will likely be required to give up some of
of the Houthi political-military leadership, its core their gains in return for an enduring peace, and such a peace may
motivations, and the nature and extent of Iranian and not be welcomed by the Houthis’ strongest backers in the war—
Lebanese Hezbollah influence within the movement. namely Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah.d The Houthis continue to
This study argues that the Houthi movement is now more pose a military and counterterrorism threat to the United States
centralized and cohesive than ever, in part due to close
mentoring from Lebanese Hezbollah and the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps. The Houthi Jihad Council is
emerging as a remarkable partner for Iran and the Houthi-
Iran relationship and should no longer be viewed as a
relationship of necessity, but rather a strong, deep-rooted b The U.S. government noted: “Ansarallah leaders Abdul Malik al-Houthi,
alliance that is underpinned by tight ideological affinity Abd al-Khaliq Badr al-Din al-Houthi, and Abdullah Yahya al-Hakim remain
sanctioned under E.O. 13611 related to acts that threaten the peace,
and geopolitical alignment. The emergence of a ‘southern
security, or stability of Yemen.” “Revocation of the Terrorist Designations of
Hezbollah’ is arguably now a fact on the ground. Ansarallah,” U.S. Department of State, February 12, 2021.
I
c The truce was up for renewal on October 2 but had not (at the time
n September 2018, one of the authors of this article of publication) been renewed immediately and thus lapsed, perhaps
published an analysis of the military evolution of the Houthi temporarily.
movementa in CTC Sentinel, noting the group’s very rapid d The Saudi and Gulf military commitment in Yemen gives a competitive
advantage to Iran, forcing Gulf missile defenses and other resources to
five-year development from an insurgent group fielding
be deployed away from the Gulf littoral shared with Iran and toward a new
roadside bombs to a state-level actor using medium-range western and southern front. The Yemen war is a geopolitical lever on the
ballistic missiles.1 Since then, the Houthis have further consolidated Saudis that Iran, through its support to the Houthis, may be in a position to
their hold over the Yemeni capital, Sana’a, and the Red Sea coast manipulate. See Gerald M. Feierstein, “Iran’s Role in Yemen and Prospects
for Peace,” Middle East Institute, December 6, 2018, and Thomas Juneau,
port city of Hodeida, and nearly won the civil war with a sustained
“How Iran Helped Houthis Expand Their Reach,” War on the Rocks, August
(but ultimately indecisive) military offensive against Yemen’s oil 23, 2021.
and gas hub at Ma’rib.2 On January 19, 2021, the outgoing Trump
administration designated the Houthi organizational institution
Ansar Allah as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO), a step that the Dr. Michael Knights is the Jill and Jay Bernstein Fellow with the
Biden administration almost immediately revoked on February 16, Military and Security Program at The Washington Institute for
Near East Policy. He has traveled extensively in Yemen since 2006.
Twitter: @mikeknightsiraq
Adnan al-Gabarni is a Yemeni journalist specializing in military

and security affairs. He previously worked for Al Masdar Online.
Twitter: @Aljbrnyadnan
a Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells noted that the Houthis are known by a variety
of names: “the ‘Huthis’ (al-Huthiyin), the ‘Huthi movement’ (al-Haraka Casey Coombs is a researcher at the Sana’a Center for Strategic
al-Huthiya), ‘Huthist elements’ (al-‘anasir al-Huthiya), ‘Huthi supporters’ Studies. He was based in Yemen in 2012-2015 as a freelance
(Ansar al-Huthi), or ‘Believing Youth Elements’ (‘Anasir al-Shabab al-
Mu’min).” Barak Salmoni, Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine Wells, Regime
journalist. Twitter: @Macoombs
and Periphery in Northern Yemen: The Huthi Phenomenon (Santa Monica:
RAND, 2010), p. 189. © 2022 Michael Knights, Adnan al-Gabarni, Casey Coombs
2 CTC SENTINEL OCTOBER 2022 K N I G H T S / A L - G A BA R N I / C O O M B S
and its partners in the region,e as well as a menace to global influential Zaydih preacher until his death (by natural causes)
commerce in the Red Sea.f All these considerations necessitate a in 2010.11 Of critical importance, Badr al-Din and his sons were
fuller understanding of the Houthi political-military leadership, members of the minority Jarudi sect of Zaydism,i the denomination
its core motivations, and the nature and extent of Iranian and of Zaydism closest to Shià Islam in political theology.j
Lebanese Hezbollah influence within the movement. Badr al-Din was thus the root of today’s Houthi movement,
In this new article, an enlarged and strengthened team with which is still dominated by his sons and other male relatives.12
extensive on-the-ground access in Houthi-held areasg will look The four marriages of Badr al-Din13 created the foundation of the
in-depth at the structure and composition of Houthi military Houthi movement in the Saàda province of northern Yemen.
leadership. An excellent anthropological and socio-political Badr al-Din had 13 sons who reached maturity.14 Of these 13, most
literature already exists on the Houthis thanks to ground-breaking married at least once. This created a baseline force consisting of
studies by RAND8 and the writings of academics such as Marieke circles of tribal protection for Badr al-Din and his sons. As noted
Brandt.9 This article builds on this literature by updating the RAND by Marieke Brandt, the preeminent anthropologist of the Houthi
study and focusing more attention on military aspects and on the area, the Khawlan tribal confederation of northern Yemen was “the
proven roles of Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah in Houthi military first incubator of the Houthi movement.”15
affairs. In the opening section, the article reviews the genealogical, Husayn Badr al-Din al-Huthi built upon this base to form the
social, political-religious, and environmental (i.e., wartime) drivers first generation of the Houthi paramilitary movement in the 1980s
for the emergence of the current generation of Houthi military and 1990s.16 He had his father’s gift for oratory and religious studies,
and security leaders. It next examines command politics under and he was highly political.k Born in either 1956 or 1959, Husayn
the Houthis’ current leader Abdalmalik al-Huthi. It then looks in-
depth at the Jihad Council established by the Houthis to centralize
military and security decision-making using a mechanism adapted h The Zaydi branch as a whole cannot be clearly defined as Sunni or Shià.
from Lebanese Hezbollah. Then the article looks at the role within Qom-trained theologian Mehdi Khalaji reflects a mainstream view that
Zaydi jurisprudence is most similar to the Hanafi and Shafei (Sunni)
the Houthi Jihad Council of the IRGC Jihad Assistant and his schools of Islamic law. Like Sunni branches of Islam, most Zaydis do
Lebanese Hezbollah Deputy. The next section explores the Houthi not reject Abu Bakr, Omar, and Uthman as the Prophet Mohammad’s
administrative takeover of Yemen’s military institutions and the rightful successors. Yemeni Zaydism differs from prevalent “Twelver”
gradual mobilization and indoctrination of a new generation of Shià Muslims dominant in Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon because Twelvers
see the proper line of descent from Prophet Mohammad running via one
active service soldiers and reserves. In the penultimate part, the descendent (the fifth imam, Mohammed al-Baqir) to a messianic 12th
article looks at how the Houthis employ armed forces and which imam, while the “Fiver” Zaydis believe in a different line of descent and
commanders have operational control of key geographic commands method of succession branching from their preferred fifth imam, Zayd.
and praetorian or specialized forces. The article concludes with See Mehdi Khalaji, “Yemen’s Zaydis: A Window for Iranian Influence,”
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 2, 2015. See also
analytic findings concerning which segments of the Houthi war
“Appendix B: Zaydism” in Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, pp. 290-294. See also
machine might support conflict termination and which elements “From Insurgents to Hybrid Sector Actors? Deconstructing Yemen’s Huthi
are most likely to continue to threaten the peace, security, or Movement,” Instituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, April 2017.
stability of Yemen. i Badr al-Din’s family are adherents to the Jarudi sect of the Zaydi branch of
Islam (with the other contemporaneous sects being Sulaymaniya, Jaririya,
Generational Change in the Houthi Leadership Butriya, and Salihiya). Houthi news sources tend to downplay this fact,
but even their own leaders occasionally reference it. Mohammed Azzan, a
The composition of the Houthi movement has changed throughout co-founder of Believing Youth and a leading mainstream Zaydi revivalist,
its lifespan, demonstrating (in the view of the authors) both a identifies the Houthi movement as “a political movement with a religious
remarkable openness to an ever-broadening general membership background belonging to the Zaydi sect, especially the Jarudi current.” See
but also, under the surface, an obdurate refusal to share real power Mohammed Azzan, “The Houthis directed the path of ‘believing youth’ to
an extremist project,” Alameenpress.net, accessed on October 11, 2022. For
beyond a small set of male antecedents related to religious scholar
broader studies on the Jarudi aspect of the Houthi movement, see Nasser
Badr al-Din al-Huthi, a sadah10 (descendant of the Prophet) and Abdullah Al-Qafari, “Zaydi Innocence from the Houthis,” Al Bayan Magazine
337 (2015) and also the following two Arabic books: Ahmed Mohammed
al-Daghshi, “The Houthis: A Comprehensive Methodological Study,” Arab
House of Sciences, December 2009 and Suleiman al-Saleh al-Ghosn and
Suleiman Bin Saleh Bin Abdulaziz, “The Truth About the Houthis,” King Fahd
e As earlier footnotes detail, the Houthis have been designated as a threat National Library, 2010.
to the peace and stability of Yemen. They have also fired anti-shipping
j The Jarudi are the closest of any Zaydi sect to mainstream “Twelver” Shiism
missiles at U.S. naval vessels, kidnapped American citizens, fired missiles
practiced in Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon. Unlike other Zaydis, and in keeping
and drones at Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and threatened Israel. For a review
with mainstream Shiism, the Jarudis reject Abu Bakr, Omar, and Uthman
of the case for designating the Houthis as terrorists, see Lucy van der Kroft,
as usurpers of Ali’s right to be Prophet Mohammad’s rightful successor.
“Yemen’s Houthis and the Terrorist Designation System,” International
On Jarudi beliefs, see the excellent tables and discussion in “Appendix B:
Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (ICCT), June 2021, pp. 11-16.
Zaydism” in Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, pp. 290-294. See also Nadwa Al-
f For instance, then president of the Houthi Supreme Political Council Saleh Dawsari, “The Houthis’ endgame in Yemen,” Al Jazeera Opinion, December
al-Samad, said the Houthis would “cut international navigation,” and the 21, 2017, and Noman Ahmed and Mahmoud Shamsan, “Analysis: Origins of
Houthi television channel Al-Masirah added that al-Samad threatened to the Houthi supremacist ideology,” Commonspace, August 23, 2022.
“block the Red Sea and target international navigation.” See Ali Mahmood,
k Husayn embraced all forms of political Islamic activity. He was briefly
“Houthis threaten to block shipping traffic in Red Sea,” National, January 9,
a member of Yemen’s parliament for a year. He broke with mainstream
2018.
Zaydism by proselytizing and propagating his political beliefs in a manner
g Al Masdar Online and the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies both operate that was unusual for Zaydis. Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, p. 290. See also
extensive contact networks and research capabilities focused on (and Marieke Brandt, Tribes and Politics in Yemen: A History of the Houthi
present in) Houthi-held northern Yemen. Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), p. 150.
was a young and politically receptive twenty-something when the 1999-2000, Husayn Badr al-Din spent a year undertaking religious
Islamic Revolution unfolded in Iran. Far from reluctant or recent studies in Khartoum20 at a time when Sudan was the most active
partners of Iran, Badr al-Din and Husayn’s family enthusiastically IRGC and Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) outstation
embraced Khomeinism and the example of the Islamic Revolution.l on the Red Sea.21 Husayn then went from Sudan to Iran, and when
As Morteza Mohatwari, a senior Zaydi cleric, said in 2010, for he returned from this retreat, he introduced the now infamous
Zaydis of Husayn’s generation the Iranian regime’s version of slogan that supercharged the Houthi movement, “the scream” (al-
Twelver Shiism is the true Zaydism because it mobilizes the masses shi‘ar): “Death to America, Death to Israel, Curse upon the Jews,
to confront foreign powers and unjust rulers.m His father Badr al- Victory to Islam.”22
Din visited Iran (and Beirut) for intermittent stays between 1979 Scholars disagree on the fundamental drivers of Husayn’s
and Badr al-Din’s death in 2010,17 usually taking Husayn and later political ambitions: One theory is that Badr al-Din and Husayn
some of his other sons with him, notably his fifth son, Mohammed were primarily pursuing a so-called hadawi23 agenda, a doctrine
(born around 1965),18 and his ninth son, Abdalmalik (born around that held sadah (collectively the Ahl al-Bayt, the descendants of the
1979),n both of whom were avid religious students produced by Prophet) to be superior to other Yemenis and the only caste fit for
Badr al-Din’s unions with sadah families.o leadership.24 In the hadawi theory, Badr al-Din and Husayn sought
By the early 1990s, Husayn had two main political influences: a return of some form of imamate or other system of governance
Iran’s first Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and under sadah leadership (which had been the long preeminent form
Usama bin Ladin, both of whose speeches he followed with of government in parts of northern Yemen from around 897 AD
particular fascination due to their willingness to stand up to Israel until 1962 AD).25 Others see a combination of social mobility and
and to American “arrogance.”p In 1994, Badr al-Din and Husayn dynastic agendas,26 with Badr al-Din and Husayn outmaneuvering
began sending 40 religious students a year to Qomq—a flow that longer-established and richer Zaydi sadah families through
would eventually produce around 800 Qom-trained students,r the dynamic use of a Lebanese Hezbollah-type Zaydi-Shià
some of whom are reported to have been groomed by the Islamic revivalist movement (called “Believing/Faithful Youth” (Muntada
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) with paramilitary training.19 In al-Shahabal-Mu’min)) that employed summer camps, social
programs, and a political party.27 Still others assess that Badr al-
Din and Husayn were surreptitiously introducing Jarudi Zaydism
l Qom-trained theologian Mahdi Khalaji noted that “Iran’s 1979 Islamic
and related Iranian Twelver aspects to the broader Zaydi practice
Revolution, led by a Twelver Shiite jurist, was a theological surprise for of Islam28 s—what Oved Lobel characterized as “a neo-Twelver core
Zaidis in Yemen because they had believed that such uprisings were what carved out of the Zaydi revival.”29 All, some, or none of these motives
differentiated them from Twelvers. Subsequently, the Twelver branch for Badr al-Din and Husayn’s activism may have been operative at
became so appealing to Yemeni Shiites that many of them traveled to Iran
to learn more about it.” See Khalaji.
the same time, but what the authors of this study assess can be said
with a higher degree of certainty is that Husayn and his father were
m Khalaji quotes Hassan Zaid, the leader of the Houthi political party Al-Haq,
as telling him: “We believe that Khomeini was a true Zaidi. Theologically
intent on breaking the mold of northern Yemeni political Islam and
our differences with Hezbollah and the Iranian government are minor, but that they looked to the Islamic Revolution in Iran and to Lebanese
politically we are identical.” Khalaji. Hezbollah for inspiration, ideas, and support.t
n Abdalmalik’s birthdate is variously given as between 1979 and 1982, All of the above factors shaped the composition of the Houthi
depending on the source. The authors assess, based on the preponderance leadership that emerged under Husayn and entered the first of the
of anecdotal reporting, that Abdalmalik’s birthdate is closer to 1979. Drawn six wars that raged between the Yemeni government and the Houthi
from details from interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and
dates and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request. See also movement in 2004-2010.30 Husayn now commanded a sizable
“Yemen designations,” U.S. Department of Treasury, April 14, 2015.
o For years after the war, Husayn berated Yemen’s government for fighting
the Islamic Republic of Iran. See this audio recording: Husayn Badr al-Din, s Brandt notes: “To many Zaydis, the new dynamic, self-assertive Zaydi
“A rare clip of the founder of the Houthi movement, Hussein al-Houthi, in activism, which had emerged from the confrontation with Sunni extremism,
which he threatens to punish the Yemeni army for its participation against was quite unfamiliar; some suspected that the Houthi movement was in
Iran,” YouTube, May 8, 2017, available at https://www.youtube.com/ fact not a revival of Yemeni Zaydism, but rather an externally operated
watch?v=UZZt810mvFE movement influenced by Iranian Twelver Shiism.” Brandt, p. 146. Jarudism
and Twelver rituals were hidden in the 1980s as the Yemeni government
p Husayn used to repeat the phrase that “the nation will not defeat America
persecuted Jarudis and Twelvers for their connection to Iran, which
and Israel without the leadership of Ahl al-Bayt,” meaning the sadah, seeing
Yemen fought in the Iran-Iraq War as an ally to Iraq. See Khalaji. Today in
himself as a Hashemite version of Usama bin Ladin. For instance: “On the
Houthi-controlled areas, Twelver religious practices such as the public
day [Osama] appeared, and we saw many people thinking that he would
commemoration of Ashura are becoming widespread in a way that is
be the savior of the nation, we would say: ‘No, that will never be achieved
foreign to mainstream Yemeni Zaydism. See Cameron Glenn, Garrett Nada,
through his hands … The nation’s salvation from the mid guidance it is
and Mattisan Rowan, “Who are Yemen’s Houthis?” Wilson Center, July 7,
experiencing will only be at the hands of the family of the Messenger of
2022.
God.’” See Husayn Badr al-Din al-Houthi, “Lessons from the guidance of the
holy Quran: The responsibility of Ahl al-Bayt, peace be upon them,” Huda. t The 2010 RAND study took a muted view of Iran’s influence on the Houthis.
live.com, December 21, 2002. See Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, pp. 120-123, 170-171. Over time, more
evidence has emerged showing the longevity of Iran’s covert operations
q Forty students per year were paid for by the Iranian authorities, a flow
in Yemen, including through leaked documents. For instance, see the
that continued from 1994 to the blockade of Yemen after the Houthi
interesting document archive stretching back to the 1980s at “Houthis
coup in September 2014. Drawn from an interview for this study. Names
in special documents( 2): Comprehensive intelligence report on Iranian
of interviewee, and date and place of interview withheld at interviewee’s
efforts to find a foothold in Yemen since the 1980s,” Al Masdar Online, April
request.
16, 2020. See also the detailed revisionist text: Oved Lobel, “Becoming
r Forty students per year in the 20 years between 1994 and 2014 equals 800 Ansar Allah: How the Islamic Revolution Conquered Yemen,” Report No. 20,
individual students. European Eye on Radicalization, March 2021.
cohort of Khawlan bir Amir confederation tribesmen, including “The selection of Abdalmalik, then a
hundreds of religious students sent to Qom seminaries and well
over 10,000 young men sent through Believing Youth summer young man in his early twenties, as
camps and social or educational programs under his stewardship the supreme military commander
inside Yemen.31 u This initial Houthi cadre demonstrated some of
the enduring characteristics of Houthi command and control.
of the wartime Houthi movement
First, in the authors’ assessment, the movement preferred the shines light on a third trend in Houthi
membership of fighters who were with Husayn since the start of command and control—that is, the
the six wars in 2004. In the authors’ view, this cadre had advantages
over all later joiners due to the longevity of their loyalty and their dominance of leaders with a special
war service.32 Examples of these elevated early joiners include connection to Iran and Hezbollah.”
key sadah military commanders Yusuf al-Madani (who married a
daughter of Husayn)v and Abdullah Yahya al-Hakim (Abu Ali),w who
Houthi movement historiographer Marieke Brandt characterized
as Abdalmalik’s military second-in-command in the years leading ranks of his relatives.x As noted, northern Yemen has a deep-seated
up to the Houthi takeover of the government in 2014. Non-sadah caste system, topped by the sadah, following by other castes—the
leaders of this status were rare, the exception being Husayn’s closest tribal sheikhs and administrators (qadi), and the “third type” (ahl
friend and ally prior to Husayn’s death in 2004, Abdullah Eida al- al-thuluth), such as artisans, shopkeepers, restaurateurs, and
Razzami, a qabili politician of similar age who served as his right- merchants.34 When Husayn was killed by the Yemeni government in
hand man in the first Houthi-government war in 2004.33 2004, Badr al-Din moved swiftly to personally hold the leadership
In the authors’ assessment, the struggle to replace Husayn as of the Houthi movement35 in order to prevent leadership from
the Houthi leader in 2005 spotlighted the second key characteristic passing outside his family, even to a longstanding qabili loyalist
of Houthi command and control arrangements—that is, Badr al- such as Abdullah Eida al-Razzami or a sadah in-law such as Yusuf
Din’s strong preference for sadah leadership drawn only from the al-Madani.36
The selection of Abdalmalik, then a young man in his early
twenties, as the supreme military commander of the wartime Houthi
movement shines light on a third trend in Houthi command and
control—that is, the dominance of leaders with a special connection
to Iran and Hezbollah. Setting aside the imprisoned Mohammedy
u The RAND study notes that “around 15,000 boys and young men had and the exiled Yahya,37 Badr al-Din bypassed five eligible sons
passed through Believing Youth camps each year,” adding that the older than Abdalmalik when Husayn died: Abdalqader, Ahmad,
Believing Youth were an ideal mechanism to groom a fighting cadre, noting: Hamid, Amir al-Din, and Ibrahim.38 Indeed, in the authors’ reading
“that demographic base—or their younger siblings—went on to provide
a recruitable hard core, susceptible (or vulnerable) to the masculine
of events, Badr al-Din did not hesitate to risk alienating the most
assertion furnished by resistance and armed activity … the rituals or senior tribes loyal to the Houthis and his elder sons at a critical
gatherings appropriated by the Houthis—where adolescents and young moment in the movement’s struggle with the Yemeni government
adults congregate together with ‘adult’ fighters—make ideal environments in 2005-2006. Badr al-Din threw his weight behind Abdalmalik,
for socialization and recruitment of youth.” Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, p.
254.
the oldest child of his second sadah bride and his ninth oldest son,
who had joined him on more visits to Iran than any other son except
v Al-Madani was born in 1977 in Muhatta, in Hajjar governorate, but he spent
his youth as one of the most promising students of Husayn Badr al-Din
Husayn and who was a gifted religious scholar and orator.39 In the
al-Huthi in Saàda. He married one of Husayn’s daughters (a sharifa, or authors’ assessment, this showed that the man entrusted with
daughter of a sadah) and gained a powerful reputation as a commander leadership of the Houthi movement had to share the same vision
in all the six wars and the fighting since then. His brother Taha al-Madani, and experiences as Badr al-Din and Husayn—that is, pursuit of an
another very senior Houthi field commander, was killed in 2016, seemingly
in Lahj. On May 20, 2021, al-Madani was sanctioned by the United States
Islamic Revolution modeled on Iran and Hezbollah.40
for threatening the peace, security, and stability of Yemen, followed by
the United Nations on November 9, 2021. See “Treasury Sanctions Senior Command Politics under Abdalmalik
Houthi Military Official Overseeing Group’s Offensive Operations,” U.S. In the view of the authors, the Houthi movement’s current leader
Department of Treasury, May 20, 2021, and “Yusuf al-Madani,” United
Nations Security Council, November 9, 2021. Details gathered from
interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and dates and places of
interviews withheld at interviewees’ request. x Sadah leadership (through religious authority) of qabili social groupings
is an old and tested formula in northern Yemen. Adel Dashela, “Northern
w Abu Ali is believed to have been born in 1984-1986 to a sadah family (al-
Yemeni Tribes during the Eras of Ali Abdullah Saleh and the Houthi
Moayyed) from Dahyan, Saàda. His early arrest by the Saleh government
Movement: A Comparative Study,” Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies,
in May 2005 for undertaking assassination and roadside bomb attacks
February 16, 2022, pp. 3, 12, 13.
in Sana’a suggests that (even in the early years of the war against
the government) he had received covert operations training of a kind y Mohammed was only released in 2006. Brandt, p. 172. Omar al-Amqi
different from most Houthi tactical commanders. See “Houthis in Special related from his interview with Mohammed Badr al-Din: “When I asked
Documents( 6) .. Report from the Counter-Terrorism Center on the crime Mohammed why he didn’t take over the leadership of the organization,
for which Abu Ali al-Hakim, Fouad, Mohammed al-Imad and others were he replied smiling: ‘I was in prison, and my brother Abdulmalik was a
imprisoned,” Al Masdar Online, May 9, 2020. See also his U.N. and U.S. lieutenant of my father and close to him, and I was not released from
government sanctions designations at “Abdullah Yahya al-Hakim,” U.N. prison until the situation is like this as you can see.’” See Omar al-Amqi,
Security Council, November 7, 2014, and “Yemen-related designations,” U.S. “Why didn’t the Houthi leadership devolve to Mohammed Badreddine?” Al
Department of Treasury, November 10, 2014. Masdar Online, April 11, 2010.
Abdalmalik al-Huthi has demonstrated personal leadership eventually thawed hard feelings with Abdallah Eida al-Razzami by
qualities that are without doubt impressive: He is ruthless, supporting the ambitions of al-Razzami’s eldest son, Yahya.af
pragmatic, unemotional, charismatic, and effective at building Thus, Abdalmalik built a cohesive and trusted command group
networks of personal loyalty and control.41 In Abdalmalik’s style by the end of the sixth war in 2010—almost all young men (like
of public talking, it is clear that he models himself closely on Abdalmalik) in their late twenties or early thirties, with very similar
Lebanese Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah.z The second to religious backgrounds cultivated in the Believing Youth movement,
sixth wars against the Yemeni government in 2005-2010 saw and with strong personal intra-group affinity within the sadah elite,
Abdalmalik progressively develop and perfect his grasp over the forged from childhood and through war.50 Others drawn from this
military command structure.42 He toured the expanding frontlines “war generation” are Abdalmalik’s full brother Abdalkhaliq, a few
of the war, and he successively sidelined older Houthi leaders of years younger than him,51 and Mohammed Ali al-Houthi, a close
Husayn’s generation and disowned involvement in their tribal first cousin of Abdalmalik, born just after Abdalmalik, who also
feuds.aa Instead, Abdalmalik cultivated a clique of younger “field emerged as a key advisor to Abdalmalik on social and political
commanders” (qa’id maydan)43 closer to his own age but often matters.52
(significantly) just younger than him and thus less senior than In the authors’ assessment, this command cadre—the war
him in years as well as religious education.ab These commanders generation, molded in their twenties as the six wars raged—are
were typically students of Husayn who had known each other in today the heart of the Houthi military and regime security command
the Believing Youth camps and shared the formative experience of and control structure. They did not have much memory of the Zaydi
fighting in the six wars.44 revivalist movement before Husayn, before the Believing Youth
One of the better known field commanders was the camps, before Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollah military support,
aforementioned Abdullah Yahya al-Hakim (Abu Ali), 45 and before the “the scream” (al-shi‘ar).53 In that sense, they are
Abdalmalik’s military second-in-command after the sidelining of exactly what Husayn named them: the “followers of the slogan”
the qabili commander Abdullah Eida al-Razzami by 2006.46 Even (Ashab al-Shi‘ar).54
accounting for some hyperbole and Abu Ali’s active intimidation of Abdalmalik kept these men alongside him as the Houthi
the press (which may generate hagiographic treatment),47 Abu Ali movement transitioned from insurgents in 2010 to co-equals in the
was (in 2006-2014) an unequaled military-political player with a post-Arab Spring National Dialogue Conference between March
track record of battlefield success.48 Abu Ali gained in importance 2013 and January 2014,55 and finally to the rulers of northern
throughout the six warsac and then took on a pivotal role in the Yemen after their September 2014 coup against the U.N.-backed
Houthi consolidation of powerad after the collapse of the Yemeni government.ag Yet, Abdalmalik also kept three influential older
government in the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011.ae Abdalmalik men in his military and security decision-making circle, and these
also overcame Yusuf al-Madani’s rivalry49 and kept him and Yusuf ’s may be particularly influential. One was Ahmed Mohammed Yahya
capable brother Taha as key field commanders, and Abdalmalik also Hamid (known as Ahmed Hamid or Abu Mahfouz), a key follower
z In the authors’ assessment, Abdalmalik deliberately uses the same calm

tone as Nasrallah, inflecting and raising his voice only in specific phrases to
fire up the audience in a way that mimics the Hezbollah leader. In addition af Yahya appears to have been born in 1987, making him in his mid-thirties
to rhetorical similarities, they both wear a ring on the little finger of their now, while his father Abdullah Eida al-Razzami is in his mid-sixties. See
right hands, often appear in front of the same blue background, and Gregory D. Johnsen, “The Kingpin of Sana’a – A Profile of Ahmed Hamed,”
constantly praise each other in letters. For an example of similar rhetorical Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, May 18, 2021. In May 2022, Yahya was
styles, see “Hezbollah and Ansar Allah, the Soldiers of God that strike in the appointed head of a Houthi delegation sent to Amman, Jordan, to negotiate
ground,” YouTube, October 12, 2016. Qom-trained theologian Mehdi Khalaji with the internationally recognized government over the reopening of roads
has also noted Abdalmalik’s apparent fascination with Nasrallah. See in Taiz, as part of the U.N.-brokered truce that started in April 2022 (and
Khalaji. which has lapsed since October 2, 2022, at the time of writing). Adnan al-
Gabarni, “Why did al-Houthi choose Yahya al-Razami as a representative in
aa For instance, in March 2005-June 2007 (2nd to 4th war) feuding between the negotiations to lift the siege of Taiz?” Al Masdar Online, May 27, 2022.
al-Razzami and the Al Mahdi clans, Abdalmalik distanced himself and
explicitly did not support his father’s friend, al-Razzami. Salmoni, Loidolt, ag As Al Masdar Online has chronicled in great detail, the Houthi shadow
and Wells, pp. 185, 309. See also Brandt, pp. 122, 129-130. government represents a parallel system of supervisory bodies in
which real policy-making authority is vested, under which the formal
ab In the authors’ collective view, this is significant. Age is important in the Yemeni government architecture exists to execute Houthi orders.
Arab world. Even a few years’ seniority in age between men gives a kind of Under Abdalmalik’s Office of the Sayyed, there is the General Council,
precedence that can be exploited by the elder man. Executive Council Supreme Political Council, Government Work Authority,
ac Abu Ali was in prison in 2005, before breaking out on January 27, 2006. See Governorate Affairs Council, Judicial Council, and Tribal Cohesion
Brandt, p. 189. Thereafter, Abu Ali was critical in many fronts, especially Council. These are almost all run by Abdalmalik’s hand-picked cadre of
late-war fighting in 2009-2010 in Manabbih. See Brandt, pp., 297, 304-305. thirty-somethings: for instance, a close confidante Safar al-Sufi at the
General Council; groomed Abdalmalik loyalist Qassem al Humran at the
ad Abu Ali is also believed to have played a major role in establishing the
Executive Council; Abdalmalik’s friend Mahdi al-Mashat at the Supreme
Houthi tactic of setting up local supervisors (mushrifeen) across all
Political Council; Mahmoud al Junaid at the Government Works Authority;
districts in Yemen and within all ministries and major military units, akin
plus Mohammed Abdalsalam and Abdalmalik al-Ajri as his foreign
to a political commissar system of surveillance and parallel authority. See
representatives and spokesmen. As with any rule, there are exceptions—
Adnan al- Gabarni, “Who are the Houthis? The hidden structures and key
one being the involvement of Husayn-era leaders like Mohsen al-Hamzi
leaders who actually run the organization,” Al Masdar Online English, March
(Judicial Council head) and Saleh Mesfir Farhan al-Shaer (judicial guardian
14, 2022.
of confiscated properties) under Abdalmalik. See al-Gabarni, “Who are the
ae Abu Ali was described by Brandt as the key military player in post-2010 Houthis?” Details also topped up with interviews for this study. Names of
Houthi takeovers and tribal fighting in Dammaj, Amran, and Sana’a. See interviewees, and dates and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’
Brandt, pp. 279-280, 334-335. request.
of Husaynah who is the director of the President of the Supreme “The Houthi Jihad Council bears an
Political Council Mahdi al-Mashat’s office and the powerful
Government Works Authority,56 and is a few years older than
unmistakable similarity to Lebanese
Abdalmalik.ai According to Gregory Johnsen’s research, it was Hezbollah’s own Jihad Council,
Ahmed Hamid who lobbied for Badr al-Din to hold open the including the centralization of
leadership role for Abdalmalik in his early years as the ‘prince
regent’ of the Houthi movement in 2005-2010.57 The second older intelligence and counter-intelligence
advisor with direct access to Abdalmalik is Ahsan al-Humran functions at Jihad Council level.”
(detailed below), who heads Abdalmalik’s Preventative Security
(al-Amn al-Waqa’i) chief58 and oversees the Houthi intelligence
agencies.59 A third older figure—and the only one drawn from
outside Abdalmalik’s circle—is Abdalkarim Amir al-Din, a much visible.64 This body had existed since 2010 or 2011, coincident with
younger brother of Badr al-Dinaj and thus an uncle to Abdalmalik the sixth Sa`da war (and growing IRGC and Lebanese Hezbollah
who is about 14 years older than him.ak Abdalkarim is the Minister involvement).65 It was a well-kept secret until around 2018, when
of Interior in the Houthi-controlled Sana’a government with close testimony of its existence started to slip out with Saleh loyalist
ties to the IRGC and Lebanese Hezbollah.60 But even in this case, defectors and enhanced scrutiny of the Houthi leadership.66 With
Abdalmalik’s people seem to be slowly taking over: The Ministry Saleh dead, the Jihad Council, consisting of approximately nine
of Interior (MoI) has been brought under the supervision of Ahsan members, now exercised its authority without disturbance by its
al-Humran, and one of Husayn’s own sons, Ali, is positioned to former ally. The Houthi Jihad Council bears an unmistakable
succeed Abdalkarim at the MoI.al similarity to Lebanese Hezbollah’s own Jihad Council,67 including
the centralization of intelligence and counter-intelligence functions
Abdalmalik’s Jihad Council at Jihad Council level.68 Like Hezbollah’s Jihad Council (which is
The first three years of Houthi control of Sana’a and northern and loosely overseen by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah),69 the
western Yemen in 2014-2017 represented an uneasy partnership Houthi Jihad Council is formally led by the overall movement’s
between the Houthis and their co-conspirator in the 2014 takeover, leader, in this case Abdalmalik al-Huthi, who has been styled “the
ousted president Ali Abdullah Saleh.61 This changed in December Leader of the Quranic Procession.”70 In the authors’ assessment,
2017 when long-standing tensions boiled over between Saleh’s there is a lot of anecdotal evidence that Abdalmalik rarely—if ever—
forces and the Houthis, with Saleh being killed by Houthi forces physically meets with all the Jihad Council due to the stringent
on December 4, 2017,62 allowing the Houthis full and unfettered security precautions he takes, in which the leader remains distant
control of the Sana’a-based government and military for the first and meets almost no other Houthi leadersam except perhaps Ahmed
time.63 Hamid and Ahsan al-Humran.71
In the reorganization that followed, the Houthis’ Jihad Council, The Houthi Jihad Council has a small secretariat, the Jihad
the movement’s supreme command authority, became more Office, which is led by an Abdalmalik loyalist known as (secretary
general or rapporteur) Abu Mohammed.an Aside from an Iranian
and Lebanese representative (see below), the remaining full
members of the Jihad Council include an observer from the
ah Greg Johnsen says Ahmed Hamid was born in 1972 and was the key backer General Council (who also represents the Executive Council);
of Abdalmalik as the successor to Husayn, energizing others to push
Abdalmalik’s takeover. See Johnsen. the Operations Official; the Military Regions Official; the Jihad
Preparation Official; the Special Forces Official; and the Security
ai The United Nations reported in 2021 that Ahmed Hamid leads the
Supreme Political Committee of the Houthi movement (its politburo, in
effect) and the Houthi-controlled Supreme Council for the Management
and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (SCMCHA), where he oversees
“intimidation of opponents, corruption activities including the diversion am “Distant” is a word that recurs in interviews with Yemenis who have insight
of humanitarian aid.” See “Letter dated 22 January 2021 from the Panel into Abdalmalik’s leadership style since he formally replaced Badr al-Din
of Experts on Yemen addressed to the President of the Security Council,” as the Houthi leader in 2010. Based on the preponderance of evidence
United Nations Security Council, January 25, 2021, p. 17. See also Johnsen. from interviews, all major military and security decisions go to Abdalmalik
for approval via the Jihad Office secretariat, the General Council, and
aj Badr al-Din al-Huthi was born in the early 1920s while his brother
the Office of the Sayyed. Physical threat may be a factor because of the
Abdalkarim was born around 1965, making him slightly younger than
increased risk of geo-location and targeting by precision weapons when
(his nephew) Husayn Badr al-Din (born in 1956 or 1959). Brandt, p. 172;
Saudi Arabia became directly involved in fighting the Houthis. Iranian and
Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, p. 106.
Hezbollah protective security training may be a related factor as well.
ak Abdalkarim is regularly mentioned as one of the top three power blocs Security protocols surrounding Abdalmalik are extraordinarily thorough,
within the Houthi movement. See Johnsen. See also Abdalkarim’s rivaling and resembling those around Lebanese Hezbollah commander
involvement with the mushrifeen system in “The Houthi Supervisory Hassan Nasrallah. According to Marieke Brandt, these precautions began
System,” Yemen Analysis Hub, ACAPS, June 17, 2020, p. 3. One report places in December 2008, which is logical as it was just ahead of the sixth war
Abdalkarim as Abdalmalik’s designated successor. See “Abdel Malik al- and at a point when the Houthis were attracting more support from
Houthi Chooses His Uncle to Succeed Him,” Asharq Al-Awsat, September Lebanese Hezbollah. See Brandt, pp. 309, 314. Some details also provided
16, 2018. in interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and dates and places of
interviews withheld at interviewees’ request.
al Colonel Ali Husayn al-Huthi, Husayn Badr al-Din’s son, is currently the
commander of police forces, which is a deputy ministerial role that typically an Abu Mohammed is known to be a former student of Husayn Badr al-Din
leads to appointment as minister. Details provided in interviews for this al-Huthi and a sadah from the Houthi home province of Saàda. Details
study. Names of interviewees, and dates and places of interviews withheld provided in interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and dates and
at interviewees’ request. places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request.
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© The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (2022)
Official.72 As later sections will detail, the Operations and Military content algorithms.83 As is the case in Iraq,84 Lebanese Hezbollah’s
Regions officials assist with operational coordination functions Arabic-fluent media advisors seem to have played a long-standing
across the different geographic military zones.73 Also discussed in role in building out Houthi information operation capabilities.au
following sections below, the Jihad Preparation Official focuses on The Special Forces Official represents the so-called “qualitative
recruitment, indoctrination, and force generation issues.74 forces” such as missile and drone forces, naval capabilities, and
Mohammed Abdal Salam,ao a close contact of Abdalmalik al- technical training programs.85 These are strategic capabilities that
Huthi, sometimes attends the Jihad Council, seemingly in his non- are commanded directly by the Jihad Council.86 Historically, these
public role as the head of Houthi media operations.75 Known best Special Forces Officials are only usually identified after their death:
as the primary (Oman-based) point of contact between the Houthi One was Hamud al-Ghumran, who died in combat around 2017;87
movement and foreign journalists and think-tanks,76 Abdal Salam the next was Hasan al-Jaradi88 (Abu Shahidav), a combat veteran
is the founding father of Houthi propaganda and disinformation from the very heart of Sa`da who was killed in Hodeida in 2018;aw
capabilities.77 Working closely with the Iran-established Islamic and a final official called Mohammed Abdalkarim al-Humran was
Radio and Television Union (IRTVU)78 and Lebanese Hezbollah killed on the Marib frontline (at Sirwah) in 2020.89 The current
media organs,79 Abdal Salam and Houthi Information Minister Special Forces Official appears to be known only as Abu Fatima.90
Dhaif Allah al-Shami80 have built out what the authors’ assess to The aforementioned Security Official (Ahsan al-Humran)91
be one of the most powerful Houthi strategic attack capabilities, appears to be dual-hatted as the head of the Preventative Security
namely its raft of television, radio, and social media broadcasters.81 body, which oversees all the other intelligence agenciesax (with the
As well as controlling and censoring landline and cellular mobile
internet inside Houthi-controlled Yemen,ap the Houthis have
developed a powerful offensive capability aimed at controlling the
international narrative surrounding the conflict in Yemen, which
has sometimes achieved decisive strategic results.aq In addition to
strong support from most of IRTVU’s members in television and
radio,ar the Houthis directly control their own Beirut-based Al-
Masirah satellite television station and the Sana’a headquarters of
Yemen’s SABA News agency.82 Abdal Salam has a deputy, SABA
News director Nasser al-Din Amer,as who heads up social media
operations via a dedicated social media center.at This operation
includes the centralized creation of messaging and hashtag
campaigns, with well-managed “Twitter banks” of prepared content au Lebanese Hezbollah liaison officers appear to be (at the time of
publication) led by Hezbollah operative Husayn al-Dirani, who has
for crowds of supporters to draw upon and amplify, including with
supported Houthi information operations for many years and who works
instructions of how to avoid being detected as bots by Twitter closely with two Yemenis: Amer al-Amer al-Marani, a former deputy director
of the National Security Bureau under the Houthi, and Mohammed Ghali
al-Battal. Al-Dirani is reported by the authors’ contacts to be an assistant
to senior Lebanese Hezbollah member and U.S.-designated terrorist Khalil
ao His real name is Abdal Salam Salah Falita. Provided in interviews for this Yusif Harb (Abu Mustafa). In 2013, Lebanese Hezbollah member Khalil Yusif
study. Names of interviewees, and dates and places of interviews withheld Harb was added to the Specially Designated Nationals List for terrorism
at interviewees’ request. through Executive Order 13224. See “Treasury Sanctions Hizballah
Leadership,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, August 22, 2013. Other
ap The Houthis control the .ye domain through their physical control of
details on al-Dirani, al-Marani, and al-Battal provided in interviews for this
internet landlines entering Yemen at Hodeida and the backbone inside
study. Names of interviewees, and dates and places of interviews withheld
northern Yemen. They employ sophisticated censorship tools (such as
at interviewees’ request.
Netsweeper). See Elias Groll, “The Other War in Yemen—for Control of
the Country’s Internet,” Foreign Policy, November 28, 2018, and Robert av Abu Shahid is an unusual kunya, meaning “father of the martyrs.” In a
Muggah, “Yemen’s Parallel War in Cyberspace,” Foreign Policy, January 6, movement where nearly every fighter had lost family members, this is a
2022. remarkable honor. Abu Shahid apparently lost his father, brothers, and
son before he himself died. Details provided in interviews for this study.
aq In the authors’ collective experience, Houthi information operations
Names of interviewees, and dates and places of interviews withheld at
and strategic propaganda efforts were ultimately more effective than
interviewees’ request.
the Houthi armed forces in stopping the UAE-backed Hodeida offensive
in 2018. While Houthi defenses were crumbling on the ground, the real aw Abu Shahid was from the Juma’ah area of Saàda, the exact wellspring of
pressure that stopped the anti-Houthi advance came in the way the fighting Badr al-Din al-Huthi’s family networks. Abu Shahid fought in some of the
was framed and presented to U.S. congressional leaders via the media and six wars, then at Tai’zz in 2015, and against the Saleh forces in 2017. Details
think-tanks (i.e., as a threat to humanitarian access and an insurmountable provided in interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and dates and
military challenge). This is the authors’ collective conclusion, based on their places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request.
synthesis of the known facts. ax The Houthis folded the two long-standing intelligence agencies (Political
ar Notably Iranian state television and radio, plus Hezbollah’s Al-Manar, Security organization or PSO, and the National Security Bureau or
Al-Mayadin, and Al-Sahat. A comprehensive listing is provided in Abdo NSB) into a single agency called the Security and Intelligence Service in
Albahesh, “The Relations of Houthis with Iran and Hezbollah,” Medium, September 2019. The Security and Intelligence Service is led by former
November 4, 2018. Deputy Minister of Interior Abdul Hakim al-Khaiwani and his deputy,
former PSO chief Qader al-Shami. On December 10, 2020, both men were
as Amer is also the Undersecretary of Yemen’s Ministry of Interior. Details
designated by the U.S. Department of the Treasury under Executive Order
provided in interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and dates and
(E.O.) 13818 and the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act
places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request.
for “serious human rights abuse.” See “Treasury Sanctions Serious Human
at Twitter is the Houthi’s most prolific social media type, followed by Rights Abusers on International Human Rights Day,” U.S. Department of the
Facebook, YouTube, and other websites, and lastly Telegram. See Groll. Treasury, December 10, 2020.
possible exception of Military Intelligenceay). Preventative Security to U.N.bd and U.S.be statements to this effect, the IRGC-QF itself
serves the same specialized leadership protection and regime admits to its support.bf Alongside Abdalmalik, the IRGC-QF
security role as the Protective Security in Lebanese Hezbollah’s “Jihad Assistant” and his Lebanese Hezbollah deputy make up a
Jihad Council.az Ahsan al-Humran was a young loyalist to Husayn triad at the heart of the Houthi war machine.94 IRGC-QF uses the
Badr al-Din who is just a few years older than Abdalmalik.ba He is same moniker—“Jihad Assistant”bg—in Iraq to describe its senior
one of many Humran family members in Husayn and Abdalmalik’s liaison officer with the top-tier Iraqi Shià terrorist group Kata’ib
inner circles.92 (The Humran are a sadah family that traces descent Hezbollah.95 Also similar to the Houthi case, the Jihad Assistant in
to the Prophet.93) Ahsan al-Humran, one of the earliest Houthi Iraq has a Lebanese Hezbollah deputy, suggesting a kind of rough
commanders, replaced Abdalmalik’s long-term Preventative template in IRGC-QF interactions with partners and proxies.96
Security chief Abu Tahabb when the latter was removed during the (In Lebanon, the Jihad Assistant is Lebanesebh and the title of the
intelligence reorganization in September 2019.bc IRGC-QF senior advisor is unclear.) The key point is that the Jihad
Assistant is always the senior military advisor to the leader,bi and in
The IRGC Jihad Assistant and his Lebanese the case of Abdalmalik al-Huthi, this is an Iranian IRGC-QF officer
Hezbollah Deputy with a Lebanese Hezbollah deputy.97
It is no secret that the IRGC-QF (Islamic Revolutionary Guard The exact nature of the relationship between Abdalmalik and
Corps-Quds Force) and Lebanese Hezbollah supported Houthi
territorial expansionism and military operations: In addition
bd According to the United Nations, Iran is responsible for both financial and
weapons transfers to the Houthis. For instance, based on the design of
the UAVs and the tracing of component parts, the U.N. panel of experts on
Yemen concluded that the material necessary to assemble the Qasef-1s
“emanated from the Islamic Republic of Iran.” “Letter dated 26 January
2018 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen mandated by Security Council
resolution 2342 (2017) addressed to the President of the Security Council,”
United Nations Security Council, January 26, 2018, p. 32. See also Carole
Landry, “UN panel finds further evidence of Iran link to Yemen missiles,”
Agence France-Presse, July 31, 2018.
be To give a recent example, Tim Lenderking, U.S. envoy to Yemen for the
Biden administration, noted in April 2021: “What I see is continued aiding
and abetting an army of Houthis by the Iranians so that they can continue
attacking Saudi Arabia, and unfortunately those attacks have risen quite
ay In the authors’ collective assessment, it seems unlikely that the current strongly in the last couple of months.” Michelle Nichols and Jonathan
head of the Military Intelligence Authority, the veteran fighter Abdullah Landay, “Iran provides Yemen’s Houthis ‘lethal’ support, U.S. official says,”
al-Hakim (Abu Ali), is taking orders from anyone below Abdalmalik al-Huthi. Reuters, April 21, 2021.
He has an unrivaled record in solving tribal disputes and is probably one of
bf IRGC-QF assistant commander Rostam Ghasemi explained the advisory
the Houthi leaders who is left to manage his own affairs, which are focused
effort in some detail to Russian Today TV on April 21, 2021. See “Qods Force
on regime security engagements with tribal leaders. That being said,
Official Rostam Ghasemi: Iran’s Friends In The Region Have Retaliated
almost no one is a “direct report” to Abdalmalik due to operational security
Against Israel And Will Continue To Do So; We Have A Few Military Advisors
concerns, suggesting that Abdullah al-Hakim (who does not sit on the
In Yemen And Have Provided Weapon-Manufacturing Technology To The
Jihad Council as a full member) may be represented in that forum by Ahsan
Yemenis,” April 21, 2021. One Houthi commander, Abdullah al-Mahdoon,
al-Humran, the key intelligence official. Abu Ali’s deputy at the Military
also spoke publicly about Iranian provision of military equipment and
Intelligence Authority is Mohammed Husayn Hashem (Abu Huriya). Details
training. Al-Mahdoon noted that “local [Yemeni] trainers were trained in
provided in interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and dates and
Lebanon and Iran on how to collect and construct the pieces of missiles
places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request.
and how to manufacture mines.” He added that “external experts and
az Lebanese Hezbollah holds leadership protective security, counter- trainers from the Lebanese Shiite Hizbollah, and al-Qods legion of Iran
intelligence, central information datasets, and surveillance capabilities supervise local Yemeni cadres.” Al-Mahdoon also said that “there are
at Jihad Council level. Matt Levitt, “Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of several secret centers for manufacturing weapons and many other centers
Lebanon’s Party of God,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March for training.” He confirmed that “these centers are equipped with modern
4, 2013, p. 14. machines to manufacture all kinds of weapons.” See Albahesh.
ba Ahsan al-Humran appears to have been born in the late 1970s. Details bg For instance, the IRGC-QF Jihad Assistant for Iraq is Brigadier General
provided in interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and dates and Hajji Hamid Nasseri. Author (Knights) interviews, multiple Iraqi contacts,
places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request. multiple sessions with significant detail, 2021, exact dates, name, and
places withheld at request of the interviewees.
bb Abu Taha’s real name is reported by multiple contacts to be Abdulrab
Jarfan, the Houthi leader placed over the National Security Bureau bh Imad Mughniyeh and then Mustafa Badreddine held the role. Shimon
(NSB) when Sana’a fell to the Houthis in 2014. He is reported to have run Shapira, “The Struggle between Israel and Hizbullah, 1982-2020,” Tablet,
protective security for Houthi leaders after Husayn’s death. He is reported August 11, 2020.
to have married a niece of Abdalmalik. Details provided in interviews for
bi Some Iran-backed groups also describe the main assistant to the military
this study. Names of interviewees, and dates and places of interviews
leader as the jihad assistant. See Basra-based MP Faleh al-Khaz’ali, who
withheld at interviewees’ request.
acts as the jihadi assistant for Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada. Another Iraqi
bc According to local contacts, NSB head Abu Taha (Abdulrab Jarfan), individual called Adnan al-Bendawi is the jihadi assistant to Iraqi Shià
NSB deputy head Abu Imad (Mutlaq al-Marani), and Political Security militia Hezbollah Harakat al-Nujaba. Author (Knights) interviews, multiple
Organization chief Qader al-Shami were all removed due to chronic Iraqi contacts, multiple sessions with significant detail, 2021 and 2022;
infighting and their services merged under new leadership (though exact dates, name, and places withheld at request of the interviewees. For
al-Shami was retained in a new deputy intelligence chief role). Details a profile of Hezbollah Harakat al-Nujaba, see Michael Knights, “Profile:
provided in interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and dates and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba,” Militia Spotlight, Washington Institute for
places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request. Near East Policy, April 27, 2021.
the Jihad Assistant is obviously a well-guarded secret, but careful “The Jihad Council format was
interviewing with persons at the edges of the Houthi security
establishment can begin to build an intriguing picture.98 Though developed by Lebanese Hezbollah
the exact identity of the current Jihad Assistant is not yet publicly in order to communicate lessons
known, a previous IRGC-QF official to play the role was IRGC-
QF Brigadier General Abdalreza Shahla’i.bj As in Iraq, the Jihad
learned across the group, and it might
Assistant is a brigadier general. His role is to advise the Houthi reasonably be expected to play this
leader in “the path of strategic jihadist and military actions” role in Yemen as well. The council
and to “be a partner in making military decisions.”99 In terms of
Iranian influence over key Houthi strategic decisions—such as might also logically provide a safe,
entering or leaving ceasefires, or undertaking strategic attacks on economical, and unobtrusive way for
Gulf States—there is no reliable data. In the authors’ assessment,
the IRGC-QF to advise the Houthi
Iran’s Jihad Assistant and Abdalmalik’s inner circle have strong
incentives to conceal any evidence of Iranian influence in order to movement.”
avoid damaging Abdalmalik’s credibility as a free-standing Yemeni
leader.100 Where Iran uses its influence, it may often be to preach
caution and the avoidance of over-reach and anecdotal evidence
suggests Iran does tend to look nervously on major Houthi offensive while Iran is a foreign nation.110 Hezbollah’s Arabs (as opposed to
actions.bk Iranian Persians) can also blend in more easily with Houthi hosts
The Jihad Council format was developed by Lebanese Hezbollah and seem to have fewer operational security restrictions, allowing
in order to communicate lessons learned across the group,101 and their advisors to visit the frontlines and move around the military
it might reasonably be expected to play this role in Yemen as zones.111
well.102 The council might also logically provide a safe, economical, Overall, analysts might profitably reassess the longevity of
and unobtrusive way for the IRGC-QF to advise the Houthi Hezbollah military support to the Houthis, looking further back
movement.bl The Jihad Assistant also decides what kind of Iranian prior to 2010. Hezbollah itself has spoken of providing military
and Hezbollah technical assistance and hardware to provide, both advice to the Houthis as far back as 1992, bm but the major
using in-country training teams and stores, or by requesting new intensification might logically have occurred after the Hezbollah
specialists or materiel from Iran and Lebanon.103 A small IRGC- tactical victories over Israel in the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war and
QF and Lebanese Hezbollah staff, now reportedly numbering in the skyrocketing of Hezbollah’s regional reputation.112 IRGC-QF
the tens, not the hundreds,104 manages the practical arrangements, appears to have based its earliest military assistance efforts to
including advising on the operation of a small set of military the Houthis out of Lebanon under the leadership of an IRGC-
industries.105 QF representative known as Abu Hadi113 and in partnership with
Lebanese Hezbollah’s deputy Jihad Assistant on the Houthi Lebanese Hezbollah senior operative Khalil Yusif Harb.114 bn There
Jihad Council—currently an officer known as Abu Zainab106—has a are scattered but growing indicators of Iranian and Lebanese
more prominent role in practical training and equipping tasks.107 As Hezbollah sponsorship of the Houthis in the fourth, fifth, and
noted by one of the authors (Knights) in a 2018 CTC Sentinel article sixth wars against the Yemeni government in 2008-2010.bo These
on Houthi military operations,108 Lebanese Hezbollah advisors have
long had more freedom of movement in Houthi areas of Yemen
than Iranians.109 The Houthis appear less sensitive about Hezbollah
involvement than about Iranian presence, possibly because
Hezbollah is seen as an (elder) sister organization to Ansar Allah,
bm Matthew Levitt ascribes Unit 3800, Hezbollah’s external special operations

bj Abdul Reza Shahla’i (also known as Yusuf Abu al-Karkh and Hajji Yusef) arm, with taking on an advise and assist role in Yemen after the Arab Spring
has been designated by the United States for threatening the peace in 2011. Levitt, pp. 288, 381, 395. The U.S. government likewise described
and stability of Iraq (in 2008) and then as a Specially Designated a Hezbollah advise and assist effort from 2012 onward. See the National
Global Terrorist (in 2011) for aiding attacks on the United States. The Security Advisor’s comments in 2012 in Karen DeYoung, “Europe Should
United States offered a $15 million bounty for Abdul Reza Shahla’i in Label Hezbollah a Terrorist Group, U.S. Urges,” Washington Post, October
December 2019 and tried to kill Shahla’i with an airstrike on January 3, 26, 2012.
2020. See “Rewards for Justice: Abdul Reza Shahla’i,” U.S. Department
bn In 2013, Lebanese Hezbollah member Khalil Yusif Harb was added to the
of the Treasury, and James Gordon Meek, Luis Martinez, and Elizabeth
Specially Designated Nations list for terrorism through Executive Order
McLaughlin, “US tried to kill Iranian commander in Yemen same night as
13224. See “Treasury Sanctions Hizballah Leadership,” U.S. Department of
Soleimani strike: Officials,” ABC News, January 10, 2020.
the Treasury, August 22, 2013.
bk For instance, in advising caution when the Houthis wanted to surge forward
bo These include sophisticated propaganda and media operations; rapid
and attack Sana’a, Aden, and Ma’rib in 2014-2015. Details provided in
evolution of commando raiding tactics and offensive mining techniques
from the fourth war onward; growing reports of maritime arms deliveries;
movements of Iranian mother ships in the Red Sea; and Yemeni
bl Considering operational security and political concerns (i.e., Houthi government detention of Lebanese and Iranian personnel in Houthi areas.
sensitivity to being seen to be foreign-advised), the Jihad Assistant and his See Michael Knights, “The Houthi War Machine: From Guerrilla War to
team will likely seek to keep a low profile and not be widely seen or met. State Capture,” CTC Sentinel 11:8 (2018). One Houthi leader, Abdullah
This is the authors’ collective conclusion, based on their synthesis of the al-Mahdoon, spoke of arms and funds arriving in time for the fourth war (in
known facts. 2006-2007). See Albahesh.
appear to be the leading edge of Hezbollah advisingbp and IRGC- The most famous turncoat was the Houthi-installed Minister
QF equippingbq of Houthi fighting units. Indeed, upon taking over of Defense (at the time of publication) Staff Major General
Sana’a in September 2014, an early Houthi priority was the release Mohammed Nasser al-Atifi,bu who attended Houthi ideological re-
of Hezbollah captives from government prisons, as well as Iranian education, swore an oath of allegiance on the Qur’an, and plays
nationals seized while delivering arms to the Houthis in 2013.br an active part in Houthi propaganda operations.bv Of interest, the
Houthis have not made sudden or sweeping changes to the Yemeni
Administration of the Houthi-controlled Military military and go to some lengths to portray this national institution
When the September 21, 2014, Peace and National Partnership as unchanged,bw an effort of uncertain success to hide the influence
Agreement was signed on the day the Houthis seized Sana’a as a of the Jihad Council and minimize negative reaction from the
last ditch effort to save the post-Arab Spring peace process,115 the military classes and other nationalists.118
Houthis sought the integration of around 40,000 Houthi fighters The power behind the minister’s throne at MoD appears
into the state security forces, and the emplacement of a Houthi with to be Staff Lieutenant Generalbx Mohammed Abdalkarim al-
familial links to the army, Zakaria al-Shami, as the deputy chief of Ghammari (informally known as Hashim al-Ghammari),119 who
staff of the Yemeni Ministry of Defense (MoD).116 After overrunning was designated by the United States and the United Nations in 2021
Sana’a in the coup of September 2014, the Houthis went further, for threatening the peace and stability of Yemen through his role in
directly controlling the MoD and MoI for the first time.bs In the procuring and deploying explosives, drones, and missiles against
latter, a slow-burning struggle for control of the police forces began targets inside and outside of Yemen.by Born in 1981,bz al-Ghammari
between loyalists of Ali Abdallah Saleh, eventually ending with
Saleh’s death at the hands of the Houthis in December 2017 and
the appointment of Abdalkarim al-Houthi as Minister of Interior in bu Major General Mohammed Nasser al-Atifi was one of Saleh’s most trusted
2019.117 In the MoD, the Houthis progressively co-opted Saleh-era and capable commanders, in command of the elite Missile Batteries Group,
generalsbt to serve alongside (and quickly under) senior Houthis. controlling Yemen’s medium-range ballistic missiles and accurate short-
range ballistic missiles. Charles Caris, “Yemen Order of Battle,” Institute for
the Study of War, February 23, 2015.
bv Houthi Minister of Defense Mohammed Nasser al-Atifi said in the IRGC-
bp Baraa Shaiban claims: “In late 2011 and early 2012, Iran initially handed the affiliated Tasnim, a few days after a drone attack on Abu Dhabi, that
‘Yemeni file’ over to Lebanon’s Hizbollah to manage it, as Hizbollah is more “painful and terrifying strikes” were to be expected in the “strategic,
familiar with the Arab world. Hizbollah then started organizing seminars military and economic depth of the coalition countries.” See Maryam
and conferences for Yemeni youth activists. The Houthis were the main Sinaee, “Houthi General Tells IRGC-Linked Website Of Coming Attacks On
point of contact on the ground for Hizbollah’s recruiting efforts of Yemenis UAE,” Iran International, January 30, 2022. Details also topped up with
from all backgrounds. In Lebanon, the handler of the Yemeni delegations interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and dates and places of
is a man called ‘Abu Mustafa.’ His real name is Khalil Yusif Harb.” Baraa interviews withheld at interviewees’ request.
Shaiban, “Yemen’s Clash of Two Revolutions,” Hudson Institute, April 4,
bw For instance, many Houthi senior military commanders (such as Abdullah
2021.
al-Hakim (Abu Ali) and Yusif al-Madani) have taken to wearing formal
bq As noted in one of the author’s (Knights) September 2018 CTC Sentinel uniforms and obeying rank conventions—for instance, not wearing red
article: “The January 2013 interception of the Jihan-1 dhow suggests a staff ‘tabs’ (epaulette) if they have not attended staff college. (Abdalmalik
powerful post-2011 effort by Iran to arm Ansar Allah in the same manner is an exception, wearing staff tabs on his field marshal’s uniform.) Equally
Iran has armed Lebanese Hizballah.” See Knights, “The Houthi War interesting, the Houthis seem to have inflated the general officer rank
Machine” and also “Yemenis intercept ‘Iranian ship,’” BBC, October 27, structure one level—meaning that Yemeni officers wearing, for example,
2009, as well as Oren Dorell, “Iranian support for Yemen’s Houthis goes brigadier general rank badges are now one level higher (i.e., brigadier
back years,” USA Today, April 20, 2015, and C. J. Chivers and Robert Worth, generals are referred to as major generals). This grants a promotion and
“Seizure of Antiaircraft Missiles in Yemen Raises Fears That Iran Is Arming salary and pension benefits to remaining serving and retired Saleh-era
Rebels There,” New York Times, February 8, 2013. See also “Final Report officers. Thus, a Houthi general wearing the same rank badges as a general
of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1929 (2010),” of the U.N.-backed PLC is almost always reported to be one rank higher.
United Nations Security Council, June 2013, pp. 14-15. Authors’ survey of articles showing imagery of tank badges and text
description of ranks.
br For instance, Abdulaziz Mahrous, who Al Masdar reported as leading
smuggling operations in the Gulf of Aden in 2021, “was among the crew bx Al-Ghammari is an example of the inflation of general officer ranks: He
arrested during the capture of the Iranian ship ‘Jihan-1’ in 2013. The Houthis wears insignia of a major general, but is accorded the rank of lieutenant
released him four days after seizing control of Sana’a in a coup d’etat in late general. Authors’ survey of articles showing imagery of tank badges and
September 2014.” Fares al-Suraihi and Alkhatab Alrawhani, “Special Report: text description of ranks.
How Iran smuggles weapons to Yemen,” Al Masdar Online English, May 9,
by The U.S. Treasury assesses: “As the Head of the General Staff of the Houthi
2021.
armed forces, the most senior commander within the Houthi military
bs Even critics of the post-2015 war in Yemen call the Houthi takeover a “coup.” leadership structure, Al-Ghamari is directly responsible for overseeing
For example, see Mareike Transfeld, “Peace and State Fragmentation in Houthi military operations that have destroyed civilian infrastructure and
Yemen,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 22, 2019. Yemen’s neighbors, specifically Saudi Arabia and the UAE. He directs the
procurement and deployment of various weapons, including improvised
bt With enough digging, some patterns appear in the practice of co-option.
explosive devices, ammunition, and UAVs [Unmanned Aerial Vehicles].
More trusted Saleh-era officers may come from families connected to
Al-Ghamari has also overseen Houthi UAV and missile attacks against
the Khawlan tribal areas in Saàda (one example being serving Minister
Saudi Arabian targets. Al-Ghamari reportedly received his military training
of Defense Mohammed Nasser al-Atifi). One deputy chief of staff of the
in Houthi militia camps run by Lebanese Hezbollah and Iran’s Islamic
MoD (Yahya Mohammed al-Shami) was trusted because his father (Major
Revolutionary Guard Corps.” See “Treasury Sanctions Senior Houthi
General Mohammed Abdalmalik al-Shami) died in the same March 20,
Military Official Overseeing Group’s Offensive Operations.”
2015, mosque bombing as many Houthi officers. Zakaria al-Shami, an
early Houthi embed at MoD prior to the Houthi coup in 2014, was linked bz Al-Ghammari’s birthdate is variously given as between 1979 and 1984. The
by his father to the Yemeni army. Details gathered in interviews and data authors believe, based on their contacts, that it is 1981. Drawn from details
collection for this study. Names of interviewees, and dates and places of from interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and dates and places
interviews withheld at interviewees’ request. of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request.
is one of Abdalmalik’s generation, who was born in Al-Ahnum (then items like medicine, food, cigarettes, spare parts, consumer goods,
in Hajja governorate, but now in Amran) but grew up in Sa`da and fertilizers, and pesticides.133 Al Masdar Online134 and various U.S.
received subsidized tuition from Husayn Badr al-Din al-Huthi at and U.N. reports135 have done a perfectly good job of describing
the Believing Youth camps.ca Interestingly, al-Ghammari had long these operations in detail, so here, the authors will instead focus
been a beneficiary of the MoD as his father had died (accidentally, in on command and control. Under al-Shaer is his deputy for
a fire)120 while serving as a civilian in the MoD, meaning that he held procurement, Major General Mohammed Ahmed al-Talbi (Abu
an honorary rank simply to continue drawing his father’s income Jafar).136 At the Iran end, two Houthi liaison officers play a major
for the family.121 At the same time, in actuality, al-Ghammari was role in procurement: An enigmatic figure known only as “M. S. al-
serving with the Houthi forces throughout the six wars, specializing Moayad” was described in the Al Masdar Online research as “the top
in the production of landmines and improvised explosive devices coordinator of the smuggling operations based outside of Yemen.”137
in Sa`da, and having received Iranian training in explosives- Said al-Jamal, another Yemeni residing in Iran, was sanctioned by
handling.122 From 2014 onward, he worked at senior levels in MoD the United States on June 10, 2021, for running a sanctions-evasion
and became the senior Houthi in the ministry, working with a team network involving shipping and money exchange companies.138 A
of deputies led by Major General Ali Hamud al-Moshaki, a Houthi Yemen-based Houthi official Akram al-Jilani appears to coordinate
from a sadah family in Dhamar governorate.123 a network of smuggling chiefs for the Red Sea (Ahmed Hels), the
Yemen’s MoD was hardly a model of efficiency in the best of Gulf of Aden (Abdallah Mahrous), and the Gulf of Oman (Ibrahim
times,124 let alone under post-2014 conditions of blockade and Helwan and Ali al-Halhali).139
with the ministry’s functions bifurcated between Houthi-held and Onshore, al-Talbi has a transshipment network that handles
government-held areas.125 Nevertheless, the ministry still has utility trucking of smuggled goods to their storage locations. This network
as a cover for the Jihad Council and is allowed to claim public credit appears to be led by Akram al-Jilani, plus an Iranian-trained
for some enabling functions: personnel, training, and equipping and Yemeni logistician Mansour Ahmed al-Saadi,140 cd and (until his
sustaining armed forces. In the authors’ collective view, the most reassignment in September 2020)ce an Iranian-trained former
important of these is the illicit procurement of military materiel bodyguard of Abdalmalik’s called Major General Hadi Mohammed
from abroad, in violation of the U.N. arms embargo.126 By combining al-Khawlani (Abu Ali).cf Little is known in the unclassified
the pioneering research undertaken by Al Masdar Online127 with realm about the exact laydown of the Houthi warehousing and
new interviews,128 a quite full picture can be constructed regarding transshipment system, but judging by numerous Saudi airstrikes on
the leadership of Houthi procurement and smuggling activities. such locations, the system is extensive.cg Iran, Lebanese Hezbollah,
Working directly with Mohammed Abdalkarim al-Ghammari is and the Houthis seem to have optimized the system to minimize
his assistant for military logistics, Major General Saleh Mesfer the number of critical components that must be smuggled from
Farhan al-Shaer (Abu Yaser),129 a U.N. and U.S.-sanctioned Houthi Iran (complete weapons systems, ballistic missile fuel, guidance
official130 from Al-Safra district in the east of Sa`da.131 Al-Shaer not units, and quality high-explosives)141 and maximize local sourcing
only heads up MoD logistics, including smuggling operations, but of military and dual-use materials.142 As noted in CTC Sentinel in
also plays the role of “Judicial Custodian” of an estimated $100 September 2018, the military industries are likely limited to a few
million worth of confiscated assets,cb some of which are made dozen warehouses, drone and missile workshops, landmine and sea
available for military use.cc mine production facilities, and training sites.143
Under al-Shaer operates what appears to the authors to be a A final interesting aspect of MoD’s role under the Houthis is
remarkably effective system for smuggling donated Iranian arms,
technology, and fuel into Yemen,132 as well as providing the Houthis
with a mechanism to control the profitable smuggling of civilian
cd Al-Saadi was designated by the United States for threatening the peace
and security of Yemen under Executive Order 13611 on March 2, 2021. At
the time of his designation, he was described as “the Houthi Naval Forces
Chief of Staff,” and he has been a well-known Houthi commander on the
ca Al-Ghammari is described by interviewees and in Yemeni media articles
Red Sea coast since 2015. See “Treasury Sanctions Key Military Leaders
as being prominent in Houthi bomb-making and training establishments
of the Ansarallah Militia in Yemen,” U.S. Department of Treasury, March 2,
since the first Saàda war, and having attended training camps in Iran,
2021.
Lebanon, and Syria during and since the six Saàda wars. See “Mohammad
al-Ghammari; the Houthi Leader Who conveyed the Iranian ‘Revolutionary ce Al-Khawlani was moved to an internal security role in Ibb during September
Guards’ Experience to Yemen,” Al-Estiklal Newspaper, September 19, 2019. Details from interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and
2022. Details also gathered in interviews and data collection for this study. dates and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request.
cf An Al-Yemen Now investigative report has a very useful image of al-Kahlani
interviewees’ request.
as one of Abdalmalik’s bodyguards and then again as a logistics official
cb “Major General Saleh Mesfer Alshaer, a close ally of Houthi leader Abdul more recently. See “Who is the Houthi terrorist called Abu Ali Al-Kahlani?”
Malik al-Houthi, serves as both the commander of the Houthi-controlled Al-Yemen Now, December 13, 2018.
military logistics support organization, where he assisted the Houthis
cg One Al Masdar Online report suggests there have been dozens of drone
in acquiring smuggled weapons, as well as the officer responsible for
and missile storage warehouses and workshops in recent years: “From
managing all assets and funds confiscated by the Houthis.” “Treasury
that date until December 2021, the investigation team monitored nearly
Sanctions Senior Houthi Military Officer Overseeing Group’s Seizure of
50 operations that the coalition announced in Houthi-controlled areas
Opposition Property,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, November 18, 2021.
‘to target and destroy an integrated network of Houthi drone capabilities
cc Al-Shaer handles the mobilization of confiscated assets like vehicles, and logistical facilities and the locations of foreign experts.’ Of these,
spare parts, fuel, consumables, tents, and many basic logistical items from about 40 operations were in Sana’a, while the rest were distributed in
his stores of confiscated material. Details from interviews for this study. Saada, Hodeidah and Mahwit governorates.” See Fares al-Suraihi, “How
Names of interviewees, and dates and places of interviews withheld at Iran infiltrates the skies of Yemen to threaten the region and the world,” Al
interviewees’ request. Masdar Online English, February 4, 2022.
its growing involvement in mass mobilization.144 Somewhat akin “Somewhat akin to the state adoption
to the state adoption of militias under Iraq’s Popular Mobilization
Forces,145 the Houthis have folded a number of their militias into of militias under Iraq’s Popular
the MoD administrative structure in order to provide them with Mobilization Forces, the Houthis
legitimacy, payment, and support.146 Some of these so-called
“Popular Committees’’ existed before 2014,ch and others are newer
have folded a number of their militias
militias raised to give paid fighting jobs to Houthi-aligned tribes.ci into the [Ministry of Defense]
Houthi sub-units are also nested within surviving Houthi-run administrative structure in order
Yemeni Army brigades, typically small cadres that stick with a
Houthi commander as he is transferred between MoD postings.147 to provide them with legitimacy,
Since 2014—and particularly since the 2017 break with Ali Abdallah payment, and support.”
Saleh and his generals—the Houthi-run MoD has encouraged
professional officers and personnel to take extended, partially paid
home leave.148 The large resultant gaps in manpower have then been
filled by a new General Mobilization Authority within MoD with an what appears to be a parallel mobilization reserve akin to Iran’s
estimated 130,000 recruits from the poorer segments of society,149 Basij forces.155 So-called Logistics and Support Brigades156 are
for whom even a minimal payment (around $30 per month) is being filled out and publicly paraded,157 and these appear to be
preferable to unemployment and complete poverty.150 reservist formations that include older or less capable recruits,
The (unnamed) Houthi Jihad Preparation Official (also known often men who already have a civilian government or academic
as the Official of the Central Committee for Recruitment and job.158 These brigades are being developed by Qasim al-Humran
Mobilization) is deputized by Abdalrahim al-Humran,151 who runs (Abu Kawthar),159 who previously oversaw the Ministry of Youth
the General Mobilization Authority, which instructs local Houthi and Sports and worked under Yahya Badr al-Din, a full brother
governorate supervisors, “neighborhood affairs managers,” and of Husayn, when Yahya was Yemen’s Minister of Education.160
“neighborhood sheikhs”cj to comb households for military-age When placed alongside each other, the various actions of the Jihad
males.152 Jihad Preparation operates a basic three-tier military Preparation Official look, in the view of the authors, very much like
human resources system that recommends recruits for either special similar IRGC or Lebanese Hezbollah efforts to militarize society
forces, technical specialist roles, or general military training.153 The and create the infrastructure for permanent mobilization.161
entire MoD force is subjected to varying degrees of ideological
indoctrination that was not common before 2014ck—and indeed a Operational Control of Combatant Units
narrowing band of soldiers even remember the pre-2014 military.cl As the Houthi movement progressively swallowed up many of
Thus, in the authors’ assessment, the Houthis truly do now control the military forces in Yemen in 2014-2017, it began to improvise
a military that is largely of their own crafting after just a few years operational control and tactical control systems for employing
of uncontested dominance.154 much larger forces on an unprecedented number of frontlines.cm
Most recently, the Jihad Preparation Official is also developing To some extent, the Houthi movement was used to fighting on
multiple geographically separated fronts at the same time from
the six Sa`da wars but not at the scale, expanse, complexity, or
intensity of the fighting against the Saudi-led coalition from 2015
ch Examples include the Hamedan Axis of Abdallah Eida al-Razzami and the
al-Hadi, al-Qasim, and Imam Zayd units. Details from interviews for this to the time of publication.162 Nor was the movement used to holding
study. Names of interviewees, and dates and places of interviews withheld an operational reserve or allocating specialized enabler units from
at interviewees’ request. one widely separated front to another as needed.cn RAND’s excellent
ci Newer post-2015 units include the Wahbi Brigades in al-Bayda, al-Mahawit early study of the Houthi military organization rightly stresses
Brigades in al-Mahawit, the Shaheri Brigades in Ibb, the Fateh Brigades in the concept of qabyala, or “group and individual autonomy over
Midi, Hajjar and Hodeida, and the Samad Brigades on the Red Sea fronts
stringent group solidarity,” meaning a highly decentralized fighting
and Tai’zz. Details from interviews for this study. Names of interviewees,
and dates and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request. system.163 As the six Sa`da wars blended into state capture and
the intense multi-front war against the Saudi-led coalition, the
cj The Arabic title of these neighborhood authorities is Aqil (singular).
Although the position existed long before the war, it has become authors of this paper assess that a more professional and centrally
particularly powerful under Houthi rule, essentially the neighborhood- coordinated system of operational control emerged, partly due to
level equivalent of Houthi supervisors (mushrifeen). Authors’ collective the assimilation of Saleh-era officers as well as due to IRGC-QF and
knowledge of the location situation in Houthi-controlled areas. Details from
Lebanese Hezbollah advice.164
ck One identified Houthi religious guidance commander for the armed forces
is Brigadier General Abed bin Mohammed al-Thair, variously described cm The Houthis moved from fighting in northern Yemen only to new offensives
as “the Deputy Chief of the Ideological Department of the Houthi on the Red Sea coast, the south coast of Yemen, and Ma’rib in the east. By
armed forces” and “deputy head of the Spiritual Guidance Department the authors’ rough calculation using mapping tools, the Houthi frontline
(Ideological) of the Yemeni armed forces.” Sinaee. Details also gathered in expanded from about 700 kilometers in early 2014 to over 1,500 kilometers
interviews and data collection for this study. Names of interviewees, and by the summer of 2015. The area occupied by Houthi forces increased from
dates and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request. around 30,000 square kilometers to 120,000 square kilometers.
cl An 18-year-old fighter today was 10 years old when the Houthis seized cn There is no evidence of a Houthi operational reserve during the six wars:
Sana’a, and was seven years old when the Ali Abdallah Saleh government All troops were allocated to a frontline at all times. This is the authors’
fell. collective conclusion, based on their synthesis of the known facts.
On the Jihad Council, there is both an Operations Official and a the following officers:
Military Regions Official,165 and these closely linked roles are critical • Third MRC (Ma’rib) is led by Major General Hadi Zuraib
to operational control and coordination of the multi-front war.166 (Abu Issam)cs and his influential aide, Brigadier General
The Operations Official is nominally a Houthi commander called Naji Rabid.175 This MRC appears to be a very small
Brigadier General Ismail Awadh167 and his deputy Ibrahim al- command that operates under the overarching authority
Mutawakkil,co who are more important than the official MoD head of of the Central Region headquarters (see below) headed
operations (G-3), former Saleh loyalist Major General Mohammed by Abdalkhaliq al-Huthi.176 The MRC often uses attached
al-Miqdad.168 On a regular basis, Ibrahim al-Mutawakkil relocates reinforcements when it is called upon to attack Ma’rib and
an operations room169 that tracks the frontlines and movements of its standing forces are reputedly smaller than other MRCs
Houthi and enemy forces.170 due to the small amount of terrain currently held by the
Alongside the Operations Official is the Military Regions Official Houthis in Ma’rib.177
who engages directly with the major geographic commands—the • The “Middle Region,” Saleh-era nomenclature that is
Military Region Commands (MRCs)—to track their needs and used by the Houthis to cover the post-2012 Fourth and
the allocation of “enablers’’ to each MRC, such as drones, missiles, Seventh MRCs (the south, headquartered in Dhammar),
intelligence capabilities, armor, and artillery.171 At the time of covers the southern arc of governorates of Al-Bayda, Ibb,
publication, the preponderance of evidence suggests that the Ta’izz, Dhammar, Al-Dhale, Lahj, Shabwa, and Abyan.178
current Military Regions Commander is the dual-hatted MoD chief The overarching Middle Region comes under the control
of staff, Mohammed Abdalkarim al-Ghammari, supported by a of Fourth MRC commander Major General Abdallatif
well-hidden assistant known only as “Sajjad.”172 The primary focus of Hamud al-Mahdi (Abu Nasser).ct Under al-Mahdi is the
this operations staff in the last two years has been coordinating the Seventh MRC (a sub-command covering Dhammar, Ibb,
multi-axis campaign by MRCs 3, 4, and 6 (and the Central Region) and Al-Bayda) commanded by Major General Nasser
to take Ma’rib city and its adjacent energy sites, with the close al-Mohammadi (Abu Murtadha al-Munabbahi).cu The
supervision (and sometimes over-involvementcp) of Abdalkhaliq southern front is largely a political and tribal engagement
al-Huthi, Yusif al-Madani, and Mohammed Abdalkarim al- front,cv with active military operations in Ta’izz and Al-
Ghammari.173 Bayda, at the western and eastern ends of the command’s
The MRCs are a system created by the U.N.-backed government frontage.179
after the fall of the Saleh government in 2012, a slight adjustment of • Fifth MRC (the west, headquartered in Hodeida) covers
the Saleh-era Military Districts.174 cq By the end of 2016, the Houthis Hodeida, Hajjar, Al Mahawit, and Raymah governorates,
had attained complete control of all the MRC headquarters and and was (until recently) actively led by veteran combat
retained their basic structure as an organizing principle for the
military.cr At the time of publication, the Houthi MRCs are led by
co Al-Mutawakkil is a very prominent Zaydi and sadah family, which was cs Zuraib is a veteran fighter from the six Saàda wars who was obscure in
a dominant force in the imamate. See Brandt, pp. 21-29, 40-44. Today, post-2011 Houthi affairs until called upon to command the Third MRC,
Taha al-Mutawakkil is the Houthi health minister. Al-Gabarni, “Who are which is a kind of “sub-command” of the Central Region (as the Houthis
the Houthis?” Adel al-Mutawakkil heads the University of Science and have thus far failed to conquer Third MRC areas in Ma’rib and Shabwa).
Technology. “Houthi official says over $13bn of Yemen’s oil wealth ‘looted’ Al-Gabarni, “Who are the Houthis?”
over 5 years,” Middle East Monitor, August 24, 2022. Issam al-Mutawakkil is
ct Abu Nasser gained notoriety for his very active insurgent operations
the spokesman for the Yemeni Petroleum Company, the state-run national
in southern Saàda during the six wars, mainly on the northernmost
oil company. Romy Haber, “The Houthis and the Hijacking of Yemen’s
frontlines adjacent to Saudi Arabia. He has a connection to Mohammed
Education Sector,” Euro-Gulf Information Centre, February 9, 2021.
Abdalkarim al-Ghammari. Abu Nasser’s effective stewardship of the
cp In the authors’ collective view, Ma’rib became an overwhelming obsession whole southern front—a quiet but very long frontline—suggests he is
for the Houthi military leadership. Third MRC assaulted from the west in an especially important commander. Abu Nasser has big shoes to fill
Sirwah, Sixth MRC sought to envelop Ma’rib from the north, and Fourth as Abdallah al-Hakim (Abu Ali) previously held the southern fronts. Abu
MRC attempted an envelopment from the south. The offensive finally Nasser focuses mainly on Ta’izz and Ma’rib-focused operations (in Al-
collapsed in January 2022 following a strong counterattack against the Bayda). Details from interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and
southern flank of the offensive. As in any operation, ‘too many cooks spoil dates and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request.
the broth’—meaning that too many intervening senior commanders and
cu Al-Mohammadi appears by his tribal name to be from the extreme west
too many command changes can negatively affect operations. For a good
of Saàda governorate, in one of the areas that fell to Houthi control at
overview of the campaign, see Alex Almeida and Michael Knights, “Breaking
the very end of the six wars. He does not appear to be one of the more
Point: Consolidating Houthi Military Setbacks in Yemen,” Washington
successful Houthi commanders and is closely supervised by Abu Nasser.
Institute for Near East Policy, January 19, 2022.
Details from interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and dates
cq Note that the 1st and 2nd MRCs in Hadramawt and the 4th MRC in Aden and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request.
still exit, but these areas are clear of Houthi forces and the Houthis have
cv In an example of this, the Houthis have raised new tribal auxiliary forces to
not created headquarters for these locations. This is the authors’ collective
give work and patronage to local tribes, with new brigades appearing with
conclusion, based on their synthesis of the known facts.
names such as Nasser and Quds (Dhamar and Ta’izz), Wahbi (Al-Bayda)
cr The gradual purging of Saleh commanders from the MRCs and the and Shaheri (Ibb). In the case of the four Nasser brigades (numbered 1, 2,
Presidential Guard Brigades in 2016-2017 was the proximate cause of 3, 4), these entirely Houthi-built and fully indoctrinated units eventually
the Saleh-Houthi showdown in December 2017. This is the collective gained the honorific descriptor “nukhba” (elites) due to their credible
assessment of the author team, reflecting the strong consensus on this battlefield performance on the Red Sea coast frontlines. Details from
issue from interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and dates and interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and dates and places of
places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request. interviews withheld at interviewees’ request.
Houthi Military Regional Commands and geographic zones of military activity

© The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (2022)
leader Major General Yusif al-Madani (Abu Husayncw). The Zaraa (Abu Badr).cy
command now appears to be led in an acting or transitional • Border Region covers northern Sa’da, and is led by Ahmed
capacity by Madani’s former MRC deputy commander Yahya Jassar, a Houthi official who formerly worked in
Hamza Abu Talib, a low-profile fighter who seems to the Jihad Office.181 Facing Saudi Arabia, the border region
have been groomed to hold the role.180 Like the southern seems to have a special sub-regional command and to
front, the Red Sea coast is now mainly a tribal engagement employ a number of long-establishedcz and new tribal
and holding action by local auxiliary units raised by the auxiliary units.da
Houthis to spread patronage among the tribes and coastal
communities.cx
• Sixth MRC (the northeast) covers Al-Jawf, Amran, and cy Zaraa is quite an obscure commander, even by Houthi standards, and has
Sa`da, and is led by Major General Jamil Yahya Mohammed no known significant combat pedigree from the six wars. He is considered
a mentee of senior Houthi leader Saleh al-Sammad, one of Abdalmalik’s
close circle, who was killed by a Saudi drone strike on April 19, 2018. Details
from interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and dates and places
of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request. See also “Yemen war:
Houthi political leader Saleh al-Sammad ‘killed in air raid,’” BBC, April 23,
2018.
cz One of these is Abdullah Eida al-Razzami’s Abdallah Hamedan axis (Kitaf
and Buqa) which is now led by his son Yahya. Other old “Ansar Allah
Brigades” from the Saàda area include Al-Hadi, Qasim and Imam Zayd.
and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request. See also al-
cw Abu Husayn is identified as al-Madani’s kunya by the United Nations here. Gabarni, “Who are the Houthis?”
“Yusuf al-Madani,” United Nations Security Council, November 9, 2021.
da For instance, the Jizan brigades are one of the newer “Ansar Allah Brigades”
cx The Houthis have raised new tribal auxiliary forces—“Ansar Allah that focus on the northwestern border of Saàda governorate. They are
Brigades”—in the Fifth MRC to give work and patronage to local tribes, led by Major General Ahmed Yahya Jassar, one of the Houthi leaders who
with new brigades appearing with names such as Sammad (Hodeida), Al- worked in the secretariat of the Jihadi Office. Details from interviews for
Mahawit (Al-Mahawit), and Fateh (Hajjah). Details from interviews for this this study. Names of interviewees, and dates and places of interviews
study. Names of interviewees, and dates and places of interviews withheld withheld at interviewees’ request. See also al-Gabarni, “Who are the
at interviewees’ request. Houthis?”
Praetorian Units in the Sana’a Area place as far back as 2014.df After seven years of re-staffing and
There are two geographic commands in the vital Sana’a area. One indoctrination under overall Houthi control, the authors assess that
is the so-called Central Region, which is again recycled Saleh-era the Presidential Protection Brigades today likely represent a fusion
nomenclature for the capital Sana’a and Sana’a governorate (plus of Saleh-era elite materiel,dg select Republican Guard officers,
parts of western Ma’rib), and is commanded by Abdalkhaliq al- Houthi supervisors and fighters, and Houthi-recruited troops who
Huthi (Abu Yunis),db the full brother of Abdalmalik.dc In the authors’ can only dimly remember a pre-Houthi era.187
collective view, Abdalkhaliq exercises tactical control182 over all A final elite reserve that appears to be cantoned in the northern
military forces in Sana’a, most importantly the Reserve Forces Sana’a area188 is the so-called Mobile Region (also variously known
(four Presidential Protection Brigades and the Missile Brigades as the Mobile Zone, the Mobile Forces, and the Central Intervention
Group).183 Abdalkhaliq is not necessarily a skilled commander,dd but Forces).189 This is led by a Houthi commander called Abdalmalik al-
he leans on a number of capable subordinates, including the Central Mortada (Abu Talib al-Sufyan), a veteran combat commander from
Region deputy commander Mohammed Abdallah (Abu Mahdi), the six wars.dh The Mobile Forces—a reputedly large strike forcedi—
who has held day-to-day command authority for Central Region is centrally located and appears (in the authors’ assessment) to be
forces since the removal of Saleh loyalists in December 2017.de postured to intervene against local uprisings, almost in the manner
The Presidential Protection Brigades were the post-2012 of a national (paramilitary) police force.190
renaming of the Saleh-era Republican Guards, who continued to Other elite forces are under the supervision of the aforementioned
serve under Saleh and his nephew Tareq Saleh until the Houthi- Special Forces Official (SFO) who is only known by the kunya Abu
Saleh showdown in December 2017.184 In the months leading up Fatima.dj The Special Forces Official’s area of responsibility seems to
to and immediately after Saleh’s death, the Presidential Protection be the Houthi units that directly draw upon Iranian and Lebanese
Brigades were purged of Saleh loyalists and bolstered with Houthi Hezbollah support,191 and the SFO role is closely associated with
recruits.185 The Presidential Protection Brigades are led by Houthi the IRGC-QF Jihad Assistant and his Hezbollah deputy and seems
fighter Abdallah Yahya al-Hasani (Abu Mohammed al-Razehi), a to work directly to the Jihad Council.192 The Special Forces Official
veteran of the six wars who is similar in age to Abdullah al-Hakim manages a network of safe houses, stores, and workshops in the
(Abu Ali).186 The backgrounds of the four unit commanders of Sana’a and Sa`da areas at which imported weapons are made ready
the Presidential Protection Brigades largely remain obscure, but or where smuggled components are integrated with in-country
at least one of the four commanders is a Houthi and has been in materials.193 There are indications that Abdallah al-Hakim (Abu Ali)
and his Military Intelligence Authority have special responsibilities
df Three of the Presidential Protection Brigades (PPB) commanders are

db As noted above, Abdalkhaliq also exercises control over operations on his
largely anonymous: Colonel Mohammed al-Shuaibi (1st PPB); Colonel
eastern flank, via the Third MRC in Ma’rib, which is under his influence.
Mohammed al-Jabiri (2nd PPB); and Colonel Abdallah Abbas (4th PPB).
The 3rd PPB commander, Fouad al-Imad, has been in position since
and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request. See also al-
November 2014 and is a Houthi. Details from interviews for this study.
Gabarni, “Who are the Houthis?”
dc Abdakhaliq was designated by the United Nations and the United States interviewees’ request.
in November 2014. See “Abd Al-Khaliq Al-Houthi,” United Nations Security
dg For instance, the authors have watched video of Presidential Protection
Council, November 7, 2014, and “Yemen-related designations.” In January
Brigade parades that include T-80 and T-72 tanks. Recently, an August
2021, Abdalkhaliq was listed as a specially designated global terrorist.
12, 2022, parade in Sana’a showed T-80BV tanks with Explosive Reactive
See “Designation of Abdul Malik al-Houthi, Abd al-Khaliq Badr al-Din
Armor in the service of the Presidential Protection Brigades. These tanks
al-Houthi, and Abdullah Yahya al Hakim as Specially Designated Global
were drawn from the 3rd Republican Guard brigade stocks. YouTube video
Terrorists,” Federal Register, January 19, 2021. Less than a month later,
URL available upon request. For a gazetteer of ground combat systems
the SDGT designation was revoked. See “Revocation of the Designations
inherited by the Houthis in 2014, see “Handbook Of Pre-War Yemeni
of Ansarallah, Abdul Malik al-Houthi, Abd al-Khaliq Badr al-Din al-Houthi,
Fighting Vehicles,” Oryx website, September 20, 2015.
and Abdullah Yahya al Hakim (and Their Respective Aliases) as Specially
Designated Global Terrorists,” Federal Register, February 16, 2021. Despite dh Abu Talib is quite enigmatic at this point but reputedly led Houthi forces
the SDGT revocation, Abdulkhaliq remained “sanctioned under E.O. 13611 of around 200 fighters in the six wars and ended that period as the field
related to acts that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Yemen.” See commander in the important Harf al-Sufyan area. He is a low-profile
“Revocation of the Terrorist Designations of Ansarallah.” operator who has, in the words of one investigator, “grown in the shadows.”
dd Abdalkhaliq has often been involved in the more ambitious and high-profile
and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request.
Houthi offensive operations, including the successful but later reversed
Aden offensive in 2015, the successful Nihm offensive in 2019, and the di The Mobile Region is described as numbering 15,000-20,000 forces, which
near-success at Ma’rib in 2020. It is unclear, however, whether he simply may be inaccurate and seems too large for a newly raised force. More likely,
shows up at major offensives to gain credit or whether his input has real either the force is much smaller or it is a command staff that can call upon
bearing on these campaigns. Authors’ own collective analysis of the relative allocated units from the MRCs and the Central Region when offensive or
success and failure of Houthi offensives in the Yemen war, 2015-2020. counter-offensive operations require the deployment of a concentrated
force. Details from interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and
de Until December 2017, a Saleh loyalist Mehdi Miqulah led the Reserve Forces,
dates and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request.
and was preceded by Major General Ali bin al-Jaifi, who died in a Saudi
airstrike in October 2016. Details from interviews for this study. Names of dj Abu Fatima appears to be from Hajjah and is a member of a sadah family.
interviewees, and dates and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ Details from interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and dates
request. and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request.
for the movement and security of Iranian and Lebanese advisors.dk against Saudi border posts through offensive mine-layingdn on
One IRGC-QF unit associated with the Houthi qualitative forces supply routes and ATGM [anti-tank guided missile] strikes on
is Unit 340,194 whose remit is to enable the transfer of military armored vehicles and outposts.”202 Yet, it is less clear how elite light
capabilities to partner forces.dl infantry forces are organized and grouped. Certain Houthi ground
The two main classes of elite forces that have been identified are forces units have been framed as elite light infantrydo and land
“qualitative forces” and “special forces.”195 The so-called “qualitative special forces commanders appear to have been identified in the
forces” are split into two main sections: past after being killed.203 dp Though most accounts of specifically
• Aerospace forces (drone and missile) are led by Yemen Air named Houthi “special forces units” appear apocryphal,dq there
Force and Air Defense commander Major General Ahmed does seem to be a training program to enhance the capabilities of
Ali Ahsan al-Hamzi, a Houthi from a sadah family who land forces commanders, staff officers, and tactical operators in
received military training in Iran according to the U.S. light infantry fighting and to reinforce ideological fervor.204 One
Treasury.196 Al-Hamzi is supported by a fast-rising young example of units that appear to have received such strengthening
Houthi known as Zakaria Abdullah Yahya Hajjar,197 another are the Nasser brigades on the Red Sea coast, which attained a kind
Iranian-trained drone and missile specialist who is drawn of honorific status (nukhba, meaning elites) after receiving such
from a sadah family from the Bani al-Harith area of Sana’a.dm training. The aforementioned Mobile Region could be another
The Houthi chief of staff Major General Mohammed example of an effort to develop elite light infantry strike forces.205
Abdalkarim al-Ghammari and Minister of Defense Staff
Major General Mohammed Nasser al-Atifi, the former head Analytic Conclusions
of the Missiles Brigade Group, work alongside the Special The Houthi movement is an evolving subject, and the trendline, in
Forces Official to support the aerospace units.198 the authors’ view, is toward a centralization of command and control,
• Naval forces (mines, missiles and boats) are led by the Naval and greater coercive power in the hands of the top leadership.206
Forces chief of staff Mansour al-Saadi, a long-standing When RAND undertook its pioneering study of the Houthis in
Houthi commander on the Red Sea coast since 2015.199 2010,207 based on evidence available then, it was absolutely right to
According to the U.S. Treasury, al-Saadi “masterminded describe the Houthi movement as a “heterogeneous” organism that
lethal attacks against international shipping in the Red Sea” appeared decentralized and non-cohesive, with its leaders cloistered
and received military training in Iran.200 in rural redoubts and unable or unwilling to take authoritarian
Perhaps surprisingly, the grouping and organization of light- control of the movement.208 The RAND authors Barak Salmoni,
infantry-type ground “special forces” in the Houthi order of battle Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine Wells presciently anticipated that
is more of a mystery. Since at least the sixth Sa`da war, there has the movement might move beyond a fighting style of “unconnected
been a noted similarity between Houthi commando operations fighting groups” to form “a coordinated, synchronized fighting
and Hezbollah border-raiding tactics against Israel.201 As noted force.”209 Likewise, anthropologist Marieke Brandt correctly
in the September 2018 CTC Sentinel article by one of the authors portrayed the traditional role of the sadah as dependent on tribal
(Knights), “Houthi forces have achieved great tactical success protection, turning their weakness (versus tribal groups) into a
strength by playing the historic role of mediator and arbiter of tribal
law and social peace.210
The situation described above has arguably changed.
dk This would make sense as Abdallah al-Hakim (Abu Ali) is probably the most
Abdalmalik al-Huthi and his inner circle of sadah followers are
respected Houthi military commander and is senior enough to operate now anything but weak mediators, bolstered now by over a decade
across MRC boundaries with overarching authority. In other environments,
intelligence and security agencies are used to move and hide Iranian and
Hezbollah advisors. In Iraq, for instance, this role is carried out by the Amn
dn These include Explosively-Formed Penetrator, large 120mm-diameter
al-Hashd, or the Popular Mobilization Forces Security Directorate. Details
shaped charges, directional charges and claymore warheads, repurposed
from interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and dates and places
naval mines, plus anti-tank and anti-personnel mines. Author (Knights)
of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request.
interview, Gulf coalition explosives ordnance technicians; names of
dl Unit 340 is the IRGC-QF Technical Department. According to Israel’s interviewee, and dates and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’
Intelligence Research Division (IRD), Unit 340 enables Iran’s partner forces request.
to develop and field military technology and military industries; the IRD
do In 2020, one unit on the Ma’rib front was described in one press report as
unit commander Aman Saar noted: “I like to give the example of Unit 340
“an elite brigade trained by militants from the Lebanese group Hezbollah.”
of Quds Force, which does design at cost to weapons … They understand
“Senior rebel commander killed in Yemen amid fierce battles,” Arab News,
that you cannot build a missile with Iranian technology and then expect
May 8, 2020.
the Yemenis to accept and operate it, so they are suitable for the Yemenis
with a relevant plant.” Veteran Israeli defense journalist Amos Harel dp The head of Houthi land special forces, Mohammed Abdalkarim al-
describes Unit 340 as “responsible for the research and development that Hamdan, was reported killed in May 2020 on the Ma’rib front. Ibid.
serves all the terrorist and guerilla organizations operating with Tehran’s
dq One of the authors (Knights) has previously described such units as the
patronage and financing … The knowhow gained by the Iranians is quickly
Katibat al-Mawt (Death Battalions), Katibat al-Ashura (Ashura Battalions),
and effectively relayed to their proxies throughout the region.” See Jennifer
but these appear to be normal Houthi units attributed elite-sounding
Bell, “Iran making ‘significant developments’ in building its weapon arsenal:
names in specific operations—in essence, a psychological operation.
Israeli media,” Al-Arabiya English, March 18, 2021.
Knights, “The Houthi War Machine.” The same author just completed
dm Zakaria Hajjar is reported by interviewees to work alongside a third Houthi writing on a book about the battle of Aden in 2015, in which Katibat al-
missile and drone commander called Ahmed Mohammed Ali al-Jowhari, Ashura Battalions is also mentioned by interviewees as a unit that was
about whom nothing is currently known. Details from interviews for this present during major offensive operations by the Houthis. Whether this is
study. Names of interviewees, and dates and places of interviews withheld an actual fixed-name unit or whether the moniker is applied to any major
at interviewees’ request. Houthi offensive force remains unknown.
“Iran sees the Houthis as a remarkable the present day.218 Badr al-Din, Husayn, and Abdalmalik, as well
as many other Houthi commanders, drew heavily on the examples
asset, on par with Lebanese and the political and military models of the Islamic Republic of Iran
Hezbollah, albeit at an earlier stage and Lebanese Hezbollah. In the formation of the Jihad Council,
of development. In the authors’ the Houthis deliberately adopted Hezbollah’s organization model,
and in the acceptance of an IRGC-QF Jihad Assistant at the
assessment, based on investigative heart of Houthi military strategy, the Houthis adopted the same
work in both Iraq and Yemen, the mentoring model as Iraqi terrorist group Kata’ib Hezbollah. The
Houthi military has adopted many features of IRGC and Lebanese
Houthis are respected by IRGC-QF to Hezbollah counterparts, including top-level command and control
a greater extent than Iraqi militias architecture, preventative security arrangements, information
because the Houthis have proven operations, training, covert procurement, military industrialization,
drone and missile forces, and guerrilla naval operations, to name
themselves to be more capable, a few.219 Indeed, the process is not yet finished: The Houthi-
cohesive, and disciplined.” controlled military is still in chrysalis form—part way through its
metamorphosis into what the authors assess to be a very close clone
of the IRGC and Lebanese Hezbollah military and security systems,
with the birth of a Basij-type mobilization and internal security
of internal security advice and procedures provided by Iran and system already coming into view.dt
Lebanese Hezbollah.211 Whereas RAND rightfully doubted (based Is it possible that IRGC and Lebanese Hezbollah provided
on data available in 2010) that the Houthi leaders could rule by this transformative support but sought no influence over the
“authoritarian control of physical coercion,”212 dr the coercive Houthi decision-making system? Based on the authors’ collective
machine that is available today is far more capable of suppressing investigation, Iranian leaders do utilize a very soft touch, but this is
dissent.213 As Adel Dashela noted in a 2022 study on tribal dynamics precisely because their alignment of ideology and goals is already
in Houthi-controlled northern Yemen,214 ds the Houthi movement so close to Abdalmalik and his inner circle.220 As noted earlier in
now employs “a totalitarian mindset, applying a logic of oppression this piece, conflict and terrorism analysts may find it profitable to
and dominance towards the northern tribes” that has allowed the look harder and further back for the beginnings of IRGC-QF and
temporary subjugation of tribal power.215 Even skeptics of Iranian Lebanese Hezbollah interactions with the Houthi leaders. It may
involvement such as Marieke Transfield draw attention to strong also be worth re-examining the drivers of the Houthi-IRGC and
“parallels in the Hizballah takeover of West Beirut in 2008 and the Houthi-Hezbollah relationships. Were these mainly relationships
Houthi grab of power in 2014 [that] also suggest some exchange of necessity, driven to unintended levels by the wars in Yemen, or
on military strategy.”216 were they highly intentional relationships of choice from the outset,
Likewise, previous scholarship was absolutely right to point to a based on a common worldview?
lack of strong public evidence of Iranian mentorship in the Houthi Whenever and however the Houthi relationships started with
movement,217 but this has been rendered moot by subsequent events IRGC-QF and Hezbollah, these relationships now appear to be
and outpaced by the gradual release of materials on the growing exceedingly strong and stable.221 In the assessment of the authors,
role of the IRGC-QF and Lebanese Hezbollah during the years in Iran sees the Houthis as a remarkable asset, on par with Lebanese
which the Houthi movement became extraordinarily successful Hezbollah, albeit at an earlier stage of development.du In the
on the battlefield, namely from the fourth Sa’da war in 2007 to authors’ assessment, based on investigative work in both Iraq and
Yemen, the Houthis are respected by IRGC-QF to a greater extent
than Iraqi militias because the Houthis have proven themselves to
be more capable, cohesive, and disciplined.222 The Jihad Assistant
dr RAND noted: “Much like the tribal shaykh who relies on soft power to
maintain influence over individuals and cannot sustain authoritarian
oversees a relationship with the Houthis that is reputedly warm,
control, both the central commanders and [local area leaders] within the discreet, respectful, and highly valued by both sides.223 According
Houthi organism must rely on local prestige to mobilize their subordinates. to the authors’ collective research, Lebanese Hezbollah’s relations
Thus, instead of leading through intimidation, the Houthi commander— with the group appear similarly respectful, egalitarian, and
whether Husayn or ‘Abd al-Malik—must cultivate loyalty and obedience
through influence and persuasion. Such methods are congruent with long
brotherly, which (again) is often not the case between Lebanese
enduring local norms according to which authority and prestige do not
emanate from authoritarian control or physical coercion.” Salmoni, Loidolt,
and Wells, p. 224.
ds Dashela notes: “The Houthi movement used an array of policies toward the
dt Indeed, the authors have found in their interviews that key Houthi
tribes, including violence, and altered tribal customs and traditions to serve
commanders like Abdallah al-Hakim (Abu Ali) and Yusuf al-Madani are
its war project, and this led to depletion of the tribes’ human resources.
being focused on internal security missions and the development of
The Houthi movement is an ideologically driven military group with a
local reserve forces. Details from interviews for this study. Names of
totalitarian mindset, applying a logic of oppression and dominance toward
interviewees, and dates and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’
the northern tribes. In other words, it lacks a base of popular support in
request.
tribal communities, which have been largely coerced into expressions of
solidarity, including participation in the Houthi war effort. While tribes du The relationship has long legs also: Houthi leaders are comparatively
enjoyed social and political privilege during the Saleh regime, they have young, often still in their thirties, forties, and fifties. They might be good
been stripped of this during the Houthi era, and they are no longer the partners for Tehran for decades to come. This is the authors’ collective
cohesive tribal entity they once were.” Dashela, p. 13. conclusion, based on their synthesis of the known facts.
and Iraqi groups.224 dv Neither Iran nor Hezbollah appear to play alignment.228 This suggests that the relationship will only grow
in the internal politics of the Houthis to a measurable extent, in closer, regardless of whether fighting in Yemen waxes or wanes,
part because the movement—unlike Iraqi militias—has a unity and and that the Houthis may play an integrated role in future Iranian
discipline that both Iran and Hezbollah appreciate in a partner.225 and Lebanese Hezbollah military campaigns.dw If a key Houthi
Iranian and Lebanese interaction with the Houthi leadership is supporter of close relations with Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollah,
so narrowly focused on Abdalmalik and the Jihad Council that it such as Abdalmalik, were to die or be otherwise replaced, there
is, in the authors’ collective assessment, probably invisible to most is now a broad-based set of leaders whose whole ideological and
Houthis and to Yemenis and the world at large.226 Though it is not political upbringing will predispose them to continue this beneficial
possible to identify any Houthi command decisions in which IRGC- and warm relationship.229 In the authors’ view, the risk that a
QF or Hezbollah forced the Houthis to decide differently than they ‘southern Hezbollah’ might emerge is arguably now a fact on the
might independently have, it is assessed as probable that Iran has ground. CTC
built up sufficient goodwill and credit with the Houthi leadership
that it can selectively call on the Houthis to serve Iranian interests
in ways that may incur new costs or difficulties for the Houthis.227 dw In essence, this process has begun already. To give two examples, the
If Abdalmalik and his inner circle decide to cede certain strategic Houthis claimed both the May 2019 drone attack on Saudi Arabia’s
decisions to Iran, almost no one would know it had happened and East-West oil pipeline and the September 2019 cruise missile and drone
no one would be in a position to protest within the centralized attacks on the Abqaiq and Khurais oil processing facilities, even though
both attacks were shown to have originated in Iraq (May 2019) and Iran
totalitarian structure of today’s Houthi movement.
and Iraq (September 2019). See Michael Knights and Tim Michetti, “How to
Therefore, even if the Houthi relationship with Iran and Present Evidence of Iranian Involvement in the Saudi Attack,” Washington
Hezbollah is not that of a proxy, this article argues that the Institute for Near East Policy, September 26. 2019. For evidence of Iraqi
connection is arguably that of a strong, deep-rooted alliance militia fundraising efforts for Houthi operations, see Hamdi Malik and
Michael Knights, “Kataib Hezbollah Behind ‘Grassroots’ Iraqi Fundraising
that is underpinned by tight ideological affinity and geopolitical
for Yemen,” Militia Spotlight, Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
February 1, 2022. The Kataib Hezbollah spokesman noted “the honorable
sons of Iraq had to ... support their Yemeni brothers. Therefore, we will
dv Again, Knights (and co-authors) detected tensions between Iraqi militias launch a big campaign under the slogan amwalokum mosayarat [your
and Lebanese Hezbollah that does not seem to exist between the Houthis money will turn to drones] ... to gather money for the Yemeni people to buy
and Hezbollah. This reflects the balance of evidence from interviews for drones.” Worthy of a separate lengthy article, ties between the Houthis and
this study. Names of interviewees, and dates and places of interviews the Iraqi Shià militias are growing quickly. This is the authors’ collective
withheld at interviewees’ request. See also Michael Knights, Crispin Smith, conclusion, based on their synthesis of the known facts. See also Katherine
and Hamdi Malik, “Discordance in the Iran Threat Network in Iraq: Militia Zimmerman, “Yemen’s Houthis and the expansion of Iran’s Axis of
Competition and Rivalry,” CTC Sentinel 14:8 (2021). Resistance,” American Enterprise Institute, March 2022.
Citations
1 Barak Salmoni, Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine Wells, Regime and Periphery 14 “Letter dated 26 January 2018 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen
in Northern Yemen: The Huthi Phenomenon (Santa Monica: RAND, 2010). mandated by Security Council resolution 2342 (2017) addressed to
2 For a good review of events in Yemen, see the Sana’a Center for Strategic the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council,
Studies’ monthly Yemen Review, which provides a comprehensive update January 26, 2018, p. 91. See also Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, p. 106 and
each month. See the archive here: https://sanaacenter.org/publications/ Brandt, p. 140.
the-yemen-review 15 Brandt, p. 144.
3 See “Revocation of the Terrorist Designations of Ansarallah,” U.S. 16 Ibid., pp. 117-125.
Department of State, February 12, 2021. 17 Oved Lobel, “Becoming Ansar Allah: How the Islamic Revolution
4 Ibid. Conquered Yemen,” Report No. 20, European Eye on Radicalization, March
5 “Treasury Sanctions Key Military Leaders of the Ansarallah Militia in 2021, pp. 10-11. Also drawn from details from interviews for this study.
Yemen,” U.S. Department of Treasury, March 2, 2021; “Treasury Sanctions Names of interviewees, and dates and places of interviews withheld at
Senior Houthi Military Official Overseeing Group’s Offensive Operations,” interviewees’ request.
U.S. Department of Treasury, May 20, 2021; “Treasury Targets Key Houthi 18 Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, p. 106.
Finance Network in Coordination with Regional Gulf Partners,” U.S. 19 Drawn from an interview for this study. Names of interviewee, and date
Department of Treasury, February 23, 2022. and place of interview withheld at interviewee’s request.
6 See Peter Salisbury, “Behind the Yemen Truce and Presidential Council 20 Lobel, pp. 10-11. Also drawn from details from interviews for this study.
Announcements,” International Crisis Group, April 8, 2022. Names of interviewees, and dates and places of interviews withheld at
7 “Yemen’s fate hangs in balance as truce collapses,” Straits Times, October interviewees’ request.
3, 2022. 21 “Sudan and Terrorism: Hearing before the subcommittee on African
8 Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells. affairs of the committee on foreign relations,” United States Senate,
9 An extraordinarily detailed and useful text is Marieke Brandt, Tribes May 15, 1997; Jonathan Schanzer, “The Islamic Republic of Sudan?”
and Politics in Yemen: A History of the Houthi Conflict (Oxford: Oxford Foreign Policy, June 10, 2010; Giorgio Cafiero, “Is a Sudanese-Iranian
University Press, 2017). rapprochement possible?” Middle East Institute, May 19, 2019.
10 Ibid., pp. 21-23. 22 Lobel, pp. 10-11. See also Brandt, pp. 132-134.
11 Christopher Harnisch and Katherine Zimmerman, “Profile: Al Houthi 23 Brandt, p. 126.
Movement,” American Enterprise Institute, January 28, 2010. 24 Ibid., p. 126.
12 Both Salmoni et al and Brandt provide fulsome reviews of Badr al-Din’s 25 Ibid., pp. 101-103 on hadawism. See also Michael Knights, “The Houthi
background and development of a family powerbase. See Salmoni, War Machine: From Guerrilla War to State Capture,” CTC Sentinel 11:8
Loidolt, and Wells, pp. 102-107 and Brandt, pp. 139-144. (2018).
13 Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, p. 104. 26 Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, pp. 102-105.
27 Ibid., pp. 5-6, 99. See also Brandt, pp. 116-118. 63 “Ali Abdullah Saleh, Yemen’s former leader, killed in Sanaa,” BBC,
28 Brandt, p. 146. December 4, 2017.
29 For a full-throated and documented making of the case for long-term 64 Details provided in interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and
Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollah involvement, see Lobel. dates and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request.
30 For an account of the six wars, see “Part III: The Six Sa’da Wars” in 65 Details provided in interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and
Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, pp. 129-242. See also “Part Two: The Sa’dah dates and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request.
Wars (2004-2010)” in Brandt, pp. 153-336. 66 Details provided in interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and
31 Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, p. 254. dates and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request.
32 This is an almost uniform view gathered from interviews for this study 67 Matt Levitt, “Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God,”
and fits with the authors’ collective assessment. Names of interviewees, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 4, 2013, pp. 14-15;
and dates and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request. See Marc R. DeVore, Armin B. Stähli, and Ulrike Esther Franke, “Dynamics of
also Adnan al-Gabarni, “Who are the Houthis? The hidden structures and insurgent innovation: How Hezbollah and other non-state actors develop
key leaders who actually run the organization,” Al Masdar Online English, new capabilities,” Comparative Strategy 38:4 (2019): pp. 32-33.
March 14, 2022. 68 Al-Gabarni, “Who are the Houthis?”
33 Brandt, pp., 122-123. 69 Levitt, pp. 14-15.
34 Adel Dashela, “Northern Yemeni Tribes during the Eras of Ali Abdullah 70 Al-Gabarni, “Who are the Houthis?”
Saleh and the Houthi Movement: A Comparative Study,” Sana’a Center 71 Ibid. Some details provided in interviews for this study. Names of
for Strategic Studies, February 16, 2022, pp. 7, 20, 52-54. interviewees, and dates and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’
35 See Omar Al-Amqi, “Why didn’t the Houthi leadership devolve to request.
Mohammed Badreddine?” Al Masdar Online, April 11, 2010. 72 Al-Gabarni, “Who are the Houthis?” Some details provided in interviews
36 Ibid. for this study. Names of interviewees, and dates and places of interviews
37 Gregory D. Johnsen, “The Kingpin of Sana’a – A Profile of Ahmed Hamed,” withheld at interviewees’ request.
Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, May 18, 2021. 73 Al-Gabarni, “Who are the Houthis?” Some details provided in interviews
38 For good genealogical mapping of Badr al-Din’s close relatives, see for this study. Names of interviewees, and dates and places of interviews
Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, p. 106. withheld at interviewees’ request.
39 Brandt, pp., 122-123. 74 Al-Gabarni, “Who are the Houthis?” Some details provided in interviews
40 This is the authors’ collective conclusion, based on their synthesis of the for this study. Names of interviewees, and dates and places of interviews
known facts, and explored further through this text. withheld at interviewees’ request.
41 This is the authors’ collective conclusion, based on their synthesis of the 75 Al-Gabarni, “Who are the Houthis?” Some details provided in interviews
known facts, and explored further through this text. for this study. Names of interviewees, and dates and places of interviews
42 Abdo Albahesh, “The Relations of Houthis with Iran and Hezbollah,” withheld at interviewees’ request.
Medium, November 4, 2018. 76 For one example of Mohammed Abdal Salam being referenced as the
43 Brandt, pp., 172, 187. Houthi spokesman, see “Spokesman for Yemen’s Houthis under fire for
44 Brandt, pp., 172, 187. wearing ‘$30,000 Rolex’ at Raisi inauguration,” New Arab, August 8, 2021.
45 See “Houthis in Special Documents( 6) .. Report from the Counter- 77 Some details provided in interviews for this study. Names of interviewees,
Terrorism Center on the crime for which Abu Ali al-Hakim, Fouad, and dates and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request.
Mohammed al-Imad and others were imprisoned,” Al Masdar Online, May 78 IRTVU is explored in detail in Hamdi Malik, “The Revolution Will Be
9, 2020. Televised in Arabic: Iran’s Media Infrastructure Abroad,” Policy Notes 122,
46 Brandt, pp. 334-335. June 30, 2022.
47 Peter Salisbury, “Why Yemen’s civil war is personal for Mohammed bin 79 Marieke Transfeld, “Iran’s Small Hand in Yemen,” Carnegie Endowment for
Salman – Saudi Arabia’s involvement in Yemen explained,” Delayed International Peace, February 14, 2017.
Gratification, June 13, 2018. 80 Details provided in interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and
48 This is the authors’ collective conclusion, based on their synthesis of the dates and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request.
known facts. 81 This is the authors’ collective conclusion, based on their synthesis of the
49 Brandt, pp. 172, 270. See also details from interviews for this study. known facts.
Names of interviewees, and dates and places of interviews withheld at 82 Albahesh.
interviewees’ request. 83 Elias Groll, “The Other War in Yemen—for Control of the Country’s
50 This is the authors’ collective conclusion, based on their synthesis of the Internet,” Foreign Policy, November 28, 2018. See also Dan O’Keefe’s
known facts. remarks at #CYBERWARCON on November 28, 2018, quoted here: Joe
51 “Yemen-related designations,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, Uchill, “Dan O’Keefe, Johns Hopkins: Houthi information operations uses
November 10, 2014. ‘Tweet Banks,’ …,” Twitter, November 28, 2018, and Joe Uchill, “Provides
52 See Johnsen. instructions how not to be captured by Twitter’s algorithms …,” Twitter,
53 This is the authors’ collective conclusion, based on their synthesis of the November 28, 2018.
known facts. 84 For more detail on the Lebanese Hezbollah and IRGC-QF role in
54 Brandt, p. 133. developing Iraqi militia information operations channels, see “Section
55 Moosa Elayah, Lau Schulpen, Luuk van Kempen, Ahamad Almaweri, Blikis 5. Information Operations: As Important as Kinetic Effects” in Michael
AbuOsba, and Bakeel Alzandani, “National dialogues as an interruption of Knights, Crispin Smith, and Hamdi Malik, “Discordance in the Iran Threat
civil war – the case of Yemen,” Peacebuilding 8:1 (2020): pp. 98-117. Network in Iraq: Militia Competition and Rivalry,” CTC Sentinel 14:8
56 See al-Gabarni, “Who are the Houthis?” Details also topped up with (2021).
interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and dates and places of 85 Al-Gabarni, “Who are the Houthis?” Some details provided in interviews
interviews withheld at interviewees’ request. for this study. Names of interviewees, and dates and places of interviews
57 Johnsen. withheld at interviewees’ request.
58 Al-Gabarni, “Who are the Houthis?” Some details provided in interviews 86 Details provided in interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and
for this study. Names of interviewees, and dates and places of interviews dates and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request.
withheld at interviewees’ request. 87 Details provided in interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and
59 Details from interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and dates dates and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request.
and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request. 88 Details provided in interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and
60 Details from interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and dates dates and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request.
and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request. 89 Details provided in interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and
61 For a good history of this uneasy relationship, see April Longley Alley, dates and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request.
“Collapse of the Houthi-Saleh Alliance and the Future of Yemen’s War,” 90 Details provided in interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and
International Crisis Group, January 11, 2018. dates and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request.
62 Ibid. 91 Al-Gabarni, “Who are the Houthis?” Details provided in interviews for
this study. Names of interviewees, and dates and places of interviews interviewees, and dates and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’
withheld at interviewees’ request. request. All details in his paragraph are drawn from interview data.
92 Based on the authors noting the repeated incident of the Humran family 124 This is the authors’ collective conclusion, based on their synthesis of the
name in sensitive roles. These include Executive Committee member and known facts. The authors have extensive on the ground experience in the
mobilization official Qasim al-Humran, Preventative Security head Ahsan Yemeni security sector, before and since the Arab Spring.
al-Humran, General Mobilization Office head Abdalrahim al-Humran, 125 This is the authors’ collective conclusion, based on their synthesis of the
and former Special Forces Official Hamud al-Humran. Details provided in known facts.
interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and dates and places of 126 This is the authors’ collective conclusion, based on their synthesis of the
interviews withheld at interviewees’ request. known facts.
93 Details provided in interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and 127 Fares al-Suraihi and Alkhatab Alrawhani, “Special Report: How Iran
dates and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request. smuggles weapons to Yemen,” Al Masdar Online English, May 9, 2021.
94 This is the authors’ collective conclusion, based on their synthesis of the 128 Details gathered in interviews and data collection for this study. Names of
known facts. interviewees, and dates and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’
95 Author (Knights) interviews, multiple Iraqi contacts, multiple sessions request.
with significant detail, 2021, exact dates, name, and places withheld at 129 Details provided in interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and
request of the interviewees. dates and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request.
96 Author (Knights) interviews, multiple Iraqi contacts, multiple sessions 130 “Treasury Sanctions Senior Houthi Military Officer Overseeing Group’s
with significant detail, 2021, exact dates, name, and places withheld at Seizure of Opposition Property,” U.S. Department of the Treasury,
request of the interviewees. November 18, 2021.
97 This is the authors’ collective conclusion, based on their synthesis of the 131 Details gathered in interviews and data collection for this study. Names of
known facts. interviewees, and dates and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’
98 Details from interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and dates request.
and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request. 132 This is the authors’ collective conclusion, based on their synthesis of the
99 Al-Gabarni, “Who are the Houthis?” Details provided in interviews for known facts.
this study. Names of interviewees, and dates and places of interviews 133 Details from interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and dates
withheld at interviewees’ request. and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request.
100 This is the authors’ collective conclusion, based on their synthesis of the 134 Al-Suraihi and Alrawhani.
known facts. 135 See “Treasury Designates IRGC-QF Weapon Smuggling Network and
101 DeVore, Stähli, and Franke, pp. 32-33. Mahan Air General Sales Agents,” U.S. Department of Treasury, December
102 This is the authors’ collective conclusion, based on their synthesis of the 11, 2019; “Treasury Designates IRGC-Qods Force Front Company and
known facts. Owner,” U.S. Treasury Department, May 1, 2020; “Treasury Sanctions
103 Details provided in interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and Network and Individuals in Connection with Iran’s Unmanned Aerial
dates and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request. Vehicle Program,” U.S. Department of Treasury, October 29, 2021; “Letter
104 Details from interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and dates dated 22 January 2021 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen addressed to
and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request. the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council,
105 Details from interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and dates January 25, 2021; “Letter dated 25 January 2022 from the Panel of
and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request. Experts on Yemen addressed to the President of the Security Council,”
106 Details from interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and dates United Nations Security Council, January 26, 2022.
and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request. 136 Al-Suraihi and Alrawhani.
107 Details from interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and dates 137 Ibid.
and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request. 138 Ibid.
108 Knights, “The Houthi War Machine.” 139 Ibid.
109 Ibid. 140 Ibid.
110 This is the authors’ collective conclusion, based on their synthesis of the 141 This is the authors’ collective conclusion, based on their synthesis of the
known facts. known facts.
111 This is the authors’ collective conclusion, based on their synthesis of the 142 Al-Suraihi and Alrawhani.
known facts. 143 See Knights, “The Houthi War Machine” as well as Lobel, p. 29.
112 This is the authors’ collective conclusion, based on their synthesis of the 144 This is the authors’ collective conclusion, based on their synthesis of the
known facts. known facts.
113 Baraa Shaiban, “Yemen’s Clash of Two Revolutions,” Hudson Institute, 145 For a reference work, see Michael Knights, Hamdi Malik, and Aymenn
April 4, 2021. Jawad Al-Tamimi, “Honored, Not Contained: The Future of Iraq’s Popular
114 Ibid. Mobilization Forces,” Policy Focus 163 (2020): pp. 58, 61, 143.
115 Elayah, Schulpen, van Kempen, Almaweri, AbuOsba, and Alzandani. 146 Al-Qodasi and al-Gabarni.
116 Naif al-Qodasi and Adnan al-Gabarni, “Parallel militaries: Anatomy of the 147 Details from interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and dates
armed forces fighting Yemen’s war,” Al Masdar Online English, January 3, and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request.
2021. 148 Al-Qodasi and al-Gabarni. See also details from interviews for this study.
117 “The Houthi Supervisory System,” Yemen Analysis Hub, ACAPS, June 17, Names of interviewees, and dates and places of interviews withheld at
2020, p. 8. interviewees’ request.
118 This is the authors’ collective conclusion, based on their synthesis of the 149 Al-Qodasi and al-Gabarni.
known facts. 150 Details from interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and dates
119 Al-Gabarni, “Who are the Houthis?” Details provided in interviews for and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request.
this study. Names of interviewees, and dates and places of interviews 151 Details from interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and dates
withheld at interviewees’ request. and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request.
120 Details gathered in interviews and data collection for this study. Names of 152 Authors’ collective knowledge of the location situation in Houthi-
interviewees, and dates and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ controlled areas. Details from interviews for this study. Names of
request. interviewees, and dates and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’
121 Details gathered in interviews and data collection for this study. Names of request.
interviewees, and dates and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ 153 The authors gained access to correspondence from the General
request. Mobilization Authority to local supervisors. Authors’ own collection.
122 Details gathered in interviews and data collection for this study. Names of 154 This is the authors’ collective conclusion, based on their synthesis of the
interviewees, and dates and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ known facts.
request. 155 For a good reference on the Basij, see Ali Alfoneh, “The Basij Resistance
123 Details gathered in interviews and data collection for this study. Names of Force,” Iran Primer, United States Institute for Peace, October 6, 2010.
156 Details from interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and dates dates and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request. The
and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request. provisional assessment of the internal security role for the Mobile Region
157 Fernando Carvajal, “Do Houthi military parades jeopardize Yemen’s fragile is the authors’ collective conclusion, based on their synthesis of the
truce,” New Arab, September 13, 2022. known facts.
158 Details from interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and dates 191 Names of interviewees, and dates and places of interviews withheld at
and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request. interviewees’ request. See also al-Gabarni, “Who are the Houthis?”
161 This is the authors’ collective conclusion, based on their synthesis of the 194 Details from interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and dates
known facts. For a good summary of the basij system, see Alfoneh. and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request.
162 This is the authors’ collective conclusion, based on their synthesis of the 195 Details from interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and dates
known facts. and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request.
163 Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, p. 234. 196 “Treasury Sanctions Key Military Leaders of the Ansarallah Militia in
164 This is the authors’ collective conclusion, based on their synthesis of the Yemen.”
165 Al-Gabarni, “Who are the Houthis?” Details provided in interviews for and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request. See also “The
this study. Names of interviewees, and dates and places of interviews Kingdom designates five individuals for their association with activities
withheld at interviewees’ request. in support of the Iranian-backed terrorist Houthi militia,” Sabq Online
166 This is the authors’ collective conclusion, based on their synthesis of the Newspaper, August 31, 2022.
167 Details provided in interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request.
dates and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request. 199 Details from interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and dates
168 Details from interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and dates and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request.
and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request. 200 “Treasury Sanctions Key Military Leaders of the Ansarallah Militia in
169 Details from interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and dates Yemen.”
and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request. 201 For a good overview of Lebanese border fighting between Hezbollah and
170 Details from interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and dates Israel, see Nick Blanford, Warriors of God: The Inside Story of Hezbollah’s
and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request. Relentless War Against Israel (New York: Random House, 2011).
171 Details from interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and dates 202 Knights, “The Houthi War Machine.” See also Lori Plotkin Boghardt and
and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request. Michael Knights, “Border Fight Could Shift Saudi Arabia’s Yemen War
172 Details from interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and dates Calculus,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, December 6, 2016.
and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request. 203 For one example of a post-death announcement of the name of a Special
173 Details from interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and dates Forces official, see “Senior rebel commander killed in Yemen amid fierce
and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request. battles,” Arab News, May 8, 2020.
174 Charles Caris, “Yemen Order of Battle,” Institute for the Study of War, 204 Details from interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and dates
February 23, 2015. and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request.
175 Details from interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and dates 205 This is the authors’ collective conclusion, based on their synthesis of the
and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request. known facts.
176 Al-Gabarni, “Who are the Houthis?” 206 This is the authors’ collective conclusion, based on their synthesis of the
177 Ibid. Topped up with detail from interviews for this study. Names of known facts.
interviewees, and dates and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ 207 Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells.
request. 208 Ibid., pp. 219-220, 227. See also Brandt, p. 201.
178 Al-Gabarni, “Who are the Houthis?” 209 Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, p. 238.
179 Details from interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and dates 210 Brandt, pp. 21-23.
and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request. 211 This is the authors’ collective conclusion, based on their synthesis of the
180 Al-Gabarni, “Who are the Houthis?” known facts.
181 Details gathered from interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, 212 Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, p. 224.
and dates and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request. 213 Dashela, pp. 3, 12, 13.
182 This is the authors’ collective conclusion, based on their synthesis of the 214 Ibid., p. 13.
known facts. 215 Ibid.
183 Caris. Note that Caris uses Presidential Protection Forces, but on the 216 Transfeld, “Iran’s Small Hand in Yemen.” See also Brandt, pp. 334-335.
ground, the more usual Houthi nomenclature is Presidential Protection 217 Transfeld, “Iran’s Small Hand in Yemen.”
Brigades. In the non-Houthi areas, the remaining loyalist presidential 218 This is the authors’ collective conclusion, based on their synthesis of the
guards are often known as Presidential Protection Forces. This is the known facts.
authors’ collective conclusion, based on their synthesis of the known 219 These factors have been discussed in this article and in Knights’ previous
facts. article in this publication. See Knights, “The Houthi War Machine.”
184 For a highly illuminating investigation into the transition of the Republican 220 This is the authors’ collective conclusion, based on their synthesis of the
Guard under the Houthis, before Saleh’s death even, see Lucas Winter, known facts.
“The Adaptive Transformation of Yemen’s Republican Guard,” Small Wars 221 This is the authors’ collective conclusion, based on their synthesis of the
Journal, March 7, 2017. known facts.
185 Al-Gabarni, “Who are the Houthis?” Details provided in interviews for 222 One of the authors (Knights, with co-authors) has tracked growing IRGC-
this study. Names of interviewees, and dates and places of interviews QF disappointment with Iranian-supported Iraqi militias. See Knights,
withheld at interviewees’ request. Smith, and Malik. For a comprehensive look at the Houthis’ integration
186 Ibid. into the Iran-led Axis of Resistance, see Katherine Zimmerman, “Yemen’s
187 This is the authors’ collective conclusion, based on their synthesis of the Houthis and the expansion of Iran’s Axis of Resistance,” American
known facts. Enterprise Institute, March 2022.
188 Details from interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and dates 223 This reflects the balance of evidence from interviews for this study.
and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request. Names of interviewees, and dates and places of interviews withheld at
189 Details from interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and dates interviewees’ request.
and places of interviews withheld at interviewees’ request. 224 This reflects the balance of evidence from interviews for this study.
190 Details from interviews for this study. Names of interviewees, and Names of interviewees, and dates and places of interviews withheld at
interviewees’ request. Houthi decisions on cross-border attacks into Saudi Arabia and the UAE,
225 This is the authors’ collective conclusion, based on their synthesis of the Houthi attacks on U.S. shipping, and Houthi engagement in ceasefire
known facts. talks.
226 This reflects the balance of evidence from interviews for this study. 228 This is the authors’ collective conclusion, based on their synthesis of the
Names of interviewees, and dates and places of interviews withheld at known facts.
interviewees’ request. 229 This is the authors’ collective conclusion, based on their synthesis of the
227 This is the authors’ collective conclusion, based on their synthesis of the known facts.
known facts. Interesting “mobilizations of bias” (i.e., decision-making
cases) that might be explored more closely by future scholars include
24 CTC SENTINEL OCTOBER 2022
Feature Commentary: Elements of a Pragmatic

Strategy to Counter Domestic Political Violence
By Brian Michael Jenkins
beginning of the domestic terrorist campaigns that would increase

Americans appear to reside in separate cultural and in the 1970s.
political camps. Increasing threats against public officials The campaigns represented an array of causes. Some far-
and displays of public hostility have prompted growing left groups like the Weather Underground opposed the war in
apprehension of future political violence. It is in this Vietnam; others like the New World Liberation Front and United
fragile and fraught environment that any efforts to contain Freedom Front rejected capitalism or opposed U.S. policies in
Central America. The Black Liberation Army took up arms against
politically motivated violence will have to operate. This
the government and capitalism, and for self-determination of
commentary outlines a determinedly pragmatic and non-
Black people. The Fuerzas de Liberacion Nacional (FALN) sought
partisan approach to address this threat that recognizes independence for Puerto Rico. Far-right anti-Castro groups
the limits of what law enforcement can do while addressing bombed countries and corporations doing business with Fidel
the greater challenge of national reconciliation. The intent Castro. Violent elements within the Ku Klux Klan and neo-Nazis
of the essay is not to be prescriptive, but rather to set down attacked minorities and communists. The primary tactic was
a framework for further discussion. bombings, but the groups also carried out armed robberies and
assassinations.
“Violence in America has risen to alarmingly high levels While it is perhaps comforting to be reminded that Americans
… This high level of violence is dangerous to our society. It have been here before and the republic survived, the current situation
is dividing our people into armed camps … jeopardizing in the United States in some respects seems more worrisome. A
our most precious institutions … poisoning the spirit of half century after the tumultuous 1960s, Americans appear even
trust and cooperation essential to their functioning … more divided in their attitudes about race and racism, ideology, and
corroding the central political processes of our democratic federal authority. Americans increasingly reside in separate cultural
society … substituting force and fear for argument and and political camps, reflecting different perceptions of reality. The
accommodation.” COVID-19 pandemic has further polarized society and contributed
M
to greater radicalization.2
any Americans in 2022 would agree with this Increasing displays of public hostility have prompted fears of
sober assessment of the country’s situation, but, political violence. Public opinion polls indicate that a growing
in fact, these quotes appeared more than a half number of Americans believe political violence is justified under
century ago in the 1968 “Report of the National some circumstances.3 But many are also alarmed by the appearance
Commission on the Causes and Prevention of heavily armed men at public protests; the assault on the U.S.
of Violence.”1 The Commission had been created to address the Capitol by a violent mob; the increasingly bellicose language of
situation during one of the most turbulent decades in modern national leaders and influencers on television, radio, the internet,
American history. The United States in the 1960s was divided by and social media; the growing volume of threats against public
race, cultural attitudes, ideology, politics, and growing opposition officials at all levels of government; and the reported increase
to the war in Vietnam. in hate crimes. Some even fear that the United States is heading
The decade had witnessed the assassination of President John
F. Kennedy; a violent reaction to the civil rights movement that
included church burnings and the murder of civil rights workers; Brian Michael Jenkins is a former Green Beret. In 1972, he initiated
the assassination of civil rights leader Martin Luther King Jr. and one of the nation’s first research programs on terrorism. His books
of JFK’s brother, senator and presidential candidate Robert F. and monographs include International Terrorism: A New Mode
Kennedy; widespread race riots; growing anti-war protests, and of Conflict; Aviation, Terrorism and Security; Unconquerable
street battles at the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Nation; Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?; The Long Shadow of 9/11;
Chicago. Paths to Destruction; and most recently, Plagues and Their
In 1968, George Wallace, the governor of Alabama, launched Aftermath. Twitter: @BrianMJenkins
a third-party presidential campaign aimed at denying both the
Democratic and Republican candidates a majority of electoral votes, Editor’s Note: The views expressed in this article are solely those
thereby throwing the election into the House of Representatives of the author and do not necessarily reflect the perspectives of the
where he could broker his support to protect the segregationists’ Combating Terrorism Center, the United States Military Academy,
cause. The same year saw the Hong Kong flu pandemic, which or the RAND Corporation.
killed between one and four million people worldwide and as many
as 100,000 people in the United States. The decade closed with the © 2022 Brian Michael Jenkins
toward another civil war.4 to launch attacks on the United States from abroad, the group
This article outlines the elements of a strategy—a determinedly increasingly relied on its affiliates and appeals to homegrown
pragmatic approach—to address the threat of political violence by jihadis to carry on its war.
domestic extremists, specifically how a country as divided as ours Organizational and procedural changes in how intelligence
can prevent domestic political violence from spinning out of control. was collected and shared, plus new counterterrorism legislation
It is written from a personal perspective, expanding upon my 2021 ultimately led to a better informed and more focused national effort
testimony before Congress, essays written during the past two years, that succeeded in containing the threat. Authorities did not prevent
and briefings on domestic political violence.5 It draws on decades every attack in the United States, but they were able to uncover and
of my own research on terrorism and that of my colleagues at the thwart more than 80 percent of the homegrown jihadi plots.6 This is
RAND Corporation and elsewhere. It is important, however, to not to say that every single plot, if not uncovered, would have led to
emphasize that these are my own thoughts. They do not necessarily an attack; some would have. In the more than 20 years since 9/11,
reflect those of the RAND Corporation, the U.S. government, the homegrown jihadis by one count killed a total of 105 people in the
U.S Army, the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, the Combating United States—an average of approximately five deaths per year.7
Terrorism Center, or any other institution. While every single death is tragic, it was a toll far less than feared
Part One of the article examines the evolution of the problem set in the immediate dark shadow of 9/11.
when it comes to domestic political violence in the United States. Perhaps the single most important reason why the United States
This section begins by looking back at efforts since 9/11 to protect did not suffer higher levels of jihadi terrorist activity was the fact
the country against attacks directed or inspired by foreign terrorist that jihadi ideology gained little traction in America’s Muslim
organizations. Although overshadowed by the cost in lives lost and communities, which had no tolerance for violent radicals and would
trillions of dollars spent in what was initially called the “Global War report these people to the FBI. There was no jihadi underground,
on Terror” and came to be seen as “forever wars” abroad, efforts no jihadi terrorist groups, no continuing jihadi terrorist campaigns.
to prevent further jihadi attacks on U.S. soil—although marred Almost all attacks were carried out by lone attackers or, in a few cases,
by initial missteps and injustices—could be described as largely by tiny conspiracies.8 The jihadi terror threat in the United States
successful and a source of lessons to be learned. This section was mostly characterized by inexperienced operators, the absence
then outlines how dealing with domestic political violence will of organization, limited resources, and one-off attacks. Some of the
be different, why it is likely to be more difficult, and therefore, jihadis died in their attacks. The majority of the attackers along
why we need to rethink strategy before implementing new laws with almost all of the plotters were apprehended, convicted, and
and policies. The section then turns to a more detailed analysis of sentenced to long prison terms. Many of the American Islamist
the political terrain in the United States and the current threat of extremists who aspired to leave the United States to join jihadi
domestic political violence. This section also speculates about why fronts abroad were intercepted. Of those who managed to evade
the country has not seen the escalation or surge of terrorist violence arrest and join a jihadi group, at least half subsequently died while
as many anticipated immediately after the January 6, 2021, attack carrying out terrorist operations abroad or were killed by U.S.
on the U.S. Capitol. military attacks or, in some cases, by their own comrades as a result
Part Two reviews recent official documents and pronouncements of deadly quarrels within a group.9
that comprise the current U.S. strategy for dealing with domestic While marred by initial missteps and blunders, the effort
violent extremism. The multifaceted nature of what government against homegrown jihadis can be judged a strategic ‘success,’
is trying to achieve raises questions about definitions, vocabulary, although jihadi armed struggles continue abroad and the danger
roles, and missions. of further jihadi attacks on American targets persists. Permanent
Part Three then lays out the basic elements that I believe should improvements in U.S. domestic counterterrorism capabilities—if
guide U.S. strategy in dealing with U.S. domestic violent extremism. maintained—diminish that threat.10 The history of the American
This is not a prescription, and it will certainly not be the last word. campaign offers a source of lessons to be learned, and some of
Its purpose is to provoke further comment and discussion. the same principles will apply to new terrorist challenges. The
experience does not, however, provide the prototype for efforts
Part One: The Evolving Problem Set of Domestic to deal with the current threat posed by today’s domestic violent
Violent Extremism extremists.
The Campaign against Homegrown Jihadis
For the past quarter century, U.S. authorities have focused on The Harder Challenge of Dealing with Domestic Terrorism
defending the country against the terrorist threat posed by a distant The domestic terrorist threat differs from that posed by homegrown
jihadi enterprise. In 1996, al-Qaìda announced it was declaring jihadis in many respects, and dealing with it, for a number of
war on the United States and launched an escalating global terrorist reasons, will be more difficult.11
campaign, culminating in the 9/11 attacks. Fearing further, even The nation has not been united or galvanized by a major
worse terrorist actions, the U.S. government responded with an domestic terrorist attack. The magnitude of the 9/11 terrorist
unprecedented international campaign directed against a non- attacks brought the country together in a fervent national effort
state organization. Military operations abroad scattered al-Qaìda’s to prevent further terrorist events. Domestic extremist attacks
central command and cadre, and made it increasingly dangerous historically have not had the same unifying effect. The 1995
for them to travel or even communicate. Diplomatic efforts built a Oklahoma City bombing—the second-worst terrorist attack in the
new international coalition to combat al-Qaìda’s global enterprise. United States—did not unite the country in common cause, nor has
Improved intelligence and increased international cooperation the January 6, 2021, assault on the Capitol Building. The country
steadily degraded al-Qaìda’s operational capabilities. Unable remains deeply divided, even in how to describe the event, with
26 CTC SENTINEL OCTOBER 2022 JENKINS
some calling it an insurrection while others claim it was “legitimate The same period saw right-wing extremists traveling across the
political discourse.”12 Indeed, America’s political differences appear country to participate in various protests, including the January
to have become more intense, which could hamper federal efforts 6 assault on the Capitol. That required coordination, logistics,
to counter future political violence. and financing. The shared experiences expanded contacts and
Domestic extremists have a sympathetic base. In contrast contributed to coalescence. Even while adhering to leaderless
to the homegrown jihadis who faced national hostility and could resistance strategies, organizationally these groups may be
not count on much sympathy from American Muslims, the beliefs maturing, a point we will return to below.
driving today’s domestic extremists are deeply rooted in American Right-wing extremists in the United States have easy access
history and society. Right now, this is probably truer of far-right to powerful firearms. Extremists of all persuasions have far easier
extremists than of those on the far left, although both belief systems access to fire-arms, including assault rifles, in the United States
have been around for more than a century. than they do in Europe and other Western countries.
Domestic extremists have bigger numbers. It is always difficult Some right-wing extremists have military or police
to estimate the membership of extremist groups. The numbers are experience. Gunning down unarmed civilians requires fanaticism,
elastic and depend on their source and definition of membership. not advanced training, but to move beyond a lone shooter attack
Counting sympathizers on the internet, groups may claim thousands would require some tactical skills. A few American jihadis had
of members while those willing to show up in person at protests may served in the military and more had sought to join the army, but
number in the hundreds. The Proud Boys, who describe themselves for the most part, they were untrained. There are concerns that
as “Western chauvinists” but who are described by others as “white domestic extremist groups have recruited veterans and that their
nationalists,” have more than 100 chapters in almost all 50 states. ideologies have to an unknown degree penetrated the armed forces
Their total membership may be as high as 6,000.13 The Boogaloo and police departments.23
movement may have (or had at one time) up to 10,000 “members.”14 Preventing radicalization may not work. The Obama
The Oath Keepers’ membership lists 38,000 names, although the administration promoted the idea of intervening before a person
organization probably has far fewer active members.15 was ready to commit a crime as an alternative to a purely law
One chapter alone of the extreme far-left Youth Liberation enforcement approach—that is, preventing radicalization and
Front claims 36,000 followers on Twitter, but that does not mean recruitment instead of incarcerating those who became terrorists.
it has that many members.16 Antifa, whose ideology does not reject These efforts—aimed primarily at heading off would-be jihadis—
violence and which President Trump said the federal government provoked resentment in Muslim communities, and it is not clear
would treat as a terrorist group,17 is better described as a universe how effective they were.24 They may be even more controversial
of like-minded activists rather than a group.18 Many of the other in the domestic environment. As the author has noted elsewhere,
entities on the ideological extremes are more fabrics of belief than “The idea of the federal government patrolling ideology to
organizations. Estimates of membership for all of these groups, far identify dangerous beliefs will provoke outrage and raise civil
right and far left, are as slippery as the labels applied to them. liberties concerns on both the left and the right.”25
Domestic extremists are better organized than homegrown The environment for intelligence collection will be less
jihadis. Both extreme far-right and extreme far-left activists have permissive. Domestic intelligence collection in a democracy is
adopted the concept of “leaderless resistance,”19 a often avoiding a always a delicate undertaking. Historically, the United States has
hierarchical structure and instead relying on local autonomous seen the pendulum swing between aggressive (and sometimes
cells to carry out attacks on behalf of their cause. This deliberate extra-legal) programs against ideologies and organizations
avoidance of centralized organization is intended to prevent deemed subversive and revelations of abuses and the imposition of
infiltration by government informants. Far-left extremists generally constraints that go too far, then back again in the face of new threats.
appear less organized than far-right extremists, some of whom As previously noted by the author, the “material support statutes
parade publicly in a semblance of uniforms. and the fact that the public and courts viewed jihadists as part of a
Continued violence begets organization. More than 90 percent of foreign threat (even though the majority were U.S.-born citizens)
the nationwide Black Lives Matter protests against police killings in gave authorities unprecedented latitude in their investigations.”26
2020 were peaceful.20 In a number of cases, however, protests were Containing jihadi terrorism in the years after 9/11 was, for the most
exploited by well-organized looters or a core of violent extremists part, achieved through intelligence, although many aspects of the
who showed up to promote their own political agendas. They were Patriot Act remain controversial. Law enforcement cannot count
joined by provocateurs wanting to escalate the confrontation or on the same degree of latitude in monitoring domestic extremists.
conduct false flag operations intended to discredit the protesters.21
In cities where protests turned into nightly battles with police, the A Deeply Divided Country
violent interlopers became dominant, street tactics were refined, The French political scientist Alexis de Tocqueville noted after
daily decisions were required, and organization emerged.22 touring the United States nearly two centuries ago—when
democracy was still an unusual form of government—that what
gave the United States strength was Americans’ strong sense of
a Although leaderless resistance is associated primarily with right-wing community.27 “Today, the catalog of trends currently eroding that
extremist groups, environmentalist and animal rights extremists as well as sense of community is depressingly long.”28
others on the far left have adopted similar decentralized approaches. Brent As the author has previously stated, “the increased polarization
L. Smith and Kelly R. Damphousse, “American Terrorism Study: Patterns
of Behavior, Investigation and Prosecution of American Terrorists, Final
of our political system tops the list. It is a long-term trend, beginning
Report,” via the National Criminal Justice Reference Service, March 27, in the 1970s, according to research at the RAND Corporation, that
2002. now manifests itself in the demonization of political opponents as
primal enemies—tyrants, traitors, terrorists.”29 “Threats of domestic political violence

As previously noted by this author, political discussion has
descended “into crude insults, ad hominem attacks and the notion come from both the extreme far-left
that profanity displays authenticity. Contemporary political rhetoric and the extreme far-right. Neither
is seemingly intended to inflame passions ... Some news channels
and the internet (along with foreign influence operations) stoke
extreme is monolithic. Historically,
the differences, and facts are often irrelevant. This uncivic culture those on the extreme far-left tend
makes vicious attacks and harassment of public officials common, to reflect specific issues ... Similarly,
discouraging ordinary people from entering public service30 ...
Irreconcilable differences on social issues reinforce the political the extreme far-right reflects
divide. Differences over racial injustice, abortion, gun control, an assemblage of attitudes and
immigration and LGBTQ rights increasingly determine whom
overlapping causes rather than a single
one is willing to associate with, reinforcing self-segregation along
political lines as we group with like-minded friends and partners.”31 ideology.”
As the author has noted elsewhere, “Even within communities,
Americans do fewer things together. Church attendance is
declining.32 Membership in civic organizations and lodges has
been decreasing for decades.33 PTA membership has dropped by minorities, opposition to immigration, anti-feminism, anti-gay
nearly half of what it was in the 1960s.34 Bowling leagues have sentiment, anti-abortion sentiment, opposition to restrictions on
almost disappeared. And the shared national experience of military private gun ownership, and—above all—fervent opposition to the
service disintegrated with the abolition of conscription in 1973. federal government. Collectively, some of these prejudices are part
Meanwhile, self-proclaimed citizen militias—driven mainly by far- of a continuing current in American history, extending back to the
right conspiracy theories—have surged since 2008, and especially beginnings of the republic. The current broadens in response to
in the past five years.”35 societal stress. More recent additions include involuntary celibates
This is a fragile and fraught political environment, so partisan that and those propelled by conspiracy theories on the internet, while the
almost every issue cleaves along party lines. Millions of Americans pandemic has led to a growing coalescence between anti-vaxxers or
believe—or profess to believe—that the 2020 presidential election those opposing COVID-restrictions and the extreme far-right, who
was “stolen” and refuse to recognize the declared winner as the see each other as reinforcements against a tyrannical government.39
legitimate president of the United States.36 Although collectively labeled “fascists” by their foes, there are
Yet, for all these faultlines, the United States in 1860 was more few in these right-wing movements who understand let alone
neatly divided than it is today. “For all the implied homogeneity in subscribe to an actual fascist philosophy, just as there are not a lot
‘red’ states and ‘blue’ states, they are more-complex mosaics—in of traditional “communists” on the left. These are epithets, tossed
terms of race, ethnicity, religion, and politics—than north versus around on Twitter and other social media, not deep descriptions of
south ever was.”37 That, at least, bodes against a binary breakdown. belief systems.
But it is against the backdrop of a polarized nation that any Economic grievances fuel both extremes. The net worth of a
efforts to contain political violence will have to operate, and it typical white family in America is 10 times greater than that of a
directly affects the formulation of any domestic counterterrorism Black family.40 Globalization and automation has impacted all blue-
strategy. This includes efforts to prevent radicalization and collar workers. Those with a high school diploma or less—whether
recruitment into the ranks of violent extremists, the collection of Black or white—have been left behind economically, lacking access
domestic intelligence, and the prosecution of violent offenders.38 to jobs that would enable them to support a family. Inequality is
growing. Just getting by has become harder. While deeply held
Galaxies of Grievance prejudices are hard to change, increasing opportunities to improve
Threats of domestic political violence come from both the the immediate economic outlook for many, while increasing
extreme far-left and the extreme far-right. Neither extreme is education and vocational training to enhance long-range prospects,
monolithic. Historically, those on the extreme far-left tend to could drain some of the animus underlying the political divide.
reflect specific issues, including the protection of organized labor, This is not to say that poverty causes political violence; it causes
women’s liberation, equal rights for persons of all races and sexual resentment, which can be exploited.
orientations, opposition to nuclear weapons or the Vietnam War, What we would today categorize as incidents of domestic
protection of the environment, anti-capitalism, opposition to police terrorism, assassinations and bombings, go back to the 19th
shootings, and anti-fascism. These causes are sometimes expressed century. Anarchists and extremists within the labor movement were
in a Marxist rhetoric, and within these movements, there are responsible for the assassination of President William McKinley
hardcore left-wing components. Today, it appears more anarchist and most of the major bombings from the 1880s into the 1920s.
than old-fashioned socialist, and for many young, self-styled After the Civil War, the Ku Klux Klan and other white supremacist
anarchists, the ideology may be little more than a philosophical groups carried on campaigns of terror that continued into the 1870s,
pretension to dress in black and raise hell. killing thousands between 1865 and 1876,41 never entirely ceasing,
Similarly, the extreme far-right reflects an assemblage of but escalating again in the late 1920s, and again in the 1960s. An
attitudes and overlapping causes rather than a single ideology. economic crisis affecting farmers in the Midwest prompted another
These include white nationalism or white supremacism, anti- wave of terrorist violence in the 1980s.42
Semitism, anti-Muslim sentiment, fears of replacement by imported Domestic terrorist attacks, primarily bombing campaigns
carried out by far-left extremists, increased sharply in the late 1960s “The approach recommended in this
and continued into the 1970s. Since then, the volume of domestic
terrorist activity has declined; the 1970s still account for almost half essay is to keep law enforcement
of the total number of domestic terrorist attacks that occurred in and the legitimate suppression of
the following 50 years.43
Terrorist analysts point out that while the first two decades of
violence separate from the country’s
this century were dominated by concerns about homegrown jihadis bitter political differences. To the
inspired by al-Qaìda and the Islamic State, domestic extremists extent that enforcement of the law
were actually responsible for more attacks and deaths. According to
statistics published by New America, attacks by homegrown jihadis is seen as politically motivated, then
resulted in 107 fatalities in the United States between 9/11 and the political violence directed against the
end of 2021, while attacks by violent extremists on the far right were
government will appear to be more
responsible for 114 deaths. During the same period, misogynist
ideology accounted for 17 deaths, Black nationalists or separatists justified. Measures to legally suppress
killed 12, and far-left extremists killed one.44 violent extremists will have greater
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
reports 893 incidents of domestic terrorism (counting both plots
public support if they are kept strictly
and attacks) between 1994 and May 2020. Its published statistics in the arena of crime.”
show domestic terrorism generally trending upward after 2006,
with far-right extremists accounting for a growing share of the total.
According to CSIS, far-right extremists accounted for 57 percent of
all terrorist plots and attacks in the United States during this period justified. Measures to legally suppress violent extremists will have
(1994-2020) while left-wing extremists accounted for 25 percent.45 greater public support if they are kept strictly in the arena of crime.
Many anticipated that the January 6 assault would inspire a
The Fallout from January 6 wave of domestic terrorism. That has not occurred, at least, not
The January 6 invasion of the Capitol Building raised legitimate yet. CSIS reported that the number of domestic terrorist plots
concerns about threats to democratic institutions and the potential and attacks dropped in 2021, although the number of fatalities
for further political violence, but it also complicates any strategy to increased from five to 30.51 According to the Global Terrorism Index
deal with that violence. The assault on the Capitol Building was an published by the Institute for Economics and Peace, there were
attempt to interrupt the transfer of power and overturn the results eight incidents and seven deaths.52 New America reported that for
of the presidential election. More than 900 participants have been the first time since 9/11, there had been no successful mass terrorist
arrested and charged with crimes varying from misdemeanors like attacks in the United States in 2021.53 (One notes that the numbers
demonstrating in a Capitol building to felonies like criminal assault are slippery.) A number of mass shootings had occurred, but none
causing bodily injury.46 Sixteen persons have been charged with of these appeared to have been politically connected. (The killing
seditious conspiracy.47 of eight workers at massage parlors in Atlanta by a shooter who
The assault involved violence: People were killed; many were claimed to have a “sex addiction” could have been categorized as a
injured. Greater violence was threatened, including chants of “Hang hate crime because the victims were Asian-Americans. However,
Mike Pence.”48 The purpose of the assault was to affect the conduct prosecutors decided to go into court with eight counts of murder.54)
of government and advance the political goals of the perpetrators. Daniel Byman has suggested that the absence of mass terrorist
Some defendants believed—and still believe—they were following attacks in the wake of January 6 by right-wing extremists reflected
President Trump’s instructions.49 pressure by federal authorities, the lack of organization on the
Concurrent with the investigations and criminal proceedings extreme far-right, and possible public revulsion after the assault on
conducted by the Department of Justice, a Congressional Select the Capitol and mass shootings like that in El Paso.55 I would agree
Committee has conducted a parallel investigation. that intense law enforcement pressure in the months following
As a result of its findings, the committee may refer matters to January 6 may have persuaded extremists to keep their heads down,
the Department of Justice, which will decide whether the former especially since it was reported on January 27, 2021, that the leader
president (or anyone else) should be charged with a crime—as of of the Proud Boys had been a longtime informer for federal and
mid-June 2022, 58 percent of Americans thought he should be.50 local law enforcement.56
The Department of Justice must then determine whether there is Even earlier, it was clear from October 2020 arrests that the
sufficient evidence to bring a criminal charge against the former FBI also had informants inside the alleged plot to kidnap the
president, and the likelihood of a conviction. What effect it would governor of Michigan.57 These revelations may be fueling paranoia
have on the American body politic, and whether this should even among extremists that any new terrorist plots could be lures by
be a consideration, are additional questions. While no one is above government agents provocateurs aimed at rolling up extreme right-
the law, is prosecuting the former president in the best interest of wing networks.
the country? While fears of infiltrators, may partly explain why far-right
The approach recommended in this essay is to keep law extremists have not launched terrorist campaigns, it may also
enforcement and the legitimate suppression of violence separate be that a traditional terrorist strategy may not fit the far-right
from the country’s bitter political differences. To the extent that extremists’ circumstances and strategy. The far-left extremist
enforcement of the law is seen as politically motivated, then political bombers of the 1970s wanted to draw attention to themselves and
violence directed against the government will appear to be more their causes. Today’s far-right extremists already have national
Storm clouds roll over Capitol Hill in Washington, D.C., on July 21, 2022. (Tom Brenner for The Washington Post via Getty Images)
attention, supportive national media outlets, not insignificant who beat up socialists, Republicans, Catholics, Jews, and union
popular support, and even the presumed approval of some members in the 1920s.
political leaders. Therefore, they have less ‘need’ for terrorist
attacks, which could alienate public support, leave them more Part Two: An Evolving U.S. Strategy
vulnerable to government pursuit and prosecution, and force them Dealing with domestic terrorism has historically been a no-go area
to go underground. Demographic differences between the left-wing for the U.S. government. To liberals, it conjured up recollections
radicals of the 1970s and today’s right-wing extremists may also of the FBI’s discredited COINTELPRO campaigns exposed in the
discourage personal decisions to drop out and ‘go underground.’ 1970s. In the 1980s, as left-wing bombers faded from the scene,
The extreme right can build a national movement without the conservatives feared that government campaigns against domestic
terrorism seen in previous waves. extremists would be used to tarnish legitimate conservative causes.
The aura of violence is still present in the display of firearms, These differences were on display even after the Oklahoma City
the military trappings and preparation for action, the semblance bombing in 1995.
of uniforms—these are overt group activities. The exaltation of The Senate hearings that followed the 1995 bombing revealed a
violence is also reflected in the bellicose rhetoric on the internet, deep reluctance by both sides of the political spectrum to support
online genocidal fantasies and plots, and in the growing volume of any expansion of domestic intelligence efforts, although for different
threats to public officials at all levels.58 reasons. No national commission was created to review the event
This is a strategy based on intimidation and threats rather than and identify lessons learned or recommend new measures. An entity
the domestic terrorism of the 1970s. It is aimed less at altering calling itself the Oklahoma Bombing Investigation Committee,
national policies and more at scaring off its foes and taking power. comprising a member of the Oklahoma House of Representatives
It is far more of a political movement than the far left had in the and three businessmen, conducted its own ‘investigation’ and
1970s, and more difficult to deal with than chasing handfuls of issued its final report six years later.60 Its recommendations were
terrorist bombers. essentially an attack on the federal government agencies, in
More nihilistic elements that want to provoke a race war or civil particular, “overzealous federal agents and prosecutors.” It accused
war, individual actors pursuing personal agendas, and wannabes the government of misconduct and abuse of power, also evident,
on the fringes seeking notoriety and approval pose the greatest it noted, in the sieges at Ruby Ridge and Waco. Its final chapter
immediate danger. There are also the gangs of thugs that assemble is a blistering broadside on federal authority. It is worth quoting
to engage in street brawls with targeted populations.59 This is as it reflects sentiments that motivate many of today’s right-wing
behavior similar to that of the squads of Italy’s fascist Blackshirts, extremists.
When group rights and individual rights are not protected, church in Charleston, South Carolina, by a self-radicalized white
the situation becomes intolerable and the people rise up supremacist.65
against their Government. Apparently, this is the point In the following five years, a number of official documents have
McVeigh had reached … It is only because people feel powerless reflected growing government concern and the evolution of strategy.
against the Government and fear its abuses that they bond These include the 2018 National Strategy for Counterterrorism,66
together to protect themselves from it … If individual rights the 2019 Department of Homeland Security Strategic Framework
were respected, if Government agents were punished when for Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence,67 and the 2021
they step on people’s rights or break laws … there would be no National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism.68
more acts of internal terrorism, no perceived need to stockpile
weapons … Militia membership would dwindle and simply The 2018 National Strategy for Counterterrorism
go away.61 The 2018 National Strategy for Counterterrorism remains focused
The senior Department of Justice official coordinating the on radical Islamist groups, but recognizes that the threats come
prosecution of Timothy McVeigh was current U.S. Attorney General from “individuals mobilized to violence by a range of domestic
Merrick Garland. Prosecutors knew the trial would be complicated and foreign ideologies.”69 The domestic component of the threat is
by the intense emotions created by the carnage, the sharp political spelled out in a single paragraph:
differences, the likelihood that the defendant would use the trial to Lastly, the United States has long faced a persistent security
promote his extremist views, and the inevitable conspiracy theories threat from domestic terrorists who are not motivated by
that would arise. The multitude of investigative paths pursued, a radical Islamist ideology but are instead motivated by
many ending nowhere, and the mountains of evidence collected other forms of violent extremism, such as racially motivated
could, by their sheer volume and complexity, confuse a jury. The extremism, animal rights extremism, environmental
challenge was to keep the jury focused on the main legal question extremism, sovereign citizen extremism, and militia
before it: Was McVeigh responsible for the bombing that caused extremism. Such extremist groups attempt to advance
the death of eight federal officials—a specific criminal charge that their agendas through acts of force or violence. Notably,
carried the death penalty? The jury agreed he was.62 domestic terrorism in the United States is on the rise, with
Today’s political partisanship has made the subject of domestic an increasing number of fatalities and violent nonlethal acts
political violence even more perilous to address than it was in the committed by domestic terrorists against people and property
1990s. It is only in the past five years that the federal government in the United States. The economic harm caused by domestic
has re-entered this politically fraught territory.b Although still terrorists has also increased sharply as domestic terrorists
overshadowed by jihadi attacks, domestic terrorist attacks were have continued to destroy property, disrupt business, and
already increasing by then. Research indicates that the gradual and perpetrate financial crimes that are designed to damage
then sharper increase in the frequency of domestic terrorist attacks, certain sectors of the United States economy.70
in particular those carried out by right-wing extremists, can be Although it claims to mark a shift in the American approach,
correlated with the re-election of President Obama in 2012 and the the 2018 National Strategy continued the themes and efforts that
election of President Trump in 2016.63 Both elections reflected the had characterized the U.S. counterterrorism campaign since the
increasing polarization of American society, especially on matters 9/11 attacks. The priority actions described in the 2018 National
of race.64 Strategy mainly addressed the threat from abroad.71
Alarm, however, increased with the August 2017 “Unite the
Right” rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, which mobilized a gathering The 2019 Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and
of white supremacist, neo-Nazi, Ku Klux Klan, militias, and others Targeted Violence
to protest the removal of the statue of a confederate general. The The Department of Homeland Security Strategic Framework
event was viewed as an ominous demonstration of how brazen for Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence published in
racist extremists had become. The effort to rid southern cities of September 2019 recognized domestic terrorism as a growing threat.
monuments glorifying the confederacy had been given impetus There has been a concerning rise in attacks by individuals
by the 2015 murder of nine African-Americans at a historic Black motivated by a variety of domestic terrorist ideologies, such
as racially- and ethnically-motivated violent extremism,
including white supremacist violent extremism, anti-
b Domestic terrorism has always been politically perilous territory for government and anti-authority violent extremism, and other
analysts and government agencies. Nonetheless, the FBI publicly reported ideological strains that drive terrorist violence.72
on disruptions of plots and attacks by domestic terrorists into the early The 2019 Strategic Framework provides a far more detailed
2000s. By then, jihadi terrorism commanded most attention. Fearful
discussion of the threat posed by domestic terrorists, focusing on
of a return to the abuses of the FBI’s counterintelligence programs
(COINTELPRO), which targeted communists, the Socialist Workers Party, white supremacists. This reflected what were recent events. In
White Hate groups, Black nationalists, and the New Left in the 1960s, civil March 2019, a gunman killed 51 Muslim worshippers at mosques in
libertarians were reluctant to endorse any new monitoring of domestic Christchurch, New Zealand. In his online manifesto, he claimed to
groups. Conservative politicians condemned anything that suggested have had brief contact with Anders Breivik, a white supremacist who
targeting of citizens on the basis of their views on issues such as the
Second Amendment, immigration, or abortion. A 2009 DHS report, in 2011 killed 77 people in Norway.73 Breivik’s manifesto highlighted
Rightwing Extremism: Current Economic and Political Climate Fueling the “Great Replacement Theory,”74 the threat that white Europeans
Resurgence in Radicalization and Recruitment, prompted strong criticism were being demographically and culturally replaced by Muslim
from the Senate. The Secretary of Homeland Security apologized, and immigrants.75 White supremacists and nationalists have broadened
the report was withdrawn. See Liz Halloran, “Napolitano Apologizes, But
Why?” NPR, April 16, 2009. It was not until the late 2010s that significant
the definition of the threat to include all immigrant populations
government attention to the domestic threat was renewed. other than those of white European heritage. Replacement theory
underpinned contemporary white supremacist grievance in the Department’s Threat Management Unit, often working with the
United States.76 LAPD’s Mental Evaluation Unit, handles hundreds of such cases
The Strategic Framework noted that several months after the a year.86
attack in New Zealand, a gunman opened fire at a Walmart store The notion of intervening to prevent targeted violence fits
in El Paso, Texas, killing 23 and wounding 26. The gunman also with post-9/11 pressure on authorities dealing with terrorism to
mentioned replacement theory in his manifesto.77 In October actively intervene before an attack occurs. Traditional criminal
2018, another gunman opened fire at a Jewish synagogue in investigations after a terrorist attack were not satisfactory. If the
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, killing 11. His online messages accused duty of law enforcement is to protect, not just punish, police had to
a Jewish charity of resettling refugees into the United States “that detect and thwart terrorist attacks before bombs exploded—or, in
kill our people.”78 Another gunman attacked a Jewish synagogue police parlance, operate “left of the boom.”
in California, citing in his online posting the Christchurch and In the wake of 9/11, a large percentage of terrorist plots in the
Pittsburgh killings as inspirations for his attack.79 United States were, in fact, thwarted by FBI and police stings.
The 2019 Strategic Framework also made reference to an Those who, due to threats or boasting of their readiness to take
anarchist claiming affiliation with antifa, who in 2019 attempted violent action, were judged to be bent upon harm could be
to ignite a propane tank at a federal facility in Tacoma, Washington. introduced to an undercover agent pretending to be a terrorist
The armed attacker was killed by police arriving at the scene. The operative. The undercover agent could not act as a provocateur to
incident led to President Trump later stating that antifa should be entrap the subject but could test whether the individual—if given
designated as a terrorist group.80 the opportunity—was willing to participate in a terrorist attack,
The 2019 Strategic Framework added one further element to in this case, a controlled event that never endangered the public.
the discussion of the threat, noting that “hate crimes and non- Active participation proving intent sufficed to warrant prosecution
ideologically motivated large-scale or disproportionately lethal under the material support provision of the federal criminal code,
acts of mass violence [italics added], including mass attacks, round which carried a severe penalty.
out the picture of terrorism and targeted violence afflicting the While stings were effective in thwarting would-be terrorists,
Homeland.”81 This was a more controversial inclusion. It reflected such operations often were criticized on grounds that, absent
the country’s growing outrage at mass shootings following the government intervention, the defendant would never have become
October 2017 shooting in Las Vegas, Nevada, in which a gunman a terrorist for want of an opportunity or competence. Preet Bharara,
on a hotel balcony fired into a crowd watching a music festival a prominent former federal prosecutor who handled some of
killing 60 people and injuring 867 others, including 411 by gunfire, these cases, points out, however, that if the authorities had not
before killing himself. Investigators have yet to find an explanation intervened, the defendant could have found their way to a genuine
for the attack, which does not appear to have any connection to an terrorist group.87 As for competence, an individual ready to act
ideology, political agenda, or known prejudice.82 could decide at any moment to use a truck or a machete to carry out
The Department of Homeland Security now refers to such acts mass murder. Competence was not a prerequisite to mass murder.
as “targeted violence,” in which “a known or knowable attacker An alternative to stings was to push even further upstream
selects a particular target prior to the violent attack. Unlike to intervene even before an individual radicalized to the point of
terrorism, targeted violence includes attacks otherwise lacking a contemplating violence. A number of countries had developed
clearly discernible political, ideological, or religious motivation, but programs aimed at deradicalizing those already incarcerated for
that are of such severity and magnitude as to suggest an intent to terrorism-related crimes, enabling them to be released. Preventing
inflict a degree of mass injury, destruction, or death commensurate radicalization to violence was the flip side of de-radicalization.
with known terrorist tactics.”83 Targeted violence can take place Programs were created to inform relevant communities of the
at schools, places of worship, transportation systems, indeed any dangers of radicalization or that terrorist radicalization and
public gathering. recruitment were going on in their communities so that they
Deconstructing the meaning and intent of this new language could intervene to dissuade those at risk from following paths to
shows how official thinking has evolved over the years. The term destruction.
“targeted violence” comes from a 1995 paper prepared for the Those manifesting signs of radicalization could be directed
National Institute of Justice,84 suggesting that law enforcement toward off-ramps in the form of professional assistance. In 2011, the
officers should go beyond their traditional role of gathering evidence, Obama administration released a strategic implementation plan
identifying and apprehending perpetrators, and assisting in the with the goal of “preventing violent extremists and the supporters
prosecution. They should also, the authors of that paper argued, from inspiring, radicalizing, financing, or recruiting individuals or
acquire the skills to deal with possible future crime, specifically groups in the United States to commit acts of violence.”88 The plan,
threat assessment—“the set of investigative and operational called Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in
techniques that can be used by law enforcement professionals to the United States, sought to assure America’s Muslim communities
identify, assess, and manage the risks of targeted violence and its that they are part of the American family; nonetheless, countering
potential perpetrators.”85 violent extremism (CVE) clearly focused on the threat of extremist
Threat assessment would arise when police learn about Islamist ideology, not surprisingly on the 10th anniversary of the
communicated threats or behavior that is menacing. This appears 9/11 attacks and following an upswing in jihadi terrorist attacks
to be the origin of the phrase “a known or knowable attacker.” Some and plots.
large police departments today have threat management units that Programs to prevent radicalization seemed to be a more benign
are called upon to deal with cases involving stalking, hostile former approach than prosecution and lengthy incarceration, but they still
employees, threats to former spouses, and similar threatening caused controversy. In the United Kingdom, which pioneered one of
situations where violence is possible. The Los Angeles Police the more ambitious prevention programs, legislation required that
public officials working in schools, universities, hospitals, and local If CVE expanded the scope of prevention, combining preventing
councils report individuals showing radical tendencies.89 In the targeted violence with terrorism broadened the horizons. The 2019
United States, where free speech is guaranteed by the constitution, DHS Strategic Framework noted that “the threats of terrorism
such interventions by the federal government would raise First and targeted violence increasingly intersect with one another,
Amendment issues. The U.S. strategy was to stay out of direct and there is likewise some alignment in the tools that can be used
involvement and instead offer federal grants to community and to counter them. Thus, rather than dealing with terrorism and
non-government groups engaged in preventing radicalization.90 targeted violence as distinct phenomena, this Strategy addresses
This came with assurances that CVE was not intended to be the problems, and the tools that can be wielded to address them,
discriminatory. Still, the federal government’s adoption of an together.”
indirect role did not blunt criticism. The 2019 Strategic Framework was not asserting that large-
From their inception to the present, civil libertarians have casualty events are a variant of terrorism, even though the public
claimed that CVE programs have resulted in discrimination and news media often see them as such. In a mass shooting, say
and infringement of the rights to equality, freedom of speech, on the scale of the Las Vegas attack or other large-scale casualty
and freedom of religion—and they have been racist. “By viewing event, DHS might be required to take action before it was known
American communities through a threat-based security lens,” the whether or not it was an act of terrorism. Depending on the nature
American Civil Liberties Union wrote recently, “these programs of the attack and scale of violence and casualties, the motivation of
have targeted and harmed Black and Brown people, particularly the perpetrator or perpetrators could be irrelevant to the response.
Muslims.”91 Activists in American Muslim communities have If, for example, there were a large-scale bombing, chemical, or
complained about being singled out by intelligence programs and biological attack, DHS would be part of the response. It would be
about prevention efforts being used by the authorities to recruit the responsibility of law enforcement to determine whether the
informants. attack was politically motivated, a hate crime, or conceivably carried
Perhaps the most striking aspect of CVE programs was their out by a “mad scientist.” A plane crashing into a building could
expansion of the scope of prevention. Preventing targeted violence, be the work of terrorists or a suicidal pilot suffering from severe
as presented in the 1995 National Institute of Justice paper, was depression; the response to the event would remain the same.
based upon the presumption that police will be informed of specific The 2019 Strategic Framework did not precisely define “severity
situations that they must evaluate and manage.92 CVE was an and magnitude,” but indicated it meant something “commensurate
effort to counter radicalization at the community level by alerting with known terrorist tactics.” But that is an elastic definition.
and educating members of the community, by enlisting local Terrorist attacks in the United States have resulted in between zero
influencers, and by “identifying signs of violent extremism and ‘off- and nearly 3,000 deaths on 9/11. Presumably, DHS had in mind
ramping’ susceptible individuals before they mobilize to violence.”93 mass killings like the shooting in Las Vegas, which DHS defined as
Preventing targeted violence looks at cases; CVE looks for cases. an act of targeted violence. Targeted violence implies the Las Vegas
The Department of Homeland Security was well aware of the shooter picked his targets for a reason, although no one knows what
criticism that countering violent extremism was perceived as anti- the shooter’s motivation was or the reasoning behind the selection
Muslim. It noted in the 2019 Strategic Framework that “DHS of his target. The Strategic Framework further blurs the lines by
training should provide guidance on privacy, civil rights, and civil mixing in the term “active shooter,” which the federal government
liberties concerns that non-government partners may have in defines as “an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting
partnering with law enforcement for countering violent extremism to kill people in a populated area.”96
(CVE) activities.”94 (It is the only time the term CVE appears in the The FBI defines a mass shooting as any incident in which four
2019 Strategic Framework.) Substituting the more anodyne term people (excluding the shooter) are killed with a gun. Congress in
“preventing targeted violence” to encompass all premeditated acts 2013 set forth the criterion of three. Other definitions of mass
of violence, thereby diluting the role of ideology as a motivation, shootings require only multiple injuries, which could add hundreds
offered a way to chuck the unwanted baggage that came with “CVE” of episodes a year.97 (While many of the databases focus on gun
while at the same time responding to public pressure to address violence, since 1970, terrorists in the United States have caused
what was perceived as a dramatic increase in mass shootings. four or more deaths using bombs on four occasions, anthrax on
State governors were equally sensitive to the criticisms that one occasion, and more recently a vehicle in a ramming attack.98 In
cooperating with the federal government on CVE programs exposed 2014, a depressed high school student stabbed 20 of his classmates
them to. In a January 2021 issue brief entitled “Preventing Targeted and a security guard, although all survived.99)
Violence,” the National Governors Association was even more That DHS may play a role in responding to large-casualty
explicit in explaining the shift from CVE to preventing targeted events that overwhelm local capabilities regardless of motivation
violence: is understandable. Where the role of DHS becomes more
Since 9/11, usage of the term “CVE” has come to be associated questionable, in my view, is in preventing such attacks. The 2019
with interventions understood as anti-Muslim and targeting Strategic Framework implies that its role in targeted violence is not
populations based on their religious beliefs. As such, we use limited to response. Going back to the document’s introduction,
“preventing targeted violence,” or “PTV,” to refer to a new it states that “the threats of terrorism and targeted violence
approach focused on preventing violence rather than potential increasingly intersect, and there is likewise some alignment in
motivations. This approach can promote greater awareness the tools that can be used to counter them [italics added].” The
among stakeholders about the various, evolving motivations footnoted reference to these introductory remarks refers specifically
behind such violence and help dispel the misconceptions that to the 1995 National Institute of Justice article entitled “Threat
only al-Qaeda- or ISIS-inspired individuals are motivated to Assessment: An Approach to Prevent Targeted Violence.”100 The
such acts of violence.95 2019 Strategic Framework, therefore, is apparently talking about
prevention, not just response. the most dangerous source of violence, accounting for a majority
Federal sponsorship of community programs to prevent of the lethal attacks and 42 (nearly three-quarters) of the 57 deaths
radicalization and recruitment to terrorist violence is legitimate, during the three-year period.
although it can be controversial, as pointed out previously.
The prevention of targeted violence, where there is no obvious The June 2021 National Strategy for Countering Domestic
ideological or political nexus, raises questions of practicality and Terrorism
mission. The National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism,106 which
Of course, it is desirable to look for ways to prevent violence, was published in June 2021, repeated an earlier threat assessment
whatever its motivation, but whether this is feasible and whether prepared by the intelligence community and released in March
it is the mission of DHS prompted some debate within the 2021. This earlier assessment warned of an elevated threat posed by
department. In discussions with the author, some DHS officials domestic violent extremists “motivated by a range of ideologies and
described it as a “kitchen sink” approach that leads not only to galvanized by recent political and societal events.”107 These include
definitional problems, but puts DHS in a gray area that could result enduring biases against minority populations and perceptions
in loss of focus and dilution of resources. of government overreach and newer developments such as the
The years following the September 2019 publication of the narratives of fraud in the 2020 election and the emboldening
Strategic Framework witnessed dramatic events that altered assault on the U.S. Capitol, protests related to the COVID-19
perceptions of U.S. domestic security. These included a number of pandemic, and conspiracy theories promoting violence.108
mass shootings, four of them resulting in eight or more fatalities; an Racially motivated and militia violent extremists were identified
alleged plot by extremists to kidnap the governor of Michigan;101 and in the March 2021 document as the most lethal domestic threats.
the January 6, 2021, mob assault on the Capitol. These events were Self-radicalizing lone offenders or small cells were considered more
reflected in the October 2020 Homeland Threat Assessment,102 the likely to carry out attacks than groups. However, the MVE threat,
first of its kind, and the May 2021 Strategic Intelligence Assessment which increased in 2020, was assessed as likely to remain elevated
and Data on Domestic Terrorism as well as ultimately the June 2021 “because of contentious sociopolitical factors.”109
National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism. The 2021 National Strategy focused “specifically on violence and
factors that contribute to it;” in other words, this was not about
The 2020 and 2021 Assessments political partisanship. “The overarching goal of this Strategy is
The 2020 Homeland Threat Assessment noted that violent preventing, disrupting, and deterring” violence.110
extremists will exploit public fears associated with COVID-19 It went on to say that:
and social grievances “driving lawful protests to incite violence, It is critical that we … confront domestic terrorism regardless
intimidate targets, and promote their violent extremist ideologies.”103 of the particular ideology that motivates individuals to
Elsewhere in the assessment, DHS mentioned incitement, violence. The definition of “domestic terrorism” in our law
indicating its awareness that violent extremists infiltrate and exploit makes no distinction based on political views – left, right, or
broader protests. The assessment warned that “DVEs and other center … We must disrupt and deter those who use violence
violent actors might target events related to the 2020 presidential to intimidate racial or religious minorities … So too must
campaigns, the election itself, election results, or the post-election we disrupt and deter those who launch violent attacks in a
period. Such actors could mobilize quickly to threaten or engage in misguided effort to force change in government policies that
violence.” The assessment also stated that, “Among DVEs, racially they view as unjust.111
and ethnically motivated violent extremists—specifically white How is this to be achieved? The 2021 National Strategy lays
supremacist extremists (WSEs)—will remain the most persistent out “four pillars” encompassing eight “strategic goals.” Pillar One
and lethal threat in the Homeland.”104 is to understand and share domestic terrorism information. That
The May 2021 Strategic Intelligence Assessment and Data on means enhancing research, sharing information, and illustrating
Domestic Terrorism, a document prepared by the FBI and DHS, transnational connections. Pillar Two aims at preventing
is more of a guidebook, informing members of Congress and the recruitment and mobilization to violence. It has two strategic goals:
public how the federal government addresses the issue of domestic strengthening prevention sources and services and addressing
terrorism, than it is an assessment.105 It reviews strategic intelligence online terrorist recruitment.
assessments for 2017, 2018, and 2019, but does not offer assessments Pillar Three aims at disrupting and deterring domestic terrorism.
for 2020 or 2021 since the congressional requirement for the The strategic goals indicate that this is primarily to be done by
reporting was part of the 2020 National Defense Authorization the Department of Justice and FBI. The document envisions the
Act, which became law in December 2019. Department of Homeland Security playing a role in analyzing and
It provides a taxonomy of the various categories of domestic assessing the threat and educating and assisting state and local law
violent extremists (DVEs). These include racially or ethnically enforcement in threat analysis. It envisions that DHS will support
motivated violent extremists (RMVEs), anti-government or efforts to improve media literacy as a mechanism for strengthening
anti-authority violent extremists (AGAAVEs), anarchist violent user resilience to online disinformation—the word “resilience”
extremists (AVEs), militia violent extremists (MVEs), Sovereign here is used in a novel fashion, meaning skepticism, resistance, or
Citizen violent extremists (SCVEs), abortion-related violent rejection.
extremists, and animal rights/environmental violent extremists— The 2021 National Strategy envisions DHS playing a major role
the last two categories are subsets of AGAAVEs and the report does in government efforts aimed at identifying and preventing terrorism
not give them their own acronyms. recruitment by providing funding to local community prevention
The summaries in the May 2021 document of the 2017, 2018, programs and by ensuring that such efforts are driven by data.
and 2019 assessments specifically identify white supremacists as According to this vision, DHS, working with the FBI, would try to
enhance the public’s understanding of the assistance that can be the country is politically divided.
provided to those in need, including how mental health experts are The strategies and strategic frameworks discussed have been
complementing traditional law enforcement. The Department also attempts to put a complex national effort into a coherent whole,
would have the task of developing potential indicators of terrorist which is their greatest utility. But these are public documents,
mobilization and recruitment. not secret wartime strategies. They inform a huge government
Despite the emphasis on prevention, the 2021 National Strategy enterprise and a vast national audience about what the government
confirms the short shelf life in official documents of the term, is doing and where the nation should go. They respond to public
“preventing targeted violence.” The 2019 Strategic Framework concerns, signal commitment, lay out goals, identify priorities,
mentioned targeted violence 110 times. The 2020 Homeland Threat and provide assurances. They catalogue what is needed or wanted,
Assessment mentioned targeted violence three times and targeted not precisely how it is to be obtained. They sometimes slide into
attacks once. The most recent document laying out government desiderata and exhortation.
strategy, the 2021 National Strategy for Countering Domestic They are products of an interagency process. They reflect
Terrorism, mentions it only twice. political concerns and constraints. They are written by committees
The second strategic goal under the 2021 National Strategy’s seeking consensus. They bridge differences with compromise
Pillar Three addresses possible legislative reforms and screening. language. They try to avoid offending or needlessly provoking
The 2021 National Strategy remains cautious—in my view, any particular group, especially in these times of heightened
appropriately—about new criminal laws to counter domestic sensitivities. Expression can at times be anodyne.
terrorism. The final strategic goal under Pillar Three addresses the
need for screening and vetting of government employees, including Part Three: Elements for Countering Domestic
those in the military and law enforcement at the federal, state, local, Political Violence
tribal, and territorial level. The following elements are not intended to be an alternative to
Pillar Four addresses long-term contributors to domestic the current national strategy. Instead, they attempt to go a step
terrorism. further and address a number of specific issues in greater detail.
That means tackling racism … It means protecting Americans They emphasize a pragmatic approach.
from gun violence and mass murders. It means ensuring … Some may argue that the elements described below do not
early intervention and appropriate care for those who pose address the broader ills that currently afflict American society and
a danger to themselves or others. It means ensuring that its government: the absence of agreement on almost anything, the
Americans receive the type of civics education that promotes dismissal of facts, tribal politics that supplant national interests,
tolerance and respect for all … And it means ensuring that congressional dysfunction, the demonization of political opponents,
there is simply no governmental tolerance … of violence as an the loss of comity and the insulting and violent rhetoric that have
acceptable mode of seeking political or social change.112 replaced political discourse, the prospect of forever contested
While this language seems sadly necessary in today’s America, it elections, settling scores rather than setting a course for the future.
could be the most contentious part of the national strategy. In the I agree that these are national problems and should be addressed.
current partisan environment, those already hostile to the federal Containing political violence is essential, but by itself will not
government see this as putting the federal government into the fundamentally alter the social and political landscape. That is a
realm of patrolling thought, seeking out those who might commit matter for civic culture and political leadership.
crimes, or intervening in school curricula. Do no harm. Right now, the country is fragile. American society
The 2021 National Strategy identifies the mission-set identified is deeply divided. Its divisions are fueled by polarized politics,
in Pillar Four as national goals, but it also makes it clear that the online poison, post-pandemic pessimism, hair-trigger sensitivities,
federal government cannot achieve them alone, and for some is not a declining sense of community, eroding trust in institutions, and
the appropriate lead. It repeatedly talks about partnership with loss of goodwill in our political process. In the country’s current
state, local, and territorial governments. Those already suspicious critical condition, even the most benign interventions to curb
of federal government overreach unwarranted by a negligible threat domestic extremism may easily escalate tensions and make things
miss the caveats, however. worse. Maintaining national cohesion is vital to success.
Avoid overreaction and overreach. The assault on the U.S.
The Arc of Threat Perception Capitol offers ample warning that domestic violent extremists
Taken together, these documents trace the shift from concern about pose a threat. As outlined above, since the 9/11 attacks, domestic
homegrown jihadis to domestic violent extremists. The threat extremists have killed more people than homegrown jihadis, but
perception changes incrementally, tentatively. Clearly defined jihadi both sets of numbers are small and below the level of terrorist
adversaries are joined by an array of domestic extremists lumped violence seen in the 1970s when there were 50 to 60 terrorist
together in the 2018 National Strategy for Counterterrorism. The bombings a year in the United States.113 It is tempting to ignore the
2019 Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism recognized issue altogether as a spasm of violence resulting from pandemic
domestic terrorism as a growing threat, focusing on violence by shutdowns, public protests, and a hotly contested election.
white supremacists. The 2020 Homeland Threat Assessment The United States has a high tolerance for individual violence.
identified white supremacist extremists as the most persistent and Overreaction could exacerbate the situation. However, the long-
most lethal threat. The 2021 National Strategy for Countering term trend of domestic political violence has generally been upward
Domestic Terrorism, as its title indicates, deals exclusively with over the last decade. Armed defiance is on greater display. We are
the threat of violence by domestic extremists who threaten the still at the front end of potential terrorist campaigns and can head
democratic process. In doing so, it communicates its awareness that extremists off before matters get worse, but we must do so cautiously.
Set realistic, achievable objectives. As with all counterterrorism “The long-term trend of domestic
efforts, the primary goal will be to protect lives by preventing
terrorist attacks.114 To sustain a functioning democratic government, political violence has generally been
authorities need to devote special attention to protecting U.S. upward over the last decade. Armed
officials against assassination, sieges, and other assaults. Public
officials are already dealing with increased threats as a consequence
defiance is on greater display. We
of the pandemic and the contested results of the election.115 This are still at the front end of potential
will have a corrosive effect on the democratic process, discouraging terrorist campaigns and can head
many from seeking office or entering public service, leaving the field
open to those comfortable with politics as scorched earth warfare. extremists off before matters get worse,
Above all, the objective of the effort should be to preclude normalizing but we must do so cautiously.”
political violence in American society.
Combating domestic terrorism means maintaining the
legal guardrails against ideologically or politically motivated
violence. It means enforcing the law; it cannot become the making half the population enemies of the state. A small percentage
continuation of politics by other means. Countering terrorism of those arrested for invading the U.S. Capitol were members of
includes efforts—primarily by law enforcement—to deter or violence-prone extremist groups bent upon subverting a democratic
bring to justice those responsible for violence combined with process. But many were ordinary people convinced they were taking
national efforts to remove or reduce the causes of the violence. patriotic action to prevent an election from being stolen. They broke
Governments may give greater weight to one or the other, the law but should not be portrayed as terrorist associates. The goal
depending on the circumstances. The first is a traditional law in dealing with domestic violent extremists is to isolate them from
enforcement role; the second may aim at ultimate reconciliation, potential constituencies, not broaden the target.117
but could also include education and psychological operations Avoid standoffs and trigger events. Standoffs and sieges like
to reduce recruiting, preventive interventions, de-radicalization Ruby Ridge and Waco should be avoided. Some extremist elements
programs aimed at altering destructive patterns of behavior, and are determined to provoke a race war or civil war. Standoffs and
other efforts. Given the current levels of distrust in government sieges can trigger further acts of violence and provoke deep political
institutions and vulnerability of other efforts to misunderstanding crises. One can only imagine the political crisis that could have
and misrepresentation, it may be better to operate mainly in a occurred if the invaders of the Capitol on January 6 had decided to
traditional law enforcement role, which is the appropriate mission take hostages to hold off National Guardsmen clearing the building.
of the FBI as well as state and local police. Adequate security based upon intelligence and responding rapidly
A counterterrorism campaign is not an instrument to ensure can reduce the possibility that things will spin out of control. The
racial equity and social justice. These obviously remain national 2017 Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia; the armed
goals, but they ought to be broader tasks for the entire nation, from protests at the Michigan statehouse and in other state capitals
voters to the Oval Office. Those who are dissatisfied by what they in 2020 and 2021; the invasion of the U.S. Capitol Building on
see as timidity in dealing with domestic extremists may quarrel with January 6, 2021; and the 2022 occupation of downtown Ottawa
this, but government cannot strip mine every seam of bigotry in and similar actions by truckers in the United States118 suggest that
American society. White supremacism, anti-Semitism, animosity the authorities must be prepared for large-scale protests, any one of
toward immigrants, hostility toward the federal government, which could quickly escalate into an armed standoff.
and other resentments represent continuing dark currents in Impede recruiting. Revulsion in reaction to bloody terrorist
American society that widen during periods of economic and attacks will erode public sympathies as it did in the immediate wake
social stress. Deeply embedded in American society, prejudice will of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. If the extremist diehards move
not be banished by legislation and cannot be eradicated by law from protest marches and street brawls to clandestine terrorist
enforcement. campaigns, that also will impede organizational recruiting:
Don’t blur the mission. Countering domestic terrorism is Fewer people are prepared to abandon their ordinary lives and
not about preventing gun violence or mass shootings. Domestic “go underground” to live on the run or lead a double life. The
terrorism is a component of “targeted violence,” but this is a broader prospects of criminal prosecution will peel off some potential
category that includes workplace violence and attacks on schools, recruits. Publicized revelations that some of the extremist leaders
places of worship, public events, and transportation systems may have been government informants and breaking up terrorist
that lack a clearly discernible political, ideological, or religious plots that have been infiltrated can have a further chilling effect.
motivation.116 These events usually involve shooters engaged in Prevention programs potentially can further reduce recruiting.
carefully planned assaults in a public place. Most aim at causing This will not stop lone actors and tiny conspiracies from plotting
mass casualties; victims are often randomly selected. The attacks attacks, but it will sow distrust and hamper organizational growth
may look like terrorism, but there is no terrorist link or discernible and collaboration.
political motive. While terrorism and targeted violence overlap Recalibrate existing programs to prevent radicalization. In
as public security concerns, they should not be conflated. Angry response to a continuing jihadi threat, authorities worldwide sought
employees ‘going postal,’ doom-obsessed adolescents, and deranged ways to identify and divert those vulnerable to radicalization. This
killers are not domestic violent extremists. was new territory. Until recently, these programs focused on would-
Isolate violent extremists from their presumed be jihadis. Whether they were effective is hard to judge.119 Nor is
constituencies. This means going after the violent fringe without it clear that they can be usefully employed to deal with would-
be domestic terrorists. Preventing the radicalization of domestic “Avoid the appearance of politicization
extremists, whose views may be acquired early in life and may draw
on greater community support, could differ significantly. Ongoing in law enforcement and prosecution ...
research is expanding our knowledge of how domestic terrorists The core mission of law enforcement
radicalize and can inform new efforts.120 These programs angered
America’s Muslim communities. Even greater push back should be
is to control crime, a mission that has
anticipated as they are extended to other communities. This is an wide public support. Departures from
area where local communities should take the lead, but DHS can this mission create uncertainty for law
support the effort with knowledge and funding.
Avoid the appearance of politicization in law enforcement enforcement officials and bring public
and prosecution. Keep the Department of Justice, the Department controversy.”
of Homeland Security, the intelligence community, the FBI, and
police departments out of politics and culture wars. The core mission
of law enforcement is to control crime, a mission that has wide
public support.121 Departures from this mission create uncertainty of anti-war protesters in the late 1960s or white supremacists and
for law enforcement officials and bring public controversy. seditious conspiracy trials in 1988 and 2012.123 Prosecutors make
The current lexicon does not always help us. For example, strategic decisions on how they portray the actions of the accused.
the January 6 invasion of the U.S. Capitol has been described as Researchers examining the outcomes of terrorist trials after 9/11
meeting the definition of terrorism; analysts debate the point. concluded that when prosecutors sought to emphasize the political
Calling ordinary criminals terrorists is an upgrade. Others describe motivations of the defendant, the case was more likely to go to trial
the January 6 event as an attempted coup or a putsch, both foreign and more likely to result in a dismissal or acquittal; the highest
words and neither of which appears in the U.S. Criminal Code. The plea bargain and conviction rates were among defendants facing
current favored term is insurrection, which does appear in the code, traditional criminal charges.124 In other words, invoking the
although it is hard to find anyone prosecuted as an “insurrectionist” terrorism enhancement, while increasing the possible penalty,
in the last 150 years. As with the label of terrorism, the question is could imperil conviction.125
not whether the invasion of the Capitol meets the legal definition of Preserve intelligence capabilities. Robust domestic intelligence
insurrection. The word itself seems obsolete, pretentious, and from collection, always difficult in a democracy, will be necessary. It must
some perspectives even high-minded. What term is strategically be accompanied by rigorous oversight to prevent abuses, creating a
useful? Violent mob may be more accurate, invokes less support, tension between necessity and constraint. Historically, the United
and it carries less political freight. States has tended to overreact in response to intelligence failures
I have used the terms terrorism and political violence and to overreact in response to revelations that authorities have
interchangeably, although in my view, terrorism is a more emotive overstepped their bounds. The pendulum swings back and forth,
term. The key element is always violence. The term terrorism may often going too far.
also cause officials to look for tactics that match past terrorist The United States currently faces a more complicated threat
campaigns while domestic violent extremists, instead of attention- matrix that includes a continuing threat posed by homegrown
getting bombings, may be following a strategy of intimidation jihadis, domestic extremists, and an array of individual actors
aimed at incremental eventual takeover. Counterterrorism should motivated by various issues. At the same time, intelligence efforts
be presented as what it basically is—law enforcement aimed at currently face growing headwinds. The memory of 9/11 has faded;
ordinary criminals. authorities were successful in preventing most further tragedies
Don’t make martyrs. Both ends of the political spectrum (largely due to intelligence); and the homegrown jihadi threat has
push for throwing the book at their adversaries on the other side. diminished. A revisionist history now unfairly seeks to portray the
Progressives have expressed discontent with what they perceive entire counterterrorism campaign as a malevolent enterprise and
as timidity on the part of the attorney general and Department domestic intelligence collection as an Islamophobic, racist program
of Justice in going after white supremacists and other far-right aimed at stigmatizing a religion, immigrants, and Black and brown
extremists, especially the leaders. Conservatives claim that the communities.
federal government has failed to appropriately prosecute and punish It is not difficult to find examples where people exploited the
those responsible for violence during the 2020 Black Lives Matter jihadi threat to expand executive authority or promote other
protests. In my view, Attorney General Garland, a seasoned jurist political objectives. Unquestionably, there is a record of inevitable
who successfully coordinated the prosecution of the Oklahoma City errors, understandable excesses, and inexcusable crimes. At the
bombers, has the experience and savvy to steer an apolitical course. same time, some conservative white communities and groups
Thus far, the prosecution of the participants in the January 6 fear that current government efforts to contain domestic political
invasion of the Capitol has been carefully calibrated to fit the crime. violence are aimed specifically at disarming and destroying them.
Most defendants have faced comparatively minor charges and plea Between these two extremes, the center is hollowed; there is a
bargains have been being pursued, resulting in modest penalties, diminished pro-intelligence constituency. Predictably, it will be
but also depriving defendants from opportunities to grandstand difficult to preserve existing intelligence collection authorities,
or portray themselves as political prisoners.122 More serious including those that are vital to successful disruptions.
charges have been brought against a small number of individuals The most contentious area includes surveillance, specifically
whose plans and actions posed a greater threat, and here again, Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act passed
plea bargains may preclude the kinds of divisive trials like those after 9/11, that allows the government to target the communications
(phone calls and emails) of foreign persons located outside the any hint of subversive thought. Whether related to organized crime
United States, including their communications with Americans.126 or political violence, the appearance of impartiality is not assured
Civil libertarians consider this a back door to warrantless by targeting every sector of society equally.
surveillance of Americans.127 The provision is due to expire in 2023. Most members of the Sicilian Mafia who referred to their
Government monitoring of social media, which has led to arrests of organization as Cosa Nostra were Italian. Most members of MS-13
terrorists, has also attracted opposition.128 are Central American, especially Salvadorans. The FBI did not look
And there is opposition to local police sharing certain kinds of for violent Klansmen in the NAACP or the B’nai B’rith. Support
information with federal authorities. Some groups demand that for the terrorist campaigns waged in the 1980s by the Justice
local police departments, among other things, end participation in Commandos of the Armenian Genocide and the Armenian Secret
federally funded countering violent extremism efforts and remove Army for the Liberation of Armenia—not surprisingly—came from
their officers from the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force operations.129 individuals in Armenian communities in Europe and the United
The national network of fusion centers has also come under fire. States. The anti-Castro Cuban bombers of the 1960s and 1970s
Some are excellent, but in my view many are mediocre and need were based mostly in Miami. The focus of intelligence activities in
adequate staffing and more training to improve their capabilities these cases was not about bias; it simply reflected the threat.
and ensure that their activities remain within constitutional The FBI’s penetration of the plot to kidnap the governor of
boundaries. Disbandment is the alternative. Michigan131 and the revelation that the leader of the Proud Boys was
These initiatives against intelligence operations reflect legitimate a government informant132 suggest that the bureau has informants
concerns, heightened by broader distrust of police as well as the in far-right extremist groups. Federal investigators, however,
federal government on both ends of the political spectrum. The are likely to have less latitude than for international terrorism in
dynamic is not new. Civil libertarians and right-libertarians share investigating domestic extremist groups or introducing evidence
suspicion of federal authority. As threats evolve, regular review obtained through informants in court. Intelligence operations
of domestic intelligence authorities and methods is appropriate. will have to adjust to minimize predictable backlash. The failure
Domestic intelligence programs and practices need not be defended of prosecutors to initially obtain convictions in the alleged plot
on all fronts. to kidnap the governor of Michigan points to the challenges of
A more pragmatic course would be to identify a core of prosecutions depending on informant testimony.133
intelligence capabilities and programs that should be preserved. Address the handling of intelligence regarding the January
Using actual cases as much as possible, it should be publicly 6 assault. Regardless of whether one views the events of January
explained why they are essential and how they have contributed 6 as a planned invasion of the Capitol or a protest that turned
to public security—avoiding the word ‘algorithm.’ That also means violent, security preparations were inadequate. It appears to have
accepting that the ability to uncover plots and prevent attacks may been not so much an intelligence failure as a failure to heed the
decline as investigations return to a traditional reactive mode; this intelligence. Why, despite intelligence available from various police
is a national choice. It means reversing the push toward prevention, departments, including the District of Columbia Police, fusion
which has driven national efforts since the 1990s, and especially centers, some FBI field offices, and other federal agencies, was it not
after 9/11, and accepting that some attacks may occur and will be put together in an intelligence warning that mobilized necessary
investigated after the event as terrorist bombings of the 1970s were. resources? Was this the result of reluctance at the federal level?
Use informants judiciously. In dealing with domestic Were agencies inhibited by the political environment? Were the
terrorism, authorities have always relied heavily on the recruitment warnings not heeded because of biases on the part of those charged
of informants and undercover agents. Informants are a critical with security? What happened or did not happen, and why?134
component of intelligence. Informants can operate in communities Accept that prevention may be more difficult and certainly
where undercover agents would be easily identified. They facilitate more controversial. The public and political leadership will
disruptions and assist in criminal investigations after attacks. continue to demand prevention, but disruptions may be harder
Knowing there may be informants impedes recruiting and may to achieve while early interventions may preclude successful
deter criminal action. Fear of FBI infiltration was the reason why prosecutions, intensifying what is often a source of tension. A
organizations, especially white supremacist groups like the Ku Klux traditional investigative approach like that which dealt with
Klan and neo-Nazis adopted a strategy of “leaderless resistance,” the terrorist bombers of the 1970s where authorities most often
relying on action by autonomous small cells and inspired responded to events that had already occurred would obviate
individuals.130 proving intent. Even jurors sympathetic to the accused would have
The recruitment and utilization of informants is subject to to confront the reality of victims, making it harder to ignore the
federal and local guidelines. Determination to avoid perpetuating fact of an attack.
prejudices has made the country acutely sensitive to any hint of The authorities could be pushed by current political realities to
bias. The recently promulgated counterterrorism strategies aim wait longer before intervening. Although it sounds Machiavellian,
at identifying potential violent actors while repeatedly reassuring government could decide to adopt a more reactive approach as a
the public that intelligence efforts are not aimed at any specific matter of strategy (at least initially). Investigations after the fact
sector of society that might feel offended. While this sensitivity is of violence are easier to justify. It reduces room for doubt and
understandable and critical, it is the nature of the threat that should allows prosecuting solely on ordinary criminal charges, leaving
drive intelligence efforts, not the biases or political preferences of aside motivation and intentions. It allows prosecutors to achieve
the law enforcement agency. more widely accepted convictions. When it is clear that criminal
America is not a police state. It does not—and should not— action appears imminent and lives are at stake, authorities must
support a vast network of informants monitoring fellow citizens for intervene regardless of worries about divisive trials or calculations
of successful prosecution. Often, however, the circumstances of any “Passing a new domestic terrorism
case are murkier.
Public officials must be protected without surrounding law is unnecessary. Past government
them with onerous physical security measures that burden caution in dealing with domestic
their families and isolate them from the public they serve. The
protection of the president is not a viable model here. Instead,
extremists reflected the lack of
threat assessment and threat management capabilities will have political consensus, not the absence of
to be expanded so that security can be flexibly applied. It is not criminal statutes, and while agreeing
just a matter of protecting people against actual attack, but against
insidious intimidation. That may require reexamining laws against that laws reflect moral values, it may
communicated threats. be preferable to avoid the inevitable
Expose foreign connections and instigation. Domestic
polarization that will come with
political extremists can have foreign connections.135 Often, they are
part of broader international movements that share ideology and renewed debates about the definition of
communicate with one another. These are not hierarchies with a terrorism and who the terrorists are.”
centralized command element, but still connected communities.
While harder to understand and portray, the foreign connections
can sometimes facilitate domestic investigations. The extensive
network of cooperative relationships forged between governments choose to portray the crime as terrorism, hoping it will provoke the
to deal with the jihadi threat can also serve to deal with domestic jury’s outrage and increase the odds of a guilty verdict. In dealing
violent extremists; exchanging information and sharing analysis with domestic terrorism defendants, that course can backfire. In
can lead to more effective countermeasures. As in the case of domestic terrorism cases, some defendants define themselves as
homegrown jihadis, domestic violent extremists are also subject to American patriots, a perspective to which some members of the jury
information operations and exhortations from abroad. These can might be sympathetic. At a minimum, it takes the jury into the more
provide another source of intelligence. complicated arena of motives. Why give the defendant a platform
Passing a new domestic terrorism law is unnecessary for his political pretensions? He only has to persuade one juror.
and distracting. There are continuing calls for a new domestic The Department of Homeland Security should play a
terrorism law to raise attention and close a “moral equivalency gap” strategic role in countering domestic political violence. A
with international terrorism.136 Enthusiasm for such legislation number of DHS’ component agencies—for example, the Secret
has dimmed for the moment, but any new attack will reignite the Service and the Transportation Security Administration—have
fervor. There is good reason to be wary. Passing a new domestic specific missions that involve countering terrorism and political
terrorism law is unnecessary. Past government caution in dealing violence. The department also has broader strategic roles. These
with domestic extremists reflected the lack of political consensus, include protecting the nation’s critical infrastructure, which includes
not the absence of criminal statutes, and while agreeing that laws the election infrastructure and in understanding, assessing, and
reflect moral values, it may be preferable to avoid the inevitable countering foreign influence operations conducted via the internet.
polarization that will come with renewed debates about the In dealing with threats, DHS promotes and supports information-
definition of terrorism and who the terrorists are.137 sharing through the national network of fusion centers that connect
What many proponents of a domestic terrorist law are looking state and local police departments and federal agencies.
for is the equivalent of the material support provision of the Patriot DHS was never intended to operate as the equivalent of the
Act, which made it a crime to provide any type of assistance to a British MI5, a national gendarmerie, or federal Special Branch.
designated foreign terrorist organization. It was used extensively to Outside of its specific component agencies, the department does not
prosecute homegrown jihadis. To enact the domestic version of the directly collect domestic intelligence or conduct its own criminal
material support provision would require authorities to designate investigations. DHS assembles information passed on to it from
domestic terrorist organizations, and that is where the problem lies. other federal agencies and state, local, tribal, and territorial police.
As previously noted by the author, “in the current environment ... The most critical function of DHS in this area is the strategic
congressional agreement on the definition of terrorism, let alone analysis of threats and providing assessments and warnings.
who’s a terrorist, seems unlikely.138 Satisfying the views of both sides The FBI remains the operational arm of the federal government
could lead to vague criteria, producing a list of hundreds of ‘terrorist for domestic intelligence collection and criminal investigations.
groups,’ or—worse—political horse trading—we’ll give you antifa if Since 9/11, the FBI’s analytical capabilities have increased, but by
you give us Proud Boys. Some of the names mentioned are not even tradition and institutional culture, the bureau is case-driven, which
organized groups, but rather broad movements or simply shared also happens to be the best posture for avoiding the appearance
attitudes.”139 In any case, in my view, the greatest threat of terrorism that it is a political instrument. To the extent that DHS and the FBI
is more likely to come from unaffiliated actors. analysis may overlap, it is not unhealthy.
Keep investigations, arrests, and prosecution narrowly DHS comprises many components, each of which have
focused on crime. Portray and treat violent offenders as specialized roles, authorities, and capabilities. In order to increase
ordinary criminals. Prosecutors may sometimes use the heavier efficiency, some support the idea that the authorities and resources
penalties that a terrorism enhancement to a criminal charge of the various components are interchangeable and can be
brings in order to persuade the defendant to plead guilty rather combined, creating a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts.
than risk a conviction and long imprisonment. They may also In other words, according to this vision, the Secret Service, Customs
and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, sacrosanct notion of a politically neutral military.
Transportation Security Agency, and other DHS entities would Let the military determine how to keep extremists out of the
become units of a larger DHS force. (DHS already has the largest ranks. Keeping the military out of politics is one concern. Keeping
law enforcement contingent in the federal government.) The DHS political extremists out of the military is a second. The presence
response to the 2020 riots in Portland, Oregon, provided a preview. of veterans and a few active-duty personnel in the January 6 mob
There may or may not be legal barriers to how far this can go, but it or some of the right-wing extremist groups has raised questions
would alter the perception of DHS, bringing it closer to a European- about whether there are anti-government, white supremacist, or
style ministry of interior, emphasizing law enforcement, with a other dangerous extremists present in the ranks. Again, this is not
national gendarmerie as an enforcement arm.140 The shape of DHS a new issue. Oklahoma bomber Timothy McVeigh was an army
and how it defines its mission going forward is beyond the scope of veteran, and several homegrown jihadis were active-duty military
this essay, but it will be critical in the new environment. personnel.c Responding to recent cases, the Pentagon has reviewed
The military has very little role in countering domestic its policies and clarified the rules, but leaves enforcement to unit
political violence. Keep it that way. Federal forces have been commanders.144 One possible criticism is that unit commanders
deployed throughout American history to put down rebellions, have other concerns and are unqualified to assess some of the secret
prevent disorder, and—in some cases where local authorities are signs and codes used by extremists.
defiant—enforce federal law, for example, the desegregation of Noting that the Pentagon’s review of extremism among service
schools. The National Guard, under state control, serves as the members found prohibited extremist activity among service
principal backup in dealing with riots when local law enforcement members to be rare—just 100 cases out of 2.1 million active and
is overwhelmed. In most recent cases, troops were sent in at the reserve personnel—the Senate Armed Services Committee in its
request of local authorities to quell riots and prevent looting. report to accompany the National Defense Authorization Act for FY
However, short of reinforcing local police and the National Guard 2023 stated its view that spending additional time and resources is
in large-scale riots or protecting its bases or its armories against inappropriate and “should be discontinued by the Department of
theft, the U.S. military does not have an operational role in domestic Defense immediately.”145
counterterrorism. The U.S. armed forces cannot be used for law My own assessment here is that the military is aware and
enforcement without the approval of Congress. determined to address the issue without undermining combat
Beyond these circumscribed missions, which must be ordered readiness.d Greater scrutiny can be carried out during recruiting.
by the president and in some cases approved by Congress, the Another possible approach may be to incorporate some instruction
American military does not do politics. It does not challenge civilian in civics—how the government works and what it means to be a
authority, but it is not a Praetorian Guard and will resist being soldier into military training. Although any such effort is likely to
used to serve as anyone’s political instrument. Military leaders provoke intense scrutiny in today’s culture wars, it is not “woke” to
are acutely aware of the dangers to the country and to the military include the kind of basic civics course that used to be mandatory in
institutions themselves of politicizing the armed forces. It is true high school. As a final measure, the Pentagon could explore ways in
that former officers—representing their own views—have engaged which it might psychologically assist recently discharged personnel
in political rhetoric that borders on sedition while others while still as they make the sometimes difficult transition to civilian life, where
in uniform have publicly expressed political views. These cases are they may be targets of extremist recruiting.
rare. Enforce the law in a patently even-handed way. While
Widespread protests in 2020, some of which led to violence, and protecting the right of protest, application of the law must be equal.
the 2020 presidential elections, which the then president claimed American society has traditionally tolerated a wide range of behavior
were fraudulent, strained relations between the president and the in political protest, even as participants crossed the line from
armed forces. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark lawful to unlawful and peaceful to violent. If conduct becomes bad
Milley later publicly apologized for appearing with the president at enough—as in aggravated assaults or looting—ordinary criminal
a photo opportunity amidst protests in Washington, D.C., because, laws can be applied. It is not considered terrorism, although some
in his words, it “created the impression of the military involved say it should be. However, application of the law should be equal.
in domestic politics.”141 When, following the elections, there were Continuing violent assaults on a federal courthouse in Portland
concerns that the then president might use the military to stay in cannot be ignored while members of a mob invading the U.S.
power, General Milley in a Veterans’ Day speech pointed out that Capitol are brought to trial. In fact, depending on sources, between
“we are unique among militaries. We do not take an oath to a king or 14,000 and 17,000 arrests were made during the Black Lives Matter
queen, a tyrant or dictator. We do not take an oath to an individual.
No, we do not take an oath to a country, a tribe, or religion. We take
an oath to the Constitution.”142
c Nidal Hasan was an active-duty Army major when he opened fire on
It became clearer weeks later what kinds of concerns had
soldiers at Fort Hood, Texas, in 2009. Katharine Poppe, “Nidal Hasan: A
motivated General Milley’s words when some of the then president’s Case Study in Lone-Actor Terrorism,” Program on Extremism, George
supporters, including a former three-star general who earlier had Washington University, October 2018. Naser Abdo was an Army private
served as the president’s national security adviser, publicly argued convicted of plotting to kill soldiers near Fort Hood in 2011. “Naser Jason
Abdo Sentenced to Life in Federal Prison in Connection with Killeen Bomb
that the then president should suspend the constitution, declare
Plot,” U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Texas, U.S. Department of
martial law, and order the military to run new elections.143 My own Justice, August 10, 2012.
assessment is that military participation in such a scenario remains d In the interest of full disclosure, the author discloses that he spoke with and
highly unlikely, and that active military involvement in dealing shared his views with members of the Pentagon working group updating its
with domestic political violence, while adding little, would risk the procedures for handling extremism.
protests.146 Most were on minor, non-violent charges, but hundreds threatened to remove this protection. This would oblige platforms
were charged with burglary and looting.147 As of May 26, 2022, to prevent what government cannot.
more than 900 participants in the January 6 assault on the Capitol A third theoretical approach would be to alter the laws on
have been charged, again most of them on comparatively minor incitement. Over the past century, the position of the Supreme
charges; 298 have entered guilty pleas.148 Sixteen individuals have Court has evolved on this issue, initially upholding restrictions on
been charged with seditious conspiracy; as of October 6, four have speech where it creates “a clear and present danger.”154 In 1969,
pleaded guilty.149 however, the court concluded that government could only punish
Promote police review. Trust in local police may sometimes be advocacy that “is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
an issue. This is not entirely new territory. FBI agents investigating action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”155 In 1982, the
the murders of civil rights leaders in the 1960s had to sometimes Supreme Court seemed to go further, ruling that for an individual’s
operate with local police officials whose personal views, connections, speech to fall under the unprotected category of incitement to
and loyalties made them uncooperative with federal investigations. imminent lawless action, the speech had to actually lead to lawless
It is not clear whether these concerns will arise again as federal action. “An advocate must be free to stimulate his audience with
authorities investigate political violence threatened or carried out spontaneous and emotional appeals for unity and action in a
by groups drawing on local sympathies. common cause. When such appeals do not incite lawless action,
For a variety reasons beyond the scope of this essay, many they must be regarded as protected speech.”156 In other words, the
police understandably feel under siege right now. Public attitudes incitement had to succeed.
toward police are evolving, although there is little public support These decisions were reached before the internet existed, which
for dismantling the criminal justice system or eliminating police enables a user to post messages that may be read by thousands,
departments; calls to do so should be rejected. At the same time, potentially millions, thereby increasing the likelihood that they
police organizations themselves have to review their recruitment, could lead to action. Legislation might address this, or future events
education, training, protocols, and personal behavior in a might lead to further cases, obliging the courts to address it.
challenging environment. It is not a matter of creating “woke” These are First Amendment issues and must be approached with
departments. It is a matter of living up to an obligation to uphold great care. There is no perfect solution. Hate groups are already
the law and protect the public. It is in the oath. adopting communications tactics to counter controls, by altering
Review the law governing incitement. U.S. law is highly speech slightly, or by migrating to more permissive platforms or to
protective of free speech, including advocacy of violence. The courts the dark web.157
have set a very high bar to prove incitement. However, the internet Political leaders need to set a better example. Domestic violent
and social media make it easy to advocate violence, facilitate the extremism is not a continuation of partisan politics by other means.
repetition of messages, and can potentially reach an audience of The most important role of political leaders may not be in the realm
millions, thereby increasing the likelihood of violent action. The of legislation, but as role models. Politics can arouse passions, but
courts have not addressed this.150 bellicose rhetoric, sly encouragement to already angry audiences,
Address the role of the internet. The internet plays a significant cynical allegations that deepen divisions are playing with fire and
role in radicalization and facilitates the formation of online can pose a clear and present danger to the republic. Politicians and
communities of like-minded extremists and conspiracy theorists. the public need to exert pressure on all officials to curb violent
While free speech—including hate speech—is protected by the and abusive rhetoric. Admittedly, this particular element falls
First Amendment of the constitution, some contend that it is not in the realm of exhortation. Private scorecards kept by objective
necessarily protected if it directly calls for violence. Under public observers may identify serial offenders—the trash-talkers and
and government pressure to reduce harmful content, many online smash mouths—but it may not discourage ugly behavior any more
social media platforms have been exercising increasing control than fact-checking has diminished patent fabrications. Nor will it
over content and accounts, but the platforms claim that this is affect who the voters in some districts choose to represent them and
technically difficult to do and requires a significant investment in allow to reflect their values. Ultimately, the quality of leadership is
human resources.151 It is true that language is supple, although the up to the voters.
same platforms seem to have less difficulty in creating sophisticated Seek to understand the extremists’ mindsets. This is different
algorithms that detect sales opportunities among users, leading from the collection of operational intelligence discussed above.
some to suspect that control measures are simply not consistent Understanding the extremists’ worldviews, motivating grievances,
with social media business models. and mindsets informs law enforcement—and broader political—
There are several paths open. One is for the government to strategies to counter political violence. Their diversity must be
impose limitations on content as a number of European countries recognized. How do extremist movements or groups on the far
do. This mean prohibiting certain expressions—words and right or far left view their struggle? How do they differ from one
symbols—or “the advocacy of discriminatory hatred that constitutes another in beliefs, strategies, recruiting, and modus operandi?
incitement to hostility, discrimination, or violence.”152 Such a law in What distinguishes the Proud Boys from the Oath Keepers or
the United States would run head on into the First Amendment. the Boogaloo Bois from the Three Percenters? How do far left
A second approach is to revise Section 230 of the 1996 extremists differ from those on the far right? How fluid is the
Communications Decency Act and legally make social network membership? Considerable research in being done outside of
platforms like publishers responsible for content on their sites.153 government, and more can be done. The challenge for government
Right now, these platforms are allowed to control who can use their is to assemble and communicate the findings to operators, planners,
sites and moderate content, but are shielded from legal liability. and policymakers.
For different reasons, some members of both political parties have Reduce anger where possible by addressing legitimate
“The campaign to defeat domestic available databases. Annual public reports of attacks and
disruptions by the FBI and other law enforcement agencies will be
political violence will take many years. essential, but are unlikely to make available the detail necessary for
Indeed, it could take decades.” analysis. New government databases will have to be developed. As
in the past, chronologies of events and statistics can also be carried
out by government-contracted research organizations. NGOs and
activist groups will also compile and publish databases, which can
grievances. While there can be no compromise with ideologies contribute to our understanding, however, it must be kept in mind
antithetical to unalienable rights, government can address the that some of these organizations have their own political agendas,
conditions stoking the anger that extremists exploit; efforts can be which can affect how they define events and lead to reporting biases.
made to reduce some of the stress created by economic conditions. Accept that the campaign to defeat domestic political violence
Research cannot prove that poverty causes terrorism or creates will take many years. Indeed, it could take decades as we saw in
terrorists, although economic stress contributes to political stress. counterterrorism campaigns against the Irish Republican Army
Those who are left behind, who lose control over their economic in Northern Ireland or violent Basque separatists in Spain. In the
fate, whose self-esteem is crushed by unemployment or salaries United States, it took more than 10 years to run down the small
inadequate to support families are fertile recruiting grounds for groups of far-left bombers that emerged in the 1970s. Anarchists
extremist beliefs on the left and right. have been around since the late 19th century. The persistent
Historically, the United States has dealt with domestic terrorism prejudices and violent spasms of the far right go back even further
by prosecuting the violent offenders and at the same time by and have been building for decades. American institutions are
coopting their potential constituencies. As indicated already, that durable; law enforcement will do its duty. With any shared sense
will be more difficult given the hardline views of many domestic of national purpose, our democracy will prevail. Without unity,
extermists today. A government cannot coopt or appease hatred, but domestic terrorists may be the least of our problems.
it can address the conditions that contribute to hopeless and anger Mistakes will be made. Learn from them. Given the state of
which, in turn, feed prejudice.158 the union, the challenge of containing political violence will not
A portion of American society—mainly middle-aged and be easy. Even with oversight, errors of judgment and execution are
younger white males without college education—has been perhaps inevitable. When they are, they must not be covered up,
left behind by technological developments, globalization, and but addressed forthrightly and sensibly. Course direction must be
insufficient investment in physical and human infrastructure. reexamined periodically.
Deprived of decent wages, unable to support their families, A Final Note. These are the elements of a pragmatic strategy
marginalized, dismissed, and disparaged, many are turning to drink to combat domestic political violence. They are mainly cautionary,
or drugs; some commit suicide.159 Facing a bleak future and angry especially as they apply to the role of federal law enforcement. I do
at the political and economic system, they are prey for extremist not believe that we are heading toward civil war, but the political
ideologues that would direct their blame toward minorities, situation in the United States right now is perilous. It is painful
immigrants, foreigners—above all, the federal government. 160 to see the bellicose language and violent imagery, proliferation
They may not resort to violence themselves, but they may nod in of personal threats and vows to settle scores so infect national
agreement. While investments are being made in needed physical discourse. We have seen in Europe, the Balkans, in the Middle
infrastructure, greater investments in education are required. East, and elsewhere how quickly people who have lived side by side
This is something that government can and should do, not as a for decades can turn on one another, exhibiting levels of savagery
component of a counterterrorism strategy, but because it is in the not seen on battlefields. A single incident can set off a destructive
national interest, and most of all, because fellow Americans need prairie fire, to use an old phrase that propelled terrorist bombers of
some help. the 1970s. The divisions are deeper now. The destruction would be
Useful analysis will require better databases. Tracking greater, hence the necessity of a prudent approach that recognizes
domestic terrorism for many years has been a ‘third rail’ for the limits of what law enforcement can do while addressing the
government agencies, discouraging the compilation of publicly greater challenge of national reconciliation. CTC
Citations
1 “To Establish Justice, To Insure Domestic Tranquility,” Final Report of 2 Garth Davies, Edith Wu, and Richard Frank, “A Witch’s Brew of Grievances:
the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence The Potential Effects of COVID-19 on Radicalization to Violent
(National Violence Commission), U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969. Extremism,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, February 1, 2021.
Also known as the National Violence Commission (known also as the 3 Meryl Kornfield and Mariano Alfaro, “1 in 3 Americans say violence against
Eisenhower Commission). This report followed that of the National government can be justified, citing fears of political schism, pandemic,”
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders—the Kerner Commission— Washington Post, January 1, 2022.
published in 1968. Together, the two reports provide a thoughtful analysis 4 David French, Divided We Fall: America’s Secession Threat and How to
of the troubled 1960s in America. Restore Our Nation (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2021); Robert Kagan,
“Our constitutional crisis is already here,” Washington Post, September Strategic and International Studies, August 12, 2021.
23, 2021; Barbara F. Walter, How Civil wars Start and How to Stop Them 36 Justin Klawans, “82% of Fox News, 97% of OANN, Newsmax Viewers
(New York: Crown, 2022). The author’s own views appeared in an essay Believe Trump’s Stolen Election Claim: Poll,” Newsweek, November 1,
he wrote for NBC’s THINK: Brian Michael Jenkins, “Politicians face 2021; Brianna Richardson, “Axios|Momentive Poll: January 6th revisited,”
violence and threats from voters—and each other. Are we nearing a civil SurveyMonkey, January 2022; Jon Greenberg, “Most Republicans still
war?” NBC News THINK, November 14, 2021. falsely believe Trump’s stolen election claims. Here are some reasons
5 Brian Michael Jenkins, “The Collapse of Comity: Perilous Times in the why,” Poynter Institute, June 16, 2022.
Third Turbulent Century of Our Political Experiment: Testimony presented 37 Jenkins, “Politicians face violence and threats from voters — and each
before the House Committee on Homeland Security,” February 4, 2021. other. Are we nearing a civil war?”
6 Brian Michael Jenkins, Paths to Destruction (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 38 Jenkins, “Countering domestic terrorism will require rethinking US
Corporation, 2020). intelligence strategy.”
7 Ibid. 39 This is discussed at length in Brian Michael Jenkins, Plagues and Their
8 Ibid. Aftermath: How Societies Recover from Pandemics (Brooklyn: Melville
9 Ibid. House Publishing, 2022). For an example of a terrorist plot resulting from
10 Michael Leiter, “Losing Afghanistan is bad. But we’re much safer from anger over COVID-19 restrictions, see Graham Macklin, “The Conspiracy
terrorism now than after 9/11,” Washington Post, August 30, 2021. to Kidnap Governor Gretchen Whitmer,” CTC Sentinel 14:6 (2021).
11 Brian Michael Jenkins, “Domestic violent extremists will be harder to 40 Kriston McIntosh, Emily Moss, Ryan Nunn, and Jay Shambaugh,
combat than homegrown jihadists,” Hill, January 31, 2021. “Examining the Black-white wealth gap,” Brookings Institution, February
12 Elizabeth Dias and Ruth Graham, “The Growing Religious Fervor in the 27, 2020.
American Right: ‘This Is a Jesus Movement,’” New York Times, April 6, 41 Ed Pilkington, “Racial terror: 2,000 black Americans were lynched in
2022. Reconstruction era, report says,” Guardian, June 16, 2020.
13 “Proud Boys,” Southern Poverty Law Center, n.d. 42 Caleb Correll, “Blood on the Plow: Extremist Group Activity during the
14 “The Boogaloo Movement,” Anti-Defamation League, September 16, 1980s Farm Crisis in Kansas,” thesis submitted to the Department of
2020. History of the University of Kansas, May 1, 2019.
15 Mike Wendling, “Oath Keepers: Leaked membership list includes police 43 Erin Miller, “Terrorist Attacks in the U.S. Between 1970 and 2013: Data
and politicians,” BBC, September 7, 2022. from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD),” START, November 2014.
16 “Youth Liberation Front,” Influence Watch, n.d. 44 “What is the Threat to the United States Today?” in Peter Bergen and
17 Betsy Woodruff Swan, “Trump says he’s naming antifa a ‘Terrorist David Sterman, “Terrorism in America After 9/11,” New America, last
Organization.’ Can he do that?” Politico, May 31, 2020. updated September 10, 2021.
18 Seth G. Jones and Catrina Doxsee, “Examining Extremism: Antifa,” Center 45 Seth G. Jones and Catrina Doxsee, “The Escalating Terrorism Problem in
for Strategic and International Studies, June 24, 2021. the United States,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 17,
19 J.M. Berger, “The Strategy of Violent White Supremacy Is Evolving,” 2020.
Atlantic, August 7, 2019. 46 Madison Hall, Skye Gould, Rebecca Harrington, Jacob Shamsian, Azmi
20 “A Year of Racial Justice Protests: Key Trends in Demonstrations Haroun, Taylor Ardrey, and Erin Snodgrass, “At least 919 people have been
Supporting the BLM Movement,” Armed Conflict Location & Event Data charged in the Capitol insurrection so far. This searchable table shows
Project (ACLED), May 25, 2021. them all,” Insider, September 21, 2022.
21 Masood Farivar, “Anarchist Groups Tied to Riots in 4 Cities,” Voice of 47 Ryan Lucas, “In a big Jan. 6 case, Oath Keepers go on trial for seditious
America, September 16, 2020; Mia Bloom, “Far-Right Infiltrators and conspiracy,” NPR, September 27, 2022.
Agitators in George Floyd Protests: Indicators of White Supremacists,” 48 Jill Colvin, “Capitol mob built gallows and chanted ‘Hang Mike Pence,’”
Just Security, May 30, 2020. Associated Press via ourquadcities.com, January 9, 2021.
22 Isabella Garcia, “Inside Portland’s Autonomous Protest Movement,” YES! 49 Joan Donovan, Kaylee Fagan, and Frances Lee, “‘President Trump
Magazine, December 9, 2020. is Calling Us to Fight’: What the Court Documents Reveal about the
23 Cynthia Miller-Idriss, “When the Far Right Penetrates Law Enforcement,” Motivations Behind January 6 and Networked Incitement,” Media
Foreign Affairs, December 15, 2020; Seth G. Jones, “Violent Domestic Manipulation Casebook, July 18, 2022.
Extremist Groups and the Recruitment of Veterans: Statement before the 50 ABC News/Ipsos poll, June 17-18, 2022.
House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs,” October 13, 2021. 51 Seth G. Jones, “The Evolution of Domestic Terrorism,” Statement before
24 Brian A. Jackson, Ashley L. Rhoades, Jordan R. Reimer, Natasha Lander, the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland
Katherine Costello, and Sina Beaghley, Practical Terrorism Prevention: Security, February 17, 2022.
Reexamining U.S. National Approaches to Addressing the Threat of 52 “Global Terrorism Index 2022: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism,”
Ideologically Motivated Violence (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, Institute for Economics and Peace, March 2, 2022.
2019). See also Brian Michael Jenkins, “Countering domestic terrorism 53 Daniel Byman, “2021 saw plenty of violence—but no mass terrorist
will require rethinking US intelligence strategy,” Hill, October 5, 2021. attacks in the U.S.,” Washington Post, December 29, 2021, citing New
25 Jenkins, “Domestic violent extremists will be harder to combat than America Foundation statistics. This statement excludes, of course, the
homegrown jihadists.” mob assault on the Capitol, which neither New America nor Professor
26 Ibid. Byman consider a mass terrorist attack. In contrast, Professor Bruce
27 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (introduction by Harvey C. Hoffman states that, “I do not think there is much doubt that what
Mansfield, translation by Delba Winthrop via University of Chicago Press, happened on January 6 was an act of terrorism.” “Professor Bruce
2002). Hoffman on Domestic Terrorism,” Georgetown Journal of International
28 Jenkins, “Politicians face violence and threats from voters — and each Affairs, April 21, 2021.
other. Are we nearing a civil war?” 54 Vera Bergengruen and W.J. Hennigan, “The Atlanta Shooter Killed Six
29 Ibid. See also James A. Thomson, A House Divided (Santa Monica, CA: Women of Asian Descent. Isn’t That A Hate Crime?” Time, March 18, 2021.
RAND Corporation, 2010). 55 Byman.
30 Brian Michael Jenkins, “Capitol rioters and threats to lawmakers could 56 Aram Roston, “Exclusive: Proud Boys leader was ‘prolific’ informer for law
distort the political landscape for years,” NBC News THINK, January 25, enforcement,” Reuters, January 27, 2021.
2021. 57 “Six Arrested on Federal Charge of Conspiracy to Kidnap the Governor of
31 Jenkins, “Politicians face violence and threats from voters — and each Michigan,” U.S. Department of Justice, October 8, 2020.
other. Are we nearing a civil war?” 58 “Threats of Violence Against Public Officials Grow,” Crime Report, June
32 Jeffrey M. Jones, “U.S. Church Membership Falls Below Majority for First 30, 2022.
Time,” Gallup, March 29, 2021. 59 “Proud Boys,” Southern Poverty Law Center; Tess Owen, “A White
33 Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Supremacist Is Organizing Fight Clubs Across the US,” Vice, September
Community (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2020). 27, 2021.
34 Ibid. 60 Charles Key, “Final Report on the Bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah
35 Catrina Doxsee, “Examining Extremism: The Militia Movement,” Center for Building, Oklahoma Bombing Investigation Committee,” September 13,
2001. 90 Jackson, Rhoades, Reimer, Lander, Costello, and Beaghley.

61 “Final Report On the Bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building 91 “The Problems with ‘Violent Extremism’ and ‘Violence Prevention’
April 19, 1995: Recommendations and Epilogue of the Oklahoma Programs,” ACLU, n.d.
Bombing Investigation Committee,” posted to Famous Trials blog by 92 Fein, Vossekuil, and Holden.
Douglas O. Linder, n.d. 93 “Department of Homeland Security Strategic Framework for Countering
62 Matt Zapotosky and Ann E. Marimow, “How the Oklahoma City bombing Terrorism and Targeted Violence.”
case prepared Merrick Garland to take on domestic terrorism,” 94 Ibid.
Washington Post, February 19, 2021. 95 “Governor’s Roadmap to: Preventing Targeted Violence,” National
63 Olivia Fortunato, Rick Dierenfeldt, Sherah Basham, and Karen McGuffee, Governors Association, January 25, 2021.
“Examining the Impact of the Obama and Trump Candidacies on Right- 96 “Department of Homeland Security Strategic Framework for Countering
Wing Domestic Terrorism in the United States: A Time-Series Analysis,” Terrorism and Targeted Violence.”
Journal of Interpersonal Violence, March 2, 2022. 97 Rosanna Smart and Terry L. Schell, “Mass Shootings in the United
64 Brian Michael Jenkins, “Domestic Terrorism and the U.S. Elections,” RAND States,” RAND, April 15, 2021.
Blog, October 7, 2020. 98 Benjamin Mueller, William K. Rashbaum, and Al Baker, “Terror Attack Kills
65 Melissa De Witte, “Controversies over Confederate monuments and 8 and Injures 11 in Manhattan,” New York Times, October 31, 2017.
memorials are part of an overdue racial reckoning for America, says 99 Mark Memmott, “At Least 20 Students Injured In Knife Attack At Pa. High
Stanford historian,” Stanford News, July 16, 2020; Mark Berman, School,” NPR, April 9, 2014.
“Prosecutors say Dylann Roof ‘self-radicalized’ online, wrote another 100 Fein, Vossekuil, and Holden.
manifesto in jail,” Washington Post, August 22, 2016. 101 For more on this plot, see Macklin, “The Conspiracy to Kidnap Governor
66 “National Strategy for Counterterrorism of the United States of America,” Gretchen Whitmer.”
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, October 2018. 102 “Homeland Threat Assessment,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
67 “Department of Homeland Security Strategic Framework for Countering October 2020.
Terrorism and Targeted Violence,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 103 Ibid.
September 2019. 104 Ibid.
68 “National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism,” National Security 105 “Strategic Intelligence Assessment and Data on Domestic Terrorism,”
Council, June 2021. Federal Bureau of Investigation and U.S. Department of Homeland
69 “National Strategy for Counterterrorism of the United States of America,” Security, May 2021.
October 2018. 106 “National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism,” June 2021.
70 Ibid. 107 “Domestic Violent Extremism Poses Heightened Threat in 2021,” Office of
71 Ibid. the Director for National Intelligence, March 1, 2021.
72 “Department of Homeland Security Strategic Framework for Countering 108 Ibid., p. 2.
Terrorism and Targeted Violence.” 109 Ibid.
73 “New Zealand Terrorist Had Contact with Breivik in Norway,” Nordic Page, 110 “National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism,” June 2021.
n.d. 111 Ibid.
74 The theory was expounded in a 2011 book by Renaud Camus, Le Grand 112 Ibid.
Remplacement. Gillian Brockell, “The father of ‘great replacement’: An ex- 113 Brian Michael Jenkins, Terrorism in the United States (Santa Monica, CA:
socialist French writer,” Washington Post, May 17, 2022. See also Graham RAND Corporation, 1980).
Macklin, “The El Paso Terrorist Attack: The Chain Reaction of Global 114 Brian Michael Jenkins, “Don’t muddy the objectives on fighting domestic
Right-Wing Terror,” CTC Sentinel 12:11 (2019). extremism,” Hill, April 6, 2021.
75 J. M. Berger, “The Dangerous Spread of Extremist Manifestos,” Atlantic, 115 Jenkins, “Capitol rioters and threats to lawmakers could distort the
February 26, 2019. political landscape for years.”
76 Elizabeth Yates, “Domestic Extremism in America: Examining White 116 “Department of Homeland Security Strategic Framework for Countering
Supremacist Violence in the Wake of Recent Attacks,” Human Rights First, Terrorism and Targeted Violence.”
June 9, 2022. 117 Brian Michael Jenkins, “Capitol Rioters Face FBI Arrests and Prosecution.
77 Macklin, “The El Paso Terrorist Attack;” Helen Lewis, “To Learn About the How Not to Make Them Martyrs in the Process,” NBC News THINK, May
Far Right, Start With the ‘Manosphere,’” Atlantic, August 7, 2019. 10, 2021.
78 Dara Lind, “The conspiracy theory that led to the Pittsburgh synagogue 118 Ellie Silverman, “Truck convoy leaves D.C. area after weeks of traffic-
shooting, explained,” Vox, October 29, 2018. snarling protests,” Washington Post, March 31, 2022.
79 John Gage, “California police investigate hate-filled 8chan manifesto that 119 Jackson, Rhoades, Reimer, Lander, Costello, and Beaghley.
could link synagogue shooting to mosque attack,” Washington Examiner, 120 Ibid.
April 28, 2019. 121 Mark H. Moore, Robert C. Trojanowicz, and George L. Kelling, “Crime and
80 Hannah Allam, “‘I am Antifa’: One Activist’s Violent Death Became A Policing,” Perspectives on Policing, U.S. Department of Justice, National
Symbol For The Right And Left,” NPR, July 23, 2020. Institute of Justice, June 1988.
81 “Department of Homeland Security Strategic Framework for Countering 122 Jenkins, “Capitol Rioters Face FBI Arrests and Prosecution. How Not to
Terrorism and Targeted Violence.” Make Them Martyrs in the Process.”
82 The most complete report of the shooting and the subsequent 123 “Sedition Trial Reveals Inner Workings of Racist Underground (From KKK
investigation can be found in “LVMPD Criminal Investigative Report of and Report Packet, 1988—See NCJ-115671,” U.S. Department of Justice,
the 1 October Mass Casualty Shooting,” Las Vegas Metropolitan Police 1988; Jacob Schulz, “The Last Time the Justice Department Prosecuted a
Department, August 3, 2018. Seditious Conspiracy Case,” Lawfare, February 24, 2021.
83 “Department of Homeland Security Strategic Framework for Countering 124 Chris Shields, Kelly R. Damphousse, and Brent L. Smith, “An Assessment
Terrorism and Targeted Violence.” of Defense and Prosecutorial Strategies in Terrorism Trials: Implications
84 Robert A. Fein, Bryan Vossekuil, and Gwen A. Holden, “Threat for State and Federal Prosecutors,” September 2009.
Assessment: An Approach To Prevent Targeted Violence,” Research in 125 Jenkins, “Capitol Rioters Face FBI Arrests and Prosecution. How Not to
Action, National Institute of Justice, September 1995. Make Them Martyrs in the Process.”
85 Ibid. 126 “Section 702 Overview,” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, n.d.
86 Miles Corwin, “Inside the LAPD’s Threat Management Unit,” Los Angeles 127 “Warrantless Surveillance under Section 702 of FISA,” ACLU, n.d.
Magazine, November 4, 2008. 128 Harsha Panduranga and Emil Mella Pablo, “Federal Government Social
87 Preet Bharara, Doing Justice: A Prosecutor’s Thoughts on Crime, Media Surveillance, Explained,” Brennan Center, February 9, 2022.
Punishment, and the Rule of Law (New York: Knopf, 2019). 129 Kade Crockford, “Boston Police Can Protect Their Residents by Limiting
88 “Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United Cooperating With the Federal Government,” ACLU, September 26, 2017.
States,” The White House, August 2011. 130 Jeffrey Kaplan, “Leaderless resistance,” Terrorism and Political Violence
89 Helen Warrell, “Inside Prevent, the UK’s controversial anti-terrorism 9:3 (1997).
programme,” Financial Times, January 24, 2019. 131 “Criminal Complaint,” United States of America v. Adam Fox, Barry Croft,
Ty Garbin, Kaleb Franks, Daniel Harris and Brandon Caserta, October 6, 144 “Report on Countering Extremist Activity Within the Department of
2020. Defense,” United States Department of Defense, December 2021.
132 Alanna Durkin Richer, “Proud Boys leader was government informant, 145 James M. Inhofe, “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
records show,” Associated Press, January 27, 2021. 2023: Report to Accompany S. 4543,” July 18, 2022.
133 Mitch Smith, “Two Men Convicted in Plot to Kidnap Michigan’s Governor,” 146 Valerie Pavilonis, “Fact Check: Thousands of Black Lives Matter
New York Times, August 23, 2022; “Remaining Defendants Convicted protesters were arrested,” USA Today, February 22, 2022.
In Conspiracy To Kidnap Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer,” U.S. 147 Ibid.
Attorney’s Office, Western District of Michigan, U.S. Department of 148 Hall, Gould, Harrington, Shamsian, Haroun, Ardrey, and Snodgrass.
Justice, August 23, 2022. 149 Spencer S. Hsu, “First Proud Boys leader pleads guilty to Jan. 6 seditious
134 These questions derive from discussions with Donell Harvin at the RAND conspiracy,” Washington Post, October 6, 2022; Lucas.
Corporation. See also Brian Michael Jenkins, “Op-Ed: Why We Need a 150 Author personal communications, Geoffrey McGovern (RAND
January 6 Commission to Investigate the Attack on the Capitol,” Los Corporation), February 2021.
Angeles Times, January 19, 2021. 151 Sean MacAvaney, Hao-Ren Yao, Eugene Yang, Katina Russell, Nazli
135 Yassin Musharbash, “The Globalization of Far-Right Extremism: An Goharian, and Ophir Frieder, “Hate speech detection: Challenges and
Investigative Report,” CTC Sentinel 14:6 (2021). solutions,” PLoS One 14:8 (2019).
136 Chuck Rosenberg and Tom O’Connor, “We need a domestic terrorism 152 “Responding to ‘hate speech’: Comparative overview of six EU countries,”
law. Call these crimes what they are, for victims, for America,” USA Today, Article 19, March 2, 2018.
March 15, 2021. 153 Daisuke Wakabayashi, “Legal Shield for Social Media Is Targeted by
137 Brian Michael Jenkins, “Five Reasons to Be Wary of a New Domestic Lawmakers,” New York Times, May 28, 2020.
Terrorism Law,” Hill, February 23, 2021. 154 Schenck v. United States, 1919.
138 Ibid. See also Brian Michael Jenkins and Richard C. Daddario, “Think 155 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 1969.
Mass Shootings Are Terrorism? Careful What You Wish For,” Politico 156 “Brandenburg test,” Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School,
Magazine, November 7, 2017. n.d. See also John R. Vile, “Incitement to Imminent Lawless Action,” First
139 Jenkins, “Countering domestic terrorism will require rethinking US Amendment Encyclopedia, Middle Tennessee State University, 2009.
intelligence strategy.” 157 Eva Frederick, “‘Dark pools’ of hate flourish online. Here are four
140 Paul Rozenzweig, “Rethinking the Homeland Security Enterprise,” controversial ways to fight them,” Science, August 22, 2019.
Lawfare, January 12, 2022. 158 See, for example, Martin Sandbu, The Economics of Belonging: A Radical
141 Dan Lamothe, “Pentagon’s top general apologizes for appearing Plan to Win Back the Left Behind and Achieve Prosperity for All (Princeton,
alongside Trump in Lafayette Square,” Washington Post, June 11, 2020. NJ: Princeton University Press, 2020).
142 General Mark Milley, “Address at the Opening of the National Army 159 Anne Case and Angus Deaton, Deaths of Despair and the Future of
Museum,” American Rhetoric, November 11, 2020. Capitalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton New Jersey Press, 2020).
143 Justin Vallejo, “Michael Flynn calls for Trump to suspend the constitution 160 Arlie Russell Hochschild, Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and
and declare martial law to re-run election,” Independent, December 3, Mourning on the American Right (New York: New Press, 2016).
2020.
A View from the CT Foxhole:

Air Vice-Marshal Sean Corbett
By Nakissa Jahanbani, Eugene Lee, and Don Rassler
J2 Joint Staff Intelligence, and as the J2 in our Permanent Joint

Sean Corbett is the founder and CEO of IntSight Global, a Headquarters [PJHQ]a—our unified combatant command, if you
management consultancy within the intelligence and security like, we only have one. I also have deep experience with signals
sector with a focus on open-source intelligence. He retired from the intelligence (SIGINT), as I ran the military element of GCHQ
Royal Air Force (RAF) in September 2018 after a 30-year career [the U.K. equivalent of the NSA] where I was responsible for nine
as a professional intelligence officer. He served tours of duty in locations globally, several imagery analysis-related tours, and some
Northern Ireland, Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, the Balkans, Libya, out-of-branch appointments (as you’re expected to do to grow
and Central America. He commanded at every rank level, including career-wise), including as the deputy U.K. military representative to
a tour as Commander of the Joint Service Signals Organisation, as NATO at NATO headquarters, and I was also the executive officer
the Head of Intelligence at the U.K.’s Permanent Joint Headquarters for DSACEUR [Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe]
and as the Chief of U.K. Intelligence in Afghanistan. Corbett also for a while as well in SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters Allied
served as Principal Staff Officer to the Deputy Supreme Commander, Powers Europe]. The culmination of my military career was being
Europe, and as the Deputy U.K. Military Representative to NATO. nominated as the Deputy Director for Commonwealth Integration
His last appointment in the military was two years at the Defense [DDCI] within the DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency]. I was the
Intelligence Agency (DIA) in Washington, D.C., as the first non-U.S. first-ever non-U.S. citizen to be a deputy director of an intelligence
Deputy Director of a major U.S. intelligence agency. His primary agency in the U.S. [It was an] incredible experience, of which I
role there was to optimize intelligence sharing with U.S. allies by am tremendously proud. It was a huge responsibility, extremely
developing and implementing a transformational change program demanding, but a huge privilege. Overall, therefore, I’ve had a
throughout the U.S. intelligence community. pretty varied career; I’ve loved every minute of it and been lucky
enough to have worked with some incredible people.
On his departure from the RAF, Corbett established a Defence, In terms of how I became an advocate of OSINT, this was
Security and Intelligence Directorate within the geospatial more of an evolution over a period of time than a specific trigger
intelligence company Earth-i, where he advanced innovative moment. For example, in my tours within the J2 at PJHQ, we had
AI applications to earth observation data, optimized for the to maintain a pretty broad awareness of global security threats,
defense and security sector. He also currently serves as a Senior and it was impossible to cover all of them through dedicated,
Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) exquisite collection capabilities. But if you asked me for one thing
and the Co-Chair of the Strategic Advisory Group at Janes. He that brought the need to embrace OSINT into stark relief, I would
is also co-host of the Janes podcast “The World of Intelligence.” have to say the Ebola pandemic in West Africa in 2014. It was
very much an intelligence-led problem set, from understanding
CTC: Can you tell us a little bit about your background, your its spread and regional impact to the security consequences
military career, and the work you’ve done over the past several (reaction of populations, civil unrest, etc.). Almost all of the
years? Specifically, how did you come into OSINT (open-source available information was at the unclassified level, and I think we
intelligence) work? as a community were not well equipped to operate at this level.
To be honest, we really struggled with the problem set. Following
Corbett: I joined the Royal Air Force in 1988, as a photographic the lessons learnt process, we therefore established an open-source
interpreter—shortly before the specialization expanded into the cell within the J2 to provide that addition layer of unclassified
RAF intelligence branch. After my first tour at the U.K.’s strategic intelligence.
imagery analysis headquarters, I went to Belize on an operational And the trend towards OSINT has only increased. There’s
tour, which is where I first started working with a U.S. agency, albeit so much happening in the world right now that government
‘informally.’ Working alongside and within the U.S. intelligence intelligence organizations can only focus on so many priorities.
community has been a theme of my entire career. You tend to find You’ve got to start looking elsewhere for some of your information
that when you’re trusted within the U.S. intelligence organizations sources and getting reflections that you wouldn’t normally consider.
and you get enhanced clearances, both sides say, ‘Oh yeah, we’ll use It was really challenging early on, if not for any other reason other
him in that role because he’s trusted and he’s a safe pair of hands.’ than the culture within the intelligence community and a general
One of my follow-on tours, for example, was as the collection
manager in JTF-SWA [Joint Task Force Southwest Asia] in Saudi
Arabia—in the U.S. SCIF [Sensitive Compartmented Information
Facility]. I’ve also completed operational tours in Northern Ireland, a Editor’s Note: The U.K. J2 concerns matters of operational intelligence and
is stationed at the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ), which concerns
Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans, and Libya. I was the U.K. joint and multinational military operations for the British Ministry of
J2 in Afghanistan for a year, working very closely with the U.S. Defense. For more information, see “Permanent Joint Headquarters,” gov.uk
46 CTC SENTINEL OCTOBER 2022 CORBETT
belief that anything that was unclassified couldn’t or shouldn’t be “There is so much data out there, and
used as an intelligence source.
methods to collect, wrangle, manage,
CTC: Can you speak a little bit about what you have done and make it available for the analysts
since your retirement in service? Because when we talk about are so good that we are almost at what I
OSINT, there’s a lot of interesting components to what you’ve
done during the second part of your career. call ‘the coming of age of OSINT.’”
Corbett: To be honest, following my DIA appointment, the
military in the U.K. didn’t really have anything to offer me after
that. I’d already smashed through my glass ceiling as an intelligence What resources have you got and what additional resources do you
professional. They say that you know when it’s time to move on need? And then maintaining that aim as much as possible, testing
from the military, and I think that’s true. When I returned from and adjusting when the need arises. This is second nature in the
the States, I was put in a holding pattern for another two-star role military but often surprisingly absent in the commercial world. In
should a suitable one become available, but during that period, I today’s information age, another lesson that can be applied both to
started to take closer look at some of the emerging open-source the miliary and the commercial world is to use AI as a tool at the
capabilities. I was lucky enough to be approached by an Earth appropriate moments, but not to be governed by it and make it an
observation company that was developing some innovative end it itself.
capabilities using video and imagery from commercial satellites, I’ll always be grateful for my time as an employee in a
which was really appealing and so I made a fairly rapid transition. commercial company, but after a couple of years, I realized that I
The great thing about that was they gave me the freedom to could probably go it alone just as well in terms of setting my own
start developing some technical techniques based on commercially work, understanding what the market needed, and applying my
available satellite imagery to support the defense, security and military experience to the commercial sector to help them optimize
intelligence sector. Specifically, I’m talking about developing their outputs, which is why I set up my own consultancy at that
machine learning algorithms and artificial intelligence to apply stage.
to imagery such as automated object recognition. This can be
a real force multiplier for the intelligence analyst. For example, CTC: How would you describe the evolution of OSINT over the
if you are monitoring an airfield with a number of different course of your career?
types of aircraft on it, you can develop the algorithms that could
automatically identify not just the numbers of aircraft present, Corbett: Certainly 10 years ago, OSINT really wasn’t leveraged
but also the specific types. We were able to do that to a very high in defense to any great extent. We used to use things like BBC
degree of accuracy and sophistication, and at the time, this was Monitoring Service to add a little bit of flavor or to help fill the
fairly cutting-edge stuff. Now, that in and of itself isn’t necessarily odd intelligence gap, but it was really an afterthought. But now,
a game changer, but if you can do that at scale with lots of different however, we’re getting to the stage—that OSINT cannot be ignored
airfields, then it frees the analyst to focus on what they should be as a legitimate source for the intelligence analyst. There is so much
doing and that’s focusing on the ‘so-what.’ For instance, you can set data out there, and methods to collect, wrangle, manage, and make
alerts within specified parameters that will flag up anomalies, such it available for the analysts are so good that we are almost at what
as when there is an unusual level of air activity. The analyst can I call ‘the coming of age of OSINT.’ That, of course, doesn’t mean
then engage to assess the significance of the anomaly. At that stage, that exquisite (and expensive) government collection capabilities
probably the defense community—certainly in the U.K.—wasn’t can be replaced, or that you don’t need the skilled analyst to provide
ready to embrace that sort of technology, and certainly not to rely the analysis and assessment. With my imagery background, a good
on the commercial sector. But nonetheless, it was good to realize case in point is the quality of commercial satellite imagery that’s
what could be achieved technically and then applied to real-life available now. I would have been absolutely delighted to have
intelligence problems and I learnt a lot going through the process. had that within the military domain when I first joined in the late
One big lesson was the ability to develop a capability rapidly, 1980s. And it’s not only the resolution, but the different sensors
something that is extremely challenging in the military research and (electro-optical, synthetic aperture radar, and even RF) that have
development community. By sitting down and working closely with proliferated but also, with the development of constellations, the
the data scientists, coders, and developers so they knew exactly what revisit rate has also improved.b One of the limitations of imagery
we were trying to achieve, we were able to meet the requirement in particular is that you’ve got to wait for the satellite to be in the
rapidly and accurately. Too often in the military community, we right orbit to collect against an area of interest. The larger your
fail to articulate the need in the right amount of depth, or remain constellation,c the faster your revisit rate.
constantly engaged throughout the process, and are then surprised In addition to developments in collection techniques is the ability
when the final product falls short. to manage all of that data: things like doing a certain amount of the
Another lesson I learnt early on was how many skills are
transferrable from the military to the commercial sector. For
example, strong leadership, and good communications skills are b Editor’s Note: The “revisit rate” refers to the gap in time for the satellite to
absolutely essential, as is having a strategy in which a clear vision revisit the same area again.
is translated into an output, where the ends, ways and means are c Editor’s Note: In this context, “constellation” refers to a satellite
cohered. What are you trying to achieve? How are you going do it? constellation, or a group of satellites working together as a system.
processing onboard the satellite as opposed to having to download

it all, which requires the satellite to link to a ground station. This
adds to the immediacy of the information that’s available.
CTC: You’re an avid angler.
Corbett: I am.
CTC: Does the world of fishing offer any lessons to us about

the evolution of OSINT? So when you think about the world of
fishing and your love of that area and your OSINT world and
your work there, is there a spot where these two domains meet?
Corbett: That’s an interesting question, and you might be surprised

to say hear me say yes, 100 percent actually. When people ask me
why I fish—because I’m also a big rugby man, and the two don’t
seem compatible—I describe fishing as an exercise in problem
solving, where you’ve got an infinite amount of variables. Any time
you go fishing, the variables will have changed. You’ve got to work
out within the conditions—whether it’s environmental conditions,
the weather, what the fish are doing, what time of year it is—the
best approach to fishing. You’ve got to hone down the different
data points and aggregate them to work out what you should be
doing: where you should be putting your bait, how you should
be presenting it, and so forth. So in that respect, there are some
similarities between fishing and the intelligence process. There’s
also a lot more science and technology involved in fishing these days.
For example, some people use sonar, which is probably cheating in
some ways, to locate under water features and therefore where the
Air Vice-Admiral Sean Corbett
fish are likely to be lying.
The other great thing about fishing for me, especially the type of the right questions. That has been facilitated by the proliferation of
fishing I do (which can involve sitting out for long periods waiting trusted OSINT providers.
for a bite from a big fish), is that it gives me time to actually sit I think another key role for OSINT in the Ukraine crisis has
down, away from the clutter and the noise of the internet, social been around the information campaign, which is of course still
media and all the rest of it, with a stack of reading. I do a lot of my running and is highly significant. I don’t know, but I would be very
research, and even some of my reporting and analysis on the lake confident that intelligence organizations have been using open-
bank. source intelligence to verify messaging that they wouldn’t have
otherwise been able to provide the public. Defense intelligence in
CTC: What role do you think OSINT has played in the U.K. has been putting out a daily sit rep [situation report] about
understanding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine? what’s going on. It’s not particularly deep, and it’s not particularly
analytical, but it keeps an official narrative going at the unclassified
Corbett: I think quite an important one, actually. In many ways, level. And it’s good enough for the general population to have the
the Ukraine example has accelerated an understanding by the awareness that they should have. Are there still challenges? Yes,
intelligence and defense communities, and the commercial sector, there are. The question is how seriously and how enduringly has
of the power that OSINT can actually bring. I started doing a little the community embraced open-source intelligence, and that’s a big
bit of talking-head engagements with the BBC when the invasion question right now.
first started, and I was a little bit concerned that the granularity of
my understanding would be nothing like what it was when I was CTC: It was interesting to see how much information was
within the community. But actually, the amount of open-source released in advance of Russia’s invasion, from particularly the
intelligence out there that you could cross-refer and validate was U.S. intelligence community. The amount of corroborating
really strong, so I could put a narrative together that was credible OSINT that was available probably made it easier for the
and I had a high level of confidence in it. That proved to be the case intelligence community to release that type of information,
in hindsight. which seems to be a real shift, at least on the U.S. side.
I think you can therefore use open sources to build a good picture
about what’s actually happening in a crisis situation and assess what Corbett: There’s two elements to that: There’s the messaging
you think is going happen there. The narrative and the reporting in terms of ‘we know what you’re doing,’ and then there’s the
and the assessment that have come from some of the mainstream influencing of ‘don’t do it because we know what you’re going to
media in past conflicts have frankly been quite shocking. It is now do.’ Now, the Russians have been doing that for years. Everybody
a lot more mature and they are starting to ask people like myself considers them to be masters of information/disinformation
campaigns, but actually, they’ve been a little bit found out because
“There’s so much data out there that
some of their information operations around Ukraine have been
very clunky to say the least. For example, you see pictures of it’s almost impossible for a human
allegedly dead civilians from attacks by Ukrainians, but then the being to cognitively take it all in and
camera continues to roll on and these people get up and walk away.
We’ve seen that happen on a number of occasions. I think some of
sort it in a structured way that leads to
the bubbles have burst there, but you do need to be—with open- an ability to assess what it all means.
source intelligence as with any form of intelligence—cognizant of Being able to scrape disparate data—
the misinformation and disinformation piece.
whether it’s off the internet or whether
CTC: So, how do we navigate the credibility of online it’s imagery, telecoms interactions, or
information with the rise of disinformation campaigns and the
spread of misinformation?
whatever—to make it manageable and
relevant for the analyst, it has to be
Corbett: It’s big business now, and I don’t think it’s a problem effectively processed and sorted.”
that’s confined to open-source intelligence. It’s all forms of both
intelligence and information and particularly common in social
media. There’s a big difference between misinformation, which
is people just repeating what they have heard, misunderstanding
or putting something that’s wrong out there, and disinformation, need people that know what they’re doing.
which is deliberately putting out false information to influence
elements of the populations or to try and change behaviors. It’s CTC: Regarding OSINT, are there any specific technologies
actually a very important and very complex issue, but the very or capabilities that you’re most excited about? Are there any
quick answer in terms of mitigating both misinformation and core obstacles the intelligence and defense community faces
disinformation is establishing and following good tradecraft. in maximizing how new OSINT-related technologies and
What do I mean by tradecraft? It’s setting analytical standards capabilities are utilized?
whereby you ensure your sources are credible and accurate. It
requires cross-referring more than one source to make sure that Corbett: In terms of technology, we’ve covered some of that already,
it is validated, and it is making sure also that you use all of the but I think that an ability to effectively collect, manage, and process
information, not just some of it. You’ll hear the phrase ‘all-source the data in an automated manner is the most exciting thing. There’s
intelligence’ bandied around a lot within the community. It rolls so much data out there that it’s almost impossible for a human being
off the tongue easily, but how many people really do all-source to cognitively take it all in and sort it in a structured way that leads to
intelligence as opposed to multi-source intelligence? It’s being an ability to assess what it all means. Being able to scrape disparate
able to assure the information you get to say, ‘We think this is right data—whether it’s off the internet or whether it’s imagery, telecoms
because …’ and be able to back it up with evidence. If you really interactions, or whatever—to make it manageable and relevant for
want to conduct all-source intelligence analysis, then you have to the analyst, it has to be effectively processed and sorted. At Janes,
consider assured OSINT as a valid source. for example, they have been able to automatically interconnect
It’s probably worth mentioning the difference between millions of data points because they’ve labeled and tagged all of
information and intelligence at this stage. Information comprises their data regardless of where they’re from, over the last number of
known data points, often disparate and seemingly unconnected, years. If you’re an analyst, that is gold dust in terms of time saving
but it only becomes intelligence when it is applied to a particular and efficiency. If you talk to an intelligence analyst anywhere, they
problem set, often with an incomplete set of data. That’s the art will say probably their greatest effort in terms of time is actually
of intelligence: taking disparate pieces of information and putting collating data into something that they can then use to conduct
it into an assessment without necessarily all the building blocks. what they should be spending most of their effort on: providing
I look at intelligence as if you’ve got about three different jigsaw the ‘so what’—the analysis and assessments. So developing and
puzzles all scrambled up: Some of the pieces are missing, some of applying AI tools to manage the data is the key thing for me.
the pieces of the image are also missing, and you’re trying to come In terms of challenges, I would say they are not so much
up with what it is you’re seeing. Open-source intelligence has a role technical—although there’s still a lot to be done in refining with
to play in that, by providing more pieces of the jigsaw. the data management—but cultural. Firstly, in the intelligence
There has to be analytical rigor and the methodology and community, there are a lot of very good deep specialists out
evidence that you can go back to, and then you’ve got a chance. there, but a lot of them will have been stove-piped into their own
There are a number of techniques, when you start getting into social individual area of expertise, whether it’s SIGINT, HUMINT,
media and some of the analytics, for example, that you can assess GEOINT, each has its own tradecraft, which don’t yet incorporate
whether a piece of information (data point) is genuine. That might OSINT. And there’s still people that say, ‘Hang on a minute. open-
be through analyzing the metadata, cross-referring images against source intelligence is not actually intelligence. Therefore, I’m not
known locations, or even analyzing a raft of unconnected tweets or going to use it.’ As much as anything, it’s about trust in the data.
other social media commentary referring to the same event. It all You still see a little bit of that, although not so much anymore. I
helps to add to the degree of confidence you have. So yes, there are think the question that is important, though, is, ‘How do I integrate
ways to mitigate disinformation and misinformation, but you do open-source data with classified?’ Because you’ve still got to protect
your information, existing security mechanisms make it really hard “There’s also an ownership issue.
to integrate different security layers. It’s a difficult challenge. There
are ways to ingest open-source onto the high-side, but they are still We are quite insular within the
not that efficient. intelligence community. There is no
The other cultural thing is that open-source can be seen as a
threat to the analyst. There is almost an assumption that if we’ve
question that open-source intelligence
got all these really good algorithms, if we’ve got all this huge amount is increasingly recognized as having
of automatically collected, publicly available data, we can get rid a role, but with a ‘we’ll do it ourselves’
of some of the analysts. And, of course, turkeys don’t vote for
Thanksgiving. And so there are people that will think, ‘Why would approach. ‘Why would we go to really
I embrace this?’ That’s not just an open-source intelligence issue, expensive commercial providers when
of course, and trust in AI remains a complex challenge. I personally
don’t see AI as a threat. There is so much happening in the world
we could develop in-house now?’”
that the more we can get the analysts to look at the ‘what are we
seeing here and what does it mean’ rather than the collating the
data, the better I think.
I think there’s also an ownership issue. We are quite insular downgrade some classified piece of information, there is so much
within the intelligence community. There is no question that out there, how do you go through the process of downgrading each
open-source intelligence is increasingly recognized as having a individual data point when there are literally millions of them?
role, but with a ‘we’ll do it ourselves’ approach. ‘Why would we go You can’t do it manually. And that’s where you apply AI and cloud
to really expensive commercial providers when we could develop computing: The problem then comes, of course, if you then start
in-house now?’ Without getting too political, defense is littered trying to integrate open-source data points, that then integrates
with good ideas that originated in the commercial sector, but were into the classified domain. There’s a lot of work going on there. It
then brought into the core, into defense, into procurement, into is really complex, and I don’t think there’s an easy solution for it.
capability development, and then, five to 10 years later, having spent I think it’s imperative, though, because our adversaries probably
lots and lots of money, without achieving the intended outcome, aren’t as constrained by security protocols as we are, and the last
they went, ‘OK, show us how you do it.’ thing we want is for them to gain an information advantage.
There’s also an issue about aggregation of data. There is an
CTC: You’ve talked about how integration has been key to argument that states that even if something is unclassified, it can
how open source as a discipline has evolved and of it being the still be sensitive. If you amalgamate lots of unclassified things
intersection between public and private. Or even just on the together, then that could actually make it make it classified. I don’t
government side of interagency cooperation, multinational fully subscribe to that view personally because I think if you’re
cooperation, seeing how we optimize or maximize our use of only [bringing] publicly available information together to make
OSINT and the related capabilities and technologies. When the assessment, it’s what anyone could do. The key is not to reveal
you think about the future of OSINT, in terms of integration intelligence gaps. So integrating the data is a hugely important
and collaboration, what comes to mind for you? It just seems question, and one we’re going to have to address soon as we start
like a field that in order for it to advance even further, it needs increasing our cloud computing capabilities and reliance.
to continue to play in that integrated space, even more so than
it already has. CTC: The evolution of OSINT and supportive technology has
increasingly been a key resource and tool for defense and
Corbett: There is definitely a requirement for as much national security communities and has enhanced how allied
collaboration as possible and whether that is between commercial nations collaborate. What concerns, if any, do you have about
and military, whether that’s just between nations, and even, dare the adversarial use of OSINT both by non-state actors and state
I say, intelligence agencies who tend to jealously guard their own actors, or proxies?
data. It’s absolutely essential because otherwise you don’t get—back
to the jigsaw analogy—you don’t get the fullest picture available. Corbett: This is something that we really do need to concern
And so, you will miss things. And I think 9/11 taught us that in ourselves with because, as I said, as much as we’re developing
hindsight—and I’ve been through the 9/11 Commission report some good techniques and open-source capabilities, the adversaries
with the lessons identified—a lot of the information was there: a) are as well. You can be sure that the Russias and the Chinas and
if you knew where you were looking, and b) if it was all brought terrorist organizations of this world are not just copying us, but they
together. Now, that’s easier said than done because of the sensitivity are doing it at scale and without necessarily applying the ethics or
of some of the information, because of how it’s derived and how to the same degree of rigor that we would go through.
it’s collected, and the fact that agencies do have different sources, What do you do about it? I think there’s inevitability that you just
methods and even IT systems. You add open-source intelligence on have to accept it in some ways, but I think also that it really drives
top of that, and it makes it incredibly complicated. home the requirement that we, as individuals and organizations
So, the really key question is, how do you integrate all that need to protect our own information. A lot of OSINT is derived from
information into one place that is coherent and that actually ticks social media, whether it’s people bragging, whether it’s somebody
all the boxes for the security requirements, particularly in the just taking a photograph of a Russian tank going past or where
age where you’ve got so much data. For instance, if you want to you’ve got civilians posting reflections of specific events. So that
while this kind of information helps us, there is the potential for it “With regards to intelligence
to also work against us. Take the example of the Strava incident.d
When people, like myself, ran around deployed secure military
sharing, there’s a real balance to be
facilities, you tended to activate your fitness app. But that sort struck between protecting your own
of data is easily accessible and can be used against you. A simple information and sharing it to the
example, but it does make the point that every individual within
our own organizations has an imperative to, as much as possible, extent necessary to be useful ... There
protect our own information. are so many advantages to sharing
One of the areas I was involved with while serving was the
information assurance piece. I used to run an organization that
intelligence with allies and partners,
used to monitor our own side to see what the OPSEC [operational but they have to be balanced with the
security] was like. And many times, it was absolutely shocking. Now need to protect sources and methods.
this goes back a few years, and the secure communications weren’t
always in place. Sometimes, there was an operational imperative to OSINT can again play a role here, by
pass on sensitive information in the clear. Things have moved on using unclassified data that has been
since then, of course, with better secure communications and even
commercial apps such as signal and Wickr which are hard, if not
corroborated with that from classified
impossible, to decrypt, but OPSEC and COMSEC [communications sources.”
security] remain very much dependent on individual vigilance.
With regards to intelligence sharing, there’s a real balance to
be struck between protecting your own information and sharing
it to the extent necessary to be useful. That’s a conundrum that commit, ‘I’m going to do this anyway.’ I started negotiating my first
we’ve been through for many years, and something that I was very contracts about three weeks before COVID hit. I thought at that
involved with when I was the DDCI at DIA. There are so many stage, I was dead in the water because you couldn’t get out and
advantages to sharing intelligence with allies and partners, but meet people and develop relationships. But I was quite lucky as I
they have to be balanced with the need to protect sources and had already done much of the groundwork and could do a lot of my
methods. OSINT can again play a role here, by using unclassified work remotely.
data that has been corroborated with that from classified sources. The second thing is, be very clear in what your expertise is and
And so it’s the degree of risk you wish to take, but also the processes where you can add value. Again, I’m lucky because of my broad
and procedures that are in place to mitigate that risk. It’s a really experience and relatively high profile within the community. So with
complicated issue, but an area in which we do need to improve. my contacts and my understanding of the IC, in the U.K. and U.S.,
and the international piece as well, I was aware of the environment.
CTC: As you mentioned earlier, you have your own consultancy If somebody asked me a question about NATO, for example, I’d
practice. How did you come to set it up? What advice would you have a good understanding of what was required and where the
offer to someone who’s seeking to set one up as well? challenges lay. I think the other requirement common to probably
any endeavor is honesty and integrity. In the commercial world,
Corbett: I learned a lot from the commercial sector, but after about there does seem to be a little bit of a gray area, which in my view
18 months, I reached a stage in which wanted to take OSINT in can impact the level of trust between industry and government. It’s
a direction where I was very comfortable doing what I thought the Richard Branson quote, to [roughly] paraphrase, ‘Just say yes to
would support the defense and intelligence sector best and in the anything they offer you and then work out how to do it afterwards.’e
way that I wanted to do it. Establishing my own business gave me That’s fine, but it’s got to be within the art of the possible and you
the freedom to pick and choose. I was lucky because I’m at a stage need the tools and resources to meet the need. Personally, my
where I can pick and choose what I want to do. reputation is the most important thing I have. Once you lose that,
In terms of what I would advise somebody in setting up a you’ll never get it back. By reputation, I mean if you say you can do
consultancy, the first thing is, understand very clearly upfront the something you need to be able to do it, and to the degree that needs
level of risk that you’re prepared to take: financial risk, personal to be done.
risk in terms of how hard you’re going to work, and whether there There’s another element to that as well, and that is the morality
is a need and an appetite and a market for what you have to offer. piece. There were a couple of cases where I was approached by some
You need to do the research, develop networks and seek advice, but big, international companies, who said, ‘Can you do this? It’s a long
you’ll never really know that until you take the plunge. So ultimately, piece of work; six months-worth of good revenue.’ And while I could
there has to be a leap of faith, and to reach a moment where you have done the work, what they were trying to achieve working with
certain defense organizations, I knew the requirement wasn’t yet
developed and the money wasn’t there. So instead of taking the
d Editor’s Note: AVM Corbett is referring to the fitness tracking app Strava
releasing a heat map visualization collected from its users in November
2017. It unknowingly released the structure of military bases and other
sensitive structures due to personnel who used the app and worked on e Editor’s Note: The British entrepreneur Richard Branson has tweeted, “If
those installations. For more information, see Alex Hern, “Fitness tracing somebody offers you an amazing opportunity but you are not sure you
app Strava gives away location of secret US army bases,” Guardian, January can do it, say yes – then learn how to do it later!” Richard Branson, “If
28, 2018. somebody offers you ...,” Twitter, January 24, 2018.
contract, doing all the work, and then putting the money in my we withdrew from Afghanistan, which demonstrated a lack of
pocket, I said, ‘I will do a six-day piece of work that tells you why coherence at best and a lack of multilateralism at worst within
you would be wasting your time and effort and money doing this NATO, and certainly between the U.S. and its closest allies and the
or why it’s more challenging than you think it will be, and where Western response to the COVID pandemic, suddenly you’re back to
best to invest instead.’ Now, that is not the most profitable way of Westphalia and it’s all about the individual state. It shouldn’t really
doing business, but when I produced that paper, this particular be all that surprising therefore that Putin acted as he did: ‘Now’s my
company went, ‘We are so grateful. You have saved us considerable opportunity because they’re [the West] in disarray, its each nation
investment, effort, and time.’ I’d like to think that in the future, for itself, there’s no political will. There’s no plan and no coherence.’
they’ll see me as a trusted source and maybe use me again. So for I think at the macro level, you’ve got an increasingly belligerent
me, the morality side and the ethics is really strong, and I think China that’s increasing its rhetoric regarding Taiwan and global
there is a correlation, not always, but there is a correlation between aspirations; you’ve got the Arctic that’s another potential flash
those companies that are honest and have got integrity, and point; you’ve got unrest in Iran and the breakdown of the Joint
success. I would also never do any work, even if legally allowed, for Comprehensive Plan Of Action (JCPOA); North Korea, which is
a nation or organization that I thought may be acting against our becoming more belligerent, as well as non-traditional threats like
values and principles or collective national security. I remember climate change, food insecurity, all the rest of it. There is so much
being approached by representatives from a fractured nation that going on that if we take short-term view, then we will really fail.
effectively wanted me to provide them with a kinetic targeting In terms of the tactical level, I am concerned that the defense
campaign. Needless to say, I declined the very lucrative offer. and the intelligence community is not embracing open-source
intelligence as quickly, as effectively, and in as an integrated manner
CTC: A final question, and it’s one we often ask senior leaders as it could be yet. We have to keep on educating. We haven’t had the
who sit across our table: What keeps you up at night? sophisticated discussion with government about how we integrate
OSINT fully into what we do. There is still a deep mistrust between
Corbett: In terms of the global strategic environment, there’s not defense and the commercial sector, and in some cases for good
a lot of good news out there right now. One of my biggest concerns reasons. Defense sees the commercial world as just trying to steal
with the West is short-termism in politics. It’s the internal politics their money from them and not deliver what’s required, and the
about ‘how do I stay in power? It’s all about me’ as opposed to grand commercial sector sees defense as leading them along, getting them
strategy. That is nowhere to be seen. It seems to me there is very to develop capabilities without paying for them, seeing what’s best,
little genuine strategic thinking within western governments, which and then ditching them when it’s not quite right. It’s getting better,
has been the case for a while. We should have been paying far more and there is an understanding that improvements are needed. But
attention to Putin’s Russia following Georgia and then Crimea, we’ve got to be much more agile and develop a level of trust that
and should have recognized China as a strategic threat far earlier. can encourage true partnerships to the benefit of all. Only then will
The question now is, how do we demonstrate collective resolve and we be well positioned to address the many security challenges that
maintain the global strategic balance without tipping us over into I have just outlined. CTC
wider scale conflict with global consequences?’
If you then put together our failure to enact a robust response
to the Russian annexation of Crimea and the chaotic way that

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RIGOROUS || JUNE/JULY

OBJECTIVE · RELEVANT ·· RIGOROUS OCTOBER 2022

INTERVIEW Department Head

Cover: A fighter loyal to Yemen’s Houthi

The Houthi Jihad Council: Command and Control

2021.3 Some Houthi leaders remained covered by older sanctions4b

Adnan al-Gabarni is a Yemeni journalist specializing in military

z In the authors’ assessment, Abdalmalik deliberately uses the same calm

RIO QUR C PRO

b. late 1970 Secretary General

(IRGC-QF) (Unknown) Ahmed

REGIONS OFFICIAL Abdalmalik

Abdallah Lt. General

al-Hakim JIHAD al-Huthi

Abu Fatima PREPARATION

F OR SSIL (Unknown) Major General

AE RON Jamil Zaraa Major General

(Abu Badr) Abdallatif

al-Saadi Jihad Council membership

bm Matthew Levitt ascribes Unit 3800, Hezbollah’s external special operations

Houthi Military Regional Commands and geographic zones of military activity

df Three of the Presidential Protection Brigades (PPB) commanders are

Feature Commentary: Elements of a Pragmatic

beginning of the domestic terrorist campaigns that would increase

primal enemies—tyrants, traitors, terrorists.”29 “Threats of domestic political violence

2001. 90 Jackson, Rhoades, Reimer, Lander, Costello, and Beaghley.

A View from the CT Foxhole:

J2 Joint Staff Intelligence, and as the J2 in our Permanent Joint

processing onboard the satellite as opposed to having to download

CTC: You’re an avid angler.

CTC: Does the world of fishing offer any lessons to us about

Corbett: That’s an interesting question, and you might be surprised

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