THE ICFAI LAW SCHOOL

THE ICFAI UNIVERSITY

DEHRADUN

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

FINAL DRAFT ON

Analysis of the scope of writ of Certiorari with the help of decided cases

Submitted by- Submitted to-

SOURV KUMAR Ms. Prachi

Xth Semester Assistant Professor

Enrollment No- 17FLICDDN02134

B.A, LL.B (HONS.)

 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to extend my heartiest thanks to my Administrative Law teacher, Ms. PRACHI for
allowing me pursue this project and guide me throughout. I would also like to express my
gratitude towards the college library and the internet sources which helped me make this project.
 INTRODUCTION

Judicial review is an essential component of the rule of law, which is a basic feature of the Indian
Constitution. The Judiciary is separate and Independent and vast powers are conferred on
Judiciary to adjudicate the disputes, entail fines & penalties, and foremost, the interpretation of
law. It is a court’s authority to review the actions of other branches or levels of government,
concerning to the court’s power to invalidate legislative and executive actions as being
unconstitutional. This is the Superior Court’s review of a lower court or an administrative body’s
honest or legal answers. It was in L. Chandra Kumar v Union Of India 1, as there was a light on
the short inclusive definition of the Judicial Review where the Hon’ble Supreme Court stated
that, “Definition of judicial review in the American context is, subject to a few modifications,
equally applicable to the concept as it is understood in Indian Constitutional Law. Broadly
speaking, judicial review in Indian comprises three aspects: judicial review of legislative action,
judicial review of judicial decisions and judicial review of administrative action.

There has been tremendous expansion in the administrative process. This is natural in a welfare
state as a welfare state is basically an administrative state. So expansion in the administrative
power is a consequence of the concept of welfare state. All legal power, according to H.W.R.
Wade, 'as opposed to duty, is inevitably discretionary to a greater or lesser extent…' Therefore,
in order to maintain rule of law it is absolutely necessary to control this discretionary element in
the administrative power. Justice Douglas of the U.S. Supreme Court has rightly remarked that it
is the majesty of the administrative law that it has been able to control absolute discretion on the
part of the government or any ruler or official because absolute discretion is a ruthless master. It
is more destructive of freedom than any of man's inventions.

Therefore, the judicial control over the administrative action becomes imperative. There are two
types of remedies against the administrative wrongs – private law remedy of suit and judicial

1
AIR 1997 SC 1125.
review through writs. Civil law remedy could be effective if the procedure is simple cheap and
expeditious, which is not so in India. Therefore, this remedy is not effective against the
administration. There is tremendous scope for this remedy in administrative matters since it lies
at the door-step of a litigant. It is the public law remedy of judicial review through writs which is
very effective and expeditious, though it is costly as only High Courts and the Supreme Court
have the power to issue these writs.

The power of judicial review is a supervisory power and not a normal appellate power against
the decisions of administrative authorities. The recurring theme of the apex court's decision
relating to nature and scope of judicial review is that it is limited to consideration of legality of
decision making process and not legality of order per se. That mere possibility of another view
cannot be a ground of interference.

WRIT JURISDICTION AND ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS

Although the term “prerogative writ” is well known wherever the language of the common law is
spoken, no lawyer has been able to give a satisfactory answer to the question what is a
prerogative writ? However, as the name indicates, it is a writ especially associated with the king.
Prerogative writs are writs which originally were issued only, at the suit of the king but which
were, later made available, to the subject. They were called prerogative because they were
conceived as being intimately connected with the lights of the Crown.5 The common law regards
the sovereign as the source of fountain of justice, and certain ancient remedial process of an
extraordinary nature which are known as prerogative writ have from the earliest time issued from
the court of Queen’s Bench Division in which the Sovereign was always prebent in
contemplation of law.

In India, the 'prerogative remedies’ derive their authority from the constitutional provisions.
Thus, Article 32 and 226 of the Indian Constitution have empowered the Supreme Court and the
High Courts respectively to issue directions, orders or writs including writs in the of nature of
habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari’
 WRIT OF CERTIORARI AND REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
‘Certiorari' is a late Latin word, being the passive form of the word ‘certiorare’ meaning to
'inform'. It was essentially a royal demand for information. The king wishing to be certified of
some matter, ordered that the necessary information be provided for him. Thus certiorari may be
defined as a judicial order operating by the Supreme Court or High Court to any constitutional,
statutory, or nonstatutory body or person, requiring the records of any action to be certified by
the court and dealt with according to law. It is a remedy operating in personam, therefore, writ
can be issued even where the authority has become functus offico, to the keeper of the records.
Similarly, writ of prohibition is a judicial order issued by the Supreme Court or a High Court to
any constitutional, statutory or non-statutory agency to prevent these agencies from continuing
their proceedings in excess or abuse of their jurisdiction or in violation of the principles natural
justice or in contravention of the law of the land. These writs are designed to prevent the excess
of powers by public authorities. Therefore, these writs are corrective in nature, thus, the
constituency within which these writs can be operative has been tremendously enlarged. These
writs now can be issued against constitutional bodies (legislature, executive^ and administrative
or their officers), statutory bodies like corporations and other authorities created under a statute,
non-statutory bodies like companies and cooperative societies and private bodies and persons.
Formerly, these writs were issued only to judicial and quasi-judicial bodies. For example, in Brij
Khandelwal v. Union of India2 the Delhi High Court refused to issue Prohibition to the Central
Government to prevent it from entering into an agreement with Sri Lanka regarding a boundary
dispute. The decision was based on the principle that prohibition does not lie against government
discharging executive functions and that prohibition is intended to control quasi-judicial and not
executive functions. But this view is no longer tenable and these writs can be issued even if
action is administrative in nature. In A. K. Kriapak v.Union of India3, the writ of certiorari was
issued to quash the action of the Selection Board. With the expansion of the concept of natural
justice and the emergence of the concept of fairness even in administrative functions, the rigidity
about certiorari and prohibition has been relaxed. Now these writs can be issue to anybody,
irrespective of the nature of the function discharged by it, if any of the grounds on which the
writs are issued is present certiorari and prohibition are now regarded as general remedies for the
judicial control of both quasi-judicial and administrative decisions affecting rights. Certiorari and
2
AIR 1975 Del. 184.
3
AIR 1970 SC 150.
Prohibition are much in common, both in scope and the rules by which they are governed. Both
are issued on similar grounds. But there is no fundamental difference between the two. Certiorari
is issued to quash a decision already made and so it is issued at a stage when the proceedings
have terminated and the authority has given a final decision to quash the decision. Prohibition is
issued when the matter has not been disposed of but is being considered by the body concerned.
The function of prohibition is to prohibit the body concerned from proceeding with the matter
further. Thus, prohibition is issued at a stage when the proceedings are in progress to forbid the
authority from continuing the proceedings. Both Certiorari and prohibition are issued on similar
grounds. These writs are issued on the following grounds: when the authority is acting or has
acted under an invalid law; jurisdictional error; error apparent on the face of the record; findings
of fact not supported by evidence; failure of natural justice. These grounds are discussed in this
chapter. A court-material constituted under the Army Act has been held subject to Certiorari and
prohibition.4 The courts have insisted again and again that certiorari will not issue as a cloak for
an appeal in disguise. Certiorari does not lie to bring up an order or decision for hearing on
merits. The function of certiorari is supervisory. Accordingly, in P. Kasilingam v. P.O. College
of Technology the Supreme Court quashed the High Court decision as it had transgressed the
limits of its jurisdiction under article 226 by entering upon the merits of the controversy.
However, the Rajasthan High Court in Mohan Lai v. Lai Chand5, held that on perusal of the
averments of the pleadings of a petition, if it is found that a petition is maintainable under Article
226 against the order of the subordinate court or the tribunal, it can be treated to have originated
before the High Court in its original jurisdiction.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India expressly elaborated the Judicial Review over legislative
actions in L. Chandra Kumar case, “The constitutional Safeguards which ensure the
independence of the Superior Judiciary are not available to the judges of the subordinate
judiciary or to those tribunals created by ordinary legislations. Consequently, judges of the latter
category can never be considered full and effective substitutes for the superior judiciary in
discharging the function of constitutional interpretation. Therefore, the power of judicial review
over legislative actions vested in High Courts under Art 226 and in Supreme Court under Art 32
of the Constitution is an integral and essential feature of the constitution, constituting part of its
4
Subhash Chander v. Union of india, AIR 1973 MP 191.
5
AIR.20Q1 Raj 87.
basic structure. The power of Supreme Court and the High Courts to check the constitutional
validity of legislations can never be excluded. The remedy for the tribunals was to appeal under
Article 136 of the Constitution through a Special Leave Petition.

Administrative agency will come under the governmental authority, which is not a court or a
legislative body, which affects the right of private parties through adjudication, rulemaking,
investigating, prosecuting, negotiating, settling, or informally acting. An administrative agency
can be called a commission, board, authority, bureau, office, officer, administrator, department,
corporation, administration, division or agency. When the President, or a Governor, or a
Municipal Governing body exercises authority of adjudication or rulemaking, it is to that
position an administrative agency.

The administration is playing an essential and significant role in designing and influencing the
socio-economic order. The authority in administrative functionaries and the agencies are
resulting in maladministration and the corruption. By the exploitation of power or misuse of
power, the administration forgets and disregards the individual’s rights. Wheare in his works6
observed: “It is not eccentric to conclude that if there is more administration, there will be more
maladministration.” Growing administrative illegality has increased court dockets with cases
demanding judicial review of administrative action.

6
3, K.C. Wheare, Maladministration and its Remedies, Hamlyn Lecture Series, 1973.
ARTICLE 136-A SPECIAL POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

Under Article 136, the Supreme Court may grant special leave to appeal against any decision of
a Tribunal. What is a Tribunal is not defined, but the Supreme Court has interpreted it in a liberal
way. A tribunal is a body or authority which is vested, with judicial power to adjudicate on
question' of law or fact, affecting the rights of citizens in a judicial manner. Such authorities or
bodies must have been constituted by the state and vested with judicial as distinguished from
administrative or executive functions.

Article 136 does not confer a right of appeal as such but a discretionary power on the Supreme
Court to grant special leave to appeal. The Supreme Court has held that even in cases where
special leave is granted, the discretionary power continues to remain with the court even at the
stage when the appeal comes up for hearing. Generally, the court does not, grant special leave to
appeal, unless it is shown that exceptional and special circumstance exist, that substantial and
grave injustice has been done and the case in question presents sufficient gravity to warrant a
review of the decision appealed against. It confers a very wide discretion on the Supreme Court
to be exercised for satisfying the demands of justice.

In Bharat Coking Coal Co. v. Karam Chand Thapar7, the Supreme Court held, Article 136

“has been engrafted by the founding fathers of the Constitution for the purpose of
avoiding mischief of injustice on the wrong assumption of law. The justice delivery
system of the country prompts this court to interfere under Article 136 of the Constitution
when the need of the society stands established and the judgment, if left outstanding,
would not only create prejudice but would have otherwise adverse effect upon the
society.”

POWERS OF THE HIGH COURTS

Article 226(1) empowers the High Courts in the States or Union Territories to issue to any
7
 (2003) 1 S.C.C. 6.
person or authority including any Government within their territories, directions, orders or writs
for the enforcement of the fundamental rights or for any other purpose.

The power of judicial review of the High Court under Article 226 is wider than that of the
Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution. The expression 'for any other purpose'
enables the High Court to exercise their power of judicial review for the enforcement of ordinary
legal rights which are not fundamental rights. High Court can issue a writ to a person or authority
not only when it is within the territorial jurisdiction of the court but also when it is outside its
jurisdiction provided the cause of action wholly or partly arises within its territorial jurisdiction.
This power of the High Court under Article 226 is concurrent with the power of the Supreme
Court under Article 32 of the Constitution.

Article 227 clause (1) confers the power of 'superintendence over all courts and tribunals
throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. However, this power does
not extend, like Article 136, over any court or tribunal constituted under any law relating to the
Armed Forces.

This power is in addition to the power conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 which is
of a judicial nature. Is this power of superintendence, administrative or judicial? Under the
Government of India Act, 1935 this power extended only to the courts and was of administrative
nature only. Under the Constitution it is extended to the tribunals and section 224 clause (2) of
the Government Of India Act, 1935, which made it of administrative nature, was not retained in
Article 227. Therefore, the power of superintendence under Article 227 is of an administrative as
well as judicial nature. The parameters of this power are well settled and it is exercised on the
same grounds as the power of judicial review. They are:

(i) It can be exercised even in those cases where no appeal or revision lies to the High Court;

(ii) The power should not ordinarily be exercised if any other remedy is available even if it
involved inconvenience or delay.

(iii) The power is available where there is want or excess of jurisdiction, failure to exercise
jurisdiction violation of principles of natural justice and error of law apparent on the face of the
record;

(iv) In the exercise of this power the High Court does not act as appellate tribunal.

(v) It does not invest the High Court with an unlimited prerogative to interfere in cases where
wrong decisions have been arrived at by judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals on questions of law
or fact. There has to be grave miscarriage of justice or flagrant violation of law calling for
interference.

Tribunal under Article 227 has the same meaning as under Article 136 for the Supreme Court. In
Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai8, the Supreme Court held that the purpose underlying vesting
of this jurisdiction under Article 227 is “paving the path of justice and removing its obstacles
therein.”

Thus a very wide discretionary power is provided to the High Court’s under articles 226 and 227.
However, it must be exercised according to the principles of judicial review.

WRIT OF CERTIORARI : SCOPE AND AMBIT

The Supreme Court in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai & Ors.9 has explained the meaning,
scope and ambit of the writ of Certiorari. The relevant extracts are;

Writ of Certiorari

The nature and scope of the writ of certiorari and when can it issue was beautifully set out in a
concise passage, quoted hereafter, by Lord Chancellor Viscount Simon in Ryots of Garabandho
and other villages Vs. Zamindar of Parlakimedi and Anr10:

8
A.I.R 2003 S.C. 3044.
9
(2003) 6 SCC 675.
10
AIR 1943 PC 164.
 "The ancient writ of certiorari in England is an original writ which may issue out of a
superior Court requiring that the record of the proceedings in some cause or matter
pending before an inferior Court should be transmitted into the superior Court to be there
dealt with. The writ is so named because, in its original Latin form, it required that the
King should "be certified" of the proceedings to be investigated, and the object is to
secure by the exercise of the authority of a superior Court, that the jurisdiction of the
inferior tribunal should be properly exercised. This writ does not issue to correct purely
executive acts, but, on the other hand, its application is not narrowly limited to inferior
"Courts" in the strictest sense. Broadly speaking, it may be said that if the act done by the
inferior body is a judicial act, as distinguished from being a ministerial act, certiorari will
lie. The remedy, in point of principle, is derived from the superintending authority which
the Sovereign's Superior Courts, and in particular the Court of King's Bench, possess and
exercise over inferior jurisdictions. This principle has been transplanted to other parts of
the King's dominions, and operates, within certain limits, in British India."

Article 226 of the Constitution of India preserves to the High Court, the power to issue writ of
certiorari, amongst others. The principles on which the writ of certiorari is issued are well-
settled. It would suffice for our purpose to quote from the 7-Judge Bench decision of this Court
in Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque and Ors 11. The four propositions laid down therein
were summarized by the Constitution Bench in The Custodian of Evacuee Property Bangalore v.
Khan Saheb Abdul Shukoor12 etc. as under :-

"the High Court was not justified in looking into the order of December 2, 1952, as an
appellate court, though it would be justified in scrutinizing that order as if it was brought
before it under Article 226 of the Constitution for issue of a writ of certiorari.”

The limit of the jurisdiction of the High Court in issuing writs of certiorari was considered by
this Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque13 and the following four propositions were
laid down :-

11
(1955) 1 SCR 1104.
12
(1961) 3 SCR 855.
13
AIR 1955 SC 233.
 "(1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction;

(2) Certiorari will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise
of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to
the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice;

(3) The court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and

not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the court will not review
findings of fact reached by the inferior court or tribunal, even if they be erroneous.

(4) An error in the decision or determination itself may also be amenable to a writ of
certiorari if it is a manifest error apparent on the face of the proceedings, e.g., when it is
based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law. In other words, it is a
patent error which can be corrected by certiorari but not a mere wrong decision."

In the exercise of certiorari jurisdiction the High Court proceeds on an assumption that a Court
which has jurisdiction over a subject- matter has the jurisdiction to decide wrongly as well as
rightly. The High Court would not, therefore, for the purpose of certiorari assign to itself the role
of an Appellate Court and step into re-appreciating or evaluating the evidence and substitute its
own findings in place of those arrived at by the inferior court.

The Constitution Bench in T.C. Basappa Vs. T. Nagappa & Anr.,14 held that certiorari may be
and is generally granted when a court has acted (i) without jurisdiction, or (ii) in excess of its
jurisdiction. The want of jurisdiction may arise from the nature of the subject-matter of the
proceedings or from the absence of some preliminary proceedings or the court itself may not
have been legally constituted or suffering from certain disability by reason of extraneous
circumstances. Certiorari may also issue if the court or tribunal though competent has acted in
flagrant disregard of the rules or procedure or in violation of the principles of natural justice

14
(1955) 1 SCR 250.
where no particular procedure is prescribed. An error in the decision or determination itself may
also be amenable to a writ of certiorari subject to the following factors being available if the
error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear
ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law but a mere wrong decision is not amenable to a
writ of certiorari.

Any authority or body of persons constituted by law or having legal authority to adjudicate upon
questions affecting the rights of a subject and enjoined with a duty to act judicially or quasi-
judicially is amenable to the certiorari jurisdiction of the High Court. The proceedings of judicial
courts subordinate to High Court can be subjected to certiorari.

While dealing with the question whether the orders and the proceedings of subordinate Court are
amenable to certiorari writ jurisdiction of the High Court, we would be failing in our duty if we
do not make a reference to a larger Bench and a Constitution Bench decisions of this Court and
clear a confusion lest it should arise at some point of time. Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar & Ors. Vs.
State of Maharashra and Anr.,15 is a nine-Judges Bench decision of this Court. A learned judge
of Bombay High Court sitting on the Original Side passed an oral order restraining the Press
from publishing certain court proceedings. This order was sought to be impugned by filing a writ
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before a Division Bench of the High Court which
dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the impugned order was a judicial order of the
High Court and hence not amenable to a writ under Article 226. The petitioner then moved this
Court under Article 32 of the Constitution for enforcement of his fundamental rights under
Article 19(1)(a) and (g) of the Constitution. During the course of majority judgment Chief
Justice Gajendra Gadkar quoted the following passage:

"The ultimate proposition is set out in terms: "Certiorari does not lie to quash
the judgments of inferior Courts of civil jurisdiction".16 These observations
would indicate that in England the judicial orders passed by civil Courts of plenary
jurisdiction in or in relation to matters brought before them are not held to be amenable to
the jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari."
15
(1966) 3 SCR 744.
16
Para 239, page 130 from Halsbury Laws Of England (Vol.11).
A perusal of the judgment shows that the above passage has been quoted "incidentally" and that
too for the purpose of finding authority for the proposition that a judge sitting on the Original
Side of the High Court cannot be called a court 'inferior or subordinate to High Court' so as to
make his orders amenable to writ jurisdiction of the High Court. Secondly, the abovesaid passage
has been quoted but nowhere the Court has laid down as law by way its own holding that a writ
of certiorari by High Court cannot be directed to Court subordinate to it. And lastly, the passage
from Halsbury quoted in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar's case is from third edition of Halsbury Laws
of England (Simond's Edition, 1955). The law has undergone a change in England itself and this
changed legal position has been noted in a Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Rupa
Ashok Hurra Vs. Ashok Hurra and Anr.17 Justice SSM Quadri speaking for the Constitution
Bench has quoted the following passage from Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn.(Reissue)
Vol.1 (1) :

"103. Historically, prohibition was a writ whereby the royal courts of common

law prohibited other courts from entertaining matters falling within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the common law courts; certiorari was issued to bring the record
of an inferior court in the King's Bench for review or to remove indictments and to public
officers and bodies, to order the performance of a public duty. All three were called
prerogative writs."

"109. Certiorari lies to bring decisions of an inferior court, tribunal, public authority
or any other body of persons before the High Court for review so that the court
may determine whether they should be quashed, or to quash such decisions. The order
of prohibition is an order issuing out of the High Court and directed to an inferior court
or tribunal or public authority which forbids that court or tribunal or authority to act in
excess of its jurisdiction or contrary to law. Both certiorari and prohibition are employed
for the control of inferior courts, tribunals and public authorities."

Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar's case was cited before the Constitution Bench in Rupa Ashok
Hurra's case18 and considered. It has been clearly held:
17
 (2002) 4 SCC 388.
18
Id.
 (i) that it is a well-settled principle that the technicalities associated with the
prerogative writs in English law have no role to play under our constitutional
scheme;
(ii) that a writ of certiorari to call for records and examine the same for passing
appropriate orders, is issued by superior court to an inferior court which certifies
its records for examination; and
(iii) that a High Court cannot issue a writ to another High Court, nor can one Bench of
a High Court issue a writ to a different Bench of the High Court; much less can
writ jurisdiction of a High Court be invoked to seek issuance of a writ of certiorari
to the Supreme Court. The High Courts are not constituted as inferior courts in
our constitutional scheme.

Thus, there is no manner of doubt that the orders and proceedings of a judicial court subordinate
to High Court are amenable to writ jurisdiction of High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution.

Authority in abundance is available for the proposition that an error apparent on face of record
can be corrected by certiorari. The broad working rule for determining what is a patent error or
an error apparent on the face of the record was well set out in Satyanarayan Laxminarayan
Hegde and Ors. Vs. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale.19 It was held that the alleged error
should be self-evident. An error which needs to be established by lengthy and complicated
arguments or an error in a long-drawn process of reasoning on points where there may
conceivably be two opinions cannot be called a patent error. In a writ of certiorari the High Court
may quash the proceedings of the tribunal, authority or court but may not substitute its own
findings or directions in lieu of one given in the proceedings forming the subject-matter of
certiorari.

Certiorari jurisdiction though available is not to be exercised as a matter of course. The High
Court would be justified in refusing the writ of certiorari if no failure of justice has been

19
(1960) 1 SCR 890.
occasioned. In exercising the certiorari jurisdiction the procedure ordinarily followed by the
High Court is to command the inferior court or tribunal to certify its record or proceedings to the
High Court for its inspection so as to enable the High Court to determine whether on the face of
the record the inferior court has committed any of the preceding errors occasioning failure of
justice.

CONCLUSION
Judicial review is an essential component of the rule of law, which is a basic feature of the Indian
Constitution. The Judiciary is separate and Independent and vast powers are conferred on
Judiciary to adjudicate the disputes, entail fines & penalties, and foremost, the interpretation of
law. It is a court’s authority to review the actions of other branches or levels of government,
concerning to the court’s power to invalidate legislative and executive actions as being
unconstitutional. This is the Superior Court’s review of a lower court or an administrative body’s
honest or legal answers.

The objective of the judicial review is to enforce the rule of law which is the basis of
constitutional and administrative law. The power of judicial review in India is rooted in the
Constitution. This is expressly conferred on the Supreme Court and the High Courts under
Articles 32,136 and 226,227 respectively.

The power of judicial review is exercised through writs. The five writs are specifically
mentioned in Articles 32 and 226. Our courts are not bound by the technicalities of the English
practice; only broad principles should be observed in their application. The scope of these writs
has expanded in recent times. It is now available in administrative actions also.

The courts can supplement these writs with any other orders and directions depending upon the
facts and circumstances of the case. For example, it can grant injunction or stay order or
declaration in suitable cases.
Thus, there is no manner of doubt that the orders and proceedings of a judicial court subordinate
to High Court are amenable to writ jurisdiction of High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution.
Certiorari jurisdiction though available is not to be exercised as a matter of course. The High
Court would be justified in refusing the writ of certiorari if no failure of justice has been
occasioned. In exercising the certiorari jurisdiction the procedure ordinarily followed by the
High Court is to command the inferior court or tribunal to certify its record or proceedings to the
High Court for its inspection so as to enable the High Court to determine whether on the face of
the record the inferior court has committed any of the preceding errors occasioning failure of
justice.