The Church and The Second Sex - Mary Daly

THE CHURCH AND
THE SECOND SEX

WITH A NEW FEMINIST
POSTCHRISTIAN INTRODUCTION
BY THE AUTHOR
MARY DALY
HARPER S' COLOPHON BOOKS / CN 375/$3.45

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the text of this book is printed

on 100% recycled paper
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MARY DALY
WITH A NEW FEMINIST

BY THE AUTHOR
HARPER COLOPHON BOOKS

Harper & Row, Publishers
New York, Evanston, San Francisco, London
THE church AND THE second SEX. Copyright © 1968. Preface and Introduc¬
tion copyright © 1975 by Mary Daly. Frontispiece copyright © 1975 by Emily
Culpepper. Printed in the United States of America. All rights reserved. No part
of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without
written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical
articles and reviews. For information address Harper & Row, Publishers, In¬
corporated, 10 East 53rd Street, New York, N.Y. 10022.
First harper COLOPHON edition 1975.

STANDARD BOOK NUMBER: 06-061375-9
This book is dedicated
to the memory of my
mother and my father
with love and
gratitude.
Contents
Autobiographical Preface to the Colophon Edition 5
Feminist Postchristian Introduction 15
Chapter One
The Case Against the Church 53
Chapter Two
History: A Record of Contradictions 74
Chapter Three
Winds of Change 118
Chapter Four
The Pedestal Peddlars 147
Chapter Five
The Demon of Sexual Prejudice: An Exercise in Exorcism 166
Chapter Six
Theological Roots of the Problem: Radical Surgery
Required 179
Chapter Seven
Toward Partnership: Some Modest Proposals 192
Conclusion
The Second Sex and the Seeds of Transcendence 220
Index 225
Acknowledgement
Quotations in Chapter One from Simone de Beauvoir, The

Second Sex, are from the English translation by H. M. Parshley,
published by Alfred A. Knopf Inc., New York, and Jonathan
Cape Ltd., London, and are used by permission.
4
Autobiographical Preface
to the Colophon Edition
The Church and the Second Sex was published in 1968, before
the cresting of the second wave of feminism. The writing began in
1965 in a small medieval city, Fribourg, Switzerland, where I lived
for seven years. It was completed in 1967 in Boston. Not counting
doctoral dissertations, it was my first book. It was written with a
great sense of pride, anger, and hope.
In 1971, after a brief, turbulent history, The Church and the
Second Sex went out of print. It formally died. I tried to "reason”
with the publisher that there was a demand for it, pointing out that
I had received many letters and telephone calls, especially from
women taking or teaching Feminist Studies, asking why the book
wasn’t available. But reason, as I had always understood the term,
had no effect upon the publishing house patriarchs, who refused to
move. So I moved on to other things, including a dramatic/trau¬
matic change of consciousness from "radical Catholic” to post-
christian feminist. My graduation from the Catholic church was
formalized by a self-conferred diploma, my second feminist book,
Beyond God the Bather: Toward a Philosophy of Women’s Libera¬
tion, which appeared in 1973.1 The journey in time/space that took
place between the publication dates of the two books could not be
described adequately by terrestrial calendars and maps. Experien-
tially, it was hardly even a mere trip to the moon, but more like
leap-frogging galaxies in a mind voyage to further and further stars.
Several woman-light years had separated me from The Church and
the Second Sex, whose author I sometimes have trouble recalling.
Then, in 1974, with the imponderable logic that characterizes the
Divinities of the Publishing World, its publishers informed me of
their celestial desire that the book appear on earth once again. O
Goddess: a Second Coming? Startled, I contemplated this new
revelation. The Divine Word had been spoken. Now, what response
should I give about this strange book and its strange author who
1 Published in Boston by Beacon Press.
5
6 THE CHURCH AND THE SECOND SEX
had inhabited a distant world? There was of course the biblical

answer: "Let it be done according to Thy Word.” However, to a
postchristian feminist that hardly seemed an appropriate response.
Therefore, I would have to devise some unique solution to the subtle
and intriguing problem posed by these Godfathers. What were the
possibilities? An updated, revised edition, perhaps? I went to my
bookcase and took the book off the shelf. Opening it with a sense of
reluctance, I felt as if this were the journal of a half-forgotten fore¬
mother, whose quaintness should be understood in historical context
and treated with appropriate respect.
Opening the book at random, I found myself in Chapter Seven,
"Toward Partnership: Some Modest Proposals.” I read a few pages
and discovered that the author was proposing that there be equality
between men and women in the Church (sic, with capital "C”).
Why, I wondered, would anyone want "equality” in the church? In
a statement that I had given to the press only three or four woman-
light years distant from now, I had explained that a woman’s asking
for equality in the church would be comparable to a black person’s
demanding equality in the Ku Klux Klan. How could the author of
this book have been so obtuse . . . ? But then, the publication
date was 1968 A.D. Flipping through a few pages, I noted that the
author had used the rather pompous editorial "we” instead of "I”
and had written "they” to refer to women, instead of "we.” Why
did she say "we” when she meant "I” and "they” when she meant
"we”? I noted with a sense of embarrassment for her that she used
the term "man” as if it were a generic term. I perceived that she had
hoped to reform Christianity. Clearly, it would be impossible to
"revise” this book in the year 1975 of feminist postchristian time/
space (hereafter referred to as A.F., which is to say Anno Femin-
arum)2.
2 The question naturally arose: why not begin renumbering the years, in¬
stead of merely using a numbering system which coincides with the A.D.
system? But the fact is that women have not entered feminist postchristian time/
space "all at once" en bloc with military precision. This is an important differ¬
ence between our time and the linear patriarchal time of "A.D.” I cannot assume
that there was one single or supreme moment of revelation in the past upon
which we must forever fix a backward gaze. Rather, since the women’s move¬
ment moves, its revelation moves. Women enter it freely, as unique selves. In¬
deed, some who are lodged in 1975 A.D. can be expected to move into 1975
A.F. Feminist time/space is on the boundary of patriarchal time and space. As
we are living now, the matter of numbering our time does not seem of central
significance, and so for the sake of convenience, and in order to communicate
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL.PREFACE TO COLOPHON EDITION 7
What to do? Since the Christian model of resignation to the will

of the Proprietor of the Word is dysfunctional in the year 1975
A.F., I considered simply refusing to allow this Second Coming of
The Church and the Second Sex. However, I hesitated at the prospect
of such a drastic refusal, partly because women continued to ask for
the book. Then another possibility occurred to me: let it become
incarnate again, with a new postchristian introduction by myself.
The advantages of this last option became apparent the longer I
reflected upon the dilemma posed by time warp. First, since the book
is a carefully researched historical record and since the material it
contains is difficult to obtain anywhere else, this Second Coming
would make the data available again for those engaged in Feminist
Studies. Second, the book itself is now part of women’s history, and
as such it is revealing. It represents a stage of thought, feelings, hope,
politics that can now be reflected upon from the perspective of new
feminist time/space. Since I was, in an earlier incarnation, the author
of that book, I am in a unique position to bring it forth again in a
new light, to tell its story and then, in the new introduction, to be¬
come its critic and reviewer. And so it was the Morning of the
Second Daly. I saw that it was a good idea.
The Story of The Church and the Second Sex
In the early sixties Europe, and specifically Fribourg, was home.

Stranger in a strange land, I felt free in the strangeness, doing just
what I had chosen to do in a seemingly unlikely place. I was ac¬
cumulating doctoral degrees, the first in theology and the second in
philosophy, at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland, while at the
same time earning enough money for survival by teaching philo¬
sophy courses to American students at three different "junior year
abroad” programs. Life was made easier by a Velosolex motor¬
bicycle on which I zoomed back and forth between the university,
where I was lectured at by pompous professors, and the American
villas, where I learned more relevant things from my own students.
our boundary-living situation, I have retained the old numbers. It may be that
at some point in our future, women will think that this transitional dating is
no longer appropriate and adopt a new expression, such as "Amazon Infinity"
(A.I.), which was suggested by Emily Culpepper during a conversation in
June, 1974 A.F.
There seems to be no way of explaining adequately how I got to

Fribourg, storybook medieval town whose streets transported me to
the thirteenth century. My passion had been to study philosophy and
theology. To a person who had grown up in the Catholic ghetto,
theology then meant "Catholic” theology. There was no place in the
United States where a female was allowed to study for the "highest
degree” in this field, the "canonical” Doctorate in Sacred Theology.
Since I would settle for nothing less than "highest degrees,” I ap¬
plied to study in Fribourg, where the theological, faculty was state-
controlled and therefore could not legally exclude women.
Why anyone would want such a degree is an unfathomable
mystery if the question is asked from the perspective of 1975 A.F.
It may seem equally mad that I persisted and obtained yet another
doctorate, this time in philosophy, from the same university. But in
the otherworld of the 1960’s A.D. these appeared to be two door¬
ways to the life of a philosopher-theologian, the life of a woman
who could think, write and teach about the most fascinating of all
questions and earn her living by doing just this. It now appears that
the naivete that gave rise to and sustained such an ambition was
astonishing. I can only say that it was a tough innocence that was
willing to cross oceans and face unknown dragons to obtain its ob¬
jectives.
I have said that Fribourg was an unlikely place. It was an im¬
probable place to have existed at all, let alone for a feminist book
to have been conceived in. Fribourg was, in fact, an experience—a
mad series of improbable situations with multidimensional mean¬
ings. For example, it meant sitting in classes taught in Latin by
white-robed Dominican priests whose lectures often made more
sense when you didn’t comprehend the language than when you
did. The oddness of this situation was compounded by the fact that
my classmates were nearly all priests and male seminarians, many
of whom were from Latin countries. It was further compounded by
the fact that in the crowded classrooms there frequently were empty
places on each side of me, because my "fellow” students feared the
temptations that might arise from sitting next to a female. But this
"outfreaking” experience was only part of the scene.
Fribourg also meant freedom—a fact which I frequently cele¬
brated in its unique tea rooms and cafes with other American stu¬
dents, mainly my own students. We rejoiced about many things:
travel, adventure, mindblowing discoveries of a different culture.
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL PREFACE TO COLOPHON EDITION 9
We also rejoiced over the fact that the Statue of Liberty was still far
away. Tired and poor, we had escaped that stifling embrace for yet
a little while. Fribourg meant learning the intense intellectual dis¬
cipline of a culture that even then had long ago disappeared from
most places on the planet earth, but which retained its fascination
for me, at least. A seven years’ ecstatic experience interspersed with
brief periods of gloom, it was a sort of lengthy spiritual-intellectual
chess game, interrupted by side trips to less ethereal realms such as
London, Dublin, Paris, Vienna, Madrid, Athens, Damascus, Cairo.
Most significantly, it was interrupted by one very special side trip
to Rome.
The Church and the Second Sex might never have happened if
there had not been one great carnival of an event, the Second
Vatican Council of the Roman Catholic Church, and if I had not
managed to go to that carnival in the fall of 1965. In some ways it
was the opposite of the experience of Fribourg. While the latter was
an internationally populated island of isolation, the Rome of
Vatican II was a sea of international communication—the place/
time where the Catholic church came bursting into open confronta¬
tion with the twentieth century. It seemed to everyone, except to
the strangely foreseeing "conservatives,” prophets of doom who in
some perverse way knew what was really going on, that the greatest
breakthrough of nearly two thousand years was happening. We met
—theologians, students, journalists, lobbyists for every imaginable
cause—and found that our most secret thoughts about "the church”
were not solitary aberrations. They were shared, spoken out loud,
allowed credibility. There was an ebullient sense of hope. Most of
us thought then that this meant there was hope for the church.
Years later, some would manage to understand that the hope was
real even though its focus was misplaced. Some would learn to
transfer the primary force of that hope away from the church and
to ourselves and each other. We would even learn to stop misnam¬
ing ourselves as "the church.” But then all eyes were turned to the
church.
For the species "Catholic Feminist,” this misplaced hope was
comparable to the euphoria experienced in a slightly later period by
the species "New Left Feminist.” To both groups, which were
distinct but partly overlapping, it appeared that a door had opened
within patriarchy which could admit an endless variety of human
possibilities. The gradual extinction of both groups was inevitable
IO THE CHURCH AND THE SECOND SEX
and desirable, although not yet desired, at least, not by their mem¬
bers. It would take time to learn that all male-controlled "revolu¬
tions” are essentially movements in circles within the same senescent
patriarchal system.
Every day during that month-long visit in Rome was fascinating,
but one day in particular was important. I borrowed a journalist’s
identification card and went into St. Peter’s for one of the major
sessions. Sitting in the section reserved for the press, I saw in the
distance a multitude of cardinals and bishops—old men in crimson
dresses. In another section of the basilica were the "auditors”: a
group which included a few Catholic women, mostly nuns in long
black dresses with heads veiled. The contrast between the arrogant
bearing and colorful attire of the "princes of the church” and the
humble, self-deprecating manner and somber clothing of the very
few women was appalling. Watching the veiled nuns shuffle to the
altar rail to receive Holy Communion from the hands of a priest was
like observing a string of lowly ants at some bizarre picnic. (In
retrospect it seems to have been an ant-poisonous picnic.) Speeches
were read at the session, but the voices were all male, the senile,
cracking whines of the men in red. The few women, the nuns, sat
docilely and listened to the reading of documents in Latin, which
neither they nor the readers apparently understood. When ques¬
tioned by the press afterward, the female "auditors” repeatedly ex¬
pressed their gratitude for the privilege of being present. Although
there were one or two exceptions, for the most part they were
cautious about expressing any opinion at all. Although I did not
grasp the full meaning of the scene all at once, its multileveled
message burned its way deep into my consciousness. No Fellini
movie could have outdone this unintended self-satire of Catholicism.
When I returned home to Fribourg, I really began to work on
The Church and the Second Sex. But it was not only the experience
of the Vatican Council in Rome that made this written expression
of anger and hope possible. Another important catalyst had been an
article by Rosemary Lauer, a Catholic philosopher, which had ap¬
peared two years earlier in Commonweal (December, 1963). That
piece had been only moderately critical of the church’s treatment of
women, but the fact that a woman vfflo retained her identity as
"Catholic” had said these things was an astounding breakthrough.
It somehow bestowed upon me the psychological freedom to "write
out loud” my own thoughts. That article functioned in a special way
that the more radical works of Simone de Beauvoir and Betty

Friedan, which I greatly admired, could not function at that point in
time: it legitimated the possibility of my own creative feminist writ¬
ing.
I wrote a letter supporting the Lauer article, and my own first
article on sexism and religion, "A Built-In Bias,” appeared in Com¬
monweal in January, 1965. Some weeks later a letter from a British
publisher in London found its way to me in Fribourg, after visiting
several wrong addresses. It contained an invitation to write a book
on women and the church, developing the ideas in the Commonweal
article, which had been spotted by someone who worked for the
publishing house. The letter was like a summons, and I knew
clearly that the time was right for the First Coming of The Church
and the Second Sex. The contract was signed in May, 1965. But it
was in the fall of that year, after the crimson and black of the
Roman circus in Saint Peter’s basilica broke through the surface of
my mind, that my visionary anger began to incarnate itself in the
form of this book.
The first five chapters were written in Fribourg. When I returned
to the United States I finished the book. Soon afterward the book
almost finished me. I was fired from my teaching job at Jesuit-run
Boston College, that is, given a terminal contract. Although the
administrators never bothered to give any reason for the termination
of our happy relationship, the press and just about everyone else put
two and two together. An uppity Second Sex was just too much for
the church. And for Boston College students that was precisely the
issue: Was their university a place where ideas could be expressed
freely, or was it "the church”?
My "case” became a cause cilehre. It was 1969, a year of demon¬
strations, and the students wanted a symbol in their crusade for
"academic freedom.” I was it. There were several months of struggle.
An estimated fifteen hundred students demonstrated. Twenty-five
hundred signed a petition. All of this was ignored by the adminis¬
tration, whose nonresponse brought forth a seven hour teach-in.
Several professors fired from other universities spoke, students spoke,
I spoke. Some local self-declared witches came and hexed Boston
College, reminding us of the churchly habit of witch-burning. The
next day the students began picketing the president’s house, and the
administration building was decorated at night with brilliant red
graffiti (faint traces of which remain to this day, despite the costly
use of modern technology to blast them away). The campus became

a circus grounds, and television cameras were quick to arrive on the
scene. The story was front page news in the Boston papers, duly
reported in the New York Times, and recounted in a syndicated
column which was published in major newspapers across the
country. My case was receiving national, international, supernatural
publicity, and the Jesuits could no longer hide behind their rosary
beads.
The bureaucratic machinery began to grind. A special meeting of
the university academic senate was held and a "faculty review com¬
mittee” was elected to investigate the case. Since the committee was
merely advisory to the president and since it was bound to "con¬
fidentiality,” even a unanimous decision in my favor would not
guarantee victory. When the academic year ended with no decision
announced, it seemed that my fate was sealed.
The spring of 1969 had been an incredible time. From the roof
of my apartment building, I could see the tower of Boston College’s
administration building, Gasson Hall. I recall having a strong in¬
tuition that there was some primary warfare going on, whose
dimensions could not be reduced to the "issue” of academic freedom.
It was an archetypal battle between principalities and powers, of
which this "case” was a blatantly noticeable instance. In cruder and
more immediate terms, I recognized that it was—and was more than
—a war between "it” and me, and I willed to go all the way in this
death battle. Perhaps the survival of "it” did not depend upon the
outcome, but mine did. The practical/personal/political issue was
simple. Under the insidious guise of “confidentiality” my teaching
career was being destroyed. The university officials had refused to
give any reasons publicly or to me privately for my firing, but the
well-known phenomenon of grapevine innuendo would destroy my
college teaching career.
Summer came, and since summer was the season when trouble¬
some students were out of the way, the administration .could be ex¬
pected to behave in the way characteristic of university administra¬
tions. I would be quietly executed in my own absence. Such were my
expectations when I arrived in June at a small college in Oregon to
teach a summer course. Then the absurdly improbable happened.
On the day of my arrival a telegram appeared in Oregon from the
president of Boston College, informing me, without congratulations,
that I had been granted promotion and tenure.
It was a strange victory. Apparently the book which had generated

the hostility which led to my firing had generated the support which
forced my rehiring. I now had the relative safety of a tenured uni¬
versity professor, subject of course to the possibility of harassment at
any time in the future. But something had happened to the meaning
of "professor,” to the meaning of "university,” to the meaning of
"teaching.” The "professors” from the various "fields” who had been
my judges, the judges of my book, had themselves never written
books, nor had they read or understood mine. Standing in negative
judgment of my teaching, they were in fear of the students who had
no use for their "teaching.” I began to understand more about the
prevailing "Beta consciousness” of academics, dwarfed by a system
of "education” which made them unfree, uncourageous, and radically
uneducated. Nor could I live under the delusion that this phenom¬
enon of soul-shrinkage was peculiar to this one university or to
church-related universities or to those engaged in this particular
field. Letters and conversations, especially with women, during and
following the event, made it clear that this was a universal disease
of "universities,” which were microcosms reflecting the patriarchal
world. I recognized that Boston College was not unusual. Perhaps,
indeed, it- lacked the more sophisticated means of oppression em¬
ployed in the "great” universities, and there was even something
like idealism that wove its way through the destruction and helped
to make possible this absurd triumph.
It was the universalist quality of this personal "revelation” that
was important. I began to understand more of the implications of
the feminist insight that "the personal is political.” The intercon¬
nections among the structures of oppression in a patriarchal society
and the destructive dynamics which these structures generate in
their victims became more and more visible. In other words, I un¬
derstood more clearly the nature of the beast and the name of the
demon: patriarchy.
The procession of consequences of The Church and the Second
Sex, then, was a transforming process. So I moved into a more ad¬
vanced class in a newly founded invisible counter-university, the
Feminist Universe, whose students from all over the planet were
beginning to discover each other.
As a result of the First Coming of The Church and the Second
Sex, I had been hurled into instant fame as exposer of Christian
misogyny—especially of the Roman Catholic variety—and
champion of women’s "equality” within the church. Armed with my

quaint and esoteric scholarship and Celtic cunning, I faced on na¬
tional television cleverly uncomprehending adversaries such as
William F. Buckley and a string of think-alike clerics. I "lectured”
to academic audiences and women’s groups across the country about
the sexism of the Christian tradition. Often in the late sixties I en¬
countered hostility in women, not toward the patriarchs whose mi-
sogynism I exposed, but toward me for exposing them.
By about 1970 this phenomenon of misplaced anger had almost
disappeared. More and more people had caught up with The
Church and the Second Sex, and the lines that formerly had elicited
hostility brought forth cheers. But the "I” who was then standing
before the friendly audiences and tossing out the familiar phrases
was already disconnected from the words, already moving through
a new time/space. I often heard the old words as though a stranger
were speaking them—some personage visiting from the past. My
concern was no longer limited to "equality” in the church or any¬
where else. I did not really care about unimaginative reform but
instead began dreaming new dreams of a women’s revolution. This
was becoming a credible dream, because a community of sisterhood
was coming into being, into be-ing. In the hearing/healing presence
of these sisters I had grown ready to try writing/ speaking New
Words.3
3 See Beyond God the Father.

feminist Postchristian Introduction
A critical review of The Church and the Second TSex,

written from the perspective of 1975 A.F. (Anno
Feminarum)
During a recent archeological dig a curious volume entitled The

Church and the Second Sex was unearthed. It appears to date from
the year 1968 A.D., approximately seven woman-light years away/
ago. Because of its significant historical content and because it
represents a period of critical reflection on the. part of a species
which is by now almost extinct, the species "Catholic Feminist,” it
seems important not only that it be made available in this time but
also that it receive a serious critical review. In this piece, I shall at¬
tempt to do justice to the author in reviewing her book, judging it
in its historical context, but I shall try not to overlook its limitations.
I shall attempt to dialogue with her work chapter by chapter.
Before proceeding to an analysis of the specific content of each

chapter, I shall make some general comments about language. The
author frequently chooses to use the term "discrimination” to de¬
scribe the predicament of women in a Christian culture. The choice
of this term rather than a more accurate word such as "oppression,”
"obliteration,” or "massacre” might seem to reveal an inclination to
be cautious and generally "reformist.” While this interpretation
would be partially correct, I should point out that "discrimination”
was the usual term employed by feminists of her time. She uses
terms such as "misogynism” and "androcentrism” frequently. While
I find these perfectly acceptable words, I note that she employs them
often where I would be inclined to write "sexism,” or "rapism.” I
suggest that the reader keep in mind that she did not have available
to her the more adequate vocabulary and greater sensitivity to
language which our feminist tradition has provided for us. This lack
of tradition and precedent explains why she sometimes uses "man”
and "he” as if these were generic terms. While I find this annoying,
15
I think that in fairness I should admit that in her circumstances I

would have done no better.
Like Simone de Beauvoir, Daly uses the "objective” pronoun
"they” to refer to women. It should be remembered that there did
not yet exist a publicly expressed or expressable sense of bonding in
sisterhood which would allow a feminist the psychological freedom
to write "wg” when referring to women. Moreover, no doubt Daly
and de Beauvoir before her felt that a sense of respectable detach¬
ment and objectivity was conveyed by the use of the pronoun "they”
to refer to women, especially if one were writing a scholarly work.
One must consider the sense of isolation experienced by feminists in
that bleak time, when even the use of the word "feminist” elicited
patronizing smiles and pop-Freudian cliches from both women and
men. In that climate, "they” must have felt quite fitting. Moreover,
there certainly was no one to criticize an expression which we
feminists now find inappropriately detached. Who at that time had
ever heard of a woman-identified woman? A few bold women
dared to say that women were "discriminated against” and that was
a dangerous and apparently solitary point of view to express about
"them.”
There are other expressions that I find grating, even though I
understand the background, for example, "chairman” (to refer to a
woman). However, I think the point has been made, and I will try
to refrain from alluding repetitiously in the course of this critique
to the same or similar examples of semantic underdevelopment.
CHAPTER ONE
The Case Against the Church
This chapter (not to mention the book’s title) reveals how

strongly Daly was influenced by the French feminist philosopher
Simone de Beauvoir. Unlike de Beauvoir, however, Daly expresses a
hope, both here and throughout the book,- for genuine change in the
status of women in the church. In the preface, of the original edition
(deleted from this text) she had described as "ironic” the tension
FEMINIST POSTCHRISTIAN INTRODUCTION 17
between the church and movements seeking to liberate women.

Clearly she did not grasp the fact that it was not ironic but rather
quite consistent with its principles that her church would oppose the
liberation of women. It might seem odd that she apparently did not
perceive this consistency, since she herself was the author of a major
expose of the long and consistent history of Christian misogynism.
This baffling optimism can be understood if one is aware of the
euphoria that prevailed among Catholics during the time of
"Vatican Council II.” So deceptive was this cloud of optimism that,
despite the evidence which she herself amassed, Daly was unable to
perceive that sexism was inherent in the symbol system of Chris¬
tianity itself and that a primary function of Christianity in Western
culture has been to legitimize sexism.
While recognizing that other cultural institutions were "dis¬
criminatory” (read: oppressive), Daly focused her attention upon
the Judeo-Christian tradition. While she did recognize that other
institutions in the West were themselves formed by and interrelated
with the religious tradition to which she directed her criticism, she
did not perceive the full import of this interrelatedness. Conse¬
quently, her concept of change coming from "outside” that religious
tradition does not satisfy me, for she was not "outside” enough.
Briefly, from within her time/space it was impossible to see the
implications of the fact that her whole species was possessed by a
planetary sexual caste system. Thus her vision had moved only
partially outside patriarchy itself, and her visionary anger did not
move her to take a qualitative leap into the new space and time of
radical feminism as we know it.
Daly had to deal with the fact that de Beauvoir was an ex-
Catholic. This would seem to explain the fact that she resorted to
the device of "biographical” explanation for the French philosopher’s
"omission” of "certain dimensions” in her analysis of Catholicism.
That is, she made a half-hearted attempt to explain de Beauvoir’s
apparent lack of hope for the church. Still, she had to agree with de
Beauvoir’s data (adding much more as a result of her own research),
and she righteously concluded that "to attack her book on the basis
of her life is to resort to argumentum ad hominem” (p. 57). It is
amusing to note that Daly even quoted approvingly from a letter of
Thomas Aquinas (whose misogynistic texts she dissects in a later
chapter with cool ferocity) in which that medieval theologian
wrote: "Remember the good things you hear, and do not consider
who says them” (p. 57). So much for our author’s use of Aquinas’s
"authority” to legitimize de Beauvoir’s attack on Christianity.
With considerable skill, Daly brings together in this chapter the
most significant texts of de Beauvoir relevant to Christianity, ar¬
ranging them according to a few dominant themes and adding ap¬
propriate commentary. In general, she agrees with the French
feminist, and for the most part rightly so. However, when she comes
to the question of "transcendence through religion?” (pp. 66ff),
Daly is not critical enough of the lyrical passages on Saint Teresa of
Avila, whose situation de Beauvoir likens to that of great queens,
"exalted by the power of social institutions above all sexual dif¬
ferentiation.” Once again there is a curious ambivalence (to use one
of her own favorite expressions) in the attitude of our author, who
was fully aware of Teresa’s sufferings from the church. In fact, in
her second chapter she herself cites several poignant passages from
Teresa’s writings in which the saint expressed her anguish over the
(church-imposed) chains that dragged her down because of her sex.
How, then, could she so exuberantly echo de Beauvoir’s unrealistic
notion that "there is hardly any woman other than Saint Teresa w7ho
in total abandonment has herself lived out the situation of hu¬
manity” (p. 68) ?
The final section of Chapter One, under the heading "Facing the
problems,” could be perplexing because of its self-contradicting
combination of astuteness and "holding back.” This syndrome is
characteristic of the author in her last-ditch struggle to salvage
Christianity in the face of her own evidence. She gives a concise
summary <of some relevant main points in de Beauvoir’s existentialist
philosophy, indicating substantial agreement with most of these. In
my opinion, Daly was right to challenge the French existentialist’s
assumption that belief in God is inseparably linked with the idea of
an immutable human nature. Today, in the light of feminist philo¬
sophy of Be-ing, we are aware of the deep connection between
women’s becoming and the unfolding of cosmic process—a process
which some would still call "God.”1 But Daly’s rebuttal of de
Beauvoir’s atheism is not vigorous enough, precisely because the
only real alternative that she (and probably also de Beauvoir)
could see to atheism was Christian faith. The author of The Church
and the Second Sex, in my opinion, had not managed to move
1 See Beyond God the Father, first chapter.
beyond this opposition of opposites: "Christian faith” versus

"atheism.” Consequently, she defends the indefensible.
"Has de Beauvoir omitted any significant data?” (p. 72) This
question appears to be astute. But I think its real meaning was: "Isn’t
there something good about the church that de Beauvoir has not
expanded upon?” This was, I believe, a desperate question, and
Daly gives a desperate reply, finding a supposed clue to the
"omitted” data in de Beauvoir’s assertion that the church provided
for Saint Teresa the needed condition for rising above the handicap
of sex. This is indeed a convoluted reply when one considers that
the church was a major cause of this "handicapped” condition of the
female sex in the first place. Again, as Daly herself points out,
Teresa was an exception, so her case says nothing to the situation of
millions of women whose creativity was totally erased. What, then,
is she trying to find in this search for "omitted” data? My informed
guess is that she was aware of a depth of consciousness to which
people became attuned through religious myth, even through op¬
pressive religious myth. She knew that the patriarchal religions, in¬
cluding Christianity, conveyed a sense of transcendence. She valued
this, and rightly so, but apparently she could not recognize a way
to depth of consciousness, hope, and transcendence that would in¬
volve breaking out of Christianity. De Beauvoir’s "atheistic” rejec¬
tion of Christianity and Daly’s desperate attempt to salvage it both
stopped short. On the road ahead of them, not yet visible, was that
point where the journeys of many women would bring insights
together, so that postchristian feminist philosophy could spring
forth.
Since I have already given some indication of the author’s
semantic handicaps, I will not repeat the same criticisms. However,
I do feel compelled to point out a few revealing expressions that
occur in this chapter. More than once she writes of her hopes for
"purification” of "distortions of doctrine” in Christianity, tacitly
assuming (1) that there is some true Christian doctrine underlying
the "distortions”; (2) that Christian doctrine is not itself a distortion.
There are. also indications that she lacked consciousness of the
political implications of grammar. For example, on page 70 I find
the sentence: "He or she is the sum total of bis works . . (italics
mine). When the author does use both pronouns ("he or she”)
or writes of the "man-woman relationship,” the masculine invariably
precedes the feminine. This was, of course, the "accepted” style, and
its use was not consciously political. But that is precisely the point.
Moreover, Daly writes of the "seminal” elements in Christian
doctrine as distinguished from its "oppressive” ideas (p. 73). Given
the totally patriarchal character of Christianity, the use of the term
"seminal” could have been used very appropriately, had it been
employed to express the phallocentric nature of Christian doctrine.
However, regretfully I must point out that this is not the sense of
the text. "Seminal” is not used to mean male-centered, and indeed
it is used in contrast with the word "oppressive.”
Some of these symptoms of nonconsciousness of the politics of
language reappear in later chapters. I shall try to refrain from over¬
stressing them. Since I am attempting an in-depth study of this
document in its historical context, it would be a serious failure on
my part if I were to slip into mere carping pedantry that would
betray the intentions of the author and discredit myself as a com¬
petent Dalyan scholar.
CHAPTER TWO
History: A Record of Contradictions
This is one of the book’s most valuable chapters. The historical

data has been meticulously researched. In many places Daly mani¬
fests a sense of irony, but in her overall view she is not ironic
enough. The chapter title, for example, reveals her own amazement.
It seems to me that the chapter would have been more accurately
entitled: "History: A Record of Hypocrisy,” or "History: A Record
of Legitimized Sexism.” But no. Daly was genuinely baffled by what
she perceived as "a puzzling ambiguity if not an outright contradic¬
tion.” The alleged conflict was between "Christian teachings on the
worth of every human person and the oppressive, misogynistic ideas
arising from cultural conditioning” (p. 74). In a certain sense, of
course, and on a literal level, this could be seen as a contradiction,
as can the contrast (also discussed in this chapter) between the
symbolic glorification of "woman” and the real social oppression of
women. However, it is significant that when discussing the second
“tension of opposites” she is clear about the hypocrisy of the glorified
"woman” idea and of how this functions to cloak social reality. In

my judgment, the greater lucidity that characterizes her discussion
of this more specific "contradiction” is due to the fact that she can
allow herself to perceive this particular symbol as functioning to
justify oppression and still remain a Christian, even Catholic, re¬
former. However, to admit the possibility that the "basic doctrine”
of Christianity might be oppressive would be to put herself un¬
equivocally outside its orbit—a genuinely threatening prospect, an
unutterable, unthinkable thought in that time/space. Thus, she con¬
tinues to make -distinctions between this "basic doctrine” and the
"oppressive ideas arising from social conditioning.”
If Daly had let go of her distinction between this supposed hard
core of Christian truth (never clearly defined) and the impurities
from somewhere outside, she would have been rocketed into the
postchristian era. In 1965-67 A.D. she was constructing a launching
pad for a future space trip which she could not have foreseen
clearly. It hardly seems appropriate for me to pass judgments upon
an author who was not an astronaut before it was possible to become
one. Rather, I am thankful for her labors. Speaking personally—and
I hope this will not appear tasteless in a review of this nature—I
must admit that if it were not for Daly’s early work, I myself prob¬
ably would never have tried on a feminist space suit.
But let us return to the subject at hand. The chapter begins with
an analysis of biblical texts. The evidence brought forth from the
Old Testament is devastating. Yet, in the very process of displaying
the self-damning biblical texts, the author manifests her character¬
istic ambivalence by expressing her dismay at theologians and
preachers who are unaware of "modern developments in biblical
scholarship.” Professorially, she adds: "Such misunderstanding of
the Old Testament has done immeasurable harm” (p. 77). If I
could take a journey back to her time, perhaps I could persuade her
to consider the possibility that understanding the symbolic messages
of the Old Testament only too well has caused immeasurable harm.
I am tempted to imagine our conversation. "Professor Daly,” I
would say, "don’t you realize that where myths are concerned the
medium is the message? Don’t you see that the efforts of biblical
scholars to reinterpret texts, even though they may be correct within
a certain restricted perspective, cannot change the overwhelmingly
patriarchal character of the biblical tradition? Moreover, this
modern’ historical accuracy about detail has often been associated
with an apologetic zeal that overlooks patriarchal religion’s function

of legitimating patriarchy. Consider, for example, the myth of Eve’s
birth from Adam. You accurately describe this as a 'hoax,’ and you
correctly point out that 'modern’ interpretations of Genesis 'come
too late for the millions of women who lived and died with the
religious conviction of their divinely ordained inferiority and sub¬
ordination’ (p. 79). Now, I would say that this myth is not only a
hoax, but a typical instance of what I call 'reversal’ of biological
and historical fact. Can’t you pursue your own line of thought
further and conclude that such reversal is a basic dynamic of
patriarchal religion? This might lead you to a further conclusion,
Professor Daly, namely, that within such a religious tradition it will
always be too late, that mere reform and modernized scholarship
will allow millions more to live and die simply with a more subtle
and sophisticated conviction of their divinely ordained inferiority.”
But I must not be carried away with this fantasy conversation. I
will leave the professor at her blackboard explaining to her pupils
the difference between the earlier creation story,“the J document,
and the later P document account. I shall let her mind her P’s and
J’s until the time when a more revolutionary consciousness can
emerge.
Daly does a competent analysis of Pauline texts. She was not un¬
aware of the distinction between texts that her contemporaries
attributed to "the real Paul” and those attributed to the "deutero-
Pauline authors.” I suspect, however, that she did not find this a
distinction of consuming interest. At any rate she does not dwell
upon it and generally writes simply about "Pauline texts.” I find
this reasonable since they had been known as such for two thousand
years and had carried that awesome and oppressive authority. How¬
ever, I must suppress my feelings of impatience when I read her
desperate straw-grasping attempt to propose one Pauline text (Gala¬
tians 3:27-28) as an instance where "the dichotomy of fixed classes
as dominant-subservient is transcended” (p. 84). The question that
comes to my mind is: "What sense does it make to assert that in
Christ 'there is neither male nor female’?” Wasn’t "Christ” an ex¬
clusively male symbol, even though somewhat "feminized”? What
on earth, then, could the text mean? But that is the point: it could
not mean anything on earth, where there definitely were and are
females and males and where that distinction has been overem¬
phasized and distorted, especially in the church. If "in Christ” meant
some unearthly place, then certainly Daly could never have been
there since the symbol says "for men only.”
The section on the patristic period obviously was painstakingly
researched. Our author searched out the Latin texts and carefully
verified her translations. One of her contemporary critics argued
that she had been selective in exhuming only misogynistic texts
from the so-called Fathers of the Church. His assumption was that
there were some philogynistic texts to be found. Clearly, Daly wins
hands down since no scholar of her time nor of any period since has
been able to find such texts to refute her position.
When we come to the section on the Middle Ages, it becomes
immediately evident that Daly is on very familiar territory. Her
biographical data, found with the book, indicates that she had
studied medieval philosophy and theology for some years. Perhaps
this explains the peculiar zest and fascination with detail which
characterizes her analysis of Thomas Aquinas. Having exposed the
abysmal views on the subject of women held by the "Angelic
Doctor” (as he was called in the Catholic tradition), she still main¬
tains that the deep roots of his thought could have been liberating
for women if their dynamics had not been blocked off by "outdated”
biblical exegesis and biology and by the prevailing views of the
culture. She did not acknowledge, of course, that "biblical exegesis”
is inevitably "outdated.” Moreover, her critique of medieval biology
is, it seems to me, too restrained. Modestly, she affirms that the
mother is "equally” active in the production of the child, instead of
simply pointing out that the female is more active—a fact which
patriarchal ideology simply reversed.
I think that I can detect in Daly’s defense of Aquinas’s "radically
liberating principles” a quality different from her lip service to the
single "liberating” Pauline text and even quite different from her
general defense of "basic Christian doctrine.” In the latter case, as I
have pointed out, she seems to be avoiding the threat of a radical
break from Christianity. But in her plea for Aquinas there is, it
seems to me, a kind of positive passion (p. 95). It is my guess that
what she adhered to in his thought—Thomistic scholar that she was
—was his ontological sense, his intuition of being. Looking back
from the vantage point of our present stage in history, I think it fair
to say that she was struggling to find ontological roots for what we
know today as feminist philosophy of Be-ing. In the better parts of
Aquinas’s work she found hints of what a philosophy of be-ing/be-
24 the church and the second sex
coming could begin to say. But, of course, as prepackaged in his

categories, this ontological sense could not be radically liberating.
The ontological process which Daly so ardently sought could only
be found in the women’s revolution, which had not yet surfaced.
Consequently she took starvation rations from the best of the
Christian philosophers. In her time, when sisterhood had not yet
emerged, moving too far ahead would have meant venturing into
an endless desert, into a state which an uncomprehending world
would have called "madness” and treated as such. It is important
for our historical sense, I think, that we try to comprehend this
situation. Moreover, I empathize deeply with Daly’s attempt to
rescue ontology.
The chapter covers much interesting material. For example, there
is information concerning the abbesses who wielded patriarchal
power. The passages from Saint Teresa are also fascinating, and
Daly’s analysis of them makes it clear enough that Teresa suffered
from sexism. At the same time, it hardly seems to me an appropriate
compliment to proclaim that the saint "anticipated what biblical
scholars would begin to suggest centuries later” (p. ioo). In fact, it
is more to the point that Teresa anticipated what feminists would
say centuries later, but in language that would make feminist hair
stand on end. In the texts cited by Daly she refers to the deity as
her "Lord,” "Judge,” and "King.” Moreover, she had a tendency to
disassociate herself from women, saying, for example, that she "was
not in the least like a woman.” Daly surely must have found this
disconcerting, but refrained from comment. Of course, she was see¬
ing Teresa "in historical context” and perhaps was showing greater
patience than I have manifested toward the Dalyan comments.
1 am thankful for the author’s research on the "early modern
period.” Her moving sketch of the efforts of nuns to break the bonds
of the cloister and become active "in the world” has influenced my
own writing on the concept of sisterhood, as well as the work of
other feminists2. Since Daly was of Catholic background, her data
is drawn primarily from the Catholic tradition. Personally, I do not
2 For an important study of the history and problems of nuns in relation to

feminism, see Janice G. Raymond, "Nuns and Women’s Liberation,” Andover
Newton Quarterly, XII (March 1972 A.F.), pp. 201-212. See also the same
author’s work entitled "Nuns and Women’s Liberation: A Study of the Effects
of Patriarchy upon Roman Catholic Religious Communities of Women and an
Alternative.” Unpublished M. A. thesis, Andover Newton Theological School,
Newton Centre, Massachusetts, 1971 A.F.
think that this detracts from the value of the work, except perhaps
quantitatively since the Protestant "reformers’ ” treatment of women
did not differ dramatically from the words and behavior of their
Catholic counterparts. Indeed, this remarkable sameness makes the
feminist critic of 1975 A.F. wonder to what significant social event
the term "reformation” could possibly have referred.
I will conclude my remarks concerning this chapter by noting
that the copious citations from what Daly refers to as "papal docu¬
ments,” particularly from the Popes Piuses, were at first misunder¬
stood by me. Because of the bizarre content of these citations, their
pomposity and internal inconsistency, I at first thought that they
were from a body of satirical literature known in her time but lost
to posterity. A second and more careful reading of the section con¬
vinced me that I had missed the point. Since I have considerable
respect for Daly’s scholarship, I take it on her authority not only
that these documents, as well as their purported authors, did actually
exist, but also that the documents were intended as straightforward,
authoritative pronouncements and exercised great influence during
her era.
CHAPTER THREE
Winds of Change
I found this chapter both puzzling and poignant. The author be¬
gins with a continued discussion of Popes, but this time the main
subject is a personage named "Pope John.” It amazes me that she
speaks with unbridled enthusiasm about the writings attributed to
this dignitary, using such expressions as "startling breakthrough”
to describe them (p. 118). Indeed, the texts she cites seem to convey
little more than some vague and grudging awareness that women
are human. The enthusiasm of our author snatching at these crumbs
tossed from on high speaks volumes about the desolation of the
culture in which she struggled to survive. Combining these texts
with a few more, garnered from the documents issued by the Second
Vatican Council, she builds a case in support of the church’s "grow¬
ing recognition ... of the equal rights of men and women” (p.
i i9ff.). She seems to become exuberant over things that the Vatican
documents do not do. For example, this document "does not speak
disparagingly of working mothers” (p. 120). Yet even this non¬
speech is precarious, it seems, for the document sternly proclaims that
"children . . . need the care of their mothers at home.” Again,
Daly rejoices that Vatican II’s Declaration on Christian Education
"has nothing to say against coeducation” (p. 121, italics mine), even
though she notes that it has regressive passages, such as those insist¬
ing that teachers "pay due regard to sex role differences.” In sum,
Daly is aware of what she calls the "three steps forward, one step
backward” movement of the church in her time. She does not seem
aware of the possibility that the real pattern of the dance may have
been "one step forward, three steps backward.”
There are indications, however, that Daly had a sense of forebod¬
ing when Pope John’s successor, known as "Pope Paul,” climbed
into the papal throne and began making statements that could not
be read as other than oppressive. Our author summons up her
optimism and manages to say that this Pope Paul "has given some
evidence of an evolution beyond the attitudes of the popes who
preceded John (p. 121, italics mine). With evident depression, she
notes some of his remarks and then moves on to another section of
her chapter. For the benefit of the lay reader I should point out that
this "Pope Paul” was the last of the popes whose name we find
recorded in any of the sources. Since in 1975 A.F. there is little
serious scholarly or popular discussion on the subject of popes, I
simply offer this information for those with antiquarian curiosity and
to illumine better the setting of Daly’s labors.
Today, the arguments in some of the petitions sent by women
theologians to the "Council fathers” appear hardly less strange than
the documents of the "fathers” themselves. One of these women,
for example, is mentioned by Daly as presenting reasoned argu¬
ments that "Canon 968, which limits ordination to men alone, is of
human tradition rather than divine origin” (pp. 124—125). Ap¬
parently Catholics believed that some of their rules were written by
men (males) and some were written by God. This belief posed some
obscure, convoluted problems concerning who had written which.
In any case, the primary focus of the "radical petitions” was the
ordination of women to the priesthood, and, of course, none of the
petitioners, any more than Daly herself, could see that the idea of
"equality” within a patriarchal institution was doomed. In fairness,
however, it should be pointed out that the vision of these "equal

rights” feminists went further than that of anyone else in the
religious world. Although their vision contained an ultimate con¬
tradiction, the idea of equality within patriarchy, that contradiction
could not be seen until a certain distance from patriarchy had been
attained and it could be seen as a whole. Their situation was com¬
parable to that of pre-space age travelers who could see parts of the
planet earth at different times but could not have that perspective
of the whole which became possible for astronauts at a later age.
These "equal rights” feminists had attained a genuinely respect¬
worthy altitude in the jet age. Their demand for women priests was
equivalent to a demand for entry into the ruling caste.
The same respect cannot be accorded to the "liberal” hierarchy
who "supported” women. The one and only champion of women’s
rights whom Daly was able to exhume from the ranks of American
bishops was a timid and inconsistent soul, one Archbishop Hallinan.
Having proclaimed that the church should not continue to per¬
petuate female subservience and "the secondary place allotted to
women in the past,” Hallinan proposed as his major reform the
idea that women could serve as "deaconesses”—a very secondary
role, subservient to that of priest. This was, nevertheless, an un¬
thinkably stellar role for women in the opinion of most of the
hierarchy. No doubt this was a generous move for an Archbishop,
and thus Hallinan was the all-American star that Daly’s desperation
drove her to exalt as "one notable exception” among the American
bishops. Given this condition of sexual politics in the Catholic
church, the women who proposed the ordination of women to the
Catholic priesthood in the mid-sixties were indeed out of tune with
their time. Their logic had brought some of them closer than they
realized to the brink of the postchristian era.
In the section on "problems of Catholic married women,” Daly
deals with the oppressive Catholic stance on birth control. The
quaint implication of the heading, of course, is that this would be a
problem only for "married women.” Given her Catholic identity, it
is understandable that Daly offers no theoretical critique of the in¬
stitution of marriage as oppressive in itself. Perhaps, however, her
basic opinion on the subject can be inferred from her biographical
notes, which indicate by omission that she herself had successfully
avoided it. In any case, the section on "Catholic married women”
deals cogently though briefly with birth control and the question of
working mothers. She touches on the abortion issue. The brevity of

her treatment of this subject should not be astonishing, since abor¬
tion was not an issue open for discussion even among radical
Catholics in the mid-sixties A.D., when this chapter was written.
What is surprising is that she mentions it at all and comes out on
the side of recognizing moral ambiguity, actually even finding one
bishop (Simons of Indore, India) who was willing to admit some
personal sense of ambiguity about the problem.
The caption heading the next section, "Problems of the emerging
sisters,” may require a word of explanation to the contemporary
reader who is, of course, accustomed to use the word "sister” to
describe and/or address another feminist. "Sister,” as used in this
work, generally has a meaning roughly equivalent to "nun,” that is,
a female member of a Catholic religious order or congregation,
usually a nonfeminist, even according to the standards of the period.
A "sister” generally wore a veil and was thought to be a "bride of
Christ,” although what this could mean behaviorally was never
clear. Although this may seem bizarre and confusing to the sisters
in the women’s movement, I can assure the reader that Daly was
quite conventional in her use of the term. "Emerging sisters,” then,
means emerging from the cloister or convent. Again, perhaps some
clarification is needed. A convent was a place where a group of
women lived under the same roof in a "community” of isolation.
Such places had rules which were male-created and structures which
were hierarchical. In these respects a convent was totally different
from a women’s collective. Finally, I should point out that the
seemingly incongruous fact that the “emerging sisters” mentioned
by Daly have men’s names (e.g. Luke, William, Charles) was
basically due to the prevailing notion that men were the superior
sex. Hence this dubious honor.
Hopefully the foregoing explanation will help to make more in¬
telligible the content of this section. Daly contrasts the private re¬
marks made by "younger and better educated sisters,” indicating a
need for "radical changes,” with statements made by their leaders
which were "not conspicuously progressive” (p. 136). Having read
my explanation, the reader will understand that those chosen as
"leaders” of the Catholic sisters of course had to attempt to please
their male masters and so were not inclined to make radical state¬
ments or even to have radical thoughts. The "younger sisters” were
low on the male-created totem pole, and they had to restrict their
criticisms to private discussions, since there was no "equality” even

among themselves. Although their immediate "superiors” were
female, the pattern of "community” was copied from males. The
convent bore some resemblance both to the patriarchal family and
to the army. It was a mini-brotherhood, in which decisions were
handed down from on high.
If some sisters in the women’s movement in 1975 A.F. are amazed
that women accepted such a regime, let me point out that options
for females in that culture were few. For some, this may have been
an escape from what could have been a far worse fate, burial in
patriarchal marriage, even though this reason would not have been
given consciously and explicitly. The other obvious option, living
alone, which today can be seen as a liberated life-style, was dreaded
by many, since they had been conditioned to believe that this would
be a life of rejection, disgrace, and isolation. Since acceptance by
men, rather than self-acceptance, was the norm, most women in the
mid-sixties A.D. still felt that they were acceptable only if they be¬
came the property of husbands in marriage or else Brides of Christ,
incorporated into a sort of Divine Harem.3 Although Daly’s bio¬
graphical data does not indicate that she ever joined any of these
Heavenly Harems, she did empathize with these "sisters” as sisters,
probably because she saw in their situation some dim and distorted
anticipation of a feminist future, which of course she herself could
not clearly imagine either.
The nuns were in many ways worse off than religious monks,
since their male superiors allowed them fewer freedoms. The system
"encouraged” them, as it did other women, to have low self-esteem
in the form of displaced or vicarious self-esteem. This explains
Daly’s description of the "emerging sisters” first emerging to fight
for causes other than their own by participating in "civil rights”
marches, for example (a pattern also discernible among other
women). Having been conditioned to ascribe value only to male
ideals and causes, their speaking out for liberation had to be for
someone else’s liberation. Only later, and partially as a result of this
experience, did some begin to wonder about their own "civil rights.”
These "progressive nuns,” as Daly calls them, began in the 1960’s
A.D. to abandon their convents. Even in the process of doing this,
they still saw themselves as loyal daughters of the church, who in¬
tended, as Daly wrote, "to serve the Church and world better” (p.
3 Expression used by Janice Raymond.
137). This pattern of emergence was not totally dissimilar from that
of other women, most of whom were imprisoned in marriage and/
or demeaning jobs. A significant number of women in that epoch,
including such apparently submerged beings as the "sisters,” were
beginning to move together, without realizing it, into the emerging
sisterhood of women.
The final section of the chapter, "Changes in fact,” lists some
events which appeared spectacular in that epoch, such as women
"serving Mass” and "distributing Holy Communion.” Daly’s
chronicle of the repressive measures against such activities is im¬
portant for understanding women’s history. Discussing the role of
Protestantism in countering the conservative influence, she gives us
insight into an important dialectic within Christianity. Understand¬
ably, she took an overly optimistic view of the Protestant influence,
attributing to Protestantism a greater dissimilarity from the Catholic
church than the facts warranted—the facts, that is, as perceived
more clearly now, seven woman-light years removed from the scene.
CHAPTER FOUR
The Pedestal Peddlars
If I could dialogue with the author of The Church and the Second
Sex today, I think we might have an enjoyable chat about this
chapter. I might be tempted to tell her that some of her readers
today must surely suspect that she had a unique talent for unearth¬
ing bizarre literature and then refuting it. I might point out that my
contemporaries who have not studied the history of her time can
be expected to wonder if she had access to some astonishing collec¬
tions of rare books. But I think I can accurately anticipate her reply.
"Rare books?” she would ask, astonished. "I found these in the local
bookstores. They were representative of a whole genre of writing
that was very common.” And, given my historical knowledge of
that period, I would be obliged in honesty to concede her point. But
I must return to the concrete reality before me: the book itself.
Discussing the phallacies of the "eternal feminine” ideology, Daly
does an acute analysis of one "Gertrud von le Fort.” Von le Fort was
comparable to a minor figure of more recent fame whom some

readers will recall: Midge Decter. Like Decter, von le Fort was a
thoroughly male-identified woman, praised and exalted by men,
functioning as "the ultimate weapon in the hands of the boys.’’4
Unlike Decter, however, the German author had a quality of per¬
versity characteristic of the committed conservative which actually
could inspire creative insight, if her words were wrenched out of
their old semantic context, heard with new ears, and understood
backward so that the meaning came out straight. For example, Daly
cites von le Fort as saying: "The priesthood could not be confided to
woman, for thereby the very meaning of woman in the Church
would have been eliminated” (p. 150). As a Catholic Feminist,
Daly was incensed at the statement, and understandably so. How¬
ever, were she here now, listening with new ears, I think that she
would have to concede that the statement is literally correct. The
problem with the statement’s author, of course, was. that she wanted
to retain "the very meaning of woman in the Church,” that is, the
oppression of women under the guise of "the eternal feminine”
mystique. Daly wanted to do away with the oppression and keep
the church, a contradiction which I have already discussed. I can
only emphasize that for her to have seen the contradiction would
have placed her in the now/here, which in her time would have
meant nowhere.
I was genuinely pleased with Daly’s analysis and refutation of
male writers on the subject of women in the 1960’s A.D. (for ex¬
ample, Bouyer, Arnold, Danniel, Oliver, Alberione) and her dis¬
section of more ancient authors still popular in her time, such as
Claudel and Teilhard de Chardin. Moreover, as I read on into her
analysis of "the divine plan” and "Mary the model of all women,” I
chuckled and became caught up into the mood. Hopefully, this ad¬
mission of personal reaction will not appear too self-indulgent to
the reader. It is sometimes difficult for a grateful disciple to sustain
the role of stern critic.
The plain fact is that I found little to disagree with in this chapter.
I must say, however, that while Daly was not exactly incorrect in
attributing the perpetuation of "Marian devotion” to a celibate
clergy, I do find a tendency to overstress the difference between the
4 Phrase originated by Robin Morgan in her poem ''The One That Got Away
or The Woman Who Made It” in Monster (Vintage Books, New York: Random
House, 1972, A.F.), p. 70.
male chauvinism of priests and that of married men or any other

men who have sexual relationships with women. Thus she wrote,
that "normal day to day relationships . . . alone can provide a
realistic understanding of persons of the opposite sex” (p. 160).
Understandably, she was particularly annoyed at the obtuseness of
Catholic celibate clerics. Moreover, she could not have foreseen
fully all of the questions which feminist thinkers of our now/here
are raising about the notion of "normalcy.” According to con¬
temporary feminist analysis the "day to day relationships” between
the sexes considered "normal” in sexist society—even since, or rather
especially since, the so-called "sexual revolution”—are intolerably
nonpersonal, oppressive, and dehumanizing. Indeed, so-called “per¬
sonal relationships” within a sexist society are seldom productive of
realistic understanding of "the other,” but rather tend to perpetuate
the vicious circle of stereotypes. Of course, Daly herself was by no
means lacking in insight concerning this vicious circle. In fact, she
had made this very point earlier in the book in her discussion of the
patristic period, where she described the inferiority enforced upon
women through socialization, which made females seem "naturally”
defective (pp. 86-87). I wish it were possible to say to her: "Re¬
member this insight and apply it consistently when analyzing your
own culture. You know that the personal is political. Your own
book displays this knowledge, even if the language in which it is
expressed seems to me a bit archaic.”'
At the end of this chapter, our author points to the fading out of
the myth of the "eternal feminine” in her time, despite the hopes
that had been expressed by such authors as Berdyaev and Rilke for
its future resurrection. I believe that she was correct in this opinion,
as far as it went. She could not have foreseen that feminists of the
future would begin to probe into a deeper past than that recorded
in patriarchal history and to express hope for a more authentic re¬
birth than that of the male-made "eternal feminine.”5 She could
not have guessed that in 1975 A.F. women would be speaking of a
Second Coming of Women.
5 See Elizabeth Gould Davis, The First Sex (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books,
1971 A.F.).
CHAPTER FIVE
The Demon of Sexual Prejudice: An Exercise in Exorcism
As I began to read this temptingly titled chapter, it struck me

that "prejudice” is not a word that I myself would choose to describe
the killing off of women’s potential, the gynocide which is really the
subject of this chapter. In short, I would choose or create a stronger
word than "prejudice.” Moreover, it struck me forcibly that once
again the lead citation is from a male. This had crossed my mind
when reading the second and fourth chapters, but now my discom¬
fort had increased. "Why would Daly have adopted such an inap¬
propriate tactic in a feminist work?” I muttered to myself
querulously. But I caught myself immediately. "After all,” I
countered, "just how many feminist writings were available to her
when she was writing this book in 1965-1967 A.D.?”The move¬
ment as we know it had not yet surfaced, and the nineteenth century
"first wave” of feminism had been submerged, its writings buried in
obscure corners of twentieth century libraries. Daly did, after all,
unearth many of the twentieth century A.D. feminist sources, as well
as the most influential oppressive texts from the long Judeo-
Christian history. Were it not for her research and carefully noted
bibliographical data, I would not have been aware of these resources.
Nor would I have been moved to "discover” other foremothers, like
Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Sojourner Truth, Matilda Joslyn Gage, or
Virginia Woolf. So I will content myself with mentally inserting
appropriate remarks from these and other great women at the be¬
ginnings of the male-headed chapters. I shall call this little game
"Fill in the Blank,” and I invite all readers to join me. Any number
can play, but the game is particularly bewitching if there are seven
(or multiples of seven) players.6
But I must proceed. In this chapter Daly discusses the mechanisms
of "role psychology” in a way which I find refreshing. She never
regresses to a merely intrapsychic perspective, but rather analyzes
6 This numerological suggestion was made by Linda Barufaldi during a con¬

versation in June, 1974 A.F.
the mechanisms of projection, introjection, and self-fulfilling proph¬

ecy as dynamics of a destructive socialization process. I am pleased
that she never resorts to the device of "blaming the victim.” She
adeptly uses the sparse data available to her, indicating that there
are connections between the imposition of passive self-images upon
women and poor intellectual performance. Moreover, she makes
the reader aware of the destruction of women’s creativity by the
anxieties which sexist society inflicts upon females who refuse to
conform to self-stunting stereotypes. Unavailable to our author was
the research of Matina Horner, well known among our contem¬
poraries, which demonstrates that a “fear of success” has plagued
women and hampered intellectual performance. Nevertheless, her
"reading” of the problem was quite consistent with Horner’s find¬
ings.
Although I am in basic agreement with this section, I sense an
incompleteness, an absence of explication of Daly’s remark that “it
is very possible that genetic factors dispose boys to be more ag¬
gressive than girls” (p. 173). Within her context this statement
seems almost like a grudging but honest admission of a possibly
innate liability in females. If we are dealing with something "in¬
nate” here (and this is still unknown), I should be inclined to see it
as an asset of women. Of course, the basic premise of this section is
that the polarization of the sexes into "aggressive” as opposed to
"passive” personalities is primarily the effect of socialization proc¬
esses, which have created exaggerated and mutilating "psychologi¬
cal” differences between the sexes, having little or no causal basis in
innate biological differences. Still, I would have liked some discus¬
sion here of the negative aspects of male "aggressivity.” While I am
sure that when Daly used the word "aggressive” she had in mind a
healthy propensity for self-affirmation, desperately needed and to be
encouraged in women, I myself tend to think also of less palatable
meanings when I hear this term. I immediately envisage a complex
web of meanings, implying both life-affirming and destructive
tendencies. Of course, I am conscious of this complex network of
meanings because in our time the horrors associated with male
"aggressivity” are unavoidably obvious. One of the most haunting
questions for feminists now is: Will the male propensity for ag¬
gressivity and violence (which I often call rapism)—whether com¬
pletely the result of socialization or partially innate—result in the
destruction of the human species? In our space/time, having wit-
nessed a great upsurge in the number of rapes of our sisters, having

recognized as manifestations of rapism the rape of southeast Asia, of
racial minorities, and of the environment, and having retained a
clear memory of the history of Watergate and the Nixionian God¬
fathers, feminists cannot possibly hear the word "aggressive” in a
totally positive sense. I am not disagreeing with Daly’s intention
here, which I believe I understand quite well. She wanted women to
affirm our great strength and largely untapped creative potential.
But I want to point out dimensions of the problem of "aggressivity”
which historical events have rendered too painfully obvious to
ignore. As Adrienne Rich has written:
A man’s world. But finished.

They themselves have sold it to the machines.7
As I read the section, "Effects upon the man-woman relationship,”

a few problems came to mind. I have already pointed out the im¬
portance of naming the female first. Thus the more proper ex¬
pression would be "woman-man relationship,” which would function
to correct, or balance, what she herself calls the built-in bias of her
culture. Even in our now/here, as we experience the growth of New
.Amazon culture, it is important to counter the culture-lag of those
who have not entered the new time/space and who attempt to
control thought through imposing old grammar and old words. We
are, after all, still in a transitional stage.
If I could leap back into the past and confront the author on her
own territory, I would casually raise some other questions about the
section. After praising her work and admitting that the section is
lucidly written and ahead of its time, I would then ask: "But why
do you worry about elements of the 'Eternal Woman’ myth as
'disastrous for marriage’ (p. 174)? Why not discuss the possibility
that marriage itself is a disaster? If you mean that the myth is
destructive for personal relationships I could not agree more. But I
wish you would put caution aside and stop talking in such in¬
stitutional terms.”
I would then pursue my critique in something like the following
manner: "You were lucky to have found one .psychoanalyst, this
Lussier, who wrote something worth quoting to support your views,
but you might have emphasized that he was an exception within his
7 From "Waking in the Dark” in Diving into the Wreck (New York: W.
W. Norton and Company, 1973 A.F.), p. 8.
profession. You know that not only clerics but also most analysts
and therapists have promoted exactly the kind of nightmarish
marital situations that you—and this Lussier—deplore.”
If I thought I still had her attention, I would continue: "Now,
about that quote from Betty Friedan on page 176: Why did you let
the implied negative value judgment on homosexuality go by with¬
out serious questioning? I realize that this issue was not your pri¬
mary focus of concern when you cited this passage. Rather, you were
pleading the cause of married women who also have careers (which
was Friedan’s intention, as well). But why did you allow to go un¬
criticized the implication that homosexual preference is a sign of
defect or failure on anyone’s part? Negative judgments upon homo¬
sexuality stem from a patriarchal social system which has a vested
interest in the nuclear family as the only 'legitimate’ life-style. In a
postpatriarchal culture, the labels 'homosexual’ and 'heterosexual,’
if retained at all, will be value-free.”
It is my opinion that Daly would have listened to these views and
considered them, were I able to make such a time trip into the past
and make myself visible and audible. But unfortunately, voices from
the future are harder to hear than those of the past. Here is her book,
solid and visible before me. I have the distinct advantage of under¬
standing her better than she could comprehend me.
Before I leave this chapter, I must say that the last section, "the
task of exorcism,” really pleased me. The author shows the phallacies
of tokenism and points out that the way to exorcism is changing
women’s image by raising up our own images in our lives. It is un¬
fortunate, however, that in the last paragraph she claims that this
will not happen "until favorable conditions are not only allowed
but also encouraged” (p. 178). I certainly do not know who will
"allow” and "encourage” women to raise up our images if not
women ourselves. And who will "remove impediments” and "foster”
the right atmosphere, if not us! It is evident that she was still hoping
for institutional, even churchly, encouragement. In 1975 A.F. we
know that women must recapture our own energy, our own lives.
We must do it ourselves.
CHAPTER SIX
Theological Roots of the Problem: Radical Surgery Required
I agree with the basic theme expressed in the beginning of this

chapter, namely that the misogynism of Christian theology is deep-
rooted and that merely removing symptoms will not cure the disease.
Daly was on the right track here, I believe, and more recent history
proved the soundness of her basic insight. Indeed, theological and
other academic reformers, feeling the pressure from feminists such
as our author herself, attempted to do exactly what she foresaw and
warned against. They tried to remove symptoms, of misogynism
(read: sexism) on a superficial level while remaining fundamentally
oppressive. Essentially this had been a "cover-up” tactic, successfully
deceiving not only the listener or reader but also the speaker or
writer. Not infrequently, "sensitized” authors, professors, and
preachers have been careful to avoid the pseudogeneric "man,” sub¬
stituting such terms as "humankind,” "humanity,” or "people.”
Often they have also avoided the exclusive use of the pronoun "he”
to refer to females and males, carefully adding "or she.” Yet if one
closely examines the content of what is being said, one frequently
finds that it is subtly oppressive, calculated to confuse those easily
satisfied with superficial grammatical reform. Some liberal theo¬
logians of the period following the First Coming of The Church
and the Second Sex also attempted to make minor adjustments in
the use of religious imagery. For example, they sometimes omitted
the term "Father” when referring to Ultimate Reality, but they al¬
most invariably compensated for this concession by stressing the
unique importance of the God-Man, Jesus. Evidently some women
were deceived by this "Band-Aid” treatment of Christianity’s sexism.
In contrast to this inadequate First (and Last) Aid, which could
hide but not cure the disease of patriarchy, our author’s approach—
despite the fact that she was writing at an earlier time than these
"faith healers” and despite her use of the conventional grammar of
that earlier period—did move in the direction of radical healing.
Naturally, I vainly wish that it had been possible for her to move
even further in that direction. She expressed the view that mis-
ogynism should be seen both as "symptom” and cause of "doctrinal
disorders.” As I was reading, it struck me as truly unfortunate that
she explicitly chose to place primary emphasis upon the idea of anti¬
feminism as a symptom, even though she did state that it was also
at the origin of the "doctrinal disorders” which perpetuate it (p.
179). I cannot refrain from pointing out that "doctrinea dis¬
order. I would say that sexism is the basic disorder, the cause of
further disorders, and that we may count among its effects the
existence and content of dogmatic "doctrines.”
Yet a careful reading convinces me that Daly was moving in the
direction of saying exactly this herself. She explicitly states that the
cause-effect relationship between misogynism and distorted "doc¬
trines” is not "one-way,” that it is more accurately described as a
"vicious circle” (p. 180). Moreover, even when she discusses anti¬
feminism as a "symptom” having roots in "the problem of con¬
ceptualizations, images, and attitude concerning God” (p. i8off),
she shows that these "conceptualizations, images, and attitudes” are
male-centered. Thus, even when she is allegedly writing of mis¬
ogynism as a "symptom,” the disorder of which it is a "symptom”
turns out to be really a more deeply hidden form of misogynism, or
at least androcentrism. Even when she writes of distortions in tradi¬
tional notions of divinity which she describes as "quite distinct from
vague identifications of God with the male sex,” she says in the same
breath that such warped ideas "may well be connected with these
[male] identifications” (p. 181). Fortunately, in our time, the
problem can be described more directly and unequivocally: I would
say that sexist conceptualizations, images, and attitudes concerning
God, spawned in a patriarchal society, tend to breed more sexist
ideas and attitudes, and together these function to legitimate and
perpetuate sexist institutions and behavior. Briefly, if God is male,
then the male is God.
Daly rightly claims that such concepts as "divine immutability”
and "divine omnipotence” function to justify misogynism. I would
add that since these very notions of "divine attributes” originated in
a patriarchal society, of course they do support the vested interests
of such a society. Basic changelessness, or what she calls "the static
world view,” is essential to patriarchy, no matter how much the
patriarchs may prattle about "progress,” "revolution,” and "change.”
This is inevitably so, because the only genuinely radical progress,
revolution, and change would be the upheaval of patriarchy itself—
movement beyond patriarchy. As for the idea of a unique, closed
"revelation” in the past, which she discusses on page 184, that too
is a product of the sexual caste system, and it functions to perpetuate
that system, to keep it closed. I agree with Daly, then, that there is
a vicious circle, that there are circles within circles, that misogynism
breeds misogynism, but I think it is misleading to write of mis¬
ogynism as a "symptom.” Sexism is the disease, the planetary
disease. It is also the demon she was trying to name.
The section entitled "Other theological developments required”
made me uncomfortable. Daly wanted to see the church not merely
as an institution but also as a movement in the world. This bifocal
vision of course allowed her to perform a delicate balancing act—
seeming to be both in and out of the church. Whatever she thought
of the institution, she could still hopefully identify with the church
as movement. This was a common enough approach in her time,
and strange though it may seem to us in the now/here, it did not
involve conscious or intentional dishonesty. Since I have some under¬
standing of her situation, I realize that it was virtually impossible
for her then to recognize the implications of the fact that the church
was an oppressive social reality. If my voice could carry back into
her world I would cry out as loud as possible: "Listen! When you
can say 'No’ to the institution you can begin to say a clearer and
more effective 'Yes’ to real movement in the world, your movement,
the movement of your sisters—past, present, and future. Then you
will really be able to talk about "Incarnation”—not some sup¬
posedly unique, male-deifying event locked forever in the past—but
the incarnate movement of your sisters. Then you will think and
speak about a Fall that matters, that is here and yet still on its way
—a Fall into freedom.”
But Daly was writing about traditional concepts and trying des¬
perately to do something about them. Nor was she totally unsuc¬
cessful. It was her critique of the story of the Fall that led me to
think of the women’s revolution as a Fall into free space, beyond
patriarchal good and evil. It seemed to me, as I meditated upon her
obviously difficult struggle to undistort all the "doctrinal distor¬
tions,” that I myself might as well continue to go all the way.
Our author writes that "the theology of marriage is in a state of

transition, but the work is by no means completed” (p. 187). I
hope that I will not seem overly ironic if I remark that it does now
seem to have been completed. She adds that "the theology of the
sacrament of Holy Orders has also suffered from a lack of balance”
(p. 187). Since I am familiar with the sources available to her, I
can honestly say that I couldn’t agree more. Fortunately, that, too,
is finished.
I do not mean to imply that I think Daly was completely wrong
in hoping for a "development of doctrine,” but I think the old words
failed her. What had to occur was a qualitative leap beyond
patriarchal "doctrine.” When women enter feminist postchristian
time/ space, whatever might have been genuine in "doctrine” is not
lost but rather transformed, wrenched out of the old context, as we
are iiving, willing, thinking, being our own thoughts. If some reality
to which a Christian doctrine was trying to point survives this leap
into the postchristian context, that is all right, but what matters is
that we survive and keep moving.
As I began to read the next section, "Needed: special attention
to the problem,” I felt genuine surprise to find the author at this
point in the book now modestly writing of "women and the church”
in a special section, since this is clearly the subject of her entire
book. Since I know well that she was not an illogical person, I tried
to find reasons for this seeming illogic. As I read over the material
and thought about the environment in which it was produced, I
understood the reasons. First, there was a special situation demand¬
ing her attention, namely the fact that some of her contemporaries
and some theologians of an even earlier period had written books
and articles about "the theology of woman.” Daly had to show that
while there was a real problem centering around "theology” and
"women,” the answer to it could not be a "theology of woman.”
Writings of this genre invariably were concerned mainly with per¬
petuating the "Eternal Feminine” stereotype while ignoring the
problems of real women. She had to perform the delicate operation
of refuting these, while at the same time stressing that there was
indeed a special focus needed upon the subject of women and
religion. Second, I think it did not seem as strange to her as it does
to me that there would be a special section on women and the
church in her book on women and the church, because she was
affected by the intellectual climate in which she was immersed.
There was strong pressure from this environment which made her
feel that the subject of her entire book still had to be seen in a
"broader theological context.” Understanding this atmosphere, I
find the section understandable. In fact, I find it valuable, since in
fact she gives here a strong, though cautiously worded, argument
that this "broader theological context” was rooted in patriarchy and
was therefore warped (read: sexist) at its roots. Moreover, her
analysis of the ill logic involved in the "theology of woman” is not
only very credible to such a critic as myself, but also useful, since
this ideological monstrosity was later superseded in patriarchal uni¬
versities by a similarly phallacious ideology, known as "the psy¬
chology of woman,” to which her critique is applicable.8
Daly concludes the chapter by clearly indicating the obstacles to
the development of a "liberating theological anthropology”—ob¬
stacles which still exist outside feminist now/here. Although I
would not of course choose the expression "theological anthro¬
pology,” I will not indulge in a lengthy quibble over her choice of
an expression which surely was one of the better semantic options
available for expressing her idea. Today we are creating feminist
theory out of women’s experience. This is, after all, what she was
striving toward.
CHAPTER SEVEN
Toward Partnership: Some Modest Proposals
I have already commented upon the title of this chapter. Women

discovering self-actualization in sisterhood in 1975 A.F. rarely talk
of "partnership” with men, since this term seems to imply an un¬
speakable poverty of imagination, as if we could glimpse nothing
more desirable than an equal piece of the patriarchal pie. More¬
over, we know clearly that there can be no easy reconciliation or
"cheap grace,” that this is a time of struggle. From where I am, as I
read this chapter, Daly appears unrealistic in her hopes for "dialogue
and cooperation between men and women” (p. 195). She could not
8 Our contemporary feminist psychologists have critiqued and refuted pseudo¬
psychology. See especially Phyllis Chesler, Women and Madness (New York:
Doubleday, 1972 A.F.).
then have understood fully what we know through shared ex¬

perience and through uncovering the histories of our foremothers
which were erased and reversed in patriarchal "history”—that sexist
socialization is unspeakably deep and self-perpetuating in the A.D.
time/space, that the rapism of males and of male institutions is not
easily unlearned. It is axiomatic among us that women and men are
not coming from the same place, that it is impossible to "dialogue”
on equal terms with the oppressor.
Although Daly’s proposals for the eradication of "discrimination”
within the Catholic church were eminently reasonable within the
context of "reform,” the hierarchy of the Catholic church was
eminently unwilling to listen to reason, continuing to oppress
women by enforcing the "feminine” footstool/pedestal role in¬
doctrination. In 1974 A.D. Paul, the last pope, sensing vibrations of
feminist energy that penetrated back through the smog of A.D.
time, attempted to co-opt that energy by proposing that Mary was
the Model of the Liberated Woman. His document clearly revealed
that this "true” Woman’s liberation consisted in standing behind
her Man/God. As a result of this document, some women laughed
so heartily that they shook themselves almost over the edge into
1974 Anno Feminarum. Other women, who had already reached
the edge, noted with interest this glaring manifestation of the
phenomenon of patriarchal reversal. Mary, remnant of the ancient
Mother Goddess of the prepatriarchal age, who had been do¬
mesticated and enchained in Christian mythology, was being placed
on display—chains and all—as The Liberated Woman.
Our author’s proposals received a different kind of attention from
leaders within the Protestant segments of Christianity, who were
more inclined to "listen to reason,” offering women token op¬
portunities which served to hide the nature of the monster Daly was
trying to reform—patriarchal religion. In apparent contrast to the
Catholic hierarchs’ blatant insistence upon polarization of the hu¬
man species into "feminine” and "masculine” roles, liberal Protes¬
tants used a tactic which I have named false inclusion, that is,
incorporation of some women into "masculine” roles. Although this
gave some the impression that there was a great difference between
Catholic and Protestant Christianity in relation to "the problem” of
women, the fact is that in their basic behavior patterns the God¬
fathers "on both sides” were on the same side, drearily alike.
Daly correctly sensed that some of her more modest proposals for
Catholicism would grudgingly be granted and that a more adequate
test of Catholic sincerity about "equality” would be the issue of
women priests. Hence there is a rather lengthy section devoted to
this subject. If by a stretch, or rather a shrinkage, of my imagination
I were to accept her basic premise that "reform” of the Catholic
church might have been possible and desirable, I would have to
agree with this priority as well as with her arguments. Yet I cannot
easily overcome my sense of dismay that the integrity of her position
required such an expenditure of energy in the refutation of bigots
who deserved no reply. Feminists of our time, of course, are careful
about wastage of energy. We have learned from our study of history
that "dialoguing” with the mindless ideologists of patriarchal reli¬
gion is useless bloodshed, timeshed, spiritshed.9 We have learned to
use a kind of power which I have named power of absence, which
is possible because we are present to each other.
I think that a key to the apparent puzzle of why Daly kept trying
can be found in her response to the argument that "the priest
represents Christ and therefore must be male.” She countered this
by claiming that such a statement "betrays a distorted understanding
of the meaning of Christ . . . giving prior importance to his male¬
ness rather than to his humanity” (p. 199). I am afraid that it was
Daly, and not the conservatives, who had missed the point about
the Christ symbol. She was trying to transcend the untranscendable,
that is, the message of male supremacy contained in the symbolic
medium itself. That did not work, as history has shown.
At the same time, our author was prophetic, without realizing
the full implications of what she was saying, when she wrote that
"the very suggestion that the same individual could be the bearer of
these two images ["woman” and "priest”] is a declaration that an
age has ended and another has begun” (pp. 206-207). If my read¬
ing is accurate, the age which she perceived—at least on some level
of consciousness—as moving toward its end was the patriarchal
epoch. But the implications of this insight were too overwhelming
to be understood all at once, in an era in which no recognizable
"cognitive minority” was there to support a vision that would run
9 "Timeshed” and "spiritshed” are new words created by Virginia Woolf. See
her book Three Guineas (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1938 A.F.),
p. 64.
totally counter to the prevailing world-view. She saw hierarchies

disappearing, priestly caste disappearing, but she did not yet foresee
the bonding of women in sisterhood, an exodus community that
would leave behind the destroyers to die of their own internal ail¬
ments.
The reader of this review has already been partially prepared for
the content of the next section, which is on "the nun.” The assess¬
ment here of the predicament of nuns seems to me essentially ac¬
curate. Of course, the idea of the "emerging nun” was destined to
self-destruct, since "emerging” would seem to have its logical con¬
sequence in ceasing to be a "nun.” Daly’s discussion of the ad¬
vantages which the nuns had "in the past” over married women
contains a statement that some sisters in the women’s movement
might find quaint. I refer to the statement that "she paid the price
of isolation from the male” (p. 211). Of course, I think that Daly
was right in isolating "isolation” as a major difficulty, but we now
realize that the more essential problem for all women in all "states
of life” has been isolation from each other. The fact of living under
the same roof, whether harem roof, convent roof, apartment build¬
ing roof, or suburban split-level roof, has not guaranteed any real
bonding among women. The invisible walls between women, con¬
structed of economic and emotional dependency upon men, divided
consciousness, self-hatred, and horizontal hostility, had been made
so thick that genuine and effective bonding was extremely difficult
not only in the past that preceded Daly’s era, but also in the past
which was her era.
The last section of the chapter assures us that the "reformed,
democratized church of the future is not yet here” (p. 213). Indeed,
it wasn’t there, and it isn’t here either. While this fact was "painfully
obvious” to our author, it is no less obvious but far less painful to
me. In her hope that the "old order” would be overcome by the
church, which she vainly wished would become "God’s avant-garde,”
Daly overlooked the fact that the church and churchly inveterately
have been the rear guard of the old order.
Her hope extended to institutions other than the church, but her
analysis of these also often reveals that the wealth of experience
which the process of the feminist revolution has brought to us was
unavailable to her. For example, she writes that "single-sex educa¬
tional institutions . . . should wherever possible evolve into, or be
replaced by, coeducational institutions” (p. 215). This might puzzle

those who are working today toward the creation of feminist uni¬
versities. Once again, I must point out that understanding the
author’s historical situation helps resolve the puzzle. The isolation
of women in nonfeminist colleges (all women’s colleges) was ap¬
palling to her, since these reinforced feminine stereotypes. Struggling
against this, she and her contemporaries looked to coeducation as
the answer. Implicit in this "solution,” of course, was the idea of
"equality” as the feminist goal. Subsequent experience demonstrated
that "equality” in fact did not happen in the so-called coeducational
institutions, which feminists now generally perceive as subeduca-
tional. The "normal day to day encounters” were not infrequently
rape in one form or another (physical or mental), especially follow¬
ing the "sexual revolution.” The instances when male members of
the university "community” did work together with female members
nonexploitatively were not frequent enough to affect the general
atmosphere or to alter the normal functioning of sexual politics.
Not only were administrators and professors by and large sexist
(even if not "intentionally” so), but the curriculum content also
was hopelessly androcentric. Today, we are experimenting with new
forms of woman-centered, woman-controlled studies which make it
possible to learn our own history and think our own thoughts. Of
course, since 1975 A.F. is still a transitional time, our methods of
surviving subeducation are shifting and diverse. Our programs,
courses, and centers are separate spaces created on the boundary of
these "educational” institutions. It is through living "on the
boundary” that women gather energy to use the resources worth
using at these institutions and to create our own resources.
Daly touches upon other institutions, such as the "field” of
medicine, politics, and the media. She could not have foreseen the
women’s health revolution that began with Self Help clinics, in
which women are recapturing control of our own bodies, relearning
and adding to the wisdom of our foremothers who were healers and
therefore burned as witches. She could not have foreseen the col¬
lective indecent exposures of the political "system” and the legal
profession, epitomized in the Watergate affair, which radicalized our
sisters’ understanding of politics and inspired our redefinition of
"politics.” Nor could she have foreseen the escalated obscenity of
the media, particularly of the non-newscasters, "talk show modera-
tors, and advertisers, whose nocturnal emissions and diurnal ejacula¬

tions penetrate our television screens, landing half-noticed before
the glazed stares of their viewers in a hundred million "living”
rooms. An increased understanding of the media’s functioning in
sexist society has inspired a more cautious assessment of its possibili¬
ties by feminists today.
Appropriately, the chapter concludes with a remark about "the
mounting suspicion in the minds of many that Christianity—par¬
ticularly as it is embodied in the Catholic church—is the inevitable
enemy of human progress (p. 219). It is my suspicion that this
was Daly’s own suspicion—though perhaps not yet fully acknow¬
ledged by herself—and that it was mounting.
CONCLUSION
The Second Sex and the Seeds of Transcendence
I sighed when I read this title, asking myself if she really had to
choose the word "seeds.” It struck me as curiously fitting that the
lead citation was from Joan of Arc. Joan had at least made a partial
escape from patriarchy (as had Daly, in her own way). Joan’s
escape was significant enough to require that the church kill her
(and later make her a "Christian saint”—the ultimate conquest of
her independence), but it was indeed partial, since her stature was
reduced to that of the Virgin-Warrior who aids men to fulfill men’s
goals. The ambiguous and partial quality of Joan’s escape is sug¬
gested by the content of the lead citation itself: "I do best by obey¬
ing and serving my sovereign Lord—that is, God” (p. 220). It
seems that Joan was able to defy the earthly "lords” because of an
ultimate—and ultimately masochistic—dependence upon the super¬
latively sadistic Lord-God who willed her torture and death.
Of course, Daly’s attention was focused not upon this ultimate
"obeying and serving” but upon Joan’s escape from the earthly
masters. However, as I read the title of the conclusion and this cita¬
tion together, it did concern me that the "seeds of transcendence”
might subintentionally have been envisaged (either by Daly or by
her readers) as this sovereign Lord’s product. In that case, the
Second Sex, dreaming of transcendence, would find itself forever
supine on the Procrustean bed of "the Sovereign Lord.” (It is no
accident that some of our sisters today have chosen to name their
feminist newspaper "Off Our Backs.”)
It may be objected that I am seeing too much in the imagery
here, which was, after all, the ordinary language of Christians. But
the problem, as I see it, is that Daly herself was not in a situation
which could enable her to examine this imagery closely enough.
Nor, to my knowledge, was anyone else of her time. However, the
most important point of her book’s conclusion is not its archaic
imagery but rather her affirmation that "the world is moving” (p.
220). The difference between de Beauvoir and herself, as she per¬
ceived it, was a difference between despair and hope. While I am
not so sure that de Beauvoir was totally despairing, I am convinced
that Daly’s hope was real, although it was not focused clearly
enough. Like de Beauvoir, she expressed the wish that "men and
women can learn to 'set their pride beyond the sexual differentia¬
tion’ ” (p. 223). The time had not yet arrived when women would
learn to set our pride not only beyond but also in the sexual dif¬
ferentiation—not in the differentiation as defined by the patriarchs
("the eternal feminine”), but as defined by us. This pride, we now
know, is rooted in Amazon power.
Feminist Postchristian Conclusion to the Feminist

Postchristian Introduction
As critic, what have I managed to say of this work? It has made

me alternately exasperated and joyful. The biographical data ac¬
cessible to me concerning the author indicates that she was not an
overly modest person, so I don’t think she would mind my saying
that she helped to build a tradition in which I now participate. I
would be less than just if I failed to acknowledge this. I have found
the work worth studying at this time, and I recommend it to scholars
who wish to understand the process of the feminist movement.
I realize that a review of the kind I have undertaken may invite
an onslaught of criticism from all sides. Some may rush to accuse
me of asserting myself as the world’s leading Dalyan scholar and
disciple. I can only assure these critics that I approached this task
with timidity; yet it did seem that I had been called, both by train¬
ing and circumstances, to take on this work.
I realize, too, that others may criticize me for "attacking” a
feminist, for even though her work dates from another period, the
fact that her book has been brought into the limelight again may
make it appear to be in "competition” with my own. I can only re¬
peat that I feel no unsisterly sense of competition, but rather only
gratitude for her influence over my own formative years.
Let me make it perfectly clear that I can foresee some of the com¬
ments that may appear in reviews of this review, or at the very least
in the conversations of my critics. Perhaps in this time of paper
shortage I can prevent some unnecessary use of these resources by
anticipating what some will feel compelled to say:
"Daly has now gone off the deep end.”

—Liberal Catholic
"I saw this coming in 1968.”

—Conservative Catholic
"Unscholarly, abrasive, slick.”

—Bosstown College Administrator
"Ladies, this is a broadside.”

—Token Woman, U.W.I.H.O.B.10
"She misunderstands both Daly and Saint Paul.”

—Radical Catholic
"I fear that she will not be taken seriously by the male theological
establishment.”
—Catholic Feminist
"Her problem has progressed from a simple case of penis envy to

a rare and convoluted delusory form of castration anxiety.”
—Eminent Psychologist
"Despite her disclaimers, she still belongs to the Judeo-Christian

tradition.”
—Liberal Protestant Professor
"She should join the Unitarian Universalists.”

—Unitarian Universalist
10 Meaning: "Ultimate weapon in the hands.of the boys.” See Robin Morgan’s
poem, "The One That Got Away,” in Monster, p. 70.
yy
"Tasteless.
—Anonymous
"Stunning! ”
—Myself
I will conclude this conclusion simply by stating that whatever

the response or nonresponse of others may be, I have enjoyed this
discussion with the 1968 A.D. Daly. Perhaps others will find it
profitable. I hope so, because the hope that a time/space seven
woman-light years ahead of now will come into be-ing depends
upon our patient efforts to build up a feminist tradition.
This hope will be fulfilled only if women continue to make
qualitative leaps in living our transcendence. A short-circuited hope
of transcendence has caused many to remain inside churches, and
patriarchal religion sometimes has seemed to satisfy the hunger for
transcendence. The problem has been that both the hunger and the
satisfaction generated within such religions have to a great extent
alienated women from our deepest aspirations. Spinning in vicious
circles of false needs and false consciousness, women caught on the
patriarchal wheel have not been able to experience women’s own
experience.
I suggest that what women require is ludic cerebration, the free
play of intuition in our own space, giving rise to thinking that is
vigorous, informed, multidimensional, independent, creative, tough.
Ludic cerebration is thinking out of experience. I do not mean the
experience of dredging out All That Was Wrong with Mother or of
instant intimacy in group encounters or of waiting at the doctoral
dispensary or of self-lobotomization in order to publish, perish, and
then be promoted. I mean the experience of be-ing. Be-ing is the
verb that says the dimensions of depth in all verbs, such an intuiting,
reasoning, loving, imaging, making, acting, as well as the courag-
ing, hoping, and playing that are always there when one is really
living.
It may be that some new things happen within patriarchy, but
one thing essentially stays the same: women are always marginal
beings. From this vantage point of the margin it is possible to look
at what is between the margins with the lucidity of The Compleat
Outsider. To change metaphors: the systems within the System do
not appear so radically different from each other to those excluded
by all. Hope for a qualitative leap lies in us by reason of that
deviance from the "norm” which was first imposed but which can
also be chosen on our own terms. This means that there has td be a
shift from "acceptable” female deviance (characterized by triviality,
diffuseness, dependence upon others for self-definition, low self¬
esteem, powerlessness) to deviance which may be unacceptable to
others but which is acceptable to the self and is self-acceptance.
For women concerned with philosophical/theological questions,
it seems to me, this implies the necessity of some sort of choice. One
either tries to avoid "acceptable” deviance ("normal” female idiocy)
by becoming accepted as a male-identified professional, or else one
tries to make the qualitative leap toward self-acceptable deviance as
ludic cerebrator, questioner of everything, madwoman, and witch.11
I do mean witch. The heretic who rejects the idols of patriarchy
and therefore refuses to bow down before the God"Method”is the
blasphemous creatrix of her own thoughts. She is finding her life
and intends not to lose it.
The witch that smoulders within feminist philosophical and
theological questioners can blaze forth. In spite of our Ph.D.’s (our
disease of degrees), it is possible to refuse intellectual servitude and
the degrading "honors” that are its rewards. To borrow from Nazim
Hikmet (courtesy of Roger Garoudy):
If I do not burn,
If you do not burn,
If we do not burn,
How shall the shadows
Become light?
The witch that smolders within every woman who cared and
dared enough to become a theologian or philosopher in the first
place seems to be crying out these days: "Light my fire!” The
qualitative leap of those flames of spiritual imagination and cerebral
fantasy can be a new dawn. I hope that we won’t trade this birth¬
right (the right to give birth to ourselves) for a mess of professional
respectability.
Virginia Woolf knew of the need for a feminist tradition, when
she wrote of her hope for the eventual arrival of Shakespeare’s
II Another way of expressing "questioner of everything” is to say “Non¬
questioner”—an expression which I frequently use to convey the fact that
women’s most important questions are treated as nonquestions by those in
patriarchal A.D. time, especially academics. See Beyond God the Father, Intro¬
duction.
sister.12 I hope for the arrival also of the sisters of Plato, of Aristotle,
of Kant, of Nietzsche: sisters who will not merely "equal” them,
but do something different, something immeasurably more. I dream
of these, my sisters, as drawing from the vision of our past and future
foremothers, waking the human species to glimpse still further stars.
12 See A Room of One’s Own (Harbinger Books, New York: Harcourt, Brace,
and World, 1929 A.F.), pp. 48-50, 117-18.
*
'
• •
.
CHAPTER ONE
The Case Against the Church
‘Christian ideology has contributed no little to the

oppression of woman’
Simone de Beauvoir
Those engaged in the struggle for the equality of the sexes

have often seen the Catholic Church as an enemy. This view
is to a large extent justified, for Catholic teaching has prolonged
a traditional view of woman which at the same time idealizes
and humiliates her. It is precisely this ambivalence, characteristic
of so many Catholic utterances about women, which those com¬
mitted to improving the legal, professional and economic
condition of women find deplorable.
Proponents of equality charge that there is inexcusable hypo¬
crisy in a species of ecclesiastical propaganda which pretends to
put woman on a pedestal but which in reality prevents her from
genuine self-fulfillment and from active, adult-size participa¬
tion in society. They point out that symbolic idealization tends
to dupe women into satisfaction with the narrow role imposed
upon them. Made to feel guilty or ‘unnatural’ if they rebel,
many have been condemned to a restricted or mutilated exis¬
tence in the name of religion. Moreover, the Church has been
described as a pressure group exercising influence on the prac¬
tical level, through whatever press media and political, reli¬
gious and social organizations it controls, to prevent changes
which would improve the condition of women. Thus it is main¬
tained, with supporting documentation, that
‘wherever the Catholic Church is strongly implanted, in the

countries where it is the state religion or simply the dominant re¬
ligion, the hierarchy has always persisted in maintaining woman
53
in her traditional situation of inferiority, and in opposing every

liberal reform capable of improving her condition in the family
and in society.’1
So effective has the conservative pressure and propaganda

been, that this idealizing ideology is accepted and perpetuated
not only by coundess members of the clergy, but indeed by
many women. Fascinated by an exalted symbol of ‘Woman’,
they are not disposed to understand the distress imposed upon
coundess real, existing women.
In the light of this state of affairs the Catholic Church appears
to many as the last stronghold of anachronism and prejudice,
refusing to adapt its structures to the condition of modern
women, still preaching to them the passive virtues of obedience,
submission and meekness, while seeming to refuse or ignore
the profound aspirations of half the human race to liberty and
full personhood.
It is true, of course, that many Catholic women in America
and other advanced countries do not suffer explicidy from any
of this, and accordingly they are not aware of any real problem.
To reach and convince such persons, recent writers of feminist
polemic have amassed an impressive body of historical facts.
These demonstrate that in the recent past Catholic bodies have
opposed the right of women to vote and to an adequate educa¬
tion; and that in some regions they still uphold legislation that
will keep married women in what can only be called a condition
of servile economic and legal dependence. Other evidence sup¬
ports the claim that in all countries in which the Catholic
Church is the state religion or the privileged religion—e.g.
Italy, Spain, Portugal—the infidelity of a woman is severely
punished (in some cases, by imprisonment) whereas the man
is punished only if he installs a concubine in the home. In these
countries, moreover, the Church promotes the totalitarian
family: the father has patria potestas over the children, even
if there is a legal separation due to his own wrong-doing, and he
has the administration of the goods of the household. Ecclesias-
1 Andree Michel and Genevieve Texier, La condition de la franfaise d'aujourd-
’hui (Geneve: Editions Gonthier, 1964), t. II, p. 26.
THE CASE AGAINST THE CHURCH 55
tical pressure against birth control fits naturally within this
context of oppression. In the poverty-stricken south of Italy,
it is shown, it is not rare for a woman to have twenty children.
The reduction of the woman to the condition of biological beast,
the spread of delinquency and prostitution coincident with the
multiplication of offspring who cannot be adequately provided
for—critics impute these in large measure to the policy of the
Church which even today, it is charged, continues to combat the
legitimate aspirations of women, justifying this by archaic
ideology, making a fetish of ‘nature’, while ignoring the vocation
of the individual to dominate ‘nature’.1
When it is objected that ecclesiastical attitudes in the ad¬
vanced countries deviate significandy from this ‘traditional’
pattern, the contemporary critics often counter by saying that
any moderation is not indicative of official attitudes, but is in¬
stead necessitated by a cultural milieu hostile to the ‘traditional’
mentality. But this counter-argument is hasty and unconvincing.
While it is impossible honesdy to maintain that it is false, never¬
theless a criticism which does not go further is simplistic and
therefore unsatisfactory. It is better to recognize that, since the
Church is immersed in a wide variety of social situations, in¬
evitably there are various patterns of interaction. The more
progressive milieu produces a more progressive Church. While
this may be seen as an enforced compromise, it would on the
other hand be naive to imagine this modification of the Church
as the stretching of a rubber band which will automatically snap
back to ‘normal’ when the pressure is removed. There is no
compelling reason to preclude the possibility that a progression
is involved. The day-to-day and country-by-country exper¬
ience of the Church is educational, and it brings about
evolution of its doctrine. However slowly, surely the Church
learns somewhat from ‘the world’, and eventually progressive
thinking does have some influence upon the upper regions of
its ponderous organism. If pessimism on this score was plausible
before Vatican II, it is no longer a completely realistic attitude.
On balance, if some of the contemporary criticism of the
1 Ibid., II, pp. 26-40.
Church’s stance on women is over-simplified and unsympathetic,

it is also in large measure supported by indisputable facts.
The very minimum required by intellectual honesty and good
faith is that the questions thus raised be faced by all without
defensiveness, rancor, or dissimulation. There is mounting evi¬
dence of a growing awareness among Catholics that there is a
problem. It is one thing, however, to know that a problem exists
and something else to face it. Moreover, it is essential to any
worthwhile discussion to establish the nature of the problem,
even though its complexity may not allow a very easy
formulation.
The second sex

The problematic of woman’s general situation has, in fact,
been expounded by the French existentialist philosopher,
Simone de Beauvoir, in her famous two-volume work, The
Second Sex—unquestionably the most vigorous and compre¬
hensive as well as influential study of the subject yet produced.
No other work of this genre has approached it in scope and
level of philosophical reflection. A wealth of research in history,
anthropology, biology, psychology, philosophy and theology went
into its making. While few people agree with all of its theses,
no important work on the subject written in the past two de¬
cades has been unaffected by it. Even works intended to
‘answer’ it are in large part derivative. As a French Jesuit scholar
put it: ‘Even where she has been contradicted and, on certain
points, refuted, her influence has left its mark and prevents
one from reposing in the comfort of ready-made ideas.’1 So
pre-eminent is de Beauvoir’s analysis that no one today who
is seriously concerned about the problem can afford to ignore it.
In Simone de Beauvoir’s study, no special section is devoted
to the role of the Church in conditioning women. However, a
vigorous criticism of Catholic ideology and practice is to be
found disseminated throughout its pages. Written by an atheist
who is an adherent of the existentialist philosophy of Jean-Paul
1 Xavier Tilliette, S.J., ‘Le feminisme et les problemes de la femme’. Etudes,

mai, 1965, p. 670.
Sartre, this analysis is characterized by a clinical detachment
which may sometimes shock the sensibilities of the reader who
is a Christian. Yet it is sometimes a wholesome thing to be
shocked into awareness. One would do well to follow the ad¬
vice of Thomas Aquinas to a student who wanted to become
a scholar: ‘Remember the good things that you hear, and do
not consider who says them.’
On the other hand it is true that biographical information
about an author may be the source of insights as to why he sees
things as he does. Thus we know from her memoirs that
Simone de Beauvoir cannot be considered a totally neutral
‘outsider’ as far as the Church is concerned. Brought up by a
pious Catholic mother and an unbelieving father, she un¬
doubtedly experienced conflicting influences from a very young
age. She has vividly conveyed in her memoirs that she had been
a pious little girl and that her early and decisive loss of faith was
not the indifferent drifting of an indecisive personality. Having
experienced Christianity—in a given milieu, to be sure—she
whole-heartedly rejected it.1 If certain dimensions are left out
of her analysis, biographical data may help to explain the
omission. However, such facts do not provide a criterion for
judging what she has written. To attack her book on the basis of
her life is to resort to argumentum ad hominem.
When the numerous passages in The Second Sex which
deal with Christianity in general and the Catholic Church in
particular are collected and examined, it becomes evident that
there are various conceivable ways in which these could be
organized. We shall strive for clarity by bringing into focus the
relatively few major themes touching the Church which recur
in the work and which are direcdy relevant to this study.
Oppression and deception

The first of de Beauvoir’s themes to be considered
is the following: the Christian religion has been an
instrument of the oppression of women. In the Middle Ages,
1 Simone de Beauvoir, Memoirs of a Dutiful Daughter (Harmondsworth,
Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1963), especially pp. 134-40.
‘the canon law -admitted no other matrimonial regime than the

dowry scheme, which made woman legally incompetent and power¬
less. Not only did the masculine occupations remain closed to
her, but she was forbidden to make depositions in court, and her
testimony was not recognized as having weight.’1
Moreover, her worst enemies were the clerics.2 Even though

modern society, at least in the predominantly non-Catholic
countries, has emancipated women from the shackles of oppres¬
sive legislation, the Church has only reluctantly gone along with
this amelioration of her legal status. In fact, ‘the Church is not¬
ably hostile to all measures likely to help in woman’s emanci¬
pation’. Why does the Church want to keep women down?
Because in their dependent condition they are a ‘powerful
trump’ in its hand. ‘There must be religion for women; and
there must be women, “true women”, to perpetuate religion.’3
To de Beauvoir, this oppression is masked by deception.
This has always been the case to some extent, but of course it
has become more necessary in recent years, for modem secular
society will no longer tolerate the oppressive legislation of the
past. Thus: ‘In modem civilization . . . religion seems much
less an instrument of constraint than an instrument of de¬
ception.’4 One form which this deception takes is the distraction
of woman’s attention from present injustice to promises of
rewards in an afterlife. ‘But, above all, it [religion] confirms
the social order, it justifies her resignation, by giving her the
hope of a better future in a sexless heaven.’5 6 Thus, her situation
is that of one who has been duped: ‘The passivity enforced
upon woman is sanctified.... There is no need to do anything
to save her soul, it is enough to live in obedience.’0 This passi-
1 Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, translated by H. M. Parshley (London:

Jonathan Cape, 1953; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1953), p. 98. The
remaining footnote references in this chapter are to the Knopf edition.
2P. 104.
3P. 624.
4P. 621.
5P. 624.
6P. 622.
vity, compensated for by daydreams of rewards in the next life,
is, in fact, a curse:
‘The curse that is upon woman as vassal consists ... in the fact
that she is not permitted to do anything; so she persists in the vain
pursuit of her true being through narcissism, love, or religion.
When she is productive, active, she regains her transcendence;
in her projects she concretely affirms her status as subject; in con¬
nection with the aims she pursues, with the money and the rights
she takes possession of, she makes trial of and senses her respon¬
sibility.’1
The enforced passive role, then, according to de Beauvoir, is

mutilating; and women have been encouraged to acquiesce in it
through the inculcation of a pie-in-the-sky mentality fostered
by the Church. Prevented from full personal development
through genuine participation in the affairs of society, they have
not achieved full adulthood. Moreover, the Catholic male may
soothe his bad conscience over depriving woman of her au¬
tonomy through a specious sort of reasoning. This is conveyed
forcefully in the section on the poet, Claudel:
‘It has been said that the earthly calling of woman is in no way
destructive of her supernatural autonomy; but, inversely, in recog¬
nizing this, the Catholic feels authorized to maintain in this world
the prerogatives of the male. Venerating woman in God, men
treat her in this world as a servant, even holding that the more
one demands complete submission of her, the more surely one will
advance her along the road of her salvation.’2
De Beauvoir maintains that religion has deceived woman in

another, though closely related, way. Besides diverting woman’s
attention to bright rewards in a future life, Christianity creates
the delusion of equality already attained.
‘Woman is asked in the name of God not so much to accept her
inferiority as to believe that, thanks to him, she is the equal of the
lordly male: even the temptation to revolt is suppressed by the
claim that the injustice is overcome. Woman is no longer denied
JPp. 679-80.
2P. 231.
6o THE CHURCH AND THE SECOND SEX
transcendence, since she is to consecrate her immanence to God;

the worth of souls is to be weighed only in heaven and not accord¬
ing to their accomplishments on earth.’1
This ‘equality’ which women have attained through Christianity
is in fact insubstantial. On the one hand, there is ample evidence
that woman is despised as a sexual being. Yet, at the same
time she is exalted in an unrealistic way. De Beauvoir main¬
tains that this pseudo-exaltation is a result of guilt feelings:
‘It is Christianity which invests woman anew with frightening
prestige: fear of the other sex is one of the forms assumed by the
anguish of man’s uneasy conscience.’2
Another element besides fear arising from bad conscience also
helps to account for this glorification: man’s will to subject her
is ambiguous.
‘By complete possession and control woman would be abased to the
rank of a thing; but man aspires to clothe in his own dignity what¬
ever he conquers and possesses.’3
Her ‘exaltation’ is therefore ultimately the glorification of man.
In short, the pseudo-equality conferred upon woman by
Christian ideology is not a genuine acceptance of her as person
and partner.
De Beauvoir is by no means naive enough to lay all the
blame upon the Church. There are many other convergent
influences, but the role of religion is powerful in the crippling
process and as a result:
‘the fact is that the traditional woman is a bamboozled conscious
being and a practitioner of bamboozlement; she attempts to dis¬
guise her dependence from herself, which is a way of consenting
to it’.4
She may be vaguely aware that something is wrong with her

situation, but the myth of equality already attained, which is
promoted in Christianity, contributes to the paralysis of her
will to strive for genuine equality.
ip. 621.
2P. 167.
3P. 80.
4P. 709.
THE CASE AGAINST THE CHURCH 6l
In consequence, women’s efforts at creative intellectual work

are hampered. Of course, some do see through the myths. A
few women writers strive to expose the problem and in so doing,
render a great service. Usually, however,
‘they are still too concerned with serving this cause to assume the
disinterested attitude towards the universe that opens the widest
horizons. . . . Woman exhausts her courage dissipating mirages and
she stops in terror at the threshold of reality.’1
That is, even gifted women who have broken through the
myths are handicapped; their capacity for objectivity and
creativity is partially worn out in the struggle to break the
webs of delusion. ‘Women do not contest the human situation,
because they have hardly begun to assume it.’2
Dogma versus women

A second theme relevant to our subject in de Beauvoir’s
work is that the Church by its doctrine implicitly conveys the
idea that women are naturally inferior. In pagan religions of
antiquity, the mother-goddess was worshipped. Judaism and
Christianity represent a reaction against this. ‘It was as Mother
that woman was fearsome; it is in maternity that she must be
transfigured and enslaved.’3 This enslavement was accomplished
symbolically in the cult of the Virgin Mother of God, who is
glorified only in accepting the subordinate role assigned to her.
‘For the first time in human history the mother kneels before her
son; she freely accepts her inferiority. This is the supreme mascu¬
line victory, consummated in the cult of the Virgin—it is the
rehabilitation of woman through the accomplishment of her
defeat.’4
The point is that women are encouraged to identify with this

image of Mary, and to do so has devastating effects. Speaking
of the servile condition of women in the Catholic countries,
de Beauvoir says: ‘And that flows in large part from women’s
ip. 710.
2P. 711.
3P. 171.
4 Ibid.
own attitude: the cult of the Virgin, confession, and the rest
lead them towards masochism.”1 In this way, de Beauvoir sees
Catholic dogma as contributing to the conditioning of women to
adore and serve man.
Harmful moral teaching

A third element in de Beauvoir’s analysis is the harmfulness
of certain aspects of moral doctrine. That Orthodox Jews in
their morning prayers thank God ‘that he did not make me a
woman’, and that Plato seems to have uttered a similar prayer
can be understood as expressions of the de facto situation. How¬
ever, a de facto situation is subject to change. Thus:
‘The males could not enjoy this privilege fully unless they believed
it to be founded on the absolute and the eternal; they sought to
make the fact of their supremacy into a right... (Among other
structures) the religions invented by men reflect this wish for
domination. In the legends of Eve and Pandora men have taken
up arms against women. They have made use of philosophy and
theology. . . .’2
There are, according to our author, two major sources of the

misogynistic cast of Catholic moral theology: Hebrew tradition
and Greek philosophy. In regard to the former she asserts:
‘Through St Paul the Jewish tradition, savagely antifeminist,
was affirmed.’ As for Greek philosophy, this lent special support
to the idea of feminine inferiority. The Aristotelian idea of
fixed ‘natures’, as well as its view of woman as having only a
minor role in procreation, that of merely supplying the matter
whereas the male supplied the form, was taken over by St
Thomas Aquinas. Thus woman’s place is fixed by the ‘nature’
which she has. This idea served the patriarchal institutions which
the Church perpetuates and reflects: the male could lay claim
to his posterity by claiming a major role in procreation. The
idea of woman’s special sinfulness, stemming from commonly
held interpretations of the Bible, combined with a notion of her
inferior ‘nature’, affirmed in Aristotelian philosophy, thus
'P. 29011.
2P. xxii.
made it seem that the sociological fact of woman’s subordination

was inscribed in the heavens.
De Beauvoir maintains that Christian antifeminism has al¬
ways been linked to antisexuality. In fact, ‘in a religion that
holds the flesh accursed, woman becomes the devil’s most fear¬
some temptation’. Perhaps one might have thought that this
should work both ways, since women can also be tempted by
men. Not at all.
‘And, of course, since woman remains always the Other, it is not

held that reciprocally male and female are both flesh; the flesh
that is for the Christian the hostile Other is precisely woman. In
her the Christian finds incarnated the temptations of the world,
the flesh and the devil. All the Fathers of the Church insist on the
idea that she led Adam into sin.’1
Moreover, ‘since the Middle Ages, the fact of having a body

has been considered, in woman, an ignominy’.2 This view is
reflected in the idea of maternity as unclean. The religious cere¬
mony of ‘churching’ after childbirth is a remnant of earlier rites
of purification.
The fact that the Church serves a patriarchal society is said
to be at the root of its moral attitudes toward women, for ‘oppres¬
sion of women has its cause in the will to perpetuate the family
and to keep the patrimony intact’.3 Hence, the Church per¬
petuates a double standard of morality. ‘When woman be¬
comes man’s property, he wants her to be virgin and he requires
complete fidelity under threats of extreme penalties.’4
One result of the ‘honest’ woman’s enslavement to the
family was the spread of prostitution.
‘Christianity poured out its scorn upon them [prostitutes] but

accepted them as a necessary evil. Both St Augustine and St
Thomas asserted that the suppression of prostitution would mean
the disruption of society by debauch.’5
ip. 167.
2P. 168.
3p. 89.
«P. 83.
5P. 102.
Prostitution illustrates the hypocrisy of the double standard.

It is the male’s demand that creates the supply, yet he suffers
no disgrace as a result. Man is measured by other standards
besides sexuality, and the respectable official remains such
whether he frequents brothels or not. Woman, having been re¬
duced to the condition of a venereal being, ‘stakes her moral
value in the contingent realm of sexuality’.1
De Beauvoir finds hypocrisy and even unconscious sadism
in Christian attitudes toward abortion.
‘It is remarkable that the Church at times authorizes the killing
of adult men, as in war or in connection with legal executions; it
reserves an uncompromising humanitarianism for man in the fetal
condition.’2
Ironically, it is very often the husband or lover who demands

abortion as a solution. Yet the Church supports legislation
against this, so that frequently abortion is done illegally under
unhygienic conditions in which the woman suffers enormously
and is subjected to the possibility of ruined health for the rest
of her life. Particularly harmful to women is the Church’s oppo¬
sition to contraception. When contraceptives are not widely
available, abortion is
‘the only recourse for women unwilling to bring into the world
children doomed to misery and death. Contraception and legal
abortion would permit woman to undertake her maternities in
freedom. As things are, woman’s fecundity is decided in part vol¬
untarily, in part by chance.’3
According to this analysis there is a basic enmity between

much traditional Christian moral teaching and the personal as¬
pirations of women. Reduced to the condition of slavery to the
species, instruments of reproduction, they cannot transcend
their situation:
‘The fundamental fact that from the beginning of history doomed

woman to domestic work and prevented her taking part in the
ip. 614.
2P. 486.
3P. 492.
shaping of the world was her enslavement to the generative
function.’1
Obviously, the Church is not to blame for this basic biological

fact. De Beauvoir’s point is that the Church is helping to per¬
petuate the enslavement after science has made liberation
possible. This it has done by forbidding to her the most effec¬
tive means of preventing repeated, unwanted maternity.
Moreover, insofar as its moral teaching suggests that gainful
employment by married women is suspect, it is perpetuating her
servility in yet another way, for:
‘It is through gainful employment that woman has traversed most

of the distance that separated her from the male; and nothing else
can guarantee her liberty in practice. Once she ceases to be a
parasite, the system based on her dependence crumbles; between
her and the universe there is no longer any need for a masculine
mediator.’2
Exclusion from the hierarchy

Analysis of de Beauvoir’s work reveals a fourth major point
of criticism of the Church. This is that the Church, by ex¬
cluding women from the hierarchy, contributes significandy to
the process of inculcating inferiority feelings and causes psycho¬
logical confusion.
‘God’s representatives on earth: the pope, the bishop (whose

ring one kisses), the priest who says Mass, he who preaches, he
before whom one kneels in the secrecy of the confessional—all
these are men.... The Catholic religion among others exerts a
most confused influence upon the young girl.’*
The effect of this is to imbue the girl with a sense of specific

inferiority. It is futile for her to aspire to such an exalted role no
matter how great her talents and piety.
The exclusion of women from the hierarchy has psychological
]P. 117.
2P. 679.
3P. 29O.
meaning distinct from her exclusion from other authoritative

groups. It is linked with an idea of divinity as male:
‘On her knees, breathing the odor of incense, the young girl aban¬
dons herself to the gaze of God and the angels: a masculine gaze.’1
This attitude is reinforced by the fact that God is called Father,

that Christ is male, that the angels, though they are pure spirits,
have masculine names. The effects of this are to be seen in many
pious women and alleged female mystics:
‘We encounter this inextricable confusion between man and God
in many devotees. The confessor in particular occupies an am¬
biguous place between earth and heaven. He listens with mortal
ears when the penitent bares her soul, but his gaze envelops her
in a supernatural light; he is a man of God, he is God present in
human form.’2
So the tendency to equate the male sex with the divine is

encouraged. It is true that there are pious men, some of whom
•have been excluded from seminaries for various reasons, who
do not become priests. However, theirs is not at all the same
case; their exclusion is individual. Moreover, the point is not at
all that a few women may have the desire to become priests
which cannot be fulfilled; it is, rather, that Catholic women, by
the fact of the exclusion of all women from such a role, are con¬
ditioned to believe that they have an irremediably inferior
nature. This conditioning leads to a devastating mutilation.
Seemingly to them the only way to triumph over this debased
nature of theirs is docility before the male, who serves as the
only intermediary between themselves and a masculine God.
Transcendence through religion?

An adequate consideration of de Beauvoir’s critique must
include a fifth point. This is her treatment of the fact that
women can achieve transcendence through religion. In view of
all she has written on the harmful aspects of religion, that she
should recognize this is perhaps astonishing. On the whole her
JP. 290.
2P. 671.
work mercilessly draws a picture of typical religious women—
especially those purported to have been mystics—as neurotic,
over-emotional, narcissistic. She describes in detail the repulsive
ascetical practices of some female saints. The reader is re¬
minded that St Angela of Foligno drank with delight the water
in which she had just washed lepers’ hands and feet. There was
Margaret Mary Alacoque, who cleaned up the vomit of a patient
with her tongue and filled her mouth with the excrement of a
man sick with diarrhoea. ‘Jesus rewarded her when she held
her lips pressed against his Sacred Heart for three hours.’1
Moreover: ‘She was the one who offered to the adoration of the
faithful the great red clot, surrounded with flaming darts of
love.’2 There is ample evidence of the sado-masochistic fanta¬
sies of female mystics brooding over the lacerated body of
Christ.
But de Beauvoir admits at least one clear exception to all this
religious neuroticism—St Teresa of Avila. Although St Teresa’s
writings also have an erotic vocabulary, nevertheless unlike the
lesser mystics she is not a hysteric, and she is not the slave of
her nerves and her hormones.
‘The truth is, as she herself understood, that the value of a mysti¬
cal experience is measured not according to the way in which it is
subjectively felt, but according to its objective influence. The
ecstatic phenomena are almost the same in St Teresa and in
Margaret Mary Alacoque, but their messages are of very diverse
interest. St Teresa poses in a most intellectual fashion the dra¬
matic problem of the relation between the individual and the tran¬
scendent Being; she lived out, as a woman, an experience whose
meaning goes far beyond the fact of her sex; she must be ranked
with Suso and St John of the Cross. But she is a striking
exception.’*
What is interesting here is that de Beauvoir recognizes the

validity of St Teresa’s experience and that she recognizes her
as an exceptional woman—almost unique (although she admits
ip. 676.
2P. 677.
3P. 674.
that a few others, notably Catherine of Siena, approach her

stature in some respects). Teresa is credited with achieving
transcendence.
Of central interest in the passages on St Teresa is the reason
given for her ability to transcend the limitations imposed upon
her sex. It is partially revealed in the following passage:
‘The women who have accomplished works comparable to those of
men are those exalted by the power of social institutions above all
sexual differentiation.... The proportion of queens who had great
reigns is infinitely above that of great kings. Religion works the
same transformation: Catherine of Siena, St Teresa, quite beyond
any physiological consideration, were sainted souls; the life they
led, secular and mystic, their acts, and their writings rose to heights
that few men have ever reached.’1
The point is that the Church as an institution can provide

the needed condition for a St Teresa to rise above the handicap
of her sex. As institution, therefore, the Church can play the
same liberating role for some of its adherents as the structure of
royal government for feminine monarchs.
Is there nothing else to explain St Teresa? De Beauvoir, in
discussing her uniqueness, seems to suggest that there is:
‘There is hardly any woman other than St Teresa who in total
abandonment has herself lived out the situation of humanity; we
have seen why. Taking her stand beyond the earthly hierarchies,
she felt, like St John of the Cross, no reassuring ceiling over her
head. There were for both the same darkness, the same flashes of
light, in the self the same nothingness, in God the same plenitude.
When at last it will be possible for every human being thus to set
his pride beyond the sexual differentiation, in the laborious glory
of free existence, then only will woman be able to identify her
personal history, her problems, her doubts, her hopes, with those
of humanity; then only will she be able to seek in her life and her
works to reveal the whole of reality and not merely her personal
self. As long as she still has to struggle to become a human being,
she cannot become a creator.’2
!P. 130.
2P. 714.
This astonishingly lyrical passage in a clinical and unrelentingly
critical work reiterates the idea that here was a unique case of a
woman who was a free person, who ‘lived out the situation of
humanity’ more totally, perhaps, than the greatest of monarchs.
As for the psychological leverage which produced this pheno¬
menon, de Beauvoir does not explain further. The one indisput¬
able fact is that Teresa of Avila was a Christian mystic.
Facing the problems

It is by no means a simple task to make a fair criticism of de
Beauvoir’s pronouncements concerning the role of the Church
in perpetuating the inferior condition of women. No one is
more ready than she to grant that there are many other factors
which, together with religion, have worked against women.
That the Church is by no means made to bear the whole burden
of guilt is evident. It is seen as one factor in the complex context
of patriarchal structures, of which it is both product and per-
petuator. Rather than being the cause of woman’s unfortunate
condition, religion appears rather as a superstructure, as an in¬
strument of oppression and deception appropriate to a culture
with given thought-patterns. This by no means lessens the
poignancy of de Beauvoir’s observations, but it does suggest
that the charge made against her, that she exaggerates the role
of the Church, is not well-founded.
It has been claimed that since Simone de Beauvoir’s writings
presuppose a certain philosophical attitude, that of the atheistic
existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre, her interpretation of the facts
should be rejected a priori by a Christian. On this basis, a naive
and pietistic rebuttal of her thesis runs something like this:
‘An atheist cannot really understand the doctrine and practice
of the Church.’ Unfortunately this sort of defensive stance,
understandable though it may be, rests upon a highly question¬
able hypothesis. It simplistically assumes that non-Christians
can have no valid insights eenceming the expressions of belief
and the behavior of Christians. Implicit in this attitude is the
idea that the Church is a congregation of disembodied spirits,
living on a wholly ‘supernatural’ plane, whose ‘official’ utter-
7° THE CHURCH AND THE SECOND SEX
ances and behavior are totally beyond the scope of merely

psychological or sociological analysis. In fact, however, Christians
are human beings, subject to the same kinds of failings as other
people, and often owe a debt of gratitude to non-believers for
their criticisms. Non-believers are an aid in the continual
struggle to purify Christian doctrine of its inevitable admixture
of nonsense and Christian practice of the tendency to hypocrisy
and injustice. A certain callousness to the harmful effects of some
ideas and situations, cloaked by the supranaturalist justification
that ‘it will all come out right at the last judgment’, has led to
—one might almost say ‘necessitated’—violent reactions.
Simone de Beauvoir’s atheistic existentialism does of course
embody several salient ideas that are particularly relevant to
her treatment of the problem of women. First, according to
this philosophy, which is one of despair, there is only this life
and what one makes of oneself in this life. Given such a per¬
spective, the failure to develop what human talents one has—to
lead the life of the escapist, and thus the life of the typical
woman as de Beauvoir sees her—has the dimensions of high
tragedy. Since the compensations of an after-life are denied,
present injustice is seen and felt in all its poignancy. It is futile
to speak about what a person might have done or might have
been. He or she is the sum total of his works and nothing more.
A second, closely related point is that since there is no God who
might have a ‘plan’ for this world, there are no fixed essences.
There is no fixed ‘human nature’. Thirdly, it follows that one
is not born man or woman; one becomes thus. This is not to
deny biological differences. What it means is that the characteris¬
tic attitudes of men and women are acquired; they are cultural,
the results of conditioning. Thus, ‘masculinity’ and ‘femininity’
are the effects of historical processes. What is called ‘femininity’
is really only a situation of fact in a given culture. It is not de¬
finitely grounded either in biology or in a mysterious feminine
essence. Fourthly, the masculine-feminine opposition is alienat¬
ing. Woman, as ‘the Other’, is exploited, duped_In order
to be liberated, she must first become conscious of her situation.
She will then cease to be imprisoned in the false values of
‘femininity’, in a pseudo-nature. Once conscious of her real
situation, she can be free to become whatever she makes of
herself.
There is no cheap and easy answer to these basic elements
in de Beauvoir’s philosophical position. In regard to the first
point: to answer this life-view simply by superimposing belief
in an afterlife upon the tragedy of the human situation on earth
(with reference to the tragedy of woman’s situation in particular)
is to miss the point of the modern atheist’s protest. De Beauvoir
claims that such a belief is itself alienating: it distracts from
the need to face the harmfulness of the given situation. Thus
the ‘cure’ perpetuates the illness. Religious thinkers increasingly
recognize that there is meaning and value in this atheistic
criticism of Christian belief. Faith in an afterlife can indeed
be used as a psychological gimmick which helps to distract atten¬
tion from present injustice.
In regard to the point about fixed essences: in the face of
modem evolutionary theory, it is extremely difficult to uphold
the idea of a fixed human nature, which is supposedly grasped
by a process of abstraction, nor does there seem to be any justi¬
fication for clinging to a medieval theory of knowledge. How¬
ever, many contemporary Christian thinkers would deny Sartre’s
thesis (adopted by de Beauvoir) that belief in the existence of
God is inseparably linked with the assertion that there is an
immutable human nature. Believing Christians also see man
as an evolving being. Moreover, even if it is legitimate to speak
of a human ‘nature’, this does not imply possession of an ex¬
haustive or even exact knowledge of this ‘nature’ through some
mysterious process of abstraction of essences. Man’s knowledge
of man is also continually evolving.
As to whether one is born or becomes man or woman, dog¬
matic assertions about an unchanging feminine essence do not
find anything like general acceptance among those who follow
developments in modern philosophy and in the social sciences
and psychology. In fact, our awareness of the profound and
subtle effects of conditioning upon the human personality is
continually increasing. There is an impressive stock of evi-
dence in support of de Beauvoir on this point, and despite the

tenacious hold of the ‘eternal feminine’ upon the popular mind,
the concept of woman is changing, whether one is existentialist
or not.
Finally, the fact that woman has been exploited and that the
fixed images of masculine and feminine have been used to
further her exploitation is indeed demonstrable, as de Beauvoir
among others has shown. There is nothing in all this to
justify a refusal of the wealth of insight which her work brings
to the problem.
What, then, can the Christian who is truly sensitive to the
problem of women and the Church offer as an adequate response
in the dialogue initiated by de Beauvoir?
As we have suggested, it will not be fruitful to begin with an
opposition of philosophical or theological ‘principles’ to her
position. This offers too easy a way of avoiding the real issues.
Indeed, many who are not adherents of Sartre’s atheistic
existentialism agree in large measure with de Beauvoir’s analy¬
sis of woman’s situation. Since human knowledge does not
begin with ‘principles’ but with experience, the most fruitful
approach will begin with an effort honestly to answer the
question: ‘To what extent is this interpretation of Christianity’s
role in the oppression of women in accord with the data of ex¬
perience, that is, with historical fact?’ This approach will entail
an examination of sources—scripture, the writings of the
Fathers and of theologians, and papal statements.
It is often the case that disagreement with a critic bears less
upon what he has actually said than upon what he has failed
to say. Therefore, one should ask a further question: has de
Beauvoir omitted any significant data? There is a suggestion
(probably an unwitting one) that she has, in the passages on
St Teresa, for whom, de Beauvoir says, the Church provided
the needed condition for rising above the handicap of her sex.
What are the implications of this? Why does de Beauvoir not
develop this theme? It must be asked whether her analysis has
brought into its perspective all of the important dimensions.
Before closing this chapter there is one other matter deserving
consideration. It seems essential to this writer that we recognize
that religious doctrine and practice are not in fact static, but
rather are continually evolving. This is in large measure the
effect of developments in the physical and social sciences, and in
psychology, mixed with the influences of changing social condi¬
tions. While there have been harmful distortions of doctrine and
practice, it is not necessary that these remain with us. A constant
purification of doctrine and reform of practice are not only
possible but necessary. The insight necessary to effect this
evolution comes from human experience, and especially from
the challenge of encounter with opposed viewpoints. There are,
clearly, promising elements already present in Christian thought
which can be sources of further development toward a more
personalist conception of the man-woman relationship on all
levels. These seminal elements must be distinguished from the
oppressive, life-destroying ideas with which they have been
confused, and by which they are in danger of being choked off.
The distinction having been made, there remains the necessity
of seeking to bring about, insofar as our own historically condi¬
tioned insights enable us, conditions in which a genuinely life-
fostering evolution can take place. For the thinker need not be
a helpless spectator of the course of history. There is both place
and need for creative thought and action.
It is probable that Simone de Beauvoir’s psychological detach¬
ment from religious belief is a reason for both the vigor and
clarity of her criticism of the Church’s role in the oppression
of women, and for its limitations. Others must continue to ex¬
plore the problem, especially those who can accept the value of
her insights and who are existentially aware of the meaning of
faith, and thereby able to move forward with hope. Such an
exploration is intended in the following chapters.
CHAPTER TWO
History: A Record of Contradictions
‘To pretend that Christianity was intended to stereo¬

type existing forms of government and society, and
protect them against change, is to reduce it to the
level of Islamism or Brahminism.’
John Stuart Mill
A study of Christianity’s documents concerning women reveals

a puzzling ambiguity if not an outright contradiction. Most
observable is the conflict between the Christian teachings on
the worth of every human person and the oppressive, misogynis-
tic ideas arising from cultural conditioning. If the latter do not
contradict they at least obscure the basic doctrine. Intimately
bound up with this dialectic there is another tension, between a
pseudo-glorification of ‘woman’ and degrading teachings and
practices concerning real women. The second tension of
opposites is an effect of the first. Its existence betrays an uneasy
awareness that ‘something is out of joint’, and it reflects an
inauthentic response to this awareness. The symbolic glorifica¬
tion of ‘woman’ arose as a substitute for recognition of full
personhood and equal rights. So we may say that the record of
Christianity in regard to women is a record of contradictions.
i. Scripture
The Bible manifests the unfortunate—often miserable—condi¬

tion of women in ancient times. The authors of both the Old
and the New Testaments were men of their times, and it
would be naive to think that they were free of the prejudices of
74
history: a record of contradictions 75
their epochs. It is therefore a most dubious process to construct
an idea of ‘feminine nature’ or of ‘God’s plan for women’ from
biblical texts. As one theologian expressed it: ‘Let us be careful
not to transcribe into terms of nature that which is written in
terms of history.’1
An example will illustrate this point. The New Testament
gave advice to women (and to slaves) which would help them
to bear the subhuman (by today’s standards) conditions im¬
posed upon them. It would be foolish to erect, on this basis, a
picture of ‘immutable’ feminine qualities and virtues. Thus,
although obedience was required of women and slaves, there
is nothing about obedience which makes it intrinsically more
appropriate for women than for men. The idea of taking
feminine ‘types’ from the Bible as models for modern women
may be an exercise for the imagination, but it is difficult to justify
as a method. Any rigid abstraction of types from history im¬
plies a basic fallacy.
Old Testament
The Bible contains much to jolt the modern woman, who is
accustomed to think of herself as an autonomous person. In
the writings of the Old Testament women emerge as subjugated
and inferior beings. Although the wife of an Israelite was not
on the level of a slave, and however much better off she was
than wives in other near-eastern nations, it is indicative of her
inferior condition that the wife addressed her husband as a slave
addressed his master, or a subject his king.
According to Fr Roland de Vaux:
‘The Decalogue includes a man’s wife among his possessions,

along with his house and land, his male and female slaves, his ox
and his ass (Ex 20:17; Dt 5:21). Her husband can repudiate her,
but she cannot claim a divorce; all her life she remains a minor.
The wife does not inherit from her husband, nor daughters from
1 Louis-Marie Orrieux, O.P., ‘Vocation de la femme: recherche biblique’,

La femme; nature et vocation. Recherches et dibats (Paris: Librairie Artheme
Fayard), cahier n. 45, decembre, 1963, p. 147.
their father, except when there is no male heir. (Nb 27:8). A vow
made by a girl or married woman needs, to be valid, the consent
of father or husband and if this consent is withheld, the vow is
null and void (Nb 30:4-i7).n
Whereas misconduct on the part of the wife was severely
punished, infidelity on the part of the man was punished only
if he violated the rights of another man by taking a married
woman as his accomplice. In the rabbinical age, the school of
Shammai permitted a husband to get a divorce only on the
grounds of adultery and misconduct. However, some teachers
of the more liberal school of Hillel would accept even the most
trivial excuse. If the husband charged that his wife had cooked
a dish badly, or if he simply preferred another woman, he could
repudiate his wife. Even earlier than this it was written in
Sirach 25:26: ‘If thy wife does not obey thee at a signal and a
glance, separate from her.’
Respect for the woman increased once she became a mother,
especially if she produced males, since these were, of course,
more highly valued. A man could, indeed, sell his daughter as
well as his slaves. If a couple did not have children, it was
assumed to be the fault of the wife. Briefly, although Hebrew
women were honored as parents and often treated with kindness,
their social and legal status was that of subordinate beings. It is
understandable that Hebrew males prayed: ‘I thank thee, Lord,
that thou hast not created me a woman.’ From the point of view
of the modern woman, the situation of women in the ancient
Semitic world—and, indeed, in the ancient world in general—
has the dimensions of a nightmare.
Christian authors through the centuries have made much of
the Genesis accounts of the creation of Eve and the geographical
location of the rib. This, together with her role as temptress
in the story of the Fall, supposedly established beyond doubt
woman’s immutable inferiority, which was not merely physical
but also intellectual and moral. So pervasive was this interpreta¬
tion that through the ages the antifeminist tradition has justified
1 Roland de Vaux, Ancient Israel, its Life and Institutions, translated by

John McHugh (New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1961), p. 39.
HISTORY: A RECORD OF CONTRADICTIONS 77
itself on the basis of the origin and activities of the ‘first mother’
of all mankind. In a somewhat more sophisticated and disguised
vein this is continued, even today, particularly by preachers and
theologians who are unaware of developments in modern bibli¬
cal scholarship. Such misunderstanding of the Old Testament
has caused immeasurable harm.
Most of the usage of Old Testament texts to support sex
prejudice reveals a total failure not only to grasp the fact of the
evolution of human consciousness in general but also to under¬
stand the fact and meaning of the evolution of thought in the
Old Testament itself. The foundation upon which the case for
the subordination of woman is built lies in the older of the two
accounts of creation. The earlier creation story (J document),
found in Genesis 2, has been stressed as a basis for Christian
thinking about women, while the P document account, found
in Genesis 1—written several centuries later—has not been
stressed, nor have its implications been understood.
Contemporary scriptural exegetes of all faiths, having the
tools of scholarship at their disposal, as well as insights of psy¬
chology and anthropology, are enabled to look critically at the
first chapters of Genesis. The two creation accounts, which
differ gready from each other, have been carefully scrutinized.
The later creation story gives no hint that woman was brought
into being as an afterthought. On the contrary, it stresses an
original sexual duality and describes God’s act of giving
dominion to both. The plural is used, indicating their common
authority to rule: ‘And God said, Let us make mankind in our
image and likeness, and let them have dominion . . .’ (Gen 1:26).
The following verse says: ‘God created man in his image. In
the image of God he created him. Male and female he created
them’ (Gen 1:27). This is understood by exegetes to mean
that the image of God is in the human person, whether man
or woman. Moreover, the plural is used in the following:
‘Then God blessed them and said to them, “Be fruitful and multi¬
ply, fill the earth and subdue it. Have dominion over the fish of
the sea, the birds of the air, the cattle and all the animals that
crawl on the earth” ’ (Gen 1:28).
Thus, the burdens of reproduction are not specially associated

with the woman, nor is there any indication that ‘technical’ or
‘professional’ work should be proper to the man.
It is the earlier (J) creation account, found in the second
chapter, which has been the source—or excuse—for many of
the disparaging theories about women. The intention of the
author of this account seems to have been to express the crea¬
tion of mankind as involving two stages. As Gerhard von Rad
explains the J view:
‘The creation of woman is very far removed from that of man, for
it is the last and most mysterious of all kindnesses that Yahweh
wished to bestow upon the man. God designed a help for him, to
be “corresponding to him”—she was to be like him, and at the
same time not identical with him, but rather his counterpart, his
complement.’1
Contemporary scholars, such as McKenzie,2 reject the idea
that the story of the later creation of Eve intends to teach the
subordination of woman. Rather, it is maintained that what is
being conveyed is her original equality. Moreover, the old argu¬
ments for feminine inferiority which were based on the use
of the word translated ‘helper’ to describe Eve do not stand up
against linguistic studies, which demonstrate that the original
word employed does not carry any implication of subordination.3
Today, both the Genesis accounts, whatever their relative merits,
are understood to teach that man and woman are of the same
nature and dignity and that they have a common mission to rule
the earth.
All of this does not change the fact that for thousands of years
theologians and preachers have dourly been grinding out assur¬
ances of divine approval of woman’s secondary place in the
universe, ‘as known from scripture’. Thus, Pope Paul’s recent
1 Gerhard von Rad, Old Testament Theology, I, trans. by D. M. G. Stalker

(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962), p. 149.
2 John L. McKenzie, S.J., The Two-Edged Sword (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1956),
P- 95-
3 Pastor Andre Dumas, ‘Biblical Anthropology and the Participation of
Women in the Ministry of the Church’, in Concerning the Ordination of Women
(Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1964), p. 30.
statement to Italian women that ‘perfect equality in their nature
and dignity, and therefore in rights, is assured to them from the
first page of sacred scripture’ comes too late for the millions
of women who lived and died with the ‘religious’ conviction
of their divinely ordained inferiority and subordination. A
psychoanalyst has written: ‘The biblical story of Eve’s birth is
the hoax of the millenia.’1 Unfortunately, the theologians who
grimly pontificated about Mother Eve down through the
centuries displayed litde sense of irony and humor.
Humorless also have been the misogynistic tirades occasioned
by the mythical account of the Fall. It should be observed that
in the biblical story, as continued in Genesis 3, the woman’s
subordination to man—a sociological fact recognized by the
author—is not the result of nature but rather of sin. Noteworthy
also is the fact that the ‘division of labor’ theme is placed in the
context of the effects of the Fall. The man is now associated
with the task of conquering nature. The woman is seen only in
the context of the burdens involved in reproduction. Isolated
in fixed sex ‘roles’, they are no longer partners in all things.
There is no indication that things must always be this way, since
in fact this division is not inscribed in ‘nature’ but rather is the
result of sin. What this suggests is that men and women, in
striving to overcome the effects of sin, should evolve toward that
real partnership on all levels which is required if the image of
God is to be realized in them.
New Testament
In the New Testament it is significant that the statements
which reflect the antifeminism of the times are never those of
Christ. There is no recorded speech of Jesus concerning women
‘as such’. What is very striking is his behavior toward them.
In the passages describing the relationship of Jesus with various
women, one characteristic stands out starkly: they emerge as
persons, for they are treated as persons, often in such contrast
with prevailing custom as to astonish onlookers. The behavior
1 Theodor Reik, The Creation of Woman (New York: George BraziUer, Inc.,
i960), p. 124.
of Jesus toward the Samaritan woman puzzled even his disciples,

who were surprised that he would speak to her in public (John
4:27). Then there was his defense of the adulterous woman,
who according to the law of Moses should have been stoned
(John 8 :1-11). There was the case of the prostitute whose many
sins he forgave because she had loved much (Luke 7:36-50).
In the Gospel narratives the close friendship of Jesus with
certain women is manifested in the context of the crucifixion
and resurrection. What stands out is the fact that these, his
friends, he saw as persons, to whom he gave the supreme yet
simple gift of his brotherhood.
The contemporary social inferiority of women was, indeed,
reflected in the New Testament. Although the seeds of emanci¬
pation were present in the Christian message, their full implica¬
tions were not evident to the first century authors. The most
strikingly antifeminist passages are, of course, in the Pauline
texts, which are all too familiar to Catholic women, who have
heard them cited approvingly ad nauseam. We now know it is
important to understand that Paul was gready preoccupied with
order in society and in Christian assemblies in particular. In
modern parlance, it seemed necessary to sustain a good ‘image’
of the Church. Thus it appeared to him an important considera¬
tion that women should not have too predominant a place in
Christian assemblies, that they should not ‘speak’ too much or
unveil their heads. This would have caused scandal and ridicule
of the new sect, which already had to face accusations of im¬
morality and effeminacy. In ancient Corinth, as one scholar
has pointed out, for a woman to go out unveiled would be to
behave like a prostitute.1 Paul was concerned with protecting
the new Church against scandal. Thus he repeatedly insisted
upon ‘correct’ sexual behavior, including the subjection of wives
at meetings. Once this is understood, it becomes evident that it
is a erversion to use Pauline texts, which should be interpreted
within their own social context, to support the claim that even
today, in a totally different society, women should be subject.
1 Pastor Andre Dumss, op. cit., p. 28.

history: a record of CONTRADICTIONS 81
Paul looked for theological justification for the prevailing

customs, such as the custom that women should wear veils. This
partially accounts for his reference to Genesis 2 in I Corinthians
11: 7ff, which he interprets to mean that woman is for man
and not the contrary. We have here the idea that man is the
‘image and glory of God’, whereas woman is ‘the glory of man’.
Then there is his biased statement which has been quoted with
relish by preachers ever since: ‘For man was not made from
woman, but woman from man. Neither was man created for
woman, but woman for man.’ Modern scripture scholars do
not, of course, agree with this interpretation of Genesis.
Moreover, Paul himself evidently noticed that there was some¬
thing wrong and corrected himself immediately afterward:
‘Nevertheless, in the Lord woman is not independent of man
nor man of woman; for as woman was made from man, so man
is now born of woman. And all things are from God.’ However,
the damage was done. For two thousand years women have en¬
dured sermons on the ‘glory of man’ theme, and we still re¬
ceive a yearly harvest of theological essays and books dealing
with the ‘theology of femininity’, which rely heavily upon the
‘symbolism of the veil’ and ‘God’s plan for women’ as made
known through Paul.
A similar procedure of using the then current interpretation
of Genesis to buttress convention is seen in another text, which
is no longer generally thought to have been written by Paul,
although it surely was written under the influence of the
Pauline tradition:
‘[I desire] also that women should adorn themselves modestly and
sensibly in seemly apparel, not with braided hair or gold or pearls
or costly attire but by good deeds, as befits women who profess
religion. Let a woman learn in silence with all submissiveness.
I permit no woman to teach or to have authority over men; she is
to keep silent. For Adam was formed first, then Eve; and Adam
was not deceived, but the woman was deceived and became a trans¬
gressor. Yet woman will be saved through bearing children, if she
continues in faith and love and holiness, with modesty’ (I Timothy
2:9-15)-
The author tries to support the androcentric attitudes and prac¬

tices of his times by reference to Genesis. The fact is, of course,
that there is no evidence that God made woman subordinate
or that the social facts of the past should be prolonged and erected
into an immutable destiny.
It is interesting to observe that those who have been fond of
quoting such texts down through the ages to keep women ‘in
their place’ have been obliged to adapt their interpretations.
For example, that famous ‘I permit no woman to teach’ was
used in the past against women who attempted to teach the
catechism. It was later used by some to support prohibitions
against their taking theological degrees. Today, women do
take such degrees and do in fact teach theology. The same
text, however, is still used by some writers to support
their exclusion from the hierarchy, although it has been
refuted. Moreover, it is evident that a certain selectivity is oper¬
ative in the use of such texts on the subject of women. Few of
those who cite this passage in justification of women’s tradi¬
tional silence would, for example, go so far as to argue that
women should not braid their hair, nor wear gold or pearls or
expensive clothing. To go to this extent would be considered
absurd. On the other hand, many still cite Paul’s words to sup¬
port the custom of women covering their heads in Church.
Such inconsistencies demonstrate the unreliability of the pro¬
cess of applying culturally conditioned texts within changed and
changing social contexts.
One of the most frequently quoted texts is, of course, the
following:
‘Wives, be subject to your husbands, as to the Lord. For the hus¬

band is the head of the wife as Christ is the head of the Church,
his body, and is himself its Saviour. As the Church is subject to
Christ, so let wives also be subject in everything to their husbands’
(Eph 5:22-24).
An Anglican scholar has pointed out that great caution must be

used in understanding this analogy: •
‘Woman certainly did not derive her being from man, nor does
she derive her significance from him.’1
The same author explains that
‘rejection of the wife’s subordination does not invalidate the

analogy, but simply requires a revision of the terms in which its
ethical and personal implications are expressed. Thus, because
marriage is a relation of mutual and not unilateral love, the exem¬
plary love of Christ for the Church stands as a pattern to be imi¬
tated by the wife no less than the husband; indeed, the full moral
and theological significance of their henosis only emerges when
the notion of male headship is discarded in favor of a higher con¬
ception of sexual order.’2
It is to be hoped that this development of the Pauline concep¬

tion, which reveals a humanist, personalist attitude toward the
man-woman relationship, will eventually prevail in Christian
thinking.
We are now in a position to see that the widespread habit of
the clergy of perpetuating the oppressive Pauline ideas is hardly
justifiable. There is perversity involved in the prolongation of
doctrines and practices in an age in which they can be seen as
faulty and harmful—which is quite a different matter from their
expression in a milieu in which they appeared justifiable. These
texts have been used over the centuries as a guarantee of divine
approval for the transformation of woman’s subordinate status
from a contingent fact into an immutable norm of the feminine
condition. They have been cited to enhance the position of
those who have tried to keep women from the right to education,
to legal and economic equality, and to access to the professions.
The irresponsible use of these texts continues today.
The equal dignity and rights of all human beings as persons
is of the essence of the Christian message. In the writings of
Paul himself there are anticipations of a development toward
realization of the full implications of this equality. We have seen
1 D. S. Bailey, The Man-Woman Relation in Christian Thought (London:

Longmans Green, and Co., 1959)3 P- 302-
2 Ibid., p. 303.
that after the harshly androcentric text in I Corinthians, he

attempts to compensate somewhat:
‘Nevertheless, in the Lord woman is not independent of man nor

man of woman; for as woman was made from man, so man is now
born of woman. And all things are from God’ (I Cor 11:11-12).
Moreover, the dichotomy of fixed classes as dominant-

subservient is transcended:
‘For as many of you as were baptized into Christ have put on

Christ. There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor
free, there is neither male nor female; for you are all one in Christ
Jesus’ (Gal 3:27-28).
As one theologian has pointed out:
‘This does not mean that the kingdom of heaven has to do with
non-sexed beings. Paul is enumerating the relationships of domi¬
nation: these are radically denounced by the Gospel, in the sense
that man no more has the right to impose his will to power upon
woman than does a class or a race upon another class or another
race.’1
It is not surprising that Paul did not see the full implications
of this transcendence. There is an unresolved tension between
the personalist Christian message and the restrictions and com¬
promises imposed by the historical situation. It would be naive
to think that Paul foresaw social evolution. For him, transcen¬
dence would come soon enough—in the next life. The in¬
consistency and ambivalence of his words concerning women
could only be recognized at a later time, as a result of historical
processes. Those who have benefitted from the insights of a
later age have the task of distinguishing elements which are
sociological in origin from the life-fostering, personalist elements
which pertain essentially to the Christian message.
1 Louis-Marie Orrieux, O.P., op. cit., p. 142.

2. The Patristic Period
An examination of the writings of the Church Fathers brings

vividly into sight the fact that there is, indeed, a problem of
women and the Church. The following statement of Jerome
strikes the modern reader as weird:
‘As long as woman is for birth and children, she is different from
man as body is from soul. But when she wishes to serve Christ
more than the world, then she will cease to be a woman and will
be called man (vir).’1
A similar idea is expressed by Ambrose, who remarks that
‘she who does not believe is a woman and should be designated by

the name of her sex, whereas she who believes progresses to per¬
fect manhood, to the measure of the adulthood of Christ. She then
dispenses with the name of her sex, the seductiveness of youth,
the garrulousness of old age.’2 3
These strange utterances can be understood only if one realizes

the lowness of women in the commonly held view. The
characteristics which the Fathers considered to be typically
feminine include fickleness and shallowness,5 * as well as garru¬
lousness and weakness,4 slowness of understanding,5 and in¬
stability of mind.0 For the most part, the attitude was one of
puzzlement over the seemingly incongruous fact of woman’s
existence. Augustine summed up the general idea in saying that
he did not see in what way it could be said that woman was made
for a help for man, if the work of child-bearing be excluded.7
1 PL 26, 567. Comm, in epist. ad Ephes., Ill, 5.

2 PL 15, 1844. Expos, evang. sec. Lucam, lib. X, n. 161.
3 John Chrysostom, PG, 61, 316. In epist. I ad Cor., cap. 14, v. 35., Homilia
XXXVII.
4 John Chrysostom, PG, 62, 544-5. In epist. I ad Tim., cap. 2, v. ir. Homilia
IX.
5 Cyril of Alexandria, PL 74, 691. Injoannis evang., lib. XII, xx, 15.
« Gregory the Great, PL 76, 453. Moral., lib. XXVIII, cap. 3.
7 PL 34, 395-6. De Genesi ad litteram IX, cap. 5.
Clement of Alexandria was also evidently baffled. Although he

was somewhat more liberal than Augustine and concluded that
men and women have the same nature, he inconsistently up¬
held masculine superiority.1
In Genesis the Fathers found an ‘explanation’ of woman’s
inferiority which served as a guarantee of divine approval for
perpetuating the situation which made her inferior. John
Chrysostom thought it followed from the later creation of Eve
that God gave the more necessary and more honorable role to
man, the more petty and the less honorable to woman.2
Ambrosiaster remarks that woman is inferior to man, since she
is only a portion of him.8 Thus there was an uncritical accept¬
ance of the androcentric myth of Eve’s creation. Linked to this
was their refusal, in varying degrees of inflexibility, to grant that
woman is the image of God, an attitude in large measure in¬
spired by Paul’s first epistle to the Corinthians. Ambrosiaster
states baldly that man is made to the image of God, but not
woman.4 Augustine wrote that only man is the image and
glory of God. Since the believing woman, who is co-heiress of
grace, cannot lay aside her sex, she is restored to the image of
God only where there is no sex, that is, in the spirit.6
Together with the biblical account, the Fathers were con¬
fronted with an image of woman produced by oppressive condi¬
tions which were universal. In contrast to their modern counter¬
parts, women in the early centuries of the Christian era—and,
in fact, throughout nearly all of the Christian era—had a girl¬
hood of strict seclusion and of minimal education which pre¬
pared them for the life of mindless subordinates. This was fol¬
lowed by an early marriage which effectively cut them off for
the rest of their lives from the possibility of autonomous action.
Valued chiefly for their reproductive organs, which also inspired
horror, and despised for their ignorance, they were denied full
personhood. Their inferiority was a fact; it appeared to be
1 PG 8, 1271-5. Stromatum, lib. IV, cap. 8.
2 PG 51, 231 . Quales ducendae sint uxores, 4.
8 PL 17, 240. Commentaria in epist. ad Corinth, pritnam.
4 Ibid.
8 PL 42, 1003-5. De Trinitate XII, 7.
‘natural’. Thus, experience apparently supported the rib story,
just as the myth itself helped ‘explain’ the common experience
of women as incomplete and lesser humans. The vicious circle
persisted, for the very emancipation which would prove that
women were not ‘naturally’ defective was denied them in the
name of that defectiveness which was claimed to be natural
and divinely ordained. Thus, Augustine taught that the order
of things subjugates woman to man.1 Jerome wrote that it is
contrary to the order of nature, or of law, that women should
speak in the assembly of men.2 He maintained that the man
should be commanded to love his wife, whereas the woman
should fear her husband:
‘For love befits the man; fear befits the woman. As for the slave,
not only fear is befitting him, but also trembling.’3
Thus the ‘ideal’ marital situation proposed by Jerome—an

‘ideal’ suited to encourage such perversities as the sado¬
masochistic couple—appears highly abnormal to the modern
person. It is significant that he was unable to find an adequate
difference between the roles of wife and slave other than the
fact that the fear of the latter should be so strong as to be accom¬
panied by trembling.
The presumed defectiveness of woman extended also, and
perhaps especially, into the moral sphere. The primary griev¬
ance against her was her supposed guilt in the Fall. The violence
of some of the tirades on this subject has psychoanalytic im¬
plications. Tertullian, for example, wrote for the edification of
his contemporaries:
‘Do you not know that you are Eve? ... You are the devil’s gate¬
way. ... How easily you destroyed man, the image of God. Be¬
cause of the death which you brought upon us, even the Son of
God had to die.’4
Clement of Alexandria taught that it is shameful for woman
1 PL 34, 204. De Genesi contra Manich. II, 11.

2 PL 30, 794. Expos, in epist. I ad Cor., cap. 14.
3 PL 26, 570. Comm, in epist. ad Ephes. Ill, 5.
4 PL 1, I4i8b-i9a. De cultu feminarum, libri duo I, 1.
to think of what nature she has.1 Augustine cynically complained

that man, who was of superior intelligence, couldn’t have been
seduced, and so the woman, who was small of intellect, was
given to him.2 The logical inconsistencies implied in this seem
to have escaped him: this dull-witted creature could hardly
have been too responsible. Moreover, she was clever enough to
seduce man, which the ingenious devil could not do. Why did
that paragon of intelligence and virtue succumb so easily? It
is all too evident that logic is not operative in such invective,
which neurotically projects all guilt upon the woman. For the
Fathers, woman is a temptress of whom men should beware.
That the problem might be reciprocal is not even considered.
There were attempts to balance the alleged guilt-laden condi¬
tion of the female sex, but these, unfortunately, did not take the
form of an admission of guilt shared by the sexes. Instead, Eve
was balanced off by Mary. Thus, for example, Origen remarks
that as sin came from the woman so does the beginning of
salvation.3 Augustine wrote that woman is honored in Mary.4
He claimed that since man (homo) fell through the female sex,
he was restored through the female sex. ‘Through the woman,
death; through the woman, life.’8 This type of compensation
produced an ambivalent image of woman. Mary was glorified,
but she was unique. Women in the concrete did not shake off
their bad reputation and continued to bear most of the burden
of blame. The sort of polemic, therefore, which attempts to
cover the antifeminism of the Fathers by pointing to their glori¬
fication of Mary ignores the important point that this did not
improve their doctrine about concrete, living women. In fact
there is every reason to suspect that this compensation un¬
consciously served as a means to relieve any possible guilt feel¬
ings about injustice to the other sex.
In the mentality of the Fathers, woman and sexuality were
identified. Their horror of sex was also a horror of woman.
1PG 8, 430. Paedagogi II, 2 (end).
* PL 34, 452. De Genesi ad litteram XI, 42.
8 PG 13, 1819 C. In Lucam homilia VIII.
4 PL 40, 186. De fide et symbolo, 4.
8 PL 38, 1108. Sermo 232, 2.
There is no evidence that they realized the projection
mechanisms involved in this misogynistic attitude. In fact, male
guilt feelings over sex and hyper-susceptibility to sexual stimu¬
lation and suggestion were transferred to ‘the other’, the
‘guilty’ sex. The idea of a special guilt attached to the female
sex gave support to the double moral standard which prevailed.
For example, in cases of adultery, the wife had to take back her
unfaithful husband, but if the wife was unfaithful, she could be
rejected.
Even in the face of such oppressive conditions a few women
managed to attain stature. Jerome admitted that many women
were better than their husbands.1 But more significant is the
fact that the existence of exceptions, no matter how numerous,
did not change the generalizations about feminine ‘nature’.
Hence the strange ambivalence which we have noted.
On the whole, then, the Fathers display a strongly disparaging
attitude toward women, at times even a fierce misogynism.
There is the recurrent theme that by faith a woman transcends
the limitations imposed by her sex. It would never occur to the
Fathers to say the same of a man. When woman achieves this
transcendence which is, of course, not due to her own efforts
but is a ‘supernatural’ gift, she is given the compliment of being
called ‘man’ ('vir). Thus there is an assumption that all that is
of dignity and value in human nature is proper to the male sex.
There is an identification of ‘male’ and ‘human’. Even the
woman who was elevated by grace retained her abominable
nature. No matter what praise the Fathers may have accorded
to individuals, it is not possible to conclude that in their doctrine
women are recognized as fully human.
Some individual women were, of course, honored and re¬
spected in the patristic age. Moreover, women exercised a role
in the Church’s ministry. The widows had the duty of instruct¬
ing female converts for baptism, but- they never constituted an
order of the ministry. The office of deaconess is referred to in
scripture (e.g. Romans 16:1), and Pliny the Younger refers
to them in one of his letters. Other documents give more de-
1 PL 26, 536. Comm, in epist. ad Ephes., Ill, 5.
tailed information.1 It appears that at first the widows ranked

higher and that later they ceded first place to the deaconesses,
who took over their functions. Whereas the widows did not
receive ordination and ‘imposition of hands’,2 * deaconesses did,
and the latter were part of the ecclesiastical hierarchy.8 In the
West especially, their functions were severely restricted because
of their sex, and they existed only until the end of the sixth
century, when baptism of adults became rare, leaving the
widows with virtually no function. In the East, their powers
were often more extended, and there is evidence that they
lasted several centuries longer in some of the Churches. There
is no small irony in the fact that during an age in which opinion
of women was so low, some of them were, in fact, members of
the hierarchy, whereas in a later and more enlightened age,
when the Church itself is urging them to take a more active
part in public life, they are completely excluded from the
hierarchy.
3. The Middle Ages
Theological opinion of women was hardly better in the Middle

Ages, although some of the fierceness of tone was mitigated.
The twelfth century theologian, Peter the Lombard, whose
Sentences became a standard textbook to be commented upon
by teachers of theology, went so far as to write that woman is
sensuality itself, which is well signified by woman, since in
woman this naturally prevails.4 * Bonaventure repeated many of
the standard ideas. He thought that the image of God is
realized more in man than in woman, not in its primary mean¬
ing, but in an accidental way.6 He repeats the old idea that
1 Cf. the article ‘Diaconesses’, in Dictionnaire de thiologie catholique (here¬

after referred to as DTC), t. IV, col. 685-703.
1 Apostolic Constitutions VIII, 25.
8 Ibid., VIII, 19, 20.
4 PL 191, 1633. Collectanea in epist. D. Pauli in epist. ad Cor., cap. XI, 8-10.
6 Comm, in Sec. Librum Sententiarum Petri Lombardi (Quaracchi edition),
dist. XVI, art. 2, q. 2.
woman signifies the ‘inferior part’ of the soul; man, the

‘superior part’.1
What was new in the picture in the Middle Ages was the
assimilation into theology of Aristotelianism, which provided the
conceptual tools for fixing woman’s place in the universe and
which, ironically, could have been used to free her. In the writ¬
ings of Thomas Aquinas, which later came to have a place of
unique pre-eminence in the Church, Aristotelian thought was
wedded to the standard biblical interpretations, so that the
seeming weight of ‘science’ was added to that of authority.
Thus, following Aristotle, Aquinas held that the female is de¬
fective as regards her individual nature. He wrote that she is,
in fact, a misbegotten male, for the active force in the male seed
tends to the production of a perfect likeness in the masculine
sex. Her existence is due to some defect in the active force (that
of the father), or to some material indisposition, or even to some
external influence, such as that of the south wind, which is moist.
He adds that, as regards human nature in general, woman is
not misbegotten, but is included in nature’s intention as directed
to the work of generation.2 * She has, then, a reason for being—
that is, she is needed in the work of generation. It seems that
this really is all she is good for, ‘since a man can be more effi¬
ciently helped by another man in other works’.*
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that Thomas
thought woman has a major or even an equal role, even in her
one specialty, i.e. reproduction. He wrote:
‘Father and mother are loved as principles of our natural origin.

Now the father is principle in a more excellent way than the
mother, because he is the active principle, while the mother is a
passive and material principle. Consequently, stricdy speaking, the
father is to be loved more.’4
1 Ibid., dist. XVIII, art. 1, q. 1.

2 Summa Theologiae, I, 92, x, ad 1. Albert the Great also wrote that woman
is misbegotten: in II P. Sum. Theol. (Borgnet), tract. 13, q. 80, membrum 1.
8 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, 92, 1 c.
4 Ibid., II—II, 26, 10 q.
He continues:
‘In the begetting of man, the mother supplies the formless matter
of the body; and the latter receives its form through the forma¬
tive power that is in the semen of the father. And though this
power cannot create the rational soul, yet it disposes the matter
of the body to receive that form.’1
Thus, the role of the woman in generation is purely passive;
she merely provides the matter, whereas the father disposes
this for the form. This view of woman as a purely passive prin¬
ciple which merely provides the ‘matter’ of the offspring is, of
course, linked to an entirely outdated and false biology: that
the mother is, in fact, equally ‘active’ in the production of the
child was unknown in the thirteenth century.
This idea of women as ‘naturally’ defective, together with
the commonly accepted exegesis of the texts concerning woman
in Genesis and the Pauline epistles, and the given social situa¬
tion of women in a condition of subjection are three factors
whose influence can be detected in Thomas’s arguments
supporting the traditional androcentric views. Thus, in regard to
marriage, he judged that, although there is proportional equality
between man and wife, there is not strict equality; neither in
regard to the conjugal act, in which that which is nobler is due
to the man, nor in regard to the order of the home, in which
the woman is ruled and the man rules.2 Moreover, the exclusion
of women from Holy Orders is upheld on the basis that a sacra¬
ment is a sign, and that in the female sex no eminence of degree
can be signified, since the woman has the state of subjection.*
There is no probability at all that Thomas was able to see this
‘state of subjection’ as merely the result of social conditioning,
of a situation which could change. He believed that social in¬
feriority was required by woman’s ‘natural’ intellectual in¬
feriority: ‘So by such a kind of subjection woman is naturally
subject to man, because in man the discretion of reason pre¬
dominates.’4 This, he thought, would have been the case even
1 Ibid., II—II, 26, 10, ad 1.
2 Ibid., Suppl., 64, 3 c.
3 Ibid., Suppl., 39, 1 c.
4 Ibid., I, 92, 1, ad 2.
if sin had not occurred, i.e. even before the Fall. Thus, in
Thomas’s view, the question of woman’s autonomy is hopelessly
closed. The best she could hope for, even in the best of worlds,
would be a kind of eternal childhood, in which she would be
subject to man ‘for her own benefit’.
The puzzlement which characterized patristic thought on
women is again starkly evident in Thomas’s writings. This is
all the more striking because his thought is worked out in an
ordered synthesis; it is not a collection of disconnected snatches
of rhetoric, as is sometimes the case with the Fathers. The very
existence of women seems to have been an awkward snag in the
orderly universe which he envisaged. For the modern reader,
it is starding to read the question posed in the Summa Theo-
logiae: ‘Whether woman should have been made in the first
production of things?’1 The very existence of the question is
significant. Although Thomas argues that human bi-sexuality
should have been ‘from the beginning’, his whole mode of
argument reveals a naively androcentric mentality which assigns
what is properly human to the male and views sexual union
as merely ‘carnal’. Woman is seen as a sort of anomaly.
The anomaly of woman had nevertheless to be assimilated
into the system. A striking ambiguity, which looks very much
like a contradiction, resulted. It was necessary to admit, for
example, that the image of God is found both in man and in
woman, for this Thomas recognized to be the teaching of
Genesis. Yet Paul had said that ‘woman is the glory of man’,
and indicated that she was not the image of God. Thomas con¬
cludes that
‘in a secondary sense the image of God is found in man, and not
in woman: for man is the beginning and end of woman; as God
is the beginning and end of every creature.’2
The degrading idea that ‘man is the beginning and end of

woman’ is reinforced by the parallel: man: woman; God:
creature. Besides the intrinsic unacceptableness of this idea,
1 Ibid., I, 92, 1 c.
3 Ibid., I, 93, 4, ad 1.
there is an extreme difficulty in reconciling it with the assertion

in the same paragraph that the image of God in its principal
meaning (i.e. the intellectual nature) is found in both man and
woman. If woman has an intellectual nature, then her end
cannot be man, for intellectuality is the radical source of
autonomous personhood.
The tension between irreconcilable ideas is also apparent
from Thomas’s teaching on the rational soul which, he holds,
is not transmitted by the reproductive process but rather is
direcdy infused by God.1 Therefore, the form which constitutes
the individual, whether male or female, as a human person is
not derived from the father, but is directly from God. Thomas
has made it clear, moreover, that in his opinion
‘there is no other substantial form in man besides the intellectual
soul; and that the soul, as it virtually contains the sensitive and
nutritive souls, so does it virtually contain all inferior forms, and
itself alone does whatever the imperfect forms do in other things.’2
What is more, he strongly maintains that intellectual under¬
standing is not by means of any bodily organ; rather it is an
operation which is per se apart from the body.* Similarly, the
operation of the will is also performed without a corporeal
organ.4
It is abundantly clear, therefore, that even according to
Thomas’s own principles, the alleged defectiveness of women,
both as to their role in generation and considered as products
of the generative process, becomes extremely difficult to uphold.
Indeed, in the light of these principles it becomes impossible
to uphold. According to Thomas, it is the intellectual soul which
makes the human person to be the image of God.5 This is
neither caused by the male, nor is it essentially different in man
and woman.
We said earlier that there is a striking difference between
Thomas and the Fathers. The latter often manifest an un-
1 Ibid., I, 118, 2 c.
2 Ibid., I, 76, 4 c.
3 Ibid., I, 75, 2 c.
4 Ibid., I, 77, 5 c.
5 Ibid., I, 93, 6 c.
resolved tension between their idea of woman in her ‘nature’

and woman with grace, to such an extent that when she has
grace, she no longer is called ‘woman’, but ‘man’. Thus, there
is an identification of ‘male’ and ‘human’, which is overcome
to some extent by grace. Thomas, of course, shares the feeling
that women as such are not quite human. However, leaving
all questions of grace aside, there is indecision in his thought
on the level of nature itself. For Thomas, possession of an in¬
tellectual soul is natural and essential to men and women. In
the light of this radical natural equality, it makes litde sense to
say that man is the principle and end of woman. Why, then,
does he say it?
The discord between the philosophical anthropology of
Thomas and his androcentric statements is due to the then
commonly accepted biblical exegesis, Aristotelian biology, and
the prevailing image and social status of women. The deep roots
of Thomas’s thought—his philosophical conceptions of the
body-soul relationship, of intellect, of will, of the person, and
his theological ideas of the image of God in the human being and
of man’s last end—clearly support the genuine equality of men
and women with all of its theoretical and practical consequences.
In opposition to the outdated exegesis and biology which he
accepted, these Thomistic principles are radically on the side
of feminism. Thomas himself could not see—or would not per¬
mit himself to see—the implications of these principles in re¬
gard to women. And we have seen why: the logical conclusions
he might have drawn would at that time have appeared contrary
to faith and contemporary experience.
Today, fidelity to truth and justice requires that thinkers
who are aware of these implications make them explicit, rather
than parroting as ‘Thomistic doctrine’ harmful and untenable
ideas which Thomas surely would not propose, were he alive
today.
Despite medieval theories, there were some cases of powerful
women in the Middle Ages. Nuns, especially, had a certain
autonomy, which even St Thomas recognized. It is one of the
ironies of history that there were abbesses who legitimately
exercised great power, far beyond what is accorded to religious

women today. They were ‘persons constituted in ecclesiastical
dignity’ who had ‘the administration of ecclesiastical affairs
and pre-eminence of grade’.1 In fact, abbesses had power of
jurisdiction. Like bishops and abbots, they wore the mitre and
cross and carried the staff.
The abbesses of St Cecilia in Cologne had the power of juris¬
diction and of suspension over clerics.2 The abbesses of
Conversano, in Italy, ruled a Cistercian abbey and its neigh¬
bouring parishes and wielded enormous power. This was sym¬
bolized in a ceremony of homage in which the newly
consecrated abbess, with mitre and cross, was seated before
the external door, under a baldachin. Each member of the clergy
under her jurisdiction passed before her, prostrating himself
and kissing her hand.3 The homage ceremony was modified
in 1709, and the last abbess of Conversano died in 1809.
Another interesting instance was that of the abbesses of Las
Huelgas, near the city of Burgos in Spain. The abbess of Las
Huelgas was
‘dame, superior, prelate, legitimate administrator, spiritual and

temporal, of the said royal monastery and of its hospital, as well
as of the convents, churches, and hermitages of its filiation, of the
villages and places of its jurisdiction, of the manors and vassalages,
by virtue of Apostolic bulls and concessions, with plenary, exclu¬
sive jurisdiction, quasi-episcopal, nullius diocesis, and with royal
privileges: a double jurisdiction exercised in peaceful possession,
as is publicly known.’4
The powers of this jurisdiction included giving legal judgment,

just as bishops did, in criminal and civil cases and in cases con¬
cerning benefices; the power of giving dimissories for ordina¬
tions; the power of giving licenses for preaching, for confessing,
for exercising care of souls, for entering religious life; the power
1 Article ‘Abbesses’, in DTC, t. I, col. 18.

2 Elizabeth Schiissler, Der vergessener Partner (Diisseldorf: Patmos, 1964),
p. 89.
8 Article, ‘Abbesses’, DTC, col. 21.
4 Ibid., col. 20.
of acknowledging abbesses, of imposing censures, and of con¬

voking synods.1
Although attempts have been made to explain away most of
this as not really constituting spiritual jurisdiction, such attempts
have not been completely successful. Thus it is suggested that
the abbesses could have convoked synods through a vicar as
intermediary, since according to canonists women are not able
to convoke synods.2 However, there is no convincing evidence
offered that there were such intermediaries.
In addition to cases such as those we have mentioned, there
were also double orders, in which both monks and nuns were
ruled by an abbess.5
Besides the abbesses, there were other great individual women
in the secular world. There were such outstanding rulers as
Clotilde and Blanche of Castille, and learned women like
Eleanor of Aquitaine and Blanche of Navarre. There were great
saints: Catherine of Siena wielded enormous influence in her
milieu, and the story of Joan of Arc has no parallel. However,
it would be absurd to judge the general condition of women
by such examples. The naive idea of those who say that ‘true
ability will always prove itself’, and point to such extraordinary
cases, simply ignores the fact that coundess women were com¬
pletely stifled by an environment which worked against the
development and expression of their talents.
The prevailing low status of women was fixed by law and
custom. By canon law a husband was entitled to beat his wife.
Canon law allowed only the dowry system for matrimony, and
under this system women were defenseless. Moreover, since
they were legally incompetent, they were not considered fit to
give testimony in court. In general, they were considered as
man’s property. Since for feudal lords marriages were a way of
gaining property, women were pawns in the game of acquiring
wealth. The Church’s complicated marriage laws offered ample
opportunity for trickery and abuse. Thus, while the history of
1 Ibid., col. 21.

3 Ibid.
* Cf. Schiissler, op. cit., p. 91.
the Middle Ages reveals a few glorious feminine personalities,

that side of the scales is extremely outbalanced by the masses
of mute and anonymous victims of hypocrisy and oppression.
4. Beginnings of the Modern Period
‘The very thought that I am a woman is enough to make my

wings droop.’1 This remark, which was made by Teresa of Avila,
suggests that the situation of women was not yet greatly im¬
proved in the sixteenth century. Why would a person of such
intelligence and greatness have such a low conception of her
own sex? Perhaps it is not too surprising when one realizes that
some preachers of the time, as well as fathers of families,
considered it wrong for women even to learn to read and write.2
In such an atmosphere, it must have been difficult for a woman
to have much esteem for herself and other members of her
sex. In fact, Teresa’s words often reflect, perhaps unconsciously,
the attitudes of her milieu. She speaks frequently of the
‘weaknesses’ of women. The following remark is revealing:
‘During the very sorest trials that I have suffered in this life, I do
not recall having uttered such expressions, for I am not in the
least like a woman in these matters but have a stout heart.’8
The implicit assumption is that real courage is normal only for

men. Moreover, more than one admirer of Teresa made re¬
marks similar to that of John of Salinas: ‘She is a man.’4 It is
thought-provoking that this great woman and her friends, when
they tried to express the nature of her uniqueness, spon¬
taneously had recourse to expressions which disassociated her
from her own sex.
Teresa’s writings abound with passages in which she ex-
1 Life, Ch. X. The Complete Works of St Teresa of Jesus. Translated and

edited by E. Allison Peers (London: Sheed and Ward, 1949), vol. I, p. 61.
2 Dominique Deneuville, Sainte Therese d’Avila et la femme, (Paris: Editions
du Chalet, 1964), p. 40. This enlightening work gives many useful references
to St Theresa’s works in French translations.
3 Spiritual Relations, III. Peers edition, vol. I, p. 317.
4 Cited in Deneuville, op. cit., p. 113.
presses a terrible uneasiness over the handicaps imposed upon

her sex. She writes of the obstacle of sex, which prevents her
from preaching.1 Irony as well as anguish are reflected in the
following passage, most of which, significandy, was deleted from
her manuscript but later restored:
‘When thou wert in the world, Lord, thou didst not despise
women, but didst always help them and show them great com¬
passion. Thou didst find more faith and no less love in them than
in men. ... We can do nothing in public that is of any use to thee,
nor. dare we speak of some of the truths over which we weep in
secret, lest thou shouldst not hear this, our just petition. Yet,
Lord, I cannot believe this of thy goodness and righteousness,
for thou art a righteous Judge, not like judges in the world, who,
being after all, men and sons of Adam, refuse to consider any
woman’s virtue as above suspicion. Yes, my King, but the day will
come when all will be known. I am not speaking bn my account,
for the whole world is already aware of my wickedness, and I am
glad that it should become known; but, when I see what the times
are like, I feel it is not right to repel spirits which are virtuous and
brave, even though they be the spirits of women.’2
Teresa suffered greatly from her awareness of the ignorance

imposed upon her sex. She refers to this ignorance many times,
and indicates that she is fully aware of its harmful consequences.
Her suffering on this account was all the more acute and last¬
ing, because she clearly saw the value of learning. The follow¬
ing passage gives an indication of the intensity of her anguish:
‘O Lord, do thou remember how much we have to suffer on this

road through lack of knowledge! The worst of it is that, as we do
not realize we need to know more than we think about thee, we
cannot ask those who know; indeed we have not even any idea what
there is for us to ask them. So we suffer terrible trials because we
do not understand ourselves; and we worry over what is not bad at
all, but good, and think it very wrong.’*
Years of experience and observation caused Teresa to modify

1 Interior Castle, VI, vi. Peers ed., vol. II, p. 298.
2 Way of Perfection, Ch. III. Peers ed., vol. II, p. 13.
3 Interior Castle, IV, i. Peers ed., vol. II, pp. 233-44.
any tendency to delusions about masculine perfection. After

describing certain exalted spiritual experiences, she says:
‘The Lord gives these favors far more to women than to men: I
have heard the saintly Fray Peter of Alcantara say that, and I have
also observed it myself. He would say that women made much
more progress on this road than men, and gave excellent reasons
for this, which there is no point in my repeating here, all in favor
of women.’1
She noted the blind underestimation of women which caused

parents to regret the birth of daughters:
‘It is certainly a matter for deep regret that mortals, not knowing
what is best for them, and being wholly ignorant of the judgments
of God, do not realize what great blessings can come from having
daughters or what great harm can come from having sons, and,
unwilling, apparently, to leave the matter to him who understands
everything and is the creator of us all, worry themselves to death
about what ought to make them glad.’2 3
Apparently, as a consequence of mystical experience, Teresa’s

understanding rose above the common interpretation of Pauline
texts concerning women, which she had at first accepted:
‘It had seemed to me that, considering what Saint Paul says about
women keeping at home (I have recendy been reminded of this and
I had already heard of it), this might be God’s will. He (the Lord)
said to me: “Tell them they are not to be guided by one part of
scripture alone, but to look at others; ask them if they suppose they
will be able to tie my hands.” ’*
Thus Teresa’s understanding—like that of Catherine of Siena,

who recorded in her Diary a similar experience—transcended
the theology of her times and anticipated what biblical scholars
would begin to suggest centuries later.
During the centuries following the Middle Ages theological
opinion concerning women did not change radically. Cardinal
Cajetan (1469-1534), a famous commentator on the writings
1 Life, Ch. XL. Peers ed., vol. i, p. 293.

2 Book of the Foundations, Ch. 20. Peers ed., vol. Ill, p. 98.
3 Spiritual Relations: Favors of God, XIX. Peers ed., vol. I, p. 344.
HISTORY: A RECORD OF CONTRADICTIONS IOI
of Thomas Aquinas and one of the leading theologians of his

time, expressed almost total agreement with Thomas’ views
about women. His usual comment on these passages was: ‘All
of this is evident’ (Omnia patent). He did, however, deviate
slightly from the Master’s doctrine by expressing the opinion
that there are many works which can be expected to be done
better by a woman than by a man.1
Ignatius of Loyola (1491-1556), founder of the Jesuits,
thought he saw a similarity between women and Satan: ‘The
enemy conducts himself as a woman. He is a weakling
before a show of strength, and a tyrant if he has his will.’2 3
Especially revealing were (and still are) reasons given for the
exclusion of women from holy orders. The Spanish Domini¬
can, Dominic Soto (1494-1560) reflected sixteenth century
opinion in his treatment of this subject: he held that the female
sex is a natural impediment to the reception of Holy Orders.
The ladies were not alone in this category, however, for he also
listed hermaphrodites inclining to this sex, monsters, and the
perpetually demented. Having given the usual arguments based
upon texts of Paul, he added that even the light of nature shows
that it would be absurd for women to be promoted to consecrate
and to hear confessions, for even if there are some who are
prudent, that sex manifests a certain poverty of reason and
softness of mind.8
Consistent with such an opinion of woman was a doctrine of
marriage which perpetuated her situation of helpless subordina¬
tion and legal impotence. Thus Soto posed the questions of
whether it is licit for a man to ‘put away’ his wife because of
fornication and because of adultery, and answered affirmatively
to both. Significandy, the question of whether a wife could ‘put
away’ her husband for such offenses was not even raised.4
Francis de Sales (1567-1622), a liberal for his age, wrote some
1 Commentarium in I partem summae theologiae S. Tkomae Aquinatis, q. 92,

a. x.
2 Spiritual Exercises, ‘Rules for the Discernment of Spirits’, First week, Rule
12.
3 In Quartum Sententiarum Commentarii, d. 25, q. x, a. 2.
1 Ibid., d. 36, q. 1, a. 1 and 3.
‘advice for married people’ which reflected the mentality of

the times.1 Addressing himself to husbands, he told them that
the weaknesses and infirmities of body and mind of their wives
should not provoke disdain, but rather a sweet and loving com¬
passion, since God made them that way
‘so that, since they depend upon you, you will receive from them
more honor and respect, and so that you will have them for com¬
panions in such a way that you will nevertheless be their chiefs
and superiors.’
While both husbands and wives are told to love tenderly and
cordially, the wife’s love for her husband should be ‘respectful
and full of reverence’. In creation woman was taken from man’s
side, under his arm, ‘to show that she should be under the
hand and guidance of her husband’. The intellectual superiority
of the male is taken for granted in these passages. De Sales’
remarks on marital fidelity suggest by their choice of wording
a moral superiority of the male as well. He wrote: ‘Husbands,
if you want your wives to be faithful to you, make them see the
lesson by your example.’ These passages reveal that the andro¬
centric assumptions of the Fathers and medieval theologians
had been preserved intact. In fact, the tone of unctuous con¬
descension does not disguise, but rather reinforces these
assumptions (the compassion of the husband is balanced by a
corresponding reverence on the part of the wife). An essentially
alienating and de-personalizing form of man-woman relation¬
ship is exalted as the Christian ideal.
Although there was no basic change in theory concerning

women during the early modern period, an important move¬
ment began which, although it most directly affected religious
women, had a wider significance. The sixteenth and seven¬
teenth centuries witnessed the beginnings of the dramatic
struggle of religious women to free themselves of the cloister.
In the Middle Ages it had become an accepted fact that once
1 Introduction a la vie devote (Paris: Editions Fernand Roches, 1930s! t. II

troisieme partie, ch. 38.
a woman became a nun, she was to be enclosed in the convent

for life. In 1289, Boniface VIII had imposed strict enclosure
upon all religious women. The Council of Trent renewed the
constitution of Boniface with a few alterations, and soon after¬
ward, Pius V issued decrees that all religious women must
accept solemn vows and the cloister. This Church legislation
reflected a strong distrust of feminine competence and morals.
The attitudes which it reflected were strongly entrenched, and
revolutionaries who saw the need for change were strongly
opposed.
Now a number of courageous women struggled to break the
old patterns. Among these was Angela Merici (1474-1540),
founder of the Ursulines, whose ideas were daring and novel
for the times. According to her idea, the Ursulines were not to
be bound by cloister, nor to have a habit nor a common life.
Their only vow was to be a vow of chastity. They were to live
a life of consecrated virginity while laboring as apostles in the
world. Unfortunately, ecclesiastical authorities were not ready
to understand these changes. After Angela’s death, the authori-
-ties—especially Charles Borromeo, Cardinal of Milan—gradu¬
ally managed to force her company back into the old monastic
forms, insisting upon cloister, religious habit, and the like. The
founder’s plans were defeated. A similar fate was imposed upon
the plans of Francis de Sales and Jeanne de Chantal for their
Sisters of the Visitation. Vincent de Paul’s Daughters of
Charity were more successful in accomplishing innovations.1
Undoubtedly, the most daring of the innovators was Mary
Ward (1585-1645), who founded the ‘English Ladies’. She
intended that her group would work ‘in the world’, conducting
schools for girls. They would be like the Jesuits, but would
not be subjected to them, as to a ‘First Order’. Rather, they
were to be governed directly by women responsible solely to
the pope, independendy of bishops and of men’s orders. Also
1 A historical study of these attempts is to be found in James R. Cain, The

Influence of the Cloister on the Apostolate of Congregations of Religious Women.
Excerpt from a doctoral dissertation in canon law, Lateran University (Rome:
1965)^ PP- i-58.
daring for the time were Mary Ward’s ideas on the education
of girls. A strong advocate of the emancipation of women, she
planned to teach girls Latin and other secular subjects which
heretofore had been reserved largely to men. She insisted
that
‘there is no such difference between men and women that women
may not do great things, as we have seen by the example of many
saints.... For what think you of this word, “but women”? As if
we were in all things inferior to some other creature which I sup¬
pose to be man! ... And if they would not make us believe we can
do nothing, and that we are but women, we might do great
matters.’1
At the same time, Mary Ward accepted part of the traditional

teaching concerning woman’s ‘place’, which her modern
counterparts are challenging in the second half of the twentieth
century. She was willing to accept the submission of wives to
their husbands, that men are head of the Church, that women
could not administer the sacraments or preach in public
Churches. It would have been extremely difficult to question
these points in the seventeenth century, when women were
still considered unfit to study Latin or to teach very small boys.
She was, however, a great revolutionary within the context
of her times, struggling to free women to develop and use their
talents in the service of the Church.
For her pains, Mary Ward was rewarded with persecution
by clerical enemies. One of the chief among these was William
Harrison, Archpriest of England, who together with some col¬
leagues wrote to Pope Gregory XV in 1621, trying to get the
congregation dissolved, since they were doing work ‘unfitting
for women’. What were the exact reasons given for opposition
to this dedicated group? The first objection of Mary Ward’s
enemies was that women had never before taken upon them¬
selves an apostolic office—an objection which revealed a strange
ignorance of the early years of Christianity—and this was no
time to begin. Describing the characteristics of women, the
1 Mother M. Margarita O’Connor I.B.V.M., That Incomparable Woman
(Montreal: Palm Publishers, 1962).
archpriest reflected the opinions prevalent in the Church: since

that sex is ‘soft, fickle, deceitful, inconstant, erroneous, always
desiring novelty, liable to a thousand dangers’, the Church
Fathers had cried out against them. Harrison’s second objection
was that while the group professed to be religious, they did not
submit to cloister, as required. Third, they presumed too much
authority, and spoke too freely on spiritual matters. This, of
course, was claimed to be against the teaching of Paul, who in
I Corinthians 14:34-5, had said that women should be silent
in the churches. Another objection was that they would teach
erroneously and lead others into heresy. Moreover, it was main¬
tained that the women would cause scandal by frequenting the
homes of people and travelling freely. Finally, these ladies
because of their apostolic work were the subject of ridicule.1
So much for the clerical refutations of Mary Ward’s efforts.
These did not, of course, represent the opinions of all of the
clergy. The Jesuits, for example, were divided on the subject.
Mary Ward appealed to Pope Urban VIII in an audience in
1624, and he had her case reviewed by a board of cardinals.
They did not come to a definite decision, but apparently agreed
with each other against the possibility of ‘the power of women
to do aught of good to any but themselves in a life consecrated
to God.’2 Finally in 1629 a decree of suppression was issued.
Mary regarded this as a spurious document, and instructed
her members to disregard it. In retaliation, three ecclesiastics
from the Holy Office arrested her in Munich in 1630 as a
heretic and a schismatic; she was imprisoned in a Poor Clare
convent, under extremely unhealthful conditions, until released
by a decree of Pope Urban.
The official Bull of suppression was signed by Urban in
1631. The wording, of the Bull eloquently reveals the ecclesias¬
tical mentality. It said, among other things,
‘certain women, taking the name of Jesuitesses, assembled and

living together, built colleges, and appointed superiors and a Gen-
1 Cited in Cain, op. tit., p. 42.

2 O’Connor, op. cit., p. 87.
eral, assumed a peculiar habit without the approbation of the Holy

See ... carried out works by no means suiting the weakness of their
sex, womanly modesty, virginal purity ... works which men most
experienced in the knowledge of the sacred scriptures undertake
with difficulty, and not without great caution.’1
The crawl of progress continued, however. The institute

survived as a ‘new institute’, with modified regulations, but in
the mid-eighteenth century it was again under fire. Benedict
XIV issued a Bull (Quamvis justo), which stated that the new
Institute of English Virgins was ‘kindly tolerated’, but that they
must not recognize Mary Ward as their founder. Finally, papal
approbation was given in 1877 tmder Pius IX, the vigorous
original plan having been modified. Not until the present cen¬
tury was Mary Ward reinstated as founder.
What is the significance of this case? It illustrates tension
and opposition between those who hold 'ecclesiastical authority
—the guardians of the traditional androcentric structures—and
those who try to bring women out of their condition of imposed
inferiority and immaturity. The arguments used by William
Harrison and the cardinals against Mary Ward are not un¬
familiar to twentieth century Catholics. The basic contest has
not changed: she and her followers struggled for the right to
teach catechism and Latin, and were rebuked as trying to do
what is unfitting for women and against the teaching of Paul.
While since then, assuredly, much territory has been gained,
today the same arguments are given to justify the enormous
obstacles to autonomy and equality which still remain. Vestiges
of the cloister still impede religious women today, hampering
their personal and intellectual development in subde ways, and
thus indirectly selling short those whom they teach and with
whom they have contact. Obstructive masculine legislation has
contributed greatly toward perpetuating the basis which exists
in fact for the caricature of ‘the good Sisters’.
1 Ibid., pp. 115-16.

5. Emancipation and Papal Documents
It was not Catholic ideology but the industrial revolution which

led to feminine emancipation. The eighteenth, nineteenth and
twentieth century theologians continued to justify the traditional
subordinate and legally helpless situation of married women.
Cardinal Gousset (1792-1866) held that the administration of
property belonged to the husband alone. He could sell or dispose
of it as he wished, without the agreement of his wife.1 The
latter was expected to follow him wherever he should decide
to go, even to a foreign country, and to submit to him in all
things.2 3 Indeed, the education permitted to young girls hardly
equipped them for anything better than the life of mindless
subjects. The clergy who concerned themselves with their
spiritual direction generally encouraged only the passive vir¬
tues, and discouraged anything more than a modest intellectual
ambition. A typical example was the work of the Abbe Juilles,
who in the middle of the nineteenth century wrote a book of
advice for girls, in which he counseled them to develop the
virtues of humility, charity, and purity, but overlooked such
virtues as courage and ambition. He encouraged them to apply
themselves to Christian teaching on a modest level, but not to
aspire to the level of scientific knowledge.*
The official Catholic reaction in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries to the modern movement toward feminine emancipa¬
tion manifested the persistence of the conflict between the
Christian concept of women as persons, made to the image of
God, and the notion of them as inferior, derivative beings. The
first pope to confront the movement was Leo XIII. Against the
socialists, whom he saw as threatening the stability of marriage,
he defended ‘paternal authority’. As for the husband-wife re¬
lationship, he re-affirmed the subjection of the female:
1 Th&ologie morale (Paris: Jacques Lecoffre et cie, 1858), I, p. 3x5.

2 Ibid., II, p. 605.
3 La jeune fille chretienne dans le monde (Paris: Ambrose Bray, 1861).
io8 THE CHURCH AND THE SECOND SEX
‘Wherefore as the Apostle admonishes: “As Christ is the head of

the Church, so is the husband the head of the wife”; and just as
the Church is subject to Christ, who cherishes it with most chaste
and lasting love, so it is becoming that women also should be sub¬
ject to their husbands, and by them in turn be loved with faithful
and constant affection.’1
This, of course, implies a limited view of woman’s ‘nature,’

which he briefly expresses in another document:
‘Women, again, are not suited for certain occupations; a woman

is by nature fitted for home work, and it is that which is best adap¬
ted at once to preserve her modesty and to promote the good
bringing up of children and the well-being of the family.’2 *
In his encyclical on Christian marriage, Leo asserted:
‘The husband is the chief of the family and the head of the wife.
The woman, because she is flesh of his flesh and bone of his bone,
must be subject to her husband and obey him; not, indeed, as a
servant, but as a companion, so that her obedience shall be want¬
ing in neither honor nor dignity.’8
The implied interpretation of Genesis is unacceptable by the

standards of modern biblical scholarship. Moreover, there is
an intrinsic inconsistency within the statement itself. The riddle
of how someone who is subject can truly be considered as a
companion did not, it seems, appear as a problem to Leo. A
comparable one-sidedness can also be seen in his treatment of
divorce, which was viewed as an unqualified evil. He even
claimed that by divorce,
‘the dignity of womanhood is lessened and brought low, and women

run the risk of being deserted after having ministered to the pleas¬
ures of men.’4
The other side of the picture was simply ignored; the fact that
many women desired nothing more than to be freed definitively
1 Encyclical Letter, Quod Apostolici Muneris, 28 December, 1878.

2 Encyclical Letter, Rerum Nov arum, 15 May, 1891.
8 Encyclical Letter, Arcanum Divinae, 10. February, 1880.
4 Ibid.
from partners who exploited their wives’ inability to obtain a
divorce under existing laws was tacidy passed over.
Although Benedict XV, in 1919, pronounced in favor of votes
for women, this did not represent any sweeping change in the
official oudook concerning women themselves. It was thought
by many Catholics that women’s votes would support conserva¬
tive and religious parties. It would be naive to suppose that this
consideration did not affect official attitudes.
One of the great struggles in the effort to achieve adulthood
for women has been the striving for an equal education. Re¬
sistance to this striving can be seen in the words of Pius XI,
who wrote in 1929, in his encyclical on the Christian education
of youth:
‘False also and harmful to Christian education is the so-called
method of “coeducation”. This too, by many of its supporters, is
founded upon naturalism and the denial of original sin; but by all,
upon a deplorable confusion of ideas that mistakes a leveling pro¬
miscuity and equality for the legitimate association of the sexes.
The creator has ordained and disposed perfect union of the sexes
only in matrimony and, with varying degrees of contact, in the
family and in society. Besides there is not in nature itself, which
fashions the two quite different in organism, in temperament, in
abilities, anything to suggest that there can be or ought to be pro¬
miscuity, and much less equality, in the training of the two sexes.’1
From the last words it appears that Pius XI was even more
horrified at the idea of equality than of promiscuity. It is note¬
worthy that he linked coeducation with equality and therefore
opposed it. Separate and ‘different’ education is, in fact, one
of the surest ways of supporting the illusion that women are
inferior in ability. In proclaiming that the ‘differences’ should
be ‘maintained and encouraged’,2 Pius XI unconsciously con¬
ceded that these differences are not as natural in origin as he
would want to believe.
In his encyclical on Christian marriage Pius XI, citing Paul,
repeated the familiar ideas on the ‘order’ of domestic society:
1 Encyclical Letter, Divini Illius Magistri, 31 December, 1929.

2 Ibid.
no THE CHURCH AND THE SECOND SEX
‘This order includes both the primacy of the husband with regard
to the wife and children, the ready subjection of the wife and her
willing obedience.’1
His hostility to feminine emancipation is hardly disguised. He

attacks those ‘false teachers’ who say that ‘the rights of husband
and wife are equal’, and who say that there should be emancipa¬
tion ‘in the ruling of the domestic society, in the administra¬
tion of family affairs, and in the rearing of children’, and that
this liberty should be ‘social, economic, and physiological’.2 3
Through loaded wording, psychological pressure is brought to
bear against women who would want to improve their situation.
He wrote, for example, that according to the doctrine of the
‘false teachers’, the married woman should, ‘to the neglect of
these [her family] be able to follow her own bent and devote
herself to business and even public affairs’.5 The whole tone and
context suggests that anyone who does devote herself to busi¬
ness or public affairs is suspected of doing this to the detriment
of her family. This is suggested also by omission, since there
is no hint of the possibility that by such activity the woman
could become a more well-rounded person and therefore a
better wife and mother. It is noteworthy, furthermore, that
Pius’s choice of language unconsciously refuted the ‘feminine;
nature’ hypothesis upon which he elsewhere relied so heavily.
It is the admission of such an ambitious ‘bent’ in women which
reveals the shakiness of his views about ‘the natural disposi¬
tion and temperament of the female sex’.
‘True emancipation’, according to Pius XI, will not involve
‘false liberty and unnatural equality with the husband’.4 He
referred to equality in dignity, and then effectively negated
this by affirming the necessity of ‘a certain inequality’.5 It is
abundantly obvious that he favored the traditional androcentric
situation; yet the pressure of social evolution forced him to use
1 Encyclical Letter, Casti Connubii, 31 December, 1930.

3 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
1 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
history: a record of contradictions III
expressions which have just enough ambiguity to leave the door

open a crack for regrettable but unavoidable social change. Thus,
he wrote:
‘Again, this subjection of wife to husband in its degree and manner

may vary according to the different conditions of persons, place,
and time.’1
This prepared the way for an evolution of doctrine, but at the

price of an ambiguity which could be interpreted in a manner
that would militate against progress as long as the social situa¬
tion and mores would allow. In the numerous passages of this
type, the pendulum swings between the strong affirmation of a
supposedly essential order, and a cautious admission of possible
deviations from this. The following passage also illustrates this
point:
‘It is part of the office of the public authority to adapt the civil
rights of the wife to modem needs and requirements, keeping in
view what the natural disposition and temperament of the female
sex, good morality, and the welfare of the family demands, and
provided always that the essential order of the domestic society
remain intact.’2
It is significant that in this process of adaptation it was the ‘pub¬

lic authority’ which was said to adapt the rights of the wife. All
this was to be decided for her. There was no suggestion of a
democratic process in which she might claim her rights or
actively further social change in her own favor.
The copious utterances of Pius XII manifest the same resist¬
ance to change, often descending into detail with great explicit¬
ness. He insisted upon male headship in marriage.* As for
married women entering the fields of work and public life:
‘It is doubtful that such a condition is the social ideal for

the married woman.’
However, he went on in the same text to claim that providence
1 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
3 Address to Married Couples, io September, 1941.
gives to the Christian family the power ‘to avoid the perils which
are doubdess hidden in [such a state]’. He praised
‘the sacrifice of a mother who, for special motives, must, beyond

her domestic duties, also work to provide with hard daily toil for
the upkeep of her family’.
His advice to such working women:
‘During the hours and days which you can dedicate entirely to
your dear ones, add zealous attention to redoubled love.’1
The text reveals the same indecision we have seen in the

writings of Pius XI between a supposed ‘ideal’ situation (that
of a bygone agricultural society) and the facts of modern life.
It is notable that work is seen by Pius XII solely as an obligation
taken on for the family, and not at all as a means of self-expres¬
sion or as a contribution to society. Moreover, stress is laid on
the double duty of the working wife, without a balancing reference
to the duties or attitudes of husbands.
In one of his widely published addresses, the ambivalence
of Pius XII’s attitude is revealed in modes of expression that
appear comical some twenty-odd years later. Having bemoaned
the fact that women have been breaking out of bondage to the
home, he could conclude:
‘Your entry into public life has come about suddenly, as an effect
of the social events of which we are being spectators; that does not
matter! You are called to take part in it.’2
A key concept in the whole adjustment, to modern society was

‘spiritual motherhood’, an easily manipulated concept which
permitted some expansion of the traditional role but with limita¬
tions.
‘Every woman is destined to be a mother, mother in the physical

sense of the word, or in a more spiritual and higher but no less
real meaning.’*
1 Address to Newlyweds, 25 February, 1944.

* Address to Women of Catholic Action, 21 October, 1945.
1Ibid.
Just how restrictive and unrealistic this conception is becomes

clear in the next passage:
‘The creator has disposed to this end the entire being of woman,
her organism, and even more her spirit, and above all her exquisite
sensibility. So that a true woman cannot see and fully understand
all the problems of human life otherwise than under the family
aspect.’1
Many women find a discrepancy between this exclusive identi¬

fication with the maternal role and their own experience of
themselves, and find this identification with one role alienating.
Pius takes care of such cases by using the expression ‘true
woman’, implying that anyone who does not fit the stereotype
is not what she should be.
While Pius XII seemed capable of viewing the work of a
married woman as legitimate only insofar as it was a necessity
imposed upon her to help support the family, his view of the
man’s work is, significandy, very different:
‘For if by elevating himself creditably and honestly in society by

means of his profession and labor, the man confers esteem and
security on his wife and children—since the pride of children is
their father—the man must not forget how much he contributes
to a happy domestic life if, in every circumstance, he shows, in
his own heart as well as in his exterior behaviour and speech, re¬
gard and respect for his wife, the mother of his children.’2
Missing entirely is any thought that esteem in society as a re¬

ward for her own professional excellence is a good to be prized
by the woman as well. For Pius XII she remained the purely
relational being, who receives esteem from society because of
her maternal role. Absent too is any recognition of the fact that
this condition of dependence upon another for one’s self-image
can be alienating.
Since the mental framework evidenced in Pius XII’s writings
is one in which women are envisioned as totally ‘other’, it is not
1 Ibid.
8 Address to Newlyweds, 8 April, 1942.
THE CHURCH AND THE SECOND SEX
114
surprising that he showed little sensitivity for their problems
and personal aspirations. The following statement is revealing:
‘A cradle consecrates the mother of the family; and more cradles
sanctify and glorify her before her husband and children, before
Church and homeland. The mother who complains because a new
child presses against her bosom seeking nourishment at her breast
is foolish, ignorant of herself, and unhappy.’1
There is in the context no suggestion of sympathetic under¬
standing or of compassion for another’s situation. The possibility
that the woman is overburdened and exhausted by repeated
pregnancies is not considered. To quote again:
‘Even the pains that, since original sin, a mother has to suffer to
give birth to her child only draw tighter the bond that binds them:
she loves it the more, the more pain it has cost her.’2
Such statements could well lead one to agree with Simone de
Beauvoir’s idea that there is an unconscious sadism at the root
of certain moral attitudes concerning women. At the very least,
there is in evidence an insensitivity and one-sidedness which is
astonishing.
Pius XII perpetuated the custom of giving a double meaning
to ‘equality’. Having granted the equality of women with men
‘in their personal dignity as children of God’, he repeats the
familiar jargon which serves to nullify the practical implications of
real equality. Thus he wrote of ‘the indestructible spiritual and
physical qualities, whose order cannot be deranged without
nature herself moving to re-establish it’, affirming that ‘these
peculiar characteristics which distinguish the two sexes reveal
themselves so clearly to the eyes of all’, that only obstinate
blindness or doctrinairism could disregard them.® The diffi¬
culty with this is, of course, that not only physical qualities but
also ‘spiritual’ ones are presumed to be linked universally and
exclusively to members of one sex. It is precisely this bridge
from the biological differentiation to the level of personality
1 Address to Women of Catholic Action, 26 October, 1941.

2 Address to Obstetricians, 29 October, 1951..
a Address to Women of Catholic Action, 21 October, 1945.
history: a record of contradictions i 15
differences which responsible thinkers today who are aware

of the role of cultural conditioning would regard as highly prob¬
lematic, and as anything but clear ‘to the eyes of all’.
Pius XII’s specific allusions to the alleged ‘spiritual’ differences
reveal the unreliability and traditional bias of his assumptions.
Thus:
‘This effective collaboration in social and political life in no way

alters the special character of the normal action of woman. Associ¬
ating herself with man in his work in the area of civil institutions,
she will apply herself principally to tasks which call for tact, deli¬
cate feelings, and maternal instinct, rather than administrative
rigidity.’1
The expression, ‘associating with man in his work’, sustains the

image of her as relational and subordinate. The text suggests,
moreover, that she should be kept out of responsible admini¬
strative posts. This is confirmed by a statement in the same
context about
‘the sensibility and delicacy of feeling peculiar to woman, which

might tempt her to be swayed by emotions and thus blur the clear¬
ness and breadth of her view and be detrimental to the calm con¬
sideration of future consequences,’
although it is conceded that these qualities are
‘of valuable help in bringing to light needs, aspirations, and dangers

in the domestic, welfare, and religious fields.’2
Having discouraged women from posts requiring ‘admini¬

strative rigidity’, Pius XII attempted in the same text, in a most
unrealistic way, to point out compensatory factors:
‘Only woman will know, for example, how, without detriment to

efficacy, to temper with kindness the repression of loose morals;
only she will know how to preserve from humiliation and educate
in decency and in the religious and civil virtues delinquent youth;
1 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
II6 THE CHURCH AND THE SECOND SEX
only she will be able to render fruitful service in the rehabilitation

of discharged prisoners and of delinquent girls.’1
Why would ‘only she’ be able to do these things? The works

described could be done by competent professional psycholo¬
gists, men or women. Pius XII seems to have been anxious,
indeed too anxious, to find a ‘role’ for women in line with
‘spiritual motherhood’. The unreliability of this conception is
as evident from exaggerated praise of supposed specifically
female talents as from the more negative statements.
The idea that the fixed sexual stereotypes might be the
effect of social conditioning was not given serious consideration
by Pius XII or his predecessors. All of the alleged specifically
feminine characteristics are seen as rooted unalterably in
feminine ‘nature’. Yet it was impossible consistendy to uphold
such a view, and like his predecessor, Pius XII unwittingly re¬
futes it. This is seen, for example, in his emotional description
of the daughter of the working mother:
‘Used to seeing her mother always absent and the home dismal in
its abandonment, she will find no attraction in it, she will not feel
the slightest inclination for domestic occupations, and she will be
unable to understand their nobleness and beauty or desire to de¬
vote herself to them some day as a wife and mother.’
Moreover, she
‘will want to emancipate herself as early as possible and, according

to a truly sad expression, “live her own life”.’2
So the alleged natural bent to domesticity is after all suspiciously

subject to rapid change.
Even aside from specific instances of unwitting self-refutation,
the whole tactic of these recent popes has been self-refuting. To
paraphrase one of Shakespeare’s famous lines, it seems the
gentlemen did protest too much. If women’s subordination
were really so ‘natural’, it would not be necessary to insist so
1 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
strongly upon it. It would seem that people would not have to
be told authoritatively to behave ‘naturally’. The opposition of
these popes to birth control, which becomes ever more acutely
embarrassing to a Church endeavouring to face up to the neces¬
sity of change, was also rooted in a rigid and inadequate con¬
ception of ‘nature’.
Hopefully, Church leaders will profit from the mistakes of
the past, and not continue to repeat them.
CHAPTER THREE
Winds of Change
‘Are there some of you who don’t like girl servers?

Please tell us why you don’t like them. We can’t
think of any good reason.’
Rita Martin
Third Grade
With the death of Pius XII the Catholic Church acquired as

pope a man entirely different from his predecessors in tempera¬
ment and stamp of mind. With Pope John XXIII came opened
windows and an on-rushing aggiomamento which lasted
throughout his brief reign. It has become abundandy clear,
despite a few discouraging setbacks, that the Church cannot
return to its condition before the advent of Pope John and
Vadcan II.
It is not surprising that one of the signs of new life in the
Church is an increasing awareness of the need to take an objec¬
tive and reappraising look at the situadon of women. The first
startling breakthrough on the ideological level came from Pope
John himself, in the encyclical Pacem in Terris of 1963. He
wrote:
‘Since women are becoming ever more conscious of their human

dignity, they will not tolerate being treated as mere material in¬
struments, but demand rights befitting a human person both in
domestic and in public life.’1
Further on, he states:
‘Thus in very many human beings the inferiority complex which

endured for hundreds and thousands of years is disappearing,
1 Pope John XXIII, Pacem in Terris. Encyclical of n April, 1963, n. 41,
Il8
WINDS OF CHANGE 119
while in others there is an attenuation and gradual fading of the
corresponding superiority complex which had its roots in social-
economic privileges, sex, or political standing.’1
In another passage, Pope John says:
‘Human beings have the right to choose freely the state of life which
they prefer, and therefore the right to set up a family, with equal
rights and duties for man and woman, and also the right to follow
a vocation to the priesthood or the religious life.’2 3
What is most striking in Pope John’s words is the sympathetic

and positive attitude they convey. Unlike his predecessors, he
frankly described change in terms of the gradual fading of in¬
feriority and superiority complexes, and he did not speak re¬
gretfully of it. Missing is the usual disparagement of feminine
emancipation which one had grown accustomed to expect from
papal writings. The customary double-talk has been dropped.
To those who are familiar with the writings of John’s predeces¬
sors, it is no less than astonishing to read the reference to ‘equal
rights and duties for man and woman’, unaccompanied by any
nullifying statement about the need for ‘a certain inequality’.
The spirit of Pope John is discernible in some statements
concerning women in Vatican II’s Pastoral Constitution on the
Church in the Modern World. This document affirms without
any hint of disapproval the following fact:
‘Where they have not yet won it, women claim for themselves an
equity with men before the law and in fact.’*
This constitution gave evidence of the Church’s growing recog¬

nition of the need for genuine practical realization of the equal
rights of men and women:
‘Nevertheless, with respect to the fundamental rights of the per¬
son, every type of discrimination, whether social or cultural,
1 Ibid., n. 43.
2 Ibid., n. 15.
3 Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modem World (Gaudium et Spes),
Introductory Statement, n. 9. All quotations from Council Documents are
taken from The Documents of Vatican II, edited by Walter M. Abbott, S.J.
(New York: America Press, 1966).
whether based on sex, race, color, social condition, language, or

religion, is to be overcome and eradicated as contrary to God’s
intent. For in truth it must still be regretted that fundamental
personal rights are not yet being universally honored. Such is the
case of a woman who is denied the right and freedom to choose a
husband, to embrace a state of life, or to acquire an education or
cultural benefits equal to those recognized for men.’1
In treating marriage, the constitution transcends the biologism

of an older theology and adopts a more personalist attitude.
It also seems to transcend the old canonical distinction be¬
tween the primary and secondary ends of marriage that was so
hampering to the development of a profound theology of
marriage. Moreover, it does not explicidy condemn artificial
contraception, but appears to leave the door open for further
consideration. It also avoids the familiar jargon about the sub¬
ordination of women. It does not speak disparagingly of working
mothers, although the following passage is ambivalent enough
to be given either a conservative or a liberal interpretation:
‘The children, especially the younger among them, need the care of
their mother at home. This domestic role of hers must be safely
preserved, though the legitimate social progress of women should
not be underrated on that account.’2 *
The Church in the Modern World has its weaknesses. It

does not attempt to clarify what might be meant by ‘legitimate
social progress’, for example. In the chapter on culture, this
passage occurs:
‘Women are now employed in almost every area of life. It is appro¬

priate that they should be able to assume their full proper role in
accordance with their own nature. Everyone should acknowledge
and favor the proper and necessary participation of women in
cultural life.’8
Whatever women’s ‘proper role’ and ‘own nature’ may be is left

in the dark. A hard-headed, progressive statement would not
1 Ibid., n. 29.
2 Ibid., n. 52.
’ Ibid., n. 60.
WINDS OF CHANGE 121
be phrased so loosely. However, the ambiguity can work both

ways.
Vatican II’s Declaration on Christian Education, moreover,
has nothing to say against coeducation, which suggests that a
long road has been traveled since the days of Pius XI. It is true
that there are regressive overtones in the passage about teachers,
admonishing them that
‘they should pay due regard in every educational activity to sexual

differences and to the special role which divine providence allots
to each sex in family life and in society.’1
However, the vagueness and impracticability of the statement

render it innocuous.
Finally, the Decree on the Apostolate of the Laity makes a
positive affirmation concerning women:
■
‘Since in our times women have an ever more active share in the
whole life of society, it is very important that they participate more
widely also in the various fields of the Church’s apostolate.’2
Overall, Vatican II did not have much to say concerning
women specifically. Under the circumstances and at that point
in history this may have been better than saying too much;
from the liberal’s point of view, a minimum of official state¬
ments is usually preferable to too many. It is also true that the
modifications attached to some of the statements give the im¬
pression of ‘three steps forward, one step backward’. Yet this
can hardly be described as anything other than progre*ss.
Pope Paul has appeared to try to maintain an openness to
progress on the question of women, and has given some evi¬
dence of an evolution beyond the attitudes of the popes who
preceded John. Addressing members of the Italian Women’s
Center during their jubilee celebration in 1965, he congratu¬
lated them for preparing themselves and others for new public
duties. Saying that the social processes which assure women of
their rights and obligations are not yet completed and that
women should explore and formulate the principles which
1 Declaration on Christian Education (Gravissimum Educations), n. 8.
2 Decree on the Apostolate of the Laity (Apostolicam Actuositatem), n. 9.
underlie true feminism., he also stated:

‘You should remind women that perfect equality in their nature and
dignity, and therefore in rights, is assured to them from the first page
of the sacred scriptures’.1
On the one hand it can be regarded as encouraging that Pope
Paul spoke of ‘perfect equality in rights’, without qualification;
on the other hand, the statement is weak in that he fails to be
specific about the implications of this ‘equality’.
Even less encouraging was Pope Paul’s much-publicized
address of 1966 to delegates of the Italian Society of Obstetrics
and Gynecology. In it the Pope stressed the symbolism of
woman and was strikingly imprecise, as the following statement
illustrates:
‘For us she is the creature most docile for any formation and suit¬
able, therefore, for all cultural and social functions and particularly
for those which are most congenial to her moral and spiritual
sensitivity.’2
One might wonder how such a ‘docile’ creature could be suit¬
able for ‘all cultural functions’. For many the great irony lay in
the fact that this address was the vehicle chosen by the Pope
to announce that the thought and norm of the Church on birth
control had not changed. One of the many puzzling problems
raised by the address was this: how can women possibly exer¬
cise ‘equal rights’ in society if they are prohibited from practic¬
ing birth control—the means necessary to free them from
unwanted and excessively numerous pregnancies?
Still other actions taken by Pope Paul have reinforced the
impression that he does not recognize the implications of
women’s equality. His rigid opposition to the legalization of
divorce in Italy was disheartening. Pope Paul’s stance had par¬
ticular significance for the women of Italy, a country where
society is extremely permissive in regard to infidelity on the
part of the husband and extremely strict in regard to the same
1 Pope Paul VI, Address to Italian Women’s Center, 30 May, 1965. Cited in
La documentation catholique, t. LXII, n. 1450, 20 juin, 1965, col. 1065.
* Pope Paul VI, Address to Delegates of the Italian Society of Obstetrics and
Gynecology, 29 October, 1966.
WINDS OF CHANGE 123
failing on the part of the wife. This general social attitude is

reflected in Italian law, which is far more lenient toward the
male, and which keeps married women in a state of subjection
and dependence. The degrading situation of Italian women
is deplorable by the standards of more advanced countries. It is
the Church alone which prevents divorce legislation and other
reforms. The Pope’s statement that divorce is a ‘sign of per¬
nicious moral decadence’ rings hollow to those familiar with the
condition of sexual morality in Italy, where application of the
double standard is flagrant. Moreover, such a statement in¬
creases the credibility gap when it is juxtaposed with his ab¬
stract statements concerning the equality of women.
Nevertheless, it is evident from the above passages that an
evolution has taken place in the official ideology. This is seen
not only in positive statements but in the omission of old for¬
mulae which expressed resistance to change. It is also evident
that the old prejudices have far from disappeared from official
Catholic thought and practice.
Beginnings of ferment
While the statements of recent popes and of the Council are
important, they are not more significant than a number of other
evidences of change in oudook. In fact, the ferment concerning
women in the Church began to manifest itself in a variety of
ways shordy after the opening of the Council. Discrimination
against women, which formerly would have passed unnoticed
except by a few, received careful scrutiny in the press. An ex¬
ample is the case of the woman journalist who, because of her
sex, was physically prevented from approaching the altar railing
to receive Holy Communion at a Council Mass during the second
session of Vatican II. (During the first session, women journa¬
lists had not even been allowed to attend the Council Mass, a
restriction which moved their male colleagues to send in a peti¬
tion on their behalf.) The event was significant in at least two
ways. First, it showed the persistence of a strange mentality
which seems to regard half the human race as not quite human.
Second, the widespread criticism of this incident showed that
the attitude it betrays is generally recognized by the modern

world as antiquated, odd, and offensive.
Another indication of the change was the appearance of peti¬
tions sent to the Council Fathers by women, requesting that
the Council reconsider the traditionally subordinate situation
of women in the Church in the light of modern scholarship, of
science, and of contemporary conditions. These petitions con¬
tained cogent arguments against the inferior role which the
Church assigns to women. Notable was the petition of Dr
Gertrud Heinzelmann, a Swiss lawyer, demonstrating that the
teaching of St Thomas Aquinas concerning women, which is
still implicitly the official doctrine of the Church, is entirely
outdated. Based upon an Aristotelian biological theory of genera¬
tion now known to be false and upon biblical interpretations no
longer acceptable by standards of modern scriptural exegesis,
the Thomistic teaching is shown as containing much that is
offensive and debasing. Dr Heinzelmann pointed out that while
Thomism contains principles from which conclusions favorable
to women could have been drawn, St Thomas himself was not
consistent in applying them. Her conclusion was that his theory
has contributed to the hampering of half of humanity in its
development, activity, and expression.1
Three German women theologians also presented petitions
to the Council. One of these, Iris Muller, described the hard¬
ship imposed upon her as a result of her conversion to Catholi¬
cism, for she had completed her studies for the Evangelical
ministry prior to her conversion and now, as a Catholic, could
not fulfill a comparable role. Written in collaboration with
Ida Raming, her petition analyzes the various traditional argu¬
ments for the exclusion of women from the priesthood, and
in an objective manner points out the defectiveness and incon¬
clusiveness of these time-honored arguments. Another theo¬
logian, Josefa Munch, petitioned for changes in canon law,
setting forth reasoned grounds for holding that Canon 968,
1 Gertrud Heinzelmann, ‘Women and the Council—Hopes and Expectations’,

in Wir schweigen nicht longer! {We Won't Keep Silence Any Longer), edited by
Gertrud Heinzelmann (Zurich: Interfeminas Verlag, 1965), pp. 79-99.
WINDS OF CHANGE 125
which limits ordination to men alone, is of human tradition

rather than divine origin. In another petition on the liturgy and
women, the same author cited a seemingly minor point of sexual
discrimination by recalling her conversation with one of the
Council Fathers. When she suggested to this bishop that the
words Orate fratres (‘Pray, brothers’), spoken by the priest
just before the Prayer over the offerings at Mass, be changed to
Orate fratres et sorores (‘Pray, brothers and sisters’), she found
the bishop completely opposed to her request. What was sig¬
nificant was the reason given for his opposition. He did not re¬
ject the idea because it seemed trivial, or because he thought the
proposed new formulation was too long, or because ‘brothers’
also implies ‘sisters’. Rather he claimed that the basic reason
for addressing the people as ‘brothers’ was that in principle a
woman cannot offer sacrifice to God. He maintained that a
laywoman has a much lesser share in the sacrifice of the Mass
than does a layman. Frau Munch’s point was that such weird
and distorted theological notions are encouraged and perpetu¬
ated by practices such as exclusively masculine forms of address
used by churchmen in speaking to an audience made up of both
men and women.1
In another realm—Catholic journalism—something new for
women began to happen shortly after the beginning of Vatican
II. A number of critical articles appeared in the most liberal
Catholic magazines, calling attention to the fact that the situa¬
tion of women in the Church needed updating. The first to
speak out were the women themselves; later other writings
appeared by clerical authors sympathetic to their cause.2
Usually the liberal articles were followed by strongly worded
1 All of these documents are in Heinzelmann, Wir schweigen nicht langer\,

op. cit.
2 Cf. Rosemary Lauer, ‘Women and the Church’, Commonweal, vol. LXXIX,
n. 13, 20 December, 1963, pp. 365-8. For letters, see vol. LXXIX, n. 20,
14 February, 1964, pp. 603-4. Cf. Mary Daly, ‘A Built-in Bias’, in Commonweal,
vol. LXXXI, 15 January, 1965, pp. 508-11; and Gertrud Heinzelmann, ‘The
Priesthood and Women’, in the same issue, pp. 504-8. An example of the open
and thoughtful type of article beginning to be written on the subject by the
clergy is Rev. George Tavard, A.A., ‘Women in the Church: A Theological
Problem?’, The Ecumenist, vol. 4, n. 1, November-December, 1965, pp. 7-10.
‘letters to the editor’, pro and con. Most of the letters from
women showed a keen awareness of the problem; by contrast,
many letters from clerics manifested strong conservatism,
failure to see the problem, and sometimes disdain. A frequent
target of those on the pro-feminist side was the use made by
preachers of texts of St Paul on the ‘place of women’, which may
have been appropriate to the social situation in which he lived
nineteen hundred years ago but which no longer apply.1 The
ecclesiastical custom of addressing mixed audiences as if there
were no women present was also criticized. A prominent
German woman pointed out that in a papal audience the Pope
addressed a mixed group as ‘My sons’ and another mixed
gathering simply as ‘Messieurs’. The letter of an American
woman expressed her dismay that when Pope Paul visited
New York he addressed a mixed audience as ‘Sons and brothers’.
These objectors were not preoccupied with etiquette for its own
sake, but with the thought-patterns reflected in an outdated
protocol: they saw the omission as symbolic of the failure of the
hierarchy in thought and action to take into account the real
existence and importance of women in the Church.
On the level of serious scholarship, works dealing with the
problem of women began to appear during the years the Council
was in session. These generally exposed the strong antifeminist
strain embedded in the Christian tradition and the need to
purify theological thought of distortions. These writings also
showed that the elements of a more authentic Christian doctrine
had existed and had found expression in all ages, although the
implications had not been fully understood and applied.
The emergence of this literature is the outcome of the rapid
social changes of modern times, together with advances in
science and scholarship. For once authors have the perspective
necessary to begin to distinguish the authentic, personalist strain
from the oppressive elements in Christian writings and prac¬
tice. Among Catholic scholars whose books have opened new
perspectives are: Elizabeth Schiissler, a young German
1 Eleanor Schoen, ‘Please! No Quotes from Paul’, National Catholic Reporter

(hereafter referred to as NCR), 20 January, 1965, p. 6.
WINDS OF CHANGE 127
theologian; Dr Govaart-Halkes, a Dutch woman; Haye van der

Meer, a Dutch Jesuit; and Jose Idigoras, a Jesuit professor of
theology at the University of Lima, Peru. Among other matters
agreed upon, all of these authors conclude that the centuries-old
reasons for the exclusion of women from holy orders are not
of a kind clearly to exclude a claim for the future admission of
women to the priesthood.
The new spirit has been manifested in yet another way.
Although Catholic women’s organizations have tended to be
conservative, an outstanding exception is the St Joan’s Inter¬
national Alliance. Originally founded to work for civic equality,
this avant-garde organization, comprised largely of professional
women, has turned its attention in recent years to achieving
equal status for women in the Church. At its twentieth council
meeting in 1963, the Alliance passed a number of resolutions
concerning fuller participation of women in the service of the
Church. It requested
‘the appropriate authorities to permit women to follow courses in

theology of all grades, to take the necessary qualifying examina¬
tions and to receive the diplomas and degrees now accessible only
to men.’
It further asked that if diaconal duties be entrusted to laymen as

an independent ministry, this ministry be open both to men
and women. It requested that representatives of the laity, both
men and women, be invited to attend meetings of the com¬
missions of the Ecumenical Council as experts, and expressed
the hope that the commission for the revision of canon law would
give special consideration to those canons which refer to women.
The Alliance moreover expressed the
‘conviction that should the Church in her wisdom and in her good
time decide to extend to women the dignity of the priesthood,
women would be willing and eager to respond.’
In regard to the liturgy, it asked that the prayers said over the
bride and bridegroom at the Nuptial Mass after the Pater Noster
be so worded as to apply to both spouses, reminding them of

their mutual obligation of fidelity.1
In 1964, the Alliance repeated the basic requests made the
previous year and expressed satisfaction that in the Constitution
on the Liturgy the prayer for the bride had been duly amended.
In addition, it asked that the Council invite qualified women to
attend its meetings as auditors. A new resolution petitioned the
commission entrusted with the revision of canon law
‘to amend those canons which concern women so that these no
longer assign to women a position of inferiority which no longer
corresponds with their civil and social status.’
This resolution stressed that the fundamental rights of all bap¬

tized persons, as affirmed in canon 87, should be recognized,
and asked for revision of specific canons.2
In its 1965 meeting the Alliance, recalling the tradition of
women deaconesses in the early Church, asked that No. 29 of
the Constitution on the Church, which decreed the introduction
of an independent diaconate, be applied to women as well as
to men. It recorded gratitude to the Holy Father for his invita¬
tion to representative women to attend the Council as
auditors, and the hope ‘that competent women will be included
in the post-conciliar commissions’. Further consideration of the
ritual of marriage was asked, ‘so that it may express the equal
rights and duties of husband and wife as affirmed in the Encycli¬
cal Pacem in Terris’.3
The resolutions of the Alliance during the conciliar period
have been substantially reaffirmed at their yearly international
meetings during post-conciliar years.
Developments at the Vatican Council

The first two interventions made at the Vatican Council on
behalf of women astonished many and delighted those con-
1 The Catholic Citizen, vol. XLIX, n. io, 15 October, 1963, p. 66. (The
Catholic Citizen is the organ of St Joan’s Alliance, i7d Dryden Chambers,
119 Oxford Street, London W.i.)
2 Ibid., vol. L, n. 10, October, 1964, pp. 72-3.
3 Ibid., vol. LI, n. 9, October, 1965, pp. 74-5.
WINDS OF CHANGE 129
cerned with the problem. In 1963, during the second session.

Cardinal Suenens of Belgium said to the Fathers in Council
that ‘in our age, when woman goes almost to the moon, it is
indispensable that she play a more important role in the Church’.
He then proposed that women be admitted to the Council as
auditors on the same terms as men. Two days later, Melkite
Archbishop Hakim of Galilee, also speaking in Council, made
an objection to the text of the Constitution on the Church, on
the score that it was so silent regarding the place of women in
the Church as to give the impression that they did not exist,
and he spoke of their indispensable work in the Church. Both
speeches were applauded in St Peter’s.1
Although many doubted that Cardinal Suenens’ proposal
would be accepted, the feat was accomplished. In the fall of
1964 the first women auditors took their places in St Peter’s for
the third session of the Council. The watching world found
this fact revolutionary, although sceptical observers pointed out
that an auditor was only a listener and, after all, had no voice
in the Council affairs. Moreover, the invitation came so late
that it appeared as an afterthought, and it was observed that
those chosen as auditors were in most cases more noted for
qualities of tact and prudence than for demonstrated ability for
progressive and creative thinking and leadership. Furthermore,
it was disconcerting to hear that women were expected to
attend general congregations of the Council only when ques¬
tions associated with women were debated. Finally, however,
perhaps as a result of a number of public complaints, women did
appear at all of the sessions of the third session of the Council,
and at least a few of these made fruitful use of the opportunity
for influence and dialogue afforded by their presence.
Nevertheless, a disappointing incident occurred during the
third session to point up the fact that the official status of women
at the Council was no more than that of silent listeners. The
famed woman economist, Barbara Ward, sent to the Council
1 Cited in The Catholic Citizen, vol. L, n. i, 15 January, 1964, p. 2. Cf also

Eva-Maria Jung, ‘Women at the Council: Spectators or Collaborators?’, The
Catholic World, vol. 200, n. 1, 199, February, 1965, p. 280.
the outline of a plan for a world-wide attack on poverty. It was

received enthusiastically by some of the hierarchy, and a layman,
James L. Norris, suggested that Miss Ward be invited to speak
to the assembled bishops. This proposal was rejected as
‘premature’, and Mr Norris spoke instead. The conservative
mentality which does not see beyond the scope of ancient preju¬
dice against women had won the day. A similar incident occurred
when lay auditors proposed that the president of the World
Union of Catholic Women’s Organizations, Miss Pilar Bellosillo,
address the Council Fathers. The proposal was rejected by the
Secretary General of the Council.
Even though the role of the auditors in St Peter’s was a silent
one, a number of eloquent and significant statements concern¬
ing women were made at the third session in connection with
Schema XIII, on The Church in the Modern World. Bishop
Coderre of St Jean, Quebec, told the Fathers that in a time of
universal evolution, women have gradually realized their own
dignity and their God-given state, which is not one of inferiority,
and that the Church must accept this situation and promote it.
Archbishop Malula of Leopoldville argued that the Church
should call on all men to aid in the completion of the great work
of civilization—the promotion of women to full human dignity
and complete responsibility. Other African bishops described
the plight of African women. Bishop Baurlein, of Djakovo,
Yugoslavia, called for all men to be treated alike, without regard
to race, sex, or social status, and said it was not enough for this
equality to be recognized theoretically; it must be translated
into social action. Saying that women’s changed status must
receive comprehensive consideration, Bishop Frotz of Cologne
pointed out that modern women expect to be accepted as equal
partners with men in intellectual and cultural life; the Church
must therefore promote the spiritual and religious interests of
woman so that she may have the opportunity of applying her
special gifts to the Church. Women, he said, must be accepted
as grown daughters, not as children.1
1 Cited in The Catholic Citizen, vol. LI, n. 1, 15 January, 1965, pp. 4-5. Cf.
also Eva-Maria Jung. op. dr., pp. 283-4.
WINDS OF CHANGE 131
Throughout the discussion of The Church in the Modem

World the American hierarchy was silent on the problem of
women—with one notable exception. In 1965, during the final
session, Archbishop Hallinan of Adanta made very strong
proposals to the Council. Although his intervention did not
reach the floor, it was filed with the Council’s general secretariat
and given wide press coverage. The Archbishop stated that
the Church must act as well as speak and he questioned whether
the Church has given the leadership that Christ by word and
example clearly showed he expected of her. He recommended
that women be allowed to act as lectors and acolytes at Mass,
and that after proper study and formation they should serve as
deaconesses, preaching and administering sacraments. They
should be encouraged, he said, to become teachers and con¬
sultants in theology and be included in whatever organization
is established for the post-conciliar implementation of the lay
apostolate. The Archbishop pointed out that the community
between man and woman must not be one of subservience, but
one of harmony, mutual respect, love, and responsibility.
‘Therefore, we must not continue to perpetuate, in the Church of

the twentieth century, the secondary place accorded to women in
the past. We must not continue to be late-comers in the social,
political, and economic developments that have today reached
climactic proportions.’
He deplored the fact that in many places the marks of inequality

still persist, in working conditions, in wages and hours of work, in
marriage and property laws. He referred to the gradualism
which limits the effectiveness of. women and said that the
Church has been slow to denounce the degradation of women
in slavery and to claim for them the rights of suffrage and eco¬
nomic equality. ‘Particularly has the Church been slow in offer¬
ing to women any other vocation than that of mother or nun.’1
1 Cited in The Catholic Citzen, vol. LI, n. io, November-December, 1965,

p. 88. An excellent collection of conciliar interventions concerning women
exists in German: Gertrud Heinzelmann, editor, Die getrennten Schwestern,
(Zurich: Interfeminas Verlag, 1967).
Emerging discussion of special problems: problems of catholic

married women
The Vatican Council had the effect of opening the door to
free discussion of all issues. Once opened, that door could not
be closed. The emergence of public discussion about the in¬
creasingly problematic—sometimes desperate—situation of
married Catholic women is another sign that anachronistic teach¬
ing and practice is becoming ever more difficult to defend. Much
of this discussion, of course, centers around the birth control
issue, which clearly touches women more profoundly than men.
The vigorous and outspoken protests against the Catholic posi¬
tion by married women have revealed a new awareness. Par¬
ticularly articulate was the protest of Dr Anne Biezanek, a physi¬
cian, director of a birth control clinic outside Liverpool (at which
most of her patients were Catholics), and mother of seven.
Converted to Roman Catholicism many years before, Dr
Biezanek has openly rebelled against the Church on the issue of
the birth control pill. Not having been able to obtain clear advice
on the use of the pill, she had taken it, with consequent im¬
provement of health. Still troubled in conscience, she talked to
a priest, who refused her Communion. In a press interview her
spontaneous remarks revealed a basic issue of the contest with
authority:
‘They’ve never cared how much women have suffered. This is

what makes me rebellious. If a priest says this is the law of God,
he’s prescribing martyrdom.’1
This drama was not new or unique, of course. But what was
new was the public attention drawn to a smouldering problem.
Also in recent years we have heard the public expression of a
troubled conscience on the part of priests themselves. It is ob¬
vious that not all are as traditionalist as those Dr Biezanek
encountered. Some have openly opposed the traditional teach¬
ing and others express dismay. A Boston pastor is reported to
have said that ‘some of the fire went out’ of his sermons when he
1 Newsweek, 6 July, 1964, p. 42.
WINDS OF CHANGE 133
handled the case of a poor, hapless sort of mother who bore her
fifth set of twins in as many years and whose husband deserted
her.1
All this discussion has underlined the fact that the current
crisis in the Church over birth control cannot be understood
merely in terms of expediency in the face of the world’s popu¬
lation problem. There is growing public concern over the pitiful
condition of many women who are without an adequate safe¬
guard against successive pregnancies. There is a development
of awareness in the Catholic consciousness that women are per¬
sons with rights and not mere instruments for the perpetuation
of the species.
Married Catholics have written articles expounding the same
basic issue. Daniel Sullivan, in an enlightening historical essay,
pointed to the conclusion that the misogynistic strain in the
Christian tradition, linked with anti-sexuality, is largely re¬
sponsible for the present crisis over birth control in the Church.2
Rosemary Ruether, theologian and mother of three children,
has presented the problematic on a personal plane, pointing out
that she could not give up her studies and professional interests
in order to have an unlimited number of children.
‘Such a request is simply a demand that I scuttle my interests, my
training, and in the last analysis, my soul. This, I feel, is not only
shockingly wrong, but, for me, psychologically impossible.’
Moreover, she says, ‘the inadequacies and tensions caused by

rhythm were too inadequate to be endured for long’; it meant
being ‘the unwitting slave of biological fecundity’. In fact,
rhythm turned out to be a ‘sexual version of the Chinese water
torture’.
The Ruethers decided against the Church’s position and
affirmed this as an act of conscience. Their decision was not
made because the Church’s position is ‘hard’. Hardness is
acceptable when you know
1 Ibid.
t Daniel Sullivan, ‘A History of Catholic Thinking on Contraception,’
What Modem Catholics Think about Birth Control, edited by William Birming¬
ham (New York: New American Library, 1964), pp. 28-69.
‘that this is the way to realize the values to which you are com¬
mitted. The hardness of the Church’s position, on the other hand,
produces weariness and disgust, rather than joy, because it rests
on a rationale that is not convincing, because it contradicts the
emotional dynamics of the marital relationship, and finally because
it becomes an intolerable thralldom lived out of a social intimida¬
tion extrinsic to oneself.’1
Mrs Ruether’s position, which still appeared radical to many in

1964, has been adopted in more recent years by an ever-increas¬
ing number of young Catholics.
Another aspect of conservative Catholic teaching on marriage
came under fire—the traditional opposition to working wives
and mothers. This is closely related to the birth control issue,
yet is distinct from it. A non-Catholic author, Betty Friedan, had
called attention to this opposition, claiming that the traditional
resistance of religious orthodoxy to professions and careers for
married women is masked today by the manipulative techniques
of psychotherapy. As an example, she cited the ‘Suggested Oudine
for Married Couples’ Discussions’, from the Family Life Bureau
of the Archdiocese of New York. The ‘oudine’ was loaded with
subde suggestions calculated to give the working wife guilt feel¬
ings; it is implied that by working she may be undermining her
husband’s position and making herself sterile. Mrs Friedan was
concerned with the crippling effects of this sort of propaganda.2 * * *
The problems of working mothers have been further dis¬
cussed by Sidney Callahan, a young Catholic author and mother
of five children. She urges a balanced soludon that recognizes
the values of creative outside work as well as the values of domes¬
tic fife. She asks for the abandonment of culturally imposed
stereotypes and a discovery of the true Christian ideal of per¬
sonal freedom which does not exclude acceptance of family
responsibility.8
1 Rosemary Ruether, ‘A Question of Dignity, A Question of Freedom’,

What Modern Catholics Think about Birth Control, pp. 233-40.
2 Betty Friedan, The Feminine Mystique (London: Victor Gollancz, 1963),
pp. 351-2.
8 Sidney Cornelia Callahan, The Illusion of Eve (New York: Sheed and
Ward, 1965).
WINDS OF CHANGE 135
Nor has the discussion of marriage and of problems of sexual
morality stopped with these particular questions. Inevitably
the question of the Church’s position on divorce has been raised.
In recent years some moralists and canonists have earnesdy
questioned the Church’s rigid laws forbidding divorce and re¬
marriage and pondered how they can be liberalized. Catholic
opposition to abortion, on the other hand, has remained un¬
animous. In the United States, where the issue of legalized
abortion has been hotly debated, not only the hierarchy but also
most laymen of the liberal wing have strongly opposed its
legalization. They have righdy pointed out that this is a subject
which must be kept distinct from that of birth control, since
the life of an existing fetus is in question. However, there has
been an irrational refusal to recognize any moral ambiguity,
the assumption being that the moral question has been com¬
pletely answered in the past and need not be discussed. The
general assumption has been that the only question for Catholics
is one of strategy—of which tactics will win out against legalized
abortion.1
Yet, the fact of moral ambiguity and complexity has been
recognized publicly by at least one bishop, Francis Simons,
Bishop of Indore, India. Bishop Simons wrote:
‘When abortion is performed to avoid almost certain or very prob¬
able serious harm to the health of the mother, its licitness is at least
arguable. ... A therapeutic abortion would seem licit only at a stage
when danger of death or serious injury to the health of the mother
is imminent.’2
Problems of the emerging sisters

A special problem in the general emergence of women is the
situation of religious sisters. More numerous than priests and
male religious, they exercise great influence, particularly as
educators, especially in the United States, with its system of
1 Representative of this attitude was the article by Robert F. Drinan, S J.,

‘Strategy on Abortion’, America, 4 February, 1967, pp. 177-9.
2 Francis Simons, ‘The Catholic Church and the New Morality’, Cross
Currents, vol. XVI, n. 4 (Fall, 1966), pp. 429-45.
parochial schools and Catholic academies and colleges. Their

public statements concerning the problem of women and the
Church have not been numerous nor conspicuously progressive
on the whole.1 On the other hand, in private discussions the
younger and better-educated sisters indicate an awareness of
the need for radical changes in their mode of life. Some note
with irony that their conspicuous and encumbering religious
habits have become symbols of glaring anachronism in patterns
of thinking and acting. The discrepancy between public and
private utterances of sisters can be explained partly by the
conservatism and timidity of some superiors, who make it
morally impossible for dissenting voices to be heard publicly.
Yet the phenomenon of the emerging sisters is a fact. Their par¬
ticipation in public demonstrations such as civil rights marches
and anti-war parades indicates a change of oudook toward ‘the
world’. More significant is their increasing attendance at in¬
tellectual and professional gatherings, and as graduate students
and visiting scholars on secular university campuses both in
the United States and in foreign countries. The recent appear¬
ance of progressive, self-critical books and essays by sisters also
reveals growing awareness and courage.
An important breakthrough occurred in 1965, when superiors
of American nuns petitioned the Holy See to give sisters a voice
in the Church bodies which rule the lives of religious women.
The petition said:
‘The Conference of Major Superiors of Religious Women earnestly

requests that sisters be asked to serve as permanent consultative
or acting members of the Sacred Congregation of Religious, of the
commission for the revision of canon law and of any post-conciliar
1A few courageous voices are beginning to be raised, however. A Medical

Mission sister who was appointed to the Pennsylvania Governor’s Commission
on the Status of Women, Sister Mary Lawrence McKenna, made a public
statement that the role of women in the Church is the most neglected area of
aggiornamento. Sister Albertus Magnus, O.P., historian and professor at Rosary
College, published a letter in which she maintained that the exclusion of women
from serving Mass has its roots in primitive ideas of female ‘uncleanness’, which
the Catholic Church has never entirely abandoned. She complained that
Vatican II ‘did not recognize women as belonging in all things equally with
men to the people of God’. NCR, 5 January, 1966, p. 6.
WINDS OF CHANGE 137
commission that may be set up for the implementing of acts of
Vatican II in regard to religious.’
Explaining the petition, Sister Mary Luke, S.L., chairman of

the conference’s executive committee and a Vatican II auditor,
was reported as saying:
‘There is a serious concern on the part of major superiors that

women should have something to do with the regulations that bind
them. Traditionally such regulations have been made by men. We
are strongly suggesting that we have representation.’
The petition was adopted by unanimous vote at a meeting in

Denver, and was sent to the Pope, the Sacred Congregation for
Religious, and all the bishops of the United States.
At the same conference meeting of superiors a number of
speakers discussed the problems facing religious women in an
age of rapid change. Sister Mary William, I.H.M., was reported
to have summarized the situation in the following words:
‘Either we find ways to develop and encourage this forward-looking,

constandy converting type of person or, by default, we will, in my
opinion, be foisting on the world psychological and spiritual
pygmies who will be a scandal to religion.’
Sister Charles Borromeo, C.S.C., a teacher of theology, was

quoted as saying:
‘To preserve dead forms is to create museums; to grow in living

and intelligent continuity with the vital past is absolutely essential.
The moment of decision would seem to be upon us, as upon the
whole Church.’1
An increasing number of progressive nuns—precisely the

‘forward-looking, constandy converting type of persons’ Sister
Mary William described—have recendy come to the decision
that they can serve the Church and the world better as lay
women than within the archaic structures of the religious orders.
A case symbolizing this trend was that of Jacqueline Grennan,
formerly Sister Jacqueline, president of Webster College in St
1 Reported in NCR, 1 September, 1965, pp. 1, n.

Louis and one of the most outstanding nuns in the United

States. Miss Grennan, who left her order in 1967 but remained
as president of the college, announced that she requested a
dispensation from her vows because of a personal conflict be¬
tween her duties as college president and her voluntary sub¬
mission as a religious to the juridical control of the Church.
Most departures of nuns have been on a stricdy individual
basis and not widely publicized. A dramatic mass exodus
occurred, however, in August, 1967 when fifty members of
the Glenmary order announced they were leaving the order
to work together as lay women. The sisters said they had taken
the step because they felt the restrictions of religious life inter¬
fered too much with their apostolic work. A few months pre¬
vious to this decision Archbishop Karl Alter of Cincinnati had
restricted the sisters’ hours, table reading, educational courses,
and contacts with laymen. After that, sisters started leaving the
order. About twenty-five sisters had left before the fifty an¬
nounced their departure as a group, leaving fewer than twenty-
five in the order. The departing group said their leaving should
not be pinned on the Archbishop’s directives as such, but that
the underlying cause was the attitude in the Church about
sisters which lies behind such directives.
Changes in fact
Although the Code of Canon Law has not been officially
revised, changes are taking place in practice. In Latin America
women have in some instances preached at Mass: in Uruguay,
for example, in the fall of 1965, on one occasion an eighteen-
year-old girl ascended the pulpit following the Gospel to preach
at all the Sunday Masses in the Basilica of Our Lady of the
Rosary in Paysandu, the country’s largest city.1 That same year
the Sacred Congregation on the Sacraments gave permission to
an order of missionary sisters to distribute Holy Communion.
In 1966 the Holy See gave bishops the faculty to allow mother
superiors of convents to distribute Holy Communion to their
communities when no priest is available. Although limited
1 NCR, 24 November, 1965, p. 12.
WINDS OF CHANGE 139
permissions of this nature had been given during the ponti¬

ficate of Pius XI and later were extended under John XXIII, a
new element appears here—that is, the bishops themselves are
now empowered to give permission without submitting in¬
dividual cases to the Holy See.1
Not surprisingly, changes are most evident in areas where the
Church is in greatest need, and not necessarily where the status
of women is most advanced in civil society. In 1964, for ex¬
ample, it was reported that a small community of sisters in
Brazil had begun conducting a parish at Nizia Floresta, sixty
kilometers south of Natal. The superior of the community tech¬
nically became ‘parish vicar’. So successful has the experiment
been that in 1967 it was reported that the procedure is being
duplicated in a number of other parishes in that country. In
these parishes sisters perform all pastoral functions except for
strictly sacerdotal functions (saying Mass, hearing confessions,
administering the sacrament of extreme unction); they baptize,
preach, teach, preside at the liturgy of the word with eucharistic
benediction, distribute Holy Communion, function as witnesses
for the Church at religious marriages, and conduct funerals.
In an interview, the first of the nun pastors, Sister Irany Bastos,
said: ‘The experiment is proving that women have more suc¬
cess than men in matters involving human relations;’2
In the United States, there has been strong opposition to
change. A great deal of publicity was given to one particular
parish in Oklahoma where the pastor, Fr John Bloms, cited
canon law in support of his policy of having girl servers. Pointing
out that according to canon 813, a priest is forbidden to say
Mass without a server, he claimed that there simply are not
enough boys available, particularly in these days when pro¬
cessions are a must. Canon 813 states that if no tonsured cleric
is available, a man or a boy may serve, and that if no man or
boy is available, a woman may do so ‘at a distance’. But what
does the expression ‘at a distance’ mean? Fr Bloms argued that
1 NCR, 26 October, 1966, p. 5.

2 Informations catholiques Internationales, 15 fevrier, 1967, pp. 9-10. See
also the issue for 1 mars, 1964, p. 9, for earlier report.
‘in our day, distance varies from submicroscopic to astronomi¬

cal. No doubt the absence of any physical contact suffices for
“at a distance”.’ Furthermore, since the Church has removed
the communion rail from churches, it makes no sense to speak
of a ‘sanctuary’. This pastor’s conviction that women should be
allowed to serve Mass came from scripture itself, he said. Christ
had women ministering to him, and it was clear to him that sex is
not a source of separation from Christ?
Possibly as a result of the publicity this policy received, Fr
Bloms was ordered by his bishop to stop the practice after it
had continued for almost a year. Fr Bloms complied with the
bishop’s order, but his reasoning has not changed. Referring to
recent developments in South America, he asked: ‘Why is it
right in one place and not in what is supposed to be the leading
country in the world?’2
Those who oppose the practice of women serving at Mass
seem unable to offer reasons except that it is not in accordance
with tradition nor provided for by present regulations. Opinion
in favor of the practice is growing. One priest writes:
‘ “We didn’t do it in the past” is an evasion, not an argument. It’s
about time we acknowledged that women have the dignity and holi¬
ness to serve God at his altar.’3
In March, 1966, it was reported that girls are serving Mass in
Holland.4
Conservative resistance
As in the case of almost any movement that is gathering
momentum, there has been a conservative resistance. In 1965
the Vatican post-conciliar liturgical commission issued a state¬
ment to the effect that women should not serve as lectors and
commentators at Mass. Many considered the statement as a
confusing and inconsistent step backward, but timidly complied,
not realizing that the statement was not binding. Actually, it was
purely advisory and was ignored in many places.
1 NCR, 24 November, 1965, p. 1, 12.
2 NCR, 8 December, 1965, p. 3.
3 NCR, 15 December, 1965, p. 4.
4 NCR, 16 March, 1966, p. 1.
WINDS OF CHANGE 141
The post-conciliar liturgical commission again disappointed

liberals by reconfirming the ancient restriction against women
serving at Mass. This directive appeared in a document sent
to the presidents of national episcopal conferences on 25
January, 1966, but its particulars were not revealed until 29
April of that year. The document left the door open for excep¬
tions where native traditions seem to indicate, but it was for the
local bishop to decide, and he was to apply to the Holy See for
permission.1 Some observers suggested at the time that this
was no cause for worrying about a permanent setback, since
the ‘native traditions’ of countries like the United States in¬
dicate the need for ‘exceptions’. They also have pointed out
that liturgical developments suggest that the practice of having
‘servers’ at Mass, whether male or female, will become a thing
of the past. In any case, it is becoming evident that in some
areas—Holland for example—such directives are of minimal
importance.
Other varied incidents in post-conciliar years offer evidence
that the spirit of Vatican II has not yet quite permeated the
atmosphere of Rome. In 1966 two women journalists were
barred from entry to a ceremony in the Sistine Chapel. Writing
in the British Weekly, one of these correspondents, an Anglican,
told that she had received an official pass to the ceremony and
had been ushered to her seat. Then an Italian bishop said to
her: ‘This is for the Pope a special day. We must not allow a
woman to sully the Sistine Chapel for His Holiness.’ She was
asked to leave.2
It is not necessary to look to Rome for incredible happenings.
In June 1966 an American woman who holds a doctorate in
theology traveled to Providence, Rhode Island, to attend the
annual meeting of the Catholic Theological Society of America,
of which she is a member. (The society admits laymen and—in
very recent times—lay women who hold doctorates in theology.
Priest members need not hold doctorates.) When she attempted
to enter the ballroom of the hotel in which the meeting was
1 NCR, 11 May, 1966, p. 3.

2 Cited in The Catholic Citizen, vol. LII, n. 5, May, 1966, p. 39.
being held, in order to attend a buffet for members of the

society, she was prevented from doing so by one of the officers,
a priest. When she insisted upon her right to enter, the priest
threatened to call the police. She replied that in this case it
would unfortunately be necessary for her to call the news¬
papers. After a long and humiliating scene, she was finally per¬
mitted to enter. This was the debut of the female sex in the
Catholic Theological Society of America.
Another form of conservative resistance to change is the
suppression of inquiry and discussion, particularly in an area
where a re-examination of old customs and ideas is desper¬
ately needed. Thus, early in 1967, the Milan archdiocese forced
the withdrawal of an Italian seminary professor’s book criticizing
the failure of Italian seminaries to prepare priests for association
with women. The author, Fr Tullo Goffi, in his book,
L’integrazione affettiva del sacerdote, maintained that in the
Italian seminary the affections are repressed and seminarians are
taught to fear woman as temptation incarnate. He gave extensive
quotations from seminarians themselves to illustrate his point.
Fr Goffi thus went to the heart of a problem which is the source
of many difficulties in the Church, and which will not be re¬
solved until open discussion and criticism is possible.
A seemingly peripheral form of conservative pressure is oppo¬
sition to the attempts of religious women to initiate and ex¬
periment with reform. In March, 1967, Pope Paul warned
more than one hundred superiors general, representing more
than a million nuns, against excessive changes of garb, although
he did favor modernizing the habit. The difficulty with this is
that an increasing number of nuns are experiencing the habit—
any habit—as a serious obstacle to adult interpersonal
relationships.
Not surprisingly, the discussion of women’s predicament in
the Church has awakened a conservative backlash in the form
of articles, editorials and letters to the editor. A large proportion
of such utterances has come from members of the clergy, who
have used a variety of tactics from misogynistic ridicule to solemn
claims that women’s subordination is ordained by God. A priest
WINDS OF CHANGE 143
inquired of those who might favor the possibility of women
priests: ‘Will they promise that alb hem-lines will never rise
and fall? ... What is the future of the biretta?’1 As another
priest letter-writer pointed out, this kind of humor tends to
backfire, since the clergy are about the only male professionals
who still wear skirts.
A clerical version of barbershop humor has also been used
in diocesan newspaper columns. In response to a statement by
a Belgian theologian, Maria Schouwenaars, that the Chinch
needs women priests, especially in women’s prisons and hos¬
pitals and in mission countries, Monsignor Charles Owen Rice,
in a column in The Pittsburgh Catholic, drew a caricature of
women as capable of nothing more than ‘tears, pouting, routine
deviousness, catty encounters, and petty gossip’.2 Such playful
outbursts of clerical misogynism provide ammunition for the
critics, who use them as illustrations of last-ditch defensive¬
ness against the modern world and half its inhabitants. Thus,
Monsignor Rice’s tirade brought on strong refutations from
both male and female readers in Europe as well as in America.
One of these, from the University of Tubingen, Germany,
pointed out that ‘it is utter perversity... that when the concern
of others is about the Gospel and reform, the clergy make of it a
fight for power’.3 4
Not all manifestations of conservatism, evidendy, are attempts
to use satire as a weapon. Completely devoid of intentional
humor, for example, were the three articles on women and the
priesthood which appeared in 1965 in UOsservatore Romano.*
Their antiquated theological method and biased arguments sug¬
gest the weakness of the case as clearly as does ineffective humor
in the other examples. The conservative backlash has, in any
1 NCR, 24 February, 1965, p. 4.

2 Monsignor Charles Owen Rice, ‘Women Priests!’, Pittsburgh Catholic,
2i October, 1965, p. 5.
3 Thomas L. Thompson, in Pittsburgh Catholic, 18 November, 1965, p. 5.
Other letters appeared in the issues of 28 October, 4 November, 11 November
and 9 December.
4 Rev, Gino Concetti, ‘La Donna e il Sacerdozio’, UOsservatore Romano,
9 November, 1965, p. 2; 11 November, 1965, p. 2; 12 November, 1965, p. 6.
case, stimulated further discussion as interest in the problem

increases.
Impetus from Protestants

Impetus continues to come as a result of the generally more
liberal attitude of Protestants. Quicker to recognize the need
for the churches to face up honestly to the problem of the harm¬
ful effects upon women of repeated unwanted pregnancies,
their leaders have been far less prone to use abstract ‘natural
law’ arguments concerning birth control, which overstress the
biological aspects of marriage. Generally they have taken a far
less legalistic and more personalist view of marriage, reflected
in a realistic assessment of marital problems. Unimpeded by a
rigid and anachronistic code of canon law, they have been free
to consider marriage primarily as a loving union rather than
chiefly as a contract for reproduction, and in this perspective
have been enabled to consider both spouses as persons with
equal rights. That these liberal attitudes have developed re-
cendy within the Catholic Church is undoubtedly due in part
to the influence of Protestant neighbors. Repeatedly it has been
observed that the thinking and practice of Catholics in pre¬
dominantly Protestant regions is more sensitive to the rights
of women than in the so-called Catholic countries.
Another aspect of the impetus from Protestantism derives
from the fact that there are women pastors in many of the
countries of northern Europe—a fact often brought up in
Catholic discussions. An argument often used by conservative
Catholic theologians is that the ordination of women in Pro¬
testant churches creates yet another obstacle to ecumenism.
The ordination of women by the Lutheran Church in Sweden
evoked such reactions a few years ago.1 The same predictable
reaction occurred in 1965 when the fifty-eighth national synod
of the Reformed Church in France adopted a motion to
ordain women, just as men, to all the ministries, including the
pastoral ministry with all its functions. Shortly after the decision
1 E.g. Rev. Fran?ois-Raymond Refoule, O.P., !Le probleme des “femmes-

pr&tres” en Suede’, Lwnitre et vie, t. VIII, n. 43, juillet-aout, 1959, pp. 65-99.
WINDS OF CHANGE 145
was announced, Charles Boyer, S.J., member of the Secretariat
for Christian Unity, complained publicly that such decisions
place an insurmountable obstacle to Christian unity.1 The same
argument was used in England in support of the negative stance
of the Anglican Archbishops’ Report on Women and Holy
Orders, in 1966.
Critics of this sort of ‘ecumenical argument’ point out that
since the knife cuts both ways, such polemic is futile. A per¬
sistent adherence to outmoded traditions can also be a grave
obstacle to union with those whose views are shaped to the needs
of the times. Proponents of the ‘ecumenical argument’ must
consider in what direction the future lies. One signpost for the
future has been the position of Episcopal Bishop James A.
Pike, formerly Bishop of San Francisco, who made the following
unequivocal statement:
‘I am for women being ordained. I feel the question is exactly
parallel to the question of race relations. There is no integral
reason why any person—regardless of race or sex—should not
have the same opportunities as any other.’2
Continuing momentum
Although some of the data we have presented may be in¬
terpreted in various ways, the indisputable fact is that the ques¬
tion of women’s situation vis-a-vis the Church has been raised
and that momentum continues.3 During the Council and within
a short period of time thereafter a number of theologians in¬
cluding Fathers Bernard Haring, Jean Danielou, Georges
Tavard, and Gregory Baum all publicly stated that they thought
1 Rev. Charles Boyer, S.J., ‘L’ordination des femmes’. La documentation

catholique, t. LXII, n. 1450, 20 juin, 1965, col. 1101-5.
2 NCR, 1 September, 1965, p. 2.
3 Cf.: Catherine Beaton, ‘Does the Church Discriminate against Women
on the Basis of their Sex?’, The Critic, June-July, 1966, pp. 21-7; Arlene
Swidler, ‘The Male Church’, Commonweal, 24 June, 1966, pp. 387-9; Rosemary
Lauer, ‘Women Clergy for Rome?’, The Christian Century, 14 September,
1966, pp. 1107-10; Monsignor John D. Conway, ‘Question Box’, NCR, 16
November, 1966, p. 8; Dan Sullivan, ‘Sex and the Person’, Commonweal,
22 July, 1966, pp. 460-4; ‘The Woman Intellectual and the Church’, A
Symposium, Commonweal, 27 January, 1967, pp. 446-58; Josefa Miinch,
‘Pourquoi je veux devenir femme pretre’, Realites, juillet, 1966, pp. 79-81.
progress is possible on the question of the ordination of women.

A leading Jesuit sociologist, Joseph Fichter, speaking at the
National Conference of Diocesan Vocation Directors in Mil¬
waukee in 1966, affirmed his opinion that the Church should
consider ordaining women as well as married men to the priest¬
hood. In that same year a group of thirty-five scholars (canonists,
theologians, sociologists and historians) who met in Pittsburgh
sent to Rome numerous proposals for the reform of canon
law. Among other things, in calling for ‘full participation of
women in the life of the Church’, certain of the group conceded
that ‘full participation’ could be interpreted to include ordination.
No doubt many hope that if they just close their eyes the
whole thing will quiedy blow over—that the ‘new breed’ and the
avant-garde types will eventually fade into merited oblivion,
and then we can ‘get back to normal’. Such wishful thinkers
might ponder the following item which appeared in the
Catholic press—an item small in size but large in significance:
‘To the Editors:
Dear Brothers in Christ,
Why do you think that we should not have girl servers? We
should be a family. We would rather have girls and boys serving.
Just because boys are stronger than girls it doesn’t mean that boys
have to serve everyday. Are there some of you who don’t like girl
servers? Please tell us why you don’t like them? We can’t think
of any good reason. I am a girl and I would really aprishiate it if
girls could serve at the altar. If everyone would only try it. After
all we are a Christian family, and Christ wants us to do things
together.
Love,
Rita Martin
Ada, Ola.
I am in the third grade. From St Joseph School.’1
On the basis of such evidence, it seems reasonable to suspect

that something even more disturbing than the ‘new breed’ lurks
menacingly on the horizon. The breed of tomorrow will have
many questions.
1 NCR, 15 December, 1965, p. 4.

CHAPTER FOUR
The Pedestal Peddlars
‘The conditions and the aims of life are both repre¬

sented in religion poetically, but this poetry tends to
arrogate to itself literal truth and moral authority,
neither of which it possesses.’
George Santayana
Despite the steady progress toward recognition of women’s per¬

sonal rights and autonomy, stereotypes concerning their sup¬
posed ‘nature’ have continued*- to reappear in modern and
contemporary thought. This tendency toward stereotypes is not
limited to theologians. It is to be found in the works of phil¬
osophers (e.g. Teilhard de Chardin, Jaspers, Edith Stein,
Whitehead, Berdyaev, Buytendijk), psychoanalysts (e.g. Freud,
Jung, Deutsch), poets (e.g. Claudel, Dylan Thomas), as well as
on the popular level in the women’s magazines and in adver¬
tizing. Somewhat counterbalancing these, there are thinkers of
the environmentalist school, who stress the impact of cultural
institutions in forcing people into stereotyped sex roles. These
include theologians (e.g. D. S. Bailey), philosophers (Sartre,
S. de Beauvoir, E. Metzke, A. Jeanniere), psychoanalysts
(Horney, Laing), sociologists (Riesman, Rossi), anthropologists
(Mead).
The myth of the ‘eternal feminine’

Although among progressive Catholic theologians and writers
there is an increasing trend away from the stereotypes, there
has been a continual stream of Catholic works of a semi-theo¬
logical nature, which are based upon the ‘eternal feminine’
motif. Fundamentally, their authors are not at all disposed to
147
abandon the ancient prejudices. Thus the French Dominican

theologian, A.-M. Henry, writing within the past decade, ap-
parendy saw nothing incongruous in the following assertion:
‘In that balanced century (the thirteenth) St Thomas had a notion

of the respective situations of the spouses in the home which, even
despite certain exaggerations, appears sound to us today.’1
For the most part, these authors would keep woman on a pedes¬
tal at all costs, paralyzing her will to freedom and personhood.
A classic of this brand of Catholic thinking is Gertrud von le
Fort’s book, The Eternal Woman, first published in Germany
in 1934. Over one hundred thousand copies of the German
original were sold, and the book was translated into French,
Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, and English. Its influence can be
traced in a number of derivative works which perpetuate its
basic fallacy, namely the confusion of ‘symbolic significance’
with concrete, historical reality.
Gertrud von le Fort’s book develops many of the key themes
of the ‘eternal feminine’ school. It claims to interpret
‘the significance of woman, not in the light of her psychological or
biological, her historical or social position, but under her sym¬
bolic aspect.’2
Such a project was doomed to be abortive, since it did not recog¬

nize the truth that man’s symbolism is derived precisely from
psychological, biological, historical, and social facts. Moreover,
these facts are changing. Since Von le Fort and others of this
school are fundamentally anti-evolutionistic as concerns women,
they attempt to draw from contingent and changing situations
certain ‘immutable’ symbols and then to arrest the evolution of
the situation by forcing it into the mold of these symbols drawn
from past experience. This process has a great attraction for a
certain type of mentality (that of William James’s ‘tender-
minded’ variety), which prefers easy metaphors to a critical
1 A. M. Henry, O.P., ‘Pour une theologie de la feminity, Lumi'ere et vie,

t. XIII, n. 43, juillet-aout, 1959, p. 123.
2 Gertrud von le Fort, The Eternal Woman, translated by Placid Jordan
O.S.B. (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1962), p. xiii.
THE PEDESTAL PEDDLARS 149
examination of the facts of concrete experience. It is also a use¬
ful rhetorical method for those who have some psychological
motivation, either conscious or unconscious, for attempting to
preserve the status quo. Inevitably the writer is unable to stay on
the high level of pure symbolism, and continually descends to
the level of historical fact, making dogmatic assertions about what
should or should not be the ‘role’ of existing individuals, in
order to keep them in line with the immutable symbols.
The characteristics of the Eternal Woman are opposed to
those of a developing, authentic person, who will be unique,
self-critical, self-creating, active and searching. By contrast to
these authentic personal qualities, the Eternal Woman is said
to have a vocation to surrender and hiddenness; hence the sym¬
bol of the veil. Self-less, she achieves not individual realization
but merely generic fulfillment in motherhood, physical or
spiritual (the wife is always a ‘mother to her husband’ as well
as to her children). She is said to be timeless and conservative
by nature. She is shrouded in ‘mystery’, because she is not
recognized as a genuine human person. Thus, the poet Claudel
in his preface to Partage de Midi wrote of woman that she is
‘someone on whose brow is inscribed the word “mystery” ’. It
is, of course, the ‘symbol’ of woman that these authors are
talking about, but the symbol turns out to be normative for the
individual. It is significant that the same alienating procedure is
not attempted with the same degree of thoroughness for the
male. There are only hints in the writings of the Eternal
Woman devotees of what the Eternal Man might be. The
androcentric society which engenders this type of speculation
tends to see men, but not women, in personalist rather than
in static, symbolic categories.
Characteristically, the ‘eternal feminine’ school is radically
opposed to female emancipation. For Von le Fort, the femi¬
nist movement had a ‘tragic’ motivation. It was a result of the
‘dissonance which had come about in feminine nature’.1 She
imagines that prior to this time the home had offered the
possibility of absolute fulfillment for the married woman and
1 Von le Fort, op. ctt., p. 48.
even for the unmarried woman. Unable to focus on the advan¬

tages of the movement, she writes of its ‘tragic drawbacks’. For
example, it is hard to get women ‘to do the work of domestic
servants which is so rewarding and so naturally in keeping with
woman’s calling’.1
Von le Fort also distrusts technical progress which emanci¬
pates women from some of the burdens of maternity:
‘The advantage that the future mother derives from the clinic,
for her own health and that of her child, is purchased at the ex¬
pense of tearing away the mystery of birth not only from the
shared experience of the family . . . but also from the awesomeness
of the primal powers that are its carriers.’
This brings about ‘a disappearance of respect for the sovereignty

of nature’.2 * Consistendy with all of this, the ultimate achieve¬
ment of emancipation within the Church, accession to the
hierarchy, is viewed as forever impossible:
‘The priesthood could not be confided to woman, for thereby the
very meaning of woman in the Church would have been elimi¬
nated.’8
Thus on all fronts the Eternal Woman is the enemy of the indi¬
vidual woman looking for self-realization and creative expansion
of her own unique personhood. As Von le Fort admitted: ‘The
mother as such does not bear the individualizing marks of the
person.’4
A clue to the fears and motivations behind the opposition
to emancipation can be seen in the repeated use of the term
‘masculinization’. It is indeed characteristic of the opposition
that it interprets woman’s efforts to become more completely
human as efforts to become ‘masculine’. Nicholas Berdyaev, for
example, thought that the modern movement for the
emancipation of women ‘seeks to lead them along masculine
ways’. This interpretation has been applauded by Catholic
1 Ibid., p. 53.
2 Ibid., p. 66.
a Ibid., pp. 94-5.
4 Ibid., p. 64.
authors. Such confused thinking arises from the fact that in the
past and still today many functions and activities which are
quite naturally human and which have nothing specifically sexual
about them have been appropriated by the males. Yet there is
more involved than a mere naive confusion based on custom.
This can be seen from Berdyaev’s remark that the drive for
emancipation is ‘an anti-hierarchic, a leveling movement’. The
opponents of emancipation have always wanted to keep the
hierarchical form of man-woman relationship, which implies all
the not all easily relinquished privileges of male headship.
A similar theme is found in the writings of Teilhard de
Chardin. Though he was a vigorous evolutionist with many
optimistic and liberating ideas about sexual relationship,
Teilhard failed to extend the implications of his dynamic vision
to the feminine half of the human race. Thus, while he favored
‘a certain emancipation’, he was fearful lest this go so far as to
‘masculinize’ her, or ‘take away the character of illuminating and
idealizing power which she exercises by the simple action of
presence and as at rest’. He even praised—as ‘the most per¬
spicacious of all’
‘the old French conception (doubtless a little narrow and jealous)

which made of the woman a luminous and inspiring influence, and
placed her outside the tumult and prose of action.’1
The last words are especially significant, for they express a

desire, dear to all of the ‘eternal feminine’ school, that woman
should be kept out from where the action is, not for her sake,
but for man’s sake. Deprived of the means to achieve her own
personhood, she presumably will inspire the man to achieve
his. Even if this would ‘work’—and there is no reason to think
that an underdeveloped person should be more ‘inspiring’—it
is impossible to justify the thesis that one half of the race should
automatically be sacrificed for the sake of the other half.
For the symbolic, non-empirical thinker, disturbing facts cause
no snags in the well-ordered dream world of symbols, for the
1 Teilhard de Chardin, Genese d'une Pensie (Paris: Grasset, 1961), pp. 154-5.
basic ambiguity of the symbols renders them elastic, and by a

selective presentation and interpretation of facts he can place
these intruders at the service of a thesis to be preserved at all
costs. Thus, even the woman who is a person capable of achieve¬
ment preserves the veil motif, according to Von le Fort, because
‘woman’s contribution at best can occupy but a secondary
place’.1 Inconsistently enough, she admits the disturbing fact
that some few women do reach the heights but, without missing
a beat, she quickly veils these cases:
‘The veil motif is still discernible, however, when woman actually

does attain to some ultimate height of achievement, for then a
charismatic vocation becomes more evident in her work than in the
work of a man.’2
Even su-h phenomena as the Church’s ‘apparent lack of esti¬

mation of the mother’ are smoothly taken care of. This attitude
of the Church
‘accentuates her actual dignity because it is an attitude signifying

the utter humility of nature in its complete surrender... yet by
this very attitude rising above itself to the level of the words of
the Magnificat: “He hath exalted the humble”.’3
It seems that there is no veil thick enough to hide the multitude

of inconsistencies of the Eternal Woman thesis.
The ‘eternal feminine’ symbolism is almost invariably flat¬
tering to the male. The built-in bias is sometimes so irrational
and loaded with unintended irony as to be truly comic. Thus
the poet Claudel wrote in The Tidings Brought to Mary:
‘Man is the priest; but woman’s privilege is to sacrifice herself.’
Louis Bouyer proclaims:
‘Femininity is a sign of the essential incompleteness of the

creature.’4
1 Von le Fort, op. cit., p. 27.

2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., p. 88.
4 Louis Bouyer, The Seat of Wisdom (New York: Pantheon, 1962), p. 87.
Teilhard de Chardin tended to see woman as analogous to
matter; man, to spirit; and matter is, of course, for the sake of
spirit, which emerges from it.1 Subtly flattering to the male is
the invariable tendency of the Eternal Woman school to describe
woman stricdy within the categories of virgin, bride, and mother,
thus considering her stricdy in terms of sexual relationship,
whether in a negative or a positive sense. It would not occur to
such writers to apply this reductive system to the male, com¬
pressing his whole being into the categories of ‘virgin, husband,
and father’.
Recent attempts to rejuvenate the Eternal Woman

Especially instructive are more recent attempts of the ‘eternal
feminine’ writers to sustain their thesis in the face of continuing
social evolution. Often, these attempts involve incredible incon¬
sistencies. Thus, Father F. X. Arnold bends over backward to
identify and criticize the antifeminist errors of the past, and then
proceeds to perpetuate them. Having condemned the notoriously
negative remarks of Nietzsche on the subject, in the very next
chapter he cites that unhappy bachelor as an authority, heartily
agreeing with one of the most alienating theses of all:
‘Man’s happiness, as Nietzsche said, is “my will”. Woman’s happi¬

ness is “his will”.’2
Once this biased hypothesis is granted, of course, the way to

social evolution is blocked; justification for the continued, or
renewed, ^oppression of women is there in full measure. And
this, in a kind of modified, adapted way, is what Father Arnold
wants. In fact, he praises the ‘prophetic vision’ of Pius XI’s
Encyclical Letter, Casti Connubii, which condemned the
‘threefold emancipation’ of women. Father Arnold even goes
so far as to call the father ‘the head, the king, the appointed
representative of authority in the family’, and the episcopus
1 Cf. Andrd A. Devaux, ‘Le feminin selon Teilhard de Chardin’, Recherches

et dibats, op. cit., cahier n. 45, decembre, 1963, pp. 125-6.
J F.X. Arnold, Woman and Man: Their Nature and Mission (Freiburg:
Herder, 1963), P- 47-
of his house.1 Such patriarchal, regressive terminology is ironic,

confirming the evidence given in support of the first sentence
of his book:
‘Far too often the world and the Church, as well as secular and
ecclesiastical history, have been looked at totally and exclusively
from a masculine viewpoint.’2
Typical of the method of those who would perpetuate

woman’s imprisonment on her time-honored pedestal is a
pseudo-psychology, which is manifest in their uncritical inter¬
pretation of certain behavior patterns as coming from some
immutable ‘nature’, without considering the possibility that this
behavior is in large measure the effect of early and subde con¬
ditioning. Thus, evidence of the ‘spiritual and mental distinc¬
tion between the sexes’ is seen by Father Arnold in the fact that
boys play with steam engines, ‘giving early evidence of the signs
of coming power’, whereas girls play with doll houses.3 The
fact that boys are given steam engines and forcefully discouraged
if they show any signs of interest in dolls is simply not taken
into account. So also, Fathers Danniel and Oliver, in their re-
vealingly entitled book, Woman is the Glory of Man, make un¬
demonstrated universalizations. Thus woman, ‘whose entire
psychology is founded upon the primordial tendency to love’,4 is
said to have ‘a natural spontaneity toward submission’,5 and to
be ‘more easily subject to illusions’.6 Those who fail to fit into
this pattern are dismissed as not being ‘true women’.
Not only a pseudo-psychology, but also a pseudo-biology be¬
comes the instrument of the contemporary pedestal'peddlers.
Danniel and Oliver resort to some amazing hypotheses from
biology. Thus: ‘Her brain is generally lighter and simpler
than man’s, which may explain her lesser capacity for
1 Ibid., p. 149-50.
2 Ibid., p. 9.
3 Ibid., p. 49.
4 E. Danniel and B. Oliver, Woman is the Glory of Man, translated by Angeline
Bouchard (Westminster, Maryland: The Newman Press, 1966), p. 21.
4 Ibid., p. 24.
• Ibid., p. 81.
deduction.’1 Apparendy aware that her alleged ‘lesser capacity

for deduction’ is less than self-evident and can easily be disputed
on the basis of widely recorded academic achievement, these
authors have a ready explanation:
‘The natural plasticity of girls enables them to adapt quite easily

to masculine methods. Girls often prove to be more diligent work¬
ers, and so make better grades than boys.’2 3
No hearing at all is given to the obvious objection that superior

achievement on the part of some girls just might be due to a
superior native intelligence and to a natural aptitude for methods
which are quite normally human and by no means specifically
‘masculine’.
Intimately connected with the pseudo-science of the contem¬
porary pedestal pushers is the elasticity of the notions employed,
which can be stretched to cover any embarrassing facts of ex¬
perience. Thus, Danniel and Oliver note that men, too, as well
as women, are intuitive, emotional, have a sense of unity, are
influenced by likes and dislikes, etc. However, men are said to
have these qualities in a ‘different’ way. Thus:
‘Man looks to intuition merely as a stimulus and a guide, and con¬
stantly submits its ideas to the grueling examination of his logic.’*
However, if women attempt to control intuition in this reason¬

able way, they are accused of becoming ‘too intensively intel-
lectualized by masculine methods’ so that they ‘gradually lose
many of their intuitive qualities’.4
Obviously, within the artificial world of this ideology, there
is no room for development. The formula is very simple: once
the a priori norms of femininity have been set up, all of the excep¬
tions are classified as ‘de-feminized’. Criticism is directed ex¬
clusively toward individuals who fail to conform; never is it
directed to the assumptions of the ideology itself. This can be
seen in the way in which the question of ‘women in authority’
1 Ibid., p. 12.
2 Ibid., p. 10.
3 Ibid., p. 8.
4 Ibid., p. 12.
is handled. There are ‘two pitfalls’ for the woman exercising

authority ‘of the masculine type’. These are ‘the danger of be¬
coming masculine’ and ‘the danger of transforming into faults
normal feminine reactions’.1 What this means is that if the
woman fails to exercise authority well, she is being ‘feminine’;
if she succeeds, this is a sure sign that she is too ‘masculine’.
Moral: she cannot win.
Unwittingly, Gertrud von le Fort herself suggested the most
efficacious means of defeating the Eternal Woman game:
‘But when the woman seeks herself, her metaphysical mystery is

extinguished; for in raising up her own image she destroys the
image that is eternal.’2 *
It is precisely this—the emergence of a significant number of

creative women who will raise up their own image—that can
significandy weaken the hold of the paralyzing stereotypes upon
human consciousness. There are signs of hope, as the ‘eternal
feminine’ writers themselves note with alarm. Danniel and Oliver
have remarked that the number of ‘de-feminized’ women is con-
standy growing. And Gertrud von le Fort wrote, in The Eternal
Woman:
‘Modem woman is to some extent no longer the one with whom

this book is concerned.’8
Theological distortions
Another aspect of the ‘eternal feminine’ phenomenon must be
considered in this context, and this is the use of Catholic
doctrine to perpetuate the symbol syndrome. Before we do so,
we need to agree that there are many other contributing sources
which have nothing direcdy to do with the Church, although
they undoubtedly influence Catholic authors. These non-church
sources include the myths of advertisers who reduce the image
of woman to that of sex object; the theories of educators
1 Ibid., p. 27.
2 von le Fort, op. cit., p. 7.
8 Ibid., p. 54.
who promote a rigid, role-determining program of studies for

girls; theories of doctrinaire Freudian psychologists who classify
women’s efforts at being human as ‘penis-envy’; and the opera¬
tive philosophy of the editors of women’s magazines that glorify
only the ‘happy housewife heroine’. These have been studied in
other books. What we are concerned with here is a species of
delusion peculiar to Catholic thinking which is especially potent
because it surrounds itself with an aura of alleged divine
approval. This delusion is rather complex. It can best be des¬
cribed in connection with two phrases familiar to Catholic ears
which, though they may be innocuous in themselves, tend to
accumulate assumptions and associations which are highly ques¬
tionable. These two phrases are ‘the divine plan’ (with its vari¬
ations, such as ‘God’s plan’, ‘God’s ordinance’, ‘divinely or¬
dained’, ‘Christ’s plan’, ‘inspired by God’), and ‘Mary as the
model of all women’.
‘The divine plan’, to start with, is often used by religious
authors and speakers to buttress claims for which there is no
conclusive argument. Generally, the phrase or one of its vari¬
ations is accompanied by some claims about ‘nature’ and her
‘laws’. Since the various sciences keep turning up with more
and more disconcerting facts and theories which defy the old
simplifications about mother nature and her ‘laws’, the need is
seen to appeal to a higher court. What could be higher or more
unassailable than ‘the divine plan’? Thus, Father Arnold alludes
to ‘the divinely ordained hierarchy between man and woman in
marriage, in the family and in public life’.1 Monsignor
Alberione, Italian author of a work on women which was trans¬
lated into English and published in the United States, illustrates
the technique so obviously that the unconscious parody would
make even the Eternal Woman see the point and laugh behind
her veil:
‘Lest we forget, let it be repeated here once more: Woman’s true

sphere is within the family circle. He who would substitute any-
1 .Arnold, op. cit., p. 148.

thing else, frustrates her true nature, disrupts the providential

plan of God and creates serious problems for society at large,
which becomes filled with neurotic, unhappy, useless and very
often, and worst of all, disruptive women!n
There are several points to be noticed about the use of the

‘God’s plan’ terminology. First, as is generally recognized by
those who study the uses of language, words and phrases are
often used (consciously or unconsciously) for purposes other than
that of communicating ideas. They may be used to arouse a de¬
sired emotional response, unaccompanied by any critical under¬
standing, as all good orators know. The eighteenth century
philosopher George Berkeley accurately described this pheno¬
menon :
‘At first, indeed, the words might have occasioned ideas that were
fitting to produce those emotions; but, if I mistake not, it will be
found that when language is once grown familiar, the hearing of the
sounds or sight of the characters is oft immediately attended with
those passions, which at first were wont to be produced by the
intervention of ideas, that are now quite omitted. ... For example,
when a schoolman tells me, “Aristotle hath said it”, all I conceive
he means by it is to dispose me to embrace his opinion with the
deference and submission which custom has annexed to that
name.’1 2
If ‘Aristode’ can elicit such a reaction, how much more so

can ‘God’.
When an audience which has been conditioned by Catholic
training hears or sees the words ‘divine plan’, ‘divinely
ordained’, etc., there tends to be a response of awe and rever¬
ence, and an inclination to assent to whatever is being proposed
as God’s plan. This effect is greatly increased if the people are
made to feel that the speaker or writer has a position of autho¬
rity in the Church and a claim to some esoteric body of know-
1 Very Rev. James Alberione, S.S.P., S.T.D., Woman: Her Influence and
Zeal as an Aid to the Priesthood, translated by the Daughters of St Paul (Boston:
St Paul Editions, 1964), p. 40.
2 George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of HumanKnowledge,
n. 20.
ledge which they themselves lack. Therefore the popularity of

such devices as the ‘God’s plan’ rhetoric among clerical authors
and speakers is not surprising. Nor is it surprising that the
phrase occurs with great frequency when the doctrine pro¬
posed is open to attack as contrary to reason, or to custom, or to
social justice. ‘God’, after all, could propose nothing unreason¬
able, unfitting, or unjust. The Eternal Woman proponents are
now especially in need of such a device, since they are working
against an aspect of social evolution which is constandy gaining
momentum.
In the second place, the ‘God’s plan’ theme is very frequendy
used to close discussion on posidons which are not only open
to challenge from the various ‘profane’ sciences, but from the¬
ology as well. These authors take advantage of their readers’
ignorance of the fact that theology, too, is evolving, and of the
fact that there is a variety of opinion among scholars and
theologians on the interpretation of nearly every significant
document and on the approach to nearly every important prob¬
lem. The fact is that theological opinion concerning the man-
woman relationship is evolving, and shows every sign of con¬
tinuing to do so, largely because of pressure from social pro¬
cesses and because of new insights from non-theological dis¬
ciplines. Theological opinion about the place of women in the
Church is also changing. There are all shades of opinion on the
many issues surrounding these two central themes. The writers
who are prone to invoke the ‘divine plan’ hide this variety be¬
hind the monolithic mask of a supposedly changeless ideology.
We may say, in the third place, that the use of such termin¬
ology not only suggests the user’s rhetorical purpose but also
reflects a naive simplicism. It requires a lack of appreciation of
the complexity of reality, and a lack of insight concerning the
limitations, projection mechanisms and other ‘tricks’ of one’s
own mind, to be able to set down with a clear conscience the
specifics of the ‘divine plan’. To whom has God confided his
blueprints? Upon reflection, therefore, it appears that such
verbal devices, which are meant to arouse reverence, should in¬
stead be recognized as warning signals.
The second seemingly innocent but loaded phrase deserving

review—a phrase which is often both the effect and the cause
of delusions—is ‘Mary as the model of all women’. The dimen¬
sions of the problem with which we are confronted here are
suggested by the following remark:
‘Devotion to Mary is, without fail, the best experience capable of
opening to the priest “the metaphysical world of woman”.’1
It does not require a specialized knowledge of psychology to be

aware of some of the difficulties involved in supporting this
hypothesis. First, there are the projection mechanisms by which
one may be deluded in his well-meaning ‘devotion to Mary’. Not
to be forgotten is the fact that the promotion of Marian de¬
votion has largely been the work of a celibate clergy, whose
manner of life has cut them off not only from marriage and
sexual experience, but also from most of the normal day to day
personal relationships which alone can provide a realistic under¬
standing of persons of the opposite sex. The confessional is
hardly a situation for normal dialogue, and it is probable that
the types of women who turn consistendy to the clergy for
advice are often over-dependent and obsessive. Even in appar-
endy normal social contacts between a woman and a priest, there
are psychological barriers on both sides. The isolated seminary
education of the priest has ill-prepared him for such social
encounters, so that what takes place is often play-acdng rather
than honest dialogue. Not infrequendy, therefore, one finds
among the Catholic clergy a warped and pessimistic view of
women which is based upon narrow, selective, or even vicarious
experience.
Some of the excesses of Marianism may well be accounted
for by this situation of the celibate clergy. There is evidence
enough to give rise to suspicions that compensation mechan¬
isms have a great deal to do with some forms of devotion to
Mary. A seminarian in Rome remarked that his ‘spiritual direc¬
tor’ told him that when he was troubled by ‘bad thoughts’ he
should immediately try to think about Mary. Such advice ap-
1 Devaux, ‘Le feminin selon Teilhard de Chardin’, op. cit., p. 134.
pears to be rather common, if not always as crude and obvious

as this. In any case, the ‘beloved in heaven’ idea leaves some¬
thing to be desired. What it can spawn is that dream world
which is precisely ‘the metaphysical world of woman’, the
ideal, static woman, who is so much less troublesome than the
real article. Since she belongs to ‘another world’, she cannot
compete with man. Safely relegated to her pedestal, she serves
his purpose, his psychological need, without having any pur¬
pose of her own. For the celibate who prefers not to be tied
down to a wife, or whose canonical situation forbids marriage,
the ‘Mary’ of his imagination could appear to be the ideal spouse.
While none of this precludes a genuine devotion to Mary on
the part of men or women, married or celibate, it does suggest
the real possibility of self-delusion. Is it mere coincidence that
the countries most noted for their ‘devotion to Mary’ are those
in which the clergy have the greatest power and in which the
legal and social situation of women is demonstrably the most
retarded? This schizophrenic situation appears to be a peculi¬
arity of Catholic culture, especially in countries where the cul¬
ture bears most clearly the marks of clerical influence, without
the challenge and modifications arising from opposed influences,
as is the case in pluralistic societies.
The idea, then, that ‘devotion to Mary is, without fail, the
best experience capable of opening to the priest “the meta¬
physical world” of woman’ is highly questionable. How does the
priest know that his devotion is not, at least in part, a confused
product of his own psychology? The realism that comes from
dialogue, from the realm of concrete human experience, is a
more trustworthy source of understanding of the opposite sex.
Moreover, when this understanding is developed, it will be dis¬
covered that there is no ‘metaphysical world’ peculiar to women,
except in the foggy realm of the mind’s own symbols. But women
in fact are not symbols; they are people, and each person is a
unique subject. To consider a person—a subject—as a symbol
is to treat him or her as an object, which is fundamentally an
egoistic and hostile act.
As remarked earlier some questionable assumptions have at-
tached to the idea of ‘Mary as the model of all women’. In the

first place the phrase assumes that a great deal is known about
that historical personage. In fact, very litde is known. De¬
ficiencies in historical knowledge have been filled in by creative
imagination, often in the circumstances just described. Further¬
more, it has also been falsely assumed that historical circum¬
stances are irrelevant, and so it has been argued that since
Mary did not act as a leader, modern women should not attempt
that role. The greatest confusion, however, comes from the
assumption that the relationship between Christ and Mary
should serve as a model for the man-woman relationship.
All three of these assumptions are operative in much writing
on woman’s place in the Church, notably in that of the Jesuit
theologian J. Galot, who attempts to outline in detail the ‘divine
plan’ for women on the basis of a universalization of certain
ideas about Mary contained in Vatican II’s Dogmatic Consti¬
tution on the Church (Lumen Gentium). Admitting that the
Council did not have the purpose of envisaging the mission
which God assigns in general to women in the Church, but rather
confines itself to some statements about Mary, Father Galot
seizes upon these statements and adds to them considerably:
‘In Mary are revealed the intentions of the divine plan concerning
the whole of femininity.’1
This assumption invokes the whole fallacious process of spin¬

ning a ‘theology of woman’ out of Marian doctrine, in which
process fantasy fills the void left by unknown historical fact
and universalizes with naive abandon.
The most catastrophic aspect of this method is its simplistic
analogizing from the Christ-Mary relationship to the man-
woman relationship in general. The inevitable fruit of this
method, despite the elaborate precautions of its proponents, is
the relegating of the woman to a hopelessly inferior situation.
Thus, Father Galot argues that as Christ operated and Mary,
being totally dependent, merely cooperated, so it is, analogously,
with the respective roles of men and women in the Church.
lJ* Galot, S.J., L’eglise et la femme (Gembloux: J. Duculot, 1965), p. 6.
The clue to the meaning of women’s ‘cooperation’ is ‘receptivity’.

Thus it follows, we are told, that man has the mission to preach
and woman has the mission to listen. However, we are assured
this does not reduce the feminine role to something small, for
‘in willing to listen and assimilate, woman is rendering service
to the man who speaks’.1 There is no evidence that the author
intends the obvious irony. With incredible naivete the argu¬
ment concludes with the affirmation that this silence is what
permits woman to play a veritable role, that of receiving the
word of God and thus of making it penetrate more deeply into
humanity.2 If logic were at all operative here, it would follow
that, given this total identification of the individual with a fixed
sex ‘role’, it should be impossible for the male to receive the
word of God, and then, of course, it would follow that he could
not transmit it. However, in this happy dream world of reified
symbols, no embarrassing logic or facts are admitted.
Inevitably, given this framework, woman is seen as a ‘relative
being’. Submission and self-effacement are her lot. Since it is
impossible to stay on the wave length of the Christ-Mary analogy
without becoming at least subliminally aware of interference
from reality, the analogy is generally supported with affirmations
about woman’s ‘nature’ which make it all appear to turn out just
right. She is said to be ‘disposed by nature’ to subordinate her
nature to another, to be ‘docile’, to be ‘less apt at reasoning’.
Thus, Father Galot supports his flimsy analogical argument for
the exclusion of women from preaching with a pronouncement
about ‘her’ (never ‘their’) capacities. ‘God’s choice’, he writes,
‘is based upon masculine aptitudes.’ Having spent two hundred
pages exaggerating woman’s ‘receptivity’, he now comes to the
real issue:
‘She is less capable of receiving the doctrinal deposit objectively, of

mastering its essential lines by a vigorous synthesis, of submitting
it to a rational work of elaboration and of exploitation, and of
transmitting it objectively after having re-thought it.’*
1 Ibid., p. 57-
2 Ibid.
s Ibid., p. 200.
The generalizing ‘she’ suggests that all women are inferior in

this respect, or should be, according to their ‘nature’. Regressing
to the stage of theological development represented by the most
antifeminist of the Fathers, Father Galot sees woman as a weak
daughter of Eve:
‘She has not lost the dispositions of impressionability and mobility
which Eve had manifested in the initial drama of humanity. She
remains fragile, more subject to an unreflected impulse, and more
accessible to seduction.’1
It is characteristic of this species of symbol-oriented writing

that it nearly always refers to ‘woman’, rather than to ‘women’.
The static, symbolic point of view does not take into account
plurality, which implies variety. It is hierarchical, but not pluralis¬
tic. It sees polarity, but not individuality; specific complemen¬
tarity, but not the likeness and autonomous self-realization which
are the basis of all genuine friendship.
Although symbols play an irreplaceable part in man’s
thought processes, there is always the danger that they will
distract him from the arduous work of wrestling with the prob¬
lems presented by the complexity of reality itself and of his own
mind. Symbols, which record human experience in shorthand,
stress similarities—some of the frequendy repeated elements of,
experience. What they leave out are the differences. It is especi¬
ally the uniqueness and dynamism of the person which cannot
be captured in the symbol.
The symbol, however, has seductive power. It is grasped
without effort, and it generally conveys some recognizable truth.
Distortion occurs when this truth is accepted as the whole truth.
The ‘old man’ serves well enough as a symbol for wisdom and
the ‘step-mother’ for wickedness, but old men are not always
wise, nor are stepmothers always wicked. To use the symbol,
which is largely derived from collective past experience, as a
norm for the future development of individuals is to confer upon
it an adequacy and an authority which it does not possess, and
to take up arms against the dynamic potential of persons.
'Ibid., p. 79.
Symbols ‘like living beings, grow and die’, as theologian Paul
Tillich pointed out. ‘They grow when the situation is ripe for
them, and they die when the situation changes.’ It is no secret
that the ‘eternal feminine’ is fading. Berdyaev and Rilke have
written hopefully, but without evidence, of its future resurrec¬
tion. Some persist in advertising a remodeled pedestal, but their
success is comparable to that of antique dealers who manage to
do a thriving business with a narrow range of customers, but
hardly can be said to be altering the course of history.
CHAPTER FIVE
The Demon of Sexual Prejudice:

An Exercise in Exorcism
‘Exorcism is that process by which the stubborn

deposits of town and tribal pasts are scraped from
the social consciousness of man and he is freed to
face his world matter-of-factly.’
Harvey Cox
A striking characteristic of the ‘eternal feminine’ phenomenon

is that it is both cause and (to a degree) effect of insensitivity to
injustice. So seductive is the ideology that the concrete problems
of individuals seeking liberty escape the attention of its adher¬
ents, whose eyes are fixed upon the static symbol, rather than
upon the varied and dynamic beings who exist in this world.
Thus, the dehumanizing aspects of exclusive male headship
are discreetly passed over. So too, the effects of inferior edu¬
cation and opportunity are ignored, while energy is expended
in describing the imagined ‘evils’ of equality.
The breeding of insensitivity to the situation of another
through stereotypes is a widespread phenomenon, which is not
confined to the problem of women. The images of the ‘greedy
Jew’ and the ‘lazy Negro’ have the same effect. In each case,
the victim is seen as completely ‘other’, not as a person with
whom one can identify or enter into a relationship of friendship
and respect. The stereotype provides a built-in excuse for not
taking the necessary steps to discover its unreliability.
Failure to resist exploitation

There is much more to the problem than this. One complica¬
tion is that many women themselves seem to justify the in-
166
DEMON OF SEXUAL PREJUDICE: EXERCISE IN EXORCISM 167
sensitivity to the ‘feminine problem’. Some of them have been
ardent promoters of the ‘eternal feminine’ (Gertrud von le Fort,
Ida Gorres, Phyllis McGinley). More important perhaps, the
majority of women have never protested their relegation, in
theory and in social fact, to sub-human categories. African
women, on the whole, did not rebel against such horrors as
ritual mutilation or such indignities as the bride-price, Moslem
women for the most part did not protest against the institution
of the harem. The majority of European and American women
did not go out and campaign for the vote, for equal education
and professional opportunity, or for legal reforms. And the
vast majority of Catholic women have not protested their passive
and voiceless position in the Church. All of this would seem to
support the ‘eternal feminine’ conception of women as naturally
passive and docile beings.
This failure to oppose exploitation might be explained in part
by lack of opportunity to protest and by the fear characteristic
of those who are in a subordinate position. It might also be ex¬
plained partly by ignorance of the facts—the euphemisms
about women’s privileged position disguise antifeminist theories
and attitudes which are operative in society. There is also
a strong probability that pre-occupation with self-interest ob¬
scures the problem for many who vaguely feel that the given
system has worked out well enough for themselves, and are too
comfortable to bother to abstract from their own condition and
see the more general aspects of the situation. Female anti¬
feminists are often members of a privileged class who are blind
to the problems of their less privileged sisters. Thus Gertrud
von le Fort could write about how ‘rewarding’ is the work of a
domestic servant, never having had to bear the ‘rewards’ of such
an existence. Then too, there is the lulling effect of habit and
custom. The reminder that ‘everyone’ behaves this way, or that
things have ‘always’ been this way has stopped many a logical
train of thought from pursuing its course.
The foregoing explanations have value but they are not com¬
pletely satisfactory.
Why do so many, who should be able to see through the
euphemisms, not see? Why is there not a greater effort to

abstract from one’s own particular situation. Why has custom
had such a stranglehold in this area?
Evidently a psychological mechanism is operative at a deeper
level than that touched by any of the reasons we have given so
far. This mechanism is not peculiar to women, but is common
to those who belong to an oppressed class. Richard Wright gave
a simple but apt description of how this mechanism operates in
the case of Negroes in Black Boy:
‘I began to marvel at how smoothly the black boys acted out the
roles that the white race had mapped out for them. Most of them
were not conscious of living a special, separate, stunted way of life.
Yet I knew that in some period of their growing up—a period that
they had no doubt forgotten—there had been developed in them
a delicate, sensitive controlling mechanism that shut off their
minds and emotions from all that the white race had said was
taboo. Although they lived in America where in theory there
existed equality of opportunity, they knew unerringly what to
aspire to and what not to aspire to. Had a black boy announced
that he aspired to be a writer, he would have been unhesitatingly
called crazy by his pals. Or had a black boy spoken of yearning
to get a seat on the New York Stock Exchange, his friends—in
the boy’s own interests—would have reported his odd ambition to
the white boss.’
A similar process takes place in other groups who are forced to

accept a stunted manner of living. This is also true of women,
who in the past and to some extent even today (in varying shades
of subtlety according to various cultural patterns) have been con¬
ditioned to accept a mutilated existence as normal.
Help in understanding how this mechanism is developed
comes from the psychoanalytic theory of repression and projec¬
tion. Since certain feelings are not permitted by society to have
expression, these are often projected to other persons or to whole
groups. Thus, the Jews in Germany and Negroes in the United
States and South Africa serve as receptacles for the repressed
problems of the majority in those societies. This, of course, re¬
quires a corresponding mechanism, which Freud called ‘introjec-
tion’, by which the ‘inferior’ accepts the role imposed upon him.
Sartre has illustrated this in describing what happened to Jean
Genet, who as a child was accused by the ‘honest’ villagers of
being a thief. Thus the ‘honest’ people were able to use Genet;
they could hate in him that part of themselves which they had
denied and projected into him. As Genet became the ‘thief’
which the villagers wanted him to be, so a Negro child becomes
the ‘lazy nigger’ which the white citizens want him to be. So, too,
do girls accept a limiting and stunting role for themselves in a
society which expects this of them. This whole process of ‘role
psychology’ or ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ involves a vicious circle.
Members of the oppressed or minority group have no other
images with which to identify than those forced upon them by
the dominant class. Slowly these persons learn to live out what is
expected of them. Since they do, in fact, become inferior in just the
way society desires, the prejudice is reinforced. If someone ques¬
tions the prejudice, numerous examples can be pointed to as
‘evidence’ that the stereotype is well grounded in ‘nature’. The
‘niggers’ who are thieves, the Jews who are sly and greedy, the
‘true women’ who are naively spontaneous, self-abasing, and
narcissistic are there in abundance, frustrating attempts to break
out of the magic circle. Which is to say that the images are self-
perpetuating.
Demonic distortions
In his stimulating book, The Secular City, theologian Harvey
Cox has described with logic and power the need for the Church
to fulfill its role as cultural exorcist. This means that the Church
has the duty of exorcising the ‘demons’ which are born of the
projection-introjection mechanisms.
‘Jesus calls men to adulthood,’ he says, ‘a condition in which they

are freed from their bondages to the infantile images of the species
and of the self.’
If the Church is to perpetuate this work, this means that

I7o THE CHURCH AND THE SECOND SEX
‘men must be called away from their fascination with other worlds
... and summoned to confront the concrete issues of this one.’1
There must be a community of persons who ‘are not burdened

by the constriction of an archaic heritage’.
What are some of the demonic distortions which plague con¬
temporary society? Cox writes of the humiliating role in which
our culture has tried to cast the Negro. He writes of the un¬
exorcised demons associated with sex, and maintains that twen¬
tieth century American culture has set up an idol which is a kind
of anti-Madonna, that is, The Girl who appears in modern
advertising, beauty contests—who is, in fact, ubiquitous. Cox
does not give any space to the Eternal Woman; the assumption
is perhaps that she is dead, at last.
In the mentality of conservative Roman Catholicism, how¬
ever, the Eternal Woman—the Madonna of the imagination—
is not dead. The Girl is recognized as a deadly enemy, for it
is characteristic of those who live on the level of ideology,
safely away from the facts of experience, that the ‘good guys’
and the ‘bad guys’ are neatly divided. For conservative Catholic
theologians and journalists, the ‘good girl’, who is the Eternal
Woman, is the only answer to the challenge of the ‘bad girl’, who
is The Girl of the world of James Bond, of Playboy, of adver¬
tising. If Cox fails to see the Eternal Woman as a demon to be
exorcised, this is undoubtedly because, being Protestant, he is at
a distance from the sub-culture of the Catholic ghetto.
The Church does, in fact, have the duty of exorcising the
Eternal Woman as well as The Girl, for both myths are des¬
tructive. Being two sides of the same mirage, they are, not sur¬
prisingly, quite similar. Both the Eternal Woman and The Girl
are, in the ultimate analysis, passive, abject, relative and irrele¬
vant beings. If the one appears to be the antithesis of the other,
the opposition does not hold up under careful scrutiny. True, the
one is represented in spiritualistic terms, while the other em¬
bodies the values of so-called secular materialism. The Eternal
Woman delights in being relegated to her pedestal, while The
1 Harvey Cox, The Secular City (New York: Macmillan, 1965), p. 154.
Girl enjoys being used as a footstool. However, if the one ap¬

pears as supra-human and the other as sub-human, the distinc¬
tion is nevertheless trivial. Both are abysmally, hopelessly, non¬
human.
In the Catholic world, the Eternal Woman is not yet dead,
and there is a web of ironies involved in the Church’s failure
to exorcise her. There is, first of all, the fact that the Church,
by reason of inertia, has not merely failed in a purely negative
fashion to exorcise her but has even actively promoted her, often
with fanatical zeal. Moreover, failing to realize that The Girl
is the Eternal Woman face-lifted and rejuvenated, the ecclesi¬
astical ideologists have tried to send forth the Eternal Woman to
do batde against her. If this has any effect at all, it can only be to
help promote The Girl, who is an ideological reaction to the
Eternal Woman and, being a reaction, will thrive as long as the
threat of the Eternal Woman is there to support her.
The final solution for both of these demons, who are but the
opposed faces of the same illusion, does not lie in the realm of
ideology, where there is only a self-perpetuating vicious circle.
It can come only from an honest confrontation with all informa¬
tion that can be wrested from the world of experience. This
implies an openness to relevant data from any of the sciences,
and a willingness to give up, if necessary, cherished notions of
‘femininity’ which are shown to be the products of social condi¬
tioning, particularly if these are revealed to be harmful.
Effects upon intelligence

Psychological studies conducted within the past few decades
have in fact yielded results which strongly suggest that the
effects of the ‘eternal feminine’ image are more subtly damaging
than readily can be imagined. Some psychologists claim that
it is possible to predict, from knowing the personality character¬
istics of young children, which ones will have rising, and which
falling, IQs. Psychologist Eleanor Maccoby has pointed out the
general lines of differentiation :
‘Here is what a child is like at age six if he or she is among those
whose IQs will increase during the next four years: he or she is
I72 THE CHURCH AND THE SECOND SEX
competitive, self-assertive, independent, and dominant in inter¬

action with other children. And the children who will show declining
IQs during the next four years are children who are passive, shy,
and dependent.’1
It is evident that the characteristics associated with a falling

IQ are those which are encouraged in girls by the ‘eternal femi¬
nine’ mystique.
Convincing evidence has been marshalled in support of the
thesis that the sort of analytic thinking required for high level
intellectual creativity is developed in children who are encour¬
aged at a very young age to take initiative. Creativity and produc¬
tivity require independence of mind and ability to detach oneself
from others. The Eternal Woman image militates against initi¬
ative and independence. The Eternal Woman is ‘by nature’ pas¬
sive, dependent, totally relational. If given this image as an ideal,
and subtly encouraged in many ways to conform to it, the girl
child is very seriously handicapped.
Undeniably some girls do succeed in acquiring and develop¬
ing the necessary qualities of independence, dominance, and
initiative. Studies indicate that many such girls have known a
close relationship with their fathers. Sometimes, too, the mother
is unusually liberated from the chains of the feminine mystique.
The fact is, however, that these girls are developing in a way
which is counter to society’s conventions, to its subtle demands.
For this, they may have to pay a terrible price. That price is
called anxiety, and it may account for the sparse creativity even
of many gifted and trained women who managed to defy
society’s effort to cast them into a passive, unthinking role.
Eleanor Maccoby has summarized the ironic situation:
‘We are beginning to know a good deal about the effects of anxiety
on thinking: it is especially damaging to creative thinking, for it
narrows the range of solution efforts, interferes with breaking set,
and prevents scanning of the whole range of elements open to
perception. When anxiety facilitates performance, as it sometimes
1 Eleanor E. Maccoby, ‘Woman’s Intellect’, The Potential of Woman, edited

by Seymour M. Farber and Roger H. L. Wilson (New York: McGraw Hill
Book Company), 1963, p. 33.
DEMON OF SEXUAL PREJUDICE: EXERCISE IN EXORCISM I73
does, it facilitates already well-learned tasks; it does not con¬

tribute to breaking new ground. From the standpoint of those who
want women to become intellectuals this is something of a horror
story.’1
The psychologists who point out the powerful effect of con¬

ditioning in hampering mental development and creativity do
not overlook biological differences; indeed they are very much
aware of biological discoveries and theories concerning sexual
differentiation. It is very possible that genetic factors dispose
boys to be more aggressive than girls. At the same time, there
is evidence pointing to the conclusion that conditioning has
grossly exaggerated and caricatured the aggressive-passive
polarity and has created differences where biology has nothing to
say. Role differences which are cultural inventions have varied
startlingly in different cultures, as anthropologists such as
Margaret Mead have shown. We have come far enough to see
that rigid, imposed dichotomies ignore the uniqueness of the
individual, curtailing human liberty and depressing human po¬
tential. It is time, therefore, to challenge anachronistic patterns,
which may have been necessary at an earlier stage of human de¬
velopment, but whose survival constitutes an obstacle to human
progress.
Effects upon man-woman relationship

There is reason to think that the ‘eternal feminine’ also has a
devastating effect upon the man-woman relationship, and clearly
this is not unrelated to its limiting of women’s creative potential.
Sociologist Alice Rossi put it very simply:
‘Social and personal life is impoverished for some part of many
men’s lives because so many of their wives live in a perpetual state
of intellectual and social impoverishment.’2
Moreover, the woman who is victimized by this myth is damaged
1 Ibid., p. 37. Additional material can be found in The Development of Sex

Differences, edited by Eleanor E. Maccoby (Stanford, California: Stanford
University Press, 1966).
2 Alice S. Rossi, ‘Equality between the Sexes: An Immodest Proposal’,
Daedalus, Spring, 1964, The Woman in America, p. 614.
in her potential to love as well as to think. Passive and narcis¬

sistic, paralyzed and alienated from her deepest self, she cannot
enter into an authentic union because she is not an authentic per¬
son. She desires to be desired; everything turns back upon her¬
self. Not surprisingly, Claudel, who was able to think of women
only in the form of the Eternal Woman, wrote that ‘Woman is a
promise that is never kept’. This mutilated creature cannot be a
true partner; she throws man back upon his solitude. And as
one author pointed out, ‘solitude is relatively less anguishing
without, than with, the company of the “eternal feminine” V
The harmfulness of the myth, then, is contagious; it affects men,
too.
Especially disastrous for marriage is an element of the Eternal
Woman myth which has been dear to popes and theologians as
well as to non-Christians: the virtual identification of women’s
being with the relational roles of wife and mother (with the
stress upon mother). Psychoanalyst Andre Lussier states that
therapy often reveals a woman who has an impression of non¬
existence, resulting from the annihilation of her personality
identity by her duties as wife and mother. Therapy also reveals
that there are men—and they are legion—for whom the person
in the wife is non-existent. These men know the wife as a posses¬
sion and the mother of their children.
‘This way of thinking,’ Lussier explains, ‘stems from foggy religious

standards, as well as a biased interpretation of the texts of St
Paul on the supposed authority of the husband over the wife. The
complacent male wallows in it.... Unconsciously the woman then
feels encouraged to regress to the pre-genital role of possessed
object. If she resists and does not give in to this regression, marital
conflicts inevitably follow.’2
While responsibility for such nightmarish situations cannot

be laid exclusively at the door of the Church, it is certain
that much clerical writing on marriage promotes this sort of
1 Dan Sullivan, ‘Beast in the Belly vs. Union with the Beloved’, NCR
29 June, 1966, p. 6.
“Andre Lussier, ‘Psychoanalysis and Moral Issues in Marital Problems’,
Cross Currents XV, Winter, 1965, p. 59.
destructive relationship. A treasure house of bad advice is

The Catholic Marriage Manual by Rev. George A. Kelly,
who served as director of the Family Life Bureau of the
Archdiocese of New York. Monsignor Kelly asserts:
‘Nothing gives a man greater satisfaction and sense of fulfillment

than a realized sense of importance. Men want recognition. They
thrive on it-Nothing like this is natural to the woman. If she is
aggressive or domineering it is because she has been made so,
and that is not good. Two egotists do not easily make a harmonious
pair.’1
Not surprisingly, Monsignor Kelly thinks that the father’s ex¬

ample ‘will probably be the most important influence in the
development of his son’s personality’.2 3 Obviously, the abased
wife in this ‘ideal marriage’, could hardly have much positive in¬
fluence upon a developing personality. Sometimes, self-
appointed marriage authorities of this breed will write of the wife
as the man’s ‘reward’ after a hard day’s work. It is characteristic
of these marriage counselors that they oppose work outside the
home on the part of the wife, since this fosters ‘undesirable
traits’, such as independence.
Since it is chiefly as mother rather than as partner that the
Eternal Woman is envisioned, the maternal role tends to be
exaggerated into grotesque proportions which have pathological
implications for sexual relationship. Devotees of the mystique
often proclaim that the wife should be a mother not only to her
children but also to her husband. This encourages infantile,
obsessive men to ‘marry a mother’, in order to perpetuate the
advantages of infantile dependence. Lussier points out that a
psychological evolution sometimes takes place in such men, so
that they eventually discover the true nature of their marriage.
When this happens, the man begins to see his wife as dominat¬
ing, much as an adolescent boy reacts against his mother. Often
he will then try to prove his independence of her by seeking
1 Reverend George A. Kelly, The Catholic Marriage Manual (New York:

Random House, 1958), p. 6.
3 Ibid., p. 20.
l-j(S THE CHURCH AND THE SECOND SEX
affairs with other women.1 It is clear that the total identifica¬

tion of the woman with the mother image is a source of sickness
in both sexes.
This identification can also be harmful to the children. It
would seem that the better educated and more energetic the
woman is, the greater is the chance that she will suffocate her
children, if she has no other oudet. Betty Friedan has pointed
out that
‘the mother whose son becomes .homosexual is usually not the

“emancipated” woman who competes with men in the world, but
the very paradigm of the feminine mystique—a woman who fives
through her son, whose femininity is used in virtual seduction of
her son, who attaches her son to her with such dependence that
he can never mature to love a woman, nor can he, often, cope as an
adult with life on his own.’2
The task of exorcism

In view of the psychological and sociological data now at our
disposal, it is irrelevant to support the ‘eternal feminine’ on the
basis that many people, including many women, are satisfied
with it in theory and in practice. When human consciousness had
evolved to the point where it became clear that slavery is harm¬
ful, abolition became morally imperative, even if some slaves
were satisfied with their shrunken existence. Although the
‘chains’ of sexual prejudice are invisible and psychological, their
coercive strength is nonetheless real. Not least among the de¬
monic aspects of the ‘eternal feminine’ is the blindness which
it brings about.
The task of exorcising this demon is one of the great chal¬
lenges of our era. It can be said with justice that the Church has
failed to rise to this challenge. Indeed, there is abundant evi¬
dence that as a power structure it has tended to ally itself with
the powers of darkness. Inevitably, the people of God have been
wounded by this alliance. The Church has been wounded in its
1 Lussier, op. cit., p. 64.

2 Betty Friedan, The Feminine Mystique (London: Victor Gollancz, 1963),
p. 275.
structures, for it has deprived itself of the gifts and insights of

more than half of its members. It has been grievously hurt in
its members of both sexes, for in a society which welcomes and
fosters prejudice, not only is the human potential of the subject
group restricted, but the superordinate group also becomes
warped in the process.
The need for exorcism is clear, but the method cannot be
substitution of a new simplistic ideology for an old one. What
this would come to in the end would be merely a face-lifting
for the Eternal Woman. Efforts should be made, certainly, to
improve the quality of Catholic writing and publishing, which
still harbors strong inclinations toward serving up archaic myth
to support traditional teachings and antiquated canon law. How¬
ever, since the roots of sexual prejudice are deep—in fact, since
this represents the neurosis of a whole culture, it cannot be ex¬
pected that logical arguments will convince the official exponents
of the ‘eternal feminine’ myth. The problem is compounded by
the fact that sometimes those who are most influential in Catho-
1
he organizations and communications media are there precisely

because they are given over to simplistic ideological thought
patterns. It will be necessary, then, to look for a way of exorcism
which strikes at the roots of the problem.
The answer, in a general sense, was suggested by Simone de
Beauvoir and unintentionally by Gertrud von le Fort. This
answer is, that women who have a consciousness of the problem,
and who have the required creative vigor and independence,
have the responsibility of changing the image of woman by rais¬
ing up their own image, giving an example to others, and especi¬
ally to the young. The thought of the immeasurable influence
which Indira Gandhi may have upon the self-images of girls in
India suggests the potency for image changing which a great
woman can have. Such influence can be exercised in varying
ways and degrees by others. The point is not to set up another
stereotype, such as that of the stateswoman, to replace the old,
but to manifest the unreliability of all stereotypes by showing
the immense variety in the potential of women. Many girls would
be encouraged to realize this potential if they could see that
normal, attractive persons are in fact doing the things they want
to do.
Despite the fact that the answer lies in the ‘raising up’ of new
images, it is doubtful that women will rise to the task in
sufficient numbers until favorable conditions are not only
allowed but also encouraged. As far as the Church is concerned,
this will require a work which has both a negative and a positive
aspect. The work of removing impediments to evolution of per¬
sonality and of fostering an atmosphere in which such evolution
can best take place is equivalent to the task of exorcism, which
is an essential part of its ministry. Furthermore, this changing
of atmosphere must take place on the two levels of theory and of
practice. The following chapters examine some dimensions of
the work ahead.
CHAPTER SIX
Theological Roots of the Problem:

Radical Surgery Required .
‘The attack by Christian apologetic upon the adult¬

hood of the world I consider to be in the first place
pointless, in the second ignoble, and in the third un¬
christian.’
Dietrich Bonhoeffer
If the change of atmosphere which is so badly needed is really

to come about, the best talents and concerted efforts of many
persons working in different areas will be required. In this chap¬
ter we shall indicate some theological inadequacies which are at
the source of Catholic androcentrism. To become aware of the
scope and context of the work of ridding theology of its ancient
bias is of first importance, not only for theologians but for all
who are interested in the women-Church problem.
Once having taken note of the more obvious misogynistic no¬
tions which have become embedded in Christian tradition, one
begins to see that the roots of these are profound and that they
are interrelated. Theology is comparable to an organism: a dis¬
ease affecting one part quickly spreads to another part. More¬
over, it is not enough to cure a symptom. In fact, instant cures
of surface manifestations might simply disguise the fact that the
disease is still present at a deeper level, ready to manifest itself
in other forms.
From one point of view, antifeminism in Christian thought
can be looked upon as a symptom. We shall consider it here
from this aspect. This is by no means to deny that misogynism
can be and is a psychological origin of the very doctrinal disorders
which, in turn, serve to perpetuate it. The cause-effect relation-
179
l8o THE CHURCH AND THE SECOND SEX
ship is not one-way. It is more accurate to describe it as a vicious

circle. We are now approaching that circle from the point of
view of the internal structure of theology itself. That is, we shall
examine those inadequacies in the conceptualizations of basic
doctrines which sustain and perpetuate androcentric theological
teachings.
Ideas about God

In theology, at the root of such distortions as antifeminism
is the problem of conceptualizations, images, and attitudes con¬
cerning God. Many intelligent people are not aware of the depth
and far-reaching consequences of this problem. It appears to
such persons that an image of God as ‘an old man with a beard’
who lives ‘up in heaven’ is too childish to be taken seriously by
any adult. They feel certain their own belief is on a level far
above these notions, and that the same is true of every educated
adult. In actuality their confidence in themselves and in others
like them is groundless. They fail to realize what a powerful grip
such images have upon the imagination even after they have been
consciously rejected as primitive and inadequate. Indeed, shades
of 'the old man with a beard’—his various metaphysical equiva¬
lents—continue to appear even in the most learned speculations
of theologians. They appear even more obviously and frequently
in the watered-down, popularized versions of these specula¬
tions, for example, in text books, religion classes, and sermons.
What does the abiding presence of such images have to do
with the problem with which this book is concerned? On one
level the answer to this question may be glimpsed when one con¬
siders that the image in question is, obviously, of a person of the
male sex. Of course, no theologian or biblical scholar believes
that God literally belongs to the male sex. However, there are bits
of evidence that the absurd idea that God is male lingers on in
the minds of theologians, preachers and simple believers, on a
level which is not entirely explicit or conscious. One has only to
think of the predictable and spontaneous reaction of shock and
embarrassment if a speaker were to stand before a group and
refer to God as ‘she’. Indeed, many would find it unfitting, not
ROOTS OF THE PROBLEM: RADICAL SURGERY REQUIRED l8l
quite ‘normal’ to refer to God as ‘she’, and chances are that if

forced to choose between ‘she’ and ‘it’ to refer to the divinity,
many would prefer the latter pronoun, which, although unsatis¬
factory, would appear to them less blasphemous than the femi¬
nine.
Even the best theological writing can occasionally reflect the
confusion over God and sex, even when a conscious effort is
being made to avoid confusion. The following passage, from a
well-known scholar, is an interesting specimen:
‘We have already noticed that in the Mesopotamian myths sex

was as primeval as nature itself. The Hebrews could not accept
this view, for there was no sex in the God they worshipped. God is,
of course, masculine, but not in the sense of sexual distinction,
and the Hebrew found it necessary to state expressly, in the form
of a story, that sex was introduced into the world by the creative
Deity, who is above sex as he is above all the things which he
made.’1
What is fascinating here is that in a passage which patently

explains that the God of the Old Testament is above sex, in
which the author goes to great pains to make this clear, we find
the bland assertion that ‘God is, of course, masculine’. The
meaning is, of course, not clear. In fact, this is the sort of non¬
sense statement which philosophers of the linguistic analysis
school delight in dissecting. What can ‘masculine’ mean if
predicated of a Being in which there is no sex? Is this a statement
about God or is it rather a statement of the author’s and/or
the Hebrews’ opinion of the male sex? In any case, the subde
conditioning effected by the widespread opinion that God is
masculine, whatever that may mean, is unlikely to engender
much self-esteem in women, or- much esteem for women.
There are other distortions in traditional notions of the di¬
vinity which are quite distinct from vague identifications of God
with the male sex, although they may very well be connected
with these identifications. Many of these distortions have
ijohn L. McKenzie, S.J., The Two-Edged Sword. An Interpretation of

the Old Testament, op. cit., pp. 93_4-
recently come under criticism by some theologians, who attribute

them to an exaggerated influence of Greek philosophy upon
Christian thought, and who now advocate a ‘de-hellenization’ of
Christian doctrine.1 It is important to be aware of these per¬
verted notions and of their bearing upon the problems with
which we are concerned in this book.
Among the misleading and harmful notions abort God which
the modern ‘de-hellenizing’ theologians have in mind are cer¬
tain concepts which occur in connection with ‘divine omnipo¬
tence’, ‘divine immutability’, and ‘divine providence’. The classi¬
cal formulations of the doctrine that God is omnipotent bear with
them associations and images which modern man tends to find
alienating. This is especially the case because these formulations
involve the idea that God is immutable. The picture which
comes through is of an all-powerful, all-just God who evi-
dendy wills or, at least, permits oppressive conditions to exist.
Moreover, this God is said to be changeless. In the face of such
a God, man is despairing and helpless. He wonders why he
should commit himself to attempting to improve his lot or trying
to bring about social justice, if such a God exists.
In fact, then, such notions can and do have the effect of para¬
lyzing the human will to change evil conditions and can inspire
callousness and insensitivity. This effect upon attitudes is re¬
inforced by certain ideas of divine providence as a fixed plan
being copied out in history. With such a frame of reference, there
is a temptation to glorify the status quo, to assume that the
social conditions peculiar to any given time and place are right
simply because they exist. Evidently, if one wishes to arouse
theological awareness concerning problems of social justice, such
as those which concern women, he should take into account the
built-in resistance arising from such thought-patterns.
Scholastic theologians can argue that this is a caricature of the
traditional doctrines of divine immutability, omnipotence, and
providence. They can point out that classical theology has always
stressed charity, that it has always insisted upon man’s free-will,
1 See Leslie Dewart, The Future of Belief (New York: Herder and Herder,
1966).
ROOTS OF THE PROBLEM: RADICAL SURGERY REQUIRED 183
which is not destroyed by divine omnipotence. They can point

to the thousand refinements in scholastic thought which are
ignored in such a representation as we have given. The diffi¬
culty is, however, that these efforts to ‘save’ man’s freedom
have never been particularly convincing, despite their subde
and elaborate logic. What comes through to modern man is a
picture of God and of man’s situation which is paralyzing and
alienating.
The static world-view

The central characteristic of the world-view which results is
changelessness. The frame of mind which it engenders is hardly
open to theological development and social change. It is there¬
fore not sympathetic to the problem that women and other dis¬
advantaged groups face in relation to the Church and to other
cultural institutions. Consistent with this static view is a limited
conception of biological nature and of the ‘natural law’—inter¬
preted as God’s will. A mentality conditioned by such ideas
instinctively opposes radical efforts to control and transcend the
limits imposed by biological nature. The typical conservative
theologians who have opposed change in the Catholic Church’s
position on birth control have this frame of reference. And, of
course, it is consistent with this line of thinking that the myth
of ‘immutable feminine nature and masculine nature’, which is in
reality a pattern of images derived in large measure from social
conditioning, be set up as normative.
The resistance which the static world-view presents to ideas
of social change is fortified by another idea which must be con¬
sidered inimical to healthy development. This is the idea that
divine revelation was given to man in the past, once and for all,
and that it was ‘closed’ at the end of the apostolic age. There can
easily follow from this the idea that certain statements in the
Bible represent descriptions of an unalterable divine plan, and
that these statements must be accepted now and forcibly applied
even though the social context in which we find ourselves is
vasdy different from the situation in biblical times. We have
seen in a previous chapter how disastrous this attitude has been
in relation to the texts of Paul and to the opening chapters of

Genesis concerning women.
Contemporary theologians are beginning to take account of the
inadequacies of the old notion of revelation as closed. Of course,
there has always been some awareness of these inadequacies
since, in fact, there has been doctrinal development in every
age. Traditional theologians have tried to reconcile this undeni¬
able fact of development with the doctrine that revelation is
‘closed’ by arguing that content which was implicitly contained
in revelation becomes, in the course of time, more explicit. Com¬
plex theories have been developed elaborating upon this, but
these have been less than completely satisfactory. They tend
to overemphasize the need for justification of every change in
terms of the past. Some contemporary Catholic theologians,
notably Gabriel Moran, are beginning to insist that revelation
is an event, and that it exists today as a present event.1 This
implies a radical openness to the facts of contemporary experi¬
ence. We are in need of such a concept of revelation, which will
help to create the atmosphere needed for honest re-examination
of contemporary issues, such as the Church’s attitude concerning
women.
Other theological developments required

The healing of Christian antifeminism will require still other
theological developments. It will be necessary that the institu¬
tionalist view of the Church—a root of many evils—be trans¬
cended. A theology which over stresses the institutional character
of the Church tends to be preoccupied with defending positions
held by authorities in the past and to close its eyes to present
realities. It is wary of all attempts at development of doctrine,
since change appears to weaken respect for authority. While
the Church can certainly be considered as an institution, this
should be balanced by an understanding of another side of its
reality. What is needed is a more prophetic vision of the Church
as a movement in the world, concerned primarily with better-
1 Gabriel Moran, F.S.C. ‘The God of Revelation’, Commonweal, vol. LXXXV
n. 18, 10 February, 1967, pp. 499-503.
ment of the human condition, and seeking to cooperate with all

who are striving for this goal. As this attitude develops, with its
emphasis upon the work to be done rather than upon vested
interests and personal and institutional prestige, women will
come more into their own among the people of God. Both the
Old and the New Testaments recognize that women as well as
men have the gift of prophecy. As Christian theology comes to
see institutional structures more in the terms of the prophetic
mission of the Church, it will become evident that the exclusion
of women from ministerial functions is unreasonable.
In order to create the theological atmosphere which we are
seeking, it will also be necessary to develop an understanding
of the Incarnation which goes beyond the regressive, sin-obsessed
view of human life which colored so much of the theology of the
past. Thought about this doctrine must become consonant
with evolutionary awareness of modern man, welcoming and
encouraging human progress on all levels as continuing the work
of the Incarnation. It must encourage active personal commit¬
ment to the work of bringing about social justice and to creative
work of all kinds.
One of the chief obstacles to envisaging the Incarnation with¬
in an evolutionary context has been a literalist interpretation of
the story of the Fall of Adam and Eve. Teilhard de Chardin, in
‘Christologie et Evolution’, an article which appeared in 1933,
wrote of this:
‘Not only must history, in order to accept Adam and Eve, be

strangled in a quite artificial way, on the level of the appearance of
man, but—in a more immediately vital area, that of belief—the
expansion of our religion is constantly stifled by the present for¬
mulation of the doctrine of original sin. It clips the wings of our
expectations and inexorably leads us back into the shadows of repa¬
ration and expiation.’
Paul Tillich in his Systematic Theology called literal belief in

the story of the Fall ‘a distinct disservice to Christianity’.
It is not by accident that two such prophetic thinkers as
Teilhard de Chardin and Paul Tillich focused attention upon
theological distortions connected with the story of the Fall. The

effects of these distortions are far-reaching. As long as theology
is obsessed with a conception of human nature as fallen from a
state of original integrity, and considers that state to have actually
existed in the past, it must be pessimistic about the present and
the future. It tends to see human life chiefly in terms of repara¬
tion and expiation. As long as this is the atmosphere of theology,
Christianity cannot fully recognize itself to be what theologian
Karl Rahner called it: ‘the religion of the absolute future’.
This static, sin-haunted view of human life reflects and per¬
petuates a negative attitude toward sexuality, matter, and ‘the
world’. In such an atmosphere antifeminism has thrived. To
some theologians, ‘woman’ came to personify all those aspects of
reality which they believed should be feared, fled from, denied
and despised. We have already examined some of the tirades of
the Fathers against the ‘daughters of Eve’. It is necessary to face
the fact that there are warped attitudes deeply embedded in
Christian thought which have continued to sustain the ‘daughters
of Eve’ theme, despite the fact that inconsistencies and absurdi¬
ties should have been self-evident to reason.
The disease of sin-obsession and antisexuality has spread
from the roots to the branches of theology. As a result, the
growth of sacramental theology has been in some ways stunted
and one-sided. This can be seen in the cases of the two sacra¬
ments most directly related to the problem of women in the
Church, matrimony and holy orders.
Theological treatises on marriage have, until very recently,
tended to view the man-woman relationship in sub-personal
categories. They have heavily emphasized the canonical dis¬
tinction between ‘primary and secondary ends’ of marriage,
stressing that the union is primarily for the production and
education of offspring. All of this has been quite consistent with
the tacit assumption that women are not fully human. It was
difficult to think of marriage as primarily a personal union, when
one partner in the union was thought to be not quite a person.
What is required now is a clear rejection of the biologism which
gave the dominant motif to the older theology of marriage. In
place of it there should be an ever increasing stress upon per-

sonalist values and goals. The theology of marriage is in a state
of transition, but the work is by no means completed. As long as
Catholic doctrine keeps women in a state of bondage to bio¬
logical fertility and paralyzes them by a degrading doctrine of
exclusive male headship, there is litde hope of their achieving
adulthood without separating themselves from the Church in
some way—if not completely and openly, then partially and
clandestinely.
The theology of the sacrament of Holy Orders has also suf¬
fered from lack of balance. There has been a disproportionate
emphasis upon the exalted status of the priest, rather than upon
his mission to serve. One is tempted to conclude, upon reading
some theological treatises, that there is a kind of phallic sym¬
bolism involved in the exaggerated emphasis upon the dignity
of the priest. This has been especially in evidence when the
question of the ordination of women has been raised. Thomas
Aquinas, for example, wrote that women cannot receive Holy
Orders because ‘eminence of degree cannot be signified in the
female sex, since woman has the state of subjection’.1 (It is inter¬
esting that he listed the feminine sex first among a group of six
impediments to reception of Orders—the others being lack of
the use of reason, the state of slavery, homicide, illegitimate
birth, and lack of physical members.)
Some of Thomas’s disciples have gone even further. An
American Dominican theologian wrote that a woman cannot be
ordained because ‘to the gathering of the Church her feminine
nature cannot represent “male”, which is precisely the sym¬
bolic sacramental distinction Christ possesses in relation to his
Church’.2 This example illustrates very well the fact that the
theological argumentation used against the ordination of women
is sometimes rooted in a Christology which tends to see greater
significance in the maleness of Jesus than in the central fact of his
humanity. Obviously, this is somewhat out of perspective. We
1 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, Suppl. 39, 1.

2 Edmund Manchak, O.P., ‘More from St Paul on a Female Priesthood’,
NCR, 26 May, 1965, p. 4.
shall consider at greater length the question of women and the

priesthood in the next chapter.
We are now in a position to see that the healing of theology’s
built-in misogynism is related to the advancement of doctrine on
many levels. Development of doctrine on one point does not
normally occur independently. Advocates of progress on the
women-Church issue should keep this in mind, if they hope to
have deep and lasting influence. Since the roots of the disease
are profound and complicated, again let us recognize that there
are no instant cures. A constant effort should be made at seeing
relationships, at sustaining a wide vision.
Needed: special attention to the problem

The fact that there is need for breadth of vision does not,
however, imply that special attention and effort should not be
directed to the problem of women and the Church. We have seen
that inadequacies in the understanding and formulation of basic
doctrines, such as those concerned with the divine attributes, the
Incarnation, the nature of the Church, will be reflected in
thought on sexual relation and the situation of women. However,
it would be a mistake to think that the cause-effect relationship
moves only in one direction. In fact, as we have already indicated,
there is reason to think that there is a reciprocal causality. From
the point of view of psychological origin, warped notions of
sexual relation and of woman may be the roots of weak and in¬
adequate conceptions concerning God, Christ, revelation, the
Church and the sacraments. For example, images of God as
jealous and vengeful, which historian Arnold Toynbee has
judged to have had a devastating effect upon Christian civiliza¬
tion,1 may well be projections and justifications of the role of the
tyrant father in patriarchal society. That is, they may be the
effects of imbalance in sexual relation. It is important, then, for
the health and authentic evolution of Christian theology, that
the question of the man-woman relationship and the problems
arising from androcentrism be made a special focus of attention.
1 Arnold Toynbee, Christianity among the Religions of the World (New York:
Charles Scribner’s Sons, Scribner Library Books), 1957, p. 19.
A more enlightened understanding in this area will have far-

reaching effects.
Another point which needs to be stressed in connection with
theological reform on the question of women is this: if a radical
re-thinking of the subject is to take place, it is necessary to opt
for a clear-cut rejection of that approach which is suggested by
the expression, ‘theology of woman’. This approach contains a
built-in assumption that ‘woman’ is in fact a distinct species
which can be understood apart from the other sex. It is founded
on the unproved supposition that there is an innate psycho-
sexual complementarity. Invariably, attempts to develop a
‘theology of woman’ fall on their various faces because they
naively assume that the sex images of a patriarchal culture infal¬
libly correspond to ‘nature’ and to God’s will.
The bias which is inherent in this approach becomes evident
when one attempts to state the corresponding formula: ‘theology
of man (male)’. Whereas the idea of a ‘theology of woman’ is
frequendy proposed, few would seriously suggest that there
should be a ‘theology of man’.
Men have been regarded as having full human status and
therefore are not seen as posing a special problem, whereas
women, who have not yet achieved this status, seem mysterious.
Because of its assumptions, a ‘theology of woman’ helps to per¬
petuate and justify this situation. It is misbegotten in that it
places sexual differentiation above personhood. Moreover, it
misconstrues the problematic of sexuality itself for, as we have
said, it assumes that one sex can be understood as if it were a
complete essence existing in isolation. In fact, the sexual differen¬
tiation has to be understood within the category of relation. Men
and women as they are, are the products of complex social
relations which are constandy in flux. That is to say, they have
a continuing history.
WThat is needed is creative effort to develop a theological an¬
thropology which will study the dynamics of human personality
and social relationship from a radically evolutionary point of
view. Within this context there needs to be developed a theology
of the man-woman relationship which rejects as alienating to
both sexes the idea of a sexual hierarchy founded upon ‘nature’

and defined once and for all. This much needed theology will
recognize that the relationship between the sexes evolves, that
its forms must change according to the conditions of diverse his¬
torical epochs and according to individual differences. It will re¬
ject any conception of ‘the common good’ which would diminish
the potential of one sex for the sake of the other. It will place
value in personal liberty and growth, which must be seen not
as opposed to, but as essential to, love and commitment. Reject¬
ing the old obsession with sex roles, it will be concerned with
the problems of persons in relation to others. It will be honest
enough to admit the ambiguity of concrete reality, which the
theologian’s abstractions cannot fully clarify or encompass.
Obstacles to theological development

It is essential to be aware, however, that there are obstacles to
the eradication of theological misogynism and to the develop¬
ment of a dynamic and liberating theological anthropology—
obstacles arising from the society in which the theologian fives
and works. The fact is that he does not five in a Platonic ‘world
of ideas’ but in human society. It would be naive to suppose that
the ancient bias could persist in doctrine if this were not given
support and apparent justification by the actual condition of
women both within the Church itself and in the secular milieu.
Within the Church itself, the exclusion of women from the
hierarchy and, until very recent years, from access to theo¬
logical education has perpetuated an atmosphere in which theo¬
logians—all male—felt no pressure to give serious attention to
the problems of the other sex in their struggle to achieve first-
class citizenship. These could be dismissed as unimportant.
Kept in ignorance of theology and canon law and of the political
realities of the Church, women have until recently lacked even
an awareness of their own situation. When questions did arise,
they were intimidated by their lack of knowledge from challeng¬
ing the situation of subservience imposed upon them. This is to
some extent still true. Even in those cases in which women have
become knowledgeable and articulate, they have found that
ROOTS OF THE PROBLEM! RADICAL SURGERY REQUIRED 191
there were few channels of communication open to them. It

has been easy for the theologians to ignore weak protests.
Moreover, it would be unrealistic to suppose that the status of
women in secular society does not affect the thinking of theo¬
logians. If complete and genuine equality of opportunity for
women did exist in Europe and the United States, the absurdity
of anachronistic theological ideas concerning them would be so
blatantly obvious that such notions would rapidly be discarded.
The existing situation in America, Britain, and most of the north¬
ern European countries is, in varying styles and degrees, one
of semi-equality. The possibility of professional and political
equality exists in theory, but a combination of negative influ¬
ences—not least among them psychological pressures—hinders
full realization of the ideal. In the Latin countries, the situation is
even more unbalanced.
Inevitably, then, the progress of theology is hindered by pre¬
vailing conditions in ecclesiastical and civil society. To the prob¬
lems and challenges posed by these conditions we shall next
turn our attention.
CHAPTER SEVEN
Toward Partnership: Some Modest Proposals
‘God created man in his image. In the image of God

he created him. Male and female he created them.’
Genesis 1:27
‘There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither

slave nor free, there is neither male nor female; for
you are all one in Christ Jesus.’
Galatians 3:28
Some believe that those concerned with the problem of eradi¬

cating sexual discrimination should concentrate their energies
upon the secular milieu rather than upon the Church. It is said
that if truly equal educational, professional and political oppor¬
tunities are attained for women in secular society, and if psycho¬
logical and social pressures which hinder them from using these
opportunities can be combatted successfully, the Church will
grudgingly but inevitably follow suit. There is something to be
said for this approach, but it is incomplete. First of all, it is seen
as incomplete by those who recognize value in the Church itself
and who therefore feel the urgency of the need for its reform.
Furthermore, it is incomplete because it considers the Church
simply as a superstructure without influence upon society. This
view fails to take into account the great power which the Church
has as pressure group and image maker. It would be as foolish
to ignore its power at this point in history as it would be to ignore
that of any great cultural institution. It is important to take into
account the fact that, while it is true that ecclesiastical attitudes
are conditioned by the secular milieu, it is also true that the
Church has influence upon the whole environment.
192
TOWARD partnership: some modest proposals 193
Our problem now is to understand the basic nature of our
task of exorcising, on the level of practical activity and within the
context of evolving structures, the ‘demon’ of sexual prejudice
in the Church. We have already seen the need for exorcism on
the level of theory, particularly through the expulsion of the
demonic myth of the eternal feminine from theology. Now we
must ask what will be the operative principle which will direct
our efforts on the level of social action.
The answer to this question must be sought by first con¬
sidering the nature of the disease which we are attempting to
cure, for an adequate cure must be appropriate to the illness.
We have seen in an earlier chapter that the disease can be under¬
stood in terms of self-fulfilling prophecy, a process by which
the dominant class projects its unwanted characteristics, its
lower self, upon the members of the oppressed class, who in
turn introject the despised qualities. Thus, the creation story
speaks the truth in declaring that Eve came from Adam. More¬
over, the workings of the process—the whole vicious circle of
role psychology—are understood neither by the oppressor nor
by his victim, both of whom are inclined to accept the myths,
such as the myth of fixed natures, which serve as its justification.
If the resultant fixed roles were harmful only to the class of
persons who have been made inferior (the slave, the Negro, the
woman) there would be compelling enough reason to seek a cure.
However, there is more to it than this. Thus the white suprema¬
cist is rent at the core of his being. Thus also the male, through
the mutilation of woman, has been caught up in a process of self-
destruction. In relation to woman as mother, wife, companion,
he is doomed to frustration if he cannot find in the other an
authentic, self-activating person—with precisely the qualities
which are stunted by the imposition of the eternal feminine.
Fated to partnership with ‘true woman’, he may find this dissoci¬
ated, narcissistic being less satisfactory than the companion of his
dreams. What is more, the ‘eternal masculine’ itself is alienating,
crippling the personalities of men and restricting their experi¬
ence of life at every level. The male in our society is not sup¬
posed to express much feeling, sensitivity, aesthetic appreciation.
imagination, consideration for others, intuition. He is expected

to affirm only part of his real self. Indeed, it may be that a good
deal of the compulsive competitiveness of males is rooted in this
half existence.
It is the nature of the disease, therefore, to inhibit the ex¬
pansion of the individual’s potential, through conditioned con¬
formity to roles, and through a total identification of the indi¬
vidual with them. It contrasts starkly with free acceptance of roles
by integrated personalities, for its effect is to hinder the inte¬
gration of personality. The healing which we seek must not be
understood as a return to a state of health presumed to have
existed in the past. This would be nothing but an abortive quest
for the state of dreaming innocence, for primitive unconscious¬
ness, or for the paradise lost by the Fall. Rather, we must strive
for that forward leap into the future of human history which is
now demanded of us. Then perhaps it will be understood that
our sickness was only the growing pains of a species on its way
to maturity.
The nature of the effort demanded of us is revealed by the
nature of our predicament, of our alienation. Disintegrated and
dissociated by processes which may have been necessary for
the development of civilization, we must seek integration by
confronting each other in a way which is qualitatively different
from that of the past. Men and women are in history, in time,
existing only in dynamic relationship to each other. We have in
the past been chained to the wheel of psychological processes
whose nature was not understood, living out roles which seem¬
ingly were predestined, written in the heavens. There is evi¬
dence that a few privileged souls in every age transcended the
blindness of the culture and achieved communication which
was profound and genuinely personal, but the literature of all
ages attests to the general failure. In our time, however, we
appear to be at the threshold of liberation from this ancient
servitude. The developing sciences, particularly psychology and
anthropology, have given us insight at last into the mechanisms
which had enslaved us. The advance of technology has provided
us with a situation in which, for the first time in history.
we have the required leisure, mobility, control of our

environment to experiment on the basis of this insight.
Our efforts, then, must be toward a level of confrontation,
dialogue, and cooperation between the sexes undreamed of in the
past, when the struggle for biological survival of the species and
numerical multiplication had to take precedence over any
thought of qualitative development of relation between the sexes.
The directing principle of our thoughts and plans concerning the
future relations of men and women in the Church and society
must be commitment to providing the possibility of ever more
profound, complete, dynamic and humanizing relationships, in
which we may hope to transcend our alienation through under¬
standing of each other and of ourselves.
It should become axiomatic that if the vicious circle of im¬
posed roles and of self-fulfilling prophecy is to be overcome
among the people of God, if the level of dialogue and coopera¬
tion between men and women which we are seeking is to be
attained, then all automatic exclusion from any Church office
or function on the basis of sex is to be eradicated.
A concerted effort should be made, then, to work toward
this eradicating of discrimination on all levels. On the parish
and diocesan levels, wherever boards and councils of laymen
are established, women should be represented, significandy and
proportionately, not merely by a few token appointments.
They should be found in positions of importance in the national
Catholic organizations. In particular, efforts should be directed
to seeking out and using the talents of gifted and highly trained
women specialists in influential and decision-making roles within
the Church. Relevant areas of specialization in which competent
women are now to be found include advanced theological re¬
search and teaching, sociology, political science, psychology, edu¬
cational administration, business administration, journalism, law,
social work. Such specialists should be recruited for post-
conciliar commissions and other organizations which may be set
up to continue the work begun by the Vatican Council.
In liturgical affairs, as participation of the laity becomes more
active, equally active participation of both sexes must be in-
sisted upon. If laymen serve as lectors and acolytes, if they

preach and distribute Holy Communion, then women should do
the same. Moreover, it is evident, if one faces the problem with
consistency, courage and sincerity, that the process of eradicating
discrimination must not stop here. The question of women clergy
must be faced.
The question of women priests

In the question of whether women may be ordained priests,
the whole problem of the situation of women in the Church is
reflected, symbolized, and crystallized. Indeed, it is evident to
anyone who has repeatedly engaged in discussions of the sub¬
ject that this can serve as a touchstone for attitudes concerning
women and the man-woman relationship. Many who would see
the appropriateness of some kind of active role for women in
the Church recoil in horror when the priesthood is mentioned.
Often, conversations which had been rational up to this point
suddenly become wildly emotional and hidden prejudices blos¬
som forth, dramatically revealing the insincerity of earlier ad¬
missions that women should be recognized as equal to men in
the Church.
The power of the issue of women priests to unmask hidden
attitudes is demonstrated in statements of a German author who
wrote:
‘Picture the relations between priestesses and men, if you have any
experience of life, any acquaintance with human nature, above all,
any imagination. What a kaleidoscope of situations • we should
have—embarrassing, grotesque, delicate, amusing, and quite in¬
tolerable. Supposing there were no theological argument, I cannot
see a single reason for discarding the logic and religious experience
of thousands of years in order to gratify the longing a handful of
women have for recognition and power.’1
It is interesting that it does not occur to the writer of this pas¬

sage, apparendy, to ‘picture the relations between priests and
women’. Yet here one could find a storehouse of situations
1 Ida Friederika Garres, ‘Women as Priests ?\ Herder Correspondence Feature
Service, 3 December, 1965.
TOWARD PARTNERSHIP: SOME MODEST PROPOSALS 197
which are grotesque, delicate, etc.—situations which need not be
conjured up by the imagination, since they exist in fact. This
peculiar one-sidedness of vision reflects the deep-seated preju¬
dice which totally identifies women, but not men, with their
sexual function. Also noteworthy is the assumption that everyone
who argues that both sexes should be represented in the
hierarchy is a woman, and moreover a woman with a ‘long¬
ing for recognition and power’. In fact, at least as many men as
women have argued the affirmative on the question of women
in the hierarchy. Moreover, only a very small percentage of the
women who have publicly taken an affirmative position on the
question have expressed a personal desire to become priests.
What they have in common is some ability to transcend stereo¬
types and to abstract from the immediate situation. What is at
stake in this issue is more radical and more universal than the
specific ambitions of a few persons.
What is at stake is the character and quality of the man-woman
relation in the Church of the future. There will be no genuine
equality of men and women in the Church as long as qualified
persons are excluded from any ministry by reason of their sex
alone. Those who point to the rising position of the laity in the
Church and then argue that women are attaining equality be¬
cause of this are ignoring the fact that the situation of men and
women is not the same here. Men have the option of becoming
priests or remaining laymen. Women have no choice. As long as
the Church maintains a significant distinction between hierarchy
and laity, the exclusion of women from the hierarchy is a radical
affirmation of their inferior position among the people of God.
By this exclusion the Church is in a very real and effective way
teaching that women are not fully human and conditioning people
to accept this as an irremediable fact. It is saying that the sexual
differentiation is—for one sex—a handicap so crippling that no
personal qualities of intelligence, virtue or leadership can over¬
come it.
That there is no valid theological objection to the ordination
of women has become increasingly evident in recent years.
Discussion by scholars in the various Protestant Churches
which have decided to ordain women has helped to manifest the

absurdity of objections on theological grounds. Of particular
interest is the dispute which occurred concerning the ordination
of women in Sweden in the 1950’s. Biblical scholar Krister
Stendahl has pointed out that scholars on both sides of the dis¬
pute were in agreement concerning the historical meaning of
the texts of St Paul concerning women. The real problem and
disagreement concerned application to modern times. Those
who took the conservative position assumed that Paul’s view
could be taken as a generally valid Christian view, normative for
all times. This is precisely the weakness of the conservative po¬
sition. Professor Stendahl maintains that in all the texts where
the New Testament speaks about the role of women in the
Church, when a reason is given, it is always by reference to the
subordinate position of women in creation. In fact,
‘the question of women’s place in the cult and ministry and in the
Christian home and in society is dealt with on the selfsame prin¬
ciple: the subordination in creation’.1
This implies that the question about the ordination of women

cannot be separated from the total problem of the emancipation
of women in our society. Thus, Professor Stendahl argues, it is
almost impossible to assent to the political emancipation of
women while arguing on biblical grounds against the ordination
of women.
There is further reason to reject the position of those who
accept the political emancipation of women but, on supposedly
scriptural grounds, reject their ordination. The New Testament
(Galatians 3:28) suggests that if there is to be a change in the
man-woman relationship, it will be in Christ. It is a peculiar
reversal of this to claim that emancipation is all right in ‘the
world’ but not in the Church. It would be more consistent, al¬
though quite mad, to crusade in the name of the Bible against
all emancipation and try to regain the social situation of the first
1 Krister Stendahl, The Bible and the Role of Women: A Case Study in
Hermeneutics, translated by Emilie T. Sander (Philadelphia: Fortress Press,
Facet Books, Biblical Series 15, 1966), p. 39.
century. Professor Stendahl summarizes the case succinctly:
‘If emancipation is right, then there is no valid “biblical” reason

not to ordain women. Ordination cannot be treated as a “special”
problem since there is no indication that the New Testament sees
it as such.’1
A frequent type of objection takes the form of an argument

from fact. Some have based their opposition upon the fact that
Jesus called only paen to be his aposdes. The weakness of this
sort of reasoning is evident. It is impossible to move with logical
certitude from this to the conclusion that only men should be
priests—such a conclusion requires quite an unjustifiable leap.
How do we know that this was the point of his choice? He also
chose only Jews, which hardly can be interpreted to mean that
only Jews can be priests. The objection fails to take into account
the cultural climate of the time. It reflects a kind of Docetism,
which refuses to recognize the implications of the full humanity
of Jesus. That is, it simply does not take into account the fact
that, being truly human, Jesus lived and thought within the
cultural context of his age.
Similar to this objection is the argument based upon the
fact that Jesus was male. It is argued that the priest represents
Christ and therefore must be male. This type of fuzzy, symbol-
oriented thinking leaves itself open to objections at both ends.
It betrays a distorted understanding of the meaning of Christ
(a point which we have already touched upon in the last chap¬
ter), giving prior importance to his maleness, rather than to his
humanity. Moreover, it is forced to be inconsistent in order to
avoid the assertion that women cannot represent Christ at all—
and few would want to go this far.
Some forward-looking Catholic writers (notably Monsignor
J. D. Conway) have suggested that Pope John was opening just
a crack the door to the priesthood for women, perhaps without
realizing it, when he wrote in Pacem in Terris:
‘Human beings have the right to choose freely the state of life
which they prefer, and therefore the right to establish a family, with
1 Ibid., p. 41.
equal rights and duties for man and woman, and also the right
to follow a vocation to the priesthood or the religious life.’
After quoting this passage. Monsignor Conway commented:
‘Pope John might object to my taking his words literally but they
deserve meditation. He noted with approval the fading of a strati¬
fied society, in which some persons are put in an inferior condition,
and others assume superior position, “on account of economic and
social conditions, of sex, of assigned rank”.’1
It is possible that Pope John’s words have prophetic implications

which will be recognized only after the passage of time.
A procedure similar to that employed by Monsignor Conway
could be used in connection with a passage already cited in an
earlier chapter from Vatican II’s Pastoral Constitution on the
Church in the Modem World:
‘With respect to the fundamental rights of the person, every type

of discrimination, whether social or cultural, whether based on
sex, race, color, social condition, language, or religion, is to be
overcome and eradicated as contrary to God’s intent. For in truth
it must still be regretted that fundamental personal rights are not yet
being universally honored. Such is the case of a woman who is
denied the right and freedom to choose a husband, to embrace a
state of life, or to acquire an education or cultural benefits equal
to those recognized for men.’2
It is clear that women cannot ‘embrace a state of life’ on the

same terms as men, as long as they are excluded from the
hierarchy.
The vast theological developments which have taken place in
recent years have implications for the specific question of
women’s ordination which have not been lost upon progressive
theologians. Recognizing the weakness of theological objections,
they have openly shifted the whole question to the arenas of
sociology and psychology. Thus, in 1966, Father Hans Rung
stated:
1 NCR, 16 November, 1966, p. 8.

2 Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, n. 29.
TOWARD partnership: some MODEST PROPOSALS 201
‘There are two factors to consider regarding the ordination of

women to the Sacred Ministry of the Church. The first is that
there are no dogmatic or biblical reasons against it. The second
is that there are psychological and sociological factors to be con¬
sidered. The solution to the problem depends on the sociological
conditions of the time and place. It is entirely a matter of cultural
circumstances.’1
It can hardly be denied that cultural circumstances, as far as

women are concerned, have changed enormously during this
century. We live in an age in which women have gained access
to nearly all the professions, including the Protestant ministry,
and have demonstrated their competence in them, often to an
unusual degree. There are few thinking people who would deny
this, or who would deny that in the face of this social evolution
the situation within the Church is anachronistic. However, there
is by no means unanimity concerning the nature of the problem
and its solution.
Among those who recognize that something is amiss and who
do sincerely wish to see the female situation improved, a variety
of attitudes exists. We shall consider two extremely opposed
approaches, both of which betray inadequate understanding of
the dimensions of the problem at hand. The first approach favors
some modest reform of women’s situation among the laity but
looks upon the question of women priests as premature, peri¬
pheral, and unrelated to the more immediate problems of women
and of the Church. It ignores the fact that exclusion of women
from the clergy not only reflects but also serves to perpetuate a
certain restrictive style of man-woman relationship. The second
attitude supposes that the ordination of women will be a panacea
for the ills of the Church in general and women in particular.
It naively ignores the complexity of the problems which are the
concern of sexual anthropology. We shall examine each of these
approaches in turn.
Despite the evidence of social evolution, there are many—
1 Hans Kiing, quoted in Progress Report to the House of Bishops (Episco¬

palian), from The Committee to Study the Proper Place of Women in the
Church’s Ministry (an unpublished report), October, 1966, p. 111.
including many women—who feel that people are not ready

for so radical a change as the introduction of women priests.
They choose to keep a prudent silence on this issue, or at least
leave the matter in abeyance. They wish to avoid what they con¬
sider to be extremism and to work realistically for small changes.
Briefly, they think that the question of women’s ordination has
surfaced prematurely. Although this position may appear to
reflect a sense of ‘balance’ and good judgment, it has inherent
difficulties.
First of all, the question simply cannot be ignored as pre¬
mature, since many Protestant churches now ordain women.
Thus it inevitably enters into the ecumenical frame of reference.
This is not to say that the ‘argument from ecumenism’—i.e. what
one church does, another must do—is valid. It does mean that
the question has been raised and must be faced.
Second, the argument that it is ‘too soon’ to consider seriously
women’s ordination puts an exaggerated emphasis upon the
factor of psychological resistance to social change. There is al¬
ways some resistance to any social change. This will be the case
no matter how delayed the reform movement may be in com¬
ing. Indeed, if there were no unwillingness to change, there
would be no discriminatory situation. In fact, it is to a large
extent true that prejudice is overcome only by the fact of change
itself. A prejudice against women university professors, for
example, is not overcome by refusal to hire them. Rather, it is
defeated by demonstration, that is, by the presence and influ¬
ence of excellent women professors.
Nevertheless the factor of psychological resistance should not
unrealistically be ignored. If in a given time and place the oppo¬
sition to change is overwhelming, and if it is reinforced by
other cultural institutions, then delay or gradualism will be
necessary. Today, however, it is clear that in the United States
and a great part of Europe, the basic conflict is not between
cultural circumstances and the admission of women to the ranks
of the clergy. On the contrary, there is a basic incongruity be¬
tween present social conditions and the absolute exclusion of
women from the official ministry of the Church. Indeed, at this
toward partnership: some modest proposals 203
point in history the Church is in the somewhat comical position

of applauding women’s legal, professional and political eman¬
cipation in secular society while keeping them in the basement
of its own edifice.
Those who use the ‘people are not yet ready’ argument are in
fact often projecting feelings of resistance within themselves.
The irrationality of these feelings is revealed in the tendency to
speak as if large numbers of women priests threaten to appear
on the scene immediately. Even the mention of the idea appears
to suggest to some that hordes of women priests (all resembling
traditional Mother Superiors) will descend like invading soldier
ants upon the heretofore all-male stronghold, thus producing
a cultural shock of titanic proportions. Clearly this will not hap¬
pen, except perhaps in the nightmares of insecure curates. Since
girls have not been encouraged in this direction, it is unlikely
that more than a very small number of them would consider the
priesthood, were it opened to them as a possibility. By the very
nature of the situation the change would be effected gradually.
The issue at stake is not one of numbers but of principle: no
human being should be disqualified from any Church office on
the basis of sex. The same criteria should be applied to candi¬
dates of both sexes.
Much of the insistence that the discussion of women’s ordi¬
nation is premature is rooted in the belief that it is a peripheral
and unimportant issue, having litde relevance for the immedi-
.. ate problems of men and women. Thus, many will dismiss this
topic as unimportant but will favor raising the status of women
among the laity. This reveals a notion of the man-woman rela¬
tion which is narrow and short-sighted. Such persons are willing
to accept discrimination on the basis of sex up to—or rather
down to—a point, and fail to affirm that this is wrong in prin¬
ciple and justifiable only w'hen circumstances make it impossible
to avoid. This position is weak and inconsistent. It would be more
consistent to hold that whatever deficiency or mysterious dif¬
ference makes women universally unfit for membership in the
hierarchy would also disqualify them from equality with men
among the laity. If sexual discrimination is desirable or at least
justifiable where the hierarchy is in question, there is no com¬

pelling reason for not perpetuating it where the functions of
the laity are in question.
When this principle of consistency is understood, it throws
some light upon the unfortunate fact that in post Vatican II
years, rather than gaining ground at an equal pace with laymen,
women have been kept in an inferior status. This has become
so painfully obvious that in 1967 the executive director of the
National Council of Catholic Women in the United States—
traditionally a very cautious organization—publicly issued a
strong protest. Her comments had been prepared for discus¬
sion by the National Council of Catholic Bishops, which was
held in Chicago in April of that year. Significantly the topic was
never discussed, but the report was issued to newsmen who
were covering the bishops’ meeting. In it the NCCW director
stated that women now seem destined to become third class
Christians, despite the emphasis upon the laity as the ‘people of
God’, which was voiced at Vatican II. She said:
‘As the participation of laymen in liturgical and ecclesiastical

affairs continues to increase, it becomes painfully obvious that
women are being left behind in a class by themselves. The position
of the Catholic woman in the spiritual worshipping community is
exactly the same as it was before the Council.’
The statement further bemoaned the fact that women still

have no active role in the liturgy, that they are very much in the
minority on parish boards and councils, that they are not in
positions of importance in national Catholic organizations.
Finally, it declared that the present situation is ‘an unhealthy
climate’ for the Catholic woman, who ‘waits for her talents and
abilities ... and, indeed, her personhood, to be recognized and
acknowledged by the Church’.1
The difficulty is that the Catholic woman will wait in vain for
such acknowledgment, unless organizations such as the NCCW
come to see and publicly affirm the full implications of the
1 Quoted in The Catholic Transcript, Hartford, Conn., 21 April, 1967

(Religious News Service).
personhood which they want to be recognized by the Church.

Because Catholic women and their organizations have been too
timid in affirming their woTth and their rights, because they
have asked for too little, they have in fact failed to make pro¬
gress. Until they have the clear-sightedness and courage to re¬
ject discrimination totally, it is to be expected that women will
be the losers on all levels. The perverse consistency in the
present trend toward third-class citizenship in the Church can be
challenged only by those who think and act with consistency.
Just as it is short-sighted to dismiss the question of women
in the hierarchy as premature and irrelevant, so also it is a mis¬
take to think of their acceptance as a panacea. There are lessons
to be learned in this matter from the experience of Protestant
churches which have ordained women. From the testimony of
these women ministers it is clear that being ordained does not
guarantee the removal of all discriminatory practices. In fact, they
do suffer from such practices in a variety of ways. This experi¬
ence indicates that the problems involved in relations between
the sexes in the Church, as in any society, are profound and
complex. There is no instant cure for them. Progress on any
level toward recognition and development of the full potential of
women should be the occasion of rejoicing but not of unrealistic
optimism. In the long run, particular advances will not be very
effective unless they are accompanied and supported by develop¬
ments in many parts of the social organism.
When studying the problem of women’s situation vis-a-vis the
Church, it is essential to realize that the solution is inseparably
bound up with the whole issue of evolving structures. It would
be rash to pretend that one can predict with certainty what
form the Church community of the future will take. However,
there is a serious danger of short-sightedness, of being fixated
upon presently existing forms which are already fading into
the past or which are doomed eventually to disappear. A con¬
sciousness of social evolution counteracts the temptation to sim¬
plistic activism, to the search for panaceas for a problem which
is all-pervasive and extremely complex. This is not to say that
an awareness of evolution should spawn a sort of quietism
which chooses to ‘wait and see’ what will happen. On the con¬
trary, it is essential to see that man is the being who shares in
the shaping of his own destiny. Thus it is necessary to work
within the existing situation, to rectify injustice within existing
structures insofar as this is possible, and at the same time to
anticipate and direct toward future developments.
It is most important, then, to go beyond thinking in terms of
the institutional Church as it has existed until the present time.
We are living in a time of social upheaval. Indeed, it appears
that we are entering upon a new stage in human evolution, and
it may be that many social structures which are still with us and
many accepted patterns of behavior are really dead remnants of
an earlier stage. Characteristic of our age is the breakdown of
class distinctions which have persisted for thousands of years—
indeed, since the human race moved from its infancy, the state
of primitive society, into its adolescence. These class distinc¬
tions have been expressed in hierarchical patterns of society.
Master and slave, feudal lord and serf, husband and wife—all
lived out their existence in fixed roles, more or less modified
according to circumstances and individual disposition. The fun¬
damental dialectic was between oppressor and oppressed. This
hierarchical vision of the world was reflected in the structures
of the Church and justified by her theology. Today these struc¬
tures remain, but modern man is experiencing them more and
more as suffocating anachronisms.
At the same time, modern man experiences an anxiety about
the disappearance of these structures. There is an awareness, in
some cases, explicit, in others half-buried in the unconscious,
that we stand at a turn in the road and that there is no going
back. This is the reason for the strange power of the women
priests issue to arouse violent and irrational responses. In fact,
the very expression ‘women priests’ juxtaposes in the most
striking way two symbols which in a former age, the age from
which we are emerging, had been understood as occupying
opposed positions in the hierarchical scheme of things. The
very suggestion that the same individual could be the bearer
of these two images is a declaration that an age has ended and

another has begun.
It is quite possible, many would say inevitable, that the distinc¬
tion between hierarchy and laity as we now know it will dis¬
appear. Since our age is characterized by the emergence of op¬
pressed minorities, it is unlikely that the Church can hold out
against this rising tide. The existence of a separate and superior
priesdy caste, of a hierarchy, appears to modern man as a quaint
leftover from an earlier stage of human development. Modern
theologians, recognizing this, stress the point that the clergy exist
in order to serve the faithful, not in order to accumulate power,
honors and prestige. A prominent theologian has pointed out that
whereas for several centuries the Catholic idea of the priest was
almost exclusively that of an ‘offerer of sacrifice’, doctrinal de¬
velopment has moved away from this. Vatican II’s Constitution
on the Church reflects growth from a cultic notion of the priest
to a ministerial one.1
This is an important transition. The priest, formerly detached,
a ‘sacred person’, an object of veneration and almost super¬
stitious awe, is beginning to be seen as a presence in the midst
of the world rather than an overseer, as brother rather than as
father. Thus there is a shift toward democratization. The priest
now sees himself and is seen in terms of mission to the world,
which requires dialogue and cooperation with his fellow men.
Since dialogue and cooperation are two-way processes, the
priest’s temptations to accept false prestige and to appraise him¬
self unrealistically will be greatly diminished.
The emphasis upon service and cooperation has the effect
of putting sharply into focus the problem which is nagging many
priests, who discover that they are, in fact, in a less advantageous
situation for serving the Christian community than many profes¬
sionally competent laymen. Indeed, a large percentage of the
clergy, in this age of specialization, are in the uncomfortable
situation of being non-professional dabblers competing with ex¬
perts in a variety of fields. Their work touches many areas re¬
quiring special competence: theology, teaching, preaching, social
1 Gregory Baum, in The Ecumenist, November-December, 1965, p. 6.
service, counseling psychology, business administration, recrea¬

tional leadership. Any of these areas of work can be handled by
qualified members of the laity, men and women, and any of
them can be handled better by lay specialists than by clerical
non-specialists. It is not surprising, then, that some are beginning
to look upon clerical caste as we now know it as irrelevant and
doomed to extinction, and to envision the Church of the future
as a community based upon charismatic ministries, and trans¬
formed into a higher and more adequately human social order.
It is essential that those who are concerned with relations
between the sexes in the Church give serious attention to this
modern development in the direction of democratization and
specialization. When the emphasis is shifted away from symbolic
roles which are identified with fixed states of life and toward func¬
tional roles freely assumed on the basis of personal qualifications
and skills, away from caste systems and towards specialization
based on ability, there will be hope for realization of that higher
level of dialogue and cooperation between men and women which
we seek.
The nun
We have not yet discussed one of the most fascinating and
paradoxical figures involved in the drama of transition from the
era which is ending to the new age which has begun. This is the
figure of the religious sister, the nun. There is a sense in which
the nun appears to embody the eternal feminine, the stereotype
of woman. She wears a veil and fives under a vow of obedience.
Traditionally, she has led a fife of silence, except when speech
is necessary, demurely carrying out the humble tasks appor¬
tioned to womanhood.
Yet, individual nuns have transcended the eternal feminine
to a greater degree than most of their married sisters. We have
seen that there were extremely powerful abbesses in the Middle
Ages, who ruled vast territories with skill and authority. There
was the brilliant and active figure of Teresa of Avila, and there
were the daring women such as Mary Ward, whose struggle we
have described, who established the first active communities of
religious women away from the cloister. In our own time, a large
proportion of Catholic professional women are religious sisters.
Among their numbers are outstanding scholars, scientists, artists,
administrators. Some of these have recendy come into the
limelight, and one speaks of ‘the emerging nun’. Indeed, more
and more frequendy these very modern women are to be seen
at professional gatherings, or on the campuses of great secular
universities, attired in medieval garb, vividly exemplifying the
paradox of the Catholic nun.
Throughout centuries in which women were under the
tutelage of father, guardian or husband, the nuns enjoyed a kind
of liberation from subjection to the male. True, they had vows
of obedience and were subject to masculine jurisdiction on the
higher and more remote levels, yet there was also always a kind
of autonomy which even Thomas Aquinas acknowledged. These
consecrated virgins were recognized as symbolizing the value
and dignity of the human person, which transcends sex roles and
functions, and at least in some individual cases they actually
realized this transcendence in their thoughts and activities. The
nun has always been the image of the old and of the new woman,
bearing in an extraordinary way the burden of the eternal femi¬
nine mystique, yet at the same time anticipating symbolically and
sometimes in concrete reality the emancipation which has only
recently begun to take hold in the world.
It it not by accident that none of the outspoken advocates of
women clergy are nuns, even though some of them privately
favor this movement. Leaving aside the psychology of vested
interests, which may help to explain this lack of enthusiasm,
there is the fact that the sisterhoods have introjected to a great
extent the attitudes of the eternal feminine. Still wearing veils,
still partly cloistered, nuns are, symbolically speaking, the
antithesis of women in the active ministry. Many still
seek fulfillment in ways which are as anachronistic as the
garb which symbolizes their ancient bondage. At the same
time, the tremors of change are being felt in even the most
conservative of convents. Even in these isolated places the
message that an age is coming to an end is being heard.
At this point in history the nun, more than ever before, is a

walking paradox. All the discussion and confusion over modi¬
fying or eliminating the habit signifies far more than a superficial
concern with style or convenience. At the heart of it is a question
of acceptance or rejection of the feminine stereotypes. The
intransigent reluctance of male ecclesiastical superiors, who still
govern the lives of religious women to permit elimination of the
habit is rooted in resistance to liberation of nuns from these de¬
personalizing images.
Strong resistance to the phenomenon of the emerging nun
comes not only from conservative prelates in Rome but also from
some who are considered to be spokesmen for the liberal side.
A particularly instructive example of this can be seen in the
statements of a priest counseling psychologist who has expressed
his unhappiness over the image of the new nun, as ‘the dynamic
college president, the flashy fund-raiser, the grant-laden
scientist’.1 These he sees as ‘masculinized women’. What are
the sisters to do, then? Their counselor is a little hazy on this,
but the words are familiar. They are to be ‘handmaids of the
spirit’, ‘real women’; they are to accept ‘Mary’s role’. Rather
than be great college presidents (an ‘aggressive and faulted
model of sisters’), they should ‘surrender themselves to their
womanhood’. Side by side with this terminology, reminiscent of
Gertrud von le Fort and Pius XII, one finds a term greatly
favored by psychologists—‘healthy’. Their critic is concerned
that the sisters become healthy and adult, yet the very images
which he perpetuates present a formidable obstacle to healthy
maturity. He writes nostalgically of the women ‘who stood al¬
ways in the shadow of great men, helping them, reassuring them,
opening them to the possibilities of their services to mankind’,
yet gives no indication of recognizing that fact that such a rela¬
tionship would be richer if reciprocal, or that to be healthy a
person might need to emerge from the shadows. What is in fact
being proposed is that the sisters serve as sublimated, ‘spiritual’
and psychologically useful objects. Yet it may be optimistic
1 Eugene Kennedy, M.M. ‘The Women who are More than Poor’, Th*
Critic, December, 1966-January, 1967, pp. 31-9.
to hope that not many sisters can be persuaded by such

‘psychology’.
The nuns, we have said, have always presented a dual and
paradoxical image. It could not have been otherwise. However,
we have arrived at that point in time when it is possible, at last,
for religious women to emerge from the cloister and veil of the
eternal feminine mystique and to realize in their lives the rich
possibilities which their unique vocation offers—possibilities
which were suggested and anticipated in the lives of great re¬
ligious women of the past. The tension of opposites in which
they have lived can be transcended if there is enough courage
and optimism.
The emergence of the nun is bound up with the emergence
of the married woman. Throughout an age in which only a small
percentage of offspring might be expected to survive to adult¬
hood, married women literally were considered to exist for the
reproductive function. The marriage act, significandy referred
to by theologians as ‘the use of the woman’, could not really be
understood as the expression of mutual love between persons,
since one of the parties was looked upon more as instrument than
as person. The husband had to be the head, since an instrument
can hardly be a partner.
Standing in extreme contrast to the situation of the married
woman, the situation of the nun was also to some extent de¬
humanizing. A compensatory figure, liberated from the burden
of reproduction, the nun was in a sense society’s affirmation—
almost a token affirmation—of the latent humanity of women.
However, she paid the price of isolation from the male. Of
course, some nuns did manage to overcome the obstacles and
form deep and enriching friendships with men. It is not by
coincidence that the greatest personalities among them did so.
Now, however, in a society which is no longer desperately
bent upon excessive reproduction for survival of the species,
which in fact begins to see a decrease in reproduction as required
for suvival, the same forces which are freeing married women to
realize their personhood are creating a new situation for, and
image of the nun. There begin to emerge vast possibilities for
more fully humanizing relations between men and women, mar¬

ried and celibate.
The basic obstacle to the attainment of these more completely
human relationships, and to the achievement of integrated, self¬
activating personhood, is isolation. ‘Isolation’ here is to be under¬
stood not simply in the obvious sense of physical separation, al¬
though it may include this, but also and more importantly in its
more subtle significations. Thus, one may be isolated within an
organization if he or she is not allowed to participate to a mean¬
ingful degree in its decision-making and in its activities. A hus¬
band and wife may be isolated from each other if they do not have
a range of common interests. Therefore, continuous effort is
needed to expand opportunities for broadened experience, and
for cooperation and dialogue between men and women.
In the case of religious women this will entail the elimination
of archaic rules and of outmoded garb, which erect barriers to
communication. It will entail the abandonment of the style of life
which prevails in ‘total institutions’, in which the inmates sleep,
eat, study, play and pray in the same building or compound. It
will involve attendance at coeducational secular universities,
adoption of-contemporary dress, experiments in living and teach¬
ing in the secular milieu, and working together with men and
with other women in a wide variety of forms of cooperative en¬
deavor. It will also mean that those who are qualified should,
together with other qualified women, move into influential and
decision-making roles in the Church as well as in other cultural
institutions.
In the process of making decisions concerning new activities
for sisters, and in carrying out these decisions, it should be
clearly affirmed that the risk of an individual’s losing her com¬
mitment to ‘the religious life’ is incomparably less grave than the
risk of foreshortening her potential as a human being. If this
principle is understood, and if its implications are courageously
followed through, we may witness the time when ‘the new nun’
is truly in the avant-garde, living out the possibilities of person-
hood which her veiled and cloistered predecessors for the most
part merely symbolized, and realizing in this world what had
been thought attainable only in the next. When this occurs, the
apparent opposition between ‘religious women’ and ‘women in
the sacred ministry’ will be overcome. Indeed, in a humanized,
democratized Church of the future, in which systems of caste
have been transcended, it may be discovered that men and
women, married and celibate, are called in abundance to min¬
ister to the people of God.
Reform in the Church and in the world

It is painfully obvious, however, that the reformed, demo¬
cratized Church of the future is not yet here, although the seeds
of it are present in the living faith, hope and courage of the
Christian community. Moreover, there is no divine guarantee
that it will come into actuality automatically. Human beings have
the power to choose, which implies capacity for failure. The
people of God have responsibility for the future of the man-
woman relationship on all levels.
The primary responsibility of the Church in this regard is
the reform of its own doctrine and practices. It is here above all
that one has the right to expect to see the old order overcome.
The New Testament, still pardy immersed in the old order,
nevertheless points beyond it: just as there is neither Jew nor
Greek, neither slave nor free, so there is neither male nor female
in Christ. That is to say, the old oppressive form of relationships
is to be transcended. It is the Church’s mission to work toward
this transcendence in history. However, the Church hardly
seems to be in any position to be ‘God’s avant-garde’, working
as a leaven in society, if in fact it incongruously refuses to pro¬
gress within its own structures.
It is precisely this incongruous situation which we now wit¬
ness : although Vatican II’s Pastoral Constitution on the Church
in the Modem World speaks out against discrimination on the
basis of sex, the situation of women in the post-conciliar Church
has not changed gready. There has been failure to see that the
fundamental problem of the right relation between men and
women is basically one, whether we are talking about education,
professional opportunity, political life, home life or ecclesiastical
affairs. The first and most essential way, then, in which the
Church ideally should carry out its mission to bring about a
development toward right relation between men and women is
by demonstration through reform of itself, in its theology and in
its life. If it did this, it would present to ‘the world’ a model and
an ideal.
However, there is a sense in which it may be too late to expect
the Church as institution to act as model. ‘The world’ is already
far ahead, and there are many who think, as does Karl Rahner,
that the Church is already in diaspora, or at least well on its way.
Thus, while total reform ‘at home’ would seem logically to pre¬
cede the reform of the secular milieu, in practice it is not advisable
for individual Christians or groups to wait for this transformation
before directing their efforts toward bringing about desirable
reforms in society. This is not to say that they should neglect
the Church, but that it can be considered as one cultural institu¬
tion among others in need of reform. Moreover, they can be
reasonably certain that in bringing about reform in the wider
milieu, their efforts will ultimately have an effect upon the insti¬
tutional Church.
The people of God as the Church in diaspora have a mission,
then, to bring about in society what the Church as institution has
failed to do within its own doctrine and structures. This will in¬
volve many different tasks and procedures, some requiring highly
specialized training, others not. We shall consider some of these.
Since the most theoretical work is sometimes the most prac¬
tical in its results, it is important to emphasize the work of re¬
search in various branches of learning which contribute to our
understanding of the sexual relation. It is important that special¬
ists in such disciplines as biology, psychology, sociology,
anthropology and philosophy bring the fruits of their labors to
bear upon our understanding of the problem, especially upon the
problem of the effect of environment in producing psychological
differences between the sexes. Without such stimuli from other
sciences, theology will not advance.
Furthermore, those who are in the field of education have
opportunities not only to communicate understanding of the
toward partnership: some modest PROPOSALS 215
problem in the classroom, but also to remedy situations which

support the feminine mystique and the masculine mystique, and
to create new situations which foster dialogue and cooperation.
The elimination of arbitrary distinctions in the education of boys
and girls will cut deeply into the heart of the problem. In par¬
ticular, single-sex educational institutions are difficult to justify
in principle, and should wherever possible evolve into, or be re¬
placed by, coeducational institutions. Even though girls’ high
schools and colleges sometimes have better professors and more
gifted students, the prevailing feminine attitudes and images on
their campuses can inhibit creative and critical thinking. It is
sometimes argued in favor of separate schools that girls can de¬
velop leadership qualities there which would be encouraged less
in a mixed school. The difficulty with this is that learning to lead
in an unnaturally segregated environment might not prove too
useful in the normal world, comprised of two sexes.
The advantages of coeducation are evident. It provides oppor¬
tunities for normal day to day encounters, on a level other than
that of dating. The two sexes learn to work together. They learn
to compete as individuals who are interested in the same pro¬
jects—which is something quite other from the hostile competi¬
tiveness which acccompanies the exaggeration of sex differences.
In a coeducational environment, boys who have been condi¬
tioned to think of girls as sex objects can make the exciting and
enriching discovery that friendship, interesting discussions and
shared insights are possible with the other sex. They can dis¬
cover that there are girls with minds every bit as good as their
own. Girls, many of whom are inclined to accept notions of male
intellectual superiority, can learn confidence in discovering their
equal ability and in developing it, whereas they are inclined to
doubt this when kept in isolation.
Isolation in one-sex institutions promotes unrealistic notions
about the other sex, as well as about one’s own. In the vacuum
of the imagination which is not supplied with general experience
of personal encounter and dialogue, the sexual stereotypes thrive.
Obsession with sex then plays a compensatory role. The
temptation for boys to see girls only as prey and as objects, and
2l6 THE CHURCH AND THE SECOND SEX
for girls to look upon themselves in the same way, is

not counterbalanced.
This is not to say that all the presently existing single-sex
schools and colleges must be abandoned, but it suggests the
direction in which they should plan future development. Their
transformation into coeducational institutions might be the ideal,
but there are other possible solutions. In the cases of men’s and
women’s colleges which are in proximity to each other or to
coeducational universities, every effort should be made to en¬
courage participation in the same classes, seminars and activities.
In some cases, it may be desirable to move an entire institution to
the campus of another.
The most extreme cases of sexually isolated institutions are, of
course, novitiates and seminaries. We have already suggested
that it would be helpful if religious women could be given the
opportunity of studying in non-sectarian coeducational institu¬
tions, on both the undergraduate and graduate levels. The
same holds true for seminarians, priests and male religious.
Priests who have spent long years in seminaries, often pre¬
ceded by all-male high schools and colleges, have not had much
opportunity for recognizing in women the fact that they are
fellow human beings. Not infrequendy, therefore, they are in¬
clined to accept the woman-as-object attitude, transposing this
view to an unrealistically ‘spiritual’ level. The urgency of chang¬
ing the situation of seminarians can hardly be over-emphasized.
Moreover, a radical change is required. Thus, those who advo¬
cate bringing a few women professors into seminaries are not
offering an adequate solution. It will be more in accord with
real needs, and more in line with the secularization process, if
efforts are directed to moving away from the seminary as it is now
known. In some cases, seminaries are close enough to co¬
educational universities so that their students could attend classes
and participate in student affairs. In other cases, seminaries
could be transported to the campuses of large secular universities,
where they could share resources with students of other de¬
nominations and of both sexes. There should also be more experi-
TOWARD partnership: some MODEST PROPOSALS 217
ments in regard to living quarters, such as living in dormitories

with other students, in apartments and in families.
The value of the whole movement toward coeducation will
of course be undermined unless there is an effort to achieve truly
equal education for both sexes. So, for example, a university
which admits girls to its school of nursing and of education but
denies them access to its more highly selective college of arts and
sciences is not truly coeducational. By such a policy it is dis¬
criminating precisely against the most ambitious and gifted girls,
the potential scholars, university professors, scientists, doctors,
lawyers. By such a policy, moreover, the image of the female
student on campus is restricted to that of the girl who chooses
the traditionally feminine and less intellectually demanding
occupations, and thus the old stereotypes are perpetuated. In fact,
the forms of discrimination which vitiate coeducation are many:
quotas, denial of loans and fellowships, discouragement of girls
from the more demanding and rewarding fields by counselors
and educators, to mention a few.
In contrast to all this, a truly equitable and truly coeducational
system would take seriously the principle that it is just as import¬
ant for every girl to be educated to her full potential as it is for
every boy. It is essential that educators not only cease to dis¬
courage girls, but that they make a special effort to encourage
them, in order to counterbalance their disadvantaged situation.
Since it is generally true that education is only taken seriously
when there is expectation that it can be used in society, it fol¬
lows that educators who are truly committed to the realization
of the full potential of girls must earnestly seek to make their
charges aware of professional opportunities and must strive to
increase such opportunities. Moreover, such committed educa¬
tors will see the necessity of providing educational possibilities
for women whose course of study or career was interrupted while
they were raising their families, and who now wish to return to
the professional world.
The mere opening of the doors of universities and professional
schools to women is not of itself adequate to bring about radical
change. Today in the United States only one in three of the
B.A.’s and M.A.’s granted are earned by women, and one in

ten Ph.D’s. Some observers have noted with alarm that des¬
pite a few widely publicized token appointments of women to
high positions in government in the United States, and despite
all the talk about America having become a ‘matriarchy’, there
is an increasing tendency in recent years for women to be con¬
centrated at the bottom of the job ladder in the more menial and
routine jobs. Only 7 % of doctors in the United States are women,
less than 4% of lawyers, and less than 1% of federal judges.
All this suggests that the realization of the potential of women
and the attainment of a higher level of cooperation between the
sexes in society will require still other forms of effort, since there
are many factors in society which militate against high am¬
bitions on the part of young women. Obviously a society which
expects women to retire from the professional or business world
for fifteen or twenty years in order to raise a family, sets up a
most effective deterrent to high aspirations. Yet there is no
reason why social innovations could not be worked out, such as
networks of child care centers, or flexible and part time work
schedules.
There is need that efforts be made in other areas as well. Thus,
it is essential that birth control information and medical assist¬
ance be made readily available to all women, regardless of eco¬
nomic status. It is particularly important that this help be ex¬
tended to women who are living in poverty and whose con¬
dition, together with that of their families, is rendered subhuman
by repeated, undesired pregnancies. However indifferent the
official Church may appear to be to their plight, it is clear by
now on which side true humanism stands, and on which side
the Church in diaspora must direct its efforts.
Another area requiring attention is that of the mass media,
which are universally conveying an image of women as mindless
sex objects and therefore conditioning the masses of people
to accept the image as reality. Influence must be brought to
bear upon advertisers, publishers and editors to change their
policies in this regard. Finally, it is essential that special efforts
be devoted to the problems of realizing equal opportunity in

employment1 and equal responsibility in politics.2
It is painfully evident that there is a long road ahead. Christi¬
anity, and the Catholic Church in particular, has not yet faced
its responsibility to exorcise the devil of sexual prejudice. In fact,
it has lagged behind the rest of the world on this issue. Other
groups have been in the avant-garde and, ironically enough,
their efforts have more often than not met with ecclesiastical
opposition. The Church must admit its past failures. However
much social conditions of the past excuse those failures, the times
no longer offer an excuse. If the institutional Church has not
accepted its responsibility to do batde against the powers of
darkness, nevertheless individuals and groups of Christians bear
that responsibility. If they fail now, there will be no answer to the
mounting suspicion in the minds of many that Christianity—
particularly as it is embodied in the Catholic Church—is the
inevitable enemy of human progress.
1 In the United States, discrimination in employment on the basis of sex

is now prohibited by federal law, in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
However, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has not demon¬
strated that its commitment to enforcement of the law in the case of women is
as serious as in the case of other groups suffering from discrimination.
2 In the United States, the practice of having separate ‘ladies’ auxiliaries’
within the political parties has not been conducive to giving to women a pro¬
portionate share in political decision making. What is needed is representation
according to numbers in the regularly constituted party committee on all
levels, and in the informal power structure. Militant organizations such as the
recently constituted National Organization for Women are necessary, and
they will play an indispensable role in bringing about reform in this area as
well as in all of the other areas we have mentioned.
CONCLUSION
The Second Sex and the Seeds of Transcendmce
‘I do best by obeying and serving my sovereign Lord

—that is, God.’
Joan of Arc
We have seen that Simone de Beauvoir’s position on the role of

Christianity in the oppression of women is in large measure
justified. We do not—nor does she—believe that the Church
alone can be ‘blamed’ for the oppressive situations which have
arisen in the process of the evolution of humanity. The Church
condoned slavery but it did not originate that institution; it
has approved of the subjection of women, but it did not initiate
it. In the larger perspective, these institutions which have been
so destructive for large segments of humanity may be seen as
necessary survival techniques for the race as a whole during one
phase of the evolutionary process.
We are now witnessing and participating in a period of growth
beyond that phase. The slaves have been freed, the Negroes
are no longer willing to play the subservient role assigned to
them, the women are beginning to become conscious of their
latent potentialities. The archaic heritage is being shaken off.
Humanity appears to be in a transitional stage and is therefore
haunted by unnamed anxieties, for it is not possible to predict
with certainty what the next stage will be or where we are going,
ultimately. In this situation, we are experiencing a dramatic
cleavage between those who, looking to the horizon, affirm that
the world is moving, and those who stubbornly insist that noth¬
ing changes. This fundamental division between liberal and con¬
servative cuts across all others. Thus, for example, a liberal
Christian feels more at home talking to an open and honest
220
THE SECOND SEX AND THE SEEDS OF TRANSCENDENCE 221
agnostic than to his conservative fellow believers, who cling to

their vision of a static Church.
In this situation, it is not astonishing that many of those whose
psychic structures are robust enough to welcome change have
lost all patience with organizations and ideologies which appear
to hold back the evolutionary process. To these, total rejection
of the old appears to be a normal and necessary part of matura¬
tion. This could in some cases be a neurotic reaction, just as
clinging to the past can be a sign of immaturity. However, there
is no reason to think that it is always so. Thus, an ad hominem
attack upon Simone de Beauvoir’s rejection of Christianity is not
an answer: it is an escape.
We have said that we are in fundamental agreement with de
Beauvoir concerning the facts of history. Is there no disagree¬
ment, then? We have already suggested the answer to this. Dis¬
agreement may bear more upon the attitude concerning the facts
and interpretation than upon the facts themselves. It also may
bear more upon what a critic has omitted than upon what is
actually said.
The fundamental difference between Simone de Beauvoir’s
vision of the Church and women and that which motivated this
book is the difference between despair and hope. For this reason
our approach is fundamentally far more radical than that of the
French existentialist. De Beauvoir was willing to accept the con¬
servative vision of the Church as the reality, and therefore has
had to reject it as unworthy of mature humanity. However,
there is an alternative to rejection, an alternative which need
not involve self-mutilation. This is commitment to radical trans¬
formation of the negative, life-destroying elements of the
Church as it exists today. The possibility of such commitment
rests upon clear understanding that the seeds of the eschato¬
logical comm unity, of the liberating, humanizing Church of the
future, are already present, however submerged and neutralized
they may be. Such commitment requires hope and courage.
De Beauvoir herself has acknowledged that religion has been
able to work a transformation, enabling women to perform works
comparable to men, although the only examples she cites are
Catherine of Siena and Teresa of Avila. We have seen that she

becomes quite lyrical concerning the case of Teresa who, it is
claimed, lived out the situation of humanity, taking her stand
beyond the earthly hierarchies, and setting her pride beyond the
sexual differentiation. We could well argue that there have been
others in all ages who have transcended ‘the earthly hierar¬
chies’, and, although they have been comparatively few, they
have served as beacons, signalling to others the fact of un¬
dreamed of possibilities in themselves. We can truly say that
the Church has, indeed, worked to bring about this transforma-'
tion, that it has inspired men and women to reach beyond
the limitations imposed by their environments, even beyond the
limitations imposed by itself as institution.
It is essential, however, that we do not dupe ourselves, sup¬
porting our optimism with a facile apologetic. It is easy to say that
Christianity has ‘always taught’ the dignity of the human person,
and indeed it is true that the prophetic voice has always called out
from the depths, however muffled that voice may have been by
alienating notions spawned in an alienated society. However, it
is not necessary to belabor this point defensively. Our optimism
is not dependent upon the past; rather, it arises from a call, a
summons into the future. Harvey Cox expressed the Christian
condition accurately when he said that Jesus Christ comes to
his people not primarily through ecclesiastical traditions, but
through social change, that he ‘goes before’ first as a pillar of
fire. There is no need, then, to be obsessed with justification
of the past. In fact, while it is necessary to watch the rear-view
mirror, this does not tell us where we are going, but only where
we have been.
Simone de Beauvoir rejects Christianity as burdensome bag¬
gage inherited from the past. The life-affirming alternative to
this is response to that liberating Power which calls us to trans¬
cend the archaic heritage and move toward a future whose seeds
are already within us. Our response to the French existentialist
is one of friendly respect and gratitude, for without her light
we may not have recognized so acutely our own darkness and
therefore may not have discovered the dimensions of our own
THE SECOND SEX AND THE SEEDS OF TRANSCENDENCE 223
light. Rather than a philosophy of despair, we choose a theology

of hope, not because the former is ‘false’, but because we think
it represents an incomplete and partial vision.
It is part and parcel of Christian hope and coinage that these
qualities do not allow us ultimately to rest in the illusion that we
are in possession of fixed blueprints for our future. God is
present, yet always hidden, and the summons from that Presence
gives a dimension of transcendence to our activity, by which we
-are propelled forward.
In the exercise of self-transcending creative activity, inspired
and driven forward by faith and hope, sustained by courage,
men and women can learn to ‘set their pride beyond the sexual
differentiation’. Working together on all levels they may come
at last to see each other’s faces, and in so doing, come to know
themselves. It is only by this creative personal encounter, sparked
by that power of transcendence which the theologians have called
grace, that the old wounds can be healed. Men and women,
using their best talents, forgetful of self and intent upon the
work, will with God’s help mount together toward a higher
order of consciousness and being, in which the alienating pro¬
jections will have been defeated and wholeness, psychic integrity,
achieved.
Index
Abbott, W. M., ii9n Borromeo, Charles, Cardinal of Milan,

abortion, 28, 64, 135 103
aggiornamento, 118 Borromeo, Sister Charles, 137
Alacoque, Margaret Mary, 67 Boston College, nf
Alberione, J., 31, 157 Bouyer, L., 31, 152
Albert the Great, 9m Boyer, C., 145
Albertus Magnus, Sister, O.P., i36n Brahminism, 74
Alcantara, Fray Peter of, 100 bride-price, 167
Alexandria, Clement of, 86f Buckley, W. F., 14
Cyril of, 85 Bull, Quamvis Justo, 106
Alter, K., Archbishop of Cincinnati, Buytendijk, F. J., 147
138
Ambrose, St., 85 Cain, J. R., io3n, xo5n
Ambrosiaster, 86 Cajetan, Cardinal, Xoi
Angela of Foligno, St., 67 Callahan, S. C., 134
antifeminism, 38f, 63f, 76, 79f, 126, Castille, Blanche of, 97
153, 167, i79f, 184, 186 Catholic married women, problems
antisexuality, 63, 186 Of, 27f, I32f
Aquitaine, Eleanor of, 97 Catholic Theological Society of Amer¬
aristotelianism, 62, 91, 95, 124 ica, 1966 Annual Meeting,
Aristotle, 91, 158 I4if
Arnold, F. X., 31, i53f, 157 Catholic Women in the United States,
Augustine, St., 63, 8sf National Council of, 1967
statement, 204
Bailey, D. S., 83n, 147 Catholic Women’s Organizations,
Barufaldi, L., 33n World Union of, 130
Bastos, Sister I., 139 Change, beginnings of, 123!'
Baum, G., 145, 207n conservative resistance to, 14of
Baurlein, Bishop of Djakavo, 130 Chesler, P., 41 n
Beaton, C., 14 5 n Christ-Mary relationship, i62f
Be-ing, philosophy of, 18, 23f, 49 churching, 63
Bellosillo, P., 130 Clotilde, 97
Benedict XIV, Pope, 106 Claudel, P., 31, 59, 147, M9, 152,
Benedict XV, Pope, 109 174
Berdyaev, N-, 32, 147, i5of, 165 Coderre, Bishop of St. Jean, Quebec,
Biezanek, A., 132 130
birth control, 27, 55, 64, 1x7, 120, coeducation, 2i5f
122, I32f, 144, 183, 218 Concetti, G., I43n
pill, 132 contraception, see birth control
Bloms, J., I39f Conversano, Abbesses of, 96
Bonaventure, St., 90 Conway, Mgr. J. D., 1450, I99f
Bonhoeffer, D., 179 Corinth, 80
Boniface, VIII, Pope, 103 Council, Ecumenical, 127
226 INDEX
Council, Second Vatican, 9f, 2^{, 55, Quod Apostolici Muneris, io8n
118, 123, 125, i28f, 132, 137, Rerum Nov arum, io8n
141, 195, 204 English Ladies, 103
Constitution on the Church, 129, equality, 53, 59f
162, 207 Eve, 22, 62, 76, 78f, 81, 86f, 164,
Constitution on Liturgy, 128 185, 193
Declaration on Christian Education, existentialism, 18, 7 of
121
Decree on Apostolate of Laity, 121 Fall, the i85f, 194
Pastoral Constitution on Church Fathers, the, 85f, 186
in Modern World, ii9f, 13 of, Feminine, Eternal, see Woman,
200, 213 Eternal
post-conciliar Liturgical Commis¬ feminism, 54
sion, i4of Fichter, J., 146
Council of Trent, 103 Freidan, B., 11, 36, 134, 176
councils, lay, 195 Freud, S., 147, 168
Cox, H., 166, i69f, 222 Frotz, Bishop of Cologne, 130
Culpepper, E., 7n
Gage, M. J., 33
Daly, M., i25n Galot, J., i62f
Danielou, J., 145 Gandhi, I., 177
Danniel, E., 31, 154! Garoudy, R., 50
Daughters of Charity, 103 Genesis, 8 if, 86, 92f, 108, 184,
Davis, E. G., 32n 192
de Beauvoir, Simone, 11, 16, i7f, 47, Genet, J., 169
56f, 114, 147, 177, 220 Girl, the, concept of, 170
de Chantal, J., 103 Glenmary order, 138
de Paul, Vincent, 103 God, masculinity of, 37f, i8of
de Sales, Francis, ioif omnipotence, 38, i82f
De Vaux, R., 75 Goffi, T., 142
deaconesses, 89f, 128, 131 Gousset, Cardinal, 107
Deneuville, D., 98n Govaart-Halkes, Dr., 127
Deutsch, 147 Gregory XV, Pope, 104
Devaux, A. A., I53n, 160 Gregory the Great, St., 850
Decter, Midge, 31
Grennan, J., 137!
Dewart, L., i82n
discrimination in employment, 219
Hakim, Melkite, Archbishop of Gali¬
distortions, demonic, 169!
lee, 129
divine plan, i57f, 183
Hallinan, Archbishop of Atlanta, 27,
divorce, 122, 135
Drinan, R. F., S.J., I35n 131
Dumas, Pastor A., 78n, 8on harem, 167

Haring, B., 145
education, 26, 44f, 109 Harrison, William, Archpriest of Eng¬
Encyclical, Arcanum Divinae, io8n land, I04f
Casti Connubii, non, 153 Hebrew tradition, 62
Divini lllius Magistri, i09n Heinzelmann, Dr. G., i24f, 13m
Pacem in Terris, 118, 128, 199 Henry, A.-M., O.P., 148
INDEX 227
Hikmet, N., 50 Manchak, E., 1870
Hillel, rabbinical school of, 76 man-woman relationship, 32, 35b 173
holy orders, theology of sacrament, 186, i88f, 198, 201/
40, 187 marriage, theology of, 40, i86f
Horner, M., 34 Mary, 31, 42, 61, 88, 157 i6of
Horney, K., 147 Mary Luke, Sister, 137
Mary William, Sister, 137
Idigoras, J., 127 maternal role, 175f
Ignatius of Loyola, 101 Mead, M., 147, 173
incarnation, 185, 188 Merici, A., 103
industrial revolution, 107 Metzke, E., 147
Institute of English Virgins, 106 Michel, A., 54nf
Islamism, 74 Mill, J. S., 74
mixed gatherings, ecclesiastical meth¬
James, W., 147 ods of address, i2 5f
Jaspers, K., 147 Moran, G., 184
Jeanniere, A., 147 Morgan, R., 3m, 48n
Jerome, St., 85, 87, 89 mother-goddess, 61
Jesuits, ror, 103, 105 Miiller, I., 124
Jesuitesses, 105 Miinch, J. i24f, i45n
Jews, 62, i68f, 199 mystics, 6yf
Joan of Arc, 46, 97, 220
John XXIII, Pope, 25, n8f, I99f Navarre, Blanche of, 197
John Chrysostom, St., 85M negroes, i68f, 193, 220
John of the Cross, St., 67 Nietzsche, F., 153
Judaism, 61 Nizia Floresta parish experiment, 139
Juilles, Abbe, 107 Norris, J. L., 130
Jung, C. G., 147 novitiates, 216
Jung, E. M., I29nf nun, the, 24, 28f, 44, 2o8f
nuptial mass, prayers at, I27f
Kelly, G. A., 175
Kennedy, E., 2ion O’Connor, Mother M. M., io4nf
Kiing, H., 20of Oliver, B., 31, I54f
Origen, 88
Laingj R. D., 147 Orrieux, L. M., 75n, 84n
Las Huelgas, Abbesses of, 96
Lauer, R., rof, i25n, i45n Pandora, 62
Laver, R., lof p atria potest as, 54
Leo XIII, Pope, i07f
patriarchal society, 62f, i88f
liturgy, lay participation in, I95f
structures, 69
Lussier, A., 35f, 174, i76n
Paul VI, Pope, 26, 42, 78, I2if, 126,
142
Maccoby, E., 17if
Paul, St., 22, 62, 8of, 86, 92f, ioof,
McGinley, P., 167
McKenna, Sister M. L., I36n iosf, 109, 126, 174, 184, 198
McKenzie, J. L., 78, i8in Peter the Lombard, 90
Malula, Archbishop of Leopoldville, Pike, J. A., Episcopal Bishop, 145
130 Pius V, Pope, 103
228 INDEX
Pius IX, Pope, 106, 153 Stein, E., 147

Pius XI, Pope, I09f, 121 Stendahl, K., I98f
Pius XII, Pope, 11 if, 118, 150 Suenens, Cardinal, 129
Plato, 62 Sullivan, D., 133, i45n, I74n
Pliny the Younger, 89 Superiors of American Nuns Petition
politics, equal opportunities, 219 to Holy See, 1965, i36f
prostitution, 63f Swidler, A., I45n
Protestant attitudes, 30, 42, 144!
Protestant ministry, 144, 201, 202, Tavard, G., i25n, 145 .
205 Teilhard de Chardin P., 31, 147, 151,
153, 185
Rahner, K., 186, 214 Teresa of Avila, St., i8f, 24, 67f, 72,
Raming, I., 124 98f, 208, 222
Raymond, J. G., 24n, 29n Tertullian, 87
Reik, T., 79n Texier, G., 54nf
Rice, Mgr. C. O., 143 Thomas, D., 147
Rich, A., 35 Thomas Aquinas, St., i7f, 23f, 57,
Riesman, D., 147 62f, 9if, 101, 124, 147, 187,
Rilke, R. M., 32, 165 209
ritual mutilation, 167 Tillich P., 165, 185
Rossi, A. S., 147, 173
Tilliette, X., 56n
Ruether, R., 133!
Toynbee, A., 188
Truth, Sojourner, 33
Sacred Heart, 67
sadism, 64
Urban VIII, Pope, 105
St. Cecilia in Cologne, Abbesses of, 96
St. Joan’s International Alliance, i27f Ursulines, 103
Salinas, John of, 98
Santayana, G., 147 van der Meer, H., 127
Sartre, Jean-Paul, 56, 69, 71, 72, 147, Visitation, Sisters of, 103
169 Von le Fort, G., 3of, I48f, 152, 156,
Schoen, E., I26n 167, 177, 210
Schouwenaars, M., 143 von Rad, G., 78
Schiissler, E., 96M, 126
seminaries, 2i6f Ward, B., 129
servers, girl, i39f Ward, Mary, i03f, 208
sexual discrimination, eradication of, Watergate affair, 35, 45
42f, 192 Whitehead, A., 147
Sexual revolution, 32 widows, 89f
Shammai, rabbinical school of, 76 wives, working, 26, 28, 134
Siena, St. Catherine of, 68, 97, 100, Woman, Eternal, 3of
222 effects on intelligence, 17if
Simons, F., Bishop of Indore, 28, 135 image of, I47f, 167, i7of, 193, 208
sisters, religious, problems of emerg¬ man-woman relationship, 35f, 173
ing, 28f, i35f recent attempts to rejuvenate, 15 3f

Soto, D., 101 task of exorcism, 36, i76f
Stanton, E. C., 33 theological distortions, i56f
INDEX 229
women emancipation and papal docu¬

deception of, 58 ments, i07f
emancipation of, 107, no, 15of, Middle Ages, 23f, 9of
198 New Testament, 79f
failure to resist exploitation, i66f Old Testament, 2if, 75f
oppression of, 57f Patristic period, 8sf
ordination of, 26f, 43f, 65f, I38f, transcendence through religion, 19,
144, 187, i96f 46f, 66f
psychological resistance to, 20if women auditors at Council, 10, 128
position of Woolf, Virginia, 33, 43n, 50
beginnings of modern period, c>8f world-view, static, i83f
changes prior to Vatican II, i23f Wright, R., 168
developments at Vatican II, I28f
• /
✓
WOMEN'S STUDIES / RELIGION
THE CHURCH AND

THE SECOND SEX
WITH A NEW FEMINIST
BY THE AUTHOR
MARY DALY
“In this new edition of The Church and the Second Sex,
Mary Daly, postchristian feminist philosopher of 1975,
unearths and criticizes the work of Mary Daly, radical
Catholic theologian of 1968. Only galactic combustion can
result. The feminist philosopher triumphs, and it is a vic¬
tory for revolutionary vision.”—Robin Morgan
“The transformation of feminist theory over the past seven

years has been dramatic, and the changes can be seen
vividly in this new edition of Mary Daly’s The Church and
the Second Sex. In her 1975 introduction, Daly dissects
her own 1968 theology in an essay combining feminist
autobiography, ironic perspective, and lucid critical vision.
There has never been a document quite like this, and it will
both unsettle and confirm those who are midway in the
journey Daly has taken from liberal Christianity to radical
feminism.”—Adrienne Rich
ABOUT THE ORIGINAL PUBLICATION (1968) OF

THE CHURCH AND THE SECOND SEX:
“A hard-hitting, highly original, and even revolutionary
little book unmasking the latent anti-feminism in so much
Catholic thinking and practice...how this supposed ideal¬
ization of women in fact masks a mutilation of human per¬
sons—both men and women.”—Thomas Merton
HARPER & ROW, PUBLISHERS
COVER DESIGN BY EMILY CULPEPPER

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THE CHURCH AND

THE SECOND SEX

HARPER S' COLOPHON BOOKS / CN 375/$3.45

the text of this book is printed

WITH A NEW FEMINIST

HARPER COLOPHON BOOKS

First harper COLOPHON edition 1975.

Autobiographical Preface to the Colophon Edition 5

Feminist Postchristian Introduction 15

Quotations in Chapter One from Simone de Beauvoir, The

1 Published in Boston by Beacon Press.

had inhabited a distant world? There was of course the biblical

What to do? Since the Christian model of resignation to the will

The Story of The Church and the Second Sex

In the early sixties Europe, and specifically Fribourg, was home.

There seems to be no way of explaining adequately how I got to

that the more radical works of Simone de Beauvoir and Betty

use of modern technology to blast them away). The campus became

It was a strange victory. Apparently the book which had generated

champion of women’s "equality” within the church. Armed with my

3 See Beyond God the Father.

A critical review of The Church and the Second TSex,

During a recent archeological dig a curious volume entitled The

Before proceeding to an analysis of the specific content of each

I think that in fairness I should admit that in her circumstances I

The Case Against the Church

This chapter (not to mention the book’s title) reveals how

between the church and movements seeking to liberate women.

beyond this opposition of opposites: "Christian faith” versus

History: A Record of Contradictions

This is one of the book’s most valuable chapters. The historical

"woman” idea and of how this functions to cloak social reality. In

with an apologetic zeal that overlooks patriarchal religion’s function

coming could begin to say. But, of course, as prepackaged in his

2 For an important study of the history and problems of nuns in relation to

however, it should be pointed out that the vision of these "equal

working mothers. She touches on the abortion issue. The brevity of

criticisms to private discussions, since there was no "equality” even

The Pedestal Peddlars

comparable to a minor figure of more recent fame whom some

male chauvinism of priests and that of married men or any other

The Demon of Sexual Prejudice: An Exercise in Exorcism

As I began to read this temptingly titled chapter, it struck me

6 This numerological suggestion was made by Linda Barufaldi during a con¬

the mechanisms of projection, introjection, and self-fulfilling proph¬

nessed a great upsurge in the number of rapes of our sisters, having

A man’s world. But finished.

As I read the section, "Effects upon the man-woman relationship,”

Theological Roots of the Problem: Radical Surgery Required

I agree with the basic theme expressed in the beginning of this

Our author writes that "the theology of marriage is in a state of

Toward Partnership: Some Modest Proposals

I have already commented upon the title of this chapter. Women

then have understood fully what we know through shared ex¬

totally counter to the prevailing world-view. She saw hierarchies

replaced by, coeducational institutions” (p. 215). This might puzzle

tors, and advertisers, whose nocturnal emissions and diurnal ejacula¬

The Second Sex and the Seeds of Transcendence

Feminist Postchristian Conclusion to the Feminist