Protracted Social Conflict
Protracted Social Conflict
Protracted Social Conflict
Cunliffe
October 2010
In the 1990s, Edward Azar predicted that contemporary conflicts after World War II, would become much more difficult to understand in their fluctuation, unpredictability and longevity, which is why he created a process of Track Two diplomacy focusing on non-official conflict resolution focusing on negotiation among clashing communities. Nonetheless, as the characteristics of conflict have once again considerably changed in the beginning of the 21st century and with the seemingly never-ending war on terror, the question becomes whether Azar's theory is still applicable to these new conflicts. I will first explain what Azar meant by protracted social conflict, then move on to the strong points and weak points of his theory and the conflict resolution process it entails, and finally assess whether or not his approach is still applicable to the unconventional conflict trend that has englobed the twenty first century.
Protracted social conflict occurs when different religious, cultural or ethnic groups of society are deprived of their basic needs (Azar, 1990). Contrary to what one might think, the basic needs that Azar is referring to are not merely the simple ones such as food and water, but also the more vital ones, such as identity, recognition, justice and security (Azar, 1990). Furthermore he explains that the resolution of such protracted social conflicts cannot occur through military means but only through Track Two diplomacy, and more specifically consensus building which must also be reinforced by socio-economic development (Azar, 1990). Thus the importance of conflict resolution is clearly underlined in Azar's theory of protracted social conflict essentially because these types of conflicts have a large tendency to spill over or involve neighbouring countries and even the international community and its key players (Azar, 1990). The first noticeable strong point of the protracted social conflict theory is that it first and foremost looks at a conflict in its socio-historical and cultural context, analyzing it from its mere formation to
what it has become today. This process is of crucial importance to the deep understanding of the protracted social conflicts, where they come from, and to visualize their transformation throughout the years in order to grasp what they have become. Thus Azar identifies four cluster variables that are usually preconditions to protracted social conflict, and they are: the communal content, human needs, governance and the role of the state and finally, the international relations or linkages (1990: 7). In sum, the role of the state and the influence or meddling of international linkages in Third World countries or developing countries often results in the marginalization of a certain minority in a particular country, or number of countries for that matter, which in turn leads to that particular group being deprived of its basic needs and this deprivation will often lead to a protracted social conflict. Azar also emphasizes on the fact that historical factors such as colonialism or historical settings, deeply affect the way these conflicts unfold (1990). When it comes to Lebanon, the end of World War One which led to the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire and the division of the Middle Eastern area among the Allies, resulted in the 'creation' of countries among different sectarian lines and also resulted in the division of whole tribes by artificial borders (Azar, 1983). Thus the very creation of countries like Syria and Lebanon was flawed and it is only foreseeable that different tribes reunited in one area would turn against each other fearing for their own survival. Furthermore, when Lebanon was handed over to the French becoming a colony, France automatically had a direct impact on the drafting of the Lebanese constitution and the 1943 National Pact which at the time favoured the Christians of the country (Azar, 1983). And even though in 1989, the Taif accords were drafted to put an end to the civil war, giving each religious sect a proportional political representation, the Christian Maronites still had the upper hand despite the population shift that occurred in the 1960s turning the muslim population into the majority. Thus if there are tensions among the christians and muslims of the country it can be directly traced to the country's formation and its colonial past (Azar, 1983).
Secondly, because protracted conflicts can be so unpredictable, and trick the observer by remaining dormant for a long period and then suddenly break out again, it is extremely important to not simply manage the conflicts, but to also to resolve them in order to put an end to the constant fluctuation of violence. Thus, another strong point of Azar's protracted social conflict theory is that it focuses on conflict resolution rather than just conflict 'management'. For conflict management theorists, resolving protracted social conflict is perceived as unrealistic and far-fetched, and so the closest accomplishment to actual conflict resolution is the containment of these conflicts (Miall, 2004: 3). Many would argue that the latter is not a proper technique for protracted social conflicts considering that their fluctuating patterns of violence wouldn't be easily subdued by any form of containment. And so, instead of conflict management, Azar's protracted social conflict theory shifts more towards conflict resolution, so instead of simply agreeing to disagree, conflict resolution aims at learning to agree again by finding the roots of the conflict and attempt to untangle them. Therefore the conflict resolution process would entail that the clashing parties be helped to negotiate and find common ground by unbiased third parties. Miall describes the third party as "skilled but powerless", explaining that "they seek to explore what the roots of the conflict really are and to identify creative solutions that the parties may have missed in their commitment to entrenched positions" (2004: 3). Thus having the opinion and view of an outsider can certainly help the clashing parties view the situation more clearly.
Moreover, Azar's theory is different than any other in terms of its process of Track Two diplomacy which is an 'non-official , sub-national and analytical problem-solving' technique (Azar, 1990: 19). The more common technique of diplomacy is Track One diplomacy which focuses on mediation among the official representatives of the conflicting parties or states in an official context, whereas Track Two diplomacy consists of mediation among citizens, scholars, thinkers and community leaders in a nonofficial manner (Azar, 1990: 19). According to Azar, Track One diplomacy is very often prone to fail considering that it occurs under a 'bargaining' framework which will most probably result in a zero-sum
outcome or in other words, a win-lose situation or simply a situation of compromise (Azar, 1990: 19). And so, the most probable results of Track one diplomacy will not put an end to a protracted social conflict considering that compromise will entail that one or more party will continue to feel marginalized by the others therefore leading to more clashes in the future. This is why Azar employs a non-traditional diplomatic technique focusing on the participation of non-officials or citizens, however as Azar mentions, it is of course more effective that these participants have a link to government officials in order for the findings of the conflict resolution workshops to have a chance to be applied by the state (1990: 34). In other words the ultimate aim is for the Track Two diplomacy efforts to eventually fuse with Track One diplomacy efforts in order to stir official opinion in the more peaceful direction (Azar, 1990:19). Furthermore, Track Two diplomacy can be much more efficient than Track One considering that the latter is almost always 'polluted' by international influences and meddling. In National Security in the Third World, Azar describes developing countries as being "trapped in a complex vortex of local, regional and superpower rivalry" and this often manifests itself during stateled mediation (1988: 278).
On the other hand, Track Two diplomacy, is not an easy process and despite its creativity, if it is not conducted correctly from start to finish, its chances of success can be seen as considerably low. In May 1984, Edward Azar and his team at the Maryland University, conducted a conflict resolution forum on Lebanon. The forum reunited many community leaders who in the beginning clutched tightly to their initial ideological agendas, but after a while eased into discussion with the opposing sides (Azar, 1990). Moreover, the process of Track Two diplomacy and non-official negotiation negotiations can be limited in terms of choice of participants. Azar admits that it is hard to find the right persons to participate in terms of education, general knowledge of the conflict and knowledge of politics in general (Azar, 1990). The process is also delicate considering that the participants should be nonofficials, preferably of moderate perspectives and able to negotiate, nonetheless, these persons should
also have the much needed link or influence on country and community officials in order for the results of the forums to be applied on a state level. Obviously these particular criteria are very difficult to find in one person, making it extremely hard, but not impossible, to find the right persons for this process.
Finally, one last limit to Azar's theory of protracted social conflict resolution is the question of whether or not it is applicable to the 'new' types of conflicts that the world is facing today with the rise of terrorism and unconventional wars. It is unclear whether non-official negotiation would be successful among parties that lean towards ideological or religious extremism, such as Al Qaeda. Azar mentioned that it was hard to get a hold of more extremist representatives when it came to negotiation forums (1990: 111-112). Thus it is unclear whether this process would work on what political scientists like Mary Kaldor call 'new wars' which are wars that have undergone what she calls a 'revolution in the social relations of warfare' (Kaldor, 2001:3). And because of their social complexity, new wars are probably more prone to be subdued by conflict 'transformation' rather than conflict resolution. Hugh Miall identifies conflict transformation as "a process of engaging with and transforming the relationships, interests, discourses and, if necessary, the very constitution of society" (2004: 4). And so, in some way, Azar's approach is aiming at conflict transformation indirectly, by working with the communities, hoping that they will later transform the society itself, but it cannot be described as a complete conflict transformation approach, considering that there is no direct contact whatsoever with government officials. Moreover, Miall stated in 'Conflict Transformation: A Multi-Dimensional Task' that with some development, Azar's theory can become one of conflict transformation (2004: 5). Also, Kalevi Holsti wrote in 1996, that the new forms of conflict that are emerging at the end of the 20th century are no longer about security, status or foreign policy but more about 'the role and status of communities within the state' (Holtsi in Miall, 2010: 80). Holtsi's view is also very similar to Samuel Huntington's theory of 'Clash of Civilizations' which explains that conflicts are no longer involving states as much as they are opposing different civilizations that often even transcend national borders
and can be described as international communities, such as for example the Arab community or the Muslim community in the world. In fact, long before Huntington, Azar had come to the conclusion that since WWII, the majority of conflicts have occurred in the Third World, and most of them were based on ethnic tensions rather than strategic aims (Fisher, 1997: 77).
And so, if Edward Azar's theory of protracted social conflict resolution was developed more in order to become one of conflict transformation, it would certainly be applicable to the 'new' conflicts that we are facing today. Especially considering that contemporary conflicts are involving communities and civilizations more than nation states. As for Leabnon, the conflict solving that the country has been through was either one of conflict management or incomplete resolution since the religious and sectarian tensions are dormant but still very much present in the country. Thus a transformation of the structure of society, that is keeping the country prone to conflict, and the fulfilment of basic needs of recognition and equal treatment to the 17 different sects that live in the considerably small country, is in my opinion a much better option for peace-building in Lebanon.
WORKS CITED Azar, Edward E., 1990. The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases. Aldershot, Dartmouth. Azar, Edward E., Paul A. Jureidini, Charles Malik, R.D. Mc Laurin, Robert J. Pranger, Kate Shnayerson and Lewis W. Snider, 1983. Lebanon and the World in the 1980s. Center of International Development, University of Maryland, Maryland. Azar, Edward E, Chung-in Moon, 1988. National Security in the Third World: The Management of Internal and External Threats. Center of International Development, University of Maryland, Maryland. Fisher, Ronald J., 1997. Interactive Conflict Resolution. Syracuse, New York. Kaldor, Mary, 2001. New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era. Polity Press, Cambridge. Miall, Hugh, Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, 2010. Contemporary Conflict Resolution. Chapter 4. Second Edition. Polity Press, Cambridge. Miall Hugh, 2004. 'Conflict Transformation: A Multi-Dimensional Task' in Berghof Handbook on Conflict Transformation http://www.berghof-handbook.net/