G.R. Nos.

L-11928-11930             March 24, 1959

VEDASTO JESALVA, DOMINADOR MARCOS, and AURELIO
MARCOS, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. Judge JOSE S. BAUTISTA of the Court of Industrial
Relations, and PREMIERE PRODUCTIONS, INC., respondents.
Cipriano Cid and Associates for petitioners.
Manuel O. Chan for respondent Premier Productions, Inc.
Martin Dolorico for respondent Judge.
LABRADOR, J.:
FACTS: Appeal by certiorari against a final order of dismissal by the Court of
Industrial Relations of its cases Nos. 598-V and 598-V (1) to 598-V (16)
based on a compromise agreement, copy of which is attached to the
answer of respondent Premier Productions, Inc., executed by and between
the said Corporation and the Philippine Movie Pictures Association,
whereby the parties agreed: (1) that the Corporation shall pay to the Union
P200,000 in settlement of the claims that the Union or its employees may
have against the Premier Productions, Inc.; (2) that the Corporation leases
to the Union its equipment and facilities to enable the Union to produce and
process two moving pictures; and (3) that in consideration of the above, all
pending petitions and cases filed by the Union in the Court of Industrial
Relations against the Corporation and its officers arising out of a labor
dispute, particularly cases Nos. 59-V, 59-V, 59-V (3), 59-V(4), 59-V(6), 59
(8), 598-V(10), 59-V(11), 59-V(12), 5988-V(15), and 598-V(16), as well as
all their pending incidents, be withdrawn and dismissed, including pending
executions, levy, attachment, and garnishment of the properties and
equipment of the corporation, etc.
ISSUES: W/O at any stage of the proceedings, especially in the last instance,
compromise may still be agreed upon by and between the parties.
RULING: YES.
RATIO DECIDENDI: It is to be noted that there appears to be no limitation on
the right to compromise, such as the one claimed by petitioners to exist
(that there was already a final executory judgment in favor of the
petitioners). We can see no reason for limiting the right of compromise to
pending cases, excluding therefrom those already in the process of
execution. And when, as in this case, no less than seventeen cases had
been filed and were pending between the parties, in different stages of
hearing or execution before the court, a compromise of all of them, whether
pending or executory, was most practical and convenient. Besides, as the
cases are related with each other, it cannot be claimed that which had
already reached the stage of execution should be taken away from the field
of compromise. We, therefore, find o legitimate objection to the
compromise as entered into, embracing all the seventeen cases pending
between the parties even if some of the members of the Union were
personally prejudiced by such a compromise agreement. The nature of a
compromise agreement is such that a party must give up some of the rights
that he has, in consideration of the same act on the part of the other side.
Rule 1.04 A Lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or
settle controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement.
Nature of compromise- a party must give up some of the rights that
he has, in consideration of the same act on the part of the other
side (Jesalva, et al. v Bautista, et al., 105 phil. 348)
Attorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case by any
agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking
appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure.
Such compromise is authorized and even encouraged by express
provisions of Law (civil code 2028, 2029)
Compromise is often the far better justice; advantages:
a. Save client from additional expenses
b. Help prevent clogging of docket
This compromise is only attained with the consent of the client- the
exclusive management of a Lawyer is only on the procedural
aspect of litigation

G.R. No. L-29543      November 29, 1969

GLORIA PAJARES, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
JUDGE ESTRELLA ABAD SANTOS, MUNICIPAL COURT OF MANILA
and UDHARAM BAZAR CO., respondents-appellees.
Moises C. Nicomedes for petitioner-appellant.
Tomas Lopez Valencia for respondents-appellees.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Facts:
Appellant Pajares was engaged in the business of buying and selling merchandise
at her stall and appelle Udharam Bazar & Co. was one of her creditors from whom
she used to buy on credit ready-made goods for resale.
Consequently, the company sued Pajares for the recovery of a certain sum of
money for the goods delivered to her in good condition (the same having been
sold), but did not make the full payment. Pajares, however, moved for a bill of
particulars, alleging that without which she would not be able to meet the issues
raised in the complaint. Such having been denied, appellant moved for a motion for
reconsideration. The same was also denied and clogged the court for seven years.
Issue:
Whether or not there has been a faithful adherence (on the part of Pajares’ lawyer)
to Rule 7, section 5 of the Rules of Court.
Held:
No, there was no faithful adhererence.
Clearly, there must be faithful adherence to Rule 7, section 5 of the Rules of Court
which provides that “the signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him
that he has read the pleading and that to the best of his knowledge, information and
belief, there is good ground to support it”; and that it is not interposed for delay
and expressly admonishes that “for a willful violation of this rule an attorney may
be subjected to disciplinary action.”
Had appellant been but prudently advised by her counsel to confess judgment and
ask from her creditor the reasonable time she needed to discharge her lawful
indebtedness, the expenses of litigation that she has incurred would have been
more than sufficient to pay off her just debt to appelle.
Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed, and petitioner-
appellant's counsel shall pay treble costs in all instances. This decision
shall be noted in the personal record of the attorney for petitioner-appellant
in this Court for future reference. So ordered.

G.R. No. 105909 June 28, 1994

MUNICIPALITY OF PILILLA, RIZAL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ARTURO A. MARAVE, as Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal, and
PHILIPPINE PETROLEUM CORPORATION, respondents.
Felix E. Mendiola for petitioner.
Makalintal, Barot, Torres & Ibarra for respondent Philippine Petroleum
Corporation.
REGALADO, J.:
Nature
: Petition for review on certiorari of a judgment of the CA
Facts:
The RTC of Tanay, Rizal rendered judgment ordering the Philippine
Petroleum
Corporation (PPC) to pay the Municipality of Pililla (municipality) business
taxes and other fees. The judgment was affirmed by the SC and became
final and executor. The case was remanded to the RTC for execution. In
connection with the execution of judgment, Atty. Felix Mendiola filed a
motion in behalf of the municipality for the examination of PPC’s gross
sales for the purpose of computing its business taxes. PPC filed a
manifestation before the RTC to the effect that Mayor Patenia of Pililla
received from it P11.5M as full satisfaction of the judgment as evidenced by
the release and quit claim documents executed by the said mayor. The
RTC issued an order denying Atty. Mendiola’s motion for examination and
execution of judgment. Atty. Mendiola filed a motion for reconsideration
claiming that the total liability amounted to P24.2M while the amount
received by the mayor was only P12.7M. He asserted that the mayor
cannot waive the balance of the judgment over which his law firm had
registered two aliens for alleged consultancy services and attorney’s fees
amounting to more than P12M. The
RTC, however, denied his MR. A petition for certiorari was filed by Atty.
Mendiola which was referred to the CA for appropriate action. PPC filed a
motion questioning the authority of Atty. Mendiola to represent the
municipality. The CA dismissed the petition for having been filed by a
private counsel in violation of the law and jurisprudence but without
prejudice to the filing of a similar petition by
the municipality thru the proper provincial or municipal legal officer. Atty.
Mendiola filed a petition before the SC to assail the decision of the CA.

Issue
: WON Atty. Mendiola, a private counsel, has authority can file an action in
court for and in behalf of the municipality of Pililla
Held
: No. Atty. Mendiola has no authority to file an action in court in behalf and
in the name of the Municipality of Pililla.
• Private attorneys cannot represent a province or municipality in
lawsuits.
Sec. 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that the provincial
fiscal shall represent the province or any municipality or municipal district
thereof in any court except (a) in cases whereof original jurisdiction is
vested in the SC or (b) in cases where the municipality or municipal district
is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some municipality or
municipal district in the same province. When the provincial fiscal is
disqualified, a special attorney may be employed by the municipal council.
Hence, only the provincial fiscal or municipal attorney can represent a
province or municipality in their lawsuits. The provision is mandatory. The
municipality’s authority to employ a private lawyer is limited only to
situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it. For this
exception to apply, the fact that the provincial fiscal was disqualified must
appear on record.
2. The fiscal’s refusal to represent the municipality is not a legal justification
for employing the services of private counsel. Unlike a practicing lawyer
who has a right to refuse employment, fiscal cannot refuse to perform his
functions on grounds not provided for by law without violating his oath of
office
Instead of engaging the services of a special attorney,
the municipal council should
request the Secretary of Justice to appoint an acting provincial fiscal
in place of
the provincial fiscal who has declined to handle and prosecute its case in
court.
3. The legality of a private counsel’s representation can be questioned at
any stage of the
proceedings.

A. M. No. 2104 August 24, 1989

NARCISO MELENDREZ and ERLINDA DALMAN, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. REYNERIO I. DECENA, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Facts:
(1st cause of action)
Aug. 5, 1975: Complainants (spouses Erlinda Dalman & Narciso Melendrez)
obtained from Atty. Reynerio Decena(Decena) a loan of P4K. This loan was
secured by a real estate mortgage. It was made to appear in the REM that the
amount borrowed was P5K. Decena assured the spouses that the REMwas a
mere formality, and due to this assurance the spouses signed the REM. Despite
the assurance, Decena collected from the spouses P500/month as usurious
interest. The spouses paidsuch usurious interest for 3 months. Because of their
failure to pay the amounts, Decena drafted a new REM. New contract of
mortgage in the amount of P10K with interest at 19%/annum. A special power of
attorney authorizing Decena to sell the mortgaged property in public auction.
Spouses never knew the implications of the new REM. They failed to pay their
obligation and so Decena acquiredtheir property in pulic auction and later sold it
to Trinidad Ylanan for P12K. Spouses then went to Decena with P10K in the
hopes of getting their property back. Decena then informs themthat their debt has
soared to P20.4K. With shattered hopes and grief in their hearts the spouses filed
this case for disbarment.
(2nd cause of action)
Spouses filed a case for estafa against Reynaldo Pineda for recovery of P2K
Decena entered into a compromise agreement with Pineda. Pineda then paid P500
to Decena. This settlementwas never brought to the attention of the spouses nor
were they ever consulted about such.

Issue: W/N Decena’s acts show gross misconduct and should

therefore be disbarred. Held:
Yes, Decena shall be disbarred. The acts of Decena as to the 1st cause of action
constitute deception, dishonesty and conduct unbecoming a member of the bar.
As to the 2nd cause of action, Decena clearly failed to get the consent of the
spouses before entering into a compromise. Decena also failed to inform the
spouses or turn over to them the P500 given to him by Pineda as downpayment
for the settlement of the case. Decena’s failure to turn over to the spouses the
money underscores his lack of honesty and candor in dealing with his clients
G.R. No. 40457 May 8, 1992
MOBIL OIL PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BRANCH VI, GEMINIANO F.
YABUT and AGUEDA ENRIQUEZ YABUT, respondents.
Ramon O. Nolasco and Manuel N. Camacho for petitioner.
Felipe C. Magat for private respondents.
NOCON, J.:
MOBIL OIL PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner,
vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BRANCH VI,
GEMINIANO F. YABUT and AGUEDA ENRIQUEZ YABUT,
respondents.
FACTS:
On November 8, 1972, petitioner filed a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal against the partnership La Mallorca and its general
partners, which included private respondents, for collection of a sum of
money arising from gasoline purchased on credit but not paid, for damages
and attorney's fees.
Petitioner, with leave of court, filed an Amended Complaint impleading
the heirs of the deceased partners as defendants. The parties agreed to
submit the case for decision on the basis of the evidence on record
adduced by petitioner but to exclude past interest in the amount of
P150,000.00 and to award nominal attorney's fees. Decision was rendered
in favor of the petitioner and against defendants. Private respondents
thereafter filed a Petition to Modify Decision and/or Petition for
Reconsideration, which was opposed by petitioner.
Then respondent court issued its disputed Order declaring its decision
null and void. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and
Clarification. Respondent court denied the motion, as well as
petitioner's Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution and
Appointment of Special Sheriff, by way of the Order. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not public respondent acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in declaring
null and void its earlier decision of July 25, 1974.
RULING: We find merit in the instant petition.
The records show that the petitioner had already adduced
evidence and formally offered its evidence in court; that at
the hearing of April 1, 1974, for the presentation of
defendants' evidence, the parties through their counsels, mutually agreed to the
waiver of the presentation of defendants' evidence on one hand, and the
waiver of past interest in the amount of P150,000.00 on the part of the
plaintiff and the payment of only nominal attorney's fees
WHEREFORE, the Orders of November 20, 1974 and February 20,
1975 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Decision dated
July 25, 1975 is reinstated and declaring the same valid and
binding against private respondents Geminiano Yabut and Agueda
Enriquez-Yabut. With costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.
March 23, 1929
In re LUIS B. TAGORDA,
Duran & Lim for respondent.
Attorney-General Jaranilla and Provincial Fiscal Jose for the Government.
MALCOLM, J.:
In re Luis B. Tagorda (1929) (card and letter)
Doctrine:
• The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young
lawyer, and especially with his brother
lawyers, is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust.
Facts:
Luis B. Tagorda was an attorney who was elected as the third member of
the provincial board of Isabela. He
admits that prior to his election, he made use of a card2 written in Spanish
and Ilocano, which contains a list of tasks he
may undertake as a notary public, and a lawyer, as well as a general
invitation to consult with him for free. Tagorda also
admits that after he was elected into office, he wrote a letter3 to one of his
hometown”s barrio lieutenants. The letter
basically informed the recipient of Tagorda”s intention to continue residing
in Echague, despite having to attend board
sessions in Ilagan, in order that he may continue to serve his hometown as
a notary public and lawyer. The letter subtly
offered information regarding Tagorda”s office hours, together with an
express request that the recipient spread the word
as to his willingness to accept land registration cases for a fee of P3.00 per
title.
The government, through the provincial fiscal of Isabela, together with the
Attorney-General, brought this matter
to the attention of the Court.
Issue:
1. W/N Tagorda”s actions constitute malpractice
Held/Ratio:
1. YES.
Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2828
expressly provides that the practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally, or through
paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice. This is in accord with the Canons of Professional Ethics
adopted by the Philippine Bar Association in
1917. Canon 27 of the said document provides that a well-merited
reputation serves as a lawyer”s most effective
form of advertisement.
A.C. No. L-1117             March 20, 1944
THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, complainant,
vs.
ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT, respondent.
Office of the Solicitor General De la Costa and Solicitor Feria for
complainant.
Francisco Claravall for respondent.
OZAETA, J.:
Religious Affairs v. Bayot (1955) (advertisement)
Doctrines:
• Law is a profession and not a trade.
• Section 25 of Rule 127 provides that “the practice of soliciting cases at
law for purpose of gain, either
personally or thru paid agents of brokers, constitutes malpractice.”
Facts:
Attorney Estanislao Bayot is charged with malpractice for publishing an
advertisement in the Sunday Tribune on
June 13, 2943. It states that he provides the service of securing marriage licenses
and performing marriage ceremonies.
Marriage license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay
publicity avoided
if desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter
free for the
poor. Everything confidential.
Legal assistance service
12 Escolta, Manila, Room, 105
Tel. 2-41-60.
Initially, he appeared in his own behalf and denied having the advertisement
published. Subsequently, he
admitted, through his attorney, that he caused its publication. He asked for “the
indulgence and mercy” of the Court,
promising “not to repeat such professional misconduct in the future and to abide
himself to the strict ethical rules of the
law profession.” He added that it was only published once and that he never had
any case by reason of the advertisement.
Issues:
1. W/N the advertisement is a violation of legal ethics.
Held/Ratio:
1. YES.
Section 25 of Rule 127 provides that “the practice of soliciting cases at law for
purpose of gain, either personally
or thru paid agents of brokers, constitutes malpractice.” It is highly unethical for an
attorney to advertise his
talents as a merchant advertises his wares. By advertising his services, the lawyer
degrades himself and his
profession. “The most worth and effective advertisement possible, even for a
young lawyer, ... is the
establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to
trust. This cannot be forced but
must be the outcome of character and conduct.” (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)
In the Tagorda case, the attorney involved repeatedly made solicitations. As a
result, he was suspended from the
practice of law. This case is less serious in nature. Considering Bayot”s plea for
leniency and his promise to not
repeat his actions, the Court merely reprimanded Bayot.

G.R. No. L-23815 June 28, 1974

ADELINO H. LEDESMA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAFAEL C. CLIMACO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch I, Silay City, respondent.
FERNANDO, J.:p
Ledesma v. Climaco (1974)
Doctrines:
• Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. The
law is dedicated to the ideal of service and not a mere trade.
Facts:
Ledesma was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Negros
Occidental. He was also the
counsel de parte for one of the accused in a case pending in the sala of Judge
Climaco. Because of his appointment, he
filed a motion to withdraw as counsel de parte. Judge Climaco denied Ledesma”s
motion. Further, Judge Climaco
appointed Ledesma as counsel de oficio for the two defendants in the case.
Ledesma then filed an urgent motion to be
allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, premised on the policy of the Comelec to
require full time service. Judge
Climaco denied this as well.
Issues:
1. W/N Ledesma should be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio?
Held/Ratio:
1. NO.
Judge Climaco, in denying the urgent motion of Ledesma, said that when Ledesma
assumed office as Election
Registrar on October 13, 1964, he knew since October 2 when trial would resume.
The case dragged on for almost
a year because of the postponements obtained by the defense. Judge Climaco noted
that there was no
incompatibility between the duty of Ledesma to the accused and to the court and
the performance of his task as an
election registrar of the Comelec and that the ends of justice would be served by
allowing and requiring Ledesma
to continue as counsel de oficio, since the prosecution has already rested its case.
The SC held that Ledesma was less than duly mindful of his obligation as counsel
de oficio. Ledesma ought to
have known that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. It
could be that for some lawyers
being appointed counsel de oficio is an irksome chore. But for lawyers of repute
and of eminence welcome such
appointments. The law is indeed a profession dedicated to the ideal of service and
not a mere trade. Hence, a high
degree of fidelity to duty is required of one so designated. The fact that a lawyers”
services are rendered without
remuneration should not occasion a diminution in his zeal. Rather the contrary.
A lawyer has an indispensable role in the defense of an accused in a criminal case.
Such should be enough to
disallow Ledesma from withdrawing. Though Ledesma is an election registrar,
there is not likely an exorbitant
demand on his time now. The SC said that Ledesma should now exert himself
sufficiently to perform his task as
defense counsel with competence, if not with zeal, if only to erase doubts as to his
fitness to remain a member of the profession in good standing.

1
In Re: Sycip (1979)
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!
Doctrines:
• The continued use of a firm name after the death of one or more of the
partners designated by it is proper only
where sustained by local custom and not where by custom this purports to Identify
the active members.
Facts:
Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by the surviving partners of
Atty. Alexander Sycip, and 2)
by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, praying that they be allowed
to continue using, in the names of
their firms, the names of partners who had passed away.
Petitioners base their petitions on the following arguments:
1. A partnership is not prohibited from continuing its business under a firm name
which includes the name
of a deceased partner as under Art 1840 of the Civil Code.
2. In regulating other professions, such as accountancy and engineering, the
legislature has authorized the
adoption of firm names without any restriction as to the use, in such firm name, of
the name of a deceased
partner
3. The Canons of Professional Ethics are not transgressed by the continued use
of the name of a deceased
partner in the firm name of a law partnership. Canon 33: The continued use of the
name of a deceased or
former partner when permissible by local custom, is not unethical but care should
be taken that no
imposition or deception is practiced through this use
4. No possibility of imposition or deception because the deaths of their respective
deceased partners were
well-publicized in all newspapers of general circulation for several days
5. No local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner”s name in a
professional firm”s name
6. Continued use of a deceased partner”s name in the firm name of law
partnerships has been consistently
allowed by U.S. Courts
Issues:
1. Whether the firms may continue to use of the partnership name despite the death
of a partner
Held/Ratio:
1. No. The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to
create undue advantages and
disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able lawyer without
connections will have to make a name
for himself starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who can join an old firm,
can initially ride on that old
firm”s reputation established by deceased partners.
Secondly, Article 1840 treats more of a commercial partnership with a good
will to protect rather than of a
professional partnership.
A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships
formed by other professionals or
for business. The difference between the practice of law from those pertaining to
business is that the law is a
profession.
Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the continued use of the name of a
deceased or former partner in the firm
name of a law partnership when such a practice is permissible by local custom but
the Canon warns that care
should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use.
However, in the Philippines, no
local custom permits or allows the continued use of a deceased or former
partner”s name in the firm names
of law partnerships. Firm names, under our custom, identify the more active
and/or more senior members or
partners of the law firm.

Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,
vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.
REGALADO, J.:
Ulep v. The Legal Clinic, Inc. (1993) (Advertising, divorce/foreign
marriage)
Doctrines:
• A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession. advertise
his talents or skill as in a manner similar
to a merchant advertising his goods. The prescription against advertising of
legal services or solicitation of legal
business rests on the fundamental postulate that the that the practice of
law is a profession.
Facts:
The Legal Clinic, Inc. had published the advertisements in annexes “A” and
“B” shown below.
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THEN Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC.
8:30 am— 6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg.,
UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE.
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce
through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to
Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa
Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special
Retiree”s Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina
Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil.
US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US
Embassy CLINIC, INC. 1 Tel. 521-7232; 521-
7251; 522-2041; 521-0767
Ulep, as a member of the bar, seeks to prevent The Legal Clinic, Inc. from
publishing any more of these
advertisements. Ulep asserts that such advertisements are unethical,
demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of
the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar.
On the other hand, The Legal Clinic claims
that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of “legal
support services” through paralegals with the use
of modern computers and electronic machines and should not therefore be
banned from advertising its services.
Issues:
1. W/N The Legal Clinic, Inc. is engaged in the practice of law
2. W/N its activities can properly be the subject of advertisements
Held/Ratio:
1. YES, The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience.
Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that
involves legal knowledge or skill. The practice of law, therefore, covers a
wide range of activities. While some of
the services being offered by The Legal Clinic merely involve mechanical
and technical knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and
programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the
computerization of research aids and materials, it is clear that it
nonetheless gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. In providing
information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and
adoption with its
attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the
client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course
of action to be taken.
2. NO, the advertisements are not allowed
As for the allowability (is this a word? hehe) of the advertisements, the
Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making
known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and
objective information or statement of facts. He is not supposed to use or
permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified,
self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or
legal services.
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer”s advertisement
of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his
profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a manner similar to a
merchant advertising his goods. The prescription against advertising
of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the
fundamental postulate that the that the practice of law is a profession.
Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, the prime incorporator, major stockholder and
proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc., was reprimanded by the Court, with a
warning that running more advertisements similar to the ones above will be
dealt with more severely. The Legal Clinic is prohibited from further
advertising its services.
(There is a lengthy discussion on advertisements in this case but it is 95%
similar to what was written in the book.)

Article 1340. The usual exaggerations in trade, when the other party had
an opportunity to know the facts, are not in themselves fraudulent. (n)
Ang karaniwang pagmamalabis sa pakikipagkalakalan, kapag ang kabilang
partido ay nagkaroon ng oportunidad na malaman ang katotohanan, ay
hindi sa kanilang sarili naging mapanlinlang

Usual or Tolerant exaggerations in trade

It is the natural tendency for merchants and traders to resort to

exaggerations in their attempt to make a sale at the highest price possible.
When the person dealing with them had the opportunity to know the facts,
the usual exaggerations in trade are not in themselves fraudulent. As long
as they do not go to the extent of malice of bad faith, such as changing the
appearance of the thing by false devices, and preventing all the discovery
of the truth by the other party. Customers are expected to know how to take
care of their concerns and to rely on their own independent judgment.

e.g.
Expressions or advertisements like:

“The cigarette that will give you utmost smoking pleasure”

“Do you want your child to get high grades? Then buy him X fountain pen.”

The law does not consider such exaggerations, even if known as false by
the party making them, as amounting to fraud that will affect the validity of a
contract.

Discussion:

The article refers to the usual exaggerations in trade which are not
fraudulent by themselves when the party has the opportunity to investigate
and know the true facts.

The exaggerations are also known as “dealer’s talk” or “traders talk” or

“dolus bonus” which constitute tolerated fraud as long as the other party
has the opportunity to check and know the facts.

What tolerated fraud covers. Tolerated fraud or dealer’s talk usually refers
to the misrepresentation of traders tending to minimize the perceived
defects of the thing or service advertised for sale; exaggerations or
magnifications of its qualities, and its establishment with qualities that it
does not possess.

Dealer’s talks do not give rise to actions for damages because of their
insignificance or because it is the credulousness or stupidity of the victim
which is real cause of his loss.

When there is a written contract, what does not appear on the face of the
contract should be regarded as trader’s talk. Hence, the need to remember
always the maxim “caveat emptor”.

Caveat emptor – the buyer has the duty to check the title of the seller over
the property plus other circumstances necessary for his own protection.
Otherwise he would be buying the property at his own risk.

What is tolerated fraud?

Tolerated Fraud refers to misrepresentation of traders tending to minimize

the perceived defects of the thing or service advertised for sale;
exaggerations or magnifications of its qualities, and its embelishment with
qualities that it does not pass.
What is caviat emptor?

It is a Latin word meaning Buyer’s beware. The buyer has the duty to check
the title of the seller over the property plus other circumstances necessary
for his own protection. Otherwise, he would be buying the property at his
own risk. There is a presumption that a person takes ordinary care of his
concerns followed by another presumption “that the ordinary course of
business has been followed”.

A.M. No. 1053 September 7, 1979

SANTA PANGAN, complainant
vs.
ATTY. DIONISIO RAMOS, respondent,
ANTONIO, J.:
Pangan v. Ramos

A.C. No. 1053. September 7, 1979.

Antonio, J.

FACTS:

Criminal Case No. 35906, Branch VII of the Court of

First Instance of Manila, entitled People v. Marieta M.
Isip bore the attorney of record of the accused is one
“Atty. Pedro D.D. Ramos, 306 Doña Salud Bldg.,
Dasmariñas, Manila. Respondent, Atty. Dionisio Ramos,
admits that he used the name “Pedro D.D. Ramos before
said court in connection with Criminal Case No. 35906,
but he avers that he had a right to do so because it is
in his Birth Certificate.

ISSUES:

WON respondent should be cited for contempt.

RULING:

Yes. The attorney’s roll or register is the official

record containing the names ad signatures of those who
are authorized to practice law. In using the names of
“Pedro D.D. Ramos” before the courts instead of the
name by which he was authorized to practice law–
Dionisio D. Ramos–respondent in effect resorted to
deception. He demonstrated lack of candor in dealing
with the courts.
G.R. No. 77656 August 31, 1987
ROBERTO ANTONIO, DIONISIO BENSION, CONRADA CHAN, MARINO
CUMLAT, VICENTE DIMACUHA, PROCOPIO ESPEJON, RODRIGO
FORBES, MANITO FUENTES, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SPECIAL ELEVENTH
DIVISION, HON. ANTONIA C. MACANDOG, in her capacity as then
presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch
CXX and ALICIA BILAN, respondents.
GANCAYCO, J:
FACTS: Roberto Antonio et al. are lessees of an apartment building foreclosed by
the GSIS after its original owner failed to pay back his loan. After due notice to
Robert Antonio et al. the property was sold to the private respondent Alicia Bilan at
a public bidding held on July 29, 1982. The bidding was not attended by the
lessees believing as tenants, they have priority in law to acquire the property and
their participation would be deemed a waiver of their right to question the act of
the GSIS in selling the property and would adversely affect their offer to buy the
same. The property was awarded to private respondent by GSIS and certified as the
owner of the property. The GSIS advised the petitioners to pay their rent and
arrearages to Alicia Bilan. But despite repeated written demands Roberto Antonio
and others failed and refused to settle their accounts prompting Alicia Bilan to file
a complaint for ejectment case with Metropolitan Trial Court. Said court rendered
judgment on January 8, 1985, ordering the petitioners to vacate the premises.
Antonio and others appealed to RTC which, on August 20, 1985, rendered a
decision affirming in toto the judgment of the MTC. The petitioners’ counsel of
record is the law office Funelas, Perez and Associates represented by Atty. Funelas
filed a petition for review on certiorari with CA. On December 5, 1986, CA
dismissed the petition and copy of same was received by said law firm on January
6, 1987 thru its messenger. Atty. Funelas then was abroad and petitioners were not
informed of the decision which became final and executory on January 22, 1987.
On February 23, 1987 Roberto Antonio et al through their new counsel, filed an
"Appearance and Motion for leave to Admit Motion For Reconsideration, together
with the Motion For Reconsideration with Prayer For Issuance TRO," with the CA,
obviously filed beyond the reglementary period for filing the same. They alleged
that their counsel of record abandoned them and migrated to the United States
without at least informing them that a decision was rendered against them. On
December 5, 1986, CA denied the petition.
ISSUES: WON the client is bound by the negligence of counsel. HELD: Yes, client
is bound by the negligence or failings of counsel. It is the duty of an attorney to
himself and to his clients to invariably adopt a system whereby he can be sure of
receiving promptly all judicial notices during his absence from his address of
record. The attorney must so arrange matters that communications sent by mail
addressed to his office or residence, may reach him promptly.
Antonio vs. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 592
Negligence of a member in the law firm is negligence of the firm.
When the counsel of records is the Law Firm, the negligence of the
lawyer assigned to the case consisting in his leaving for abroad
without notifying his colleagues is negligence of the Law Firm.

G.R. No. 97664 October 10, 1991

OUANO ARRASTRE SERVICE, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. PEARY G. ALEONOR, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court
of Cebu, Branch XXI and INTERNATIONAL PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.,
and THE COURT OF APPEALS, ** respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
Ouano v aleanor
Facts
Private respondent International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (IPI) filed
a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City against Mercantile
Insurance Company, Inc. (Mercantile) and petitioner Ouano Arrastre Service,
Inc. (OASI) for replacement of certain equipment imported by IPI which were
insured by Mercantile but were lost on arrival in Cebu City, allegendy because of
mishandling by petitioner OASI.
Petitioner OASI’s answer was filed by the law firm of Ledesma, Saludo and
Associates (LSA) and signed by Atty. Manuel Trinidad of the Cebu office or branch
of LSA. However, Atty. Fidel Manalo, a partner from the Makati office of LSA
filed to postpone the hearing stating that the case had just been endorsed to him by
petitioner OASI.
After trial which Atty. Manalo handled for OASI, the trial court
rendered a decision holding Mercantile and petitioner OASI jointly and severally
liable for the cost of replacement of the damaged equipment plus damages,
totalling P435,000.00.
Only Mercantile appealed from the decision. When the IPI filed a motion for
execution of the decision against petitioner OASI which public respondent granted,
the petitioner’s cousel, through Atty. Catipay of the Cebu Branch of the LSA,
filed a notice of appeal claiming that the decision was “mistakenly sent” by the trial
court to the law firm’s Head Office in Makati.
Petitioner, through the same counsel, filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order granting the writ of execution
alleging that the failure to file an appeal was due to excusable
neglect and slight “oversight” claiming that there was
miscommunication between LSA-Cebu and LSA main office as to who would
file the notice of appeal. The respondent judge denied OASI’s motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit and ordered that the writ of execution be enforced.
On appeal, the CA dismissed petitioner’s appeal on the grounds that there had been
a valid service of the decision and that it was final and executor upon OASI.
Hence, petition for review to the Court.
Issue: Whether or not LSA having represented itself to the public as a single
firm, be allowed to contend that its main office and its branch office in effect
constitute separate law firms with separate and distinct personalities and
responsibilities.
Held: Petitioner’s counsel was and is the firm of Ledesma, Saludo and
Associates (and not any particular member or associate of that firm) which firm
happens to have a main office in Makati and a branch office in Cebu City. The
Court notes that both the main and branch offices operate under one and the same
name, Saludo Ledesma and Associates. Having represented itself to the public
as comprising a single firm, LSA should not be allowed at this point to pretend
that its main office and its branch office in effect constitute separate law firms
with separate and distinct personalities.

A.M. No. 177-MJ November 27, 1975

CONCEPCION DIA-AÑONUEVO, complainant,
vs.
MUN. JUDGE BONIFACIO B. BERCACIO OF TABACO,
ALBAY, respondent.
MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:
A.M. No. 177-MJ November 27, 1975CONCEPCION DIA-AÑONUEVO,
complainant,vs.MUN. JUDGE BONIFACIO B. BERCACIO OF TABACO,
ALBAY, respondent.
Facts:Mrs. Concepcion Dia-Añonuevo, claims to be a co-owner of an
undivided interest of a certain parcel of irrigated riceland situated in
Cabilogan, Sto. Niño, Sto. Domingo, Albay. This property was the object of
a deed of sale executed by Maximo Balibado, Justo Balibado and Petrona
Balibado de Barriosin favor of Alfredo Ong and acknowledged before
Municipal Judge Bonifacio Bercacio, respondent herein, as ex-officio notary
public, on January 25, 1972. complainant informed respondent judge that
the vendors owned only one-third undivided portion of the property and that
she and other cousins of hers owned two-thirds thereof. Judge Bercacio
advised the complainant to redeem or repurchase the property from the
vendee, Alfredo Ong. Complainant then requested the judge to intercede in
their behalf with the vendee to allow them to redeem the property and for
that purpose she gave respondent the amount of P3,500.00 to be used to
pay Alfredo Ong. Respondent agreed and received the amount of
P3,500.00. Respondent sent the corresponding letter to Alfredo Ong but
the latter did not answer.Forth with a complaint was filed on March 8, 1972
with the Court of First Instance of Albay. During the pendency of the civil
case, complainant asked respondent judge to allow her to withdraw
P3,500.00 she had deposited with him as she was then in need of money,
but no action was taken by respondent
Issue: WON respondent is engaging in the practice of law violating
Judiciary Act of 1948
Ruling: Yes. Respondent violated Section 77 of the Judiciary Act of 1948,
as amended, which provides in part: All provisions relative to the
observance of office hours and the holding of sessions applicable to courts
of first instance shall likewise apply to municipal judges, but the latter may,
after office hours and with the permission of the district judge concerned,
engage in teaching or other vocation not involving the practice of
law ...Respondent submits that it was Atty. Berango and not he who
assisted the complainant, Mrs.Añonuevo, and her co-plaintiffs as counsel in
the civil case. Respondent's claim is belied, however, bythe active interest
he took in the case of Mrs. Añonuevo manifested as follows: (a) He gave
Mrs.Añonuevo legal advice on the remedy available to her and her co-
owners with regards to the property sold to Alfredo Ong. (b) He accepted
from Mrs. Añonuevo the sum of P3,500.00 for purposes of redeeming the
property from the vendee, plus P100.00 for incidental expenses. (c) He
wrote to Alfredo Ong for and in behalf of Mrs. Añonuevo and her co-owners
offering to redeem the land in question. (d)When his attempts at an out-of-
court settlement failed, he caused the filing of the complaint in Civil Case
No. 4591 for which he was issued a receipt for docket and legal research
fees. (e) He was present together with Atty. Berango at the pre-trial of July
5, 1972, and although, as he claims, it was Atty.Berango who made an
appearance for that pre-trial, the trial Judge nonetheless took note
ofrespondent's presence so that the Order dictated on that occasion reads:
"Attys. Berango and Bercacioare notified of the date of the trial.The practice
of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court or participation in
courtproceedings but also includes preparation of pleadings or papers in
anticipation of a litigation, giving oflegal advice to clients or persons
needing the same, etc

Rule 5.07. A judge shall not engage in the private practice of law. Unless
prohibited by the Constitution or law, a judge may engage in
the practice of any other profession provided that such
practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with judicial
functions.
What is basically prohibited as judges is to practice law. Judges however, may
engage in other lawful professions (other than the practice of law) as long as they
are not prohibited by the Constitution or by law. Even then, judges must still
refrain from engaging in such other professions if such engagement will conflict
with their judicial functions.
Dia-Anonuevo vs. Bercacio, 68 SCRA 81
“The rule disqualifying a municipal judge from engaging in the practice of law
seeks to avoid the evil possible use of the power and influence of his office to
affect the outcome of a litigation where he is retained as counsel. Compelling
reasons of public policy lie behind this prohibition, and judges are expected to
conduct themselves in such a manner as to preclude suspicion that they are
representing the interests of party-litigant. The practice of law is not limited
to the conduct of cases in court or participation in court proceedings but also
includes preparation of pleadings or papers in anticipation of a litigation, and
giving of legal advice to clients or persons needing the same.”
G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988
FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS
BERNAL, JR., HEIRS OF MARISSA BERNAL, namely, GLICERIA DELA
CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS BERNAL, SR., respondents.
CORTES, J.:

Facts:
The petitioners owned a firewall that had weakened and collapsed on the tailoring
shop owned by the private respondents, causing injuries and death to Marissa
Bernal, a daughter. The RTC ruled that the petitioners were guilty of gross
negligence and awarded damages to respondents. The petitioners appealed to the
CA, but the latter affirmed the decision of the RTC. A copy of the decision of the
CA was received by the petitioners on August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987, the
last day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, the petitioners asked the CA to
extend the time to file a motion for reconsideration. According to a previous case,
Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, the fifteen-day period  for appealing or for
filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended. The petitioners contend that
the case of Habaluyas could not be made binding because it has not been published
in the Official Gazette at the time the CA promulgated its decision.

Issue:
Is the ruling on an unpublished case binding?

Ruling:
Yes. There is no law requiring the publication of a Supreme Court decision for it to
be binding and effective. The counsel of the petitioners should be responsible for
keeping abreast with Supreme Court decisions as a lawyer.

Canon 5 - a Lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments,

participate in continuing legal education programs, support efforts
to achieve high standards in Law schools as well as in the practical
training of Law students and assist in disseminating the Law and
jurisprudence.
A Lawyer must walk the dynamic movements of the Law. Lawyer's
life is continuous and laborious. He must keep abreast of the
decisions of the SC; particularly where issues have been clarified,
reiterated and published n the advance reports of the sc decisions
(de roy v ca, 157 sca 757)
De Roy vs. Court of Appeals, 157 SCRA 757
It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep upbreast
of
decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified,
consistently
reiterated, and published in the advance report of Supreme Court decisions (G.R.s)
and in such
publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.