CASE NO: 10-R

;
UILS CHANDIGARH UNIVERSITY MOOT COURT PRACTICAL 2022

IN THE HON’BLE COURT OF DISTRICT

COURT SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE

IN THE PROCEEDINGS BETWEEN

NAMBIYANDAN SUBRAMANIYAM PLAINTIFF

VERSUS
A & O TATNEFT DEFENDANT

DRAWN AND FILED BY

COUNSELS APPEARING ON BEHALF
THE PLAINTIFF

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

CONTENT PAGE NO.

1) LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .......................................................3
2) INDEX OF AUTHORITIES......................................................... 4
3) STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION.............................................. 7
4) STATEMENT OF FACTS........................................................... 8
5) ISSUES RAISED........................................................................ 9
6) SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS................................................. 10
7) ARGUMENTS ADVANCED...................................................... 12
I)WHETHER THIS ISSUE IS SUBJECT TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF
DELHI.
II)WHETHER THE ADVERTISEMENT AMOUNTS TO AN OFFER OR NOT.
III)WHETHER THE PROPOSAL MADE BY THE PLAINTIFF RESULTED IN A CONTRACT OR NOT.
IV)WHETHER THE ADVERTISEMENT, IF CONSIDERED AN OFFER, WAS REVOKED OR NOT.

8) PRAYER................................................................................... 18

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 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

& AND
AIR ALL INDIA REPORTER
CPC CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
Edn. EDITION
Eg. EXAMPLE
H.C HIGH COURT
HON’BLE HONORABLE
i.e. THAT IS
Ori ORISSA HIGH COURT
SC SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
SCC SUPREME COURT CASES
V. VERSUS

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 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

A) PRIMARY SOURCES

STATUTES REFERRED

Indian Contract Act, 1872

Civil Procedure Code, 1908

Delhi High Court Act, 1966

Delhi High Court (Amendment) Act, 2015

SUPREME COURT JUDGMENTS

1) Col. D.I. McPherson v M.N. Appanna, AIR 1951 SC 184.

2) Banwari Lal v Sukhdarshan Dayal, (1973) 1 SCC 294.

3) CWT V Abdul Hussain Mulla Muhammad Ali, (1988) 3 SCC 562

HIGH COURT JUDGEMENTS

1) Adikanda Biswal v Bhubaneshwar Development Authority, AIR 2006 Ori 36

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 FOREIGN COURTS JUDGEMENTS

1) Weeks v Tybald, 1605 Noy: 74 ER 982.

2) Harvey v Facey, 1893 AC 552.

3) Balfour v Balfour, (1919) 2 KB 571.

4) Jones v Padvatton, (1969) 1 WLR 328(CA).

5) Merritt v Merrit, (1970) 1 WLR 211 (CA).

6) Entores Ltd v Miles Far East Corporation, (1955) 2 QB 327

7) Newcomb v De Roos, (1859) 2 E&E 271

8) Weeks v Tybald, 1605 Noy: 74 ER 982.

9) Harvey v Facey, 1893 AC 552.

10) Balfour v Balfour, (1919) 2 KB 571.

11) Jones v Padvatton, (1969) 1 WLR 328(CA).

12) Merritt v Merrit, (1970) 1 WLR 211 (CA).

13) Entores Ltd v Miles Far East Corporation, (1955) 2 QB 327

14) Newcomb v De Roos, (1859) 2 E&E 27

B) SECONDARY SOURCES

BOOKS REFERRED

1) Avtar Singh, Contract & Specific Relief (Eastern Book Company, Twelfth Edition)

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 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, states:

9. Courts to try all civil suits unless barred.
The Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a
civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred.
1 [Explanation I].- A suit in which the right to property or to an office is contested is a suit of a
civil nature, notwithstanding that such right may depend entirely on the decision of questions as
to religious rites or ceremonies.
2 [Explanation ll].- For the purposes of this section, it is immaterial whether or not any fees are
attached to the office referred to in Explanation I or whether or not such office is attached to a
particular place.

Section 5 of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966, states:

5) Jurisdiction of High Court.

(1) The High Court of Delhi shall have, in respect of the territories for the time being included in
the Union territory of Delhi all such original, appellate and other jurisdiction as, under the law in
force immediately before the appointed day, is exercisable in respect of the said territories by the
High Court of Punjab.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, the High Court of
Delhi shall also have in respect of the said territories ordinary original civil jurisdiction in every
suit the value of which exceeds [rupees five lakhs*].
*Section 2 of the Delhi High Court (Amendment) Act, 2015, states:
2. In sub-section (2) of section 5 of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966, for the words ‘‘rupees
twenty lakhs’’, the words ‘‘rupees two crore’’ shall be substituted.

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 STATEMENT OF FACTS

1) That the respondent above named bought ‘A & O Tatneft’.

2) That the respondent put an advertisement in the local paper saying that she
was willing to sell ten Doyle Silverfield motorbikes at a price of Rs.
20,00,000 instead of the retail price of Rs.50,00,000.

3) That the advertisement also stated that anyone who wanted the above
mentioned bike should contact the respondent in person at the shop of ‘A &
O Tatneft’ or email her at nallamuthukrishnan@A&OTatneft.co.in.

4) That this advertisement appeared in the paper ‘Hapkloph Times’ on

Saturday, 1st 2018.

5) That this advertisement was seen by the plaintiff at 14:17 on the same day
and sent an email ordering two of the bikes to the defendant.

6) That the defendant receives the email on her machine at 15:03 on Saturday.

7) That the defendant changed her mind about the discount and released a
notice in the paper on the next day stating that the discount price was no
longer subsisting.

8) That the paper was published at 08:13 and was delivered to the plaintiff at
10:07. The defendant begins business on the same Sunday. The email is read
by her at 10:50 and declines to sell the motorcycles stating that the discount
was no longer available.

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 ISSUES RAISED

WHETHER THIS ISSUE IS SUBJECT TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE

HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF DELHI.
II

WHETHER THE ADVERTISEMENT AMOUNTS TO AN OFFER OR NOT.

III

WHETHER THE PROPOSAL MADE BY THE PLAINTIFF RESULTED IN A

CONTRACT OR NOT.
IV

WHETHER THE ADVERTISEMENT, IF CONSIDERED AN OFFER, WAS

REVOKED OR NOT

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 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

WHETHER THIS ISSUE IS SUBJECT TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE HON’BLE HIGH

COURT OF DELHI.

The Hon’ble Court’s pecuniary jurisdiction is limited to lawsuits involving amount/

value of subject matter or damages claimed of Rs. 2 Crores and above. Thus, this
lawsuit, which involves a subject matter of Rs. 40 Lakhs, is not maintainable under
the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi.

II

WHETHER THE ADVERTISEMENT AMOUNTS TO AN OFFER OR NOT.

It is submitted that the advertisement was not an offer in itself, but was in effect
an instrument to invite offers from the public at large. The right of acceptance or
rejection of proposals lies with the defendant. If this advertisement is said to be
an offer, the proposer might be bound by innumerable contracts, if many parties
agree as to the conditions of the offer.

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 III

WHETHER THE PROPOSAL MADE BY THE PLAINTIFF RESULTED IN A CONTRACT

OR NOT.

The respondent, on receiving the offer made by the plaintiff, refuses to sell the
motorcycles, stating that the discounted price was no longer available, meaning a
contract had never arisen. She has not signified her assent, but in purpose shown
her disagreement with the reply email sent by her to the plaintiff.

IV

WHETHER THE ADVERTISEMENT, IF CONSIDERED AN OFFER, WAS REVOKED OR

NOT.

The defendant submits that the communication of revocation of the

advertisement was made on 10:07 on Sunday, when the newspaper was delivered
to the plaintiff, before the communication of acceptance was completed at 10:50,
as she had could have recalled her email. Also, in the case of instantaneous
communications, postal rules cannot apply, and as communication of revocation
of proposal occurred before the communication of acceptance, no contract was
formed

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 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

WHETHER THIS ISSUE IS SUBJECT TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT
OF DELHI.

The respondent humbly submits that this Hon’ble Court has no jurisdiction over this
issue as, according to Delhi High Court (Amendment) Act 2015:

2. In sub-section (2) of section 5 of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966, for the words
‘‘rupees twenty lakhs’’, the words ‘‘rupees two crore’’ shall be substituted.

The sub-section (2) of the Section 5 of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966, reads as:

5. Jurisdiction of High Court of Delhi—

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, the High
Court of Delhi shall also have in respect of the said territories ordinary original civil
jurisdiction in every suit the value of which exceeds [rupees five lakhs.]

Section 15 of the CPC, 1908, states:

“Every suit shall be instituted in the Court of the lowest grade competent to try it.”
Simply stating, this means that the Delhi H.C. shall have no original power to provide
judgment on a case where the subject matter’s value/ damages claimed is less than Rs. 2
Crores. The defendant thus argues that the lawsuit, where the value of the subject
matter is Rs.40 Lakhs, should preliminarily be tried in a district court by a District Judge
or Additional District Judge.

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 II

WHETHER THE ADVERTISEMENT AMOUNTS TO AN OFFER OR NOT.

The defendant submits that she issued an advertisement for the sale of 10 Doyle
Silverfield motorcycles dated 01.09.2018. However, quite opposite to the view of the
plaintiff, the advertisement was intended as an invitation to offer, not an offer in and by
itself. An offer has been defined in Sec. 2(a) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, as: “When
one person signifies to another his willingness to do or to abstain from doing anything,
with a view to obtaining the assent of that other to such act or abstinence, he is said to
make a proposal.” It was held in the case of Weeks v Tybald1 that an offer must be
made to a definite person. “It is not averred nor declared to whom the words were
spoken.” The problem was found that if an offer of this kind could be accepted by
several persons, the offeror would find himself bound by innumerable contracts. If this
is to be considered as an offer, the defendant will be bound by every person who fulfills
the terms of the contract. This is not feasible as she, in the advertisement, specified the
number of motorbikes she was willing to sell, i.e, 10. If she receives orders for more
than 10 Doyle Silverfields, she would still be bound by the contracts, but wouldn’t be
able to honor them. The basic distinction between an offer and an invitation to offer can
be perhaps learned from the important case of Harvey v Facey2 , where the telegram
informing the plaintiff about the lowest price of a property owned by the defendant was
held to be an invitation to treat. Another case very similar to this one is the Supreme
Court Case of Col. D.I. McPherson v M.N. Appanna3 . A landmark case where a
Development Authority announced allotment of plots on a first come first served basis
was held as an invitation to offer and the response to it an offer.

Furthermore, a prominent principle of law is that an “offer or an acceptance or its

acceptance should be made with the intention of creating a legal relationship.5 ” There
is no actual provision in the Indian Contract Act that requires legal intent as an essential
of a contract. However, prominent cases like Balfour v Balfour6 , Jones v Padvatton7 and
Merritt v Merritt8 have influenced Supreme Court decisions several times. In the
decision of Balfour v Balfour, Justice Atkin held that: “The defence to this action on the
alleged contract is that the defendant, the husband, entered into no contract with his
wife, and for the determination of that it is necessary to remember that there are
agreements between parties which do not result in contracts within the meaning of that
term in our law. The ordinary example is where two parties agree to take a walk
together, or where there is an offer and an acceptance of hospitality. Nobody would
suggest in ordinary circumstances that those agreements result in what we know as a
contract, and one of the most usual forms of agreement which does not constitute a
contract appears to me to be the arrangements which are made between husband and
wife. It is quite common, and it is the natural and inevitable result of the relationship of
husband and wife, that the two spouses should make arrangements between
themselves - agreements such as are in dispute in this action - agreements for
allowances, by which the husband agrees that he will pay to his wife a certain sum of
money, per week, or per month, or per year, to cover either her own expenses or the
necessary expenses of the household and of the children of the marriage, and in which
the wife promises either expressly or impliedly to apply the allowance for the purpose
for which it is given. To my mind those agreements, or many of them, do not result in
contracts at all, and they do not result in contracts even though there may be what as
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between other parties would constitute consideration for the agreement. The
consideration, as we know, may consist either in some right, interest, profit or benefit
accruing to one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or responsibility given,
suffered or undertaken by the other. That is a well-known definition, and it constantly
happens, I think, that such arrangements made between husband and wife are
arrangements in which there are mutual promises, or in which there is consideration in
form within the definition that I have mentioned. Nevertheless they are not contracts,
and they are not contracts because the parties did not intend that they should be
attended by legal consequences. To my mind it would be of the worst possible example
to hold that agreements such as this resulted in legal obligations which could be
enforced in the Courts. It would mean this, that when the husband makes his wife a
promise to give her an allowance of 30s. or 2l. a week, whatever he can afford to give
her, for the maintenance of the household and children, and she promises so to apply it,
not only could she sue him for his failure in any week to supply the allowance, but he
could sue her for non-performance of the obligation, express or implied, which she had
undertaken upon her part. All I can say is that the small Courts of this country would
have to be multiplied one hundredfold if these arrangements were held to result in legal
obligations. They are not sued upon, not because the parties are reluctant to enforce
their legal rights when the agreement is broken, but because the parties, in the
inception of the arrangement, never intended that they should be sued upon.
Agreements such as these are outside the realm of contracts altogether. The common
law does not regulate the form of agreements between spouses. Their promises are not
sealed with seals and sealing wax. The consideration that really obtains for them is that
natural love and affection which counts for so little in these cold Courts. The terms may
be repudiated, varied or renewed as performance proceeds or as disagreements
develop, and the principles of the common law as to exoneration and discharge and
accord and satisfaction are such as find no place in the domestic code. The parties
themselves are advocates, judges, Courts, sheriff's officer and reporter. In respect of
these promises each house is a domain into which the King's writ does not seek to run,
and to which his officers do not seek to be admitted. The only question in this case is
whether or not this promise was of such a class or not. For the reasons given by my
brethren it appears to me to be plainly established that the promise here was not
intended by either party to be attended by legal consequences. I think the onus was
upon the plaintiff, and the plaintiff has not established any contract. The parties were
living together, the wife intending to return. The suggestion is that the husband bound
himself to pay 30l. a month under all circumstances, and she found herself to be
satisfied with that sum under all circumstances, and, although she was in ill-health and
alone in this country, that out of that sum she undertook to defray the whole of the
medical expenses that might fall upon her, whatever might be the development of her
illness, and in whatever expenses it might involve her. To my mind neither party
contemplated such a result. I think that the parole evidence upon which the case turns
does not establish a contract. I think that the letters do not evidence such a contract, or
amplify the oral evidence which was given by the wife, which is not in dispute. For these
reasons I think the judgment of the Court below was wrong and that this appeal should
be allowed.” In the case of Banwari Lal v Sukhdarshan Dayal9 , where a loudspeaker was
used to state the terms and statements of the sale, this principle was the basis of the
decision of the court. Justice Chandrachud said: “Microphones… have not yet acquired
notoriety as carriers of binding representations. Promises held out over loudspeakers
are often claptraps of politics. In the instant case, the announcement was, if at all, a
puffing up of property put up for sale.” In another relevant case, the Supreme Court
noted the presence of a third contractual element other than the agreement and
consideration; the intention of the parties to create legal relations, and its acceptance in
English Law.10 Thus, legal intention is an essential of a contract, and without it, the

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plaintiff’s advertisement cannot be said to be a proposal, and will only be concluded as
an invitation to treat.

III

WHETHER THE PROPOSAL MADE BY THE PLAINTIFF RESULTED IN A CONTRACT OR

NOT.

The respondent submits that there formed no contract between the plaintiff and the
defendant, as there never occurred an acceptance of the proposal of the plaintiff by the
defendant. For a contract to exist there must be an offer and its acceptance. Sec. 2(b) of
the Indian Contract Act, 1872, has defined acceptance of a proposal as: “When the
person to whom the proposal is made signifies his assent thereto, the proposal is said to
be accepted. A proposal, when accepted, becomes a promise.”
As argued beforehand, the discount price issued by the defendant is to be treated as an
invitation to offer. Resultantly, the order placed by the plaintiff through an email is an
offer to buy the motorbikes. The plaintiff, however, realized that the discount was far
too much and she was bearing heavy losses, and issued a notice of withdrawal of the
discount on Sunday. When the offer was received by the defendant the same day, she
declined his offer replying the discount was no longer available. Clearly, it is within the
rights of the defendant to deny selling the plaintiff the bikes. She has not signified
anything that may be mistaken for an acceptance, whether implied or overt. She shows
her dissent through her reply email. This is similar to the case of Harvey v Facey11. The
judgment by Lord Morris was as follows: “Their Lordships cannot treat the telegram
from L. M. Facey as binding him in any respect, except to the extent it does by its terms,
viz., the lowest price. Everything else is left open, and the reply telegram from the
appellants cannot be treated as an acceptance of an offer to sell to them; it is an offer
that required to be accepted by L. M. Facey. The contract could only be completed if L.
M. Facey had accepted the appellant's last telegram. It has been submitted for the
appellants that L. M. Facey's telegram should be read as saying “yes” to the first
question put in the appellants' telegram, but there is nothing to support that
contention.” Thus, due to the fact that the defendant never accepted the offer of the
plaintiff, no contract will be said to have formed.

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 IV

WHETHER THE ADVERTISEMENT, IF CONSIDERED AN OFFER, WAS REVOKED OR NOT.

The defendant humbly submits that even if it is considered that the advertisement
issued by the defendant amounts to an offer, and not an invitation to offer, assuming
arguendo, the same was revoked before it could be fully accepted “The communication
of an acceptance is completei) as against the proposer, when it is put in a course of
transmission to him so at to be out of the power of the acceptor; ii) as against the
acceptor, when it comes to the knowledge of the proposer. The communication of a
revocation is completei) as against the person who makes it, when it is put into a course
of transmission to the person to whom it is made, so as to be out of the power of the
person who makes it; ii) as against the person to whom it is made, when it comes to his
knowledge.” There is no separate legislation governing online contracts. Thus, going by
this law, the acceptance is said to complete when ‘it is put in a course of transmission’
to the defendant, so as to be out of the power of the plaintiff. However, the sent email
is not ”put into a course of transmission to the person to whom it is made, so as to be
out of the power of the person who makes it”, as an email can be recalled or deleted,
like in Gmail & Outlook, before the receiver has viewed the said email. Hence, it is still
within the power of the plaintiff to recall the order. Thus, acceptance is completed when
the defendant views the plaintiff’s email, i.e., at 10:50. However, before this could be
completed, the revocation of the ‘assumed offer’ takes place on the same day when the
notice of the discount being called off in the newspaper is delivered to the plaintiff at
10:07. Therefore, the ‘offer’ stands revoked. A landmark case in English Court of Appeal,
Entores Ltd v Miles Far East Corporation12 , Justice Denning held that in a case of
instantaneous communication, in this case, telex, the postal rule cannot apply. His
judgment is as follows: “The problem can only be solved by going in stages. Let me first
consider a case where two people make a contract by word of mouth in the presence of
one another. Suppose, for instance, that I shout an offer to a man across a river or a
courtyard but I do not hear his reply because it is drowned by an aircraft flying
overhead. There is no contract at that moment. If he wishes To make a contract, he
must wait till the aircraft is gone and then shout back his acceptance so that I can hear
what he says. Not until I have his answer am I bound. I do not agree with the
observations of Hill J in Newcomb v De Roos.13 Now take a case where two people
make a contract by telephone. Suppose, for instance, that I make an offer to a man by
telephone and, in the middle of his reply, the line goes "dead" so that I do not hear his
words of acceptance. There is no contract at that moment. The other man may not
know the precise moment when the line failed. But he will know that the telephone
conversation was abruptly broken off: because people usually say something to signify
the end of the conversation. If he wishes to make a contract, he must therefore get
through again so as to make sure that I heard. Suppose next, that the line does not go
dead, but it is nevertheless so indistinct that I do not catch what he says and I ask him to
repeat it. He then repeats it and I hear his acceptance. The contract is made, not on the
first time when I do not hear, but only the second time when I do hear. If he does not
repeat it, there is no contract. The contract is only complete when I have his answer

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accepting the offer. Lastly, take the Telex. Suppose a clerk in a London office taps out on
the teleprinter an offer which is immediately recorded on a teleprinter in a Manchester
office, and a clerk at that end taps out an acceptance. If the line goes dead in the middle
of the sentence of acceptance, the teleprinter motor will stop. There is then obviously
no contract. The clerk at Manchester must get through again and send his complete
sentence. But it may happen that the line does not go dead, yet the message does not
get through to London. Thus the clerk at Manchester may tap out his message of
acceptance and it will not be recorded in London because the ink at the London end
fails, or something of that kind. In that case, the Manchester clerk will not know of the
failure but the London clerk will know of it and will immediately send back a message
"not receiving." Then, when the fault is rectified, the Manchester clerk will repeat his
message. Only then is there a contract. If he does not repeat it, there is no contract. It is
not until his message is received that the contract is complete. In all the instances I have
taken so far, the man who sends the message of acceptance knows that it has not been
received or he has reason to know it. So he must repeat it. But, suppose that he does
not know that his message did not get home. He thinks it has. This may happen if the
listener on the telephone does not catch the words of acceptance, but nevertheless
does not trouble to ask for them to be repeated: or the ink on the teleprinter fails at the
receiving end, but the clerk does not ask for the message to be repeated: so that the
man who sends an acceptance reasonably believes that his message has been received.
The offeror in such circumstances is clearly bound, because he will be estopped from
saying that he did not receive the message of acceptance. It is his own fault that he did
not get it. But if there should be a case where the offeror without any fault on his part
does not receive the message of acceptance - yet the sender of it reasonably believes it
has got home when it has not - then I think there is no contract. My conclusion is, that
the rule about instantaneous communications between the parties is different from the
rule about the post. The contract is only complete when the acceptance is received by
the offeror: and the contract is made at the place where the acceptance is received.” If
this precedent is to be followed, the contract should have been completed at 10:50 on
Sunday, where the acceptance was duly received by the defendant, but the notice of
revocation was delivered to the plaintiff at 10:07, thereby successfully resulting in a
successful revocation of the ‘offer’ before a contract could have arisen. Hence, for the
above stated reasons, the ‘offer’ made by the defendant will stand revoked.

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 PRAYER

Wherefore, in light of the facts stated, arguments advanced and authorities cited,
the Respondent humbly prays before this Hon’ble Court, to be graciously pleased
to:

1) Declare that no contract was ever formed between the parties.

2) Dismiss the suit.

AND/OR

Pass any other order that the Court may deem fit in light of Justice, Equity and
Good Conscience.

and for this kindness, the Plaintiff, as duty-bound as ever, shall humbly pray.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED
COUNSELS ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF

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