G.R. No.

124371               November 23, 2000 On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States
citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816 was
PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner,  issued in his favor by the United States District Court, Southern
vs. District of New York.6 
COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F.
LLORENTE, respondents. Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in
1945, Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy,
DECISION to visit his wife and he visited the Philippines.7 He discovered
that his wife Paula was pregnant and was "living in" and having
PARDO, J.: an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente.8 

The Case On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in

the Office of the Registrar of Nabua as "Crisologo Llorente," with
The case raises a conflict of laws issue. the certificate stating that the child was not legitimate and the
line for the father’s name was left blank.9 
What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the Court of
Appeals1 modifying that of the Regional Trial Court, Camarines Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on
Sur, Branch 35, Iriga City2 declaring respondent Alicia F. February 2, 1946, the couple drew a written agreement to the
Llorente (herinafter referred to as "Alicia"), as co-owners of effect that (1) all the family allowances allotted by the United
whatever property she and the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente States Navy as part of Lorenzo’s salary and all other obligations
(hereinafter referred to as "Lorenzo") may have acquired during for Paula’s daily maintenance and support would be suspended;
the twenty-five (25) years that they lived together as husband (2) they would dissolve their marital union in accordance with
and wife. judicial proceedings; (3) they would make a separate agreement
regarding their conjugal property acquired during their marital
The Facts life; and (4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her
adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted her fault and
The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully. The agreement
of the United States Navy from March 10, 1927 to September was signed by both Lorenzo and Paula and was witnessed by
30, 1957.3  Paula’s father and stepmother. The agreement was notarized by
Notary Public Pedro Osabel.10 
On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente
(hereinafter referred to as "Paula") were married before a parish Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16,
priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur.4  1951 filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the State of
California in and for the County of San Diego. Paula was
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in
United States and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in barrio the proceedings. On November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of
Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur.5  the State of California, for the County of San Diego found all
factual allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory
judgment of divorce.11 
On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final.12  Transfer Certificate of Title No. 188652; and my lands in
Antipolo, Rizal, Philippines, covered by Transfer Certificate of
In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines. Title Nos. 124196 and 165188, both of the Registry of Deeds of
the province of Rizal, Philippines;
On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in
Manila.13 Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of the first "(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned
marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who properties, whether real or personal properties, shall not be
did not oppose the marriage or cohabitation.14  disposed of, ceded, sold and conveyed to any other persons,
but could only be sold, ceded, conveyed and disposed of by and
From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as among themselves;
husband and wife.15 Their twenty-five (25) year union produced
three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente.16  "(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole
executor of this my Last Will and Testament, and in her default
On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and or incapacity of the latter to act, any of my children in the order
Testament. The will was notarized by Notary Public Salvador M. of age, if of age;
Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses
Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the will, "(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful
Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three substitute should served (sic) without bond;
children, to wit:
"(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or
"(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO testamentary dispositions heretofore executed, signed, or
exclusively my residential house and lot, located at San published, by me;
Francisco, Nabua, Camarines Sur, Philippines, including ALL
the personal properties and other movables or belongings that "(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of mine
may be found or existing therein; in any degree in the Llorente’s Side should ever bother and
disturb in any manner whatsoever my wife Alicia R. Fortunato
"(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and my children with respect to any real or personal properties I
and to my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and gave and bequeathed respectively to each one of them by virtue
Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, all my real properties of this Last Will and Testament."17 
whatsoever and wheresoever located, specifically my real
properties located at Barangay Aro-Aldao, Nabua, Camarines On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial
Sur; Barangay Paloyon, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate and
Baras, Sitio Puga, Nabua, Camarines Sur; and Barangay allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved
Paloyon, Sitio Nalilidong, Nabua, Camarines Sur; that Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate.18 

"(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife Alicia On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion for the
R. Fortuno and unto my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. reason that the testator Lorenzo was still alive.19 
Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, my real
properties located in Quezon City Philippines, and covered by
On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, "On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular
the trial court admitted the will to probate.20  Llorente, meritorious, and so declares the intrinsic disposition of
the will of Lorenzo Llorente dated March 13, 1981 as void and
On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, declares her entitled as conjugal partner and entitled to one-half
Lorenzo died.21  of their conjugal properties, and as primary compulsory heir,
Paula T. Llorente is also entitled to one-third of the estate and
On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a then one-third should go to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz
petition22 for letters of administration over Lorenzo’s estate in her and Beverly, all surname (sic) Llorente, for them to partition in
favor. Paula contended (1) that she was Lorenzo’s surviving equal shares and also entitled to the remaining free portion in
spouse, (2) that the various property were acquired during their equal shares.
marriage, (3) that Lorenzo’s will disposed of all his property in
favor of Alicia and her children, encroaching on her legitime and "Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the
1/2 share in the conjugal property.23  estate of the deceased, Lorenzo Llorente. As such let the
corresponding letters of administration issue in her favor upon
On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding her filing a bond in the amount (sic) of P100,000.00 conditioned
(Sp. Proc. No. IR-755), a petition for the issuance of letters for her to make a return to the court within three (3) months a
testamentary.24  true and complete inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, and
credits, and estate which shall at any time come to her
On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate possession or to the possession of any other person for her, and
proceedings, the trial court gave due course to Paula’s petition from the proceeds to pay and discharge all debts, legacies and
in Sp. Proc. No. IR-888.25  charges on the same, or such dividends thereon as shall be
decreed or required by this court; to render a true and just
On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in account of her administration to the court within one (1) year,
the newspaper "Bicol Star".26  and at any other time when required by the court and to perform
all orders of this court by her to be performed.
On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint
decision, thus: "On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want
of evidence could not be granted.
"Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the
divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and "SO ORDERED."27 
inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he
contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for
is likewise void. This being so the petition of Alicia F. Llorente reconsideration of the aforequoted decision.28 
for the issuance of letters testamentary is denied. Likewise, she
is not entitled to receive any share from the estate even if the On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicia’s motion for
will especially said so her relationship with Lorenzo having reconsideration but modified its earlier decision, stating that
gained the status of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1). Raul and Luz Llorente are not children "legitimate or otherwise"
of Lorenzo since they were not legally adopted by
him.29 Amending its decision of May 18, 1987, the trial court
declared Beverly Llorente as the only illegitimate child of The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American
Lorenzo, entitling her to one-third (1/3) of the estate and one- citizen long before and at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula;
third (1/3) of the free portion of the estate.30  (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is
duly established, admitted and undisputed.
On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of
Appeals.31  Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are
necessarily governed by foreign law.
On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its
decision, affirming with modification the decision of the trial court The Civil Code clearly provides:
in this wise:
"Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Alicia is declared as upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
co-owner of whatever properties she and the deceased may
have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years of cohabitation. "Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to
the law of the country where it is situated.
"SO ORDERED."32 
"However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with
On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
motion for reconsideration of the decision.33  successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the
On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals,34 denied the motion person whose succession is under consideration, whatever
for lack of merit. may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country
wherein said property may be found." (emphasis ours)
Hence, this petition.35 
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction
The Issue and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them.
Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.37 
Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the
various arguments raised,36 the issue is simple. Who are entitled While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court
to inherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente? of Appeals did not admit the foreign law. The Court of Appeals
and the trial court called to the fore the renvoi doctrine, where
We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. We the case was "referred back" to the law of the decedent’s
remand the case to the trial court for ruling on the intrinsic domicile, in this case, Philippine law.
validity of the will of the deceased.
We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York
The Applicable Law was not sufficiently proven, in the same breath it made the
categorical, albeit equally unproven statement that "American
law follows the ‘domiciliary theory’ hence, Philippine law applies Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of
when determining the validity of Lorenzo’s will.38  Appeals,41 that once proven that respondent was no longer a
Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the
First, there is no such thing as one American law.1ªwph!1 The ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner
"national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot could "very well lose her right to inherit" from him.
possibly apply to general American law. There is no such law
governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,42 we recognized the divorce obtained
States. Each State of the union has its own law applicable to its by the respondent in his country, the Federal Republic of
citizens and in force only within the State. It can therefore refer Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects
to no other than the law of the State of which the decedent was may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is
a resident.39 Second, there is no showing that the application of concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on
the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by New York State the status of persons.
law.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of
The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it Appeals must be reversed.43 We hold that the divorce obtained
contained dispositions in favor of Alice, who in the trial court’s by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and
opinion was a mere paramour. The trial court threw the will out, recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the
leaving Alice, and her two children, Raul and Luz, with nothing. effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the
decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the trial
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice court.
entitled to one half (1/2) of whatever property she and Lorenzo
acquired during their cohabitation, applying Article 144 of the Validity of the Will
Civil Code of the Philippines.
The Civil Code provides:
The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete
disregard of the will, already probated as duly executed in "Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and
accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the
fatal, especially in light of the factual and legal country in which they are executed.
circumstances here obtaining.
"When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or
Validity of the Foreign Divorce consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign
country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.40 we held that owing to the nationality observed in their execution." (underscoring ours)
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his
the same being considered contrary to our concept of public second wife and children by her is glaringly shown in the will he
policy and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was
that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid a foreigner, not covered by our laws on "family rights and duties,
according to their national law. status, condition and legal capacity."44 
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from HILARION, JR. and ENRICO ORENDAIN, represented by FE
Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law which must be D. ORENDAIN, Petitioners,1 
pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in vs.
accordance with the formalities required is answered by TRUSTEESHIP OF THE ESTATE OF DOÑA MARGARITA
referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated. RODRIGUEZ, Respondent.

As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever DECISION
public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of
legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the same to the NACHURA, J.:
succession of foreign nationals. Congress specifically left the
amount of successional rights to the decedent's national law.45  This petition for certiorari, filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, assails the Order2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other Manila, Branch 4 in SP. PROC. No. 51872 which denied
issues raised. petitioners’ (Hilarion, Jr. and Enrico Orendain, heirs of Hilarion
Orendain, Sr.) Motion to Dissolve the Trusteeship of the Estate
The Fallo of Doña Margarita Rodriguez.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the First, we revisit the long settled facts.
Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 17446 promulgated on
July 31, 1995 is SET ASIDE. On July 19, 1960, the decedent, Doña Margarita Rodriguez,
died in Manila, leaving a last will and testament. On September
In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the 23, 1960, the will was admitted to probate by virtue of the order
Regional Trial Court and RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of of the Court of First Instance of Manila City (CFI Manila) in
divorce granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by Special Proceeding No. 3845. On August 27, 1962, the CFI
the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the Manila approved the project of partition presented by the
County of San Diego, made final on December 4, 1952. executor of Doña Margarita Rodriguez’s will.

Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for At the time of her death, the decedent left no compulsory or
determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorente’s will forced heirs and, consequently, was completely free to dispose
and determination of the parties’ successional rights allowing of her properties, without regard to legitimes,3 as provided in her
proof of foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall will. Some of Doña Margarita Rodriguez’s testamentary
proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the dispositions contemplated the creation of a trust to manage the
deceased within the framework of the Rules of Court. income from her properties for distribution to beneficiaries
specified in the will, to wit:
No costs.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.
CLAUSULA SEGUNDA O PANG-DALAWA: - x x x Ipinaguutos
.R. No. 168660               June 30, 2009 ko na matapos magawa ang pagaayos ng aking Testamentaria
at masara na ang Expediente ng aking Testamentaria, ang lahat Boulevard, Maynila, na maaring isanla kung walang fondo na
ng pagaare ko sa aking ipinaguutos na pangasiwaan sa habang gagamitin sa ipagpapaigui o ipagpapagawa ng panibago
panahon ay ipagbukas sa Juzgado ng tinatawag na alinsunod sa kaayusang hinihingi ng panahon.
"FIDEICOMISO" at ang ilalagay na "fideicomisario" ang manga
taong nasabi ko na sa itaas nito, at ang kanilang gaganahin ay xxxx
ang nasasabi sa testamentong ito na gaganahen ng
tagapangasiwa at albacea. x x x x CLAUSULA DECIMA SEGUNDA O PANG-LABING DALAWA: -
Ang kuartang matitipon sa Banco ayon sa tagubilin na
CLAUSULA TERCERA O PANG-TATLO: - Ipinaguutos ko na nasasaysay sa Clausulang sinusundan nito ay gagamitin sa
ang kikitain ng lahat ng aking pagaare, na ang hindi lamang manga sumusunod na pagkakagastusan; at ganito din ang
kasama ay ang aking lupain na nasasabi sa Certificado de gagawin sa lahat ng aking pagaare na nasasakop ng
Transferencia de Titulo No. 7156 (Lote No. 1088-C), Certificado fideicomiso at walang ibang pinaguukulan. Ang
Original de Titulo No. 4588 (LOTE No. 2492), Certificado pagkakagastusan na ito ay ang sumusunod:
Original de Titulo No. 4585 (Lote No. 1087) ng lalawigan ng
Quezon, at ang bahaging maytanim na palay ng lupang xxxx
nasasaysay sa Certificado Original de Titulo No. 4587 (Lote No.
1180) ng Quezon, ay IIPUNIN SA BANCO upang maibayad sa CLAUSULA VIGESIMA CUARTA O PANG-DALAWANGPU AT
anillaramiento, ang tinatawag na "estate Tax", ang "impuesto de APAT: - Ipinaguutos ko sa aking manga Tagapangasiwa na sa
herencia" na dapat pagbayaran ng aking pinagbibigyan na fondong ipinapasok sa Banco para sa gastos ng Niña Maria,
kasama na din ang pagbabayaran ng "Fideicomiso", gastos sa Misa at iba pa, kukuha sila na kakailanganin para maitulong sa
abogado na magmamakaalam ng testamentaria at gastos sa manga sumusunod: Florentina Luna, Roberta Ponce, Marciada
Husgado. Ngunit bago ipasok sa Banco ang kikitaen ng Ponce, Benita Ponce, Constancia Pineda, Regino Pineda,
nabangit na manga gagaare, ay aalisin muna ang manga Tomas Payumo, Rosito Payumo, Loreto Payumo, Brigido
sumusunod na gastos: Santos at Quintin Laino, Hilarion Orendain at manga anak. Ang
manga dalaga kung sakali at inabutan ng pagkamatay ko na
xxxx ako ay pinagtiisan at hindi humiwalay sa akin, kung magkasakit
ay ipagagamot at ibabayad sa medico, at ibibili ng gamot, at
CLAUSULA DECIMA O PANG-SAMPU: - Ipinaguutos ko na ang kung kailangan ang operacion ay ipaooperacion at ipapasok sa
manga pagaareng nasasabi sa Clausulang ito ay Hospital na kinababagayan ng kaniyang sakit, at kahit
pangangasiwaan sa habang panahon, at ito nga ang maypagkakautang pa sa "impuesto de herencia at estate tax" ay
ipagbubukas ng "Fideicomiso" sa Jusgado pagkatapos na ikukuha sa nasabing fondo at talagang ibabawas doon, at ang
maayos ang naiwanan kong pagaare. Ang pangangasiwaang paggagamot ay huag pagtutuusan, at ang magaalaga sa kanya
pagaare ay ang manga sumusunod: ay bibigyan ng gastos sa pagkain at sa viaje at iba pa na manga
kailangan ng nagaalaga. Kung nasa provincia at dadalhin ditto
xxxx sa Maynila ay bibigyan ng gastos sa viaje ang maysakit at ang
kasama sa viaje, at ang magaalaga ay dito tutuloy sa bahay sa
Ang lahat ng pagaaring nasasabe sa Clusulang ito (hindi Tuberias at Tanduay na natatalaga sa manga may servicio sa
kasama ang "generator" at automovil) hindi maisasanla o akin, at kung mamatay at gusting iuwi sa provincia ang bangkay
maipagbibili kailan man, maliban sa pagaaring nasa Quezon ay iupa at doon ilibing at dapit ng Pare at hated sa nicho na
natotoka sa kanya. Ganito din ang gagawain kung mayasawa expressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will,
man ay nasa poder ko ng ako ay mamatay. Ang wala sa poder that is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy."
ko datapua at nagservicio sa akin, kaparis ng encargado, ang
gagawaing tulong ay ipagagamot, ibibili ng gamot at kung xxxx
kailangan ang operacion o matira sa Hospital, ipaooperacion at
ipagbabayad sa Hospital.4 (emphasis supplied) Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that [Petra, Antonia and
Rosa, all surnamed Rodriguez] could not challenge the
xxxx provision in question. [They] had no right to vindicate. Such a
right may never arise. The twenty-year period is still with us.
As regards Clause 10 of the will which explicitly prohibits the What would transpire thereafter is still locked up in the
alienation or mortgage of the properties specified therein, we inscrutable future, beyond the power of mere mortals to foretell.
had occasion to hold, in Rodriguez, etc., et al. v. Court of At any rate, We cannot anticipate. Nor should We. We do not
Appeals, et al.,5 that the clause, insofar as the first twenty-year possess the power either of conferring a cause of action to a
period is concerned, does not violate Article 8706 of the Civil party when, under the circumstances disclosed, it had none.7
Code. We declared, thus:
Almost four decades later, herein petitioners Hilarion, Jr. and
The codal provision does not need any interpretation. It speaks Enrico Orendain, heirs of Hilarion Orendain, Sr. who was
categorically. What is declared void is the testamentary mentioned in Clause 24 of the decedent’s will, moved to
disposition prohibiting alienation after the twenty-year period. In dissolve the trust on the decedent’s estate, which they argued
the interim, such a provision does not suffer from the vice of had been in existence for more than twenty years, in violation of
invalidity. It cannot be stricken down. Time and time again, We Articles 8678 and 870 of the Civil Code, and inconsistent with
have said, and We now repeat, that when a legal provision is our ruling in Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals.9
clear and to the point, there is no room for interpretation. It must
be applied according to its literal terms. On April 18, 2005, the RTC issued the herein assailed Order:10

Even with the purpose that the testatrix had in mind were not as The above-cited provisions of the civil code find no application in
unequivocal, still the same conclusion emerges. There is no the present motion to dissolve the trust created by the testatrix.
room for intestacy as would be the effect if the challenged There is no question that the testamentary disposition of Doña
resolution of January 8, 1968 were not set aside. The wishes of Margarita Rodriguez prohibiting the mortgage or sale of
the testatrix constitute the law. Her will must be given effect. properties mentioned in clause X of her Last Will and Testament
This is so even if there could be an element of uncertainty forevermore is void after the lapse of the twenty year period.
insofar as the ascertainment thereof is concerned. In the However, it does not mean that the trust created by [the]
language of a Civil Code provision: "If a testamentary testatrix in order to carry out her wishes under clauses 12, 13
disposition admits of different interpretations, in case of doubt, and 24 will also become void upon expiration of the twenty year
that interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative period. As ruled by the Supreme Court in Emetrio Barcelon v.
shall be preferred." Nor is this all. A later article of the Civil Code CA, "the codal provision cited in Art. 870 is clear and
equally calls for observance. Thus: "The words of a will are to unequivocal and does not need any interpretation. What is
receive an interpretation which will give to every expression declared void is the testamentary disposition prohibiting
some effect, rather than one which will render any of the alienation after the twenty year period." Hence, the trustees may
dispose of the properties left by the testatrix in order to carry out 2. WHETHER THE LOWER COURT IS CORRECT IN
the latter’s testamentary disposition. STATING THAT THE ABOVE-CITED PROVISIONS OF
THE CIVIL CODE FINDS NO APPLICATION IN THE
The question as to whether a trust can be perpetual, the same PRESENT MOTION TO DISSOLVE THE TRUST
finds support in Article 1013[,] paragraph 4 of the Civil Code, CREATED BY THE TESTATRIX.
which provides that "the Court, at the instance of an interested
party or its motion, may order the establishment of a permanent 3. CONCOMITANT THERETO, [WHETHER] THE
trust so that only the income from the property shall be used." In LOWER COURT [IS] CORRECT IN APPLYING
the present case, the testatrix directed that all the twenty five ARTICLE 1013 PARAGRAPH 4 OF THE CIVIL CODE.11
(25) pieces of property listed in the tenth clause should be
placed under the trusteeship and should be perpetually Before we delve into the foregoing issues, it is noteworthy that
administered by the trustees and a certain percentage of the the present petition, albeit captioned as a petition for certiorari,
income from the trust estate should be deposited in a bank and is actually a petition for review on certiorari, raising only pure
should be devoted for the purposes specifically indicated in the questions of law. On more than one occasion, we have allowed
clauses 12, 13 and 24.1awphi1 erroneously labeled actions based on the averments contained
in the petition or complaint.12 Thus, we now disregard the
The wishes of the testatrix constitute the law. Her will must be incorrect designation and treat this as a petition for review on
given effect. This is even if there could be an element of certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
uncertainty insofar as the ascertainment thereof is concerned.
This Court so emphatically expressed it in a decision rendered The petition is impressed with merit.
more than sixty years ago. Thus, respect for the will of a testator
as [an] expression of his last testamentary disposition, The issues being intertwined, we shall discuss them jointly.
constitutes the principal basis of the rules which the law
prescribes for the correct interpretation of all of the clauses of Quite categorical from the last will and testament of the
the will; the words and provision therein written must be plainly decedent is the creation of a perpetual trust for the
construed in order to avoid a violation of his intentions and real administration of her properties and the income accruing
purpose. The will of the testator clearly and explicitly stated therefrom, for specified beneficiaries. The decedent, in Clause
must be respected and complied with as an inviolable law 10 of her will, listed a number of properties to be placed under
among the parties in interest. Such is the doctrine established perpetual administration of the trust. In fact, the decedent
by the Supreme Court of Spain, constantly maintained in a great unequivocally forbade the alienation or mortgage of these
number of decisions. properties. In all, the decedent did not contemplate the
disposition of these properties, but only sought to bequeath the
Hence, this petition, positing the following issues: income derived therefrom to various sets of beneficiaries.

1. WHETHER THE TRUSTEESHIP OVER THE On this score, we held in Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals 13 that
PROPERTIES LEFT BY DOÑA MARGARITA the perpetual prohibition was valid only for twenty (20) years.
RODRIGUEZ CAN BE DISSOLVED APPLYING We affirmed the CA’s holding that the trust stipulated in the
ARTICLES 867 AND 870 OF THE CIVIL CODE. decedent’s will prohibiting perpetual alienation or mortgage of
the properties violated Articles 867 and 870 of the Civil Code.
However, we reversed and set aside the CA’s decision which expenses, including the estate tax, be deposited in a fund
declared that that portion of the decedent’s estate, the with a bank;
properties listed in Clause 10 of the will, ought to be distributed
based on intestate succession, there being no institution of heirs 3. Clause 10 enumerated the properties to be placed in
to the properties covered by the perpetual trust. trust for perpetual administration (pangasiwaan sa
habang panahon);
As previously quoted, we reached a different conclusion and
upheld the trust, only insofar as the first twenty-year period is 4. Clauses 11 and 12 directed how the income from the
concerned. We refrained from forthwith declaring the decedent’s properties ought to be divided among, and distributed to
testamentary disposition as void and the properties enumerated the different beneficiaries; and
in Clause 10 of the will as subject to intestate succession. We
held that, in the interim, since the twenty-year period was then 5. Clause 24 instructed the administrators to provide
still upon us, the wishes of the testatrix ought to be respected. medical support to certain beneficiaries, to be deducted
from the fund deposits in the bank mentioned in Clauses
Thus, at present, there appears to be no more argument that the 2 and 3.
trust created over the properties of the decedent should be
dissolved as the twenty-year period has, quite palpably, lapsed. Plainly, the RTC was mistaken in denying petitioners’ motion to
dissolve and ordering the disposition of the properties in Clause
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the RTC ruled otherwise and 10 according to the testatrix’s wishes. As regards these
held that: (a) only the perpetual prohibition to alienate or properties, intestacy should apply as the decedent did not
mortgage is declared void; (b) the trust over her properties institute an heir therefor. Article 782, in relation to paragraph 2,
stipulated by the testatrix in Clauses 12, 13 and 24 of the will Article 960 of the Civil Code, provides:
remains valid; and (c) the trustees may dispose of these
properties in order to carry out the latter’s testamentary Art. 782. An heir is a person called to the succession either by
disposition. the provision of a will or by operation of law.

We disagree. xxxx

Apparent from the decedent’s last will and testament is the Art. 960. Legal or intestate succession takes place:
creation of a trust on a specific set of properties and the income
accruing therefrom. Nowhere in the will can it be ascertained xxxx
that the decedent intended any of the trust’s designated
beneficiaries to inherit these properties. The decedent’s will did (2) When the will does not institute an heir to, or dispose of all
not institute any heir thereto, as clearly shown by the following: the property belonging to the testator. In such case, legal
succession shall take place only with respect to the property of
1. Clause 2 instructed the creation of trust; which the testator has not disposed;

2. Clause 3 instructed that the remaining income from xxx

specified properties, after the necessary deductions for
We find as erroneous the RTC’s holding that paragraph cannot be subjected indefinitely to a trust because the
4,14 Article 1013 of the same code specifically allows a perpetual ownership thereof would then effectively remain with her even in
trust, because this provision of law is inapplicable. Suffice it to the afterlife.
state that the article is among the Civil Code provisions on
intestate succession, specifically on the State inheriting from a In light of the foregoing, therefore, the trust on the testatrix’s
decedent, in default of persons entitled to succeed. Under this properties must be dissolved and this case remanded to the
article, the allowance for a permanent trust, approved by a court lower court to determine the following:
of law, covers property inherited by the State by virtue of
intestate succession. The article does not cure a void 1. The properties listed in Clause 10 of the will,
testamentary provision which did not institute an heir. constituting the perpetual trust, which are still within
Accordingly, the article cannot be applied to dispose of herein reach and have not been disposed of as yet; and
decedent’s properties.
2. The intestate heirs of the decedent, with the nearest
We are not unmindful of our ruling in Palad, et al. v. Governor of relative of the deceased entitled to inherit the remaining
Quezon Province, et al.15 where we declared, thus: properties.

Article 870 of the New Civil Code, which regards as void any One final note. To obviate confusion, we clarify that the
disposition of the testator declaring all or part of the estate petitioners, although correct in moving for the dissolution of the
inalienable for more than 20 years, is not violated by the trust trust after the twenty-year period, are not necessarily declared
constituted by the late Luis Palad; because the will of the as intestate heirs of the decedent. Our remand of the case to
testator does not interdict the alienation of the parcels devised. the RTC means that the probate court should now make a
The will merely directs that the income of said two parcels be determination of the heirship of the intestate heirs of the
utilized for the establishment, maintenance and operation of the decedent where petitioners, and all others claiming to be heirs
high school. of the decedent, should establish their status as such consistent
with our ruling in Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Hon. del Rosario.17
Said Article 870 was designed "to give more impetus to the
socialization of the ownership of property and to prevent the WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED.
perpetuation of large holdings which give rise to agrarian The Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 4 in SP.
troubles." The trust herein involved covers only two lots, which PROC. No. 51872 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trust
have not been shown to be a large landholding. And the income approved by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 4 in SP.
derived therefrom is being devoted to a public and social PROC. No. 51872 is DISSOLVED. We ORDER the Regional
purpose – the education of the youth of the land. The use of Trial Court of Manila, Branch 4 in SP. PROC. No. 51872 to
said parcels therefore is in a sense socialized. There is no hint determine the following:
in the record that the trust has spawned agrarian conflicts.16
1. the properties listed in Clause 10 of Doña Margarita
In this case, however, we reach a different conclusion as the Rodriguez’s will, constituting the perpetual trust, which
testatrix specifically prohibited the alienation or mortgage of her are still within reach and have not been disposed of as
properties which were definitely more than the two (2) properties yet; and
in the aforecited case. The herein testatrix’s large landholdings
 2. the intestate heirs of Doña Margarita Rodriguez, with Seangio, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 98–90870 of the RTC, and
the nearest relative of the decedent entitled to inherit the praying for the appointment of private respondent Elisa D.
remaining properties. Seangio–Santos as special administrator and guardian ad litem
of petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed
G.R. Nos. 140371-72             November 27, 2006 Seangio, opposed the petition. They contended that: 1) Dy
Yieng is still very healthy and in full command of her faculties; 2)
DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and VIRGINIA the deceased Segundo executed a general power of attorney in
D. SEANGIO, Petitioners,  favor of Virginia giving her the power to manage and exercise
vs. control and supervision over his business in the Philippines; 3)
HON. AMOR A. REYES, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Virginia is the most competent and qualified to serve as the
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, administrator of the estate of Segundo because she is a certified
Branch 21, Manila, ALFREDO D. SEANGIO, ALBERTO D. public accountant; and, 4) Segundo left a holographic will, dated
SEANGIO, ELISA D. SEANGIO-SANTOS, VICTOR D. September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of the private
SEANGIO, ALFONSO D. SEANGIO, SHIRLEY D. SEANGIO- respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view of the
LIM, BETTY D. SEANGIO-OBAS and JAMES D. purported holographic will, petitioners averred that in the event
SEANGIO, Respondents. the decedent is found to have left a will, the intestate
proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced by
DECISION the proceedings for the probate of the will.

AZCUNA, J.: On April 7, 1999, a petition for the probate of the holographic will
of Segundo, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 99–93396, was filed by
This is a petition for certiorari1 with application for the issuance petitioners before the RTC. They likewise reiterated that the
of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining probate proceedings should take precedence over SP. Proc.
order seeking the nullification of the orders, dated August 10, No. 98–90870 because testate proceedings take precedence
1999 and October 14, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court of and enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.2
Manila, Branch 21 (the RTC), dismissing the petition for probate
on the ground of preterition, in the consolidated cases, docketed The document that petitioners refer to as Segundo’s holographic
as SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 and SP. Proc. No. 99-93396, and will is quoted, as follows:
entitled, "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Segundo C.
Seangio v. Alfredo D. Seangio, et al." and "In the Matter of the Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana
Probate of the Will of Segundo C. Seangio v. Dy Yieng Seangio,
Barbara D. Seangio and Virginia Seangio." Tantunin ng sinuman

The facts of the cases are as follows: Ako si Segundo Seangio Filipino may asawa naninirahan sa
465-A Flores St., Ermita, Manila at nagtatalay ng maiwanag na
On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition for pag-iisip at disposisyon ay tahasan at hayagang inaalisan ko ng
the settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo lahat at anumang mana ang paganay kong anak na
si Alfredo Seangio dahil siya ay naging lapastangan sa akin at (signed)
isan beses siya ng sasalita ng masama harapan ko at mga
kapatid niya na si Virginia Seangio labis kong kinasama ng loob ikatlong saksi
ko at sasabe rin ni Alfredo sa akin na ako nasa ibabaw gayon
gunit daratin ang araw na ako nasa ilalim siya at siya nasa On May 29, 1999, upon petitioners’ motion, SP. Proc. No. 98–
ibabaw. 90870 and SP. Proc. No. 99–93396 were consolidated.4

Labis kong ikinasama ng loob ko ang gamit ni Alfredo ng akin On July 1, 1999, private respondents moved for the dismissal of
pagalan para makapagutang na kuarta siya at kanya asawa na the probate proceedings5 primarily on the ground that the
si Merna de los Reyes sa China Bangking Corporation na millon document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo does
pesos at hindi ng babayad at hindi ng babayad ito ay nagdulot not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and
sa aking ng malaking kahihiya sa mga may-ari at stockholders thus does not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of
ng China Banking. the Civil Code. According to private respondents, the will only
shows an alleged act of disinheritance by the decedent of his
At ikinagalit ko pa rin ang pagkuha ni Alfredo at ng kanyang eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other compulsory
asawa na mga custome[r] ng Travel Center of the Philippines na heirs were not named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee,
pinagasiwaan ko at ng anak ko si Virginia. hence, there is preterition which would result to intestacy. Such
being the case, private respondents maintained that while
Dito ako nagalit din kaya gayon ayoko na bilanin si Alfredo ng procedurally the court is called upon to rule only on the extrinsic
anak ko at hayanan kong inaalisan ng lahat at anoman mana na validity of the will, it is not barred from delving into the intrinsic
si Alfredo at si Alfredo Seangio ay hindi ko siya anak at hindi validity of the same, and ordering the dismissal of the petition for
siya makoha mana. probate when on the face of the will it is clear that it contains no
testamentary disposition of the property of the decedent.
Nila[g]daan ko ngayon ika 20 ng Setyembre 1995 sa longsod ng
Manila sa harap ng tatlong saksi. 3 Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss
contending that: 1) generally, the authority of the probate court
(signed) is limited only to a determination of the extrinsic validity of the
will; 2) private respondents question the intrinsic and not the
Segundo Seangio extrinsic validity of the will; 3) disinheritance constitutes a
disposition of the estate of a decedent; and, 4) the rule on
Nilagdaan sa harap namin preterition does not apply because Segundo’s will does not
constitute a universal heir or heirs to the exclusion of one or
(signed) more compulsory heirs.6

Dy Yieng Seangio (signed) On August 10, 1999, the RTC issued its assailed order,
dismissing the petition for probate proceedings:
Unang Saksi ikalawang saksi
A perusal of the document termed as "will" by
oppositors/petitioners Dy Yieng Seangio, et al., clearly shows
that there is preterition, as the only heirs mentioned thereat are I
Alfredo and Virginia. [T]he other heirs being omitted, Article 854
of the New Civil Code thus applies. However, insofar as the THE RESPONDENT JUDGE, WITHOUT EVEN COMPLYING
widow Dy Yieng Seangio is concerned, Article 854 does not WITH SECTIONS 3 AND 4 OF RULE 76 OF THE RULES OF
apply, she not being a compulsory heir in the direct line. COURT ON THE PROPER PROCEDURE FOR SETTING THE
CASE FOR INITIAL HEARING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT
As such, this Court is bound to dismiss this petition, for to do OF THE JURISDICTIONAL FACTS, DISMISSED THE
otherwise would amount to an abuse of discretion. The TESTATE CASE ON THE ALLEGED GROUND THAT THE
Supreme Court in the case of Acain v. Intermediate Appellate TESTATOR’S WILL IS VOID ALLEGEDLY BECAUSE OF THE
Court [155 SCRA 100 (1987)] has made its position clear: "for EXISTENCE OF PRETERITION, WHICH GOES INTO THE
… respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL, DESPITE THE FACT
allowed the case to progress when, on its face, the will appears THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE THAT THE AUTHORITY OF
to be intrinsically void … would have been an exercise in futility. PROBATE COURTS IS LIMITED ONLY TO A
It would have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus DETERMINATION OF THE EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE
added futility. The trial court could have denied its probate WILL, I.E., THE DUE EXECUTION THEREOF, THE
outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the TESTATOR’S TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY AND THE
testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUISITES OR SOLEMNITIES
was resolved(underscoring supplied). PRESCRIBED BY LAW;

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Suspend II

Proceedings is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Special
Proceedings No. 99–93396 is hereby DISMISSED without EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE RESPONDENT
pronouncement as to costs. JUDGE HAS THE AUTHORITY TO RULE UPON THE
INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL OF THE TESTATOR, IT IS
SO ORDERED.7 INDUBITABLE FROM THE FACE OF THE TESTATOR’S WILL
THAT NO PRETERITON EXISTS AND THAT THE WILL IS
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC in BOTH INTRINSICALLY AND EXTRINSICALLY VALID; AND,
its order dated October 14, 1999.
III
Petitioners contend that:
RESPONDENT JUDGE WAS DUTY BOUND TO SUSPEND
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED IN EXCESS OF HER THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE INTESTATE CASE
JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION CONSIDERING THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE THAT
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND TESTATE PROCEEDINGS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER
DECIDED A QUESTION OF LAW NOT IN ACCORD WITH INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS.
LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED
ORDERS, DATED 10 AUGUST 1999 AND 14 OCTOBER 1999 Petitioners argue, as follows:
(ATTACHMENTS "A" AND "B" HEREOF) CONSIDERING
THAT:
First, respondent judge did not comply with Sections 3 and 4 of eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to his estate for the reasons that
Rule 76 of the Rules of Court which respectively mandate the he cited therein. In effect, Alfredo was disinherited by Segundo.
court to: a) fix the time and place for proving the will when all
concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code
cause notice of such time and place to be published three requires that the same must be effected through a will wherein
weeks successively previous to the appointed time in a the legal cause therefor shall be specified. With regard to the
newspaper of general circulation; and, b) cause the mailing of reasons for the disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in
said notice to the heirs, legatees and devisees of the testator his document, the Court believes that the incidents, taken as a
Segundo; whole, can be considered a form of maltreatment of Segundo by
his son, Alfredo, and that the matter presents a sufficient cause
Second, the holographic will does not contain any institution of for the disinheritance of a child or descendant under Article 919
an heir, but rather, as its title clearly states, Kasulatan ng Pag- of the Civil Code:
Aalis ng Mana, simply contains a disinheritance of a compulsory
heir. Thus, there is no preterition in the decedent’s will and the Article 919. The following shall be sufficient causes for the
holographic will on its face is not intrinsically void; disinheritance of children and descendants, legitimate as well as
illegitimate:
Third, the testator intended all his compulsory heirs, petitioners
and private respondents alike, with the sole exception of (1) When a child or descendant has been found guilty of
Alfredo, to inherit his estate. None of the compulsory heirs in the an attempt against the life of the testator, his or her
direct line of Segundo were preterited in the holographic will spouse, descendants, or ascendants;
since there was no institution of an heir;
(2) When a child or descendant has accused the testator
Fourth, inasmuch as it clearly appears from the face of the of a crime for which the law prescribes imprisonment for
holographic will that it is both intrinsically and extrinsically valid, six years or more, if the accusation has been found
respondent judge was mandated to proceed with the hearing of groundless;
the testate case; and,
(3) When a child or descendant has been convicted of
Lastly, the continuation of the proceedings in the intestate case adultery or concubinage with the spouse of the testator;
will work injustice to petitioners, and will render nugatory the
disinheritance of Alfredo. (4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence,
intimidation, or undue influence causes the testator to
The purported holographic will of Segundo that was presented make a will or to change one already made;
by petitioners was dated, signed and written by him in his own
handwriting. Except on the ground of preterition, private (5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support the
respondents did not raise any issue as regards the authenticity parents or ascendant who disinherit such child or
of the document. descendant;

The document, entitled Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, (6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the
unmistakably showed Segundo’s intention of excluding his child or descendant;8
 (7) When a child or descendant leads a dishonorable or execution of the instrument and the intention of the testator.12 In
disgraceful life; this regard, the Court is convinced that the document, even if
captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended by
(8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the penalty Segundo to be his last testamentary act and was executed by
of civil interdiction. him in accordance with law in the form of a holographic will.
Unless the will is probated,13 the disinheritance cannot be given
Now, the critical issue to be determined is whether the effect.14
document executed by Segundo can be considered as a
holographic will. With regard to the issue on preterition,15 the Court believes that
the compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the
A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil will. It was, in the Court’s opinion, Segundo’s last expression to
Code, must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole
the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an heir16 to
made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed. the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The mere mention
of the name of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the document
Segundo’s document, although it may initially come across as a did not operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her name
mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a was included plainly as a witness to the altercation between
holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed Segundo and his son, Alfredo.1âwphi1
by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis
causa[9] can be clearly deduced from the terms of the Considering that the questioned document is Segundo’s
instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition holographic will, and that the law favors testacy over intestacy,
of the latter’s property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with. Article 838 of
nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the the Civil Code provides that no will shall pass either real or
disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance
testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is probated, the
absence of Alfredo.10 right of a person to dispose of his property may be rendered
nugatory.17
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will
of the testator, expressed in the form and within the limits In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have
prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in allowed the holographic will to be probated. It is settled that
succession. All rules of construction are designed to ascertain testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the
and give effect to that intention. It is only when the intention of decedent take precedence over intestate proceedings for the
the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it same purpose.18
cannot be given effect.11
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the
Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21, dated August 10,
is not learned in the law, as illustrated in the present case, 1999 and October 14, 1999, are set aside. Respondent judge is
should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an directed to reinstate and hear SP Proc. No. 99-93396 for the
expert, taking into account the circumstances surrounding the allowance of the holographic will of Segundo Seangio. The
intestate case or SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 is hereby suspended which denied the Motion for Reconsideration thereto.
until the termination of the aforesaid testate proceedings.
Petitioners call us to reverse the CA’s assailed Decision and
instead affirm the Decision of the RTC which disallowed the
[G.R. No. 174489 : April 07, 2012]  notarial will of Paciencia.

ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR, SEBASTIAN M. BALTAZAR, Factual Antecedents

ANTONIO L. MANGALINDAN, ROSIE M. MATEO, NENITA A.
PACHECO, VIRGILIO REGALA, JR., AND RAFAEL TITCO, Paciencia was a 78 year old spinster when she made her last
PETITIONERS, VS. LORENZO LAXA, RESPONDENT. will and testament entitled “Tauli Nang Bilin o Testamento Miss
Paciencia Regala”[7] (Will) in the Pampango dialect on
D E C I S I O N  September 13, 1981.  The Will, executed in the house of retired
Judge Ernestino G. Limpin (Judge Limpin), was read to
DEL CASTILLO, J.: Paciencia twice.  After which, Paciencia expressed in the
presence of the instrumental witnesses that the document is her
It is incumbent upon those who oppose the probate of a will to last will and testament.  She thereafter affixed her signature at
clearly establish that the decedent was not of sound and the end of the said document on page 3[8] and then on the left
disposing mind at the time of the execution of said will. margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof.[9]
Otherwise, the state is duty-bound to give full effect to the
wishes of the testator to distribute his estate in the manner The witnesses to the Will were Dra. Maria Lioba A. Limpin (Dra.
provided in his will so long as it is legally tenable. [1]cralaw  Limpin), Francisco Garcia (Francisco) and Faustino R. Mercado
(Faustino).  The three attested to the Will’s due execution by
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[2] of the June 15, affixing their signatures below its attestation clause[10] and on the
2006 Decision[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof,[11] in the presence of
80979 which reversed the September 30, 2003 Decision[4] of the Paciencia and of one another and of Judge Limpin who acted as
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 52, Guagua, Pampanga in notary public.
Special Proceedings No. G-1186.  The assailed CA Decision
granted the petition for probate of the notarial will of Paciencia Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia
Regala (Paciencia), to wit: bequeathed all her properties to respondent Lorenzo R. Laxa
(Lorenzo) and his wife Corazon F. Laxa and their children Luna
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the appeal to be Lorella Laxa and Katherine Ross Laxa, thus:
impressed with merit, the decision in SP. PROC. NO. G-1186
dated 30 September 2003, is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one x x x x
entered GRANTING the petition for the probate of the will of
PACIENCIA REGALA. Fourth - In consideration of their valuable services to me since
then up to the present by the spouses LORENZO LAXA and
SO ORDERED.[5] CORAZON F. LAXA, I hereby BEQUEATH, CONVEY and GIVE
all my properties enumerated in parcels 1 to 5 unto the spouses
Also assailed herein is the August 31, 2006 CA Resolution [6]  LORENZO R. LAXA and CORAZON F. LAXA  and their
children, LUNA LORELLA LAXA and KATHERINE LAXA, and There being no opposition to the petition after its due
the spouses Lorenzo R. Laxa and Corazon F. Laxa both of legal publication, the RTC issued an Order on June 13,
age, Filipinos, presently residing at Barrio Sta. Monica, 2000[15] allowing Lorenzo to present evidence on June 22,
[Sasmuan], Pampanga and their children, LUNA LORELLA and 2000.  On said date, Dra. Limpin testified that she was one of
KATHERINE ROSS LAXA, who are still not of legal age and the instrumental witnesses in the execution of the last will and
living with their parents who would decide to bequeath since testament of Paciencia on September 13, 1981.[16]  The Will was
they are the children of the spouses; executed in her father’s (Judge Limpin) home office, in her
presence and of two other witnesses, Francisco and Faustino.
[17]
x x x x   Dra. Limpin positively identified the Will and her signatures
on all its four pages.[18] She likewise positively identified the
[Sixth] - Should other properties of mine may be discovered signature of her father appearing thereon.[19]  Questioned by the
aside from the properties mentioned in this last will and prosecutor regarding Judge Limpin’s present mental fitness,
testament, I am also bequeathing and giving the same to the Dra. Limpin testified that her father had a stroke in 1991 and
spouses Lorenzo R. Laxa and Corazon F. Laxa and their two had to undergo brain surgery.[20]  The judge can walk but can no
children and I also command them to offer masses yearly for the longer talk and remember her name.  Because of this, Dra.
repose of my soul and that of D[ñ]a Nicomeda Regala, Epifania Limpin stated that her father can no longer testify in court.[21]
Regala and their spouses and with respect to the fishpond
situated at San Antonio, I likewise command to fulfill the wishes The following day or on June 23, 2000, petitioner Antonio
of D[ñ]a Nicomeda Regala in accordance with her testament as Baltazar (Antonio) filed an opposition[22] to Lorenzo’s petition. 
stated in my testament. x x x[12] Antonio averred that the properties subject of Paciencia’s Will
belong to Nicomeda Regala Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-
The filial relationship of Lorenzo with Paciencia remains interest; hence, Paciencia had no right to bequeath them to
undisputed.  Lorenzo is Paciencia’s nephew whom she treated Lorenzo.[23]
as her own son. Conversely, Lorenzo came to know and treated
Paciencia as his own mother.[13]  Paciencia lived with Lorenzo’s Barely a month after or on July 20, 2000, Antonio, now joined by
family in Sasmuan, Pampanga and it was she who raised and petitioners Sebastian M. Baltazar, Virgilio Regala, Jr., Nenita A.
cared for Lorenzo since his birth.  Six days after the execution of Pacheco, Felix B. Flores, Rafael Titco, Rosie M. Mateo (Rosie)
the Will or on September 19, 1981, Paciencia left for the United and Antonio L. Mangalindan filed a Supplemental
States of America (USA).  There, she resided with Lorenzo and Opposition[24] contending that Paciencia’s Will was null and void
his family until her death on January 4, 1996. because ownership of the properties had not been transferred
and/or titled to Paciencia before her death pursuant to Article
In the interim, the Will remained in the custody of Judge Limpin. 1049, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code.[25]  Petitioners also
opposed the issuance of Letters of Administration in Lorenzo’s
More than four years after the death of Paciencia or on April 27, favor arguing that Lorenzo was disqualified to be appointed as
2000, Lorenzo filed a petition[14] with the RTC of Guagua, such, he being a citizen and resident of the USA.[26]  Petitioners
Pampanga for the probate of the Will of Paciencia and for the prayed that Letters of Administration be instead issued in favor
issuance of Letters of Administration in his favor, docketed as of Antonio.[27]
Special Proceedings No. G-1186.
Later still on September 26, 2000, petitioners filed an Amended
Opposition[28] asking the RTC to deny the probate of Paciencia’s USA and lived with him and his family until her death in January
Will on the following grounds: the Will was not executed and 1996; the relationship between him and Paciencia was like that
attested to in accordance with the requirements of the law; that of a mother and child since Paciencia took care of him since
Paciencia was mentally incapable to make a Will at the time of birth and took him in as an adopted son; Paciencia was a
its execution; that she was forced to execute the Will under spinster without children, and without brothers and sisters; at the
duress or influence of fear or threats; that the execution of the time of Paciencia’s death, she did not suffer from any mental
Will had been procured by undue and improper pressure and disorder and was of sound mind, was not blind, deaf or mute;
influence by Lorenzo or by some other persons for his benefit; the Will was in the custody of Judge Limpin and was only given
that the signature of Paciencia on the Will was forged; that to him after Paciencia’s death through Faustino; and he was
assuming the signature to be genuine, it was obtained through already residing in the USA when the Will was executed.[33] 
fraud or trickery; and, that Paciencia did not intend the Lorenzo positively identified the signature of Paciencia in three
document to be her Will.  Simultaneously, petitioners filed an different documents and in the Will itself and stated that he was
Opposition and Recommendation[29] reiterating their opposition familiar with Paciencia’s signature because he accompanied her
to the appointment of Lorenzo as administrator of the properties in her transactions.[34]  Further, Lorenzo belied and denied
and requesting for the appointment of Antonio in his stead. having used force, intimidation, violence, coercion or trickery
upon Paciencia to execute the Will as he was not in the
On January 29, 2001, the RTC issued an Order[30] denying the Philippines when the same was executed.[35] On cross-
requests of both Lorenzo and Antonio to be appointed examination, Lorenzo clarified that Paciencia informed him
administrator since the former is a citizen and resident of the about the Will shortly after her arrival in the USA but that he saw
USA while the latter’s claim as a co-owner of the properties a copy of the Will only after her death.[36]
subject of the Will has not yet been established.
As to Francisco, he could no longer be presented in court as he
Meanwhile, proceedings on the petition for the probate of the already died on May 21, 2000.
Will continued.  Dra. Limpin was recalled for cross-examination
by the petitioners.  She testified as to the age of her father at the For petitioners, Rosie testified that her mother and Paciencia
time the latter notarized the Will of Paciencia; the living were first cousins.[37]  She claimed to have helped in the
arrangements of Paciencia at the time of the execution of the household chores in the house of Paciencia thereby allowing
Will; and the lack of photographs when the event took place. [31] her to stay therein from morning until evening and that during
the period of her service in the said household, Lorenzo’s wife
Aside from Dra. Limpin, Lorenzo and  Monico Mercado and his children were staying in the same house.[38]  She served
(Monico)  also took the witness stand.  Monico, son of Faustino, in the said household from 1980 until Paciencia’s departure for
testified on his father’s condition.  According to him his father the USA on September 19, 1981.[39]
can no longer talk and express himself due to brain damage.  A
medical certificate was presented to the court to support this On September 13, 1981, Rosie claimed that she saw Faustino
allegation. [32] bring “something” for Paciencia to sign at the latter’s house. [40] 
Rosie admitted, though, that she did not see what that
For his part, Lorenzo testified that: from 1944 until his departure “something” was as same was placed inside an envelope.[41] 
for the USA in April 1980, he lived in Sasmuan, Pampanga with However, she remembered Paciencia instructing Faustino to
his family and his aunt, Paciencia; in 1981 Paciencia went to the first look for money before she signs them.[42]  A few days after
or on September 16, 1981, Paciencia went to the house of
Antonio’s mother and brought with her the said envelope. On September 30, 2003, the RTC rendered its
[43]
 Upon going home, however, the envelope was no longer with Decision[56] denying the petition thus:
Paciencia.[44]  Rosie further testified that Paciencia was referred
to as “magulyan” or “forgetful” because she would sometimes WHEREFORE, this court hereby (a) denies the petition dated
leave her wallet in the kitchen then start looking for it moments April 24, 2000; and (b) disallows the notarized will dated
later.[45]  On cross examination, it was established that Rosie September 13, 1981 of Paciencia Regala.
was neither a doctor nor a psychiatrist, that her conclusion that
Paciencia was “magulyan” was based on her personal SO ORDERED.[57]
assessment,[46] and that it was Antonio who requested her to
testify in court.[47] The trial court gave considerable weight to the testimony of
Rosie and concluded that at the time Paciencia signed the Will,
In his direct examination, Antonio stated that Paciencia was his she was no longer possessed of sufficient reason or strength of
aunt.[48]  He identified the Will and testified that he had seen the mind to have testamentary capacity.[58]
said document before because Paciencia brought the same to
his mother’s house and showed it to him along with another Ruling of the Court of Appeals
document on September 16, 1981.[49]  Antonio alleged that when
the documents were shown to him, the same were still On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC Decision and granted the
unsigned.[50]  According to him, Paciencia thought that the probate of the Will of Paciencia.  The appellate court did not
documents pertained to a lease of one of her rice lands,[51] and it agree with the RTC’s conclusion that Paciencia was of unsound
was he who explained that the documents were actually a mind when she executed the Will.  It ratiocinated that “the state
special power of attorney to lease and sell her fishpond and of being ‘magulyan’ does not make a person mentally unsound
other properties upon her departure for the USA, and a Will so [as] to render [Paciencia] unfit for executing a Will.”[59] 
which would transfer her properties to Lorenzo and his family Moreover, the oppositors in the probate proceedings were not
upon her death.[52]  Upon hearing this, Paciencia allegedly able to overcome the presumption that every person is of sound
uttered the following words: “Why will I never [return], why will I mind.  Further, no concrete circumstances or events were given
sell all my properties?”  Who is Lorenzo?  Is he the only [son] of to prove the allegation that Paciencia was tricked or forced into
God?  I have other relatives [who should] benefit from my signing the Will.[60]
properties.  Why should I die already?” [53]  Thereafter, Antonio
advised Paciencia not to sign the documents if she does not Petitioners moved for reconsideration[61] but the motion was
want to, to which the latter purportedly replied, “I know nothing denied by the CA in its Resolution[62] dated August 31, 2006.
about those, throw them away or it is up to you. The more I will
not sign them.”[54]  After which, Paciencia left the documents with Hence, this petition.
Antonio.  Antonio kept the unsigned documents
Issues
and eventually turned them over to Faustino on September 18,
1981.[55] Petitioners come before this Court by way of Petition for Review
on Certiorari ascribing upon the CA the following errors:
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
I. Rule 75
Production of Will. Allowance of Will Necessary.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED THE PROBATE OF Section 1. Allowance necessary. Conclusive as to execution. –
PACIENCIA’S WILL DESPITE RESPONDENT’S UTTER No will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH SECTION 11, RULE 76 OF THE proved and allowed in the proper court. Subject to the right of
RULES OF COURT; appeal, such allowance of the will shall be conclusive as to its
due execution.
II.
Due execution of the will or its extrinsic validity pertains to
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the
IN MAKING CONCLUSIONS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.[65] 
THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD; These formalities are enshrined in Articles 805 and 806 of the
New Civil Code, to wit:
III.
Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the
IN RULING THAT PETITIONERS FAILED TO PROVE THAT testator's name written by some other person in his presence,
PACIENCIA WAS NOT OF SOUND MIND AT THE TIME THE and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by
WILL WAS ALLEGEDLY EXECUTED[63] three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator
and of one another.
The pivotal issue is whether the authenticity and due execution
of the notarial Will was sufficiently established to warrant its The testator or the person requested by him to write his
allowance for probate. name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also
sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the
Our Ruling last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be
numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part
We deny the petition. of each page.

Faithful compliance with the formalities laid down  The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon
by law is apparent from the face of the Will. which the will is written, and the fact that the testator
signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some
Courts are tasked to determine nothing more than the extrinsic other person to write his name, under his express
validity of a direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses,
and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the
Will in probate proceedings.[64]  This is expressly provided for in pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one
Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which states: another.

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the

witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them. Art.  799.    To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the
testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by
public by the testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall disease, injury or other cause.
not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with
the Office of the Clerk of Court. It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making
the will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the
Here, a careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the
compliance with the formalities laid down by law.  The testamentary act.
signatures of the testatrix, Paciencia, her instrumental witnesses
and the notary public, are all present and evident on the Will.  In this case, apart from the testimony of Rosie pertaining to
Further, the attestation clause explicitly states the critical Paciencia’s forgetfulness, there is no substantial evidence,
requirement that the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses medical or otherwise, that would show that Paciencia was of
signed the Will in the presence of one another and that the unsound mind at the time of the execution of the Will.  On the
witnesses attested and subscribed to the Will in the presence of other hand, we find more worthy of credence Dra. Limpin’s
the testator and of one another.  In fact, even the petitioners testimony as to the soundness of mind of Paciencia when the
acceded that the signature of Paciencia in the Will may be latter went to Judge Limpin’s house and voluntarily executed the
authentic although they question her state of mind when she Will.  “The testimony of subscribing witnesses to a Will
signed the same as well as the voluntary nature of said act. concerning the testator’s mental condition is entitled to great
weight where they are truthful and intelligent.” [69]  More
The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound importantly, a testator is presumed to be of sound mind at the
mind at the time of the execution of the will lies on time of the execution of the Will and the burden to prove
the shoulders of the petitioners. otherwise lies on the oppositor.  Article 800 of the New Civil
Code states:
Petitioners, through their witness Rosie, claim that Paciencia
was “magulyan” or forgetful so much so that it effectively Art. 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound
stripped her of testamentary capacity. They likewise claimed in mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary.
their Motion for Reconsideration[66] filed with the CA that
Paciencia was not only “magulyan” but was actually suffering The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at
from paranoia.[67] the time of making his dispositions is on the person who
opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator, one month, or
We are not convinced. less, before making his will was publicly known to be insane, the
person who maintains the validity of the will must prove that the
We agree with the position of the CA that the state of being testator made it during a lucid interval.
forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound
so as to render him unfit to execute a Will. [68]  Forgetfulness is Here, there was no showing that Paciencia was publicly known
not equivalent to being of unsound mind.  Besides, Article 799 of to be insane one month or less before the making of the Will. 
the New Civil Code states: Clearly, thus, the burden to prove that Paciencia was of
unsound mind lies upon the shoulders of petitioners.  However
and as earlier mentioned, no substantial evidence was loved and treated Lorenzo as her own son and that love even
presented by them to prove the same, thereby warranting the extended to Lorenzo’s wife and children.  This kind of
CA’s finding that petitioners failed to discharge such burden. relationship is not unusual.  It is in fact not unheard of in our
culture for old maids or spinsters to care for and raise their
Furthermore, we are convinced that Paciencia was aware of the nephews and nieces and treat them as their own children.  Such
nature of her estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of her is a prevalent and accepted cultural practice that has resulted in
bounty and the character of the testamentary act.  As aptly many family discords between those favored by the
pointed out by the CA: testamentary disposition of a testator and those who stand to
benefit in case of intestacy.
A scrutiny of the Will discloses that [Paciencia] was aware of the
nature of the document she executed.  She specially requested In this case, evidence shows the acknowledged fact that
that the customs of her faith be observed upon her death. She Paciencia’s relationship with Lorenzo and his family is different
was well aware of how she acquired the properties from her from her relationship with petitioners.  The very fact that she
parents and the properties she is bequeathing to LORENZO, to cared for and raised Lorenzo and lived with him both here and
his wife CORAZON and to his two (2) children. A third child was abroad, even if the latter was already married and already has
born after the execution of the will and was not included therein children, highlights the special bond between them. This
as devisee.[70] unquestioned relationship between Paciencia and the devisees
tends to support the authenticity of the said document as
Bare allegations of duress or influence of fear  against petitioners’ allegations of duress, influence of fear or
or threats, undue and improper influence and  threats, undue and improper influence, pressure, fraud, and
pressure, fraud and trickery cannot be used as trickery which, aside from being factual in nature, are not
basis to deny the probate of a will. supported by concrete, substantial and credible evidence on
record.  It is worth stressing that bare arguments, no matter how
An essential element of the validity of the Will is the willingness forceful, if not based on concrete and substantial evidence
of the testator or testatrix to execute the document that will cannot suffice to move the Court to uphold said allegations. [71] 
distribute his/her earthly possessions upon his/her death.  Furthermore, “a purported will is not [to be] denied legalization
Petitioners claim that Paciencia was forced to execute the Will on dubious grounds.  Otherwise, the very institution of
under duress or influence of fear or threats; that the execution of testamentary succession will be shaken to its foundation, for
the Will had been procured by undue and improper pressure even if a will has been duly executed in fact, whether x x x it will
and influence by Lorenzo or by some other persons for his be probated would have to depend largely on the attitude of
benefit; and that assuming Paciencia’s signature to be genuine, those interested in [the estate of the deceased].”[72]
it was obtained through fraud or trickery.  These are grounded
on the alleged conversation between Paciencia and Antonio on Court should be convinced by the evidence
September 16, 1981 wherein the former purportedly repudiated presented before it that the Will was duly 
the Will and left it unsigned. executed.

We are not persuaded. Petitioners dispute the authenticity of Paciencia’s Will on the
ground that Section 11 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court was not
We take into consideration the unrebutted fact that Paciencia complied with.  It provides:
RULE 76 Judge Limpin, suffered a stroke in 1991 and had to undergo
Allowance or Disallowance of Will brain surgery.  At that time, Judge Limpin could no longer talk
and could not even remember his daughter’s name so that Dra.
Section 11. Subscribing witnesses produced or accounted for Limpin stated that given such condition, her father could no
where will contested. – If the will is contested, all the longer testify.  It is well to note that at that point, despite ample
subscribing witnesses, and the notary in the case of wills opportunity, petitioners neither interposed any objections to the
executed under the Civil Code of the Philippines, if present in testimonies of said witnesses nor challenged the same on cross
the Philippines and not insane, must be produced and examination.  We thus hold that for all intents and purposes,
examined, and the death, absence, or insanity of any of them Lorenzo was able to satisfactorily account for the incapacity and
must be satisfactorily shown to the court. If all or some of such failure of the said subscribing witness and of the notary public to
witnesses are present in the Philippines but outside the province testify in court.  Because of this the probate of Paciencia’s Will
where the will has been filed, their deposition must be taken. If may be allowed on the basis of Dra. Limpin’s testimony proving
any or all of them testify against the due execution of the will, or her sanity and the due execution of the Will, as well as on the
do not remember having attested to it, or are otherwise of proof of her handwriting.  It is an established rule that “[a]
doubtful credibility, the will may nevertheless, be allowed if the testament may not be disallowed just because the attesting
court is satisfied from the testimony of other witnesses and from witnesses declare against its due execution; neither does it have
all the evidence presented that the will was executed and to be necessarily allowed just because all the attesting
attested in the manner required by law. witnesses declare in favor of its legalization; what is decisive is
that the court is convinced by evidence before it, not necessarily
If a holographic will is contested, the same shall be allowed if at from the attesting witnesses, although they must testify, that the
least three (3) witnesses who know the handwriting of the will was or was not duly executed in the manner required by
testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in law.”[73]
the handwriting of the testator; in the absence of any competent
witnesses, and if the court deem it necessary, expert testimony Moreover, it bears stressing that “[i]rrespective x x x of the
may be resorted to. (Emphasis supplied.) posture of any of the parties as regards the authenticity and due
execution of the will x x x in question, it is the mandate of the
They insist that all subscribing witnesses and the notary public law that it is the evidence before the court and/or [evidence that]
should have been presented in court since all but one witness, ought to be before it that is controlling.” [74]  “The very existence
Francisco, are still living. of [the Will] is in itself prima facie proof that the supposed
[testatrix] has willed that [her] estate be distributed in the
We cannot agree with petitioners. manner therein provided, and it is incumbent upon the state
that, if legally tenable, such desire be given full effect
We note that the inability of Faustino and Judge Limpin to independent of the attitude of the parties affected
appear and testify before the court was satisfactorily explained  thereby.”[75] This, coupled with Lorenzo’s established
during the probate proceedings. As testified to by his son, relationship with Paciencia, the evidence and the testimonies of
Faustino had a heart attack, was already bedridden and could disinterested witnesses, as opposed to the total lack of evidence
no longer talk and express himself due to brain damage.  To presented by petitioners apart from their self-serving
prove this, said witness presented the corresponding medical testimonies, constrain us to tilt the balance in favor of the
certificate.  For her part, Dra. Limpin testified that her father, authenticity of the Will and its allowance for probate.cralaw 
 direct ascending line — were illegally preterited and that in
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.  The Decision dated consequence the institution is void.
June 15, 2006 and the Resolution dated August 31, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80979 are AFFIRMED. On August 29, 1963, before a hearing was had on the petition
for probate and objection thereto, oppositors moved to dismiss
on the ground of absolute preterition.
G.R. No. L-23445             June 23, 1966
On September 6, 1963, petitioner registered her opposition to
REMEDIOS NUGUID, petitioner and appellant,  the motion to dismiss.1äwphï1.ñët
vs.
FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID, oppositors and The court's order of November 8, 1963, held that "the will in
appellees. question is a complete nullity and will perforce create intestacy
of the estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid" and dismissed
Custodio O. Partade for petitioner and appellant. the petition without costs.
Beltran, Beltran and Beltran for oppositors and appellees.
A motion to reconsider having been thwarted below, petitioner
SANCHEZ, J.: came to this Court on appeal.

Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died on December 1. Right at the outset, a procedural aspect has engaged our
30, 1962, single, without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. attention. The case is for the probate of a will. The court's area
Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz of inquiry is limited — to an examination of, and resolution on,
Salonga Nuguid, and six (6) brothers and sisters, namely: the extrinsic validity of the will. The due execution thereof, the
Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all testatrix's testamentary capacity, and the compliance with the
surnamed Nuguid. requisites or solemnities by law prescribed, are the
questions solely to be presented, and to be acted upon, by the
On May 18, 1963, petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed in the Court court. Said court at this stage of the proceedings — is not called
of First Instance of Rizal a holographic will allegedly executed upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions
by Rosario Nuguid on November 17, 1951, some 11 years of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy therein.1
before her demise. Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to
probate and that letters of administration with the will annexed A peculiar situation is here thrust upon us. The parties shunted
be issued to her. aside the question of whether or not the will should be allowed
probate. For them, the meat of the case is the intrinsic validity of
On June 25, 1963, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, the will. Normally, this comes only after the court has declared
concededly the legitimate father and mother of the deceased that the will has been duly authenticated.2 But petitioner and
Rosario Nuguid, entered their opposition to the probate of her oppositors, in the court below and here on appeal, travelled on
will. Ground therefor, inter alia, is that by the institution of the issue of law, to wit: Is the will intrinsically a nullity?
petitioner Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased,
oppositors — who are compulsory heirs of the deceased in the We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for
probate of the will, nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this
litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears in the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not
record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will, inofficious. ...
probability exists that the case will come up once again before
us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Except for inconsequential variation in terms, the foregoing is a
Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. reproduction of Article 814 of the Civil Code of Spain of 1889,
These are the practical considerations that induce us to a belief which is similarly herein copied, thus — 
that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of
the provisions of the will in question.3 After all, there exists a Art. 814. The preterition of one or all of the forced heirs in
justiciable controversy crying for solution. the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution
of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall void
2. Petitioner's sole assignment of error challenges the the institution of heir; but the legacies and
correctness of the conclusion below that the will is a complete betterments4 shall be valid, in so far as they are not
nullity. This exacts from us a study of the disputed will and the inofficious. ...
applicable statute.
A comprehensive understanding of the
Reproduced hereunder is the will: term preterition employed in the law becomes a necessity. On
this point Manresa comments:
Nov. 17, 1951
La pretericion consiste en omitar al heredero en el
I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and testamento. O no se le nombra siquiera o aun
memory, having amassed a certain amount of property, do nombrandole como padre, hijo, etc., no se le instituya
hereby give, devise, and bequeath all of the property which I heredero ni se le deshereda expresamente ni se le
may have when I die to my beloved sister Remedios Nuguid, asigna parte alguna de los bienes, resultando privado de
age 34, residing with me at 38-B Iriga, Q.C. In witness whereof, un modo tacito de su derecho a legitima.
I have signed my name this seventh day of November, nineteen
hundred and fifty-one. Para que exista pretericion, con arreglo al articulo 814,
basta que en el testamento omita el testador a uno
(Sgd.) Illegible cualquiera de aquellos a quienes por su muerte
corresponda la herencia forzosa.
T/ ROSARIO NUGUID
Se necesita, pues, a) Que la omision se refiera a un
The statute we are called upon to apply in Article 854 of the Civil heredero forzoso. b) Que la omision sea completa; que el
Code which, in part, provides: heredero forzoso nada reciba en el testamento.

ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all It may now appear trite bat nonetheless helpful in giving us a
of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at clear perspective of the problem before us, to have on hand a
the time of the execution of the will or born after the death clear-cut definition of the word annul:
of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the
 To "annul" means to abrogate, to make void ... In que este articulo como especial en el caso que le motiva
re Morrow's Estate, 54 A. 342, 343, 204 Pa. 484.6 rige con preferencia al 817. 10

The word "annul" as used in statute requiring court to The same view is expressed by Sanchez Roman: — 
annul alimony provisions of divorce decree upon wife's
remarriage means to reduce to nothing; to annihilate; La consecuencia de la anulacion o nulidad de la
obliterate; blot out; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; institucion de heredero por pretericion de uno, varios o
to abolish. N.J.S.A. 2:50 — 38 (now N.J.S. 2A:34-35). todos los forzosos en linea recta, es la apertura de la
Madden vs. Madden, 40 A. 2d 611, 614, 136 N..J Eq. sucesion intestada total o parcial. Sera total, cuando el
132.7 testador que comete la pretericion, hubiese dispuesto de
todos los bienes por titulo universal de herencia en favor
ANNUL. To reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to de los herederos instituidos, cuya institucion se anula,
make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish; to do away porque asi lo exige la generalidad del precepto legal del
with. Ex parte Mitchell, 123 W. Va. 283, 14 S.E. 2d. 771, art. 814, al determinar, como efecto de la pretericion, el
774.8 de que "anulara la institucion de heredero." ... 11

And now, back to the facts and the law. The deceased Rosario Really, as we analyze the word annul employed in the statute,
Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she there is no escaping the conclusion that the universal institution
left forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents, now of petitioner to the entire inheritance results in totally
oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid. And, the will abrogating the will. Because, the nullification of such institution
completely omits both of them: They thus received nothing by of universal heir — without any other testamentary disposition in
the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; the will — amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was
neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of written. Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854 offers
preterition. Such preterition in the words of Manresa "anulara no leeway for inferential interpretation. Giving it an expansive
siempre la institucion de heredero, dando caracter absoluto a meaning will tear up by the roots the fabric of the statute. On
este ordenamiento referring to the mandate of Article 814, now this point, Sanchez Roman cites the "Memoria annual del
854 of the Civil Code.9 The one-sentence will here institutes Tribunal Supreme, correspondiente a 1908", which in our
petitioner as the sole, universal heir — nothing more. No opinion expresses the rule of interpretation, viz:
specific legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It is in this
posture that we say that the nullity is complete. Perforce, ... El art. 814, que preceptua en tales casos de
Rosario Nuguid died intestate. Says Manresa: pretericion la nulidad de la institucion de heredero, no
consiente interpretacion alguna favorable a la persona
En cuanto a la institucion de heredero, se anula. Lo que instituida en el sentido antes expuesto aun cuando
se anula deja de existir, en todo o en parte? No se añade parezca, y en algun caso pudiera ser, mas o menos
limitacion alguna, como en el articulo 851, en el que se equitativa, porque una nulidad no significa en Derecho
expresa que se anulara la institucion de heredero en sino la suposicion de que el hecho o el acto no se ha
cuanto prejudique a la legitima del deseheredado Debe, realizado, debiendo por lo tanto procederse sobre tal
pues, entenderse que la anulacion es completa o total, y base o supuesto, y consiguientemente, en un testamento
donde falte la institucion, es obligado llamar a los
 herederos forzosos en todo caso, como habria que inheritance including "la porcion libre (que) no hubiese
llamar a los de otra clase, cuando el testador no hubiese dispuesto en virtud de legado, mejora o donacion. 14
distribudo todos sus bienes en legados, siendo tanto mas
obligada esta consecuencia legal cuanto que, en materia As aforesaid, there is no other provision in the will before us
de testamentos, sabido es, segun tiene declarado la except the institution of petitioner as universal heir. That
jurisprudencia, con repeticion, que no basta que sea institution, by itself, is null and void. And, intestate succession
conocida la voluntad de quien testa si esta voluntad no ensues.
aparece en la forma y en las condiciones que la ley ha
exigido para que sea valido y eficaz, por lo que 4. Petitioner's mainstay is that the present is "a case of
constituiria una interpretacion arbitraria, dentro del ineffective disinheritance rather than one of preterition". 15From
derecho positivo, reputar como legatario a un heredero this, petitioner draws the conclusion that Article 854 "does not
cuya institucion fuese anulada con pretexto de que esto apply to the case at bar". This argument fails to appreciate the
se acomodaba mejor a la voluntad del testador, pues aun distinction between pretention and disinheritance.
cuando asi fuese, sera esto razon para modificar la ley,
pero no autoriza a una interpretacion contraria a sus Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the
terminos y a los principios que informan la forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not
testamentifaccion, pues no porque parezca mejor una mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither
cosa en el terreno del Derecho constituyente, hay razon instituted as heirs nor are expressly
para convereste juicio en regla de interpretacion, 16
disinherited."   Disinheritance, in turn, "is
desvirtuando y anulando por este procedimiento lo que el a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his
legislador quiere establecer. 12 share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law. " 17 In
Manresa's own words: "La privacion expresa de la legitima
3. We should not be led astray by the statement in Article 854 constituye la desheredacion. La privacion tacita de la misma se
that, annullment notwithstanding, "the devises and legacies denomina pretericion." 18 Sanchez Roman emphasizes the
shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious". Legacies and distinction by stating that disinheritance "es siempre voluntaria";
devises merit consideration only when they are so expressly preterition, upon the other hand, is presumed to be
given as such in a will. Nothing in Article 854 suggests that "involuntaria". 19 Express as disinheritance should be, the same
the mere institution of a universal heir in a will — void because must be supported by a legal cause specified in the will itself. 20
of preterition — would give the heir so instituted a share in the
inheritance. As to him, the will is inexistent. There must be, in The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's
addition to such institution, a testamentary disposition granting parents, the forced heirs. It simply omits their names
him bequests or legacies apart and separate from the nullified altogether. Said will rather than be labeled ineffective
institution of heir. Sanchez Roman, speaking of the two disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced heirs suffer
component parts of Article 814, now 854, states that preterition from preterition.
annuls the institution of the heir "totalmente por la pretericion";
but added (in reference to legacies and bequests) "pero On top of this is the fact that the effects flowing from preterition
subsistiendo ... todas aquellas otras disposiciones que no se are totally different from those of disinheritance. Preterition
refieren a la institucion de heredero ... . 13 As Manresa puts it, under Article 854 of the Civil Code, we repeat, "shall annul the
annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire institution of heir". This annulment is in toto, unless in the will
there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of The destructive effect of the theory thus advanced is due
devises or legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under Article mainly to a failure to distinguish institution of heirs from
918 of the same Code, such disinheritance shall also "annul the legacies and betterments, and a general from a special
institution of heirs", put only "insofar as it may prejudice the provision. With reference to article 814, which is the only
person disinherited", which last phrase was omitted in the case provision material to the disposition of this case, it must
of preterition. 21 Better stated yet, in disinheritance the nullity be observed that the institution of heirs is therein dealt
is limited to that portion of the estate of which the disinherited with as a thing separate and distinct from legacies or
heirs have been illegally deprived. Manresa's expressive betterments. And they are separate and distinct not only
language, in commenting on the rights of the preterited heirs in because they are distinctly and separately treated in said
the case of preterition on the one hand and legal disinheritance article but because they are in themselves different.
on the other, runs thus: "Preteridos, adquiren el derecho a Institution of heirs is a bequest by universal title of
todo; desheredados, solo les corresponde un tercio o dos property that is undetermined. Legacy refers to specific
tercios, 22 el caso. 23 property bequeathed by a particular or special title. ... But
again an institution of heirs cannot be taken as a
5. Petitioner insists that the compulsory heirs ineffectively legacy. 25
disinherited are entitled to receive their legitimes, but that the
institution of heir "is not invalidated," although the inheritance of The disputed order, we observe, declares the will in question "a
the heir so instituted is reduced to the extent of said legitimes. 24 complete nullity". Article 854 of the Civil Code in turn merely
nullifies "the institution of heir". Considering, however, that the
This is best answered by a reference to the opinion of Mr. Chief will before us solely provides for the institution of petitioner as
Justice Moran in the Neri case heretofore cited, viz: universal heir, and nothing more, the result is the same. The
entire will is null.
But the theory is advanced that the bequest made by
universal title in favor of the children by the second Upon the view we take of this case, the order of November 8,
marriage should be treated as legado and mejora and, 1963 under review is hereby affirmed. No costs allowed. So
accordingly, it must not be entirely annulled but merely ordered.
reduced. This theory, if adopted, will result in a complete
abrogation of Articles 814 and 851 of the Civil Code. If
every case of institution of heirs may be made to fall into
the concept of legacies and betterments reducing the G.R. No. L-62952 October 9, 1985
bequest accordingly, then the provisions of Articles 814
and 851 regarding total or partial nullity of the institution, SOFIA J. NEPOMUCENO, petitioner, 
would. be absolutely meaningless and will never have vs.
any application at all. And the remaining provisions THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RUFINA GOMEZ,
contained in said article concerning the reduction of OSCAR JUGO ANG, CARMELITA JUGO, respondents. 
inofficious legacies or betterments would be a surplusage
because they would be absorbed by Article 817. Thus,
instead of construing, we would be destroying integral
provisions of the Civil Code.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: and admit to be legally and properly entitled to
inherit from me; that while I have been estranged
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside that portion of the from my above-named wife for so many years, I
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals (now intermediate cannot deny that I was legally married to her or
Appellate Court) dated June 3, 1982, as amended by the that we have been separated up to the present for
resolution dated August 10, 1982, declaring as null and void the reasons and justifications known fully well by
devise in favor of the petitioner and the resolution dated them: 
December 28, 1982 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.  Art. IV. That since 1952, 1 have been living,
as man and wife with one Sofia J. Nepomuceno,
Martin Jugo died on July 16, 1974 in Malabon, Rizal. He left a whom I declare and avow to be entitled to my love
last Will and Testament duly signed by him at the end of the Will and affection, for all the things which she has done
on page three and on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof for me, now and in the past; that while Sofia J.
in the presence of Celestina Alejandro, Myrna C. Cortez, and Nepomuceno has with my full knowledge and
Leandro Leano, who in turn, affixed their signatures below the consent, did comport and represent myself as her
attestation clause and on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 of own husband, in truth and in fact, as well as in the
the Will in the presence of the testator and of each other and the eyes of the law, I could not bind her to me in the
Notary Public. The Will was acknowledged before the Notary holy bonds of matrimony because of my
Public Romeo Escareal by the testator and his three attesting aforementioned previous marriage; 
witnesses. 
On August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition for the probate
In the said Will, the testator named and appointed herein of the last Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo in
petitioner Sofia J. Nepomuceno as his sole and only executor of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXIV, Caloocan
his estate. It is clearly stated in the Will that the testator was City and asked for the issuance to her of letters testamentary. 
legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had two
legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952, he had On May 13, 1975, the legal wife of the testator, Rufina Gomez
been estranged from his lawfully wedded wife and had been and her children filed an opposition alleging inter alia that the
living with petitioner as husband and wife. In fact, on December execution of the Will was procured by undue and improper
5, 1952, the testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner herein, Sofia influence on the part of the petitioner; that at the time of the
J. Nepomuceno were married in Victoria, Tarlac before the execution of the Will, the testator was already very sick and that
Justice of the Peace. The testator devised to his forced heirs, petitioner having admitted her living in concubinage with the
namely, his legal wife Rufina Gomez and his children Oscar and testator, she is wanting in integrity and thus, letters testamentary
Carmelita his entire estate and the free portion thereof to herein should not be issued to her. 
petitioner. The Will reads in part: 
On January 6, 1976, the lower court denied the probate of the
Art. III. That I have the following legal heirs, Will on the ground that as the testator admitted in his Will to
namely: my aforementioned legal wife, Rufina cohabiting with the petitioner from December 1952 until his
Gomez, and our son, Oscar, and daughter death on July 16, 1974, the Will's admission to probate will be
Carmelita, both surnamed Jugo, whom I declare
an Idle exercise because on the face of the Will, the invalidity of The petitioner submits that the validity of the testamentary
its intrinsic provisions is evident.  provision in her favor cannot be passed upon and decided in the
probate proceedings but in some other proceedings because
The petitioner appealed to the respondent-appellate court.  the only purpose of the probate of a Will is to establish
conclusively as against everyone that a Will was executed with
On June 2, 1982, the respondent court set aside the decision of the formalities required by law and that the testator has the
the Court of First Instance of Rizal denying the probate of the mental capacity to execute the same. The petitioner further
will. The respondent court declared the Will to be valid except contends that even if the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article
that the devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void pursuant 739 of the Civil Code of the Philippines were applicable, the
to Article 739 in relation with Article 1028 of the Civil Code of the declaration of its nullity could only be made by the proper court
Philippines. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:  in a separate action brought by the legal wife for the specific
purpose of obtaining a declaration of the nullity of the
WHEREFORE, the decision a quo is hereby set testamentary provision in the Will in favor of the person with
aside, the will in question declared valid except the whom the testator was allegedly guilty of adultery or
devise in favor of the appellant which is declared concubinage. 
null and void. The properties so devised are
instead passed on in intestacy to the appellant in The respondents on the other hand contend that the fact that
equal shares, without pronouncement as to cost.  the last Will and Testament itself expressly admits indubitably
on its face the meretricious relationship between the testator
On June 15, 1982, oppositors Rufina Gomez and her children and the petitioner and the fact that petitioner herself initiated the
filed a "Motion for Correction of Clerical Error" praying that the presentation of evidence on her alleged ignorance of the true
word "appellant" in the last sentence of the dispositive portion of civil status of the testator, which led private respondents to
the decision be changed to "appellees" so as to read: "The present contrary evidence, merits the application of the doctrine
properties so devised are instead passed on intestacy to enunciated in Nuguid v. Felix Nuguid, et al. (17 SCRA 449)
the appellees in equal shares, without pronouncement as to and Felix Balanay, Jr. v. Hon. Antonio Martinez, et al. (G.R. No.
costs." The motion was granted by the respondent court on L- 39247, June 27, 1975). Respondents also submit that the
August 10, 1982.  admission of the testator of the illicit relationship between him
and the petitioner put in issue the legality of the devise. We
On August 23, 1982, the petitioner filed a motion for agree with the respondents. 
reconsideration. This was denied by the respondent court in a
resolution dated December 28, 1982.  The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after
declaring the Will to be validly drawn, it went on to pass upon
The main issue raised by the petitioner is whether or not the the intrinsic validity of the Will and declared the devise in favor
respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when of the petitioner null and void. 
after declaring the last Will and Testament of the deceased
Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area
intrinsic validity of the testamentary provision in favor of of inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution of the
herein petitioner.  extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule is expressed thus: 
xxx xxx xxx in such proceedings determines and can
determine nothing more. In them the court has no
... It is elementary that a probate decree finally and power to pass upon the validity of any provisions
definitively settles all questions concerning made in the will. It can not decide, for example,
capacity of the testator and the proper execution that a certain legacy is void and another one
and witnessing of his last Will and testament, valid. ... (Castaneda v. Alemany, 3 Phil. 426) 
irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and
enforceable or otherwise. (Fernandez v. The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given
Dimagiba, 21 SCRA 428)  exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to
do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain
The petition below being for the probate of a Will, provisions of the Will. 
the court's area of inquiry is limited to the extrinsic
validity thereof. The testators testamentary In Nuguid v. Nuguid (17 SCRA 449) cited by the trial court, the
capacity and the compliance with the formal testator instituted the petitioner as universal heir and completely
requisites or solemnities prescribed by law are the preterited her surviving forced heirs. A will of this nature, no
only questions presented for the resolution of the matter how valid it may appear extrinsically, would be null and
court. Any inquiry into the intrinsic validity or void. Separate or latter proceedings to determine the intrinsic
efficacy of the provisions of the will or the legality validity of the testamentary provisions would be superfluous. 
of any devise or legacy is premature. 
Even before establishing the formal validity of the will, the Court
xxx xxx xxx in Balanay .Jr. v. Martinez (64 SCRA 452) passed upon the
validity of its intrinsic provisions. 
True or not, the alleged sale is no ground for the
dismissal of the petition for probate. Probate is one Invoking "practical considerations", we stated: 
thing; the validity of the testamentary provisions is
another. The first decides the execution of the The basic issue is whether the probate court erred
document and the testamentary capacity of the in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will,
testator; the second relates to descent and before ruling on its allowance or formal validity,
distribution (Sumilang v. Ramagosa, 21 SCRA and in declaring it void. 
1369) 
We are of the opinion that in view of certain
xxx xxx xxx unusual provisions of the will, which are of dubious
legality, and because of the motion to withdraw the
To establish conclusively as against everyone, and petition for probate (which the lower court
once for all, the facts that a will was executed with assumed to have been filed with the petitioner's
the formalities required by law and that the testator authorization) the trial court acted correctly in
was in a condition to make a will, is the only passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even
purpose of the proceedings under the new code before its formal validity had been established.
for the probate of a will. (Sec. 625). The judgment The probate of a will might become an Idle
 ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the
void. Where practical considerations demand that will. Result, waste of time, effort, expense, plus
the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, added anxiety. These are the practical
even before it is probated, the court should meet considerations that induce us to a belief that we
the issue (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 64 O.G. 1527, 17 might as well meet head-on the issue of the
SCRA 449. Compare with Sumilang vs. validity of the provisions of the will in question.
Ramagosa L-23135, December 26, 1967, 21 (Section 2, Rule 1, Rules of Court. Case, et al. v.
SCRA 1369; Cacho v. Udan L-19996, April 30, Jugo, et al., 77 Phil. 517, 522). After all, there
1965, 13 SCRA 693).  exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution. 

There appears to be no more dispute at this time over the We see no useful purpose that would be served if we remand
extrinsic validity of the Will. Both parties are agreed that the Will the nullified provision to the proper court in a separate action for
of Martin Jugo was executed with all the formalities required by that purpose simply because, in the probate of a will, the court
law and that the testator had the mental capacity to execute his does not ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its
Will. The petitioner states that she completely agrees with the provisions. 
respondent court when in resolving the question of whether or
not the probate court correctly denied the probate of Martin Article 739 of the Civil Code provides: 
Jugo's last Will and Testament, it ruled: 
The following donations shall be void: 
This being so, the will is declared validly drawn.
(Page 4, Decision, Annex A of Petition.)  (1) Those made between persons who were guilty
of adultery or concubinage at the time of the
On the other hand the respondents pray for the affirmance of donation; 
the Court of Appeals' decision in toto. 
(2) Those made between persons found guilty of
The only issue, therefore, is the jurisdiction of the respondent the same criminal offense, in consideration
court to declare the testamentary provision in favor of the thereof; 
petitioner as null and void. 
(3) Those made to a public officer or his wife,
We sustain the respondent court's jurisdiction. As stated descendants and ascendants, by reason of his
in Nuguid v. Nuguid, (supra):  office. 

We pause to reflect. If the case were to be In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for
remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be declaration of nullity may be brought by the
gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilt of the
protracted. And for aught that appears in the donor and donee may be proved by
record, in the record, in the event of probate or if preponderance of evidence in the same action. 
the court rejects the will, probability exists that the
case will come up once again before us on the Article 1028 of the Civil Code provides: 
 The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, Second. Petitioner herself initiated the
concerning donations inter vivos shall apply to presentation of evidence on her alleged ignorance
testamentary provisions.  of the true civil status of the testator, which led
private respondents to present contrary evidence. 
In Article III of the disputed Will, executed on August 15, 1968,
or almost six years before the testator's death on July 16, 1974, In short, the parties themselves dueled on the
Martin Jugo stated that respondent Rufina Gomez was his legal intrinsic validity of the legacy given in the will to
wife from whom he had been estranged "for so many years." He petitioner by the deceased testator at the start of
also declared that respondents Carmelita Jugo and Oscar Jugo the proceedings. 
were his legitimate children. In Article IV, he stated that he had
been living as man and wife with the petitioner since 1952. Whether or not petitioner knew that testator Martin
Testator Jugo declared that the petitioner was entitled to his Jugo, the man he had lived with as man and wife,
love and affection. He stated that Nepomuceno represented as already married, was an important and specific
Jugo as her own husband but "in truth and in fact, as well as in issue brought by the parties before the trial court,
the eyes of the law, I could not bind her to me in the holy bonds and passed upon by the Court of Appeals. 
of matrimony because of my aforementioned previous
marriage.  Instead of limiting herself to proving the extrinsic
validity of the will, it was petitioner who opted to
There is no question from the records about the fact of a prior present evidence on her alleged good faith in
existing marriage when Martin Jugo executed his Will. There is marrying the testator. (Testimony of Petitioner,
also no dispute that the petitioner and Mr. Jugo lived together in TSN of August 1, 1982, pp. 56-57 and pp. 62-64). 
an ostensible marital relationship for 22 years until his death. 
Private respondents, naturally, presented evidence
It is also a fact that on December 2, 1952, Martin Jugo and Sofia that would refute the testimony of petitioner on the
J. Nepomuceno contracted a marriage before the Justice of the point. 
Peace of Victoria, Tarlac. The man was then 51 years old while
the woman was 48. Nepomuceno now contends that she acted Sebastian Jugo, younger brother of the deceased
in good faith for 22 years in the belief that she was legally testator, testified at length on the meretricious
married to the testator.  relationship of his brother and petitioner. (TSN of
August 18,1975). 
The records do not sustain a finding of innocence or good faith.
As argued by the private respondents:  Clearly, the good faith of petitioner was by option
of the parties made a decisive issue right at the
First. The last will and testament itself expressly inception of the case. 
admits indubitably on its face the meretricious
relationship between the testator and petitioner, Confronted by the situation, the trial court had to
the devisee.  make a ruling on the question. 
When the court a quo held that the testator Martin in secrecy, especially so when she was already
Jugo and petitioner 'were deemed guilty of about 50 years old at the time of marriage. 
adultery or concubinage', it was a finding that
petitioner was not the innocent woman she THIRD: The fact that petitioner broke off from
pretended to be.  Martin Jugo in 1923 is by itself conclusive
demonstration that she new that the man she had
xxx xxx xxx openly lived for 22 years as man and wife was a
married man with already two children. 
3. If a review of the evidence must be made
nonetheless, then private respondents respectfully FOURTH: Having admitted that she knew the
offer the following analysis:  children of respondent Rufina Gomez, is it
possible that she would not have asked Martin
FIRST: The secrecy of the marriage of petitioner Jugo whether or not they were his illegitimate or
with the deceased testator in a town in Tarlac legitimate children and by whom? That is un-
where neither she nor the testator ever resided. If Filipino. 
there was nothing to hide from, why the
concealment' ? Of course, it maybe argued that FIFTH: Having often gone to Pasig to the
the marriage of the deceased with private residence of the parents of the deceased testator,
respondent Rufina Gomez was likewise done in is it possible that she would not have known that
secrecy. But it should be remembered that Rufina the mother of private respondent Oscar Jugo and
Gomez was already in the family way at that time Carmelita Jugo was respondent Rufina Gomez,
and it would seem that the parents of Martin Jugo considering that the houses of the parents of
were not in favor of the marriage so much so that Martin Jugo (where he had lived for many years)
an action in court was brought concerning the and that of respondent Rufina Gomez were just a
marriage. (Testimony of Sebastian Jugo, TSN of few meters away? 
August 18, 1975, pp. 29-30) 
Such pretentions of petitioner Sofia Nepomuceno
SECOND: Petitioner was a sweetheart of the are unbelievable. They are, to say the least,
deceased testator when they were still both single. inherently improbable, for they are against the
That would be in 1922 as Martin Jugo married experience in common life and the ordinary
respondent Rufina Gomez on November 29, 1923 instincts and promptings of human nature that a
(Exh. 3). Petitioner married the testator only on woman would not bother at all to ask the man she
December 5, 1952. There was a space of about 30 was going to marry whether or not he was already
years in between. During those 30 years, could it married to another, knowing that her groom had
be believed that she did not even wonder why children. It would be a story that would strain
Martin Jugo did not marry her nor contact her human credulity to the limit if petitioner did not
anymore after November, 1923 - facts that should know that Martin Jugo was already a married man
impel her to ask her groom before she married him in view of the irrefutable fact that it was precisely
his marriage to respondent Rufina Gomez that led
 petitioner to break off with the deceased during Manila, Branch XXXVIII, which admitted to and allowed the
their younger years. probate of the last will and testament of Adoracion C. Campos,
after an ex-parte presentation of evidence by herein private
Moreover, the prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is respondent. 
against the making of a donation between persons who are
living in adultery or concubinage. It is the donation which On January 31, 1977, Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her
becomes void. The giver cannot give even assuming that the father, petitioner Hermogenes Campos and her sisters, private
recipient may receive. The very wordings of the Will invalidate respondent Nenita C. Paguia, Remedios C. Lopez and Marieta
the legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing the C. Medina as the surviving heirs. As Hermogenes Campos was
properties to a person with whom he had been living in the only compulsory heir, he executed an Affidavit of
concubinage.  Adjudication under Rule 74, Section I of the Rules of Court
whereby he adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the entire
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The estate of the deceased Adoracion Campos. 
decision of the Court of Appeals, now Intermediate Appellate
Court, is AFFIRMED. No costs.  Eleven months after, on November 25, 1977, Nenita C. Paguia
filed a petition for the reprobate of a will of the deceased,
SO ORDERED.  Adoracion Campos, which was allegedly executed in the United
States and for her appointment as administratrix of the estate of
the deceased testatrix. 

G.R. No. L-54919 May 30, 1984 In her petition, Nenita alleged that the testatrix was an American
citizen at the time of her death and was a permanent resident of
POLLY CAYETANO, petitioner,  4633 Ditman Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that the
vs. testatrix died in Manila on January 31, 1977 while temporarily
HON. TOMAS T. LEONIDAS, in his capacity as the Presiding residing with her sister at 2167 Leveriza, Malate, Manila; that
Judge of Branch XXXVIII, Court of First Instance of Manila during her lifetime, the testatrix made her last wig and testament
and NENITA CAMPOS PAGUIA, respondents. on July 10, 1975, according to the laws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.,
nominating Wilfredo Barzaga of New Jersey as executor; that
Ermelo P. Guzman for petitioner.  after the testatrix death, her last will and testament was
presented, probated, allowed, and registered with the Registry
Armando Z. Gonzales for private respondent.  of Wins at the County of Philadelphia, U.S.A., that Clement L.
McLaughlin, the administrator who was appointed after Dr.
Barzaga had declined and waived his appointment as executor
in favor of the former, is also a resident of Philadelphia, U.S.A.,
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: and that therefore, there is an urgent need for the appointment
of an administratrix to administer and eventually distribute the
This is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking to annul the properties of the estate located in the Philippines. 
order of the respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of
On January 11, 1978, an opposition to the reprobate of the will laws of the said foreign country on procedure and
was filed by herein petitioner alleging among other things, that allowance of wills (Exhibits E to E-10); and that the
he has every reason to believe that the will in question is a petitioner is not suffering from any disqualification
forgery; that the intrinsic provisions of the will are null and void; which would render her unfit as administratrix of
and that even if pertinent American laws on intrinsic provisions the estate in the Philippines of the late Adoracion
are invoked, the same could not apply inasmuch as they would C. Campos. 
work injustice and injury to him. 
WHEREFORE, the Last Will and Testament of the
On December 1, 1978, however, the petitioner through his late Adoracion C. Campos is hereby admitted to
counsel, Atty. Franco Loyola, filed a Motion to Dismiss and allowed probate in the Philippines, and Nenita
Opposition (With Waiver of Rights or Interests) stating that he Campos Paguia is hereby appointed Administratrix
"has been able to verify the veracity thereof (of the will) and now of the estate of said decedent; let Letters of
confirms the same to be truly the probated will of his daughter Administration with the Will annexed issue in favor
Adoracion." Hence, an ex-partepresentation of evidence for the of said Administratrix upon her filing of a bond in
reprobate of the questioned will was made.  the amount of P5,000.00 conditioned under the
provisions of Section I, Rule 81 of the Rules of
On January 10, 1979, the respondent judge issued an order, to Court. 
wit: 
Another manifestation was filed by the petitioner on April 14,
At the hearing, it has been satisfactorily 1979, confirming the withdrawal of his opposition,
established that Adoracion C. Campos, in her acknowledging the same to be his voluntary act and deed. 
lifetime, was a citizen of the United States of
America with a permanent residence at 4633 On May 25, 1979, Hermogenes Campos filed a petition for
Ditman Street, Philadelphia, PA 19124, (Exhibit D) relief, praying that the order allowing the will be set aside on the
that when alive, Adoracion C. Campos executed a ground that the withdrawal of his opposition to the same was
Last Will and Testament in the county of secured through fraudulent means. According to him, the
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A., according to "Motion to Dismiss Opposition" was inserted among the papers
the laws thereat (Exhibits E-3 to E-3-b) that while which he signed in connection with two Deeds of Conditional
in temporary sojourn in the Philippines, Adoracion Sales which he executed with the Construction and
C. Campos died in the City of Manila (Exhibit C) Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP). He also
leaving property both in the Philippines and in the alleged that the lawyer who filed the withdrawal of the opposition
United States of America; that the Last Will and was not his counsel-of-record in the special proceedings case.
Testament of the late Adoracion C. Campos was
admitted and granted probate by the Orphan's The petition for relief was set for hearing but the petitioner failed
Court Division of the Court of Common Pleas, the to appear. He made several motions for postponement until the
probate court of the Commonwealth of hearing was set on May 29, 1980. 
Pennsylvania, County of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and
letters of administration were issued in favor of On May 18, 1980, petitioner filed another motion entitled
Clement J. McLaughlin all in accordance with the "Motion to Vacate and/or Set Aside the Order of January 10,
1979, and/or dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. In this 1) He ruled the petitioner lost his standing in court
motion, the notice of hearing provided:  deprived the Right to Notice (sic) upon the filing of
the Motion to Dismiss opposition with waiver of
Please include this motion in your calendar for rights or interests against the estate of deceased
hearing on May 29, 1980 at 8:30 in the morning for Adoracion C. Campos, thus, paving the way for
submission for reconsideration and resolution of the hearing ex-parte of the petition for the probate
the Honorable Court. Until this Motion is resolved, of decedent will. 
may I also request for the future setting of the case
for hearing on the Oppositor's motion to set aside 2) He ruled that petitioner can waive, renounce or
previously filed.  repudiate (not made in a public or authenticated
instrument), or by way of a petition presented to
The hearing of May 29, 1980 was re-set by the court for June the court but by way of a motion presented prior to
19, 1980. When the case was called for hearing on this date, the an order for the distribution of the estate-the law
counsel for petitioner tried to argue his motion to vacate instead especially providing that repudiation of an
of adducing evidence in support of the petition for relief. Thus, inheritance must be presented, within 30 days
the respondent judge issued an order dismissing the petition for after it has issued an order for the distribution of
relief for failure to present evidence in support thereof. Petitioner the estate in accordance with the rules of Court. 
filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. In
the same order, respondent judge also denied the motion to 3) He ruled that the right of a forced heir to his
vacate for lack of merit. Hence, this petition. legitime can be divested by a decree admitting a
will to probate in which no provision is made for
Meanwhile, on June 6,1982, petitioner Hermogenes Campos the forced heir in complete disregard of Law of
died and left a will, which, incidentally has been questioned by Succession 
the respondent, his children and forced heirs as, on its face,
patently null and void, and a fabrication, appointing Polly 4) He denied petitioner's petition for Relief on the
Cayetano as the executrix of his last will and testament. ground that no evidence was adduced to support
Cayetano, therefore, filed a motion to substitute herself as the Petition for Relief when no Notice nor hearing
petitioner in the instant case which was granted by the court on was set to afford petitioner to prove the merit of his
September 13, 1982. petition — a denial of the due process and a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
A motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the rights of jurisdiction. 
the petitioner Hermogenes Campos merged upon his death with
the rights of the respondent and her sisters, only remaining 5) He acquired no jurisdiction over the testate
children and forced heirs was denied on September 12, 1983. case, the fact that the Testator at the time of death
was a usual resident of Dasmariñas, Cavite,
Petitioner Cayetano persists with the allegations that the consequently Cavite Court of First Instance has
respondent judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction exclusive jurisdiction over the case (De Borja vs.
when:  Tan, G.R. No. L-7792, July 1955). 
The first two issues raised by the petitioner are anchored on the This contention is without merit. 
allegation that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion when he allowed the withdrawal of the petitioner's Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the
opposition to the reprobate of the will.  petitioner and thus, the respondent judge should have denied its
reprobate outright, the private respondents have sufficiently
We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the established that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an
respondent judge. No proof was adduced to support petitioner's American citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia,
contention that the motion to withdraw was secured through Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Therefore, under Article 16 par. (2) and
fraudulent means and that Atty. Franco Loyola was not his 1039 of the Civil Code which respectively provide:
counsel of record. The records show that after the firing of the
contested motion, the petitioner at a later date, filed a Art. 16 par. (2).
manifestation wherein he confirmed that the Motion to Dismiss
Opposition was his voluntary act and deed. Moreover, at the xxx xxx xxx
time the motion was filed, the petitioner's former counsel, Atty.
Jose P. Lagrosa had long withdrawn from the case and had However, intestate and testamentary successions,
been substituted by Atty. Franco Loyola who in turn filed the both with respect to the order of succession and to
motion. The present petitioner cannot, therefore, maintain that the amount of successional rights and to the
the old man's attorney of record was Atty. Lagrosa at the time of intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall
filing the motion. Since the withdrawal was in order, the be regulated by the national law of the person
respondent judge acted correctly in hearing the probate of the whose succession is under consideration,
will ex-parte, there being no other opposition to the same. whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property
The third issue raised deals with the validity of the provisions of may be found. 
the will. As a general rule, the probate court's authority is limited
only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, Art. 1039. 
the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with
the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the
validity of the will normally comes only after the court has nation of the decedent. 
declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However,
where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity the law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of
of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national law of the
should meet the issue. (Maninang vs. Court of Appeals, 114 decedent. Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law
SCRA 478). does not provide for legitimes and that all the estate may be
given away by the testatrix to a complete stranger, the petitioner
In the case at bar, the petitioner maintains that since the argues that such law should not apply because it would be
respondent judge allowed the reprobate of Adoracion's will, contrary to the sound and established public policy and would
Hermogenes C. Campos was divested of his legitime which was run counter to the specific provisions of Philippine Law. 
reserved by the law for him. 
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the relief. Furthermore, such request should be embodied in a
provisions of the will, as provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 motion and not in a mere notice of hearing. 
of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply.
This was squarely applied in the case of Bellis v. Bellis (20 Finally, we find the contention of the petition as to the issue of
SCRA 358) wherein we ruled:  jurisdiction utterly devoid of merit. Under Rule 73, Section 1, of
the Rules of Court, it is provided that: 
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or
good customs may be involved in our system of SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons
legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the settled. — If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it Philippines at the time of his death, whether a
has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or
amount of successional rights, to the decedent's letters of administration granted, and his estate
national law. Specific provisions must prevail over settled, in the Court of First Instance in the
general ones.  province in which he resided at the time of his
death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
xxx xxx xxx country, the Court of First Instance of any province
in which he had estate. The court first taking
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
and under the law of Texas, there are no forced exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the
validity of the provision of the will and the amount place of residence of the decedent, or of the
of successional rights are to be determined under location of his estate, shall not be contested in a
Texas law, the Philippine Law on legitimes cannot suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that
be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.  court, in the original case, or when the want of
jurisdiction appears on the record. 
As regards the alleged absence of notice of hearing for the
petition for relief, the records wig bear the fact that what was Therefore, the settlement of the estate of Adoracion
repeatedly scheduled for hearing on separate dates until June Campos was correctly filed with the Court of First Instance
19, 1980 was the petitioner's petition for relief and not his of Manila where she had an estate since it was alleged and
motion to vacate the order of January 10, 1979. There is no proven that Adoracion at the time of her death was a citizen
reason why the petitioner should have been led to believe and permanent resident of Pennsylvania, United States of
otherwise. The court even admonished the petitioner's failing to America and not a "usual resident of Cavite" as alleged by
adduce evidence when his petition for relief was repeatedly set the petitioner. Moreover, petitioner is now estopped from
for hearing. There was no denial of due process. The fact that questioning the jurisdiction of the probate court in the petition for
he requested "for the future setting of the case for hearing . . ." relief. It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the
did not mean that at the next hearing, the motion to vacate jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief, against his
would be heard and given preference in lieu of the petition for opponent and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or
question that same jurisdiction. (See Saulog Transit, Inc. vs. memory, do hereby declare thus to be my last will and
Hon. Manuel Lazaro, et al., G. R. No. 63 284, April 4, 1984).  testament.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is 1. It is my will that I'll be burried in the cemetery of the catholic
hereby dismissed for lack of merit. church of Lipa City. In accordance with the rights of said
Church, and that my executrix hereinafter named provide and
FIRST DIVISION  erect at the expose of my state a suitable monument to
perpetuate my memory.
G.R. No. L-40207 September 28, 1984
xxx xxx xxx
ROSA K. KALAW, petitioner, 
vs. The holographic Will, as first written, named ROSA K. Kalaw, a
HON. JUDGE BENJAMIN RELOVA, Presiding Judge of the sister of the testatrix as her sole heir. Hence, on November 10,
CFI of Batangas, Branch VI, Lipa City, and GREGORIO K. 1971, petitioner ROSA K. Kalaw opposed probate alleging, in
KALAW, respondents. substance, that the holographic Will contained alterations,
corrections, and insertions without the proper authentication by
Leandro H. Fernandez for petitioner.  the full signature of the testatrix as required by Article 814 of the
Civil Code reading: 
Antonio Quintos and Jose M. Yacat for respondents. 
Art. 814. In case of any insertion, cancellation,
erasure or alteration in a holographic will the
testator must authenticate the same by his full
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: signature.

On September 1, 1971, private respondent GREGORIO K. ROSA's position was that the holographic Will, as first written,
KALAW, claiming to be the sole heir of his deceased sister, should be given effect and probated so that she could be the
Natividad K. Kalaw, filed a petition before the Court of First sole heir thereunder. 
Instance of Batangas, Branch VI, Lipa City, for the probate of
her holographic Will executed on December 24, 1968.  After trial, respondent Judge denied probate in an Order, dated
September 3, 197 3, reading in part: 
The holographic Will reads in full as follows:
The document Exhibit "C" was submitted to the
My Last will and Testament  National Bureau of Investigation for examination.
The NBI reported that the handwriting, the
In the name of God, Amen. signature, the insertions and/or additions and the
initial were made by one and the same person.
I Natividad K. Kalaw Filipino 63years of age, single, and a Consequently, Exhibit "C" was the handwriting of
resident of Lipa City, being of sound and disposing mind and the decedent, Natividad K. Kalaw. The only
question is whether the win, Exhibit 'C', should be
 admitted to probate although the alterations and/or voided by the Trial Court for lack of authentication by the full
insertions or additions above-mentioned were not signature of the testatrix, should be probated or not, with her as
authenticated by the full signature of the testatrix sole heir. 
pursuant to Art. 814 of the Civil Code. The
petitioner contends that the oppositors are Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and
estopped to assert the provision of Art. 814 on the interlineations made by the testator in a holographic Will litem
ground that they themselves agreed thru their not been noted under his signature, ... the Will is not thereby
counsel to submit the Document to the NBI FOR invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the
EXAMINATIONS. This is untenable. The parties particular words erased, corrected or interlined.1 Manresa gave
did not agree, nor was it impliedly understood, that an Identical commentary when he said "la omision de la
the oppositors would be in estoppel.  salvedad no anula el testamento, segun la regla de
jurisprudencia establecida en la sentencia de 4 de Abril de
The Court finds, therefore, that the provision of 1895." 2
Article 814 of the Civil Code is applicable to Exhibit
"C". Finding the insertions, alterations and/or However, when as in this case, the holographic Will in dispute
additions in Exhibit "C" not to be authenticated by had only one substantial provision, which was altered by
the full signature of the testatrix Natividad K. substituting the original heir with another, but which alteration
Kalaw, the Court will deny the admission to did not carry the requisite of full authentication by the full
probate of Exhibit "C".  signature of the testator, the effect must be that the entire Will is
voided or revoked for the simple reason that nothing remains in
WHEREFORE, the petition to probate Exhibit "C" the Will after that which could remain valid. To state that the Will
as the holographic will of Natividad K. Kalaw is as first written should be given efficacy is to disregard the
hereby denied.  seeming change of mind of the testatrix. But that change of
mind can neither be given effect because she failed to
SO ORDERED. authenticate it in the manner required by law by affixing her full
signature, 
From that Order, GREGORIO moved for reconsideration
arguing that since the alterations and/or insertions were the The ruling in Velasco, supra, must be held confined to such
testatrix, the denial to probate of her holographic Will would be insertions, cancellations, erasures or alterations in a holographic
contrary to her right of testamentary disposition. Will, which affect only the efficacy of the altered words
Reconsideration was denied in an Order, dated November 2, themselves but not the essence and validity of the Will itself. As
1973, on the ground that "Article 814 of the Civil Code being , it is, with the erasures, cancellations and alterations made by
clear and explicit, (it) requires no necessity for interpretation." the testatrix herein, her real intention cannot be determined with
certitude. As Manresa had stated in his commentary on Article
From that Order, dated September 3, 1973, denying probate, 688 of the Spanish Civil Code, whence Article 814 of the new
and the Order dated November 2, 1973 denying Civil Code was derived: 
reconsideration, ROSA filed this Petition for Review on certiorari
on the sole legal question of whether or not the original ... No infringe lo dispuesto en este articulo del
unaltered text after subsequent alterations and insertions were Codigo (el 688) la sentencia que no declara la
nulidad de un testamento olografo que contenga ultimo del año en que fue extendido3(Emphasis
palabras tachadas, enmendadas o entre ours). 
renglones no salvadas por el testador bajo su
firnia segun previene el parrafo tercero del mismo, WHEREFORE, this Petition is hereby dismissed and the
porque, en realidad, tal omision solo puede Decision of respondent Judge, dated September 3, 1973, is
afectar a la validez o eficacia de tales palabras, y hereby affirmed in toto. No costs. 
nunca al testamento mismo, ya por estar esa
disposicion en parrafo aparte de aquel que SO ORDERED.
determine las condiciones necesarias para la
validez del testamento olografo, ya porque, de G.R. No. 76464 February 29, 1988 
admitir lo contrario, se Ilegaria al absurdo de que
pequefias enmiendas no salvadas, que en nada TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ADRIANA MALOTO,
afectasen a la parte esencial y respectiva del ALDINA MALOTO CASIANO, CONSTANCIO MALOTO,
testamento, vinieran a anular este, y ya porque el PURIFICACION MIRAFLOR, ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH
precepto contenido en dicho parrafo ha de OF MOLO, AND ASILO DE MOLO, petitioners, 
entenderse en perfecta armonia y congruencia vs.
con el art. 26 de la ley del Notariado que declara COURT OF APPEALS, PANFILO MALOTO AND FELINO
nulas las adiciones apostillas entrerrenglonados, MALOTO, respondents.
raspaduras y tachados en las escrituras matrices,
siempre que no se salven en la forma prevenida,
paro no el documento que las contenga, y con
mayor motivo cuando las palabras enmendadas, SARMIENTO, J.:
tachadas, o entrerrenglonadas no tengan
importancia ni susciten duda alguna acerca del This is not the first time that the parties to this case come to us.
pensamiento del testador, o constituyan meros In fact, two other cases directly related to the present one and
accidentes de ortografia o de purez escrituraria, involving the same parties had already been decided by us in
sin trascendencia alguna(l).  the past. In G.R. No. L-30479, 1 which was a petition for
certiorari and mandamus instituted by the petitioners herein, we
Mas para que sea aplicable la doctrina de dismissed the petition ruling that the more appropriate remedy
excepcion contenida en este ultimo fallo, es of the petitioners is a separate proceeding for the probate of the
preciso que las tachaduras, enmiendas o will in question. Pursuant to the said ruling, the petitioners
entrerrenglonados sin salvar saan de pala bras commenced in the then Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Special
que no afecter4 alteren ni uarien de modo Proceeding No. 2176, for the probate of the disputed will, which
substancial la express voluntad del testador was opposed by the private respondents presently, Panfilo and
manifiesta en el documento. Asi lo advierte la Felino both surnamed Maloto. The trial court dismissed the
sentencia de 29 de Noviembre de 1916, que petition on April 30, 1970. Complaining against the dismissal,
declara nulo un testamento olografo por no estar again, the petitioners came to this Court on a petition for review
salvada por el testador la enmienda del guarismo by certiorari. 2 Acting on the said petition, we set aside the trial
court's order and directed it to proceed to hear the case on the
merits. The trial court, after hearing, found the will to have are still named as heirs in the said will, Aldina and Constancio
already been revoked by the testatrix. Adriana Maloto, and thus, are bequeathed much bigger and more valuable shares in the
denied the petition. The petitioners appealed the trial court's estate of Adriana than what they received by virtue of the
decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court which, on June 7, agreement of extrajudicial settlement they had earlier signed.
1985, affirmed the order. The petitioners' motion for The will likewise gives devises and legacies to other parties,
reconsideration of the adverse decision proved to be of no avail, among them being the petitioners Asilo de Molo, the Roman
hence, this petition.  Catholic Church of Molo, and Purificacion Miraflor. 

For a better understanding of the controversy, a factual account Thus, on May 24, 1967, Aldina and Constancio, joined by the
would be a great help.  other devisees and legatees named in the will, filed in Special
Proceeding No. 1736 a motion for reconsideration and
On October 20, 1963, Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her annulment of the proceedings therein and for the allowance of
niece and nephews, the petitioners Aldina Maloto-Casiano and the will When the trial court denied their motion, the petitioner
Constancio, Maloto, and the private respondents Panfilo Maloto came to us by way of a petition for certiorari and mandamus
and Felino Maloto. Believing that the deceased did not leave assailing the orders of the trial court . 3 As we stated earlier, we
behind a last will and testament, these four heirs commenced on dismissed that petition and advised that a separate proceeding
November 4, 1963 an intestate proceeding for the settlement of for the probate of the alleged will would be the appropriate
their aunt's estate. The case was instituted in the then Court of vehicle to thresh out the matters raised by the petitioners. 
First Instance of Iloilo and was docketed as Special Proceeding
No. 1736. However, while the case was still in progress, or to be Significantly, the appellate court while finding as inconclusive
exact on February 1, 1964, the parties — Aldina, Constancio, the matter on whether or not the document or papers allegedly
Panfilo, and Felino — executed an agreement of extrajudicial burned by the househelp of Adriana, Guadalupe Maloto Vda. de
settlement of Adriana's estate. The agreement provided for the Coral, upon instructions of the testatrix, was indeed the will,
division of the estate into four equal parts among the parties. contradicted itself and found that the will had been revoked. The
The Malotos then presented the extrajudicial settlement respondent court stated that the presence of animus
agreement to the trial court for approval which the court did on revocandi in the destruction of the will had, nevertheless, been
March 21, 1964. That should have signalled the end of the sufficiently proven. The appellate court based its finding on the
controversy, but, unfortunately, it had not.  facts that the document was not in the two safes in Adriana's
residence, by the testatrix going to the residence of Atty. Hervas
Three years later, or sometime in March 1967, Atty. Sulpicio to retrieve a copy of the will left in the latter's possession, and,
Palma, a former associate of Adriana's counsel, the late Atty. her seeking the services of Atty. Palma in order to have a new
Eliseo Hervas, discovered a document entitled "KATAPUSAN will drawn up. For reasons shortly to be explained, we do not
NGA PAGBUBULAT-AN (Testamento)," dated January 3,1940, view such facts, even considered collectively, as sufficient
and purporting to be the last will and testament of Adriana. Atty. bases for the conclusion that Adriana Maloto's will had been
Palma claimed to have found the testament, the original copy, effectively revoked. 
while he was going through some materials inside the cabinet
drawer formerly used by Atty. Hervas. The document was There is no doubt as to the testamentary capacity of the testatrix
submitted to the office of the clerk of the Court of First Instance and the due execution of the will. The heart of the case lies on
of Iloilo on April 1, 1967. Incidentally, while Panfilo and Felino the issue as to whether or not the will was revoked by Adriana. 
The provisions of the new Civil Code pertinent to the issue can overt physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling
be found in Article 830.  the will carried out by the testator or by another person in his
presence and under his express direction. There is paucity of
Art. 830. No will shall be revoked except in the evidence to show compliance with these requirements. For one,
following cases:  the document or papers burned by Adriana's maid, Guadalupe,
was not satisfactorily established to be a will at all, much less
(1) By implication of law; or  the will of Adriana Maloto. For another, the burning was not
proven to have been done under the express direction of
(2) By some will, codicil, or other writing executed Adriana. And then, the burning was not in her presence. Both
as provided in case of wills: or  witnesses, Guadalupe and Eladio, were one in stating that they
were the only ones present at the place where the stove
(3) By burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating (presumably in the kitchen) was located in which the papers
the will with the intention of revoking it, by the proffered as a will were burned. 
testator himself, or by some other person in his
presence, and by his express direction. If burned, The respondent appellate court in assessing the evidence
torn cancelled, or obliterated by some other presented by the private respondents as oppositors in the trial
person, without the express direction of the court, concluded that the testimony of the two witnesses who
testator, the will may still be established, and the testified in favor of the will's revocation appear "inconclusive."
estate distributed in accordance therewith, if its We share the same view. Nowhere in the records before us
contents, and due execution, and the fact of its does it appear that the two witnesses, Guadalupe Vda. de
unauthorized destruction, cancellation, or Corral and Eladio Itchon, both illiterates, were unequivocably
obliteration are established according to the Rules positive that the document burned was indeed Adriana's will.
of Court. (Emphasis Supplied.)  Guadalupe, we think, believed that the papers she destroyed
was the will only because, according to her, Adriana told her so.
It is clear that the physical act of destruction of a will, like Eladio, on the other hand, obtained his information that the
burning in this case, does not per se constitute an effective burned document was the will because Guadalupe told him so,
revocation, unless the destruction is coupled with animus thus, his testimony on this point is double hearsay. 
revocandi on the part of the testator. It is not imperative that the
physical destruction be done by the testator himself. It may be At this juncture, we reiterate that "(it) is an important matter of
performed by another person but under theexpress public interest that a purported win is not denied legalization on
direction and in the presence of the testator. Of course, it goes dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very institution of testamentary
without saying that the document destroyed must be the will succession will be shaken to its very foundations ...."4
itself. 
The private respondents in their bid for the dismissal of the
In this case, while animus revocandi or the intention to revoke, present action for probate instituted by the petitioners argue that
may be conceded, for that is a state of mind, yet that requisite the same is already barred by res adjudicata. They claim that
alone would not suffice. "Animus revocandi is only one of the this bar was brought about by the petitioners' failure to appeal
necessary elements for the effective revocation of a last will and timely from the order dated November 16, 1968 of the trial court
testament. The intention to revoke must be accompanied by the in the intestate proceeding (Special Proceeding No. 1736)
denying their (petitioners') motion to reopen the case, and their One last note. The private respondents point out that revocation
prayer to annul the previous proceedings therein and to allow could be inferred from the fact that "(a) major and substantial
the last will and testament of the late Adriana Maloto. This is bulk of the properties mentioned in the will had been disposed
untenable.  of: while an insignificant portion of the properties remained at
the time of death (of the testatrix); and, furthermore, more
The doctrine of res adjudicata finds no application in the present valuable properties have been acquired after the execution of
controversy. For a judgment to be a bar to a subsequent case, the will on January 3,1940." 7 Suffice it to state here that as
the following requisites must concur: (1) the presence of a final these additional matters raised by the private respondents are
former judgment; (2) the former judgment was rendered by a extraneous to this special proceeding, they could only be
court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; appropriately taken up after the will has been duly probated and
(3) the former judgment is a judgment on the merits; and (4) a certificate of its allowance issued. 
there is, between the first and the second action, Identity of
parties, of subject matter, and of cause of action. 5 We do not WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING and
find here the presence of all the enumerated requisites.  SETTING ASIDE the Decision dated June 7, 1985 and the
Resolution dated October 22, 1986, of the respondent Court of
For one, there is yet, strictly speaking, no final judgment Appeals, and a new one ENTERED for the allowance of Adriana
rendered insofar as the probate of Adriana Maloto's will is Maloto's last will and testament. Costs against the private
concerned. The decision of the trial court in Special Proceeding respondents. 
No. 1736, although final, involved only the intestate settlement
of the estate of Adriana. As such, that judgment could not in any This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
manner be construed to be final with respect to the probate of
the subsequently discovered will of the decedent. Neither is it a G.R. No. 106720 September 15, 1994
judgment on the merits of the action for probate. This is
understandably so because the trial court, in the intestate SPOUSES ROBERTO AND THELMA AJERO, petitioners, 
proceeding, was without jurisdiction to rule on the probate of the vs.
contested will . 6 After all, an action for probate, as it implies, is THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CLEMENTE
founded on the presence of a will and with the objective of SAND, respondents.
proving its due execution and validity, something which can not
be properly done in an intestate settlement of estate proceeding Miguel D. Larida for petitioners.
which is predicated on the assumption that the decedent left no
will. Thus, there is likewise no Identity between the cause of Montilla Law Office for private respondent.
action in intestate proceeding and that in an action for probate.
Be that as it may, it would be remembered that it was precisely
because of our ruling in G.R. No. L-30479 that the petitioners
instituted this separate action for the probate of the late Adriana PUNO, J.:
Maloto's will. Hence, on these grounds alone, the position of the
private respondents on this score can not be sustained.  This is an appeal by certiorari from the Decision of the Court of 
Appeals 1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 22840, dated March 30, 1992, the
dispositive portion of which reads;
 PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned Considering then that the probate proceedings
decision of November 19, 1988 of the trial court is herein must decide only the question of identity of
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the the will, its due execution and the testamentary
petition for probate is hereby DISMISSED. No capacity of the testatrix, this probate court finds no
costs. reason at all for the disallowance of the will for its
failure to comply with the formalities prescribed by
The earlier Decision was rendered by the RTC of Quezon law nor for lack of testamentary capacity of the
City, Branch 94, 2 in Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, and the testatrix.
instrument submitted for probate is the holographic will of
the late Annie Sand, who died on November 25, 1982. For one, no evidence was presented to show that
the will in question is different from the will actually
In the will, decedent named as devisees, the following: executed by the testatrix. The only objections
petitioners Roberto and Thelma Ajero, private respondent raised by the oppositors . . . are that the will was
Clemente Sand, Meriam S. Arong, Leah Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar not written in the handwriting of the testatrix which
Sand, Fe Sand, Lisa S. Sand, and Dr. Jose Ajero, Sr., and their properly refers to the question of its due execution,
children. and not to the question of identity of will. No other
will was alleged to have been executed by the
On January 20, 1983, petitioners instituted Sp. Proc. No. Q- testatrix other than the will herein presented.
37171, for allowance of decedent's holographic will. They Hence, in the light of the evidence adduced, the
alleged that at the time of its execution, she was of sound and identity of the will presented for probate must be
disposing mind, not acting under duress, fraud or undue accepted, i.e., the will submitted in Court must be
influence, and was in every respect capacitated to dispose of deemed to be the will actually executed by the
her estate by will. testatrix.

Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: xxx xxx xxx
neither the testament's body nor the signature therein was in
decedent's handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections While the fact that it was entirely written, dated
which were not duly signed by decedent; and, the will was and signed in the handwriting of the testatrix has
procured by petitioners through improper pressure and undue been disputed, the petitioners, however, have
influence. The petition was likewise opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. satisfactorily shown in Court that the holographic
He contested the disposition in the will of a house and lot will in question was indeed written entirely, dated
located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte. He claimed that said and signed in the handwriting of the testatrix.
property could not be conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as Three (3) witnesses who have convincingly shown
she was not its sole owner. knowledge of the handwriting of the testatrix have
been presented and have explicitly and
Notwithstanding the oppositions, the trial court admitted the categorically identified the handwriting with which
decedent's holographic will to probate. It found, inter alia: the holographic will in question was written to be
the genuine handwriting and signature of the
testatrix. Given then the aforesaid evidence, the
requirement of the law that the holographic will be some other person, the evidence adduced have
entirely written, dated and signed in the not shown any instance where improper pressure
handwriting of the testatrix has been complied or influence was exerted on the testatrix. (Private
with. respondent) Clemente Sand has testified that the
testatrix was still alert at the time of the execution
xxx xxx xxx of the will, i.e., at or around the time of her birth
anniversary celebration in 1981. It was also
As to the question of the testamentary capacity of established that she is a very intelligent person
the testratix, (private respondent) Clemente Sand and has a mind of her own. Her independence of
himself has testified in Court that the testatrix was character and to some extent, her sense of
completely in her sound mind when he visited her superiority, which has been testified to in Court, all
during her birthday celebration in 1981, at or show the unlikelihood of her being unduly
around which time the holographic will in question influenced or improperly pressured to make the
was executed by the testatrix. To be of sound aforesaid will. It must be noted that the undue
mind, it is sufficient that the testatrix, at the time of influence or improper pressure in question herein
making the will, knew the value of the estate to be only refer to the making of a will and not as to the
disposed of, the proper object of her bounty, and specific testamentary provisions therein which is
the characterof the testamentary act . . . The will the proper subject of another proceeding. Hence,
itself shows that the testatrix even had detailed under the circumstances, this Court cannot find
knowledge of the nature of her estate. She even convincing reason for the disallowance of the will
identified the lot number and square meters of the herein.
lots she had conveyed by will. The objects of her
bounty were likewise identified explicitly. And Considering then that it is a well-established
considering that she had even written a nursing doctrine in the law on succession that in case of
book which contained the law and jurisprudence doubt, testate succession should be preferred over
on will and succession, there is more than intestate succession, and the fact that no
sufficient showing that she knows the character of convincing grounds were presented and proven for
the testamentary act. the disallowance of the holographic will of the late
Annie Sand, the aforesaid will submitted herein
In this wise, the question of identity of the will, its must be admitted to probate. 3 (Citations omitted.)
due execution and the testamentary capacity of
the testatrix has to be resolved in favor of the On appeal, said Decision was reversed, and the petition for
allowance of probate of the will submitted herein. probate of decedent's will was dismissed. The Court of Appeals
found that, "the holographic will fails to meet the requirements
Likewise, no evidence was presented to show for its validity." 4 It held that the decedent did not comply with
sufficient reason for the disallowance of herein Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code, which read, as
holographic will. While it was alleged that the said follows:
will was procured by undue and improper pressure
and influence on the part of the beneficiary or of
 Art. 813: When a number of dispositions appearing In the same vein, Article 839 of the New Civil Code
in a holographic will are signed without being reads:
dated, and the last disposition has a signature and
date, such date validates the dispositions Art. 839: The will shall be disallowed in any of the
preceding it, whatever be the time of prior following cases;
dispositions.
(1) If the formalities required by law
Art. 814: In case of insertion, cancellation, erasure have not been complied with;
or alteration in a holographic will, the testator must
authenticate the same by his full signature. (2) If the testator was insane, or
otherwise mentally incapable of
It alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were either making a will, at the time of its
unsigned and undated, or signed but not dated. It also found execution;
that the erasures, alterations and cancellations made thereon
had not been authenticated by decedent. (3) If it was executed through force
or under duress, or the influence of
Thus, this appeal which is impressed with merit. fear, or threats;

Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court provides that will shall (4) If it was procured by undue and
be disallowed in any of the following cases: improper pressure and influence, on
the part of the beneficiary or of some
(a) If not executed and attested as required by law; other person;

(b) If the testator was insane, or otherwise (5) If the signature of the testator
mentally incapable to make a will, at the time of its was procured by fraud;
execution;
(6) If the testator acted by mistake or
(c) If it was executed under duress, or the did not intend that the instrument he
influence of fear, or threats; signed should be his will at the time
of affixing his signature thereto.
(d) If it was procured by undue and improper
pressure and influence, on the part of the These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to
beneficiary, or of some other person for his disallow a will. 5 Thus, in a petition to admit a holographic will to
benefit; probate, the only issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the
instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent's last will and
(e) If the signature of the testator was procured by testament; (2) whether said will was executed in accordance
fraud or trick, and he did not intend that the with the formalities prescribed by law; (3) whether the decedent
instrument should be his will at the time of fixing had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will was
his signature thereto.
executed; and, (4) whether the execution of the will and its A person may execute a holographic will which
signing were the voluntary acts of the decedent. 6 must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the
hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no
In the case at bench, respondent court held that the holographic other form, and may be made in or out of the
will of Anne Sand was not executed in accordance with the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
formalities prescribed by law. It held that Articles 813 and 814 of (Emphasis supplied.)
the New Civil Code, ante, were not complied with, hence, it
disallowed the probate of said will. This is erroneous. Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result
in the disallowance of a holographic will that is
We reiterate what we held in Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil. unquestionably handwritten by the testator.
476, 479 (1919), that:
A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its
The object of the solemnities surrounding the requirement affects the validity of the dispositions contained in
execution of wills is to close the door against bad the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to
faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these
testaments and to guaranty their truth and dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does
authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject not render the whole testament void.
should be interpreted in such a way as to attain
these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate,
one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of Article
object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise 814. In the case of Kalaw vs. Relova 132 SCRA 237
of the right to make a will. So when an 242 (1984), this Court held:
interpretation already given assures such ends,
any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds Ordinarily, when a number of erasures,
nothing but demands more requisites entirely corrections, and interlineations made by the
unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator in a holographic Will have not been noted
testator's last will, must be disregarded. under his signature, . . . the Will is not thereby
invalidated as a whole, but at most only as
For purposes of probating non-holographic wills, these formal respects the particular words erased, corrected or
solemnities include the subscription, attestation, and interlined. Manresa gave an identical commentary
acknowledgment requirements under Articles 805 and 806 of when he said "la omission de la salvedad no anula
the New Civil Code. el testamento, segun la regla de jurisprudencia
establecida en la sentencia de 4 de Abril de
In the case of holographic wills, on the other hand, what assures 1985." 8 (Citations omitted.)
authenticity is the requirement that they be totally autographic or
handwritten by the testator himself, 7 as provided under Article Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or
810 of the New Civil Code, thus: insertions were made on the date of the holographic will or on
testator's signature, 9 their presence does not invalidate the will
itself. 10 The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte, in its entirety. This is correct
of such changes. and must be affirmed.

It is also proper to note that the requirements of authentication As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to
of changes and signing and dating of dispositions appear in pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be
provisions (Articles 813 and 814) separate from that which probated. However, in exceptional instances, courts are not
provides for the necessary conditions for the validity of the powerless to do what the situation constrains them to do, and
holographic will (Article 810). The distinction can be traced to pass upon certain provisions of the will. 11 In the case at bench,
Articles 678 and 688 of the Spanish Civil Code, from which the decedent herself indubitably stated in her holographic will that
present provisions covering holographic wills are taken. They the Cabadbaran property is in the name of her late father, John
read as follows: H. Sand (which led oppositor Dr. Jose Ajero to question her
conveyance of the same in its entirety). Thus, as correctly held
Art. 678: A will is called holographic when the by respondent court, she cannot validly dispose of the whole
testator writes it himself in the form and with the property, which she shares with her father's other heirs.
requisites required in Article 688.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
Art. 688: Holographic wills may be executed only Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 22840,
by persons of full age. dated March 30, 1992, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, except
with respect to the invalidity of the disposition of the entire
In order that the will be valid it must be drawn on house and lot in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte. The Decision
stamped paper corresponding to the year of its of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94 in Sp.
execution, written in its entirety by the testator and Proc. No. Q-37171, dated November 19, 1988, admitting to
signed by him, and must contain a statement of probate the holographic will of decedent Annie Sand, is hereby
the year, month and day of its execution. REINSTATED, with the above qualification as regards the
Cabadbaran property. No costs.
If it should contain any erased, corrected, or
interlined words, the testator must identify them SO ORDERED.
over his signature.
G.R. No. 72706 October 27, 1987
Foreigners may execute holographic wills in their
own language. CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN, petitioner, 
vs.
This separation and distinction adds support to the interpretation HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Third Special
that only the requirements of Article 810 of the New Civil Code Cases Division), VIRGINIA A. FERNANDEZ and ROSA
— and not those found in Articles 813 and 814 of the same DIONGSON, respondents.
Code — are essential to the probate of a holographic will.

The Court of Appeals further held that decedent Annie Sand

could not validly dispose of the house and lot located in PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of THIRD: All my shares that I may receive from our
respondent. Court of Appeals in AC-G.R. SP No. 05744 properties. house, lands and money which I
promulgated on August 30, 1985 (Rollo, p. 108) ordering the earned jointly with my wife Rosa Diongson shall all
dismissal of the petition in Special Proceedings No, 591 ACEB be given by me to my brother SEGUNDO ACAIN
and its Resolution issued on October 23, 1985 (Rollo, p. 72) Filipino, widower, of legal age and presently
denying respondents' (petitioners herein) motion for residing at 357-C Sanciangko Street, Cebu City. In
reconsideration.  case my brother Segundo Acain pre-deceased
me, all the money properties, lands, houses there
The dispositive portion of the questioned decision reads as in Bantayan and here in Cebu City which
follows:  constitute my share shall be given to me to his
children, namely: Anita, Constantino, Concepcion,
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and Quirina, laura, Flores, Antonio and Jose, all
respondent Regional Trial Court of the Seventh surnamed Acain. 
Judicial Region, Branch XIII (Cebu City), is hereby
ordered to dismiss the petition in Special Obviously, Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. Thus it is the
Proceedings No. 591 ACEB No special children of Segundo who are claiming to be heirs, with
pronouncement is made as to costs.  Constantino as the petitioner in Special Proceedings No. 591
ACEB 
The antecedents of the case, based on the summary of the
Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, (Rollo, pp. After the petition was set for hearing in the lower court on June
108-109) are as follows:  25, 1984 the oppositors (respondents herein Virginia A.
Fernandez, a legally adopted daughter of tile deceased and the
On May 29, 1984 petitioner Constantino Acain filed on the latter's widow Rosa Diongson Vda. de Acain filed a motion to
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City Branch XIII, a petition for the dismiss on the following grounds for the petitioner has no legal
probate of the will of the late Nemesio Acain and for the capacity to institute these proceedings; (2) he is merely a
issuance to the same petitioner of letters testamentary, universal heir and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB (Rollo, p. 29), been pretirited. (Rollo, p. 158). Said motion was denied by the
on the premise that Nemesio Acain died leaving a will in which trial judge.
petitioner and his brothers Antonio, Flores and Jose and his
sisters Anita, Concepcion, Quirina and Laura were instituted as After the denial of their subsequent motion for reconsideration in
heirs. The will allegedly executed by Nemesio Acain on the lower court, respondents filed with the Supreme Court a
February 17, 1960 was written in Bisaya (Rollo, p. 27) with a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
translation in English (Rollo, p. 31) submi'tted by petitioner which was subsequently referred to the Intermediate Appellate
without objection raised by private respondents. The will Court by Resolution of the Court dated March 11, 1985
contained provisions on burial rites, payment of debts, and the (Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 3; Rollo, p. 159). 
appointment of a certain Atty. Ignacio G. Villagonzalo as the
executor of the testament. On the disposition of the testator's Respondent Intermediate Appellate Court granted private
property, the will provided:  respondents' petition and ordered the trial court to dismiss the
petition for the probate of the will of Nemesio Acain in Special (E) There may be nothing in Article 854 of the New
Proceedings No. 591 ACEB  Civil Code, that suggests that mere institution of a
universal heir in the will would give the heir so
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner instituted a share in the inheritance but there is a
filed this present petition for the review of respondent Court's definite distinct intention of the testator in the case
decision on December 18, 1985 (Rollo, p. 6). Respondents' at bar, explicitly expressed in his will. This is what
Comment was filed on June 6, 1986 (Rollo, p. 146).  matters and should be in violable. 

On August 11, 1986 the Court resolved to give due course to (F) As an instituted heir, petitioner has the legal
the petition (Rollo, p. 153). Respondents' Memorandum was interest and standing to file the petition in Sp.
filed on September 22, 1986 (Rollo, p. 157); the Memorandum Proc. No. 591 ACEB for probate of the will of
for petitioner was filed on September 29, 1986 (Rollo, p. 177).  Nemesio Acain and 

Petitioner raises the following issues (Memorandum for (G) Article 854 of the New Civil Code is a bill of
petitioner, p. 4):  attainder. It is therefore unconstitutional and
ineffectual. 
(A) The petition filed in AC-G.R. No. 05744 for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not private
is not the proper remedy under the premises;  respondents have been pretirited. 

(B) The authority of the probate courts is limited Article 854 of the Civil Code provides: 
only to inquiring into the extrinsic validity of the will
sought to be probated and it cannot pass upon the Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some,
intrinsic validity thereof before it is admitted to or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
probate;  whether living at the time of the execution of the
will or born after the death of the testator, shall
(C) The will of Nemesio Acain is valid and must annul the institution of heir; but the devisees and
therefore, be admitted to probate. The preterition legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not;
mentioned in Article 854 of the New Civil Code inofficious. 
refers to preterition of "compulsory heirs in the
direct line," and does not apply to private If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before
respondents who are not compulsory heirs in the the testator, the institution shall he effectual,
direct line; their omission shall not annul the without prejudice to the right of representation. 
institution of heirs; 
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the
(D) DICAT TESTATOR ET MERIT LEX. What the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they are not
testator says will be the law; mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither
instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited (Nuguid v.
Nuguid, 17 SCRA 450 [1966]; Maninang v. Court of Appeals,
114 SCRA 478 [1982]). Insofar as the widow is concerned, left by universal title to petitioner and his brothers and sisters.
Article 854 of the Civil Code may not apply as she does not The effect of annulling the "Institution of heirs will be,
ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a necessarily, the opening of a total intestacy (Neri v. Akutin, 74
compulsory heir. Stated otherwise, even if the surviving spouse Phil. 185 [1943]) except that proper legacies and devises must,
is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted as already stated above, be respected. 
from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line. (Art. 854,
Civil code) however, the same thing cannot be said of the other We now deal with another matter. In order that a person may be
respondent Virginia A. Fernandez, whose legal adoption by the allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an
testator has not been questioned by petitioner (.Memorandum interest iii the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be
for the Petitioner, pp. 8-9). Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate
known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to and an interested party is one who would be benefited by the
the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate
legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a like a creditor (Sumilang v. Ramagosa, 21 SCRA 1369/1967).
legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she has totally Petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither a devisee or a
omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that both legatee there being no mention in the testamentary disposition
adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their of any gift of an individual item of personal or real property he is
legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly called upon to receive (Article 782, Civil Code). At the outset, he
disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the appears to have an interest in the will as an heir, defined under
legally adopted child.  Article 782 of the Civil Code as a person called to the
succession either by the provision of a will or by operation of
Pretention annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws law. However, intestacy having resulted from the preterition of
open to intestate succession the entire inheritance including "la respondent adopted child and the universal institution of heirs,
porcion libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto en virtual de legado petitioner is in effect not an heir of the testator. He has no legal
mejora o donacion" Maniesa as cited in Nuguid v. standing to petition for the probate of the will left by the
Nuguid, supra; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA deceased and Special Proceedings No. 591 A-CEB must be
[1982]). The only provisions which do not result in intestacy are dismissed. 
the legacies and devises made in the will for they should stand
valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes are As a general rule certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal,
concerned.  except when the questioned order is an oppressive exercise of j
judicial authority (People v. Villanueva, 110 SCRA 465 [1981];
The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers Vda. de Caldito v. Segundo, 117 SCRA 573 [1982]; Co Chuan
and sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator results in Seng v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 308 [1984]; and Bautista
totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such v. Sarmiento, 138 SCRA 587 [1985]). It is axiomatic that the
institution of universal heirs-without any other testamentary remedies of certiorari and prohibition are not available where the
disposition in the will-amounts to a declaration that nothing at all petitioner has the remedy of appeal or some other plain, speedy
was written. Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854 of and adequate remedy in the course of law (DD Comendador
the Civil Code offers no leeway for inferential interpretation Construction Corporation v. Sayo (118 SCRA 590 [1982]). They
(Nuguid v. Nuguid), supra. No legacies nor devises having been are, however, proper remedies to correct a grave abuse of
provided in the will the whole property of the deceased has been discretion of the trial court in not dismissing a case where the
dismissal is founded on valid grounds (Vda. de Bacang v. Court us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on
of Appeals, 125 SCRA 137 [1983]).  the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will
in question. After all there exists a justiciable
Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB is for the probate of a will. controversy crying for solution. 
As stated by respondent Court, the general rule is that the
probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of In Saguimsim v. Lindayag (6 SCRA 874 [1962]) the motion to
the will, the due execution thereof, the testator's testamentary dismiss the petition by the surviving spouse was grounded on
capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities petitioner's lack of legal capacity to institute the proceedings
prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally which was fully substantiated by the evidence during the hearing
comes only after the Court has declared that the will has been held in connection with said motion. The Court upheld the
duly authenticated. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is probate court's order of dismissal. 
not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the
provisions of the will (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 449 [1966]; In Cayetano v. Leonides, supra one of the issues raised in the
Sumilang v. Ramagosa, supra; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, motion to dismiss the petition deals with the validity of the
114 SCRA 478 [1982]; Cayetano v. Leonides, 129 SCRA 522 provisions of the will. Respondent Judge allowed the probate of
[1984]; and Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 206 the will. The Court held that as on its face the will appeared to
[1985]).  have preterited the petitioner the respondent judge should have
denied its probate outright. Where circumstances demand that
The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Under intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions be passed upon even
exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to before the extrinsic validity of the will is resolved, the probate
do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain court should meet the issue. (Nepomuceno v. Court of
provisions of the will (Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, supra). Appeals, supra; Nuguid v. Nuguid, supra). 
In Nuguid v. Nuguid the oppositors to the probate moved to
dismiss on the ground of absolute preteriton The probate court In the instant case private respondents filed a motion to dismiss
acting on the motion held that the will in question was a the petition in Sp. Proceedings No. 591 ACEB of the Regional
complete nullity and dismissed the petition without costs. On Trial Court of Cebu on the following grounds: (1) petitioner has
appeal the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the probate no legal capacity to institute the proceedings; (2) he is merely a
court, induced by practical considerations. The Court said:  universal heir; and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter
have been preterited (Rollo, p. 158). It was denied by the trial
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be court in an order dated January 21, 1985 for the reason that "the
remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be grounds for the motion to dismiss are matters properly to be
gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be resolved after a hearing on the issues in the course of the trial
protracted. And for aught that appears in the on the merits of the case (Rollo, p. 32). A subsequent motion for
record, in the event of probate or if the court reconsideration was denied by the trial court on February 15,
rejects the will, probability exists that the case will 1985 (Rollo, p. 109). 
come up once again before us on the same issue
of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: For private respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will
waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. and allowed the case to progress when on its face the will
These are the practical considerations that induce appears to be intrinsically void as petitioner and his brothers and
sisters were instituted as universal heirs coupled with the OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II, petitioner, 
obvious fact that one of the private respondents had been vs.
preterited would have been an exercise in futility. It would have COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FERNANDO V. GOROSPE, JR.,
meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added futility. The in his Official Capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC-Makati,
trial court could have denied its probate outright or could have Branch 61, and PACITA PHILLIPS as the alleged executrix
passed upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions of the alleged will of the late Dr. Arturo de
before the extrinsic validity of the will was resolved (Cayetano v. Santos, respondents.
Leonides, supra; Nuquid v. Nuguid, supra. The remedies of
certiorari and prohibition were properly availed of by private MENDOZA, J.:
respondents. 
These are petitions for review on certiorari of the decisions of
Thus, this Court ruled that where the grounds for dismissal are the Thirteenth and the Special Eighth Divisions of the Court of
indubitable, the defendants had the right to resort to the more Appeals which ruled that petitioner has no right to intervene in
speedy, and adequate remedies of certiorari and prohibition to the settlement of the estate of Dr. Arturo de Santos. The cases
correct a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of were consolidated considering that they involve the same
jurisdiction, committed by the trial court in not dismissing the parties and some of the issues raised are the same.
case, (Vda. de Bacang v. Court of Appeals, supra) and even
assuming the existence of the remedy of appeal, the Court The facts which gave rise to these two petitions are as follows:
harkens to the rule that in the broader interests of justice, a
petition for certiorari may be entertained, particularly where On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino and a resident
appeal would not afford speedy and adequate relief. (Maninang of Makati City, filed a petition for probate of his will1 in the
Court of Appeals, supra).  Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, docketed as Sp. Proc.
No. M-4223. In his petition, Dr. De Santos alleged that he had
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DENIED for no compulsory heirs; that he had named in his will as sole
lack of merit and the questioned decision of respondent Court of legatee and devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.; that
Appeals promulgated on August 30, 1985 and its Resolution he disposed by his will his properties with an approximate value
dated October 23, 1985 are hereby AFFIRMED.  of not less than P2,000,000.00; and that copies of said will were
in the custody of the named executrix, private respondent Pacita
SO ORDERED. de los Reyes Phillips. A copy of the will2 was annexed to the
petition for probate.
G.R. No. 129505           January 31, 2000
On February 16, 1996, Judge Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr. of RTC-
OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II, petitioner,  Makati, Branch 61 issued an order granting the petition and
vs. allowing the will. The order reads:
PACITA DE LOS REYES PHILLIPS, respondent.
On 03 August 1995, the Court issued an Order setting
----------------------------- the hearing of the petition on 12 September 1995, at 8:30
o'clock in the morning, copies of which were served to
G.R. No. 133359           January 31, 2000 Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc. and Ms. Pacita de los
Reyes Phillips (Officer's Return, dated 04 September Intsia Streets, Forbes Park, Makati City has been named
1995 attached to the records). When the case was called as sole legatee and devisee of petitioner's properties,
for hearing on the date set, no oppositor appeared nor real and personal, approximately valued at not less than
any written opposition was ever filed and on motion of P2 million, Ms. Pacita de los Reyes Phillips was
petitioner, he was allowed to adduce his evidence in designated as executor and to serve as such without a
support of the petition. bond.1âwphi1.nêt

Petitioner personally appeared before this Court and was From the foregoing facts, the Court finds that the
placed on the witness stand and was directly examined petitioner has substantially established the material
by the Court through "free wheeling" questions and allegations contained in his petition. The Last Will and
answers to give this Court a basis to determine the state Testament having been executed and attested as
of mind of the petitioner when he executed the subject required by law; that testator at the time of the execution
will. After the examination, the Court is convinced that of the will was of sane mind and/or not mentally
petitioner is of sound and disposing mind and not acting incapable to make a Will; nor was it executed under
on duress, menace and undue influence or fraud, and duress or under the influence of fear or threats; that it
that petitioner signed his Last Will and Testament on his was in writing and executed in the language known and
own free and voluntary will and that he was neither forced understood by the testator duly subscribed thereof and
nor influenced by any other person in signing it. attested and subscribed by three (3) credible witnesses in
the presence of the testator and of another; that the
Furthermore, it appears from the petition and the testator and all the attesting witnesses signed the Last
evidence adduced that petitioner in his lifetime, executed Will and Testament freely and voluntarily and that the
his Last Will and Testament (Exhs. "A", "A-1", "A-2", "A- testator has intended that the instrument should be his
4", "A-5") at his residence situated at 9 Bauhinia corner Will at the time of affixing his signature thereto.
Intsia Streets, Forbes Park, Makati City; said Last Will
and Testament was signed in the presence of his three WHEREFORE, as prayed for by the petitioner (testator
(3) witnesses, namely, to wit: Dr. Elpidio Valencia (Exhs. himself) the petition for the allowance of the Last Will and
"A-6", "A-7", "A-8", "A-16", "A-16-A"), Atty. Edward J. Testament of Arturo de Santos is hereby APPROVED
Berenguer (Exhs. "A-3", "A-3-A", "A-9", "A-10", & "A-11"), and ALLOWED.
and Atty. Victoria C. delos Reyes (Exhs. "A-12", "A-13",
"A-14", "A-17", & "A-18"), who in turn, in the presence of Shortly after the probate of his will, Dr. De Santos died on
the testator and in the presence of each and all of the February 26, 1996.
witnesses signed the said Last Will and Testament and
duly notarized before Notary Public Anna Melissa L. On April 3, 1996, petitioner Octavio S. Maloles II filed a motion
Rosario (Exh. "A-15"); on the actual execution of the Last for intervention claiming that, as the only child of Alicia de
Will and Testament, pictures were taken (Exhs. "B" to "B- Santos (testator's sister) and Octavio L. Maloles, Sr., he was the
3"). sole full-blooded nephew and nearest of kin of Dr. De Santos.
He likewise alleged that he was a creditor of the testator.
Petitioner has no compulsory heirs and Arturo de Santos Petitioner thus prayed for the reconsideration of the order
Foundation, Inc., with address at No. 9 Bauhinia corner
allowing the will and the issuance of letters of administration in It appears, however, that in Sp. Proc. No. M-4223, Judge
his name. Gorospe had denied on August 26, 1996 petitioner's motion for
intervention. Petitioner brought this matter to the Court of
On the other hand, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Appeals which, in a decision4 promulgated on February 13,
Phillips, the designated executrix of the will, filed a motion for 1998, upheld the denial of petitioner's motion for intervention.
the issuance of letters testamentary with Branch 61. Later,
however, private respondent moved to withdraw her motion. Meanwhile, Judge Gorospe issued an order, dated September
This was granted, while petitioner was required to file a 4, 1996, returning the records of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 to
memorandum of authorities in support of his claim that said Branch 65 on the ground that there was a pending case
court (Branch 61) still had jurisdiction to allow his intervention.3  involving the Estate of Decedent Arturo de Santos pending
before said court. The order reads:
Petitioner filed his memorandum of authorities on May 13, 1996.
On the other hand, private respondent, who earlier withdrew her Acting on the ORDER dated 28 August 1996 of Branch
motion for the issuance of letters testamentary in Branch 61, 65, this Court, transferring this case to this Branch 61 on
refiled a petition for the same purpose with the Regional Trial the ground that this case is related with a case before this
Court, Makati, which was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 Court, let this case be returned to Branch 65 with the
and assigned to Branch 65. information that there is no related case involving the
ESTATE OF DECEDENT ARTURO DE SANTOS
Upon private respondent's motion, Judge Salvador Abad Santos pending before this Branch.
of Branch 65 issued an order, dated June 28, 1996, appointing
her as special administrator of Dr. De Santos's estate. There is, however, a case filed by ARTURO DE
SANTOS, as petitioner under Rule 76 of the Rules of
On July 29, 1996, petitioner sought to intervene in Sp. Proc. No. Court for the Allowance of his will during his lifetime
M-4343 and to set aside the appointment of private respondent docketed as SP. PROC. NO. M-4223 which was already
as special administrator. He reiterated that he was the sole and decided on 16 February 1996 and has become final.
full blooded nephew and nearest of kin of the testator; that he
came to know of the existence of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 only by It is noted on records of Case No. M-4223 that after it
accident; that the probate proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. M-4223 became final, herein Petitioner Pacita de los Reyes
before Branch 61 of the same court was still pending; that Phillips filed a MOTION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF
private respondent misdeclared the true worth of the testator's LETTERS TESTAMENTARY, which was subsequently
estate; that private respondent was not fit to be the special withdrawn after this Court, during the hearing, already
administrator of the estate; and that petitioner should be given ruled that the motion could not be admitted as the subject
letters of administration for the estate of Dr. De Santos. matter involves a separate case under Rule 78 of the
Rules of Court, and movant withdrew her motion and filed
On August 28, 1996, Judge Abad Santos ordered the transfer of this case (No. 4343).
Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 to Branch 61, on the ground that "[it] is
related to the case before Judge Gorospe of RTC Branch Octavio de Santos Maloles [II] filed a MOTION FOR
61 . . ." INTERVENTION before Case No. M-4223 and this
motion was already DENIED in the order (Branch 61) of
 26 August 1996 likewise for the same grounds that the On November 4, 1996, Judge Abad Santos granted petitioner's
matter is for a separate case to be filed under Rule 78 of motion for intervention. Private respondent moved for a
the Rules of Court and cannot be included in this case reconsideration but her motion was denied by the trial court.
filed under Rule 76 of the Rules of Court. She then filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals
which, on February 26, 1997, rendered a decision6 setting aside
It is further noted that it is a matter of policy that the trial court's order on the ground that petitioner had not
consolidation of cases must be approved by the shown any right or interest to intervene in Sp. Proc. No. M-4343.
Presiding Judges of the affected Branches.
Hence, these petitions which raise the following issues:
Initially, in his decision dated September 23, 1996,5 Judge Abad
Santos appeared firm in his position that " . . . it would be 1. Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court —
improper for (Branch 65) to hear and resolve the petition (Sp. Makati, Branch 61 has lost jurisdiction to proceed with the
Proc. No. M-4343)," considering that the probate proceedings probate proceedings upon its issuance of an order
were commenced with Branch 61. He thus ordered the transfer allowing the will of Dr. Arturo de Santos.
of the records back to the latter branch. However, he later
recalled his decision and took cognizance of the case "to 2. Whether or not the Honorable (Regional Trial Court —
expedite the proceedings." Thus, in his Order, dated October Makati, Branch 65) acquired jurisdiction over the petition
21, 1996, he stated: for issuance of letters testamentary filed by (private)
respondent.
Considering the refusal of the Hon. Fernando V.
Gorospe, Jr. of Branch 61 to continue hearing this case 3. Whether or not the petitioner, being a creditor of the
notwithstanding the fact that said branch began the late Dr. Arturo de Santos, has a right to intervene and
probate proceedings of the estate of the deceased and oppose the petition for issuance of letters testamentary
must therefore continue to exercise its jurisdiction to the filed by the respondent.
exclusion of all others, until the entire estate of the
testator had been partitioned and distributed as per Order 4. Whether or not (private) respondent is guilty of forum
dated 23 September 1996, this branch (Regional Trial shopping in filing her petition for issuance of letters
Court Branch 65) shall take cognizance of the petition if testamentary with the Regional Trial Court — Makati,
only to expedite the proceedings, and under the concept Branch 65 knowing fully well that the probate
that the Regional Trial Court of Makati City is but one proceedings involving the same restate estate of the
court. decedent is still pending with the Regional Trial Court —
Makati, Branch 61.
Furnish a copy of this order to the Office of the Chief
justice and the Office of the Court Administrator, of the First. Petitioner contends that the probate proceedings in
Supreme Court; the Hon. Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr.; Branch 61 of RTC-Makati did not terminate upon the issuance of
Pacita De Los Reyes Phillips, Petitioner; and Octavio de the order allowing the will of Dr. De Santos. Citing the cases
Santos Maloles, Intervenor. of Santiesteban v. Santiesteban7 and Tagle v. Manalo,8 he
argues that the proceedings must continue until the estate is
fully distributed to the lawful heirs, devisees, and legatees of the
testator, pursuant to Rule 73, §1 of the Rules of Court. Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will,
Consequently, petitioner contends that Branch 65 could not either during the lifetime of the testator or after his death,
lawfully act upon private respondent's petition for issuance of shall be conclusive as to its due execution.
letters testamentary.
Rule 76, §1 likewise provides:
The contention has no merit.
Sec. 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will. — Any
In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled that the executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any
authority of the court is limited to ascertaining the extrinsic other person interested in the estate, may, at any time
validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound after the death of the testator, petition the court having
mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be
prescribed by law.9  in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.

Ordinarily, probate proceedings are instituted only after the The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition in
death of the testator, so much so that, after approving and the court for the allowance of his will.
allowing the will, the court proceeds to issue letters
testamentary and settle the estate of the testator. The cases The rationale for allowing the probate of wills during the lifetime
cited by petitioner are of such nature. In fact, in most of testator has been explained by the Code Commission thus:
jurisdictions, courts cannot entertain a petition for probate of the
will of a living testator under the principle of ambulatory nature Most of the cases that reach the courts involve either the
of wills.10  testamentary capacity of the testator or the formalities
adopted in the execution of wills. There are relatively few
However, Art. 838 of the Civil Code authorizes the filing of a cases concerning the intrinsic validity of testamentary
petition for probate of the will filed by the testator himself. It dispositions. It is far easier for the courts to determine the
provides: mental condition of a testator during his lifetime than after
his death. Fraud, intimidation and undue influence are
CIVIL CODE, ART. 838. No will shall pass either real or minimized. Furthermore, if a will does not comply with the
personal property unless it is proved and allowed in requirements prescribed by law, the same may be
accordance with the Rules of Court. corrected at once. The probate during the testator's life,
therefore, will lessen the number of contest upon wills.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the Once a will is probated during the lifetime of the testator,
court having jurisdiction for the allowance of his will. In the only questions that may remain for the courts to
such case, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court decide after the testator's death will refer to the intrinsic
for the allowance of wills after the testator's death shall validity of the testamentary dispositions. It is possible, of
govern. course, that even when the testator himself asks for the
allowance of the will, he may be acting under duress or
The Supreme Court shall formulate such additional Rules undue influence, but these are rare cases.
of Court as may be necessary for the allowance of wills
on petition of the testator.
 After a will has been probated during the lifetime of the estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the
testator, it does not necessarily mean that he cannot alter province in which he resides at the time of his death, and
or revoke the same before his death. Should he make a if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of
new will, it would also be allowable on his petition, and if First Instance of any province in which he had estate.
he should die before he has had a chance to present The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
such petition, the ordinary probate proceeding after the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
testator's death would be in order.11  exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by
a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of
Thus, after the allowance of the will of Dr. De Santos on the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be
February 16, 1996, there was nothing else for Branch 61 to do contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal
except to issue a certificate of allowance of the will pursuant to from that court, in the original case, or when the want of
Rule 73, §12 of the Rules of Court. There is, therefore, no basis jurisdiction appears on the record.
for the ruling of Judge Abad Santos of Branch 65 of RTC-Makati
that — The above rule, however, actually provides for the venue of
actions for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons.
Branch 61 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati having In Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, it was held:13 
begun the probate proceedings of the estate of the
deceased, it continues and shall continue to exercise said The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75,
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all others. It should be Section 1), specifically the clause "so far as it depends on
noted that probate proceedings do not cease upon the the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location
allowance or disallowance of a will but continues up to of the state," is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption
such time that the entire estate of the testator had been of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased
partitioned and distributed. Persons. Venue and Processes." It could not have been
intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter,
The fact that the will was allowed during the lifetime of because such legal provision is contained in a law of
the testator meant merely that the partition and procedure dealing merely with procedural matters.
distribution of the estate was to be suspended until the Procedure is one thing, jurisdiction over the subject
latter's death. In other words, the petitioner, instead of matter is another. The power or authority of the court
filing a new petition for the issuance of letters over the subject matter "existed was fixed before
testamentary, should have simply filed a manifestation for procedure in a given cause began." That power or
the same purpose in the probate court.12  authority is not altered or changed by procedure, which
simply directs the manner in which the power or authority
Petitioner, who defends the order of Branch 65 allowing him to shall be fully and justly exercised. There are cases
intervene, cites Rule 73, §1 which states: though that if the power is not exercised conformably with
the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court
Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it
decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of legally. However, this does not amount to a loss of
his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be jurisdiction over the subject matter. Rather, it means that
proved, or letters of administration granted, and his the court may thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or
 that the judgment may thereby be rendered defective for the jurisdiction attaches and continues to be vested in the
lack of something essential to sustain it. The appearance Court of First Instance of the province, and the trials may
of this provision in the procedural law at once raises a be held by any branch or judge of the court.
strong presumption that it has nothing to do with the
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. In plain Necessarily, therefore, Branch 65 of the RTC of Makati City has
words, it is just a matter of method, of convenience to the jurisdiction over Sp. Proc. No. M-4343.
parties.
Second. Petitioner claims the right to intervene in and oppose
Indeed, the jurisdiction over probate proceedings and settlement the petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by private
of estates with approximate value of over P100,000.00 (outside respondent. He argues that, as the nearest next of kin and
Metro Manila) or P200,000.00 (in Metro Manila) belongs to the creditor of the testator, his interest in the matter is material and
regional trial courts under B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. The direct. In ruling that petitioner has no right to intervene in the
different branches comprising each court in one judicial region proceedings before Branch 65 of RTC-Makati City, the Court of
do not possess jurisdictions independent of and incompatible Appeals held:
with each other.14 
The private respondent herein is not an heir or legatee
It is noteworthy that, although Rule 73, §1 applies insofar as the under the will of the decedent Arturo de Santos. Neither
venue of the petition for probate of the will of Dr. De Santos is is he a compulsory heir of the latter. As the only and
concerned, it does not bar other branches of the same court nearest collateral relative of the decedent, he can inherit
from taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the from the latter only in case of intestacy. Since the
testator after his death. As held in the leading case of Bacalso decedent has left a will which has already been probated
v. Ramolote:15  and disposes of all his properties the private respondent
can inherit only if the said will is annulled. His interest in
The various branches of the Court of First Instance of the decedent's estate is, therefore, not direct or
Cebu under the Fourteenth Judicial District, are a immediate.
coordinate and co-equal courts, and the totality of which
is only one Court of First Instance. The jurisdiction is His claim to being a creditor of the estate is a belated
vested in the court, not in the judges. And when a case is one, having been raised for the first time only in his reply
filed in one branch, jurisdiction over the case does not to the opposition to his motion to intervene, and, as far as
attach to the branch or judge alone, to the exclusion of the records show, not supported by evidence.
the other branches. Trial may be held or proceedings
continue by and before another branch or judge. It is for . . . . [T]he opposition must come from one with a direct
this reason that Section 57 of the Judiciary Act expressly interest in the estate or the will, and the private
grants to the Secretary of Justice, the administrative right respondent has none. Moreover, the ground cited in the
or power to apportion the cases among the different private respondent's opposition, that the petitioner has
branches, both for the convenience of the parties and for deliberately misdeclared the truth worth and value of the
the coordination of the work by the different branches of estate, is not relevant to the question of her competency
the same court. The apportionment and distribution of to act as executor. Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of
cases does not involve a grant or limitation of jurisdiction, Court requires only an allegation of the probable value
 and character of the property of the estate. The true (1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to
value can be determined later on in the course of the their legitimate parents and ascendants;
settlement of the estate.16 
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and
Rule 79, §1 provides: ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and
descendants;
Opposition to issuance of letters
testamentary. Simultaneous petition for administration. — (3) The widow or widower;
Any person interested in a will may state in writing the
grounds why letters testamentary should not issue to the (4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children
persons named therein as executors, or any of them, and by legal fiction;
the court, after hearing upon notice, shall pass upon the
sufficiency of such grounds. A petition may, at the same (5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of
time, be filed for letters of administration with the will the Civil Code.18 
annexed.
Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not a compulsory heir
Under this provision, it has been held that an "interested person" who may have been preterited in the testator's will.
is one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or
one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor, and Nor does he have any right to intervene in the settlement
whose interest is material and direct, not merely incidental or proceedings based on his allegation that he is a creditor of the
contingent.17  deceased. Since the testator instituted or named an executor in
his will, it is incumbent upon the Court to respect the desires of
Even if petitioner is the nearest next of kin of Dr. De Santos, he the testator. As we stated in Ozaeta v. Pecson:19 
cannot be considered an "heir" of the testator. It is a
fundamental rule of testamentary succession that one who has The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a
no compulsory or forced heirs may dispose of his entire estate testator, a necessary concomitant of his right to dispose
by will. Thus, Art. 842 of the Civil Code provides: of his property in the manner he wishes. It is natural that
the testator should desire to appoint one of his
One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of confidence, one who can be trusted to carry out his
all his estate or any part of it in favor of any person wishes in the disposal of his estate. The curtailment of
having capacity to succeed. this right may be considered a curtailment of the right to
dispose.
One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate
provided he does not contravene the provisions of this Only if the appointed executor is incompetent, refuses the trust,
Code with regard to the legitimate of said heirs. or fails to give bond may the court appoint other persons to
administer the estate.20 None of these circumstances is present
Compulsory heirs are limited to the testator's — in this case.
Third. Petitioner contends that private respondent is guilty of
forum shopping when she filed the petition for issuance of letters
testamentary (Sp. Proc. No. M-4343) while the probate
proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. M-4223) were still pending. MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
According to petitioner, there is identity of parties, rights
asserted, and reliefs prayed for in the two actions which are A Petition to Review the Decision of April 28, 1981 of
founded on the same facts, and a judgment in either will result respondent Appellate Court in CA-G.R. No. 12032-R entitled
in res judicata in the other. "Rafael E. Maninang and Soledad L. Maninang vs. Hon.
Ricardo Pronove, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
This contention has no merit. As stated earlier, the petition for Pasig, Branch XI, and Bernardo S. Aseneta". 
probate was filed by Dr. De Santos, the testator, solely for the
purpose of authenticating his will. Upon the allowance of his will, Pertinent to the controversy are the following antecedental
the proceedings were terminated.1âwphi1.nêt facts: 

On the other hand, the petition for issuance of letters On May 21, 1977, Clemencia Aseneta, single, died at the Manila
testamentary was filed by private respondent, as executor of the Sanitarium Hospital at age 81. She left a holographic will, the
estate of Dr. De Santos, for the purpose of securing authority pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder: 
from the Court to administer the estate and put into effect the
will of the testator. The estate settlement proceedings xxx xxx xxx
commenced by the filing of the petition terminates upon the
distribution and delivery of the legacies and devises to the It is my will that all my real properties located in
persons named in the will. Clearly, there is no identity between Manila, Makati, Quezon City, Albay and Legaspi
the two petitions, nor was the latter filed during the pendency of City and all my personal properties shagllbe
the former. There was, consequently, no forum shopping. inherited upon my death by Dra. Soledad L.
Maninang with whose family I have lived
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decisions of the continuously for around the last 30 years now.
Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. Dra. Maninang and her husband Pamping have
been kind to me. ... I have found peace and
SO ORDERED. happiness with them even during the time when
my sisters were still alive and especially now when
G.R. No. L-57848 June 19, 1982 I am now being troubled by my nephew Bernardo
and niece Salvacion. I am not incompetent as
RAFAEL E. MANINANG and SOLEDAD L. Nonoy would like me to appear. I know what is
MANINANG, petitioners,  right and wrong. I can decide for myself. I do not
vs. consider Nonoy as my adopted son. He has made
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO L. PRONOVE, JR., as me do things against my will.
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and
BERNARDO S. ASENETA, respondents.  xxx xxx xxx
On June 9, 1977, petitioner Soledad Maninang filed a Petition On December 19, 1980, the lower Court denied reconsideration
for probate of the Will of the decedent with the Court of First for lack of merit and in the same Order appointed Bernardo as
Instance-Branch IV, Quezon City (Sp. Proc. No. Q-23304, the administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased
hereinafter referred to as the Testate Case).  Clemencia Aseneta "considering that he is a forced heir of said
deceased while oppositor Soledad Maninang is not, and
On July 25, 1977, herein respondent Bernardo Aseneta, who, as considering further that Bernardo Aseneta has not been shown
the adopted son, claims to be the sole heir of decedent to be unfit to perform the duties of the trust. " 
Clemencia Aseneta, instituted intestate proceedings with the
Court of First Instance-Branch XI, Pasig, Rizal (Sp. Proc. No. Petitioners Maninang resorted to a certiorari Petition before
8569, called hereinafter the Intestate Case" for brevity).  respondent Court of Appeals alleging that the lower Court
exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing the Orders of dismissal of the
On December 23, 1977, the Testate and Intestate Cases were Testate Case (September 8, 1980) and denial of reconsideration
ordered consolidated before Branch XI, presided by respondent (December 19, 1980). 
Judge. 
On April 28, 1981, respondent Court 3 denied certiorari and
Respondent Bernardo then filed a Motion to Dismiss the Testate ruled that the trial Judge's Order of dismissal was final in nature
Case on the ground that the holographic will was null and void as it finally disposed of the Testate Case and, therefore, appeal
because he, as the only compulsory heir, was preterited and, was the proper remedy, which petitioners failed to avail of.
therefore, intestacy should ensue. In support of said Motion to Continuing, it said that even granting that the lower Court
Dismiss, respondent Bernardo cited the cases of Neri vs. Akutin committed errors in issuing the questioned Orders, those are
(72 Phil. 322); Nuguid vs. Nuguid (17 SCRA 449), and Ramos errors of judgment reviewable only by appeal and not by
vs. Baldovino (2 CA Rep. 2nd, 878). 1 Certiorari. 'Thus, this Petition before us. 

In her Opposition to said Motion to Dismiss, petitioner Soledad We find that the Court a quo a quo acted in excess of its
averred that it is still the rule that in a case for probate of a Will, jurisdiction when it dismissed the Testate Case. Generally, the
the Court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination of and probate of a Will is mandatory. 
resolution on the extrinsic validity of the will; and that
respondent Bernardo was effectively disinherited by the No will shall pass either real or personal property
decedent. 2 unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with
the Rules of Court. 4
On September 8, 1980, the lower Court ordered the dismissal of
the Testate Case in this wise:  The law enjoins the probate of the Will and public policy requires
it, because unless the Will is probated and notice thereof given
For reasons stated in the motion to dismiss filed by to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his
petitioner Bernardo S. Aseneta which the Court property by Will may be rendered nugatory. 5
finds meritorious, the petition for probate of will
filed by Soledad L. Maninang and which was Normally, the probate of a Will does not look into its intrinsic
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-23304 is validity. 
DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.
 ... The authentication of a will decides no other The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the
question than such as touch upon the capacity of will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity
the testator and the compliance with those had been established. The probate of a will might
requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes become an Idle ceremony if on its face it appears
for the validity of wills. It does not determine nor to be intrinsically void. Where practical
even by implication prejudge the validity or considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of
efficiency (sic) of the provisions, these may be the will be passed upon, even before it is
impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding probated, the court should meet the issue.
its authentication. The que0stions relating to these
points remain entirely unaffected, and may be The Nuguid and the Balanay cases provide the exception rather
raised even after the will has been than the rule. The intrinsic validity of the Wills in those cases
authenticated .... 6 was passed upon even before probate because "practical
considerations" so demanded. Moreover, for the parties in
Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the the Nuguid case, the "meat of the controversy" was the intrinsic
provisions of the will cannot be entertained in validity of the Will; in fact, the parties in that case "shunted aside
Probate proceeding because its only purpose is the question of whether or not the Will should be allowed
merely to determine if the will has been executed probate." Not so in the case before us now where the probate of
in accordance with the requirements of the law. 7 the Will is insisted on by petitioners and a resolution on the
extrinsic validity of the Will demanded. 
Respondent Bernardo, however, relies on the pronouncement
in Nuguid vs. Nuguid  8, reading:  Moreover, in the Nuguid case, this Court ruled that the Will was
intrinsically invalid as it completely preterited the parents of the
In a proceeding for the probate of a will, the testator. In the instant case, a crucial issue that calls for
Court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination resolution is whether under the terms of the decedent's Will,
of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the private respondent had been preterited or disinherited, and if the
will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix's latter, whether it was a valid disinheritance. Preterition and
testamentary capacity and the compliance with the disinheritance are two diverse concepts. 
requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The
intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only ... Preterition "consists in the omission in the
after the court has declared that the will has been testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of
duly authenticated. However, where practical them, either because they are not mentioned
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither
the will be passed upon, even before it is instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited."
probated, the Court should meet that (Neri vs. Akutin, 72 Phil. 325). Disinheritance, in
issue. (Emphasis supplied)  turn, "is a testamentary disposition depriving any
compulsory heirs of his share in the legitimate for
Our ruling in Balanay vs. Hon. Martinez  9 had a similar thrust:  a cause authorized by law." (Justice J.B.L. Reyes
and R.C. Puno, "An Outline of Philippine Civil
Law", 1956 ed., Vol. III, p. 8, citing cases)
 Disinheritance is always "voluntary", preterition Coming now to the procedural aspect, suffice it to state that in
upon the other hand, is presumed to be view of our finding that respondent Judge had acted in excess of
"involuntary" (Sanchez Roman, Estudios de his jurisdiction in dismissing the Testate Case, certiorari is a
Derecho Civil 2nd edition, Volume 2.o p. 1131). 10 proper remedy. An act done by a Probate Court in excess of its
jurisdiction may be corrected by Certiorari. 13 And even
The effects of preterition and disinheritance are also totally assuming the existence of the remedy of appeal, we harken to
different.  the rule that in the broader interests of justice, a petition for
certiorari may be entertained, particularly where appeal would
... The effects flowing from preterition are totally not afford speedy and adequate relief. 
different from those of disinheritance. Pretention
under Article 854 of the New Civil Code shall annul WHEREFORE, the Decision in question is set aside and the
the institution of heir. This annulment is in toto, Orders of the Court of First Instance-Branch XI, Rizal, dated
unless in the wail there are, in addition, September 8, 1980 and December 19, 1980, are nullified.
testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or Special Proceeding No. Q-23304 is hereby remanded to said
legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under Article Court of First Instance-Branch XI. Rizal, therein to be reinstated
918 of the same Code, such disinheritance shall and consolidated with Special Proceeding No. 8569 for further
also "annul the institution of heirs", but only proceedings. 
"insofar as it may prejudice the person
disinherited", which last phrase was omitted in the No pronouncement as to costs. 
case of preterition (III Tolentino, Civil Code of the
Philippines, 1961 Edition, p. 172). Better stated
yet, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that
portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs G.R. No. L-34395 May 19, 1981
have been illegally deprived. 11
BEATRIZ L. GONZALES, petitioner, 
By virtue of the dismissal of the Testate Case, the determination vs.
of that controversial issue has not been thoroughly considered. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA (BRANCH V),
We gather from the assailed Order of the trial Court that its BENITO F. LEGARDA, ROSARIO L. VALDEZ, ALEJANDRO
conclusion was that respondent Bernardo has been preterited LEGARDA, TERESA LEGARDA, JOSE LEGARDA, BENITO
We are of opinion, however, that from the face of the Will, that LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y
conclusion is not indubitable.  FERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ,
CARMEN LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, ALEJANDRO
As held in the case of Vda. de Precilla vs. Narciso  12 LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, RAMON LEGARDA Y
HERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JAIME
... it is as important a matter of public interest that LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, CELSO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT,
a purported will is not denied legalization on ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA. TERESA
dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very institution of LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA. ANTONIA LEGARDA Y
testamentary succession will be shaken to its LOBREGAT, JOSE LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, ROSARIO
foundation, ... LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, BENITO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT,
EDUARDO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, TRINIDAD F. (b) 1,429 shares of the Benguet Consolidated
LEGARDA, and the ESTATE OF DONA FILOMENA ROCES Mining Company and a 1/7 interest in certain
DE LEGARDA, respondents.  shares of the San Miguel Brewery, Tuason &
Legarda, Ltd., Philippine Guaranty Company,
Insular Life Assurance Company and the Manila
Times. 
AQUINO, J.:1äwphï1.ñët
(c) 1/7 of the properties described in TCT Nos.
Beatriz Legarda Gonzales appealed from the decision of the 80226, 80237 to 80243 (7 titles), 80260, 80261
Court of First Instance of Manila, dismissing her complaint for and 57512 of the Manila registry of deeds. 
partition, accounting, reconveyance and damages and holding,
as not subject to reserve troncal, the properties which her 1/21st of the properties covered by TCT Nos.
mother Filomena Races inherited in 1943 from Filomena 48164, 84714, 48201, 48202, 48205, 48203,
Legarda (Civil Case No. 73335). The facts are as follows:  48206, 48160 and 48192 of the Manila registry of
deeds; 
Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y
Tuason, died [Manila] on June 17, 1933. He was survived by his 1/21st of the property described in TCT No. 4475
widow, Filomena Races, and their seven children: four of the registry of deeds of Rizal, now Quezon City;
daughters named Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa and Filomena and 1/14th of the property described in TCT No. 966 of
three sons named Benito, Alejandro and Jose.  the registry of deeds of Baguio; 

On July 12, 1939, the real properties left by Benito Legarda y 1/7th of the lot and improvements at 127 Aviles
Tuason were partitioned in three equal portions by his described in TCT No. 41862 of the Manila registry
daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased of deeds; 1/7th of the lots and improvements at
son Benito Legarda y De la Paz who were represented by 181 San Rafael describe in TCT Nos. 50495 and
Benito F. Legarda.  48161 of the Manila registry of deeds; 

Filomena Legarda y Races died intestate and without issue on 1/7th of the property described in TCT No. 48163
March 19, 1943. Her sole heiress was her mother, Filomena of the Manila registry of deeds (Streets); 
Races Vda. de Legarda. 
l/21st of the properties described in TCT Nos.
Mrs. Legarda executed on May 12, 1947 an affidavit 48199 and 57551 of the Manila registry of deeds
adjudicating extrajudicially to herself the properties which she (Streets and Estero): 
inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena Legarda. The
said properties consist of the following: 1äwphï1.ñët 2/21st of the property described in TCT No. 13458
of tile registry of deeds of T0ayabas. 
(a) Savings deposit in the National City Bank of
New York with a credit balance of P3,699.63.  These are the properties in litigation in this case. As a result of
the affidavit of adjudication, Filomena Races succeeded her
deceased daughter Filomena Legarda as co-owner of the y Tuason which the children inherited in representation of their
properties held proindiviso by her other six children. father, Benito Legarda y De la Paz. 

Mrs. Legarda on March 6, 1953 executed two handwritten Mrs. Legarda died on September 22, 1967. Her will was
Identical documents wherein she disposed of the properties, admitted to probate as a holographic will in the order dated July
which she inherited from her daughter, in favor of the children of 16, 1968 of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special
her sons, Benito, Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildren in Proceeding No. 70878, Testate Estate of Filomena Races Vda.
all). The document reads: 1äwphï1.ñët de Legarda. The decree of probate was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals in Legarda vs. Gonzales, CA-G.R. No. 43480-R, July
A mis hijos :  30,1976. 

Dispongo que se reparta a todos mis nietos hijos In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter
de Ben, Mandu y Pepito, los bienes que he of the testatrix, filed on May 20, 1968 a motion to exclude from
heredado de mi difunta hija Filomena y tambien the inventory of her mother's estate the properties which she
los acciones de la Destileria La Rosario' inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena, on the ground
recientemente comprada a los hermanos Values that said properties are reservable properties which should be
Legarda.  inherited by Filomena Legarda's three sisters and three brothers
and not by the children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all
De los bienes de mi hija Filomena se deducira un surnamed Legarda. That motion was opposed by the
tote de terreno que yo he 0donada a las Hijas de administrator, Benito F. Legarda. 
Jesus, en Guipit 
Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Mrs. Gonzales
La case No. 181 San Rafael, la cede a mi hijo filed on June 20, 1968 an ordinary civil action against her
Mandu solo la casa; proque ella esta construida brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and her mother's estate
sobre terreno de los hermanos Legarda for the purpose of securing a declaration that the said properties
Races. 1äwphï1.ñët are reservable properties which Mrs. Legarda could not
bequeath in her holographic will to her grandchildren to the
(Sgd.) exclusion of her three daughters and her three sons (See Paz
FILOMEN vs. Madrigal, 100 Phil. 1085). 
A ROCES
LEGARD As already stated, the lower court dismissed the action of Mrs.
A  Gonzales. ln this appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 she
contends in her six assignments of error that the lower court
6 Marzo 1953  erred in not regarding the properties in question as reservable
properties under article 891 of the Civil Code. 
During the period from July, 1958 to February, 1959 Mrs.
Legarda and her six surviving children partitioned the properties On the other hand, defendants-appellees in their six counter-
consisting of the one-third share in the estate of Benito Legarda assignments of error contend that the lower court erred in not
holding that Mrs. Legarda acquired the estate of her daughter
Filomena] Legarda in exchange for her conjugal and hereditary this case of the doctrine in the Florentino case and other
shares in the estate of her husband Benito Legarda y De la Paz pertinent rulings, it may be useful to make a brief discourse on
and in not holding that Mrs. Gonzales waived her right to the the nature of reserve troncal, also called lineal, familiar,
reservable properties and that her claim is barred by estoppel, extraordinaria o semi-troncal. 
laches and prescription. 
Much time, effort and energy were spent by the parties in their
The preliminary issue raised by the private respondents as to five briefs in descanting on the nature of reserve troncal which
the timeliness of Mrs. Gonzales' petition for review is a closed together with the reserva viudal and reversion legal, was
matter. This Court in its resolution of December 16, 1971 denied abolished by the Code Commission to prevent the decedent's
respondents' motion to dismiss and gave due course to the estate from being entailed, to eliminate the uncertainty in
petition for review.  ownership caused by the reservation (which uncertainty
impedes the improvement of the reservable property) and to
In an appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 only legal issues can discourage the confinement of property within a certain family
be raised under undisputed facts. Since on the basis of the for generations which situation allegedly leads to economic
stipulated facts the lower court resolved only the issue of oligarchy, and is incompatible with the socialization of
whether the properties in question are subject to reserva ownership. 
troncal that is the only legal issue to be resolved in this appeal. 
The Code Commission regarded the reservas as remnants of
The other issues raised by the defendants-appellees, feudalism which fomented agrarian unrest. Moreover,
particularly those involving factual matters, cannot be resolved the reserves, insofar as they penalize legitimate relationship, is
in this appeal. As the trial court did not pass upon those issues, considered unjust and inequitable. 
there is no ruling which can be reviewed by this Court. 
However, the lawmaking body, not agreeing entirely with the
The question is whether the disputed properties are reservable Code Commission, restored the reserve troncal, a legal
properties under article 891 of the Civil Code, formerly article institution which, according to Manresa and Castan Tobenas
811, and whether Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda could has provoked questions and doubts that are difficult to resolve. 
dispose of them in his will in favor of her grandchildren to the
exclusion of her six children.  Reserva troncal is provided for in article 811 of the Spanish Civil
Code, now article 891, which reads: 1äwphï1.ñët
Did Mrs. Legarda have the right to convey mortis causa what
she inherited from her daughter Filomena to the reservees ART. 811. El ascendiente que heredare de su
within the third degree and to bypass the reservees in descendiente bienes que este hubiese adquirido
the second degree or should that inheritance automatically go to por titulo lucrative de otro ascendiente, o de un
the reservees in the second degree, the six children of Mrs. hermano, se halla obligado a reservas los que
Legarda? hubiere adquirido por ministerio de la ley en favor
de los parientes que eaten dentro del tercer grade
As will hereinafter be shown that is not a novel issue or a y pertenezcan a la linea de donde los bienes
question of first impression. lt was resolved in Florentino vs. proceden 
Florentino, 40 Phil. 480. Before discussing the applicability to
 ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his The persons involved in reserve troncal are (1) the ascendant or
descendant any property which the latter may brother or sister from whom the property was received by the
have acquired by gratuitous title from another descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title, (2) the descendant
ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to or prepositus (prepositus) who received the property, (3) the
reserve such property as he may have acquired by reservor (reservista) the other ascendant who obtained the
operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are property from the (prepositus) by operation of law and (4) the
within the third degree and who belong to the line reserves (reservatario) who is within the third degree from
from which said property came.  the prepositus and who belongs to the (line o tronco) from which
the property came and for whom the property should be
In reserve troncal (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by reserved by the reservor. 
gratuitous title property from an ascendant or from a brother or
sister; (2) the same property is inherited by another ascendant The reservees may be half-brothers and sisters (Rodriguez vs.
or is acquired by him by operation of law from the said Rodriguez, 101 Phil. 1098; Chua vs. Court of First Instance of
descendant, and (3) the said ascendant should reserve the said Negros Occidental, L-29901, August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA 412).
property for the benefit of relatives who are within the third Fourth degree relatives are not included (Jardin vs. Villamayor,
degree from the deceased descendant (prepositus) and who 72 Phil. 392). 
belong to the line from which the said property came. 
The rationale of reserve troncal is to avoid "el peligro de que
So, three transmissions are involved: (I) a first transmission by bienes poseidos secularmente por una familia pasen
lucrative title (inheritance or donation) from an ascendant or bruscamente a titulo gratuito a manos extrañas por el azar de
brother or sister to the deceased descendant; (2) a posterior los enlaces y muertes prematuras or impeder que, por un azar
transmission, by operation of law (intestate succession or de la vide personas extranas a una familia puedan adquirir
legitime) from the deceased descendant (causante de la bienes que sin aquel hubieran quedado en ella (6 Castan
reserve) in favor of another ascendant, the reservor Tobenas Derecho Civil, Part l, 6th Ed., 1980, p. 203; Padura vs.
or reservista, which two transmissions precede the reservation, Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065). 
and (3) a third transmissions of the same property (in
consequence of the reservation) from the reservor to the An illustration of reserve troncal is found in Edroso vs. Sablan,
reservees (reservatarios) or the relatives within the third degree 25 Phil. 295. ln that case, Pedro Sablan inherited two parcels of
from the deceased descendant belonging to the line of the first land from his father Victorians. Pedro died in 1902, single and
ascendant, brother or sister of the deceased descendant (6 without issue. His mother, Marcelina Edroso, inherited from him
Castan Tobenas Derecho Civil, Part l, 1960, 6th Ed., pp. 198-9). the two parcels of land. 

If there are only two transmissions there is no reserve. Thus, It was held that the land was reservable property in the hands of
where one Bonifacia Lacerna died and her properties were Marcelina. The reservees were Pablo Sablan and Basilio
inherited by her son, Juan Marbebe, upon the death of Juan, Sablan, the paternal uncles of Pedro Sablan, the prepositus.
those lands should be inherited by his half-sister, to the Marcelina could register the land under the Torrens system in
exclusion of his maternal first cousins. The said lands are not her name but the fact that the land was reservable property in
reservable property within the meaning of article 811 (Lacerna favor of her two brothers-in-law, should they survive her, should
vs. Vda. de Corcino, l l l Phil. 872).  be noted in the title. 
In another case, it appears that Maria Aglibot died intestate in because representation is confined to relatives within the third
1906. Her one-half share of a parcel of conjugal land was degree (Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480). 
inherited by her daughter, Juliana Mañalac. When Juliana died
intestate in 1920, said one-half share was inherited by her Within the third degree, the nearest relatives exclude the more
father, Anacleto Mañalac who owned the other one-half portion.  remote subject to the rule of representation. But the
representative should be within the third degree from
Anacleto died intestate in 1942, survived by his second wife and the prepositus (Padura vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065). 
their six children. lt was held that the said one-half portion was
reservable property in the hands of Anacleto Mañalac and, upon Reserva troncal contemplates legitimate relationship.
his death, should be inherited by Leona Aglibot and Evarista illegitimate relationship and relationship by affinity are excluded. 
Aglibot, sisters of Maria and materna aunts of Juliana Mañalac,
who belonged to the line from which said one-half portion came Gratuitous title or titulo lucrativo refers to a transmission
(Aglibot vs. Mañalac 114 Phil. 964).  wherein the recipient gives nothing in return such as donacion
and succession (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 189-190,
Other illustrations of reserva troncal are found in Florentino vs citing 6 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., 195 l, p. 360). 
Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; Nieva and Alcala vs. Alcala and
Deocampo, 41 Phil. 915; Maghirang and Gutierrez vs. The reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the
Balcita 46 Phil. 551; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Dizon vs. death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival,
Galang, 48 Phil. 601; Riosa vs. Rocha, 48 Phil. 737; Centeno at the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree
vs. Centeno 52 Phil. 322; Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. belonging to the line from which the property came 
89; Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279; Fallorfina vs. (Sienes vs. E Esparcia l l l Phil. 349, 353). 
Abille, CA 39 O.G. 1784. 
The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable
The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the property but subject to the resolutory condition that such title is
descendant, or the one at the end of the line from which the extinguished if the reservor predeceased the reservee. The
property came and upon whom the property last revolved by reservor is a usufructuary of the reservable property. He may
descent. He is called the prepositus(Cabardo vs. Villanueva. 44 alienate it subject to the reservation. The transferee gets the
Phil. 186, 190).  revocable and conditional ownership of the reservor. The
transferee's rights are revoked upon the survival of the
In the Cabardo case, one Cornelia Abordo inherited property reservees at the time of the death of the reservor but become
from her mother, Basilia Cabardo. When Cornelia died, her indefeasible when the reservees predecease the reservor.
estate passed to her father, Lorenzo Abordo. ln his hands, the (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25
property was reservable property. Upon the death of Lorenzo, Phil. 295; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Florentino vs.
the person entitled to the property was Rosa Cabardo, a Florentino, 40 Phil. 480: Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil.
maternal aunt of Cornelia, who was her nearest relative within 279.) 
the third degree. 
The reservor's title has been compared with that of the vendee
First cousins of the prepositus are in the fourth degree and are a retro in a pacta de retro sale or to a fideicomiso conditional. 
not reservees. They cannot even represent their parents
The reservor's alienation of the reservable property is subject to than interest in the reservable property. (J. J. B. L.
a resolutory condition, meaning that if at the time of the Reyes in Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l5.) 
reservor's death, there are reservees, the transferee of the
property should deliver it to the reservees. lf there are no Even during the reservista's lifetime,
reservees at the time of the reservor's death, the transferee's the reservatarios, who are the ultimate acquirers of
title would become absolute. (Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; the property, can already assert the right to
Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944; Mono vs. Nequia 93 Phil. prevent the reservista from doing anything that
120).  might frustrate their reversionary right, and, for this
purpose, they can compel the annotation of their
On the other hand, the reserves has only an inchoate, expectant right in the registry of property even while the
or contingent right. His expectant right would disappear if he (reservista) is alive (Ley Hipotecaria de Ultramar,
predeceased the reservor. lt would become absolute should the Arts. 168, 199; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295). 
reservor predecease the reserves. 
This right is incompatible with the mere
The reserves cannot impugn any conveyance made by the expectancy that corresponds to the natural heirs of
reservor but he can require that the reservable character of the the reservista lt is likewise clear that the
property be recognized by the purchaser (Riosa vs. Rocha 48 reservable property is no part of the estate of the
Phil. 737; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295, 312-3; Gueco vs. reservista who may not dispose of them (it) by will,
Lacson, 118 Phil. 944).  so long as there are reservatarios existing (Arroyo
vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 226, 237).
There is a holding that the renunciation of the reservee's right to
the reservable property is illegal for being a contract regarding The latter, therefore, do not inherit from
future inheritance (Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89, 96).  the reservista but from the descendant
(prepositus) of whom the reservatarios are the
And there is a dictum that the reservee's right is a real right heirs mortis causa, subject to the condition that
which he may alienate and dispose of conditionally. The they must survive the reservista. (Sanchez
condition is that the alienation shall transfer ownership to the Roman, Vol. VI Tomo 2, p. 286; Manresa,
vendee only if and when the reserves survives the reservor Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310, cited
(Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353). 1äwphï1.ñët by J. J.B.L. Reyes in Padura vs. Baldovino, L-
11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065). 
The reservatario receives the property as a
conditional heir of the descendant (prepositus) Hence, upon the reservista's death, the reservatario nearest to
said property merely reverting to the line of origin the prepositus becomes, "automatically and by operation of law,
from which it had temporarily and accidentally the owner of the reservable property." (Cane vs. Director of
stayed during the reservista's lifetime. The Lands, 105 Phil. l5.) 
authorities are all agreed that there being
reservatarios that survive the reservists, the latter In the instant case, the properties in question were indubitably
must be deemed to have enjoyed no more than a reservable properties in the hands of Mrs. Legarda.
Undoubtedly, she was a reservor. The reservation became a
certainty when at the time of her death the reservees or relatives We have stated earlier that this case is governed by the doctrine
within the third degree of the prepositus Filomena Legarda were of Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, a similar case, where it
living or they survived Mrs. Legarda.  was ruled: 1äwphï1.ñët

So, the ultimate issue in this case is whether Mrs. Legarda, as Reservable property left, through a will or
reservor, could convey the reservable properties by will otherwise, by the death of ascendant (reservista)
or mortis causa to the reservees within the third degree (her together with his own property in favor of another
sixteen grandchildren) to the exclusion of the reservees in of his descendants as forced heir, forms no part of
the second degree, her three daughters and three sons. As the latter's lawful inheritance nor of the legitime,
indicated at the outset, that issue is already res judicata or cosa for the reason that, as said property continued to
juzgada.  be reservable, the heir receiving the same as an
inheritance from his ascendant has the strict
We hold that Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic obligation of its delivery to the relatives, within the
will to her sixteen grandchildren the reservable properties which third degree, of the predecessor in interest
she had inherited from her daughter Filomena because the (prepositus), without prejudicing the right of the
reservable properties did not form part of her estate (Cabardo heir to an aliquot part of the property, if he has at
vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 191). The reservor cannot make a the same time the right of
disposition mortis causa of the reservable properties as long as a reservatario (reserves). 
the reservees survived the reservor. 
ln the Florentino case, it appears that Apolonio Florentino II and
As repeatedly held in the Cano and Padura cases, the his second wife Severina Faz de Leon begot two children,
reservees inherit the reservable properties from Mercedes and Apolonio III. These two inherited properties from
the prepositus, not from the reservor.  their father. Upon Apolonio III death in 1891, his properties were
inherited by his mother, Severina, who died in 1908. ln her will,
Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties she instituted her daughter Mercedes as heiress to all her
should be inherited by all the nearest relatives within the third properties, including those coming from her deceased husband
degree from the prepositus who in this case are the six children through their son, Apolonio III. 
of Mrs. Legarda. She could not select the reservees to whom
the reservable property should be given and deprive the other The surviving children, begotten by Apolonio II with his first wife
reservees of their share therein.  Antonia Faz de Leon and the descendants of the deceased
children of his first marriage, sued Mercedes Florentino for the
To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary recovery of their share in the reservable properties, which
disposition of the reservable properties in favor of the reservees Severina de Leon had inherited from Apolonio III which the latter
in the third degree and, consequently, to ignore the reservees in had inherited from his father Apolonio II and which Severina
the second degree would be a glaring violation of article 891. willed to her daughter Mercedes. 
That testamentary disposition cannot be allowed. 
Plaintiff's theory was that the said properties, as reservable
properties, could not be disposed of in Severina's will in favor of
Mercedes only. That theory was sustained by this Court. 
It was held that the said properties, being reservable properties, daughter, a full-blood sister of the prepositus and ignored the
did not form part of Severina's estate and could not be inherited other six reservors, the relatives of the half-blood of
from her by her daughter Mercedes alone.  the prepositus. 

As there were seven reservees, Mercedes was entitled, as a In rejecting that contention, this Court held that the reservable
reserves, to one-seventh of the properties. The other six property bequeathed by the reservor to her daughter does not
sevenths portions were adjudicated to the other six reservees.  form part of the reservor's estate nor of the daughter's estate but
should be given to all the seven reservees or nearest relatives
Under the rule of stare decisis et non quieta movere, we are of the prepositus within the third degree. 
bound to follow in this case the doctrine of the Florentino case.
That doctrine means that as long as during the reservor's This Court noted that, while it is true that by giving the
lifetime and upon his death there are relatives within the third reservable property to only one reserves it did not pass into the
degree of the prepositus regardless of whether those reservees hands of strangers, nevertheless, it is likewise true that the
are common descendants of the reservor and the ascendant heiress of the reservor was only one of the reservees and there
from whom the property came, the property retains its is no reason founded upon law and justice why the other
reservable character. The property should go to the nearest reservees should be deprived of their shares in the reservable
reservees. The reservor cannot, by means of his will, choose property (pp. 894-5). 
the reserves to whom the reservable property should be
awarded.  Applying that doctrine to this case, it results that Mrs. Legarda
could not dispose of in her will the properties in question even if
The alleged opinion of Sanchez Roman that there is no reserva the disposition is in favor of the relatives within the third degree
troncal when the only relatives within the third degree are the from Filomena Legarda. The said properties, by operation of
common descendants of the predeceased ascendant and the Article 891, should go to Mrs. Legarda's six children as
ascendant who would be obliged to reserve is irrelevant and reservees within the second degree from Filomena Legarda. 
sans binding force in the light of the ruling in
the Florentino case.  It should be repeated that the reservees do not inherit from the
reservor but from the reservor but from the prepositus, of whom
It is contended by the appellees herein that the properties in the reservees are the heirs mortis causa subject to the condition
question are not reservable properties because only relatives that they must survive the reservor (Padura vs. Baldovino, L-
within the third degree from the paternal line have survived and 11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065). 
that when Mrs. Legarda willed the said properties to her sixteen
grandchildren, who are third-degree relatives of Filomena The trial court said that the disputed properties lost their
Legarda and who belong to the paternal line, the reason for reservable character due to the non-existence of third-degree
the reserva troncal has been satisfied: "to prevent persons relatives of Filomena Legarda at the time of the death of the
outside a family from securing, by some special accident of life, reservor, Mrs. Legarda, belonging to the Legarda family, "except
property that would otherwise have remained therein".  third-degree relatives who pertain to both" the Legarda and
Races lines. 
That same contention was advanced in the Florentino case
where the reservor willed the reservable properties to her
That holding is erroneous. The reservation could have been
extinguished only by the absence of reservees at the time of
Mrs. Legarda's death. Since at the time of her death, there were
(and still are) reservees belonging to the second and third
degrees, the disputed properties did not lose their reservable
character. The disposition of the said properties should be made
in accordance with article 891 or the rule on reserva troncal and
not in accordance with the reservor's holographic will. The said
properties did not form part of Mrs. Legarda's estate. (Cane vs.
Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l, 4). 

WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set

aside. lt is hereby adjudged that the properties inherited by
Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda from her daughter Filomena
Legarda, with all the fruits and accessions thereof, are
reservable properties which belong to Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa,
Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda y Roces, as
reservees. The shares of Rosario L. Valdes and Benito F.
Legarda, who died in 1969 and 1973, respectively, should
pertain to their respective heirs. Costs against the private
respondents. 

SO ORDERED.