G.R. No. 204819

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC
G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014
JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their
minor children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and
MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education,
Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and
Local Government, Respondents.
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G.R. No. 204934
ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION PHILIPPINES, INC. [ALFI], represented by its
President, Maria Concepcion S. Noche, Spouses Reynaldo S. Luistro & Rosie B . Luistro,
Jose S. Sandejas & Elenita S.A. Sandejas, Arturo M. Gorrez & Marietta C. Gorrez, Salvador
S. Mante, Jr. & Hazeleen L. Mante, Rolando M. Bautista & Maria Felisa S. Bautista,
Desiderio Racho & Traquilina Racho, F emand Antonio A. Tansingco & Carol Anne C.
Tansingco for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Therese Antonette C.
Tansingco, Lorenzo Jose C. Tansingco, Miguel F emando C. Tangsingco, Carlo Josemaria
C. Tansingco & Juan Paolo C. Tansingco, Spouses Mariano V. Araneta & Eileen Z. Araneta
for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Ramon Carlos Z. Araneta & Maya
Angelica Z. Araneta, Spouses Renato C. Castor & Mildred C. Castor for themselves and on
behalf of their minor children, Renz Jeffrey C. Castor, Joseph Ramil C. Castor, John Paul
C. Castor & Raphael C. Castor, Spouses Alexander R. Racho & Zara Z. Racho for
themselves and on behalf of their minor children Margarita Racho, Mikaela Racho, Martin
Racho, Mari Racho & Manolo Racho, Spouses Alfred R. Racho & Francine V. Racho for
themselves and on behalf of their minor children Michael Racho, Mariana Racho, Rafael
Racho, Maxi Racho, Chessie Racho & Laura Racho, Spouses David R. Racho & Armilyn A.
Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor child Gabriel Racho, Mindy M. Juatas
and on behalf of her minor children Elijah Gerald Juatas and Elian Gabriel Juatas,
Salvacion M. Monteiro, Emily R. Laws, Joseph R . Laws & Katrina R. Laws, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Culture and Sports, HON. CORAZON SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social Welfare
and Development, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ARSENIO M. BALISACAN, Socio-Economic Planning Secretary and
NEDA Director-General, THE PHILIPPINE COMMISSION ON WOMEN, represented by its
Chairperson, Remedios lgnacio-Rikken, THE PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE
CORPORATION, represented by its President Eduardo Banzon, THE LEAGUE OF
PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Alfonso Umali, THE
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Oscar Rodriguez,
and THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President
Donato Marcos, Respondents.
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G.R. No. 204957
TASK FORCE FOR FAMILY AND LIFE VISAYAS, INC. and VALERIANO S.
AVILA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of
Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
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G.R. No. 204988
SERVE LIFE CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, INC., represented by Dr. Nestor B. Lumicao, M.D.,
as President and in his personal capacity, ROSEVALE FOUNDATION INC., represented by
Dr. Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D., as member of the school board and in his personal capacity,
ROSEMARIE R. ALENTON, IMELDA G. IBARRA, CPA, LOVENIAP. NACES, Phd., ANTHONY
G. NAGAC, EARL ANTHONY C. GAMBE and MARLON I. YAP, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE
T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary,
Department of Education and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of
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G.R. No. 205003
EXPEDITO A. BUGARIN, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. SENATE
PRESIDENT, HON. SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and HON.
SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.
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G.R. No. 205043
EDUARDO B. OLAGUER and THE CATHOLIC XYBRSPACE APOSTOLATE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
DOH SECRETARY ENRIQUE T. ONA, FDA DIRECTOR SUZETTE H. LAZO, DBM
SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD, DILG SECRETARY MANUELA. ROXAS II, DECS
SECRETARY ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Respondents.
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G.R. No. 205138

PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF XSEMINARIANS, INC. (PAX), herein represented by its National
President, Atty. Ricardo M . Ribo, and in his own behalf, Atty. Lino E.A. Dumas, Romeo B.
Almonte, Osmundo C. Orlanes, Arsenio Z. Menor, Samuel J. Yap, Jaime F. Mateo, Rolly
Siguan, Dante E. Magdangal, Michael Eugenio O. Plana, Bienvenido C. Miguel, Jr.,
Landrito M. Diokno and Baldomero Falcone, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government,
HON. CORAZON J. SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and Development,
HON. ARSENIO BALISACAN, Director-General, National Economic and Development
Authority, HON. SUZETTE H. LAZO, Director-General, Food and Drugs Administration,
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, and THE BOARD
OF COMMISSIONERS, Philippine Commission on Women, Respondents.
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G.R. No. 205478
REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ, M.D., JACQUELINE H. KING, M.D., CYNTHIA T. DOMINGO, M.D.,

AND JOSEPHINE MILLADO-LUMITAO, M.D., collectively known as Doctors For Life, and
ANTHONY PEREZ, MICHAEL ANTHONY G. MAPA, CARLOS ANTONIO PALAD, WILFREDO
JOSE, CLAIRE NAVARRO, ANNA COSIO, and GABRIEL DY LIACCO collectively known as
Filipinos For Life, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary of the Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary of the
Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary of the Department of
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G.R. No. 205491
SPOUSES FRANCISCO S. TATAD AND MARIA FENNY C. TATAD & ALA F. PAGUIA, for
themselves, their Posterity, and the rest of Filipino posterity, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT of the Republic of the Philippines, Respondent.
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G.R. No. 205720
PRO-LIFE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, Inc., represented by Loma Melegrito, as Executive

Director, and in her personal capacity, JOSELYN B. BASILIO, ROBERT Z. CORTES, ARIEL
A. CRISOSTOMO, JEREMY I. GATDULA, CRISTINA A. MONTES, RAUL ANTONIO A.
NIDOY, WINSTON CONRAD B. PADOJINOG, RUFINO L. POLICARPIO III, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE
T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department
of Education and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 206355
MILLENNIUM SAINT FOUNDATION, INC., ATTY. RAMON PEDROSA, ATTY. CITA

BORROMEO-GARCIA, STELLAACEDERA, ATTY. BERTENI CATALUNA
CAUSING, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT
OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Respondents.
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G.R. No. 207111
JOHN WALTER B. JUAT, MARY M. IMBONG, ANTHONY VICTORIO B. LUMICAO, JOSEPH

MARTIN Q. VERDEJO, ANTONIA EMMA R. ROXAS and LOTA LAT-GUERRERO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO ABAD, Secretary,
Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of
Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports
and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
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G.R. No. 207172
COUPLES FOR CHRIST FOUNDATION, INC., SPOUSES JUAN CARLOS ARTADI

SARMIENTO AND FRANCESCA ISABELLE BESINGA-SARMIENTO, AND SPOUSES LUIS
FRANCIS A. RODRIGO, JR. and DEBORAH MARIE VERONICA N. RODRIGO, Petitioners,
vs.
Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and
Local Government, Respondents.
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G.R. No. 207563
ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH and ABDULHUSSEIN M. KASHIM, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of
the Department of Health, and HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management, Respondents.
OPINYONG SUMASANG-AYON AT SUMASALUNGAT
Paunang Salita
Sa herarkiya ng mga karapatang pantao, walang hihigit pa sa karapatang mabuhay, at

nasasalamin ng ating Saligang Batas ang ganitong paniniwala. Ayon dito, pantay na
pangangalagaan ng pamahalaan ang buhay ng ina at ang buhay na kanyang dinadala. 1
Bakas sa adhikaing ito ang pagkilal a sa malaking bahaging ginagampanan ng ina sa pagbibigay
ng buhay.
Kaya't sasalungatin ko ang bigkasin ng aking mga kapatid na Mahistrado, na ang pagpapalaya
sa pasiya ng may-katawan ay kumikitil ng buhay ng kapwa-taong isisilang pa lamang. Wala sa
takda ng Saligang Batas at Repub lic Act No. 10354 (The Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012), o RH Law, ang pagkitil ng buhay. Nguni't inuunawa rin nito
ang karapatan ng mag-asawa na magpalaki ng kanilang pamilya ng may dangal sa buhay.
Napakahalaga din sa pananaw ng Saligang Batas at ng RH Law ang kalusugan ng pamayanan,
lalong-lalo na ang kalusugan ng mga ina o magiging ina ng pamayanang ito. Kaya't mahalaga na
ang bawat interpretasyon ng RH Law ay ayon sa ikabubuti ng pamilyang Pilipino at kalusugan ng
ina.
Naitakda na sa Saligang Batas, at alinsunod naman dito ang RH Law, na ang buhay ay
pangangalagaan mula sa conception. Kung ano ang puntong iyon ay katanungan para sa mga
dalubhasa ng siyensiya, at hindi para sa Korte Suprema. Mayroong prosesong naitakda ang RH
Law kung saan kinikilala ang pangunahing kapangyarihan ng Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) sa pagsusuri sa mga katangian ng isang metodo o gamot upang alamin kung ito ay
gagamitin sa pagkitil ng buhay na pinagbabawal ng Saligang Batas. Maaari lamang saklawan ng
Korte Suprema ang tanong na ito kung ang prosesong legal ay lumabag sa mga alituntunin ng
due process at mga kaakibat na procedural rules nito. Sukdulang panghihimasok ang magtakda
kami sa panahong ito kung ang mga hormonal contraceptives ay abortifacient o hindi.
Gayundin, ang may-katawan na daraan sa paglilihi, pagbubuntis at maaaring ikapeligro ng

sariling buhay ay nararapat na pakinggan ng pamahalaan. Maaaring imungkahi ng kapamilya,
kasama na ng kanyang asawa, ang altematibong paraan upang harapin ang sitwasyong
pangkalusugan. Nguni't sa bandang huli, ang pasiya ng may-katawan ang dapat manaig. At
bagama't ang may-katawan ay wala pa sa hustong gulang, kung siya ay nabuntis na, hindi dapat
hadlangan ang kanyang kakayahang humingi ng tulong ukol sa reproductive health kahit walang
pahintulot ng kanyang magulang sapagka't nakasalalay sa ganitong kakayahan ang kanyang
kalusugan at mismong buhay.
Sa panig ng mga matataas na nanunungkulan sa pamahalaan na inatasang magpatupad ng RH

Law, hindi nararapat na sila ay hayaang lumabag sa katungkulang ito. Binigyan sila ng
kapangyarihan ng pamahalaan upang ipatupad ang mga batas, at hindi nila maaaring gamitin
ang nasabing kapangyarihan upang biguin ang mga nilalayon ng pamahalaan para sa mga
mamamayan, lalo na't ang mga layuning ito ay kaugnay sa usaping pangkalusugan.
Sinusuportahan ng RH Law ang pagsulong at pangangalaga sa karapatan ng kababaihan. Ang

pagkakaloob ng mabisa at mahusay na reproductive health care services ay ayon sa layunin
nitong masiguro ang kalusugan ng mag-ina, at makapagtatag ng sapat na pamantayan alang-
alang sa kapakanan ng lahat.
Hindi maikakaila na ang paulit-ulit na pagbanggit sa mga katagang "medically-safe, non-

abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable and quality reproductive health care services, methods,
devices and supplies" sa RH Law ay di-pangkaraniwang pagpapahalaga sa buhay ng tao at ang
sadyang pagwawaksi sa abortion bilang isang krimen na may karampatang parusa ayon sa ating
batas.
Ang Pasanin ng Petitioners
Pinapalagay bilang isang paunang pag-unawa, na ang lahat ng batas ay hindi labag sa Saligang
Batas o konstitusyonal. Ito ay pangunahing prinsipyo na matagal nang kinikilala, kung kaya't
2
iniiwasan ng Korte Suprema na ipawalang-bisa ang isang batas bilang pagkilala sa dunong,
3
dangal at kabayanihan ng Kongreso na gumawa nito, at sa Pangulo na nagpatibay dito. Ang 4

tungkuling magpatupad ng Saligang Batas ay hindi natatangi sa Korte Suprema; ito ay kaakibat
na katungkulan ng Kongreso at ng Pangulo. 5
Dahil ang lahat ng batas ay ipinapalagay na konstitusyonal, ang sinuman na dudulog sa Korte
Suprema upang ipawalang-bisa ito ay mabigat ang susuungin. Ipapawalang-bisa lamang ng
Korte Suprema ang isang batas o bahagi nito kung malinaw na maipakikita ng petitioner ang
paglabag nito sa Saligang Batas. Kinakailangang malinaw at totohanan ang mga batayan sa
6
pagpapawalang-bisa ng batas, at hindi maaaring ang mga ito ay haka-haka lamang. Saka 7
lamang ipapawalang-bisa ng Korte Suprema ang isang batas kung malinaw na naipakita ang
pagmamalabis at pagsalungat ng Kongreso sa ating Saligang Batas. 8
Ang Pasiya ng Mayorya
Ayon sa Decision, ang RH Law ay konstitusyonal maliban na lamang sa mga sumusunod na

bahagi nito:
1. Section 7, at ang kaukulang bahagi nito sa Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)
9
ng RH Law, sa dahilang ito ay: a) nag-uutos sa mga non-maternity specialty hospitals at

mga ospital na pagmamay-ari o pinatatakbo ng mga religious group na agarang ituro sa
pinakamalapit na health facility ang mga pasyenteng wala sa emergency condition o
hindi serious case, ayon sa R.A. 8344, na naghahangad ng serbisyo ukol sa modern
10
family planning methods, at b) nagbibigay-daan sa mga menor de edad na may anak o
11
nagkaroon ng miscarriage na makinabang sa modern family planning methods kahit

walang pahintulot ng kanilang mga magulang; 12
2. Section 23(a)(1), at ang Section 5.24 ng IRR ng RH Law, sa dahilang pinarurusahan
13 14
ni to ang kahit sinong health care service provider na hindi nagpalaganap o tumangging
magpalaganap ng mahalagang kaalaman kaugnay ng mga programa at serbisyo ukol sa
reproductive health, nang walang pakundangan sa religious beliefs ng mga health care
service providers na ito;
3. Section 23(a)(2)(i), at ang kaukulang bahagi nito sa IRR ng RH Law, sa dahilang
15 16
nagbibigay-daan ito sa isang may asawa na wala sa emergency condition o hindi serious
case na sumailalim sa reproductive health procedures kahit walang pahintulot ng
kanyang asawa;
4. Section 23(a)(2)(ii) sa dahilang pinarurusahan nito ang health care service provider
17
na hihingi ng pahintulot ng magulang bago magsagawa ng reproductive health procedure

sa menor de edad na wala sa emergency condition o hindi serious case;
5. Section 23(a)(3), at ang Section 5.24 ng IRR ng RH Law, sa dahilang pinarurusahan
18
nito ang kahit sinong health care service provider na hindi nagturo o tumangging ituro sa
pinakamalapit na health facility ang mga pasyenteng wala sa emergency condition o
hindi serious case na naghahangad ng serbisyo ukol sa modern family planning
methods;
6. Section 23(b), at ang Section 5.24 ng IRR ng RH Law, sa dahilang pinarurusahan nito
19
ang kahit sinong public officer na ayaw magtaguyod ng reproductive health programs o
gagawa ng kahit anong hahadlang o makakasagabal sa malawakang pagsasakatuparan
ng isang reproductive health program;
7. Section 17, at ang kaukulang bahagi nito sa IRR ng RH Law, kaugnay sa
20 21
pagsasagawa ng pro bona reproductive health services sa dahilang naaapektuhan nito

ang conscientious objector sa pagkuha ng PhilHealth accreditation; at
8. Section 3.0l(a) at 3.01Q) ng IRR ng RH Law sa dahilang nagdadagdag ito ng
22 23
salitang "primarily" sa kahulugan ng abortifacient, na labag sa Section 4(a) ng RH Law

24
at Section 12, Article II ng Saligang Batas.

25
Ang Religious Freedom, ang Compelling State Interest Test, at ang Conscientious Objector
Bago ko talakayin ang mga substantibong mga argumento ukol sa religious freedom, nais kong
batikusin ang paggamit ng isang technical legal test upang timbangin kung alin sa dalawa: (a)
ang polisiya ng pamahalaan, gaya ng reproductive health, o (b) isang karapatan gaya ng
religious freedo m, ang dapat manaig. Sa palagay ko, hindi akma ang paggamit ng technical
legal test na compelling state interest sa kasong hinaharap natin.
Hindi ako sumasang-ayon na nararapat gamitin ang compelling state interest test upang tiyakin
ang legalidad ng RH Law - partikular na ang paggarantiya ng pamahalaan sa ligtas, mabisa,
abot-kaya, de-kalidad, naaayon sa batas at hindi abortifacient na reproductive health care
services, methods, devices at supplies para sa lahat, pati na ang mahalagang kaalaman ukol
dito - sa kadahilanang buo ang pagkilala ng RH Law sa religious freedom, kaya't hindi na
kailangan ang test na ito. Sa Estrada v. Escritor, ipinaliwanag natin na:
26
The "compelling state interest" test is proper where conduct is involved for the whole gamut of
human conduct has different effects on the state's interests: some effects may be immediate and
short-term while others delayed and far-reaching. A test that would protect the interests of the
state in preventing a substantive evil, whether immediate or delayed, is therefore necessary.
However, not any interest of the state would suffice to prevail over the right to religious freedom
as this is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights - "the most
inalienable and sacred of all human rights," in the words of Jefferson. This right is sacred for an
invocation of the Free Exercise Clause is an appeal to a higher sovereignty. The entire
constitutional order of limited government is premised upon an acknowledgment of such higher
sovereignty, thus the Filipinos implore the "aid of Almighty God in order to build a just and
humane society and establish a government." As held in Sherbert, only the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests can limit this fundamental right. A mere balancing of interests
which balances a right with just a colorable state interest is therefore not appropriate. Instead,
only a compelling interest of the state can prevail over the fundamental right to religious liberty.
The test requires the state to carry a heavy burden, a compelling one, for to do otherwise would
allow the state to batter religion, especially the less powerful ones until they are destroyed. In
determining which shall prevail between the state's interest and religious liberty, reasonableness
shall be the guide. The "compelling state interest" serves the purpose of revering religious liberty
while at the same time affording protection to the paramount interests of the state. (Emphasis
27
ours)
Ginamit ang compelling state interest test sa Estrada v. Escritor upang malaman kung ang
respondent doon ay nararapat na bigyan ng exemption laban sa kasong administratibo bunga ng
pakikisama niya sa lalaking hindi niya asawa ayon sa Civil Code. Karaniwan, bilang kawani ng
pamahalaan, mahaharap ang respondent sa kasong disgraceful and immoral conduct. Bagkus,
inilahad ng respondent na bagama't walang basbas ng pamahalaang sibil ang kanilang
pagsasama, may basbas naman ito ng kanilang relihiyon na Jehovah's Witnesses and the Watch
Tower and Bible Tract Society. Kaya't hindi siya nararapat na sampahan ng kasong
administratibo bunga nito.
Sa kadahilanang aminado naman ang Solicitor General na tunay at tapat ang paniniwala ng
respondent sa kaniyang relihiyon, at nagdudulot ng ligalig sa kanyang paniniwala ang banta ng
disciplinary action bunga ng kasong disgraceful and immoral conduct, nagpasiya ang Korte
Suprema na nararapat na patunayan ng pamahalaan kung tunay nga na may compelling secular
objective na nagbunsod dito upang hindi payagan ang pakikisama ng respondent sa lalaking
hindi niya asawa. Nararapat din, ayon sa Korte Suprema, na ipakita ng pamahalaan na gumamit
ito ng least restrictive means sa pagpigil ng karapatan ng mga tao sa pagtatanggol nito ng
compelling state interest.
Ukol dito, inihayag ng Korte Suprema na "the government must do more than assert the
objectives at risk if exemption is given, it must precisely show how and to what extent those
objectives will be undermined if exemptions are granted." Sa kalaunan, bigo ang pamahalaan
28
na patunayan ang pakay nito sa pagbabawal sa relasyon ng respondent. Bunsod nito, binigyan
ng exemption sa parusa ang respondent batay sa kanyang religious freedom.
Malinaw sa Estrada v. Escritor na sa ilalim ng compelling state interest test, ipinagtutunggali ang
religious freedom ng mga mamamayan at ang interes ng pamahalaan sa pagpapatupad ng
patakarang sinasabing nagpapahirap sa religious convictions ng ilan. Kapag hindi nanaig ang
interes ng pamahalaan, magbibigay ng exemption sa patakaran ang Korte Suprema para sa
mga mamamayang naninindigan para sa kanilang religious freedom. Isinaad din sa Estrada v.
Escritor na nakagawian na ng Korte Suprema na magbigay ng exemption sa halip na
magpawalang-bisa ng mga patakaran ng pamahalaan pagdating sa usapin ng religious freedom.
Hindi ito ang sitwasyon sa ilalim ng RH Law. Ayon sa petitioners, katumbas ng isang
pagkakasala sa ilalim ng kanilang relihiyon ang pagsasagawa ng serbisyo ukol sa modern family
planning methods at pagbibigay ng payo ukol dito. Labag ito sa religious freedom ng mga
conscientious health professionals na naniniwalang likas na masama ang contraception. Dahil
dito, nararapat na ipawalang-bisa ang RH Law. At, ayon sa mga kapatid kong Mahistrado,
walang compelling state interest para payagan ang pamahalaang pilitin ang health professionals
na lumabag sa kanilang paniniwala. Ang totoo, walang paglabag sa paniniwala na pinapataw
ang RH Law.
Ang Opt-Out Clause
Nakalimutan ng petitioners ang kabuuan ng RH Law. Batid ng Kongreso na maaaring

makasagasa sa paniniwala at ikaligalig ng ilang medical professionals ang kautusang ito sa RH
Law. Dahil mismo dito kaya nag-ukit ang Kongreso ng exemption sa RH Law para sa mga
conscientious objectors sa pamamagitan ng "opt-out clause." Sa ilalim ng opt-out clause na
nakapaloob sa Section 7 ng RH Law, hindi obligadong magdulot ng serbisyo kaugnay sa modern
family planning methods ang mga non-maternity specialty hospitals at mga ospital na
pagmamay-ari at pinatatakbo ng mga religious groups. Sa kabilang banda, pinahahalagahan sa
ilalim ng Section 23(a)(3) ng RH Law ang conscientious objection ng health care service
providers batay sa kanilang ethical o religious beliefs. Ayon dito, exempted sila sa kaparusahan
na ipapataw sa mga tatangging magdulot ng reproductive health care services at magbigay ng
mahalagang kaalaman ukol dito .
Samakatuwid, hindi na nararapat na gamitin pa ang compelling state interest test upang matiyak
ang legalidad ng RH Law. Matatandaang sa ilalim ng compelling state interest test, kai langang
ipakita ng pamahalaan kung paano mawawalan ng saysay ang mga layunin nito sa pagbuo ng
RH Law kung magbibigay ito ng exemptions sa mga itinatakda ng batas. Nguni't dahil kinilala na
ng RH Law ang religious freedom ng mga conscientious objectors sa pamamagitan ng
exemption na naka-ukit na dito, wala na sa pamahalaan ang pasanin upang ipagtanggol ang
interes nito sa pagsisikap na mapangalagaan ang reproductive health ng mga mamamayan.
Naging sensitibo ang Kongreso sa paniniwala ng mga conscientious objectors sa pamamagitan

ng paglalatag ng exemptions sa RH Law. Sa puntong ito, kung kakailanganin pa ng Kongreso na
patunayan ang compelling state interest, mawawalan ng saysay ang respeto sa isa't isa na
iniaatas ng ating Saligang Batas sa mga magigiting na sangay ng pamahalaan.
Ang agarang pagturo na lamang sa pinakamalapit na health facility o health care service
provider sa mga pasyenteng naghahangad ng serbisyo ukol sa modern family planning methods
ang nalalabing katungkulan ng mga conscientious objectors, ng mga non-maternity specialty
hospitals, at mga ospital na pagmamay-ari at pinatatakbo ng mga religious groups. Ito ay upang
malaman ng pasyente kung saan siya tutungo at upang hindi naman sila mapagkaitan ng
serbisyong inihahandog ng pamahalaan para mapangalagaan ang kanilang reproductive health.
Ayon sa Solicitor General:
74. The duty to refer, as an "opt out" clause, is a carefully balanced compromise between, on
one hand, the interests of the religious objector who is allowed to keep silent but is required to
refer and, on the other, the citizen who needs access to information and who has the right to
expect that the health care professional in front of her will act professionally. The concession
given by the State under Section 7 and 23(a)(3) is sufficient accommodation to the right to freely
exercise one's religion without unnecessarily infringing on the rights of others.
29
Ayaw magpadala ng mga petitioners. Giit nila, labag pa rin sa kanilang religious freedom ang
pag-aatas ng duty to refer. Sang-ayon dito ang Decision at nagsaad ito na ang opt-out clause ay
isang "false compromise because it makes pro-life health providers complicit in the performance
of an act that they find morally repugnant or offensive. "
30
Ayon sa paninindigang ito, ang pagturo sa pasyente sa ibang pinakamalapit na health facility o
health care service provider na makatutulong sa kanila ay kahalintulad na kaagad ng
contraception, ang bagay na kanilang itinuturing na likas na masama. Totoo naman na maaaring
puntahan nga ng pasyente ang itinurong health facility o health care service provider at doon ay
makakuha ito ng serbisyo ukol sa modern family planning methods na makasalanan sa paningin
ng conscientious objector. Nguni't bunga lamang ng pagsasanib ng napakaraming posibilidad
ang resultang ito.
Maaaring magpasiya ang pasyente na hindi na lang kumunsulta, o kaya ay pumunta ito sa
health facility o health care service provider na iba sa itinuro sa kanya ng conscientious objector.
Maaari ding magpayo ang naiturong health facility o health care service provider na hindi hiyang
o nararapat sa pasyente ang modern family planning methods dahil sa kundisyon ng kanyang
pangangatawan. Maaaring pagkatapos ng lahat ng pagpapayo, pagpapatingin at paghahanda
ukol sa gagawing modern family planning method o procedure ay magpasiya ang pasyente na
huwag na lang ituloy ang lahat ng ito.
Isa lamang sa maraming posibilidad ang kinatatakutang resulta ng mga petitioners, at

gayunpaman, hindi huling hakbang na maghahatid sa pasyente tungo sa contraception ang
pagtuturo sa ibang health facility o health care service provider.
Ayon sa Decision, walang idinudulot na paglabag sa religious freedom ang pag-uutos sa mga
ikakasal na dumalo sa mga seminar ukol sa responsible parenthood, family planning,
breastfeeding at infant nutrition dahil hindi naman sila obligadong sumunod sa mga ituturo dito.
Hindi rin masama ang pagbibigay-daan na mabigyan ng mahalagang kaalaman tungkol sa family
planning services ang mga menor de edad na may anak o nagkaroon ng miscarriage para
matutunan nila ang mga bagay na makatutulong sa kanila upang pangalagaan ang kanilang
katawan at anak o dinadala. Kung gayon, at kahalintulad ng nasabing sitwasyon, wala rin dapat
pagtutol sa atas ng RH Law na ituro ng mga conscientious objector ang mga pasyente sa
pinakamalapit na health facility o health care service provider na makatutulong sa kanila.
Ang pagpapahalaga sa informed choice ng mga Pilipino pagdating sa usapin ng reproductive

health ang pundasyon ng RH Law. Mananatili ang pagpapasiya sa pasyente; hinihiling lamang
na huwag hadlangan ng conscientious objectors ang kanilang daan tungo sa paggawa ng
masusing pagpapasiya.
Kinikilala ng International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights na ang religious freedom ay
maaari ding mapasailalim sa mga "limitations ... prescribed by law and ... necessary to protect
public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others." Bukod
31
dito, hindi rin maikakaila na maaaring ipagbawal ng pamahalaan ang isang gawain kahit
alinsunod pa ito sa religious convictions kung ito ay labag sa "important social duties or
subversive of good order." 32
Sa kanilang pagpasok sa propesyon, tinanggap ng mga medical professionals ang mga moral
values at kaakibat na katungkulan sa mga pasyente. Isa di to ang napapanahong duty to refer
33
sa ibang health facility o health care service provider kung batid nila na dahi l sa kanilang
religious beliefs, hindi nila maaaring ihatid ang serbisyong hinihingi o kinakailangan ng
pasyente. Upang mapanatili ang ethical practice, hinihikayat ng mga pantas ang mga
34
conscientious objectors na maglingkod kalapit ang ibang medical professionals na hindi

conscientious objectors upang maayos na mapanatili ang isang referral system para masigurado
na maibibigay sa pasyente ang mga pangangailangan nitong hindi kayang tugunan ng
conscientious objector. Mahalaga ito upang masiguro na tuloy-tuloy ang serbisyong
35
pangkalusugan para sa mga taong nangangailangan nito.
Dahil dito, hindi maituturing na dagdag pasanin ng medical professionals ang duty to refer sa
ilalim ng RH Law. Likas na ito sa kanilang propesyon. Sa katunayan, nasa kapangyarihan ng
Kongreso ang maglatag ng mga alituntunin at dagdag na pasanin sa propesyon ng medisina
ayon sa police power nito upang isulong ang public health. At, inuunawa ng RH Law na dahil sa
religious convictions, hindi maaaring isagawa ng isang medical professional ang serbisyo ukol sa
modern family planning methods kahit hinihingi pa ng pasyente. Dahil dito, pinapayagan sila na
tumanggi ng pasyente at papuntahin ito sa ibang medical professional na makatutulong di to.
Kung tutuusin, maituturing na paglabag sa sinumpaang tungkulin ng mga medical professionals

ang pagtangging magturo ng pasyente sa ibang medical professional. Maaari itong maging
basehan ng disciplinary action laban sa kanila. Ayon sa isang lathalain, dahil ang mga medical
professionals ay napapaloob sa isang monopoly sa paghahatid ng serbisyong pangkalusugan,
ang ilan sa kanila na mas pinahahalagahan ang kanilang religious interests nang walang
pakundangan sa kapakanan ng kanilang pasyente ay nababalot sa isang matinding conflict of
interest. Kilala ang dakilang propesyong ito sa pagpapakasakit para sa ikabubuti ng ibang
36
tao, kaya naman ang pagtanggi kahit sa pagtuturo na lamang sa ibang health facility o health
37
care service provider ay maituturing na pagkait ng serbisyong pangkalusugan sa mga pasyente.
Upang mabigyan ng katumbas na proteksyon ang karapatan ng mga pasyente sa tuloy-tuloy na

serbisyong pangkalusugan, minabuti ng Kongreso na patawan ng parusa ang mga conscientious
objectors na tatangging tuparin man lamang ang duty to refer. lpinataw ang parusa upang
masiguro na hindi naman magagamit ng conscientious medical professionals ang exemption na
ipinagkaloob sa kanila upang ipataw ang kanilang religious beliefs sa kanilang mga pasyente.
Pinaiiral ito ng prinsipyong ang karapatan ng malayang pagsamba at pagpapahayag ng relihiyon
ay nangangahulugan na walang karapatan ang sinuman na mang-api sa paniniwalang hindi
ayon sa kanila.
Sa puntong ito, nais kong linawin na ipinagbabawal ng Section 23(a)(l) ang pagkakait ng
mahalagang kaalaman, pagbabawal sa pagpapalaganap nito o sadyaang pagbibigay ng maling
impormasyon kaugnay ng mga programa at serbisyo ukol sa reproductive health, karapatan ng
lahat sa informed choice at ang paggarantiya ng pamahalaan sa ligtas, mabisa, abot-kaya, de-
kalidad, naaayon sa batas at hindi abortifacient na family planning methods.
Sa kabilang banda, ipinagbabawal naman ng Section 23(a)(2) ang pagtangging magsagawa ng

ligtas at naaayon sa batas na reproductive health procedures dahil lamang sa ang taong
naghahangad nito, bagama't nasa hustong edad, ay hindi makapagpakita ng pahintulot ng
kanyang asawa o magulang. Hindi nito ipinagbabawal ang pagtangging magsagawa ng
reproductive health procedures dahil sa kanilang religious beliefs.
Ang mga health care service providers na tinutukoy sa Section 23(a)(l) at Section 23(a)(2) ay
hindi ang mga conscientious objectors. Kung conscientious objector ang isang health care
service provider, maaari na siyang tumanggi sa unang pagkakataon pa lamang, at wala na
siyang oportunidad para magbigay ng maling impormasyon kaugnay ng mga programa at
serbisyo ukol sa reproductive health dahil tinanggihan na niya ang pasyente. Gayundin, wala
nang oportunidad ang mga conscientious objectors na tumangging magsagawa ng ligtas at
naaayon sa batas na reproductive health procedures sa isang may-asawa o menor de edad
dahil sa kakulangan ng pahintulot ng asawa o magulang. Paglapit pa lamang ng pasyente sa
kanya na humihingi ng serbisyo ukol sa reproductive health, maaari na siyang tumanggi, at ang
pagtangging ito ay dahil sa kanyang religious beliefs, hindi dahil sa kawalan ng pahintulot.
Kung conscientious objector ang health care service provider, mapapasailalim siya sa Section
23(a)(3) na nagsasabing isasaalang-alang at irerespeto ang kanilang ethical o religious beliefs.
Ayon dito, bagama't maaaring parusahan ang iba kung sila ay tatangging magsagawa ng de-
kalidad na health care services o tatangging magbigay ng mahalagang kaalaman ukol dito,
pinapayagan ang mga conscientious objector na tumanggi kung wala sa emergency condition o
hindi serious case ang pasyente. Hindi parurusahan ng batas ang mga conscientious objector na
tumanggi, at kabilang ito sa exemption na inilatag ng RH Law para sa kanila.
Sa gayon, malinaw ang legislative intent ng Kongreso na hindi mapapasailalim ang mga
conscientious objector sa Section 23(a)(l) at Section 23(a)(2). Maaari nang tumanggi sa
pasyenteng wala sa emergency condition o hindi serious case sa unang pagkakataon pa lamang
ang sinumang health care service provider, pribado o pampubliko, na tumututol sa paghahatid at
pagsasagawa ng reproductive health services at procedures at pagbibigay ng mahalagang
kaalaman ukol dito dahil sa kanilang religious beliefs.
Nguni't, kalakip ng karapatan ng pagtanggi ng mga conscientious objector ang katungkulang

ituro ang mga pasyenteng wala sa emergency condition o hindi serious case sa ibang
pinakamalapit na health facility kung saan nila makukuha ang serbisyo at mahalagang kaalaman
ukol sa reproductive health na ninanais nila.
FDA Certification sa Section 9
Ayon sa Decision, "empty as it is absurd" ang huling pangungusap sa unang talata ng Section
38
9 ng RH Law na nag-uutos na makukuha lamang sa kondisyong hindi gagamitin bilang

39
abortifacient ang mga produkto na kasama o isasama sa essential drugs list (EDL). Ayon sa
kanila, hindi naman maaaring naroroon ang FDA upang maglabas ng certification ukol dito sa
tuwing ipamamahagi ang contraceptive. Sa halip, iminungkahi na baguhin ang pagkakasulat ng
pangungusap upang linawin na walang kahit anong abortifacient na isasama o maisasama sa
EDL.
Noong oral arguments, nilinaw ni A ssociate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo ang bagay na ito sa
Solicitor General, partikular na sa paraan kung paano masisiguro ng pamahalaan na hindi
gagamitin bilang abortifacient ang mga produkto sa EDL:
JUSTICE DEL CASTILLO:
Just one question, Counsel. The RH Law allows the availability of these contraceptives provided
they will not be used as an abortifacient.
SOL. GEN. JARDELEZA:
Yes, Your Honor.

So there's a possibility that these contraceptives, these drugs and devices may be used as an
abortifacient?
No, Your Honor, there will be [sic] not be a possibility. After you have the FDA certifying that ...
(interrupted)
Yes, but why does the law still [say] that, " ... provided that they will not be used as an
abortifacient [?]"
The context of that, Your Honor, is that, there are certain drugs which are abortifacients.
So how then can . .. how can a government make sure that these drugs will not be used as an
abortifacient?
To the best of my understanding, Your Honor, for example, a woman who is pregnant and then
the doctor says there is no more fetal heartbeat then the unborn or the fe tus is dead. The doctor
will have to induce abortion. Sometimes you do this by curettage, which I think, incision. But
many times there are drugs that are abortifacient; they are life-saving because then you bring the
woman to a health center, the baby is dead, you induce abortion, the doctors can correct me,
once that drug, I think, is called oxytoxin. So any hospital has oxytoxin in its pharmacy because
you need that as a life-saving drug. That is the context of that provision which says, " ... should
not be used as an abortifacient." Meaning, just like restricted drugs, oxytoxin will only be used in
a hospital to be used for therapeutic abortion, that I believe, Your Honor, is the meaning of that, "
... cannot be used as an abortifacient." Meaning, the National Drug Formulary contains oxytoxin,
I believe, today but that is to be used under certain very very restrictive conditions, that's the
meaning of " ... should not be used as an abortifacient." Meaning, a woman who is healthy in the
pregnancy cannot go to a doctor and the doctor will say, "You want an abortion, I'll give you
oxytoxin", that cannot be done, Your Honor; that's my understanding.
So when there's only a choice between the life of the mother and the life of the child.
Yes, that's my understanding. The best example is the, the monitor shows there is no more fetal
heartbeat. If you don't induce abortion, the mother will die.
Thank you, counsel. (Emphases supplied)

40
Sa gayon, maaaring isama ng FDA ang ilang maaaring gamiting abortifacients, tulad ng oxytoxin,
sa National Drug Formulary dahil ang mga ito ay ginagamit upang mailabas ang patay na
sanggol mula sa sinapupunan ng ina. Ginagawa ito upang mailigtas ang buhay ng ina na
maaaring mameligro bunga ng impeksiyon kung hahayaang nasa loob ang patay na sanggol.
Nagpapahiwatig lamang ang huling pangungusap sa unang talata ng Section 9 ng legislative
intent na kahit may mga abortifacients na isasama sa EDL, ipinagbabawal na gamitin ang mga
ito bilang abortifacient, o paraan upang mapatay ang malusog na sanggol sa sinapupunan.
Pahintulot ng Asawa
Mayroong pangunahing karapatan, at pangangailangan, ang lahat ng tao sa sariling

pagpapasiya. Biniyayaan ng kaisipan ang lahat ng tao upang malayang maipahayag ang
kanyang saloobin, makabuo ng sariling pananaw at makapagpasiya para sa kanyang
kinabukasan.
Sa ilalim ng ating Saligang Batas, pinangangalagaan ng due process clause ang garantiya ng
kalayaan sa bawat Pilipino. Nagsasabi ito na walang sinuman ang maaaring bawian ng buhay,
kalayaan at ari-arian nang hindi ayon sa paraang inilatag sa batas. Panangga ng mga
mamamayan ang due process clause sa hindi makatuwirang pamamalakad at pagsamsam ng
pamahalaan. Gayunpaman, "[t]he Due Process Clause guarantees more than fair process, and
the 'liberty' it protects includes more than the absence of physical restraint." Nagtatakda ang
41
due process clause ng limitasyon sa kapangyarihan ng pamahalaan pagdating sa mga

karapatan ng mamamayan. Bukod sa mga karapatang ginagarantiya ng Bill of Rights, saklaw
42
ng due process clause ang lahat ng bahagi ng buhay ng tao. Kabilang na rito ang karapatan ng
sariling pagpapasiya.
May nakapagsabi na "[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common
law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from
all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law. " Sa
43
katunayan, "[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what
shall be done with his own body." 44
Ayon sa Decision, isang pribadong paksa na dapat talakayin ng mag-asawa ang desisyon sa
usapin ng reproductive health, at hindi maaaring mapunta lamang sa asawang sasailalim dito
ang pagpapasiya. Hinay-hinay tayo. Hindi naman ipinagbabawal ng RH Law ang pagsanib ng
pasiya ng mag-asawa kaya't hindi dapat sabihin na nakapaninira ng pagsasamahan ng mag-
asawa ang karapatan ng may-katawan na magpasiya ukol sa reproductive health. Nguni't sa
panahon ng di-pagkakasundo ng pasiya, walang ibang makatuwirang sitwasyon kundi kilalanin
ang karapatan ng taong may-katawan na magpasiya. Hindi nawawalan ng karapatan ang tao
45
dahil lamang sa pag-aasawa. Hangga't hindi ito labag sa batas, may kalayaan ang bawat isa na
gawin ang kanyang nais at magpasiya ayon sa makabubuti para sa kanyang sarili. Hindi
isinusuko sa asawa sa oras ng kasal ang pagpapasiya ukol sa sariling katawan. Kung hindi,
bubuwagin nito ang prinsipyo sa likod ng batas laban sa violence against women.
Sa ilalim ng RH Law, ihahandog sa lahat ang mahalagang impormasyon ukol sa modern family
planning methods. Ipinapalagay din na paglilimian ng asawang sasailalim sa procedure ang mga
magiging epekto nito sa kanya at sa kanyang mahal sa buhay. Kung magdesisyon siya na
sumailalim sa napiling reproductive health procedure, hindi ito dapat hadlangan ng sinuman.
Bahagi pa rin ito ng informed consent na pundasyon ng RH Law.
Walang anumang nakasulat sa RH Law na nag-aalis sa mag-asawa ng kanilang karapatang

bumuo ng pamilya. Sa katunayan, tinitiyak nito na ang mga maralita na nagnanais magkaroon
ng anak ay makikinabang sa mga payo, kagamitan at nararapat na procedures para matulungan
silang maglihi at maparami ang mga anak. Walang anumang nakasulat sa batas na
nagpapahintulot sa pamahalaan na manghimasok sa pagpapasiya "[that] belongs exclusively to,
and {is] shared by, both spouses as one cohesive unit as they chart their own destiny." Walang
46
anumang nakasulat sa RH Law na humahadlang sa pagsali ng asawa sa pagtimbang ng mga

pagpipiliang modern family planning methods, at pagpapasiya kung ano ang pinakamabuti para
sa kanyang asawa. Kung may epekto man ang RH Law, ito ay ang pagpapatibay ng
makatotohanang sanggunian sa pagitan ng mag-asawang pantay na magpapasiya ukol sa isang
bagay na magtatakda ng kanilang kinabukasan.
Sa pamamagitan ng pagpapahalaga sa pangunahing pasiya ng asawang sasailalim sa

reproductive health procedure, pinaiigting lamang ng RH Law ang pangangalaga sa
pangunahing karapatan ng bawat tao na magpasiya ukol sa kanyang sariling katawan. Sa
pamamagitan din nito, naglalatag ang RH Law ng proteksiyon para sa mga medical
professionals laban sa mga asunto at panliligalig bunga ng pagkuwestiyon o paghamon kung
bakit nila isinagawa ang reproductive health procedure sa kabila ng kawalan ng pahintulot ng
asawa.
Pahintulot ng Magulang
Itinuturing din ng Decision na "[e]qually deplorable" ang bahagi ng RH Law na nagbibigay-daan

47
sa mga menor de edad na may anak o nagkaroon ng miscarriage na makinabang sa modern

family planning methods kahit walang pahintulot ang kanilang mga magulang. Ayon dito,
pinuputol ng Section 7 ang parental authority sa mga menor de edad "just because there is a
need to tame population growth."48
Hindi angkop na manghimasok ang Korte Suprema sa katanungan kung ang RH Law ay isang
population control measure sapagka't ang Kongreso lamang ang makasasagot sa tanong kung
ano ang nag-udyok dito sa pagbuo ng nasabing batas. Ang tanging dapat pagtuunan ng pansin
ng Korte Suprema ay kung ang batas at ang mga nilalaman nito ay alinsunod sa itinatakda ng
Saligang Batas. Masasabi nating ispekulasyon lamang ang paghusga sa hangarin ng Kongreso
na handa itong sirain ang parental authority upang isulong lamang ang population control.
Pasintabi po, hindi maaaring ganito ang tono ng Korte Suprema patungo sa Kongreso.
Kinikilala ng RH Law na hindi lamang edad ng isang tao ang tanging palatandaan upang
mahandugan ng fa mily planning services. Batid nito ang pangkasalukuyang sitwasyon ng
paglaganap ng maagang pagkamulat at pagsubok ng mga kabataan sa kanilang sekswalidad.
Nangangailangan ding mabigyan ng kaalaman, at kung kinakailangan, mahandugan ng modern
family planning services kung ito ay kanilang gugustuhin, ang mga menor de edad na nanganak
o nagkaroon ng miscarriage . Bilang isang hakbang sa pangangalaga ng pangkalahatang
kalusugan, ang pagbibigay ng modern fam ily planning services sa mga menor de edad na ito ay
daan upang maunawaan nila ang mga kahihinatnan at kaukulang pananagutan ng pagiging
isang magulang, gayong nabuntis na sila, pati na ang pagbuo ng pamilya.
Hindi akma ang antas ng pagpapahalaga sa parental authority ng Decision, na sa pangamba ng

D ecision ay mawawala dahil lamang sa pakinabang ng menor de edad sa family planning
services nang walang pahintulot ng kanilang magulang.
"[P]arental authority and responsibility include the caring for and rearing of unemancipated
children for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and
physical character and well-being." Pinag-uukulan ng ilang karapatan at tungkulin ang mga
49
magulang kaugnay sa kanilang mga anak na wala pa sa tamang gulang. Maaaring talikuran o
50
ilipat ang parental authority at responsibility ayon lamang sa mga halimbawang nakasaad sa
batas. Mabibinbin o mapuputol ito ayon lamang sa mga sitwasyong nakasaad sa Family Code.
51 52
Walang anumang nakasulat sa RH Law na nagsasabing napuputol ang parental authority kapag
ang menor de edad ay may anak na o nagkaroon ng miscarriage. Hindi nito dinadagdagan ang
mga halimbawang nakasaad sa Family Code ukol sa pagkawala ng parental authority. Walang
anumang nakasulat sa batas na nagbibigay-kapangyarihan sa pamahalaan upang humalili sa
ina at ama sa pagdamay at pagtugon sa mga pangangailangan ng kanilang mga menor de edad.
Kailanma'y hindi kaya at hindi maaaring gawin ito ng pamahalaan, hindi lamang dahil hindi ito
praktikal nguni 't dahil walang makatutumbas sa inaasahang pagmamahal ng magulang. Sa
ganitong pagsubok sa buhay ng isang menor de edad, higit lalo niyang kailangan ang "comfort,
care, advice and guidance from her own parents." Sa ilalim ng RH Law, hindi pinagbabawalan
53
ang mga menor de edad na may anak o nagkaroon ng miscarriage na humingi ng payo sa
kanilang magulang, at hindi pinagbabawalan ang mga magulang na magbigay nito. Ipinapalagay
na hangad lamang ng mga magulang ang makabubuti para sa kanilang anak.
Sa pagsasabi na hindi kailangan ang parental consent ng mga menor de edad na may anak o
nagkaroon ng miscarriage bago mabigyan ang mga ito ng modern family planning services,
pinanghihimasukan ng pamahalaan ang ugnayan sa pagitan ng menor de edad at ang nilapitan
nitong medical health professional. Kadalasan, pinagkakaitan ng reproductive health services ng
mga pribado at pampublikong health professionals ang mga menor de edad dahil sa kai sipang
masyado pa silang mga bata para magkaroon ng kaalaman sa mga bagay ukol sa kanilang
sekswalidad. Ang paghingi ng parental consent ang madalas na dahilan upang tanggihan ang
ganitong pagsangguni ng mga kabataan. Minsan nga, hinihiya pa ang mga ito. Nguni't
kailangang tandaan na nagdalang-tao na ang mga menor de edad na ito, at hindi na masasabing
wala silang muwang pagdating sa mga bagay na sekswal.
Bahagi ng RH Law ang paninindigan ng pamahalaan na ang mga kabataan ay active rights
holders, at katungkulan ng pamahalaan na siguraduhin na matatamasa nila ang kanilang mga
karapatan nang walang diskriminasyon. Upang mapangalagaan ang karapatan ng mga
54
kabataan na magkaroon ng mahalagang kaalaman ukol sa kanilang kalusugan, ipinag-uutos ng

RH Law ang pagtuturo ng age- and development-appropriate reproductive health education sa 55
lahat ng pribado at pampublikong paaralan.
Naaayong linawin na sakop ng kautusang magturo ng reproductive health education sa kanilang

mga mag-aaral ang mga pribadong paaralan. Opsyonal ang paggamit ng curriculum na bubuuin
ng Department of Education. Ang nasabing curriculum ay gagamitin ng mga pampublikong
paaralan at maaaring gamitin ng mga pribadong paaralan.
Ito ang paglilinaw ni Representative Edcel C. Lagman kaugnay sa giit ng petitioners na

lumalabag sa equal protection clause ng Saligang Batas ang RH Law dahil ginagawa nitong
mandatory sa pampublikong paaralan at opsyonal sa pribadong paaralan ang reproductive
health education . Ayon sa kanya:
143. xx x [A]ge and development appropriate RH education is mandatory in formal and

non-formal educational system without distinction whether they are public or private,
where adolescents are enrolled. Clearly, private schools are not exempt from affording
their adolescent pupils/students [with] proper and appropriate RH education.
144. The difference only pertains to the RH curriculum which shall be formulated by
DepEd which "shall be used by public achools and may be adopted by private schools."
145. If the DepEd curriculum is not adopted by private schools, they can form ulate their
own curriculum subject to the review and approval of the DepEd which has jurisdiction
over private schools. Private schools are accorded equal flexibility in adopting their own
curriculum after requisite consultation as provided m the RH Law. (Emphases supplied)
56
Bukod sa pagbibigay sa kanila ng age- and development-appropriate reproductive health

education, ginagawaran din ng dagdag na karapatan ang mga menor de edad na may anak o
nagkaroon ng miscarriage na makinabang sa mga reproductive health services na inihahandog
ng pamahalaan.
Kaagad na mauunawaan ang katuwiran kung bakit may dagdag na karapatan na ibinibigay sa
mga menor de edad na may anak o nagkaroon ng miscarriage. Kung ang hindi pa nagbubuntis
ay may karapatan sa akmang kaalaman, higit na may karapatan ang nagbuntis na. Naglahad
ang Committee on the Rights of the Child na "[a}dolescent girls should have access to
information on the harm that early marriage and early pregnancy can cause, and those who
become pregnant should have access to health services that are sensitive to their rights and
particular needs." Batay sa karapatan ng mga kabataan na malayang maihayag ang kanilang
57
pananaw sa mga bagay na may kinalaman sa kanila, nararapat na isaalang-alang ang kanilang
saloobin. Kung mababatid na may tamang kamalayan at nasa hustong pag-iisip ang menor de
58
edad na may anak o nagkaroon ng miscarriage, sapat na na ibigay nila ang kanilang informed
consent. 59
Public officers at skilled health professionals
Hindi ako sang-ayon sa Decision na walang totoong pagkakaiba sa pagitan ng pribado at

pampublikong health officers. Naniniwala ako na napakalaki ng pagkakaiba sa pagitan nila at
nagmumula ito sa kadahilanang inaasahan ang mga pampublikong health officers bilang
frontline sa paghahatid ng serbisyong pangkalusugan. Bilang public officers, may pananagutan
60
sila sa taong-bayan sa lahat ng oras, at nararapat na maglingkod sila nang may dangal,
katapatan, kahusayan, ganap-taglay ang pagiging makabayan at makatarungan, at payak ang
pamumuhay. Maaari din nating banggitin na ang sambayanan ang nagpapasahod sa kanila.
61
Sa pamamagitan ng paglilingkod ng mga pampublikong health officers naisasakatuparan ng

pamahalaan ang tungkulin nito na pangalagaan ang kalusugan ng mga mamamayan, lalo na
ang mga maralitang bahagya na ngang makabili ng sapat na pagkain sa araw-araw.
Sa puntong ito, binibigyang-diin na maaaring maging conscientious objectors ang mga

pampublikong health officers. Malinaw ito sa RH Law mismo na naglatag ng karapatan sa
conscientious obj ection nang walang pasubali sa pagitan ng pribado at pampublikong health
professionals. Pinagtitibay ito ng IRR ng RH Law na nagsasabing maaring maging conscientious
objectors ang mga pampublikong skilled health professionals sa ilalim ng bahaging ito:
SECTION 5.24. Public Skilled Health Professional as a Conscientious Objector. - In order to

legally refuse to deliver reproductive health care services or information as a conscientious
objector, a public skilled health professional shall comply with the following requirements:
a) The skilled health professional shall explain to the client the limited range of services
he/she can provide;
b) Extraordinary diligence shall be exerted to refer the client seeking care to another
skilled health professional or volunteer willing and capable of delivering the desired
reproductive health care service within the same facility;
c) If within the same health facility, there is no other skilled health professional or
volunteer willing and capable of delivering the desired reproductive health care service,
the conscientious objector shall refer the client to another specific health facil ity or
provider that is conveniently accessible in consideration of the client's travel arrangement
s and financial capacity;
d) Written documentation of compliance with the preceding requirements; and
e) Other requirements as determined by the DOH.
In the event where the public skilled health professional cannot comply wit h all of the above
requirements, he or she shall deliver the client's desired reproductive health care service or
information without further delay. (Emphasis supplied)
Sa gayon, hindi karapat-dapat na sabihing lumalabag sa equal protection clause ng ating

Saligang Batas ang RH Law at IRR nito. Kaugnay nito, tinutuligsa ang sumusunod na bahagi ng
Section 5 .24 ng IRR ng RH Law:
Provided, That skilled health professionals such as provincial, city, or municipal health officers,
chiefs of hospital, head nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office
are specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these
Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors. (Emphasis suppl ied)
Itinatadhana nito na hindi maaaring maging conscientious objectors ang mga pampublikong
skilled health professionals na mismong inatasang magsagawa ng mga kautusan at programa sa
Halim ng RH Law at IRR nito. Malinaw ang dahilan nito. Walang makabuluhang
pagsasakatuparan ng RH Law, at pangangalaga sa reproductive health ng sambayanan, kung
hahayaan ang mga provincial, city, o municipal health officers, chiefs of hospital, head nurses at
supervising midwives - iyong mga itinuturing na nasa front line ng paghahatid ng serbisyong
pangkalusugan - na tumangging magbigay ng reproductive health care services at mahalagang
kaalaman ukol dito.
Makikitang hindi discriminatory ang nasabing probisyon kapag inilapat ang test of
reasonableness. Sakop lamang nito ang mga public skilled health professionals na inatasang
62
isagawa ang mga kautusan at programa sa ilalim ng RH Law at IRR nito. Makikita na iyon
lamang mga may management prerogative at kapangyarihang mag-impluwensiya ng
pamamalakad ng kanilang institusyon ang hindi maaaring tumangging maghatid ng reproductive
health care services at mahalagang kaalaman ukol dito. Malinaw ang pagkakaiba nila sa ibang
pampublikong health professionals na maaaring maging conscientious objectors.
Malinaw din na may kaugnayan sa layunin ng RH Law ang pagbubukod sa mga skilled health
professionals gaya ng provincial, city, o municipal health officers, chiefs of hospital, head nurses
at supervising midwives . Walang sinuman ang makapagsasabi na ito ay "palpably arbitrary or
capricious" gayong ang sakop nito ay iyon lamang mga itinuturing na pinuno ng mga
63
pampublikong institusyon. Walang dahilan upang ipangamba na ipatutupad lamang ang

pagbubukod na ito sa umiiral na kalagayan o kaya hindi ito ipatutupad sa lahat ng provincial, city,
o municipal health officers, chiefs of hospital, head nurses at supervising midwives .
Bilang mga kawani ng pamahalaan, nalalagay sa isang pambihirang katayuan ang mga public
officers para isakatuparan ang mga nilalayon ng pamahalaan. Dahil dito, malaki ang nakaatang
na responsibilidad sa kanila upang ilunsad ang mga balakin ng pamahalaan. Pagdating sa
reproductive health programs, magiging kahangalan para sa pamahalaan kung hahayaan nito na
sariling mga kawani ang humadlang sa pamamagitan ng paglalatag ng mga salungat na
patakaran gamit ang makinarya ng pamahalaan. Samakatuwid, hindi dapat payagang tumalikod
sa tungkulin ang isang public officer na mismong inatasang isagawa ang mga kautusan at
programa sa ilalim ng RH Law at IRR nito, o biguin nito ang paglulunsad ng isang reproductive
health program.
PhilHealth Accreditation
Sa ilalim ng Section 17 ng RH Law, hinihikayat ang mga pribadong reproductive health care
service providers, gaya ng gynecologists at obstetricians, na magbigay ng libreng reproductive
health care services katumbas ng 48 oras bawat taon sa mga maralitang pasyente. Itinatakda
din ng Section 17 na kailangang magbigay ng nasabing serbisyo katumbas ng 48 oras ang mga
medical professionals upang magkaroon sila ng PhilHealth accreditation. Ayon sa Decision,
nararapat na bigyan din ng exemption ang mga conscientious objectors sa panuntunang ito dahil
sa kanilang religious beliefs na nagbabawal sa kanilang magbigay ng serbisyo ukol sa
reproductive health.
Ayon sa petitioners, tinututulan nila ang pagpapalaganap ng contraceptives , na itinuturing nilang

likas na masama. Hindi nila tinututulan ang pagpapahalaga sa reproductive health ng mga
mamamayan, partikular na ang mga maralita. Tinutukoy sa Section 17 ang pagbibigay ng libreng
reproductive health care services.
Batay sa RH Law, tumutukoy ang reproductive health care sa paghahatid ng lahat ng serbisyo,
kagamitan, pamamaraan at fac ilities na makatutulong sa ikabubuti ng reproductive health sa
pamamagitan ng pagtugon sa mga sakit na kaugnay nito. 64
Kasama dito ang pagpapanatili ng sexual health upang mapabuti ang antas ng buhay at
personal relations ng mga mamamayan. Saklaw ng reproductive health care ang mga
sumusunod na bahagi nito:
1) Family planning information and services which shall include as a first priority mak ing
wo men of reproductive age full y aware of their respective cycles to make them aware of
when fertilization is highly probable, as well as highly improbable;
2) Maternal, infant and child health and nutrition, including breastfeeding;
3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion complications;
4) Adolescent and youth reproductive health guidance and counseling;
5) Prevention, treatment and management of reproductive tract infections (RTis), HIV

and AIDS and other sexuall y transmittable infections (STis);
6) Elimination of violence against women and children and other forms of sexual and
gender-based violence;
7) Education and counseling on sexuality and reproductive health;
8) Treatment of breast and reproductive tract cancers and other gynecological conditions
and disorders;
9) Male responsibility and involvement and men's reproductive health;
10) Prevention, treatment and management of infertility and sexual dysfunction;
11) Reproductive health education for the adolescents; and
12) Mental health aspect of reproductive health care. 65
Makikita sa listahang ito ang lawak ng saklaw ng reproductive health care na tinutukoy sa
Section 1 7. Masasabing isa lamang sa family planning information and services ang
contraceptives at contraception na tinututulan ng mga conscientious objectors. Mayroon pang
labing-isang bahagi ng reproductive health care na kasunod nito. Maaaring gamitin ng mga
reproductive health care service providers ang mga libreng serbisyo na mapapaloob sa
anumang bahagi ng reproductive health care upang mabuo ang 48 oras na kakailanganin nila
para sa kanilang PhilHealth accreditation . Maaari ngang ibuhos ng conscientious objector ang
lahat ng 48 oras sa pagpapalaganap ng natural family planning method. Alalahanin ng lahat na
pribilehiyo at hindi karapatan ang magkaroon ng PhilHealth accreditation kaya't tama lang na
isukli ng gynecologists at obstetricians ang 48 oras na pro bona service sa maralita upang
mapangalagaan ang kanilang reproductive health.
Kung tutuusin, reproductive health care ng mga pasyente ang pangunahing pinagtutuunan ng
pansin ng mga gynecologists at obstetricians. Kung bibigyan sila ng exemption sa Section 17
dahil conscientious objector sila, ang tanging magiging epekto nito ay hindi nila kakailanganing
magbigay ng anumang libreng serbisyo. Kung gayon, mawawalan ng saysay ang layunin ng
pamahalaan sa ilalim ng RH Law na ihatid sa mga maralitang mamamayan ang kadalubhasaan
ng mga pribadong reproductive health care service providers.
Pahuling Pasabi
Walang pinapanigan ang Korte Suprema kundi ang Saligang Batas, at pinakinggan ang lahat ng
dumulog dito sa usapin ng RH Law. Hati-hati ang opinyon pagdating sa reproductive health at
family planning. Halimbawa, bagama't may mga pagtutol ang bahagi ng Simbahang Katolika sa
reproductive health at family planning, itinuturing naman itong alinsunod sa mga aral ng Islam.
Ayon safatwah na inilabas ng Assembly of Darul-Iftah of the Philippines kaugnay sa reproductive
health at family planning, walang kasulatang napapaloob sa Qur' an na nagbabawal sa pagpigil
at pag-aagwat sa pagbubuntis at pagbabawas sa dami ng anak.
Ayon din sa kanila, hindi salungat sa konsiyensiya ang family planning. Sa katunayan,
itinataguyod ito ng Shariah. Itinakda ng Qur'an na kailangang pasusuhin ng ina ang sanggol
hanggang ito ay dalawang taong gulang, at nagbabala ang Propeta laban sa pagpapasuso ng
inang nagdadalang-tao. Malinaw dito ang layuning pag-aagwat ng pagbubuntis, kung saan
kinakailangang hindi mabuntis ang ina sa loob ng dalawang taon na ito ay nagpapasuso.
Pinapayagan ang lahat ng methods of contraception hangga't ang mga ito ay ligtas, naaayon sa
batas, aprobado ng medical professionals at alinsunod sa Islamic Shariah. Wala ring nakikitang
pagtutol ang Shariah sa pakahulugan ng International Conference on Population and
Development sa reproductive health, patina ang mga prinsipyo nito ukol sa pagpapasiya sa
66
dami at pag-aagwat ng mga anak, pagkakaroon ng kaalaman ukol sa sariling sekswalidad,

pagiging ligtas sa mga sakit kaugnay sa reproduction, at pagkakaroon ng safe at satisfying sex
life sa pagitan ng mag-asawa. Kung susukatin ang mga adhikain ng RH Law batay sa religious
freedom ng mga Muslim, na bumubuo sa limang porsiyento ng mga Filipino, wala itong hatid na
ligalig o pasanin.
Sa likod ng karapatan sa malayang pagsamba at pagpapahayag ng relihiyon ay ang pagrespeto

sa paniniwala ng iba. Hati-hati maging ang mga opinyon ng mga Katoliko pagdating sa
reproductive health at family planning. Malaking bahagi ng mga Katoliko ang sumusuporta sa RH
Law at mga layunin nito. Dahil dito, walang maituturing na iisang awtoridad pagdating sa usaping
ito kundi ang Saligang Batas. Ito ang nag-iisang batayan na isasaalang-alang upang makarating
ang Korte Suprema sa konklusyong makatarungan para sa lahat.
AKO AY SANG-AYON sa Decision na ang SECTIONS 4(A), 9, 15, 17 AT 24 NG RH LAW AY

HINDI LABAG SA SALIGANG BATAS. SANG-AYON DIN AKO na ang RH LAW AY HINDI
LABAG SA RIGHT TO LIFE, RIGHT TO HEALTH, RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE
LAW AT RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF THE LAW ng mga mamamayan. Bukod dito, SANG-A
YON AKO NA ANG RH LAW A Y HINDI LABAG SA PRINCIPLE OF NON-DELEGATION OF
LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY, ONE SUBJECT - ONE BILL RULE AT AWTONOMIYA ng mga
pamahalaang lokal at ng Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao sa ilalim ng Saligang Batas.
SANG-AYON AKO na HINDI PA NAPAPANAHON UPANG MAGPAHAYAG ANG KORTE

SUPREMA UKOL SA PAGPAPAWALANG-BISA NG SECTION 14 dahil hindi pa nakabubuo ng
curriculum ang Department of Education. Hindi pa rin napapanahon upang ipahayag kung ang
RH Law ay labag sa right to health ng mga mamamayan dahil wala pang contraceptive na
naisusumite para sa pagsusuri ng FDA sa ilalim ng RH Law.
SANG-AYON AKO na nararapat na IPAWALANG-BISA ANG SECTION 3.0l(A) AT 3.01(J) NG

IRR NG RH LAW dahil nagdadagdag ito ng salitang "primarily" sa kahulugan ng abortifacient, na
hindi naman ayon sa mga titik ng Section 4(a) ng RH Law.
GAYUNPAMAN, hindi nito maaapektuhan ang paniniwala kong ang LAHAT NG MGA
PROBISYON NG RH LAW NA TINUTULIGSA NG PETITIONERS AY PAWANG
KONSTITUSYONAL.
SAMAKA TUWID, ako ay bumoboto para ipahayag na HINDI LABAG SA SALIGANG BATAS
ang SECTIONS 7, 17, 23(A)(1), 23(A)(2)(I), 23(A)(2)(11), 23(A)(3) AT 23(B) NG RH LAW.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Punong Mahistrada
Footnotes
1
Art icle II, Section 12 .
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) Party-List

2
v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177508, 7 August 2009, 595 SCRA 477; Samson v. Aguirre, 373
Phil. 668 (1999); US v. Grant, 18 Phil. 122 (1910).
Insular lumber Co. v. Court of Tax Appeals, 192 Phil. 221 (1981); Municipality of Jose
3
Panganiban, Camarines Norte v. Shell Company, 124 Phil. 197 (1966); Yu Cong Eng v.
Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385 (1925).
4
Garcia v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 111511, 5 October 1993, 227 SCRA 100.
5
Id.
Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) v. Secretary of Budget and

6
Management, G.R. No. 164987, 24 April 2012, 670 SCRA 373; Cawaling, Jr. v.
COMELEC, 420 Phil. 524 (2001); Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr., 279 Phil. 843 (1991).
7
Cawaling v. COMELEC, supra note 7.
8
Basco v. ?ACCOR, 274 Phil. 323 (1991).
9
Section 7. Access to Family Planning. - All accredited public health facilities shall
provide a full range of modern family planning methods, which shall also include medical
consultations, supplies and necessary and reasonable procedures for poor and marg
inalized couples having infertility issues who desire to have children: Provided, That
family planning services shall likewise be extended by private health facilities to paying
patients with the option to grant free care and services to indigents, except in the case of
non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group,
but they have the option to provide such full range of modern family planning methods:
Provided, further, That these hospitals shall immediately refer the person seeking such
care and services to another health facility which is conveniently accessible: Provided,
finally, That the person is not in an emergency condition or serious case as defined in
Republic Act No. 8344.
No person shall be denied information and access to family planning services,

whether natural or artificial: Provided, That minors will not be allowed access to
modem methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or
guardian/s except when the minor is a lready a parent or has had a miscarriage.
Sa ilalim ng R.A. 8344 (An Act Penalizing the Refusal of Hospitals and Medical Clinics
10
to Administer Appropriate Initial Medical Treatment and Support in Emergency or Serious

Cases), sinasabi na:
SECTION 2. Section 2 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 702 is hereby deleted and in
place thereof, new sections 2, 3 and 4 are added, to read as follows:
"SEC. 2. For purposes of this Act, the following definition sshall govern:
"(a) 'Emergency' - a condition or state of a patient wherein based on the objective

findings of a prudent medical officer on duty for the day there is immediate
danger and where delay in initial support and treatment may cause loss of life or
cause permanent disability to the patient. (Emphases supplied)
Ayon sa IRR ng RH Law:

11
Section 5.21. Family planning services shall likewise be extended by private

health facilities to paying patients with the option to grant free care and services
to indigents, except in case of non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals
operated by a religious group, but have the option to provide such full range of
modern family planning methods; Provided further, That these hospitals shall
immediately refer the person seeking such care and services to another health
facility which is conveniently accessible; Provided finally, That the person is not in
an emergency condition or serious case as defined in RA 8344.
Section 5.22. Exemption of Private Hospitals from Providing Family Planning

Services. - Private health facilities shall provide a full range of modern family
planning methods to clients, unless the hospital is owned and operated by a
religious group, or is classified as a non-maternity specialty hospital, as part of
their annual licensing and accreditation requirements. In order to receive
exemption from providing the full range of modern family planning methods, the
health care facility must comply with the following requirements:
a) Submission of proof of hospital ownership and management by a religious

group or its status as a non-matem ity specialty hospital;
b) Submission to the DOH of an affidavit stating the modern family planning

methods that the facility refuses to provide and the reasons for its objection;
c) Posting of a notice at the entrance of the facility, in a prominent location and

using a clear/legible layout and font, enumerating the reproductive health
services the facility does not provide; and
d) Other requirements as determined by the DOH.
Within sixty (60) days from the effectivity of these Rules, the DOH shall develop
guidelines for the implementation of this provision.
Ayon sa IRR ng RH Law:

12
Section 4.06. Access to Family Planning Information and Services. - No person

shall be denied information and access to family planning services, whether
natural or artificial: Provided, That minors will not be allowed access to modern
methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or
guardian/s except when the minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage.
Section 4.07. Access of Minors to Family Planning Services. - Any minor who
consults at health care facilities shall be given age-appropriate counseling on
responsible parenthood and reproductive health. Health care facilities shall
dispense health products and perform procedures for family planning: Provided,
That in public health facilities, any of the following conditions are met:
a) The minor presents written consent from a parent or guardian; or
b) The minor has had a previous pregnancy or is a lready a parent as

proven by any one of the following circumstances, among others:
1. Written documentation from a skilled health professional;
2. Documentation through ancillary examinations such as ultrasound;
3. Written manifestation from a guardian, local social welfare and

development officer, local government official or local health volunteer; or
4. Accompanied personally by a parent, grandparent, or guardian.
Provided further, That consent shall not be required in the case of abused or
exploited minors, where the parent or the person exercising parental authority is
the respondent, accused, or convicted perpetrator as certified by the proper
prosecutorial office or the court.
Provided further, That in the absence of any parent or legal guardian, written
consent shall be obtained only for elective surgical procedures from the
grandparents, and in their default, the oldest brother or sister who is at least 18
years of age or the relative who has the actual custody of the child, or authorized
representatives of children's homes, orphanages, and similar institutions duly
accredited by the proper government agency, among others. In no case shall
consent be required in emergency or serious cases as defined in RA 8344.
Provided finally, That in case a minor satisfies any of the above conditions but is
still refused access to information and/or services, the minor may direct
complaints to the designated Reproductive Health Officer (RHO) of the facility.
Complaints shall be acted upon immediately.
Section 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are prohibited:

13
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall:
(I) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination thereof, and/or

intentionally provide in correct in formation regarding programs and services on
reproductive health including the right to informed choice and access to a full
range of legal, medically-safe, non-abortifacient and effective family planning
methods;
Section 5.24. Public Skilled Health Professional as a Conscientious Objector. - In order

14
to legally refuse to deliver reproductive health care services or information as a

conscientious objector, a public skilled health professional shall comply with the following
requirements:
a) The skilled health professional shall explain to the client the limited
range of services he/she can provide;
b) Extraordinary diligence shall be exerted to refer the client seeking care
to another skilled health professional or volunteer willing and capable of
delivering the desired reproductive health care service within the same
facility;
c) If within the same health facility, there is no other skilled health

professional or volunteer willing and capable of delivering the desired
reproductive health care service, the conscientious objector shall refer the
client to another specific health facility or provider that is conveniently
accessible in consideration of the client's travel arrangements and
financial capacity;
d) Written documentation of compliance with the preceding requirements;

and
In the event where the public skilled health professional cannot comply with all of
the above requirements, he or she shall deliver the client's desired reproductive
health care service or information without further delay.
Provided, That skilled health professionals such as provincial, city, or municipal

health officers, chiefs of hospital, head nurses, supervising midwives, among
others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty to
implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be
considered as conscientious objectors.
Within sixty (60) days from the effectivity of these rules, the DOH shall develop
guidelines for the implementation of this provision.

15
(2) Refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health procedures on

any person of legal age on the ground of lack of consent or authorization of the
following persons in the following instances:
(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: Provided, That in case of

disagreement, the decision of the one undergoing the procedure shall prevail;
and xxx.
Section 16.01. The following acts are prohibited:

16
a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall:
2. Refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health procedures on

i. Spousal consent in case of married persons: Provided, That in case of

disagreement, the decision of the one undergoing the procedure shall prevail;
and

17
(2) Refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health procedures on

xxx
(ii) Parental consent or that of the person exercising parental authority in the case
of abused minors, where the parent or the person exercising parental authority is
the respondent, accused or convicted perpetrator as certified by the proper
prosecutorial office of the court. In the case of minors, the written consent of
parents or legal guardian or, in their absence, persons exercising parental
authority or next-of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical procedures and
in no case shall consent be required in emergency or serious cases as defined in
Republic Act No. 8344; and x x x.

18
(3) Refuse to extend quality health care services and information on account of
the person's marital status, gender, age, religious convictions, personal
circumstances, or nature of work: Provided, That the conscientious objection of a
health care service provider based on his/her ethical or religious beliefs shall be
respected; however, the conscientious objector shall immediately refer the
person seeking such care and services to another health care service provider
within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible: Provided, further,
That the person is not in an emergency condition or serious case as defined in
Republic Act No. 8344, which penalizes the refusal of hospitals and medical
clinics to administer appropriate initial medical treatment and support in
emergency and serious cases.
Section 23 . Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are prohibited:

19
(b) Any public officer, elected or appointed, specifically charged with the duty to
implement the provisions hereof, who, personally or through a subordinate,
prohibits or restricts the delivery of legal and medically-safe reproductive health
care services, including family planning; or forces, coerces or induces any person
to use such services; or refuses to allocate, approve or release any budget for
reproductive health care services, or to support reproductive health programs; or
shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health
program as mandated by this Act;
Section 17. Pro Bono Services for Indigent Women. - Private and nongovernment
20
reproductive health care service providers including, but not limited to, gynecologists and
obstetricians, are encouraged to provide at least forty-eight (48) hours annually of
reproductive health services, ranging from providing information and education to
rendering medical services, free of charge to indigent and low-income patients as
identified through the NHTS-PR and other government measures of identifying
marginalization, especially to pregnant adolescents. The forty-eight (48) hours annual pro
bono services shall be included as a prerequisite in the accreditation under the
PhilHealth.
Section 6.11. Pro Bono Services for Indigent Women. - Private and nongovernment
21
reproductive healthcare service providers including, but not limited to, gynecologists and
obstetricians, are encouraged to provide at least forty-eight (48) hours annually of
reproductive health services, ranging from providing information and education to
rendering medical services, free of charge to indigent and low-income patients as
identified through the NHTS-PR and other government measures of identifying
marginalization, especially to pregnant adolescents. The forty-eight (48) hours annual pro
bono services shall be included as a prerequisite in the accreditation under the
PhilHealth.
Section 6.12. Affidavit Attesting to Pro Bono Service. - For purposes of the above
provision, the health care providers involved in the provision of reproductive
health care shall subm it as part of requirements for PhilHealth accreditation a
duly notarized affidavit attested to by two witnesses of legal age, following the
format to be prescribed by PhilHealth, stating the circumstances by which forty-
eight (48) hours of pro bono services per year have been rendered. The same
shall be submitted to PhilHealth along with the other requirements for
accreditation.
Section 6.13. Specification of Pro Bono Services. - Reproductive health care that
may be provided pro bono shall be according to the definition of reproductive
health care in Section 3.01 (ss) of these Rules.
Services for which PhilHealth reimbursement is being or shall be applied for by

the health care provider shall not be counted as part of the forty-eight (48)-hour
requirement for pro bono services.
Section 3.01. For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined as follows:
22
a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces abortion or the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA). (Emphasis supplied)
Section 3.01. For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined as follows:
23
j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective, and scientifically proven

modern family planning method, device, or health product, whether natural or
artificial, that prevents pregnancy but does not primarily destroy a fertilized ovum
or prevent a fertilized ovum from being implanted in the mother's womb in doses
of its approved indication as determined by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA). (Emphasis supplied)
Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be
24
defined as follows:
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the
FDA.
25
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. lt shall equally protect the
life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary
right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
455 Phil. 411 (2003).
26
Id. at 577-578.
27
Id. at 530.
28
Memorandum of the Office of the Solicitor General, p. 25.

29
Decision.
30
Article 18(3).
31
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).

32
The Limits of Conscientious Refusal in Reproductive Medicine, The American College

33
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Committee on Ethics Opinion, Number 385,

November 2007, Reaffirmed 2013.
Id.
34
Id.
35
Unethical Protection of Conscience: Defending the Powerful against the Weak, Bernard
36
M. Dickens, PhD, LLD, American Medical Association Journal of Ethics, September

2009, Volume 11, Number 9: 725-729.
Id.
37
Decision.
38
Section 9. The Philippine National Drug Formulary System and Family Planning
39
Supplies. - The National Drug Formulary shall include hormonal contraceptives,

intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective
family planning products and supplies. The Philippine National Drug Formulary System
(PNDFS) shall be observed in selecting drugs including family planning supplies that will
be included or removed from the Essential Drugs List (EDL) in accordance with existing
practice and in consultation with reputable medical associations in the Philippines. For
the purpose of this Act, any product or supply included or to be included in the EDL must
have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on the
condition that it is not to be used as an abortifacient. (Emphasis supplied)
TSN, 6 August 2013, pp.171-173.

40
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702.

41
Atienza v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188920, 16 February 2010, 612 SCRA 761.
42
Union Pacific Railway v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250.

43
Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 105 N.E. 92.

44
Nasusulat sa Family Code of the Philippines na:

45
Article 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall
belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision
shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which
must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing
such decision.
Naglatag ang batas ng panuntunan na sakaling hindi magkasundo ang mag-

asawa sa pamamahala at pagtamasa sa kanilang ari-arian, mananaig ang pasiya
ng asawang lalaki. Maihahalintulad dito ang probisyon ng RH Law na
nagpapahalaga sa saril ing pagpapasiya ng taong may katawan ukol sa
resproductive health. Nagbibigay lamang ang batas ng kalutasan sa panahong
hindi magkasundo ang mag-asawa.
Decision.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Article 209.

49
Id., Article 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with
50
respect to their unemancipated children or wards the following rights and duties:
1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right
precept and good example, and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with
their means;
2) To give them love and affection , advice and counsel, companionship and
understanding;
3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty,
integrity, self-discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in
civic affairs, and inspire in them compliance with the duties of citizenship;
4) To enhance, protect, preserve and maintain their physical and mental health at
all times;
5) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise

their activities, recreation and association with others, protect them from bad
company, and prevent them from acquiring habits detrimental to their health,
studies and morals;
6) To represent them in all matters affecting their interests;
7) To demand from them respect and obedience;
8) To impose discipline on them as may be required under the circumstances;

and
9) To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon parents and
guardians. (316a)
Id., Article 210.

51
Article 228. Parental authority terminates permanently:
52
1) Upon the death of the parents;
2) Upon the death of the child; or
3) Upon emancipation of the child. (327a)
Article 229. Unless subsequently revived by a final judgment, parental authority

also terminates:
1) Upon adoption of the child;
2) Upon appointment of a general guardian;
3) Upon judicial declaration of abandonment of the child in a case filed for

the purpose;
4) Upon final judgment of a competent court divesting the party

concerned of parental authority; or
5) Upon judicial declaration of absence or incapacity of the person

exercising parental authority. (327a)
Article 230. Parental authority is suspended upon conviction of the parent or the
person exercising the same of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil
interdiction. The authority is automatically reinstated upon service of the penalty
or upon pardon or amnesty of the offender. (330a)
Article 231. The court in an action filed for the purpose or in a related case may
also suspend parental authority if the parent or the person exercising the same:
1) Treats the child with excessive harshness or cruelty;
2) Gives the child corrupting orders, counsel or example;
3) Compels the child to beg; or
4) Subjects the child or allows him to be subjected to acts of

lasciviousness.
The grounds enumerated above are deemed to include cases which have
resulted from culpable negligence of the parent or the person exercising parental
authority.
If the degree of seriousness so warrants, or the welfare of the child so demands,

the court shall deprive the guilty party of parental authority or adopt such other
measures as may be proper under the circumstances. The suspension or
deprivation may be revoked and the parental authority revived in a case filed for
the purpose or in the same proceeding if the court finds that the cause therefor
has ceased and will not be repeated. (332a)
Article 232. If the person exercising parental authority has subjected the child or
allowed him to be subjected to sexual abuse, such person shall be permanently
deprived by the court of such authority. (n)
Decision.
53
Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 4, Adolescent health and
54
development in the context of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, U.N . Doc.
CRC/GC/2003/4 (2003).
Section 14. Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education. - The

55
State shall provide age-and development-appropriate reproductive health education to

adolescents which shall be taught by adequately trained teachers in formal and no
nformal educational system and integrated in relevant subjects such as, but not limited
to, values formation ; knowledge and skills in self-protection against discrimination;
sexual abuse and violence against women and children and other forms of gender based
violence and teen pregnancy; physical, social and emotional changes in adolescents;
women's rights and children's rights; responsible teenage behavior; gender and
development; and responsible parenthood: Provided, That flexibility in the formulation
and adoption of appropriate course content, scope and methodology in each educational
level or group shall be allowed only after consultations with parents-teachers-community
associations, school officials and other interest groups. The Department of Education
(DepEd) shall formulate a curriculum which shall be used by public schools and may be
adopted by pdvate schools. (Emphasis supplied)
Joint Memorandum (Of Respondent House of Representatives and Respondent-

56
Intervenor Rep. Edcel C. Lagman), pp. 57-58.
General Comment No. 4, Adolescent health and development in the context of the
57
Convention on the Rights of the Child, U.N. Doc. CRC/GC/2003/4 (2003).
Id.
58
Id .
59
Estampa, Jr. v. City Government of Davao, G. R. No. 190681, 21 June 2010, 621
60
SCRA 350.
CONSTITUTION, Article XI, Section I; Amit v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 176172,
61
20 November 2012; San Jose, Jr. v. Camurongan, 522 Phil. 80 (2006).
Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, G.R. Nos. 192935 and 193036, 7
62
December 2010, 637 SCRA 78.
Quinto v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189698, 22 February 2010, 613 SCRA 385.
63
Section 4(q).
64
Id.
65
Ang kahulugan ng reproductive health ay "a state of complete physical, mental and
66
social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity in all matters relating
to the reproductive system and to its fanctions and processes."
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Our nation is at a crossroads.
Perhaps no other piece of legislation in recent history has so bitterly and piercingly divided us as
much as Republic Act No. 10354 or more popularly known as the RH Law. That this law has cut
1
deeply into the consciousness and wounded the soul of our nation is evident from the profound
depth of conviction with which both proponents and opponents of this law have argued their
cause before the bar of public opinion, Congress, and now, before this Court.
With the passage of the RH Law, the present case before us is the last remaining obstacle to its
implementation.
The RH Law is primarily a national family planning policy with universal access to contraceptives
and informed-free choice as its centerpiece. Its proponents laud the law for what they perceive
as a sound and aggressive contraceptive strategy geared towards population control, poverty
alleviation, women empowerment, and responsible parenthood. Its opponents, however, deplore
the law for what they claim brings about a contraceptive mentality leading to the lowering of
moral standards, destruction of marriage and the family, a population winter, and a culture of
death.
The path that we, as a nation, will take has already been decided by Congress, as
representatives of the people, under our system of government. The task before the Court, then,
is not to say which path we ought to take but to determine if the chosen path treads on
unconstitutional grounds. But this is not all. For the Court, which was once generally a passive
organ in our constitutional order, has been given expanded powers under the present
Constitution. It is now not only its right but its bounden duty to determine grave abuse of
discretion on the part of any branch, instrumentality or agency of government, and, equally
2
important, it has been given the power to issue rules for the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights. The Court cannot, therefore, remain an idle spectator or a disinterested
3
referee when constitutional rights are at stake. It is its duty to protect and defend constitutional
rights for otherwise its raison d'etre will cease.
With these considerations in mind, I am of the view that the social gains or ills, whether imagined
or real, resulting from the implementation of the RH Law is beyond the scope of judicial review.
Thus, even if we assume that the grave and catastrophic predictions of the opponents of the RH
Law manifest itself later on, the remedy would lie with Congress to repeal or amend the law. We
have entrusted our destiny as a nation to this system of government with the underlying hope
that Congress will find the enlightenment and muster the will to change the course they have set
under this law should it prove unwise or detrimental to the life of our nation. The battle in this
regard remains within the legislative sphere. And there is no obstacle for the law's opponents to
continue fighting the good fight in the halls of Congress, if they so choose. Thus, the Court will
refrain from ruling on the validity of the RH Law based on its wisdom or expediency.
This is not to say, however, that this law is beyond judicial scrutiny. While I will tackle several
constitutional questions presented before this Court in this Opinion, it is my considered view that
the paramount issue, which is properly the subject of constitutional litigation, hinges on two vital
questions: (1) when does the life of the unborn begin? and (2) how do we ought to protect and
defend this life?
On the first question, I am fully in accord with the result reached by the ponencia. Absent a clear
and unequivocal constitutional prohibition on the manufacture, distribution, and use of
contraceptives, there is nothing to prevent Congress from adopting a national family planning
policy provided that the contraceptives that will be used pursuant thereto do not harm or destroy
the life of the unborn from conception, which is synonymous to fertilization, under Article II,
Section 12 of the Constitution. The plain meaning of this constitutional provision and the
4
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission bare this out.
It is upon the answer to the second question, however, where I find myself unable to fully agree
with the ponencia. Congress accomplished a commendable undertaking when it passed the RH
Law with utmost respect for the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization. Indeed, this law is
replete with provisions seeking to protect and uphold the right to life of the unborn in consonance
with the Constitution.
However, where the task of Congress ends, the Court's charge begins for it is mandated by the
Constitution to protect and defend constitutional rights. With the impending implementation of the
RH Law, the Court cannot tum a blind eye when the right to life of the unborn may be imperiled
or jeopardized. Within its constitutionally-mandated role as guardian and defender of
constitutional rights, in general, and its expanded power to issue rules for the protection and
enforcement of such rights, in particular, the Court may, thus, issue such orders as are
necessary and essential to protect, defend and enforce the right to life of the unborn.
The framers of, and the people who ratified the Constitution set in bold and deft strokes the
protection of the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization because it is precious, sacred and
inviolable. For as long as this precept remains written in our Constitution, our solemn duty is to
stay the course in fidelity to the most cherished values and wisdom of those who came before us
and to whom we entrusted the writing and ratification of our Constitution. History will judge this
Court on what it did or did not do to protect the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization.
There is, therefore, no other recourse but for this Court to act in defense of the life of the unborn.
These reasons primarily impel the writing of this Opinion.
Deliberations of the Constitutional

Commission on Article II, Section 12 of
the Constitution.
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution provides, in part:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and
the life of the unborn from conception.x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Article II, Section 12 of the present Constitution was originally Article II, Section 9 of the draft of
the Constitution:
family as a basic social institution. The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the
life of the unborn from the moment of conception. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
5
The draft of the Constitution was slightly differently worded as it made use of the phrase "from
the moment of conception" while its present wording is "from conception." The change in
wording, as will be discussed later, was to simplify the phraseology. But the intended meaning of
both phrases, as deliberated by the Constitutional Commission, is the same.
The background and basis of the subject constitutional provision were explained in the
sponsorship speech of Commissioner Villegas. He emphasized that, based on incontrovertible
scientific evidence, the fertilized ovum is alive; that this life is human; and that the fertilized ovum
is a human person. Though that last point, he acknowledged, was highly contested in law.
Commissioner Villegas went on to discuss why abortion could not be justified even in so-called
hard cases such as pregnancies resulting from rape or incest; pregnancies of mentally ill
mothers; and pregnancies of mothers mired in abject poverty.
The justification for disallowing abortion in hard cases sets the tone on the nature of the right to
life of the unborn, as a fundamental right, that recurs throughout the deliberations:
The main reason why we should say "no" (to abortion in hard cases) are: (1) a wrong cannot be
righted by another wrong, (2) no one should be deprived of human life without due process and
we have established scientifically that from the moment of conception, the fertilized ovum has
already life; and (3) a fetus, just like any human, must be presumed innocent unless proven
guilty. It is quite obvious that the fetus has done no wrong. Its only wrong is to be an unwanted
baby. (Emphasis supplied)
6
Commissioner Villegas would later re-emphasize this point at the end of his sponsorship speech,
thus:
What is being affirmed in this formulation is the moral right as well as the constitutional right of
the unborn child to life. x x x The views I express here transcend religious differences. As I have
declared in another occasion, this is not a Roman Catholic position. Since time immemorial, even
before Christianity was brought to our soil, as you very well know, our ancestors referred to the
baby in the womb of the mother as tao-siya'y nagdadalang-tao. Ang dinadala ay tao; hindi
halaman, hindi hayop, hindi palaka-tao.
Madam President, let me also quote from a non-Christian in our Commission. In a public hearing,
the honorable Commissioner Uk.a said the following: "As a Muslim, I believe in the Ten
Commandments, and one of the Ten Commandments is "Thou shalt not kill." From the time of
conception, there is already life. Now if you put down that life, there is already killing, a violation
of one of the Ten Commandments. The overwhelming majority of Filipinos agree with
Commissioner Uk.a that we should support Section 9. We have received up to now more than
50,000 signatures from all over the Philippines, from individuals belonging to all walks of life. I do
not think there is any other issue in which we have been bombarded with more numerous
signatures. Let us, therefore, listen to all of them and mandate that the State should equally
protect the life of the mother and the unborn from the moment of conception. (Emphasis
7
supplied)
Subsequently, Commissioner Nolledo would re-echo these views:
Killing the fetus, while categorized as abortion in our Revised Penal Code, is plain murder
because of its inability to defend itself. Let the unborn.
Madam President, the unborn which is cherished, precious and loving gift of God, enjoy
constitutional protection in a Christian country like ours.8
The subject constitutional provision, thus, sought to recognize the right to life of the unborn as a
fundamental right. As Commissioner Padilla observed:
Madam President, after the sponsorship of Commissioner Villegas on Section 9, I wanted to
state that I fully concur with his views in support of Section 9 on the right of the unborn from
conception. I found his exposition to be logical, not necessarily creative, much less critical, but
logical. Madam President, I would like to state that the Revised Penal Code does not only
penalize infanticide but it has various provisions penalizing abortion; Article 256, intentional
abortion; Article 257, unintentional abortion; Article 258, abortion practiced by the woman herself
or by her parents; and Article 259, abortion practiced by a physician or midwife and dispensing of
abortives.
However, I believe the intention of the proponents of Section 9 is not only to affirm this punitive
provision in the Penal Code but to make clear that it is a fundamental right that deserves to be
mentioned in the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
9
The unique status of the fundamental right accorded to the unborn was explored in later
discussions. It was emphasized that the subject constitutional provision was intended to protect
only the right to life of the unborn unlike the human person who enjoys the right to life, liberty and
property:
MR. SUAREZ. Going to these unborn children who will be given protection from the moment of
conception, does the Commissioner have in mind giving them also proprietary rights, like the
right to inheritance?
MR. VILLEGAS. No, Madam President. Precisely, the question of whether or not that unborn is a
legal person who can acquire property is completely a secondary question. The only right that we
want to protect from the moment of conception is the right to life, which is the beginning of all
other rights.
MR. SUAREZ. So, only the right to life.
MR. VILLEGAS. Yes, it is very clear, only the right to life.
MR SUAREZ. That is the only right that is constitutionally protected by the State.
MR. VILLEGAS. That is right, Madam President. (Emphasis supplied)

10
The deliberations also revealed that the subject constitutional provision was intended to prevent
the Court from making a Roe v. Wade ruling in our jurisdiction:
11
MR VILLEGAS. Yes, Madam President. As Commissioner Padilla already said, it is important

that we have a constitutional provision that is more basic than the existing laws. In countries like
the United States, they get involved in some ridiculous internal contradictions in their laws when
they give the child the right to damages received while yet unborn, to inheritance, to blood
transfusion over its mother's objection, to have a guardian appointed and other rights of
citizenship; but they do not give him the right to life.
As has happened after that infamous 1972 U.S. Supreme Court decision (Roe v. Wade), babies
can be killed all the way up to 8 and 8 1/2 months. So precisely this basic provision is necessary
because inferior laws are sometimes imperfect and completely distorted. We have to make sure
that the basic law will prevent all of these internal contradictions found in American jurisprudence
because Filipino lawyers very often cite American jurisprudence. 12
xxxx
MR VILLEGAS. As I have said, we must prevent any possibility of legalized abortion, because
there is enough jurisprudence that may be used by Congress or by our Supreme Court.
Let me just read what happened after the Roe v. Wade decision in the U.S. Supreme Court. xx x
So, these are the floodgates that are open?
REV. RIGOS. Which are?
MR. VILLEGAS. As I said, American jurisprudence looms large on Philippine practice and
because it is a transcendental issue, we have to completely remove the gossibility of our
Congress and our Supreme Court following this tragic trail. 13
There was, thus, a clear rejection of the theory used in Roe v. Wade that the test of human
personality was viability. Further, the subject constitutional provision was intended to prohibit
Congress from legalizing abortion:
MR. VILLEGAS. "Protection" means any attempt on the life of the child from the moment of
conception can be considered abortion and can be criminal.
MR. SUAREZ. So, principally and exclusively, if may say so, what the Commissioner has in mind
is only an act outlawing abortion.
MR. VILLEGAS. Exactly, Madam President.
MR. SUAREZ. So that is the real thrust and meaning of this particular provision.
MR. VILLEGAS. That is right.
MR. SUAREZ. Can we not just spell it out in our Constitution that abortion is outlawed, without
stating the right to life of the unborn from the moment of conception, Madam President?
MR. VILLEGAS. No, because that would already be getting into the legal technicalities. That is
already legislation. The moment we have this provision, all laws making abortion possible would
be unconstitutional. That is the purpose of this provision, Madam President. 14
xxxx
MR. NATIVIDAD. Madam President, I rose to ask these questions because I had the impression
that this provision of the Constitution would prevent future Congresses from enacting laws
legalizing abortion. Is my perception correct, Madam President?
MR. VILLEGAS. Exactly. Congress cannot legalize abortion. It would be unconstitutional.
MR. NATIVIDAD. In what way will it collide with this provision?
MR. VILLEGAS. Any direct killing of the unborn from the moment of conception would be going
against the Constitution and, therefore, that law would be, if Congress attempts to make it legal,
unconstitutional.15
The sole exception to this constitutional prohibition against abortion is when there is a need, in
rare cases, to save the life of the mother which indirectly sacrifices the unbom's life under the
principle of double effect:
MR. BENNAGEN. In making a decision as to which life takes priority, the life of the mother or the
life of the unborn, what criteria are contemplated by the committee on which to base the
decision?
MR. VILLEGAS. We have articulated this moral principle called the principle of double effect.
Whenever there is need, for example, to perform a surgical operation on the mother because of a
disease or some organic malfunctioning, then the direct intention is to save the mother. And if
indirectly the child's life has to be sacrificed, that would not be abortion, that would not be killing.
So, in those situations which we said are becoming rarer and rarer because of the tremendous
advance of medical science, the mother's life is safe. 16
Intricately related to the prohibition of legalizing abortion was the intention to prevent Congress,
through future legislation, from defining when life begins other than at the time of fertilization:
MR. DAVIDE. Precisely. So, insofar as the unborn is concerned, life begins at the first moment of
conception. Therefore, there is no need to delete. There is no need to leave it to Congress
because that is a matter settled in medicine.
xxxx
REV. RIGOS. Yes, we think that the word "unborn" is sufficient for the purpose of writing a
Constitution, without specifying "from the moment of conception.
MR. DAVIDE. I would not subscribe to that particular view because according to the
Commissioner's own admission, he would leave it to Congress to define when life begins. So,
Congress can define life to begin from six months after fertilization; and that would really be very,
very dangerous. It is now detennined by science that life begins from the moment of conception.
There can be no doubt about it. So, we should not give any doubt to Congress, too.
Thank you, Madam President. (Applause) (Emphasis supplied)

17
Much of the debates, however, centered on the meaning of the phrase "from the moment of
conception." It is clear from the deliberations that the intended meaning of the phrase "from the
moment of conception" was fertilization or the moment the egg is fertilized by the sperm.
REV. RIGOS. In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence which reads:
The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment
of conception.
When is the moment of conception?
xxxx
MR. VILLEGAS. As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it is when the ovum is fertilized by the
sperm that there is human life. Just to repeat: first, there is obviously life because it starts to
nourish itself, it starts to grow as any living being, and it is human because at the moment of
fertilization, the chromosomes that combined in the fertilized ovum are the chromosomes that are
uniquely found in human beings and are not found in any other living being. (Emphasis
18
supplied)
Significantly, the framers intentionally made use of the term "from the moment of conception" so
that the people who will ratify the Constitution would easily understand its meaning:
MR. TINGSON. We would like Commissioner Rigos to know that the phrase "from the moment of
conception" was described by us here before with the scientific phrase "fertilized ovum."
However, we figured in the committee that the phrase "fertilized ovum" may be beyond the
comprehension of some people; we want to use the simpler phrase "from the moment of
conception." 19
During the deliberations, the meaning of "from the moment of conception" was repeatedly
reaffirmed as pertaining to the fertilization of the egg by the sperm. As a necessary consequence
of this definition, any drug or device that harms the unborn from the moment of fertilization is
considered an abortifacient and should be banned by the State:
MR. GASCON. Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to ask a question on that point. Actually that is
one of the questions I was going to raise during the period of interpellations but it has been
expressed already. The provision, as it is proposed right now, states:
The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment
of conception.
When it speaks of "from the moment of conception," does this mean when the egg meets the
sperm?
MR VILLEGAS. Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm.
MR. GASCON. Therefore, that does not leave to Congress the right to determine whether certain
contraceptives that we know of today are abortifacient or not because it is a fact that some of
these so-called contraceptives deter the rooting of the fertilized ovum in the uterus. If fertilization
has already occurred, the next process is for the fertilized ovum to travel towards the uterus and
to take root. What happens with some contraceptives is that they stop the opportunity for the
fertilized ovum to reach the uterus. Therefore, if we take the provision as it is proposed, these so-
called contraceptives should be banned.
MR. VILLEGAS. Yes, if that physical fact is established, then that is what we call abortifacient
and, therefore, would be unconstitutional and should be banned under this provision. 20
(Emphasis supplied)
This was further confirmed in the following exchanges:
MR.GASCON. x x x
xxxx
I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term "the life of the unborn from the moment of
conception," we are also actually saying "no," not "maybe" to certain contraceptives which are
already being encourage at this point in time. Is that the sense of the committee or does it
disagree with me?
MR AZCUNA. No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because contraceptives would be preventive. There is
no unborn yet. That is yet unshaped.
MR. GASCON. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was speaking more about some contraceptives,
such as the intra-uterine device which actually stops the egg which has already been fertilized
from taking route to the uterus. So, if we say "from the moment of conception," what really occurs
is that some of these contraceptives will have to be unconstitutionalized.
MR. AZCUNA. Yes, to the extent that it is after the fertilization, Mr. Presiding Officer. (Emphasis
21
supplied)
Later, Commissioner Padilla initiated moves to reword the phrase "from the moment of
conception" to "from conception" to simplify the phraseology of the subject constitutional
provision without deviating from its original meaning, that is, conception pertains to fertilization. 22
The real challenge to the proponents of the subject constitutional provision, however, was the
move by several members of the Commission to change the phrase "protect the life of the
mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception" to "protect the life of the
mother and the life of the unborn." In other words, there was a move to delete the phrase "from
the moment of conception." Opponents of the subject constitutional provision argued that the
determination of when life begins should be left to Congress to address in a future legislation
where there is greater opportunity to debate the issues dealing with human personality and when
it begins.
23
After a lengthy exchange, the proponents of the subject constitutional provision scored a decisive
victory when the final voting on whether to retain or delete the phrase "from the moment of
conception" was held:
THE PRESIDENT. x x x So, if the vote is "yes", it is to delete "from the moment of conception." If
the vote is "no," then that means to say that the phrase "from the moment of conception"
remains. 24
xxxx
THE PRESIDENT. The results show 8 votes in favor and 32 against; so, the proposed Rigos
amendment is lost. 25
Hence, the phrase "from the moment of conception" was retained. Subsequently, the Padilla
amendment was put to a vote. With a vote of33 in favor, 3 against, and 4 abstentions, the Padilla
amendment was approved. Thus, the present wording of the second sentence of Article II,
Section 12 of the Constitution makes use of the simplified phrase "from conception."
Key Characteristics of Article II, Section 12
Several important characteristics or observations may be made on the nature, scope and
significance of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution relative to the protection of the life of the
unborn based on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
First, the framers were unequivocal in their intent to define "conception" as the fertilization of the
egg by the sperm and to accord constitutional protection to the life of the unborn from the
moment of fertilization. The plain meaning of the term "conception," as synonymous to
fertilization, based on dictionaries and medical textbooks, as aptly and extensively discussed by
the ponencia, confirm this construction. In addition, petitioners correctly argue that the definition
of "conception," as equivalent to fertilization, was the same definition prevailing during the 1980's
or at around the time the 1987 Constitution was ratified. 26
Hence, under the rule of constitutional construction, which gives weight to how the term was
understood by the people who ratified the Constitution, "conception" should be understood as
27
fertilization.
Second, the protection of the life of the unborn under Article II, Section 12 is a self-executing
provision because:
(1) It prevents Congress from legalizing abortion; from passing laws which authorize the
use of abortifacients; and from passing laws which will determine when life begins other
than from the moment of conception/fertilization;
(2) It prevents the Supreme Court from making a Roe v. Wade ruling in our jurisdiction;
28
and
(3) It obligates the Executive to ban contraceptives which act as abortifacients or those
which harm or destroy the unborn from conception/fertilization.
Article II, Section 12 is, thus, a direct, immediate and effective limitation on the three great
branches of government and a positive command on the State to protect the life of the unborn.
Third, Article II, Section 12 recognized a sui generis constitutional right to life of the unborn. The
framers repeatedly treated or referred to the right to life of the unborn as a :fundamental right and
thereby acknowledged that the unborn is a proper subject of a constitutional right. That this right
is founded on natural law and is self-executing further provides the unmistakable basis and intent
to accord it the status of a constitutional right. However, it is sui generis because, unlike a person
who possesses the right to life, liberty and property, the unborn's fundamental right is solely
limited to the right to life as was the intention of the framers. Clearly, then, Article II, Section 12
recognized a sui generis right to life of the unborn from conception/fertilization and elevated it to
the status of a constitutional right.
Fourth, because the unborn has been accorded a constitutional right to life from
conception/fertilization under Article II, Section 12, this right falls within the ambit of the Court's
power to issue rules for the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights under Article VIII,
Section 5(5) of the Constitution:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, xx x.
Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court.
This is significant because it imposes upon this Court the duty to protect such right pursuant to its
rule-making powers. In recent times, the Court acknowledged that the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and hannony of nature under Article II,
Section 16 of the Constitution, though found in the Declaration of Principles and Policies (like the
subject right to life of the unborn) and not in the Bill of Rights, may be given flesh pursuant to the
power of the Court to issue rules for the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. It,
thus, proceeded to promulgate the rules governing the Writ of Kalikasan. 29
With far greater reason should the Court wield this power here because the unborn is totally
defenseless and must rely wholly on the State to represent its interest in matters affecting the
protection and preservation of its very life. It does not necessarily follow, however, that the Court
should issue a set of rules to protect the life of the unborn like the Writ of Kalikasan. How the
Court is to protect and enforce the constitutional right to life of the unborn, within the context of
the RH Law, is the central theme ofthis Opinion.
With the groundwork constitutional principles in place, I now proceed to tackle the
constitutionality of the RH Law and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR).
The RH Law does not contravene Article
II, Section 12 of the Constitution.
The RH Law prohibits the use of abortifacients in several provisions in consonance with Article II,
Section 12 of the Constitution, to wit:
(1) Section 2:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – x x x
The State likewise guarantees universal access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective,

legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health care services, methods, devices, supplies which
do not prevent the implantation of a fertilized ovum as determined by the Food and Drug
Adrrllnistration (FDA) and relevant information and education thereon according to the priority
needs of women, children and other underprivileged sectors, giving preferential access to those
identified through the National Household Targeting System for Poverty Reduction (NHTS-PR)
and other government measures of identifying marginalization, who shall be voluntary
beneficiaries of reproductive health care, services and supplies for free. (Emphasis supplied)
(2) Section 3:
SEC. 3. Guiding Principles for Implementation. - This Act declares the following as guiding
principles: x x x
(d) The provision of ethical and medically safe, legal, accessible, affordable, non-abortifacient,
effective and quality reproductive health care services and supplies is essential in the promotion
of people's right to health, especially those of women, the poor, and the marginalized, and shall
be incorporated as a component of basic health care;
(e) The State shall promote and provide information and access, without bias, to all methods of
family planning, including effective natural and modem methods which have been proven
medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-
based medical research standards such as those registered and approved by the FDA for the
poor and marginalized as identified through the NHTS-PR and other government measures of
identifying marginalization: Provided, That the State shall also provide funding support to
promote modem natural methods of family planning, especially the Billings Ovulation Method,
consistent with the needs of acceptors and their religious convictions; x x x
(j) While this Act recognizes that abortion is illegal and punishable by law, the government shall
ensure that all women needing care for post- abortive complications and all other complications
arising from pregnancy, labor and delivery and related issues shall be treated and counseled in a
humane, nonjudgmental and compassionate manner in accordance with law and medical ethics;
(Emphasis supplied)
(3) Section 4:
SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as
follows: x x x
(a) Aborfifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus
inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in
the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.
xxxx
(e) Family planning refers to a program which enables couples and individuals to decide freely
and responsibly the number and spacing of their children and to have the information and means
to do so, and to have access to a full range of safe, affordable, effective, non-abortifacient
modem natural and artificial methods of planning pregnancy.
xxxx
(l) Modern methods of family planning refers to safe, effective, non-abortifacient and legal
methods, whether natural or artificial, that are registered with the FDA, to plan pregnancy.
xxxx
(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals and couples, to decide freely and
responsibly whether or not to have children; the number, spacing and timing of their children; to
make other decisions concerning reproduction, free of discrimination, coercion and violence; to
have the information and means to do so; and to attain the highest standard of sexual health and
reproductive health: Provided, however, That reproductive health rights do not include abortion,
and access to abortifacients. (Emphasis supplied)
(4) Section 9:
SEC. 9. The Philippine National Drug Formulary System and Family Planning Supplies. - The
National Drug Formulary shall include hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables
and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies. The
Philippine National Drug Formulary System (PNDFS) shall be observed in selecting drugs
including family planning supplies that will be included or removed from the Essential Drugs List
(EDL) in accordance with existing practice and in consultation with reputable medical
associations in the Philippines. For the purpose of this Act, any product or supply included or to
be included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is
made available on the condition that it is not to be used as an abortifacient.
These products and supplies shall also be included in the regular purchase of essential
medicines and supplies of all national hospitals: Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall
not purchase or acquire by any means emergency contraceptive pills, postcoital pills,
abortifacients that will be used for such purpose and their other forms or equivalent. (Emphasis
supplied)
The key provision is found in Section 4(a) which defines an "abortifacient" as "any drug or device
that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of
the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the
FDA." That last phrase which effectively bans contraceptives that prevent the fertilized ovum
from reaching and being implanted in the mother's womb guarantees that the fertilized ovum will
not be hanned or destroyed from the moment of fertilization until its implantation. Thus, the RH
Law protects the unborn from conception/fertilization in consonance with the Constitution.
As earlier noted, the RH Law is to be commended for its zealous protection of the life of the
unborn from conception/fertilization. It repeatedly emphasizes that the contraceptives which will
be made available under the law should be non-abortifacient. It prohibits the use of abortifacients
and penalizes the use thereof. Thus, it cannot be said that the law violates Article II, Section 12
of the Constitution.
The IRR's definition of "abortifacient"

and "contraceptive" contravenes Article
II, Section 12 of the Constitution and the
RH Law itself.
Petitioners Alliance for the Family Foundation Philippines, Inc. (ALFI) et al. argue:
9.1.9 The IRRs, which have been signed by the Secretary of Health himself, among others, veer
away from the definition of the term "abortifacient" in SEC. 4 (a) of the RH Law, such that in the
IRRs, the term has, in effect, been re-defined.
9.1.10 Rule 3 - Definition of Terms, Section 3.01 (a) of the IRRs, as signed, states:
"Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces abortion or the destruction of a
fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted
in the mother's womb upon determination of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)."
And "primarily" means the drug or device has no other known effect aside from abortion.
(footnote 14, JRRs)
9.1.11 x xx x
9.1.12 One can readily spot how the insertion of the word "primarily" has radically, if not
deceptively, changed the meaning of "Abortifacient" under the RH Law. As explained above, the
primary mechanism of action of contraceptives is really to prevent ovulation or fertilization, but
this does not happen all the time because in some instances break-through ovulation occurs and
the built-in and back-up abortive action sets in. With the definition under the IRR, abortifacient
contraceptives will not be classified as abortifacients because they do not "primarily" and "solely"
cause abortion or are abortive. Well, this should not be surprising anymore because as indicated
in the explanatory note of the IR.Rs, the only goal is to save [the] mother's lives and to reduce
maternal mortality rate, without any reference to saving the life of the unborn child or decreasing
infant mortality rate.
9.1.13. Clearly, but unfortunately, the true legislative intent is: for the State to fund and fully
implement the procurement and widespread dissemination and use of all forms of contraceptive
products, supplies and devices, even if they are abortifacients and harmful to the health of
women. This goes counter to the constitutional intent of Section 12, Article II which is to afford
protection to the unborn child from the incipient stage of the existence of life, that is, from the
very moment of conception or fertilization, and to give equal protection to the life of the mother
and the life of the unborn from conception. 30
I agree.
Section 3.0l(a) of the IRR defines "abortifacient" as:
Section 3.01 For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined as follows:
a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces abortion or the destruction of a
fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted
in the mother's womb upon determination of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). (Emphasis
supplied)
On the other hand, the RH Law defines "abortifacient" thus:
follows:
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus
the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.
Clearly, the addition of the word "primarily" in the IRR is ultra vires for it amends or contravenes
Section 4(a) of the RH Law.
More importantly, I agree that the insertion of the qualifier "primarily" will open the floodgates to
the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution. As defined in the
IRR, a drug or device is considered an abortifacient if it "primarily" induces abortion or the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach
and be implanted in the mother's womb; where "primarily" means that the drug or device has no
other known effect aside from abortion. In other words, under the IRR, a contraceptive will only
be considered as an "abortifacient" if its sole known effect is abortion or, as pertinent here, the
prevention of the implantation of the fertilized ovum.
Consequently, a drug or device which (a) prevents fertilization, (b) but does not provide a 100%
guarantee of such prevention, and (c) has a fail-safe mechanism which will prevent the
implantation of the fertilized ovum in case fertilization still occurs will not be considered an
"abortifacient" because the known effect thereof is not solely prevention of implantation since (1)
it primarily prevents fertilization and (2) only secondarily prevents the implantation of the fertilized
ovum in case fertilization still occurs.
However, a drug or device that cannot provide a 100% guarantee that it will prevent fertilization
and has a fail-safe mechanism which prevents implantation of the fertilized ovum (or
harming/destroying the fertilized ovum in any way) if fertilization occurs is unconstitutional under
Article II, Section 12 and must be banned by the State. In more concrete terms, if a drug or
device provides only a 90% guarantee of prevention of fertilization, then there is a 10% chance
that fertilization will still occur and the fertilized ovum would be destroyed by the fail-safe
mechanism of the contraceptive.
We cannot play the game of probabilities when life is at stake. The destruction or loss oflife is
permanent and irrevocable. Our constitutional mandate is to protect the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization. We cannot protect this life 90% of the time and allow its destruction 10%
of the time. We either protect this life or we do not. There is nothing in between.
If we are to truly give flesh to the constitutional precept that the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization is precious, sacred and inviolable, all reasonable doubts should be
resolved in favor of the protection and preservation of the life of the unborn, and any probability
of destruction or loss of such life should be absolutely proscribed. The supreme law of the land
commands no less.
For parallel reasons, the IRR's definition of "contraceptive" under Section 3.0lG) is
unconstitutional because of the insertion of the qualifier "primarily," to wit:
Section 3.01 For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined as follows:
xx xx
j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and scientifically proven modem family
planning method, device, or health product, whether natural or artificial, that prevents pregnancy
but does not primarily destroy a fertilized ovum or prevent a fertilized ovum from being implanted
in the mother's womb in doses of its approved indication as determined by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA). (Emphasis supplied)
Although the RH Law does not provide a definition of "contraceptive," a reasonable and logical
deduction is that "contraceptive" (or allowable contraceptive to be more precise) is the opposite
of "abortifacient" as defined under the RH Law. This seems to be the tack adopted by the IRR in
defining "contraceptive." However, the IRR's definition of"contraceptive" again added the qualifier
"primarily." For similar reasons with the previous discussion on the IRR's definition of
"abortifacient," this definition of "contraceptive" opens the floodgates to the approval of
contraceptives which are actually abortifacients because of their fail-safe mechanism. Hence, the
qualifier "primarily" in Section 3.0lG) is, likewise, void.
In view of the foregoing, the word "primarily" in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the IRR should be
declared void for (1) contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and (2) violating Article II, Section
12 of Constitution.
Within the .framework of implementation

of the RH Law, it is necessary for this
Court to exercise its expanded
jurisdiction and power to issue rules for
the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights in order to
adequately protect the right to life of the
unborn.
The Court should not limit its scrutiny to the constitutional validity of the RH Law and its IRR. This
is because the right to life of the unborn from conception/fertilization is a constitutional right
properly within the ambit of the Court's power to issue rules for the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights under Article VIII, Section 5( 5) of the Constitution. In Echegaray v. Secretary
of Justice, the Court described this power to issue rules as one of the innovations of the present
31
Constitution to expand the powers of the Court:
The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others,
it enhanced the rule maldng power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:
x x x x x x x x x
"Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
x x x x x x x x x
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and
legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade,
and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special
courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme
Court."
The rule maldng power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the
power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights.
The Court was also granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. x x x 32
Viewed in light of the broad power of the Court to issue rules for the protection and enforcement
of constitutional rights, the power to disapprove the rules of procedure of quasi-judicial bodies is
significant in that it implies the power of the Court to look into the sufficiency of such rules of
procedure insofar as they adequately protect and enforce constitutional rights. Moreover, the
power to disapprove the aforesaid rules of procedure necessarily includes or implies the power to
approve or modify such rules or, on the one extreme, require that such rules of procedure be
issued when necessary to protect and enforce constitutional rights. In other words, within and
between the broader power to issue rules for the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights and the narrower power to disapprove the rules of procedure of quasi-judicial bodies, there
exist penumbras of this power that the Court may exercise in order to protect and enforce
constitutional rights.
Furthermore, the power to determine when the aforesaid powers may be exercised should be
understood in conjunction with the Court's expanded jurisdiction, under Article VIll, Section I of
the Constitution, to determine "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government."
Taken together, the expanded jurisdiction of the Court and the power to issue rules for the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights provide the bases for the Court (1) to look into
the sufficiency of safeguards in the implementation of the RH Law insofar as it will adversely
affect the right to life of the unborn, and (2) to issue such orders as are necessary and essential
in order to protect and enforce the constitutional right to life of the unborn. This is especially true
in this case because the expanded powers of the Court was granted to it to prevent a repeat of
the bitter experiences during martial law years when rampant human rights violations occurred.
Verily, the expanded powers were conferred on this Court at a great price and were given for a
clear purpose. Here, a more basic right-the right to life of the unborn- is at stake; the right from
which all human rights emanate.
It should come as no surprise that at a time our nation is set to embark on a great social
experiment, where the full machinery of the State will be utilized to implement an aggressive
national family planning policy, the Court should find itself reflecting on the threshold of its
constitutionally-mandated powers. The Court is beckoned to courageously sail forth to the new
frontiers of its powers in order to stem the tide of oppression, nay destruction, against a most
vulnerable group that may be trampled upon by this great social experiment. For can there be
any group more vulnerable than the unborn?
As they say, we stand on the shoulders of giants. They have blazed the trail for this Court in
order that we may see clearly what we can and ought to do in defense of the life of the unborn.
They have seen fit to equip this Court with expanded powers in preparation for a future that they
must have known would involve moments of great clashes between the juggernaut of
majoritarian interests and the politically powerless and marginalized. We are in that moment. And
we ought to firmly stand by the legacy and solemn charge that the :framers of, and the people
who ratified our Constitution conferred upon us.
Against this backdrop, I delineate what the Court in the exercise of its expanded jurisdiction and
power to issue rules for the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights is mandated to do
in defense of the life of the unborn within the framework of implementation of the RH Law.
The Food and Drug Administration

(FDA) should be directed to issue the
proper rules of procedure that will
sufficiently safegua,rd the right to life of
the unborn.
Preliminarily, central to the protection of the right to life of the unborn is the proper determination,
through screening, testing and/or evaluation, by the FDA, using the standard under the
Constitution, as adopted under the RH Law, on what will constitute allowable contraceptives
under the RH Law. During the oral arguments of this case, I delved upon the crucial task that lay
ahead for the FDA:
Justice Del Castillo:
Counsel, just a few follow-up questions on contraceptives.
Atty. Noche:
Yes, Your Honor.

You have identified contraceptives as abortifacient.
Atty. Noche:
Yes, Your Honor.
There are so many contraceptives and the respondents have taken the view that not all are
abortifacients. So to resolve this issue, why don't you identify, why don't you name these
contraceptives and then let's test them if they are abortifacient then the issue is settled, so
instead of making generalization that all contraceptives are abortifacient, don't you think that the
proper course of action to take is to identify all these because practically all drugs are
abortifacients, even a simple aspirin, so these are [as a] matter of degree. So, perhaps those that
would cause tremendous harm and maybe we can ban them. But unless we have not identified
them just to say that all abortifacients, don't you think that ... . . ..
Atty. Noche:
If Your Honor, please, hormonal contraceptives, what we' re saying is that hormonal
contraceptives which include, you know, the pills, and the injectables, and intrauterine devices,
Your Honor, and the patches, Your Honor, implants they're proven to be abortifacients, Your
Honor. Vasectomy, sterilization procedures, Your Honor, they are also referred to as
contraceptives, Your Honor, but they are not abortifacients because they don't contain
hormones, Your Honor.
No, I was suggesting that because the respondents would also come out with their own
authorities, so to resolve it once and for all, let's test them.
Atty. Noche:
If Your Honor, please, we also have an objection about giving, of course, I'm sure, Your Honor,
I've been referring to delegating the authority to the Food and Drug Administration, so we have a
problem with that, Your Honor, because, I mean, these hormonal contraceptives are proven to be
abortifacients, Your Honor, and .... (interrupted)
I am not just referring to the Food and Drug Administration. My point is, let's put it to test because
this is just xx x evidentiary, it's a matter of fact, we cannot make generalizations. [They're] saying
that these are not abortifacients, you are saying x x x that they are abortifacients, then let's prove
it. That is just my suggestion.
Atty. Noche:
If Your Honor, please, may I, you know, bring out the very important point that we have always
tried to bring out, Your Honor. Section 12, otherwise, we forget this, Section 12, Article II
mandates the protection of the unborn from conception. And that protection is not just from death
but from any risks or threat of harm, or injury or any form or degree, remote or direct, momentary
or permanent and it has proven already that anything, Your Honor, that you introduce into the
body that disrupts the, you know, workings in the uterus or the physiology in the uterus is hannful
to the fertilized ovum so ..... (interrupted)
Yes, Counsel, but the protection comes in only after, if I may grant you, the fertilization. But
before that, the unborn is not protected, the unborn is protected from conception so before that
it's not [a] regulated act.
Atty. Noche:
If Your Honor, please, before fertilization there is no person to speak of.
Exactly.
Atty. Noche:
There is no fertilized ovum to speak of, there is no unborn that needs any protection, Your Honor,
at least, under Section 12. So, really the protection that we are referring to under Section 12 is
protection that starts from conception. That is when we say they're already a person in that
fertilized ovum that the Constitution mandates, that the State protects, Your Honor.
I even concede that upon the meeting of the egg and the sperm x x x there is life already, it
should be protected, I concede that.
Atty. Noche:
Thank you, very much, Your Honor, for saying that because that's really life there.
Thank you, Counsel. 33
Under Section 4(a) of the RH Law, the FDA is charged with the task of determining which
contraceptives are not abortifacients:
SEC. 4. Definition ofTerms. – For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as
follows:
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus
the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA. (Emphasis supplied)
The drugs or devices, which will be approved by the FDA, will then be included in the National
Drug Formulary and Essential Drugs List as provided under Section 9 of the RH Law:
SEC. 9. The Philippine National Drug Formulary System and Family Planning Supplies. - The
National Drug Formulary shall include hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables
abortifacients that will be used for such purpose and their other forms or equivalent.
Contrary to the interpretation of petitioners, Section 9 does not automatically mandate the
inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-
abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary
and Essential Drugs List. This provision should be read in relation to Section 4(a) of the RH Law
which requires the FDA to first determine whether the subject contraceptives are non-
abortifacients, among other standards (e.g., safe, effective). The law should be construed in such
a way as to avoid a declaration of unconstitutionality.
The IRR provides the following guidelines for such determination, viz:
Section 7.04 FDA Certification of Family Planning Supplies. The FDA must certify that a family
planning drug or device is not an abortifacient in dosages of its approved indication (for drugs) or
intended use (for devices) prior to its inclusion in the EDL. The FDA shall observe the following
guidelines in the determination of whether or not a drug or device is an abortifacient:
a) As defined in Section 3.01 (a) of these Rules, a drug or device is deemed to be an

abortifacient if it is proven to primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside
34
the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in
the mother's womb;
b) The following mechanisms do not constitute abortion: the prevention of ovulation; the
direct action on sperm cells prior to fertilization; the thickening of cervical mucus; and any
mechanism acting exclusively prior to the fertilization of the egg by the sperm;
c) Jn making its determination, the FDA shall use the best evidence available, including
but not limited to: meta-analyses, systematic reviews, national clinical practice guidelines
where available, and recommendations of international medical organinrtions;
d) Jn the presence of conflicting evidence, the more recent, better-designed, and larger
studies shall be preferred, and the conclusions found therein shall be used to determine
whether or not a drug or device is an abortifacient; and
e) Should the FDA require additional expertise in making its determination, an

independent evidence review group (ERG) composed of leading experts in the fields of
pharmacodynarnics, medical research, evidence-based medicine, and other relevant
fields may be convened to review the available evidence. The FDA shall then issue its
certification based on the recommendations of the ERG.
It is only proper for the Court to recognize that the FDA possesses the requisite technical skills
and expertise in determining whether a particular drug or device is an abortifacient. It is also only
proper that the Court accords deference to this legislative delegation of powers to the FDA for
this purpose. However, for obvious reasons, the unborn cannot appear, on its behalf, to
represent or protect its interest, bearing upon its very right to life, when the FDA proceeds to
make such a determination.
Within this framework of implementation, and given the unique status of the unborn and the
exceptional need to protect its right to life, the Court must step in by directing the FDA to issue
the proper rules of procedure in the determination of whether a drug or device is an abortifacient
under the RH Law. Such rules must sufficiently safeguard the right to life of the unborn. As a
penumbra of its power to issue rules to protect and enforce constitutional rights and its power to
disapprove rules of procedure of quasi-judicial bodies, the Court has the power and competency
to mandate the minimum requirements of due process in order to sufficiently safeguard the right
to life of the unborn in the proceedings that will be conducted before the FDA. 1bis is in line with
the declared policy and numerous provisions of the RH Law according utmost respect and
protection for the right to life of the unborn.
In determining whether a drug or device is an abortifacient, the FDA will necessarily engage in a
quasi-judicial function. It will determine whether a set of facts (active properties or mechanisms of
a drug or device) comply with a legal standard (definition of non-abortifacient) which will
ultimately bear upon the right to life of the unborn. Considering that quasi-judicial bodies involved
in, say, rate-fixing follow the due process requirements of publication, notice and hearing, where
the lesser right to property is involved, then withfar greater reason should the proceedings before
the FDA require publication, notice and hearing.
Any erroneous determination the FDA makes can result to the destruction or loss of the life of the
unborn. Plainly, the life and death of countless, faceless unborns hang in the balance. Thus, the
determination should be made with utmost care where the interest of the unborn is adequately
represented.
Consequently, the Solicitor General should be mandated to represent the unborn and the State's
interest in the protection of the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in the proceedings
before the FDA. If the Solicitor General is made to represent the State's interest in, say, cases
involving declaration of nullity of marriage, then, again, with far greater reason should it be made
to represent the unborn and State's interest in protecting the life of the unborn. Interested parties
should also be allowed to intervene in the proceedings for all persons have a valid and
substantial interest in the protection of the right to life of the unborn under the concept of
intergenerational responsibility.35
In making the aforesaid determination, the FDA should follow the strict standards laid down in the
Constitution, as adopted in the RH Law, as to what constitute allowable contraceptives. The IRR
has provided guidelines as to what constitute allowable contraceptives but these guidelines
should be applied only insofar as they do not contravene the standard laid down in the
Constitution. Given the advances in science and medicine, drugs or devices may be developed
which satisfy the guidelines in the IRR but still result to the destruction of the unborn from
fertilization. (This was the case with the contraceptive with a fail-safe mechanism which required
the voiding of the subject qualifiers in the IRR's definition of terms, as previously discussed.)
The Constitution is always the polestar; the drug or device should not harm or destroy the life of
the unborn from conception/fertilization. Necessarily, the rule of evidence to be followed by the
FDA, in consonance with the Constitution, is that, in weighing the evidence as to whether a drug
or device is an abortifacient, all reasonable doubt should be resolved in favor of the right to life of
the unborn from conception/fertilization.
Finally, the other requirements of administrative due process laid down in the seminal case of
Ang Tibay v. The Court of Industrial Relations should be followed.
36
The other details of the rules of procedure should be left to the sound discretion of the FDA.
However, the FDA must ensure that these details sufficiently safeguard the life of the unborn.
In sum, I find that the Court should issue an order:

(1) directing the FDA to formulate the rules of procedure in the screening, evaluation and
approval of all contraceptives that will be used under the RH Law,
(2) the rules of procedure shall contain the following minimum requirements of due
process:
(a) publication, notice and hearing,
(b) the Solicitor General shall be mandated to represent the unborn and the
State's interest in the protection of the life of the unborn,
(c) interested parties shall be allowed to intervene,
(d) the standard laid down in the Constitution, as adopted under the RH Law, as
to what constitute allowable contraceptives shall be strictly followed, i.e., those
which do not harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization,
(e) in weighing the evidence, all reasonable doubts shall be resolved in favor of
the right to life of the unborn from conception/fertilization, and
(f) the other requirements of administrative due process, as summarized in Ang

Tibay, shall be complied with.
The FDA should be directed to submit these rules of procedure, within 30 days from receipt of
the Court's decision, for the Court's appropriate action.
The FDA should be directed to inform

this Court as to whether the
contraceptives that it previously
approved and is currently available for
use and distribution in our jurisdiction
comply with the constitutional standard
of allowable contraceptives.
In his Memorandum, the Solicitor General stated that—
49. There are currently fifty-nine (59) contraceptive drugs and seven (7) intrauterine devices duly
approved for sale by the FDA and currently available in the market. x x x 37
However, the Solicitor General did not categorically state that these drugs and devices were
screened, evaluated and/or tested under the standard laid down in Article II, Section 12 of the
Constitution, as adopted under Section 4(a) of RH Law. The apparent reason for this seems to
be that these drugs and devices were screened, evaluated and/or tested by the FDA prior to the
enactment of the RH Law and the ruling that the Court now categorically makes in this case.
Plainly, it would not make sense to impose strict rules of procedure for the evaluation of
contraceptives that will be used under the RH Law while allowing a possible continuing violation
of the Constitution relative to contraceptive drugs and devices that were previously approved by
the FDA and are currently being used and/or distributed in our jurisdiction.
There is, thus, an urgent necessity to determine if the aforesaid contraceptive drugs and devices
comply with the Constitution and RH Law, i.e. they do not harm or destroy the unborn from
conception/fertilization, in general, and they do not prevent the implantation of the fertilized
ovum, in particular. Also, of particular significance is whether the FDA evaluated the currently
available contraceptive drugs and devices against the standard laid down, as discussed in a
previous subsection, concerning unallowable contraceptives which (1) do not provide a 100%
guarantee of preventing fertilization and (2) has a fail-safe mechanism which destroys the
fertilized ovum if fertilization occurs (e.g., prevents the implantation of the fertilized ovum on the
uterus).
Thus, the FDA should be ordered to immediately inform this Court whether its previously
approved and the currently available contraceptive drugs and devices in our jurisdiction were
screened, evaluated and/or tested against the afore-discussed general and specific standards. It
should be emphasized that the FDA is not being asked to re-screen, re-evaluate or re-test the
aforesaid contraceptive drugs and devices but only to inform this Court if they were screened,
evaluated and/or tested against the constitutional and statutory standards that the Court upholds
in this decision. Thus, this will not take an inordinate amount of time to do considering that the
files should be readily available with the FDA. This information will allow the Court to take
immediate remedial action in order to protect and defend the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization, if the circumstances warrant. That is, if the contraceptive drugs or
devices were not screened, evaluated and/or tested against the constitutional and statutory
standards that the Court upholds in this decision, then it would be necessary to suspend their
availability in the market, as a precautionary measure, in order to protect the right to life of the
unborn pending the proper screening, evaluation and/or testing through the afore-discussed
rules of procedure that the FDA is directed to issue.
It should be noted that Section 7.05 of the IRR effectively and impliedly mandates that these
existing drugs and devices be screened, evaluated and/or tested again by the FDA against the
standard or definition of abortifacient under Section 4(a) of the RH Law. But the serious flaw in
this procedure is that, in the meantime, the aforesaid drugs and devices shall remain available in
the market pending the FDA's certification, to wit:
Section 7.05 Drugs, Supplies, and Products with Existing Certificates of Product Registration.
Upon the effectivity of these Rules, all reproductive health care drugs, supplies, and products
that have existing Certificates of Product Registration (CPRs) from the FDA shall be provided
certifications stating that they do not cause abortion when taken in dosages for their approved
indications.
Thus, if such drugs and devices are later determined by the FDA to be an abortifacient under the
standard laid down in the Constitution, as adopted under the RH Law, then the loss or
destruction of many unborn may have already resulted or taken place. As previously noted, the
proper course of action is to immediately determine if they were screened, evaluated and/or
tested against the afore-discussed general and specific constitutional and statutory standards.
And, if not, to immediately suspend their availability in the market, as a precautionary measure,
in order to safeguard the right to life of the unborn pending the proper screening, evaluation
and/or testing through the afore-discussed rules of procedure that the FDA is directed to issue.
The life of the unborn should not be placed at risk any minute longer.
The DOH in coordination with all concerned government agencies should be directed to
formulate the rules and regulations or guidelines that will govern the purchase and distribution/
dispensation of the product or supply which will be covered by the FDA's certification, under
Section 9 of the RH Law, that said product and supply is made available on the condition that it is
not to be used as an abortifacient.
Section 9 of the RH Law states–-
SEC. 9. The Philippine National Drug Formulary System and Family Planning Supplies. – The
National Drug Formulaiy shall include hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables
1âwphi1
abortifacients that will be used for such purpose and their other forms or equivalent. (Emphasis
supplied)
Preliminarily, the necessity of imposing proper rules of procedure, which sufficiently safeguards
the right to life of the unborn, in the FDA's determination of what will be considered allowable
contraceptive drugs and devices upon implementation of the RH Law, can be better appreciated
if viewed within the context of Section 9 of the RH Law, as afore-quoted. Once the FDA approves
contraceptive drugs and devices like hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables
and other family planning products and supplies, they will be included in the Essential Drugs List
(EDL ). As manifested by the Solicitor General, only drugs and medicines found in the
EDL/Philippine National Drug Formulary System (PNDFS) may be dispensed (whether for free or
for a reduced amount) by public health care facilities. These contraceptive drugs and devices,
38
thus, become widely and easily accessible to the public. In fact, the IRR devolves the distribution
of these contraceptives up to the barangay level with the DOH as the lead agency tasked with its
procurement and distribution. Thus, an erroneous determination by the FDA has an immediate
and widespread impact on the right to life of the unborn.
However, there is another even more crucial aspect in the implementation of the RH Law which
has far greater impact on the right to life of the unborn than the FDA's determination of what are
allowable contraceptives. It is found in the proviso of Section 9 which states "any product or
supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said
product and supply is made available on the condition that it is not to be used as an
abortifacient." In other words, under this section, products and supplies (hereinafter "subject
products and supplies") which are abortifacients (or have abortifacient properties) will also be
included in the EDL provided that these products and supplies will not be used as abortifacients
as certified by the FDA.
I share the view of the ponencia that the aforesaid certification is empty and absurd. Such
certification cannot guarantee that the subject products and supplies will not be used as
abortifacients. The ponencia modifies the phrase from "it is not to be used" to "it cannot be used"
in order to protect the right to life of the unborn.
With due respect, I am of the view that the change in wording will not alter the result. The
certification is of limited value. Even with the change in wording, there will be no guarantee that
the subject products and supplies will not be used as abortifacients. I submit that the proper area
that should be strictly scrutinized is the implementing rules and regulations of Section 9 relative
to the purchase and distribution of the subject products and supplies.
But before going to that, I find it necessary to discuss the rationale of this proviso in Section 9.
The Senate Journal of October 8, 2012 summarizes the discussions leading to its final version,
viz:
On page 9, line 8 of the bill, after the word "PRACTICE" and the period (.), Senator Lacson
proposed the insertion of a new sentence to read: FOR THE PURPOSE OF THIS ACT, ANY
FAMILY PLANNING PRODUCT OR SUPPLY INCLUDED OR TO BE INCLUDED IN THE
ESSENTIAL DRUG LIST MUST HAVE A CERTIFICATION FROM THE FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION (FDA) OF THE PHILIPPINES THAT SAID PRODUCT AND SUPPLY HAS
NO ABORTIF ACIENT OR ABORTICIDE EFFECT.
Senator Cayetano (P) expressed willingness to accept the amendment, subject to style, but she
explained that there are certain medications which are effectively abortifacient but are not used
for such purpose. These medications, she explained, cannot be simply banned because they are
necessary drugs for purposes for which they were introduced and are prescribed under very
strict guidelines by a medical practitioner.
She suggested that an amendment be made to require the issuance of a certification that such
drugs should be used for their intended medical purpose and not as abortifacient.
Citing another example, Senator Cayetano (P) said that a particular drug is being prescribed to
teenagers to treat the breakout of acne, provided an assurance is given that the patient is not
pregnant or otherwise sexually active because it could cause severe physical abnormality to a
fetus like being born without limbs. She noted that the said drug could not be banned because it
has to be used for an intended purpose.
Senator Lacson expressed apprehension that a woman who has acne and wishes to have an
abortion may take advantage of the essential drug being provided by the government to avail of
its abortive side effect.
Senator Cayetano (P) agreed with Senator Lacson that the said essential medicine should not be
used as abortifacients. However, she said that the medical consultants present in the gallery
point out that a number of drugs with similar effect are actually available in the market and
banning these drugs could pose a great danger as they are being prescribed for a particular
purpose. In addition to the literature that come with the drugs, she suggested that stronger
warnings be made by health professionals that in no case shall these drugs be prescribed and
made available as abortifacients.
Upon query of Senator Lacson, Senator Cayetano (P) replied that these drugs that are
prescribed to treat very serious medical conditions have been available in the market for the
longest time such that withdrawing them from the market would be very detrimental to the health
system in the country. For instance, she said that Oxytocin is used to induce labor in conditions
necessitating that the baby be delivered right away, like in cases when the baby's umbilical cord
has encircled his/her neck. She said that Oxytocin is actually intended to save a baby's life; thus,
it should not be given to a two-month pregnant woman. She reiterated that withdrawing an
essential medicine such as Oxytocin from the market would totally debilitate the maternity health
care system.
Asked how it could be ensured that such and similar drugs would not be used as abortifacients.
Senator Cayetano (P) replied that a health professional who prescribes a drug such as Oxytocin
to a woman who is in her first trimester of pregnancy is clearly prescribing it as an abortifacient
and should therefore be held liable under the Revised Penal Code.
Asked whether the government would be providing drugs such as Oxytocin. Senator Cayetano
(P) said that health care providers involved in childbirth have expressed their desire to have
access to such drugs because these are essential medicines that could actually improve
maternal mortality rate since it could enable them to immediately save the life of a child.
However, she underscored the importance of ensuring that the FDA would be very strict on its
use.
At this juncture, Senator Sotto asked Senator Lacson what his particular proposed amendment
would be, Senator Lacson replied that he would like to insert a provision, subject to style, that
would ensure that the drugs cannot be used as abortifacients but they can be used for the
purpose for which they were introduced in the market. Senator Sotto suggested that the Body be
presented with the actual text of the amendment before it approves it. (Emphasis supplied)
As can be seen, the purpose of including the subject products and supplies in the EDL is their
importance in treating certain diseases and/or their use as life-saving drugs. Yet, at the same
time, these products and supplies can be used as abortifacients.
The inclusion of these products and supplies in the EDL, under Section 9 of the RH Law, will
necessarily present numerous challenges. On the one hand, the State has a substantial interest
in making available the subject products and supplies in order to treat various diseases and, in
some instances, these products and supplies are necessary to save lives. On the other hand, by
allowing the subject products and supplies to be included in the EDL, the right to life of the
unborn may be jeopardized if access to these products and supplies are easily obtained by
unscrupulous individuals.
The answer to the problem was touched on during the legislative deliberations. It lies in the strict
regulation of these products and supplies. The IRR states:
Section 8.03 Review of &isting Guidelines. Within thirty (30) days from the effectivity of these
Rules, the DOH shall review its existing guidelines for the procurement and distribution of
reproductive health supplies and products including life-saving drugs, and shall issue new
guidelines that are consistent with these Rules.
xxxx
Section 8.08 Logistics Management. The DOH shall be responsible for the transportation,
storage, and distribution of reproductive health products and supplies to their respective
destinations. Upon delivery to the local government units, the respective provincial, city, and/or
municipal health officers shall assume responsibility for the supplies and shall ensure their
prompt, continuous, and equitable distribution to all the applicable hospitals, health centers, or
clinics within their respective areas of responsibility, taking into consideration existing storage
facilities and other factors that may hinder the effective distribution/use of the said supplies.
The DOH shall designate a regional officer to oversee the supply chain management of
reproductive health supplies and/or health products in his or her respective area, as assigned by
the DOH The officer shall promote speedy and efficient delivery of supplies, with the end goal of
expedited distribution of quality-checked health products to the local government units. Towards
this end, innovations on logistics and supply management, such as direct delivery of goods to the
points of distribution, consistent with the intent and scope of these Rules shall be encouraged.
Provided, That where practicable, the DOH or LGUs may engage civil society organizations or
private sector distributors to accomplish the intent of this provision subject to the provisions of
applicable rules and regulations.
Within sixty (60) days from the effectivity of these Rules, the DOH shall issue guidelines for the
implementation of this provision.
Section 8.09 LGU-initiated Procurement. An LGU may implement its own procurement,
distribution and monitoring program consistent with these Rules and the guidelines of the DOH.
Clearly, then, the primary responsibility for the regulation of the subject products and supplies
lies with the DOH. It is not certain whether the DOH has issued the rules and regulations relative
to the purchase and distribution of these products and supplies. The Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) issued by this Court may have pre-empted the issuance of the subject guidelines
relative to the purchase and distribution of these products and supplies.
But, again, pursuant to the expanded jurisdiction of this Court and as a penumbra of its power to
issue rules for the protection and enforcement of the right to life of the unborn as well as the
exceptional need to protect such life, the Court can require that, in the promulgation by the DOH
of the subject rules and regulations or guidelines, certain minimum requirements of due process
shall be followed.
I find that, under these premises, publication, notice and hearing should precede the issuance of
the rules and regulations or guidelines which will govern the purchase and distribution of the
subject products and supplies. In other words, there should be public hearings and/or
consultations. The Solicitor General should be mandated to represent the unborn and the State's
interest in the protection of the life of the unborn in these proceedings before the DOH. And
interested parties should be allowed to intervene.
Concededly, the DOH shall issue the rules and regulations or guidelines pursuant to its quasi-
legislative (not quasi-judicial) powers, however, again, there is no obstacle to requiring that this
rule-making process be subjected to a higher degree of due process, considering that the
requirements of publication, notice and hearing are mandated in, say, the issuance of tax
regulations where the lesser right to property is involved. With far greater reason should
publication, notice and hearing be mandated because the subject rules will ultimately impact the
right to life of the unborn. Also, while the Court cannot order the DOH to submit the subject rules
for the Court's appropriate action since it involves a quasi-legislative function, there is nothing to
prevent an aggrieved party from challenging the subject rules upon its issuance, ifthe
circumstances warrant, based on grave abuse of discretion under the Court's expanded
jurisdiction.
The rules and regulations or guidelines should provide sufficient detail as to how the subject
products and supplies will be purchased and distributed or dispensed: what these products and
supplies are, who shall be authorized to purchase them; who shall be authorized to store them;
who shall be authorized to distribute or dispense them; the limits of what can be distributed or
dispensed by particular individuals or entities; how the distribution or dispensation shall be strictly
regulated; how accountability shall be enforced; and so forth.
Admittedly, the formulation of the proper rules and regulations or guidelines will necessarily
present numerous challenges. The possible difficulties were already brought out in the afore-
cited legislative deliberations.
Take the example of the girl with acne. The drug that is needed to treat the acne is an
abortifacient. Several challenges will face the regulator in this regard. If the drug is given to her
by prescription, nothing will prevent the girl, upon purchasing the drug, to give such drug to her
pregnant friend who intends to have an abortion. One option that the regulator has is to require
that the drug be personally administered by her (the girl's) physician so that there is no danger
that the drug could be misused by the girl. The regulator must weigh whether the protection of
the life of the unborn is greater than the inconvenience imposed on the girl of having to frequent
the clinic of her physician so that the drug can be personally administered to her. Here, the
answer is obvious although there may be other means of regulation that can achieve the same
end. Or take the example of health workers being given life-saving drugs which may also be
used as abortifacients. The regulator now faces the challenge of how to make sure that the
health worker does not abuse the life-saving drugs that will be placed in his or her control and
possession. This would involve, among others, strict monitoring and inventory procedures.
I do not intend to provide definite answers to the challenges that will face regulators relative to
the regulation of the subject products and supplies. My goal is a modest one: to point out the
difficulty and complexity of the problem of regulating these products and supplies. This provides
greater reason why a higher level of due process is necessary in the proceedings which will
result to the issuance of the rules and regulations or guidelines relative to the purchase and
distribution or dispensation of the subject products and supplies. For very easily, given the
complexity or difficulty of the problem of regulation, the interests of the unborn may be relegated
to the sidelines.
In fine, the afore-discussed minimum due process requirements are the only meaningful way to
give effect to the constitutional right to life of the unborn from conception/fertilization under the
premises. It is worth repeating, as elsewhere stated, that the unborn cannot represent itself in the
DOH's rule-making process which will ultimately bear upon its very right to life. Without the
utmost care, transparency and proper representation of the unborn in the DOH's proceedings,
which will result to the issuance of rules and regulations or guidelines on the purchase and
distribution of the subject products and supplies, it is not difficult to discern how easily the right to
life of the unborn may be trampled upon.
Pending the issuance and publication of these rules by the DOH, the TRO insofar as the proviso
in Section 9 of the RH Law, as implemented by Section 7.03 of the IRR, relative to the subject
39
products and supplies, which are made available on the condition that they will not be used as an
abortifacient, should remain in force.
OTHER ISSUES
With respect to the other constitutional issues raised in this case, I state my position in what
follows- concurring in some, dissenting in others- relative to the results reached by the ponencia:
The ponencia ruled that the RH Law adequately protects the right to health.
While I agree that the right to health is not violated, I wish to address here
in greater detail petitioners claims.
Article II, Section 15 in relation to Article XIII, Sections 11 to 13 of the Constitution provides:
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.
xxxx
Health
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health
development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services
available to all people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the
underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide
free medical care to paupers.
Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory system
and undertake appropriate health manpower development and research, responsive to the
country's health needs and problems.
Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled persons for rehabilitation,
self-development and self-reliance, and their integration into the mainstream of society.
The right to health is, thus, recognized as a fundamental right.
Petitioners argue that the contraceptives that will be made available under the RH Law have
grave side-effects that will adversely affect the users, especially women, in violation of the right
to health.
I find petitioners' argument unavailing.
While indeed the RH Law will make available contraceptives that may have harmful side-effects,
it is necessary to remember that the law does not impose their use upon any person.
Understandably, from petitioners' point of view, it would seem "irrational" for (1) a person to take
contraceptives, which have known harmful side effects and, in the long term, even lead to
premature death, and (2) the government to subsidize the same in order to prevent pregnancy or
to properly space childbearing given that there are other safer means and methods of family
planning. But the weighing of which value is superior to the other is a matter left to the
individual's sound judgment and conscience. It is his or her choice; an axiom of liberty; an
attribute of free will. Men and women are free to make choices that harm themselves, like
cigarette-smoking or excessive intake of alcohol, in order to attain a value that they perceive is
more important than their own health and well-being. For as long as these choices are made
freely (and do not harm the unborn from conception/fertilization insofar as this case is
concerned), the State cannot intervene beyond ensuring that the choices are well-informed
absent a clear and unequivocal constitutional or statutory command permitting it to do so.
40
Under the RH Law, there is nothing to suggest that the contraceptives will be made available
without properly informing the target users of their possible harmful side effects. The law itself
mandates complete information-dissemination and severely penalizes deliberate misinformation.
Section 19(c) of the RH Law in relation to Sections 7.07 to 7.11 of the IRR cover this concern,
viz:
SEC. 19. Duties and Responsibilities. – x x x
(c) The FDA shall issue strict guidelines with respect to the use of contraceptives, taking into
consideration the side effects or other hannful effects of their use.
Section 7.07 Technical Requirements for Family Planning Products. Technical requirements for
applications for product registration shall include a product insert or information leaflet for the
consumers and health care providers. Appropriate information for the consumers, as determined
by the FDA, shall be written in Filipino and/or local languages, as appropriate. The text or
wording shall be in layman's terms. Graphics shall be used as appropriate for emphasis or
guidance of the consumer using the product: Provided, That highly technical information such as
medical terminology may be retained in its English version.
At a minimum, the information on the insert or leaflet for consumers or health professional/worker
shall include the name of the product, pharmacological category (when applicable), use or
indication, proper use, contraindications and any precaution or health warning, and possible side
effects and potential health risks. Side effects, adverse effects and other possible health effects
shall be clearly described.
Within thirty (30) days from the effectivity of these Rules, the FDA shall develop guidelines for the
implementation of this provision.
Section 7.08 Provision of Product Iriformation. The FDA shall provide the public access to
information regarding a registered reproductive health product. Among others, the FDA shall post
in its website all approved reproductive health products (generic and branded) with all relevant
information relevant to proper use, safety and effectiveness of the product, including possible
side effects and adverse reactions or events. As appropriate, the FDA shall issue an advisory to
inform the consumers about relevant developments regarding these products.
Section 7.09 Post-Marketing Surveillance. All reproductive health products shall be subjected to
Post-Marketing Surveillance (PMS) in the country. The PMS shall include, but not be limited to:
examining the health risk to the patient, and the risk of pregnancy because of contraceptive
failure.
The FDA shall have a sub-unit dedicated to reproductive health products under the Adverse Drug
Reaction Unit who will monitor and act on any adverse reaction or event reported by consumers
and health professionals or workers. The system for reporting adverse drug reactions/events
shall include online reporting at the FDA and DOH website, along with established reporting
mechanisms, among others.
Companies with registered products shall be required to have a Post-Marketing Surveillance

department, division, section, unit, or group that will monitor and investigate all health-related
reactions or risks, or failure of the product to prevent pregnancy.
Section 7.10 Product Monitoring. To ensure the stability, safety, and efficacy of reproductive
health products, the FDA shall oversee the provider and/or distributor's compliance with proper
distribution, storage, and handling protocols. This shall be done in coordination with private or
public reproductive health programs, and the company providing the supplies. The FDA
inspectors shall inspect outlets for proper storage and handling of products and supplies, and act
on complaints in the field in coordination with the office of the Deputy Director General for Field
Office.
Section 7.11 Renewal of Product Registration. In the renewal of product registration of

reproductive health products, the FDA shall consider, among others, the following: the Adverse
Drug Reaction I Adverse Event Reports, PMS reports, and studies on the safety and
effectiveness conducted by the PMS unit of the product company.
Section 7.12 Denial or Revocation of Product Registration. After the careful evaluation of PMS
data and other supporting evidence, the FDA shall deny or revoke the registration of reproductive
health products that are ineffective or have undesired side effects that may be found during
testing, clinical trials and their general use.
We must, thus, reasonably presume that the health service provider will adequately inform the
potential users of the contraceptives as to its possible hannful side effects. In any event,
petitioners may come before the courts, at the proper time, if, in the implementation of the law,
the right to health of the users of the contraceptives are not properly protected because they are
given inaccurate information on the contraceptives' possible harmful effects.
3 - Freedom of Religion
3.a - Establishment Clause
I agree with the ponencia that the RH Law does not violate the Establishment Clause for the
reasons stated in the ponencia.
3.b - Free Exercise Clause vis-a-vis

the Duty to Inform [Section 23(a)(l)) and
the Duty to Refer [Section 23(a)(3))
I shall jointly discuss the constitutional validity of the duty to inform and duty to refer under the
RH Law because they are intricately related to each other.
The ponencia ruled that the duty to inform and duty to refer imposed on the conscientious
objector is unconstitutional for being violative of the Free Exercise of Religion Clause, to wit:
Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free exercise
clause of the conscientious objectors, however few in number. Only the prevention of an
immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the
infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy
of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable.
xx xx
Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in
the perceived scenario of the subject provisions. After all, a couple who plans the timing, number
and spacing of the birth of their children refers to a future event that is contingent on whether or
not the mother decides to adopt or use the information, product, method or supply given to her or
whether she decides to become pregnant at all. On the other hand, the burden placed upon
those who object to contraceptive use is immediate and occurs the moment a patient seeks
consultation on reproductive health matters.
Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the infringement of the
conscientious objector's religious freedom, the respondent have failed to demonstrate "the
gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests" which could limit or override a person's
fundamental right to religious freedom. Also, the respondents has not presented any government
effort exerted to show that the means it seeks to achieve its legitimate state objective is the least
intrusive means. Other than the assertion that the act ofreferring would only be momentary,
considering that the act of referral by conscientious objector is the very action being contested as
violative of religious freedom, it behooves the respondents to demonstrate that no other means
can be undertaken by the State to achieve its objective without violating the rights of the
conscientious objector. The health concerns of women may still be addressed by other
practitioners who may perform reproductive health-related procedures with open willingness and
motivation. Suffice it to say, a person who is forced to perform an act in utter reluctance deserves
the protection of the Court as the last vanguard of constitutional freedoms.
xxxx
The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from being obligated to
render reproductive health service and modem family planning methods, includes exemption
from being obligated to give reproductive health information and to render reproductive health
procedures. Clearly, subject to the qualifications and exemptions earlier discussed, the right to
be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family
planning methods, necessarily includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive
health information and to render reproductive health procedures. The terms "service" and
"methods" are broad enough to include the providing of information and the rendering of medical
procedures. 41
I agree that the duty to refer, under pain of penal liability, placed on the conscientious objector is
unconstitutional, however, I find that the conscientious objector's duty to inform is constitutional.
To place the Free Exercise of Religion Clause challenge in its proper context, it is necessary to
distinguish two key concepts in the RH Law: (1) the duty to inform, and (2) the duty to refer.
The main provisions on the duty to inform and duty to refer vis-a-vis the conscientious objector
42
is found in Section 23(a)(l) in relation to 23(a)(3) of the RH Law, viz:
SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are prohibited:
(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination thereof, and/or intentionally
provide incorrect information regarding programs and services on reproductive health including
the right to informed choice and access to a full range of legal, medically-safe, non-abortifacient
and effective family planning methods;
xxxx
(3) Refuse to extend quality health care services and information on account of the person's
marital status, gender, age, religious convictions, personal circumstances, or nature of work:
Provided, That the conscientious objection of a health care service provider based on his/her
ethical or religious beliefs shall be respected; however, the conscientious objector shall
immediately refer the person seeking such care and services to another health care service
provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible: Provided, farther, That
the person is not in an emergency condition or serious case as defined in Republic Act No. 8344,
which penalizes the refusal of hospitals and medical clinics to administer appropriate initial
medical treatment and support in emergency and senous cases;
The duty to inform is embodied in the above-quoted Section 23(a)(1), which penalizes a public or
private health care service provider for: (1) knowingly withholding information or restricting the
dissemination of information, and/or (2) intentionally providing incorrect information; where
"information" pertains to the programs and services on reproductive health including the right to
informed choice and access to a full range of legal, medically-safe, non-abortifacient and
effective family planning methods.
This provision, thus, seeks to ensure that all persons, who are qualified to avail of the benefits
provided by the law, shall be given complete and correct information on the reproductive health
programs and services of the government under the RH Law. It does not provide any exception
to the duty to inform. Thus, a conscientious objector is mandated to provide complete and correct
information even if this will include information on artificial contraceptives to which he or she
objects to on religious grounds. Otherwise, he or she shall suffer the penal liability under the law.
The duty to refer, on the other hand, is provided in the proviso of Section 23(a)(3), which is
likewise quoted above. This provision penalizes a public or private health care service provider
for refusing to extend quality health care services and information on account of a person's
marital status, gender, age, religious convictions, personal circumstances, or nature of work.
However, it respects the right of the conscientious objector by permitting him or her to refuse to
perform or provide the health care services to which he or she objects to on religious or ethical
grounds provided that he or she immediately refers the person seeking such care and services to
another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently
accessible. As an exception to the exception, the conscientious objector cannot refuse to perform
or provide such health care services if it involves an emergency condition or serious case under
Republic Act No. 8344. 43
It should be noted that the first sentence of Section 23(a)(3) of the RH Law refers to the refusal to
extend quality health care services and information. However, the proviso in the aforesaid
section, which imposes the duty to refer on the conscientious objector, is limited to referring the
person to another health care service provider for purposes of availing health care services only,
not health care services and information. The implication is that the conscientious objector is
required to provide complete and correct information, and, in the event that the person asks for
health care services that the conscientious objector objects to on religious or ethical grounds, the
conscientious objector has the duty to refer the person to another health care service provider.
This interpretation is in accord with the wording of Section 23(a)(1) of the RH Law, which
provides no exceptions to the duty to inform.
It should be further noted, and not insignificantly, that Section 23(a)(3) of the RH Law does not
state that the conscientious objector should refer the person to another health care service
provider who can perform or provide the heath care services to which the conscientious objector
objects to on religious or ethical grounds. Thus, a literal reading of this provision would permit the
conscientious objector to refer the person to another health care service provider who is himself
a conscientious objector. The IRR attempts to fill this ambiguity in Section 5.24(b) to (e) thereof,
viz:
Section 5.24 Public Skilled Health Professional as a Conscientious Objector. In order to legally
refuse to deliver reproductive health care services or information as a conscientious objector, a
public skilled health professional shall comply with the following requirements:
xxxx
b) Extraordinary diligence shall be exerted to refer the client seeking care to another
skilled health professional or volunteer willing and capable of delivering the desired
reproductive health care service within the same facility;
c) If within the same health facility, there is no other skilled health professional or
volunteer willing and capable of delivering the desired reproductive health care service,
the conscientious objector shall refer the client to another specific health facility or
provider that is conveniently accessible in consideration of the client's travel
arrangements and financial capacity;
d) Written documentation of compliance with the preceding requirements; and
In the event where the public skilled health professional cannot comply with all of the above
requirements, he or she shall deliver the client's desired reproductive health care service or
information without further delay. x x x
This notwithstanding, and for purposes of the succeeding discussion on the Free Exercise of
Religion Clause, the necessary premise is that the duty to refer involves referring the person to
another health care service provider who will perform or provide the health care services to which
the conscientious objector objects to on religious or ethical grounds. Though this is not explicitly
stated in the RH Law, the law must be so reasonably construed given the policy of the law to
provide universal access to modem methods of family planning.
As noted earlier, the duty to inform and the duty to refer are intricately related. The reason is that
the duty to inform will normally precede the duty to refer. The process of availing reproductive
health programs and services under the RH Law may be divided into two phases.
In the first phase, the person, who goes to a health service provider to inquire about the
government's reproductive health programs and services under the RH Law, will be provided
with complete and correct information thereon, including the right to informed choice and access
to a full range of legal, medically-safe, non-abortifacient and effective family planning methods.
In the second phase, after receiving the information, the person would then ordinarily reach a
decision on which reproductive health programs and services, if any, he or she wishes to avail.
Once he or she makes a decision, he or she now asks the health service provider where and
how he or she can avail of these programs or services.
From the point of view of the health care service provider, the first phase involves the
transmission of information. Petitioners claim that this act of giving complete and correct
information, including information on artificial contraceptives, imposes a burden on a
conscientious objector, like a Catholic doctor, because he or she is required to give information
on artificial contraceptives which he or she believes to be immoral or wrong.
I disagree.
Petitioners failed to convincingly show that the act of giving complete and correct information,
including those on artificial contraceptives, burdens a Catholic doctor's religious . beliefs. Note
that the law merely requires the health service provider to give complete and correct information.
Presumably this can even be done by simply giving the person a handout containing the list of
the government's reproductive health programs and services under the RH Law. The valid
secular purpose of the duty to inform is readily apparent and the State interest in ensuring
complete and correct information is direct and substantial in order that the person may make an
informed and free choice.
The law does not command the health service provider to endorse a particular family planning
method but merely requires the presentation of complete and correct information so that the
person can make an informed choice. A conscientious objector, like a Catholic doctor, is, thus,
not compelled to endorse artificial contraceptives as the preferred family planning method. On its
face, therefore, there appears to be no burden imposed on the conscientious objector under the
duty to inform.
To my mind, to successfully claim that a conscientious objector, like a Catholic doctor, is

burdened by the duty to inform, petitioners should have demonstrated that, for a Catholic doctor,
the mere mention of artificial contraceptives (what they are and how they work) to the person is
immoral under the tenets of the Catholic faith. In the case at bar, petitioners failed to carry this
onus. Moreover, after providing the complete and correct information as mandated by the RH
Law, there is nothing to prevent the conscientious objector, like a Catholic doctor, from speaking
against artificial contraceptives on religious or ethical grounds because the RH Law cannot
curtail freedom of speech; the Constitution is deemed written into the law.
For the foregoing reasons, I find that petitioners failed to clearly show that the act of giving
complete and correct information on reproductive health programs and services under the RH
Law burdens a conscientious objector's religious beliefs. Thus, I find that the duty to inform under
Section 23(a)(l) of the RH Law is constitutional even with respect to the conscientious objector. In
other words, the conscientious objector has the duty to inform under the aforesaid section.
I now turn to the duty to refer. As already mentioned, I reach an opposite result here. The central
reason is that the second phase involves a crucial distinguishing feature from the first phase. In
the first phase, the person merely receives the complete and correct information from the health
service provider but, in the second case, the person now decides to act on the information. He or
she makes a decision to avail of one or more of the government's reproductive health programs
and services under the RH Law. In case the person seeks to avail of a program or service which
the conscientious objector objects to on religious or ethical grounds, Section 23(a)(3) imposes on
the conscientious objector the duty to refer the person to a health service provider who can
perform or provide such program and service.
This is an entirely different scenario. The person has already made a decision and now seeks to
accomplish an act which the conscientious objector considers immoral or wrong on religious or
ethical grounds. When the RH Law compels the conscientious objector to make such a referral,
under pain of penal liability, the religious or ethical beliefs of the conscientious objector is clearly
burdened because he or she is made to either (1) join in this intention or (2) aid in the
accomplishment of this intention which he or she considers immoral or wrong.
To illustrate, a Catholic doctor, who objects to the use of artificial contraceptives, is compelled to
refer a person who seeks such services to another health care service provider who will, in turn,
perform or provide services related to artificial contraception. In such a case, the Catholic doctor
is effectively commanded to either (1) join in the intention of the person to use artificial
contraceptives or (2) aid in the accomplishment of this intention. From another perspective, the
Catholic doctor may view the referral as an essential link in the chain of events which would lead
to the availment of the person of such artificial contraceptives.
Consequently, in the above scenario, I am of the view that the religious or ethical beliefs of the
conscientious objector are clearly burdened by the duty to refer, thus, calling for the application
of the test enunciated in Estrada v. Escritor, to wit:
44
1. The sincerity and centrality of the religious belief and practice;
2. The State's compelling interest to override the conscientious objector's religious belief
and practice; and
3. The means the State adopts in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to the
exercise of religious: freedom. 45
Anent the first test, insofar as the Catholic health service provider is concerned vis-a-vis the use
of artificial contraceptives, I find that petitioners have met the sincerity and centrality test. The
Catholic Church's teaching on the use of artificial contraceptives as immoral, evil or sin is of time
immemorial and well documented. Its sincerity and centrality to the Catholic faith cannot be
seriously doubted as a papal encyclical, Humanae Vitae, has even been principally devoted to
re-stating or expressing the Catholic Church's teaching on artificial contraceptives, to wit:
Faithfulness to God's Design
13. Men rightly observe that a conjugal act imposed on one's partner without regard to his or her
condition or personal and reasonable wishes in the matter, is no true act of love, and therefore
offends the moral order in its particular application to the intimate relationship of husband and
wife. If they further reflect, they must also recognize that an act of mutual love which impairs the
capacity to transmit life which God the Creator, through specific laws, has built into it, frustrates
His design which constitutes the norm of marriage, and contradicts the will of the Author of life.
Hence to use this divine gift while depriving it, even if only partially, of its meaning and purpose,
is equally repugnant to the nature of man and of woman, and is consequently in opposition to the
plan of God and His holy will. But to experience the gift of married love while respecting the laws
of conception is to acknowledge that one is not the master of the sources of life but rather the
minister of the design established by the Creator. Just as man does not have unlimited dominion
over his body in general, so also, and with more particular reason, he has no such dominion over
his specifically sexual faculties, for these are concerned by their very nature with the generation
of life, of which God is the source. "Human life is sacred- all men must recognize that fact," Our
predecessor Pope John XXIII recalled. "From its very inception it reveals the creating hand of
God." (13)
Unlawful Birth Control Methods
14. Therefore We base Our words on the first principles of a human and Christian doctrine of
marriage when We are obliged once more to declare that the direct interruption of the generative
process already begun and, above all, all direct abortion, even for therapeutic reasons, are to be
absolutely excluded as lawful means of regulating the number of children. (14) Equally to be
condemned, as the magisterium of the Church has affirmed on many occasions, is direct
sterilization, whether of the man or of the woman, whether permanent or temporary. (15)
Similarly excluded is any action which either before, at the moment of, or after sexual
intercourse, is specifically intended to prevent procreation-whether as an end or as a means. (16)
Neither is it valid to argue, as a justification for sexual intercourse which is deliberately

contraceptive, that a lesser evil is to be preferred to a greater one, or that such intercourse would
merge with procreative acts of past and future to form a single entity, and so be qualified by
exactly the same moral goodness as these. Though it is true that sometimes it is lawful to
tolerate a lesser moral evil in order to avoid a greater evil or in order to promote a greater good,"
it is never lawful, even for the gravest reasons, to do evil that good may come of it (18)-in other
words, to intend directly something which of its very nature contradicts the moral order, and
which must therefore be judged unworthy of man, even though the intention is to protect or
promote the welfare of an individual, of a family or of society in general. Consequently, it is a
serious error to think that a whole married life of otherwise normal relations can justify sexual
intercourse which is deliberately contraceptive and so intrinsically wrong. 46
Because petitioners have met the first test, the burden shifts to the government to meet the last
two tests in order for the constitutional validity of the duty to refer to pass muster.
Anent the second test, the government failed to establish a compelling State interest to justify the
duty to refer under pain of penalty. The purpose of the duty to refer is to facilitate the availment of
the government's reproductive health programs and services. That is, it is logically more
convenient that, after receiving complete and correct information on the government's
reproductive health programs and services from a conscientious objector, the person should be
readily referred to another health service provider who can perform or provide the chosen
program or service to which the conscientious objector objects to on religious grounds.
The primary State interest, therefore, that the duty to refer serves is the facility of availing such
programs and services or, in short, the person's convenience. Put another way, if there were no
duty to refer and, thus, the conscientious objector is allowed to say to the person, "Sorry, I do not
know of and/or cannot refer you to such a health service provider because I would be helping
you to accomplish something that I consider immoral or wrong," then, at most, the person suffers
the inconvenience of having to look for the proper health service provider, on his or her own, who
can provide or perform the chosen program or service. Plainly, the person's convenience cannot
override the conscientious objector's religious freedom; a right founded on respect for the
inviolability of the human conscience. 47
Anent the third test, which is intimately related to the second test, there are clearly other means
to achieve the purpose of the duty to refer. Upon the implementation of the RH Law, through
Sections 5.22, 5.23, and 5.24 of the IRR, the government will already be able to identify both
48 49 50
conscientious objectors and non-conscientious objectors. It can, therefore, map out an effective
strategy to inform all potential patients or target beneficiaries where they can avail of the
complete reproductive health programs and services under the RH Law (which refer simply to the
identity and location of all non-conscientious objector health service providers). This is well-within
the State's administrative and logistical capability given its enormous machinery and the
mandate of Section 20 of the RH Law, which provides that:
"SEC. 20. Public Awareness. - The DOH and the LGUs shall initiate and sustain a heightened
nationwide multimedia-campaign to raise the level of public awareness on the protection and
promotion of reproductive health and rights including, but not limited to, maternal health and
nutrition, family planning and responsible parenthood information and services, adolescent and
youth reproductive health, guidance and counseling and other elements of reproductive health
care under Section 4(q).
Education and information materials to be developed and disseminated for this purpose shall be
reviewed regularly to ensure their effectiveness and relevance."
The information, then, as to which health service provider is not a conscientious objector can
easily be disseminated through the information campaign of the government without having to
burden the conscientious objector with the duty to refer.
Based on the foregoing, the duty to refer fails to meet the criteria set in Estrada v.
Escritor. Thus, it is unconstitutional.
51
Before closing the discussion on the duty to inform and the duty to refer, I wish to highlight the
preferred status that religious freedom occupies in the hierarchy of constitutional rights by way of
analogy. Let us assume that the State promulgates a law which subsidizes the purchase of
weapons due to rising criminality. The law requires store owners, in the business of selling such
weapons, to fully inform their buyers of the available weapons subsidized by the government. A
store owner is, thus, required to inform a buyer that the following are the government subsidized
weapons: knives and guns. The store owner would have no problem acceding to this duty to
inform. But suppose, one day, a buyer comes to his store and says that he wants to buy a gun in
order to kill or murder his neighbor. The store owner, assuming he acts in accordance with his
conscience, would ordinarily refuse to sell the gun. If the law, however, requires the store owner
to refer the buyer to another store where the buyer can avail of this gun, despite the latter's
motive for buying the gun, would this not impose a burden on the conscience of the store owner?
To a non-believer, the matter of the duty to refer relative to, say, artificial contraceptives may
seem too inconsequential to merit constitutional protection. But the Court cannot judge the truth
or falsity of a religious belief nor the seriousness of the consequences that its violation brings
upon the conscience of the believer. For to the believer, referring a person to a health service
provider where the latter can avail of artificial contraceptives may be of the same or similar level
as referring a person to a store owner where he can purchase a gun to kill or murder his
neighbor. It constitutes a breach of his or her covenant relationship with his or her God, and,
thus, affects his or her eternal destiny. That, precisely, is the province of the Free Exercise of
Religion Clause. That the believer may not have to choose between his or her earthly freedom
(imprisonment) and his or her eternal destination.
In view of the foregoing, I find that the duty to refer imposed on the conscientious objector under
Sections 7 and 23(a)(3) of the RH Law is unconstitutional for violating the Free Exercise of
Religion Clause. Consequently, the phrase, "Provided, further, That these hospitals shall
immediately refer the person seeking such care and services to another health facility which is
conveniently accessible," in Section 7 and the phrase, "however, the conscientious objector shall
immediately refer the person seeking such care and services to another health care service
provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible," in Section 23(a)(3) of
the RH Law should be declared void. Consequently, Sections 5.24(b) to (e) and 5.25 of the IRR,
which implements the aforesaid provisions of the RH Law, are void.
In another vein, I agree with the ponencia that the last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the IRR is
ultra vires because it effectively amends Section 4(n) in relation to Section 23(a)(3) of the RH
Law.
Under Section 4(n) of the RH Law, a public health care service provider is defined as follows:
follows:
(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public health care institution, which is duly
licensed and accredited and devoted primarily to the maintenance and operation of facilities for
health promotion, disease prevention, diagnosis, treatment and care of individuals suffering from
illness, disease, injury, disability or deformity, or in need of obstetrical or other medical and
nursing care; (2) public health care professional, who is a doctor of medicine, a nurse or a
midwife; (3) public health worker engaged in the delivery of health care services; or (4) barangay
health worker who has undergone training programs under any accredited government and NGO
and who voluntarily renders primarily health care services in the community after having been
accredited to function as such by the local health board in accordance with the guidelines
promulgated by the Department of Health (DOH).
While last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the IRR states:
Provided, That skilled health professionals such as provincial, city, or municipal health officers,
chiefs of hospital, head nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office
are specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these
Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors. (Emphasis supplied)
The above-enumerated skilled health professionals fall within the definition of a "public health
care service provider" under Section 4(n) of the RH Law. Under Section 23(a)(3) of the RH Law,
both public and private health service providers may invoke the right of a conscientious objector.
The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the IRR is, thus, void insofar as it deprives the skilled
health professionals enumerated therein from the right to conscientious objection.
I also agree with the ponencia that the last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the IRR is
unconstitutional for being violative of the Equal Protection Clause although I find that the proper
standard of review is the strict scrutiny test.
The IRR effectively creates two classes with differential treatment with respect to the capacity to
invoke the right of a conscientious objector: (1) skilled health professionals such as provincial,
city, or municipal health officers, chiefs of hospital, head nurses, supervising midwives, among
others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty to implement the
provisions of the RH Law and its IRR, and (2) skilled health professionals not belonging to (1).
Those belonging to the first class cannot invoke the right of a conscientious objector while those
in the second class are granted that right.
In our jurisdiction, equal protection analysis has generally followed the rational basis test coupled
with a deferential attitude to legislative classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a law absent
a clear and unequivocal showing of a breach of the Constitution. However, when the
52
classification burdens a suspect class or impinges on fundamental rights, the proper standard of
review is the strict scrutiny test.
53
Under the strict scrutiny test, the government must show a compelling or overriding end to justify
either: (1) the limitation on fundamental rights or (2) the implication of suspect classes. The
54
classification will only be upheld if it is shown to be suitably tailored to serve a compelling State
interest. Suspect classes include classifications based on race, nationality, alienage or
55
denominational preference while classifications impinging on fundamental rights include those

affecting marriage, procreation, voting, speech and interstate travel. 56
Here, the classification impinges on the fundamental right of free exercise of religion, as
operationalized through the right of a conscientious objector, which the RH Law recognizes and
respects. The government must, therefore, show that the differential treatment between the first
class and second class of skilled health professionals serves a compelling State interest.
I find that the State has failed to prove how curtailing the right of conscientious objection of those
belonging to the first class will further a compelling State interest. One perceptible reason for
depriving the right of conscientious objection to those belonging to the first class appears to be
the fear that this will paralyze or substantially degrade the effective implementation of the RH
Law considering that these skilled health professionals are employed in public health institutions
and local government units.
This fear rests on at least two assumptions: (1) most, if not all, skilled health professionals
belonging to the first class are conscientious objectors, and (2) the State is incapable of securing
the services of an adequate number of skilled health professionals who are not conscientious
objectors. Both assumptions have not been proven by the State. And, even if it were so proven, it
must be recalled that the right of the conscientious objector is a limited one: he or she may
refuse to perform or provide reproductive health services to which he or she objects to on
religious grounds. In such a case, the solution is for the person to avail of such services
elsewhere. Consequently, the State would now have to show that the inconvenience caused on
the part of the person, who must secure such services elsewhere (which could be as near as the
doctor in the next room or as far-flung as the doctor in another province or region) overrides the
freedom of religion of conscientious objectors belonging to the first class. As earlier noted it is
self-evident that the person's convenience cannot override the freedom of religion of the
conscientious objector; a constitutionally protected right predicated on respect for the inviolability
of the human conscience. (Even if this inconvenience would entail, for example, added
transportation costs, it cannot be seriously argued that one can place a monetary value on the
inviolability of the human conscience.)
Hence, I find that the last paragraph of Section 5 .24 of the IRR is unconstitutional on equal
protection grounds.
3.c- Family Planning Seminars
I agree with the ponencia that Section 15 of the RH Law mandating a family planning seminar as
a condition for the issuance of a marriage license is constitutional for reasons stated in the
ponencia.
4- The Family Planning And The Right To Privacy
4.a. Decision-making by the spouses
I agree with the ponencia that Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law is unconstitutional but for
different reasons.
The ponencia ruled that the aforesaid provision contravenes Article XV, Section 3 of the
Constitution and the constitutional right to privacy of the spouses relative to the decision-making
process on whether one spouse should undergo a reproductive health procedure like tubal
ligation and vasectomy. According to the ponencia, the decision-making process on reproductive
health procedures must involve both spouses, that is, the decision belongs exclusively to both
spouses, in consonance with the right of the spouses to found a family. Otherwise, this will
destroy family unity. Further, this process involves a private matter that the State cannot intrude
into without violating the constitutional right to marital privacy. The spouses must, thus, be left
alone to chart their own destiny.
Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law provides that:
"SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are prohibited:
xxxx
(2) Refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health procedures on any person of
legal age on the ground of lack of consent or authorization of the following persons in the
following instances:
(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: Provided, That in case of disagreement, the
decision of the one undergoing the procedure shall prevail; x x x (Emphasis supplied)
This provision contemplates a situation where the spouses are unable to agree if one of them
should undergo a reproductive health procedure like tubal ligation or vasectomy. It does not
dispense with consulting the other spouse but provides a mechanism to settle the disagreement,
if one should arise.
Indeed, the decision-making process in this area is a delicate and private matter intimately
related to the founding of a family. The matter should, thus, be decided by both spouses under
the assumption that they will amicably settle their differences and forthwith act in the best interest
of the marriage and family. But, as in all relations between and among individuals, irreconcilable
disagreements may arise. The law, therefore, steps in to break the impasse.
The law, however, settles the dispute by giving the spouse, who will undergo the procedure, the
absolute and final authority to decide the matter. The rationale seems to be that the spouse, who
will undergo the procedure, should ultimately make the decision since it involves his or her body.
Like the ponencia, I am of the view that this provision in the RH Law clearly violates Article II,
Section 12 in relation to Article XV, Sections 1 and 3(1) of the Constitution, which are quoted
hereunder:
family as a basic autonomous social institution. x x x
xxxx
Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it
shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development. x x x
xxxx
Section 3. The State shall defend:
(1) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the
demands of responsible parenthood; x x x
Taken together, these constitutional provisions are intended to, among others, prohibit the State
from adopting measures which impair the solidarity of the Filipino family. In particular, Section
57
3(1) explicitly guarantees the right of the spouses to found a family in accordance with their
religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood. This necessarily refers to,
among others, the number of children that the spouses will bring into this world.
The provision speaks of this right as properly belonging to both spouses. The right is, thus,
conferred on both of them and they are to exercise this right jointly. Implicit in this provision is
that the spouses equally possess this right particularly when read in light of Article II, Section
14 of the Constitution which enjoins the State to ensure the fundamental equality before the law
58
of women and men.
Thus, the spouse, who will undergo the reproductive health procedure, cannot be given the
absolute and final authority to decide this matter because it will destroy the solidarity of the
family, in general, and do violence to the equal right of each spouse to found the family in
accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood, in
particular.
My disagreement with the ruling of the ponencia, however, is that it falls on the other extreme.
When the ponencia states that the aforesaid decision-making process must be settled through
the spouses' mutual consent and that the State cannot intrude in such process because of the
right to marital privacy, the implicit result is that the other spouse, who refuses to give his or her
consent, is given the absolute and final authority to decide this matter. In other words, the result
reached by the ponencia is merely the opposite of that under the RH Law. That is, the non-
consenting spouse is effectively given the absolute and final authority in the decision-making
process.
I find this result equally repugnant to the afore-discussed constitutional provisions.
To my mind, the State can intervene in marital rights and obligations when there are genuine and
serious disagreements between the spouses. This is a basic postulate of our Constitution relative
to marriage and family relations as well as our existing family laws and rules of procedure. The
constitutional right to privacy does not apply in this situation because the conflict of rights and
obligations is between one spouse and the other, and does not involve a dispute between the
State and the spouses.
This view is consistent with the provisions of the Family Code on dispute resolution between
spouses which preserves and adheres to the constitutional precept on the solidarity of the family
and the right, belonging to both spouses, to found the family. State intervention, which provides
the solution to the problem, involves calling upon the courts to ultimately settle the dispute in
case of disagreement between the spouses. To illustrate, the Family Code explicitly provides
how disagreements shall be settled in various marital and family relations' controversies, to wit:
ARTICLE 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the
court shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or
there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall
not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family.
xxxx
ARTICLE 73. Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession, occupation, business or
activity without the consent of the other. The latter may object only on valid, serious, and moral
grounds.
In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not:
(1) The objection is proper, and
(2) Benefit has accrued to the family prior to the objection or thereafter. If the benefit
accrued prior to the objection, the resulting obligation shall be enforced against the
separate property of the spouse who has not obtained consent.
The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of creditors who acted in good faith.
xxxx
ARTICLE 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years
from the date of the contract implementing such decision. x x x
xx xx
ARTICLE 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the
persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail,
unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.
xxxx
ARTICLE 225 . The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the
property of their unemancipated common child without the necessity of a court appointment. In
case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the
contrary. (Emphasis supplied)
While there appears to be no law prior to the RH Law specifically dealing with the decision-
making process on undergoing reproductive health procedures by one spouse, there is no
obstacle to the application of the above principle (i.e., "in case of disagreement, the court will
decide") because such decision-making process is properly subsumed in the mass of marital
rights and obligations, and the general principles governing them, provided in our Constitution
and family laws and is, therefore, within the ambit of the judicial power of courts to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. The principle of
59
"in case of disagreement, the court will decide" properly governs how conflicts involving marital
rights and obligations shall be resolved, without giving to one spouse the absolute and final
authority to resolve the conflict, and, thus, preserving the equal right of the spouses to found the
family and maintaining the solidarity of the family in consonance with the Constitution.
Of course, unlike most of the above-quoted Family Code provisions, neither the husband nor
wife's decision in this particular situation can, in the meantime, prevail considering that the
effects of the reproductive health procedures may be permanent or irreversible. Thus, the
decision-making process on undergoing reproductive health procedures by one spouse requires
the consent of both spouses but, in case of disagreement, the courts will decide.
The key principle is that no spouse has the absolute and final authority to decide this matter
because it will run counter to the constitutional edict protecting the solidarity of the family and
equally conferring the right to found the family on both spouses. Consequently, while I agree that
Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law is unconstitutional, the declaration of unconstitutionality should
not be construed as giving the non-consenting spouse the absolute and final authority in the
decision-making process relative to undergoing a reproductive health procedure by one spouse.
The proper state of the law and rules of procedure on the matter is that the decision shall require
the consent of both spouses, and, in case of disagreement, the matter shall be brought before
the courts for its just adjudication.
4.b. - The need of parental consent
I agree with the ponencia that the phrase, "except when the minor is already a parent or has had
a miscarriage," in Section 7 of the RH Law is unconstitutional but for different reasons. This
provision states, in part, that:
SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. – x x x
No person shall be denied information and access to family planning services, whether natural or
artificial: Provided, That minors will not be allowed access to modem methods of family planning
without written consent from their parents or guardian/s except when the minor is already a
parent or has had a miscarriage. (Emphasis supplied)
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states, in part:
family as a basic autonomous social institution. x x x
The description of the family as a "basic" social institution is "an assertion that the family is
anterior to the state and is not a creature of the state" while the reference to the family as
60
"autonomous" is "meant to protect the family against the instrurnentalization by the state." 61
This provision is, thus, a guarantee against unwarranted State intrusion on matters dealing with
family life.
The subject of parental authority and responsibility is specifically dealt with in the last sentence of
the above constitutional provision which reads:
The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency
and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
As a natural right, parental authority is recognized as an inherent right, not created by the State
or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental relationship. More62
important, as pertinent in this controversy, the present Constitution refers to such right as
"primary" which "imports the assertion that the right of parents is superior to that of the state." 63
Title IX of the Family Code is the principal governing law on parental authority. Chapter 3,
Section 220 thereof provides:
Chapter 3. Effect of Parental Authority Upon the Persons of Children
ARTICLE 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with respect to
their unemancipated children or wards the following rights and duties:
(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right precept
and good example, and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means;
(2) To give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and
understanding;
(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty,
integrity, self-discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic
affairs, and inspire in them compliance with the duties of citizenship;
(4) To enhance, protect, preserve and maintain their physical and mental health at all
times;
(5) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their
activities, recreation and association with others, protect them from bad company, and
prevent them from acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies and morals;
(6) To represent them in all matters affecting their interests;
(7) To demand from them respect and obedience;
(8) To impose discipline on them as may be required under the circumstances; and
(9) To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon parents and guardians.
As can be seen from the foregoing, the constitutional and statutory recognition of parental
authority (for as afore-stated such authority precedes the State and laws) is broad and indivisible,
full and complete in all matters relating to the rearing and care of minors in order to promote their
welfare and best interest. Further, the deprivation or loss of parental authority, which is governed
by the judicial process, arises only in exceptional cases when the best interest of the minor so
requires. There is, therefore, an inherent public policy recognizing the necessity of keeping
parental authority intact and shielding it from undue State intrusion or interference.
Viewed in this light, Section 7 of the RH Law is a radical departure from the afore-discussed
public policy as embodied in our Constitution and family laws. The decision on access to modem
methods of family planning by minors evidently falls within the ambit of parental authority, in
general, and Article 220 of the Family Code, in particular, which recognizes the parents' right and
duty to provide advice and counsel, moral and spiritual guidance, as well as to protect, preserve
and maintain the minor's physical and mental health. It cannot be doubted that the use of modem
methods of family planning by a minor will greatly impact his or her physical, mental, moral,
social and spiritual life. And yet Section 7 would exempt such a decision by a minor, who is
already a parent or has had a miscarriage, from parental authority by allowing access to modem
methods of family planning without parental consent.
I find that this proviso in the RH Law is unconstitutional in view of the nature and scope of
parental authority.
Because parental authority is a constitutionally recognized natural and primary right of the
parents, with emphasis on "primary" as giving parents a superior right over the State, the State
cannot carve out an exception to such authority without showing or providing a sufficiently
compelling State interest to do so. A limited but blanket exception from parental authority, such
as that found in Section 7 of the RH Law, will undoubtedly destroy the solidarity of the family as
well as foster disrespect and disobedience on the part of the minor. It disrupts the natural state of
parent-child relationship and is wholly inconsistent with the pUtpose and essence of parental
authority granting the parents the natural and primary right in all matters relating to the rearing
and care of the minor in order to safeguard his or her well-being.
In the case at bar, the State failed to prove such sufficiently compelling State interest. The
rationale of Section 7 seems to be that a minor, who is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage, by reason of such fact alone, automatically and definitively attains a level of maturity
that demands that he or she no longer be placed under the parental authority of his or her
parents relative to decisions involving access to modem methods of family planning. However,
there is no basis to reach this conclusion. The State has provided none. And the opposite is
probably more true; in that the early parenthood or miscarriage of the minor is a sign of
immaturity which, therefore, necessitates greater parental guidance, supervision and support for
the minor, including decisions relative to access to modem methods of family planning. This is
especially true in the case of the minor who faces the early prospect of raising a child or children.
Further, if the pUtpose of Section 7 of the RH Law is to uphold the interest of the minor, who is
already a parent or has had a miscarriage, from his or her parents who unjustifiably withholds
consent for him or her to have access to modem methods of family planning, there are less
intrusive means to achieve this pUtpose considering that a judicial remedy, where the courts can
look into the particular circumstances of a case and decide thereon based on the best interest of
the minor, may be availed of by the minor.
The State has, therefore, not only failed to prove a sufficiently compelling State interest to carve
out an exception to the constitutionally recognized parental authority of parents but also failed to
prove that the apparent goal of this provision cannot be attained by less intrusive means. Hence,
Section 7 of the RH Law, particularly the phrase, "except when the minor is already a parent or
has had a miscarriage," is unconstitutional for violating the natural and primary right of parents in
rearing their minor children as recognized under Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution.
Additionally, the distinction based on the predicament of the minor, as already being a parent or
has had a miscarriage, vis-a-vis the requirement of parental consent on matters relating to
access to modem methods of family planning is unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. A
parallel standard of review leads to the same end result.
The proviso in Section 7 of the RH Law effectively creates two groups with varying treatments:
(1) minors who are already parents or have had a miscarriage, and (2) minors who are not
parents or have not had a miscarriage. The first group is exempt from parental consent while the
second is not.
For convenience, I reproduce below the baseline principles on equal protection analysis which I
utilized in a previous section:
In our jurisdiction, equal protection analysis has generally followed the rational basis test coupled
with a deferential attitude to legislative classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a law absent
a clear and unequivocal showing of a breach of the Constitution. However, when the
classification burdens a suspect class or impinges on fundamental rights, the proper standard of
review is the strict scrutiny test.
Under the strict scrutiny test, the government must show a compelling or overriding end to justify
(1) the limitation on fundamental rights or (2) the implication of suspect classes. The
classification will only be upheld if it is shown to be suitably tailored to serve a compelling State
interest. Suspect classes include classifications based on race or nationality while classifications
impinging on fundamental rights include those affecting marriage, procreation, voting, speech
and interstate travel.
As stated earlier, the fundamental right involving the parental authority of parents over their minor
children is unduly limited by the proviso in Section 7 of the RH Law, thus, calling for the
application of the strict scrutiny test. The government must show that a compelling State interest
justifies the curtailment of parental authority of parents whose minor children belong to the first
group (i.e., minors who are already parents or have had a miscarriage) vis-a-vis parents whose
minor children belong to the second group (i.e., minors who are not parents or have not had a
miscarriage). However, for reasons already discussed as to the maturity level of such group of
minors and the apparent purpose of the subject legal provision, the government has failed to
show such compelling State interest. Hence, the phrase "except when the minor is already a
parent or has had a miscarriage" in Section 7 of the RH Law is, likewise, unconstitutional on
equal protection grounds.
4.c- Access to information
I agree with the ponencia that there is nothing unconstitutional about the capacity of a minor to
access information on family planning services under Section 7 of the RH Law for the reasons
stated in the ponencia. In addition, for practical reasons, the State or parents of the minor cannot
prevent or restrict access to such information considering that they will be readily available on
various platforms of media, if they are not already available at present. It is only when the minor
decides to act on the information by seeking access to the family planning services themselves
that parental authority cannot be dispensed with (as discussed in a previous section).
5- Age-And Development-Appropritate Reproductive Health Education
I agree with the ponencia that the constitutional challenge against Section 1464 of the RH Law is
unavailing insofar as it is claimed to violate Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution on the natural
and primary right and duty of parents to rear their children. Indeed, the State has a substantial
interest in the education of the youth. Pursuant to its police power, the State may regulate the
content of the matters taught to adolescents particularly with respect to reproductive health
education in order to, among others, propagate proper attitudes and behavior relative to human
sexuality and sexual relations as well as properly prepare the young for marriage and family life.
The topics to be covered by the curriculum include values formation; knowledge and skills in self-
protection against discrimination; sexual abuse and violence against women and children and
other forms of gender based violence and teen pregnancy; physical, social and emotional
changes in adolescents; women's rights and children's rights; responsible teenage behavior;
gender and development; and responsible parenthood. The curriculum is, thus, intended to
achieve valid secular objectives. As the ponencia aptly noted, the RH Law seeks to supplement,
not supplant, the natural and primary right and duty of parents to rear their children.
Further, the constitutional challenge against Section 14 relative to the Free Exercise of Religion
Clause is premature because, as noted by the ponencia, the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports (DECS) has yet to formulate the curriculum on age- and development-appropriate
reproductive health education. A Free Exercise of Religion Clause challenge would necessarily
require the challenger to state what specific religious belief of his or hers is burdened by the
subject curriculum as well as the specific content of the curriculum he or she objects to on
religious grounds. Moreover, the proper party to mount such a challenge would be the student
and/or his or her parents upon learning of the specific content of the curriculum and upon
deciding what aspects of their religious beliefs are burdened. It would be inappropriate for the
Court to speculate on these aspects of a potential Free Exercise of Religion Clause litigation
involving a curriculum that has yet to be formulated by the DECS.
As to the equal protection challenge against Section 14, I agree with the ponencia that there are
substantial distinctions between public and private educational institutions which justify the
optional teaching of reproductive health education in private educational institutions. (By giving
private educational institutions the option to adopt the curriculum to be formulated by the DECS,
the RH Law effectively makes the teaching of reproductive health education in private
educational institutions optional because the aforesaid institutions may completely discard such
curriculum).
However, I disagree that the academic freedom of private educational institutions should be a
basis of such justification. Article XIV, Section 5(2) of the Constitution provides that, "[a]cademic
freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning." Thus, only institutions of higher
learning enjoy academic freedom. Considering that the students who will be subjected to
reproductive health education are adolescents or "young people between the ages often (10) to
nineteen (19) years who are in transition from childhood to adulthood," then this would
65
presumably be taught in elementary and high schools which are not covered by academic
freedom.
Nonetheless, I agree with the ponencia that, by effectively decreeing optional teaching of
reproductive health education in private educational institutions, the RH Law seeks to respect the
religious belief system of the aforesaid institutions. I find this to be a reasonable basis for the
differential treatment between public and private educational institutions.
As previously discussed, the general approach in resolving equal protection challenges in our
jurisdiction is to utilize the rational basis test. Here, the classification between public and private
educational institutions neither contains a suspect classification nor impinges on a fundamental
right, thus, the rational basis test is apropos. In British American Tobacco v. Sec. Camacho, we
66 67
explained that –
Under this test, a legislative classification, to survive an equal protection challenge, must be
shown to rationally further a legitimate state interest. The classifications must be reasonable and
rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation. Since every law has in its favor the preswnption of constitutionality, the burden of
proof is on the one attacking the constitutionality of the law to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that the legislative classification is without rational basis. The presumption of constitutionality can
be overcome only by the most explicit demonstration that a classification is a hostile and
oppressive discrimination against particular persons and classes, and that there is no
conceivable basis which might support it. 68
Noticeably, the RH Law is replete with provisions respecting the religious freedoms of individuals.
In fact, one of its central and guiding principles is free and informed choice, thus, negating the
imposition of any family planning method on an individual who objects on religious grounds. The
same principle appears to have been carried over relative to the teaching of reproductive health
education in private educational institutions. Congress may have legitimately concluded that the
State interests in societal peace, tolerance or benevolent-neutrality accommodation, as the case
may be, vis-a-vis the various religious belief systems of private educational institutions in our
nation will be better served by making the teaching of reproductive health education (which may
touch on or impact delicate or sensitive religious beliefs) as merely optional in such institutions.
We can take judicial notice of the fact that majority of the private educational institutions in our
nation were established and are run by religious groups or sects.
The classification in Section 14 of the RH Law, thus, rests on substantial distinctions and
rationally furthers a legitimate State interest. It seeks to further no less than the constitutional
principle on the separation of State and Church as well as the Free Exercise of Religion Clause.
In fine, it is not for this Court to look into the wisdom of this legislative classification but only to
determine its rational basis. For the foregoing reasons, I find that the differential treatment
between public and private educational institutions in the law passes the rational basis test and
is, thus, constitutional insofar as the equal protection challenge is concerned.
6- Due Process and Free Speech Clause
I agree with the ponencia that the void for vagueness doctrine is inapplicable to the challenged
portions of the RH Law for reasons stated in the ponencia.
However, I find it necessary to discuss in greater detail why the void for vagueness doctrine is
not applicable particularly with respect to the duty to inform under Section 23(a)(l) of the RH Law.
The reason is that the void for vagueness challenge is inextricably related to freedom of speech
which, under the exceptional circumstances of this case, once again requires the Court to take
steps to protect this constitutional right pursuant to its expanded jurisdiction and as a penumbra
to its power to issue rules for the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights.
As previously discussed, Section 23(a)(l) of the RH Law imposes a duty to inform on both public
and private health care service providers:
SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are prohibited:
(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination thereof, and/or intentionally
provide incorrect information regarding programs and services on reproductive health including
the right to informed choice and access to a full range of legal, medically-safe, non-abortifacient
and effective family planning methods;
In effect, the law requires that complete and correct information on the government's
reproductive health programs and services, including the right to informed choice and access to
a full range of legal, medically-safe, non-abortifacient and effective family planning methods, be
given to all persons who are qualified beneficiaries under the RH Law. The law and its IRR
however, does not define the nature and extent of "complete and correct information." Petitioners
claim that, without this definition, the duty to inform should be nullified under the void for
vagueness doctrine.
I disagree.
The RH Law enjoys the presumption of constitutionality and should be given a construction which
will avoid its nullity. The phrase "[k]nowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination
thereof, and/or intentionally provide incorrect information regarding programs and services"
under Section 23(a)(l) of the RH Law should be reasonably and narrowly construed as merely
requiring the health care service provider to provide and explain to persons the list of the
government's reproductive health programs and services under the RH Law. To illustrate, ifthe
government's reproductive health programs and services under the RH Law consists of A, B, C
and D, then a health care service provider is required to transmit this information to a person
qualified to avail of the benefits under the law.
But it is not as simple as that
The RH Law itself provides that the individual should be allowed to make a free and informed
choice. As a result, the government has set a self-limiting policy that it will not endorse any
particular family planning method. Yet, invariably, potential beneficiaries of these programs and
services will seek the advice or counsel of health care service providers as to which programs
and services they should avail of.
When this occurs, can the government control the opinions that health care service providers will
give the potential beneficiaries by limiting the content of such opinions? That is, can the
government prevent health care service providers from giving their opinions or controlling the
content of their opinions, in favor or against, a particular reproductive health service or program
by mandating that only a particular opinion will comply with the "complete and correct
information" standard under Section 23(a)(l) of the RH Law?
I submit that the government cannot do so without violating the Free Speech Clause.
The "complete and correct information" standard cannot be construed as covering matters
regarding the professional opinions (including the opinions of a conscientious objector on
religious or ethical grounds as previously discussed) of health service providers, either for or
against, these programs and services because this would constitute an abridgement of freedom
of speech through subsequent punishment. The government cannot curtail such opinions without
showing a clear and present danger that will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has
a right to prevent. In the case at bar, there is no attempt on the part of the government to satisfy
69
the clear and present danger test. Consequently, the "complete and correct information"
standard under Section 23(a)(l) should be narrowly construed in order not to violate the Free
Speech Clause. As earlier noted, the only way to save it from constitutional infirmity is to
construe the "complete and correct information" standard as referring to information containing
the list of the government's reproductive health programs and services under the RH Law.
Anything beyond that would transgress the free speech guarantee of the Constitution.
Indubitably, an expansive and broad intetpretation of the "complete and correct information"
standard will give the government the unbridled capacity to censor speech by only allowing
opinions on the reproductive health programs and services under the RH Law which it favors.
The government can use the "complete and correct information" standard to force health care
service providers to endorse the former's preferred family planning method despite the clear
policy of the RH Law granting free and informed choice to the individual. This cannot be done
without violating the Free Speech Clause.
Of course, this would mean that health care service providers, who are for or against certain
programs and services under the RH Law, will be able to influence potential beneficiaries over
which family planning method or means to avail of. This is the price of living in a democratic
polity, under our constitutional order, where opinions are freely expressed and exchanged. The
Constitution guarantees freedom of speech and, thus, tilts the balance in favor of the individual's
right to free speech unless the State can show that controlling the individual's speech can pass
the clear and present danger test. Here, as afore-stated, the government has failed to satisfy this
test. If the government desires to push a preferred family planning method, it has the full
machinery of the State to back up its information campaign under Section 20 of the RH Law.
However, it cannot force individual health care service providers, under pain of penal liability, to
express opinions that are favorable to certain reproductive health programs and services under
the RH Law. Government may try to convince health care service providers, but not force them. 1âwphi1
The above disquisition should not, of course, be taken to mean that health care service providers
shall be exempt from their professional or ethical responsibilities which they owe to their patients
and which may result to administrative, civil or criminal liabilities of the former based on their
code of ethical conduct not unlike the code of ethics for lawyers. But, unavoidably, the
professional opinion or advice of health care service providers will be sought by potential
beneficiaries under the RH Law and, in that instance, the "complete and correct information"
standard cannot be utilized by the State to curtail the health care service provider's freedom of
speech.
Thus, I find that the "complete and correct information" standard under Section 23(a)(l) of the RH
Law and, hence, the duty to inform (as discussed in a previous subsection) is constitutional only
insofar as it requires health care service providers to provide a list of the government's
reproductive health programs and services under the RH Law to qualified beneficiaries. Further,
given the afore-discussed peculiar circumstances of this case and in order to adequately protect
the right to free speech of health care service providers, it is necessary for the Court to issue an
order directing the DOH to generate the complete and correct list of the government's
reproductive health programs and services under the RH Law which will serve as the template
for the "complete and correct information " standard and, hence, the duty to inform under Section
23(a)(I) of the RH Law. The DOH should be directed to distribute this template to all health care
service providers covered by the RH Law. This will forestall any confusion on the nature and
scope of the "complete and correct information" standard which is necessary given the penal
clause under the duty to inform.
7- Equal Protection
I agree with the ponencia that the RH Law does not violate the equal protection clause insofar as
it is claimed to single out the poor to reduce their numbers and that the poor may be the subject
of government subsidy for the programs under the RH Law for reasons stated in ponencia.
8. Section 7 (Involuntary Service)
I am fully in accord with the ruling of the ponencia that Section 17 of the RH Law does not violate
the constitutional prohibition against involuntary servitude and that it is unconstitutional insofar as
it imposes a duty to conscientious objectors to render pro bona reproductive health care services
to which the conscientious objector objects to on religious or ethical grounds for reasons stated
in the ponencia. Corrorarily, the conscientious objector can be required to render pro bona
reproductive health care services for as long as it involves services that he or she does not
object to on religious or ethical grounds.
9. Delegation of Authority To The FDA
I am fully in accord with the ruling of the ponencia that Congress can validly delegate to the FDA
the authority or power to determine whether the drugs, devices, methods or services to be used
under the RH Law comply with constitutional and statutory standards for reasons stated in the
ponencia.
10. Autonomy Of The Local Government Units (LGUs)

And The Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
I concur with the ponencia that the RH Law does not violate the local autonomy ofLGUs and the
ARM1v1 guaranteed under Article II, Section 25 and Article X, Section 2 of the Constitution.
70 71
I have reservations, however, with regard to the following statements in the ponencia:
In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the establishment
of health care facilities, the hiring of skilled health professionals, or the training of barangay
health workers, it would be the national government that would provide for the funding of its
implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute. The national government still has the say when
it comes to national priority programs which the local government is called upon to implement like
the RH Law.
Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavour", the local government units are merely
encouraged to provide these services. There is nothing in the wording of the law which can be
construed as making the availability of these services mandatory for the local government units.
For said reason, it cannot be said that the RH Law amounts to an undue encroachment by the
national government upon the autonomy enjoyed by the local governments. 72
First, under Sections 5, 10 and 13 of the RH Law, the LGUs are not prevented from using
73 74 75
their own funds to provide the specified services therein. The law appears to encourage LGUs to
spend for these specified services on the assumption that the LGUs will see for themselves that
these services are beneficial to them and, thus, warrant their own expenditure therefor.
Second, the use of the phrase "shall endeavor" appears only in Sections 5 and 6 of the RH Law.
Sections 8, 13 (last sentence) and 16 use the word "shall" relative to the duties required of the
76 77 78
LGUs therein. Thus, the duties of the LGUs under these sections are mandatory.
Third, the ponencia's construction of the word "endeavor" under Sections 5 and 6 of the RH Law
might give the wrong impression that the LGUs are not mandated to cooperate with the national
government in the implementation of the programs set under these sections. However, the
framework of action of the RH Law is based, among others, on the effective partnership between
the national government and LGUs. 79
In fact, the LGUs are effectively designated as implementing agencies of certain aspects of the
programs under the RH Law.
In line with this policy, a more reasonable interpretation of the phrase "shall endeavor" under
Sections 5 and 6 is to read it in conjunction with the proviso (which is identical for both sections)
stating that, "Provided, further, That the national government shall provide additional and
necessary funding and other necessary assistance for the effective implementation of this
provision." Thus, the use of the phrase "shall endeavor" should be understood as a recognition
by Congress of the realities on the ground where the LGUs may not have enough funds to fulfill
their mandate under these sections. However, if the national government provides for the needed
funds, the LGUs cannot refuse to cooperate and do its part in the implementation of these
sections. In other words, under these sections, the law mandates, not merely encourages, LGUs
to fulfill their duties unless prevented from doing so for justifiable reasons such as the lack of
available funds.
11. Natural Law
I agree with the ponencia that natural law may not, under the particular circumstances of this
case, be used to invalidate the RH Law. However, I disagree with the following statements:
While every law enacted by man emananted from what is perceived as natural law, the Court is
not obliged to see if a statute, executive issuance or ordinance is in conformity to it. To begin
with, it is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate body. Moreover, natural laws are mere
thoughts and notions on inherent rights espoused by theorists, philosophers and theologists. The
jurists of the philosophical school are interested in the law as an abstraction, rather than in the
actual law of the past or present.80
These statements, I submit, are not necessary in the disposition of this case and appear to be an
inaccurate description of natural law. The Court need not foreclose the usefulness of natural law
in resolving future cases. I submit that the statement that natural law is not applicable in the
resolution of this particular case suffices.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to PARTIALLY GRANT the petitions.
1. The word "primarily" in Sections 3.01(a) and 3.01(J) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations is VOID for contravening Section 4(a) of Republic Act No. 10354 and Article
II, Section 12 of Constitution.
2. The phrase, "Provided, further, That these hospitals shall immediately refer the person
seeking such care and services to another health facility which is conveniently
accessible," in Section 7 and the phrase, "however, the conscientious objector shall
immediately refer the person seeking such care and services to another health care
service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible," in
Section 23(a)(3) of Republic Act No. 10354 are UNCONSTITUTIONAL for violating the
Free Exercise of Religion Clause under Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution.
Consequently, Sections 5.24(b) to (e) and 5.25 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations, insofar as they implement the aforesaid provisions, are VOID.
3. The last paragraph of Section 5 .24 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations is
VOID insofar as it deprives the skilled health professionals enumerated therein of the
right to conscientious objection for violating Section 4(n) in relation to Section 23(a)(3) of
Republic Act No. 10354 and Equal Protection Clause under Article III, Section 1 of the
Constitution.
4. Section 23(a)(2)(i) of Republic Act No. 10354 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL for violating

the constitutional right of both spouses to found a family under Article XV, Section 3(1) of
the Constitution.
5. The phrase "except when the minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage" in
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10354 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL for violating the natural
and primary right of parents to rear their minor children under Article II, Section 12 of the
Constitution.
6. Section 17 of Republic Act No. 10354 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it requires

conscientious objectors to render pro bono reproductive health care services to which the
conscientious objector objects to on religious or ethical grounds as a prerequisite to
PhilHealth accreditation.
Pursuant to the expanded jurisdiction of this Court and its power to issue rules for the protection
and enforcement of constitutional rights, the Court should issue an order:
1. DIRECTING the Food and Drug Administration to formulate the rules of procedure in
the screening, evaluation and approval of all contraceptive drugs and devices that will be
used under Republic Act No. 10354. The rules of procedure shall contain the following
minimum requirements of due process: (a) publication, notice and hearing, (b) the
Solicitor General shall be mandated to appear to represent the unborn and the State's
interest in the protection of the life of the unborn, (c) interested parties shall be allowed to
intervene, (d) the standard laid down in the Constitution, as adopted under Republic Act
No. 10354, as to what constitutes allowable contraceptives shall be strictly followed, i.e.,
those which do not hann or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization, (e)
in weighing the evidence, all reasonable doubts shall be resolved in favor of the
protection and preservation of the right to life of the unborn from conception/fertilization,
and (f) the other requirements of administrative due process, as summarized in Ang
Tibay, shall be complied with.
The Food and Drug Administration is DIRECTED to submit these rules of procedure,
within thirty (30) from receipt of this decision, for the Court's appropriate action.
2. DIRECTING the Food and Drug Administration to IMMEDIATELY, and in no case to

exceed five days from the receipt of this decision, INFORM this Court if the
contraceptives that it previously approved for use and distribution in the Philippines were
screened, evaluated and/or tested against the standard laid down in the Constitution, as
adopted under Republic Act No. 10354, on allowable contraceptives, i.e., those which do
not harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization; and those which
do not prevent the implantation of the fertilized ovum. The contraceptive drugs and
devices previously approved by the Food and Drug Administrationshould not include
contraceptives which (1) do not provide a 100% guarantee of preventing fertilization and
(2) has a fail-safe mechanism which destroys the fertilized ovum if fertilization occurs
(e.g., prevents the implantation of the fertilized ovum on the uterus).
3. DIRECTING the Department of Health in coordination with other concerned agencies

to formulate the rules and regulations or guidelines which will govern the purchase and
distribution/dispensation of the products or supplies under Section 9 of Republic Act No.
10354 covered by the certification from the Food and Drug Admnistration that said
product and supply is made available on the condition that it is not to be used as an
abortifacient subject to the following minimum due process requirements: (a) publication,
notice and hearing, (b) the Solicitor General shall be mandated to represent the unborn
and the State's interest in the protection of the life of the unborn, and (c) interested
parties shall be allowed to intervene. The rules and regulations or guidelines shall
provide sufficient detail as to the manner by which said product and supply shall be
strictly regulated in order that they will not be used as an abortifacient and in order to
sufficiently safeguard the right to life of the unborn. Pending the issuance and publication
of these rules by the Department of Health, the Temporary Restraining Order insofar as
the proviso in Section 9 of Republic Act No. 10354, as implemented by Section 7.03 of
the IRR, relative to the subject products and supplies, which are made available on the
condition that they will not be used as an abortifacient, shall remain in force.
4. DIRECTING the Department of Health to generate the complete and correct list of the
government's reproductive health programs and services under Republic Act No. 10354
which will serve as the template for the complete and correct information standard and,
hence, the duty to inform under Section 23(a)(l) of Republic Act No. 10354. The
Department of Health is DIRECTED to distribute copies of this template to all health care
service providers covered by Republic Act No. 10354.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

G.R. No. 204819

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Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014

G.R. No. 204934

G.R. No. 204957

G.R. No. 204988

G.R. No. 205003

EXPEDITO A. BUGARIN, JR., Petitioner,

G.R. No. 205043

EDUARDO B. OLAGUER and THE CATHOLIC XYBRSPACE APOSTOLATE OF THE

G.R. No. 205138

G.R. No. 205478

REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ, M.D., JACQUELINE H. KING, M.D., CYNTHIA T. DOMINGO, M.D.,

G.R. No. 205491

G.R. No. 205720

PRO-LIFE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, Inc., represented by Loma Melegrito, as Executive

G.R. No. 206355

MILLENNIUM SAINT FOUNDATION, INC., ATTY. RAMON PEDROSA, ATTY. CITA

G.R. No. 207111

JOHN WALTER B. JUAT, MARY M. IMBONG, ANTHONY VICTORIO B. LUMICAO, JOSEPH

G.R. No. 207172

COUPLES FOR CHRIST FOUNDATION, INC., SPOUSES JUAN CARLOS ARTADI

G.R. No. 207563

ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH and ABDULHUSSEIN M. KASHIM, Petitioners,

OPINYONG SUMASANG-AYON AT SUMASALUNGAT

Sa herarkiya ng mga karapatang pantao, walang hihigit pa sa karapatang mabuhay, at

Gayundin, ang may-katawan na daraan sa paglilihi, pagbubuntis at maaaring ikapeligro ng

Sa panig ng mga matataas na nanunungkulan sa pamahalaan na inatasang magpatupad ng RH

Sinusuportahan ng RH Law ang pagsulong at pangangalaga sa karapatan ng kababaihan. Ang

Hindi maikakaila na ang paulit-ulit na pagbanggit sa mga katagang "medically-safe, non-

Ang Pasanin ng Petitioners

dangal at kabayanihan ng Kongreso na gumawa nito, at sa Pangulo na nagpatibay dito. Ang 4

Ang Pasiya ng Mayorya

Ayon sa Decision, ang RH Law ay konstitusyonal maliban na lamang sa mga sumusunod na

ng RH Law, sa dahilang ito ay: a) nag-uutos sa mga non-maternity specialty hospitals at

nagkaroon ng miscarriage na makinabang sa modern family planning methods kahit

na hihingi ng pahintulot ng magulang bago magsagawa ng reproductive health procedure

pagsasagawa ng pro bona reproductive health services sa dahilang naaapektuhan nito

salitang "primarily" sa kahulugan ng abortifacient, na labag sa Section 4(a) ng RH Law

at Section 12, Article II ng Saligang Batas.

Ang Opt-Out Clause

Nakalimutan ng petitioners ang kabuuan ng RH Law. Batid ng Kongreso na maaaring

Naging sensitibo ang Kongreso sa paniniwala ng mga conscientious objectors sa pamamagitan

Ayon sa Solicitor General:

Isa lamang sa maraming posibilidad ang kinatatakutang resulta ng mga petitioners, at

Ang pagpapahalaga sa informed choice ng mga Pilipino pagdating sa usapin ng reproductive

conscientious objectors na maglingkod kalapit ang ibang medical professionals na hindi

pangkalusugan para sa mga taong nangangailangan nito.

Kung tutuusin, maituturing na paglabag sa sinumpaang tungkulin ng mga medical professionals

care service provider ay maituturing na pagkait ng serbisyong pangkalusugan sa mga pasyente.

Upang mabigyan ng katumbas na proteksyon ang karapatan ng mga pasyente sa tuloy-tuloy na

Sa kabilang banda, ipinagbabawal naman ng Section 23(a)(2) ang pagtangging magsagawa ng

Nguni't, kalakip ng karapatan ng pagtanggi ng mga conscientious objector ang katungkulang

FDA Certification sa Section 9

9 ng RH Law na nag-uutos na makukuha lamang sa kondisyong hindi gagamitin bilang

JUSTICE DEL CASTILLO:

SOL. GEN. JARDELEZA:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE DEL CASTILLO:

SOL. GEN. JARDELEZA:

JUSTICE DEL CASTILLO: