Proclus Commentary On Plato's 'Republic' Volume 1

General Introduction
1. the place of the REPUBLIC in the

neoplatonic commentary tradition
If you asked a random philosopher of the twentieth or twenty-
first century ‘What is Plato’s most important book?’ we think he or
she would reply ‘The Republic, of course.’ Thanks to the Open Syllabus
Project we don’t need to rely on mere speculation to intuit professional
philosophy’s judgement on this matter.1 We can see what book by Plato
professional philosophers put on the reading lists for their students.
The Open Syllabus Project surveyed over a million syllabi for courses in
English-speaking universities. Filtering the results by discipline yields
the result that only two texts were assigned more frequently for subjects
in Philosophy (that is, Philosophy subjects generally – not merely sub-
jects on the history of philosophy). Plato’s Republic comes third after
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and John Stuart Mill’s Utilitarianism.
If you remove the filter for discipline, then Plato’s Republic is the second-
most assigned text in university studies in the English-speaking world,
behind only Strunk and White’s Elements of Style.2 Thus graduates of
English-language universities in our time and place are more likely to be
acquainted with a work of philosophy than they are to be acquainted
with any of the works of Shakespeare, and the philosophical text
through which they are likely to be acquainted with the discipline is
Plato’s Republic. For us, it is Plato’s greatest work and certainly among
the greatest works of philosophy ever.
Philosophers and other university academics might be surprised to
learn that their judgement was not the judgement of antiquity. In the
first thousand years after Plato’s death, the award for ‘most influential
book by this author’ would undoubtedly go to the Timaeus. Nothing he
wrote attracted more philosophical discussion. After a slow start, the
Parmenides caught up to finish equal first. The reading order of Platonic
1
http://explorer.opensyllabusproject.org/
2
This result is principally due to the conservatism of the American (and to a large extent
Canadian) university curriculum. They read ‘the greats’ – the British no longer do.
The UK results, unfiltered by discipline, have books on research methods at the top.
The first work in the top ten not dedicated to methodology or organisational behaviour
is Edward Said’s Orientalism, which sneaks in at number nine.
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Access paid by the UCSB Libraries, on 09 Sep 2018 at 06:40:58, subject to the Cambridge
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316650899.001
dialogues established by Iamblichus (born c. 245 ce) and followed by

Neoplatonic philosophers in both Athens and Alexandria is simulta-
neously evidence of that assessment of importance and also partly its
cause. Let us turn to the nature of the Iamblichean canon of Platonic
dialogues and the Republic’s place outside of it.
The transition from Hellenistic to post-Hellenistic philosophy is,
in large part, a revitalization of older Aristotelian and Platonic
philosophies. As a result, the transition to post-Hellenistic philoso-
phy was also marked by an increasing involvement of books in the
activities characteristic of philosophers.3 In fact, this coincided with
an increasing pursuit of bookish activities among the cultural elites
of the Roman Empire.4 Given the size of the Platonic corpus, as
well as the absence of a Platonic voice in the dialogue form telling
one how to read the books of Plato, practical questions about the
arrangements of the Platonic dialogues and their purposes in edu-
cation were particularly pressing. The account of various early
attempts to order and classify Plato’s dialogues has been related by
Tarrant.5 When we turn to the Neoplatonists in particular, we find
that Plotinus’ free-ranging engagement with the Platonic dialogues
does not recommend any particular reading order, though one can
see that he frequently finds important insights contained in isolated
passages from Timaeus, Sophist, Philebus and Parmenides. The famous
analogy between the Sun and the Good in Republic VII is of course
prominent among the allusions to or citations of Plato’s works in
Plotinus’ Enneads.
Porphyry, unlike Plotinus, approached the exegesis of Plato’s works
much more systematically and wrote commentaries. In addition to the
fragments of his Timaeus Commentary, we have small bits of evidence
pointing to the existence of commentaries on Parmenides, Cratylus,
Philebus, Sophist, and Phaedo, as well as the Republic. Significantly, given
the extent to which Socrates’ criticisms of Homer dominate Proclus’
Commentary, Porphyry too shows an interest in finding Platonic teach-
ings in the works of Homer by means of allegorical readings. When we
add to this the slender but nonetheless persuasive evidence of two other
early Neoplatonists – Amelius and Theodore of Asine6 – we can see
evidence of relatively thorough engagement with Republic among the
first generation of Neoplatonic philosophers after Plotinus.
3
This was increasingly true of the Hellenistic schools themselves. It was not merely that
reviving Aristotelianism or Platonism meant now paying close attention to books
written by philosophers who had been dead for centuries. Stoicism and Epicureanism
also became increasingly bookish. See Snyder (2000).
4
Johnson (2010). 5 Tarrant (1993). 6
See Baltzly (forthcoming).
1. The Republic in the Neoplatonic commentary tradition
Iamblichus was the Neoplatonic philosopher who was perhaps most

important for the subsequent fortunes of the Republic within the com-
mentary tradition. He established a canon of twelve dialogues which
he took both to sum up the entire philosophy of Plato and also to
correlate with the gradations of the cardinal virtues that were devel-
oped by Plotinus and systematised by Porphyry.7 Thus canon forma-
tion is built around an ideal of moral and cognitive development
intended to assimilate the soul of the Platonist to the divine – the
Neoplatonic specification of the telos or goal of living. The educational
programme was built around ten dialogues that progress from the
theme of self-knowledge to the civic virtues to purificatory virtues to
contemplative virtues, with different dialogues apparently promoting
contemplation of various kinds and orders of being in the Neoplatonic
hierarchy.
1. Alcibiades I – introductory on the self
2. Gorgias – on civic virtue
3. Phaedo – on cathartic or purificatory virtue
4. Cratylus – logical – on names – contemplative virtues
5. Theaetetus – logical – skopos unknown
6. Sophist – physical – the sublunary demiurge
7. Statesman – physical – skopos unclear
8. Phaedrus – theological – on beauty at every level
9. Symposium – theological – skopos unknown
10. Philebus – theological – on the Good
These dialogues were classified as either physical or theological.
The former seem to have had some connection to the being of things in
the realm of visible nature (i.e. the realm of physis), while the latter dealt
with incorporeal being (which the Neoplatonists take to be divine). Thus,
according to Iamblichus, the Sophist had as its central unifying theme or
skopos ‘the sublunary Demiurge’, probably on the grounds that the dialo-
gue reveals the sophist to be one who traffics in images and the things here
in the sublunary realm are images of the celestial and intelligible realms.
By contrast, the Iamblichean skopos of the Phaedrus transcends the level of
nature or physis by dealing with ‘beauty at every level’ – right up to Beauty
Itself and the intelligible gods.
Two additional ‘perfect’ or ‘complete’ dialogues summed up the
entirety of the doctrines communicated in the first decadic arrangement.
11. Timaeus – physical
12. Parmenides – theological
7
Brisson (2006).
Of these two, the former was a summa of all physical teaching, while the
latter presented all Plato’s theology in one dialogue.
The Republic is conspicuously absent from this list. While we have
evidence of commentaries by Iamblichus on Alcibiades, Phaedo, Phaedrus,
Sophist, Philebus, Timaeus, and Parmenides, we have no evidence of any
work on the Republic by Iamblichus. Proclus mentions Iamblichus by
name 114 times in his various other works, but there is not a single
mention of him in the Commentary on the Republic. In a sense this is
surprising. Two things stand out about the dialogues on Iamblichus’
list. First, many of them contain passages which relate a myth. Secondly,
many of them contain passages that invite speculations of
a Neopythagorean sort. Some of them, such as the Timaeus, contain
both. Iamblichus’ efforts to position Platonism as continuous with
Pythagoreanism have been well documented by O’Meara.8 Prior to
Iamblichus, Porphyry had given allegorical interpretations of the pro-
logues and mythic passages in Plato, but these interpretations discov-
ered mostly ethical teachings or teachings related to the soul.9
Iamblichus’ interpretations of Platonic myths look beyond the realm
of the human soul and interpret at least some of them as allegorically
encoding important information about intelligible reality.10 So one
might reasonably expect that the Republic would have been a prime
candidate for elevation to Iamblichus’ canon of important dialogues.
There are three myths – at least by Proclus’ reckoning (in Remp. II
96.4) – and while the Myth of Er might plausibly be supposed to have
the fate of the soul as its main import, the Cave clearly aims higher and
so should hold out attractions for the more ‘elevated’ Iamblichus.
Moreover, as Proclus’ Essay 13 shows, the nuptial number had already
attracted plenty of numerological speculation in the broadly
8
O’Meara (1989). The idea that Plato’s philosophy is ultimately Pythagorean philoso-
phy is not, of course, a novel idea on Iamblichus’ part. One could equally well cite
Numenius in this regard and perhaps the Neopythagoreans who came before him. Cf.
Bonazzi, Lévy and Steel (2007). But so far as the rest of the Neoplatonic commentary
tradition was concerned, Iamblichus’ intervention was probably the decisive one.
9
On Porphyry’s place in the development of allegorical readings of the prologues and
myths in Platonic dialogues, see Tarrant’s discussion of the interpretation of the
Atlantis myth; Tarrant (2007).
10
A good example of this tendency on the part of Iamblichus and those associated with
him, like Theodore of Asine, to read Plato’s myths at a metaphysically higher level than
Porphyry is provided by the Phaedrus. Iamblichus identified key phrases in Phdr. 245c
as providing clues to the structure of the intelligible realm. The ‘sub-celestial arch’, the
‘revolution of the heaven’, and the ‘super-celestial place’ all became important symbols,
laden with metaphysical significance. Proclus identifies Iamblichus and Theodore as
the philosophers who rediscovered this truth in Plato; cf. Plat. Theol. IV.23 68.23–69.8
and Bielmeier (1930).
Pythagorean tradition. So given Iamblichus’ emphasis on mythic pas-

sages in Plato and on Pythagorean number speculation, it is somewhat
surprising to find the Republic absent from his canon of dialogues.
There is broad consensus that one reason for the exclusion of the
Republic from the Iamblichean canon of twelve key dialogues was pure
practicality: it is simply too long. It has long been recognised that our
written commentaries – with the exception of those of Simplicius – were
grounded in classroom teaching, either very directly, as in the case of the
commentaries apo phôn ês or somewhat more indirectly, as in the case of
Proclus’ commentaries.11 If applied to the Republic, the sort of meticu-
lous treatment that is offered to the texts like Parmenides or Timaeus
would yield a course of lectures and a written commentary that would be
positively vast. In addition, there may be issues about the unity of the
Republic. As far back as Praechter, it was recognised that one of
Iamblichus’ most influential contributions to the Neoplatonic reception
was the elevation of the role of the central theme or skopos of a dialogue
in the interpretation of individual passages.12 Proclus does offer a skopos
for the whole of the Republic, and in doing so reflects on previous
disagreements about what its skopos should be. Yet while Proclus finds
a single skopos for the dialogue – it is about both justice and the politeia, as
these are two ways of looking at the same thing – it is not as neat and tidy
as the central themes identified for other dialogues. Moreover, Proclus
himself seems to treat the Republic as a logos that has other logoi within it,
each of which can be subjected to the same questions with which one
normally opens the reading of a dialogue. Thus in Essay 13 Proclus
treats the so-called speech of the Muses (Rep. VIII 545e, ff.) as a logos
about which it is appropriate to offer opinions regarding its style and
central theme. Similarly, the commentary on the Myth of Er opens with
an identification of its theme (prothesis). So, in spite of the unity that
Proclus seeks to impose upon the Republic in Essay 1, there emerges
from the subsequent essays a sense in which the Republic constitutes
a logos within which there are other logoi.
This observation intersects in an interesting way with a puzzling
piece of information from the Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic
Philosophy. The author of the latter work, in the passage immediately
before elaborating the twelve canonical dialogues of Iamblichus,
makes some observations on spurious dialogues. He notes that every-
one accepts that Sisyphus, Demodocus, Alcyon, Eryxias and the Definitions
don’t belong in the Platonic corpus. He adds that Proclus rejected as
not genuine (notheuei) the Epinomis – in part because, on the assump-
tion that the Laws remained unrevised at Plato’s death, he couldn’t
11
Festugière (1971), Lamberz (1987), Richard (1950). 12
Praechter (1910).
have written the Epinomis. Then, surprisingly, the author of the

Anonymous Prolegomena tells us that Proclus rejected (ekballei) the
Republic and the Laws because they consist of many logoi and are not
written in the manner of dialogues. Now, ekballei here cannot mean
‘rejected as not a genuine work of Plato’. After all, Proclus has gone to
considerable trouble to interpret the Republic and his works are littered
with references to the Laws. Nothing in Proclus’ writing suggests that
he supposed these books to be anything other than more of the
inspired philosophy of Plato – works that the Platonic diadochus (suc-
cessor) has a duty to harmonise with the canonical dialogues of Plato.
Moreover, Anonymous does not use ekballei in relation to the Epinomis,
but instead notheuei. So it seems more likely that Anonymous supposed
that Proclus – or someone – had rejected Republic for some purpose – not
rejected it as a genuine work of Plato. But what Platonist and what
purpose?
One possible explanation is that some Platonist supposed that both
the Republic and the Laws did not admit of a suitably tight single skopos
in order that they should be considered among the twelve dialogues
that perfectly and completely convey Plato’s philosophy. If this were
so, then it would not merely be the length of these works that kept
them outside the Iamblichean canon, but rather principled concerns
about whether these dialogues had the kind of unity that characterises
a single living organism (Phdr. 265c). This is the standard of unity
expected for a truly important Platonic dialogue, as Proclus shows in
his discussion of the seventh major topic in the preliminary to the
discussion of any dialogue (in Remp. I 6.24–5). While the preliminary
discussion – or at least as much of it as we now possess – suggests that
Proclus thought this question could be answered in the affirmative, his
actual practice in commenting on the Republic reveals the grounds on
which others might well have doubted this. So our conjecture is that
Anonymous was confused. It was not Proclus who rejected the Republic
and the Laws for the purpose of inclusion within the central canon of
Platonic works. It was rather another Platonist. We suspect, though
we cannot prove, that this other Platonist was Iamblichus. Clearly,
Iamblichus did not reject either the Republic or the Laws as inauthentic.
After all, Iamblichus’ letters show ample evidence of engagement with
both works.13 Rather, we suspect that Iamblichus rejected both works
as suitable for inclusion in the core curriculum that completely con-
veyed Plato’s philosophy on the grounds that it did not satisfy the
skopos requirement as satisfactorily as did those dialogues that were
included. It seems to us not coincidental that this report on ‘Proclus’’
13
Dillon and Polleichtner (2009).
rejection of the ‘authenticity’ of the Republic and the Laws immediately

precedes Anonymous’ account of the Iamblichean canon.14
The Anonymous Prolegomena goes on to report that some philosophers
saw fit to include the Laws and the Republic in the curriculum.
Accordingly, Anonymous feels obliged to say what the skopos is for
each of these works. He reports a view on this matter similar to one
that Proclus himself criticises in his Essay 1. Each dialogue is about
a different kind of politeia or constitution. According to Anonymous, the
skopos of the Republic is the ‘unhypothetical’ (i.e. ideal) politeia, while the
Laws concerns the politeia that is ‘hypothetical’ in the sense that laws and
customs are laid down. Anonymous also refers to a ‘reformed’ politeia
where we deal with the evil disturbances in our souls. The latter he takes
to be the skopos of the Epistles.
Proclus himself criticises Platonists who take the skopos of the Republic to
be merely the politeia in the external sense of a set of political arrangements
(in Remp. I 8.6–11.4). In fact, the skopos of the Republic concerns the
relations between the classes in the city and also the relation among the
parts of the soul – both an internal and external politeia. Now, Proclus’ view
is that the parts of the soul other than reason are not immortal (in Remp. II
94.4–19) and he thinks that Plato himself makes this clear at the end of the
dialogue in Republic X. Nonetheless, since we live with the mortal, irra-
tional soul as our companion, our way of life is twofold and so is our
happiness (in Parm. 931.18–23). Political virtue – or better, ‘constitutional
virtue’ – is the excellence that the whole soul possesses and in particular the
excellence that arises for the whole as a consequence of how its parts are
related. This political virtue and the corresponding political kind of happi-
ness is the business of the Republic on Proclus’ view (cf. in Remp. I 26.
29–27.5). Within the Iamblichean curriculum, the work that teaches
political virtue and paves the way for the Phaedo’s treatment of cathartic
or purificatory virtue is the Gorgias.
O’Meara collects in tabular form lists of works within the Platonic
corpus and outside it that could be studied under the heading of
14
Our speculations are consistent with, but go beyond Westerink (1962), p. xxxvii). He
agrees that it is absurd to suppose that Proclus rejected the authenticity of a work on
which he wrote an extensive commentary. He thinks that the word ekballei may mean
‘merely that he left them out of the list of dialogues proper’. We are not sure exactly
what that might mean. Perhaps he means what we have recommended: that their multi-
book composition was a basis for excluding them from the canon of standard works
taught in the Platonic schools and correlated with the moral progress of the pupil
through the gradations of virtue. We think it likely that the initiator of this exclusion
was Iamblichus, not Proclus, however. In any event, we agree with
Westerink’s assessment that ‘there may be some misunderstanding here, either on
the lecturer’s or on the reportator’s side’ (p. xxxvii).
‘political virtue’ (pp. 65–7). He also notes that in our single surviving
commentary on the Gorgias, Olympiodorus refers more often to the
Laws and the Republic than to any other Platonic dialogue.15 So while the
Republic did not make the list of Iamblichus’ twelve core dialogues, it was
obviously treated as an important source of illumination for political
virtue and political happiness. As a text to teach in the manner in which
the Neoplatonists taught Plato, its length certainly made it less practi-
cal. There may also have been objections raised to the dialogue on the
grounds of its unity. It might seem to us modern readers that the
Gorgias – with its three distinct speakers and range of topics – is no
more or less unified than the Republic. But Olympiodorus in his com-
mentary tells us what unifies the Gorgias. Its skopos is political or con-
stitutional happiness. The form of this kind of happiness is justice and
temperance. (These are, of course, the virtues from Republic IV that
involve all three parts of the soul.) The efficient cause of this kind of
happiness is the philosophical life, while its paradigmatic cause is the
cosmos. On Olympiodorus’ division of the parts of the dialogue, the
conversations with Gorgias, Polus and Callicles elucidate the efficient,
formal and final causes of political happiness respectively. So the unity
of these causes yields a similar unity for the dialogue. We note that
Proclus’ specification of a similar skopos for the Republic does not yield
a division of the text that is quite so neat and tidy. This could have given
rise to the view that, among these two dialogues with similar themes, the
Gorgias had a greater degree of unity than the Republic.
We believe that it would be a mistake to take a particular Platonic
dialogue’s place within (or outside) the Iamblichean canon too ser-
iously. By ‘too seriously’ we mean that – in spite of the Neoplatonists’
explicit identification of some dialogue as introductory or related to
a lower kind of happiness than the contemplative eudaimonia and union
with the divine that is the stated goal of their complete programme of
study – most ‘beginning’ commentaries do not consistently confine
themselves to simple lessons on lower levels of reality. In truth,
Proclus will happily import into his exegesis of an argument that is
putatively concerned only with political happiness considerations hav-
ing to do with the very highest levels of being. Thus, for example, his
elucidation of Socrates’ function argument in Republic I (352e–354a)
relates the distinction between things that have a function F because
they alone can perform that function and things that have a function
G because they perform G best to the dual nature of the highest principle
as both source of unity and source of goodness. Whatever they may say,
in practice the Neoplatonic commentary tradition teaches all the
15
See also Tarrant (2010).
2. The unity of Proclus’ Republic Commentary
mysteries of Platonism from all the dialogues that they interpret for
their students. This observation is salient to the next section of our
introduction. One of the things that has made modern scholars suspi-
cious of the idea that Proclus’ Commentary was ever intended by its
author to be a single work is the fact that different essays within the
collection seem to be addressed to quite different audiences. In fact, this
is not unique to the Republic Commentary. Proclus seems to move freely
between relatively straightforward exegesis and remarks on the most
arcane of Neoplatonic doctrines in all his works. While the Timaeus
Commentary is more frequently addressed to those with significant back-
ground knowledge, it is not invariably so. Moreover, the Alcibiades
Commentary frequently digresses into material that seems to be directed
to those who are not mere beginners.16
2. the unity of proclus’ REPUBLIC

COMMENTARY
As long ago as 1929 Carl Gallavotti argued for the heterogeneity of the
essays contained in the Republic Commentary as we now possess it and
sought to establish a chronology for the composition of the scattered
writings that have come to be included in it.17 The Republic Commentary
we possess, Gallavotti argued, is a descendant, not of a unified work
arranged by Proclus himself, but instead traces its origins back to
a collection put together at some point after Proclus’ death (p. xlvi).
It combines independent pieces on topics in the Republic with an
Introduction or Isagoge. The result is a kind of portmanteau of fundamen-
tally disparate materials. Gallavotti supposed that some essays included
under the title of the Republic Commentary are for beginners – the
vestiges of the Introduction – while others are learned digressions on
points of detail that would have been well beyond the understanding of
the audience for the Introduction.
This hypothesis about the heterogeneity of the work has had con-
sequences for its modern language translations. There is only one
modern language translation of the entirety of Proclus’ Republic
Commentary – the three-volume French translation of A. J. Festugière
published in 1970.18 Very substantial portions of the work were
16
To take but one example among many, consider the digression on the ‘more secret’ of
the doctrines on love described at in Alc. I 50.23 ff. Here the beginner is treated to ideas
drawn from the Chaldaean Oracles, as well as the ‘three monads’ that figure so promi-
nently in Proclus’ understanding of the Philebus. All this even before the student has
completed the dialogue that allegedly instructs him in what he truly is – a soul!
17
Gallavotti (1929). 18 Festugière (1970).
translated into Italian by M. Abbate in 2004.19 In 2012 Robert

Lamberton published his translation of Essays 5 and 6 (with facing
page Greek text) under the title Proclus the Successor on Poetics and the
Homeric Poems.20 Abbate’s choices about which parts of the Republic
Commentary to include in his translation are conditioned not only by
the limits of human endurance – the text of Kroll runs to 664 pages
excluding the scholia he prints at the end – but also by his view about the
nature of the work that we now possess. Abbate translates what he takes
to be the original Introduction, omitting Essays 6, 12, 13 and 16. The last,
Essay 16, is the massive line-by-line commentary on the Myth of Er.
This is the only part of the Republic Commentary that goes through
Plato’s text with the same level of detail that we find in Proclus’ other
commentaries on the Parmenides, Timaeus and Alcibiades I.21 Lamberton
feels similarly justified in translating only Essays 5 and 6 since he agrees
with Sheppard’s somewhat more circumscribed hypothesis about the
underlying disunity of the Republic Commentary as we now possess it.22
We wish to demur slightly from this scholarly consensus. In this
section we argue that Proclus’ Republic Commentary has more unity
than is often supposed. In our view Sheppard shows that
Gallavotti’s more specific claims about the order of composition of the
essays are not well-supported by the evidence.23 She, Lamberton and
Abbate nonetheless agree that the existing manuscript is clearly
a mixture compounded from a student-oriented Introduction to the
Republic (Essays 1–5, 7–8, 10–12, and 14–15) into which have been
integrated other essays composed for different audiences, purposes
and occasions. Thus they suppose that Proclus’ Republic Commentary
has significantly less unity than its single title would suggest. Indeed,
Sheppard and Lamberton both argue that the work is not entirely
consistent since Essay 5 presents a quite different taxonomy of poetry
than Essay 6. Since the two essays are not consistent on this subject, we
can safely infer that they belong to different layers of Proclus’ intellec-
tual development – even if we cannot identify the finer distinctions in
intellectual development as Gallavotti had supposed.
We reply that even if it is granted that the essays in Proclus’ Republic
Commentary had distinct purposes related to different settings and that
the collection of essays may have grown organically as Proclus added to
it, it remains that Proclus’ Republic Commentary constitutes a work that is
no less unified than Plato’s own dialogue. We address the alleged
19
Abbate (2004). 20
Lamberton (2012).
21
Unlike the case of the Republic, however, each of these sustained, line-by-line commen-
taries breaks off before the commentator reaches the end of the dialogue.
22
Sheppard (1980). 23 Sheppard (1980), 36–9.
10
inconsistency between Essays 5 and 6 in the introduction to Essay 6. For

the moment, let us address individually the various ‘oddities’ that these
commentators suppose to have been integrated with the Isagoge to the
Republic to yield the present heterogeneous collection of works. In the
next section we’ll look at the content of the work as a whole and argue
that it fits together rather better than these scholars have supposed.24
What parts of the existing Republic Commentary are alleged to be
accretions to the original Introduction? Essay 6 advertises itself as emer-
ging from a lecture that Proclus gave for the celebration of Plato’s
birthday.25 This would indeed be a special ‘one-off’. Similarly, Essay
13 contains a lengthy discussion of the views of various Platonists on the
nuptial number in the Republic and this level of discussion of earlier
interpretations of Plato’s text is not, on the whole, reproduced in other
Essays. Essay 16 is a line-by-line commentary on the Myth of Er, while
no other essay in the Republic Commentary proceeds by a detailed exeg-
esis of every line of Plato’s text. In addition Essay 16 is massive. It makes
up roughly 40 per cent of the whole of the Republic Commentary.
The final appendix in Essay 17 discusses Aristotle’s criticisms of
Plato’s Republic in his Politics. The only other essay in the Republic
Commentary that treats a philosopher other than Plato at this level of
detail is the short Essay 9 on the views of Theodore of Asine in relation
to women’s virtues.
But even acknowledging these oddities about Essays 6, 13, 16 and 17, it
still remains true that Proclus’ Commentary contains at least one essay
centred on one or more topics in all the ten books of Plato’s dialogue.
The work thus covers the whole of the Republic. Now, it is also true that it
treats the topics discussed within these books with uneven levels of detail.
But we believe this partly reflects judgements about which parts of the
work are the most significant and/or most in need of interpretation by the
Platonic diadochus. Modern books dealing with Plato’s Republic as a whole
have not lavished the same attention on the Myth of Er that Proclus does.
But, by the same token, modern books dealing with Plato’s Statesman
have not treated the story of the cosmic reversal as a key moment in the
dialogue. But all that we know of the tradition of Neoplatonic
24
Our conviction in this regard has been substantially influenced by conversations with
David Pass who completed his PhD thesis on the Republic Commentary at Berkeley and
who was involved in the early stages of this project. David returned to the USA to
pursue his career there and has not been involved in this book, but we are grateful to
him for his dogged defence of the unity of the Republic Commentary. Readers who wish
to see the case for a stronger unity thesis than that which we defend prosecuted with
great zeal should consult David’s thesis.
25
For the relation of the written work to Proclus’ birthday lecture and that lecture to
a previous lecture by Syrianus, see Sheppard (1980), 32.
11
commentaries on the Statesman suggests that it was, for them, the part of
the text that demanded the most detailed treatment.26 The Neoplatonists
seem to have regarded the mythic aspects of Plato’s works as especially
dense with hidden meanings of precisely the sort that the Platonic
diadochus is suited to elucidate. Moreover, when we modern teachers of
Plato lecture on the Republic, we do so to classrooms of people who have
very little familiarity with philosophy and typically no previous acquain-
tance with Plato. This is not the case for the audience that Proclus
addresses in his Republic Commentary. As Abbate notes, even the essays
that Gallavotti supposes to constitute the Introduction presuppose signifi-
cant technical vocabulary and acquaintance with the Platonic corpus.27
If the elucidation of the Myth of Er occupies a number of pages in
Proclus’ book on the Republic that is disproportionate to the number of
pages that the Myth takes up within the context of Plato’s dialogue itself,
then this may reflect either Proclus’ judgement about what part of the
dialogue is most important or his decision about what part of the dialogue
his audience needs the most help in understanding or both. His judge-
ment may not be ours and his audience is almost certainly not ours. But
this does not mean that his exegesis of the Myth of Er is a separate
enterprise that was only later folded into the same manuscript as the
rest of his Introduction to the Republic.
We grant that Essay 6 notes the circumstances surrounding its com-
position and these are not merely the ordinary classroom setting implied
by, say, the first lines of Essay 1. But nothing would prevent this work
from now being used in that ordinary classroom setting. We also grant
that the lengthy Essay 6 clearly aims to do more than introduce students
to Plato’s philosophy as it is conveyed in the Republic. It seeks to show
that Plato’s philosophy is in agreement with Homer’s views on the
gods – when, of course, Homer’s theology has been carefully extracted
from the poems’ surface meaning by the application of appropriate
interpretive methods. But this aim of reconciling Plato with other
sources of authority is one that is common to all Proclus’ commentaries.
The Timaeus Commentary, for instance, often digresses to show the
consistency of what is taught in the text at hand with the Chaldaean
Oracles or with Orphic verses. Granted, those digressions to harmonize
Plato’s teachings with other authoritative sources are not as extensive as
Essay 6’s efforts to reconcile Plato with Homer. But there are two
important differences between Homer and, say, the Chaldaean Oracles.
First, Plato at least appears to attack Homer’s theology in the Republic in
ways that he does not, for instance, appear to attack other sacred sources
of wisdom in the Neoplatonic canon. Second, there is simply a lot more
26
Cf. Dillon (1995). 27
Abbate (2004).
12
Homeric text to be reconciled with the wisdom of Plato than is the case
with these other sources of wisdom.
With respect to Essay 13 and the nuptial number, there exists
a substantial scholarly literature on this question that has not been
confined to antiquity.28 If we now regard the interpretation of this
obscure passage as a matter for a good footnote rather than a key to
Plato’s thought in the Republic, it is because we do not share with Proclus
the confidence that Plato was a Pythagorean who communicated things
to us through number symbolism. Everyone agrees that Proclus’
Commentary on the Timaeus forms a unified work. But the density of his
commentary on Timaeus 34b2–37c5 (where the Demiurge implants the
various numbers and harmonies in the World Soul) outstrips even that
concerned with the nature and identity of the Demiurge (Tim.
27c1–31b3). The commentary on the symbolic significance of the various
numbers and harmonies similarly involves the exposition of the views of
earlier commentators such as Porphyry, Amelius, and Theodore of Asine.
As with the myths in Plato, the Neoplatonists regard passages having to
do with numbers as conveying deep truths symbolically by Pythagorean
means.29 Nothing in Essay 13’s occupation with what we might regard as
a trivial puzzle or level of detail or the explanation of the views of earlier
Platonists is inconsistent with Proclus’ commentary practice as evidenced
elsewhere. Given Proclus’ interpretive preoccupations, there is no need
to regard Essay 13 as an alien element integrated into an otherwise
cohesive Introduction to the Republic.
Essays 8 and 9 present a slightly different challenge to our argument
for the essential unity of Proclus’ Republic Commentary. Our view is that
Essays 8 and 9 represent a ‘doublet’. Proclus treated the same topic once
in Essay 9, drawing upon the work of Theodore of Asine. Essay 8 is
longer, treats of further problems – though it covers some of the same
problems – and does not mention Theodore.30 It was perhaps intended
to supersede the shorter essay, but both have been included in our
current version of the Republic Commentary. But there is precedent for
this. The Timaeus Commentary gives two considerations of one and the
same lemma. Baltzly argued that this is evidence of a similar doublet in
that work: the second version involves a reworking and expansion of
some of Syrianus’ views that appear in the first treatment of the
28
Callataÿ (1996). 29 Cf. Baltzly (2016).
30
Theodore is, in any case, a rather equivocal figure in Proclus’ commentaries. On the
one hand, he is listed in the opening of the Platonic Theology as one of the inheritors of
the true Platonic philosophy, along with Plotinus, Amelius, Porphyry and Iamblichus
(Plat.Theol. I 6.16, ff). On the other hand, when one considers the reports of his views
that Proclus provides us with, there is in fact very little that he finds in those views that
he agrees with.
13
lemma.31 If the existence of such a doublet does not render the Timaeus
Commentary a heterogeneous mix, the existence of such a parallel double
treatment of the same topic in the Republic Commentary is not proble-
matic in and of itself.
To appreciate the sense in which the Republic Commentary covers the
whole of Plato’s dialogue, it is useful to line the essays up with the books
of the Republic that they discuss.
Proclus Book of Plato’s Republic

that is primary focus
Essay 1 – on the seven kephalaia of the Book I
Republic: (i) its skopos; (ii) literary form; (iii)
setting and characters; (iv) sense in which it
concerns a politeia; (v) the relation of its poli-
teia to those in the actual world; (vi) means
through which we consider it; (vii) the dia-
logue’s unity.
Incomplete – ends with (iii)
Essay 2 – on the arguments against Book I
Polemarchus’ definition of justice
Missing entirely
Essay 3 – on the four arguments against Book I (the remaining
Thrasymachus’ definition of justice sections principally
First two arguments missing concern 351a–354 c)
Essay 4 – precepts for poetic depictions of the Book II esp. 379b–d and
gods 380d–383c
Essay 5 – ten questions about the consistency of Books II, III and X, as
what Plato says about poetry both within the well as Phaedrus, Laws
Republic and in relation to other dialogues and Timaeus
Essay 6 – on the agreement of Homer with Books II, III and X
Plato
Essay 7 – on the tripartite division of the soul Book IV
and the virtues
Essay 8 – on whether virtue in women is the Book V, 451c–457c
same as in men
Essay 9 – on the views of Theodore of Asine on Book V, 451c–457c
whether men’s and women’s virtue is the
same
Essay 10 – on the difference between the phi- Book V, 476a–480a
losopher and the lover of sights and sounds
Essay 11 – on the Good Book VI, 504d–509e
31
Baltzly (2013a), p. 26.
14
3. Looking forward to volumes II and III
(Continued)
Proclus Book of Plato’s Republic

that is primary focus
Essay 12 – on the Cave Book VII, 514a–517e
Essay 13 – on the speech of the Muses and the Book VIII, 545d–??
interpretation of the nuptial number
Essay 14 – on the three arguments that the life Book IX, 580a–588c
of the just person is happier
Essay 15 – on the three main topics of Book X Book X in toto
Essay 16 – line-by-line commentary on the Book X, 614b–621c
Myth of Er
Essay 17 – reply to Aristotle’s criticisms of Republic passim and
Plato’s politeia Aristotle’s Politics
While it is true that the level of treatment afforded to each of the

books is not what one would expect of a modern commentary on the
Republic, this reflects differences of judgement about what parts of
Plato’s dialogue are most important and which parts stand in greatest
need of exegesis.
3. looking forward to volumes ii and iii

While we think that the collection of essays taken as a whole presents
a reasonably unified attempt to interpret and explain the Republic, we
will nonetheless preface each essay in each of the volumes in this series
with a short introduction. Readers who find themselves unpersuaded by
the argument of the previous section can treat the individual essays as
self-standing, independent studies if they like. This volume contains
Essays 1 and 3–6, each with an accompanying introduction. In this
section we would like to preview the contents of volumes II and III.
The previous section addressed the negative case against the basic unity
of the Republic Commentary, viz. that the differences among its compo-
nent parts suggest that what lay between the covers of our single ill-
treated codex was a potpourri of works having only the text of the
Republic in common. In addition to previewing the content of coming
volumes, this section will make a positive case for the basic unity of the
Republic Commentary by showing recurring ideas in Essays 7–16.
Essay 7 concerns the tripartite division of the soul and the account of
the four cardinal virtues in Book IV. It also provides us with an account
of what distinguishes the political or constitutional gradation of virtue
from others, and in particular, what distinguishes it from the
15
contemplative virtues that the dialogues that come after the Phaedo in
Iamblichus’ reading order are supposed to promote. To do this, Essay 7
applies the distinction that Plato draws in the Sophist to the parts of the
soul (and the analogous classes of persons in the ideal city). It is one
thing to consider the virtue of the reasoning part (or the spirited or
appetitive parts) kath’ auto or in itself and another to consider this part’s
virtue pros allo or ‘in relation to another’. The political virtues are
manifested in the various psychic parts’ relational activities (I 208.
29–30). Each gradation of virtue (ethical, political and purificatory)
includes all four of the cardinal virtues. But within each gradation, one
of the cardinal virtues is pre-eminent. Justice is the virtue that is parti-
cularly characteristic of political virtue (in Remp. I 12.26–13.6).
Among these political virtues, some are more political – i.e. more
relational – than others. The political gradation of wisdom is a virtue
that reason alone exhibits in its own right. Similarly, the spirited part of
the soul, since it ideally rules over appetite in conjunction with reason,
gets its own proprietary virtue – courage. These two virtues Proclus
calls ‘ruling virtues’ (in Remp. I 228.13). Appetite, since it is ideally only
ruled and never itself a ruler, exhibits no virtue in its own right. Spirit is,
of course, also subordinate to reason so it shares with appetite the virtue
of self-control. Similarly, all the parts need to play their role in justice.
Since virtues are states that tend towards perfection and living well, the
political virtues exhibit a classic example of the Neoplatonic descent
from greater to lesser perfection.
Psychic part kath’ auto virtue relational virtue

Reason Wisdom Justice, the cause of self-control
Spirit Courage Justice, auxiliary cause (sunaition) of
self-control
Appetite Justice, self-control
We have seen before that Proclus seeks to justify claims in Socrates’

Book I function argument that Socrates’ audience in the Republic simply
accepts at face value. In Essay 7 Proclus similarly seeks to explain the
subordination of appetite to spirit and spirit to reason by reference to
the ordered metaphysical triad of hyparxis, dynamis and nous.32 So Essay
7 – though it belongs to the essays in the Republic Commentary that
Gallavotti supposed to make up an Isagoge to the work – presupposes
a significant understanding of Neoplatonic metaphysics and also
32
For this triad, see Plat. Theol. I 80.21 ff. For the correlation with the soul, see in Remp.
I 226.11–18 and MacIsaac (2009).
16
elucidates the Republic by reference to logical distinctions drawn in the

Sophist.
Essay 7 also paves the way for the discussion of whether the virtues are
the same in men and women – the topic that occupies much of Essays 8
and 9. The introduction to Essay 7 makes the point that where the
essence of x is the same as the essence of y, the virtues of x and y are the
same too. Essays 8 and 9 both open by defending this claim where the
values of x and y are male guardians and female guardians. But both
essays also take up important intertextual questions in Platonism.
In particular, how should one interpret the sameness of virtue in men
and women in relation to the claims in the Timaeus that a soul will never
make its first descent into a female body, with incarnation as a woman
being reserved as a warning for those who have exhibited moral failings
in their first incarnation (Tim. 42b)?33 So while both essays have sec-
tions where Proclus explains Plato’s Republic from the Republic itself,
they also resemble Essay 5 in posing questions about how the Republic
can be made consistent with other dialogues. Thus the intertextuality of
Essays 7 and 8 is strikingly similar to that of Essay 5.
Essay 10 first seeks to show that the distinction that Socrates draws
between Beauty Itself (which is one of the objects known by the
philosopher) and the ‘many beautifuls’ that occupy the sight-lovers
is compatible with the Neoplatonic distinction between participated
and unparticipated forms. By Proclus’ lights, there is a threefold
distinction: first there is an unparticipated form that serves as
a paradigmatic cause of the participated form. Then there is the
participated form that is a cause that is coordinate with or on the
same level as the thing that participates in it, and only after that is
there the beautiful particular. Proclus shows how Socrates’ vocabulary
can accommodate this threefold distinction within its opposition
between the one and the many. Indeed, it is thanks to this that we
can easily see – he argues – that Plato does not recognise any such
form as the Ugly Itself. Another puzzle that is internal to Neoplatonic
metaphysics concerns the status of monadic forms in the region above
the Moon. While here in the sublunary there are many instances of
the form Donkey, above there is one and only one thing that partici-
pates in the form of Sun. In the latter case, the opposition between
form and participant does not map onto the distinction between one
and many. So while Essay 10 has the Republic as its point of departure,
the questions that it concentrates on are intimately related to other
33
A problem that continues to attract attention among modern scholars. For a recent
valuable contribution, see Harry and Polansky’s (2016) own – very different! –
reconciliation of the two Platonic passages. See also Baltzly (2013b).
17
dialogues – and particularly to the Parmenides where Socrates evinces

some puzzlement about the range of Forms and whether there are
Forms for valueless things like hair, dirt and mud. As with the essays
previously discussed, there is very little sense in which Essay 7 is
merely introductory in its implicit presuppositions about the level of
the audience’s understanding and, moreover, merely introductory to
the Republic, whilst leaving other, harder Platonic dialogues to one
side.
As one might expect, Essay 11 on the Good in Republic VII uses
Plato’s analogy with the Sun to explain the sense in which the Good is
‘beyond being’ in a distinctively Neoplatonic way. He does this by
relating the analogy of the Sun in the Republic to other Platonic texts.
Proclus considers three senses of ‘the good’. The first is ‘the good in
us’ – i.e. the thing that, being present to our lives, makes them go well.
This good he takes to be the subject of discussion in the Philebus. Proclus
takes Socrates’ remark at Republic 505 c about those who suppose
pleasure to be the Good as a ploy by which Plato broaches the topic of
the good in us, but only in order to make clear that the good that he is
now going to discuss is not the good in us. Similarly, Proclus is confident
that the Good under discussion in the part of the Republic is not the
Form of the Good considered as one Form among many. In order to
show this, he turns now to the Sophist with its discussion of the ‘greatest
kinds’ or megista genê. His essay briefly summarises a distinction
between the genê which constitute each subject as the subject that it is
and other Forms that perfect each subject. While the former are exis-
tence-endowing (hyparchtikos), the latter are perfection-endowing (tele-
iôtikos, in Remp. I 270. 24–5). The first group are made up of the Sophist’s
greatest kinds (Being, Sameness, Difference) and, in a secondary way,
Forms corresponding to sortals, such as Living Being, Horse, Man, etc.
Perfective Forms include Justice, Strength, Beauty, etc. In one sense, we
can speak of a Form of the Good that belongs to the same order as these
perfective Forms, though it stands at the head of that order (270.19).
Proclus calls this Form of the Good to hôs eidos agathon (271.15). Now,
the perfection-conferring Forms are subordinate to the megista gen ê
(and perhaps to the other constitutive forms like Man as well). After
all, when something is good, it is. But a thing can be without being good.
So Being (to einai) is not the same as being Good (to eu) and the latter is
subordinate to the former (in Remp. 271.1–2). So the Good considered
as a Form on the same level with Justice or Beauty is not the subject of
discussion in Republic VII either, since the Good that Socrates discusses
there ‘is king over the intelligible realm’ (Rep. 509d2).
The super-essential Good that lies beyond the Good as Form is the
subject that Socrates now approaches by means of the analogy with the
18
Sun. But Proclus supposes that he indicates it only in a veiled manner

because of the presence of the sophists, Thrasymachus and Cleitophon,
in front of whom one would not reveal the deepest mysteries (274.1–3).
Accordingly, the analogy with the Sun hints only at what The Good is
not or, more accurately, what it transcends. It transcends both Truth
and Being (277.14–27) inasmuch as it is the cause of these things and the
cause is superior to that of which it is the cause. Proclus argues at length
that, as a result of this, the Good beyond Being is not an object of
knowledge or epist êm ê. Rather, the understanding (gnôsis) of it is nega-
tive and achieved by subtraction (kata aphairesis, 285.5) – a method of
knowing that Proclus takes to be practised in the first hypothesis of the
Parmenides. But Glaucon and the other participants in this discussion
are not ready for such an exercise (286.5). Nonetheless, Proclus sup-
poses that what is taught by means of analogy in the Republic concerning
the Good is one and the same with the doctrine that is conveyed in a very
compressed manner in Epistle II 312e. Thus Proclus addresses the
mysterious character of the analogy that is meant to illuminate the
Good armed with several weapons from the Neoplatonists’ hermeneu-
tic armoury. First, he reads into Plato’s text the metaphysics of ontolo-
gical levels characteristic of Neoplatonism. Second, he avails himself of
conspicuous intertextuality in interpreting the Republic by reference to
the Sophist. Finally, he accounts for the cryptic nature of Plato’s
words in the Republic by appealing to considerations involving audience,
as well as to considerations about the ineffable nature of the highest
principle of all.
Proclus’ discussions of the analogies of the doubly divided line and
the cave in Republic VII (Essay 12) similarly involve relating what is said
in the Republic to other dialogues. Thus, for instance, the initial division
of the line into two halves – corresponding to the visible and the
intelligible – is related to the passage in the Philebus (16c) where
Socrates urges the person who wants to investigate being to see if,
after having brought all the particulars under the one Form, there are
two sub-species into which it divides (and if not two, then choose the
smallest number possible in the process of division). Similarly, Proclus
proceeds on the assumption that the further divisions of the line create
a four-term geometric proportion of the sort that is said to be the most
beautiful kind of bond at Timaeus 31 c and the judgement of Zeus in
Laws VI 757b. When Socrates describes the prisoner who has escaped
from the cave getting accustomed to the world above, he remarks that he
would first find it easiest to look at reflections in water or the night sky
(Rep. 516a). Proclus takes this opportunity to relate the stars in the night
sky to the idea, developed in his Timaeus Commentary, that both the
heavenly spheres and the stars and planets are gods. The light of these
19
heavenly bodies is analogous to the divine light of the Good that is

reflected in the intelligibles. As the escaped prisoner needs to see the
complete night sky before attempting to see the Sun, so too the philo-
sopher needs to see the entire intelligible cosmos (no êtos diakosmos)
before he can hope to approach the Good beyond Being. Finally, the
fact that Socrates says that the vision of the Good is difficult to see at
Rep. 517c1 is related to Socrates’ similarly indirect approach to the
Good in Philebus 65a1. There Socrates says that if he and Protarchus
cannot hunt the Good down in a single Form, they will secure it by the
conjunction of three: beauty, symmetry and truth. Presumably Proclus
takes Socrates’ mention of two of the ‘three monads’ of the Philebus –
beauty and truth – in relation to the Good at Rep. 517c2–4 as sufficient
warrant for supposing that here too Socrates counsels the philosopher
to enter initially into the ‘vestibule of the Good’ in the manner that the
Philebus describes. Indeed, it is at this point in the Republic Commentary
that Proclus refers his readers and/or auditors to his (now lost) book
On the Three Monads in the Philebus (295.25).
Both Essays 11 and 12 form part of what Gallavotti took to be an
Introduction to the Republic. He supposed that works such as Essay 6 on
the harmony of Homer and Plato, or the detailed exegesis of the Myth of
Er in Essay 16 were originally quite different in character and combined
with these introductory materials on the Republic by some later editor.
While it is true that Essays 11 and 12 contain parts that are more or less
straightforwardly exegetical of the Republic, we note here the extent of
cross-textual references, as well as the sophisticated understanding of
Neoplatonic metaphysics that is presupposed by them. We believe that
a better appreciation of these aspects of the ‘easy’ parts of the Republic
Commentary should diminish the temptation to see the work as made up
of parts that are radically different in character. Both (relative) beginners
and advanced students would find much to absorb and consider in these
essays.
Republic VIII 545d marks a definite turning point in Plato’s dialogue,
both in its content and in its style, though this fact has perhaps not been
appreciated as fully as it should be by modern commentators. At this
point, Socrates’ description of the ideal polis and the nature and educa-
tion of its Guardians is complete. He now proposes to return to the
earlier discussion of other kinds of politeia that had been postponed in
order that he might address the objections voiced by his conversational
partners at the opening of Book V. Since Plato goes on to highlight the
deficiencies of the alternatives to the ideal civic and psychic constitu-
tions by describing their devolution from that ideal, he must first con-
front the reverse of the question raised by Glaucon at 471 c–e. Glaucon
was happy to agree that the city described by Socrates was the best, but
20
wondered about how it might come about. Following the revelation of the
Guardians’ nature as philosophers and practitioners of infallible dialec-
tical reasoning, there is now a genuine puzzle about how a city governed
by such people could ever devolve into the increasingly fractured and
fractious civic and psychic types that Socrates goes on to describe in
Book VIII and the beginning of Book IX. It is as difficult to say how the
Kallipolis could fall apart as it is say how it could come about.
In Book V, Socrates’ response to Glaucon’s challenge about how the
ideal city might come about begins by making a comparison with
painters – the very same artists whose work will soon be dismissed as
three removes from the truth in Republic X. It would be unfair to
reproach a painter who had depicted in great detail the finest and
most beautiful human being with the charge that he could not show
with similar exactitude how this ideal man should come about.
In explaining how the Kallipolis might fall apart, Socrates avails himself
of the poetic conceit of allowing the Muses to tell how the homonoia that
ensures the perpetuation the best politeia could be lost. The first step in
the Muses’ tale concerns how the Guardians – impressive though their
education might be – cannot through the means of reasoning combined
with sense perception (546b1–2) grasp the optimum time for procrea-
tion. This optimum time is expressed as the nuptial number. Both the
content and style of this passage are famously difficult, as befits the
oracular speech of divine beings such as Muses. What is less noted is the
fact that Plato seemingly attributes the entire account of the devolution
of poleis and souls that makes up Book VIII to the Muses. At 547b1
Glaucon asks Socrates, ‘What do the Muses say after this?’ and while
Socrates reverts to a more normal style of speaking at no point does he
explicitly drop the pretence that he is reporting what the Muses say.
Indeed, the poetic character of the narrative of civic and psychic decline
is reinforced again at 550c4 when Socrates says, ‘Shall we not speak after
the manner of Aeschylus of “another man ordered after another city”?’ at
the beginning of the explanation of how oligarchy evolves from timoc-
racy. In fact, the speech of the Muses is never explicitly drawn to a close.
Modern readers such as ourselves who are disinclined to credit Plato
with an authority built on divine insight would be likely to suppose that
he has merely used the voice of the Muses as a literary device. It serves to
highlight a fulcrum upon which to turn the dialogue in a new direction
and when it has served that purpose Plato just abandons it. Proclus, of
course, is not such a modern reader. Essay 13 on the speech of the Muses
is a response to the fact that at this point a new voice enters Plato’s text.
It also true the Essay is overwhelmingly focused on the proper inter-
pretation of the so-called nuptial number. Proclus dedicates nearly
three quarters of this eighty-page essay to assorted numerological and
21
astrological considerations about the proper interpretation of Plato’s

text, as well as the calculation of the most auspicious times for procrea-
tion more generally. But Essay 13 is not simply a learned digression
cataloguing previous interpretations of an opaque but inconsequential
detail of Plato’s Republic. Proclus really does treat the speech of the
Muses as a new logos. Accordingly we get some of the same preliminary
questions asked of it as are asked of the dialogue as a whole in Essay 1. Its
skopos is to reveal the causes for the destruction of the best politeia, and
while one of these causes lies in the Guardians themselves, the other
cause lies in the nature of the cosmos (II 7.8–16). The latter affords
Proclus the opportunity to connect the speech of the Muses to Plato’s
Timaeus. The speech of the Muses also has a distinctive quality which is
‘lofty’ (hyps êlos, cf. 545c3) that is fitting for beings such as the Muses
when they announce the destruction of the city in the manner of an
oracle. Moreover, the mode through which the teaching is communi-
cated to us is one that requires Proclus, in his role as teacher, to spend
a great many pages helping us to unlock the message. The teaching is
apophatic by virtue of its speakers, for the Muses speak to us in the same
manner as those who are inspired and give oracles. Moreover, the
teaching is iconic by virtue of its subject, ‘for to indicate the truth from
numbers is to teach from icons, and what is iconic is akin to souls and all
that is cosmic’ (II 8.12–14). So the very first part of the speech of the
Muses demands close attention. The Pythagorean technique of teach-
ing from iconic numbers is compounded by the apophatic style of the
Muses who deliver the lesson. Small wonder that Proclus feels justified
in spending considerable time unpicking the meaning of the nuptial
number! If he has chosen to spend more time on the nuptial number
than on Plato’s account of the devolution of constitutions in the rest of
Book VIII, then this may be because he took this part of Plato’s text to
be the part with which his audience would need the most help.
Essay 13 is not merely concerned with the nuptial number. Proclus
prefaces his detailed treatment of this subject with a discussion of the
claim that ‘all that has come to be is subject to destruction’ (546a2).
Proclus dedicates eight pages of his essay to the proper interpretation of
key concepts in Plato’s claim, such as ‘generated’ and ‘time’, and relates
these to the teaching of the Timaeus on similar topics. Modern readers
may find this exegesis of the Republic in terms of the Timaeus otiose. But
we think that Proclus is not wrong to supply Plato with argument where
it is needed. It is a genuine puzzle how the Guardians – whose compe-
tence to govern is grounded in knowledge of the Good – could allow the
Kallipolis to fail. Plato has indeed painted himself into a corner by
combining the portrait of his super-qualified rulers with the authorial
decision to present the inferior states through a narrative of decline
22
from an ideal. When Plato lets the Muses explain how this is possible, he
implicitly invites the reader to judge the narrative of psychic and civic
decline by the evidential standards we apply to poetry. He says, in effect,
‘Hear my tale the way you would hear Homer’s.’ Perhaps Proclus is not
wrong to suppose that the same tale can be told to a different evidential
standard.
We cannot be certain how or to what extent Proclus may have framed
the preliminary discussion of the destructibility of all that is generated
or the detailed discussion of the nuptial number that follows in terms of
the broader aims of Book VIII. Essay 13 belongs to the second half of
the manuscript of the Republic Commentary. As noted above, Essay 13
was originally composed of an introduction and 45 paragraphs. The first
eight paragraphs and part of the ninth are now missing in Vaticanus
2197 though Kroll recovered the first two pages of Essay 13 from
elsewhere. The longer introduction that might well have explained
why Proclus chose to focus on these topics, among all the things in
Book VIII worthy of comment, is a great loss. In view of this omission,
we should be hesitant to dismiss Essay 13 as a scholastic excursus on
a trivial detail in Republic VIII.
Essays 14 and 15 deal with Books IX and X respectively. The first is
very short – only three pages – and concludes with a diagram setting out
the key points in the three arguments that seek to show that the just life
is happier than the life of injustice. It does stand out as introductory, but
it is almost the only essay in the hypothesized Isagoge to the Republic that
does. Essay 15 presents a similar overview of the three key arguments of
Book X. Proclus provides a unifying structure to the topics treated in the
concluding book of the Republic. There are three key topics: the con-
demnation of imitative poetry, the demonstration of the soul’s immor-
tality, and the providential care for souls that is exercised by gods and
daemons as these human souls enter and leave mortal bodies. Proclus
supposes that these apparently disparate topics are in fact unified by
virtue of their psychological effect upon the reader. The discussion of
the dangers of poetry is purificatory – it separates us from material
images and from the false paideia associated with the faculty of imagina-
tion. The demonstration of the soul’s nature has the effect of bringing
about the soul’s reversion upon itself. Finally, the teachings on the god’s
providential care for souls prompts the soul’s reversion upon beings that
are higher than itself (II 85.11–26). Thus the content of Book X is
unified by the stages of separation from the body, reversion upon the
self, and ascent to the divine that correspond to the gradations of virtues
in Neoplatonic moral philosophy. Even though Essay 15 is far briefer
than the line-by-line commentary on the Myth of Er that makes up
Essay 16, Proclus nonetheless takes the opportunity to clear up certain
23
important matters in the course of his exegesis of the main headings of

Book X. Thus it is important that, after we have considered the demon-
stration of the soul’s immortality, we be clear about what part of the soul
is immortal. Proclus believes that Timaeus 69c7 shows that it is the
rational soul alone – and not the irrational soul – that is immortal.
(Syrianus’ lectures on Phaedrus 245c5, as conveyed by Hermias, show
the extent of the concern about making Plato consistent on this
subject.34) But we can also see that Plato means to restrict the argument
for the soul’s immortality to the rational soul by considering what is said
at Rep. X 611e1. If we are to see the true nature of the soul, we must look
to the soul’s love of wisdom and the (intelligible) things to which the
soul is attached. For Proclus, it is obvious that the irrational soul is
analogous to the barnacles that have attached themselves to the sea god
Glaucus. Finally, having divided the Myth of Er into four principal
parts, Proclus provides a very brief summary of the key symbolic ele-
ments in the myth. This summary leaves the door open for a longer,
more detailed treatment. Indeed, Proclus characterises these brief
accounts of the symbolic elements as ‘seeds’ that can be further devel-
oped by anyone who is willing and able to decode them (II 95.21–4).
Thus the conclusion of Essay 15 leads quite naturally on to Essay 16.
It is the development of the seeds planted here.
At several points in his Republic Commentary Proclus relates the
three classes within the city to the various orders of gods that govern
the cosmos. His introduction to the lengthiest essay in the
Commentary – Essay 16 on the Myth of Er – returns to this theme.
Like the speech of the Muses, the myth is its own logos and, as such, it
has its own subject or prothesis (II 97.9). On the one hand, this is
compatible with the investigation into the nature and value of justice
that constitutes the skopos of the Republic taken as a whole. Thus the
myth quite reasonably spells out the rewards that await the just and
the unjust person after death. But, Proclus insists, a far simpler myth
could have accomplished this without all the detail that is offered to
us in the Myth of Er. So we can attribute an additional objective to
Plato’s detailed myth and Proclus supposes that a clear indication of
this further objective is given by Socrates’ remark at Rep. IX 592b2
that at least the ideal city exists as a paradigm in the heavens for anyone
who wants to look at it and enrol himself as a citizen. Accordingly, the
dual prothesis of the Myth of Er is to teach us about the celestial
republic, in addition to reinforcing the rewards of justice and the
penalties for injustice that we will meet after this life. In this celestial
34
245c5 is problematic since the most obvious reading has Socrates saying ‘All soul is
immortal.’ Cf. Menn (2012).
24
republic, the gods correspond to the Guardians. They regulate the

cosmic laws announced by Necessity and her daughters, the Fates
(Rep. 617c–d). The daemones correspond to the Auxiliaries, while the
‘ephemeral souls’ (617d6) correspond to the third class in the earthly
republic. So while Proclus regards the myth of Er as a logos that is in
some ways distinct (as was the speech of the Muses), it is nonetheless
subordinate to the Republic and its aims.
This teaching takes the form of a myth because we are now
dealing with higher matters (theôrêtikôteros) and so this is communi-
cated in a manner that is not merely mythical, but actually mystical
(II 99.21–2). While Proclus relates and endorses the responses of
Porphyry to Epicurean criticisms of Plato’s use of myth, he also adds
his own justifications for this mode of teaching. Myths present the
intellectual light of truth clothed in fiction and this is fitting for human
beings since we are ourselves partial intellects clothed by the faculty of
imagination (II 107.25–108.15). The efficacy of myths, Proclus argues,
is proved by parallel considerations about the efficacy of mystical rites.
Here too, even people who do not fully understand the truth that is
unknowably concealed within the rites can be benefited (though this
benefit is not inevitable). Proclus concludes his introductory remarks
on the Myth of Er with a reference to his work, On Mythic Symbols,
which is now lost to us.
What follows is a line-by-line commentary covering Republic
614b2–621b4 that takes up almost exactly 250 pages of Kroll’s second
volume. We will say more about the themes that dominate this com-
mentary in volume III of this series. But it is perhaps helpful to put the
level of exegetical effort involved on Proclus’ part – at least as that effort
is measured by pages – into some context. In his commentary on the
Myth of Er Proclus averages roughly 36 pages of exegesis for each OCT
page of Plato’s text. By contrast, the figure is over 40 pages per page for
the surviving portion of the Timaeus Commentary. The ratio of com-
mentary to pages of the dialogue commented on is lower in the case of
Proclus’ Alcibiades Commentary – about 24 to 1. So, gauged by the
exegetical effort expended, the myth of Er has a ‘semantic density’ that
Proclus regards as greater than that of the very first dialogue in the
Iamblichean canon (the Alcibiades I) but less than one of the two key-
stone dialogues that complete the reading cycle.
Proclus’ Republic Commentary concludes with a short treatise in which
he addresses the criticisms offered by Aristotle in Politics II 2 1261a10 ff.
Essay 17 was regarded by Gallavotti as a separate work that found its
way into the diverse materials making up the current Republic
Commentary. But at least he regarded it as a work of Proclus. Earlier
scholars sought to assign it to the Platonist Euboulos who is mentioned
25
in Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus.35 The work is undoubtedly Proclus’, but it

is in very bad condition. Only the first eight pages survive and the last
two of those are very scrappy indeed. Yet the content is one that
a Platonist such as Proclus would see as intimately connected to the
overall purpose of the Republic Commentary, for what Aristotle questions
is the thesis that a polis is better to the extent that it is more unified.
Doubt about this specific claim has obvious implications for the idea
that the One is the source of all that is good and that degrees of unity
coincide with degrees of being and of betterness. On the final page of
what survives of Essay 17 Proclus draws the political concerns that
motivated the work into the realm of metaphysics and the soul’s salva-
tion (368.7–10). Noting that most people put their private interests
ahead of the common interest, he observes that nothing drags the soul
down into the final stages of particularity more than the affliction that
Socrates calls ‘individualism’ (idiôsis, 462b). So the political issue of the
unity of the state is set in the context of both the metaphysics of the One
or the Good and also the soul’s descent into becoming. As tattered as the
essay is in our present version of the text, it does not seem too far
removed from the fusion of political thought, soteriology and metaphy-
sics that characterizes the other essays in the collection. It is not, we
submit, merely an appendix on matters only vaguely related to the other
material in the Republic Commentary. Proclus seeks to defend the thesis
that the more unified a thing is, the better it is. This claim is central to
Proclus’ philosophical project and we can discern even in the truncated
version of this essay the manner in which he brought that political and
metaphysical concern to bear on the final end of philosophical educa-
tion – the elevation of the soul and its assimilation to the divine.
4. the value of proclus’ REPUBLIC

COMMENTARY
Over the past thirty years the research community in ancient Greek
philosophy has made great strides in opening up the thought of the
post-Hellenistic period and late antiquity to non-specialists. This effort
has been comparable to the way in which Hellenistic philosophy was
opened up to non-specialists in the 1970s and 1980s – though the task
has been far greater since the sheer volume of late antique texts is so vast
compared with our scattered evidence on the schools of the Hellenistic
age. The vanguard of this opening up of late antique thought has, of
course, been the Ancient Commentators on Aristotle project led by Sir
35
For details see the introduction to Stalley’s translation of Essay 17; Stalley (1995).
26
4. The value of Proclus’ Republic Commentary
Richard Sorabji, but in addition to this we now have English translations

of many of the important Plato commentaries and other works emer-
ging from a variety of presses, as well as the careful work of the Budé
series in French.
Is this work important to anyone other than historians of philosophy?
What relevance does Proclus’ thought have to the philosophical con-
cerns of the early twenty-first century? Perhaps more specifically – what
value does an English translation of Proclus’ Republic Commentary have
for anyone who is not already enmeshed in the intricacies of late antique
Neoplatonism? In this section we’ll distinguish some ways in which
works in ancient philosophy have applicability or relevance. We argue
that Proclus’ Republic Commentary’s relevance is not likely to be the same
as that of some works of Aristotle or the Stoics. Rather, we’ll argue that
Proclus’ essays on the Republic have relevance for twenty-first-century
philosophy because, if we are really to understand them, we must also
understand much more about the broader intellectual life of late anti-
quity. The project of embedding Proclus’ philosophy within the cul-
tural project of pagan philosophers in the fifth century invites us to take
up a similar perspective on the broader cultural significance of philoso-
phy in our own time. We could, of course, do this without using Proclus
as a prompt, but he provides a useful contrast precisely because his
cultural project seems so alien to us.
It is worth remembering that ancient Greek philosophy has been
a source of ideas for contemporary analytic philosophers in the late
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. (Those in the Continental
tradition have seldom had doubts about the relevance of ancient philo-
sophy to philosophy’s present concerns.) Hilary Putnam claimed to find
inspiration for functionalism in Aristotle’s hylomorphic account of the
soul–body relationship.36 Martha Nussbaum, Julia Annas and Dan
Russell have all used Hellenistic philosophy to good effect in developing
insights in contemporary ethical theory and moral psychology.37 Will
late antique Neoplatonism have a similar direct applicability to existing
problems in contemporary philosophy? Will it lead to the posing of new
problems whose salience becomes suddenly relevant to us as a result of
reflection on Neoplatonism?
We are not confident of a similar direct applicability of late antique
Neoplatonism to the concerns of contemporary philosophy. Too much
of Neoplatonic philosophy is too tightly tied to their metaphysics –
a metaphysics many contemporary philosophers regard as largely
36
Putnam (1975). Putnam’s claim to find the origins of functionalism in Aristotle was
argued at greater length in Nussbaum (1978).
37
Nussbaum (1994), Annas (1993), Russell (2012).
27
implausible. Consider the debates about the extent to which Aristotle’s

function argument in Nicomachean Ethics I 7 presupposes his views about
form and substance. Or the independence of Stoic views about the goal
of living from their pantheism. There is scope for argument in these
cases, but there is no comparable scope for arguing that the Neoplatonic
view of the goal of living (assimilation to the divine) or the doctrine of
gradations of virtue can be separated from their commitment to theism
or to the incorporeality of the soul. To the extent that contemporary
moral theorists are not theists and not soul–body dualists, the moral
philosophy of the Neoplatonists will seem to them untenable. Similarly,
Proclus’ Republic Commentary makes it very clear that the Neoplatonists’
ideas in political theory presuppose the belief that the cosmos is itself
a single, unified living being that is providentially administered by
a range of divinities, both encosmic and extra-cosmic. This cosmic
community, they believe, is the paradigm for successful human political
communities. To the extent that we find the former implausible, we will
be inclined to regard the latter as holding merely historical interest.
The incompatibility between the preferred metaphysics of contempor-
ary philosophers and Neoplatonists goes deep. It is not simply that many
twenty-first-century philosophers are atheists or materialists. These dif-
ferences in ontology are undergirded by differences in the explanatory
priorities of Neoplatonists in contrast with those of modern philosophy.
We tend to see parts as ontologically prior to the wholes that they make
up. From our point of view, sentience, consciousness and thought are
things whose causal evolution from insentient, unconscious and unthink-
ing nature needs an explanation.38 The Neoplatonists, by contrast, regard
wholes as explanatory of the parts whose identities are dependent upon
their inclusion in the whole. Intellect and soul are more ontologically
basic and it is they who explain the emergence of material particulars.
We not only disagree with the ancient Neoplatonists about what
demands an explanation, but we also differ in the sorts of explanans we
reach for even when we share an explanandum. The contrast between our
preferred problem-solving tool-kit and that of the Neoplatonists is
nicely illustrated by one of those relatively rare cases in which we
share a philosophical problem. For the Neoplatonists, the unity of
things is a fact that demands explanation and the One is the (ultimate)
explanation of that fact.
38
To be fair, there are some contemporary metaphysicians who defend the priority of
wholes over parts or panpsychism. But even among the defenders of such views, there is
a clear sense that one ought to come to this position as a last resort. The contrary views
are regarded as so much more initially plausible that panpsychism is (allegedly)
vindicated only by the failure of the alternatives.
28
Until the emergence of the Problem of the Many in 1980 it is unclear

that contemporary philosophers regarded the unity of things as a fact in
need of an explanation. The Problem of the Many is often illustrated
with the example of clouds, but the molecules making up your tea cup
would serve as well. We think that, on the one hand, there is one cloud
in the sky. But the edges of that cloud seem vague. We could draw its
boundaries so as to include one water droplet and exclude another or
vice versa. But this different composition would yield a different cloud.
So how is it that we have just one cloud in that clear blue sky and not
many?
The range of responses to the Problem of the Many form an
interesting contrast with the Neoplatonists’ straightforward explana-
tion – an ultimate source of unity that things can share in to
a greater or lesser degree. Some contemporary philosophers have
gone for nihilism: the unity of objects is, in fact, an illusion. There
are parts, but not unitary objects composed from them. The other
extreme response is one that has come to be called ‘brutalism’: it is
just a brute fact that some parts – in this case, some water droplets –
form a cloud while other aggregates of water droplets do not. While
critics have complained that the brutalist response is ad hoc insofar as
it posits a vast and unconnected body of brute mereological facts, no
one has – to our knowledge at least – proposed a single ‘one-maker’
as a solution. Such a proposal would, of course, have the effect of
rendering the fact of each thing’s unity no longer brute. It would
instead be explicable in the same terms as the unity of all other
things. No one today seems to have a taste for that kind of solution
and the preferred tools for addressing the Problem of the Many tend
to involve appeal to the vagueness of terms like ‘cloud’ or to the idea
that the identity of one thing (e.g. one aggregate of water droplets
with a cloud) is relative. In short, confronted with a philosophical
puzzle, we tend to look for solutions in the way in which we represent
the situation. The Neoplatonists would certainly agree that there are
situations in which the soul’s embodied condition leads us to mis-
represent fundamental facts about the universe (e.g. the real nature
of causation). But in the case at hand, they reach into the philoso-
phers’ tool-kit for a metaphysical solution: things are unified because,
in addition to the things that are, there is something that is a source
of unity that is itself so unified that it cannot strictly be said to be at
all.
Given the divergences just discussed, we think it is unlikely that in
making it easier for non-specialists to read late antique Neoplatonism
we will contribute to contemporary philosophy in quite the same way
that Long and Sedley or Inwood and Gerson did when they published
29
source books on Hellenistic philosophy.39 Nonetheless, the indirect

applicability of Neoplatonism to contemporary philosophy is, we
believe, fruitful and worth exploring.
In late antiquity Neoplatonism was part of broader educational and
cultural projects. Moreover, the Neoplatonic philosophers seem to have
been acutely aware of their involvement in those projects. Philosophy –
and in late antiquity philosophy was largely synonymous with Platonism –
was part of elite education or paideia. The mainstay of this education was
rhetoric, but philosophy was not divorced from rhetoric. Plato was him-
self one of the paragons of good prose style. So any educated person
would have had some acquaintance with his dialogues. The social func-
tion of elite education has been well described by historians of late
antiquity.40 It functioned as a marker of class and as a means through
which one could assert a right to treatment of a certain sort. It was, in
short, a valuable form of ‘social capital’. The educated person was ren-
dered capable of a style of speech and writing that did not merely evince
his familiarity with the canon of great works but creatively deployed that
familiarity to fashion a public persona. A claim to paideia was an implicit
claim not be to treated in the ways unsuitable for a gentleman. So, for
instance, one would not ordinarily flog a gentleman. The following anec-
dote about the pagan philosopher Hierocles illustrates the way in which
paideia could be used to maintain the person’s dignity even in circum-
stances where he was not accorded the treatment proper to a gentleman.
Damascius relates that when Hierocles went to Constantinople he came
into conflict with Christian authorities and was flogged and exiled for
some offence that Damascius does not relate. His response illustrates the
attitude expected of the possessor of paideia in late antiquity:
As he flowed with blood [sc. after the flogging], he gathered some into the
hollow of his hand and sprinkled it on the judge exclaiming: ‘There Cyclops,
drink the wine now that you have devoured the human flesh.’
(fr. 45, Athanassiadi 1999)
The allusion to Homer’s Odyssey (9.347) through which Hierocles
rebukes his judge is precisely the kind of learned remark that
a cultured man should be able to make. Even when he has been sub-
jected to a treatment that is unbefitting to an educated man, he asserts
his superiority to his tormentors by a display of erudition – a display that
only similarly erudite men might grasp and admire.
The pursuit of philosophy beyond that associated with the normal
study of rhetoric was simultaneously consistent with the ideal of an
39
Long and Sedley (1987), Inwood and Gerson (1988).
40
For an overview and bibliography, see Watts (2012).
30
educated person, but also in some ways undermined the values asso-
ciated with the kind of public life that such education enabled. It is useful
to remember that the Neoplatonists adapted a work such as Epictetus’
Enchiridion as a preliminary to the study of philosophy. The very stakes
that paideia helped one to compete for – position, reputation, wealth –
look rather less significant from the point of view that such
a philosophical introduction encourages. We submit that philosophical
paideia also went deeper. The educated person who had not gone so far
as to pursue the life of the philosopher lived his education publically.
The performance of paideia was always principally a crafting of the
image of the self for others’ consumption. But philosophical education
sought to transform one’s experience of all things so that you lived in and
through metaphors drawn from the texts of the divine Plato.
The performance of Platonic philosophy was not merely the construc-
tion of a self-image for the consumption of others, but a construction of
a different experiencing subject for the benefit of that subject.
Neoplatonic philosophical writing always centred on the classroom
and the discussion circle in which this personal transformation was
pursued. The philosophical texts that we now possess are, we submit,
not merely attempts to interpret Plato or to solve philosophical pro-
blems. They are steps along the way to a return of the soul to its divine
origin. In practical terms, we think this means that they manifest signs of
a project to think outside the concepts and assumptions recommended
by embodied experience and to take on a new conceptual repertoire
drawn from these philosophers’ understanding of Plato. They are phi-
losophic texts, to be sure, but they are also psychagogic. This is the
educational project in which late antique Platonism is engaged.
In addition to the educational project of coming to live through the
Platonic dialogues, Platonists in late antiquity were engaged in at least
two competing cultural projects. Pagan Platonists sought to exhibit many
of the central texts of a gentleman’s education, together with traditional
civic practices, as part of a philosophically coherent whole. This is parti-
cularly evident in Essay 6 of the present volume in which Proclus seeks to
show that the philosophical truths hidden behind Homer’s allegorical
poetry are consistent with Plato’s divine wisdom. For their part, Christian
Platonists sought to render the works of pagan philosophers (such as
Plato) and the content of traditional paideia (such as Homer) safe for the
consumption of young Christians. Writing on the influence of the
Platonists Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nyssa, Peter Brown observes:
A subtle shift occurred by which the rhetorical antithesis between non-Christian
paideia and ‘true’ Christianity was defused. Paideia and Christianity were pre-
sented as two separate accomplishments, one of which led, inevitably, to the
31
other. Paideia was no longer treated as the all-embracing and supreme ideal of
a gentleman’s life. It was seen, instead, as the necessary first stage in the life-cycle
of the Christian public man. A traditional ornament, paideia was also
a preparatory school of Christian character.41
Thus while the educational project of all the Platonist philosophers was
personal and transformative, the cultural project was synoptic and pub-
lic. Each kind of Platonist sought to weld the works that they all loved
into a coherent whole consistent with their differing religious commit-
ments. It was an effort to see how all the important things could, in the
broadest sense, hang together and how the whole might be helpfully
communicated to future generations.
Are contemporary teachers and writers of philosophy engaged in any
comparable educational and cultural projects? In what way do our
projects influence the form and content of our philosophical writing?
These are questions that we seldom pose for ourselves. When we speak
of the indirect application of late antique philosophy to contemporary
problems, we have in mind the way in which the contextualising of the
practice of teaching philosophy, writing philosophy, and living philo-
sophically in the late Roman Empire can make us aware of the signifi-
cance of the broader context within which contemporary academics and
students teach, write and attempt to live philosophically in the twenty-
first century. Neoplatonic philosophical practice – suitably contextua-
lised to their broader cultural aims of late antique paideia – provides
contemporary philosophers with an opportunity for us to see our own
discipline with fresh eyes.
Different as the twenty-first century may be from the fifth, there is one
clear bridge connecting us with Proclus. We noted at the outset of this
introduction just how often academics in general (and not just philoso-
phers) put Plato’s Republic on the reading list for university courses. It was
an important book for Proclus and for the Neoplatonists and it remains
an important book for us. We too seek to understand it for ourselves and
to explain it to students. Many of its themes – the nature of philosophy,
the true aim of education – are as urgent for us as they were for philoso-
phers in late antiquity. We are not naı̈ve enough to think that answers that
are wholly satisfactory for us in our time and place will emerge directly
from Proclus’ text. His Republic is not our Republic (though it must be said
that he often draws our attention to features of Plato’s text that we tend to
overlook). Rather, part of the value of his book for us is the way in which it
prompts us to think about our use of Plato’s Republic in the projects we call
education and our role in identifying and preserving what we regard as
the best of our culture.
41
Brown (1992), 123.
32
We will attempt to provide some observations on the broader pro-

jects of Neoplatonic philosophising in the course of our notes and
introductions to the individual sections within this book. If the argu-
ment of this final section of the General Introduction is sound, then
using the philosophy of late antiquity to shed light on contemporary
philosophy must take historians of philosophy outside their usual com-
fort zone. If we are to use the Platonic schools of late antiquity as a useful
vantage point on the meaning of philosophy and true education for us,
we will need to read more intellectual and social history than many
historians of philosophy are wont to do. After all, to see philosophical
education and the activities of philosophers in the broader cultural
context of late antiquity, we need to know much more than the philo-
sophical texts and the arguments to be extracted from them. This, at
least, is our suggestion for finding contemporary relevance in late
antique Neoplatonism. But whatever your interest in Proclus’ Republic
Commentary, we hope that the translation and essays in this volume will
help you realise your telos.
33
Introduction to Essay 1
Essay 1 of Proclus’ Republic Commentary introduces itself as a guide to

the techniques for interpreting a Platonic text. Given the close relation-
ship between the communal reading of texts under the guidance of
a teacher and the writing of commentaries,1 it becomes a kind of
commentary on commentary. Outlining the main headings under
which one should discuss a Platonic dialogue, Proclus produces in this
essay a broad discussion of the Republic as a whole. The process
described is, however, clearly not intended to be an invariable system,
as we can see both from Proclus’ own practice as a commentator and
from the fact that some of the topics suggested in Essay 1 are specific to
the Republic. The essay should be of particular interest to modern read-
ers of Proclus, both for the breadth of its discussion of what has now
become the pre-eminent Platonic dialogue, and for the unusually clear
insight that it gives into how Proclus believed that Plato should be read.
Proclus deals, in this broad discussion, with topics which must concern
any reader of the Republic, in particular the nature of the dialogue’s unity
and the relationship between its literary form and philosophical con-
tent. In that light it is all the more to be regretted that a large part of this
essay is missing, but what does survive gives a good indication of the
approach that the lost sections would have followed, and other com-
mentaries by Proclus provide further insight into these lost parts of the
discussion.
Proclus insists that one should strike a middle path between the
extremes of introducing irrelevant material and neglecting what is
essential for the preliminary discussion (5.12–21). In order to do this,
he says, seven topics must be addressed: (1) the aim (skopos) of the text,
(2) its genre (eidos), (3) material background (hyl ê), a topic subdivided
into characters, places and times, (4) the various politeiai proposed by
Plato, (5) whether the sole constitution in accordance with reason is one
or if there are multiple possibilities, (6) how Plato judged that we should
see the constitution adopted and whether any aspects were left unex-
amined, (7) the consistency of Plato’s doctrine in the text. The fourth,
fifth and sixth of these topics are, of course, not applicable to the study of
all Platonic texts, but are dictated by the choice of the Republic as the
1
See Marinus on Proclus’ practice of teaching by day and writing by night (Proclus 22).
43
example. Nonetheless, Proclus presents the essay to follow as a guide to

Platonic interpretation in general. Unfortunately Essay 1 breaks off in
our manuscripts part way through the third of these topics, though
something can be inferred of the missing parts given the overlapping
nature of the topics and the foreshadowing of later parts in the section
which is preserved.
The standing assumption of an essay like this is that interpretation is
a skill which can be taught and replicated. Proclus’ students are to follow
his instructions ‘as if following in [his] footprints’ (5.9–10). What he
presents is not merely a series of topics to discuss but also a manner of
discussion which it may not be possible fully to describe, but which is
learned by immersion in examples of Platonic interpretation. In this
essay, as in a different way in Essay 6, we are given a glimpse of the
Neoplatonic school at Athens as a textual community at work.2 While
Essay 6 gives us a record of an advanced lecture, the stated purpose of
Essay 1 is to guide its audience into the correct methods of reading and
commenting. Such reading is, as the title of this essay implies,
a communal reading practice (synanagnôsis) under the guidance of an
experienced interpreter.
Proclus, like other post-Iamblichean Platonists, follows Iamblichus
in seeing each dialogue as possessing a single skopos. In the case of the
Republic, establishing the skopos requires Proclus to negotiate two con-
tending theories: (1) that its main concern is justice and that the
arrangement of cities (politeia) is introduced as a secondary considera-
tion or (2) that its main concern is the arrangement of cities (politeia) and
that justice is a secondary consideration. Proclus’ response is on this
occasion one with which a modern reader of Plato may well concur: the
distinction is an artificial one within the terms of the Republic, ‘since
what is justice in a single soul is a constitution of [the best] kind in the
well-ordered state as a whole’ (11.13–14).3 This is not, Proclus states,
a matter of two separate skopoi, but of one skopos when rightly consid-
ered. The possibility of two skopoi is ruled out by what the Neoplatonists
take to be the strong injunction for the thematic unity of each dialogue
communicated at Phaedrus 264 c, where Socrates had Phaedrus agree
that a discourse (logos) should be unified as an animal is unified.
Much of what survives of Essay 1 is concerned with the setting and
characters of the Republic, and with what might broadly be termed its
literary character. Implicit throughout these sections on the
2
On the Neoplatonic schools as textual communities see the General Introduction and
Baltzly (2014).
3
Van Liefferinge (2002), 199 draws a comparison with a similar division in anglophone
and francophone scholarship on Plato.
44
introduction to the Republic, though unstated, is the view that the

introductions to Platonic dialogues are not merely window-dressing
but contribute to the philosophical work of the text. Already
Porphyry, unlike some of his contemporaries, saw the introductions as
important and worthy of interpretation. For him, however, these were
primarily ethical, guiding the reader on the way in which one should
practise philosophy. Iamblichus, by contrast, committed as he was to the
view that each dialogue had only one skopos, needed to interpret the
introductions as contributing to that skopos, and in this view Proclus
follows him.4 It is for this reason that these details of time and place (and
no doubt of character too) are interpreted by Proclus as delineating the
skopos of the text and hence its placement in the gradual ascent which the
Iamblichean curriculum was intended to bring about.
The second topic which Proclus considers after the skopos is the
‘genre’ (eidos) of the text. Though the options which Proclus proposes
do not correspond to genres in a modern sense, we have felt this
translation apt in reflecting Proclus’ attempt to place the Republic within
two separate systems for categorising texts. The first of these systems is
that sketched by Plato himself at Republic 392d, ff.: the three eid ê of
discourse (lexis) there are mimetic (e.g. tragedy and comedy), non-
mimetic (e.g. dithyrambs and histories insofar as these do not imitate
characters), and mixed. Proclus reasonably places the Republic in the
‘mixed’ category, since it contains some sections imitating characters
interacting with one another and others which are not concerned with
depicting such relations. The second system which Proclus outlines,
followed by ‘some Platonists’ (15.20), divides texts into expository
(hyphêgêtikon), investigative (z êt êtikon), and mixed.5 In this schema too,
the Republic falls into the mixed category, since ‘[t]here are certainly
numerous investigative passages in it, and there are also expository ones’
(15.23–4). These two schemata of classification are based on quite
different criteria: where the first looks to the literary form of the text,
the second is concerned with the apparent degree of dogmatism or
(possibly inconclusive) enquiry. Moreover, Plato’s own schema is
intended to apply to texts in general, while that of the Platonic inter-
preters (such as Thrasyllus and Albinus) aims explicitly at the categoris-
ing of Platonic dialogues. Nonetheless, given that mimesis of characters
and ‘investigative’ passages will to a degree correlate with one another,
there is some overlap between the two senses in which the Republic is
4
On this development with particular reference to Proclus see our General Introduction;
the General Introduction in Tarrant (2007) and especially 21–2 and 46–9; as well as
Gersh (2003).
5
See our note ad loc. for discussion of the history of this type of classification.
45
‘mixed’. Proclus’ conclusion to this section appears briefly to bring

together these two senses of mixture:
Perhaps it is also the case that the mixed genre of discourse is appropriate to
discussion of the arrangement of states, in which are gathered together all kinds
of actions and words and ways of life. (15.27–16.1)
In this concluding sentence of this section of his discussion, Proclus
does not specify whether it is the mixture of dialogue and exposition or
the mixture of expository and investigative approaches that is apt for
a discussion of the arrangement of cities. It is perhaps legitimate to see
both forms of mixture as fitting the nature of the second discussion of
justice and the ideal constitution which is reported in the Republic: both
types of mixture allow Plato to produce a unified theory and to include
the actions, words and ways of life that are to be harmonised in the ideal
state (and individual).6
Moreover, in Tim. I 28 15 ff. sheds further light on Proclus’ thinking
here. In that passage, Proclus identifies the recapitulation of the
Timaeus, since such recapitulation is a kind of cycling back (anakykl êsis),
with reversion. He places it, in other words, within a major and recur-
ring pattern in his thinking: procession, reversion and remaining.7
Within this tripartite schema, the Republic would be a kind of procession
through which form is imposed on the multiplicity of matter – in this
case the kinds of deeds, words and ways of life. This would leave the first
conversation corresponding to ‘remaining’, implying perhaps that
Socrates participates in sophistic struggles while remaining apart and
uncorrupted by them. Hermias, similarly, supposes that Socrates enters
into the realm of phenomenal beauty in hearing Lysias’ speech, but
without becoming part of it (in Phdr. 15.20–2). With Phaedrus he leaves
the city (=intelligibles) but never abandons himself.
Proclus finishes his discussion of the Republic’s eidos by placing the
dialogue within a further triad: the three occasions on which he believes
the ideal constitution to have been discussed. The idea, which appears as
well in the opening of Proclus’ Commentary on the Timaeus (I 8.30–9.12
and 28.16–20), is that there was a first discussion at the Piraeus, a second
in Athens (our text of the Republic) and a recapitulation on the
following day (found in the introduction to the Timaeus). These three
conversations are characterised respectively as argumentative in form,
mixed in form (argumentative and narrative, providing better order than
the previous discussion) and lastly in summary and without characters.
6
A further related schema for categorising discourse, into a demonstrational (or Socratic)
manner and a revelatory one, appears at in Tim. I 7.18–8.13. Proclus concludes that the
Timaeus ‘mixes the demonstrational method with the revelational’ (trans. Tarrant 2007).
7
On this fundamental pattern in Proclus’ thought see Chlup (2012), 62-82.
46
This is much more than an incidental observation of the fit between

literary form and philosophical content, though it is that as well. For
Proclus this distinction is nothing less than one between three different
stages of the life of the soul: the first corresponds to the soul which is still
fighting against the passions, the second the soul which has mastered the
passions but retains a memory of the battle against them, and the third the
soul which ‘has been taken entirely up into contemplation and has shed
the memory of those contests’ (16.10–11). The choice of this middle
discussion, Proclus explains, is appropriate since political virtue ‘is ther-
apeutic of these [irrational impulses] and has contemplation as its goal, by
concentrating the reason in us’ (16.13–17). The eidos of the Republic, in
other words, fits both the subject matter discussed and the position of this
text at the level of the political virtues in the Iamblichean curriculum.8
Proclus’ discussion of the fit between form and philosophy also
provides a neat transition to his next topic: material circumstances
(hyl ê).9 The first of the sub-topics is the choice of place, and Proclus
draws a sharp distinction between the seaside setting of the Piraeus and
the city. Both are considered as symbolic of mental dispositions: the sea
as a place ‘full of tumultuous and variegated life’, representative of
immersion in genesis, and the city away from the sea as calm and predis-
posing its inhabitants to quiet contemplation (16.26–18.6). Though this
is in a sense an instance of the widespread notion that events suit the
places in which they occur, Proclus’ understanding of these places is also
more than this. These types of setting are treated both as actually having
these effects on the people who inhabit them and also as symbolic cues
to the status and meaning of the dialogue.10 By setting the conversation
of the Republic in the city, recollecting an earlier discussion at the sea,
Proclus suggests that Plato is reinforcing the point made by the mixed
form of the dialogue itself (in both of the senses of generic mixture that
he raises): the dialogue is to be a contemplation, from an elevated and
dispassionate perspective, of the solution to problems faced by souls still
embroiled in civic life and the passions.
8
On the position of the Republic in the Iamblichean curriculum see the General
Introduction.
9
The Anonymous Prolegomena also uses this category of the ‘matter’ of the text (16) and
likewise subdivides it into characters, time and place. As the text is a cosmos (14) it is
made up of matter and form.
10
Similarly in the Timaeus Commentary Proclus responds to the question of whether the
story of Atlantis is historical or symbolic by asserting that it is both, following in this
respect Iamblichus and Syrianus. As Tarrant (2007), 83 observes, for Iamblichus ‘the
war between Athens and Atlantis symbolizes [a contrast of cosmic oppositions] that is
found everywhere and at every level, being quite as important for the construction of
the cosmos as Heraclitus had long ago maintained’. On the development of this reading
in response to earlier approaches see Tarrant (2007), 60–84.
47
Proclus’ understanding of the temporal settings, as he notes himself,

brings them into harmony with the spatial ones (18.7). The first con-
versation at the Piraeus, he says, is set during the festival of Bendis, that
in the city during the Lesser Panathenaea. Though there is some con-
fusion in Proclus’ treatment of the dating of the Lesser and Greater
Panathenaea11 and the relationship and differences between Bendis and
Athena is not made entirely clear, the broad difference between the two
festivals and their goddesses does emerge neatly. Bendis, as a foreign
(Thracian) goddess, is felt to be appropriate to genesis, since the goddess
and her rites are strangers, just as the soul is a stranger in the realm of
becoming (19.17–19).12 The rites of the Panathenaea, by contrast ‘are
appropriate for the second and third conversations, since these conver-
sations imitate a soul ascending into itself and drawing in its life away
from lower things and towards its own intellect’ (19.5–8). Spatial and
temporal settings, in other words, reinforce each other in Proclus’
reading. Both indicate that the Republic regards events of the world of
genesis from a position above that world.
The manuscript of Essay 1 unfortunately breaks off just a sentence and
a bit into the next of Proclus’ topics: the characters in the dialogue.
Having reminded us that this is his next topic, he observes that there
are ten characters who converse together. There are in fact eleven
characters in the Republic,13 so how Proclus arrived at ten is difficult to
say. Perhaps one of the minor, non-speaking characters was omitted from
the tally, but in that case one wonders why others were not. In any case,
the round ten provides Proclus with a pleasing decad of characters, and it
is highly likely that the significance of this number would have figured in
his discussion, just as the famous puzzle of the missing fourth in the
opening of the Timaeus attracts extensive discussion in the Timaeus
Commentary (I 14.4–26.20). What then might Proclus have said about
the ten? Other works of Proclus give some assistance: at in Tim. I 23.21–9
Proclus states in his discussion of the numerical significance of the
missing fourth person that ‘the triad is holier than the tetrad, the tetrad
than the decad, and everything within the decad than whatever follows it’
(I 23.21–9 trans. Tarrant). This in itself perhaps motivates his desire to
find ten rather than eleven characters in the Republic. The division of
11
See our note to 18.18.
12
This does not denigrate the non-Hellenic goddess so much as place her in a particular
position in Proclus’ divine hierarchy. Proclus proclaimed, after all, that the philosopher
should be ‘the hierophant of the whole world’ and showed a keen interest in non-
Hellenic rites (Marinus, Proclus 19.26–30). The details are in this case somewhat
difficult to ascertain; see our note on 18.28.
13
Socrates, Glaucon, Adeimantus, Thrasymachus, Polemarchus, Cephalus, Clitophon,
Lysias, Euthydemus, Niceratus, Charmantides.
48
the Republic into ten books may have been another factor. A further
important decad is the division, from Book 3 onwards, of the Timaeus
Commentary according to the notion that the Demiurge bestows ten gifts
upon the cosmos. Proclus shows, then, a plain preference for discovering
decadic structures, which may go back to Iamblichus.14
Further symbolism of the decad is also appropriate, and may very
likely have figured in Proclus’ discussion. Also in the Timaeus
Commentary, he states that ten (like nine) bears ‘a symbol of the cosmos’
(ἀμφότεροι δὲ οἱ ἀριθμοὶ κόσμου φέρουσι σύμβολον (87.30–88.1)) A related
idea, that the decad ‘has encompassed all things within itself in seminal
form’ (πάντα μὲν σπερματικῶς ἐντὸς αὑτῆς περιειληφυῖα) appears in the
Theology of Arithmetic (Theol. Arith. 79.16–17)). This all-embracing
character of the decad could be brought into line with Proclus’ remarks
in his discussion of the ‘middle’ genre of the Republic that reason ‘in its
concentrated form knows synoptically how it put in order the things
dependent upon it, and on the other hand unfolds itself henceforth
towards contemplation of the whole, so that it sees the constitution in
all things and the one statesman of the cosmos’ (in Remp. 16.17–20).
If Proclus saw the Republic as representing this synoptic view which
reason takes of things dependent upon it, a decad of characters as
a representation of the totality would doubtless have struck him as
apposite. Such inclusiveness and multiplicity, however, must come at
the cost of greater distance from the unity of the monad: while in the
Timaeus Commentary Proclus can see the reduction in number of char-
acters from four to three as an ascent in the level of perfection (in Tim.
I 23.31–24.1),15 the inclusion of such a large number of characters in the
Republic must have seemed appropriate to a dialogue dealing with
a relatively divided and multiple level of existence.
It is further likely that Proclus will have divided this decad in accor-
dance with the various numerical relationships that were considered to
be represented in it. In particular, the division into two pentads may well
have seemed appropriate, since, again as he observes in the Timaeus
Commentary when discussing the sons of Poseidon and Clito, the pentad
is an image of justice (I 182.14–17).16 Given Proclus’ conviction that the
skopos of the Republic was justice, the double pentad implied in the decad
cannot have failed to strike him as significant. Such a division of char-
acters obviously could be carried out in many different ways, and one
14
Cf. Iambl. in Tim. fr. 49 and note ad loc in Dillon (1973).
15
‘a symbol of the higher perfection that has subsumed in advance as far as possible, all
that comes second, and fully supplied what is lacking in them’ (in Tim. I 23.31–24.1,
trans. Tarrant 2007).
16
In support of this reading of the text see Tarrant 2007, 281 n. 773, who cites Theol.
Arith. 35.6–40.6.
49
can only speculate how Proclus would have gone about it, and what
further meanings he would have seen in the different groupings.
The allegorical interpretations of characters in the Parmenides
Commentary give some indications of the kinds of interpretation of
characters and groups that Proclus may well have offered in Essay 1 of
the Republic Commentary. Socrates, in the Parmenides Commentary, is an
individual intellect or, in the triad of Being, Life and Intellect (concep-
tualised as three distinct moments in the hypostasis Nous), Intellect
proper (in Parm. 628.1ff), and a similar reading may have been offered
here too.17 Likewise Plato’s uncles, Glaucon and Adeimantus, serve as
a dyad prior to the monad in the ascent to higher and simpler realities (in
Parm. 663), with Glaucon superior to Adeimantus (in Parm. 665), and it
is likely that Proclus saw them in such a dyadic relationship in the
Republic too. Proclus may well have taken the discussion of characters
as an opportunity to make some observations regarding the movement
of attention from some characters to others in the course of the Republic,
in particular from characters who have a low level of understanding
(especially Thrasymachus) to Glaucon and Adeimantus who can
appreciate Socrates’ arguments at a higher level. The early sections of
the dialogue could also have offered an opportunity to discuss types of
ignorance, as the Anonymous Prolegomena suggests in its outline of the
topics that one might consider relating to Platonic characters (Anon.
Proleg. 16). The identification of Thrasymachus with the thymos, for
instance, and the interpretation of his refutation as the mastery of the
impulses from this part of the psyche, appears in Olympiodorus (in Alc.
I 61.7) and may well have figured in Proclus’ discussion too.
Individual details of the introductory sections no doubt seemed to
Proclus to cry out for allegorical interpretation. Cephalus’ inability to
come up from the Piraeus to the city to visit Socrates (328b5–d6) would
no doubt, given Proclus’ views of the significance of the Piraeus and the
city discussed above, have seemed to represent his inability to rise to
calm contemplation free of the disturbances of genesis. This soul, none-
theless, would clearly be in the process of separating itself from the
body, given his mastery over sexual desire in his old age (328d6–329d6).
Hermias, similarly, has Cephalus in the Republic represent correct opi-
nion (I 15.4). The passing of argument from Cephalus to Polemarchus
(331d) may consequently have figured as the first steps in an ascent of
the soul. It is likely too that the minor characters of the Republic, like
those of the Parmenides, were treated together as dependent on higher
causes; at in Parm. 661.10 ff. the visitors from Clazomenae are
17
On the understanding of Socrates in the dialogues as representing this hypostasis see
Griffin (2014).
50
interpreted together as ‘all the individual and perceptible reason-

principles . . . dependent on the primary cause’, and the minor charac-
ters of the Republic may have been similarly interpreted.
At a less abstract level, Proclus may have wanted to make clear here, as
he does in Essay 6, that not all voices within a Platonic dialogue are
created equal:
. . . we do not consider it right to extract the opinion of Plato from the words of
Callicles nor those of Thrasymachus, nor will we say that someone catches Plato
out with his refutations, if he should attempt to refute him through the brazen
things uttered by the sophists. But whenever Parmenides or Socrates or
Timaeus or some other similarly divine man speaks, then we believe that we
are hearing the teachings of Plato. (110.10–17)
By a combination of such relatively pragmatic points and complex
allegorising, Proclus is likely to have felt that he offered a full discussion
of the dialogue’s characters. This is likely to have been a substantial
section, to judge by the amount of analysis of character in his other
surviving commentaries.
The surviving sections of Essay 1, in discussing the skopos of the
Republic, naturally contain some discussion relating to the fourth and
fifth of Proclus’ topics, concerned as they are with the nature of the
politeia in this dialogue and its relation to other Platonic politeiai.18 Such
points as those at 9.17–10.17 will no doubt have been made more fully in
the fourth and fifth of Proclus’ topics. He will have argued that the
Republic discusses the best constitution and the Laws the second-best,19
and that this first constitution is ‘the commonality which is defined in an
undivided way, in accordance with a single civic well-being, when
people are gathered together in mutual goodwill for a single communal
life’ (10.10–12). To the sixth of Essay 1’s topics (whether Plato left any
aspect of this constitution unexamined) it is highly likely that Proclus
responded in the negative, inclined as he is, like other post-Iamblichean
interpreters, to find perfection and complete premeditation in every
aspect of Plato’s works. In the sixth problem of Essay 5, where he
addresses an apparent incompleteness in Socrates’ exposition of the
modes necessary for good education, Proclus defends him on the
grounds that he says as much as it befits the statesman to say on these
technicalities, and it is very likely that Proclus did the same here. His
seventh and final topic, the consistency of dogmata in the Republic as
a whole, must to some extent have restated, and no doubt extended, the
views on the skopos of the text discussed earlier. Though a dialogue as
18
On Neoplatonic political philosophy see especially O’Meara 2003 with the review in
Abbate (2005), as well as Abbate (2006).
19
On the somewhat mysterious ‘third constitution’ see our note to 9.26.
51
long and varied as the Republic must offer difficulties for any unifying
reading, Proclus’ sensible view that its topic is both the politeia and
justice (as two aspects of the same thing) will have facilitated such
unification.
Even in the early Timaeus Commentary Proclus is a confident and
capable interpreter who gives no sense of applying a cookie-cutter
method to the text. Though Essay 1 of the Republic Commentary presents
its reading as a model for his audience to follow, and there are indeed
close similarities between the approach that he recommends and
demonstrates here and his practice in other commentaries, his approach
is sensitive, both here and in other instances, to the different demands of
different Platonic dialogues. It must be stressed too that in Essay 1
Proclus offers only a guide to arranging introductions to Platonic
dialogues. This is to be a preliminary delineation of a dialogue’s most
important features, much like the opening sections of the commentaries
on the Timaeus, Parmenides and Alcibiades, but not an exhaustive
treatment.
In Essay 1 as in all of Proclus’ essays there are, to be sure, readings of
Plato which will seem forced to modern readers, especially if they are
unaccustomed to Neoplatonic ways of reading. There are, nonethe-
less, other readings which remain persuasive, for instance his balanced
assessment of the question of unity of the Republic. It would be a gross
distortion to see in Proclus only a reader prone to flights of allegory,
with nothing to contribute to our own reading of Plato. His commen-
taries both develop his own system of thought and do provide genuine
insight into Plato and the reading of Plato in antiquity, though these
two aspects would not have seemed to him to be separate. While the
tendency of Proclus, like other Neoplatonic readers, is to see the
maximum of meaning in even the smallest details of Plato, an essay
like the current one allows a much broader overview of his interpreta-
tion of the dialogue. Here we are likely to find more common ground
between ancient and modern readings. In his discussion of the signifi-
cance of the setting of the dialogue, though the details of Proclus’
understanding of the physical and temporal setting will probably not
be fully persuasive, he is surely justified in seeing these as significant
parts of the dialogue.20 The essay offers, in short, both a lucid entry-
point to ancient discussion of Plato and an overview of the topics
which ancient readers themselves considered most important in the
analysis of a dialogue.
20
For the reinstatement of issues of character and setting into the reading of Plato in
recent years see, for instance, Blondell 2002.
52
essay 1
By Proclus the Lycian, Diadochus 5
of the Platonic School
Into which major parts and how many one must divide the text before
collectively reading Plato’s Republic, if we are to interpret it correctly. 5
I would like to demonstrate to you how one should arrange introductions

to Platonic dialogues, if one is not going to handle them casually, taking
as my example the text of the Republic. By following the account that I will 10
present, as if following in my footprints, and moving on in the same way
to the interpretation of other texts, you may aim for a correct method in
these matters. You must not leave this section [of the text] dry and
neglected, imitating the majority of interpreters, who announce before-
hand only what the problem is that the text discusses. Nor should you 15
pile up distantly related researches that have nothing to do with the
subject, in the enquiries (skemmata) prior to the text. I know that some
of the other Platonists do this: they introduce so many endless arguments
through their replies to those who hold a different view that it becomes
unworkable. You must rather bring before the eyes of those studying 20
with you only the text under discussion, interpreting each work’s purpose
(prothesis), its genre (eidos), the material circumstances (hylê),21 its teaching
(dogmata), and in summary the subject (hypothesis) of discussion which
runs through the text as a whole.22 In this way the whole intention
(boulêma) of the dialogue can become evident to your audience.23 25
Well then, I shall explain, just as I said, the model [for interpretation]
by reference to the Republic. So I say that before reading the Republic, one
21
The topic of material background (hylê ) is later divided into times, places and char-
acters (kairoi, topoi, prosô pa) at 6.9 and 6.27. Only the first two of these are discussed
before the text of this essay breaks off. For the sense of hylê as ‘subject matter’,
Festugière compares Pseudo-Longinus, On the Sublime 13.4 and Herodotus VII 188.
22
On each of these topics see the introduction to this essay.
23
The Vatican MS here reads τοῖς ἀκουσομένοις ‘for those who will be auditors’ at the end
of the sentence, a reading adopted by Grynaeus in his editio princeps, but relegated to the
appartus by Kroll. The phrase makes fine sense but is not necessary along with the
similar participial phrase τοῖς ἀκούουσι earlier in the sentence (I 5.24). Either is
perfectly acceptible in itself, but the two together are unnecessary and uncharacter-
istically repetitive for Proclus. It is more likely that the more unusual phrase (τοῖς
ἀκουσομένοις) has been explained by τοῖς ἀκούουσι, a marginal gloss which has subse-
quently intruded into the text, though it is hard to imagine many readers of Proclus
requiring a gloss for such a simple expression.
53
Essay 1
6 who is going to understand it properly must distinguish the following

seven things.
1. Firstly, one must determine the aim (skopos), according to
rules (kanôn) concerning the discovery of the aims of
Platonic dialogues, which I know that I have spoken about
many times.24
5 2. Secondly, what is the genre (eidos) of the discussions, according
to which the author of the Republic wrote it? And this will
certainly be clear to those who remember the types and numbers
of genres that figure in the discussions.25
3. Thirdly, one must examine the material circumstances (hylê) to
the discussions in the Republic. This is incidentally considered
under the topics of characters (prosôpon) and places (topos) and
10 times (kairos).26 I know, at any rate, that I have said that it is
necessary to show how all of these relate to the aim of each
dialogue.
4. Fourthly, since the discussion in this text is primarily concerned
with a political constitution (politeia), one must separate the
constitutions in Plato, with reference to the way in which they
have been distinguished by him here and elsewhere, and to say
15 what sort of constitution he discusses in this text.27
5. Fifthly, taking up this sole28 constitution in itself which
accords with reason, separate from the constitutions ruled
by the passions, one must consider whether it is only one or
if there are in fact many, and if there are many, how many
and which ones [accord with reason]. And once one has
20 established these things with cogent arguments, the enquiry
(theôria) must primarily consist in apprehending by
24
Rules for the discovery of the skopos are given in chapter 9 of the Anonymous
Prolegomena. It seems quite plausible that this work is much indebted to a now lost
Introduction to Plato’s Philosophy that Proclus perhaps gestures towards at in Alc. 10.4.
For discussion, see Mansfeld (1994), 28–30.
25
Proclus will subsequently (14.15 ff.) use the Republic’s own categories of purely narra-
tive, purely dramatic and a style that mixes both (392d5 ff.) to classify the Republic itself.
The categories of style used in the Anon. Proleg. (17.1–15) are considerably more
complex.
26
Compare Anon. Proleg. 16.7–8: Ἐν δὲ τῷ διαλόγῳ ἀναλογεῖ μὲν τῇ ὕλῃ τὰ πρόσωπα καὶ ὁ
χρόνος καὶ ὁ τόπος ἐν ᾧ τοὺς διαλόγους ἔγραψεν ὁ Πλάτων.
27
Though the text breaks off before Proclus’ discussion of the fourth and subsequent
points, the topic of the nature of politeia arises in relation to the problem of establishing
a skopos.
28
We translate the MS reading μόνην, defended by Radermacher and accepted by
Festugière, rather than Kroll’s μόνον, adopted by Abbate.
54
<1. The aim of the Republic>
reasoning the types [of constitution] among these numerous

[options].29
6. Sixthly, one must consider the number of ways in which Plato
himself judges that we should see the constitution adopted itself,
and whether he left unexamined any aspect of enquiry concern-
ing it.
7. Seventhly, one must bring into sight and demonstrate the con-
sistency of doctrine (dogmata) that runs through the whole text, 25
just as [Plato] himself says in the Phaedrus (264c2–5) – how the
entire work is perfectly finished, structured like a single animal
that possesses parts and limbs composed in relation to each
other.30
In this exposition, the number of major topics will become familiar, 7
and the arrangement among these which we discussed will become
clear, as well as how all of these look to one aim.
<1. the aim of the REPUBLIC: 7.5-14.14>

Firstly then, if you wish, let us examine the first of the seven points 5
which we mentioned. This was to look at the aim itself of the Republic.
I believe that I have heard many men disagreeing on this topic, and
arguing their own opinions very well. At any rate there are many who 10
maintain that its purpose concerns justice and who think that we should
bear in mind [the following points]:
(1) Firstly, that this is the first enquiry in the text, namely what the
just is and who the just man, and the discussions with Cephalus
and Polemarchus and Thrasymachus are on this topic.
29
This is all rather puzzling and we can only speculate on Proclus’ eventual answer to this
question since the relevant part of Essay 1 has now been lost. It seems likely to us that
there might be multiple ‘constitutions that accord with reason’ based on the different
notions of political justice corresponding to the arithmetic, geometric, and harmonic
means. Proclus is, of course, very fond of these themes (cf. in Tim. II 198.17 and 317.25
cf. Olympiodorus, in Grg. §35.13). The constitution of the Republic corresponds to
geometric proportionality since it accords the greater authority to the worthier persons
(the Guardians). The constitution of the Laws admits, as a practical point, the need for
some admixture of arithmetic equality insofar as it finds a role for allocating offices by
lot (where each person, regardless of his worth, has an equal chance of being accorded
authority). The state corresponding to harmonic proportion is harder to fathom, but
see Boethius Arith. II. 45. On the plurality of constitutions acceptable to the
Neoplatonists, see O’Meara (2003), 101–5.
30
Kroll observes that there is a problem with the text in 6.28. Like Festugière we translate
following Kroll’s suggestion of adding ἔχοντος before πρός.
55
Essay 1
(2) Secondly, that the consideration of arrangement of cities (politeia)

15 comes into the discussions for the sake of [understanding] justice,
so that we might be able to see in large letters what it is not easy
to see in small ones (368d). This search for a more exact defini-
tion of justice arises from the confusion of Adeimantus and
Glaucon,31 and Socrates wishes to produce a more vivid defini-
20 tion [of justice] for those present, as a result of these discussions
of the arrangement of cities (politeia). Therefore, if one thing is
thought worthy of investigation for the sake of something else,
and the latter goal is among the topics under investigation, then
the [proponents of this account of the skopos] say it is necessarily
the case that the topic for whose sake the other topic was intro-
duced should be considered the objective (skopos) [of the dialo-
gue]. After all, the one of the two is primary and the other is
incidental [to the investigation of the primary one].
25 (3) Thirdly, they say that Socrates himself on many occasions
emphatically bears witness that the purpose (prothesis) concerns
justice, whenever he mentions some other point and is led by the
discussion to fall back to justice, and says many times: ‘since this
is the reason for our enquiry’.32
(4) And finally, when he brings the just man to the end of his life,
8 and moves on to the honours which he receives in Hades, he
says that for all these reasons one must practise justice and live as
if contending before the eyes of gods who bestow prizes of
victory, and because the prizes are great for a life such as
5 this.33 So these [interpreters] employ arguments of this kind,
leading us to consider the aim (skopos) to be discussion of justice.
Other interpreters, who are no fewer than this first group and who
write no less exactly, consider the purpose to be discussion of the
arrangement of cities (politeia), even though the first enquiry concerns
justice, [which they say] is not introduced as introductory, but as
10 straightforwardly34 providing a way into the speculations about
31
Confusion of Glaucon: II 357a2–358a9. Confusion of Adeimantus: II 362d1 ff.
32
Kroll offers 336e, 368e and 588b. The latter two, at least, seem clearly apt, the first
perhaps somewhat less obviously so.
33
This paraphrases without quite quoting Rep. X 621c–d.
34
We adopt Festugière’s conjecture of εὐθυπορώτερον for the plainly corrupt
εὐρυπρόσωπον (8.9–10). Abbate (2004) proposes an otherwise unattested word
εὐρυπρόσοδον to account for the MS reading, translating the resulting phrase,
εὐρυπρόσοδον . . . ὁδόν as ‘un’ampia via di accesso’. The meaning is not, in any case,
substantially different. Nonetheless, the repetition of ὁδός in adjective and noun, and
the necessity to conjecture an unattested word, incline us to translate with Festugière,
though certainty is impossible.
56
arrangement of cities. These readers cite as evidence the most ancient

known title: when Aristotle summarises this work (fr. 180), he says that
he is summarising ‘the Republic’ (Politeia), and in the Syssiticus (fr. 181) he
refers to it in the same way, and in the Politics similarly (B1 1261a6), as 15
does Theophrastus in his Laws and in many other places. Although the
title is ancient, it is clear to everyone that some dialogues have been
named by Plato on the basis of their subject matter (prâgma), and not
after their characters, like the Alcibiades or Phaedo, and on the basis of the
topics discussed in the dialogues, rather than after their settings, like the 20
Symposium.35 So all of these take their title from the main topic (proê-
goumenon problêma), not from a topic secondary to that and which is not
the primary enquiry. In any case he named the Sophist in this way, since
this was the topic for investigation in that dialogue: the sophist. 25
Although countless things are said about being and non-being, these
things contribute to the discussion of the sophist. In the same way he 9
also named the Statesman after the main enquiry, although he related
a great deal about the cycle of the cosmos (272e5 ff.). But because these
things are spoken about for the sake of the statesman, the text has
received only the name of the Statesman. So in the same way he very
clearly ascribed this title to the text, that is, the Republic, on the basis of 5
the subject treated, because this is the primary object of enquiry, given
that the titles on the basis of subject matter derive not from the dialo-
gues’ circumstantial discussions but from the primary subjects of
enquiry.
Firstly then, [such interpreters] point to these two facts concerning 10
the title, just as I said:
(1) that the title is ancient and not spurious as are some other
attributions of titles, which belong to more recent scholars
who have taken advantage of their authority.36
(2) that the title is derived from the subject matter and from the
primary subjects of the work, not from merely incidental ones
(so that we cannot suggest that it is one of the titles derived from 15
the characters or incidental circumstances).
35
The question of why Plato’s dialogues have the names they do is the sixth of the ten
questions treated in the Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy. The conclusion of
this section is missing, but the author begins to explain that some, like the Sophist, take
their title from the subject under investigation.
36
Proclus may have in mind Thrasyllus or others like him. According to Diogenes
Laertius he gave two titles to each work (3.57). In the case of the Republic the dual
title was ‘Πολιτεία ἢ περὶ δικαίου’. On Thrasyllus and the questions confronting anyone
seeking to organise and classify the works of Plato, see Tarrant (1993) and specifically
on the issue of the double titles Mansfeld (1994), 71–4.
57
Essay 1
Such interpreters then consider this title clearly to have proven that
the main enquiry (prothesis) concerns the arrangement of cities (politeia).
Secondly, these interpreters call as their witness Plato himself, who
says clearly in the fifth book of the Laws (739b) that this is the first and
20 best constitution (politeia), in which all property (women, children,
possessions, money) is common to everyone, whether this is
a constitution of gods or of men divine by nature,37 since it is
a paradigm of the truly divine constitution. The second constitution is
that in the Laws, which he says that he is in the process of teaching; it has
a certain share in immortality38 and is not far from the one before it.
25 The third [constitution] that he says he will describe after this is con-
sistent with these [first two], but is far inferior to both.39 Given that he
says that he is about to go through [one of these three], and he deems the
other worthy of discussion on another occasion, it is doubtless clear from
this that [when he talks about the first constitution] he describes neither
the one that he is currently narrating nor the one that he will narrate, but
one that he has already completed elsewhere. Where then was it decreed
in his works that everything should be in common and nothing owned
10 privately other than in the text at hand? And what above all characterises
this constitution other than the common ownership of all? Therefore if
he says that he has spoken of this [first constitution] in just the same way
as he is currently speaking about the second and will speak about the
5 third, it is clear to anyone that in the same way the aim (skopos) of the
Laws concerns the second constitution, and this text before us (i.e. the
Republic) concerns the first one, and that work which teaches about the
third constitution, has an aim concerned with the third. Therefore in
this way the Laws have as their aim to describe the first society among
10 those divided up by lot,40 just as the Republic [has as its aim] presenting
37
εἴτε θεῶν οὖσαν εἴτε θείων τινῶν φύσει. Compare Laws 739d6–7 ἡ μὲν δὴ τοιαύτη πόλις, εἴτε
που θεοὶ ἢ παῖδες θεῶν αὐτὴν οἰκοῦσι.
38
Compare Laws 739e3–4 ἣν [sc. Politeia] δὲ νῦν ἡμεῖς ἐπικεχειρήκαμεν, εἴη τε ἂν γενομένη
πως ἀθανασίας ἐγγύτατα καὶ ἡ μία δευτέρως.
39
At Laws 739e5 the Stranger adverts to a third constitution that he will describe after this
one (sc. the one in the Laws). It is far from clear to modern readers that this promise is
ever fulfilled. Nonetheless, the Neoplatonists seize upon this remark and suppose that
there is a third Platonic constitution. See in Remp. II 8.15–23 and in Tim. I 446.5 where
Proclus likens the governance of the three states to the activity of higher- and lower-
order divine demiurges: Zeus for the highest, Dionysus for the second constitution,
and Adonis for the third. Compare Anon. Proleg. 26.35–45. The third ‘reformed’ state is
that alleged to be dealt with in Letters VII and VIII. See also Alcinous, Handbook, ch. 24.
40
As Abbate notes this is probably a reference to the fact that the land of the citizens of
Laws is divided and not held in common as it is in the Republic. Recall that Dionysus is
the patron Demiurge of the second constitution. Dionysus’ cosmic role – as befits one
who was torn apart by the Titans – lies in dividing things; cf. in Tim. II 197.19–21.
58
the commonality which is defined in an undivided way,41 in accordance

with a single civic well-being, when people are gathered together in
mutual goodwill for a single communal life. And it does not treat one
kind of virtue separated from the others, as some say that justice is. It is
then a topic which is more scientific (epistêmonikôteron) and more com- 15
plete, since it takes together all goods along with justice and is not
devoted only to one form of virtue.
Thirdly then, those who offer this argument say that Socrates
himself in the Timaeus, when he is asked by Timaeus to summarise 20
what he has said on the previous day, goes through all the guidelines
concerning the constitution which he had discussed at length on the
previous days (17c). This is because the speculations concerning
justice were motivated by this topic [i.e. the constitution]. This con-
templation of justice, both in itself and in relation to injustice, was 25
a side-task; the main task was describing the best constitution – how it
might arise and, once it has arisen, how it can be preserved and
through what practices (epitêdeuma). He would not, when he is
asked to recap what has been said, remind those listening only of
the discussions concerning the ordering of the constitution, if this 30
were not the ultimate aim (skopimôtaton telos)42 of what he had said: 11
the ordering of the constitution. For all of these reasons it is clear that
the aim of the Republic is nothing else than the description of the best
constitution, as the aim of the Laws is description of the laws.
Though these two groups maintain positions of this kind, we accept 5
the arguments of both, and say that these men do not truly disagree, but
that the text’s purpose concerns both the constitution and justice prop-
erly defined. These are not, however, two aims (skopos), for that would
not be possible. At any rate it is necessary that the discussion (logos),
insofar as it has a use, will have one aim, like a living animal, just as each 10
animal is arranged in respect of all its parts according to one consistent
arrangement (homologia).43 These two aims are in fact the same as each
other, since what is justice in a single soul is a constitution of this kind in
the well-ordered state as a whole. In fact, the three classes in the 15
constitution are analogous to the three parts of the soul: the guardian
class, since it deliberates, is analogous to reason (logos), the auxiliary
41
We take the adverb ἀδιαιρέτως (10.10) with the participle ἀφοριζομένην in the following
line as do Festugière and Abbate.
42
Given the claim below that it would be impossible for the dialogue to have two aims or
skopoi, the comparative is somewhat jarring. But see in Alc. 9.15. All the subordinate
objectives of a dialogue are coordinated by the ultimate aim.
43
Proclus appeals to the ideal of organic unity for written works that is recommended in
Phaedrus 264c – a touchstone for the Neoplatonic notion of a single, unique skopos for
each dialogue. Cf. Anon. Proleg. 15.13.
59
Essay 1
class, since it fights on the state’s behalf, is analogous to thymos, the

labouring class, since it fulfils physical requirements, is analogous to the
desiring part. So if each person is that in terms of which he lives, reason
20 is the guardian, the thymos is the auxiliary, and desire is the labourer, so
that justice is the constitution which extends through all classes: each
individual performs his own task, one living in the manner of a labourer,
another as an auxiliary and another as a guardian, that is, living in
a physical way, or in a protective manner, or intellectually. This is in
25 fact Plato’s opinion, that there exists a single disposition (hexis) that
orders the city and a household and each individual. If this is so, then
each one of us lives a civic life when put in order by justice, and the city
lives justly when it is arranged in accordance with the best constitution.
If the general public (dêmos) is in the city what the desiring part is in each
30 individual, and the part of the city that deliberates is reason [in the
12 individual], as he says in the Laws (III 689a9),44 justice in itself would
indeed be a constitution of the soul, and the best constitution would be
justice for the city.
If this is true, the person who teaches about justice – provided that he
does not do so in a way that leaves things out – also teaches about
5 constitutions since he sees justice in all its aspects. One who speaks
about the correct constitution (politeia), if he should see all of it and not
merely some aspects, will also speak throughout about justice as it exists
in an individual, as [a kind of] constitution, and how it organises the
public within us, by means of the auxiliary part in us, in accordance with
10 the judgement of the guardian part in us. We can understand that Plato
has this opinion on the topic, bearing in mind that when he moves from
the enquiry concerning justice to the discussion of the constitution he
says that he makes the transition not from one subject to another that is
different in nature, but as if from small letters to larger and clearer ones,
15 which say the same things (Rep. II 368d1–7). So the subject matter
(hylê) differs, as small letters and large ones, but the formal type (eidos)
is the same, just as it is for the letters. The form of the best constitution
[in the soul] and the form of the justice in the city differ from each other
only with respect to the quantity of the underlying substrates (ta hypo-
20 keimena), but they have been allocated a single essence (ousia). For these
reasons he says that each one of us should look to the constitution
within us, employing that very expression (Rep. IX 591e1), and should
44
In fact, Plato’s Athenian Stranger says only that the part of the soul that feels pleasure
and pain corresponds to the dê mos. Not only are the other correlations not stated, the
equation of the soul’s capacity for pleasure and pain (τὸ λυπούμενον καὶ ἡδόμενον αὐτῆς,
689b1) with the appetitive part does not sit comfortably with the idea that reason and
thymos have their own characteristic pleasures.
60
give the governance of it to the best part and not to the avaricious one.
These things have been written in the ninth book.
Once more, following these words, we have found that he has 25
described justice in each individual as a constitution. As we have made
clear elsewhere,45 self-control is especially characteristic of virtue at the
ethical level, since nothing is so fitting as self-control for those who are
being educated.46 Justice is characteristic of political virtue, since the 13
process of bringing others to order especially requires the justice which
defines for individuals what they deserve. Courage is characteristic of
cathartic virtue, since it belongs especially to courage to be invulnerable
to the affections which are the true enemies lurking within us. And
intelligence (phronêsis) characterises contemplative virtue, since it is the 5
proper task of contemplation (theôria) to reflect intelligently on what
must be the case concerning true realities. Therefore if justice charac-
terises political virtue, how is it not necessary for the justice of each to be
a constitution for the soul and for the justice of the whole city to be
a constitution – one in keeping with the truth? So let us not say that there
are two aims (skopos), but that the aim of discussing justice in the city and 10
that of discussing the best constitution are really one. And [let us say that]
he begins the enquiry from justice as it is in the constitution of an
individual, but moves from there to enquire into the best constitution,
as this is justice among multiple people. The transition is made as if from 15
small letters to larger ones, as he says himself, and the difference lies in
the objects instantiating the form, but there is no difference in that form,
which is one and the same in different underlying objects. So the change
is from constitution to constitution, from that which is contemplated in
one individual to that in many, and from justice to justice, from that 20
which exists in a condensed manner to that which is more conspicuous.
It is not that one is the primary object of enquiry (zêtêma) and the other
incidental. For the terms ‘primary’ and ‘incidental’ [are predicated] truly
in the case of two things, but we say that these [sc. justice in the
individual and in the city] are not two things, but rather just one.
So for these reasons, in the discussion of changes of constitutions, he
looks at each in a single man and in a whole city, examining both the 25
timocratic man and the timocratic state, and then the oligarch and the
oligarchic state, and the democratic man and the democratic state, and
the tyrannical man and the tyrannical state (Rep. VIII 544d6 ff). And he
45
Such a discussion does not appear in any of our extant works.
46
Proclus alludes to four of the five gradations of the virtues (ethical, civic, cathartic and
theoretic) recognised by the Neoplatonists, leaving aside the hieratic virtues. Each
grade of virtue involves all of the cardinal virtues, but in the various grades one virtue
particularly stands out. Thus the gradations of the virtues preserve the axiom ‘all things
in all, but in each according to nature’.
61
Essay 1
30 makes the same judgement about the aristocratic constitution and the
14 tyrannical one as he does about justice itself and the extreme of injustice
[in individuals], since these do not differ from one another, but justice in
one individual is aristocracy in a city, and the extreme of injustice [in an
individual] is tyranny in a city.
5 We shall say then that the title of the work is harmonious with the
enquiry into justice, since the title expresses the same thing, that is
justice, since it is a constitution of the soul living in accordance with
correct reasoning. Even if he did not give the work the title of ‘justice’,
but rather the constitution (politeia), just as he called another work Laws,
10 we need not be astonished. One must give titles from things that are
more familiar, and the name Constitution, just as he said himself, is more
familiar than ‘justice’.47 Let us say that we have in fact discussed this
thoroughly and that we have perfectly determined the aim of the text of
the Republic.
<2. genre (EIDOS): 14.15–16.25>

15 The second major topic following this previous one was the literary
genre (eidos) of the dialogues, in terms of which the author arranged this
work. And I think that this does not require a long discussion from me,
but it is necessary merely to remind you that Plato himself says in this
20 text (392d, ff.) that there exist three genres of discourse (lexis). He calls
one the dramatic and purely mimetic, speaking of comedy and tragedy.
Next is the narrative and non-mimetic, [which is used] for example by
those authors who write dithyrambs and histories of events, when they
write without impersonation of characters (prosôpopoiia). Thirdly there is
25 the mixture of both, such as he says that Homer’s poetry is, variously
representing some things by narration of events, others by mimêsis of
characters.
Of these three genres that are distinguished in Plato, it is clearly
necessary to ascribe the work before us to the mixed genre of discourse,
since it describes some things as actions and others as words. In the
15 actions it provides pure narrative, requiring two qualities (idea): clear
delineation of characters and events, and accuracy of representation
(parastasis). For example, it says that [Socrates] went down to the
Piraeus and prayed to the goddess and observed the festival and wel-
5 comed the procession of citizens and foreigners, and then – returning
homewards – he turned back towards Polemarchus’ house and saw
47
Kroll supplies the familiar 368d passage, where the same letters are written in larger
print in the city. (But see also 545b3–4.) However, Plato nowhere makes the semantic
point that the word ‘politeia’ is more familiar than the word ‘justice’.
62
<2. Genre (eidos)>
Cephalus and those keeping company with Cephalus, and [the account]
embraces all such details of the assembly. On the other hand in the
words of each person it makes the most exact mimêsis – of some speaking 10
as old men, others in a mythic manner, others as sophists – and it records
both the knowledge (gnôsis) and the way of life (zôê) appropriately for
each person.48 For preserving in these speeches what is appropriate (to
prepon) for each character is the mark of the highest mimêsis. Similarly in
drama one must imitate in one way slave characters when they speak, in
another way characters who are free, in one way women and in another 15
way men when they are saying something. The one who is imitating
each person must set down the expressions appropriate to their natures,
ages, fortunes, habits, status.
So this work [the Republic] must be ascribed to the mixed genre of
discourse. If, however, we should divide the genres in the following way, 20
as some Platonists do,49 into the expository (hyphêgêtikon), the investi-
gative (zêtêtikon) and the mixed, we shall again select from these the
mixed and ascribe the Republic to that. There are certainly numerous
investigative passages in it, and there are also expository ones, when
Socrates expounds the dissolution of the best constitution through the 25
words of the Muses or the drama of events in Hades through the report
of Er. And perhaps it is also the case that the mixed genre of discourse is
appropriate to discussion of the arrangement of cities (politeia), in which
are gathered together all kinds of actions and words and ways of life. 16
This too requires more than casual consideration: this constitution is
described three times – in the Piraeus in argumentative form, on the
third occasion in the explanation to Timaeus in summary and without 5
characters, and in the middle in narrative, with that narrative providing
characters and events, but in better order than the previous discussion.50
Neither the first discussion nor the third one seemed to harmonise so
well with discussion of the constitution as has the middle one. The first
of them imitates the life of the soul when it is still fighting against the
passions, and the last imitates the life of the soul which has been entirely 10
carried up into contemplation and has shed the memory of those
48
See below 53.10–16 ff., where these two things are distinguished as separate qualifica-
tions for successful mimêsis.
49
According to Diogenes Laertius (3.49–51), Thrasyllus made such a division and it is
also found in Albinus, Introduction, ch. 3. For discussion see Tarrant (1993) and
Mansfeld (1994).
50
For Proclus’ idea that there are three discussions on justice and the ideal politeia – one
that occurred in Piraeus; one that occurred the next day when he told Timaeus,
Hermocrates, Critias and an unnamed fourth person about it in Athens (i.e. our text
of the Republic); and a third recapitulation given the following day that is found in the
introduction to the Timaeus – see in Tim. I 8.30–9.12 and 28.16–20.
63
Essay 1
contests. But the middle discussion imitates the life of the soul which has
already become still but which remembers nonetheless the contests it
undertook, when it restrained into order the great throng of forms of
irrational life. So it is with good reason that [Plato] understood this
15 middle conversation to be appropriate to the discussion of the constitu-
tion, since the political life is therapeutic51 of these [irrational impulses]
and has contemplation as its goal, by concentrating the reason in us.
This reason alone52 in its concentrated form knows synoptically how it
put in order the things dependent upon it, and on the other hand unfolds
itself henceforth towards contemplation of the whole, so that it sees the
20 constitution in all things and the one statesman of the cosmos.53 And
in fact if the paradigm of this best constitution is in the heavens, the
demiurge of the heavens is the best of statesmen, whom only the one
who has established the constitution within himself will see.
25 But the genre of the discourses, I think, has been made sufficiently
clear.
<3. material circumstances: 16.26–19.23>

The third [major topic] in the discussion before us was to consider the
material circumstances (hylê) of the text, seen under three headings:
51
The political virtues achieve the moderation of the passions – not their extinction.
So while the political virtues have the contemplative life as their ultimate goal, the
achievement of that end awaits the acquisition of the cathartic virtues which take the
aspiring philosopher from metriopatheia to apatheia. The locus for the cathartic virtues
within the Iamblichean ordering of dialogues is the Phaedo with its emphasis on the
separation of the soul from the body. For metriopatheia and apatheia as distinct stages in
the moral development of the would-be Platonic philosopher, see the texts in Sorabji
(2005), vol. 3, § 13(c).
52
Kroll considered emending μόνος (16.17) to μένων. Festugière preferred to keep
μόνος, seeing it as parallel to the same adjective applied to the demiurge a few
lines later (16.23). This is indeed plausible: only reason can put the lower parts of
the soul into order, and only one who has done this can contemplate the creator of
the heavens who is the cosmic statesman. Abbate likewise maintains the MS
reading.
53
The compression of Proclus’ expression makes this sentence a little difficult, but
we take it that he alludes to the idea developed in Rep. IX that reason is the only
part of the soul capable of considering the good of all the parts. Here ‘the things
dependent on it’ (τὰ μεθ᾽ ἑαυτόν) are the irrational parts of the soul. Political virtue
‘gathers together’ the reason and allows it to put the lower parts of the soul in
order. This is foundational for the work of the cathartic virtues, which will in
turn, by separating the soul from the body insofar as possible during embodied
life, enable contemplation and so progression to the theurgic virtues. All of this is
condensed heavily in this passage.
64
<3. Material circumstances>
characters, times, places. So let us discuss these points following upon 17

those which preceded.
The place is the Piraeus in the first conversation, the city in
the second and third. And it is clear I suppose to those who have listened
attentively to Plato that places near the sea must be full of tumultuous 5
and variegated life,54 but that cities further from the sea are pure of
those evils. The cities belong to gods of a similar sort to themselves, to
whom they are dedicated, because [those cities] are receptive of the most
intelligent souls, as [Plato] himself says55 about the place allotted to
Athena – a place which, he tells us, the goddess chose because it would 10
be especially suited to producing men who were most similar to her.
[This being the case] it is certainly clear that order and an intelligent
(emphrôn) life and reason would belong to a city of this kind. If this is
Plato’s opinion concerning both locations [sc. Piraeus and Athens], we
would not say anything discordant [with this], if we should say that [the
first setting] is appropriate for the first conversation, in that the discus- 15
sion about justice, and if you wish, about the constitution, is not lacking
in tumult, as is plausible. Nor is it short of sophistic contests, as Socrates
contends on behalf of justice against the many-headed sophistic life.56
The second setting, on the other hand, [is very well suited] to a company
free from tumult, which has gone aside on its own, with the calm that is 20
appropriate to philosophy and speaking with those of similar nature to
itself, to contemplate the same things which it contemplated with great
difficulty amongst the tumult. Perhaps one of the places might be suited
to genesis and the other to that which is pure of genesis and ethereal, as the
Socrates in the Phaedo might say (109b6 ff; 111b6). For genesis is replete 25
with salty life and full of storms and great waves that submerge souls, so 18
54
Probably an allusion to Laws 705a where the Athenian Stranger quotes a line from
Alcman: ‘For the sea is, in very truth, “a right briny and bitter neighbor”’. Proclus
mentions that the realm of Becoming is replete with salty life below at 17.25.
Compare Hermias in Phdr. 84.7–12 Lucarini and Moreschini (= 79.7–13
Couvreur): ‘Plato habitually condemned the conduct of sailors (243C7) as
unmanly, ignoble and corrupt conduct. This is doubtless why he also expelled
the nautical [element] from his state. One would classify sailors as analogous to
enmattered forms and to the ways of life that revolve around bodies in that they
always practise their profession on the water, which is to say, in [the realm of]
generation. Hence he urges one to keep away from them.’ The sea as a negative
image of embodiment also occurs in the oracle on Plotinus which Porphyry
records (Vita Plotini 22.25–28); see too the notes of Brisson and Flamand (1992),
579–80).
55
Proclus alludes to Critias 109b1–d2 in which Athena and Hephaestus choose as their
allotment the territory and people of Athens where they sow good men and ἐπὶ νοῦν
ἔθεσαν τὴν τῆς πολιτείας τάξιν.
56
Cf. Soph. 240c4 for the ‘many-headed sophist’.
65
Essay 1
that their life is not without tumult, even if they live in accordance with
reason. And that second place belongs to souls who have attained a cycle
5 that is pure and free from sorrow, even though they still remember the
disturbance that lies in genesis and the struggles in which they contended
in those places.
Let that suffice concerning the places. One can see that the times, into
which he has divided the conversations, are harmonious with these: he
sets the one in the Piraeus during the festival of Bendis and the other in
10 the city during the Panathenaea. Do we not know that the festival of
Bendis is intended to worship Artemis in accordance with the customs
of the Thracians, and that the name Bendis is Thracian? For this reason
the Thracian theologian,57 along with many names of Selênê, ascribes
the name Bendis to this goddess:
15 Ploutônê and Euphrosynê and mighty Bendis. (Orph. Frag. 200 Kern)
The Panathenaea (and he is speaking here of the Lesser Panathenaea)
follow upon the festival of Bendis and have the worship of Athena as the
reason for the celebration.58 Therefore both are daughters of Zeus, both
20 maidens, and let it be added too that both are light-bearers, although
one is a lightbearer in that she brings the invisible rational formative
57
i.e. Orpheus, who was torn apart by the Thracian women and into whose teachings
Pythagoras was initiated when he was in Thrace – hence the familiarity of Socrates’
audience (which includes Timaeus, of course) with Orphic wisdom. Cf. Proclus in Tim.
III 167.32 (= Iamblichus, in Tim. fr. 74, Dillon).
58
On Proclus’ conception of the relation among these festivals, see Tarrant as well as
Festugière on in Tim. I 26.13 and 85.4. In short, Proclus assumes that Plato’s
dialogues take place in relation to symbolically significant festivals.
The Parmenides has for its setting the Greater Panathenaea (in Parm. 618.24),
while the Timaeus occurs – as he supposes – during the Lesser Panathenaea (in
Tim. I 84.25), which he takes to follow the Bendidia at the Piraeus. Proclus takes
the settings of the Parmenides and the Timaeus to indicate that the first deals with
transcendent reality (since Athena’s peplos and her victory over the Giants symbolise
her elevation to be one with Zeus), while the setting of the latter indicates that it is
a work that deals with what is encosmic (cf. in Tim. I 84.14)). This is symbolically
satisfying, but viewed in the context of his view about the dates of these festivals,
the chronology is wrong and requires that Proclus believe that the date of the
Lesser Panathenaea varied from that of the Greater. He gives the date of the
Bendidia as the nineteenth day of Thargelion (in Tim. I 26.15). If we allow
one day for Socrates to relate the account of his conversation in Piraeus to
Hermocrates, Timaeus, Critias and the unnamed fourth, then the following day –
21 Thargelion – must be the occasion for the Lesser Panathenaea when the
conversation of the Timaeus takes place. But Proclus claims that the Greater
Panathenaea take place on the third day from the end of Hecatombaeon.
Therefore the dates of the Greater and Lesser Panathenaea must differ. But this
is in fact false: they took place on the same date each year, with the Greater being
celebrated on this date every fourth year.
66
<3. Material circumstances>
principles of nature to light,59 the other in that she joins the intellective
light to souls:
there burned from her helmet and her shield an unwearying fire (Il. 5.4),
and in that she removes the mist (achlys) which, when it is present, 25
prevents a soul from seeing what is divine and what is human.60 Since
both goddesses have characteristics of these kinds, it is clear that one is
the overseer of genesis and the midwife of those principles bringing
about generation,61 while the other is the guide leading souls in their
ascent and chorus-leader of intellect and true intelligence (phronêsis) and
possesses greater authority in the celestial levels, and that from above 19
she completes all the sublunary order.
So if these things that we say are true, the festival of the Bendidia would
be appropriate for the first conversations, just as the place is, since it
imitates a soul ordering genesis but not without tumult. The Panathenaea, 5
on the other hand, are appropriate for the second and third conversa-
tions, since these conversations imitate a soul ascending into itself and
drawing in its life away from lower things and towards its own intellect.
Instead of ordering things that are unlike it towards itself, [this soul] is
present with things like itself and shares in intellections and visions fitting 10
for those who are happy spectators. And if you wish, you might consider
that Plato mentions the foreign rites on the grounds that they are appro-
priate to a soul living in a holy manner even though it lives with genera-
tion, ‘consorting with foreign rites’ – [foreign] by virtue of being
generation-producing (genesiourgos) rather than celestial. He mentions
hereditary [Hellenic] rites, however, like the Panathenaea, as they are
suited to a soul reverting to its appropriate character (êthê) and living
intellectively and in a way, as he says, that is appropriate ‘to its own 15
kindred star’ (Tim. 42b4). For those things are truly the inheritance of
souls, because our fatherland is there, due to our sowing by the demiurge.
These rites of genesis, on the other hand, are foreign, even if they belong
59
The basis for this cosmic role for Bendis is far from transparent on the basis of the
Orphic poems (which seem like the obvious source of authority for Proclus in this
context). Bendis is matched with Artemis at Orph fr. 257 and Artemis is, in Proclus’
mind, another identity for Hecate (Plat. Theol. VI 51.24–8) – the life-giving goddess
who bears a torch.
60
It is Athena who removes the mist from the eyes of Diomedes at Il. 5.127 and from the
Achaeans at 15.668.
61
It appears that Proclus here assigns to Bendis something like the encosmic role envisaged
for Athena herself which he supposes to be symbolised by setting the Timaeus during the
Lesser Panathenaea. See above note 38. Or perhaps Athena’s role as symbolised at the
Lesser Panathenaea is encosmic but super-lunary, while Bendis/Artemis/Hecate’s role as
symbolised by setting the Republic at the Bendidia is encosmic but sub-lunary.
67
Essay 1
20 to ruling gods. It is necessary for one who has understanding to fulfil

one’s obligations to these deities too, but to look to others and to hasten
back [to those] as quickly as possible, just as Socrates did: although he
took part in the festival among these [lower gods] and prayed to them and
observed the rites, he turned homewards at once.
This is sufficient discussion concerning the times.
And it still remains to go through [what there is to be said]
25 about the characters. So there are ten who keep company with each
20 other . . .
68
The opening part of Essay 3 is missing from the manuscript in the

Laurentian library, along with the latter parts of Essay 1 and the
entirety of Essay 2. In what remains, Proclus delves into the argument
of Rep. I 351a–352d for the claim that justice is more powerful than
injustice. At that point in Plato’s text, Socrates argues that injustice
leads to faction and discord within a group, or even within an indivi-
dual, and such groups or individuals are therefore less capable than
those who are just. Proclus takes up an obvious objection to this – if
their injustice was really complete, then there would be no internal
dissension. In the final part of the essay, Proclus considers the argu-
ment (Rep. 352d–54a, ff.) that the just life is happier. We will examine
the text that we still possess later in this introduction. First, however,
we will ask about whether we can make any responsible conjectures
about what we are missing.
The list of headings at the opening of the work tells us only that Essay
2 was ‘On the arguments by Socrates against the definition of justice
given by Polemarchus’. Essay 3 is titled ‘On the four arguments in the
Republic in defence of justice against Thrasymachus’ four claims (dog-
mata) about it’. Unlike the case of the longer Essay 6 (where the person
who composed the headings at the opening of the manuscript gave us
a further breakdown of the topics within the essay), Essays 2 and 3 are
given only titles. Based on this evidence, can we have any hope of
knowing what is missing?
One hypothesis is prompted by noticing the difference between
the descriptions of Essays 2 and 3. The former mentions the
definition (horos) of justice given by Polemarchus, while the latter
speaks not of Thrasymachus’ definition of justice but instead of his
claims (dogmata) about it. When we look carefully at Plato’s text, we
find that Socrates refers to the list of goods attached by
Thrasymachus to injustice (348a). These goods seem to be four in
number.
(1) Thrasymachus claims that injustice is more profitable (lysiteleˆs)
than justice and Socrates answers this charge briefly at the very
end (354a).
69
(2) Thrasymachus claims that injustice is virtue and good judge-

ment (euboulia), while justice is simple naivety (euêtheia).
Socrates argues instead that it is injustice that is vice and ignor-
ance (349b–350 c).
(3) Thrasymachus claims that injustice is stronger than justice
(344 c) and Socrates answers this claim in 351a–352d.
(4) Thrasymachus claims that the unjust person is happy and blessed
(344b) and Socrates argues against this claim too (352d–354a).
We have Proclus’ treatment of the last two items on the list. What
prevents us from supposing that the missing portions of Essay 3
addressed themselves to points (1) and (2)?
The first thing that stands in the way of this supposition is the fact
that the question of the relative profitability of justice is dealt with
so briefly and, indeed, follows almost immediately from the conclu-
sion that the just person is happier by being just and that Socrates
treats it as an easy and obvious consequence (354a). Now, he notes
that the refutation of (3) would follow easily from the conclusion
reached regarding (2). If justice is wisdom and virtue, while injustice
is ignorance and vice, he thinks that it would be easy to show that
justice is stronger. But because he does not wish to reach the con-
clusion simply (haplôs), he gives the longer argument that Proclus
discusses. He makes no argument regarding the profitability of
justice that is similarly independent of the conclusion regarding
(4), the happiness of the just person. This very brevity, plus the
fact that the two issues discussed by Proclus follow the order of
the dialogue, suggests that the first of the four topics dealt with was
not the profitability of justice.
What then might be the first of the dogmata of Thrasymachus
discussed in the missing section of Essay 3? It might be that we should
attach no particular attention to the presence of the word ‘definition’
in the title of Essay 2 and its absence from the title of Essay 3. After all,
two of the things asserted by Thrasymachus in Book I that are most
discussed in the contemporary literature on Plato are the definitions of
justice offered by the sophist and the relation between them.
Thrasymachus begins by defining justice as ‘the benefit of the stron-
ger’ (338 c), but then equates this with adherence to the laws of the
established rulers (339a). This equation creates problems if he grants
that the established rulers may make mistakes in crafting legislation to
serve their own interests. This admission is initially granted (339b) and
then withdrawn when Thrasymachus sees where it leads (340d, ff.).
One diagnosis of Thrasymachus’ dialectical moves is that Plato wished
to portray him as an immoralist, rather like Callicles. He supposes that
70
the nature of justice consists in more or less what Cephalus and others
suppose: it is simply adherence to law and custom. But Thrasymachus
wants to insist that this adherence is foolish since it works to someone
else’s advantage. So while it appears that Thrasymachus is entering the
conversation to answer the question that Polemarchus and Socrates
have just posed – viz. What is justice if it is not helping friends and
harming enemies? (336a) – in fact he is much more interested in
providing a comment on the value of justice on the assumption that
its nature is just what shallow thinkers such as Cephalus take it to be.1
Is there a reason to think that our preoccupations would have been
Proclus’ preoccupations?
We think this is unlikely. Proclus is not characteristically concerned
to show how Plato artfully explores the relations among different phi-
losophical questions by exhibiting his characters entangled in the con-
sequences of not observing the relevant distinctions. Rather, Proclus’
goals are usually far more partisan: to defend Plato (or Homer!) and to
defend the things that a good Platonist ought to value, like justice. With
this partisan tendency in mind, which claims made by Thrasymachus in
Book I that are contested by Socrates are likely to have drawn Proclus’
attention?
Given the strong connection that exists in Proclus’ mind between the
cosmic community ruled by the gods and the ideal state ruled by the
guardians, we think it likely that the question of the beneficence of the
ruling art was one of the dogmata of Thrasymachus dealt with in the
missing part of our Essay 3. In response to Thrasymachus’ insults about
Socrates’ naivety when it comes to sheep and shepherds, Socrates argues
that every form of rule, insofar as it is rule, considers only the good of
the governed (345b5 ff.). The argument is long and complex. Its rele-
vance to the subsequent argument in the later books of the Republic is
obvious. So we think it likely that one of our two missing sections of
Essay 3 dealt with it.
We think it likely that the other missing section of Essay 3 was
dedicated to a discussion of Thrasymachus’ claim that justice is foolish-
ness. Socrates’ argument at 349b–350c is also lengthy and complicated.
It culminates in the famous blushing of Thrasymachus (350d3) –
a dramatic juncture that marks the transition to the final and glorious
arguments that conclude that justice is stronger than injustice and that
the just person is happy. Proclus adverts to the conclusion of the argu-
ment of 349b–350c in his discussion of the extant fourth part of Essay
3.2 Here he observes that Socrates makes use of the conclusion that
1
See the lucid exposition in Annas (1981). 2
in Remp. I 26.18–29.
71
justice is a virtue at 353e7–8 in the final argument whilst noting that it is

a premise that Thrasymachus had previously agreed to. Proclus
digresses briefly to discuss this premise. He does not rehearse any of
the reasoning that leads Socrates to the conclusion at 350c –
a conclusion that Proclus now characterises as the view that justice is
a virtue and coordinate with (systoichos) intelligence (phronêsis) and wis-
dom (sophia). Instead, he delivers an utterly specious argument for the
claim that justice is a virtue. Consider the person who denies the claim
and asserts that justice is not a virtue. Either this person speaks intelli-
gently or unintelligently. If the latter, then what he says is false.
Therefore justice is a virtue.3 If the person who asserts that justice is
not a virtue speaks intelligently, then, Proclus reasons, he speaks cor-
rectly. And if he speaks correctly, then intelligence is a virtue. But justice
is coordinate with intelligence, and whatever is coordinate with or
ranked alongside a virtue is a virtue. So justice is a virtue.4 Now, it
must be admitted that not every argument in Proclus’ commentaries is
pure philosophical gold. But this brief ten-line defence of a key premise
in the final argument seems to be uncharacteristically bad. It strains
credulity to accept that the fourth part of our text contains the entirety
of Proclus’ analysis of a key disagreement between Thrasymachus and
Socrates. Hence we think it is likely that one of our two missing discus-
sions in Essay 3 dealt with the argument from 349b–350c in which
Socrates establishes that the just man is akin to the person of intelligence
and thus that justice is a virtue.
So much, then, for what might have been in the parts of Essay 3 that
are now missing. What is illuminating in the portions that do remain?
The first thing to be said is that, as is often the case, the Neoplatonist
attends more carefully to parts of Plato’s text that modern commentators
pass over without much comment. The remaining portions of Essay 3 take
up about seven pages in the text of Kroll. These are split very unevenly
between the discussion of the claim that justice is stronger than injustice
and the claim that the just person is happy. While modern commentators
have been very interested in the latter and its relation to Aristotle’s function
3
Of course, even if one grants the premise that everything said unintelligently is false,
it still does not follow from the falsity of ‘justice is not a virtue’ that justice is
a virtue. After all, it does not follow from the falsity of ‘Waldo is not a wombat’ that
Waldo is a wombat. Waldo may in fact be a quoll. Some psychic dispositions too
may be neither virtues not vices, and this possibility should be salient for Proclus
given the context. While Thrasymachus believes that injustice is a virtue, he hesi-
tates to call its opposite a vice, preferring instead to regard virtue as simple naivety
rather than vice (348c11).
4
This fork of the disjunctive syllogism is obviously question-begging. The person who
denies that justice is a virtue is also likely to deny that it is coordinate with intelligence.
72
argument in Nicomachean Ethics I 7.1097b25–1098a20, the argument at

351a–352c showing the powerlessness of unjust persons or groups to
achieve their ends has had far less attention. Yet Proclus dedicates five of
the seven pages in the remainder of Essay 3 to the latter. The difference is
perhaps attributable to the ‘top down’ approach to philosophy character-
istic of Neoplatonism compared with the ‘bottom up’ approach character-
istic of contemporary philosophy. When modern philosophers hear that
the claim ‘justice is more powerful than injustice’ they will regard this as
a short-hand way of expressing the thought that just persons or just
institutions are better able to achieve their ends than are unjust persons
or unjust institutions.5 This orientation is ‘bottom up’ in the sense that
most of us suppose that differences among abstractions like justice or
injustice supervene on differences among the concrete individuals that
exhibit the properties in question. If justice is indeed more powerful than
injustice, that is because just people and just institutions are more powerful
than unjust ones. But for Proclus and the Neoplatonists in general, the
order of explanation is exactly the other way around. The superiority of just
persons or institutions is explained by the nature of justice. The persons or
institutions have the powers (and the essence and the activities) that they
have because they are participants in the relevant Form. There is an expla-
natory priority of the more abstract over the more concrete.
To his credit, Proclus focuses on the obvious objection to Socrates’
argument at 351a–352c. Socrates begins from the idea that unjust
cooperative actions will inevitably involve dissension among the mem-
bers of the coalition. This starting point is, considered on its own,
dubious enough. Socrates simply refuses to acknowledge the possibi-
lity that a city or a band of thieves might regularly treat others unjustly
yet honour their commitments to one another and treat one another
with complete fairness. He simply assumes that injustice inevitably
brings with it factionalism (stasis) and in-fighting, while justice inevi-
tably brings with it friendship (philia) and unity (homonoia, 351d4–6).
But even if one were to concede this as a necessary principle of
group dynamics, the move from the level of the collective to the intra-
personal case seems to require argument. Socrates asks Thrasymachus
whether he is willing to accept that injustice retains the power to cause
factionalism when it occurs only in a single individual (351e6–7) and
Thrasymachus seems to grant this premise simply in order to bring the
5
It is also a proposition that strikes the modern ear as distinctly implausible. We suppose
that just institutions are by their nature democratic in some sense and recognise that
action based on consensus and agreement takes longer. Authoritarian institutions are
probably more powerful at least in their ability to respond immediately and decisively to
new situations.
73
whole tiresome exercise to a close. The largest part of Proclus’ discus-

sion is dedicated to investigating a possible objection. If a person is
really completely unjust, would there be factionalism among the parts of
his soul? Anticipating Hume’s delightful turn of phrase, Proclus asks
about the person in whom reason is completely enslaved to passion.
Will there be the internal analogue of the (allegedly) inevitable dis-
sension among thieves that (allegedly) detracts from their capacity to
act effectively?
While Proclus addresses the obvious objection it is by no means
clear that his reply is convincing. He credits the reasoning part of
the soul with two essential functions – a cognitive and a vital func-
tion. It seems that the former relates to the understanding of means
to ends and the latter involves the having of correct desires. In the
case where reason is reduced to only its first function – that of
discovering the means to the ends endorsed by the passionate part
of the soul – reason still does something of its own. But ‘each doing
its own’ is justice. So even in the person in whom reason is com-
pletely subordinated to the inferior part of the soul, there is still
justice at least in this attenuated sense.
This conclusion, however, is not obviously relevant to the objection
that the completely unjust person might lack internal factionalism and
so might be effective. Proclus shows only that justice (in a rather atte-
nuated sense) is still present in the person who is capable of undertaking
unjust actions. Proclus is perhaps misled by Socrates’ own non-sequitur
at 352b8–352d4. He argues that it is through justice (i.e. through their
ability to collaborate and be friends) that the band of thieves accomplish
their unjust ends. But even if justice in this sense plays an essential causal
role in the effective actions of unjust persons, this does not show that in
describing them as unjust we speak falsely (352b8–c3). Nor does it
establish that ‘justice is more powerful than injustice’ unless one accepts
a general principle to the effect that where A is causally necessary for B,
then A is more powerful than B. Socrates’ argument that there is still
a trace of justice in groups who succeed in committing injustices relies
on the premise that just people are more capable or powerful than the
unjust (352b6–9). That premise, in turn, relies on the supposition that
injustice necessarily involves debilitating factionalism whether within
a collective or within an individual. Proclus’ objection aims at this
putatively necessary connection between injustice and faction. His
response is even less convincing than Socrates’ argument at 352b8–d4.
While Socrates seems to aim at the claim that it is the justice of the
unjust that enables their action, Proclus seems to aim only at the claim
that no person with any real agency lacks justice.
74
In spite of what we see as the weakness of Proclus’ response, the issue

is one that captured the imagination of the scholiast. The longest scho-
lion in the Laurentian manuscript of the Republic Commentary addresses
itself to exactly this part of Proclus’ text.6 We append a translation of the
scholion to this introduction. In general, the scholiast seeks to draw
a connection between the ‘dissimilar similarity’ that obtains between the
One and matter and the relation of the thoroughly unjust agent to the
just person. The dissimilar similarity of the One and matter is explained
by Proclus at in Alc. I 189.16. Both matter and the One are devoid of
Form, as well as unlimited and unknowable. The One is all things in
a manner that is superior, while matter is all things in a way that is
inferior. Proclus himself applies this dissimilar similarity to the person
who is wise and the person who is doubly ignorant (i.e. is ignorant and
ignorant of his ignorance). They resemble one another in something
analogous to the way in which matter resembles the One.7 The scholiast
attempts a similar comparison between the just person and the utterly
unjust person, but the terms of the comparison are not entirely
perspicuous.
The tendency to interpret the arguments of Republic I in relation to
the highest principle of Neoplatonic metaphysics is not confined to the
scholiast. Proclus himself does the same thing in his explanation of one
of the premises in Socrates’ function argument (352d–353e). Socrates
secures Thrasymachus’ agreement to the premise that a thing, x, has the
function F if either x is the only thing that does F or it is the thing that
does F best (353a10–11). Proclus grounds this premise, which is simply
agreed to by the participants in the discussion in Plato’s text, in the
character of the One. It is the ultimate source through which all things
have their functions. When x has function F because it alone does F, this
is an image of the One. When x has function F because it does x better
than any alternative to x, this is an image of the first cause of all things in
its role as the Good.
Proclus’ discussion of the function argument is otherwise unremark-
able. He reconstructs it as a series of four syllogisms, giving a very clear
exposition of Socrates’ argument. If he recognised the similarity with
the argument in Nicomachean Ethics, he does not remark upon it.
In general, Essay 3 attends closely to the details of the arguments in
Republic I. This gives the impression of a basic introduction. It is not
6
There is another lengthy scholion (II 375.3–376.7) in the Laurentian at I 265.26 and it
too involves the notion of a dissimilar similarity between matter and the One. This
concept is a prominent one in Ps.-Dionysius and it is entirely possible that its salience
for the scholiast is a result of being acquainted with his works.
7
Cf. Layne (2009).
75
without reason that Gallavotti took it to form part of an Isagoge to the

Republic. Upon closer examination, however, principles of Neoplatonic
metaphysics are invoked in ways that presuppose familiarity with the
system. It may be a work for beginners in Platonist philosophy, but it
also speaks to those who are more advanced in their understanding.
Appendix: Scholion to in Remp. I 21.17 (= II 369.4–370.23)

Perhaps it is necessary to say that in the case of a disposition of this sort
[sc. complete injustice] there is a dissimilar similarity to justice which is like
the dissimilar similarity customarily attributed in the case of matter and the
first [cause]. To the extent that the superior parts of the soul follow those
that are inferior, they are not compelled (since in fact the concept of
suffering injustice at someone’s hands is that of the compulsion involved
in the things attendant upon being robbed by him), but [in the case at hand,
the superior parts of the soul] willingly subordinate themselves to the
worse. They [sc. the superior parts of the soul] commit injustice against
themselves, and for this reason they in no way do the things that are fitting
for themselves. So too we also assumed that the unjust city was less capable
of getting things done for this reason, since it is the one in which some of
the citizens rob others of the things that belong to them by force and for
this reason they are enemies and do not act with the cooperation of the
whole soul. But we have said that the one in which the citizens and the
knaves are united has a share in justice. Therefore, when the sort of justice
that is present in it is present to the soul, then there would be no action
undertaken by this [sort of disposition] or only with great difficulty – not
[merely?] by virtue of the fact that the parts of the soul in it are factiona-
lized, but instead along with the compulsion that some parts exercise over
others and at this point the soul does not act eagerly.
What about this then? In the case of this disposition where there is
conflict, is there no trace of justice? Surely one ought to say No. Reason
has its value to the extent that it sees the good and takes it for itself, even
if it is in conflict with passion due to the fact that it does not yet know the
good and it either dominates or is dominated. If, however, the soul was
reason alone, then in that case it would be even more necessary for the
[good] action to come about. But since the soul is observed to be
tripartite, it is necessary for all the parts of the soul to be united with
one another if what is proposed is in fact to be done by it. It is for this
reason that in the case of perfect vice the image of concord [among the
parts of the soul] becomes the cause of actions that are perverted, since
the image is perverted.8 There is such a concord of discord among the
8
We omit lines 7–10 since these are repeated at the end of the scholion. They certainly
make more sense there.
76
worse [parts of the soul] (for it comes about through the weakness of the
reasoning part), just as in the case of matter there is something incor-
poreal that is inferior to bodies and the ungenerated thing that is
inferior to what has come to be. As a result, it seems that justice is
present in a multitude to the extent that there is a kind of concord there
to be a cause of actions and it is because of this that the things that have
been pulled aside [contain] some trace of concord that is made capable
of acting concordantly with concord. If the concord is truly natural and
truly justice with true beliefs about the good as the object of desire, then
the actions are correct. If, however, it is the unnatural concord where
the better parts follow those that are worse and all that remains are mere
images that are false and merely apparent [then the actions are not].
In addition, such a way of life is not always able to maintain concord
with itself. After all, the common notions (through which it has a motive
towards salvation) inhere in the soul essentially and are unable to remain
entirely inactive.
77
essay 3
i. on the four arguments about justice

5 in the REPUBLIC opposed to the four
opinions thrasymachus has about it.
A. Third argument: that justice is more powerful
than injustice: 20.7–24.24
<1. Review of the argument: 20.7–21.7>
*** that which does not stand in need is more powerful than that which
does, since it is instead self-sufficient all by itself in relation to the very
being that it is. This being true, he shows that injustice stands in need of
10 justice to the extent that it exists. In the absence of justice, injustice is
idle and lacking in agency. He reminds us of this fact through many
[examples] (Rep. I 351b–e) – for instance in the case of cities: if a city
were full of injustice, it would never be able to do anything, either in
relation to some other city or in relation to itself, due to discord
15 (dichonoein),9 since it would be composed of people who commit injus-
tice and those who suffer it. Similarly in the case of an army – if there was
complete injustice in it, then it would be factionalised within itself, and
engaging in factionalism it will fall apart and be ineffective in matters of
war. The same goes for a household in which there is not even a trace of
20 justice. Since it is necessary that this household is full of discord, it is not
capable of action, since the people who live there are not on good terms
with one another. Most remarkable of all, however, is the fact that the
presence of injustice within a single [person] necessitates that he is filled
with factional strife in relation to himself. And through this strife he is
9
διχονοεῖν – the sort of internal dissension that we convey in English when we say that ‘he
was in two minds about cheating on his taxes’. Closer still is the sense of double-
mindedness in the German vocabulary of doubt: zweifeln, zweifelhaft. Proclus’ thought
in this objection revolves around the claim about the two effects of collective or
individual injustice that Socrates makes at Republic 352a1–3. The first of these is that
the unjust agent is incapable of coordinated action due to internal conflict (πρῶτον μὲν
ἀδύνατον αὐτὸ ποιεῖν πράττειν μεθ’ αὑτοῦ διὰ τὸ στασιάζειν). The second is that the unjust
agent is an enemy to himself (ἔτι δ’ ἐχθρὸν εἶναι ἑαυτῷ). But in Alcibiades 126c4 Socrates
asks, leadingly, whether Alcibiades associates friendship with concord and enmity with
discord or being of two minds about things (Ἆρ’ οὖν φιλίαν λέγεις ὁμόνοιαν ἢ διχόνοιαν;).
Thus, as usual, Proclus’discussion is solidly grounded in the Platonic corpus.
78
I. On the four arguments about justice
rendered weaker, since he gets swept along towards one thing or

another and is unable to bring himself to make a choice. It is therefore 25
necessary that everyone who is unjust has some trace of justice, to the
extent that he is capable of intending to do anything. The following
syllogism comes about as a consequence of these facts:
1. Everything that is unjust is weak when it is separate from justice; 21
2. Everything that is separate from justice requires justice in order
to be capable of anything, since it is weak otherwise.
Therefore, everything that is unjust requires justice in order to be
capable of anything.
Here again is another syllogism:
1. Everything that is unjust requires justice in order to be capable of 5
anything;
2. Everything that requires justice in order to be capable of any-
thing is weaker than justice.
Therefore everything that is unjust is weaker than justice.
But this was the thesis that was proposed.
<2. Objection and reply: 21.8–23.30>

But perhaps someone might raise a problem: Are we in fact failing to
assume complete injustice in a person when we stipulate this – that if he
were unjust, then there would be cognitive dissonance?10 After all, the 10
person who is like this has some justice to the extent that his reason is
still able to be in conflict with passion. But the person who is completely
unjust treats reason as a slave to passion – a slave who advocates on its
behalf and brings before it courses of action. So how are we to agree that 15
there is discord in this sort of person, when the one thing that his entire
soul says is that which passion utters, and it impels itself towards that
goal to which passion moves its whole way of life? Injustice does what it
likes in such a soul, while justice is not present in it.
Let us say the following in response to this problem: the first [and
highest] disposition (hexis) of the soul is one where reason dominates
entirely over passion and possesses its own highest perfections which 20
are double – one a perfection of the cognitive [part], the other of the vital
[part]. The final [and lowest] is the disposition in which passion holds
power over reason in every way, with the result that it stands in opposi-
tion to the former condition and reason is thus neither capable of
10
διχονοεῖν πρὸς ἑαυτόν. See previous note on ‘being in two minds’ about something.
‘Cognitive dissonance’ might over-translate the phrase, but tepid phrases like ‘discor-
dant with himself’ arguably understate the matter. We thank the anonymous reviewer
for the press for his or her suggestion of cognitive dissonance.
79
Essay 3
discriminating anything properly nor has any correct desire. Since these
are the limit cases, there come from them intermediates, one of which is
25 better, the other worse, and there is another one that is intermediate
between these two.
Were passion to be in conflict with reason and passion nonetheless
sometimes dominate, then this sort of disposition [among the parts of
the soul] is better than the one that is called the lowest, though it is
worse than the highest and is genuinely intermediate between these two.
After all, reason is yet strong to some extent and fights against passion
30 both in terms of its vital and its cognitive [capacities] but – because it
doesn’t have perfect understanding (gnôsis) but only something more
22 like opinion11 – it gives in at times to passion. If knowledge were
present, passion would not resist since knowledge orders the entire
way of life from the top down.12
But if reason is not in conflict with passion because it has been
enslaved with respect to its way of life and proposes the same object of
5 desire as passion does, yet somehow its cognitive part is still capable of
seeing and, because of this, discovers means for the fulfilment of pas-
sion, then this sort of disposition is worse than the previous one in which
reason halfway lives its own life. After all, the discovery of means for
things that are proposed is the distinctive feature of the cognitive power.
10 Now suppose reason understands what is needed and desires what is
needed, but does not understand perfectly. Nonetheless, suppose that
the imperfection were such that only the best opinions were present in it
and it was, in fact, already on the road to knowledge. This sort of
disposition is the one that is closest to the best in which there is never
any conflict. [In this imperfect condition], there is generally conflict
15 with passion. This is because the reason that possesses knowledge does
not yet hold power, but [a kind of] potential reason does, although the
passions fight against it. This is because it does not merely have right
opinions, but has in some way begun to have a share in knowledge
(epistêmê). This sort of understanding (gnôsis) empowers reason’s cogni-
tive part and prepares it to hold out more strongly against passion by
20 virtue of the fact that it has a greater vision of the good and is more in
accordance with its nature.
11
διότι δὲ οὐκ ἔχει γνῶσιν τελέαν, ἀλλὰ δοξαστικὴν μόνον. At in Tim. II 120.25 gnôsis is
contrasted with δοξαστικὴν ἢ αἰσθητικὴν ἀντίληψιν on the grounds that real gnôsis or
understanding grasps the explanation for the fact and not merely the fact itself.
12
ἐκ πρύμνης κοσμούσης – literally ‘from the stern’– since this is where ships were steered
from. Cf. Critias 109c2 where the gods direct their human charges by means of
persuading their souls (steering from the stern, as it were) rather than compelling
their bodies. We have adapted the Greek idiom to an English one that functions in
roughly the same way.
80
Thus whenever reason is completely and utterly perfect none of the

things that are unjust are done due to the power of that which is best.
Whenever reason is completely and utterly imperfect by virtue of both
the cognitive part’s lack of clarity and the fact that the vital part is not in
its proper condition, then once again nothing unjust gets done due to
the fact that the deliberative part generally does not exist.13 Since the 25
limit cases are of this sort, then among the intermediate dispositions
that remain, the one that is closer to the better disposition would again
refrain from actions [sc. that are unjust], since the injustice it possesses is
solely internal.14 The disposition that comes after this would act, but
not with the resolution15 of the whole soul because of the conflict. 23
The disposition that comes after this one [in the order of descent] is
the one that seems to act and to act with the whole soul, but this itself is
not without justice. After all, what is the distinctive feature of justice but
‘doing one’s own job’? But this exists in a way even in this [corrupt
disposition of the soul], for to the extent that the cognitive part in reason 5
performs the function that belongs to it – keeping a sharp lookout and
discovering that which it seeks – to that extent it ‘does its own job’.
However, to the extent that reason is enslaved so as to desire in common
with the passionate part, it does not do its own job. Accordingly, when-
ever some action arises from injustice it is necessary that justice is
present to the person who performs the action. 10
If, however, you assume the disposition that is even worse than this
one – the one in which reason has already been rendered blind and the
desiring part has been perverted – then this disposition is plausibly
13
διὰ τὸ μηδ’ ὅλως εἶναι τὸ βουλευόμενον. At 11.29 τὸ βουλευόμενον seems to be equivalent to
reason but it seems that here Proclus is drawing more fine-grained distinctions among
the powers of the reasoning part of the soul. Proclus’ aim in this argument is to show
that Plato has properly considered the unjust agent as the one in whom reason is
inevitably in conflict with passion or desire (and consequently the unjust person’s
effectiveness is lessened by virtue of this internal dissension). The proposed alternative
of the objector – the person who is so thoroughly unjust that his reason has ceased to be
in conflict with passion – is someone who is not an agent at all by Proclus’ reckoning.
The things that get done by this person are not actions, for they do not spring from any
deliberative capacity: the deliberative capacity is extinguished in such a person.
14
This psychic disposition has ‘internal injustice’ merely in the sense that passion is
sometimes in conflict with reason, but ex hypothesi reason always wins in this conflict, so
the agent does nothing unjust except perhaps by mistake since reason’s cognitive aspect
is not inevitably reliable in discerning what ought to be done.
15
οὐχ ὅλῃ τῇ ψυχῇ δεδογμένα. Compare Rep. V 450a5 where Thrasymachus declares it
a ‘joint resolution’ of the assembled party that Socrates must provide more details of
the proposed communal family arrangments among the Guardians. The absence of
such joint resolve is characteristic of the souls of the lovers who let the bad horses carry
them into the sexual act and sometimes repeat it, albeit with some reservations (Phdr.
256c6).
81
Essay 3
inactive, since justice, though still present, is so indistinct as to seem

non-existent.16 Yet it exists in a way, to the extent that it is impossible for
15 the soul to abandon entirely the common conceptions and, in particular,
by virtue of its aiming at the good. Therefore to the extent that it has an
impetus towards the good, it participates in justice, for if complete and
utter injustice were to be engendered in a soul, a soul would perhaps lose
its very being.17 After all, it is also the case that a body that is
diseased throughout undergoes destruction. Therefore in a soul that is
single – even in the case of the last grade of injustice – it is necessary for
20 there to be some trace of justice through which the soul’s essence is
preserved. As a result, there will inevitably be discord in this [psychic
condition] since I dare say there is conflict between the entire soul and
the foundational common conceptions that are in it. This disposition
lacks agency (apraktos) due to the fact that the trace of justice in the soul
has grown so indistinct that it can do little more than declare that soul
25 exists – that soul which in itself can do nothing because of its weakness.18
16
δικαιοσύνης ἀμυδροτάτης ἔτι οὔσης, ὡς μηδ᾽ εἶναι δοκεῖν· The line is difficult and
F proposes to transpose ἔτι to a position after δοκεῖν. He translates ‘puisque la justice
y est complètement affaiblie, au point de sembler n’exister même plus’. Keeping the
temporal sense of the adverb with the previous clause makes some sense of what follows,
though. Some trace of justice is inevitably present in the soul so long as it exists.
17
Compare Rep. X 609b–e. Injustice is the characteristic vice of the soul. But since the
soul is immortal, injustice does not bring about the non-existence of the soul in
a manner parallel to the way in which the characteristic vice of the body (disease)
brings about the destruction of the body. Disease renders the body a corpse, but
injustice does not lead to the non-existence of the soul in the same way. It would
seem, then, that the immortal and incorporeal soul differs from the body in this respect.
So what does the characteristic vice of the soul do to it if it does not destroy its very
being? It seems that Proclus’ answer might be that it destroys the soul’s capacity for
agency.
18
The translation here is one of which we cannot be certain. At lines 23–6 Proclus writes:
ἄπρακτος δέ ἐστιν ἕξις, διότι τὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἴχνος ἀμυδρωθὲν ἐκείνην σχεδὸν μόνην
ἀπέφηνεν οὖσαν τὴν μηδὲν καθ᾽ ἑαυτὴν δι’ ἀσθένειαν πρᾶξαι ἰσχύουσαν. The uncertainty
arises because it is unclear what ἐκείνην refers to. There are three feminine nouns in
proximity. It could be the disposition, the soul, or the injustice refered to in line 19.
Festugière takes the last of these options and translates: ‘comme la trace de la justice
a été affaiblie, elle a fait qu’il n’y a plus là pour ainsi dire que l’injustice, l’injustice qui,
réduite à elle-même, | ne peut, par faiblesse, rien faire’. This is certainly possible, but it
is a long way back to line 19. We prefer to take ἐκείνην to refer to ψυχή rather than either
the soul’s ἀδικία or its ἕξις. Abbatte similarly translates: ‘infatti la traccia della giustizia,
pur rimanendo indistinta, ha fatto in modo che sia praticamente sola quell’anima che
non ha la forza per realizzare nulla a causa della propria intima debolezza’. Given
a choice it seems more charitable to regard Proclus as someone who cleaves to the
sensible idea that it is mostly people (i.e. souls) who act – not the dispositions of, or the
injustice in, their souls. We remain puzzled, however, by the aorist in ἀπέφηνεν. Is it
gnomic? That doesn’t seem to be characteristic of Proclus’ style though. A personal
tick? An oddity of late antique Greek?
82
But it is obvious that even in this sort of [psychic] disposition there is

inevitably a trace of justice, since the person would not want to wrong
himself or destroy that which is his own. Thus since he at least preserves
a sense of justice towards himself he is not simply unjust. But since he
would not know how to guard [even his own interests] he is unjust
through not preserving what is necessary for self-preservation.19 30
Therefore all these doctrines are true: (1) that injustice is the cause of 24
discord of the self with itself and not merely of discord with another. (2)
That all injustice destroys the power of agency in proportion to the
degree of injustice. (3) That while injustice requires justice in order to
act, justice does not require injustice in order to act. All these things 5
being true, [the claim that] justice is more potent than injustice will win.
One might also draw an additional conclusion on the basis of what has
just now been said – the very thing that Amelius was the first to see.
Often lesser evils come about from greater injustice, while from lesser
injustice, greater evils come about.20 For when injustice rules comple- 10
tely, there is a way of life that lacks agency. But when injustice is present
together with justice, some action arises from it.
Let no one think that this statement is false because greater evils
might arise from intemperance or weakness and that these [arise]
because the evil is greater. For weakness of will is both a vice and also
not a vice – at least inasmuch as reason fights against passion, so that in 15
this fashion it does not make the evil [of this character flaw] complete.
Consequently, due to this [conflict] lesser evil arises from weakness of
will, because it is a mixture that results from a vice and what is not a vice.
But the statement is true when there are two vices at issue, though it is
not true in the case of a vice and what is not a [complete] vice.21
19
The trace of justice in every soul is necessary for constituting it as a soul. It is δι’ ὃ
σῴζεται κατ᾽ οὐσίαν (20.13). Thus anyone who has a soul is not entirely devoid of justice
and thus not simply unjust (μόνως ἄδικος). Proclus apparently regards as evidence of this
the fact that even corrupt people don’t want to wrong themselves – i.e. to commit
injustice against themselves. This sounds odd in English, but the Greek verb adikein
can convey this wider sense of ‘wronging’ someone and can thus be reflexive (οὐ γάρ
που καὶ ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖν ἐθέλει). But the ignorant and unjust person does not adequately
understand the real nature of his self-interest. In commiting unjust acts he in fact
further diminishes and obscures the trace of justice whose existence is necessary to
constituting him as a soul at all. In his ignorance he thus fails to preserve that which is
really necessary for self preservation (οὐκ εἰδὼς δὲ ὅπως ἂν φυλάξειεν, ἄδικός ἐστιν, δι’ ὧν
οὐ χρὴ φυλάττειν ἑαυτὸν φυλάττων).
20
The context makes clear that ‘greater injustice’ in fact means ‘an agent who is more
unjust’, i.e. one whose soul is far more badly disordered and in whom reason is less
effective.
21
Amelius wishes to defend the view that a greater degree of personal injustice (i.e. a more
disordered soul) yields fewer unjust acts while a lesser degree of personal injustice
83
Essay 3
It is clear that there is also this axiom regarding that which has the
20 power to lead up to the good to which he appealed in setting out the
third argument. That which is more self-sufficient is closer to the good.
But of necessity, what is closer to the good is more powerful than what is
further from it. Consequently justice is plausibly a more powerful thing
than injustice.
B. Fourth argument: the just life is the happy life: 24.25–27.6

25 It remains for us to deal with the fourth argument, which shows, as we
said earlier, that the just person is happy and that the unjust person is
not, as Thrasymachus claimed. He shows this by the following rule
(kanôn): the function (ergon) of anything is either that which it alone
does or does best (Rep. 352e). By ‘alone’ [he means] for instance that only
30 the eye sees or only the ears hear or only the tongue tastes. By ‘does best’
25 [he means] like a pruning knife cuts vines [better than anything else], but
a shoemaker’s knife does not. Or like a shoemaker’s knife cuts leather,
but a butcher’s knife does not. Or like a butcher’s knife cuts meat, but
not the others. Each of these things has [as its function] cutting the thing
that was mentioned because it does this best, while it cuts other things
5 less well. [In the former examples] each has the stated function – seeing,
hearing or tasting – because it alone does this. You might even carry this
rule right up to the first principle of all things: it is because it is One itself
that it gives to some things a function that is uniquely theirs, while it is
because it is the good that it gives to others a function that, if it not
10 unique to them, is nonetheless one that they do best.22 After all, it is from
this [first principle] that it belongs to all things to have their appropriate
yields more unjust acts. Intemperance or weakness of will is introduced as a potential

counter-example. Presumably the counter-example has two thoughts behind it. First,
the principle (greater vice → fewer vicious acts; lesser vice → more vicious acts) should
generalise from injustice to all vices. (This is perhaps dubious, since it is the lack of
coordination and proper cooperation among the parts of the soul that is characteristic
of injustice and it is this that yields the result about effective agency that stands behind
the principle.) Second, the proponent of the counter-example also seems to assume that
a high degree of intemperance is a worse vice than a tiny bit of injustice and, further,
that the former yields more bad acts than the latter. The response that Proclus offers
defeats the second presupposition by insisting that intemperance or weakness of will do
not fall within the domain of vices over which the variables in the principle are meant to
range.
22
Proclus traces the ‘uniquely or best’ principle to the two ways that Plato refers to the
archê of all things – as either the One or the Good. Where something has its function
because it alone among all other things brings that about, it is because of the One.
Where something has its function by virtue of the fact that it does this better than
anything else, this is because of the Good.
84
functions (erga) – different ones for different things – and all

existent things [sc. the intelligibles] are the deeds (erga) of that
first principle, just as that which comes last [performs] no deeds,23
and in the case of the things that are intermediate, there are for
some, but not for others.
Having established this rule, he assumes a thesis of the sort that is
indisputable: each thing accomplishes the function appropriate to it by 15
virtue of possessing the virtue appropriate to it – a virtue with which
(meta) and in accordance with which (kata) it fulfils its own function.
After all, virtue is the perfection of each thing and when it is active it
makes the thing act perfectly.
Next there is a different thesis, which is twofold, concerning the soul.
At one point (353d3–6) he [Socrates] asks if the soul’s function is delib- 20
eration, management and ruling (for he says that by this faculty only
would one act). At another point (353d9) he asks if life is the function of
soul, for it is by means of this alone – the soul – that we live. He has made
this question twofold either in order that you might assume the dis-
tinctive function of the rational soul (i.e. deliberation and the things
coordinate with it) and not merely this [rational function] alone but also 25
the function of the entire soul (since living, and not those other func-
tions, is the task of the irrational soul) or in order that you might assume
both the cognitive and desiring [parts] of the soul, which he called
‘life’.24
In any case, these premises having been posed, the argument goes as
follows:
1. It belongs to soul alone to deliberate, manage, rule and simply to 26
live.
2. According to the rule, what belongs to the soul alone is the
function of the soul.
3. Therefore simply living, as well as deliberating, managing and
ruling, is the function of the soul.
Then there is a second, different argument:
1. Life is the function of the soul, as we have shown.
2. Every function that is accomplished with the appropriate virtue 5
is done well.
23
Cf. ET, Prop 56: ‘All that is produced by secondary beings is in a greater measure
produced from those prior and more determinative principles from which the second-
ary were themselves derived.’ Matter, by contrast, produces nothing. We think that
Proclus’ comment here trades on the ambiguity of ergon as ‘function’ and as ‘deed’ – in
this context, in the sense of product.
24
That is to say, the argument is supposed to be indifferent to differences in the way in
which we divide the soul’s functions.
85
Essay 3
3. Therefore the soul’s [act of] living together with the appropriate
virtue is done well.
Third:
1. The soul’s living well comes about together with the soul’s virtue
coming about.
2. That which comes about together with the soul’s virtue comes
about together with justice, for justice was shown to be a virtue of
the soul.
3. Therefore living well for the soul comes about together with
10 justice.
Fourth:
1. Justice is the cause of living well.
2. The cause of living well is the cause of happiness.
3. Therefore justice is the cause of happiness.
After all, living well is happiness and everyone agrees with this – that
15 living well and happiness are the same – no matter whether they say that
living well lies in the soul or that it lies in the externals or that it lies in
both, for there would be no happiness in the absence of living well. Thus
the fact that justice contributes towards the happy life has been shown
through these [syllogisms].
Socrates assumed that justice is a virtue of the soul on the basis of
20 having shown earlier25 that it is coordinate with intelligence (phronêsis)
and wisdom (sophia), while injustice is coordinate with their opposites.
After all, everyone has assumed that intelligence and wisdom are
virtue.26 And it would in fact be ridiculous not to speak in this manner
since even the person who denies that intelligence is a virtue speaks
either intelligently or unintelligently. If he speaks unintelligently, then
25 what he says is not true and intelligence is instead a virtue. If, however,
he speaks intelligently and due to this [sc. speaking intelligently] he
25
At 349d Socrates asserts that the just person is intelligent and good (phronimos kai
agathos) on the basis of the fact that he does not seek to ‘overreach’ or ‘outdo’ (pleon
echein) other just people, but only unjust ones. In this respect he resembles the musician
or the expert craftsman who does not seek to ‘out-tune’ others when it comes to tuning
her instrument (whatever that might mean), but only to tune it better than the non-
musician. It is presumably this similar recognition of right limits that makes
Thrasymachus admit that both have intelligence. The move from ‘good musician’ or
‘good carpenter’ to simply ‘good’ in the analogical case is much more dubious. In any
event, at 350b Thrasymachus admits that the just man is wise and good (sophos kai
agathos). At 351a, Socrates moves (unchallenged) from this admission to the claim that
justice is wisdom and virtue (sophia kai aretê ). Proclus thinks – quite plausibly – that it is
this admission that is recalled by Socrates at 353e7.
26
The perfect tense suggests that ‘everyone’ in this context means all the parties to the
discussion in Book I of Republic, including Thrasymachus.
86
speaks correctly, then once again intelligence is a virtue. Therefore if

justice is coordinate with intelligence, then it is coordinate with virtue.
But what is coordinate with virtue is virtue rather than being [simply]
not vice. It is clear, then, that it is necessary that justice is a virtue that
belongs to the soul.
If someone were to be puzzled about how it can be that he said that 30
deliberation and ruling is the function of the soul but not contempla-
tion, when this is something superior [to deliberation or ruling], this is
easily met with the claim that these things that were established as 27
functions of the soul are the distinctive features of political happiness.
It was necessary to consider this [kind of happiness] and the [psychic]
functions that belong to this [sort of happiness], since we are enquiring
into political justice, which is what Thrasymachus had in mind when he
claimed that justice is the interest of the stronger. Consequently it is 5
reasonable for Socrates [or Plato?] to have taken up only those functions
that belong to political justice, since they pertain to the soul alone.27
27
The reason for the puzzlement imagined in these last few sentences is the absence from
the discussion of any reference to contemplation as a higher faculty of the soul or to the
nature of justice at higher levels on the scale of virtues. Proclus’ response is that Plato/
Socrates is not concerned with those here, since he is responding to arguments about
justice at the political level. On the nature of justice at the contemplative level, and
Proclus’ own embodiment of this virtue at this level, see Marinus, Proclus 24.
87
In this essay Proclus considers in careful detail three very short passages
from Book II of the Republic (379b1–c7, 380d1–81c9 and e8–82e6).
These passages provide the philosophical justification for the guidelines
(typoi) on depictions of the gods in the poetry that is suitable for the ideal
city. The standard here is simply truth. Other restrictions on poetry are
imposed in virtue of the effect on the citizens of the Kallipolis of the
accompanying music or the narrative form, and these restrictions are
part of the content of Essay 5. Here, however, Plato is concerned to
argue that some depictions of the gods within the Homeric poems are
unacceptable simply because they are false. Proclus interprets Plato’s
text so that it argues for four central claims.1
1. The gods are never responsible for any evil or harm.
2. The gods are only responsible for good things.
3. The gods never undergo change.
4. The gods never mislead or deceive.
Each of these claims is philosophically interesting. But Essay 4 also
contains interesting asides on a number of related issues. These include
the question of whether there is a Form of the Bad, corresponding to the
Good Itself, and serving as the paradigm of all things evil. Proclus also
reviews briefly his teaching on the kind of existence had by what is evil
and the manner in which these things are to be explained. The essay
concludes with a discussion of four issues that were urgent for those who
held to the old pagan ways. How is it that the gods appear to human
beings given their immutability and singleness? How are people misled
by oracular statements if it is indeed a beneficent god who speaks
through the oracle? Similarly, how does it happen that people are misled
by daemons if they are indeed intermediaries between humans and
gods? Some readers of Plato may find these concerns of no
1
In fact, Plato himself indicates only three guidelines, treating Proclus’ first two theses
together (cf. Rep. 380d1: Τί δὲ δὴ ὁ δεύτερος ὅδε;). Nonetheless, Proclus treats the first of
these as twofold and this is by no means implausible. As Proclus points out, we would
have no more reason to be grateful to the gods for not causing us harm than we would
have to be grateful to an imaginary being like the goat-stag. After all, the goat-stags
never give us any trouble, but that fact is hardly likely to make it reasonable for us to hold
them dear as we should hold dear the gods!
88
philosophical interest since they doubt the existence of divine epipha-

nies or the truth of divine oracles. But late antiquity was a world suffused
with the divine2 – or so its inhabitants supposed – and we will simply fail
to understand them if we fail to understand the urgency of these issues.
In some ways Essay 4 looks like an introductory work aimed at
students beginning the study of Plato. Indeed, Gallavotti’s hypothesis
about the chronology and structure of the Republic Commentary places it
in the original Isagoge to the Republic. But a bit more attention to the
knowledge that is presupposed by this alleged introduction should lead
us to the conclusion that it is not really very introductory.
Proclus makes brief comments on the logical structure of the argu-
ments at 379b1–c7 and 380d1–381c9 concerning the gods’ non-
maleficence, beneficence and changelessness. The brevity of these
remarks is matched by the density of the content. Proclus seems to
regard it as obvious that his audience can construct for themselves the
series of syllogisms that lead from the stated premises to the stated
conclusion. This is in fact a non-trivial exercise. Taking it for granted
that mere identification of the premises is sufficient, Proclus then makes
comments on the logical form of the premises, and these comments
presuppose that the audience understands universal affirmative and
universal negative statements, as well as conversion. There is even
a particularly opaque aside that appears to touch on the question of
whether some predicates (such as ‘is responsible for no evils’) can have
quantifiers embedded within them. So the audience for this work has
a fair degree of logical sophistication.
In addition to logical sophistication, Essay 4 presupposes a good
grasp of the puzzling simplicity of the divine henads in Neoplatonism.
In his discussion of the opening premise in Plato’s argument ‘every god
is really (tôi onti) good’ Proclus explains the qualifier ‘really’ by adverting
to the distinction between what has been ‘rendered substantial’ (ousiôtai)
in accordance with (kata) the good and what participates in the good.
This is not merely the claim that a god is essentially good – that it could
not remain a god and fail to be good. Rather, it is the claim that a god is
not a subject that is first something else (e.g. a god) and then bears the
additional property of being good.3 So the claim goes beyond mere
insistence that goodness is a property necessarily had by god. Proclus’
account of divine goodness is inextricably entangled with this views
about divine simplicity. In addition, although Proclus does not say so,
in this context he must be restricting the term ‘god’ to the henads – as he
2
See Lane Fox (1987) for examples illustrating the pervasiveness among pagans of belief
in the reality of divine epiphanies.
3
28.22: οὐκ ἄλλο τι ὤν, εἶτα ἀγαθός, ἀλλ’ αὐτοαγαθός, ὥσπερ τὸ πρῶτον αὐτὸ τἀγαθόν.
89
does in Elements of Theology, prop. 129. Divine intellects and divine souls
are regularly referred to as gods, but as ET 129 makes clear, this is
a distinct, relational use of ‘god’.4 Only the henads will be good by being
‘substantialised’ by the Good without being the subject of any other
sortal term such as ‘intellect’ or ‘soul’. None of this is said. So although
the explanation of the individual premises has the superficial appearance
of the kind of explanation that one might offer beginning students in
philosophy, once one delves into what is in fact being said it is clear that
the explanations presuppose significant understanding of Neoplatonic
metaphysics.
Proclus’ discussion of 380d1–381c9 (gods never undergo change
either by themselves or by another) is followed by a short digression
in which he discusses an objection of great significance for the whole
project of pagan Neoplatonism. Plato argues against the possibility that
a god could be changed by something else by appeal to a principle
linking goodness to impassivity. A thing is more resistant to undergoing
change by the agency of another when it is in a better condition.
A healthy plant, for instance, is more resistant to drought than is a sick
one (Rep. 380e3–381a1). Since a god is in a better condition than any-
thing else, it would be maximally resistant to change by any external
agent. Proclus, however, subtly transforms the argument by using
a more general causal principle: if x undergoes change by the agency
of y, then y is more powerful than x. But nothing is more powerful than
a god. Therefore a god does not undergo change by any agency external
to itself (33.24–30 below). But Proclus immediately recognises that this
argument might seem to yield the conclusion that there can only be one
god. After all, the second premise in the argument seems to require that
‘x is a god’ is true only if there is no y such that y is more powerful than x.
The only polytheism that seems compatible with this is one in which
there are multiple gods all of whom are equally powerful. But this sort of
egalitarian polytheism is very far from Proclus’ pagan Platonism. His
view is henotheism. This is a form of polytheism that is necessarily non-
egalitarian since it asserts that, while there are many gods, all of them are
subordinate to, and (in some sense) products of, a single supreme god.
In short, one of the premises Proclus’ uses in his argument threatens to
collapse henotheism into monotheism and Proclus spends a little over
a page explaining how this threat can be met. As you might expect, the
argumentation is dense. In effect, he argues that every divinity is maxi-
mally powerful within the rank that it occupies. This remains true even
4
ET 129, Πᾶν μὲν σῶμα θεῖον διὰ ψυχῆς ἐστι θεῖον τῆς ἐκθεουμένης, πᾶσα δὲ ψυχὴ θεία διὰ τοῦ
θείου νοῦ, πᾶς δὲ νοῦς [θεῖος] κατὰ μέθεξιν τῆς θείας ἑνάδος· καὶ ἡ μὲν ἑνὰς αὐτόθεν θεός, ὁ δὲ
νοῦς θειότατον, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ θεία, τὸ δὲ σῶμα θεοειδές.
90
if there are ranks above that rank. Moreover, when it comes to gods, it
does not follow from the fact that x is more powerful than y (i.e. x is a god
that belongs to a rank higher than the rank to which y belongs) that y is
weaker than x. But it is in virtue of a thing’s weakness – that is to say, in
virtue of its failure to possess the power that is proper to its rank – that
one thing can be causally affected by another. The details of the argu-
ment and the implications of it for Proclus’ idea of self-subsistence have
been discussed elsewhere.5 For our purposes here, however, this brief
summary suffices as another illustration of the way in which Essay 4
touches on difficult metaphysical issues in the course of a seemingly
introductory exegesis of Plato’s arguments.
Other features of Essay 4 indicate that Proclus assumes his audience is
aware of the content of other dialogues and of standing problems in the
history of Platonism. So 32.13–33.8 provides a corollary of the argu-
ment showing that the gods are responsible only for good things.
The corollary is that there is no Form for things that are bad – a Form
that stands as a counterpart to the Form of the Good and provides a first
principle and paradigmatic cause of bad things. Why is this a relevant
question to raise? Why would anyone suppose that there should be such
a Form? The answer is that the range of Forms was raised by Plato
himself in Parmenides 130c5–d2. Evil is not among the examples about
which Parmenides presses the young Socrates in that dialogue. He asks
only whether there are Forms for such base things as hair, mud, and dirt.
But Plotinus’ student, Amelius, drew the inference that there must be
such a Form of Evil and Proclus discusses Amelius’ view in this context
(in Parm. 829.22–831.24), as well as in his independent treatise on the
nature of evil.6 Without some background knowledge of this debate
within Platonism, the drawing of the corollary on the non-existence of
a Form for evil things seems completely unmotivated – a glorious non-
sequitur that breaks the flow of Proclus’ exegesis of the Platonic text.
Essay 4 is not simply an introductory text addressed solely to beginners
in the study of Plato’s philosophy.
The fourth guideline – that the gods do not deceive – is one in which
Proclus’ discussion improves significantly on Plato’s. The structure of
Plato’s argument is not completely clear and it is not particularly direct.
Proclus, however, sets up a disjunctive syllogism and eliminates both
possibilities briefly and directly. If the gods deceive, then this can
happen in only two ways. Either (1) they are themselves subject to
deception and pass along these falsehoods to human beings whilst
5
Baltzly (2015).
6
Opsomer and Steel (2003). See chapters 43–4 for Proclus’ more extended discussion of
the existence of a Form for evils.
91
being unaware that they are falsehoods or else (2) they are aware that the
messages that they give to human beings contain falsehoods and they
deceive us either through enmity or through kindness. (1) is ruled out on
the grounds that deception is hateful to every rational being. Unlike us,
however, it is always within a god’s power to avoid it. In the case of (2)
there are only two motives the gods could have for deceiving someone.
Either the person is an enemy and the god’s aim is to harm him or the
person is a friend to the gods but is not in his or her right mind.
(The only person for whom the truth is not beneficial is someone who
is not in his or her right mind.) But gods, who only benefit and never
harm, have no enmity towards anyone. Somewhat more controversially,
Proclus claims that no god is a friend to anyone who is not in his or her
right mind.7 Thus, having no friends for whom the truth is not bene-
ficial; they are never motivated to deceive out of love for their friends.
The Platonic theses about the gods discussed in Essay 4 provide
Proclus with a convenient occasion for raising three questions at the
end. The first of these is a general philosophical worry to which he
dedicates an entire treatise: if the gods are not responsible for evils,
where do they come from? This question obviously emerges from the
first two Platonic theses that the gods are not responsible for evils, but
rather only for things that are good. The other two questions emerge
quite naturally from Proclus’ treatment of the fourth stricture on poetic
depiction: the gods never deceive.
As Opsomer and Steel have rightly observed,8 the Neoplatonists’ views
on the nature of evil arise from detailed and direct engagement with specific
passages in Plato’s dialogues. One of those key Platonic texts is in the part of
Republic II that forms the focus of Proclus’ attention in Essay 4:9
7
Cf. Plato, Rep. 328e3: Ἀλλ’ οὐδείς, ἔφη, τῶν ἀνοήτων καὶ μαινομένων θεοφιλής. One might
expect some question to arise in Proclus’ mind about the consistency of this claim with
Phaedrus 244d5 where the second form of god-given madness arises for those who are
unwell and in great difficulties (νόσων γε καὶ πόνων τῶν μεγίστων) because of some
inherited sin, and this madness works to the benefit of those who are unwell. Such
people would seem to be friends of the gods, inasmuch as the madness that they send
enables them to prophesy and to find the means to escape the ancestral curse. While the
mania enables them to discover the true solution, it also seems to be a condition that
involves taking on other false beliefs. So these victims seem to be people who are
benefitted – if not by divine deception, at least by a divinely given propensity to form
some false beliefs. Syrianus’ class on the Phaedrus, reflected in the notes of Proclus’ class-
mate Hermias, concentrates on the question of how the inheritance of sins can be just in
the first place. Cf. Hermias in Phdr. 101.9, ff in the pagination of Lucarini and
Moreschini.
8
Opsomer and Steel (2003).
9
The other key text in the Republic occurs in the Myth of Er (617a4–5) and, as we shall see
in volume III of this series, it too provokes a discussion of the sources of evil in the world.
92
Therefore, since god is good, he is not the cause of all things – as many people
say – but is instead the cause of few things in human affairs, not being respon-
sible for many things, for there are a great many more bad things for us than
good things. Among the good things, no one else [but god] is to be held
responsible, but for the bad things it is necessary to seek some [other] causes
(atta aitia), but not god. (379c2–7)
In his introduction to the question of what is responsible for evil
(37.4–8) Proclus offers two alternatives. Either what Plato has said is
false and the gods are the causes of evil or else something else is the cause
of evil. Now, if this something else is in fact a product of the gods’
creative activities, then they are still responsible. If, on the other hand,
the something else that is the cause of evils is not a product of the gods,
then there will be more than one first principle or archê of things and
these will be opposed.
In his solution he first calls into doubt the presupposition that there is
any single thing that is the cause of evils. Either this will be matter or it
will be a Form of evil. He has already shown that such a Form of evil is
incompatible with the divine nature of Forms (32.13–33.7) and here
simply reminds us that all Forms are divine and intellectual. Nor can
matter be the principal cause (pro êgoumen ê aitia) of evil since it is some-
thing that comes from the gods as a necessary condition for the realm of
Becoming. As such, it does not make things bad (kakopoioun). But, on the
other hand, it cannot be said to be good, since it is the final stage in the
emanation from the One. Instead, it belongs to the class of things that
are necessary and for the sake of something else (38.3).10
Though he denies that there is any arch ê or principal cause of evil,
Proclus does not deny the existence of evil. Instead, he has a complex
view about the kind of existence that evil has. Proclus rather claims that
nothing is evil per se (de Mal. §9). Each evil is what it is only in relation to
some other particular good (de Mal. §51; cf. Plato, Tht. 176a5–8).
As a relational property, evil supervenes on the intrinsic properties of
things. Proclus conveys this idea by calling evil something that has
‘derivative existence’ (parupostasis, de Mal. §49).
Unlike a relational property such as fatherhood, however, there is no
single uniform cause upon which it supervenes. This is part of what it
means to deny that it has an archê or principal cause. So it turns out that
evil is uncaused but only in a very specific sense (de Mal. §50.29–31).
Within the framework of Aristotle’s theory of causes, it lacks a formal
cause (de Mal. §49.7–11 and in Remp. I 38.4). As a result, evil has only
the kind of accidental causes that chance events have in Aristotle’s
10
If more of Proclus’ Timaeus Commentary had survived, we do not doubt that we would
have an extended discussion of matter and its relation to evil at Tim. 47e3–5.
93
theory.11 Consider, for example, the tragic murder of Hapless Harold

at the town’s well at midnight. The temple robbers plan to rendezvous
at the well at midnight before going on to rob the temple. It thus seems
not implausible to suppose that we can cite the formal and final causes
of their presence there. (As robbers, they rob. That’s the formal cause.
The robbery is the final cause of the plan according to which they are
to meet at midnight.) Now, Hapless Harold has dropsy and so goes to
the well to slake his thirst and this happens at midnight. His presence
at the well admits of a proper explanation too. Qua victim of dropsy,
his thirst is explicable. The water in the well is a suitable final cause.
What admits of no explanation in terms of formal and final causes is
why Harold happens to be at the well at the same time as a gang of
murderous robbers. Thus to deny that evil has a per se cause is to deny
that there is a uniform, informative explanation of evils.
Proclus makes clear in his work on the existence of evil that he thinks
that Republic 379c2–7 is evidence in favour of his view about evil lacking
a per se cause. He writes:
And it seems to me that Plato in the Republic intimates this when he says that the
divinity is not be held responsible: ‘we must look for some other causes of evils’.
For by these words he signifies that these causes are many and indefinite, and
that they are particular [or partial].
(de Mal. 47.11–15, trans. after Opsomer & Steel with supplement)
This coincides perfectly with Proclus’ comments in Essay 4. Here he
says that the ‘other causes’ of evil things are particular or partial because
‘they are none of the things that are universal, such as intellect or soul or
body’ (38.7).12 Even when ensouled beings, such as the temple robbers
11
The understanding of the sense in which chance events both do and do not have causes
for Aristotle is indebted to Sorabji (1980).
12
This opposition between particular or partial (merikos) and universal or whole (holos) is
difficult to equate with distinctions in contemporary metaphysics. It was, of course,
Aristotle who introduced the technical terms that we now translate as ‘universal’ (to
katholou) and particulars (kath’ hekasta). The term katholou is derived from kata plus
holon – literally ‘in accordance with the whole’. As Aristotle himself used this terminol-
ogy, it does not appear to admit of degrees: a universal is that which is ‘had by many’
while a particular is incapable of being had by anything. The Neoplatonists, however,
subsumed the contrast between universals and particulars to a broader contrast
between holos and merikos. In some contexts, merika means ‘particulars’ and is used
interchangeably with kath’ hekasta (Proclus, in Tim. II 3.1–6). In other contexts, we find
that the contrast between ‘whole,’ and the translation ‘part’ or ‘partial’ seems to be
more appropriate. Sometimes we even get a mixture of the two. Thus, Proclus’ Timaeus
Commentary characterises the elements as ‘whole parts’ – a notion we might better
express as ‘universal parts’.
This is not simple ambiguity: the Neoplatonists see a deep link between our familiar
concept of a universal and the idea of wholeness. The key connection is unity:
94
in the example above, do evil things, it is not soul as such that explains
this. We cannot explain robbery and murder by saying ‘Ensouled beings
did it’ in the same way in which we can explain Hapless Harold’s health
by saying ‘the doctor cured him’. (Remember, of course, that we do not
provide a per se cause if we say that Jones cured him unless we add that
Jones is a doctor. Jones cures qua doctor, not qua Harold’s golfing
partner.) Similarly, Proclus also says that the ‘other causes’ are plural.
An evil such as illness in a body has as a sine qua non the body’s plurality
of parts. So too, evil in a soul has the plurality of psychic parts as a pre-
condition. These pluralities are, in turn, necessary for a sensible world
of the kind that we have – a world that is good, since it is modelled on an
intelligible living being (Tim. 30b–d). Proclus sums up his position in
the following terms.
Thus evil things are brought about as subsistent by-products of the principal
activities of existent things and do so for no other reason than the good.
The universe utilises these by-products for its needs and they are rendered as
good by virtue of the power of the things that use them. It is for this reason that
there is no unmixed evil, but instead [all] have been allotted some trace of <the>
good. Thus even that which is evil comes from the gods inasmuch as it is, in
a way, good, and these things are due to other causes that are partial and plural,
arising as something external to the being of those many things themselves.
(de Mal. 38.22–9, Opsomer and Steel)
Following the discussion of where evils come from (37.23–39.1) the two
remaining problems and responses that Proclus gives in Essay 4 may
seem a bit odd to some readers. Proclus’ penchant for questions about
epiphanies and oracles are part and parcel of the Neoplatonism of his
time. In late antiquity a learned person accepted the supernatural.
The Neoplatonists were not only learned people, they were also philo-
sophers and in late antiquity this social identity was inseparable from
piety.13 Moreover, Plato’s dialogues also contain references to divine
beings, daemons, divination, life after death, and other such superna-
tural topics. So while the remaining problems of Essay 4 may seem odd
to modern readers, they are – relative to the nature of philosophy in late
a universal manages to be one and the same thing across all its instances. Horseness is so
unified that its essential unity can withstand even multiple locations where it is none-
theless wholly present. The participation of Bucephalus and Mister Ed, as well as
a whole host of less famous equines, does not diminish the universal’s mysterious unity
in plurality in the slightest. An element such as water is also a ‘universal part’ in Proclus’
terminology, perhaps, inasmuch as it is a mass term that lacks the fixed individuation
conditions of concrete particulars. Just as Horseness remains one regardless of its
plurality of participants, so too the element water remains the element in spite of the
fact that some of it is here and some of it there.
13
Cf. Brown (1971) and Fowden (1982).
95
antiquity – distinctly philosophical and also firmly grounded in Plato’s

texts.
In Plato’s dialogues the soul is clearly distinct from and superior to
the body in power and dignity. It controls the body (Phdo 80b) and is
more akin to the intelligible Forms than it is to the composite body
(78b–79 c). It may be doubted whether Plato himself had fully worked
out and articulated for himself the radical notion of incorporeality that
we find in Plotinus, in which what is incorporeal is simultaneously
everywhere and nowhere.14 But equally it is hard to doubt that the
seeds of this radical notion of incorporeality are there in the
dialogues.15 Yet at the same time, in dialogues such as Phaedo,
Phaedrus and Republic, Plato depicted the soul, separated from the
composite body, journeying to various places under the earth or in the
heavens. But how does the incorporeal soul have a specific location
except by association with an extended body? Furthermore, on the
one hand, the soul is said to experience emotions and desires as
a result of the soul’s association with the body (Phdo 81b). Yet in the
Myth of Er, for example, souls experience desires and emotions even
when they are not embodied.
At least with respect to the incorporeal soul, the Neoplatonists find
the solution to these problems in the idea of the soul’s ‘vehicle’ or
och êma. In Proclus’ version of this doctrine, the human soul has two such
vehicles.16 The primary and most immaterial of the psychic vehicles is
the ‘luminous’ (augoeid ês) body that is immortal and natural to the soul.
It contains the highest gradations of the irrational aspects of the soul and
has a kind of perception that involve a single ‘sense’ modality and occurs
in a way that does involve being acted upon.17 In addition to this
luminous body, there is also a mortal, pneumatic or spiritual body.
This pneumatic body is associated with the irrational soul in its lower
manifestation. It too has a kind of perception and, like the perception
that is innate to the luminous body, it involves a single modality, but
with the pneumatic body perception takes place in a way that involves
the body being acted upon. Finally, there is the ‘oyster body’ – the
14
Menn (1998), 374 makes the point that even Plotinus’ conception of the soul’s incor-
poreality is not that of Cartesian dualism. Plotinus recognised degrees of incorporeality.
Both qualities and souls are incorporeal, but the former are more divided and closer to
bodies. Both are incorporeal, but in this sense souls are more incorporeal than qualities.
15
What is interrogation of the nature of participation in the first third of the Parmenides if
not an extended meditation on the conceptual difficulties attendant upon the claim that
the incorporeal is somehow present to the corporeal?
16
For earlier versions of the doctrine, see Dodds (1963) and Finamore (1985).
17
ET 208 and in Tim. III 236.31–37.31.
96
squishy accretion of flesh that most of us are inclined to regard as our

only body. This theory in the elaborate form in which Proclus presents
it cannot of course be found in Plato’s dialogues. But there are at least
suggestions of a vehicle for the soul in the image of the winged chariots
in the Phaedrus myth18 and the fact that the Demiurge assigns each soul
to a star and places it there ‘as in an ochêma’ (Tim. 41e2). The description
of the ‘oyster body’ derives from Phaedrus 250c6.19
These psychic vehicles are invoked by the Neoplatonists to explain
the puzzles we noted above. The soul’s vehicles explain how we can
sensibly regard an incorporeal thing as located in Tartarus or at the edge
of the river Lêthê. The susceptibility of the pneumatic vehicle to per-
ceptions caused by impacts explains how souls can be punished in the
afterlife. Finally, in the case at hand, the luminous vehicle is used to
explain how divine epiphanies occur.
Proclus’ views on the nature of divine epiphanies are interesting
for the light they shed on the operation of ‘passwords’ (synthêmata)
or ‘symbols’ (symbola). In the case of epiphanies, the gods project
visions (phasmata) that – like the luminous bodies that are to per-
ceive them – are extended and possess a location in space. Yet the
visions – like the senders – are projected as a divine light. They are
potent and re-present (eikonizein) the powers of the gods through
their self-evident symbols (39.13–15). So the intermediate nature of
these images makes them a suitable bridge (as it were) between
incorporeal gods and human beings. In this respect, they are
likened to the way that the ineffable divine ‘passwords’ work.
These too are given a shape (in some sense) in order that the
incorporeal can meet the corporeal halfway (39.16–17).
A password may be verbal, but it need not be. These can include
ritual actions and objects that function in the context of theurgic
practice to indicate the practitioner’s fitness for ‘conjunction’ (sys-
tasis) with the divine. The idea of a password derives from the use
of broken tokens, the two halves of which are reunited by the
parties to the arrangement (or their representatives) in order to
establish their bona fides. The divine visions are extended (protei-
18
Especially since Plato uses the term ochêma at 247b2 to refer to the chariots that
correspond to the divine souls.
19
καθαροὶ ὄντες καὶ ἀσήμαντοι τούτου ὃ νῦν δὴ σῶμα περιφέροντες ὀνομάζομεν, ὀστρέου
τρόπον δεδεσμευμένοι. Partisans for a purely rationalist Plato, free from the religiosity
of the Neoplatonists, are invited to dwell upon the clear allusion to the sô ma–sê ma
theme (Grg. 493a, Crat. 400c). The Neoplatonists may give undue attention to the
religious dimension of Plato’s works, but they are not mistaken about the presence of
this dimension.
97
nein) by the gods, as one might hold out one half of the broken
token, and ‘match’ the character of the recipient’s luminous psychic
vehicle. As we shall see in Essay 6, Proclus also draws parallels
between telestic rites – such as the Eleusinian mysteries – and the
consumption of inspired poetry by a suitably prepared audience
(75.5 ff.). Poetry of the right kind is not merely a potential source
of knowledge about the gods, at least for those who can read the
allegorical meaning behind the surface meaning. Rather, the symbola
within poetry can function as synthêmata that connect us with the
gods in a manner parallel to the way in which divine visions con-
nect us to the gods.
98
essay 4
On the theological guidelines (typoi) in
the second book of the Republic
i. exposition of plato’s view: 27.9–37.2

A. Introduction: 27.9–28.23
Among the theological guidelines that he expounded in the second book
of the Republic, the first is that what the gods aim at is always goodness 10
and it is for these things alone that they are to be held responsible – by
‘these things’ I mean all of the things that are good, but that they are
never responsible for the opposites [of these things]. Plato takes it as
axiomatic that every god is good, for whenever he says that ‘the god is
good’,20 it is necessary to understand him to mean every god. After all, 15
the addition of the definite article [‘the’] shows either that the thing is
unique in its pre-eminence (as when we say ‘the poet says’, allocating this
person an exceptional status by virtue of the fact that he is the greatest)21
or else it shows that the plurality as a whole (to holon plêthos) [is the
subject of discussion], as when we say that ‘the whale is a mammal’22
[thereby] attaching the definite article in place of ‘every’. Thus if he in
fact expressed himself by saying that ‘the god is good’ then he would 20
either mean that the first god is good23 or that every god is good.
However, it is evident from the conclusion that is drawn subsequent
to these [statements] that he did not intend to enforce these precepts
solely on the subject of the first god, because [later] he says that each of
the gods is the finest and best possible.24 It is also evident from the fact
that the poets are to respect these guidelines in the things that they 25
write – [people] whose discourse is certainly not about the first god.
20
Rep. II 379b1: Οὐκοῦν ἀγαθὸς ὅ γε θεὸς τῷ ὄντι τε καὶ λεκτέον οὕτω;
21
i.e. Homer; cf. I 112.2 below.
22
We have taken the liberty of changing Proclus’ example (ὁ ἄνθρωπος λογικός) since it
works in Greek, but not in English. Though we say ‘the wombat is a marsupial’, we do
not treat ‘man’ the same way. In the latter case, we indicate generality precisely by
dropping the definite article and say instead ‘man is rational’.
23
i.e. the definite article connotes the first god because it functions to pick out the pre-
eminent god, as ‘the poet’ picks out Homer – the greatest poet.
24
The subsequent argument is the one that shows that the gods do not change form. This
is not an exact quotation, but Plato does use ‘every’ with just the implication that Proclus
requires: Rep. II 381c7–9 Ἀδύνατον ἄρα, ἔφην, καὶ θεῷ ἐθέλειν αὑτὸν ἀλλοιοῦν, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἔοικε,
κάλλιστος καὶ ἄριστος ὢν εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ἕκαστος αὐτῶν μένει ἀεὶ ἁπλῶς ἐν τῇ αὑτοῦ μορφῇ.
99
Essay 4
Thus, if we are speaking correctly, then this is the first axiom to be

assumed: that every god is good. The Oracles too provide testimony on
behalf of this axiom in the lines where they condemn the impiety of men,
saying:
28 And do you not know that every god is good? O, drudges, sober up . . .
(Or. Chald. fr. 15, trans. Majercik)
In addition, in the Laws it is said that there are three things that
characterise the gods: goodness (X 900d), power (902c), and under-
5 standing (901d). He apprehends the first [of these three] through the
first guideline, but the other two through the second guideline when he
says that truth and immutability are in the gods. After all, of these two,
the first pertains to understanding, while the second pertains to power.
At any rate, truth is the perfection of understanding, while impassivity
(apatheia) is the perfection of power.
10 Therefore this is the first axiom, and he assumed it with the specific
logical distinction (diorismos) that is necessary. After all, he did not
simply say ‘the god is good’ but rather that the god is really (tôi onti)
good, distinguishing in his habitual manner that which really is from
that which is really not, by means of preserving the former unmixed with
its opposite, while the latter is said to have been already contaminated
15 with what is inferior. What he calls really (ontôs) life or really intellect or
beauty is that which in no way subsists with its opposite – lifelessness,
lack of intellect or ugliness. On the other hand, what is not really each of
these things is that which is mixed with something inferior.25 Thus
every god is really good, since it is rendered substantial (ousiômenos) in
accordance with the good, and does not possess the good as something
subsequently acquired or as a disposition that belongs to it (for
20 that which is good in this manner has participated in the good but is
not really good).26 Therefore the god is good in respect of the
very existence in virtue of which it is a god. It is not something
25
Compare in Tim. I 233.1–5 and II 128.6 ff. where Proclus distinguishes ‘that which
really is’ (τὸ ὄντως ὄν = the noetic realm) from that which is not really real (τὸ οὐκ ὄντως
ὄν = the psychic realm) and that which is not really unreal (τὸ οὐκ ὄντως οὐκ ὄν = the
sensible realm) from that which is really not real (τὸ ὄντως οὐκ ὄν = matter)
26
πᾶς οὖν θεὸς ὄντως ἀγαθός, οὐσιωμένος κατὰ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ οὐκ ἔχων ἐπίκτητον οὐδ’ ὡς ἕξιν
τὸ ἀγαθόν (τὸ γὰρ οὕτως ἀγαθὸν οὐ τῷ ὄντι ἀγαθὸν <ὂν> τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μετέσχεν). Given
what has just been said about things that are really F (οἷς μηδὲν ὑπάρχει τῶν ἀντικειμένων)
this means more than that every god is essentially good (i.e. it couldn’t remain a god
and yet not be good). It also precludes any god from being good in one respect but bad
in another. Such a thing is, of course, possible if relational properties can be essential.
Suppose that every elephant is essentially bigger than a breadbox. Then no elephant
can become smaller than a breadbox and yet remain an elephant. Yet it might submit to
being qualified by opposites in at least this sense: every elephant may be smaller than
100
II. Divine beneficence
else which is then subsequently good, but is instead good-in-itself just

like the first Good Itself.27
i i . d i v i n e b e n e fi c e n c e : 2 8 . 2 3 – 3 3 . 8
A. The first argument: the gods are not responsible
for evil: 28.23–31.2
When this single axiom has been assumed, it is split into two
arguments28 through which it is shown, on the one hand, that every 25
god is responsible for good things and, on the other, that no god is
responsible for any evil. The latter argument goes like this:
1. Every god is really good.
2. Nothing really good is harmful.
3. That which is not harmful does no harm.
4. That which does nothing evil is responsible for none of the evils.
Therefore every god is responsible for none of the evils.
The terms ‘nothing’ and ‘none’ have been assumed as part of the 30
premise and as a part of the predicate because otherwise the subject 29
could not have the determinate term ‘every’.29 Next [note] that while all
the Queen Mary. If a god is ὄντως ἀγαθός it is not merely inevitably good, it is also free
from any admixture of evil even in a relational way.
27
κατ’ αὐτὴν ἄρα τὴν ὕπαρξιν ὁ θεὸς ἀγαθός, καθ’ ὃ καὶ ἔστιν θεός, οὐκ ἄλλο τι ὤν, εἶτα ἀγαθός,
ἀλλ’ αὐτοαγαθός, ὥσπερ τὸ πρῶτον αὐτὸ τἀγαθόν. This seems to be strictly true only of
the divine henads (ET prop. 119), not divine intellects or souls that Proclus is often
inclined to call gods (though cf. ET, prop. 129 where the distinction between theos and
theios is applied to distinguish henads from other divine beings). The Good Itself is
nothing other than good (ὃ μηδέν ἐστιν ἄλλο ἢ ἀγαθόν, ET prop. 8). Only the henads will
resemble the One in respect of being too simple to admit of predication of any sort.
28
i.e. the premise ‘Every god is really good’ is common to both arguments.
29
The scholiast notes (vol. 2, 370–1): ‘Strictly the predicate term is “that which is
responsible [for ___ evil]” to which the further qualification “no” has been added.
These things are obvious from the fact that in the major premise we say “all that is
responsible for no evil” and if we take the “all” as qualifying “that which is responsible”
when it is now the subject, it is obvious that in the minor premise it [the “no”?] was
qualifying the predicate.’
This is obscure but it seems that Proclus enters into a debate about whether qualifying
phrases (prosdiorisma) – including quantifiers – can apply in some way to the predicate
term as well as the subject term in a syllogism. Aristotle claims at On Interpretation 17b14
that if a universal quantifier is applied to both the subject and predicate term, the
resulting sentence must be false and gives as his example ‘every man is every animal’.
If the scholiast has things right, then the point of Proclus’ remark is that there are
negative qualifying phrases that apply to the subjects – e.g. no thing that is really good is
harmful – and so by extension to the premise so that we can speak of an E statement.
(Hence Proclus’ use of ὡς μέρος εἴληπται τῆς προτάσεως καὶ τοῦ κατηγορουμένου, which
101
Essay 4
these premises seem to be negations, except for one they appear as

affirmations by conversion and the resulting [premises] always assume
the subject terms with negation.30 With respect to [these] formidable
5 examples of logical reasoning, consider the factual character (to pragma-
teiôdes) and connection [among] the premises. ‘Every god is really
good’ – the axiom for this argument. ‘That which is really good is not
harmful’, for if it is rendered substantial in [the fact of] its goodness and
is not something that is good in some respect (for then it would not be
10 really good), then it does not have the capacity for harm. After all, this
[capacity] is something it would have to have by participation in the
opposite and in this case it would never have been really good [in
the first place]. Nor is there any other aspect [of it] that participates in
the opposite, for that which is really beautiful does not participate
in what is ugly either with respect to its power or with respect to its
activity, if we have in fact correctly distinguished that which really is [F]
15 from that which is not [F] really. Thus that which is really good – since it
does not have the capacity for the opposite of the good (such as the
capacity for harming) – is for this reason not harmful.
‘Since it is that which is not harmful’ he says ‘it in no way harms’
(379b5–6). In what respect do these things differ? Or is the answer that
the former [statement] removes the power for harming, while this goes
20 further yet to remove the opposite activity. While ‘harmful’ means what
would be capable of harming, even if it does not harm [in some specific
instance], while its activity is actual harm. The respect in which that
Festugière found sufficiently puzzling that he would have liked to have translated
προτάσεως as ‘subject of the premise’.) But in addition, there is a form of negative
qualification that applies within the predicate, e.g. that which is responsible for no evil.
It must be within the predicate, otherwise when that predicate appears as subject, it
couldn’t take an additional quantifer: all that is responsible for no evil.
At least this is the most that we can make of the passage and the scholion. The locus
for this discussion has been a scholion in Aristotle that has seemed to some to attribute
to Theophrastus a difference of opinion with Aristotle, together with the Commentary
on the Prior Analytics attributed to Ammonius where the distinction between qualifica-
tions of the predicate and qualifications within the predicate is drawn. See Fortenbaugh
(2003) for an overview. We do not think that this passage from Proclus sheds any
particularly new light on the issue, but perhaps specialists will see more in it than we do.
30
It is possible to utilize the stated premises to construct a series of three syllogisms, the
first of which is Celarent and the latter two are Camestres. In doing so you will convert
3 and 4, but not 2, to A statements. Thus: 1. Every god is really good. 2. No really good
thing is harmful. So, (C.1.) No god is harmful. Converting 3 to an A statement we
continue: 3. Everything that does harm is harmful. C.1. No god is harmful. So, C.2.
No god is a thing that does harm. Converting 4 to an A statement we continue: 4.
Everything that is responsible for evil/harm does harm. But C.2. No god is a thing that
does harm. So no god is responsible for evil/harm. (For the equation of doing harm and
doing evil, see below 29.28.)
102
which is able to heat differs from that which heats is the same respect in
which the harmful differs from that which harms. It is obvious in all such
cases that what is actually [being or doing F] is capable [of being or
doing F], but what is capable is not inevitably actual. Thus, if something 25
does harm, then it is also harmful, but the converse is not the case.
Converting [the proposition] through negation, he assumed that what is
not harmful in no way harms.31
‘That which does no harm’ he says, ‘does nothing evil’, for these
things are co-extensive with one another: if something does harm,
then it provides something evil to that which undergoes the harm.
Similarly, if something does evil, then it harms the object of the action. 30
The fact that this is true one could grasp from the definition of harm, for 30
this was defined in Book I (335b): harm is making a thing worse with
respect to its characteristic excellence. But if it makes it worse, then it is
obvious that it damages the thing undergoing the harm. Thus if some-
thing harms in no way at all, then it makes nothing worse in respect of its 5
characteristic excellence. If among all the things [that there are], it
damages none [of them], then there is nothing to which it does some-
thing evil. After all, that which does something evil, damages the reci-
pient [of the evil], and it seems that these things convert: harming and
doing evil. The one [term], however, must be referred to what under- 10
goes participation, while the other is referred to what participates, for
what gets participated in is the evil, but this is not what gets harmed.
Rather, it is that in which this [evil] exists. As a result [the evil] harms the
underlying subject, but it is that which is in the subject that does evil. So,
for instance, if something brings about illness, it is not the illness that
undergoes harm, but rather that which has the illness. Therefore, there 15
is no [evil] separate from things that are evil, since evil is inevitably in
something else.32 It is obvious that everything that does some evil harms
some subject that exists prior to the evil. Thus when he [Plato] says that
what does not harm does nothing evil, he assumes this on the basis that
no subject is rendered worse nor does the thing make any condition in
this subject that is contrary to nature.33 Thus there is a difference 20
between the terms in this premise.
31
i.e. premise as it is presented in Plato’s text is logically equivalent to the universal
affirmative ‘everything that does harm is harmful’.
32
Proclus thus provides another reason for rejecting the idea of an archê of evil. Such
a first principle would need to be something separate and this is incompatible with the
idea that evil always exists in a subject.
33
in Rem. I 30.17–20 λέγων οὖν τὸ μὴ βλάπτον μηδὲν κακὸν ποιεῖν ἐκ τοῦ μηδὲν ὑποκείμενον
διατιθέναι χεῖρον λαμβάνει μηδὲ διάθεσιν ἐν αὐτῷ ποιεῖν παρὰ φύσιν. The first pair (τὸ μὴ
βλάπτον . . . μηδὲν ὑποκείμενον διατιθέναι χεῖρον) looks at the situation from the point of
view of the subject of harm. The second pair (μηδὲν κακὸν ποιεῖν . . . μηδὲ διάθεσιν ἐν αὐτῷ
103
Essay 4
He says that what does no evil is, of course, responsible for none of the
things that are evil. If something is responsible for some [evil] then it
would have to have the capacity (dynamis) to do evil and as
a consequence will at some point in time have the corresponding
actuality (energeia).34 If, however, we should posit that what is capable
25 as already in act, then there will be that which is responsible for some evil
when it produces some evil. But it results from this that the thing that
does no evil whatsoever does something evil. But this impossibility did
not result from the hypothesis that was assumed – that what is capable of
doing something is already in act (for what is impossible does not follow
from what is possible). Rather, the impossibility resulted from [the
assumption] that what in no way does evil was said to be responsible
30 for some evil. Therefore it is true that this thing [that in no way does
31 evil] is responsible for none of the evils. This syllogism thus leads to the
conclusion that every god is responsible for no evil.
B. The second argument: the gods are only responsible

for good things: 31.2–32.13
[The argument] that comes after this shows that each god is responsible
for good things alone, doing so through terms that are opposite to the
5 previous ones where he assumed the negations. [These arguments] have
the correct order too, with the first one removing that which is worse
from the gods, while the second adds that which is better [to them].
After all, it would be no great feat for the gods to fail to be responsible
for evil things, for neither is the goat-stag [responsible for any evil].35
ποιεῖν παρὰ φύσιν) looks at the situation from the point of view of the evil that is present
in the subject. For this perspectival difference between the harmful and what does evil,
see above 30.9–11.
34
The connection between dynamis, energeia and time has its roots in Aristotle’s De Caelo
argument for the world’s eternity. There Aristotle argues against the view that the
world is destructible, but will in fact never be destroyed – a view he associates with
Plato’s Timaeus. If the world’s capacity for destruction were genuine, then at some
point it must be actualised. But then it will both be destroyed and yet not destroyed (as
was assumed). Yet the case of the world seems to be a special one in Aristotle’s mind, for
he also thinks that an item like a cloak may have the potential to be cut up yet is not cut
up, but instead wears out instead. I think we must imagine that in the case at hand
Proclus is concentrating not on a specific thing that is capable of causing evil, but rather
on the abstraction ‘that which is capable of causing evil’ – an item whose ontological
status is not clear. If this thing is to merit its name, then this capacity must be actualised
at some point. But this supposition then yields the contradiction that what does no evil
whatsoever does evil.
35
The goat-stag is like Santa Claus – notoriously non-existent (cf. Aristotle, Phys. IV.1,
208a30). Failing to cause bad things would not do much to endear the gods to us. After
all, non-existent things can do that.
104
However, being responsible for the existence of all the good things
[would be a significant achievement.] Therefore the second argument
goes like this: 10
1. Every god is really good.

2. That which is really good is exclusively beneficial.
This is opposed to that which is harmful since it signifies a beneficial
capacity, for that which is beneficial is one thing, but that which benefits
is another. Food, after all, is beneficial even if it not actually [benefitting
anyone]. It is for this reason that it is possible to go on to the next
[premise]
3. That which is exclusively beneficial exclusively benefits. 15
Surely it does not harm, since it is exclusively beneficial. It is uni-

versally not harmful. Nor again is it possible that it should not at any
time benefit, for what is potential admits of coming to be. If this were
assumed to happen, then it will turn out that what never benefits at some
point benefits – something impossible. And this is not because of the
assumption [that what is potential admits of coming to be],36 but
because we assumed that what is able to benefit never benefits. 20
Furthermore
4. That which exclusively benefits does only good things.
For to harm would be to do something evil, but it has been assumed
only to benefit. Again, it is also necessary to recognise the difference
between these two terms. The act of benefitting refers its activity to the
subject, while the act of doing good (to agathapoiein) refers [its activity]
towards the things in the subject. So, for instance, [the act of doing 25
good] makes health or virtue, but it does not benefit the products.
Rather it benefits the things that participate in these, viz. the body [in
which health is present] and the soul [in which virtue is present].
Consequently, since they have reference to different things, these
terms are not the same, though they would convert [with one another] –
which is something for which some people have condemned this
argument.37
36
Compare 30.26 above.
37
It would seem that the objection is that premise 4 treats ‘to benefit’ and ‘to do good’ as
synonyms. But this cannot be true since the former has as its object the subject who is
benefitted, while the latter has as its object the beneficial quality in the subject (e.g. the
health that the medical do-gooder brings about). Proclus concedes that the terms differ
in meaning but that this does not detract from Plato’s argument since they convert with
one another.
105
Essay 4
32 The remaining assumption in this syllogism is:
5. That which does only good things is responsible only for good
things.
From this it follows that
Every god is responsible only for good things.
5 While for our part, we have gone through all the premises in the case
of the second syllogism, Plato set out only the extremes38 when he said
that everything that is really good is exclusively beneficial and that
everything that is exclusively beneficial is responsible only for good
deeds (eupragia, Rep. 379b13), assuming ‘the good deed’ in place of
‘all that is good’. It is for this reason that he also inferred that the gods
are responsible only for good things when it comes to human beings, for
10 ‘good deeds’ [take place] among humans and this is because actions [take
place among humans] and this is so because choice [takes place among
them]. While there are things that are good for irrational [creatures] and
things that lack soul, there are no actions [in their case]. It is for this
reason that what is good in their case is not called a good deed.
C. Corollary: there is no form of evil: 32.13–33.8

We said what the common starting point (archê) of the two syllogisms is.
15 Let us now state what corollary it is possible to draw from both of them.
For if the god is responsible for good things alone and every god is
responsible for nothing evil, then it is demonstrated at the same time
that there is no form (idea) for evils. After all, the god will be the form for
20 evils if in fact every form is a god, as Parmenides said.39 If, then, the
form of evils is a god, and if every god is responsible for good things
alone and for nothing evil, then there will be a form of evil things that is
responsible for good things alone and for nothing evil. But that which is
38
i.e. the first and the last premises.
39
Kroll refers to Parm. 134c, but this passage does not say that every Form is a god – only
that the gods have a better claim than anyone else to know the Forms. Festugière takes
it as obvious that this is not a doctrine to be found in Plato’s dialogues but it instead
appears in Middle Platonism as a consequence of the identification of the Forms with
thoughts in the mind of god. But one might well ask why the thoughts of a god should
be themselves gods. In Proclus’ case the answer is that being a god is a matter of degree.
Strictly speaking, the henads are gods (autothen theos, ET, prop. 129). Intellects that
participate in the henads are maximally divine (theiotatos). Each intellect, however, is
a plentitude of Forms (ET 176). In general, it is characteristic of what is divine to (1)
exercise providence and (2) to transcend that over which they exercise providence (ET
122). Forms, identified with divine intellects, will meet both conditions. Hence Proclus
regards them as gods.
106
responsible for no evil at all is not a paradigm for evil things, for the
paradigm is one particular [cause] among the [six kinds of] causes. Since
it is not a paradigm for evil things, it is not a form of evils, for all forms 25
are paradigms. Thus it is a consequence that the form of evils would not
be itself – this [putative] form of evils.
Now, if there is a form of evil, what will it be which creates in relation
to it? For perhaps you might say that it is not the form that creates, but
rather there is something else that [does the creating] by looking to it.
Now, if it is the god that has it [as a paradigm], then this is impossible – if 30
in fact the god is responsible for none of the evils. On the other hand, if
the one who creates is something here among the evils [of the sensible
realm], then since he knows the paradigm in its entirety, he will also 33
know the image [that he is alleged to create by looking to this paradigm].
However, the creator will then create evil knowingly – something that is
in fact impossible, since everyone who does evil does so out of ignor-
ance, as has been shown in the Meno (77 c, ff.).
These are matters encompassed in the two syllogisms involved in the
first precept – matters in accordance with which it is necessary to 5
construct myths about the gods, always celebrating their beneficence
and preserving their blamelessness for evils.
<iii. divine immutability: 33.8–36.9>

Moving along to the second [precept] (380d1), we shall find that it is double.
It is common to it to reveal the doctrine that what is divine is impassive in 10
every respect, and neither changes nor engages in the deception that it does
change, for this too would transfer to it a kind of passivity since that which
willingly deceives is not impassive.40 You might say that the second precept
is [itself also] double since the entire discourse is divided into [a part that
says] that what does not change itself corresponds with the truth and
[another part that says] that since it is changeless it does not mislead obser- 15
vers or deceive them that it does change. The one [part] (380d1–381e7)
shows that the divine is changeless, the other (381e8–382a1) shows that it is
exclusively truthful and free from all deceit and falsehood.
How, then, is the first of these two things shown? Well, Plato once
again assumes the following axiom prior to the argument: that every-
thing that changes either changes by itself (as when a soul freely and 20
deliberately becomes vicious or virtuous) or else by [the agency of]
another (as when a body is heated or cooled). Having assumed this
[axiom], he infers that the divine too must change in one of these two
ways, unless it is changeless.
40
The argument for this rather unobvious claim is provided below at 35.10–27.
107
Essay 4
<A. Gods do not undergo change by anything else: 33.24–35.5>

First let us assume that some god changes by the agency of something
25 else. Now, everything that undergoes change is weaker than that which
does the changing, if in fact the one acts while the other undergoes. But
everything divine is maximally powerful and weakness is far removed
from the gods since it is a [kind of] passivity that is material. It is not the
case, therefore, that any of the gods is changed by something else,41
since there is nothing more powerful and that which undergoes change
30 by something else has something that is more powerful [than it].
34 This argument might seem to make it the case that there is only one god,
for among the many, there will exist one that is more powerful [than the
rest]. Or rather, while there exists one that is more powerful, it is not more
powerful than something weaker, but [more powerful] than one which has
its own intrinsic, unshakeable power.42 After all, the Solar Intellect is not
5 weak because it does not have that power that the Demiurge has. Rather, it
has the highest power among what has the form appropriate to it. Therefore
that which is weak is weak through a decline in the power that is proper [to
a thing of its kind] – not due to its inferiority to that which is superior [to it].
Otherwise everything, save for one, would be weak. And if weakness is
10 something evil, everything would participate in evil save for one. Decline
(hyphesis), however, is not an evil for anything, for [the thing that is inferior
to something superior] is rendered a substance in accordance with this
41
οὐκ ἄρα ὑπ’ ἄλλου μεταβάλλεταί τις τῶν θεῶν. In his apparatus, Kroll suggests τι for τις
and possibly θείων instead of θεῶν. This would yield instead ‘It is therefore not the case
that anything belonging to divine [beings] is changed by another.’ Presumably he
thought this would preserve the same subject in the conclusion as in the immediately
preceding premise: τὸ δὲ θεῖον πᾶν δυνατώτατον. But this seems to overlook the ease
with which Proclus shifts between ‘the divine’ and ‘god’ for the premise just quoted
continues: καὶ ἀσθένεια πάθος οὖσα ὑλικὸν πόρρω τῶν θεῶν. In the next paragraph
Proclus will go on to address the objection that immediately leaps to mind: surely
some gods are more powerful than others, so the premise that every god is maximally
powerful is doubtful.
42
ἢ τὸ μὲν δυνατώτερον ἔστιν, οὐκ ἀσθενεστέρου δὲ δυνατώτερον, ἀλλὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἔχοντος
ἀσάλευτον δύναμιν. It is not immediately apparent which of the two – the more powerful or
less powerful god – the genitive ἔχοντος goes back to. We think it goes with ἀσθενεστέρου
and that would be the implication of the grammatical rules too. To refer it to the greater
god requires that we have a genitive absolute whose noun is the same as the subject of the
sentence. This is not strictly allowable, but it is a rule that is so often broken that the
linguistic argument is hardly bulletproof. We also think that taking the subject of ἔχοντος to
be the god that is weaker makes better sense of the example that follows. So if we were to
impose our interpretation upon the text more forcefully, we would write: ‘Or rather, while
there exists one that is more powerful, it is not more powerful than one that is weaker.
Instead, since [the lesser god] has its own intrinsic power, it remains unfazed (asaleutos) [by
the greater power of the other god].’ In the interest of preserving an ambiguity that might
be there we instead translate the final genitive as a comparative.
108
process of declension [from higher causes].43 If, therefore, the ‘weakness’

associated with decline is substantial, and if everything evil is not substantial
qua evil (for what is substantial is natural, while evil is contrary to nature),
then decline would not be something evil, nor would it in this way count as
weakness. Rather, whenever a thing should fail to have the power that is
assigned to it, then at that point the lack of power counts as evil. What 15
changes by the agency of something else necessarily has this sort of absence
of power, since it fails to achieve the power proper to it. If therefore every-
thing that is divine is the best and most powerful thing in the order in which
it belongs, even if one is more powerful than another, then what is inferior
submits in no way at all to change by that which is superior. For although it 20
is best at a greater level, nothing among the things that are best is such as to
change things that are similar.44 Instead it preserves at a greater level what is
best among them. After all, that which brings about change entirely assim-
ilates the thing that undergoes change to itself. If then what is superior were
to change one of the things that are inferior, it would assimilate the thing
that is subject to the change to itself. But what is made like the superior 25
thing becomes more powerful and, having become more powerful, it is 35
consequently more changeless. If therefore, there among the gods, that
which is superior were to change something inferior, then the subject of the
change would become more changeless – something that is in fact impos-
sible. Thus it has been shown that everything that is divine is incapable of
being changed by something else. 5
<B. The gods do not change themselves: 35.5–36.9>

The remaining alternative is that if it changes, this is something that it
undergoes by its own [agency]. However, everything that undergoes
a change by its own agency has a change either for the better or for the
worse. Now nothing would at any time willingly change itself for the
worse, for it appears that everything that has this happen to it suffers this
through ignorance of the good. If, on the other hand, it were to change 10
itself in some way for the better, then such a change would be chosen
43
οὐδενὶ δὲ ἡ ὕφεσις κακόν· οὐσίωται γὰρ κατὰ ταύτην. The passive verb here indicates that,
for example, the Solar Intellect is the very thing that it is in part because of its decline
relative to the power of the Demiurge. If it had a different, more potent intrinsic
dynamis, it would be a different thing. On the central role of declension or hyphesis in the
metaphyics of emanation, see ET prop. 97. The attributes that causes possess in
a primary way (prô tô s) or in their role as causes (kat’ aition) can only be had by their
participants through declension (kath’ hyphesin).
44
i.e. the lower orders in the series of which the highest god is the monad or source.
These lower orders are similar to their cause and are able to revert upon it in virtue of
this fact; cf. ET prop. 29.
109
Essay 4
because prior to the change it was lacking some good that was appro-
priate to it. On the basis of these two [lines of reasoning] we will
attribute to the divine either acting involuntarily or else standing in
need of some good. However, the knowledge that belongs to the gods is
the best and the life they have is one that is self-sufficient (autarkês).
15 Therefore neither do they lack some good nor do they undergo any-
thing involuntarily. And if this is so, then it is not the case that they
change by their own agency any more than they change by the agency of
others.
Let us again draw45 a corollary from these facts: that the gods are not
similar in substance (homoousios) with us either in bodies or in souls, for
20 it pertains to every body to change by the agency of something else,
while it pertains to our souls to change by their own agency. Thus,
if the divine souls are said in the Laws to be moved with a self-moving
motion – since [motion] is the most primary of the changes – we
discover that this manner of change is neither for the better nor for
25 the worse but is instead a discursive (metabatikos) kind of life that [goes]
from one act of cognition (noêsis) to another while maintaining the
same completeness.46 It is for this reason that some call this
‘unchangeable change’47 inasmuch as it does not depart from the
good appropriate to it, but is instead always complete or perfect – as
Aristotle says about the celestial motions.48 The fact that the present
argument has assumed changes that involve alteration in the thing that
30 undergoes the motion, but has not [mentioned anything about] dis-
36 cursive changes, [is clear] through the explanation of the [words] that
come next.
Next we will learn to refute those who say that the gods change into
men or into some other sort of animal in the course of their dealings
with human beings or in their epiphanies. Therefore, although it is
5 impossible for gods to be subject to being altered, it is possible for
them to live in a manner that is ‘discursive’ (metabatikos) since this is
45
Reading λάμβανε with Festugière rather than the MS’ λαμβάνει. Kroll suggests
λαμβάνεται but Festugière’s parallel with the imperative at 29.5 is more persuasive.
Some change is needed, for it is Proclus, not Plato, who draws this corollary.
46
Cf. Hermias, in Phdr. 118.21–30 (Lucarini and Moreschini). In this passage Syrianus or
Hermias confronts the objection that the argument from self-motion (Phdr. 245c–e)
limits immortality to soul. So what about intellect? Is it not immortal? The reply makes
clear that the self-motion of soul and the motion of intellect are tantamount to the fact
of their being alive. (They differ in the manner of their lives and so ‘immortal’ must be
used in a different sense if it is to be applied to them.) The activity of life is thus not
a change in the way in which, say, moving from one position to another or undergoing
qualitative change is.
47
See the parallel passage at in Tim. I 128. It is not clear who this unnamed person is.
48
Festugière corrects Kroll’s reference to Cael. II 4 to Meteo I 2, 339a25.
110
a kind of change that does not involve being subject to alteration.49

We say that this is just like the case where visible things admit change
of place without undergoing qualitative alteration. The changes that
are at the same time [local and] qualitative are those of partial souls
ascending or descending insofar as they are the souls of enmattered
bodies.
<iv. divine truthfulness: 36.10–37.2>

These things show that every god is changeless. It remains now to 10
consider this: whether the divine – while not itself changing either by
its own agency or by another’s – nonetheless deceives us in the manner
of magicians and appears to be such as it is not. Once again let the
following be assumed as an axiom for these [discussions]: all that
deceives either has falsehood in itself and, having been deceived, 15
deceives another or else it knows the truth itself but through its
activities deceives another – whether because it is not otherwise able
to overcome enemies or in order to benefit friends who are out of their
minds and not capable of being helped through the truth. Is it then the
case that the gods have falsehood within them and thus deceive 20
[others] in this manner? No: this is impossible, for every such false-
hood is hateful to gods and men, since there is no one who would wish
to have deception within himself. After all, being deceived is contrary
to everyone’s will. Is it the case, then, that while they are not them-
selves deceived, they deceive others? No, this is not possible either, for
there is nothing that is hateful to the gods nor anyone who is a friend
who is out of his mind. Thus it is not fitting in any way at all for the 25
gods to deceive – not insofar as they are themselves deceived, nor
inasmuch as they are friends of those who are subject to deception,
nor as enemies.
Such, then, are the outlines that he intends to set out concerning
myths about the gods and they preserve these three [principles]: (1)
that which is divine is good and responsible only for things that are
good; (2) the divine is unchanging and undergoes change neither by 30
the agency of another nor by itself; and (3) the divine is truthful and 37
neither deceives through being itself deceived nor through deception
itself.50
49
ἀναλλοιώτου τῆς μεταβάσεως οὔσης· Proclus’ expression here is very compressed, but the
following example suggests something like the translation we have given.
50
οὔτε διὰ τὸ ἀπατᾶσθαι ἀπατῶν οὔτε δι’ αὐτὸ τὸ ἀπατᾶν. Presumably the second disjunct
means something like ‘for some other purpose, such as harming an enemy, etc’.
Festugière translates: ‘ni par le seul plaisir de tromper’.
111
Essay 4
<v. problems and solutions: 37.3–41.29>

These things having been shown by Plato, there is this puzzle about the
first [claim, i.e. (1) above]: Where do evils come from? Either they come
5 from the gods (in which case the argument showing that they are
responsible only for good things is false) or they come from something
else. Now, if this something else is itself a result of the gods, then divine
responsibility for evils is greater by far. If, however, this something else
is not a result of the gods, then the first principles are more than one in
number – one [principle] for good things and one for those that are bad.
With regard to the second [i.e. (2) above], how do the self-revelations
10 of the gods come about since sometimes what appears are luminous
apparitions without form and sometimes it is one that has been given
a form? Were we not to admit these [reports of visions], we would
overturn the entire hieratic art and the works of the theurgists and,
even apart from these things, [we would overturn] the unbidden (auto-
matos) epiphanies of the gods when they reveal themselves in different
[forms] at different times. It is therefore puzzling how something that
15 belongs to the gods is witnessed in various forms if the divine is not
mutable.
With regard to the third [i.e. (3) above], how are false oracular
pronouncements given (of which all the oracular sites are full), [on the
supposition that] the oracles who proclaim them do not lie? And since
the Good is prior to Truth, how is it not the case that the gods will, on
account of the good, sometimes tell a lie to and deceive those who are
20 unworthy to receive the truth from them?51
These, then, are matters about which one might be perplexed in
relation to the previous arguments, even if they were demonstrated as
a matter of necessity.
<Where evil comes from: 37.23–39.1>

These matters have been dealt with at greater length elsewhere, but
for the moment let us say briefly, if you like, that in relation to the
25 first problem, evil comes neither from the gods nor makes its entrance
into existent things from some other principal cause (proêgoumenê
aitia).52 After all, it is not possible either to introduce forms for things
that are evil nor to say that matter is the cause of them, for all forms
51
Changing Kroll’s full-stop to a question mark, as does Festugière without comment.
52
Proclus here recapitulates briefly some of his account of evil from On the Existence of
Evil. He rejects both Plotinus’ idea that matter is an archê of evil and also the view of
Amelius that there are Forms corresponding to things that are bad. For an overview
according to which the bad things in the world have no per se cause, see Baltzly (2009).
112
are both divine and intellectual.53 They govern substances or the

perfections that are in substances. Matter is introduced from the 30
divine as necessary to the cosmos and neither makes things bad 38
(kakopoios), since it is something that contributes towards the genesis
of the universe, nor is it something good, since it is the last stage of
the things that are universal. Instead, it ranks among the things that
are necessary, for everything of this sort is for the sake of something.
Therefore it is in no way necessary to posit either a formal or material
cause for evils, nor generally speaking, is there a single origin (archê) 5
for them but rather as he says54 one ought to say there are partial and
scattered causes that give them the status of a by-product (paruposta-
sis). [The causes of evil are] partial on the ground that they are none of
the things that are universal, such as intellect or soul or body, while
they are plural on the ground that they are not one. And it is for this
reason that he said it is necessary to seek other things (all’ atta) that
are causes for those that are bad (Rep. 379 c). After all, inevitably when 10
a body shares in what is bad then there are in that body different
things (diaphora atta) which – being asymmetrically disposed towards
one another – produce disease as a by-product when each [of these
various elements] seeks to dominate [the others].55 And if a soul [is
bad] then in that soul there are different forms of life that are in some
way opposed. It is from the conflict of these with one another that
something evil gets introduced when each [part] acts on its own 15
behalf. But it was necessary for body to be the sort of thing composed
from what is in conflict, in order that there might be something that is
perishable and that the cosmos should be complete since it has been
constituted out of all things. And it was [similarly] necessary for there
to be a mixture of souls here below in order that living things here
should not lack a portion of rationality and, conversely, that rational
lives should not be implanted in bodies without some intermediary
and perform or undergo the things associated with irrational living 20
beings – desiring, sensing, imagining – for these things are needed by
mortal beings, even if they are destined to be preserved for a short
time. Thus evil things are brought about as subsistent by-products of
the principal activities of existent things and do so for no other reason
than the good. The universe utilises these by-products for its needs
and they are rendered as good by virtue of the power of the things 25
53
As at I 39.26, noera (intellective) here bears the sense of noê ta (intellectual).
54
Kroll points us to Tim. 48a and 68e, but the parallel is far from clear. It seems more
plausible to suppose that ‘partial and scattered’ is Proclus’ interpretation of Socrates’
remarks at Rep. 379c that the gods are not the causes of all things, but only of those
relatively few things that are good.
55
On disease as a result of imbalance or lack of symmetry, see in Tim. II 63.1–16.
113
Essay 4
that use them. It is for this reason that there is no unmixed evil, but
instead [all] have been allotted some trace of <the> good.56 Thus even
that which is evil comes from the gods inasmuch as it is, in a way,
good, and these things are due to other causes that are partial and
plural, arising as something external to the being of those many things
30 themselves.57 Thus in relation to the enquiry concerning evils, this is
39 as much as the account says, revealing that the gods are not respon-
sible for them.
<How divine epiphanies occur: 39.1–40.5>

With respect to the second inquiry about [the gods’] self-revelations the
following ought to be said: that since the gods remain immutable – there
being no multiplication of them nor anything given off – it is divine
visions (phasmata) that are projected and which receive a genesis in the
5 region around us. For since those who are viewing are employing bodies,
while the gods are themselves incorporeal, the visions that are extended
from the gods to those who are worthy have, on the one hand, something
akin to those from whom they are extended and something akin to those
who have the vision.58 It is for this reason that they are seen, but not seen
by everyone.59 In fact, when they are seen by those who see them it is by
10 means of the luminous [bodies] that envelop their souls, since of course
they are frequently seen when the eyes are closed.60 Thus insofar as [the
visions] are extended and are manifested in one place or another in the
air, then they have an existence akin to those who have the vision. But on
56
Festugière would read τἀγαθοῦ for the MS ἀγαθοῦ.
57
καὶ ταῦτα ὑπ’ ἄλλων μερικῶν αἰτίων καὶ πλειόνων ἐπεισοδιῶδες γεγονὸς αὐτοῖς τοῖς πολλοῖς
ἐκείνοις. The dative is puzzling. Festugière translates: ‘comme un élément qui vient
s’ajouter par incidence à ces nombreux agents eux-mêmes’. But it is hard to see how the
neuter dative can refer to the plural and partial causes. It is perhaps instead the things
(ταῦτα) that are presumably the products of those causes. For ἐπεισοδιῶδες as ‘external
to the being or essence of things’, compare the distinction between the intrinsic and
extrinsic kinds of plurality drawn at in Parm. 1187.41–1188.4: ῥητέον δὲ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὅτι
ἔστιν οὐσιῶδες πλῆθος ἐν τοῖς οὖσι, τὸ δὲ καὶ ἔξωθεν ἐπιγιγνόμενον καὶ ἐπεισοδιῶδες, καὶ τὸ
μὲν ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσιν ὑφεστηκὸς, τὸ δὲ ἐν τοῖς ἐνύλοις πράγμασιν.
58
A clever deployment of the Neoplatonic doctine of mean or intermediate terms. In the
procession from a level of being that is A to one that it not-A, there is an intermediate
that is both A (in one sense) and not-A (in another sense). Thus in the procession from
the absolutely ungenerated intelligibles to the generated visible cosmos, the inter-
mediate is soul which is both generated (in one sense) and ungenerated (in another). Cf.
in Tim. II. 127.25–131.25.
59
As Festugière notes, this is presumably because those who cannot see them are not akin
to the divine visions in the requisite way, while those who can are.
60
For the role of the soul’s ‘luminious body’ in prophecy and divine epiphanies see
Sorabji (2005).
114
the other hand, insofar as they are projected as a divine light and are
effective and inasmuch as they represent the powers of the gods through
their self-evident symbols, they are dependent upon the superior beings 15
who hold them forth. It is also for this reason that the ineffable divine
tokens (synthêmata)61 are given a shape, having been put forward now in
one form, now in another. The Oracles also make this evident in relation
to what is said to the theurgist: that while everything divine is incorpor-
eal, bodies are bound to them for our sake since it is not possible for us to 20
participate in an incorporeal manner in incorporeal things due to the
corporeal nature into which we have been grafted.62 These [phasmata]
therefore are manifested or become invisible in accordance with the will
of the gods, but they themselves [sc. the gods] are invisible, remaining just
as they are since they neither acquire anything from these visions nor do 25
they undergo alteration. The case is parallel to that of the intelligible
forms that do not become corporeal or composites or things that have
taken on a shape when the things that are rendered subsistent in con-
forming with them are rendered subsistent as this kind of thing, as
a result of the former existents that are not this kind of thing.63
Therefore every god is shapeless, even if he should reveal himself in a 40
manner that involves shape, for the shape is not one that is in him, but
rather one that results from him since it is not possible for the one to
whom he is revealed to see that which is without shape in a manner that
involves no shape. Instead the one who sees sees in a manner that
involves shape appropriately to his nature. Let what is said be enough
on the second enquiry. 5
<Oracles do not deceive: 40.5–41.10>

In relation to the third [problem] it must be said that the falsehood is
not in those giving the oracles but in those who receive the oracular
61
The synthê mata are the words, objects or actions used in theurgic rituals that express the
readiness of the theurgist for divine union. The English translation ‘password’ suggests
only verbal cues, but this implication is unwanted. The idea of a password as something
that grants access is useful and English presents no other natural alternatives.
The Greek word’s origins in a broken token, whose parts once rejoined testify to
a person’s identity, seem most appropriate. As with the divine visions, there must be
something in common between the utterer (who can say only words with a definite
form) and the unutterable reality of the gods (who are to hear the theurgist’s request).
62
I 39.17–22 = fr. 143 (Majercik). Compare in Remp. II 242.8–12 (= fr. 142).
63
μεμορφωμένα τῶν ὑφισταμένων κατ’ αὐτὰ τοιούτων ὑφισταμένων, ἐκ μὴ τοιούτων ἐκείνων
ὄντων. Convoluted expression, even by Proclus’ standards. We think the point is that
the intelligible forms are not reciprocally enformed in any sense when the things that
are rendered existent in conformity with them (i.e. sensibles) are thus rendered existent
on the basis of [conforming with] the Forms that are not such as they are.
115
Essay 4
pronouncements.64 In every oracular shrine, the one who gives the

oracle neither deceives nor is deceived. However, those who consult
10 the oracle receive the pronouncements in a different manner due to
their own weakness or lack of aptitude. Nor does this come about
contrary to the will of those who give the oracles, for they want the
ones who are worthy consultants to have only those things of which
they are worthy. However, it does not belong to some who consult the
oracle to know the truth that is established in purity before them, but
15 through the falsehood that has come into them and exists in them, they
experience such things as do belong to them. Therefore they65 neither
fail to know the truth nor do they conceal it (for it is not lawful for
them), but they employ [a truth] concealed by those who share in it, for
the benefit of those who conceal [that] truth.66 Now what the lack of
20 aptitude is through which the truth is received, not as it turns out to be,
but as it turns out not to be, when those who receive it have distorted it,
has been related at greater length in what has been written On the
Oracles. The historical record among the prophetic shrines testifies on
our behalf too when they say that it is either due to the place or the
moment or through the manner of reception of the oracular pro-
25 nouncements or through some other error that falsehood has come
to have a derivative existence (paruphistasthai) amid the oracular
shrines. It is also possible for this to result from the questions not
having been put correctly, not to mention other things that are more
41 strictly causes – causes that come from here below while the gods
themselves always offer the truth from on high for those who are
capable of receiving it.67
While these matters have received a sufficient discussion elsewhere,
it has been shown on the basis of all these things that among the rules
5 (nomos) governing theology there are these two. And, since the second
one is twofold, all three guidelines (typos) are as follows: (1) it is proper
to allocate to the gods only making of what is good; (2) it is proper to
regard them as completely and utterly unchangeable (either by their
own agency or by anything else); (3) they are truthful in all activities.
64
See the similar discussion of the self-deception of mortals in Essay 6.
65
More likely ‘the gods’, but possibly ‘those giving the oracles’.
66
The expression is very difficult here, but Proclus appears to mean that while the gods
do not themselves conceal the truth, they willingly use a truth which they know has been
concealed by the mortal inquirers with their highly imperfect interpretive apparatus.
Yet this concealment is also for the sake of these very inquirers. Proclus makes his point
clearer through the discussion of concrete, Homeric examples in Essay 6.
67
Proclus’ account of oracular error, by positing numerous causes and absolving the gods
of any responsibility, neatly follows his account of the arising of evil and imperfection
in general.
116
These things are consistent with the three [divine attributes] in book 10
10 of the Laws (900d), as we said – viz. goodness, power and
knowledge.
<Truthfulness and daemons: 41.11–29>

However, since Plato added in his remarks on truth (382e) that it is not
only that which is divine that is totally without falsehood, but also what
is daemonic, it is necessary to infer from this additional [claim]: that
what is truly daemonic in every respect – and is not just daemonic 15
relatively speaking (kata schesin)68 (a being who endures various changes
and who deceives those with whom it would become intimate) – every
one that is essentially daemonic is also truthful since it is rational, while
what is irrational is not receptive of truth or falsehood. It is for this
reason that Plato did not say that everything divine or daemonic is 20
truthful, but rather said that it is entirely lacking in falsehood, for it is
entirely unreceptive of falsehood.69 But while the one [the divine] by its
nature only tells the truth, the other states neither truth nor falsehood.
Thus such daemons as belong to the deceptive kind – one who is said to
have subverted prophecies or hearkened to invocations or to have rela-
tions with someone of their own will – are among those that are 25
daemons relatively speaking. If, however, there are some people who
are deceived by daemons that are genuinely daemons, then they are
deceived through themselves and not through the daemons, just as we
said in the case of the gods (40.14–15), for there is a common account
given by Plato concerning the absence of falsehood in both gods and
daemons.
68
Proclus distinguishes here between ‘daemonic’ as an absolute and a relative term.
A particular sort of higher being can count as daemonic relative to, say, human souls
but without being daemonic considered absolutely. Proclus (and Syrianus) use this
distinction to explain why Plato’s Timaeus refers to the sublunary gods as ‘daemons’ at
40d6–7; cf. in Tim. III 154.32–155.9 = Syrianus in Tim. fr. 20 (Klitenic-Wear).
69
Proclus here attaches great significance to Plato’s wording at Rep. 382e6: Πάντῃ ἄρα
ἀψευδὲς τὸ δαιμόνιόν τε καὶ τὸ θεῖον. His thought is that irrational daemons – which are of
course only daemons in the relative sense – do not admit of or propound falsehoods:
qua irrational they are neither true nor false. We can’t help but be reminded of the
(probably apocryphal) story of a certain logical positivist who was allegedly inducted
into the secret band of atheists who allegedly ran that godless legacy of godless
utilitarians – University College London. Not believing that religious utterances had
any truth value at all, the positivist in question was allowed to swear ‘I do not believe
that “God exists” is true’.
117
a. some issues
Essay 5 has been of interest to scholars of Proclus principally because of
its relation to the longer Essay 6 and because of what it might tell us
about the composition of the Republic Commentary more generally.
The particular details of its content have not held a great deal of
intrinsic interest either for those interested in Neoplatonism or for
those interested in Plato. Lamberton nicely epitomises the prevailing
attitude to Proclus’ short essay.
If we had only the fifth and not the sixth essay of the Republic commentary,
Proclus’s place in the history of poetics would quickly dissolve into thin air. He
would remain one of the early defensive commentators on Plato on poetics, a dry
scholar, formulating modest questions and providing reasoned answers, some-
times calling upon relevant outside opinion.1
This short introduction is not going to overturn utterly this largely
negative appraisal of Essay 5. The content of the roughly twenty-nine
pages that make up Essay 5 is not likely to set the hearts of Plato scholars
racing with the profound insights it offers into Plato’s account of poetry.
However, we will argue that this short essay nicely illustrates some
features of Proclus’ characteristic approach to the interpretation of
Plato. In addition, we will argue that the differences between Essay 5
and Essay 6 may hold less significance in relation to the composition of
the Republic Commentary and the evolution of Proclus’ views from those
of Syrianus than has been argued. Essay 5 and Essay 6 clearly have
different purposes and the exciting account of allegorical meaning that
is developed in Essay 6 is nowhere apparent in Essay 5. But it is not
necessary to infer from this (as did Gallavotti2) that Essay 5 belonged
originally to notes for an introductory class on the Republic, while Essay
6 (along with Essays 9, 13, 16 and 17) were independent works entirely
distinct from this Introduction that were subsequently combined with it
to give us the text now included in Kroll’s edition. Nor is it necessary to
suppose that Essays 5 and 6 have different and incompatible theories of
inspired poetry, the more sophisticated of which belongs to Proclus,
while the simpler account of Essay 5 belongs to Syrianus (as do
1
Lamberton (2012), xvii. 2
Gallavotti (1929).
118
A. Some issues
Lamberton and Sheppard).3 The evidence is certainly consistent with that

hypothesis, but we will argue that this hypothesis is not clearly superior to
other, more modest explanations of the differences between the two
Essays.
Essay 5 addresses ten questions about Plato’s doctrines concerning
poetry. Three of the ten concern the proper understanding of the
Republic considered more or less in isolation.
(1) Why is poetry exiled from the ideal city if, by Plato’s own
admission, there is something divine about it (398a)?
(4) How can we explain the fact that Socrates pleads ignorance of
the musical modes appropriate to drinking parties and to
mourning (398e–399 c) when he also says that he has been
instructed by Damon (400b–c)?
(6) What are the modes and metres that he finally approves of and
why, given the importance of these things, has this been left
unclear?
Four more questions concern the relation of the Republic to other

Platonic dialogues or to the views of other Platonists.
(2) Why does Plato not accept tragedy and comedy on the basis of
their ability to moderate the passions as Aristotle supposed?
(Recall that in the Neoplatonists’ understanding of things,
Aristotle is an occasionally heterodox Platonist.)
(3) Why does the Republic (395a–b) seem to disagree with the
Symposium (223d) on whether the same person can write both
comedy and tragedy?
(5) What are Plato’s views on mousikê and its species? This question
quickly turns to the correct understanding of the Republic’s
views on poetry in relation to what is said at Phaedo 61a and
Phaedrus 245a.
(7) What were the errors of the poets known to Plato and why did
he say in Laws II, 669c that the Muses could never be mistaken?
This topic leads on to the question of Plato’s own competence
as a judge of good poetry and thus to Critias the Elder’s appar-
ent praise of Solon’s rather bad poetry in Timaeus 21c.
The last three questions seek to fill out or supplement what is said in
the Republic so as to arrive at Platonic answers to quite general questions:
(8) Who is the best poet in Plato’s view and what qualities make
him so?
3
Lamberton (2012), Sheppard (1980).
119
(9) What is the goal or telos of poetry?

(10) What god within the universe plays the role on the cosmic
scale that the good poet should seek to emulate here below?
In the following section we will consider Proclus’ answer to these

questions as illustrations of his characteristic methods of interpreting
Plato. Prior to that, however, let us consider the significance that
scholars have supposed that Essay 5 has for broader issues about the
nature of the Republic Commentary and Proclus’ independence from his
teacher Syrianus.
b . t h e s i g n i fi c a n c e o f e s s a y 5
in the proclean corpus
Gallavotti used the differences between Essays 5 and 6 on the question
of allegory as an important piece of evidence for his thesis of the
fundamental disunity of the Republic Commentary as a whole.
The argument is nicely summarised and assessed by Sheppard.4
Gallavotti supposed that there were two distinct approaches to allego-
rical meanings in poetic claims about the gods taken in each of the essays
and that they were flatly inconsistent with one another. Essay 5 men-
tions only briefly the idea that the surface meaning of statements about
the gods in poetry may function as screens or veils for a deeper allego-
rical meaning. So while allegory plays only a minor role in Essay 5,
Essay 6 is centred on providing allegorical readings of Homer that will
show that he is in fundamental agreement with Plato. Moreover, the
brief mention of allegorical meaning in Essay 5 suggests that the surface
meaning that veils the deeper allegorical meaning must respect the
guidelines for the depiction of gods that Socrates announces at 379a–c
and 380d–81c. (The demonstrations of these typoi are, as we have seen,
the subject of Essay 4.) Essay 5 thus seems to assert that even the surface
meaning of what may prove to be, on closer examination, allegorical
poetry cannot involve the use of language or stories that are inconsistent
with the gods’ beneficent and unchanging behaviour. This comes out
most clearly at 65.29–66.9. But Essay 6 provides a theory of allegorical
poetry in which properties or actions that are utterly opposed to the
gods’ nature can be used as proper and effective symbols of the divine
reality (77.13–28). Thus Gallovotti argued that the two essays are
simply inconsistent on the subject of allegorical poetry.
As Sheppard recognised, this overstates the case. While Essay 5 certainly
mentions poetic depictions of the gods that inaccurately represent divine
4
Sheppard (1980), 15–18.
120
B. The significance of Essay 5 in the Proclean corpus
nature (44.15; 45.18), the emphasis is much more on inaccurate depictions

of heroes and, as Sheppard notes, Proclus does not appeal to allegorical
meanings to explain away bad conduct on the part of heroes in Essay 6.
Moreover, the question of the educational value of poetry dominates in
Essay 5. While it is true that Proclus criticises the use of obscene or
shameful language even when this is a screen for a deeper meaning, he
expressly adds that this is a problem when the audience is young and not
able to interpret properly the deeper meaning (44.16–17). So the limited
remarks on allegory in Essay 5 do not deny what Essay 6 asserts – that the
inspired Homer can lead a certain select audience (77.1–4) to the truth
about the gods by means of allegorically attributing to them characteristics
that are precisely opposed to their nature (77.19–27). This will indeed
transgress the guidelines (typoi) defended in Essay 4 for the surface content
of tales about the gods. But Proclus thinks those guidelines apply in virtue
of legitimate educational aims for a specific audience and not all poetry is,
or should be, addressed to that audience.5 Sheppard and Lamberton thus
both reject Gallovotti’s claim that Essays 5 and 6 present inconsistent
accounts of the constraints on sound allegorical poetry and that this
demonstrates the fundamental disunity of the Republic Commentary in its
current form.
Nonetheless, both Sheppard and Lamberton argue that the two
essays do contain inconsistent divisions of the poetic art. Essay 5
works with a simple division between inspired and didactic poetry.
This division is common to the views of Syrianus as they are reflected
in Hermias’ scholia on the Phaedrus (97.29 ff., 146.28 ff. (Couvreur)).
However, Essay 6 invokes a threefold distinction between inspired,
didactic, and mimetic poetry with the latter category being further
subdivided between accurate or eikastic mimetic poetry and inaccurate
or phantastic mimetic poetry. Sheppard concluded that the threefold
5
This question of audience must be the solution to the text in Essay 5 that seems most
obviously inconsistent with Proclus’ account of the relation of surface meaning to
allegorical meaning in Essay 6: 65.29–66.9. In this passage in Essay 5 Proclus addresses
the question of who, in Plato’s view, is the best poet. This best poet will not, he says, use
screens for his allegorical meanings that are dissimilar to their subjects. He’ll use the
voluntary transfer of power from father to son rather than (presumably) the overthrow
of fathers by sons (as is depicted in the story of Zeus and his father). Presumably,
however, in the context of this question in Essay 5 the issue is not whether this use of
dissimilar allegorical surface meanings makes Homer a bad poet, but rather what
hypothetical present or future poet would be best. Such an ideal poet would combine
the inspired and hidden meanings of Homer with a surface content that is ‘child safe’.
Thus the answer to this question in Essay 5 does not place limitations on how allegorical
meaning can possibly be transmitted. It merely observes that it would be desirable and
possible to combine this transmission with a surface meaning that poses no danger to the
youth if the poem should fall into the wrong hands.
121
division of the kinds of poetry was a later development of Proclus’ own

thought (p. 37). Let us examine these divisions of the poetic art in more
detail and evaluate what we can infer from the differences.
c. two incompatible divisions

of the poetic art?
Essay 5’s fifth question asks about Plato’s account of mousikê – not
merely poetry. Mousikê is a term that defies easy translation into
English. The word mousikê can refer to any art over which the Muses
preside. The sense is wider than ‘music’ and might be better charac-
terised as ‘culture’ or ‘arts and letters’. In the fifth question, Proclus
attempts to systematize the various senses of mousikê that Plato distin-
guishes. These will include philosophy itself (cf. Phdo 61a), activities
said to be inspired by the Muses (Phdr 245a), and things that lead the
soul up to Beauty (Phdr 248d), whether these things are the product of
inspiration or not. Poetry is a kind of mousikê and since poetry includes
musical accompaniment, music is also a kind of mousikê. While all
poetry is mousikê, not all mousikê is poetry (57.3–6). Schematically, the
four kinds of mousikê that Proclus identifies in the fifth question include:
Type (highest to Properties Platonic text for

lowest) authority
Philosophy as Not widely recognised as a form of Phdo 61a
mousik ê mousik ê, but the philosopher
possesses all the goods of edu-
cative mousik ê in a manner that
is simple and unified
Possession by the A form of possession by the Muses Phdr 245a where
Muses that restricted to the composition of Socrates catalogues
moves a person poetry that (apparently) praises the beneficial kinds
to compose good men and inspires its audi- of madness (mania)
inspired poetry ence to emulate them.
The mousik ê of Not divinely inspired as the for- Phdr 248d where
music lovers mer kinds of mousik ê are. Leads Socrates says that
the music lover from auditory the first descent of
harmony to intelligible harmony. the soul is into the
Contrasted with the Lover who life of a philosopher,
is led back to intelligible beauty a lover of beauty, or
from all instances of sensible someone musical
beauty (not merely auditory and erotic.
ones) as well as the philosopher
122
C. Two incompatible divisions of the poetic art?
(Continued)
who, stimulated by all sensibles,
reverts upon all intelligibles.
Educative mousikê The subject matter of the Republic. Rep. 398c in
It adapts harmonies and particular?
rhythms that lead the soul of
those educated to virtue.
Nothing is said about content.
Coordinate with gymnastikê.
Before delving too deeply into the division of mousikê , let us look
briefly at the threefold division of poetry from Essay 6. Our presentation
more or less follows that of Sheppard and Lamberton.
Lives Poetry Platonic Homeric

authority example
Soul connected to Inspired poetry – madness Phdr 245a; Ion Subjects are
gods, trans- and possession by the 533d–534c; gods them-
cending its own Muses. Such poets are Laws 682a; selves; Ares
intellect messengers of divine Alc. II 147b; and
(178.11) mystical conceptions Phlb. 65a; Rep. Aphrodite
which are concealed 378d. (Od. 8.266).
behind often obscene
or disturbing symbols
(185.20).
Soul reverted Epistemic poetry – reveals Laws 630a; Alc. Subject is the
upon itself and conceptions of both II 142e. soul or nat-
its intellect material and immater- ure;
(179.3) ial reality through epis- Heracles’
têm ê that accords with soul in the
intellect (186.22) underworld
(Od 11.601)
Soul borne along Mimetic poetry – imitates Soph. 235a; Heroes acting
by its lower sensible things either Laws 667 c; in character
powers and accurately or Rep. 597e. (accurate)
engaged in inaccurately.
sense percep-
tion and imagi-
nation (179.15)
The first thing to say is that the divisions in Proclus’ account of

mousikê seem more responsive to Plato’s texts than to any ideal of an
exhaustive and exclusive division of either poetry or the larger, vaguer
123
category of mousikê. Consider the fact that Proclus says that all poetry
is mousikê, but not all mousikê is poetry. But his division of the kinds of
mousikê leaves no place for obvious examples of genres of poetry.
Where, for instance, would tragedy and comedy fit? They are clearly
forms of poetry and if all poetry is mousikê, then they should belong
somewhere. Yet they are not educative – or at least not successfully so.
Nor do they belong in the second category of inspired poetry given
that this category is apparently restricted to the depiction of good
persons that successfully engenders emulation among those who seek
the good. Though Proclus does not say so in Essay 5, the Phaedrus
subsequently provides the answer to where the rest of the poetry goes.
It belongs with the sixth of the incarnations discussed at 248d. So, at
least in the context of mousikê in the Phaedrus, it isn’t under the
direction of the Muses at all. It is poetry, but not – in the relevant
sense – mousikê.
This fact recommends the hypothesis that Proclus is not interested in
giving an account of the kinds of poetry in the fifth question of Essay 5. He is
concerned to show how Plato’s various remarks on mousikê in various
dialogues are to be interpreted in relation to one another. So the focus is
on mousikê in the first instance, and poetry only inasmuch as it is mentioned
in relation to mousikê in some (but not all) of these instances. In addition,
apparently arbitrary stipulations are to be explained by reference to the
Platonic texts under consideration. Why, for instance, is the inspired
poetry of Essay 5 restricted to the depiction of good men in such a way
as to inspire emulation? Precisely because of what Plato says at Phaedrus
245a when he is describing the third form of mania. It is ‘a possession by the
Muses and a madness’ that takes hold of a ‘gentle and pure soul’.
It ‘awakens and arouses to Bacchic frenzy’ the soul of the possessed poet
‘to songs and other poetry, and thus by adorning countless deeds of the
ancients educates later generations’.6 Nothing other than fidelity to the text
requires that only this can serve as the subject matter of inspired poetry.7
When Proclus turns to Phaedrus 245a again in his discussion of the
inspired poetry of Essay 6 (180.10–182.20), quite different details serve
as the grist for his interpretive mill. Proclus comments on why this is
6
Phdr 245a1–5 τρίτη δὲ ἀπὸ Μουσῶν κατοκωχή τε καὶ μανία, λαβοῦσα ἁπαλὴν καὶ ἄβατον
ψυχήν, ἐγείρουσα καὶ ἐκβακχεύουσα κατά τε ᾠδὰς καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ποίησιν, μυρία τῶν
παλαιῶν ἔργα κοσμοῦσα τοὺς ἐπιγιγνομένους παιδεύει.
7
Oddly, however, Proclus gestures towards a connection between the Phaedrus 245a
passage and Republic 10 by means of the idea that even this poet is ‘three removes from
the truth’. That is to say, the Good is one thing. The good hero whom the poet depicts is
another. And the young people who are educated in the Good by means of the depiction
of the hero are yet another. So his concern with the detail of Plato’s Phaedrus is
combined with a concern to establish intertextual connections.
124
C. Two incompatible divisions of the poetic art?
both possession and madness. He explains why it comes only to gentle

and pure souls. He remarks on the fact that it involves both an arousing
and an excitation to Bacchic frenzy. This time, however, the discussion
of the clause ‘adorning countless deeds of the ancients educates later
generations’ is postponed until last and Proclus broadens the sense of
inspired poetry’s educative function. It is educative for those persons
whose souls are prepared for a mystical teaching.
The fact that the task of clarifying mousikê has priority over giving an
account of the kinds of poetry is also attested by the odd relations among
the last three kinds of mousikê. As we have seen, the apparently restricted
content of inspired poetry in Essay 5 results from Proclus’ focus on one
particular clause in Plato’s text in the Phaedrus. The discussion of
the second kind of mousikê is entirely conditioned by the specific account
of the initial incarnation of souls at Phaedrus 248d2–a4. In this case, the
life of mousikê is characterised in a particular way because it is juxtaposed
with the life of the philosopher and the erotic person. The latter is
treated as someone who is in love with all kinds of beauty, while mousikê
is given a narrower range relating only to auditory beauty. The fourth
category of educative mousikê is also characterised in terms of its concern
with what we would call music, but the two forms of mousikê are
distinguished by the ‘direction’ this musical focus takes. In the former,
the music lover ascends to intelligible harmonies from sensible ones.
In the latter, the musical trainer instils virtue in the souls of the young by
his or her comprehension of the psychic effects of music.
We submit that Proclus does not present one theory of inspired
poetry in Essay 5 and another, more mature and sophisticated theory
in Essay 6. Rather, in each essay Proclus is like a jazz musician.
The Platonic texts that are under discussion are like musical themes
that the previous soloist has played. Proclus now inherits these themes
and improvises on them, riffing on them in a way that suits this parti-
cular performance. The image of improvisational jazz performance is,
of course, modern. But as we argued in the General Introduction, the
point of philosophical education in the schools of late antiquity was the
achievement of a form of Platonic literacy that could be performed both
externally, for those capable of appreciating such performances, and
also internally for the sake of organising the knowledge associated with
general paideia and for the sake of seeing oneself and one’s life in terms
of images borrowed from the Platonic texts. This performative aspect of
Platonic literacy fits well with our image of jazz improvisation since in
each case one will adapt the external or internal performance to the
specific context at hand. In Essay 5, the performance context is provided
by the tradition of ‘problems in an author’. He sets himself ten puzzles
to deal with and addresses them in a relatively brief span of pages.
125
In Essay 6 a far wider range of texts are invoked to provide the provoca-
tion for his improvisations. Moreover, he affords himself much more
space – a longer solo, as it were – within which to combine these themes.
It is even possible that the two performances have been tailored to
different audiences. We know nothing about the implicit audience for
Essay 5, but (as we will discuss in the next chapter) Essay 6 seems to draw
together material for a lecture celebrating Plato’s birthday. Such an
event would include not only students but also senior members of the
Platonic school and perhaps learned pagan patrons.
It must be acknowledged that Sheppard and Lamberton’s hypothesis
of development on Proclus’ part would explain the differences we have
observed between Essays 5 and 6. But we prefer our explanation that
these differences are attributable to the differences in the range of
Platonic texts to which Proclus is attending in each case and the extent
of the solo improvisation on those texts. The improvisation hypothesis
goes naturally with a broader view about the purpose of the Platonic
commentaries. The ultimate goal of the Neoplatonic life is to transcend
the condition of embodiment so as to live a godlike life. This goal is
facilitated – somehow – by reading Plato (and of course the other texts in
the Neoplatonic canon). The facilitation takes place by learning to ‘read’
one’s life experience through the lens of these texts. We hypothesise that
this goal was understood as an ability, much as Sextus regarded scepticism
as an ability to balance arguments so as to achieve epochê. For the
Neoplatonists it is perhaps the ability to see all things through concepts
and metaphors derived from the Platonic texts. What better way for the
master and teacher to communicate that ability than through demon-
strating its use in drawing creative connections among Plato’s works?
After all, the capacity to relate the Phaedrus to the Republic and the Republic
to the Ion and all of them to Homer is presumably a first step in relating
every canonical dialogue to every aspect of one’s own experience.
d. beyond the REPUBLIC
The last three questions that Proclus addresses in Essay 5 take us

beyond either puzzles about the consistency of Plato’s statements in
the Republic (questions 1, 4 and 6) or the relation of the Republic to other
dialogues (questions 2, 3, 5 and 7). The questions take the audience or
readership to broader questions that are relevant for a Platonist in late
antiquity.
The first of these considers who, according to Plato, would be the
best poet. Throughout this question (and question 7) Proclus utilises
the technical vocabulary of the schools of rhetoric. This might seem
126
D. Beyond the Republic
surprising to people who are reading this book on the basis of their
interest in Plato rather than late antique Platonism. While many of
Plato’s dialogues evince a hostility to rhetoric and oppose it to the
study of philosophy, the situation in the fifth century ce is very different.
Rhetorical studies became the mainstay of a gentleman’s education or
paideia. In addition, however, Neoplatonic philosophers became inter-
ested in rhetorical theory and brought rhetoric into the ambit of philo-
sophy by treating it as – at least for the most part – a compartment of the
art of logic. The traditional five parts of the art of rhetoric (invention,
arrangement, style, memory, and delivery) were superseded by
a philosophically inclined curriculum that diminished the role of the
latter two parts and concentrated on composition and style rather than
delivery. Students could now expect to work through a standard curri-
culum that involved:
1. the Progymnasmata of Aphthonius. This work includes examples
and accounts of fourteen exercises corresponding to the stock
types of composition: myth, narrative, encomium, ekphrasis, etc.
This work was followed by four more theoretically oriented works and
commentaries upon them:
2. Hermogenes, On Issues
3. Ps.-Hermogenes, On Invention
4. Hermogenes, On Ideas (sc. of style)
5. Ps.-Hermogenes, On the Method of Forceful Speaking
Proclus’ teacher, Syrianus, composed commentaries on the two genuine
works of Hermogenes among these latter four books. While it is
a common part of a Platonic philosopher’s biography that he turns
away from rhetoric to the study of philosophy, this is itself
a conventional trope of biographical writing. Even Proclus’ brief dis-
cussions in questions 7 and 8 of Essay 5 show that he is well acquainted
with the technical vocabulary of rhetoric and, of course, expects that the
audience to whom his teaching is directed to be familiar with it as well.
Kennedy reviews the content of one of the many introductions to the
standard rhetorical canon – that of Marcellinus.8 While Syrianus’ com-
mentaries on Hermogenes are not of much philosophical interest, there
are some features of Marcellinus’ introduction to the rhetorical corpus
that relate Platonic themes to the rhetorical curriculum. Marcellinus
divides the kinds (eid ê) of rhetoric (deliberative, judicial, and panegyric)
and correlates these kinds of rhetoric with the three parts of the soul
discussed in the Republic, assigning them to the appetitive, thymetic, and
8
Kennedy (1980), 188.
127
rational parts of the soul respectively. What Kennedy found surprising

in this is the way in which it elevates panegyric to the loftiest position
among the kinds of rhetoric since it is now correlated with the highest
part of the soul. While Aristotle had given the highest rank to delib-
erative oratory, the imperial context of late antiquity regarded the
oratory of praise (or blame) as more important.9
This says a lot about the uses of rhetoric in the late Roman Empire,10
but it also gives a particular salience to Proclus’ concern with Plato’s
view of the best poet. Note that this question in Essay 5 concentrates on
how the best poet will praise good men. Nor is it strange that a Platonic
introduction to the art of rhetoric should correlate the faculty of reason
with panegyric. After all, it is reason that knows the Good and thus
praises or condemns the subject of the address depending on the extent
to which he participates in it. The continuity between philosophy and
rhetoric in late antiquity makes it unsurprising that Proclus would
detour into a discussion of Plato’s guidelines on literary style, as well
as poetic content. It also makes it unsurprising that an introduction to
the rhetorical corpus works with a Platonic division of the soul.
Question 9 in Essay 5 emphasises the political purpose or telos of
poetry – or at least of mimetic poetry. As noted in the General
Introduction, the Neoplatonists regarded Plato’s Gorgias as a dialogue
focused upon the gradation of virtue that they call ‘political’ or ‘con-
stitutional’. That is to say, political virtue concerns the right relations
among the parts of the soul that the Republic identifies with justice. So it
is fitting that question 9 stresses the subordination of the poet and his art
to the art of the statesman. Indeed, Proclus’ brief discussion reminds his
audience that the good is the goal of all things that are done well (67.25).
Question 10 takes the civic context of question 9 to a cosmic scale.
Central to Proclus’ political philosophy is the parallel between the
cosmos and a well-governed political community.11 The Guardians of
the Republic are analogous to the gods who are the causes of all things,
while the Auxiliaries are analogous to the daemones who serve these
gods as intermediaries (in Remp. II 3.5–10). The more numerous pro-
ducers in the ideal city correspond to the souls that are elevated or
dragged down by these daemonic intermediaries (in Remp. II 99.
13–14) in accordance with the laws of fate that govern the whole
9
Kennedy (1983), 114.
10
Kennedy describes the uses of panegyric or epideictic oratory in the late empire in these
terms: ‘The most obvious political function of epideictic is in expression of loyalty to the
state by an individual, sometimes a suspect individual, or on the part of a city, but the
speeches were conversely used to express to the public the values or ideals of the rulers
themselves through the mouths of those who praised them’ (Kennedy (1983), 24).
11
Cf. O’Meara (2003), 94–8.
128
E. Conclusion
cosmos. In this context, it is unsurprising that Proclus should seek to

identify some divine force within the cosmic politeia that corresponds to
the specific role of the poet in Plato’s Republic.
e. conclusion
The brief Essay 5 thus provides a good illustration of several tendencies
in Proclus’ commentary practice. First, it demonstrates his concern to
exhibit Plato as consistent with himself, both in the dialogue under
consideration and also across dialogues. When these links between dia-
logues are made, it is often very specific features of the text that deter-
mine what Proclus will have to say about it on that particular occasion.
We sometimes see these connections between dialogues made at a variety
of points and what Proclus says about the two works is not always the
same in both cases. It need not be inconsistent, but different occasions of
intertextuality often lead to different degrees of emphasis on different
aspects of the two texts in question. We can see this in the case at hand by
considering the way in which Phaedrus 245a is treated with greater or
lesser detail in Essays 5 and 6. Finally, Essay 5 shows Proclus’ tendency to
connect the Platonic text under discussion with wider philosophical
issues and to relate human affairs to their cosmic analogues.
129
essay 5
5 Plato’s views on the art of poetry, the kinds
that fall under it, and the best harmonies
and rhythms
<introduction: 42.1–43.25>
It is necessary first to state and resolve the puzzles about the reason
why Plato does not receive the art of poetry but rather expels it from
5 the correct political order – even if he does pour myrrh over it, as
is fitting for statues in the most holy of rites, and crown it as holy,
just as it was customary to crown those statues (Rep. 398a7–8). This
itself is particularly worthy of investigation: if, according to him,
there is something divine about poetry, how is it to be thrown out
of what is a divine political order? And if there is not something
10 divine about it, then how is it to be honoured with the honours that
belong to the gods?
Second, why in the world does he not admit tragedy and comedy in
particular when these things contribute towards the expiation (aphosiô-
sis) of the passions? These passions are impossible to shut out entirely or
to indulge in safely, and which doubtless demand some exercise at an
15 opportune moment12 – an exercise which, when it has been fulfilled in
the hearing of these [sc. tragedy and comedy], renders us undisturbed by
these passions the rest of the time.13
Third, how can it be that in the Symposium (223d) he has forced both
Agathon and Aristophanes to agree that comedy and tragedy are pro-
20 ducts of the same knowledge, whilst in the Republic he does not want the
same person to be the creator of both, even though these things [sc.
comedy and tragedy] are closely related? Nor, for that matter, is he
12
As Festugière notes, ἐν καιρῷ is subsequently replaced with ἐμμέτρως when Proclus
recapitulates the second question at 49.15.
13
This problem needs to be seen in the context of the competing accounts – Stoic and
Platonic on the one hand, Peripatetic on the other – of the right role for the passions.
The Platonists side with the Stoics in urging apatheia as the ideal. The sage will not
undergo the passions. The Peripatetic ideal, which is described here, is metriopatheia:
the sage will experience the right emotions to the right degree under the right
circumstances. The viewing of comedy and tragedy might be deemed an appropriate
‘training ground’ for the person who aims at the latter ideal. As we shall see, the
proponent of apatheia will view the effects of tragedy and comedy quite differently.
130
<Introduction>
willing for the same person to be an actor in both – not even allowing for
the fact that the actor is an imitator.14
Fourth, why on earth does Socrates say that he does not know the
musical modes that are fitting for a symposium or for lamentation,15 nor
those which his interlocutor offers as better than the others and more 25
useful for education? Yet he also says that he knows something about
rhythms, laying claim to this on the basis of Damon’s teaching, and
refers to those rhythms which Damon taught him (Rep. 400b).
Fifth, what is the real art of the Muses (mousikê ) according to Plato?
And what the second- and third-order arts of mousikê ?16 In any event, he 43
seems to say different things about these matters in different places.
While he doubtless sets up poetry as a kind of mousikê , at another point
he separates it from music.
Sixth, which kinds of musical modes does he accept as useful for
education – which is the one that the poets must attempt, in his view? 5
And which of the rhythms is picked out [by him as suitable for educa-
tion]? These, after all, are things that seem to have been left undefined,
though they are in fact particularly in need of definition for those who
are to discuss education.
Seventh, what does he say are the errors of the poets he could have
known in his time17 and what are the reasons why he says the Muses 10
14
Proclus’ expression here is very compressed. He seems to assume that his audience’s
intimate knowledge of Plato’s Republic will allow them to make sense of his very brief
remarks.
15
Socrates says at 399a5 that he does not know the ‘harmonies’, and so leaves it to Glaucon
to supply the names of the Dorian and Phrygian modes that are fitting for his educative
purposes. He also asks Glaucon at 398e1 to identify the modes appropriate for funerals
or symposia. In what follows we’ll translate harmonia as ‘musical modes’ or ‘modes’ when
it is clear that it is being used in this technical sense, but many inferences that Proclus
draws require the reader to keep in mind the broader sense of ‘harmony’ or ‘fitness’.
16
The question that Proclus pursues here is hard to characterise in English. The word
mousikê can be literally any art over which the Muses preside. The sense is wider than
‘music’ and might be better characterised as ‘culture’. Proclus attempts to systematize
the various senses of mousikê that Plato distinguishes. These will include philosophy
itself (cf. Phdo 61a), activities said to be inspired by the Muses (Phdr 245a), and things
that lead the soul up to Beauty (Phdr 248d), whether these things are the product of
inspiration or not. Poetry is a kind of mousikê and since poetry includes musical
accompaniment, music is mousikê.
17
τίνα ἁμαρτήματα εἶναι τῶν κατ’ αὐτόν φησιν ποιητῶν. Since we have φησιν already, κατ’
αὐτόν must mean something like ‘the poets known to Socrates [or Plato]’. Cf. the
opening lines of Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus, ὁ κατ᾽ἡμᾶς φιλόσοφος. A natural assumption
on the part of Proclus’ audience is that we would need to look to more modern critics to
identify the faults of poets whose work post-dates the dramatic setting of the Republic.
But in fact Plato doesn’t address the works of his contemporaries either – only those
who pre-date him significantly, like Homer, Hesiod or Simonides. So the entire
question is one that invites an answer by Proclus on Plato’s behalf.
131
Essay 5
could never be in error (Laws II, 669c)? Through the understanding of

these things we shall discover how it was that he was the best critic of
poetry – not, as some thought long ago, among the worst due to his
praise for the poetry of Solon in the Timaeus.18
Eighth, who is the best poet according to Plato and what are the
15 qualities of both content and style that he excels at so as to be char-
acterised [as the best]? After all, we think that it is necessary for there to
be someone who has been entirely successful to whom one looks in
order to judge poetry.
Ninth, what is the objective (telos) of correct poetry according to him?
After all, it is necessary in every case for correctness to have reference to
20 some objective or goal and it is through this that there is either correct
or bad practice that makes for the success or failure of each endeavour.
Tenth, who is the poet in the universe? The one to whom the poet
here below looks when the latter realises his proper end? After all,
among the things that are truly good there is not one that fails to exist
25 much prior among universal things than among particulars.
< fi r s t q u e s t i o n : 4 3 . 2 6 – 4 9 . 1 2 >
Beginning from the top, then, let us state the reason why, when he
himself was giving the outlines of educational theory, he did not
accept poetry, even though these things were well regarded as educa-
44 tive in those times. It seems that, since all poetic activity is mimetic,
he recognises that there are two ways for them to go wrong in their
mimetic activities. Sometimes they represent the things about which
they produce their narratives in a way that lacks similitude (377e).
5 Other times there is similitude, but since they are imitators of various
things, they produce correspondingly various imitations, as one would
expect.19
When they imitate things that concern gods or heroes, they are thus
unaware of the fact that they imitate in a way that lacks similitude. They
attempt to say something about them through impassioned language
and even contrary to nature or contrary to divine law, whether within
18
Cf. in Tim. I 90.25–6 where Callimachus and Douris are identified as the people who
make this criticism of Plato’s discernment.
19
It is harder to place this criticism directly in Plato’s text. Perhaps Proclus has in mind
the abbreviated criticism of poetic depictions of human affairs at Rep. 392b. Variety
(poikilia) has a close connection with appearance in Proclus. At this point in the Republic
Socrates criticizes the poets for depicting unjust men who appear happy. (They cannot,
of course, be happy – at least given the argument of the dialogue.) Otherwise Plato’s
criticism of variety seems to relate not to the content of poetic works, but to young
people playing a variety of roles.
132
<First question>
10 the fictions (plasma) of myth or outside of the myths.20 On the one hand, 10
they assimilate heroic things to human traits and verbally drag them
down into the same passions like greed, illiberality, pretentiousness, and
licentiousness. (These things are entirely unworthy of heroes whom we
take to be children of the gods.) On the other hand, in the case of the
gods, they use indecent language as a screen21 for the truth about them – 15
these being matters about which it is not easy for the audience in general
and for young people in particular to become competent readers (kritês).
Both these things manifest imitation that lacks semblance. One of
them obviously does not conform to that which it imitates, while the
other does not obviously conform due to the appearance of absurdity
corresponding to the screen of myth-making.22 It is necessary for the 20
one who imitates to choose concepts that are appropriate to the things,
given that they are intended as icons of those things, and he must select
language that is fitting for those conceptions. It is for this reason that
that he [Plato] was long in the habit of saying about the poetry of divine
myths that it lies beautifully23 – calling that lie beautiful which hides the 25
truth through beautiful language. However, on the subject of the
20
The types of failures to produce a proper likeness of the heroes which Proclus imagines
here are apparently the sorts of qualities for which Euripides was (in)famous, in
particular bringing heroes down to the human level. The phrase εἴτε ἐν μύθων
πλάσμασιν εἴτε ἄνευ μύθων ‘whether within the fictions of myths or outside of myths’
is initially puzzling: how could a representation of any of the traditional heroes be
‘outside of myth’? Proclus appears to have in mind the licence which poets might take
in inventing new versions of myth. In such innovating versions, the offensive repre-
sentations might lack even the sanction of mythic tradition, and in that sense be
‘outside the myths’ (or more literally ‘without the myths’).
21
The notion of a ‘screen’ (παραπέτασμα) is a central one for Proclus, on which see also
the introduction to Essay 5 (p. 120): the myth as screen covers the divine reality to
which it alludes, requiring allegorical interpretation to reach the true meaning.
22
τῶν μὲν αὐτόθεν οὐκ ἐφαρμοζόντων, οἷς μιμοῦνται, τῶν δὲ οὐκ αὐτόθεν ἐφαρμοζόντων διὰ τὴν
κατὰ τὸ πρόσχημα τῆς μυθοποιΐας φαινομένην ἀτοπίαν. The false depiction of heroes as
greedy (for instance) is an example where the fiction obviously does not conform to its
subject matter. The depiction of (for instance) Hera seducing Zeus so that he loses
attention to the matter at hand does conform to what it depicts, though only when the
allegory is interpreted correctly. Both kinds of depiction make such poetry dangerous
for the young. See the more extensive discussions of both kinds of representation in
Homer in Essay 6.
23
Kroll in the addendum to volume 2 and Festugière add a negation here, citing Rep.
377d9 and e7 where Socrates says that the lie that Hesiod tells about what Cronos did
to Ouranos is ‘not a pretty one’. But this seems to ignore Proclus’ general theory of this
part of the Republic. On his reading, these disturbing tales – allegorically interpreted of
course – are capable of conveying deep theological truths to those who can read the
signs. For this reason he probably takes Socrates’ claim that Hesiod does not lie
beautifully to be ironic. Proclus’ attribution of this habitual saying to Plato is based
on Proclus’ theory of allegory – not on what Socrates simply says in the Republic.
133
Essay 5
imitations of things to do with the heroes, he did not say that it fails to lie
45 beautifully, but rather that it simply lies whenever it portrays those heroes
to be like human beings. Thus, in the case where it should speak the
truth, poetry lies due to the inappropriateness of the passions which the
poets project upon the heroes. But in the case where it ought to lie, it
5 does not manage to do that beautifully due to the inappropriateness of
the language it employs in the divine myths that refer to the gods.
As he clearly says in the Timaeus (19d5–e2), the explanation for
these things is that the race of imitators is particularly capable of
imitating those things that they were raised with. That which lies
10 outside each person’s upbringing is something that becomes hard for
him to imitate in actions and harder still in words.24 Thus [the poets]
are not able to give their heroes deeds that are fitting for them and
through these deeds imitate the things that belong to their way of life,
doing some things bravely and others with self-control. Nor are they
able to give them speech that they might actually utter – whether it be
15 for someone engaged in war or peace or addressed to gods or to
humans. Rather, they give them such language as the many use
when they blaspheme the gods and speak boldly or when they flatter
or insult other people.
They go wrong for the same reason when it comes to the gods. On the
basis of understanding the language that they [sc. the poets] are accus-
tomed to and the things with which they were raised, they suppose such
20 things to contribute towards concealing the gods – thefts, rapes, mis-
takes, adulteries, wars and plots that involve the gods – while they
entirely neglect to apply to the things about which they speak those
very words that belong to people who were brought up properly and
which are repeated constantly, high and low, in well-functioning poli-
25 ties, such as right, justice, law, simplicity, respect and all such things.
These are part of the shared upbringing of people who have been
properly turned into citizens. In any event, it is unbearable for them
to have things that are shameful and illicit uttered, for they do not hold it
fitting to defile the tongue by saying these words, since the tongue is an
46 instrument for celebrating the gods and for conversing with good
people. Thus, since the imitation that lacks semblance is double, his
rebuke against the poets is offered in these terms: what they do is similar
either to the case where someone intends to represent Achilles in
5 a picture but [mistakenly] depicts Thersites or else it is similar to the
case where he represents Achilles but does not preserve his courageous
way of life – [the opposite of] what he called in the Laws (II 668d)
[depicting] well and with correctness.
24
A nice reversal of the usual order of things in which actions are harder than words.
134
<First question>
He reproached the poetic imitation that involves likeness25 in

another manner due to the lifelike similitude of various kinds of
moral characters, since we find imitations of cowards, those lacking 10
in self-control, or in intellect that are as lively as those of the brave, the
self-controlled, and wise. This variety is unsuited in every way to
education, since education strives to imprint the characters of those
who are educated solely with goods in both word and deed. The human
soul naturally delights in imitations.26 This is why we are all fond of 15
stories (philomythos) and why if, when we are young, should we become
habituated to living with a great diversity in our imitations, we then
become assimilated to them due to our devotion. We become people
such as them, and diverse character results from our enjoyment of
variety since we are moulded by diverse imitations. Once again, the 20
explanation for why poetry tends to produce varied kinds of character
rather than simplicity of character is the same as that which we earlier
said had been written in the Timaeus: the race of imitators finds it easier
to imitate the things with which they were brought up. Since the poets
were brought up with all manner of people with varied characters, they 25
dislike imitation of those who are simple and straightforward in their
character. They produce poems that are like those varied characters
and which are capable of making other people who take them seriously
like that too. Therefore we shall find too that those among our con-
temporaries who are particularly keen on these matters possess char-
acter that is particularly varied. There is, in any event, the argument
that in all cases wonder assimilates one to the object of wonder and 47
every experience of pleasure unites one to the thing that pleases.
Accordingly, the laws and customs dealing with the education of
young people must monitor such poetry since, because it is pleasant
for youth, it is not at all conducive towards virtue. Indeed, the greater 5
the pleasure, the more harmful it is. One ought to select the Muse that
is, on the one hand, the most austere, and on the other the one that
leads directly to virtue. We do not regard as a wonder the medical art
that pleasures, but rather the one that heals. The education of souls is a
medical art which corrects the irregularities and discord of the passions 10
in souls.27 Consequently, it is necessary for this form of medicine to be
selected, as well as poems and activities generally, that contribute
towards the elevation of the young – not the things that delight but
harm youth, but the things that produce order, even if they should
prove to be less pleasing.
25
Reading ὁμοίαν for the MS’s ἀνομοίαν. Cf. 47.16 above. Either Proclus has slipped or
the copyist has. Festugière also finds ἀνομοίαν surprising but does not emend.
26
Cf. Aristotle, Poetics 1448b6. 27
Cf. Tim. 43a, ff.
135
Essay 5
15 Let us say by way of summary that there are two explanations for why
poetry may be inadmissible in correct education. It may be inadmissible
in what it truthfully imitates (i.e. things to do with human beings) [on
account of] the variety involved in the imitation. Alternatively, it may be
inadmissible in those things which it imitates falsely [on account of] the
unbefitting nature of the imitation. The latter is twofold: it is either
unbefitting in the language alone or it is unbefitting to the facts, as we
have shown.
20 Now, since we have generally assumed that poetry is sacred to the
Muses and that its origin for humans came about by virtue of their
inspiration (epipnoia), it was surely entirely appropriate that he
[Socrates] did not think it necessary to send it away dishonoured when
he exiled it from his city for the reasons just mentioned.28 Rather [he
25 treated it] as sacred to the Muses and afforded it honours similar to
those honours given to statues, viz. incense and a crown (Rep. 398a). For
let us not think the following – that, even if it should not turn out to be
appropriate for the best city, he will reckon that this sort of poetry fails
to harmonise with every way of life and is harmful for all. Rather, he will
48 reckon that there are some people who would be benefitted even from
the words of this [poetry]. In any event, as he himself says, even the
poetry that has represented divine matters falsely has a place in the
intermediate mysteries,29 wherein things that have been uttered in
a symbolic manner appear to be fitting for the totality of the worship
5 of the gods. The recitation of these [words] contributes towards the
universal hieratic art, since the very life30 of the listeners has been
established among the gods and can now safely hear such words –
words through which the lowest classes of pneumatic beings are invited
28
Having summed up the first part of the first of his ten problems (why is poetry exiled
from the ideal city?), Proclus now turns to the second part of this question (why was it
nonetheless honoured with incense and crowns?). Though this second part of the
question figures in Proclus’ original statement of ten problems (42.6–8), it was not
repeated when he took up the first of the ten (43.26).
29
Where does Plato say anything like this? One possibility is Rep. 378a where Socrates
suggests that if the stories that misrepresent the gods must be heard, it should only be as
part of a secret ceremony for a select audience that demands, not the sacrifice of a mere
pig, but some great beast that is hard to procure in order that they should seldom be
heard. If this is correct, then there is perhaps a reason to accept Kroll’s emendation of ἐν
μέσοις ἱεροῖς to ἐν μεγίστοις ἱεροῖς. Against this, however, we have one other occurrence of
‘intermediate sacred rites’ in Proclus – at in Remp. I 253.29, where it seems to refer to
celebrations associated with Athena. Both passages are difficult to fathom.
30
αὐτῆς τῆς ζωῆς τῶν ἀκουόντων ἐνιδρυθείσης τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ ἀσφαλῶς ἤδη τῶν τοιούτων
ἀκουούσης λόγων. The phrasing is odd, since it is the life (zô ê ) that is the audience of
the words. Festugière seems to take ‘the very life’ to be equivalent to soul in this context
(‘l’âme même des auditeurs a été au préalable solidement établie chez les dieux’) though
Proclus is in the habit of using zô ê to talk about the way of life that a soul follows.
136
<First question>
in.31 When these beings have worked their magic by virtue of these
symbols, they provide for the divine inspiration to proceed unhindered
from those [higher beings] into us as if they [the pneumatic beings?] had 10
been satiated with the words and the things in which they delight.
Thus we might also find that the imitation of a variety of kinds of
moral character would be a beneficial thing to some people for whom
the absence of variety is more harmful than variety. It is surely for this
reason that it is useful for every tyrannical constitution, since it does not
allow for the one person to take pleasure in the worst form of life alone, 15
but rather introduces the elevation that results from the imitation of all
kinds of ethical characters, including at the same time both better and
worse pursuits.32 It would seem that just as this variety [in the range of
the kinds of character depicted] is harmful for the form of constitution
that is kingly and divine, so too, for the one that is lowest and tyrannical,
it is beneficial. Simplicity, then, is twofold – either better or worse than 20
variety. One thing, by taking on variety, would be harmed and become
worse [than it was] insofar as it has been infected with what is worse. But
the other one would be benefitted and become better [than it was]
insofar as it has the benefit of what is better.
Therefore, even if poetry is beneficial to some other constitutions, for 25
the constitution that ranks first it is to be exiled since it fails to harmo-
nise with it, though it is still to be honoured as an image (agalma) of the
31
Reading ἐπάγεται for ἐπανάγεται with Kroll, Festugière and Lamberton in line 7: δι’ ὧν
ἐπανάγεται καὶ τὰ τελευταῖα τῶν πνευμάτων, καὶ θέλξαντα τοῖς τοιοῖσδε συμβόλοις
ἀκώλυτον προξενεῖ παρ’ ἐκείνων εἰς ἡμᾶς προϊέναι τὴν θείαν ἐπίπνοιαν, οἷον
ἀποπλησθέντων οἷς χαίρουσιν ὀνόμασιν καὶ πράγμασιν. Festugière and Lamberton take
the subject of the neuter participle θέλξαντα to be the (masculine) logoi or words. That is
certainly not impossible, though there are other neuters in closer proximity. We prefer
to take it with τὰ τελευταῖα τῶν πνευμάτων. This choice too has costs. The problems are:
(1) taking ἐκείνων to refer back to the divinities a few lines earlier, (2) the shift of the
lower entities back into the genitive just after. If this is right, then it recommends the
idea that the lowest and most irrational kinds of daemones accept the performance of
ancient verses (such as those of Homer) as a kind of ritual sacrifice. (Even if the content
of the poetry is, of course, inappropriate for the Kallipolis.) These daemones make us
receptive to the divine inspiration from on high. This inspiration does not flow to us
through the words themselves (since these are not, in fact, fitting to the gods). Rather,
in the image of the magnetised rings from the Ion, the poetry induces the lowest link in
the chain to connect us to the divine inspiration that flows from on high. The (irrational
and mistaken) poetry is not what’s playing inside the theatre. It is rather the ticket that
the daemon-on-the-door requires to let you in to a show that is always going on.
32
Festugière reminds us of Rep. VIII 568b where the tragic poets are said to offer hymns
to tyranny and to lead people towards democracy and tyranny. Perhaps Proclus’
defence of poetry here is to show that by Plato’s own reasoning, there are states
where the imitation of varied characters would be more wholesome than holding the
mirror up to the uniformly debased and diseased moral characters of the inhabitants.
137
Essay 5
Muses. Now although we say that every craft (technê) is sacred to some
divinity, it does not follow from this that we will be willing for our
49 guardians to be technically skilled, since they have only one business to
pursue – the preservation of the city. Thus he plausibly sent the crafts
down to the lower city, and poetry he sent to another city altogether.
Some crafts have an instrumental role for the person who practises
5 politics and for the rulers, insofar as these crafts are ranked below
them and do not dispute [their subordination to the statesman’s author-
ity, but rather] stick to their own rank in relation to the preservers of the
city. Poetry on the other hand, since it is full of arrogance and exults in
[its claim] to educate, is not to be included among the arts, lest we
10 inadvertently erect obstacles for the rulers from the lower city and
nurture endeavours that are maximally opposed to the guardian’s pro-
ject. So in this way we shall respond to the first of the problems.
<second question: 49.13–51.25>

So to the second [problem]: this was [the claim that] it is absurd to
banish tragedy, if indeed it is possible through these [genres of poetry]
15 to satisfy the passions in a manner that is well-balanced (emmetrôs)
and, having satisfied them, to have conditions beneficial for education
since the affliction of the passions has been treated. This [problem],
which provided Aristotle with considerable grounds for objection and
provided the proponents of these [genres] of poetry with a pretext for
their arguments against Plato, is one we will resolve in the following
20 manner, following on what has already been said.
Since, on the one hand, every imitation of diversity in moral character
enters into the thought of the audience easily due to its imitative
[nature], and on the other hand, due to its diversity it becomes harmful
to them (since the person who is devoted to imitations necessarily comes
25 to be such as the objects of imitation are), [such imitation of diversity in
moral character] is utterly alien to young people’s progress (agôgê)
towards virtue. After all, virtue is simple and most closely resembles
god himself, for whom we say the One is most fitting.33 It is necessary
for the person who most closely resembles this sort of thing to flee from
33
ἁπλοῦν γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ αὐτῷ τῷ θεῷ μάλιστα προσεοικός, ᾧ φαμεν διαφερόντως προσήκειν
τὸ ἕν. The translation is not capable of capturing the alliteration τῷ θεῷ μάλιστα
προσεοικός. . . διαφερόντως προσήκειν τὸ ἕν. We should remember that the goal of living
for the Platonists is likeness or assimilation to god and that this is achieved through the
acquisition of successively higher gradations of the virtues. Given the identity of the
highest manifestation of divinity with the One or source of all unity, the acquisition of
virtue involves a corresponding ‘simplicity’ that is incompatible with diversity or
plurality in character (poikilia). This is not entirely far-fetched: as a minimum, the
138
<Second question>
the way of life that is opposed to simplicity. As a consequence, it will be

necessary for him to be pure of all diversity of character.34 If this is so, 30
then it is also necessary for one who is young, and being young and
easily moulded due to his youth, to keep as far as possible from all
pursuits that drag one down into this [diversity]. It is thus clear that 50
since comedy and tragedy imitate every kind of character and fall upon
their audience in conjunction with pleasure, we must beware of them, 5
lest their allure draw those who are easily led into a similar condition
(sympatheia), filling the lifestyle of the young with the evils that result
from imitation. Instead of an expiation that relates to moderation of the
passions35 there is implanted in their souls a condition (hexis) that is
injurious and hard to remove; a condition that obscures its unity36 and
simplicity, the opposites of these things having been impressed [upon 10
the soul] from its fondness for the various objects of imitation.
These [genres of] poetry in particular reach out37 to that [aspect] of
the soul that is most exposed to the passions. One [comedy] arouses the
love of pleasure and leads to absurd laughter, while the other [tragedy]
virtuous person feels no temptation to do what he ought not and so experiences no

internal dissension or diversity of conflicting motivations.
34
The references to flight (pheugein) and purification (kathareuein) seem calculated to
bring to the minds of his audience the famous passage at Tht. 176b1 and the idea from
the Phaedo that philosophy is a purification.
35
Festugière claims that ἀφόσίωσις here does not bear the same sense that it bears in 42.12
where he takes it to be best understood to refer to a purgation. It is not clear this is
correct. The πρὸς τὰ πάθη μετρίας ἀφοσιώσεως seems to be much the same as the
ἀφοσίωσιν τῶν παθῶν at 42.12 since here the passions are understood as things ‘which
it is not possible to shut out entirely nor to indulge in safely and which doubtless
demand exercise at the right time’. That is to say, the previous passage works with an
Aristotelian conception of the passions as inevitable and appropriate (albeit under the
right circumstances, to the right degree, with the right person, etc.). Proclus can reject
either of two aspects of the Peripatetic ideal. First, he can and does reject metriopatheia
as an (ultimate) goal. We can, in fact, do better than that, though metriopatheia is
certainly a first step towards apatheia. Second, he can and does reject the idea that
tragedy and comedy can play a role as a useful training ground for the emotions. His
own counter-proposal for the nature of emotional therapy (50.24–6) is so compressed
as to be very unclear, but it is clear that he thinks of it as an alternative to the use of
tragedy and comedy.
36
τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ ἁπλοῦν ἀφανίσασαν. While there is such a thing as τὸ ἓν τῆς ψυχῆς (cf. in
Parm. 1071.26) it seems unlikely that any such thing is at issue in this passage. It would
be possible, perhaps, to obscure the One of the soul – though not to destroy it. It seems
more likely, however, that καὶ here is epexegetical and that Proclus has in mind the idea
that the consumption of tragedy can lead to psychic disunity in which we enjoy (for
instance) lamentation in the face of terrible circumstances but, at the same time, would
not want ourselves to respond in this way were such circumstances to befall us (cf. Rep.
X 605c, ff.).
37
For ἀποτείνονται in this sense, cf. in Tim. I 43.18–19 ζωὴν ἔχουσιν ἔνυλον καὶ πρὸς τὸ
μερικὸν ἀποτείνονται τοῦ ὅλου ἀποστάντες.
139
Essay 5
15 trains one in the love of pain and drags one down into ignoble lamenta-
tions. Each, however, nurtures the emotional aspect of us and would do
so to a greater extent the more they achieve their function. Thus we too
say that the statesman must devise some emetics (aperasis) for these
passions, but not with the consequence that our attraction to them is
20 intensified, but in a way opposed to this so that they are restrained and
their motions are checked in a manner that is harmonious (emmelôs).
Thus, these genres of poetry which are, in addition to their variety
(poikilia), immoderate (ametros) in their stimulation of the passions, are
far from useful for the expiation [of the passions].38 For expiations do
25 not consist in excess, but rather in activities that are condensed39 and
have little similarity with the things for which they are expiations.
If there is no need for us to have the people who are educated turn out
to be lovers of lamentations or lovers of laughter, then there would be
no need for them to associate with imitations that serve to multiply both
these feelings.
51 These, then, are two things that made Plato decline entry for tragedy
and comedy into the correct constitution as things worthy of serious
concern for young people. One thing is the variety (poikilia) of the
imitations in these [poetic genres], as has been said. The other is their
capacity to set in motion in an immoderate manner the passions, which
5 he wishes to reduce as far as possible. Third, in addition to these, is
the tolerance for tasteless errors in judgement (plêmmeleia) about the
heroic and divine genera that run through them all. To be sure, none of
them abstain from words that strain the bounds of piety, blaspheming
10 the gods, and uttering about heroes speeches that are unworthy of
heroes – things which, if our young people were to put faith in them,
would develop into a gigantic way of life and atheist fantasies. If such
a way of life is taken to an extreme, the entire chorus of virtue will depart
since it will not wish to dwell in a lifestyle that is atheist and casts off the
higher beings.40 On the other hand, if the youth do not put faith in them,
15 then even if the poems possess something worthwhile, they will not
38
No English translation captures the musico-metrical opposition of emmelô s and
ametros.
39
ἐν συνεσταλμέναις ἐνεργείαις. Proclus tends to use this vocabulary in relation to principles
that are more proximate to the One and, as a consequence, condensed in their number
but more powerful than the greater plurality of things that are subordinate to them. Cf.
in Tim. III 102.28 and ET 177.8.
40
The departure of ‘the chorus of virtue’ is an instance of a motif beginning in Hesiod,
who prophesies in the Works and Days that Aidôs and Nemesis will leave the earth as the
race of iron comes to its violent end (197–200). This was much imitated: in Aratus’
Phaenomena, for instance, Dikê similarly leaves the earth, though earlier in the Hesiodic
succession of races, during the time of the race of bronze.
140
<Third question>
deem them trustworthy, due to lack of trust in them when it comes to

larger matters. After all, we are all naturally such that, for those whom
we would not trust when it comes to matters that are particularly worthy
of serious consideration, neither do we give them our attention on
matters of lesser importance. So it turns out that these [poetic genres]
are either necessarily superfluous for those who are to be educated or
else harmful to them.
Foreseeing these things Plato does not give a chorus to the creators of 20
poetry of this kind,41 nor does he entrust the hearing of them to those
who are young. This he does, as has been said, for the sake of safe-
guarding against three things: worthless (ponêros) opinions, immoderate
passions, and variety (poikilia) among all the lifestyles. The first of these
is an evil for the part of us that knows, the second for the part that 25
desires, and the third is an evil for the whole soul.
<third question: 51.26–54.2>

Now that these matters have been subjected to thorough scrutiny, let us
hasten to the following, which we set out above as something related to
what came before. How can he be in accord with himself when in the
Symposium he compels acceptance of the claim that it belongs to the
same art to make comedy and tragedy, and yet in the Republic they are
not even near one another, since he says that they do not result from the 52
same disposition (hexis), due to the fact that our nature has been natu-
rally fragmented into a different one for a different purpose,42 so that in
the case of tragedy alone not everyone is similarly disposed towards all
the parts of this kind of poetry, but rather some get some parts of it right 5
and others other parts. And the same goes for comedy.
Now, that the human soul has gone from universal activity to [activ-
ity] that is most particularised due to its departure from Life and its
descent to the final stage is a truth for all to see. For that former [Life or 10
soul] made the one that is cosmic, looking to what is whole (to holon) and
arranging the universe (to pan) in cooperation with the gods, scarcely
attending to Becoming – [a realm] where of course the Leader here
below scarcely attends to the Earth since he is accustomed to look to the
whole.43 The descent into this form came about when it [sc. the soul]
41
The city used to ‘give a chorus’ to three playwrights to perform their tragedies
each year in the City Dionysia. This provision of a chorus for the harmful entertain-
ment of tragedy is here juxtaposed against the departure of the ‘chorus of virtue’ just
mentioned.
42
Compare Proclus’ διὰ τὸ τὴν φύσιν ἡμῶν ἄλλην πρὸς ἄλλο πεφυκέναι κατακεκερματισμένην
with Rep. 395b3–4 φαίνεταί μοι εἰς σμικρότερα κατακεκερματίσθαι ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσις.
43
Kroll and Festugière plausibly identify ὁ ἐνταῦθα κορυφαῖος with the Sun.
141
Essay 5
15 was led from that which is more general and universal into what is more
partial or particular – when, from the cosmic logos in accordance with
which it lived earlier, it chose only that of the mortal living being. And
then from this, the soul proposed for itself something else even more
particular – that which is human – instead of the universal providence
20 for all of mortal life taken as one. And then from this, the soul defines its
own life in terms of some specific human life, that of a philosopher, and
abandons the common logos of that which is human. From this, it next
enters into life in a particular region and a specific city, and then some
particular family, thus of course becoming partial instead of holistic.
From its descent into this state, it remains for the soul to take on in
25 addition other dispositions, some of which come from proximate causes
such as fathers or seeds, while others come from its surroundings and
the distinctive nature found in these surrounds. Yet other dispositions
result from the circumstances of the way of life appropriate to the places
in which the soul has been stationed when it has fallen to its lowest
53 point. The fragmentation of the soul’s nature has restricted its capacity
for the various crafts, knowledges and pursuits. Different souls are
suited by nature to different activities, and not even towards these
activities as a whole, since it has divided by means of its own powers
5 the ways of life that are concerned with them. This thing that I’ve just
stated is truest44 of all and so it is due to this fact this some are able to
produce comedy, while others produce tragedy and for them it is not
comedy as a whole, nor similarly everything to do with tragedy [that
they produce, but rather some part of it].45
Nonetheless, there are two things that those who produce these two
10 forms of poetry need: both understanding (gnôsis) and life-experience
(zôê).46 They need the first so as to have the craft for how each of the two
44
The superlative ‘truest’, as Lamberton notes, means ‘at the highest level of generality’.
By tracing specialisation in technai back to a fundamental point of Neoplatonic meta-
physics (the fragmentation of the soul in taking on a specific incarnation) Proclus feels
himself able to (1) give an ultimate explanation of such narrowing of faculties and
specialisation, (2) reconcile the apparently contradictory accounts in Plato. As so often
in late-antique Platonism, the tasks of explaining Plato and of explaining reality are
inextricable.
45
At Poetics 1448b24–27 Aristotle, following his arguments concerning the naturalness of
mimê sis to human beings, proposes that writers’ individual characters (τὰ οἰκεῖα ἤθη,
1448b24) inclined them to imitate different types of actions. Proclus combines this
Aristotelian idea with a Neoplatonic account of the soul’s descent into specificity.
46
It is certainly not obvious from Proclus’ choice of words exactly what he has in mind
here. Festugière translates ‘similitude de vie’ on the basis of what he takes to be an
explication at 53.23. We think that (as often) it is wise to consider Platonic texts that are
likely to be in the back of Proclus’ mind when he writes. We think that zô ê here should
be interpreted in light of Tim. 19d6–e1 (τὸ μιμητικὸν ἔθνος, οἷς ἂν ἐντραφῇ, ταῦτα
142
<Fourth question>
is to be handled – from what parts it is composed, how they must be

arranged, the sort of dramatic characters that are needed – which are of
course just the things that who customarily write about these matters
address. The life-experience, on the other hand, they need in order to
supply the sort of imitation of moral habits which corresponds to the
given deeds and characters, so that they do not become imitators who 15
lack a resemblance with the subject matter proposed by them [for
imitation].47 [This being so] it is possible there is a single technical
understanding for both [tragedy and comedy], which is what Socrates
says in the Symposium (for he does not say that same person is able to
imitate [in both tragedy and comedy] but is able to know how to make
comedy and tragedy). However, that does not extend to a necessity that 20
there be one type of imitation for both genres, insofar as that imitation
relies on suitability of character.48 This is just what Socrates says in the
Republic (395a–b): that it is impossible for the same person to imitate in
both the comic and the tragic manner. After all, imitation especially
concerns the formation of character and the same character is not
suitable for both tragedy and comedy, since the former involves fond- 25
ness for mourning, while the latter involves a fondness for the
ridiculous.
As a result Socrates plausibly distinguished technical matters from the
matters of character. He says at one point that the same person can
know both [genres] but at another point that it is not possible for the
same person to be an imitator in both. Both technical skill and character
are needed for these genres, and while the former [sc. technical skill] is
common to both, the latter [sc. character] necessarily differs. 54
So much, then, for this [problem].
<fourth question: 54.3–56.19>

What then shall we say about the fourth [problem]? How is it that
Socrates denies that he knows the differences among the musical
modes and yet says these things while, on the subject of rhythms, he 5
says that he has heard something from Damon, and [why does he] refer
μιμήσεται ῥᾷστα καὶ ἄριστα). The poet needs the right kind of life experience to write
a particular kind of character convincingly.
47
καὶ μὴ ἀνόμοιοι γένωνται μιμηταὶ τῶν προτεθέντων αὐτοῖς. Lamberton’s treatment of the
passive participle seems not to catch adequately the sense of the aorist. We think it is
not merely ‘what is before them’ but rather ‘what was (originally) proposed by them’ as
the thing to be imitated.
48
Thus while any playwright will understand the rules of composition in general, each
will not have a feel for the imitation of particular character types. This depends upon
his having the zô ê or life experience to bring that kind of character to life.
143
Essay 5
the knowledge about them to Glaucon, saying ‘You are musical’

(398e1)?
Let us then say with respect to this enquiry that it pertains to the
statesman to say something about modes and about rhythms, but not [to
10 speak] in the manner of a musician. It is necessary to the role of one of
them to define the form of the modes that contribute towards the
correct educational path for young people, while the other must be
precise about all the differences among the modes – which stimulate
the part of the soul which is fond of sad things, which ones release the
part that has a love of pleasure, and which moderate the motions of both
15 [these tendencies]. After all, it is necessary for a person, if he is indeed
genuinely musical, to have investigated which [modes] are beneficial for
which political constitutions. It is for this reason that they speak rightly
when they say that it is thus necessary that the statesman must not be
unmusical nor the musician withdrawn from public affairs. In the for-
mer case, where the statesman is unmusical, he will not even know
a particular mode contributes towards education due to his ignorance
20 of music. In the latter case, where the musician is withdrawn from public
affairs, he will welcome every [musical mode] indiscriminately, whether
they contribute to a lack of culture or to education. But in fact music
professes to render the soul sympathetic to things that are beautiful and
averse to what is ugly.
25 In this case, by virtue of sticking to what is fitting for the statesman
qua creator (dêmiourgos) of a political order, Socrates leaves the distinc-
tion of the musical modes to others, while he himself merely outlines the
contribution of a mode towards education.49 Analogously, it falls to the
person who is truly a statesman to define the objective for the general –
i.e. with whom one must go to war on the ground that they have
55 undertaken to commit injustice – but the various ways of conducting
the war and specific decisions he leaves to the general insofar as he is the
person who knows where, how and through what means one ought to
conduct war. So too, the statesman will command the doctor to heal
5 those who should be healed50 – not merely making their death a long
one51 – but the manner of healing he will hand over to the doctor to
decide whether it is possible to do this by diet, drugs or by surgery.
Similarly, he will advise the orator to orate and to persuade on the
49
The parallel between the statesman and the cosmic Demiurge is a familiar one in
Neoplatonic political theory. Here, just as the Demiurge of the Timaeus leaves to the
younger gods the detailed work of fabricating the mortal beings (41a, ff.), so too
Socrates as statesman leaves the details of the musical modes to others.
50
Cf. Rep. 407e1. In the Kallipolis, the sick person whose life is no longer beneficial to
him or to the city will not be treated.
51
Echoing Plato’s description of Herodicus at 406b4.
144
<Fourth question>
grounds that the same things are just and expedient, but he will leave it
to the orator to distinguish and to perceive the kinds of speeches which
he will use so that he will be able to persuade and the varieties contained 10
in those types, [to see] whether it is necessary to persuade those listening
by stately speeches or by representation of character or by speeches
possessing great intensity,52 for he will win over each audience through
appropriate means.
Surely, then, it is like this too in the case of the musical modes.
The statesman will go as far as setting up guidelines for choosing 15
among them, but the detailed work that involves the differences
among them he will leave to the musician. It is for these reasons, there-
fore, that Socrates says that he does not know the modes – neither which
ones go with funerals nor which with parties – but only goes so far as to
stipulate that the educator must look to whatever mode would render 20
the student orderly (tetagmenos) in every action, every situation, and in
all his passions, so that in situations of violence or constraint, the
student is rendered manly and does not slacken the mainspring of his life
force.53 On the other hand, in situations where things are going
smoothly and he can do as he likes, he is self-controlled and does not
lose control54 due to the present favourable circumstances. After all, it is 25
normal for the soul to be humbled when there is a confluence of things
that are unwanted and for it to be filled with conceit when it enjoys
a confluence of things that it does want.55
If, whilst denying that he knows the musical modes because of what is
fitting for the statesman, he nonetheless says something about rhythms,
this is undoubtedly the fault of Glaucon’s ignorance (400a). While he
[Glaucon] said he knew the modes and the forms that they come in, he 56
said he was ignorant of the rhythms and whether some of them were
suitable for education. Thus, in order that their potential for this might
be demonstrated and in order that the account of music in general and 5
its contribution towards education might not be left incomplete by him,
it was appropriate for Socrates to speak briefly on the subject of
rhythms – establishing how there is something educational in them
52
In his description of the orator’s process in the formation of speeches Proclus casually
demonstrates his own familiarity with the terminology and practice of rhetoric.
On Proclus’ early excellence in rhetoric see Marinus, Proclus 8.
53
55.23 μὴ χαλῶντα τὸν τόνον τῆς ζωῆς, which Festugière renders elegantly as ‘ne relâ-
chant pas la tension de l’élan vital’ and Lamberton similarly as ‘not relaxing his vital
intensity’. Compare the tenor of the virtuous soul in Stoicism.
54
μὴ ἐκμελῆ γιγνόμενον – the Greek has connotations of musical discord that relate to the
influence of proper education through the right musical modes. We cannot find any
easy way to capture this in the English translation.
55
There are strong verbal echoes of Rep. 399a throughout this paragraph.
145
Essay 5
that leads to virtue. Then immediately, preserving his role as statesman

10 and not wanting to change to being a musical expert, he refers the the-
oretical consideration of the rhythms to Damon and draws one conclu-
sion from all this (400d): that the educator must aim at eloquence
(eulogia), proper harmony and proper rhythm, and evidently he must
look to the entire soul in respect of these. After all, it is through
eloquence that reason (logos) in us is perfected, while what is irrational
in us is made orderly due to proper harmony and rhythm. The former
15 finds an origin in the powers themselves (for they are harmonised prior
to the activities), while the latter is harmonised solely in its activities, for
the movements [of the irrational part of the soul] are ordered through
rhythms on the ground that rhythm is the type of order appropriate to
them insofar as they are measured by time and the ‘before’ and ‘after’ are
present in them.56
< fi f t h q u e s t i o n : 5 6 . 2 0 – 6 0 . 1 3 >
20 Enough on these matters. Let us turn to the following. According to
him [Plato], what must one know about mousikê and poetry? How are
they related to one another? How many categories of mousikê are there?
It would seem that at some points he attaches mousikê to poetry – for
25 instance, when he says the poet ‘sits on the tripod of the Muse’ (Laws
4.719c) or when he says that the possession of the Muses takes hold
upon a gentle and innocent soul, rouses it to Bacchic frenzy, and inspires
it to songs and other poetry (Phdr. 245a). But at other points he seems to
have placed them apart from one another, as is the case when he
distinguishes the kinds of lives [in Phdr. 248d–e]. He takes the musical
57 way of life and puts it in the first [rank] as he does with all those who are
lovers of beauty, but puts the poetic way of life into the sixth rank, as he
does with all those who are imitative. Thus, having seen that there are
5 many forms of mousikê, he seems to put the entire poetic genus under
56
Proclus’ point here seems to presuppose an understanding of the categories through
which the Neoplatonists explain the nature of the soul: essence, power and activity.
The rational soul is eternal – that is to say, timeless – in its essence. Further, its powers
arise from its having been constituted as a harmony by the Demiurge. It is only the
rational soul’s activities that are temporal and these will have a harmony that results
from the harmonising of powers that are prior to its activities. The irrational soul,
however, is, by Proclus’ reckoning, distinct from the kind of soul into which the
Demiurge inserts the musical harmonies. Moreover, it is not eternal and wholly
temporal. Hence it must be harmonised by means of rhythyms that are similarly
essentially temporal. On the soul’s eternal essence and temporal activity in Proclus,
see Steel (1978). On the harmonisation of the rational soul’s powers and its activities,
see Baltzly (2009), 31–6.
146
<Fifth question>
mousikê , but all that is musical is not confined to poetry. It is worthwhile,

therefore, for us to say what mousikê he would call poetic, once we have
defined all the forms of mousikê.
Therefore, we say that philosophy itself is the ‘greatest mousikê’ (Phdo
61a3–4), just as it is the most erotic, if you are willing to say that what is
most erotic is that which has harmonised, not the lyre, but [has estab- 10
lished] the soul itself in the best harmony57 – a harmony through which
it is able both to introduce order (kosmein) to all things human and to
celebrate the divine matters perfectly, imitating the Leader of the Muses
himself who, on the one hand, celebrates the Father with intellectual
songs and, on the other, establishes continuity throughout the whole
cosmos by means of insoluble bonds, ‘moving all things together’ as 15
Socrates in fact says in the Cratylus (405c).58 It is for this reason that he
would say that inspired mousikê belongs in the primary sense (prôtôs)
with the philosopher (though the fact that the philosopher is divinely
inspired is something that escapes most people) and to an even greater
extent the goods of educative mousikê are his and he has in a simple
manner (haplôs) all the things that we look to when we deem mousikê to 20
be a serious matter for anyone. This, of course, is the most advanced
form of musician, who, as we have said, is identical with one who is truly
a philosopher – someone for whom none of the goods of mousikê are
lacking.
He says that possession by the Muses is mousikê in another sense
inasmuch as it stimulates and moves souls to inspired poetry, in relation 25
to which he would say that whoever ‘arrives at the gates of poetry
without the madness of the Muses is one who is an imperfect poet and
that his poetry – that of a man in his senses – will be eclipsed by that of
those who are mad’ (Phdr. 245a). In this case that which is musical and 58
that which is poetic come to the same thing, with inspired mousikê
perfecting the inspired poet. After all, he does not say that possession
by the Muses inspires a person to anything other than becoming a poet –
on the one hand, celebrating the great deeds of those who have gone
before in hymns and, on the other, rousing those who come after to the 5
pursuit of education through them. At this point he has shown what the
function of poetry is and the extent to which it pertains to education, as
well as showing that it is not the same as the function of the lawgiver, but
that instead it is genuinely three removes from the truth since it educates
57
Cf. Laches 188d for tuning the soul rather than the lyre.
58
For Apollo as ‘Leader of the Muses’ and principle of cosmic and psychic harmonisa-
tion, see in Tim. II 208.10, 294.31 and in Crat. 176.60 ff. The title Leader of the Muses
(Mousagêtês) is a popular one for Apollo, adopted by Plato for his own purposes.
As Festugière observes, Proclus adopts Plato’s ‘etymologie fantasiste’, interpreting
Apollo as homopolôn (‘moving all things together’).
147
Essay 5
those who are keen on the pursuits that aim at good things through 10
encomia of those who previously aimed at good things.59 This mode of
education was especially familiar to the ancients – through a certain kind
of experience of those who had lived virtuously, leading others to virtue
on the basis of imitating them. For instance, the person who, according
to the poet, says the following makes this clear:
15 So too we have heard the fame of men of old (Il. 9.524)
and
Do you not see what fame the goodly Orestes won
among all mankind (Od. 1.298–9)
20 or
Such warriors have I never since seen, nor shall I see
Mightiest were these (Il. 1.262, 267).
Each of these teaches, but it teaches by example. The Lawgiver,
however, does not teach in this manner, but he rather says who the
25 genuinely good person is and how the student might come to be like
this. His education works by means of universal paradigms, not parti-
cular ones.
He says that there is also a third form of mousikê which, unlike the
previous one, is no longer inspired. Nonetheless, it leads upwards from
59 perceptible harmonies to the imperceptible beauty of divine
harmonies,60 for such a musician too is a lover of beauty just as the
person who is erotic,61 even if the one is reminded of beauty through
sight, while this musician is reminded of beauty through hearing. In any
event, he counted this person in the first incarnation, along with the
5 erotic person. He made those who have chosen a life that is upward
leading (anagôgos) and concerned with reversion (epistreptikos) from the
things that are last to those that are first (and from whence the soul has
descended here) three in number: the philosopher, the erotic person,
59
It seems that Proclus here tries to align the claim from Rep. 597e that the poet is at three
removes from the truth with the description of inspired educative poetry from Phdr.
245a. The poet is at three removes since he is looking to the fine deeds of men in the
past who pursued the Good and composing encomia to them for the purpose of
inspiring future generations to the pursuit of the Good. It seems that these people
are each closer to the Good (or to truth) than the poet who seems to have them as
intermediaries between himself and the Good.
60
‘Imperceptible’, that is, to the physical senses. Plotinus similarly speaks of the depen-
dence of sense-perceptible music on music in the intelligible at En. V 8.1.
61
The context for these remarks is Phdr. 248d3–4 where the first descent of the soul into
a body is as ‘a philosopher or lover of beauty or a person who is musical and erotic’
(φιλοσόφου ἢ φιλοκάλου ἢ μουσικοῦ τινος καὶ ἐρωτικοῦ).
148
<Fifth question>
and the musician. The latter’s activities concern the beauty that is in
harmonies and rhythms. From these, he ascends to the imperceptible
harmonies and the rhythms that are never known through hearing, but 10
are instead apparent to the reasoning of discursive thought. The erotic
person’s activities concern all that is beautiful in sense perception since
he is such as to be reminded of beauty simpliciter and not the beauty of
any particular thing.62 The philosopher goes from all sensible forms to
the vision of the intelligible things of which these sensibles are images,
since he has undergone preparation and grasps the goal of both the
musician and the erotic person in advance. After all, a particular beauti- 15
ful thing is doubtlessly (pantôs) beautiful, I suppose, and some particular
form is doubtlessly a form. Now, the person who sees every form knows
both: that which is beautiful simpliciter, a certain form, and also the
individual beautiful thing. As a result, this sort of musician would be 20
coordinate with the philosopher.
Now he also says that there is another kind of mousikê in addition to
these that educates students’ moral character through both harmonies
and rhythms that lead to virtue. It discovers which harmonies and
rhythms are able to educate the passions of souls and to shape them
with the best character traits in every action and situation. [It also dis- 25
covers] those harmonies and rhythms that are opposite to these that
produce discord in the souls, tensioning or slackening them and leading
into disharmony and absence of rhythm. One might say that this is an
educative music that is subordinate to politics and coordinate with
gymnastics. It is this [kind of music] that Socrates looks to in the
Republic when he introduced guidelines (logoi) concerning musical 60
modes and rhythms. Conversely, at the point at which he is searching
for the sciences that have some sort of attraction63 towards the truth, he
looks to the music which is prior to this, and does not see fit to embrace
this sensible harmony, but rather that which leads us up towards uni-
versal principles (logoi), moving our intellect into the intelligibles away 5
from the sensible.64
62
Cf. Proclus’ remarks on the ‘Aphrodisiac person’ in Essay 6: in Remp. I 108.1–109.7.
63
ἐχούσας τι πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν ὁλκὸν; cf. Rep. 527.b.9 where we find ὁλκὸν . . .. . . ψυχῆς πρὸς
ἀλήθειαν as well as Rep. 521d3 and 524e1 where the attraction is towards Being.
64
Reading ἀναγωγόν for the manuscript’s ἀνάγειν – a conjecture by Wendland, recorded
in Kroll’s critical apparatus and followed by Festugière and Lamberton.
The comparison is with the passage at Rep. 531a. When Socrates seeks sciences that
will turn the soul from Becoming to Being, he rejects a music theory focused on audible
sound in preference for a mathematical music theory. So too, it seems, the educative
music described in this passage is higher than what we normally call music insofar as an
understanding of this music is an understanding of its effects on the souls of the
audience.
149
Essay 5
Since the [kinds of mousikê] are four in number according to him

[Plato] it is already clear how poetry ought to be ranked below mousikê –
either the inspired kind or the kind that is not – and from what kind it is
10 to be distinguished, namely the kind that leads upward. The first way of
life [in the Phaedrus] had this [kind of mousikê] and he distinguished this
[kind of mousikê] from poetry insofar as it [sc. poetry] is imitative, since
this mousikê does not wish to live in an imitative manner, but instead to
snatch itself from imitations to the paradigms of the harmonies and
rhythms down here.65
<sixth question: 60.14–63.15>

15 But since these things have been defined, let us not neglect to define the
questions which follow on from these: What modes does he select as the
ones that the poet must embrace for the education of the young? And
what rhythms does he compel the poet to emulate, since he is prevented
from using all the modes or all the rhythms insofar as they give rise to an
20 uncultured (amousos) variety in the character of those who are being
educated? Even if it seems, for the reasons given earlier, that the judge-
ment of these things properly belongs to others, we are left up in the air,
thirsting to hear what it is that Socrates thinks, since he ranks highest
among musicians – an assessment that I think he himself would agree
25 with since, on the one hand, he says that philosophy is the highest [kind
of] mousikê (Phdo 61a) and, on the other, he himself has never neglected
it throughout his life. These are things that this ironic man says earn-
estly, even though he says before his last day that he knows nothing
(Apol. 21d). So what are his thoughts on both modes and rhythm, the
30 ones that are conducive to education? In which ones are the poets to be
61 compelled to compose – those who are to sing to the young66 and the
only ones for whom he will provide a chorus, since he will not do so for
those who imitate diversity of moral character?
65
While rhythms were said above to contain ‘the before and after’ this does not mean that
they do not have atemporal paradigms. Cf. Plat. Theol. V 130.25 where the movement
of the heavenly bodies are the rhythms that are ‘first and best’. These spatial and
temporal movements imitate non-temporal orders of priority and posteriority that
are present in their intelligible paradigms.
66
We follow (as does Lamberton) Festugière’s conjecture ὅσοι for ὅσα. The MS reading
is, however, possible and would give a slightly different meaning. Rather than specify-
ing that Socrates’ restrictions apply to the poets who will compose for the young, the
MS reading would specify poems/songs which are directed to this audience. This too is
possible, as Proclus is certainly willing to allow different requirements for poems
directed not to the young but to those who are philosophically advanced and able to
see past apparently unsuitable surface meanings to the meanings hidden behind them.
This distinction will be vital for his defence of Homer in Essay 6.
150
<Sixth question>
Well, when it comes to the rhythms he heard about from Damon

and whose account he accepted, it is clear that, among those that are
composite rhythms, he accepts the enoplios,67 which is made up of
an iamb, a dactyl and a pariambis. This creates a manly character 5
and is preparatory for all actions that involve necessity and absence
of choice.68 Among the simple rhythms, it is clear that he accepts the
heroic dactyl about which he says he heard the account of Damon
who ‘ordered’ the dactyl and the heroic,69 thereby indicating that he 10
believes this rhythm to be such as to produce orderliness and even-
ness and good things of this sort. As a result of both, he says, the
soul is rendered simultaneously agile (eukinêtos) and quiescent (êre-
maios). When both these are well mixed with one another, they truly
implant education [in the soul]. After all, he also says in the
Statesman (309b) that, when it comes to moral character, one should 15
not choose only the one that is easily moved (eukinêtos), since it is
quick to change and restless; nor should one choose only that which
is quiescent, since when it exists separated from the other it is idle
and ineffective. However, the two rhythms together produce both
[psychic qualities] in moderation when they are combined with one
another.
Now, when it comes to the modes, once those that produce lamenta- 20
tion (thrênopoios) and those that are proper for parties – the one releasing
the love of pleasure, the other intensifying the love of pain – have been
thrown out, some people deem him to have accepted the remaining ones
that Damon taught, the Phrygian and the Dorian, as educative. But they
then go on to disagree among themselves, with some saying that the 25
Phrygian is peaceful, while the Dorian is warlike according to him.
Others say that it is the other way around: that the Phrygian is warlike,
since it is ecstatic, while the Dorian is peaceful since it is soothing
(katastêmatikos).70 For our part, however, since we find him in the
Laches (188d) saying clearly that the man who is himself good and 62
genuinely educated has harmonised neither the lyre nor some
67
Rep. 400b4–5.
68
It appears that Proclus supplies the justification of the enoplios metre from Socrates’
remarks about modes: παρατεταγμένον πρὸς πάσας τὰς ἀναγκαίας καὶ ἀκουσίους πράξεις
here seems to correspond to Plato’s ἔν τε πολεμικῇ πράξει ὄντος ἀνδρείου καὶ ἐν πάσῃ
βιαίῳ ἐργασίᾳ at Rep. 399a6. See above, 55.22 ἐν μὲν τοῖς βιαίοις καὶ ἀκουσίοις
ἀνδριζόμενον. The name itself (‘armed’ metre) suggests the character which Plato
ascribes to it, as does its appearance in Xenophon’s Anabasis (6.1.11).
69
61.8–9 Δάμωνος καὶ δάκτυλόν γε καὶ ἡρῷον διακοσμοῦντος; cf. Plato Rep. b4–7 καὶ
δάκτυλον καὶ ἡρῷόν γε, οὐκ οἶδα ὅπως διακοσμοῦντος καὶ ἴσον ἄνω καὶ κάτω τιθέντος.
70
Cf. in Alc. 197.17–198.8 where instruments, rather than modes, are contrasted as
soothing or exciting. The instrument that is exciting or kinetic is of course the pipe,
which is linked with the Phrygian mode and ecstatic states.
151
Essay 5
entertaining71 instrument, but his very own soul – [tuning it] not in
the Phrygian, Ionian or Lydian mode, but in the Doric, which is the
5 only Greek mode – [this being so] we believe that, among the modes,
he believes this one alone to suffice for education. On the other hand,
the Phrygian is adapted to sacred rites and divine possession on the
ground that in the Minos (318b) he clearly says that Olympian songs
move those who are naturally apt for possession to ecstasy, but do not
contribute towards education.72 Among the rhythms, we also believe
10 that he assumes that the enoplios does not contribute anything useful
to educating the souls of the young, though it does contribute to the
motivation to warlike deeds and derives its name from this fact.
The dactyl or heroic [metre] alone fits harmoniously with those
who are being educated and generally has been given an order by
15 equality. It seems to me that it is for this reason that he says he heard
Damon ‘ordering’ this rhythm – insofar as it is educative and con-
tributes towards a way of life that has truly been ordered. Therefore
we ought to say that he judges that there is a single mode (the Dorian)
and a single rhythm (the dactyl) that is suitable for poets who intend
20 to educate. For there is also commonality to them in accordance with
the logos of equality. After all just as the dactylic rhythm is put
together from arsis and thesis in equal [measure],73 so too the Dorian
mode has an equal proportion (logos) on either side of the tone. After
all, the two tetrachords that distinguish it as what it is are sung by
25 reference to the tone [between them].74 The logos of equality suits the
virtues of the irrational forms [of the soul], subtracting the excess or
the deficiency – things which are, of course, the province of
inequality.
Let it be said that these things show which modes and which rhythms
63 he [Plato] chose for educative poetry. Just as he did away with variety in
the case of imitations and for this reason exiled this sort of poetry, so too
in the case of modes and rhythms he also turns away their multifarious
(pantodapos) dispositions, which overpower the hearing of many people.
5 He shows this too when he scorns the instruments that are called pan-
71
Accepting F’s emendation οὐδὲ παιδιᾶς ὄργανα which restores the text of Laches 188d4.
72
Proclus refers to this passage again as authority for this understanding of the Phrygian
mode in Essay 6: I 84.20.
73
Arsis and thesis are ‘equal’ in the hexameter in the sense that the part of each foot ‘in
arsei’ is equal to the part ‘in thesei’, since of the two possible feet the spondee is made up
of two long syllables while the dactyl is made up of a long and two shorts, those two
shorts being equal to a long.
74
Since two of the defining tones are equidistant (in terms of interval) to a central one, the
Dorian mode too can be treated as ‘equal’ though in a rather different sense from the
equality of the hexameter. On equality (ἰσότης) see Baltzly (2009), 213 n. 432.
152
<Seventh question>
harmonic (399c) and the triangle75 and the flute itself. These are like the
panharmonic instruments due to the plurality of holes, since it is as
a result of the fact that a variety of modes are able to be produced
through them that [the panharmonic instruments] have come to have
the name. Thus, to speak briefly, it is necessary in every case for the poet 10
who heeds his advice to look to these two things, whether in imitations
or in musical modes or in rhythms – beauty and simplicity. Of these, the
one is intellectual and the other is divine. And this is plausibly so, for it is
necessary for the soul to be assimilated to these things that are prior to
it. After all, body and matter are posterior to the soul, and while the one 15
is ugly, the body is composite.
<seventh question: 63.15–65.15>

Now that these things have been concluded on our part, let us see in
what way he censures the poets of this own time and for what reasons he
says that they fall short of the true mousikê. After all, the fact that the
Muses themselves would never err in the way in which these people do
reveals that the latter abandon the real mousikê and are carried along into 20
the mousikê that tends to please the masses.
Among the mistakes that the poets of his own time make, one involves
the failure to make the speeches, the modes and the rhythms appropriate
to the form of life that is being imitated, sometimes attaching manly 25
discourses to women, sometimes womanly [words] to men – and not
even the words of good (spoudaios) women. This however is not the case
with correct imitation, just as it is not [correct] to assign the rhythm that
belongs to brave men to cowards or vice versa.
Another mistake is the mixing of modes and rhythms in relation to the
forms of the words, combining incompatibles. Examples include put- 64
ting words of lamentation with the Dorian mode or putting the mourn-
ful Lydian mode with words that are manly. It is in fact necessary to fit
the mode to the logos and the metre to the mode. If the logos is manly, the
rest must be thoroughly that way too. If, however, the logos is mournful, 5
then the rest must be of similar force. It seems that through these things
he teaches that although the modes are distinguished by the corre-
sponding ways of life, through their indiscriminate use of every mode
75
This is not the modest percussion instrument now called ‘the triangle’ but a kind of
triangular lyre with unequal strings, as Festugière observes. He cites Athen. IV 175D,
who claims for it a Syrian origin, and Sophocles (though without naming the passage –
it is our frag. 401, from the dialogue of the lost Mysians). It is likely that the objection to
it is exacerbated by its ‘foreign’ associations (whether Syrian or Phrygian) and its
unequal appearance.
153
Essay 5
10 in every case, the poets have conveyed the impression that a difference
of this kind does not exist among the modes, but instead all are capable
of being harmonised with every kind of moral character – that it turns
out one is able, on the one hand, to mourn in the Ionian mode and, on
the other, to pass the time in the midst of symposia in the Mixolydian,
which is what76 some have chosen to say: even though they admit that
these things are so and that there are these differences among logoi and
metres, and that the words of the brave man would not fit the coward
15 nor would the manly rhythm be fitting for the coward. It is surely absurd
when the modes at either end of the range have been distinguished in
this way that it is not also proper for one kind of moral character to be
distinguished from the other in accordance with them. Therefore the
matter is just as I said: it seems that the combining of all things is the
basis for blaming the poets.
The previous [criticism] – that [the poets] do not provide logoi and
20 modes and metre that accord with the underlying moral character or
form of life (even if these things have not been thrown together at
random) – [is the sort of point made by] someone who is teaching us
that it is necessary to refer the use and the arrangement of all these
things to the facts.77 After all, it is necessary for the meanings (ennoia),
25 which have their primary power in the words, to follow the latter [sc. the
facts], while it belongs to the modes to follow upon the words, and the
metres to follow upon the modes.
Now if we have uncovered the things that were said truly in the
Laws (669b–670b), then it is surely obvious that we would deem by
far the best critic of poetry to be the person who utilises these
65 definitions of poetry and distinguishes the measures of all these
things – words, modes and metres. [The best critic, i.e. Plato]
would not be someone who is a fraud, as it seemed to some on the
basis of the [remarks] in the Timaeus (21c) about Solon’s poetry –
5 comments which he [Plato] assigned to the Elder Critias in
a situation where he had to say things that were more fitting for
someone related to him. In addition, the praise of Solon has been
aimed at his creative power (exousia), in both words and thoughts.
After all, the words ‘most free’ of poets reveal the fearlessness (adeia)
that is present in his poetry since he neither pays attention to the
10 aptness (hôra) of words (about which most people go to great lengths
76
reading ὃ in line 12 with Kroll, but removing the full stop before. The point seems to be
that some people admit that there are differences among these things and that while
some combinations of logos, mode and metre are inappropriate, there is more flexibility
than Plato would seem to admit.
77
An inelegant translation for an inelegant sentence.
154
<Eighth question>
when they ‘curl’78 their verses) nor for thoughts that concern what is
complex (which takes the edge off moral character’s ascent towards
virtue when some people insist on it). Consequently, it seems to me
that this word (‘most free’) is a fitting one to utter79 in relation to
him in light of the idiosyncrasies of Solon’s poems, even if it is 15
Critias who is the critic.
<eighth question: 65.16–67.9>

This, however, being sufficient for this investigation, it follows for us
to say who the best poet would be according to Plato. What matters
of content (pragmatika) characterise him, and what matters of style
(lektika) are fitting? Now it is necessary for poetry that is truly 20
praiseworthy according to him – whether it should speak about gods
or about daemones – to look to those guidelines which he himself
stated: it must celebrate them as beings that provide only good things;
and as beings that are immutable in their substance, powers and
activities; as always possessing the very truth that is innate to [sub-
stances] that are unities. And if he should make up some myths about 25
them – as he in fact must, since Plato inevitably assigns mythologia to
the poets (for he says that the poet, if he indeed wishes to be a poet,
must make myths rather than logoi (Phdo 61b)) – he needs to make up
things that are similar to his underlying subjects rather than be willing 30
to disguise them through the use of what is dissimilar.80 And he must
take from terms that are natural those that are in accordance with 66
nature, [taking] for instance, marriages, births, the rearing of offspring
or relations (systaseis) that are in accordance with nature rather than
78
The verb derived from bostruchos (‘a lock of hair’) is relatively rare. The verb suggests, in
the gendered manner of many ancient critical terms, a certain effeminacy and excessive
fussiness of style. Could Proclus be offering a subtle jab at Dionysius of Halicarnassus’
use of the same verbal form in relation to Plato in ‘On Literary Composition’? Cf. De
compositione verborum 25.209–12 ὁ δὲ Πλάτων τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ διαλόγους κτενίζων καὶ
βοστρυχίζων καὶ πάντα τρόπον ἀναπλέκων οὐ διέλειπεν ὀγδοήκοντα γεγονὼς ἔτη.
79
εἰς αὐτὸν ἀπορρῖψαι. The verb often has the sense of uttering a word in disparagement –
a latent possibility that our translation cannot adequately capture.
80
Lamberton (2012), 49, n. 61 and Sheppard (1980), 16–17 see here a contradiction of
Proclus’ view in Essay 6 that such representation of the gods by means of unlike
images is allowable. It may, however, be that the discussions are concerned with
different types of poetry for different purposes. The references to education in the
current passage make it clear that Proclus is here discussing poetry aimed at a general
audience, including young and inexperienced readers/listeners. For this audience,
such inversions are likely to give a wrong impression. For a philosophically and
theologically aware reader, however, such inversions can be useful. See Introduction
to Essay 5, note 1.
155
Essay 5
freakish (teratôdês).81 When it comes to moral characters, he must take

those that are sanctified and worthy, since they have always been
ordered by the beautiful and the good; for instance, law and justice,
5 the honours given to fathers by sons and traditions handed down
from fathers to sons from the beginning. These things, then, would
be the screens (parapetasmata) that are fitting for conceptions (noê-
mata) of the gods since they draw towards [the gods] things that
follow from [the gods].82 And if [the poetry that is truly praiseworthy]
10 were to speak83 about men or heroes it must, apart from any dissim-
ulation, compose for the heroes what is fitting for heroes – allocating
to them the freedom from the passions that is proper to demigods.
When it comes to men, [truly praiseworthy poetry will] always com-
pose things that tend towards the praise of those who are good,
utilising people of this sort in imitation and adorning their deeds
15 with words, but blaming the deeds of bad men. [It does this,] in
order that young people should benefit from hearing it – dwelling
upon that which is better in its words, and always pursuing simplicity
in moral character instead of that which is complex through imitation.
This is the sort of thing that should be the content of poetry accord-
ing to Plato. When it comes to style, then, in the specific choices of
20 words, since this is subordinate to meaning, it is above all necessary for
it to be narrative in accordance with the notions previously discussed. If,
however, it is somehow necessary for there to be mimêsis84 (for this too is
how Plato defined him: just as he is concerned with myth, so too the
poet is also mimetic), then as a matter of necessity the mimêsis must not
25 share in variety, but must instead be mimêsis simply of good people. If at
some point a person who is in the grip of passion is imitated, he should
not go unpunished, nor should there be pleasure taken in the mimesis.85
81
That is, when drawing images from the physical world to describe the gods the poet
should draw on ‘natural’ rather than ‘unnatural’ actions.
82
ταῦτα γὰρ ἂν εἴη πρέποντα παραπετάσματα τῶν θείων νοημάτων ἀπὸ τῶν μετ᾽ αὐτοὺς
ἑλκόμενα πραγμάτων ἐπ᾽ αὐτούς. For screens, see above 44.14. The expression here is
very terse. A more literal translation would be Lamberton’s more cryptic ‘drawing over
them things subsequent to them’.
83
εἰ δὲ περὶ ἡρώων ἢ ἀνθρώπων λέγοι at 66.9 goes back to 65.19 for its subject: τὴν ὡς
ἀληθῶς ἐπαινετὴν παρ᾽ αὐτῷ ποιητικήν, εἴτε περὶ θεῶν εἴτε περὶ δαιμόνων λέγοι . . .
84
This seems to be mimê sis in the technical sense of dramatisation, with the poet
presenting the words of the characters in direct speech; cf. Rep. 392d–394d.
85
The assertion that narrative is preferable to mimê sis of action implicitly places tragedy
below epic and other forms of narrative as opposed to dramatic art. Aristotle’s
definition of tragedy includes the fact that it is ‘a mimesis . . . of people acting and
not [conveyed] through narration’ (δρώντων καὶ οὐ δι᾽ἀπαγγελίας, 1449b26–7).
Proclus’ Platonic insistence on representing only good characters so far as possible
implicitly rejects the Aristotelian position that the best tragedy will involve a central
156
<Ninth question>
In keeping with these [preferences for good characters], when it

comes to writing the music it is necessary to respect the mode that
tends towards virtue and to use this mode in particular. And if it were to
adopt at some point one of the other modes – say when someone who is
bad is represented briefly – then it must make clear the repulsion it feels 67
towards this kind of mode as something that is not worth serious
attention, but as instead vexing, in order that it might be [poetry] that
is relevant to politics.
And of course if metre were to be employed, it is necessary to inter-
weave them appropriately with the mode – for the most part those that 5
are serious, but occasionally those that are playful – for in this manner it
would be consistent with itself. The [ideal] poetry, according to Plato,
would thus be a mimetic disposition that, through both myths and logoi
and in conjunction with mode and metre, is capable of disposing the
souls of the audience to virtue.86
<ninth question: 67.10–68.2>

So, according to him the best form of poetry is this sort. Since it has this 10
character, it is easy for anyone to draw a conclusion about what its goal
(telos) is. If the poet is an imitator, then [it is obvious] that pleasure is not
its goal – as has been assumed by those who suppose that the poet can
undertake any content for his mimêsis, make use of every mode, and 15
strive after all of the metres in order to render his poetry pleasurable.
That this is not true he has shown in the Laws (667c) through the
following syllogism: The poet is an imitator. Every imitator has as his
goal producing what is similar to the paradigm, whether it is going to 20
please people or not. Thus the poet will not make it his goal simply to
please. This too is a familiar [observation]: if he were in fact to intend
to be an imitator of the sort that we have been saying, then he will look
to the good as a telos, for after all, we say that the goal of every under-
taking that is done well (i.e. virtuously), whether in imitation or without
character who is exceptional neither for moral excellence nor for wickedness, and
who falls into misfortune because of ‘a mistake’ (the often misunderstood hamartia)
(1452b34–1453a10).
86
This concluding definition implicitly rejects every feature of Aristotle’s famous defini-
tion of the ideal tragedy (a definition whose form Proclus may be imitating here):
‘Therefore tragedy is a mimesis of a serious and complete action, possessing a certain
magnitude, by means of ornamented language employed, each differently in different
parts of the play: it represents people acting and is not conveyed through narration, and
through pity and terror it produces a purgation of such emotions’ (1449b24–28; our
translation). Proclus, by contrast, values narrative over mimesis, has no real place for
pleasure or ornament, and recommends against evoking negative emotions.
157
Essay 5
25 imitation, is nothing other than the good. It is, of course, worthwhile to

understand what this [good] is – that since it is the vanguard of the
political form of life, its goal is not to lead the soul up to that which is
contemplative, but to lead it towards that which is political. It was for
this reason that we said that it is necessary for the statesman to deter-
30 mine the bounds of the poet’s activities – as he does for the general, the
68 doctor and the orator – while the poet, for his part, must create compo-
sitions that convey the soul to this end, using the rules which the
politician lays down in the manner that has been described.
<tenth question: 68.3–69.19>

Since this [sc. the ninth problem] has become familiar to us, I think it is
clear what the last of the problems that we are enquiring into is: who,
5 then, is the universal poet/creator and to what statesman above him
does he look?87 After all, the universal general is someone different from
the universal orator, and the universal doctor is different yet again.
The universal general works together with the Father to bring order
to the cosmic conflict, ensuring that the better always triumphs over the
10 worse, while also ensuring that the power of the latter is not wiped out
(for it is altogether necessary for what is worse to exist in order that the
universe should be composed from opposites). The universal doctor, on
the other hand, empowers the nature that is in the universe in order that
all bodies might be connected and that the universe is always free from
age and illness in accordance with its nature. The universal orator,
however, utilises intellective logoi to persuade those things to live
15 which the governing intellect in the universe wishes to live.88 [All this
being so] there must also be the one who is the cosmic poet, who is
a maker of myths in a unique manner. He makes imitations both visible
and beautiful of things both invisible and beautiful and makes imitations
that exist naturally of the things that exist intellectually; using musical
modes (harmonia) through which it is provided for the virtue that is in
the whole to dominate and for vice to be diminished. He gives the
87
Sc. as the earthly poet looks to the statesman here to guide his activities.
88
ὃ δὲ τοῖς νοεροῖς λόγοις πείθων ταῦτα ζῆν ἃ βούλεται ὁ πολιτικὸς ἐν τῷ παντὶ νοῦς. The idea
that the universal orator persuades beings within the universe to live is one that sounds
initially quite odd. After all, persuasion is typically addressed to that which is already
alive since the lifeless (and perhaps the undead as well!) are notoriously immune to the
charms of rhetoric. It is perhaps this oddness that prompts Lamberton to opt for the
translation ‘thrive’ for ζῆν and persuades Festugière to supply ‘comme’ where nothing
in the Greek warrants the idea that the universal orator persuades things how to live. Yet
the image that Proclus offers of the universal orator is surely present in English when
we speak of ‘coaxing’ tomato seeds or what have you ‘into life’.
158
<Tenth question>
rhythmic metre to the motions [in the universe] so that they undergo 20
a motion that is rational (kata logon), and produces a single living
harmony and one rhythm that is composed from all things.
I think this poet would seem to be none other than the great colla-
borator of the great statesman and the god who is truly educative, since
he looks to the intellect of the great statesman. Now, the universal 25
statesman is the great, celebrated Zeus from whom89 Plato himself
says (Laws 624a) that the art of politics derives. The collaborator for
this god among every order in the universe – whether in motions that are
quick or slow, or in periods that are short or extended – is none other
than Apollo, who is the poet/creator of imitations that are endowed with 69
harmony and rhythm. The general among these [gods] is the great Ares
who presides over conflicts and rouses all things to the cosmic opposi-
tion. The demiurge90 of persuasion is none other than Hermes, through 5
whom the other gods address each other [utilising other Hermes], and
Zeus addresses them all, utilising the Hermes within him. Asclepius is
the one who reveals all things to be in a natural condition since it is
through him that the universe neither sickens nor grows old, nor
releases the elements from their indissoluble bonds.91 Thus, if it is
necessary for me to go on about things that ought not be expressed (ta
anexoista), then it is obvious who this poet is: he moves the Sirens to sing, 10
‘uttering a single voice, one tone’ as Plato says in the myth in the tenth
book of the Republic (617b). As Timaeus says, it is he who sets in motion
the orbits of the divine souls that are turned92 with rhythmic motions in
proportion. Everything that has its origin from souls is the work 15
(poiêma) of Apollo, harmonious and rhythmic. Looking to this [universal
poet] let the earthly poet compose hymns to the gods. And let him
compose hymns to good men, whether in myth or without myth.
Otherwise, if he turns to other subject matter, let him know that he
sins against poetry and against Apollo.
89
Reading παρ’ οὗ for παρ’ ᾧ in 68.25 with Festugière and Lamberton.
90
ὁ δὲ πειθοῦς δημιουργὸς οὐκ ἄλλος ἢ ὁ Ἑρμῆς, δι’ ὃν καὶ δημηγοροῦσιν ἄλλοι θεοὶ κατ’ ἄλλους.
There is a play on the noun dêmiourgos (worker, creator) and the verb dêmêgorein (to
speak in the assembly) that cannot be adquately captured in translation.
91
Cf. Tim. 33a7 and Proclus in Tim. II 62.33–64.10. In this passage Proclus divides
‘demiurgic health’ from Asclepian health. There the latter has the more circumscribed
role of returning what has entered an unnatural state to the natural one, while demiur-
gic health seems to play the more general role envisioned here.
92
Reading περιφερομένους instead of the MS’s προφερομένους at line 14 with Kroll’s
suggestion.
159
1. introduction
Essay 6 of the Republic Commentary is the most discussed section of the
entire work. It and Essay 5 are the only parts which have received
a previous translation into English, and on Essay 6 in particular readers
have the benefit of a substantial body of insightful scholarship.1 This
essay, and its apparent incompatibility with Proclus’ other discussion of
Homer in Essay 5, have also been important to the case for the Republic
Commentary as a posthumous assemblage of materials. The differences
between these two essays seem to us less compelling than they have to
many others, and more likely to be related to differences of audience and
occasion.2
Essay 6 sees Proclus responding to Socrates’ objections to the poetry
of Homer. He is, consequently, obliged to interpret these passages
within the terms of his own views on the nature and effects of poetry.
The essay offers, therefore, the fullest response within Platonic terms to
Plato’s own objections to poetry in the Republic. In addition to this
contribution to our knowledge of a deeply contested issue in the history
of Platonism, Essay 6 also provides insight into the reading of Homer in
late antiquity. As is well known, the harmonising of Homer and Plato is
often achieved by means of allegory, but this is by no means always the
case, as we demonstrate below in outlining other items in Proclus’
hermeneutic tool-kit.
The essay is unique in the Republic Commentary in announcing its
original setting: as a special lecture delivered on Plato’s birthday.3
The implied audience are committed students who can be entrusted
1
Friedl (1936), Buffière (1956), Pépin (1958), Coulter (1976), Sheppard (1980),
Lamberton (1986) esp. pp. 180–232; Kuisma (1996), Struck (2004), Pichler (2005), St-
Germain (2006a) and (2006b).
2
See the introduction to Essay 5 and the General Introduction.
3
The celebration of Plato’s birthday, on the seventh day of Thargelion, was common in
Platonic schools of the Roman era. Porphyry mentions his own performance of a poem,
The Sacred Wedding, on this occasion in the school of Plotinus (VP 15 with note in Pepin
(1992), 265–6). See also Festugière (1970), vol 1, 86 note 1. It is always possible that such
a reference to a lecture’s setting is a rhetorical topos, but there is no particular reason to
doubt the historicity on this occasion. Proclus is not otherwise inclined to such orna-
mentation of his essays.
160
1. Introduction
with what Proclus treats as special teaching for a select few (205.21–3).
On occasions in the course of the essay, readers are reminded of this
original setting: Proclus will turn to address his students, to turn their
attention from one point to another, to distinguish them from a broader
public, and in the closing lines to urge them not to reveal what he has
chosen to teach this select audience. From its initial oral version it has,
however, been highly developed. This is as one would expect from
Marinus’ description of Proclus’ habits of work (Procl. 22): his writing
in the evening followed directly from the activity of teaching during
the day. As Sheppard rightly observes, we have in Essay 6 a complex
process of development: an initial lecture by Syrianus (71.3) was fol-
lowed by discussion between him and Proclus (71.26–7). At some later
point Proclus himself gave a lecture on Plato’s birthday (69.23) which he
subsequently wrote up into its current form.4 The relative clarity of the
pedagogical setting in this essay should not, however, lead us to consider
it altogether a special case; the other essays in the commentary undoubt-
edly had their own backgrounds in the oral teaching of the school, as is
clear from Essay 1.
Essay 6 aims at nothing less than a reconciliation of Homer and
Plato: the inspired poet must be brought into agreement with the
teaching of Plato as Proclus understands it. To this end, allegorical
reading is useful, but it is by no means the only tool in Proclus’
hermeneutic tool-kit. Rather, he works in a variety of interpretive
modes to produce his Homeric readings. This reconciling of autho-
rities is far more for Proclus than a merely intellectual exercise. It is
part of an attempt to produce a complete and coherent account of the
Hellenic cultural inheritance. This means, above all, demonstrating
that the major authoritative texts are in agreement, and that the tradi-
tional religion can be understood to harmonise with them.
By Proclus’ day this is not a new undertaking, but rather one that
had been attempted with increasing urgency over some centuries.
Recent work on Porphyry has demonstrated the way in which he
attempted to develop a universal tradition of wisdom, with
Hellenism as a central component.5 In this ambitious project the
careful interpretation of canonical texts was the privileged means for
bringing widely varied materials into agreement. Earlier still, the
bewildering variety of materials treated by authors of the ‘Second
Sophistic’ had been in part an attempt to synthesise and collect the
inherited culture. The surviving corpus of Philostratus can reasonably
be seen as a playful and exuberant series of sorties into the inherited
culture, remaking whatever it touches in a contemporary (and
4
Sheppard (1980), 32. 5
On Porphyry’s Hellenism see Johnson (2013).
161
idiosyncratic) image.6 In a very different way Plutarch had also

assembled a mass of inherited material in his Moralia and Parallel
Lives. There, however, especially in the latter group of works, the
concern is more overtly the relationship of Greek culture to the
Roman Empire. We do not propose that all of these very different
authors knowingly took on the mantle of defender of tradition, but
they do, in a range of ways, respond to a common set of problems.
The heterogeneity of the Hellenic inheritance and the resulting ten-
sions within it called for some response, and the tendency to learn this
tradition, at the more basic levels of education at least, as a set of
disconnected facts, skills and values, surely exacerbated the
problem.7 While the difference between the playfulness of
a Philostratus and the mental world of Proclus is in part the difference
between the sophist’s public display of paideia and the philosopher’s
private use of a version of that paideia for the education, and indeed
transformation, of his students, the difference is due as well to
a changed relation of intellectual and broader public. Though this
concern to synthesise had existed before Christianity had become an
obviously dominant force, the rise of the new religion gave increased
urgency to this old undertaking.
The clearest glimpse of this attitude of ‘us and them’ appears in the
final lines of Essay 6:
Dear friends, let these thoughts be a memorial of thanks for the company of our
teacher. They have been told by me to you, but are not to be spoken to the
masses. (205.21–3)
These lines do more than merely give ‘plus de solennité à la
conclusion’;8 though such instructions to one’s audience do appear
6
There are few studies of Philostratus’ cultural engagements across his corpus. See
Elsner (2009), Billault (2000), Miles (2018).
7
Kaster summarises well the result of the traditional education:
Far from understanding his culture, the man emerging from the schools of grammar
and rhetoric would have no overall view of history, only a memory of disjointed but
edifying vignettes; no systematic knowledge of philosophy or of any philosophic school,
but a collection of ethical commonplaces; no organic sense even of the language he had
so painstakingly acquired, but rules and categories, divided and subdivided, or rare
lexical titbits to display like precious jewels. The items amassed over years of schooling,
like slips filed away in a vast rank of pigeonholes, could be summoned up individually
and combined to meet the needs of the moment, but no unifying relationship among
them was perceived. (Kaster (1997), 12)
In this light the attempts of Proclus and others to unify Plato and other landmarks of the
inherited culture appear as a drawing together of the disparate material already
acquired, and the antithesis of the audience’s previous education.
8
Festugière (1970) vol. 1, 221, n. 8.
162
2. Modes of poetic composition and interpretation
with some frequency in late-antique Platonism,9 they are not merely

a topos but reflect a genuine sense of the separateness of the philosophical
school from an increasingly hostile wider community. As Sheppard
observes, following a suggestion of Dodds, ‘the masses’ (hoi polloi) is
one of the ‘code-phrases’ employed by Proclus to refer to the
Christians.10 We need not, however, limit Proclus’ warning solely to
Christians: the non-philosophical masses in general are to be avoided, as
Proclus warns elsewhere (e.g. in Alc. 245.6–8; Hymn III 12–13 and Hymn
IV.14). This type of call for secrecy also emphasises the importance of
the material communicated: nothing less than the true reading of
a sacred text, in which can be found symbolic myths with the potential
for theurgic use.11
2. modes of poetic composition and

interpretation in essay 6
Essay 6 exhibits the full range of Proclus’ versatility and ingenuity in the
interpretation of texts. In addition to the relatively well-known flights of
metaphysical allegory, he also has recourse to explanations based on the
Neoplatonic scale of virtues, the various levels and kinds of gods and
daemones, and theurgic ritual. He also employs types of explanation
that do not depend so closely on his broader philosophical commit-
ments, for instance interpretations by reference to changes of customs
from the heroic age to his present day. Developing his reading of
Homer occupies the first of the essay’s two books, and Proclus discusses
especially the passages criticised by Socrates in Republic III. Proclus’
stated purpose is therefore ostensibly defensive. Nonetheless, the dis-
cussion goes beyond defensiveness to argue positively for the profound
wisdom of a Homer who anticipates the major teachings of Platonism as
Proclus understands it. The essay’s second book shifts its focus to
proving that, despite his disparaging remarks about Homer and poetry
in general, Plato had the highest esteem for Homer, and consistently
treated him as an inspired and authoritative source.
The multiplicity of interpretive approaches in Proclus is motivated by
his sense that texts themselves communicate in different ways because of
9
Festugière rightly notes the similarity of Porphyry’s Letter to Marcella 284.17 and Stob.
Hermet. fr. XI 4. To this we would also add the opening of Porphyry’s On Images (fr.
351), quoted in our note ad loc, and Sheppard (1980), 33 cites Epictetus I 29.30 and 64.
10
As Saffrey (1975) also notes. On Christianity as the ‘unnamed adversary’ in this essay
see Lamberton (2016).
11
On the Neoplatonic schools as textual communities see Baltzly (2014). For discussion
of the theurgic efficacy of symbols see van den Berg (2001), 91–111, and Pichler (2005),
241–53.
163
their differing natures. Proclus’ two accounts of the types of poetry (in
Essays 5 and 6) have attracted considerable attention.12 In Essay 6,
Proclus divides poetry into three classes, the last of which is subdivided
into two. The highest form of poetry is ‘divinely inspired’ (entheos), and
it is this type which can appropriately be interpreted allegorically. These
myths are composed of symbola/synthêmata, and are not necessarily
governed by straightforward likeness to the higher realities to which
they refer. Though it has often been asserted that Proclus sees symbola as
necessarily unlike their referents, it is rather that they can operate even
by antithesis.13 It is not necessary that symbola have no likeness to the
realities to which they refer, but that antithesis is one of the types of
likeness that they can have.14 The second of Proclus’ types of poetry is
described variously as ‘didactic’ or ‘scientific’ (epist êmôn), though he
does not use the former term himself.15 Though its position between
the best, inspired poetry and the lower, mimetic kinds is clear, much else
about it is not.
While [it] recognises the essence of the things that truly exist, and it loves to
contemplate the beautiful and the good, both in words and in deeds, it also
brings each of the subjects that it treats into an interpretation (herm êneia) in
metre and rhythm. (179.6–9)
The didactic character of this middle type of poetry is clear in Proclus’
description of it as ‘full of advice and of the best councels, and abound-
ing in intellective proportion’ (179.10–12). The final sentence of this
paragraph of definition makes clear what this type of poetry can achieve:
these poems ‘provide a recollection of the cycles of the soul and of the
unseen logoi and diverse powers in them’ (179.13–15). As van den Berg
has argued, this focus on recollection is the essential quality of this type:
like the practice of mathematics, it is a technique for inducing the soul to
remember itself. The ‘cycles of the soul’ are those of the Timaeus (43c7
ff.), which are disordered when the soul incarnates into a physical
body.16 The broad definition of the content of such poetry suggests
12
See the introduction to Essay 5 on the relationship between these.
13
Van den Berg (2001), 122 rightly observes that the interpretation of καί is decisive for
the correct reading of this passage.
14
As van den Berg (2001), 125 notes: ‘[Proclus’] argumentation appears to hinge precisely
on the point that opposites have something in common, and therefore have some form
of likeness’.
15
As Sheppard (1980), 184 notes in her discussion of this type. We refer to this type of
poetry as ‘scientific’, though it must be conceded that none of the available terms for
this category is fully satisfactory. For the remains of Proclus’ commentary on Hesiod’s
Works and Days see Marzillo (2010) and van den Berg (2014b).
16
For fuller discussion see van den Berg (2001), 126–8. Regarding recollection in
Proclus: Steel (1997) and Helmig (2013).
164
that it is not merely ethical, though it does have an important ethical

component, but conveys other kinds of knowledge concerning ‘the
essence of the things that truly exist’ (τὴν οὐσίαν τῶν ὄντων). By means
of this knowledge the soul achieves self-knowledge and puts in order its
cycles.
All of these types of poetry are defined not as genres nor by their
subject matter, but rather by the way in which they are produced by
poets and how they are received by readers. Between production and
reception there is assumed to be a complete symmetry, so that poetry
produced by divine inspiration can (ideally at least) affect the divine
parts of our own souls, that produced at the level of intellect assists the
intellectual parts of ourselves to achieve self-knowledge, while the two
mimetic kinds (eikastic and phantastic) appeal to the emotional part.
There will certainly be differences in the types of subject matter pre-
sented, but the primary difference is not in the subjects treated but in the
production and reception of the poetry.
Closely related to the distinction between the highest two types of
poetry, the inspired and the scientific, are the concepts of the symbolon
and the eikôn. The neat distinction between these two terms on the
basis of unlikeness and likeness, which has often been drawn between
them, does not hold, for a number of reasons discussed in detail by van
den Berg.17 In brief, eikones and symbola come from different sources:
while symbola come from the gods and appear in inspired poetry,
eikones are produced by the human soul, as a way of articulating the
logoi which make it up. These eikones are projected in order to assist the
soul to know itself. The two types of poetry which use these different
instruments function at distinct levels. Proclus is only concerned,
however, to distinguish eikones and symbola in contexts where these
distinctions of levels and types of revealing knowledge are concerned;
they can otherwise be used as synonyms, since the fact that both work
by different types of likeness (mixed with un-likeness) means that the
two concepts overlap.18
2.1 Allegorical Reading

Proclus’ allegorical reading has attracted considerable scholarly atten-
tion, and rightly so: his readings of this kind exemplify the most devel-
oped form of this practice among Platonists. Allegorical reading and
17
van den Berg (2001), 120–36.
18
van den Berg (2001), 126. Their use as synonyms was already observed by John Dillon
(1990). As Dillon concludes, ‘it is only when he is on his very best behaviour that
Proclus maintains any strict distinction between the two terms’: (1990), 254.
165
allegorical writing had a long history by Proclus’ time,19 and it is clear

that Proclus’ teacher Syrianus had made a particular contribution to
Proclus’ own practice. As Sheppard has demonstrated, Syrianus tended
to transpose earlier allegories into the terms of a developed Neoplatonic
metaphysics.20 Indeed, Proclus claims often in Essay 6 to be doing
nothing more than reproducing his teacher’s interpretations.21 For all
that allegorical readings can seem arbitrary and fanciful to modern
readers, they would have seemed not at all so to a reader like Proclus,
who would have felt that such reading was guided by established tradi-
tions of interpretation and guidelines concerning when different types
of allegorical and other reading were allowable and indeed required.
It has often been remarked that allegory, including that of Proclus, is
frequently defensive, attempting to produce a satisfactory and praise-
worthy meaning for passages or texts with an inappropriate surface
meaning. This defensive purpose is often evident in Essay 6, given
that the stated purpose is to defend Homer from the criticisms of
Socrates. Proclus’ reading (132.8–140.24) of the sexual union of Zeus
and Hera in Iliad 14, responding to Socrates’ rejection of this passage as
blasphemous and unsuitable for a young audience (Rep. 390b6–c6),
draws on Syrianus’ lost monograph ‘dedicated to this myth as a whole’
(133.6). Syrianus, Proclus tells us, interpreted this myth ‘with the most
divine inspiration’ (entheastikôtata (133.6–7)). To prepare his audience,
Proclus first reminds us that after the one first principle of the whole
(the One and Good) come ‘bi-formed (duoeid ês) causes . . . which
Socrates in the Philebus has called Limit and Unlimited’ (133.21–3).
These causes and the orders that follow from them have been contrasted
as male and female, even and odd, paternal and maternal. Nonetheless,
because of the unifying nature of the cause from which they emerge,
‘these orders hasten back towards unity (henôsis)’ (I 133.29–30).
The mythic images of marriage, sexual union, and offspring allow the
creators of those myths to trace ‘the whole divine expanse spread out in
its variety by means of these processions and communions, from above
right through to the encosmic gods’ (134.2–7). In this light, Hera’s
adornment of herself prior to the divine union represents bringing her
various powers to perfection; Zeus awakens the divine desire within
himself, ‘and extends the cause that brings the plurality together into
one’ (135.2–3).
19
On this earlier history in relation to Proclus see especially Lamberton (1986) and
Struck (2004).
20
See Sheppard (1980), 39–103. On Syrianus’ interpretation of Homer see Manolea
(2004).
21
See for instance 71.21–27, 152.7–153.20.
166
A single unification and an insoluble intertwining of both of these gods is

accomplished which is separate from the universe and which transcends the
encosmic receptacles. This is because Zeus leads her upwards towards this
communion, while Hera holds out towards him the lower and encosmic
union. While the gods are eternally united according to each sort of union,
the myth divides and separates things which are eternally coexistent with each
other, and it ascribes on the one hand the union (mixis) separate from the
universe to the will of Zeus, and their common activity when it proceeds into
the cosmos to the providence of Hera (I 135.4–13).
Proclus is just as careful as Plotinus had been some centuries earlier to
emphasise that the temporal language which myths and the interpreters
of myths are obliged to use does not imply that the realities described
really developed in a temporal succession.22 Far more than Plotinus,
however, he is concerned to work out his allegories in every detail.
The difference stems from the much more pressing need to construct
a coherent Hellenic tradition, centred on, but not limited to, the
Platonic tradition. Proclus is also characteristically exact regarding
where in the hierarchy of gods/levels of reality this myth falls: it
describes a hypercosmic/encosmic process.23
Such metaphysical allegory is appropriate, in Proclus’ view, to the
interpretation of myths concerning the gods, but would not be appro-
priate to myths concerning heroes.24 This distinction is evident, for
instance, in his discussion of the lamentations of gods and heroes, where
the passages in Homer that ascribe lament to these two classes are
treated quite differently. The case of the Homeric heroes, whom
Proclus discusses first, does not require allegory, but rather Proclus
considers the nature of the characters depicted.25 In the case of the
gods, however, such passages are to be understood as metaphysical
allegory: such myths ‘demonstrate the providential care of the gods
for the coming into being and passing away of mortal things by speaking
of the gods’ tears’ (I 124.26–8). Likewise their laughter, he goes on to
say, symbolises their providential care over the other side of genesis, its
coming into being rather than its passing away (I 125.5–128.23). Given,
however, the subtle gradations of Proclus’ divine hierarchy, the picture
22
Plotinus III 5.24–30. See also Porphyry ap. Proclum in Remp. II 107.6–15
23
On the hypercosmic/encosmic position of Zeus and Hera see Platonic Theology VI 103.
17–21, though Proclus is not there concerned with the meaning of the union of Zeus
and Hera. See below on the relation of Platonic and Homeric myth to these same levels
of reality.
24
This distinction does not appear to have been shared by Porphyry, for instance, among
his predecessors, who was willing to apply metaphysical allegory to the conflict
between Achilles and Hector. See on this Sellew (1989).
25
See below on the scale of virtues and reasonable expectations.
167
cannot be quite this simple. Among ‘the last of the classes that follow the
gods at each moment and that care directly for mortals, and employ
appetites and sufferings and have their life among these things’ (125.
23–6) such affections and their expression in lamentation can arise as
they do in mortals; that is, the daemones exist at a sufficiently divided
and particularised level that they experience emotions which can be
compared to human ones.
A further allegory dealing with a relatively low level of reality is
Proclus’ reading of the choice of Paris (I 108.1–109.7): he cannot, of
course, concede that a real choice among these goddesses was made by
the barbarian Paris. Rather, he sees it as a representation of the choice of
ways of life, with Hera representing the kingly life, Athena presumably
the philosophical life (which is attributed in this passage to her father
Zeus), and Aphrodite the life dominated by desire.26 It is not, however,
the choice of Aphrodite in itself that constitutes Paris’ mistake but his
choice of a merely physical Aphrodite, lacking as he does awareness of
the intelligible beauty. A truly Aphrodisiac man, Proclus asserts, is as
much Athenaic as Aphrodisiac (I 108.25). A lowly soul like Paris’,
however, remains at the level of the physical and the Aphrodisiac
daemones (I 109.4–7). On this occasion, the reading does not require
the upper flights of Proclean metaphysics, though the way in which the
divine chains encompass all the levels of existence is implied by his
limitation of Paris’ perspective to only the lowest of these.27
Proclus is not attempting to sketch a full Platonic theology in Essay 6,
but an understanding of the different levels of the divine chains, the
layers of reality, and the parts of the human composite is implicit in his
discussion at every turn. Allegory functions as an important hermeneu-
tic instrument for the integration of Homeric and Platonic wisdom, but
it is not, as will appear below, the only means of uniting the complex
edifice of Proclean thought with the Homeric texts.
2.2 Providence, gods and daemones

Allegory is far from the only instrument which Proclus has to demon-
strate the conformity of Homeric thought with his own understanding
of Platonism and the working of reality at its various levels.28 Indeed,
Proclus’ conviction that reality proceeds from the One down to the
26
Proclus discusses the choice of Paris again at in Remp. II 263–4, with different attribu-
tions of types of lives to deities. See our note to I 108.12.
27
Similar observations in Kuisma (1996), 101–2.
28
This tripartite correlation is asserted, for instance, at 101.10–13: ‘So how would one
give, in response to these difficulties, an account that is appropriate, one that harmo-
nises the teaching of Homer with both the nature of things and the teaching of Plato?’
168
multiplicity of the physical world, and that the gods manifest themselves
at all of these various levels, supplies him with a structure that allows
him to integrate the radically different religious thought of the Homeric
epics with his understanding of Plato.
Proclus’ discussion of the violation of the oaths in Iliad 4 (in Remp.
I 100.19–106.10) provides an excellent example of this. Having dealt
with other instances of the gods’ apparent responsibility for evils in
Homer by defining these evils as such only in a relatively insignificant
sense, Proclus acknowledges that in this further example the Socrates of
the Republic raises a much more difficult issue: the gods do appear in this
instance to lead human beings to commit evil. Because of this, and the
difficulty of reaching what he believes to be a correct understanding of
the passage, he is once more keen to stress that such poetry is not
suitable for the young (I 101.14–17).
Proclus’ solution draws upon his understanding of the interweaving
of providence over the universe as a whole, providence over individual
parts (this latter kind administered by daemones), and the freely chosen
acts of individual human beings (‘that which is in our power’, to eph’
hêmin). The gods ‘do not render godless and unjust those who are being
punished, but rather they call forth to action those who are suited to
such practices, so that these people act in accordance with their internal
disposition and bring out those evil activities of which they have the
birthpangs, and so they become worthy of justice’ (I 102.24–9). Turning
to a medical analogy, Proclus compares the gods’ behaviour to that of
physicians who cut into the skin to bring out festering liquid (103.9–11).
This justifies the gods’ leading the Trojans into evil in two respects: it is
required for the providence of the whole, and it is ultimately for the
good of the Trojans themselves.29
The case of the archer Pandarus, who is led by Athena to shoot at
Menelaus, presents the problem most forcefully. He consequently
receives further discussion by Proclus, though the solution is essentially
the same. The Homeric line which states that Athena sought out
Pandarus on the battlefield (Il. 4.88) is taken, not implausibly, to indi-
cate that he was especially prone to the dishonourable action required.
His freedom to choose is still his own, as Proclus infers from Athena’s
question at 4.93:
29
On some related problems of inherited guilt and postponed punishment in Ten
Problems Concerning Providence see van den Berg (2014a). Van den Berg rightly contrasts
Plutarch’s understanding of punishment as therapeutic with the absence of this idea in
Proclus’ Ten Problems (250–2). The discussion of the violation of the oaths does,
however, make important use of such medical imagery for the action of providence.
For more on Proclus’ theory of providence and the origins of evil see Phillips (2007)
and Chlup (2012), 201–33.
169
Indeed, now would you obey me, bright-minded son of Lycaon?
Pandarus’ action, like that of the other Trojans, is required by the divine
plan as a whole, and is for his own benefit. Nonetheless, this beneficial
action is not forced upon him by the gods but merely presented to him
in the same way that the choice of a new incarnation as a tyrant is
presented as one possible option in the Myth of Er (I 104.20–8).
No allegorising is required on this occasion to reconcile the apparently
scandalous Homeric incident with a Platonic belief in the complete
goodness of divinity.
Proclus’ discussion of Achilles’ apparent lack of reverence for the
gods (I 146.6–149.29) provides further insight into his non-allegorical
means of reconciling Homer and Plato. Much as his approach to Plato’s
various statements on poetry was to consider these to refer to different
levels of poetic composition, and his response to the problem of
Pandarus was to place the action within the different levels of provi-
dence and human freedom, Proclus explains to his satisfaction Achilles’
apparently impious utterances by reference to the different levels at
which divinity manifests itself. Proclus does not content himself with
arguing merely for an Achilles who pays the necessary respect to the
gods, but for one who ‘is unshakeably correct in his attitude to matters
divine’ (I 146.18–19), reminding us that it is Achilles who advises the
Achaeans to appease the Trojan priest Chryses, and that he obeys
Athena’s command not to harm Agamemnon, and commits himself (in
some unspecified way) to the will of the gods. Beyond this, Proclus sees
Achilles as a proto-theurgist, whose knowledge of ritual synthêmata is
demonstrated by purifying the ritual phialê and keeping it dedicated to
Zeus alone, and by the ritual appropriateness of standing in the centre of
the enclosure ‘to call upon the one who reaches to all places from the
centre of the cosmos’ (I 146.17–147.6).30 Proclus cannot, of course,
deny that Achilles does seem to address Apollo as ‘the most destructive’.
But in fact it is not to the god Apollo that this abuse is directed. Rather,
it is directed at a daemon and a low-level one at that: ‘only the daemonic
being, and this was not even the very first such being to whom universal
authority has been assigned, but rather a daemon assigned the proximate
supervision of a particular’ (I 147.11–14). Since each god ‘extends from
above all the way to the final levels’ (I 147.8–9), one must ask which level
of a god is meant in any given context. The lowly and divided form of
Apollo addressed by Achilles in this instance is the guardian daemon of
Hector. Achilles’ battle against the Xanthus is similarly justified: he
30
See further on Proclus’ ascription of theurgic knowledge to Achilles our discussion on
pages 173–5.
170
fought not against a god but either against the manifest water or some
local, and so relatively minor, power (I 148.27–9).
2.3 The scale of virtues and reasonable expectations

A further hermeneutic move which likewise does not need recourse to
allegory draws on another of the hierarchies which Proclus inherits and
develops: the scale of virtues.31 Explanation of characters’ action on this
basis allows Proclus to define what can and cannot reasonably be
expected of people at a particular stage of development. In particular,
the location of characters’ understanding at the political/civic level of
virtue assists Proclus in accepting what appear to him the ethical limita-
tions of Homeric characters.
In part of his response to Socrates’ criticism of the emotional excesses
of epic characters, Proclus discusses the lamentations of Homeric her-
oes (I 122.21–124.23). By contrast with the interpretation of divine
lamentation that follows, in which Proclus does develop the allegorical
reading discussed above, the behaviour of the heroes is explained as an
appropriate mimêsis of the type of people that they were:
Let us say in response to these censures that the poet appropriately depicts the
heroes as men who are absorbed in practical actions and have chosen the life
appropriate to these actions, and has brought them into his poem suffering
emotion about each of the things that happens to them and living in this way
(I 124.1–5).
The heroes are not, he observes, philosophers practising the cathartic
virtues, but are at a lower stage of virtue and actively engaged in warfare
(I 124.5–14). Besides being an entirely reasonable point, this also impli-
citly places the heroes at the level of political virtue. One cannot,
consequently, expect them to exemplify or even strive for apatheia, as
does a philosopher perfecting the cathartic virtues, but only metrio-
patheia. This understanding of the nature of the heroes reappears in
passing in Proclus’ discussion of the Homeric and Platonic myths of the
afterlife, where he sees Achilles’ famous rebuke to Odysseus for his
praise of Achilles’ status in death (Od. 11.487–91) as an expression of
Achilles’ ongoing attachment to the body (I 119.22–120.17). This is not,
however, like the attachment of souls who have indulged the appetites of
the oyster-like body while they were alive, but because Achilles was
supreme in the active life (ton en praxei bion (I 120.2)) and possessed
practical virtue (praktikê aretê (I 120.10–11)) he retains a desire for the
bodily instrument by which he exercised that virtue. Proclus’ Achilles is
31
On the scale of virtues see Saffrey et al (2001); van den Berg (2003) and Baltzly (2004).
171
not then merely one who should be understood as operating at the level
below the cathartic virtues, but as one who exemplified outstanding
virtue, albeit at these lower levels up to and including the political.
A somewhat similar type of explanation is also employed in defending
the passages which ‘seem to incline those hearing them to scorn self-
control’ (I 129.1–3). Accepting Socrates’ view that the first and most
important form of self-control (sôphrosynê) is obedience to those in
power, Proclus argues that this does not apply to Achilles’ disobedience
towards Agamemnon, as Agamemnon is not a worthy ruler like the
Platonic Guardians but rather has power without virtue (I 130.
1–131.4). Though he possesses the instrument which should make it
possible to exercise virtue, that is, political power, Agamemnon fails to
do so because of a personal lack. Both characters, Achilles and
Agamemnon, are judged against the political virtues and, while
Achilles is supposedly exemplary, Agamemnon fails even by this stan-
dard. Likewise in his discussion of the apparent avarice of Homeric
heroes, Proclus is careful to paint Achilles in the most positive way that
he can. Achilles’ acceptance of money and gifts from Agamemnon is not
motivated by his greed, he says, but is in acknowledgement of
Agamemnon’s implied repentance. His acceptance of gifts from Priam
in return for Hector’s body is in accordance with an ancient custom and
the strategic benefit of diminishing the resources of an enemy in war
(143.18–146.5). Achilles is once more the exemplar of virtue appropri-
ate to his circumstances and type of life.
Odysseus’ remarks to the Phaeacians (Od. 9.6–10), which Socrates’
censures as conveying an ideal of nothing more than pleasure (Rep.
390a8–b4), are again interpreted by Proclus as referring to the levels
of virtue below the cathartic. Though his first defence of this passage
alludes briefly to the possibility of allegorising the happiness of the
Phaeacians to refer ‘to a level higher than mortal nature’ (I 131.8–9),
the longer defence (consisting of Proclus’ second and third points
(I 131.12–132.7)) is made on purely ethical grounds, at the surface
level of the text (to phainomenon (131.12)). Proclus observes that
Homer’s Odysseus does not praise pleasure but ‘good cheer’ (euphro-
synê). Alluding to Timaeus 80b, where Plato contrasts the pleasure
(h êdonê) taken in music by the ignorant with the good cheer (euphrosynê)
of the intelligent, Proclus applies the distinction to both the music and
the enjoyment of food and drink in Odysseus’ lines. What Odysseus
praises, he suggests, is no different from the appropriate satisfaction
endorsed by Plato himself. Music, he adds, extends education through-
out the whole city from above, making the city harmonious and inspir-
ing virtue through appropriate musical modes (I 131.17–24). In the
third point of his response to this passage he sees Odysseus’ praise of
172
the necessities of life as consistent with ‘our own school’s teaching’

(I 131.29). Odysseus praises, he suggests, having what is necessary for
human life so that there is an absence of need.32 Proclus indicates once
more that such needs are more pressing for the mass of humanity than
for the philosopher, when he describes these physical goods as those
‘which the great multitude of those in cities require’ (I 131.26). This
does not imply, of course, that the philosopher is entirely free from
these needs while embodied, but does indicate once more that Proclus
takes Homer to be writing (on the surface at least) for a level of virtue
below the cathartic, where these requirements are more acute.
By situating Homer’s heroes below the level of the cathartic virtues,
and in particular at the political level, Proclus is able to assess them in
terms which the best of the heroes can plausibly be argued to meet, and
to justify Homer’s text at the surface level, without recourse to allegory.
Allegorical interpretation, after all, is considered suitable for myths
concerning the gods rather than heroes, so some other means of inter-
preting these tales is required if Homer’s text is to be rescued from
Socrates’ critique. References to the supposed customs of the heroic age
also assist Proclus in this line of argument by reference to realistic
expectations. In short, Proclus reasonably argues that one cannot expect
Homeric characters to conform to the highest forms of Platonic ethics,
both because of the type of characters described and the remote age in
which they are supposed to have lived.
2.4 Theurgy
The longest passage in which theurgic ritual is used to explain Homer is
at I 152.7–153.20.33 Here, Proclus is addressing Socrates’ objection to
Achilles’ sacrifice of twelve Trojan prisoners on the funeral pyre of
Patroclus (Rep. 891b6–c6). The initial explanation, which makes refer-
ence only to the surface meaning (to phainomenon), was discussed above:
Achilles’ violence here is no worse than killing Trojans on the battle-
field. Next Proclus adds:
Secondly, if it is necessary to recall in addition the more secret contemplation of
these verses by our teacher [sc. Syrianus], it must be said that the whole rite
(pragmateia) conducted by Achilles around the pyre imitates the rite of immor-
talisation (apathanatismos) of the soul among the theurgists, leading up the soul
of Patroclus into the transcendent life. (152.7–12)
32
On the Hellenistic background to Proclus’ discussion see our notes ad loc.
33
On this ritual see Finamore (2004) with a discussion of apathanatismos at 130–4. See also
Van Liefferinge (2000); Lewy (1978), 184–5 and 207; Majercik (2013), 30–46.
173
The reading that follows does not directly refer to the kinds of meta-
physical abstractions which the majority of Syrianus’ distinctive read-
ings employed.34 Rather, Achilles’ ritual is said to represent (mimeitai)
the rite of apathanatismos, which itself both refers to such higher realities
and works to transport the soul to them. Achilles the Theurgist may be
an even more surprising development than Homer the Theologian, but
that is very nearly what Proclus (following Syrianus) suggests. It must be
stressed, however, that Proclus does not say that Achilles’ rite is iden-
tical to the theurgic one. The verb mimeitai is important here, empha-
sising that it resembles the theurgic rite in important respects but is
distinct from it. Given Achilles’ moral excellence up to the level which
he has achieved, he seems to be able to understand something of a ritual
which could be properly practised by a fully educated theurgist. His
status as a hero and piety (in Proclus’ eyes) may also be thought to assist
him in approximating the higher ritual.35
Examination of Proclus’ reading of Achilles’ sacrifice is hampered by
the limited evidence for the rite of apathanatismos; in Remp. 152.
7–153.20 is itself the major source for this aspect of theurgic practice.
Furthermore the scholarly reconstruction of the broader process of
theurgy remains highly contested. Nonetheless, it is clear that Proclus
sees this ritual as ensuring the proper care of the vehicle (ochêma) of the
lower part of the soul, and as one which leads up the higher part of the
soul. The ‘manifest vehicle’, which is not immortal but does outlive the
body, is taken away, presumably for its gradual dissolution;36 the ascent
of the higher part of the soul is ‘by the airy and lunar and solar rays’.
Lewy may well be correct that in this ritual the theurgist (represented in
the analogy by Achilles) aimed to call forth the soul of the initiate,
following upon the symbolic death of the body.37 The ‘rays’ (augai)
mentioned here appear in several of the Chaldaean fragments, as for
instance in fr. 115:
You must hasten towards the light and towards the rays of the Father, from
where the soul, clothed in mighty intellect, has been sent to you.
34
On the character of these readings see Sheppard (1980), 85 who summarises:
‘In a number of these [interpretations], when we relate the interpretations given by
Proclus to the tradition of Homeric interpretation we can see that Syrianus’ distinctive
contribution was the development of transcendent metaphysical allegory.’
35
Pichler (2005), 251 sees in mimeitai merely a reference to the status of the rite as
a representation in the text of Homer. If this were the case then such language would be
needed for all other references to Homer, but none in fact occur.
36
On the doctrine of the soul’s vehicles see Finamore (1985).
37
Lewy (1978), 206–7. Followed in this by Majercik (2013), 38.
174
As in Proclus’ version of Achilles’ ritual, the soul is to progress upwards

via these rays to its final destination.
There has been much discussion concerning the nature of the higher
stages of theurgy, in particular whether these involved the use of phy-
sical objects and rituals or were a purely contemplative undertaking.38
Though it is probably impossible to be certain, it may also be that such
attempts to categorise present a false dichotomy: these rites may well
have had physical and contemplative components. At any rate, the ritual
to which Proclus likens Achilles’ pragmateia seems to have had a physical
component and yet to have been concerned with an elevated stage of
theurgic progression. Proclus assumes that at least some in his audience
will know the details of this ritual and does not elaborate on them.
Rather, he telescopes the three levels involved in his interpretation:
Achilles’ ritual, the theurgic ritual and the theurgic ritual’s symbolic
meaning. In this way Achilles’ ritual comes to have the same significance
as the theurgic apathanatismos:
The golden crater is a symbol of the spring (p êg ê) of souls and the libation is
a symbol of the outflowing from there, which conducts a greater life to the
divided soul, and the pyre is a symbol of the unmixed purity which can lead
towards the imperceptible and away from bodies. (I 152.26–153.1)
Much must remain mysterious here, but the structure of the interpreta-
tion is clear: one ritual mimics (mimeitai) another, which in turn has
a symbolic relationship to the higher realities to which the rites aim to
return their recipients.
Homer’s descriptions of transformations and epiphanies of the gods
(I 109.9–114.29) are likewise understood primarily without allegory but
by reference to a Neoplatonic understanding of theurgy.39 Though
allegory is used incidentally in this discussion, in the reading of the
story of Proteus in Odyssey 4, Proclus’ main line of explanation here is
not allegorical, but rather understands the Homeric ascription of mut-
ability to the gods in two ways: (1) like Iamblichus he argues that the
different parts of the human composite are able to receive the gods only
in their own ways. Given the divided and multiple nature of our souls,
we perceive as similarly variable what is in fact immutable and simple.
(2) While mutability is not to be attributed to the deities, it does
characterise the daemonic beings further down a particular divine
38
The bibliography on the nature of theurgic practice is extensive. See especially
Majercik (2013); Chlup (2012), 163–84; Van Liefferinge (1999); Shaw (1995);
Sheppard (1982); van den Berg (2001), 66–111; Lewy (1978); and Festugière (1968).
39
Determining the form which theurgy took before its adoption by Neoplatonists is
difficult given the fragmentary state of the evidence. See however Saffrey (1981) and
Tanaseanu-Döbler (2013).
175
chain. The Homeric passages which Socrates criticised, Proclus argues,

can each be understood in one of these two ways. This detailed under-
standing of the psychological mechanics of epiphany on the one hand,
and of the gradations of the divine chains on the other, allows Proclus to
accommodate the Homeric accounts within his own metaphysics.
2.5 Interpreting and employing Plato in Essay 6

For Proclus’ purposes in Essay 6 it is imperative to reconcile Plato with
Homer. To this end, Proclus places emphasis, especially in the
essay’s second book, on parts of Plato that are ostensibly in praise of
Homer, and seeks to explain those passages that are critical of Homer as
relating only to certain kinds of poetry. His categorisation of poetry into
three kinds makes the latter undertaking relatively straightforward.
Beyond this, Proclus aims to demonstrate that Homer was himself
aware of these three kinds of poetry and exemplified each of them,
though his work is characterised primarily by the highest type.
Selective citation allows Proclus to argue for Plato’s supposed venera-
tion of, and influence by, Homer. Plato, Proclus argues, has imitated
Homer’s manner of presentation, and has also followed his lead in
subject matter. In ‘A General Defence of both Homeric and Platonic
Myths’’ (I 117.25–122.20), Proclus sees the accounts of the posthumous
fate of souls in both Homeric and Platonic myth as literally true. It is, of
course, evident that Plato’s myths are influenced here by Homeric
myth, as Proclus observes. He claims too that both shared the same
intellectual vision (theôria (I 164.8–13)), extending even to their mutual
focus on encosmic reality and the gods associated with it, including the
demiurgic monad only to the extent that this is necessary to understand
the things which depend upon it (I 164–5).
In arguing that Plato imitates Homer’s choices in presenting his
material, Proclus realises that he also opens Plato to some of the criti-
cisms that Socrates makes of the Homeric poems in the Republic: he too
works by imitation and stirs the emotions of his readers. When he
argues that Plato imitates Socrates just as vividly as Homer imitates
Achilles and others, and that he stirs his readers’ emotions at Socrates’
death as vividly as Homer does for the death of Patroclus, Proclus comes
remarkably close to appreciating such imitation and emotion for its own
sake (I 163.19–164.7). Though he is willing to concede that Plato and
Homer share these qualities, and even that Plato, like Homer, must be
expelled from Plato’s own ideal state (I 163.2–9), this last concession is
limited by its very nature. The Platonic state of the Republic does not,
after all, exist outside of the theorising of Platonists, and in the
176
meantime, both Plato and Homer will have much to contribute to those
raised under less pure and unified regimes.
Both Plato and Homer are, for Proclus, theios.40 Nonetheless, their
works are, reasonably enough, treated quite differently. While Homer’s
divine inspiration is constantly stressed, and the lower types of poetic
composition present in his work treated as relatively unimportant or
uncharacteristic, Plato’s imitation of Homer often seems an intellectual
one. Summarising this broad difference of approach Proclus writes:
Homer, speaking from divine inspiration and possession by the Muses, teaches
us about divine matters and human. Plato establishes these same things by the
irrefutable methods of knowledge, and through his demonstrations makes them
clearer for the majority of us, who need such assistance for understanding truly
existent things. (159.1–6)
What Homer has taught us in mythic and inspired form, it seems, Plato
has conveyed by means of reasoned argument.
Yet, as the length of Proclus’ discussion of the relationship between
Homer and Plato would imply, things are not quite so straightforward.
Later in the second book of Essay 6, Proclus suggests that Plato was
influenced by Homer ‘not only when divinely inspired and composing
myths, but even when he was writing philosophically and rhetorically’
(171.13–14). Though Proclus’ immediate point is that Plato drew on
Homer in all aspects of his work, this also suggests that Plato did
compose his myths with divine inspiration and not only by philosophi-
cal reasoning. Similarly, Socrates in the Phaedrus is said to speak ‘with
divine inspiration and like a poet’ (I 166.12–13). Nonetheless, it is more
often the case for Proclus that Plato’s text offers reasoning where
Homer’s offers inspired poetry.
Inspired poetry, containing as it does synth êmata, is treated as capable
of assisting the soul in its return to its origins. This brings it into close
connection with the work of theurgy.41 As Pichler notes, however, the
two are not equated, since inspired poetry remains at the level of theôria
while theurgy works directly on its practitioner.42 Though such poetry
can assist in the ascent, its function is less direct and more limited than
that of theurgy. Do we have then a graded sequence from philosophical
reasoning (Plato) to divinely inspired poetry (Homer) to theurgy?
In practice, this is not quite the case: though the restriction of
Homeric poetry to a readership of initiates might seem to imply an
even higher valuation of it than of the Platonic texts, it must be stressed
40
For the divine Plato see for example, in Tim. 3.9.22; in Crat. 92.1; in Parm. 708.28.
41
See Pichler (2005), 241 on myths as Hilfsmittel for epistrophê of soul. He rightly sees
a similarity of purpose for inspired poetry and theurgy (248 and 251).
42
Pichler (2005), 252.
177
that Platonism is treated as the hermeneutic key to the understanding of

Homer. The two bodies of works and types of expression are treated as
complementary, but the poems, with their stranger and riskier modes of
expression, must be translated into the terms of Proclean Platonism to
be properly understood. It is striking in this regard how frequently
Plato’s Myth of Er plays a part, whether stated or unstated, in Proclus’
reading of Homeric myth.43 Though Platonic myth is less frequently
treated as divinely inspired, it often features as the hermeneutic key to
myth that is treated as so inspired.
Though the distinctions in Proclus’ treatment of Homer and Plato
seem on occasion perfectly clear, the picture becomes more tangled on
closer inspection. All of the sources of authority in Proclus’ world
(Homer, Plato, the Chaldaean Oracles and others) are directed to the
same purpose: assisting in the liberation and ascent of the soul. They do
not all, however, communicate in the same ways. Though each may on
occasion be useful to interpret the others, it is overwhelmingly the
thought of Plato, as Proclus understands it, which is the key to inter-
preting the others. For all that Homer’s poetry, at its best, is produced
and validated by divine inspiration, it is Platonism through which it and
all else must be interpreted.
43
As Pichler (2005) observes at several points, summarising his position at 237.
178
Essay 6
<BOOK I>
proclus the successor on the things said by 20
plato in the REPUBLIC on homer and poetry
<6.1.1 introduction: 69.23–71.17>

It occurred to me recently that, in the lecture for Plato’s birthday,44 I should
consider how one might compose an appropriate reply on behalf of Homer 25
to Socrates in the Republic – to show that Homer’s teachings are completely
in accord with the natural facts and, above all, with the doctrines of the 70
philosopher himself on matters both divine and human. [I considered] how
one might save Plato from self-contradiction and show that such things as
he wrote in praise of Homer’s poetry, as well as the accusations uttered
[against it], all result from a single knowledge, one intellectual conception, 5
and a single plan that is worthy of the gods. Looking into these matters, one
might well raise difficulties like the following: if Plato correctly sought to
refute Homer and to point out variations from the truth that pertains to the 10
subject, then how is it still possible to reckon this poet among those who
have knowledge, especially since it is a matter of teachings about the divine
classes and things that always exist? On the other hand, if on both these and
other subjects the Homeric legacy is deemed to be proper, then how in that
case is one still able to agree that Plato acts in accordance with intellect and
irrefutable understanding (gnôsis)? 15
Thus, as I said, these are things in need of examination. Among all
these matters, this one in particular seems to me to demand quite exten-
sive examination: the fact that Plato is at odds with himself in the argu-
ments concerning Homer. For how could these things be coherent with
one another – when it is said by him in the Phaedo (95a1) that Homer is a 20
divine poet, yet in the Republic (597e7 ff.) he is shown to be the third from
the truth? These things just don’t line up with one another.45 Nor is there
44
For the circumstances surrounding the composition of Proclus’ work, see the General
Introduction.
45
οὐ γὰρ λίνον λίνῳ συνάπτειν. A proverbial expression that Rosamond Kent Sprague
translates as ‘not combining flax with flax’ in Euthydemus 298c6 in Cooper (1997). For
Proclus’ uses, see in Remp. I 70.22, II 30.25, 205.30 and in Tim. III 298.7.
179
Essay 6
any stratagem for making each [of Plato’s claims] mean the same thing.
The first claim demonstrates that Homer engaged in an activity that went
25 beyond every human and partial conception46 and that the gods were
established within his own thought (noêsis). The second claim, however,
shows that Homer was conversant [merely] with images of the truth,
wandering somewhere far from the knowledge of the gods. Never mind
the fact that Plato says at one point that poetry itself is supposed to be the
result of possession or madness (Phdr. 245a2) from the Muses and calls
30 the race of poets ‘divine’ (Laws 682a2). But at other points he represents
them as makers of images and illusions, far removed from true under-
71 standing. In the light of this he does not seem to wish to be saved from
self-contradiction in his judgements on the content of poetry.
Therefore let us move on to what we heard from our teacher on these
5 matters when he set out those teachings which the Homeric poems have
in common with the truth subsequently contemplated by Plato. To sum
up, let us go through in order and let us consider: first, if there is any
possible way to resolve Socrates’ problems; second, the objective (skopos)
10 behind the apparent confrontation with Homer; third, the single and
irrefutable truth that is set before us everywhere in Plato’s views on both
poetry itself and on Homer. In this manner, each of them will be
revealed to us as an envoy (theôros) of divinities who accords with
intellect and knowledge – both men teaching the same things about
the same matters; both being expounders (exêgêtês) of the same truth
15 about the things that are, since they have proceeded from one divinity
and fill out (symplêroun) a single series.47
6.1.2 on the way that the divine myths are

elaborated by the theologians, providing a
j u s t i fi c a t i o n a n d r e s o l v i n g t h e o b j e c t i o n s
20 raised against them.
<Introduction: 71.21–7>
Such, then, are the matters at hand that I’ve undertaken to offer argu-
ments about. And as I said, it is necessary to hold both Plato himself and
46
μεριστῆς ἐπιβολῆς. Human concepts are apt to chop up or individualise the indivisible
understanding of all divine matters – an understanding that strains the limits of
discursive thought or dianoia. By contrast, Homer does not merely have partial repre-
sentations of the gods, but the gods are themselves established within his non-
discursive noê sis.
47
Plato and Homer will both belong to the series which descends from Apollo through
the Muses. Homer, of course, belongs to the series of the Muses (in Remp. I 184.29) and
Plato has his origin in Apollo, who is the leader of the Muses; cf. Anon. Proleg. §1, 47.
180
6.1.2 The divine myths as elaborated by theologians
his follower [sc. Syrianus] – or as I would say, his hierophant – respon-

sible for them. It falls to me as the speaker to attempt to record as 25
accurately as possible all that was said then, as well as such things as he
consented to explain in subsequent further considerations on these
matters.
<1. Socrates’ objections: 72.1–74.9>

Now, since prior to everything else Socrates blames the manner of the 72
myth-making through which Homer and Hesiod conveyed their stories
about the gods – and prior to Homer and Hesiod, Orpheus and anyone
else who with inspired lips48 expounded things eternally and invariably 5
the same – it is surely necessary for us to demonstrate that the very
composition of the Homeric myths was proper for the facts about which
it doubtless provides an indication (endeixis) [and to do this] before we
provide an outline of the meaning (theôria) of specific teachings. After
all, one might well ask,49 how could these words, which stray so far from 10
the good, the beautiful and the orderly, and which are shameful and
unlawful, how could they at any time become fitting for things that have
been allotted an existence that accords with Goodness Itself and which
coexist with the Beautiful; things in which order exists in the primary
mode and from which all that is has been made manifest, replete with 15
beauty and replete with undefiled powers? How do such things fit in
with the stuff that fills the phantasmagoria (teratologia)50 of tragedy or
the illusions that coexist with matter, since they are as a whole lacking in
justice and divine law? For it would not be lawful to apply such things to
the sort of existence (hypostasis) possessed by gods who transcend 20
everything – I mean, adulteries, acts of theft, being hurled from heaven,
as well as injustices committed against fathers, bindings, castrations, and
all the other things that both Homer and other poets go on about.
Instead, just as the gods themselves are separate from all other things –
united with the Good and insulated from inferior things, remaining 25
instead unmixed with everything and immaculate, pre-existing in accor-
dance with one limit and a single order that is uni-form – in the same
manner what pertains to the discourse about them are things that
48
For the ‘inspired lips’ of Orpheus, compare in Crat. §110.70.
49
Punctuating with a question mark in lines 16 and 19, with Festugière and Lamberton.
50
Teratologia is relatively uncommon term, but one that Proclus invokes often in relation
to the surface meaning of the poets’ tales; cf. in Crat. §105.39 and §116.13. In his
exposition of the fabulous tales related by Homer, Proclus will show how to interpret
away the apparently fantastic to arrive at a truth about the divine. Cf. in Crat 105.39–40
τὴν φαινομένην τερατολογίαν εἰς ἐπιστημονικὴν ἔννοιαν ἀναπέμπειν with in Remp. I 86.1–3
διὰ τὴν φαινομένην τερατολογίαν τῆς ἐν τοῖς ἀδύτοις ἱδρυμένης ἀληθείας ἀνακινοῦσιν τὴν
ζήτησιν . . .
181
Essay 6
transcend words and are full of intellect; things that are able, by virtue of
30 the order to which they belong, to conform themselves to the ineffable
73 superiority of the gods and able to refer back up to them.51 Further, in
mystical acts of intellectual awareness concerning divinity it is even
necessary for the soul’s apprehensions to be pure of material products
of the imagination (phantasma); to reject every alien opinion (doxasma)
5 that is set in motion from the irrational soul below; to deem everything
else insignificant relative to the immaculate superiority of the gods; and
to place trust only in correct logos and the mightier spectacle of intellect
for the truth about the gods. Let no one tell us such things about the
10 gods as it is fitting to say about human beings, nor attempt to apply the
affections (pathos) that belong to irrational and enmattered substance
(ousia) to the beings who transcend in their simplicity the intellect,
intellective substance and life, for these symbols will not resemble the
kind of existence that belongs to the gods.
Thus, unless they are in fact going to fall short of the truth that is
found in these [divine] beings, it is necessary for myths to conform
15 somehow to the facts – facts whose contemplation they attempt to
conceal by means of visible screens (parapetasma). Rather, just as Plato
himself frequently conveys divine matters in a mystical manner
through certain images – though he does not allow anything ugly nor
any trace of disorder nor any material and troubling product of imagi-
20 nation to intrude into the myths, but instead the very conceptions
(noêma) about the gods, immaculate and intellectual, have been con-
cealed [in Plato’s images], while representations (apeikasmenon) of
them have been projected like icons (agalma) that resemble what is
inside,52 likenesses of a secret doctrine (theôria) – so too it was neces-
sary for the poets and for Homer himself, if they were to fashion myths
25 fitting for the gods, to reject, on the one hand, those combinations that
are multi-form and filled throughout with words that are maximally
opposed to the facts, and also necessary, on the other hand, for them to
conceal from the many the understanding of divine matters that is
51
in Remp. I 72.29–73.1 καὶ τὰ ἀπεικάζεσθαι δυνάμενα κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν τάξιν πρὸς τὴν
ἐκείνων ἄρρητον ὑπεροχὴν ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς ἀναπέμπειν. We take δυνάμενα to govern both
infinitives. Lamberton seems to omit the final clause: ‘capable of depicting in terms
of their own class their ineffable transcendence’.
52
This part of the sentence seems to echo Alcibiades’ description of Socrates at
Symposium 216d4–217a2. Where in Plato the ἀγάλματα are the things hidden inside,
in Proclus they are used as a metaphor for the outer form of Platonic myth. The other
difference is that Proclus is arguing for a close similarity between the outer form of
Platonic myth and its inner content, whereas Alcibiades claims that Socrates’ outer
form is quite unlike what is found inside him.
182
none of their business and at the same time to use mythic constructions 30
concerning the gods in a manner that is lawful (euagôs), preferring
those which aim at the Beautiful and the Good. These are the things
for which, I believe, Socrates criticises both the myth-making of 74
Homer and the other poets. Yet perhaps someone who was not pleased
with the marvels that are manifested in their words might bring
a different accusation. Indeed, there are people among us who are
particularly in the habit of blaming ancient myths as being the cause, 5
on the one hand, of serious licentiousness in beliefs about the gods and,
on the other, for being the cause of seriously absurd and mistaken
imaginings. They blame them for nothing less than having driven the
multitudes to the present disorder and frightful confusion, where
sacred laws have been violated.
<2. Proclus’ reply: 74.9–86.23>

<a. Good and bad use of myths: 74.9–76.17>
We see no need for a long discourse directed towards those who blame 10
the tradition of myths for mistakes about the divine. First, in the case of
those who have neglected the service of beings superior to them due to
the visible fictions (phainomena plasmata), it turns out that they were
drawn into this irrational and gigantic53 impiety without knowing either 15
the objective (skopos) or the power of myth-making. After all, the myths
have put out the fancy costumes that they project (instead of the secret
truth that is established within) and utilise visible screens for thoughts
that are invisible and unknowable to the many. And this is in fact the 20
special good that belongs to them: they don’t disclose any of their truths
to the profane masses, but instead extend only some traces of the entire
mystagogy to those whose nature permits them to be turned from these
things to a contemplation that is inaccessible to the many. So if there are
people who consume only the superficial aspects (proschêma) of the
mythic fictions (instead of seeking the truth within them), or people 25
53
The Giants connote for Proclus rebellion against gods. Part of this connotation, of
course, derives from stories of the Gigantomachy, but these mythic stories are given
a particular salience for Proclus because of Plato’s own use of the Giants as an image for
materialism in the Sophist. Plato’s Giants had by Proclus’ day taken on a further
meaning as a code-word for Christians, whom the Neoplatonists considered to exem-
plify materialism and base devotion to the passions. Proclus uses this expression again
at in Remp. II 176.14, and it appears also in Damascius’ Philosophic History (fr. 19 in
Athanassiadi (1999), on which see Athanassiadi (1993), 7). Marinus, also employing the
mythic analogy with the Giants to describes Proclus’ Christian enemies colourfully
says that his master’s temporary withdrawal from Athens was because he was ‘in a crisis
caused by some vulture-giants’ (ἐν περιστάσει τινῶν γυπογιγάντων (Proclus 15.19)); see
on this curious phrase the note by Saffrey, Segonds and Luna (2001), 118–19 n. 8.
183
Essay 6
who pursue the imaginary and figurative apprehensions54 of the myths

(instead of the purification of the intellect), how could anyone devise
a way to blame the myths for these peoples’ lack of discipline (parano-
30 mia)? Instead, blame those who use the myths badly for their mistakes
concerning them.
75 Furthermore, there are all the other cases where something excep-
tionally holy and valuable seems to be established in the gods themselves
and directed by them. [In these cases], when we see ordinary people
harmed, we do not blame the generation of these things for these harms,
5 but instead blame the condition of the soul when it lacks intellect –
a condition possessed by these people. After all, who would not agree
that the mysteries and sacred rites lead souls up from the enmattered
and mortal form of life and connect them to the gods? Who would not
agree that they remove by means of intellectual illumination all the
mental disturbances (tarachê) that creep in as a result of the irrational
[life of the body] and that they eject by means of the gods’ light that
10 which is indefinite or dark from those who are initiated. – Yet at the
same time there is nothing to preclude55 the multitude from undergoing
all kinds of depravity from these things as well. The goods and potenti-
alities consequent upon these [rites] are then put to bad use in a way that
corresponds with the person’s own [psychic] disposition. Having
absented themselves from the gods and the sacrifices that are genuinely
15 sacred, they are carried into a life filled with passions and irrationality.
Let anyone who blames the myths for the terrible and misguided con-
founding of ancient customs also blame the revelation of the mysteries
and introduction of the initiations to mankind. And what need is there
20 to talk about these things [sc. the mysteries or the initiations]? You
might as well blame the very creation of the universe, the order among
the wholes, and the providence over everything down here on the
grounds that those who have received them make bad use of what they
have been given by these things.
Now, I would not say that these [claims] are pious, nor would I deem
it worthwhile to regard the charges against myths that derive from the
25 deviations of the masses as just. After all, one ought not to judge the
excellence or defectiveness of things on the basis of deviant usage.
Instead it is necessary to evaluate each on the basis of its intrinsic nature
and the [standard of] correctness that pertains to them. In fact, the
54
At in Crat. §116.1–3 Proclus cites Euthyphro as an example of someone who reasons
imaginatively about the gods when he supposes that they engage in battles and con-
spiracies against one another.
55
Reading τοῦ for τὸ in οὐδὲν παραιρεῖται τοὺς πολλοὺς τὸ μὴ οὐχὶ καὶ ἐκ τούτων παντοίας
ὑπομένειν διαστροφάς. This is the normal construction and Proclus consistently uses the
genitive of separation with related constructions of this same verb.
184
Athenian Stranger (Laws I 646a) does not even think that it is necessary 76
to expel drunkenness from the well-ordered city due to the fact that the
conduct of ordinary people surrounding intoxication is pointless and
fails to observe limits. Instead he says that [judged] on the basis of the
opposite usage which is correct and intelligent, even this makes
a significant contribution to education. Even though someone might 5
say that drunkenness destroys both the bodies and souls of those who
engage in it, nonetheless the Lawgiver will not, for this reason, deprive it
of the value that belongs to it or its contribution towards virtue. Thus, it
is not necessary to avoid drunkenness due to the fact that ordinary
people pursue it in a manner that is uneducated and uncultured,56 nor 10
do initiations and the powers of the mysteries merit condemnation by
intelligent people because of the wickedness of those who receive these
things, nor would the myths justly be thought to be harmful to listeners
due to the disturbed condition of those who use these myths in
a haphazard and irrational manner. Instead, in all these cases one
ought to blame the disorderly and thoughtless disposition of those 15
who engage in these practices. Because of this disposition they employ
means that aim at the good for inferior ends, and so they fail to achieve
the goal proper to those means.
<b. On the obscenity of Homer’s myths: 76.17–79.18>
Now, if someone were to condemn the maker of myths for the apparent
obscenity [in the stories] or for the vulgarity of the language [in them]
and for these reasons deprive the myth-maker of [his claim to] the 20
proper imitation of divine matters (for after all, every imitator repre-
sents the form that belongs to those things through what is naturally
appropriate to the paradigms, rather than through things that are most
opposed and furthest flung57 from the substance or power of their
archetypes) – well, then, [if one is going to make this kind of criticism]
I think it is first necessary to draw a distinction among the purposes 25
(proairesis) of myths and put aside as separate from those that are
described as educational the ones that are more inspired and which
gaze more towards the [nature of this] universe than towards [improv-
ing] the character of the audience. Next, one must distinguish among
the ways of life that belong to those who make use of the myths. Some
ways of life are to be counted among those natural for youth or whole-
some for people whose moral character is not complex. Other ways of 77
56
Cf. Laws I 640e where Plato distinguishes between the proper and improper uses of
drunkenness.
57
As Festugière notes, the sense of βεβλημένων in καὶ πόρρω τῆς τῶν ἀρχετύπων οὐσίας καὶ
δυνάμεως βεβλημένων is not obvious. He offers ‘qui a été jeté au hasard’ and Lamberton
similarly translates ‘through things randomly thrown out’.
185
Essay 6
life, however, belong to those who are able to be roused towards

intellect, the universal genera of gods, the processions through all
beings, and the series (seira) and endpoints that hasten to extend as far
as the last things.58 Now doubtless when we have separated from one
5 another in this manner both the kinds of myths and the propensities of
those who are to receive them, let us agree with those who say that those
myths that Homer and Hesiod wrote59 do not contribute towards edu-
cation and are not fit for the ears of young people. But let us add this fact:
10 that they nonetheless align with the nature of things that are universal
and with the order of things that exist. They connect to the things that
are really existent those people who are able to be led upward to a
synoptic vision of matters divine.
The fathers of myth-making saw that nature creates icons of forms
15 that are immaterial and intelligible and that it adorns the cosmos down
here with imitations of them – representing things that are indivisible in
a manner that is divided, things that are eternal through what proceeds
in time, and things that are intelligible through those that are sensible.
[Nature also imitates] what is immaterial in a material manner, what
lacks extension in a manner that is extended, and what is established in
20 a stable manner through change. In a way that follows both Nature and
the procession of the beings that exist visibly and with images, they
themselves [sc. the fathers of myth-making] contrive images of the
divine conveyed in words and imitate the superior power of paradigms
by means of things that are most opposed and furthest removed from
25 them. That which is beyond nature they indicate by means of things that
are contrary to nature; that which is more divine than all reason they
indicate by means of things that are contrary to reason; and that which is
supersimplified beyond every divisible [kind of] beauty they indicate by
means of things that are made to appear as obscene. Thus they also
doubtless remind us of the transcendent superiority [of the paradigms]
in accordance with a discourse that is fitting.60
58
The people who live these lives are, of course, philosophers. They are potentially
spectators of the landscape of the intelligible realm whose features Proclus briefly
mentions here.
59
Interestingly Proclus uses the dual here of Homer and Hesiod, suggesting that they are
regarded as a natural pair. Perhaps he has in mind the common aims (as he supposes) of
Homer’s inspired poetry and Hesiod’s Theogony. The fragments that remain to us of
Proclus’ commentary on Works and Days show that he took this work to be educative,
not theological. Cf. van den Berg (2014b) contra Marzillo (2010).
60
καὶ οὕτω δὴ κατὰ λόγον τὸν εἰκότα τῆς ἐκείνων ἡμᾶς ἀναμιμνήσκουσιν ἐξῃρημένης ὑπεροχῆς.
Both Lamberton and Festugière give κατὰ λόγον τὸν εἰκότα an epistemic sense.
Lamberton: ‘They do this, in all probability, to remind us . . .’; cf. Festugière ‘in
toute probabilité’. But Lamberton’s translation expresses purpose – they do something
in order to remind us – while Proclus simply says that they do, in fact, remind us of the
186
Again, in addition, when it comes to each individual order of

gods descending from above down to their end-points and passing 78
through all the genera among [various kinds of] beings, it is possi-
ble to see that the endpoints of the series reflect (proïstanai)61 the
sorts of properties that the makers of myths assign to the gods
themselves62 – the sorts of properties that both bring these things 5
into existence and sustain them. It is through such things that the
makers of myths conceal the secret understanding (theôria) of the
most fundamental things. After all, the last of the genera of dae-
mons – those that are turned towards matter – govern (proïstanai)
perversions of powers which are in accordance with nature, the
ugliness of enmattered things, temptation towards vice, as well as
disorderly and discordant motions. For it is necessary for these 10
things too to be in the universe and to fill out the diversity of the
universal order, and it is necessary for the generation of their
derivative existence (parupostasis)– and of their stability and perma-
nence – to be included within the eternal genera.63 Of course, these
things having been observed by the founders of sacred rites, they 15
issued orders for defined periods of laughter or lamentation to be
celebrated, thus discharging their religious duties to these genera
[of daemons] and allotting to them their fair share of the general
service that pertains to what is divine.
paradigms’ superiority. We suspect κατὰ λόγον τὸν εἰκότα ought to be heard in the
context of the phrase that describes in general terms what the myth-makers are doing:
εἰκόνας καὶ αὐτοὶ πλάττοντες ἐν λόγοις at 77.21. Proclus is playing on the same linguistic
similarity that Plato does in the Timaeus when he discusses the ‘likely account of
a likeness’.
61
προΐστημι in the middle voice is the term that Proclus often uses when he is talking
about some element x in a poetic fiction serving as a screen (parapetasma) for some y in
the order of things. x is what is projected in front of y to screen it. This, however, often
makes for an awkward translation. If x serves as screen for y, then there is some sense in
which y ‘reflects’ x – though not like a normal mirror reflects you while you are shaving
in it. Instead, y ‘reflects’ x more like a mirror in a fun-house reflects things. Yet
a distorted or incomplete reflection is still a reflection. Screens may serve a variety of
functions. On the one hand, because the y in question may be beyond the limits of
discursive thought, y can make it known (in some sense), as one might hang a sheet over
an invisible ghost to give it shape and make it visible (in some sense). Equally, screens
can keep the real content of divine truths out of the hands of unworthy auditors by
distracting them with things like scandalous stories.
62
An example follows at 147.8 ff. where Proclus explains that the Apollo who protects
Hector from Achilles (and whom Homer calls ‘malicious’) is not the god who stands at
the head of the Apollonian series, but rather a daemon who constitutes one of the
lowest members of that series.
63
Proclus uses the vocabulary associated with his own solution to the problem of evil. For
a brief overview, see Baltzly (2009), 271–2.
187
Essay 6
Therefore, [there is a parallel between the hieratic art and the original
myth-makers].64 The art of sacred things distributes in the requisite
20 manner the totality of religious worship to the gods and to the gods’
attendants, lest any who eternally follow upon the gods be left out and
lack a share of the service that falls to them. The hieratic art draws the
first group [sc. the gods] to itself by means of the most holy rites and
mystical symbols. But it summons the gifts of the other group [sc. the
attendants of the gods] by means of shows of passion, doubtless through
25 some ineffable affinity.65 In a manner parallel to this, the fathers of the
myths in question looked, generally speaking, at the entire procession of
divine beings and were anxious for their myths to ascend into the
universal series that proceeds from each [god]. On the one hand, they
established the surface [content] and imagistic [aspect] of their [myths]
as an analogue to the lowest kinds who rule over the passions and things
30 that are final and enmattered. On the other hand, they transmitted the
disguised content that is unknown to ordinary people to those who are
enamoured with the sight of Being, as a revelation of the transcendent
79 being of the gods in their sanctuaries. Thus each of the myths is surely
daemonic on the surface level, but divine according to its secret meaning
(theôria).
5 Of course, if we have stated things correctly, then because of these
facts it is not proper to deprive the Homeric myths of their relationship
to the things that genuinely exist on the grounds that they would not
contribute towards the education of young people. (After all, the goal of
10 such myths is not to be educational, nor did the makers of these myths
transmit them with an eye to that goal.) Nor is it right to refer the things
written by Plato to the same class as the more inspired ones, but it is
instead necessary to define each separately. The one group is more
philosophical, while the other pertains to hieratic customs.
15 The former are fitting for young people to hear, while the latter are
fitting for those who have been led correctly through every other kind of
education, generally speaking, and who now aim to establish the soul’s
64
ὥσπερ coordinates with οὕτως ἄρα seven lines further on to form a single sentence that
stretches over sixteen lines. Rather than trying to preserve Proclus’ sentence structure –
as Festugière and Lamberton do – we have taken some liberties to yield a translation
that reads more easily.
65
τῶν δὲ τοῖς φαινομένοις παθήμασιν προκαλεῖται τὰς δόσεις διὰ δή τινος ἀρρήτου συμπαθείας.
Do the practitioners of the hieratic art experience the passions or merely manifest their
outward signs? Do the gods’ attendants experience these passions so that the sympatheia
is a literal sharing of emotions? It is hard to say. Lamberton’s ‘shows of passion’ and
‘ineffable affinity’ nicely preserve the ambiguity and we can see no room for
improvement.
188
intellect in the hearing of such myths as if in a kind of mystical

instrument.66
<c. Socrates’ distinction of two kinds of myths: 79.18–81.28>
However, Socrates adequately indicates these things for those who
are able to comprehend, and he indicates that he attacks Homer’s
myth-making as neither educational nor well adapted to the 20
unformed and innocent character67 of young people and he demon-
strates how myth’s hidden and secret good requires some kind of
mystical and divinely inspired act of intelligence (noêsis).68 Ordinary
people though, failing to grasp Socrates’ arguments and falling short
of the intended meaning (dianoia) of the philosopher, denounce this 25
kind of myth in its entirety.
It is worthwhile to listen to what Socrates says about these myths and
the reason for which such a mythical account is to be rejected:
‘The young person is not able to distinguish what is allegory (hyponoia)
from what is not. Instead such opinions as he might take on at that age 30
become hard to erase and resistant to change. For these reasons we 80
should take great care to ensure that the things that they hear first are
the finest mythic tales that have been told that lead towards virtue’ (Rep.
378d). Thus we say quite reasonably that the Homeric myths have not 5
66
καὶ εἰς τὴν τῶν τοιῶνδε μύθων ἀκρόασιν ὥσπερ ὄργανόν τι μυστικὸν ἱδρῦσαι τὸν τῆς ψυχῆς
νοῦν ἐφιεμένοις. An alternative translation would treat the soul’s intellect as if it
were a mystical organ. This is the solution that Festugière adopts. We follow
Lamberton in treating the myths and the hearing of them as a kind of mystical
instrument that transports the soul and establishes it in intellect. This seems to better
preserve the parallel that has just been introduced between the hieratic art and inspired
poetry.
67
ἀπλάστοις καὶ ἀβάτοις ἤθεσιν: Proclus’ phrasing here echoes, as Festugière observes,
Phaedrus 245a2: ἁπαλὴν καὶ ἄβατον ψυχήν. This is far from a trivial echo, as the Platonic
passage is the discussion of the madness that comes from the Muses, which can only
work upon ‘a simple and innocent soul’. This is, of course, a fundamental passage for
Proclus’ own views on inspired poetry, in which connection he quotes the Platonic
phrase at I 181.4–5. It is somewhat paradoxical that these qualities of soul should make
the inspired poetry of Homer unsuitable for young people, since it is just these same
qualities that the soul requires to be inspired in the first place. As Hunter (2009), 24
observes, ‘[i]n choosing ἄβατος Plato was also, as often, imitating in language the
subject of his discourse. “Untrodden” to describe a soul is, to put it simply, the kind
of “metaphor” which one might expect to find in poetry.’ Proclus chooses a term, in
short, which evokes a sacral context and the aspects of Plato’s discussion of poetry
which he finds most useful in the development of his own thoughts on the role of the
art.
68
Proclus’ point here seems to be that Socrates gives the reader of the dialogue the
opportunity to see that he recognises the revelatory function of Homer’s poetry, as well
as condemning its inappropriateness for young people. Where does he indicate the
former? Proclus subsequently cites Rep. II 378a4–6.
189
Essay 6
given a good imitation of divinity, for they are not conducive69 to virtue
or education nor do they contribute towards the lawgivers’ putting
young people on the right path. In this respect they appear to have no
similarity to the things that are, nor would they be appropriate for those
who preside over the science of politics. But in another respect they are
10 harmonised with the gods and elevate those with a suitable nature for
the contemplation of the gods. The good that belongs to them is not
educational but rather mystical and they are aimed, not at a juvenile
disposition, but at a mature one. Socrates makes this clear when (Rep.
15 378a) he says it is fitting for ‘a few people to hear’ myths of this sort
‘having been sworn to secrecy’ and having made a sacrifice, ‘not of a pig,
but of some large and rare’ victim. Socrates, then, is far from deeming
this manner of myth-making worthless though the majority of people
think that he does, since the hearing of such myths is shown to rank
20 alongside the holiest of rites and the most perfect of mysteries. For the
fact that it is necessary to reveal such myths accompanied by sacrifices,
and the greatest and most perfect sacrifices at that, in secret, demon-
strates that the meaning (theôria) in them is a mystical initiation (mysta-
gôgia) and a sacred rite (teletê) that elevates the audience.
Whoever among us has evicted from his soul what is childish or
25 juvenile, brought order to the unbounded impulses of the imagination,
and promoted intellect to be the leader his own life, this is the person
who would enjoy the best circumstances for sharing in the visions
(theama) that have been concealed within these sorts of myths.
However, someone who still stands in need of education or symmetry
30 in his moral character could not undertake the contemplation of these
things safely. For it is necessary that one should not bring anything from
81 the material [realm] below to the mystical conceptions (noêma) of the
gods, and it is also necessary that someone still racked by the motions of
the imaginative faculty should not rush into apprehensions (epibolê) that
are clearly visible to intellect. It is also necessary not to confuse the
5 affections of irrational activities with the transcendent goods of con-
templative ones. Rather, putting trust in Socrates and the order of steps
in the ascent to the divine, it is necessary to grasp separately first the
correct education of moral character and then the synoptic intellective
vision (noera periôpê) of Being. One needs to live in a manner that is
fitting to both, starting from the ascent that is inferior and more
10 involved with the political life and finishing up with the ascent to the
69
οὐ γὰρ πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ παιδείαν οὐδὲ τὴν ὀρθὴν τῶν νέων ἀγωγὴν συντελοῦσιν τοῖς
νομοθέται. As Festugière and Lamberton note, it seems necessary to assume some
verb such as φέρουσι or τείνουσι as understood with πρός.
190
mystical unification with what is divine.70 These matters, however,

belong to discussions of a different sort.
On the basis of what has already been said, it will be recalled that the
kind (eidos) of myth was deemed to be twofold by Socrates. I mean that
there is one kind that is educational and another kind that is related to
initiations (telestikos). While the former provides for ethical virtue, the 15
latter furnishes contact with the divine, and though the one is able to
benefit humanity in general, the other is adapted only to the few.
The former is common and familiar to people, but the other is secret
and doesn’t fit well with those who are not eager to be completely settled
in the divine. One is coordinate with the [psychic and moral] disposi- 20
tions of young persons, while the other is revealed only with difficulty
and in conjunction with religious rites and mystical traditions.
Now, if these are indeed the things that Socrates has imparted to us,
how can we say that there is not agreement between him and Homer
about the things that Homer relates in a mythic manner? And how is it
not obvious, therefore, that when it comes to Homer’s myth-making, 25
Socrates rejects and disagrees with it just to the extent that it is incom-
patible with the present subject (hypothesis) of the discussion, and its
teaching on the education of young people? These, however, are mat-
ters to be dealt with a little later on.
<Allegorical interpretation of obscene myths: 81.28–86.23>

Now, suppose71 that those who are lawgivers concerned to care for the 30
[psychic] dispositions that are more imperfect must handle mythic
stories in one manner. Suppose further that those who indicate by
means of inspired apprehensions the ineffable being of the gods to 82
people who are capable of following the upward path of contemplation
must handle mythic stories differently. [If this is so], then we will not be
at a loss for how to lead [stories like] the casting out of Hephaestus up to
the level of the irrefutable knowledge concerning the gods. Nor will we
have trouble with [stories like] the binding of Cronos or the castration of
Ouranos – stories which Socrates of course says are unsuited for the 5
hearing of young people and in no way fitted to the psychic dispositions
of those who stand solely in need of education, for, generally speaking,
70
It is of course just this progression from the civic or political virtues to the intellectual
and hieratic ones that Marinus’ biography ascribes to Proclus himself.
71
This sentence is in fact a conditional: if there must be these two approaches to mythic
stories, then we won’t be puzzled about how to bring such episodes as the castration of
Ouranos into our body of irrefutable knowledge of the gods. But it seems better to
break Proclus’ original thirteen-line sentence into shorter ones for ease of
understanding.
191
Essay 6
the mystical understanding of the gods could not come about at a time
when the vessels for containing it are alienated from it.72 When we
10 speak to those who have attained such visions (theama), saying, for
instance, that the casting of Hephaestus [from heaven]73 indicates the
procession of the divine from on high right down to the last things
created in the realm of sensibles (a procession that is set in motion,
completed and supervised by the father and maker74 of all things); or
15 we say that the bonds of Cronos75 illustrate the unification of universal
creation76 with the intellectual and paternal superiority (hyperochê) of
Cronos; or we say that the castration of Ouranos hints at the distinc-
tion of the Titanic series from the continuous cosmic order77 – when
we do this, we would perhaps be saying things that are familiar [to
philosophers] and tracing the fictitious and tragic [aspects of] the
20 myths to the intellective contemplation of the divine genera. For
everything among us that is imagined to be associated with what is
worse and which belongs to the inferior column (systoichia), the myths
make a corresponding substitution for them involving a nature and a
power that is superior. For instance, for us [down here] bondage is
something that prevents or inhibits activity. But up there, bondage is
25 contact and ineffable unification with things that are causes. Down
here being cast out is a kind of violent motion done [to us] by some-
thing else. But when applied to the gods, it indicates the generative
procession and its free-ranging and effortless presence to all things – a
procession that is not cut off from its native starting points, but instead
30 goes out from them to all things in order. While castration brings
83 about a lessening of power in the case of things that are divisible and
enmattered, in the case of the primary-effective (prôtourgos) causes, it
hints at the procession of things that are secondary into an inferior
order from causes of their very own. Primary things remain established
undiminished in themselves, and they are not moved from themselves
5 because of the procession from them, nor diminished by the separation
72
Cf. Rep. 501c on the kind of psychic container that the gods love.
73
Hephaestus is reported to have been thrown from heaven by Zeus (Il. 1.590–4) as well
as by Hera, who was ashamed of his deformity (Il. 18.395–405). This seems to have
been among the traditional problems for exegetes of Homer; cf. Heraclitus, Homeric
Problems 26.1 ff.
74
i.e. the Demiurge; cf. Tim. 28c3–4 ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς.
75
It is unclear which binding of Cron0s Proclus has in mind: that in Hesiod Theog. 718 or
Night’s advice to Zeus to get Cronos drunk on honey and bind him, Orph. fr. 154
(Kern). For Proclus’ understanding of the bonds of Cronos, see in Tim. III 208.33 ff.
and Platonic Theology V 5.
76
On the increasingly more particularised acts of creation that are contrasted with
‘universal creation’, cf in Tim. II 3.1 ff.
77
Cf. in Crat. §111.111.
192
of these [lesser things] from them, nor divided because of the division
among the lesser realities.78
These are matters that Socrates says it is impractical for young people
to hear about, but nonetheless it is fitting that those who are able to
comprehend the truth about the gods on the basis of mythic symbols
should investigate and be spectators of them in secret. It is not to be 10
completely rejected for this reason; that is, because it is not fitting for
the characters of young people. For what has happened to these mythic
fictions is in fact what Plato somewhere79 says has happened to those
divine and most sacrosanct of doctrines.80 For these too are objects of 15
ridicule by the many, but for those who have been awakened to intellect,
few though they be, they reveal a certain affinity of their own with the
facts and provide, on the basis of the hieratic works themselves, for
confidence in their connate power in relation to the divine. For the gods
delight in hearing such symbols and are readily prevailed upon by those
who summon them and who display81 the distinctive properties of the 20
gods themselves through those well-known divine tokens (synthêma)
that are appropriate and closely akin to them. Mysteries and initiatory
rites also have an effective component82 in these [properties or divine
tokens] and through these they introduce visions that are complete,
stable and simple for initiates to see – visions which young people, and 25
to a much greater extent, people of immature character, are not recep-
tive to. So let us not [merely] say83 that the myths of the Greek theolo-
gians do not educate for virtue, but let us show that they are not in
78
That is, in spite of the fact that subsequent orders of being proceed from them, they do
not undergo any change – even a self-initiated change – because of this fact. Cf. ET,
prop. 30.
79
Kroll suggests Rep. V 452a, ff where the idea of exercising in the nude was thought to be
ridiculous, though its benefits were realised by a few knowledgeable people. Festugière,
however, thinks that Proclus has in mind Tht. 172c4, while Sheppard (1980) argues for
Epistle II 314a. As Lamberton notes, while the idea of protecting secret doctrines from
the masses is a common theme in later Platonism, it is not particularly prevalent in
Plato’s own dialogues.
80
As becomes clear from what follows, the divine doctrines that Proclus has in mind are
specifically those of the hieratic art.
81
Kroll amends πρωφαινοῦσιν to προφαίνουσιν, which is followed by Festugière and
Lamberton. While it is true that the word is not otherwise used by Proclus, it seems
that there is nothing impossible in the manuscript reading. The sense would then be
that the gods bear witness or formally declare the distinctive properties of individual
gods through uttering the watchwords that summon them since these watchwords in
some sense mirror those distinctive properties.
82
Deleting the καὶ before τὸ δραστήριον with Festugière.
83
μὴ τοίνυν λέγωμεν ὡς . . ., ἀλλ’ ὡς οὐχὶ . . . δεικνύωμεν. The ‘let us’ here is, in effect, ‘let
someone’. Proclus’ point is that the total rejection of Homer is contingent not merely
upon his stories lacking educational value for young people, but having no utility for
193
Essay 6
complete agreement with the hieratic precepts. And let us not [merely]
30 say that, through their incongruous symbols, they imitate things that
are divine in a way that lacks similitude, but let us show that they provide
84 for us no ineffable affinity towards participation in the divine.84
Let it be the case that some [of the myths] that contribute towards the
education of the young have a great deal of plausibility (to eikos), and
much propriety (euprepeia) within the guidelines that have been revealed
5 for myth-making and that they are entirely free of opposing terminol-
ogy and connect with things divine through similarity of symbols.
The other myths, however, that aim at a more inspired condition
(hexis) and produce the entire story by bringing into harmony the last
things with the very first through analogy alone,85 and through the
10 affinity that the effects within the universe have with the causes that
have generated them – these myths reasonably take no consideration for
most of us, using all kinds of language as a demonstration of divine
subjects.
Furthermore, we say that there is one musical mode (harmonia) that is
15 imitative and cares for the souls of young people due to its concern with
stimulating them towards virtue. There is another mode, however, that
is inspired and able to move the audience and to produce a divine
madness that we call superior to self-control.86 We interpret the first
to constitute a universal education, while we reject the other as incom-
patible with the political arrangement [of the Republic]. Or is it not for
20 this reason that Socrates thought to banish the Phrygian mode from
styles of music that contribute towards education – because it moved
souls to ecstasy?87 Therefore just as musical modes are twofold, where
one kind is appropriate for educational purposes while the other is
divorced from education, so too mythology is divided into one kind
25 that involves the correct upbringing for young people and another kind
that involves the hieratic and symbolic evocation of the divine. The first
method works through images (eikôn) and is appropriate for genuine
philosophers, while the demonstration of the divine essence that works
through secret divine tokens (synthêma) belongs to the guides of sacred
30 rites that are more mystical – something on the basis of which Plato
mature, educated seekers after the divine. This, of course, is precisely what cannot be
shown.
84
Reading θείων for θεῶν in line 2.
85
In contrast to the previous kind of poetry, the symbols do not stand to their referents in
a relation of similarity but rather analogia – which may well involve the kind of opposite
use of terms illustrated above by ‘bondage’, ‘castration’, etc.
86
The contrast is between the educative Dorian mode and the ecstatic Phrygian one;
cf. 60.15–62.27.
87
Laches 188d.
194
himself of course saw fit to make many of his own doctrines more
persuasive and clear. So in the Phaedo (62b3) he reveals that which is 85
spoken in secret: that human beings are in a kind of prison, respecting it
with fitting silence.88 [In this dialogue] he also uses initiations as evi-
dence for the different allocations to souls going off to Hades (69c4)
depending on whether they have been purified or are impure. He also 5
takes from the sacred and hereditary rites indications about forks and
three-way intersections [in the underworld] (108a4) – all things that are
doubtless full of symbolic meaning (theôria) and of the things repeated
again and again by the poets: ascents and descents, the symbols
(synthêma)89 of Dionysus and the sins of the Titans that are spoken of, 10
the crossroads in Hades, and the wanderings [upon the roads in the
underworld], and everything of that sort. As a consequence, Plato
himself would not entirely dishonour this sort of myth-making, but he
nonetheless judged that it was out of place when it came to educational
policy for the young. Because of these facts he provides guidelines for 15
divine depiction (theologia)90 that are commensurate with educational
practices.
It seems to me that the tragic aspect of poetic fictions, as well as that
which is monstrous and contrary to nature, motivates the audience in
a variety of ways towards the search for truth, and is a channel (holkos)
towards secret understanding (gnôsis).91 [This tragic aspect of poetic 20
fictions] does not allow us to remain at the level of surface meaning
because of its manifest implausibility. Instead it is necessary for us to
penetrate into the interior of the myths and to concern ourselves with
88
Is this deliberate irony on Proclus’ part? On the one hand, Plato δηλοῖ . . . τό τε ἐν
ἀπορρήτοις λεγόμενον. On the other, he is said to σιγῇ τῇ πρεπούσῃ σέβων. Either
Proclus regards Socrates’ statements to his friends as sufficiently veiled to count as
respecting the proper silence on this secret doctrine or he is having a subtle dig at Plato,
implying perhaps that Homer does a better job at keeping secrets.
89
Reading the MS’ συνθημάτων rather than παθημάτων, a conjecture by Abel recorded in
Kroll’s critical apparatus and accepted by Lamberton. Festugière translated the MS
reading (‘mots de passe dionysiaques’). Proclus’ description of the dismemberment of
Dionysus as a symbol (synthê ma) at I 175.3 supports the MS reading here. Damascius’
discussion of these synthê mata in his Phaedo Commentary (I 4–13) gives some indication
of the meaning that Proclus alludes to here, though it would be unwise to assume that
Damascius’ opinion is identical to that of Proclus.
90
Not theology as a science of the highest being, but rather Proclus has in mind the
constraints that Socrates places on depictions of the gods. These τυποί τῆς θεολογίας are
discussed in Essay IV.
91
For a holkos towards Being or towards truth, cf. Rep. 521d3, 524e1, and 527b9. In this
case the channel leading the soul to these things is the sight of the fingers on a hand
which are simultaneously larger and smaller. It is a similar puzzlement with seemingly
impossible appearances that moves the soul to go beyond appearances to reality and
truth.
195
Essay 6
the intellect (nous) of the creators of myth that has been invisibly con-
cealed, and to consider what sort of natures and the extent of the powers
these [myth-makers] signified to posterity by these symbols when they
25 received them into the discursive thought (dianoia) about them.92 Now,
on the one hand, these sorts of myths arouse in people who are more
86 naturally suited the desire for the meaning (theôria) that is concealed
within them and, through their apparent monstrosity, stimulate them to
the search for the truth that is established within their innermost
sanctuaries.93 Yet, they also do not permit the profane to touch those
things which it is not lawful for them to touch. [Since this is so], how
5 could it be that they are not especially suited to the gods themselves –
beings whose [mode of] existence they interpret? After all, there are
many genera [of beings] that have been sent forth from the gods – some
in the daemonic order, some in the angelic – that astonish those aroused
to participation in them and who are trained (gymnazein) to the recep-
10 tion of the light. These beings lift such people up on high towards
unification with the gods. One can particularly observe the kinship
that these myths have with the race of daemons through recognition
of the fact that the majority of daemonic activities take place in
a symbolic manner. For instance, if some among us have – in waking
visions or even in sleep – had encounters with daemons, then they have
15 enjoyed inspiration from them that makes manifest many things that
have come about or even that will come about. In all such imaginings
(phantasia), some things are indicated by others in the manner of the
makers of myth. And it is not [inevitably] the case that some are images,
while others are paradigms signified through these [images]. Rather,
some are symbols [of the things indicated], while others have an affinity
(sympatheia) with them [sc. the things indicated] through analogy.94
92
Accepting Lamberton’s conjecture of ἀπιθανότητα for the manuscript’s πιθανότητα and
also reading διαβαίνειν for διαβάλλειν with Festugière, Lamberton and Kroll’s addendum.
The general sense of the sentence is clear enough, but the specific connotations are not
so clear. Much depends on how we understand nous and dianoia. Lamberton renders
both as ‘meaning’ and that seems not unreasonable, but perhaps undersells the contrast
that might be lurking between something non-discursive that is hidden invisibly in the
poem and the discursive thought that is the narrative of the poem. We have preferred to
keep a much more literal translation in this case to allow readers to speculate for
themselves.
93
ἐν τοῖς ἀδύτοις ἱδρυμένης. Proclus’ choice of terminology reinforces the parallel that he
introduced earlier between the operation of inspired poetry and that of initiatory rites.
94
ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς τοιαύταις φαντασίαις κατὰ τοὺς μυθοπλάστας ἄλλα ἐξ ἄλλων ἐνδείκνυται,
καὶ οὐ τὰ μὲν εἰκόνες, τὰ δὲ παραδείγματα, ὅσα διὰ τούτων σημαίνουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν
σύμβολα, τὰ δὲ ἐξ ἀναλογίας ἔχει τὴν πρὸς ταῦτα συμπάθειαν. Cf. Sheppard (1980), 197.
There are three relations between that which indicates and the object indicated. In the
first case, x can be an image or copy of some paradigm y. Alternatively, x can be
196
6.1.3 The conflict among the gods
Now if this mode of myth-making is daemonic,95 how shall we deny that 20

it transcends in every respect all other varieties of myth, [surpassing]
both the kind of myth that is interpreted with an eye to nature and
natural powers,96 as well as the kind that oversees the education of the
characters of souls?
6 . 1 . 3 i n t h e c a s e o f t h e c o n fl i c t a m o n g t h e 87
gods [related] by the theologians [sc.
homer, hesiod, orpheus], what are the
different manners in which the secret
truth in it can be brought to light?97
<87.4–95.31>
<Introduction: the problem, 87.4–28>
On the topic of the kinds of myths through which both the other poets
and Homer rendered the mystical conceptions concerning the gods 5
invisible to ordinary people let the foregoing suffice. The next thing,
I think, is to provide, in response to Socrates’ arguments, an appropriate
spelling out (diarthrôsis) of individual fictional episodes and to take the
episodes of conflict among the gods (as well as any other thing that the 10
gods do or undergo) that Homer hands down through his poetry and to
consider them in terms of the qualities of the psychic conceptions that
are involved. Let us examine for ourselves first, if you wish, this so-called
battle of the gods which Homer created, but which Socrates deemed
worthy of criticisms on the ground that it was in no way suitable for the
a symbol of y. Finally, x can indicate y on the basis of analogia. Compare Festugière:

‘Parenté, dis-je, car, en toutes ces sortes de fictions imaginaires des mythoplastes,
certaines choses sont indiquées par d’autres choses, et il n’est pas vrai que, dans ce
que les mythoplastes signifient par ces fictions, certaines choses soient copies, celles-là
modèles, non, les unes sont des symboles, les autres, en vertu d’une analogie, ont
affinité avec ces premières.’
95
Lamberton rightly points out that we need to understand ‘daemonic’ here in terms of
the rank that is superior to souls and to nature – things that are involved in the inferior
kinds of myths immediately alluded to.
96
Proclus perhaps has in mind naturalising allegory that understands, for instance,
Hera’s name as alluding to the element air or the more complex reading of the
conspiracy against Zeus (Il. 1.396 ff.) as an allegorical catalogue of the elements
(Heraclitus, Homeric Problems, §25).
97
As Lamberton notes ‘The Battle of the Gods’ or Theomachia is the traditional title
given to book 20 of the Iliad. As a Platonist, Proclus of course finds the very idea of
conflict among the gods to be absurd. But the ridiculous nature of the fighting between
the gods depicted in Iliad 20 was already reason for allegorical interpretations of the
meaning of the poem. See Heraclitus, Homeric Problems, §§52–8.
197
Essay 6
15 hearing of students. The fact that there is neither dissension (stasis) nor
differences and division of a mortal kind among the gods, but peace
and a life without sorrow, is something that the poet himself shows in
a sense when he says of Olympus that it stretches beneath the gods,
that they have every enjoyment and spectacles that are inconceivably
beautiful.
20 There they take their pleasure, the blessed gods, for all their days (Od. 6.46)
At what point is it possible for dissension or war to creep in

among those who have been assigned eternal enjoyment and always
project graciousness and who delight in the good things which they
25 possess? If, then, it is necessary for the words concerning the gods
to have regard for their providence and the nature of the things that
are the subjects of their providence, then I think this is how we
must interpret (aphermêneuein) their mythic opposition to one
another.
<First explanation: 87.29–89.9>

30 One way [to explain this away] is that the divided processions of all
beings and the essential distinctions take their origin from up there98
88 from the division among the primary-effective causes that is unknow-
able to all. Having been hypostatised in accordance with the super-
simplified first principles of things that are universal, they [sc. the
processions] are divided from one another.99 Some [processions] are
dependent upon the monad of Limit which unifies, and these define
5 their own existence (hypostasis) around it. Others receive the uninter-
rupted power, plurality and the productive cause of plurality and pro-
cession from the Unlimited which generates things that are universal,
and they project their own existence in respect of it [sc. the
98
In what follows, Proclus discusses in very abstract terms the kinds of oppositions found
among some of the highest principles in his ontology, first pursuing this theme at the
level of the dyad Limited–Unlimited and subsequently among four of the five greatest
kinds of the Sophist, and then going on to include Similarity–Dissimilarity and
Equality–Inequality. In short, when myth depicts gods in conflict, this is to be alle-
gorised in terms of the oppositions among the highest causes that generate the
increasing variety and plurality manifested in the procession down to the sensible
realm. Lamberton notes the similarity of this strategy for interpreting conflict to
Iamblichus’ treatment of the myth of Atlantis; cf. Proclus, in Tim. I 77.24–78.12 =
Iamblichus fr. 7 (Dillon).
99
καὶ κατὰ τὰς ὑπερηπλωμένας τῶν ὅλων ἀρχὰς ὑφιστάμεναι διεστήκασιν ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων· For
the passive here as ‘hypostasised’ or ‘made to subsist’ cf. ET 18.6–7 πᾶν τὸ ὑποστατικόν
τινος κρεῖττόν ἐστι τῆς τοῦ ὑφισταμένου φύσεως. It is not, we think, as Lamberton
supposes ‘issuing forth from the first principles of the universe’.
198
Unlimited].100 In the very same way that the most primary origins of all
existent things have been distinguished from one another, in just this
way too all the divine genera and the things that genuinely are will have 10
a procession that involves a corresponding distinction from one
another. Those at the beginning in the first case [sc. those that proceed
from Limit] [are the causes of] unification for things that are secondary,
while the others [sc. those derived from the Unlimited] provide the
power of division. While the former are the causes of reversion for the
things that have proceeded, rolling their plurality into the origins with 15
which they belong, the latter defines the procession and the subordinate
production that results from the first principles. Furthermore, the one
group are those who provide an abundance of generative [power] for the
things that are lower, while the other group are those who are able to
cause changeless and undefiled purity.101 The first group [originating
with Limit] have attached to themselves the cause of goods that are
separate, while the second [originating with the Unlimited attach to 20
themselves the cause of goods] that coexist with the participants.102
It is doubtless from here [sc. in the Limit and Unlimited] that this sort
of opposition among the genera [of Being] gets diversified amidst all the
orders of being. The [form of] Rest that stably establishes the things that
are in themselves is opposed to the powers of Motion that are effective
and filled with life. The commonality (koinônia) of Sameness, [which 25
exists due to a] common origin, gets logically distinguished (antidiairein)
by the distinctions among species that belong to Difference, while the
genus of Similarity has been allocated an order that has the same
corresponding opposition to Dissimilarity, and likewise for the opposi-
tion of Equality to Inequality. In all these cases, the divisions are
demarcated from above as a result of the original dyad, in accordance 30
with which each of the [pairs of] beings is both rendered distinct by 89
virtue of the limits that belong with them and, having been logically
100
καὶ περὶ αὐτὴν προστησάμεναι τὴν οἰκείαν ὕπαρξιν. There is no real tension between the
series stemming from the Limited ‘being hypostatised’ in relation to it and the series
stemming from the Unlimited ‘projecting their own existence’. All the entities under
discussion will count as ‘self-constituted’ (cf. ET props. 40–44). As such they derive
their existence both from their prior causes and from reversion upon themselves.
101
The former function seems to be one that is related to the Unlimited, while the latter
better fits with the metaphysical role of Limit; cf. Plat. Theol. I 122.10 and III 32.17. Yet
the next pair seems to return to the previous order of Limit, followed by Unlimited.
102
The Limit and things in its series are associated with the unparticipated monad that
transcends its effects, while the Unlimited and its products are associated with the cause
as immanent in the effect. Thus things in the series that originates in Limit play the
role of an unparticipated, paradigmatic cause, while those that trace their origins back
to the Unlimited play the role of participated cause. For these two kinds of causation,
cf. ET, prop. 23.
199
Essay 6
distinguished from each other, proceed from their productive causes.

And yet, woven together with one another, they produce the variety that
belongs to secondary things.
5 Given that there is this sort of opposition among the gods themselves
and among the most primary of things that are, what is there to be amazed
at, if the makers of myth have observed this fact and drop hints to their
pupils about it through [depicting] wars [among the gods], since while the
divine genera are eternally unified with one another, at the same time they
reflect both the unity and the unmixing division that exists among them?
<Second explanation: 89.10–24>

10 I think there is also another way to address [this question about conflict
among the gods]. While the gods are indivisibly endowed with shared
nature and have been established in one another in a manner that is uni-
formed, there are also the processions from them into the universe and the
shares (metadosis) that undergo division in the participants. Having become
15 divisible down here below, they get infected with opposition, since the
things that are the subjects of divine providence are unable to receive the
powers or the multi-form illuminations that proceed in an unmixed man-
ner from these [higher causes] in a way that doesn’t involve confusion.103
Furthermore, the final ranks of beings104 that are dependent upon the
divine realities themselves – ranks of beings which have been produced far
from the most primary of causes and are proximate to the things that they
20 are in charge of so that they have an existence that is oriented towards
matter – well, these things already participate in various distinctions and
oppositions and govern in a divisible manner the things that are enmat-
tered, cutting off and dividing up the powers that pre-exist in a uni-form
and indivisible manner within their own primary-effective causes.
<Application to the poets: 89.25–92.27>
<Application of first solution to poets other than

Homer: 89.25–90.13>
25 Having stated the number and character of the ways in which the
mystical utterances of the theologians tend to attribute war to the
103
Thus, for instance, the visible cosmos is unable to receive the whole of eternity all at
once and temporal passage is the result of this inability. Cf. in Tim. II 100.19–25.
104
Proclus has angels and daemones in mind, though this is hardly clear from just what is
said here. But at 91.1 it becomes clear that the ranks of beings that are proximate to
and in charge of sensibles are angels and daemones.
200
gods themselves, let us say that the other poets who are inspired when
it comes to the interpretation of divine matters made their attribution
of wars and conflicts among the gods in terms of the first manner. 30
That is, [these battles hint at the fact that] the divine genera have 90
undergone division in accordance with the most primary first princi-
ples of things that are universal. Disguising the truth, the myths say
that there is in some sense conflict and war with one another when
those whose role it is to elevate are opposed to those that bring about
generation, or things that generate continuity are opposed to those
that generate distinctions, or the things that unify are opposed to
those that pluralise the procession of beings, or when universals are
opposed to those that create in a manner that involves particularity, or
when things that reunite105 are opposed to those that preside over 5
things [that remain] divided. It is from this, I think, that they speak of
antagonism between the Titans and Dionysus or between the Giants
and Zeus, for insofar as they are creators who are prior to the cosmos,
unification, indivisible creation, and the wholeness prior to the parts 10
belong to Dionysus and Zeus. But the Giants and the Titans bring
their demiurgic powers into plurality. They manage the things that
are in the universe in a divided manner, and are the proximate Fathers
of things that are enmattered.
<Application of the second solution to Homer: 90.13–92.27>

Let us consider, however, that the divine lore (theomythia) of Homer
invents conflicts among the gods in the second manner [discussed 15
above]. First, he sets the demiurgic monad [i.e. Zeus] aside entirely
from the plurality of the gods, and does not show him either proceeding
as far as the opposition that brings about generation, nor taking a stand
against it. Rather, while this monad is stably grounded in itself, the
number of gods that have proceeded from this monad – simultaneously 20
remaining and proceeding into the universe – are said to undergo
division when they are occupied with the exercise of providence over
encosmic things. Second, among those gods who have been distin-
guished from the Father, some remain in the Father and exist without
proceeding from their appropriate monad – those, of course, whom the
105
καὶ τὰ ἀναπλωτικὰ τοῖς τῶν μερικῶν προστάταις ἀντικείμενα. Festugière provides
a lengthy note on the precise sense of ἀναπλωτικά, comparing it with occurrences in
other authors. In general terms, Proclus thinks that other inspired poets – apart from
Homer – hint at the opposition that permeates higher causes as a consequence of the
complementary functions of Limit and Unlimited. Thus in this lengthy sentence, two
kinds of causal tendencies are contrasted throughout: one on the side of unity, whole-
ness, continuity, etc.; the other on the side of plurality, difference, division, etc.
201
Essay 6
poem says have been established ‘within Zeus’ (Il. 20.13)106 and who, 25
together with the Father, exercise providence over things that are uni-
versal in a manner that is transcendent – [when it comes to these gods,] the
myth does not concede, even on a surface level, that they have any conflict
with one another nor do they stand opposed to one another. The others,
however, who have departed from this monad to settle downward among
the further ranks – having become more particularised and being more
91 proximate to the things that they manage – well, they go to fill out the
armies of angels or daemones and he does provide for them to be in
conflict with one another due to their very significant natural affinity
towards things that are inferior and their being allotted a providence that
5 is divisible.107 In fact, I think that the sufferings of the subjects of
providential care – wounds, blows and counter-blows – are in a way
more akin to them [sc. the angels and daemones who exercise that
providence] and that the opposition that brings about generation is not
far removed from the order that governs them (diakosmêsis). Likewise for
the divisible aspect of the creation that extends into secondary things and
the piecemeal quality of the providence that belongs to powers such as
10 these. But this does not apply to causes that are first principles and
transcend all of the things that are subject to their providential care and
are separate. Furthermore, the angelic orders of the superior genera are
15 dependent upon the leadership of the gods and they do preserve the
distinguishing characteristics of their leaders (even if they do so in
a manner that is partial and has been rendered plural). Because of this,
they are referred to by the names of these leaders and since they have been
created to be in an analogous relationship to the things that are the most
primary, they appear, even as they proceed [to lower levels], to be iden-
tical in some sense to those more universal than themselves.
This is not something that only the myths told by the Greeks have
managed to do in disguise – I mean, of course, denoting both the leaders
20 and those who serve them through the same names – rather, the sacred
rites of non-Greeks108 transmit [insights into the divine nature by the
106
At the beginning of Iliad 20, Zeus summons all the gods to his house and this is the point
at which the poet writes Ὣς οἳ μὲν Διὸς ἔνδον ἀγηγέρ’ (‘so they were gathered in the house
of Zeus’), which Proclus takes to mean ‘so they were gathered within Zeus’. Zeus
announces his intention to watch the final battle between the Greeks and Trojans from
his position on Olympus, but bids the other gods to go forth, each to the side that he or
she is supporting. This is doubtless the locus for Proclus’ thought on the monad that
remains stably grounded in itself while the other gods proceed to exercise providence.
107
The opposition is between the divided or particularised providence of the daemones –
each one looking after some specific feature of creation – and the universal or total
providence of the gods that remain within the monad; cf. 90.26.
108
This would explain the admonition from the Chaldaean Oracles that one is not to
change the nomina barbara; cf. fr. 150 (des Places/Majercik).
202
same means], for they too say that the angels that are dependent
upon the gods take particular delight in the very fact of their
eponymy with them and that they are invested with the vehicles
of the leaders of their series and manifest themselves to theurgists 25
in place of these leading gods.109 Thus if we too attach110 Athena,
Hera or Hephaestus fighting down here in the realm of Becoming,
or likewise attach Leto, Artemis or the river Xanthos to a different
order that is secondary and proximate to things that are divisible 92
and enmattered – there is no need to be surprised on account of the
commonality among the names. After all, each series carries the
name of its monad, and the divided spiritual beings [at the lower
end of that series] love to receive the same names as those beings
that are universal [sc. the gods at the head of their series]. It is for
this reason that there are many and various Apollos, Poseidons and 5
Hephaesti. Some of them are separate from the universe, while
others have been stationed around the heavens. Yet others have
been put in command of universal elements, and some have been
given authority over an individual one. It would not be surprising if
a maximally particularised111 Hephaestus who has been allotted 10
a daemonic rank should have as his designated task the providential
care of the enmattered fire that has been placed upon the Earth, or
that he should be the guardian of some craft such as that of the
blacksmith (after all, the descent of the gods’ providence has been
assigned a well ordered procession from universal and unified
causes that exist on high down to the final division). Now this 15
[lowest] Hephaestus would delight in the preservation of the prop-
erty that he has been allotted and would be opposed to causes that
bring about the dissolution of that thing’s composition. Therefore
‘war’ or the division of various and sundry powers exists among
these classes, and they have a natural relationship (oikeiotês) to or
alienation (allotriotês) from one another. They have an individualised
natural affinity (sympatheia) towards the things that they manage. 20
They also have verbal disagreements, and they defend their allies
through jests – all the sorts of things that are reasonably conceived
109
Cf. Or. Chald. fr. 148 (des Places/Majercik). Hence one needs to be cautious in
assuming that what appears to be an epiphany of a god is really that god and not
one of the daemones attached to his or her order who has been invested with the
leader’s vehicle or ocheˆma; cf. Iamblichus, Myst. II §10. On psychic vehicles in general,
see Finamore (1985).
110
Reading ἀνάπτομεν with the first hand in the MS rather than ἀναπέμποιμεν with the
third hand (that of Kroll’s corrector).
111
ὁ μερικώτατος ῞Ηφαιστος, i.e. some daemonic being that stands at the lowest end of the
series that runs up through progressively more universal Hephaesti.
203
Essay 6
in the imagination about the final stages of the divine orders.112

This is why, even when the myths depict these sorts of powers in
25 conflict or at odds with one another over things that are the sub-
jects of their providence, the myths would not, in a sense, be far off
the truth about them, for the sufferings (pathos) of the subjects of
providence are proximately transferred to these powers.
<Application to Homer of the two principles

of explanation: 92.28–95.31>
<Application of the first principle: 92.28–93.24>

Thus, to put it briefly, there are two concepts (epinoia) to be seen in the
30 ‘wars’ that the poets inspired by Apollo113 speak about so often. One [of
these two general ideas] has to do with the two first principles of
93 universal things – principles which the transcendent cause of the unity
of all things has introduced, conceiving the division of the well-ordered
divine genera in accordance with the antithesis of these principles and
providing by means of these genera for the opposition that things have
to one another. (Whether it is necessary to refer to the most primary
5 hypostases as Limit and Unlimited or the Monad and the Indefinite
Dyad, there appears in any case to be a certain logical distinction
(antidiairesis) towards one another that they possess – a logical distinc-
tion in terms of which the orders of gods have been made separate from
one another.) The other [concept for understanding the wars of the
poets] derives from the opposition and the variety involved with the last
rank among the things that are [sc. angels and daemones]. It transfers
112
καὶ ἡ πρὸς τὰ διοικούμενα μεριστὴ συμπάθεια, καὶ αἱ διὰ λόγων ἐναντιώσεις καὶ διὰ τῶν
σκωμμάτων ἄμυναι, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα περὶ τὰς ἀποτελευτήσεις εἰκότως ἐμφαντάζεται τῶν
θείων διακοσμήσεων. The ‘verbal disagreements’ seem to be a way of indicating the
oppositions of natural forces, such as fire that the lowest Hephaestus manages and
water – presumably managed by a lowest Poseidon. These oppositions will be διὰ
λόγων in the sense they take place through the active-forming principles or logoi that
are the manifestation of incorporeals that are most proximate to matter. The jests of
the gods are presumably the occasion for laughter, which Proclus understands to be
a symbol of the divine activity that orders the world – an activity that is ‘free from
envy’, just like the Demiurge of the Timaeus. Cf. in Remp. I 127.22–4.
113
Proclus seems to like this rather uncommon adjective (phoibolê ptos) and uses it fre-
quently (in Remp. I 185.14; II 269.4; Plat. Theol. V 77.5 and 131.25; in Crat. 71.138; in
Parm. 646.23; in Tim. I 18.17). If his understanding of its meaning is consistent with
that of Plotinus, it simply means one possessed by the Muses (cf. Enn. V 8.10, 40–2
ὥσπερ εἴ τις ὑπὸ θεοῦ κατασχεθεὶς φοιβόληπτος ἢ ὑπό τινος Μούσης). Perhaps someone
who is phoibolê ptos is a particularly good poet, since he is someone possessed by the chief
of the Muses.
204
this sort of difference (diastasis) to their proximate governors (sc. the 10

gods), positing that the gods ‘make war’ on one another, when they thus
go into enmattered nature and undergo division in relation to it.
It will appear to those listeners who are serious that the poet
[sc. Homer] indicates the first in a way when he says: 15
. . . when far-seeing Zeus

Put Cronos beneath the earth (Il. 14.203–4)
And elsewhere writing about Typhon he says:
as the earth beneath groaned when thundering Zeus in his
anger smote the land about Typhon in the country of the 20
Arimoi, where they say is the abode of Typhon.
for in these words he hints in a general way at the war between the
Titans and Zeus and what is called the ‘en-Tartarization’ by the
Orphics.114
<Application of the second principle: 93.24–95.31>

Moreover, it is especially in accordance with the second general idea115 25
that Homer relates the gods making war or quarrelling with one another
over human affairs. ([He does this in passages] where one might well
admire the poet’s divinely inspired and intellectual composition of his
fictions. For he says that these genera commit to this war for the sake of
these [human affairs]. Even given that they have been allotted the very 30
last position in the divine procession, it is nonetheless the case that they 94
are dependent upon the gods, and while they are proximate to those
whom they manage [sc. human beings and their affairs], they are also
naturally related (syngeneia) to their own leaders [sc. the higher divine
orders upon which they depend].) On the one hand, their natural affinity
(sympatheia) towards things that are inferior is indicated when Homer
transfers the life that has undergone division, with its conflict and the
opposition, from one group to the other. (In just the same way 5
Orpheus116 too connected the Dionysian images with things being put
114
Orph. fr. 122; cf. in Tim. I 188.27–189.7. In the Timaeus Commentary, Proclus regards
the fate of the Athenian army and Atlantis – the first vanished and the second sunk
below the waves – as an imitation of the Orphic ‘en-Tartarization’: ‘For in order that
the last things should enjoy divine providence, it was necessary that both the better
column and the inferior one should extend its own power from above right down to
the foundation of the cosmos’ (trans. Tarrant).
115
Reading ἐπιβολὴν for ὑπερβολὴν with Kroll’s suggested emendation. It clearly returns
to the use above at 92.28.
116
Included among Orph. fr. 209. The clearest narration of the Orphic episode is perhaps
Damascius in Phdo §129. Dionysus, seeing his image in a mirror, follows it and is thus
205
Essay 6
together or taken apart and lamentations, attributing to those [images]

all these things that are derived from the subjects of providential care.)
10 On the other hand, he indicates the natural relation of these individua-
lised spirits to the series from which they have proceeded by the fact that
he describes them by the same names that he used to celebrate the
powers that transcend enmattered things, and by using the numbers
and shapes that pertain to their [non-individualised and thus more]
universal orders.
Those [gods] taking part in the war are eleven in number in imitation
of the army of gods and daemones that has been arranged in eleven parts
15 to follow after Zeus.117 (Phdr. 246e). Those who are in command of the
better column118 are connected to the Pentad [or number five] (for the
odd, the spherical and the just leadership of all things that are secondary,
as well as [the faculty of] extending from the middle to all of the
20 numbers, is appropriate for beings that wish to govern what is more
intellectual and more perfect in relation to the One). Those who are in
charge of the inferior series119 of enmattered things have proceeded in
accordance with the Hexad [or number six]. They possess, therefore, the
task of bringing to perfection the things subject to providence through
25 the appropriate number. But they are left behind by those that are
before them because of their attribution to the even number and that
which is coordinate with the worse nature.120 There is then nothing
scattered over the universe. He is gathered up and returned to heaven by Apollo.

It appears that in Proclus’ understanding of this episode Dionysus himself does not
really undergo division, since instead images of Dionysus – albeit ones that have
received the entire form of their paradigm – preside over Becoming; in Tim.
I 336.30). See Festugière’s note ad loc.
117
The idea of eleven gods following Zeus, of course, alludes to Phaedrus 246e4 ff. But the
eleven gods that are subsequently discussed by Proclus are enumerated by Homer in
Iliad 20.31–40. Hera, Athena, Poseidon, Hermes and Hephaestus aid the Greeks while
Ares, Apollo, Artemis, Leto, the river Xanthus and Aphrodite go to the Trojans.
The allies of the Trojans – who are, of course, six in number – are inferior, while
the pentad of Greek allies is superior.
118
The column in question is simultaneously a military column and also the superior
column in the Pythagorean table of opposites; cf. 96.19 below. In this case, the gods in
the better column are the five who fight for the Greeks, while the gods who support
the Trojans are six in number and belong to the inferior column.
119
Accepting Kroll’s suggestion of σειρᾶς for μοίρας with Festugière.
120
The numbers five and six have many associations in the neo-Pythagorean tradition to
which Proclus belongs. The most salient one for five seems to be the connection with
justice (cf. in Remp. II 22.9, 53.19, 93.17 and Theol. Arith. 35.6). The five superior
gods – or more specifically, their daemonic representatives – will ensure that the
generation-producing give-and-take between opposing forces remains confined
within the bounds of justice. The number six is associated with the soul (in Tim. II 270.
8–9 and Theol. Arith. 45.8, ff) and the lower, inferior order of six gods are more
proximate to the bodies that they enliven and guide.
206
surprising if someone were to call these genera ‘gods’ due to the fact that
they are naturally related to their leaders or if someone were to intro-
duce acts of war [among them] due to their solicitude for the things
down here that are proximate to them.
The antithesis between Apollo and Poseidon represents121 the
apparent opposition of all the universal things in the sublunary realm 30
(and I think it is for this reason the gods do not fight, for the particular 95
individuals in them are preserved by the things that are universal for as
long a time as [the universals] should exist).122 The [antithesis]
between Hera and Artemis represents logical distinction (antidiairesis) 5
down here between rational and irrational souls, between those that
are separate [from the body] and those that are not, and between those
beyond nature and those who belong to it. While one is the cause of
things that are better, the other is the cause of inferior things being
brought to labour and of leading them into the light. That between
Athena and Ares represents the distinction (diakrisis) that belongs to
the conflict as a whole that brings about the generation [of the uni-
verse], into the providence which conforms with Intellect and the
providence which works through necessity, since she rules in an intel- 10
lectual manner over opposites, while he strengthens their natural
powers and rouses them up against one another. The [antithesis]
between Hermes and Leto reflects the various and sundry differences
corresponding to the cognitive and vital motions of souls. Hermes
perfects acts of understanding, while Leto perfects vital acts, since123 15
these are frequently set apart from one another and stand opposed to
each other. The remaining antithesis between Hephaestus and the
river Xanthus arranges in the requisite manner the opposing first
principles of the universal corporeal composite. Hephaestus welds
together (synkrotein) the powers of hotness and dryness, while
121
Festugière adopts Kroll’s suggested emendation παρίσταται for προΐσταται at 94.30.
This seems plausible in light of the use of this verb in the parallel at 95.8.
122
σώζεται γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν ὁλικῶν τὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς μερικά, καθ’ ὅσον ἂν ᾖ χρόνον. We can think of
the universal things as, for instance, species of living beings. These preserve the
individual members that are contained in them since it is the species that makes
each one what it is. Lamberton translates as ‘for as long as [these universals] exist’.
This seems unlikely to us. Given the extent to which Plato’s Timaeus occupies Proclus’
mind, we think that it is more likely that he means that the general kinds and the
individuals who fall under them will endure as long as there is time. See Proclus’
understanding of the sense in which time came into being (and would pass away) with
the cosmos itself at in Tim. III 50.15 ff.
123
Reading ἐπεὶ καὶ for the MS’ εἰ καὶ. Festugière suggests this as one option, though he
himself and Lamberton both take Kroll’s suggestion of ᾗ instead. This, however,
seems odd to us in connection with πολλάκις. If τὰς γνώσεις τελειοῦντος and τὰς ζωάς
frequently come apart, it seems odd to speak of them insofar as they are separate.
207
Essay 6
20 Xanthus combines wetness and coldness, from which the entirety of

Becoming has been constituted. But since it is necessary for all opposi-
tions to end in concord with one another, Aphrodite is present too, just
as we said, imparting friendship to the things that are opposites,
though at the same time fighting on the side of the things that are
25 worse. This is because these [worse things] in particular are the ones
that get brought to order when they come to be in symmetry with and
agreeable to those among the opposites that are better.
Let this be enough on the subject of battles among the gods according
to Homer. After all, it is permissible for those who wish to grasp some-
thing more precise on this subject to become familiar with the contem-
plations (theôria) of our teacher [Syrianus] where many remarkable
30 doctrines are uncovered and which he elaborated in his monograph,
Solutions to Homeric Problems.
96 6.1.4 how one might defend the divine

myths which seem to hold the gods
responsible for evils
<96.1–100.18>
Let us turn now to the next of Socrates’ difficulties concerning
Homer. And it follows, I think, to consider this: since the gods
obtain their existence (hyparxis) pre-eminently in accordance with
5 goodness, how does the poetry consider the gods responsible for
both evils and goods, when it is necessary to ascribe to them the
originary (archêgos) cause of good things alone? For since Socrates
demonstrates that god is the creator of only good things, and of
nothing evil, he thought this [attribution of responsibility for evil to
10 them] an objectionable point in the Homeric poems.124 And he
seemed to call the Theomachy to account on the grounds that it
was destructive of the divine unity, and to expose these lines (Rep.
379d), which now lie before us to investigate, as very far below the
goodness of the gods:
‘Two pithoi sit upon the threshold of Zeus,
full of fates, one of fine things, but the other
15 of wretched ones.’ (Il. 24.527–8)
124
Rep. II 379a, ff. and Essay 4 above.
208
6.1.4 Myths holding the gods responsible for evils
<General principles of the teaching: 96.16–98.25>

So in response to such objections, let it be said that there are a pair of
columns of opposites (systoichia)125 in the cosmos, which we also spoke
about earlier (94.17), arising from above from the gods themselves.
That is, all things have been divided by the bi-formed (dyoeidês)126 first 20
principles (archê) of existent things: the orders of the gods, the hypostases
of existent things, the types of souls, the powers in nature, the revolu-
tions of the heavens, the distinctions of enmattered things. And this twin
procession of things established at its end a double genesis both of the
events that befall human beings and of those that are allotted in accor- 25
dance with justice. For in fact some of these things belong to the greater
fate (moira), and some to the lesser. [By those belonging to the lesser
fate] I mean, for example, the conditions of bodies in accordance with
nature, beauty and strength and good health, and among the things 97
which are exterior to the composition of the body and befall souls, [such
things as] power and honours and wealth belong to one column (systoi-
chia), and the opposite conditions and circumstances belong to the
other, worse column.127 So of these things, which are allotted by neces- 5
sity in the manner discussed, it was the custom of the ancients to call
good those which belong to the better part itself, and to give the name of
evils to those belonging to the opposite part. And on these occasions
they do not in this way mean, I suppose, evil itself, in the way that we
agree that an unjust and undisciplined condition of the soul is an evil. 10
Rather they concede to call these evils on the grounds that they are
impediments to activity (energeia) and obstacles to our being disposed in
accordance with nature, and because they interrupt the easy completion
of the soul’s anticipation of human aims. And [they concede that these
things are described as evils] in a manner different to what are called
125
The reference is to the Pythagorean table of opposites as expounded in Aristotle’s
Metaphysics. Proclus follows Syrianus in qualifying the sense in which these are actually
opposed in such a way that one is really good and the other really bad. Cf. Syrianus, in
Metaphys. 165.32–166.14.
126
This marks the first occurrence of this neologism in the Republic Commentary. Perhaps
because of Plato’s frequent use of monoeidê s as a distinguishing mark of Forms, Proclus
and the other Neoplatonists often juxtapose the ‘uni-form’ character of intellect with
the ‘bi-form’ character of things such as soul – which is, of course, composed from
Sameness and Difference in the psychogony of the Timaeus – and draws other con-
trasts grounded in this difference; cf. in Tim. II. 299.4–7. But of course, the soul’s bi-
form character has its origins in higher principles and it is to the higher dualities such
as Sameness and Difference or Limit and Unlimit that Proclus now directs our
attention.
127
Marinus thinks all of these positive qualities worth mentioning in his account of
Proclus’ own life and character (Proclus 3), though he too places such advantages of
body and circumstances at this relatively low level.
209
Essay 6
155 evils of the soul itself, so that in this way they are accustomed to list
among evils disease and powerlessness and a life which is lacking in
necessities. And what need is there to call poetry in general to witness
for the usage of the word? In fact the account of the Pythagoreans which
20 allocates the paired columns of opposites of existent things in a universal
order did not think it unworthy to call one the column of the good and
the other the column of the evil. Yet how could one agree that ‘the even’
or ‘that which is of unequal length’ (heteromêkês) or ‘motion’ should be
arranged among the number of such evils, that is, all those things that we
25 define as privations of the good things? And how should we say that ‘the
female’ and ‘the type (genos) of difference’ and ‘dissimilarity’ are con-
trary to nature relative to existent things? But it is, I think, clear to
everyone,128 that he [i.e. Pythagoras] named ‘evil’ the inferior series
(seira) of the oppositions that exist through all the processions of existent
things, on the grounds that [this series] is lacking by comparison to the
30 other, and is not primarily a creator of good, nor does it obtain as its
98 portion the same separation with regard to the one cause of all that is
beautiful and good.129
So then it is appropriate to attach this pair of columns of the good and
bad things arising in the cosmos to the demiurgic monad. For indeed
5 the divisions of the gods and the division of the classes after the gods are
attached to that very first origin. And one must ascribe the responsibility
for both the good and bad things which happen to souls in accordance
with fate and justice, which are allotted at the time of coming into being,
to that which sets in order the universe and sends down souls into the
10 place of mortality. For indeed the creation of fate (heimarmenê) depends
upon the providence of the demiurge,130 and the series of justice lies
under it and follows the boundaries established by him,131 because it is
an ‘avenger of the divine law’, as the Athenian stranger says (Laws IV
716a).132 And the forethought (promêthia) of fortune (tychê) which fulfils
the things allotted by justice is defined in accordance with the will of the
128
Kroll’s conjecture of δήπου for δὴ τοῦτο in line 27 is appealing. The emphasis that δή
would throw on παντί seems a bit excessive, given that Proclus has been raising
sensible queries regarding the Pythagorean tables of opposites, in order to answer
them here. The particle δήπου would also sit more comfortably with the more
cautious tone of οἶμαι.
129
That is, the separation from the source of the series or column of the ‘evil’ is greater
than that of the ‘good’. The unequal contribution of the causes in the two columns is
examined with reference to the pair male and female in Baltzly (2013b).
130
Cf. in Tim. III. 273.19–25. 131
Following Kroll’s conjecture of ἐκείνου for ἐκείνης.
132
Proclus here alludes to one of the Neoplatonists’ favourite passages from the Laws.
It imagines the initial address to the inhabitants of the new city and invokes what the
Neoplatonists take to be an Orphic quotation (Kern 201 = Porphyry ap. Eusebius PE
III 9). It also stresses the importance of ‘following god’ and thus functions as
210
6.1.4 Myths holding the gods responsible for evils
father. So the demiurge and father has established in himself the cause 15
of all things both good and bad, both of those better in the giving and
those worse, both of those better fated equally with those that are
obstacles to the activity of souls towards external things, and he guides
all things according to intellect, allotting appropriate things to each one 20
and leading up all things towards his own paternal care (epistasia). For
indeed it is by looking towards the Good, and for the sake of perfecting
those who receive them, that he allots to souls both the things which
belong to the better column and those that belong to the inferior. 25
<Interpretation of Homer’s two pithoi: 98.26–100.18>

So if we have said these things correctly, we shall also accept the way that
Homer arranges in the demiurgic intellect of Zeus the double and
primary-effective (prôtourgos) causes both of the good things that he
gives to souls and the bad ones. Moreover, among all of the intellective 30
kings,133 the dyad is especially appropriate to the demiurge of the 99
universe (for the dyad sits beside him, as the oracle says).134 Also
appropriate to him is the steering of all things135 and the organising of
each one, where that thing will136 render virtue victorious in the uni-
verse, while evil is defeated. How does it differ to say these things and to 5
liken the demiurge to a draughts-player,137 reallocating souls to the lives
a confirmation of the Neoplatonic telos of assimilation to the divine. See below 101.
22–4.
133
Festugière and Lamberton refer to In Tim. 1.306.1–13 where Proclus discusses
Amelius’ views on the identity of the Demiurge and his view that there are three
Demiurges in the Timaeus, correlated with the three kings of Epistle II 312e. While
Proclus rejects Amelius’ reading of the identity of the Demiurge in the Timaeus,
Amelius also correlated the three kings of Epistle II with the Orphic gods Phanes,
Ouranos, and Cronos. There is no suggestion that Proclus rejects this identification.
The following reference to the Chaldaean Oracles suggests that Proclus may have in
mind some additional correlation between the three kings of Epistle II and the
Chaldaean system.
134
Fr. 8 (des Places/Majercik): δυὰς παρὰ τῷδε κάθηται. | ἀμφότερον γὰρ ἔχει, νῷ μὲν
κατέχειν τὰ νοητά, | αἴσθησιν δ᾽ ἐπάγειν κόσμοις (cited by Proclus at In Crat. 51.27–30).
135
The image of ‘steering all things’ seems to allude to Pol. 272e. When the helmsman of
the universe drops the tiller, fate and innate desire make the world turn backwards.
A likely inference, then, is that while his hand is on the tiller, the Demiurge/
Helmsman governs fate. This passage from the Statesman is the focus of
Neoplatonic attention. See Dillon (1995).
136
Following, as do Lamberton and Festugière, Kroll’s suggestion of the future indica-
tive (ἀποδείξει) rather than the aorist optative (ἀποδείξειεν).
137
The draughts-like game of petteia was a favourite metaphor of Plato, as Lamberton
notes (p. 115 n.145), and the primary comparison here is of course between the
teachings of Plato (Laws 10.903d) and Homer. Heraclitus, fr. 52 (αἰὼν παῖς ἐστι
παίζων, πεσσεύων. παιδὸς ἡ βασιληίη) may also be further in the background.
211
Essay 6
appropriate to each of them? Two, then, let these sources be considered,

of both better and worse measures, by means of which the demiurge
leads souls in accordance with justice. The poet, speaking in the manner
of myth, has called these pithoi, perhaps because he casts the proper limit
10 upon each thing through intellective persuasion (peithô) (as Timaeus
says (48a), intellect is the ruler of necessity, in that he persuades it
[necessity] to lead all things towards the best).138 Alternatively [he
may speak this way] to demonstrate their capacity and inclusiveness of
all kinds and of the most varied effects.139 And in those vessels the father
15 has gathered beforehand in unity the dispersed multiplicity of all things
which he allocates to souls. According to this reasoning, Plato and
Homeric poetry are in agreement with each other. While Plato says
that god must not be held responsible for any evil, the Homeric poems
introduce all good things from there, but in a pair of columns of
20 opposites (systoichia) divide them into two classes, each helpful to those
who receive them. [The poems] demonstrate the opposition of them to
each other, and they separate some of them as good things, and some as
the opposite to the good things. And the fact that what is said to be evil is
not the sort of thing that Plato’s argument denies [can be true] of the
25 gifts of the gods is, I suppose, clear from what Homer says next:
Thus the gods gave wonderful gifts to Peleus
from the hour of his birth. (Il. 24.534–5)
But upon him god bestowed evil too. (Il. 24.538)
100 So what this evil is, he himself added:

Because to him were born no powerful sons in his halls,
but he produced one son, all untimely. And now I do not care for him
5 in his old age. (Il. 24.538–41)
Surely he does not seem to you to hold the god responsible for true
evils? Has he not called the lack of children, the absence of care ‘evils’?
And in this way we called these evils earlier, since they work to produce
10 in souls unhappiness about the life here and discontent. Even if it is
unlawful for those who are genuinely practising philosophy to call these
evils, still they appear to those who choose the practical life as obstacles
to the life lived in accordance with virtue. For this reason too, I suppose,
the Athenian Stranger (Laws II 661d1–2) contends that all such things
138
Proclus makes a small but important change in his paraphrase of Timaeus 48a, sub-
stituting πάνταs for τὰ πλεῖστα. Timaeus claims only that intellect leads ‘most things’
rather than ‘all things’ towards the best.
139
That is, Homer has chosen the image of pithoi (large storage jars) either because the
sound of the word suggests persuasion (peithô ) or because the image appropriately
suggests inclusion and containment.
212
6.1.5 The violation of the oaths to the gods
are evils for the good, and good things for the wicked.140 And in fact he 15
holds the god responsible for these things and for all things that are
given by the universe, so that it is not Homer alone and Achilles in
Homer who says these things, but also Plato himself and the lawgiver in
his text.
6.1.5 how the poem seems to ascribe the

violation of the oaths to the gods: 20
the true teaching regarding them.
<100.21–106.10>
Let that suffice with regard to this previous enquiry. And the next of the
topics to consider is how the poem says that the violation of the oaths
and treaty was by the will of great Zeus and with Athena assisting the
counsel of her father. [We must discuss this] because Socrates also 25
found fault with ascribing the origin [archê] of evils to the very first of the
gods.141 And it is entirely appropriate to be thoroughly at a loss about
this, namely how the one accusing the god of such things does not
accuse him of the greatest evils, and of true evils. For it will no longer 101
be possible to appear to make a valid point by speaking of poverty and
illness and contrary elements of this kind (systoichia),142 but we shall be
ascribing to the god the responsibility for what are agreed by everyone
to be evils. And on the one hand the Timaeus says (41e) that the 5
demiurge ordains everything for souls prior to their descent into
becoming (genesis), so that it is not responsible for the subsequent evil.
But [Homer’s] discourse by contrast allows that even upon those des-
cending and involved already in becoming (genesis) [the god] bestows
from there the cause of the greatest evils. So how would one give, in 10
response to these criticisms, an account that is appropriate, one that
harmonises the teaching of Homer with both the nature of things and
the teaching of Plato?143
140
Festugière observes (117 n.4) that the point in Plato is somewhat different.
The Athenian Stranger says rather that it is better for the unjust man not to live
a long life, and that he cannot enjoy what would be good things for a good man.
141
Given the context it appears that Proclus means ‘very first of the gods’ (τοὺς
πρωτίστους τῶν θεῶν) here in the sense of greatest in power, supreme, rather than
anterior in the generations of the gods. Though Socrates does indeed find fault with
the stories of the earliest gods (Ouranos and Cronos at Rep. 377e), the issue in the
current passage is ascribing responsibility for evil not only to gods but to some of the
greatest of these: Zeus and Athena. Socrates raises this issue at Rep. II 379e.
142
i.e. the mere absence of a good, as illness is the absence of health.
143
We add, with Festugière, the obviously necessary question-mark.
213
Essay 6
It has been said earlier and let it be reiterated now with regard to all
15 that is going to be said by us, that the hearing of these myths is not well
suited to the disposition of the young. This is because it is not possible
for the young to discern the natures of really existent things nor to lead
back the visible signs (synthêma) of the truth to invisible contemplation
20 (theôria), nor to see correctly how everything in the cosmos is brought
about by the will of the god through the other causes as intermediaries.
But let us demonstrate that these things [i.e. Homer’s narrative of the
violation of the oaths] belong to the philosophy of Plato.
The Athenian stranger also says that the god holds the beginning and
25 the end and the middle of existent things, and that justice follows
him,144 since she is the avenger of those abandoning the divine law
(Laws IV 715e–716a). And these, as the speech of that man says, are
those burning in their soul with hybris, due to youth and foolishness.145
They seem to hold power for a time, then in turn pay the appropriate
penalty to justice, when they have utterly ruined themselves and their
30 city and their home (Laws IV 716a-b). Therefore the Athenian stranger
102 relates these things in a political manner, and Homer, in a divinely
inspired way, says that those committing many offences and the greatest
injustices pay the penalty for their errors in accordance with the one will
of Zeus,
5 with their heads and their wives and children. (Il. 4.162)146
So [he says that] Zeus primarily fulfils this justice, both transcendentally
and invisibly for all, and that Athena works secondarily under him and
10 works together with him to complete the things decided by the paternal
providence of Zeus. ‘For terrible is she who completes the intention
177 (nous) of the son of Cronos’, as Orpheus says (Orph. fr. Kroll). And
finally there are those who submit to his punishment. For that which is
in our power (to eph’ hêmin) must also be woven into the working of the
whole beings (ta hola).147 So for this reason those making the libations
15 and taking the oaths, say about those who transgress them:
144
This is an instance of the common association of dikê with Zeus. To take one famous
example: Pheidias’ Zeus at Olympia was accompanied by her.
145
In the Laws passage, the imagined address speaks to two kinds of citizens: those who
follow god and those who through their pride deem themselves above the law.
146
In its original context this line is spoken by Agamemnon to the wounded Menelaos,
assuring him that the Olympians will punish the Trojans for their violation of the
oaths.
147
That is, human choices are interwoven with the actions of the gods (‘the whole
beings’). Unravelling the relationships between the providence of the whole, the
providence over individuals exercised by daemones, and the choices made by human
beings, is the concern of much of this part of the essay, and of Proclus’ opuscula on
providence and the nature of evil.
214
may their brains flow upon the ground as does this wine (Il. 3.300),148
and those transgressing submit themselves to justice and show them-

selves deserving of punishments. So then the violation of the oaths and 20
treaty is brought about by these people especially who are ready to suffer
the punishments decided by the gods in view of earlier errors, since the
gods direct mortal affairs in accordance with justice. But they are said to
be put in motion and led into activity by the gods themselves.
[The gods] do not render godless and unjust those who are being 25
punished, but rather they call forth to action those who are suited to
such practices, so that these people act in accordance with their internal
disposition and bring out those evil activities of which they have the
birthpangs, and so they become worthy of justice.
‘This’, says Plato, ‘is not justice, because the just 30
and justice are beautiful things, but rather it is punishment, 103
a suffering that follows upon injustice, and both the one who
meets with it and the one who does not is wretched’ (Laws
728c).149 So [in the Homeric example] people who have committed
many, very great injustices and have a wicked disposition, which is
labouring to bring forth yet greater and more terrible evils, submit to 5
punishment – something which initially seems to aggravate their con-
dition, since it leads them to the violation of the oaths, but in fact
leads them to submit to justice for their transgressions, performing an
operation like the opening up of wounds,150 which in the short term
extends the sufferings of bodies but, by casting out the pus concealed 10
under the skin, becomes in time the cause of health arising. The poem
teaches that this punishment begins from above, from Zeus (because
justice follows him as the avenger of those transgressing the divine
law), but is completed through Athena as intermediary, so that the 15
Trojans at some point pay the penalty, seeing into what evils they
have led themselves and how they bound their own life to the due
punishments. So the gods demonstrated that the definition of the most
extreme punishment which [the Trojans] had placed upon those doing
wrong was unshaken151 in their own case too, for their violation of the
148
So do the unnamed Greeks and Trojans affirm the terms of the agreement based on
the outcome of the single combat between Paris and Menelaus. Ironically, it is of
course Aphrodite who subverts the oath sworn between the warring sides by rescuing
Paris from death at Menelaus’ hands (3.383).
149
According to Gorgias 478d–e, the person who has committed injustice and escaped
punishment is even more miserable than the man who is caught and punished.
It nonetheless remains that both are wretched, albeit in different ways.
150
Proclus uses the same medical analogy at in Alc. 119.2.
151
Kroll alters the manuscripts’ ἀσάλευτον ἐφ’ to σαλευτὸν ὑφ’. The latter adjective
(σάλευτον) is very rare, appearing in one poem of Meleager (A.P. 5.174) and as
215
Essay 6
20 oaths and treaties. Firstly then, the gods are not responsible for this
transgression and disordered activity of the Trojans, but the Trojans,
because of their own wickedness, showed themselves worthy of [being
the instrument] of such an activity, and of them especially
Pandarus,152 because of his ambition and avarice and because he had
25 shown himself to live a godless life. For this reason Athena, going
forth in accordance with the plan (nous) of her father, does not move
just anyone to this deed, but she is said to seek out Pandarus, who is
especially suited to the action which will bring about punishment:
searching if she might find somewhere Pandarus opposed to the gods
30 (antitheos) (Il. 4.88).153
104 For such a type really is rare and difficult to find, one that will submit
to doing anything and having anything done to them, being opposed to
divinity because of the Gigantic154 and utterly brazen disposition of the
5 soul. So then just as doctors are not responsible for the incisions and
cauterisations, but rather the diseases of those being treated are respon-
sible, so the gods too are not responsible for these acts of impiety
regarding the oaths and the treaty, but rather the dispositions of those
performing these acts.155 And secondly, in addition to this, we should
consider that Athena is said not to go forth and compel Pandarus to
10 action, but only to test whether he would give himself over to this
action. That which is in our power (to eph’ hêmin) is not taken away
from us, even if we have committed the worst offences:
a variant (for ἀσάλευτον) in Didymus the Blind’s Commentarium in Zacchariam.

The adjective given by the MS, ἀσάλευτος, however, is very common in Proclus.
A TLG search turns up numerous Proclean examples, generally in contexts like this
one concerned with the immutability of the cosmic order. It also has good classical
philosophical pedigree (e.g. Pl. Ax. 370d). Introducing the idea of a ‘wavering’ limit
here, as Kroll’s text does, would not make sense. Festugière likewise notes: ‘Nulle
raison, à mon avis, de corriger 103.18’ (p. 120, n. 3). Lamberton concurs (p. 123,
n. 155).
152
Pandarus presents a special problem since at Il. 4.90 Athena persuades him to fire an
arrow at Menelaus, thus breaking the truce. Proclus seeks to absolve the gods of this
sin by suggesting that Athena merely appeals to the man’s existing greed when she
suggests that Alexander will reward him with ‘glorious gifts’ (4.98). Her ‘persuasion’ is
not any form of compulsion, nor can she be blamed for prompting his actions.
153
Proclus takes antitheos in this Homeric line as ‘opposed to the gods’, as is made clear on
lines 2–3 of the following page (p. 104), where it is glossed in this way. He would
certainly have known that this sense would not work on all occasions (e.g. when
applied to Menelaus).
154
On the significance of the giants see the note above on 74.15–16.
155
Cf. the medical metaphor in Decem Dubitationes with van den Berg (2014a) who
especially brings out the difference of meaning of similar metaphors in Plutarch and
Proclus.
216
Indeed, now would you obey me, bright-minded son of Lycaon? (Il. 4.93)
And he, out of greed for money and power, obeys and leaps forward 15
to unjust actions, while the poet all but shouts these things to us, which
Socrates also says in the Republic (X 618a–b): that many things are
offered to souls by the universe, which can astonish and confuse those
who are thoughtless (anoêtos) and reveal them making errors regarding 20
their choices of ways of life. So just as the prophêtês holds out the life of
a tyrant, and the first man making a choice foolishly selects it
(619b7–9), although that which is holding it out to him is a thing
entirely divine, in just the same way, when Athena puts before
Pandarus the choice of a more powerful and wealthier status combined
with godlessness, or its opposite, he makes the worse choice. Athena is 25
not responsible for the choice, but rather the wickedness of the one
choosing.156 Neither is it the prophêtês who is responsible for the
tyranny, but the greed of the one taking on this way of life. Thus
Pandarus has been said to ‘obey’ Athena out of thoughtlessness,
because he did not so much obey her, but rather the love of money 30
and thoughtlessness of his own soul. In fact, would it not be astonish- 105
ing if Athena were responsible, not for intelligence (phronêsis), but
thoughtlessness (anoia)? But the efflux (aporroia) of intellect is cun-
ning, says Plotinus (II 3.11),157 and the emanation (ellampsis) from
self-control is licentiousness and the excess158 of courage is reckless- 5
ness. For as many different forms of life as there are, it is necessary that
there should be a similar kind of participation in the greater powers.
Some people participate intellectively in the intellective, and some on
the level of opinion, and some on the level of phantasia. And some
people dispassionately (apathôs) experience the passions, some with
moderate affection (metriopathôs), and some in the grip of passion
(empathôs).159 Everything is set in motion by the gods and according 10
to [the agent’s] own suitability (epitêdeiotês). In this way the violation of
the oaths is not performed by Zeus and Athena but by Pandarus and
the Trojans. This activity depends upon the gods, since it is
a forerunner of justice, and since it prepares those submitting to the
complete correction of their sins (for such is the punishment, as the 15
156
Very close here to the words of Plato’s prophê tê s: αἰτία ἑλομένου, θεὸς ἀναίτιος (Rep.
617e4–5).
157
This is in Plotinus’ discussion (in the essay ‘On Whether the Stars are Causes’ (III 3))
of the weakening of supposed influences from the stars, so that what is good in the
heavens appears in distorted and diminished form in human beings. The phrases on
intellect and cunning follow Plotinus verbatim but the rest of the sentence paraphrases
more loosely.
158
Translating Kroll’s conjecture ἐπίδοσις rather than the MS’s δόσις
159
On apatheia, metriopatheia and the scale of virtues in Proclus, see Baltzly (2004).
217
Essay 6
Athenian Stranger taught us).160 And divinity is not responsible for

true evils for souls, but the wicked dispositions of souls are what lead
them into mistaken actions. All activity, even if it should be unharmo-
20 nious as it proceeds into the universe, arises with the gods having
ordained it, and providence either at the level of the whole or of the
parts. It happens unjustly for the one who acts and justly for the one
who is affected, as Plotinus says (IV.3.16). To the extent that [the
action] is godless it has its genesis from the partial cause which carries
25 out the impassioned act, while to the extent that it is good, for
achieving its proper end it results from those [gods] who ordained it.
It was necessary that those who embarked upon the greatest crimes
would at some time be called to justice, but this would never happen,
were it not for their wickedness being fully unfolded. At any rate many
dispositions of the mind, by remaining latent, make those who have
30 them unable to acquire the appropriate treatment. For this reason as
106 well the gods take counsel about stopping the war and the Trojans
being saved, and the goddess, who presides over justice,161 prevents
such an action, so that [the Trojans] may quickly be punished for their
sins. And her collaborator moves [the Trojans] towards the violation
5 of the oath, so that acting in accordance with the full measure of their
wickedness, they might receive the full measure of correction. It was
not good either that they remain untreated or that the wickedness
dwelling secretly within them should be treated before the secondary
transgressions. So when the whole unjust life in them has been cut
10 open, justice follows, restraining the whole of their impiety.
6.1.6 what does it mean in the poem that

strife is established among the gods by
zeus through themis? an explanation of
t h e w h o l e m e a n i n g ( T H E ÔR I A ) o f t h e m y t h .
<106.14–107.30>
So let us answer the difficulty spoken of above in some such way as this.
15 And since Socrates also makes mention (Rep. II 379e5) of contention of
160
Lamberton aptly cites Aristotle, Rhetoric 1369b12–14: διαφέρει δὲ τιμωρία καὶ κόλασις· ἡ
μὲν γὰρ κόλασις τοῦ πάσχοντος ἕνεκά ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ τιμωρία τοῦ ποιοῦντος, ἵνα πληρωθῇ.
161
The context in the Iliad would suggest that Proclus is thinking of Hera, as Festugière
and Lamberton observe, though she is not a good fit for a ‘goddess who presides over
justice’. Festugière speculates that Proclus may have considered Hera to be
a mouthpiece for Themis here. Alternatively, Kroll notes that the corrector who worked
on the Laurentian MS in the eleventh or twelth century (in Kroll’s praefatio, p. vi),
proposed the masculine ὁ τῆς δίκης προστάτης, which in the context would refer to Zeus.
218
6.1.6 Strife among the gods
the gods in Homer and the strife to which Zeus stimulates the multitudes
of the gods, elevating all of them to himself through Themis,162 we must
have some discussion concerning this too. It has been said many times
that Zeus is the monad of all the multiplicity of encosmic gods,163 and 20
that he is able to bring all of them forth from himself and to turn them
back towards himself.164 But since his activity going forth into multi-
plicity is double, part reverting to its source, and part moving towards the
care [promêtheia] of lower things, the poem also ascribes two speeches of 25
Zeus to the gods.165 In the earlier speech, he underlies the multiplicity of
the gods as the one demiurge of the whole, giving to them a share of his
unmixed purity, and he bestows powers upon them separate from the
universal division as a whole. For this reason he also exhorts all the gods 107
to keep away from the war and the opposition that is characteristic of
encosmic things. However in his second speech, he somehow moves
them towards providential care of inferior things and directs them
towards their allocated processions in relation to the universe, so that 5
not only are they assembled in accordance with the one demiurgic
intellect, which it is not possible for them to transgress, as the poem
says (Od. 5.104), nor to prevail against it, but so that they also are active
according to their own characters in relation to the things governed by
providence (ta pronooumena). For which reason in fact Zeus says:
Assist both sides, wherever the inclination of each of you lies (Il. 20.25). 10
Since, on the other hand, the processions of the gods are not drawn
apart from the demiurgic monad, Themis first turns them back towards
that:
162
In anticipation of this solution to the problem, Proclus characterises Zeus’ action of
sending Themis to summon the other gods at the opening of Iliad 20 in terms that
evoke the metaphysics of reversion. Anagô gê is of course familiar. For anakinein see
above 86.2 where the monstrous surface meaning of the myths stimulate those with
a philosophic nature to seek the higher hidden truths that they conceal.
163
Festugière aptly cites in Tim III 220.30 on the double action of the demiurge.
164
Cycles of procession and return recur in Proclus’ thought. Here Zeus as monad is
considered both to send out the other gods into the cosmos in order to carry out the
work of providence and to gather these same deities back to himself. The cyclic and
timeless nature of this process means that we can conceptualise either of the two
motions first: it offers Proclus no difficulty, in other words, to see the first speech of
Zeus as a gathering together of the gods, separating them from the cosmos, and
the second as sending them forth into providential activity. The Timaeus he sees, by
contrast, as describing the two phases of Zeus’/the demiurge’s activity as a unit
(107.20). This understanding of the two speeches of Zeus in the Iliad appears again
below at 165.13.
165
These two speeches, as Kroll already observed, are Il. 8.5–27 and Il. 20.20–30. In the
first of these Zeus threatens to cast the gods into Tartarus if they involve themselves in
the fighting, and in the second he urges them to fight for whichever side they choose.
219
Essay 6
15 Zeus bade Themis call the gods back to council (Il. 20.4),
so that by exercising their providential care in accordance with the will

of the father, they might also put into action the judgement of Themis.
20 But while the poet relays to us two distinct speeches of the universal
demiurge to the young gods, the Timaeus (41a) depicts him in a unified
way (hênômenôs), both turning the multiplicity back towards himself and
rousing them to providential care of mortals, so that they lead in
accordance with justice all the secondary beings of their own creation.
And this is not at all different from the notion of both moving them
25 towards war and rousing them towards himself through Themis. In fact
those who oversee the generative nature steer the war in matter, and
those acting in accordance with justice depend upon the universal
Themis, whose child is Justice,166 and they imitate the one demiurgic
intellect, for which it is not lawful (themis) to do anything except the
30 finest, as Timaeus himself says (30a).
108 6.1.7 what is the judgement of the

goddesses in the myth of the poet and what
differences between ways of life does it
allegorically convey?
<108.3–109.7>
Well now concerning the judgement of the goddesses, about which there
5 has been a lot of idle chatter, and which the myths, in their ancient
manner of speaking, say occurred in the presence of Alexander, it is not
right to consider that there was really strife among the goddesses when
they were subject to the judgement of a barbarian man.167 One ought
rather to think that there is a choice of ways of life, which Plato speaks
about on many occasions, subject to the gods who serve as guardians
(ephoros) of souls. And I suppose that Plato himself teaches this clearly in
10 the Phaedrus (252e–253e, 265b), saying that the kingly life belongs to
Hera, the philosophical life to Zeus, and the life governed by desire to
Aphrodite.168 Therefore when souls, according to their own judgement,
166
Cf. Hesiod, Theogony 901. Proclus equates the three daughters of Themis (Good
Order, Justice and Peace) with geometric, harmonic and arithmetic means established
by the Demiurge within the World Soul; in Tim. II 198.14–28.
167
On Proclus’ understanding of the choice of Paris see Pichler (2005), 211–16, who
rightly compares Sallustius, De Diis et Mundo 4 and 5.
168
Proclus discusses the choice of Paris again at In Remp. II 263–4. The arrangement
there is slightly different: though he again attributes the kingly life (basilikos) and the
life dominated by desire (erôtikos) to Hera and Aphrodite, the third option is the
warlike life (polemikos) (II 263.22), attributed to Athena.
220
6.1.8 The meaning of the gods’ transformations
choose certain ones of the lives that are offered to them by the universe,
and reject others, then the myths, by transferring to the gods themselves 15
the characteristics of the lives, say that it is the guardians of the variation
in forms among them who are judged by those selecting lives. According
to this same manner of speaking, Alexander is said to have been appointed
judge of Athena and Hera and Aphrodite, these being the three lives that 20
were held out before him, but he chose the life dominated by desire, and
this too not with intelligence (phronêsis), but running after the beauty of
visible things and pursuing the mere image of the intelligible beauty.169
One who is truly dedicated to desire employs intellect and intelligence as
his guiding principles, and in company with these contemplates both the
true beauty and the visible, and is not less under the influence of Athena 25
than of Aphrodite. However, one who pursues with passion the erotic
form of life in itself is cut off from those things that are truly beautiful and
good, and because of his foolishness and greed leaps after the image
(eidôlon) of the beautiful, and lies fallen upon it, and does not reach the 109
balanced perfection belonging to the erotic life. So then the one who is
perfectly dedicated to desire and is of concern to Aphrodite is led upwards
to the divine beauty itself, looking past the things which are beautiful in
sense-perception. But since there are also Aphrodisian daemones govern- 5
ing the beauty that is manifest [to the senses] and has its existence in
matter, for this reason even the man who follows only the image is said to
obtain the assistance of Aphrodite.
6.1.8 what is the meaning of the

transformations of the gods that are
introduced in the divine myths and in how
many ways do they arrange them and for 10
what kinds of reasons?
<109.11–114.29>
<Introduction of the problem and preliminary

concepts: 109.11–110.20>
This is what we shall say in response to this objection of Socrates. Since
we have already explained not only that the divine produces good works,
169
This diagnosis of the flaw in Paris’ character mirrors the diagnosis of Lysias in Plato’s
Phaedrus in the lectures of Proclus’ teacher Syrianus as they are reported in Hermias’
commentary. Lysias is ignorant of the intelligible beauty that is the object of Socrates’
love (44.6, ed. Lucarini and Moreschini). Because the object of Lysias’ love is the
sensible beauty in the outward form of Phaedrus, he is a licentious lover (11.19–20).
221
Essay 6
but also that it is unchangeable and without form and simple and always
15 the same and remains as it is,170 Socrates reasonably considers worthy of
judgement such lines from Homer as the following:
and the gods, in the likeness of strangers from foreign lands,
taking on all sorts of forms, frequent the cities (Od. 17.485–6),
20 and in addition all of the things that have been said about Proteus and
Thetis, how they change from their own forms and take on various
appearances.171
It is altogether clear, I suppose, that it is not appropriate for those
who are genuinely undertaking the political stage of their education to
listen to such things.172 This is because, if a stable state (politeia) is going
25 to exist, it is necessary that its paradigm also remains unchangeable, and
the paradigm of the constitution which is based on straightforward
character must be straightforward, and not variable or changing in all
kinds of transformations. When the creator ‘looks always to that which
110 is unchanging and he produces its form (idea) and power (dynamis),
everything is of necessity accomplished beautifully’, as Timaeus says
(28a6–b2). ‘But when he works with reference to what has come to be,
using a created model (genêton paradeigma), the result is not beautiful’.173
5 Indeed, the images (eidôlon) of [models] which admit change are much
more full of becoming (genesis) and of variability (poikilia) and material
ugliness [sc. than the images of models that are changeless].
And it is necessary next to bring together the thought of Homer,
which is divinely inspired, with philosophical reasoning (logismos).
170
Proclus regards the arguments of Rep. II, 379b1–16 and 380d1–c7 regarding the gods’
beneficence and changelessness as rigorous demonstrations from self-evident axioms.
See Essay 4 above and 115.8 below.
171
Proteus’ transformations are recounted at Od. 4.454–8.
172
The variation between the earlier translations of the phrase τῆς πολιτικῆς παιδείας
(109.22) reflects the difficulty of isolating its exact significance. While Festugière saw
this as ‘the education given by the city’ (l’éducation donnée par la cité (p.127)),
Lamberton translated it as ‘civic education’. The latter, we believe is better.
The myths discussed are not suitable for those receiving the political or civic stage
of their education, that is, those who are at a relatively early stage in their ascent
through the scale of virtues. On the scale of virtues see Saffrey, Segonds and Luna
(2001), lxix–c and Baltzly (2004).
173
Pace Festugière and Lamberton, Timaeus has not yet started speaking about the
Demiurge in the cosmic sense at this point of the dialogue, but is rather speaking
about the activity of a more earthly craftsman (δημιουργός), who might produce the
objects on which he works either by reference to the forms or by imitating already
existing physical objects. Timaeus’ Demiurge, who creates the cosmos as a whole,
though he delegates some subordinate tasks in the work of creation to other deities,
could not be said to create by reference to a generated (that is, secondary and physical)
paradigm as an inferior, worldly craftsman might.
222
Indeed, I am well aware that Homer has made one of the suitors speak
the words that we are considering, for which it is not legitimate to 10
chastise the poet. Similarly we do not consider it right to extract the
opinion of Plato from the words of Callicles nor those of
Thrasymachus, nor will we say that someone catches Plato out with
his refutations, if he should attempt to refute him through the brazen
things uttered by the sophists. But whenever Parmenides or Socrates or 15
Timaeus or some other similarly divine man speaks, then we believe that
we are hearing the teachings of Plato.174 And in fact we shall make
a judgement regarding the conceptions of Homer, not from what the
suitors say or one of those in his work who have been discredited for
their wickedness, but from what the poet himself clearly says or Nestor 20
or Odysseus.
<Response to Socrates’ objections: 110.21–114.29>
<Agreement of Homer with the working of theurgy: 110.21–112.12>

In any case, even if someone should want to ascribe these things to the
thought of Homer, he will find no lack of arguments which are in
agreement with all of the working (pragmateia)175 of theurgy, on the
one hand, and, on the other, with initiatory rites (teletai), mysteries and
the epiphanies of the gods, which are sent down from above, both in
dreams and in waking life, and which the prophetic utterance 25
(phêmê)176 of human beings has relayed. In all of these [contexts] the
gods hold forth many forms of themselves, and appear to change into
many shapes (schêma).177 Sometimes their formless light has been
projected, sometimes it has been shaped into the form of a human
174
An uncharacteristically clear statement of one of Proclus’ fundamental interpretive
principles: some of Plato’s characters speak for Plato. Yet even when it comes to the
words of an authorised mouthpiece, the character does not speak simply for Plato.
After all, the problem at hand is to explain how Socrates’ criticisms of Homer are only
apparent and do not mark a difference in doctrine between Homer and Plato.
175
The word πραγματείαι is slightly ambiguous. It could refer either to rituals, the sense
in which Festugière takes it (‘toutes les opérations de l’art hieratique’) or to written
works, as Lamberton translates (‘all of the hieratic treatises’). Both uses occur fre-
quently in Proclus: for the former see, for instance, in Remp. I 152.10 (of the rituals
carried out by Achilles at the pyre of Patroclus) and for the latter in Remp. I 133.6 (of
a monograph by Syrianus). In either case, Proclus aims to support Homer’s view by
reference to the theory and practice of theurgy.
176
Taking φήμη here specifically as prophetic utterance, a sense in which this word is also
use at in Remp. 2.236.4 and 2.144.11.
177
The contrast is between appearing in different forms on different occasions on the one
hand, and taking on multiple forms in a single manifestation on the other.
223
Essay 6
111 being, and sometimes again into some other shape.178 And the mys-
tical doctrine (mystagôgia) bestowed by the gods hands down this
teaching as well. For it says:
after this invocation you will either see a fire, similar to a child
extended by bounds over the billow of air,
5 or you will see a formless fire, from which a voice is sent forth,
or you will see a sumptuous light, rushing like a spiral around the field.
But you may even see a horse, more dazzling than light,
or even a child mounted on the nimble back of a horse,
10 [a child] of fire or covered with gold or, again, a naked [child]
or even [a child] shooting a bow and standing on the back [of a horse].
(Or. Chald. 146)179
15 In this and in the lines which the Oracles add next, they ascribe
neither alteration nor variability nor change to the divine from any-
where, but they demonstrate different types of participation (methexis)
in it. This is because the simplicity of the gods appears variable to those
seeing it, though the gods neither change nor attempt to deceive, but
nature itself defines the characteristics of the gods, in accordance with
the measures of those who participate in them. Although the god who is
20 participated is one, intellect participates in it differently, and intellective
soul differently again, and phantasia differently, and sense-perception
differently.180 Intellect receives it without division, the intellective soul
receives it by explication (aneiligmenôs),181 phantasia receives it in form,
and sense-perception receives it affectively. And that which is partici-
pated is uni-form (monoeidês) in its substantive existence (hyparxis), but
25 multi-form by participation (methexis), and it is unchanging in itself and
steadfastly established, but appears different at different times to those
participating in it due to their own weakness. Not only this, but the
weightless also appears to participate in [great] weight to those who are
112 filled with it. As one of the gods says, ‘the wretched heart of the one
178
Cf. 37.9–15 above.
179
The fiery vision is described in similar terms in fr.148 (des Places/Majercik). There are
some similarities too in the brief fragments 144 (on ‘forming the formless’) and 145
(on apparitions of light). Marinus also speaks of Proclus experiencing luminous
apparitions of Hecate (Ἑκατινοῖς φωτοειδέσιν) in the Life of Proclus (28.17–18).
Marinus specifies, however, that these apparitions, unlike those described in the oracle
quoted here, were of the goddess face to face (αὐτοπτουμένοις). On the meaning of this
term in the Greek magical papyri see the note on this passage in Saffrey, Segonds and
Luna (2001), 155–6, n. 12.
180
ET, prop. 142 makes this same point about the different manifestations of the gods at
different levels of existence.
181
Or more literally ‘by expanding it out’. ET 93 discusses the way in which the infinity of
things which have being is not infinite to them or to their superior principles, but only
to subsequent principles, so that they evade their explication (anelixis).
224
receiving [me] does not bear me’.182 For this reason the poet, in other
verses, with divine inspiration and because he has perceived such things
too, says regarding Athena:
the oaken axle creaked loudly
under her weight, for it carried a dread goddess (Il. 5.838–9). 5
And in this instance too one could ask: how is the weightless the cause
of weight? But the reason is that it is necessary for the thing participated
to appear like that which participates in it. So whether some of the gods
should appear in the likeness of strangers, or whether they should present
some other form, one must not ascribe the apparent change to them, but 10
rather to the phantasia creating variation in the different receptacles.
<The gods change their forms because of the multiplicity of

their powers: 112.13–113.19>
So this is one of the ways in which poetry describes the things which are
unchanging, changing into multiple forms. But it does this in another
way whenever the divine itself extends various visions to those who gaze 15
towards it, since it is a thing of many powers and full of all sorts of forms.
On those occasions, in order to demonstrate the variation in the powers,
[Homer] says that the thing itself, which has these powers in itself,
changes into many forms, projecting different ones at different times. 20
While it is always active through all of the powers, because of the
differing intellections of souls it always appears different through the
multiplicity of the [powers] which are embraced [within it].
It is in this way that Proteus is said to change his own form for those
who look at him, presenting a different appearance at each moment.183 25
Even though he is lesser than the very first gods, immortal, but not yet
182
As Festugière notes, correcting δοχέως to δοχῆος (as does Wolff, followed by Kroll)
gives a trochaic tetrameter, which would indicate that this fragment does not come
from the Chaldaean Oracles, since these appear to have used only dactylic hexameters.
(See Dodds (1961), 267 n. 17.) Lewy ((1978), 39–40) discusses the nature of the
‘recipient’ in Chaldaean rites as a vehicle through whom the god could speak, seeing
this as a Chaldaean technical term despite the metre. Dodds, however, argues that it
may be of Porphyrian origin, though connected by later Neoplatonists with theurgy,
as Proclus plainly does. Majercik ((2013, 271), summarising these arguments, adds
that ‘[T]he more common expression is κάτοχος. In a theurgic context, the “recipient”
is the medium who “receives” the conjured god.’
183
ἄλλος καὶ ἄλλος: though this does not echo the wording of Homer, this type of phrasing
had become common for describing Proteus, e.g. Philostratus, VA 1.4: ὡς ποικίλος τε
ἦν καὶ ἄλλοτε ἄλλος. Nonnus (Dionysiaca 1.13–33) uses Proteus’ poikilia as an analogy
for the poikilia of his text. Neither the language of poikilia nor the allos-phrases appear
in the Homeric passage, but have clearly gathered in the scholarly/poetic vocabulary
225
Essay 6
a god, and a servant184 of Poseidon, but not yet one who has attained
a leading position, nonetheless he is an angelic intellect (nous . . .
angelikos)185 allotted to Poseidon, and he both possesses and encom-
113 passes in himself all of the forms of things that come to be. Firstly
Eidothea is placed under his command, she being a daemonic soul
related to the appropriate (oikeios) intellect, which is divine, and who
has attached her own intellections (noêsis) to the forms of that intellect.
5 And there follows also a number of other souls, rational and eternal,
which the myth refers to as ‘seals’. For this reason too Proteus is
described as counting them (Od. 4.411), because the poetry is demon-
strating their eternity. This, I suppose, is because the number of things
coming to be and passing away is indefinite.186 So then because Proteus
is an intellect, and an intellect which possesses many powers and is
10 entirely full of forms, as the partial souls gaze upon it and project the
changes of their own intellections differently upon different forms, they
imagine that the change belongs to the objects of intellection. This is
why he seems to become all things to those clinging to him,
as many things as creep
15 upon the earth and water and divinely kindled fire (Od. 4.417–18).
All of the forms that he has and has embraced, or rather all those that
he is, always and eternally, seem to arise in turn because of the partial
apprehension of those contemplating him.
<The gods assume the forms of the classes into which they
descend: 113.20–114.29>
20 Let us speak next about the third [possibility]. Namely, when it is not
a matter of various figures (schêma) of the one [deity] manifest through
used by Nonnus, Philostratus and Proclus. None of this language appears on the few
occasions when Plato’s Socrates mentions Proteus. With the one exception of the
Republic passage that prompts Proclus’ discussion here, Proteus is used ironically by
Plato to represent an interlocutor who refuses to impart the knowledge that he has of
the topic under discussion, and who keeps shifting his position to conceal this knowl-
edge: Euthyphro 15d3; Euthydemus 288b8; Ion 541e7.
184
Echoing Homer’s own term here: ὑποδμώς (Od. 4.386), which is otherwise a rare word.
185
Proclus sees a similar succession in the Parmenides: Pythodorus is likened to the
angelic order (as a second interpretive choice after the divine soul), Antiphon resem-
bles the daemonic soul, and therefore relays words (logoi) from Pythodorus to the men
from Clazomenae, who are individual souls (in Parm. 629.10–24). See also the discus-
sion of this passage in Lamberton (1986), 226–7.
186
That is, the fact that Proteus counts these souls indicates that they must be eternal,
since it is possible to enumerate them, as generated and perishable things cannot be
counted.
226
the receptacles subject to it, nor a matter of the object of contem-

plation being a thing of many powers and unified but presenting an
appearance (phantasia) of change because of the multiplicity of its
powers, but rather when the same thing goes forth through differ-
ent classes and settles itself even among the final ones, multiplying 25
itself numerically and descending into lower orders. In this case too
the myths say that what is proceeding to this form from above
changes into the thing into which it has made the procession.
Hence the myths say that Athena takes on the likeness of Mentor
(Od. 2.268) and Hermes that of a seagull (Od. 5.51) and Apollo that 30
of a hawk (Il. 15.237), thereby indicating their more daemonic 114
orders, into which they have proceeded from the universals.
Because of this, when they record divine epiphanies, they attempt
to keep them free of shape and form, as for example when Athena
appears to Achilles and is manifest to him alone, although the 5
whole army is present. In that passage no shape or pattern (typos)
of the goddess is handed down in accordance with the mythic
screen (proschêma), but it simply says that she was present. What
the manner of that presence was, the narrative leaves unspoken. But
when they record angelic epiphanies, they introduce into the story 10
gods taking on other forms, but these forms are in fact of
a universal nature, for example, going into a human form or into
the general form of a man or a woman without further specifica-
tion. In this way Poseidon and Athena were present too, and again
to Achilles:
Poseidon and Athena quickly
came and stood near him, like in their form to men. (Il. 21.284–5) 15
And whenever they relate daemonic visitations, then they do not

think it unworthy to record transformations into individual and partial
things or even into the forms of different kinds of animals, for the last of 20
the classes, which eternally follow the gods, are manifested through
such figures.
So you see how such narratives are shaped in accordance with the
arrangement of realities, since simplicity is appropriate to the divine,
universality to the angelic, individuality to the daemonic. And the
intellective is appropriate to the first, the rational to the second, and 25
the class of irrationality to the last, since an irrational life of this sort has
been woven into the order of the daemones.
This is what I have found it possible to say about the ways in which the
myths in Homer contrive changes of the things without change, and the
ways in which they introduce multiplicity of forms into the things that
are uni-form.
227
Essay 6
115 6.1.9 how one must defend the sending of

the dream, which appears to ascribe
falsehood to the gods, and to show that
the divine is without falsehood.187
<Statement of the problem: 115.4–13>
5 It remains for me to speak about the sending of the dream, which the
poet says was sent by Zeus to Agamemnon. Socrates finds fault with this
at the end of his discussion of guidelines (typos) regarding theology (Rep.
388a), for the reason that everything divine and daemonic is without
falsehood, as he himself had shown to be necessary by demonstrational
10 (apodeiktikos) methods. But the poet says that Agamemnon was deceived
by this dream. Certainly, how is it not strange, if indeed ‘dreams come
from Zeus’ (Il. 1.63) and according to his decree, that this is practically
the only deceptive one, of all the those deemed worthy of memory –
a dream which has its very first origin from Zeus?
<Responses: 115.13–117.21>
<Traditional response: 115.13–26>

Let us reply in the terms in which the majority of interpreters who are
15 accustomed to address this difficulty do: that the lie had its existence in
the imagination (phantasia) of Agamemnon.188 Zeus indicates in his words
to the dream, and the dream in turn indicates through its terminology
(rhêma) to Agamemnon,189 that it is necessary to move the whole army
20 and attack the enemy with all soldiers (because this is what is meant by the
term ‘with all forces’ (passudiêi) on both occasions). [The majority of
interpreters say that] Agamemnon misunderstands the command and
187
Sheppard (1980), 58–62 discusses this passage with particular reference to the extent
to which it conveys Syrianus’ reading.
188
Friedl (1936), 59–65 argued that, whenever Proclus cites Homeric interpretation pre-
dating Syrianus, he is drawing on Syrianus who in turn drew on Porphyry’s Homerica
Zê tê mata. Though here it is likely that Proclus follows Syrianus in first reporting this
earlier material, which is indeed found in Porphyry, it need not follow that Proclus
never consulted Porphyry’s work for himself, nor that it was the sum of his reading in
Homeric interpretation.
189
τοῦ γὰρ Διὸς ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὸν ὄνειρον λόγοις καὶ αὖ τοῦ ὀνείρου διὰ τῶν πρὸς τὸν
Ἀγαμέμνονα ῥημάτων ἐνδεικνυμένων. Proclus’ description of the manner in which the
dream is sent to Agamemnon places the dream as an intermediary through which the
logoi of the god – with all that that term connotes for a Neoplatonist – is translated into
concrete words. Homer’s text, in which Zeus addresses the dream and sends it forth to
relay his words, provides a textual justification for this; cf. Il. 2.8–10.
228
6.1.9 The dream that ascribes falsehood to the gods
overlooks the greater part of the army, and although deprived of the hand
of Achilles he nevertheless attempts the battle. [They say that] he does not
achieve his goal because of his own inexperience in judging divine
apparitions.190 In this way it is not Zeus who is responsible for the 25
deception, but he who misunderstands the commands of Zeus.
<Syrianus’ response: 115.26–116.24>

So let that stand as we have said, but let the conception (epibolê) of our
teacher (kathêgemôn)191 be added to this, since it aims [to make sense] of
both the intention of Homer and of the true state of reality. If Zeus is 116
assumed to care (pronoein) about the honour due to the hero Achilles,
and yet considers how he might destroy so large a number of Greeks (Il.
2.3–4), how is it not necessary for him to be antecedently responsible for
the deception? He would not have destroyed the Greek force if Achilles 5
were present, nor would they have paid the penalty for the injustice to
him. Therefore it is better to say that the deception comes from the god
for the good of those who are deceived.192 Moreover the good is more
powerful than truth, and while among the gods they are closely united
with each other (because there exists neither intellect without divinity,
nor divinity without intellective substance (noera ousia)), among the 10
things that participate [in the gods] they are often divided, and the
good arises because of a falsehood and the true fails to attain the portion
of the good.193 For this reason too Socrates himself, when he is estab-
lishing the laws for the guardians, instructs them to employ a great deal
of falsehood (Republic 459c) in keeping with the opinion of the ignorant,
since they are not otherwise able to attain the good which is appropriate 15
to them. So if someone should say that god acts beneficently to some
people through truth, and to others through falsehood, but that he
nevertheless leads all back towards the good, this would be nothing
astonishing. Moreover of the things that come into being, some exist
without matter and others with matter, in which is the true falsehood.194 20
190
Kroll cites Macrobius, In Somnium Scipionis I 7.4 ff., which gives the same Homeric
interpretation, and goes on to apply the same principle to an apparently misleading
oracle in the Aeneid.
191
This is Proclus’ normal term for Syrianus.
192
The idea that the gods may deceive mortals or even prompt them to evil for their own
ultimate good is also put to use in the discussion of the violation of the oaths above:
I 100–106.
193
ἀποπίπτει τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοίρας. For periphrastic phrases formed with the noun moira,
see LSJ s.v. A. v and compare Plato, Phlb. 54c10 and 60b3–4.
194
Sheppard (1980), 60 astutely notes the slide in the meaning of ‘false’ (ψευδής) from
a logical one (‘false’ instead of ‘true’) to a metaphysical one (‘falsehood’ as a property
intrinsic to material things).
229
Essay 6
So in the providence of souls, if Zeus should care, in the manner

described, for some in one way and others differently, and care for
some immaterially through the truth and others materially through
falsehood, these things would also, I suppose, have a rationale fitting
for the gods.
<Proclus’ addition: 116.24–117.21>

25 And if it is necessary to say this:195 let us assert that deception and
falsehood are born in that which participates, but that this happens
through the will of the god, so that the discordant element might
become more self-controlled by means of the deception. In just this
way whatever is material is engendered down here, but exists according
30 to the providence of the demiurge, so that there might be both becom-
ing and dissolution, which brings the universe to completion.
117 Therefore the divine does not deceive, but the one deceived is
deceived by himself, though this arises in accordance with the will of
the divine for the good of the one who suffers it. Although the god
creates immaterially, that which comes into being arises materially, and
5 though the god works without division, the created arises in parts, and
though the god communicates by signs intellectively, deception arises as
a derivative existence (paryphistasthai)196 in the one receiving the sign.
The divine poet himself also demonstrates this point, that while truth
exists in the presence of the gods falsehood is engendered because of the
foolishness of those receiving, when he has Zeus advise the dream ‘to say
10 everything very exactly’ (Il. 2.10). So how does falsehood arise in a god
according to Homer? And how is a god responsible for deception?
Unless one should mean that the deception arising here as a derivative
existence is not engendered against the will of the god. But the disposi-
tion of the young is not able to distinguish and to contemplate these
15 things: how even though the universals remain free from evil, evil arises
in the things which participate divisibly in them; and how even though
the greater beings do not deceive us, we are often deceived; and how
when we are deceived we experience this in accordance with providence.
195
Proclus turns now to his own synthesis of Syrianus’ opinions and those of earlier
commentators. It is difficult to say how much of the immediately preceding section
was already Proclus’ extension and adaptation of Syrianus’ view.
196
See Sheppard’s discussion of evil as παρυφίστασις in Proclus, according to which ‘evil
is rather like the harmful side-effects of a beneficent drug: it has no special cause
distinct from the cause of good. Moreover, unlike the side-effects of a drug, it arises
not because of the nature of the cause but because of the nature of the object affected’
(Sheppard (1980), 61). See the discussions of Opsomer and Steel (1999), Opsomer
(2001), and Chlup (2012), 201–33.
230
6.1.10 General defence of Homeric and Platonic myths
For this reason Socrates wished that the young should not listen to such 20
stories, because they are not able to hold well-articulated mental
impressions (phantasia) about them.
6.1.10 a general defence of both homeric and

platonic myths, in which they speak about
the places of judgement in hades and the
various allocations which disembodied
souls possess, corresponding to the 25
distinctive features of their
embodied lives.
<117.22–122.20>
Since we have now completed our discussion of these things, let us
examine again, from another starting point, the things written in the
third book of the Republic. Before all else, let us examine the things 118
which the poet has uttered in mythological form regarding things in
Hades, either speaking in his own person or using some other as
speaker. Let us consider whether these possess some truth and appear
consistent with the teachings of Plato. So what does that man mean 5
who prefers a servile position in the life here to all the possessions in
Hades (Od. 11.488–503)? And what is the meaning of the fearful
dwelling places that the gods despise (Il. 20.64–5), and the apparition
and the soul, that go about devoid of intellect (Il. 23.103–4), and the
lives compared to shadows (Od. 10.495), and the lamentations of souls
carried from here to there (Il. 16.856–7), and the comparison of them 10
to bats (Od. 24.6–14), and the smoke and the shrill cry (Il. 23.107–8),
and all such things that have been written in the poems, and the rivers
in Hades, and the most melodramatic of the names?197 Socrates did
indeed censure these things and made one common argument against 15
them all, namely that while they are fine in other regards, we fear198 for
the sake of the guardians, that they might come to consider death
a frightening thing because of such terrors (387c3–5). Yet it is clear,
I suppose, to anyone, that Plato himself uses such names and allegories
(ainigma) on many occasions. And I pass over the rivers in the Phaedo 20
197
These Homeric passages are chosen, of course, because they are Plato’s examples of
inappropriate poetry at Republic 386b8–387c5.
198
The text appears to be corrupt at this point, giving δέομεθα as the verb. The passage of
the Republic echoed here has φοβούμεθα, and Festugière reasonably conjectures
δειδισσόμεθα, which both gives an appropriate meaning and could readily be corrupted
into δέομεθα.
231
Essay 6
(112a–114c), and the wanderings of souls (108c) and their confusion,

and the crossroads (108a) and the punishments and the carrying away
in the streams, and the lamentations of those in the underworld and
their crying out and the supplication of those whom they have
wronged (113d–114b). Passing by these things, of which Plato says
that the realm of Hades is full, how could one deny that what he has
25 written at the end of the text conveys the same thought as the Homeric
poems: the bellowing mouth (Rep. 615e), Tartarus, the blazing dae-
mones torturing Ardiaeus (615c5–616a4), the souls covered in dirt and
filth (614d)? What extremity of melodrama is missing from these
119 things?199 Consequently, consistent reasoning must either reject
both Homeric and Platonic myth or must not find fault with the
teaching of Homer.
So whether some Epicurean should attempt to bring a charge against
such myths or someone else should, let us say about both, that the
5 dispositions of souls separated from the body differ and that the places
in the universe into which they are settled are of varied form. Some souls
are so separated from the mortal instruments that they neither have any
relation (schesis)200 towards the things that are worse nor are they filled
10 up with the disturbance in those instruments and material foolishness.
Of necessity the luminous garments that they wear are pure, and are not
dirtied by material vapours or grown thick from the earthy nature.
Other souls though, because they have not entirely purified themselves
through philosophy, but are drawn to cling to the oyster-like body and
15 pursue the life associated with it,201 show vehicles (ochêma) attached
to themselves of a similar kind to those who are able to see,202 vehicles
that are shadowy and material and weighed down by the past
199
Literally: ‘What of the greatest tragedy is lacking in these things’. Proclus’ attitude to
tragedy is uniformly negative and references such as this one and the one above
(118.13: ‘the most melodramatic of the names’) assume without further discussion
that tragedy is the height of overwrought bad taste.
200
Proclus accepts the ideas of Theodore of Asine and Iamblichus that reincarnation in
animal form for wicked souls consists in the existence of a very intimate relation
(schesis) between the soul and an animal body. Thus souls may be more or less tightly
related to the bodies that they animate. See in Tim. II 142.24–7 (= Theodore testi-
monium 20 (Deuse) and Iamblichus, in Tim. fr. 52) and in Remp. II 309.28–310.18;
311.19–22 (= Theodore, test. 38).
201
The notion of the physical body as ‘oyster-like’ begins in Plato, Philebus 21c8. With
the development of a theory of ‘vehicles’ of souls, which facilitate souls’ interaction
with their physical bodies but which can be separated and purified of the body’s
influence, the ‘oyster-like’ body takes on a role as the last and most material of bodies.
See for instance Marinus, Proclus 3.11–12 where the traces of Proclus’ virtues are said
to have been evident even ‘in his final and oyster-like garment’ (ἐν τῷ τελευταίῳ καὶ
ὀστρεώδει αὐτοῦ περιβλήματι).
202
On the doctrine of the soul’s assorted vehicles, see Finamore (1985).
232
(opisthobarês),203 and dragging with them a great deal of the mortal

composite. For this reason Socrates says in the Phaedo that such souls,
loitering around their tombs, give rise to shadowy visions (81d), and 20
the poet similarly has recounted that they dart about like shadows (Od.
10.495).
Moreover there are many differences as well among the souls that still
clasp themselves to the life down here. Some souls, who lived more
actively and had not yet departed from such a life, embrace the instru- 25
ment suited to practical activities and loathe being separated from it, just
as the soul of Patroclus does when ‘deprived of its manliness and youth’
(Il. 22.363). When they are in Hades they long for it to accompany
them, like the soul of Achilles does, because he too prefers the life here 120
to one separated from the body, since he cannot operate in that life, but
in the active life he was supreme. Through bad living other souls indulge
the oyster-like body and the life associated with it, because they believe 5
that there is nothing better than the life in it. The inspired poetry
likened these souls to bats, because they are carried to the dark and
most remote part of the universe, which one might call a ‘cave dreadful
and divine’ (Od. 24.6), and because the wings of their souls are fleshy and
thick and earthy.204 In light of this why would it be astonishing that 10
Achilles, who possesses practical virtue, should desire the life in com-
pany with the body, since that body can serve his actions? Heracles,
because he was purified by initiation and had shared in the pure fruits,205
achieved the complete restoration to the gods:
He himself, among the immortal gods, 15
rejoices in celebrations and has as his wife
Hebe of the beautiful ankles. (Od. 11.602–3)
Many things have been said in many places already concerning the
deification of Heracles. But Achilles, by contrast, still desires success in
actions and this life, and he pursues the instrument appropriate to the 20
203
This word, though in Greek in general not very common, appears with some fre-
quency in Proclus, probably because of its appearance in the Chaldaean Oracles:
δύσκαμπτος καὶ ὀπισθοβαρὴς καὶ φωτὸς ἄμοιρος (155, line 1). It also appears in circum-
stances somewhat similar to this passage (dealing with the hindering effect of this kind
of baggage of the soul) in Plotinus VI 9.4.22.
204
The idea of the soul’s wings comes, of course, from the Phaedrus, but for the antipathy
between mental acuity and density of flesh see Tim. 75a.
205
The phrase seems to suggest an allegorical understanding of the Apples of the
Hesperides. Heracles, as Festugière notes, was reputed to be one of the first strangers
initiated into the Eleusinian Mysteries, and became in later times (e.g. in Roman
funerary art) the exemplar of the human being who achieves immortality through his
labours (Festugière 139, n. 1).
233
Essay 6
life here and longs for it. Plato himself says that it is according to their
habits that souls for the most part choose their second lives (Republic
620a). And how does it not belong to the Homeric teaching, divinely
inspired as it is, to distinguish the soul and its spectral image (eidôlon),206
25 and [to distinguish] the intellect from the soul, and to state that the soul
employs the image, but that the intellect is more divine than both? [And
does it not belong to that teaching] to consider the image and the soul to
be in some way acquaintances, and that while the soul is still restrained
121 in bodies it appears as protector of the oyster-like body, and that it longs
for its providence over it even when that body is no more, but that the
intellect cannot be apprehended by our motions that are imaginative
(phantastikos) and limited by form?207 It is because of these beliefs that
5 Achilles, when he sees Patroclus speaking about the burial208 of his
body, believes that [Patroclus’] soul and apparition are in Hades, but
that there is no intellect in them nor any intelligence (phronêsis) using
them (Il. 23.107–8).209 The activities of the irrational disposed him to
postulate the presence of these two parts, but he was not able, on the
basis of the dream visions, to believe in the tradition concerning the
intellective soul.210
206
Festugière similarly translates eidô lon as ‘l’image fantomatique’. Given the reference to
Heracles not long before, it is likely that it is this distinction between soul and mere
ghostly image that is meant. The passage from later in this essay (172.10–27), which
Lamberton cites in support of understanding the eidô lon here as the body (as image of
the soul), tends rather to support the view that it is Heracles’ ghostly apparition which
is meant in the current passage. Heracles’ body, after all, is not there for Odysseus to
see, but only the apparition, while ‘the man himself’ (which Proclus identifies with his
soul) has been taken to Olympus.
207
We have followed Festugière’s repunctuation of this sentence and his omission of the
καί at 120.28. Lamberton rightly argues, however, that Festugière’s corrections do not
seem to have solved all of the problems of this difficult sentence. We believe that
Lamberton is correct to return to the manuscript readings κατεχομένης (120.27) and
κηδεμόνα (120.28). While it makes good sense to see the soul as a guardian of the
oyster-like body, it does not make sense to see the apparition in this way, as this
presumably only exists as a kind of vestige after the separation of soul and body.
On 121.1 we accept Lamberton’s γιγνομένου for the manuscript’s γιγνομένην.
208
Pace both Festugière and Lamberton περὶ τῆς ταφῆς must be ‘about his burial’ rather
than ‘near his tomb’/‘près du tombeau’, as Patroclus has not at this point been buried,
and has come precisely to ask for burial.
209
Quite closely paraphrasing Il. 23.107–8.
210
The last sentence of this section of the discussion is again very difficult, and
Lamberton is right to see a change of subject between the two halves of it (the activities
of the irrational parts in the first section, Achilles himself in the second). We take it to
mean that Achilles sees the apparition of Patroclus as verifying only the survival of
some, irrational parts of his friend, and not necessarily the higher faculties. Proclus
appears to be alluding to Il. 23.104: ψυχὴ καὶ εἴδωλον, ἀτὰρ φρένες οὐκ ἔνι πάμπαν
234
And how are these things not also entirely in harmony with the 10
realities themselves, in the fact that the majority of souls depart from
their bodies with lamentation and are wrenched away with difficulty
because of their lives in it and their longed-for pleasures?211 These
pleasures, at any rate, as Socrates also says (Phaed. 83d), as if they had
a nail, transfix them and fasten them to their bodies. [And how is it not 15
in harmony with reality] that souls going out from the body employ
vehicles that are shadowy and clouded by lunar vapours212 and weighted
down and earthly, and that such souls make an inarticulate sound and
a material noise, which the poetry has called ‘a shriek’? Just as in the case
of souls which are ascending the instruments213 give out a voice that is 20
harmonious and in tune, and manifest with a rhythmic motion, so in the
case of those souls being carried away below the earth and who are more
irrational the sound is like a shriek, carrying a trace only of the appetitive
and illusory (phantastikos) life.
Moreover the regions of Hades and the places of judgement under 25
the earth and the rivers, which both Homer and Plato have taught to us,
must not be thought empty imaginings and mythical horrors. Rather
just as for souls which are ascending into the heavens a wide variety of 122
places have been assigned for their allocation up there, so one must also
believe that places have been dedicated under the earth for souls which
are still in need of punishment and purification. These places are made
up, on the one hand, from diverse effluences of the elements above the
earth, which effluences [Plato and Homer] have called rivers and 5
streams. While on the other hand, different orders of daemones have
been appointed there, some as avengers, some to inflict punishment,
some for purification, and some as judges. If the poetry has spoken of
‘places dank and terrible to look upon which the gods despise’ (Il.
20.65), it is not right to find fault with this. While these [descriptions 10
of these places of judgement] astonish214 souls through their variety and
(‘a soul and an image but there is no mind in it at all’). Proclus’ wording implies that he
sees Achilles as not accepting a pre-existing tradition concerning such survival.
211
There is a striking double meaning to Proclus’ choice of adjective here: πολυάρατος.
The usual meaning is ‘much prayed for’, ‘much desired’, but given that an ἀρά can be
a curse as well as a prayer, this composite adjective also develops the sense ‘much
cursed’ (in which it appears, for example, in Damascius, Philosophic History, fr. 18.7).
See further on another such usage n. 229 below.
212
Following Kroll’s emendation of σειρηνίων to σεληναίων, as do Festugière and
Lamberton.
213
Though these ‘instruments’ are the subtle bodies more normally referred to as
‘vehicles’ (ochêmata), the term organa suits their role in this passage as both instruments
of the body and musical instruments.
214
The effects of being astonished (kataplassô ) can be good or ill. Souls who are primed to
ascend can be astonished by the surface meaning of the myths and look for the inner
235
Essay 6
the appearances of those who preside over them, they are to be expli-
cated in terms of the different allocations that are proper for the vari-
eties of moral characters of those who have been carried there [for
judgement]. The places at the [innermost] limit of the universe, contain-
15 ing much material disorder and lacking the benefit of the solar rays, are
those [destinies] that are furthest from the gods.
Let that suffice for discussion of these lines, which Socrates thought
worthy of crossing out, and which he thought that those who were
educated by him should not listen to at all. This is because he considered
that through them the soul’s love of the body would be increased and the
20 separation from this life might appear to the imagination more fearful
than anything.
6.1.11 what are the reasons for which the

poetry attributes lamentations to the
heroes and to the gods, and even to the
best of the heroes and to the greatest of
the gods?
<122.21–126.4>
<Statement of the problem: 122.21–123.28>
25 It follows, I suppose, upon what has just been said, to consider the question
of how poetry does not encourage each one of us to be a lover of tears and
a lover of lamentation, when it makes even the heroes, not to say even the
gods themselves, weep for the deaths of their dearest ones. After all in Plato
123 (Phaedo 59a)215 Socrates has been celebrated for remaining unsoftened and
unyielding towards the tears of his family members, but Apollodorus, for
weeping in floods, has been thought worthy of censure by the great
teacher,216 along with anyone else behaving similarly. But the divine poet
5 tells of the heroes grieving without restraint for the loss of their family
members. Moreover, someone might say, even if it was necessary that
Priam experience such suffering, ‘rolling in the dung’ and ‘calling upon
each man by name’ (Il. 22.414–15), since he was a barbarian and more
irrational, surely it was not necessary that Achilles, the child of a goddess,
10 should grieve, lying now on his back, then on his front and then on his side,
truth (above 86.7), while souls that lack intelligence can be astonished by the many
ways of life that they can choose from and make poor choices (104.18).
215
The Phaedo, as the foundational Platonic text for the Neoplatonic notion of cathartic
virtues, is an important point of reference in this part of the discussion.
216
Socrates is here the kathê gemô n, the same term which Proclus habitually uses of
Syrianus.
236
6.1.11 Lamentations of the heroes and the gods
and that he should lament like a child, pouring dust down over his head (Il.
24.9–12). And even if this suffering is appropriate to humans who have as
their lot a mortal nature, still it is not suitable for the gods themselves.
So why was it necessary for Thetis to weep saying:
Alas, I am wretched, alas how unfortunate in my bearing of an outstanding child 15
(Il. 18.54)?
Surely divinity sits calmly, far from pleasure and grief. And even if one
dared to introduce the gods suffering such emotions, still it was not
necessary that the greatest of the gods mourn for Hector when he was
pursued (Il. 22.169), nor for his son, Sarpedon (Il. 16.143), and to
exclaim ‘alas for me’ over both of them.217 This sort of mimêsis does 20
not seem at all appropriate to its paradigms, introducing tears to the
tearless, griefs to the griefless, and in general sufferings to those who are
without suffering. For such things as these Socrates chastises the poet
and he throws him out from the education of the young, since he is
ensuring that there might not arise through such expressions as these an 25
obstacle for him in elevating them directly towards virtue. Education is
especially concerned with griefs and pleasures, and if these become too
intense, the lawgiver must fail to achieve the goal appropriate to him.
<Response: 124.1–126.4>
<The character of the heroes: 124.1–23>

Let us say in response to these censures that the poet appropriately 124
depicts the heroes as men who are absorbed in practical actions and have
chosen the life appropriate to these actions, and has brought them into
his poem suffering emotion about each of the things that happens to
them and living in this way. For philosophers and for those who are 5
engaged in purifying themselves, pleasures and griefs and the combina-
tions of these are not at all appropriate. This is because they are
separating themselves from these things and are doing away with all
mortal foolishness and they are striving to strip themselves of those
forms of life which entangle them like nets,218 snatching themselves 10
away from all affects depending on matter and that bring about genera-
tion. But for those engaged in warfare and acting in accordance with the
emotive faculty (to pathêtikon), both pleasures and griefs are appropriate,
as are sympathies and antipathies, and the tragic drama of all such
passions. And how could there be any place for intensity in action, if 15
217
All these passages are, of course, cited by Socrates at Rep. 388a–c.
218
Following Kroll’s conjecture, as does Festugière, though without comment.
237
Essay 6
the appetites were not experienced intensely? Therefore it is not sur-

prising that both Priam and Achilles lament and grieve for their family
members, since they are not philosophers and do not wish to separate
themselves from becoming and are not living in the manner of the
Guardians. The loss of loved ones and being left without children and
20 the destruction of cities all seem to men engaged in warfare to provide
a great portion of suffering. So it is appropriate to them to perform great
deeds, because they possess a heroic nature, and the emotive faculty is
appropriate to them because they are intensely engaged with particulars.
<Symbolic lamentations of gods and heroes: 124.23–126.4>

In the case of the gods themselves, when they are said to weep and grieve
25 for those dearest to them, this is told in a different manner, and one
which long ago seemed fitting to the creators of myths, who were
accustomed to demonstrate the providential care of the gods for the
coming into being and passing away of mortal things by speaking of the
gods’ tears. By nature that over which providence is exercised is worthy
30 of tears, and so gives to the creators of myths a reason to speak allegori-
cally about it in terms like:
125 Your tears are the race of suffering men,
as someone says in a hymn to Helios (Orph. fr. 354). For the same
reason in the mysteries we have received in a mystical manner the
5 tradition of sacred lamentations, because these are a symbol of the
providence which comes to us from the higher beings. Therefore both
Thetis and Zeus are said to grieve for those dearest to them when they
are in extreme danger, not because they are affected emotionally in the
same manner as humans, but because there proceed from them
10 a certain distinct forethought and a dispensation upon particulars.
And whenever the arrangement of the universe coincides with this
divided providence, the preservative activity of that which exercises
providence is unimpeded. But when, on the other hand, [the order of
the universe] stands opposed (insofar as there is a part of the cosmos
15 that, having been allotted becoming, awaits its destruction), then the
myths represent the particularity of the providence assigned to this
thing, thanks to its status as a part, by saying that those who exercise
providence ‘lament’. Saying this they all but shout out that the lament
is a symbol (synthêma) among them of the individual providence exer-
cised upon particulars.
So we shall explain the laments attributed to the very first of the gods
20 in the way that we have suggested, since initiatory rites have handed
down sacred lamentations of Kore and Demeter and of the greatest
238
6.1.12 The laughter among the gods
goddess herself219 among their secrets (aporrêta). But in the case of the
last of the classes that follow the gods at each moment and that care
directly for mortals, and employ appetites and sufferings and have their 25
life among these things, it is not surprising if they should rejoice at the
salvation of those over whom providence is exercised, and shrink from
and be distressed by their destruction, and change in accordance with
their sufferings:
The nymphs weep when there are no leaves on the oaks,
and the nymphs rejoice again, when rain makes the oaks flourish, 30
as one of the poets says. All things exist in a divine way among the 126
220
gods, but partially and in a daemonic mode among the divided beings
who preside over us.
This suffices for the present topic (prothesis) of the laments that are
described among the gods.
6.1.12 what is the reason for the laughter 5

described among the gods, and why does
the poetry make them laugh
uncontrollably at hephaestus?
<126.5–128.23>
Next we must consider the emotion that is most opposed to these
[lamentations] – that concerned with uncontrolled laughter. We must
consider whether the myths have rightly attributed it to the gods, 10
because this too has been deemed by Socrates to be an objectionable
point. It is indeed worth contemplating the reason for which the myths
introduce the gods laughing, and moreover laughing uncontrollably.
So unquenchable laughter arose among the blessed gods,
says the poem 15
when they saw Hephaestus bustling through the palace. (Il. 1.599 f.)
219
Festugière suggests, following Boyancé (1937), p. 53 n. 3) that the ‘greatest goddess’ is
Themis-Anangke.
220
Quoting two lines from Callimachus, Hymn 4 (In Delum), 84–5, though in reversed
order, no doubt because quoting from memory. Proclus quotes Callimachus again at
in Remp. I 150.11–15: fr.466, in support of an argument that human sacrifice was an
ancient Thessalian custom. It appears that for Proclus ‘the poet of Cyrene’ (150.
12–13) was primarily a source for religious history. He disagrees with the criticism by
Callimachus (and Duris of Samos) that Plato was not a competent judge of poetry: see
In Tim. I 90.25–6.
239
Essay 6
So what is the laughter of the gods, and whyever do they laugh at

20 Hephaestus moving and being in action? This is because the
theologians221 state that Hephaestus, as I believe we have said in another
discussion, is a demiurge and creator of the visible universe.222 For this
reason too he is said to have crafted the houses for the gods:
for each one the famous and lame Hephaestus made a house (Il. 1.607–8),
25 since he has crafted the encosmic receptacles (hypodochê) for them. And he
is described in the poetic tradition as lame in both feet, because the object
of his craftsmanship is ‘without legs’. This is because there is no need for
movement of the feet for one whose motion is that concerned with
127 intellect and intelligence (phronêsis), as Timaeus says (Tim. 33d–34a).
And he is said to be the overseer of bronze-working and to work in bronze
himself, because the heavens have often been sung about in poetry as
‘bronze’,223 and you could gather together many other passages expres-
5 sing belief in this opinion. Since all providence concerned with the
perceptible is called a game of the gods, and through this providence
the gods take part in demiurgic activity along with Hephaestus (for which
reason, it seems to me, Timaeus calls the gods in the cosmos ‘young’
(Tim. 42d6), since they oversee matters that are always becoming and are
worthy of being called a game), the makers of myths are accustomed to
10 call the separate operations of providence, of the gods exerting their
influence into the cosmos, ‘laughter’. Moreover when the poet says that
the gods are amused and laugh with ‘unquenchable laughter’ at
Hephaestus moving, he indicates nothing other than that they are co-
15 creators who help bring the art of Hephaestus to completion, and are
chorus-leaders of the good order coming to the universe from above.
While Hephaestus puts in order all of their encosmic receptacles and
offers the entirety of the physical powers to the providential activities of the
gods, the other gods exert their activity with the ease which is appropriate
to them, and without departing from the comfort which belongs to them,
20 they extend their own benefits to these [physical powers] and they move
the things that are universal (ta hola) by means of their perfective acts of
providence. So in summary, one must define the laughter of the gods as
their unstinting activity into the universe and the cause of the good order of
221
Lamberton is right to disagree with Festugière’s attempt to identify the ‘theologians’
of this passage with the interpreters of Homer and Orpheus rather than the poets
themselves. Both the poets and their interpreters are θεόλογοι for Proclus.
222
Proclus employs this understanding of Hephaestus as demiurge of the sensible world
on a number of occasions: In Tim. 142.14 and II 27.16, Plat. Theol. VI 403–20-22 and
below in the Sixth Essay at I 141–3. See on this Sheppard (1980), 68 and 80–2.
223
For instance Il. 17.424–425: ὡς οἱ μὲν μάρναντο, σιδήρεοις δ᾽ ὀρυμαγδός | χάλκεον
οὐρανὸν ἷκε δι᾽αἰθέρος ἀτρυγέτοιο.
240
6.1.13 Passages in Homer encouraging loss of self-control
encosmic things. And because such providence is unceasing224 and the 25

sharing out of all good things by the gods is infinite, one must agree that
the poet has appropriately called the laughter of the gods ‘unquenchable’.
You see again how we say this in accordance with the nature of reality: the
myths do not always say that the gods weep, but they do say that the gods 30
laugh ‘without restraint’, since their tears are symbols (synthêma) of the 128
gods’ providential care for mortal and perishable things, which sometimes
are and sometimes are not, but their laughter is a symbol of their activity
upon the universe and upon the totalities (plêrôma) that fill the universe,
which are moved always in the same way. For this very reason I think too
that when we divide the creations into gods and human beings, we attri- 5
bute the laughter to the creation (genesis) of the divine ones, and the tears to
the construction of human beings or animals:
Your tears are the race of suffering men,
but laughing you have begotten the holy race of gods. (Orphic fr. 354) 10
When we divide them into celestial and sublunary, once more in the
same way we attribute the laughter to the celestials and the tears to the
sublunary. And again when we draw conclusions concerning the coming
to be and dissolution of the sublunary things themselves, we attribute 15
their coming to be to the laughter of the gods and their dissolution to
the lamentations. It is for these reasons that in the mysteries as well, the
leaders of the holy rites do both of these things at the appointed times, as
was said earlier.225 In the same manner people lacking in intellect do not 20
understand either the things done among the theurgists in secret rites or
such fictions as we have been discussing. Hearing both of these things
without knowledge produces a strange and peculiar confusion in the
lives of the majority regarding reverence towards the divine.
6.1.13 defence of the passages of all 129

kinds in the poetry of homer which seem to
incline those hearing them to scorn self-
control: 129.1–132.7
Let that suffice regarding the laughter of the gods, which the poetry 5
has described as ‘unquenchable’ for the reasons written above. And
224
Following, as does Lamberton, Festugière’s suggestion of ἀκατάληκτος (‘unceasing’)
for Kroll’s and the MS’ ἀκατάληπτος (‘untouchable’ or ‘incomprehensible’).
225
Festugière rightly compares I 78.14. We accept Kroll’s ὡς in line 18, as do Festugière
and Lamberton.
241
Essay 6
following upon such questions it is necessary to consider the pas-

sages concerned with self-control, in case the poems of Homer do
us damage in this regard.226 And of self-control, Socrates says (Rep.
10 III 389d), the greatest form is respect towards those in power,
and second the control of the desires and the pleasures in the
soul, and another third form follows upon these, which we shall
consider a little later.227 So Achilles seems to do wrong with respect
to the former of these two forms of self-control, when he says such
15 outspoken things to his ruler as:
you who are soaked with wine, and have the eyes of a dog (Il. 1.225),
and the verse that follows. And Odysseus seems to do wrong with
respect to the other [form of self-control], just as when, defining
the finest of lives, he says that a city of men especially receives it,
20 when
good cheer holds sway throughout all the land.
And guests throughout the hall listen to a bard,
seated all in order, and the tables are full beside them
of bread and meats, and drawing drink from a mixing bowl
25 the wine-pourer pours in wine and fills the cups. (Od. 9.6–10)228
Because in these lines he establishes no goal of life other than much-
wished-for pleasure229 and the fulfilment of desires.
226
Proclus’ choice of verb in μή πῃ ἆρα πρὸς ταύτην ἡμᾶς διαλωβᾶται τὰ Ὁμήρου ποιήματα
echoes the language of the ‘greatest accusation’ against poetry in Republic X, 605c6–7:
τὸ γὰρ καὶ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς ἱκανὴν εἶναι λωβᾶσθαι.
227
Festugière supposes that the forward reference is to the discussion of the passion of
Zeus and Hera (132.13 ff.) and the entrapment of Ares and Aphrodite (141.1, ff) since
these passages from Homer were used by Plato as examples of the poetry that did not
contribute to the third domain for self-control noted at 389e1–2: τῶν περὶ πότους καὶ
ἀφροδίσια καὶ περὶ ἐδωδὰς ἡδονῶν. But Proclus’ way of describing the second domain
within which self-control must be exercised would seem to take in all of these.
So either Proclus has expressed himself badly in characterising the second form or
the third form of self-control remains something of a mystery.
228
Proclus, along with Maximus of Tyre (1.3.5), quotes the line as οἰνοχόος προχέῃσι
rather than οἰνοχόος φορέῃσι.
229
The adjective πολυάρατος has two quite distinct meanings: either (a) ‘much-wished
for’ (e.g. Od. 6.280; Pl. Tht. 165e or (b) ‘much-cursed’ (Dam. Isid. 18.7). Proclus uses
the word on several occasions: also of pleasures at in Remp. 1.121.13; of wealth at
In Tim. 1.42.19 and of evil (kakia) at In Tim. 1.375.2. Damascius is equally fond of it in
the Philosophic History/Life of Isidore, using it of forensic rhetoric (138.9); political
honours (343.4); flattery (18.7); and magicians (goêtai) (92.7). Damascius and Proclus
use the term in both of its senses, and on occasion (as in the present passage) the two
meanings appear to be present together.
242
6.1.13 Passages in Homer encouraging loss of self-control
<Responses: 130.1–132.7>
<The case of Achilles: 130.1–131.4>

When Socrates censures these things in the narratives of Homer, we 130
shall meet the objection by reference to our solution to the earlier
problem, namely by agreeing that it would be appropriate for the
Guardians, whom Socrates himself establishes as rulers of his city, to
be entitled to so great a superiority, on account of their education and 5
virtue, towards those who are ruled, both the auxiliaries and all the
others, and to possess the most and greatest honour. [The Guardians]
truly are established as saviours and benefactors of the whole city, and
no one would expect anything unholy or unjust to come to those ruled 10
by them, since they rule in accordance with reason and justice. But the
poet, by contrast, does not concede that Agamemnon is superior in
virtue to all of his subjects, nor does he allow him to be counted
among those who do good to others, but rather among those who
receive benefit, especially from the expertise of Achilles in generalship.
And the poet, I suppose, depicts Achilles appropriately (eikotôs), in the 15
scenes in which he causes offence and gives in to his own emotions, since
he is struck down by those who are more powerful and who provide
greater profit230 to the public. And Homer depicts the best of the
Hellenes outspokenly holding discussions with [Agamemnon], and not
at all taking into account the great number of the soldiers following him 20
nor the fleet, because virtue is on all occasions an honourable thing, but
the instruments of virtue are not.231 Therefore we shall not say that the
one bringing such rebukes commits an error against the rulers and
saviours of the whole community, but rather against those who are
superior in their great number of followers, yet altogether lacking in 25
virtue.232 In fact a little later the king of these numerous and uncoun-
table soldiers acknowledges Achilles’ superiority in virtue and bitterly
laments his own ill-fortune:
I acted in folly, and I myself do not praise it,
230
The manuscript reading φιλίαν (130.16) seems a bit weak and not really to the point.
We have adopted Wendland’s attractive conjecture: ὠφέλειαν, which Festugière con-
siders ‘peut-être mieux’.
231
The point is very briefly expressed but appears to be that Achilles’ virtue or excellence
(aretê ) is something which ought to be universally recognised, but the possession by
Agamemnon of ‘instruments’ of virtue – that is, the army – is not. As Festugière
concludes: ‘Agamemnon serait τίμιος s’il était vertueux’.
232
Agamemnon’s relative lack of individual virtue by contrast with his political power is
already implicit in Achilles’ angry speech to his nominal leader (Il. 1.225–44).
243
Essay 6
131 and
One man is equal now to many troops, the one whom Zeus loves in his heart,
since now he has honoured him. (Il. 9.116–18)
<The case of Odysseus: 131.5–132.7>

5 Next let something be said in response to Socrates’ censuring of the
words of Odysseus. Firstly, it has seemed best to interpret such things in
a more symbolic manner, with those who transfer what are called ‘the
wanderings’ into other, concealed meanings (hyponoia), and who think it
right to allot the Phaeacians and the happiness among them to a level
10 higher than mortal nature.233 And in fact the feast among them and the
banquet and the harmonious song will turn out to be spoken about in
a different manner, and not that in which they have been understood by
the majority.
Secondly, let it be said that it is possible, even for those who pursue
the surface meaning of the poetry, to answer such arguments and to
15 demonstrate firstly that the wisest of the Hellenes himself does not
think it right that pleasure should reign in well-ordered states but rather
‘good cheer’ (euphrosynê ). Where these things differ from each other we
have learned from Plato himself.234 Next, Plato considers that through
music the city as a whole becomes harmonious and like-minded in itself,
20 when it listens to the modes which lead to virtue. The fact that not just
anyone establishes the music for the masses, but one who has a share of
the divine inspiration concerning it, extends education and true virtue
through the whole city from above, from the overseers of this art which
is one.235
Thirdly, let it be said that Odysseus ascribes abundance of the neces-
sities of life, which the great multitude of those in cities require, to those
25 who have come to share in harmony of this sort. He did not praise a life
where the people are stuffed full of such things, but rather praised the
233
The ‘wanderings’ (books 9 to 12 of the Odyssey) were, of course, among the most
popular objects of allegorical reading.
234
At Tim. 80b Plato contrasts enjoyment taken in sounds by the intelligent and the
unintelligent with euphrosynê and hêdonê respectively. Not coincidentally, perhaps, the
Stoic theory of eupatheia or good feelings presents euphrosynê as the correct, rational
counterpart to the mistaken pathos of hêdonê. Since the context here in Proclus’
Commentary goes beyond mere enjoyment of sound to the rational enjoyment of
such things as food, it seems likely that he intends his audience to understand the
whole Stoic account as implicit in Plato’s brief remark.
235
That is, there is a single art of harmony (mousikê ) of which Apollo is patron and the
Muses overseers. This art produces order not only in sounds but also in individuals
and states.
244
6.1.14 The union (synousia) of Zeus with Hera
lack of none of the things which especially bring to completion a mortal

life. Therefore the wisest of the Hellenes appears to express views which
are in keeping with our own school’s teachings236 and with undistorted 30
preconceptions237 of the happiness of the people. But if anyone should 132
exclude that enjoyment and education through inspired (entheos) music,
and instead consider that Homer admits feasts and entertainments that
are unmeasured and uncultured and concerned only with pleasure,
Socrates reasonably says that such things are far from the way of his 5
own city. It is not right that unlimited pleasure should rule in a city of
fortunate people nor a way of life appropriate to gluttons.
6.1.14 what is the allegorical meaning of

the union (SYNOUSIA) of zeus with hera? and
what is the adornment of hera? and what is
the place in which their union takes place? 10
and what is the desire felt by zeus? and what
is the divine sleep? a general interpretation
of all mythology of that sort.
<Statement of the problem: 132.13–133.18>
So it is not difficult to meet such criticisms as these from Socrates. But
a greater problem awaits us next, and one more difficult and concerned
with the greatest things, namely the unions of Zeus with Hera,238 15
236
At issue is the central question of Hellenistic philosophy: are ‘the externals’ necessary
in addition to virtue for happiness? Is the agent who possesses the virtues and has
a sufficiency of the goods of fortune happier than the virtuous person who lives in
grinding poverty and illness? Proclus’ view here seems in keeping with his measured
view on pleasure. It is fine for Odysseus to praise the absence of need for the things that
fulfill our mortal natures. The desiring faculty, when it is properly attuned to the
command of reason and spirit, cares for the body and desires the things that keep it in
its natural state (in Remp. I 226.27–227.3; in Tim. III 287.17–20). There is nothing
unreasonable in this, provided that one does not slip into thinking that these externals
are themselves goods – or indeed, that pleasure is. It is not. But neither is it something
bad (cf. Damascius, in Phlb. 19.1–3). On the whole question of pleasure and happiness
in Proclus, see Van Riel (2000), 120–33.
237
The Hellenistic mood of the sentence continues with an appeal to ‘preconceptions’.
Anyone who has a concept of happiness can see that it cannot be lacking in what is
necessary for the mortal life. Those who have undistorted preconceptions do not
confuse this conceptual truth with the view that the good life consists in a surfeit of
these externals alone. For undistorted preconceptions as a criterion of truth in
Proclus, see also in Alc. I 142.16 and in Parm. 974.31.
238
The theme of unions of Zeus and Hera more generally is also discussed at in Crat. 92.
26–93.22. On the differences between these two discussions: Sheppard (1980), 74.
245
Essay 6
because Socrates wished to pluck this out on the grounds that it was
not at all appropriate for the young to hear. And how could such
passages not seem altogether to hint at (hyponoein)239 an unlawful
opinion regarding the greatest of the gods, when they say that he
20 forgot all accepted standards because of desire for Hera, and was
eager to be with the goddess right there on the ground, and did not
restrain himself to go into the bedroom, and that he stooped to say
the sorts of things that human lovers say? Each of those human
25 lovers firstly puts union with the object of desire before all else, and
then says that he has suffered something greater than he has ever
suffered before. Such things as these Zeus is made to speak in the
poem:
Never did such desire for a goddess or for a woman
30 rush about the heart in my chest and master it (Il. 14.315–16),
133 and he says that he desires her more than when they first ‘mingled in
love’
coming to bed without their parents knowing. (Il. 14.295ff).
5 So our teacher has written a special monograph240 dedicated to this
myth as a whole, in which he revealed the secret (aporrêtos) contem-
plative meaning (theoria) of it with the most divine inspiration. Let us
say as much of what has been written there as is relevant to the present
10 topic, and as succinctly as possible: What is the union of Hera with
Zeus? And what is the cause of bringing them both together? And
how is Zeus said to awaken and to sleep at different times? And what
is the manner of his deception, through which the myth says that the
greatest goddess deceived him? And what power does this sexual
desire (erôs) possess, which he says that he feels exceptionally strongly
15 for Hera, during their embrace? All of these aspects of the passage,
when they meet with the appropriate explanation, would demonstrate
to us that Homer is pure from all blasphemy in the verses under
discussion.
239
Proclus employs a verb here that is more generally used to indicate speaking or writing
with a second, allegorical meaning. Though that is not what the current sentence
suggests, concerned as it is with sketching what is inappropriate in the surface mean-
ing, Proclus’ solution will in this instance be precisely to identify acceptable, and
indeed praiseworthy and inspired, hyponoiai.
240
Once more the reference is to Syrianus. On Syrianus’ methods of metaphysical
allegory see the introduction to this essay. Sheppard rightly translates
προηγουμένην . . . πραγματείαν as ‘a special monograph’, that is, a monograph devoted
exclusively to a particular subject, citing for this sense of προηγουμένος Longinus’
On the Sublime 44.12 with the note of Russell (1964), 193 on the passage.
246
<Syrianus’ and Proclus’ solution: 133.19–140.24>
<The meaning of the union of Zeus and Hera: 133.19-135.17>

Well now, all the divine orders proceed from the one first principle of 20
the whole, that Plato was accustomed to name the One and the Good,
and they proceed also from bi-formed (dyoeidês) causes which become
manifest directly after this first principle, which Socrates in the Philebus
(16 c, 23 c) has called Limit and Unlimited, and which other sages used
to honour with other names. And these orders are divided from each 25
other and distinguished according to the division appropriate to the
gods on the basis of the second principles. In accordance with this
distinction, the interpreters of the truth concerning the gods have
been accustomed to contrast the masculine with the feminine, and the
even with the odd, and the paternal with the maternal. And these orders
hasten back towards unity (henôsis) and communion in one nature 30
(homophyês koinônia)241 because of the very first cause which shows to 134
beings the way to all unified goods. Hence, I think, the makers of myth
have taken marriage and sexual union, as well as the offspring that result
from them, as the starting point for a symbolic vision (theôria) for
ascending to the gods. Then in turn they assumed the embraces and
couplings of the descendants [as yet further parts of this symbolic vision] 5
until they saw completely that the whole divine expanse spread out in its
variety by means of these processions and communions, from above
right through to the encosmic gods. So, just as among the gods who are
before the creation of the universe, they have sung of the coming
together (synodos) and reproduction (synapogennêsis) of Cronos and
Rhea and Ouranos and Gaia, in just the same way among the gods 10
involved in the creation of the universe they have handed down
a tradition of the very first union (syzeuxis) of Zeus and Hera.242
While he has obtained as his portion the paternal dignity, she is the
mother of all things of which Zeus is the father; and while he, in the rank of
monad, brings forth the universe (ta hola), she brings things into existence
241
The phrase touches upon an idea stated more fully at ET prop. 114, that ‘the divine
series is akin to the One or the Good and of like nature with it (ὁμοφυής)’. Here Proclus
suggests that, because of this likeness of nature which the gods have with their source,
they are able to revert to it. This notion, and the associated vocabulary, appear
frequently in Proclus.
242
It seems probable that Syrianus gave significant attention to the allegorical interpreta-
tion of material from Orphic poems and perhaps Hesiod’s Theogony as well. At least he
takes Aristotle to task for his comments at Metaphys. 1091b4–6 for both misunder-
standing and underappreciating the metaphysical insights to be gained from ‘the
theologians’. Cf. Syrianus, in Metaphys. 182.9 ff.
247
Essay 6
15 secondarily through the generative dyad; and while he brings the

Intelligible into likeness with the Limit (peras), she brings it into likeness
with the Unlimited (apeiria). In this way it is appropriate in each class of
20 gods that there exist primordial causes analogous to those. So it is neces-
sary for the unification of these greatest gods that both things pre-exist
(proüparchein), namely the unitary transcendence (hyperochê) of the mona-
dic and demiurgic god, and the final turning back towards that one by the
generative and dyadic cause. This is because the communion of the greater
beings in one nature is completed in this manner: while the higher beings
25 are established in themselves and in the ones more divine than themselves,
the lesser beings give themselves to the powers of the higher ones.
And it is for these reasons, I think, that Hera, in eagerness for the union
(synousia) with Zeus, brings her entire being (ousia) to completion and
prepares herself beforehand with all her various powers: those which are
30 pure, those which are procreative, those that are intellective, and those
135 that are unifying (henopoios). And Zeus awakens the divine desire within
himself, through which he fills all of the things which participate directly
in him with goods, and extends the cause that brings the plurality together
into one. He also extends the activity that enables the reversion of
secondary things upon himself. A single unification and an indissoluble
5 intertwining of both of these gods is accomplished which is separate from
the universe and which transcends the encosmic receptacles. This is
because Zeus leads her upwards towards this communion, while Hera
holds out towards him the lower and encosmic union. While the gods are
10 eternally united according to each sort of union,243 the myth divides and
separates things which are eternally coexistent with each other, and it
ascribes on the one hand the union (mixis) separate from the universe to
the will of Zeus, and their common activity when it proceeds into the
cosmos to the providence244 of Hera. The reason is as follows: while
15 the paternal initiates the goods that are transcendent and more unified,
the maternal initiates the goods that are proximate to the participants and
pluralised thanks to their various processions.245
243
Proclus describes more fully these two types of union (encosmic and hypercosmic)
below. Here his point is that the two are in fact different aspects of one, and that the
myth divides the non-temporal reality by treating these as two separate unifications,
and by narrating the union as an event at a specific time rather than as an eternal state.
The notion that myth divides in time what is in reality non-temporal is discussed by
Plotinus at En. III 5.9.24–6.
244
Proclus here equates the forethought (pronoia) that Hera gives to the seduction and
distraction of Zeus to the providence (also pronoia) exercised by the goddess over the
cosmos.
245
The idea is that under Zeus (and the paternal) are grouped all unifying and transcen-
dent goods, while under Hera (and the maternal) are grouped all that leads into
procession. For this reason, the union of these deities takes on a double aspect: that
248
<The sleep of Zeus: 135.17–136.14>

It is therefore plausible that among the symbols (symbolon) handed down
by the myths the sleep and the waking [of Zeus] have been treated in
a divided manner. While the waking reveals the providence extended by
the gods into the cosmos, the sleep reveals the life separate from all lower 20
things, although the gods are in fact exercising providential care over the
universe and are established in themselves at the same time. But just as the
Timaeus describes the demiurge of the universe as at one time working
upon and establishing the earth, the heavens, the planets, the fixed stars, 25
the cycles of the soul, and the cosmic intellect, and describes him at
another time as remaining at rest in his own character (42e) and separated
from the whole class of gods working upon the universe, in just the same
way, but much earlier, the myths show the father sometimes wakening
towards all encosmic things, and at other times sleeping, in order to 30
demonstrate his double life.246 As one of the gods says, he ‘possesses the
intelligibles in his mind, and he brings sense-perception to the worlds’.247 136
Therefore one might say that he awakens according to the latter activity
(since waking is among us mortals an activity of the perception), and
according to the former activity he sleeps, since he has preferred a life
separate from perceptible things and defined in accordance with perfect 5
Intellect. [And one might say that] when he wakes he makes plans regard-
ing human affairs (since in accordance with this same life he exercises
providential care over matters in the cosmos), but, when he sleeps and
ascends apart into a separate unification with Hera, that he does not forget
about the other life, but rather that he possesses the transcendent life while 10
also possessing the goddess who is active in the cosmos and the life
associated with her. Nature does not produce its secondary products in
separation from intellection, nor again does it reduce its providence over
lesser things because of intellection, but at the same time and in accor-
dance with justice it governs the things over which providence is exercised
and it ascends into its intelligible vantage point (periôpê).248
initiated by Zeus is concerned with unification, reversion and transcendence, that

initiated by Hera is concerned with plurality and procession. The two apparently
contrary movements/types of divine union are ultimately one.
246
On the double activity of Zeus: Plat.Theol. 260.3–6 Portus.
247
Or. Chald. 8. We slightly amend Majercik’s translation (‘he’ for ‘it’ and ‘his’ for ‘its’) to
fit the passage in which the quotation is made. These lines appear more fully at
Proclus, in Crat. 51.27–30: . . . δυὰς παρὰ τῷδε κάθηται. | ἀμφότερον γὰρ ἔχει, νῷ μὲν
κατέχειν τὰ νοητά, | αἴσθησιν δ᾽ ἐπάγειν κόσμοις.
248
The choice of periô pê , here translated as ‘vantage point’, suggests the passage in Plato’s
Politicus in which the captain of the universal ship is said to let go of his rudder and turn
into himself (οἷον πηδαλίων οἴακος ἀφέμενος, εἰς τὴν αὑτοῦ περιωπὴν ἀπέστη (272e4–5)).
249
Essay 6
<The place of union: 136.15–137.2>

15 Accordingly the myth reveals this type of transcendent superiority,
when it speaks of Zeus’ union with Hera taking place on Ida, because
it is there that Hera goes and gives herself to the greatest Zeus. So what
else shall we say that Ida represents allegorically than the place of the
20 forms (idea)249 and the intelligible nature, to which Zeus ascends and
leads up Hera; he does not, because of desire, turn to that which
participates, but rather because of an overflowing of goodness he gives
to her a second unification (henôsis) with himself and with the intelligi-
ble. These are the sorts of desires belonging to the greater beings:
concerned with reversion of the lower beings towards the first things,
25 and with filling them with the good things that are in the higher beings
themselves, and with bringing to perfection those lower than them-
selves. Therefore the myth does not diminish the dignity of the greatest
Zeus, when it hands down that he came together with Hera there on the
ground, nor when it tells that he did not bear to go into the bedroom,
because it means that he has chosen the hypercosmic embrace over the
30 encosmic one. At any rate the bedchamber built by Hephaestus demon-
strates the arrangement of the universe and the perceptible realm. This
137 is because Hephaestus is the demiurge of this universe, as has also been
said earlier.250
<The adorning of Hera: 137.2–139.19>

And if you also wish to understand the adorning of Hera,251 through
which she joined herself to the greatest of the gods and called forth the
5 paternal providence of Zeus to communion with her own generative
powers, you will better perceive, I think, the superiority of the transcen-
dent union of the gods, which is celebrated in this myth. For she renders
herself similar in every respect to the Mother of the Gods,252 from whom
249
The etymologising is discussed by Friedl (1936), 102–3, along with the etymologising
allegory applied to the Trojan War in Hermias’ account of Syrianus’ teaching (in Phdr.
77.16 ff.).
250
126.19 ff. Sheppard (1980), 68 compares Syrianus’ in Met. 83.1–11. See also in Tim.
I 142.25–143.1.
251
This Homeric passage was clearly popular with allegorical readers of various philo-
sophical affiliations: Heraclitus, Homeric Allegories 39; Plutarch, De aud. poetis 19–20.
252
The Mother of Gods is the cause of Hera and every effect reverts upon its cause
through being similar to it; cf. ET, prop. 32. She exhibits in a more particularised way
the powers that pre-exist in a more universal mode of existence in her cause; cf. ET,
prop. 71. Thus through Hera’s preparations for the seduction, the myth allegorically
communicates facts about one of the fundamental causal processes in the universe –
reversion.
250
she herself has in fact come forth, and she adorns herself with the partial
powers which pre-exist in a more universal manner in the Mother, and 10
she all but makes herself into a subordinate Rhea, and goes to the
demiurge of the universe, who has ascended into his own domain in the
intelligible. Because she is going to join herself to Zeus when he is
mimicking the Father in living a life separate from the encosmic gods, it
is necessary for her to bring herself into likeness in all of her divine order 15
to the Mother, who is the perfection of Hera herself, and in this way to
establish a union in one nature with Zeus. So the flowing hair of the
goddess and her braids, which are scattered everywhere and which she
gathers back together into one, are altogether not without significance, in
that they correspond to the flowing hair of the Mother: 20
her hair is seen by a sharply shuddering light, 253
says one of the gods. And the poet too has called Hera’s locks ‘full of
light’ (Il. 14.176). Her girdle (zônê), adorned as it is with tassels which go 25
before it, but which are not cut off from it, is made in the likeness of the
‘girdle’ (zôstêr) which is there in the intelligible, the universal and all-
encompassing girdle.254 This goddess too255 (sc. Hera) is zoogonic and
generates the whole multiplicity of souls, which the number of the
tassels attached to the girdle symbolically demonstrates.256 And the ear- 30
rings and shoes represent the very first and the last of the divided powers 138
flowing forth from there, some of which subsist around the highest
253
One can only concur with Festugière that this fragment of a Chaldaean oracle (Or.
Chald. 55) is ‘bien mystérieux’. His correction ‘her hair looks like that of a man with
bristling hair’ (χαῖται μὲν γὰρ ἐς ὀξὺ πεφρίκοτα φῶτα βλέπουσιν) certainly produces
a sentence that is easier to understand, but loses the connection with the discussion of
light in the goddess’s hair in Proclus’ interpretive comments following the quotation.
Light and fire are elsewhere important to the Chaldaean Oracles’ descriptions of
epiphanies of Hecate, and it is much more likely that the φῶς here is ‘light’ rather
than ‘mortal, man’. Lamberton wisely does not follow Festugière’s conjecture.
The identification of Rhea with Hecate was common, and appears also in Proclus,
Hymn 6 as Sheppard ((1980), 69) observes. Festugière is right to dismiss Lewy’s
translation, ‘for her hairs are seen by the glaring terrifying light’ (Chaldaean Oracles
and Theurgy, p.90) but Lewy’s note (p. 90 n. 94) seems to be along the correct lines,
giving πεφρικότι φωτὶ an instrumental sense and taking ἐς ὀξὺ as an adverbial expression
modifying it. Majercik likewise translates ‘[f]or her hair appears dazzlingly in shim-
mering light’.
254
Proclus correctly connects these two words, both of which begin in Homeric Greek as
synonyms for belt or girdle. Zô stê r, however, appears in Damascius (De Principiis
1.241.24) as the name of a Chaldaean, hypercosmic ‘source’ (pêgê). See the note of
Festugière, p. 157, n. 1.
255
That is to say, she is like the mother of gods from whom she has proceeded, Rhea, in
being life-engendering. For Rhea as the source of life, see in Crat. 52.9 and Or. Chald.
fr. 56 (des Places/Majercik).
256
This alludes to the hundred tassels mentioned at Il. 14.181.
251
Essay 6
powers of the goddess and project from those, while others receive in
5 turn the lower processions around her feet.257 The ambrosia and olive
oil are symbols (synthêma) of the unmixed powers of the goddess, since
the unyielding orders (taxis) subsist around her. Therefore what exists
there as the invincible might of the gods and the generative cause of
purity is signified here through these symbols.258 That is, the ambrosia
10 represents the power which overcomes all impurity and all defilement,
and the olive oil, since it is productive of strength and appropriate to
athletics, is suited to the nature of the divinity of the Curetes.259 In fact
the very first Curetes were dedicated to the order (taxis) of Athena, both
in other respects and in that they are said to have been crowned with the
15 branch of the olive, as Orpheus says (Orph. fr. 133).260
Therefore this goddess (Hera) is made perfect with symbols (symbo-
lon) of this kind and becomes, as it were, a Rhea at the level of the
particular. And she goes in union with the demiurge of the universe in
accordance with this type of life, in which he especially imitates Cronos,
20 in that he does not proceed into the universe but, being separate from
encosmic things, he does not take counsel concerning the unsleeping
providence exercised over universals, but rather is separated from per-
ceptions in the divine sleep, and emulates the father in this way.
The father is the very first of all the gods to be said to sleep:
25 Then Cronos ate deceptive food
and lay snoring loudly. (Orph. fr. 115)
So it is appropriate that the preparation of Hera is arranged by refer-
ence to the universal Rhea,261 since Zeus is established in accordance with
257
Syrianus also reads the allegorical meaning of feet in terms of lower (peripezios)
powers. Compare Hermias in Phdr. 29.30 in the edition of Lucarini and Moreschini
(= 27.29 Couvreur) where the fact that Socrates and Phaedrus wade across the stream
is interpreted as follows: ‘To wet their feet in the water means for their whole being,
rising above generation, to contact generation [only] with the last or ground-level
(peripezios) faculties of the soul (as ‘feet’ shows), that is, with the rational soul con-
templating generation from above.’ Similarly at 86.16 (=81.11 Couvreur), the low-
hanging myrtle is said to stand for the chthonic gods because its low and shrubby
nature corresponds to their lower powers.
258
Lamberton (1986), 213–14 aptly comments that the ‘attributes of this εἰκών of the
goddess are analyzed in a manner reminiscent of Porphyry’s work on statues’.
259
As the Curetes are associated closely with Rhea, Proclus is alluding to the point that he
has made earlier (and to which he will shortly return) that Hera is making herself
resemble Rhea in the dressing scene.
260
Festugière notes that Proclus also associates the Curetes and Athena at in Crat.
112.18 ff., where Proclus refers to the same Orphic fragment.
261
We take this to mean both that Hera imitates all of the qualities of Rhea, insofar as that
is possible at a lower level, and also that Rhea, as a higher and so simpler being, is
complete in a way that Hera, existing in a greater degree of differentiation, is not.
252
Cronos and, because of his likeness to that god, he honours especially his 30
union with Hera on Ida, while she goes forth into the cosmos. And what is
more, the magic belt (kestos)262 and the assistance of Aphrodite increase 139
yet further her resemblance to Rhea. After all, there is also a pre-existent
monad for this goddess up there [in the intelligible], proceeding from the
connective divinity of Ouranos above through Cronos as an intermediary
and illuminating every intellective way of life with the light of beauty. But 5
Aphrodite is said to carry the belt on her chest (Il. 14. 214), because she
possesses its power projecting out, as it were, before her. Hera, on the
other hand, somehow hides it under her breast (Il. 14. 219; 223), since she
possesses a different property of its being (hyparxis),263 but nonetheless
she too possesses the belt, inasmuch as she herself has been filled with the 10
universal Aphrodite. She does not bring from outside the power which
connects her to the demiurge, but rather she has conceived this in herself.
And common preconceptions also demonstrate the communion of these
goddesses, in that they honour Hera with the title of Goddess of Unions
and Overseer of Marriages, since she initiates activities of this type, 15
beginning from her very self. She unites herself to the demiurge in
accordance with the belt within her, and because of this she provides
lawful union to all other things with each other.
<Nature of the erotic desire of Zeus: 139.20–140.6>

But why are they said first to have gone to bed in the beginning ‘without 20
their parents’ knowledge’ (Il. 14. 296), and then to be united even more
now, through the great force of desire which Zeus feels for Hera? In fact
the defining characteristics of both other goods and unification are
262
In Homer (Il. 14.214) kestos is an adjective (‘embroidered’) agreeing with the girdle
(himas) of Aphrodite. In Hellenistic poetry it came to be regarded as a substantive,
denoting the girdle itself (Callimachus, Aet. Oxy. 2080.55; A.P. 5.120), an identification
which continued into literature of the Roman era (e.g. Lucian, Dearum Judicium 10.18).
Sheppard (1980), 71 astutely observes that Syrianus’ interpretation of the kestos, from
which Proclus selects what suits his purpose here, was a double one: Aphrodite as
goddess of beauty assists Hera to beautify the lower world by lending her the kestos (for
this see Hermias, In Phaedrum 34.9–10 Lucarini and Moreschini (=31.28–32 Couvreur);
she also beautifies Hera for her reversion in the same way. It is because Hera is currently
being beautifed for her reversion that the higher, intelligible Aphrodite (rather than the
lower Aphrodite of the sensible world) is responsible here (139.2–5).
263
Taking the hyparxis as that of the kestos, as Lamberton does, rather than that of
Aphrodite, as does Festugière. The difference in the way in which the two goddesses
manifest this hyparxis is alleged to be hinted at through some difference in the way in
which they wear the magic kestos. In the case of Aphrodite ἀπὸ στήθεσφιν ἐλύσατο
κεστὸν ἱμάντα ποικίλον (214), while she instructs Hera ἱμάντα τεῷ ἐγκάτθεο κόλπῳ
ποικίλον (219).
253
Essay 6
25 twofold: one type is connate with the things unified, while the other comes
to them from above, from more perfect causes. According to the first of
these, they are said to act without the knowledge of their begetters, since
they achieve this as a unification of their own, but according to the second
they are led back up to the causes themselves. For that reason this second
30 type of unification is said to be greater and more complete than the other.
140 Although both are in fact simultaneous and eternal among the gods, the
myths divide them in time, as is the case with the sleep and waking, and
with procession and reversion, so too in the case of the sharing out of their
own goods into secondary levels and participation in the primary (prôto-
5 urgos) causes. Although these things coexist along with each other, the
makers of myth conceal the truth and separate them.264
<Conclusion: 140.6–24>
Therefore everything regarding the union of the greatest Zeus and Hera
is said by Homer in a theological manner. And in fact Socrates in the
Cratylus (404b) also bears witness to these matters, when he explains the
10 etymology of Hera’s name from no other origin than desire (erôs), since
she is, as he says, the lover of Zeus.265 So we shall not blame Homer for
writing such things about the greatest gods in accordance with secret
doctrine. Even if they are not suitable for young people to hear on
a surface level, but are suitable only for us, the poets who have written
such things might say,
15 This discourse is not for the young, nor do we write such things as educa-
tional texts, but ‘with raving mouth’.266 And it is the madness of the Muses
that produces this effect on us, and if anyone arrives at the doors of poetry
without this madness, they have declared that both he and his poetry is
incomplete.267 (Phdr. 245a)
But enough has been said on this topic; let us proceed in turn through
20 the unions of Ares and Aphrodite and the bonds made by Hephaestus,
264
Sheppard (1980), 72–3 observes that Hermias (41.14–20 Couvreur = 44.10–16
Lucarini & Moreschini) interprets the secret union of Zeus and Hera in the same
way as Proclus, indicating the dependence of both on Syrianus. The physical inter-
pretation recorded by Eustathius (3.227.46 ff.), in which Zeus is the aithê r and Hera
the air, and the secret union is a potential one prior to their actual union, is not
straightforwardly transposed to a metaphysical level, but may nonetheless underlie it
(5th and 6th, p. 72).
265
At 404b9–c4 Proclus’ Cratylus Commentary connects the demiurgic intellect (i.e.
a level of Zeus) with three goddesses – one higher than him (Demeter, upon whom
the intellect reverts); one lower than him (Kore, for whom he exercises providential
care) and Hera who is at the same level. Il. 14. 328 is cited as evidence of this.
266
Quoting Heraclitus fr. 12. 267 Or ‘uninitiated’ (atelê s).
254
6.1.15 Aphrodite, Ares and Hephaestus
because Socrates does not allow these passages either to be handed

down to the young (Republic 390c). So let us briefly consider what the
poetry conveys allegorically through these things.
6.1.15 what is conveyed allegorically 141

by the mythology regarding aphrodite
and ares and the bonds of hephaestus,
with which it says that hephaestus
bound them both together?
<141.1–143.16>
So both of these gods are active around the entire cosmos, I mean 5
both Hephaestus and Ares. While Ares separates the oppositions that
belong to the universe and arouses them eternally and preserves them
unchanged, so that the cosmos is complete and filled with all the
forms,268 Hephaestus brings the entire perceptible universe into
order with his art, and fills it with physical, formative principles
(logoi physikoi) and powers. And while he has established twenty tri- 10
pods (Il. 18.373–7) around the heavens, so that he might adorn them
with the most perfect of polyhedrons, he has also shaped the variable
and multiform appearances of sublunary things, crafting by his artful
manufacture:
brooches and ear-rings that are curved or shaped like cups, and necklaces (Il. 15
18.401).269
Moreover both require Aphrodite for their own activity: Ares so that
he can implant harmony and order among the opposites, Hephaestus so
that he can produce in perceptible creations beauty and splendour
(aglaia),270 as much as he was able to perfect this cosmos as the most 20
beautiful of visible things. While Aphrodite exists at all levels,271
Hephaestus shares in her eternally and in accordance with the higher
268
Cf. the similar remarks in the conclusion to Essay 5 regarding Ares as ‘universal
general’ (68.6–11 and 69.1–4), where too his role includes ‘rousing all things to cosmic
opposition’ (69.3–4).
269
Cf. in Tim. II 70.24 where the same line is quoted and Proclus divides the contribution
that the Demiurge makes to the creation of the cosmos from the work that Hephaestus
contributes in these terms: ‘while Hephaestus shapes the universe by his own hands
(autourgikô s), the Demiurge does so by his will alone’.
270
Aglaia is one of the Graces and another wife of Hephaestus (cf. Hesiod, Theog. 945).
At in Tim. I 333.5 Proclus lists Eukleia, Euthenia, Euphêmê and Philophrosunê as
their children who ‘help make the corporeal part of the universe fittingly beautiful’.
271
On the role of Aphrodite in Proclus’ thought, including this passage, see Lankila (2009).
255
Essay 6
orders, but Ares in accordance with the lower. For instance if

Hephaestus does so hypercosmically, Ares does so encosmically, and if
25 Hephaestus does so celestially, Ares does so at a sublunary level. For this
reason Hephaestus is said to marry Aphrodite in accordance with the
will of Zeus, but Ares is said in the myth to commit adultery with her.
This is because communion with the cause which produces beauty and
which binds together belongs by nature to the demiurge of perceptible
things, but the power that provides unification is foreign to the one who
142 presides over the division and opposition of encosmic things. For the
types of gods concerned with division are opposite to those concerned
with bringing together. So it is this cooperation of dissimilar causes that
5 the myths have referred to as adultery. And in fact the universe needs
such communion, so that the opposites might be harmonised and war in
the cosmos have an end in peace. While above, in the celestial realm,
beauty shines forth, and so do the forms and splendour and the creations
10 crafted by Hephaestus, below in the realm of becoming are the opposi-
tion of the elements and their battle and the rivalry of powers and the
gifts of Ares in general. Because of this, it is from above that Helios (Od.
8. 271–2; 302) sees the conjunction of Ares and Aphrodite, and informs
Hephaestus, inasmuch as he works with him over the whole of creation.
15 And Hephaestus is said to throw over them bonds of all kinds that are
invisible to the others (Od. 8.280), since he puts generated things into
order by means of the rational principles of his art, and produces one
composite from the oppositions of Ares and the harmonising goods of
Aphrodite, because there is need of both in genesis.
20 Since there are some bonds for celestial things and other bonds for
the sublunary (the former being insoluble, as the Timaeus says (43a), and
the latter soluble), for this reason Hephaestus releases again the bonds
with which he bound Ares and Aphrodite, and does this in particular in
obedience to Poseidon (Od. 8.358). He (sc. Poseidon), by contrast,
25 wishing that perpetual generation (aeigenesia) be preserved and that
the cycle of transformation revolve back into itself, considers the things
that come into being to be worthy of decay, and sends on the things that
perish to come into being again.272 So why is it surprising, if Homer says
that Ares and Aphrodite are bound together by the bonds of
30 Hephaestus, when the Timaeus (31 c) has also called the demiurgic
principles, with which those in the heavens compose things which
143 come into being, ‘bonds’? And how is it not in accordance with the
nature of things that Homer says Hephaestus releases the things bound
272
Proclus associates Poseidon with motion (hence the epithet ‘Earthshaker’; in Crat. 85.
23–8) and his domain of the sea with Becoming (in Crat. 86.11). See also in Tim.
1.173.14 and 182.12.
256
6.1.16 The criticisms raised by Socrates
from the bonds that bring about generation, since these are by their
nature soluble? It appears, since the universal demiurge assembles the
cosmos from the opposed elements and produces friendship in it
through correspondences (analogia), that he brings together the activ- 5
ities of Hephaestus and Ares and Aphrodite. That is, he produces the
oppositions of the elements in accordance with his offspring, Ares, who
is within him, and devises a way to produce friendship in accordance
with the power of Aphrodite, and he binds that which depends upon
Aphrodite (ta Aphrodisiaka)273 to that which depends on Ares (ta Areïka),
and takes the art of Hephaestus as his paradigm. He himself is all things, 10
and he acts in company with all of the gods. Moreover the young
demiurges imitate their father and produce mortal creatures, and then
receive them back again when they perish.274 They produce the bonds
in the cosmos with the aid of Hephaestus and themselves anticipate the 15
causes of their dissolution; on every occasion, the one who provides275
the bond knows also the necessity of its release.
6.1.16 what must be said in response to

the criticisms raised by socrates
concerning the avarice ascribed to
the heroes in homer? 20
<143.18–146.5>
Let that suffice in response to Socrates’ objection. After this, we must
examine those parts of the poems which he says will increase the avarice
of our souls. What did Phoenix have in mind when he advised Achilles
to accept gifts and then to cease from his wrath, but not to cease 25
otherwise?276 And what about Achilles receiving gifts from
Agamemnon in compensation for his aggression (Il. 19.140), and what
about his refusal to give back the body of Hector except on condition of
receiving money (Il. 22.579)? One who pays heed to such things
273
Kroll’s tentative suggestion of Ἀφροδισιακά for the MS’ Ἀφροδίσια (p.472) is certainly
correct, as Festugière saw (p. 162 n. 3). It is also adopted by Lamberton.
274
Cf. Tim. 42d5–43a6. Proclus assumes that his audience knows Plato’s dialogue well
enough that the salient points of the passage to which he alludes will be obvious to
them. The Demiurge delivers the making of the mortal parts of the soul to the
younger gods, who put this together not with the indissoluble bonds that bind the
rational soul, but with tiny pegs. Proclus comments briefly that this work is appro-
priate to Hephaestus (in Tim. III 321.15).
275
Following Festugière’s conjecture of παρέχων for περιέχων (p. 162 n. 4). Again, also
adopted by Lamberton (2012), p. 199 n. 233).
276
Il. 9.515, criticised at Rep. III 390e4.
257
Essay 6
30 increases his desire for possessing money so that it grows terrible and
insatiable. So in response to these points let us briefly respond that
Phoenix was indeed advising Achilles to accept money and to cease
from anger, and that Achilles did accept the money and cease, because
5 both of them considered the giving of money to be evidence of the
repentance of the one giving. They did not do so to indulge the avar-
icious part of the soul, nor because they believed that increase of money
was the definition of happiness (eudaimonia), as is evident from the fact
that they themselves did not ask for money initially, but accepted it
10 when it was offered. And even if Achilles gave back the body of Hector
to his father for money, we shall say that there was in fact a custom of
this sort, of receiving ransoms for the bodies of the enemy. Furthermore
it is necessary to bear in mind that one might call this a strategic
consideration: to destroy the wealth of one’s opponents, and to increase
one’s own possessions, when one is forced to wage war in a foreign land.
15 All of these and similar actions had a rational justification for those
heroes when they were carried out by them, because they acted under
pressure of external circumstances and acted in accordance with cus-
toms different from ours.
By contrast they are altogether harmful to hear for those who are
raised under the lawgiver himself,277 since their natures are philosophi-
20 cal and their education has been directed entirely towards this philoso-
phical life, and for whom possessions, and even more so excess of
property, have been banned. And if you wish, let us add to those factors
the things said by Achilles, namely that he himself accuses Agamemnon
of avarice and he attacks that passion (pathos) as disgraceful:
25 Honoured Atreidês, greediest of all men (Il. 1.122).
He reveals the disregard which he himself has for the possession of
money when he says that though he has succeeded in every respect and
enslaved cities and taken prisoners, he takes home but a little of the
wealth and is not rewarded above others, and he commits to
30 Agamemnon the division of all of the booty, since he does not consider
either the presence of possessions of any worth nor their accumulation:
145 And I go to the ships, having a reward that is a little and my own,
when I am weary from waging war. (Il. 1.167–8)
The gifts were not yet appropriate at the beginning, when Agamemnon
5 was offering them, but when Achilles did not yet think that it was the right
time to be reconciled with him. So it was not the promise of money that
277
That is, customs and moral standards such as those of the Homeric epics are unsuited
to those educated to be Guardians in Plato’s ideal society.
258
6.1.17 The heroes’ lack of concern about divinity
made him more gently disposed towards the aggressor, but when he had in
any case understood that he should make an end of his wrath. Achilles
himself was preparing to avenge his friend, and the gifts were delivered by 10
Agamemnon without Achilles paying any attention to them nor consider-
ing that they added anything to the goods that he possessed. And the
profusion of prizes awarded by Achilles in the games demonstrates his
indifference to these things. He showed his affection for each of those
contending by giving them appropriate gifts, and to Nestor, who could not 15
compete because of his age, he gave a golden phialê, better than the others.
So how can one be called avaricious who, according to Homer, uses
money as is necessary? And one, moreover, who cares little for posses-
sions when they are present, and who does not concern himself with
them when they are absent, and is content to have less than others, and 20
who, in the midst of the assembled Hellenes, rebukes as suffering from
a disease of the soul a man who is excessive in his measureless hunger for
money? And how is Phoenix a teacher of avarice when he merely bids
that Achilles fulfil an ancient Hellenic custom? For this is what he says:
We learned the fame of men who lived before, 25
they were receivers of gifts and could be swayed
by words. (Il. 9.524 and 9.526)
Because these things were appropriate to heroic times and the customs
which those men employed in their dealings with each other, they were
thought suitable for the most outstanding representation278 in Homer.
But such things are far from appropriate for young people raised among 146
us, for whom no other task has been assigned by the lawgiver except
education and advancement in virtue. The pursuit of money and worry
about the things necessary for those living a mortal life have been dele- 5
gated to others, who carry out the work for the city below.279
6.1.17 how must one make a defence

regarding the apparent lack of concern
about divinity in the poetic representation
of the heroes?
<Statement of Achilles’ apparent impiety: 146.6–17>
These things then can be explained in the manner stated above; next it
would follow that we raise the other objections, which accuse Achilles of 10
278
Lamberton and Festugière both translate ‘most exact’ as though the text read ἀκριβεστάτης.
If we follow the MS’ ἀκροτάτης we must translate ‘most outstanding’ or similar.
279
Proclus seems to speak here as if he is himself inhabiting the city of the Republic.
259
Essay 6
a lack of concern about divinity. How could this not characterise some-
one who would dare to say to Apollo such things as:
You harmed me, far-shooter, most destructive of all the gods (Il. 22.15)?
15 And one, moreover, who fights against the river Xanthus, although it is
a god, and who offers his hair not to the Spercheius but to Patroclus
when he is dead (Il. 23.141–51)?
<Achilles against Apollo: 146.17–148.24>

If any of the heroes in Homer is unshakeably correct in his attitude to
matters divine then it is Achilles, who demonstrates that he himself
20 serves Apollo when he advises that the Hellenes send sacrifices to the
god and brings it about that they appease the god’s priest in every way
possible. And he demonstrates this too by readily obeying the com-
mands of Athena to him when she comes (Il. 1.217), and by soothing his
own anger with an incantation (Il. 9.186–9),280 and by extending even to
25 the point of irrationality his reverence to the gods. And he, most of all, is
obedient, in that he serves the gods and commits himself as a most
effective aid to the will of the greater beings in ready obedience to them,
147 and he pours libations to Zeus and prays to the gods with appropriate
understanding (Il. 16.225–49). It is clear evidence of Achilles’ reverence
towards divinity, and his knowledge of the symbols (synthêma) belonging
to each of the beings honoured, that he purifies the phialê and sets it
apart, dedicated to Zeus alone, and that he stands in the centre of the
enclosure to call upon the one who reaches to all places from the centre
5 of the cosmos. And if he speaks disparagingly to Apollo with more
280
Proclus refers to the opening of the ‘embassy to Achilles’, in which the hero is
described playing the lyre and singing. He is the only character to do so in the Iliad.
Proclus’ wording here (ἐπᾴδων τῷ θυμῷ) suggests that he sees Achilles not merely
singing but employing an incantation to control his anger. Though the verb ἐπᾴδω/
ἐπαείδω can indicate simply ‘sing’ rather than ‘incant’, its uses by Neoplatonists from
Plotinus through to Damascius always denote incantations, e.g. Plotinus, Ennead
4.4.43, discussing the effects of drugs and magic on the spoudaios; Iamblichus, De
Vita Pythagorica 25.114 and Porphyry, Vita Pythagorae 33 and 40 on the supposed
Pythagorean use of song to regulate the soul; Damascius, Philosophos Historia 226.1
(Zintzen), with some irony, of Marinus’ persuasion of Isidore to accept the position of
diadochos. Armstrong (1966–88) suggests in his note on Ennead IV 4.43 (vol. 4, 268–9)
that Plotinus may be ‘thinking of Plato’s metaphorical use of ἐπῳδή for salutary
philosophical exhortation in Charmides 156–7’, and it is likely that this passage has
influenced all of the Neoplatonic uses of this word-group in the sense of an incanta-
tion to moderate the soul and its passions. Proclus refers to the Charmides on a few
occasions: in Alc. 166.21 and 185.14 (on the topic of sô phrosynê and regulation of the
pathê ), and in Tim. 1.82 (for the dialogue’s contribution to knowledge of the familial
relationships of Plato).
260
6.1.17 The heroes’ lack of concern about divinity
boldness than he ought, one must recognise that the Apollonian orders
(taxis) extend from above all the way to the final levels, and that some of
these are divine, some angelic, some daemonic, and these last are 10
divided into multiple forms. So he did not address the god in words
like these, but only the daemonic being, and this was not even the very
first such being to whom universal authority has been assigned, but
rather a daemon assigned the proximate supervision of a particular,
and in fact (why not say it clearly?) the guardian (phrouros) of Hector 15
himself. And the poet states explicitly:
The god who works from afar, entirely in the form of Agenor,
stood by him before Achilles. (Il. 21.600–1)281
So Achilles calls this Apollo ‘the most destructive’, insomuch as he

actively stands in the way, protecting his enemy unharmed, and 20
[Achilles] does not offend against the god himself, but the one allotted
to the most divided parts of the Apollonian chain. In fact it is necessary
not to attribute all words and all actions to that very first deity, but to 25
allot some to his second and third processions, asking, for instance, who
is the one who sits beside Zeus and the Olympian gods, who is the one
who turns the solar sphere, and who is the Apollo of the air, and who is
the chthonic one, and who the protector of Troy, and who is the one
who cares for Hector individually, regarding whom the poet also says: 30
Hector went to Hades, and Phoebus Apollo left him (Il. 22.213)? 148
By looking to all of these orders of being we shall be able to say that

Achilles’ words are addressed to some such particularised power, which 5
wishes to preserve the subject of its providence (to pronooumenon), but
becomes an impediment to Achilles’ correction.282 This is illustrated by
the fact that the phrase ‘you harmed’ would be especially appropriate to
such a daemon, who is keeping Achilles from the goal of his present
labours. And the expression ‘most destructive’ is clearly appropriate to
that one among the gods and daemones who is especially opposed to 10
Achilles. He who most protects the one who has caused pain, keeping
281
As Kroll notes, Homer has πρόσθε ποδῶν rather than Ἀχιλῆος in 21.601.
282
Festugière takes the last part of this sentence as ‘qui veut sauver l’objet de sa provi-
dence, mais qui empêche Achille de réussir’ (p. 167) and Lamberton (p. 207) similarly
‘desirous of saving the object of his providence and thus posing an obstacle to the
success of Achilles’. Rather than taking the sense of ‘success’ here, κατόρθωσις is better
understood in its more common sense as ‘correction’. The daemonic, Apollonian
entity whom Achilles addresses is concerned with preserving his particular object of
providential concern, Hector; Achilles, by contrast, in destroying Hector, performs
a correction for the sake of the providence of the whole. See also the discussion of the
providence of the whole and of the part in Proclus’ reading of the violation of the oaths
by Pandarus.
261
Essay 6
him free from all suffering, becomes all the more an obstacle to the one
who has been injured, when that one is seeking revenge. And if this
manner of speaking still does not seem undeserving of punishment for
15 Achilles, even so a little later it is said that he himself will be killed by
some Apollonian power:
When Paris and Phoebus Apollo slay you
strong though you are. (Il. 22.359–60)
So how does the poem not make us more circumspect concerning
20 divinity and the daemonic? Moreover, I am well aware that those who
are expert in mystery rites (teletê) have dared to say many such things
about the daemones. Perhaps for those who are protected by more divine
powers there is no need for any punishment for such offences, but for
other human beings justice follows to restrain their errors in words.
<Achilles against the Xanthus: 148.25–149.13>

25 What is more, it is not difficult to meet the objection concerning the battle
that Achilles is said to have had with the Xanthus. He was not disobedient
towards the god himself, but he contended either against the manifest
water which impeded his charge against the enemy, or against one of the
30 local powers with the allied gods. And in fact he fought with Athena and
149 Poseidon present and allied to him. The poetry seems to me to weave in
contests at all different levels, at one time telling of the battles of human
5 beings against each other, at another those of the greater types of being, as
in the passage called ‘Theomachy’. And it hands down the story of this
opposition of the heroes to certain daemonic natures, demonstrating to
those who are able to understand such things that the very first of the last
are somehow equal to the last of the first, and especially when they are
10 moved and guarded by the gods themselves. And it is not only Achilles
who is said to have contended against the Xanthus, but Heracles is also
said to have contended like this against the Achelous, and Achilles, mod-
elling his own life on Heracles, did not shrink from contests of this sort.283
<Achilles and the Spercheius: 149.14–29>

15 We shall resolve the third of the objects of enquiry lying before us by
saying that at first it was a principal good for Achilles to offer his hair to
283
Achilles names Heracles as an example at Il. 18.117–21 (as Kroll, Festugière and
Lamberton note ad loc.). This is very likely what Proclus has in mind, though
Achilles’ words are not related to the battle against the Xanthus but to his choice to re-
enter the battle and defeat Hector, even though he will die soon afterwards. Heracles
similarly, he suggests, did not flee death despite the opposition of Hera.
262
6.1.18 The heroes’ neglect of their manner of life
the Spercheius in accordance with his promise when he should return

home. But then when he had given up on his return and believed this
prediction of his mother:
Soon your fate will come upon you after Hector (Il. 18.96), 20
how was it not necessary, as a second choice, to cut off his hair in
honour of his friend? Similarly our Socrates receives the garland
which Alcibiades was carrying for the god, and wears it, and thinks
neither that he himself does anything inappropriate nor that he
overlooks the young man doing anything inappropriate. We learn 25
about this in the Second Alcibiades (151a7–c2).284 It goes without
saying that his hair is not yet consecrated to the river. One who has
announced that he will offer his hair after his return, if he should
be deprived of that return, is likewise prevented from consecrating
his hair.
6.1.18 how one should defend the 150

apparent neglect in the poetry by the
heroes regarding their manner of life,
or the wholly wicked narrative among
the poets in their myths.
But enough on these topics. It remains for me to convey a suitable
(eikos)285 account of the things done to Hector by Achilles and the 5
dragging of Hector’s body around the tomb of Patroclus, and the things
he did to the captives, throwing them onto the funeral pyre. Socrates
(391b–c) says that these things are not true about a man who was the
child of a goddess and the most prudent Peleus, and who was moreover 10
descended from Zeus and raised under the tuition of the most wise
Cheiron.
284
Proclus does not doubt the authenticity of this dialogue.
285
The range of possible meanings for eikos suits Proclus well here: he claims to offer an
explanation that is both ‘appropriate’ in an ethical sense but also ‘plausible’. What
Proclus does not do in this first section of his discussion is turn to allegory. A fragment
of Didymus the Blind (Commentarii in Ecclesiasten 9:10) mentions an allegorising
reading by Porphyry of Achilles and Hector, who argued that this episode presented
better material for allegory than did the conflict between Christ and Satan. See Sellew
(1989). Proclus’ omission of allegory here is in keeping with his general approach: the
myths concerning heroes do not receive the kind of metaphysical allegory that can be
applied to myths concerning the gods.
263
Essay 6
<Defence of Homer: Achilles’ dragging of Hector and sacrifice of

prisoners: 150.11–153.20>
<Achilles’ dragging of Hector: 150.11–151.23>

So it has been said by the ancients that this was a Thessalian custom, and
the poet of Cyrene bears witness to it:
Long ago a Thessalian man still
15 dragged murderers around the
tomb of the dead. (Callim. fr.
588 Pfeiffer)286
And thus in fulfilling this custom he has undertaken the ritual offer-
ings owed to Patroclus. In addition Hector dragged Patroclus when he
was dead, so that
he might cut the head from his shoulders with sharp bronze,
20 and drag the body to the Trojans and give it to the dogs (Il. 17.126–7).
Achilles was not unaware of these acts, but knew about them because
Iris told him, [when she said]:
Famous Hector
25 was most eager to drag him, and his heart drove him to fix
his head on the stakes, cutting it from his soft neck.
But get up and lie here no longer. Let reverence enter your heart,
151 since Patroclus is a plaything of the Trojan dogs. (Il. 18.175–9)
So how did Achilles not exact an appropriate penalty from him, by
dragging him around the tomb of Patroclus, and honouring his friend in
this way? How did he not exact a just punishment from Hector by means
5 of the dragging, for the intention Hector had held, even though he did
not do all that he proposed? [And did he not act justly] by giving back
the body to his family and allowing him to be granted burial?
By applying such limitations to his actions, he acts in accordance with
universal justice and the providence of the gods.287 Thus the poet says
10 that Achilles obeys the will of the greater powers and forms a more
286
The ‘poet of Cyrene’ is Callimachus once more, who appears to be useful to Proclus
for matters of (supposed) fact and as a writer of hymns (at I 125.29–126.1), though his
criticisms of Plato’s poetic judgement are to be rejected (in Tim. I 90.20). The lines
quoted here are listed as fr. 588 by Pfeiffer (1949), who notes the report of
Callimachus’ view of the supposed tradition in Schol. ABD Gen. on Il. 22.397.
287
Here appears more clearly the notion that Achilles acts as the instrument of the
providence of the whole, while Hector is protected only by the providence (pronoia)
of his attendant daemon. See previous section and note 282 on katorthoˆseis.
264
gentle plan concerning Hector, so that he even tends the remains with
his own hands:
And so when the slaves had bathed him and anointed him with oil,
and had cast upon him a beautiful shroud and a chiton,
Achilles himself lifted him and placed him on a bed. (Il. 24.587–9) 15
So all of the actions concerning those departing this life were carried
out by Achilles in appropriate proportion: he especially honoured his
friend, not only by contending successfully against the enemy, but also 20
by exacting justice from Hector for his unholy intention. And then he
abandoned repaying the hybris of the enemy, instead granting a humane
response to Priam and the final service to Hector.
<Achilles’ sacrifice of prisoners: 151.24–153.20>
<Justification of the surface meaning: 151.24–152.6>

Regarding those sacrificed on the funeral pyre something must be said. 25
Firstly, on the surface level, the honour due to Patroclus was entirely
fulfilled through these acts as well, and in killing them [by casting them
onto the pyre] he did nothing more savage than if he had killed them just
as he did the others who crossed his path. What difference would there
be to suffer this by the funeral pyre rather than by the river? And how 152
did they not fare better when their bodies were entirely obliterated by
the fire than if they had been dismembered by the beasts and suffered the
same as Lycaon, to whom Achilles says:
Lie here now with the fish, who will lick the blood 5
from your wound without care. (Il. 21.122–3).
<Syrianus’ symbolic interpretation: 152.7–153.20>

Secondly, if it is necessary to recall in addition the more secret con-
templation of these verses by our teacher,288 it must be said that the
whole rite (pragmateia) conducted by Achilles around the pyre imitates 10
the rite of immortalisation (apathanatismos) of the soul among the theur-
gists, leading up the soul of Patroclus into the transcendent life.289
288
This is, once more, Syrianus. Though Syrianus’ teaching as conveyed by Proclus is
generally concerned with metaphysical allegory, this particular reading is not. Rather,
it relies on a perceived similarity of structure and purpose between a theurgic ritual
and that carried out by Achilles.
289
On this rite see Lewy (1978), 184–5 and 207 and our introduction to this essay.
265
Essay 6
Therefore standing before the pyre he is said to call upon the winds,
Boreas and Zephyrus (Il. 23.194–5), so that the manifest vehicle (to
15 phainomenon ochêma) might receive its appropriate care through their
visible movement, and that which is more divine than this [vehicle]
might invisibly be purified and return to its own allotted sphere (lêxis),
drawn upwards by the airy and lunar and solar rays, as one of the gods
says.290 And Achilles is said to pour libations on the pyre ‘for the whole
night’:
20 from a golden crater, taking a double cup,
calling upon the soul of poor Patroclus (Il. 23.219 and 221).
The poet is all but proclaiming to us that Achilles’ ritual was con-
25 cerned with the soul of his friend,291 and not with the manifest vehicle
alone, and that all of the rites have been conducted symbolically by
Achilles. The golden crater is a symbol of the spring (pêgê) of souls and
the libation is a symbol of the outflowing from there, which conducts
a greater life to the divided soul,292 and the pyre is a symbol of the
153 unmixed purity which can lead towards the imperceptible and away
from bodies. In general one could find many pieces of evidence for
this concealed meaning (hyponoia),293 if one should concur with the
reading of our teacher.
5 If Achilles’ care for Patroclus is of this kind, it would not be out of
place for one to say that these twelve who are sacrificed at the pyre are
arranged as attendants for Patroclus’ soul, since Achilles knows and
cares for its leading part (to hêgemonikon). Therefore he has chosen this
number as most appropriate for those who are going to follow the
10 leading part, and since it is dedicated to the all-encompassing
290
While the physical vehicle, the body, is burned away, the ‘more divine’ (that is, non-
physical, pneumatic) vehicle of the soul goes to its own sphere. The word chosen here
for the ‘sphere’ or ‘abode’ of the soul (lêxis) is frequent in Proclus and appears also, for
instance, of the abode of souls at Hermias, in Phaedr. 90.23 (Lucarini & Moreschini =
86.26–27 Couvreur) and of the abode of the gods at in Phaedr. 29.30. The language of
‘drawing’ and ‘leading up’ the soul also appears in the Emperor Julian’s references to
this rite: 172a (τὰς ἀναγωγοὺς ἀκτῖνας ἡλίου), 172c (ἕλξει καὶ ἀνάξει), on which passage
see Lewy (1978), 186. The ‘rays’ (augai) are also a standard term in the Chaldaean
purification: e.g. 213.2, cf. Lewy (1978), 188–90.
291
See on this Pichler (2005), 249–53.
292
Compare in Tim. III 247.26–249.26 for Syrianus’ intepretation of the crater in
Timaeus 41d. It appears that there are correlations with the notion of the ‘font of
souls’ in the Chaldaean Oracles and it is likely that Syrianus supposed Achilles to imitate
a Chaldaean rite in this detail too.
293
Though hyponoia is often used of an allegorical meaning, it is not an allegory that
Proclus proposes here but a partly concealed mimetic relationship of one ritual to
another. That second (theurgic) ritual, however, is understood to have a complex set
of symbolic meanings.
266
processions of the gods.294 So it is far from the case that Achilles carries
out this entire ritual because of a terrible savagery and wildness of soul,
but rather in keeping with certain hieratic laws (thesmos) set apart for
those who die in war. So let us not charge him with arrogance against 15
both men and gods nor let us disbelieve the poem, if Achilles, being the
child of a goddess and Peleus, and the student of Cheiron, did such
things. He performed these actions with complete justice, by the law of
war, and employing sacred ritual processes. In all of these respects the
poet has entirely preserved the appropriate measures of mimêsis. 20
<Symbolic interpretation of the myth of Theseus and

Peirithous: 153.21–154.10>
So those of Socrates’ accusations that are concerned with Homer can be
met with such a reply as this. And if one of the poets should tell of
Theseus and Peirithous setting out to abduct Helen or descending to
Hades,295 we might perhaps consider these things as well, since they are 25
expressed more in the manner of myth, to be worthy of the appropriate
interpretation (theôria). We might say that these heroes are said by the
myth to have snatched Helen and gone to Hades because they were
lovers of the unmanifest beauty and not the manifest one, and that
Theseus, because of his high-mindedness, was led back up by
Heracles, while Peirithous remained there, because he was unable to 154
dedicate himself to the steep path of contemplation.296 Even if such
myths somehow manage things differently, this has no bearing on
Homeric poetry, which everywhere gives, in accordance with mimêsis,
an appropriate account of the gods, and the class greater than us, and the 5
294
Festugière (173, n. 1) has a thorough note on the meanings of the number twelve in
Proclus and reasons for it. The Phaedrus is once more the ultimate source of the notion
of processions, which is extended in Proclus to occur at all levels of being.
295
Proclus’ reference to ‘one of the poets’ here is left as vague as Plato’s own in the
passage in question (391c). Though Plato probably has in mind the treatment of these
themes in Attic drama (Euripides is known to have written a Peirithous which dealt
with the attempt to abduct Persephone), it is unlikely that Proclus had any knowledge
of these works.
296
This allegorical interpretation of the myths concerning Theseus and Peirithous does
not seem to appear elsewhere. When Plutarch deals with this part of Theseus’ story
(Theseus 31–5) he resorts to a heavily rationalising account to free the myth from its
unbelievable elements and Theseus from the worst of his misbehaviour. Proclus’
interpretation, by contrast, treats the episodes in question as challenges in the con-
templative life, much as was done with episodes of the Odyssey. The phrasing ‘steep
path of contemplation’ (τὸ ἄναντες . . . τῆς θεωρίας), in connection with the rescue by
Heracles and Peirithous’ failure to be rescued, suggests the Choice of Heracles. This
well-known allegorical narrative, which goes back to Prodicus (Xen. Mem. 2.1.21–34),
sees Heracles choose the more difficult over the easy path.
267
Essay 6
heroic lives. And it indicates some things in a more secret way (aporrê-
toteron), and directly teaches us some things about these matters with
intellect and rational knowledge, and does not leave any kind of being
unexamined, but hands down a teaching about each acting in its own
10 class (taxis), both relative to itself and to other things.
<BOOK II>
6.2.1 plato is everywhere accustomed to
revere homer as guide to the truth.297
<154.12–159.6>
15 These then would be the sort of things that one could say in response to
Socrates’ criticisms of Homer in the Republic. Starting anew from
another point, let us demonstrate that Plato himself in many places, in
fact one might say in general in all places, adopts Homer and considers
him an ally and calls upon him as a witness to his own teachings.
Sometimes before his own demonstration he refers the truth of what
20 he is about to say to Homer’s utterance as if to a divine oracle, some-
times after [his own] demonstrations he proves that the knowledge
gained is irrefutable on the basis of the judgement of Homer, and
155 sometimes in the midst of discussions of the truly existent he refers to
him the origin of the whole enquiry.
For instance in the Phaedo (94d), where Socrates especially unfolds his
own life and the whole expanse of his knowledge to his followers, he
5 establishes, by numerous arguments of all kinds, that the harmony of
the body is one thing, and the nature of the soul is another, and they are
essentially separated from one another, then in concluding he falls back
upon this poet and, employing his words as the most vivid evidence,
10 shows that the soul transcends the harmony of the mixtures concerned
with the body. As he says, that which fights against the life stationed in
the chest when it is moved [by emotion], and that says, ‘bear up, my
heart’ (Od. 20.17), is altogether separate by nature from that against
which it fights, and that which rises up against the body could not have
15 its existence based in the body. Continuing in this way and drawing the
conclusion to his argument, that one must admit that the essence (ousia)
of the soul is different from the harmony of the body, he concludes the
297
Proclus shifts at this point from defending Homer against the objections of Socrates in
the second and third books of the Republic to the positive project of demonstrating
Plato’s respect for Homer and emulation of the poet, as both Festugière and
Lamberton also note. Following Kroll’s suggestion we, like Festugière and
Lamberton, cut the unnecessary δεύτερον at the end of the title.
268
6.2.1 Plato everywhere reveres Homer
whole discussion as if by reference to an inescapable necessity, and says,

‘if we should say the opposite, we would be in agreement neither with
the divine poet Homer nor with ourselves’ (95a). 20
So it is far from the case that he holds the judgement of Homer in
dishonour, since he considers disagreement with him as equal to things
totally impossible.298 Rather he considered him in agreement with
himself and a friend in arguments concerning the soul, since he believed
that disharmony with himself was no different to disharmony with 25
Homer. In the Laws he calls him a most divine poet, thinking this epithet
‘divine’ suitable for him, just as other names are for other [poets]. At any
rate it seems, he says, that this poet has become the most divine.299 And 156
when he is discussing the change of constitutions, and teaching how it is
that communities of human beings have moved forward from patriar-
chal authority to this present type, he uses the Homeric poems as his
evidence at all points,300 and finally extends to all inspired poetry 5
a single panegyric, and the greatest one at that: ‘the race of poets is also
divine,301 and when they sing they take hold of many things that have
happened in accordance with truth, with the aid of some of the Graces
and Muses’ (III 682a).
In the Minos when he is explaining the judgement of this hero which 10
Homer had, he continues: ‘in the Nekuia of the Odyssey he has repre-
sented him passing judgement, holding a golden sceptre’ (319d), and he
says that ‘the golden sceptre is nothing other than the education (pai-
deia), by which he governed Crete’ (320d). It is not only in this dialogue 15
that he uses Homer as his witness for the history of Minos, but also in
the Laws (I 624a) when he writes: ‘So do you say this, in accordance with
Homer, on the grounds that Minos went to keep company with his
father every nine years and, following his utterances, gave laws to your 20
cities?’302 And in general, in all places, he considers it appropriate to
learn the truth about the heroes from Homer.
298
Following Festugière’s removal of Kroll’s question mark in 155.22, as does
Lamberton.
299
As Festugière notes, Proclus seems to conflate Laws 682a3 where poets in general are
praised, with the passage in the Ion (530b10) where Homer is described as ‘most divine
poet’.
300
At 680b5–c1 Plato has the Athenian Stranger quote the description of the Cyclopes’
stateless and ‘primitive’ way of life from Od. 9.112–5 and at 681e3–5, from Hector’s
speech to Achilles, in which he recalls the ancestors of the Trojans living in the
foothills of Ida before the establishment of Troy.
301
The quotation on this occasion omits ἐνθεάστικον, but is complete at 185.10–13 below.
302
Here at the beginning of the Laws the Athenian Stranger is asking his interlocutors
whether they believe the laws of their cities to be of divine or human origin. In the lines
quoted he asks the Cretan, Cleinias, whether he agrees with this view because he
269
Essay 6
In the Gorgias, after many long contests which he has had with
25 Callicles regarding self-control and the other parts of virtue, when he
is going to relate a myth, albeit one which is no myth but a logos, as he says
himself (Gorg. 523a), and is about to recall the judges in Hades and the
procession of the gods from the one father to the three demiurgic
monads, and the allotment [of powers] in the universe, he makes a
30 beginning of his divine myth from the Homeric teaching, writing: ‘For
157 just as Homer says, Zeus and Poseidon and Pluto divided the rule’
(523a).303 A little later, when he is establishing Minos as judge for the
souls in Hades, he adds to his own Homer’s teaching, as a divinely
inspired one (526c). I omit to mention that he has also taken the starting
5 point for his account of the places of judgement in Hades from Homer.
But we shall come to this point in turn later.304
believes Homer’s story that Minos visited his father Zeus and laid down the Cretan
laws in keeping with Zeus’ teaching. The Platonic Minos, the authorship of which is
uncertain, is clearly treated as genuine here by Proclus, but is discussed very rarely.
It had no place in the standard curriculum and there is no record of any Neoplatonic
commentary. The only other Neoplatonic reference is a brief one in the Anonymous
Prolegomena, where it is mentioned with the Clitophon as a dialogue for which it is
difficult to determine a time and place: Ἐν δὲ τῷ διαλόγῳ ἀναλογεῖ μὲν τῇ ὕλῃ τὰ
πρόσωπα καὶ ὁ χρόνος καὶ ὁ τόπος ἐν ᾧ τοὺς διαλόγους ἔγραψεν ὁ Πλάτων. ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν
προσώπων ἐν παντὶ διαλόγῳ ἐστὶν εὐπορῆσαι, χρόνον δὲ καὶ τόπον οὐκ ἐν παντὶ δυνάμεθα
λέγειν, καθάπερ ἐν Μίνωϊ καὶ Κλειτοφῶντι (16.6–10). In his Life of Theseus, Plutarch
plainly has the Minos’ rehabilitation of its title character in mind when he writes:
ἔοικε γὰρ ὄντως χαλεπὸν εἶναι φωνὴν ἐχούσῃ πολεί καὶ μοῦσαν ἀπεχθάνεσθαι. καὶ γὰρ ὁ
Μίνως ἀεὶ διετέλει κακῶς ἀκούων καὶ λοιδορούμενος ἐν τοῖς Ἀττικοῖς θεάτροις . . . (Thes.
16.3). The phrase φωνὴν ἐχούσῃ πολεί καὶ μοῦσαν (‘a city possessing fame and a muse’)
has attracted some discussion. Ziegler, in the Teubner text, asks: ‘ex aliquo poeta
petitum?’ Robert Renehan (1979), however, in a short note argues convincingly that
though Plutarch does indeed have the Minos in mind in this passage generally, he is
drawing on Laws 667a (ἔχομεν μοῦσαν τῆς τῶν χορῶν καλλίω καὶ τῆς ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς
θεάτροις) and 666d (ποίαν δὲ ἥσουσαν οἱ ἄνδρες φωνὴν ἢ μοῦσαν) with the general line
of argument of the Minos and the verb ἀπεχθάνεσθαι from that dialogue. Like Proclus,
in other words, Plutarch adopts the Minos’ view that the Attic tragedians had unfairly
maligned the character of Minos. For both writers, this fairly obscure dialogue is
connected with the Laws, and reasonably enough since the topic of its first part is the
nature of law. Both Platonists also cite Homeric authority for the view of Minos as
wise lawgiver: Od. 11.569 by Proclus and Od. 19.179 by Plutarch (along with Hesiod
fr. 103 Rzach).
303
On Zeus, Poseidon and Pluto as the three demiurgic monads, see in Crat. 86.20–87.4.
Zeus presides over souls prior to their birth, while Poseidon conducts them into
Becoming and Pluto releases them from it.
304
Festugière sees here a reference to the long discussion of the Myth of Er in the
sixteenth essay of this commentary (II 96–359). This is possible, but he could also
be anticipating the shorter discussion of judgements of the dead and the topography of
the afterlife at I 168–9.
270
6.2.1 Plato everywhere reveres Homer
In the Apology of Socrates (41a), he [sc. Socrates] indicates the place

allotted [to Homer in the underworld] and its proximity to his own
[situation]: ‘or again, what would one of you give to meet with Orpheus
and Hesiod and Homer? I, at any rate, am willing to die many times, if 10
these things are true’.305 How could one contrive to consider that such
a man is not truly wise about matters divine, to whom even Socrates looks
as an authority and whose lot in Hades he wishes to imitate? The fact that
[Socrates] considers it a truly blessed thing to return to a similar place 15
(taxis) in the cycle of incarnations306 as him bears witness that Homer had
reached the highest level of all knowledge and of all virtue.
In turn in the Symposium (and let us also remind ourselves of what is
written there), he openly wonders at the whole of Homer’s discussion of
his subjects (pragmateia) and says that it should be emulated by those
who are intelligent: ‘one who looks to Homer and Hesiod and the other 20
good poets will be keen to emulate the works that they leave behind, which
grant immortal fame and memory to them, since the works are immortal
themselves’ (209d). Therefore it is far from the case that he considers as 25
entirely ‘at three removes from the truth’ and providing only an illusion of 158
knowledge of the truly existent the poems of Homer and of other poets
who have shared in the divinely inspired madness (since these, evidently,
are the other good poets to whom he refers). Rather he deems them worthy
of emulation and of memory, and to be offspring of no ordinary
intelligence.
And in the Ion he descants upon this poet for his other qualities and
above all he advises that one should spend time with him and draw benefit
from his instruction for its intellectual and informative content:307 ‘It is 5
enviable that [a rhapsode] must spend time with the many other good
305
Characteristically, and in keeping with his purpose here, Proclus omits the other
possibility that Socrates raises in this well-known passage: that death might be like
a night of dreamless sleep (40c5–e4). Proclus’ mental progression from one passage to
the next is perhaps facilitated by the reference to meeting with the judges of the dead
(Minos, Rhadamanthus and Aiacus) in the lines just before those quoted (40e7–41a5).
306
The phrase εἰς τὴν ὁμοίαν ἐκείνῷ τάξιν ἀποκαταστῆναι (157.14–15) is unusual, especially
its verb; Festugière translates ‘le fait d’être retourné dans la même troupe qu’Homère’
and Lamberton ‘returning to the same rank as Homer’. The verb and cognate noun
are used by Proclus in reference to circular motions: for instance that of the sirens in
the Myth of Er (in Remp. 2.237.12) and of the planets (in Tim. 2.289.16). We take the
current sentence to refer to the occupation of a similar place in the cycle of incarna-
tions. The Platonic passage itself has no hint of reincarnation, and seems to imagine an
eternal resting place; Proclus appears to imagine Socrates and Homer occupying the
same place for a period of time prior to subsequent incarnations, though the point is
not made at length nor with great clarity.
307
As Sheppard observes (1980), 141–2 Proclus treats the Ion as a genuine and serious
work which develops a view of inspired poetry compatible with that in the Phaedrus.
Like the Minos cited a little earlier, it is a work rarely discussed and outside the normal
271
Essay 6
poets, and above all in the company of Homer, the best and most divine of
10 poets, and to learn thoroughly his thought, not only his verses’ (530b).
From these and all such passages let us draw together one conclusion:
that Plato considered Homer to be in agreement with himself and a
15 leader and teacher not only of the tragedians (and let it be granted that
he is their leader too, insofar as he is a leader in mimêsis),308 but also
a teacher of philosophical doctrines, and the most important of them at
that. Given that in his discourses about the gods and the triple division
among the demiurges309 and about the allocation in Hades and about
20 the substance of the soul Plato ascribes to Homer the responsibility for
his own contemplation, and [given that he] names him the most divine
of poets and says that he must be imitated by the intelligent and that
after his release from this life he considers it a valuable thing to be with
Homer, how is it not evident to anyone that he approved of Homer’s
25 whole way of life and embraced his poetry and considered as his own
Homer’s judgement about the truly existent?
So let us not blow out of proportion what he says in the Republic and
say that Plato is a prosecutor of the teaching of Homer, nor that he
declared Homer’s work to be a mere creation of likenesses on the same
30 level as the sophists, nor let us suppose that the two men were wholly at
159 odds with each other. Homer, speaking from divine inspiration and
possession by the Muses, teaches us about matters divine and human.
Plato establishes these same things by the irrefutable methods of knowl-
5 edge, and through his demonstrations makes them clearer for the
majority of us, who need such assistance for understanding truly existent
things.
6.2.2 for what reasons does plato in the

REPUBLIC judge the poetry of homer
unsuitable to be heard by the young?
<159.7–163.9>
10 Such [Homeric] teaching is not fitting for those raised under the law-
giver himself and who are perfected in the very first form of life,310 those
who must maintain their souls innocent of all variety and all dispositions
Neoplatonic curriculum (for the few other references to this text: Sheppard,
pp. 142–3).
308
Cf. Rep. X 595c and 598b for Homer as leader of the tragedians.
309
A reference to the division of the cosmos between Zeus, Poseidon and Pluto at Gorg.
523a that has been discussed above.
310
See below I 177.14–178.5. Proclus provides a triple division of the kinds of lives that
humans lead, corresponding to the threefold division of the kinds of poetry.
272
6.2.2 Plato judges Homer unsuitable for the young
opposed to the beautiful and the good, and must look only to the
standard of virtue, since this teaching contrives screens of multiple 15
forms over the simplicity of things divine, and uses ugly and unnatural
manifestations as screens over the truth beyond nature311 and over the
existence that is beyond all that is beautiful. If this is so, how is it not
appropriate, on these grounds, to banish the Homeric vision (theôria) 20
from Platonic philosophy, if not also to concede that we must remove
the text of Plato himself from the knowledge of Plato?312 By just the
same argument [as that employed against Homer] it is also necessary to
declare [Plato’s writing] not at all suitable for those raised in that type of
city. How would it be appropriate for those who are going to be 25
obedient to the decrees of the lawgiver and who will establish their life
unmixed with any evil, and who will make intellect and knowledge the
guide of their whole way of life, to listen to the sophist Thrasymachus
calling ‘most loathsome’ the one who is wisest (I 338d), and to hear 160
Callicles referring to those who are self-controlled as ‘fools’ (Gorg.
491e), and to hear Socrates himself speaking about pleasure as a good
and developing besides a proof [that it is so], and various people pro-
pounding some problem or other in the dialogues, in keeping with the 5
surface mimêsis? It is necessary for the logoi concerned with truly existent
things to be universally uni-form (monoeidês) and simple, and that the
teaching [about them] for youths raised there [in the ideal state] be
unmixed with things that are opposite to them, and [they must be]
pure of all variability and of every disposition that is opposed to virtue. 10
So when will these representations of character that Plato’s writings
present, and the multifarious variety of these teachings, and the mani-
fold cut and thrust of dialectic contests, be harmonious with that form
of education, which aims always at a single simplicity and one standard 15
of life, and is transcendent over all kinds of images and all illusion?
At any rate Socrates, in considering these things, examines what form
of expression would be appropriate for teaching about the things that
truly exist to the young raised under his method, and he urges espe-
cially that we should do away with the mimetic form of discourse, and 20
that the poets should be pure of the variety present in it. And if it
should be necessary to employ mimêsis, that they must put forward only
representations of those living in accordance with virtue and whose
utterances are accompanied by knowledge, but not of vulgar and
311
‘Beyond nature’ or ‘supernatural’ in the sense of being beyond the realm governed by
Nature as a source of motion and order. For the natural versus supernatural contrast in
relation to these screens, see above 77.24–8.
312
That is, to ban the dialogues of Plato, mimetic and dramatic as they are, while
preserving the teaching extracted from them.
273
Essay 6
25 common characters nor of many-headed beasts (Rep. IX 588c7–8) nor

in general of those opposite to the good. So if this treatment by Plato
of these subjects represents every kind of form of life, and he puts what
is in character into the speeches, and each character speaks as far as
161 possible as if on the stage, both the wise and the ignorant, the self-
controlled and the undisciplined, the most just and the most unjust,
the one with real knowledge and the sophist, and if all kinds of contests
5 of philosophical opinions are enacted, and those defending positions
opposed to the truth are sometimes more persuasive than those
arguing for the truth, how could this treatment have a place with the
lawgiver of that simple and intellectual (noêros) constitution? How
would it not rather suffer the same fate as the Homeric poems, since
we refuse to admit these because of their variability of characters and
their creation of mere images?
So the same argument compels us to expel from the state both
10 Homer and Plato himself, and to declare that while each of them is a
leader and founder of that way of life, we must reject the mimetic
practice of both, which runs through practically the entire work of
each, since it is foreign to the perfection belonging to that state.
The lawgiver, establishing [laws] in accordance with that [perfection],
15 rejects many goods of the second and third orders, on the grounds that
they are beneath the very first constitution. I mean for example the
distribution of property, which we have received in the Laws (V
737c–d), the division of the whole according to harmonious
20 proportions,313 the variety of archons (Laws VI), the individual care
of children (Laws VII), education through drunkenness (II
671a–672d). All of these things are to the highest degree appropriate
for those who are going to live according to the second-best constitu-
tion, but they would clearly be not at all appropriate for those who are
going to number among the inhabitants of the very first and truly
25 celestial city. For what difference does the division of allotments
make to those who possess all things in common? And what use is
the divided care of children to those who are in common fathers of all
who are born? And what use are drinking and symposia and boys’
choruses for those who have shown their characters to be entirely
steadfast and not in need of external charms?314 So why should one
30 be astonished if the dialogues of Plato holding out to us ‘unstinting
313
Festugière identifies this not entirely clear reference as Laws V 737e1–738b1 and
745b3–e6.
314
Cf. Rep. X 608a where Socrates speaks of the spell or charm of poetry (epô idê ) and the
counter-charm of the argument they have just rehearsed against poetry. Similarly, the
drinking, symposia, etc. in the Laws are part of a safeguard (phylakê) of right education
(654d7–e1).
274
6.2.2 Plato judges Homer unsuitable for the young
meadows’ (Soph. 222a)315 of all beautiful things, and the works of the 162
poets possessed by the Muses should be out of keeping with the very
first of societies? The variable would never be harmonious with the
simple, nor the multiform to the uni-form, nor the class of mimetic
works with the paradigm of the best way of life. 5
‘We are depicting’, Socrates says, ‘the paradigm of a correct and
perfect state.’316 For exactly that reason we bring and bestow on it all
goods: unity, simplicity, truth, self-sufficiency. It is as if someone should
introduce to the intelligible forms (which we postulate as paradigms of 10
the things that exist) shape and magnitude and colour and whatever else
is appropriate to the images of these things, but not appropriate to the
primordial and truly existent kinds [sc. the noetic forms]. [When some-
one does this] we say that he confounds what is separate in essence and
interweaves incongruous things. Similarly, I think, we would never
agree to present to people whose moral characters have been born and 15
raised in the perfect state, and brought to completion according to the
paradigm of the best education, imitations through words and images of
all kinds of lives as well as the theatrical representation of the different
passions among human beings. This is because all the unmixed and
pristine and perfect habits of life attached to that city are pure of all 20
others.317 And we select for the education of those raised there only
what is coordinate with intellect and the immaterial and intellective
logoi. Mimêsis as a whole is conjoined to appearances, but not to what is
true, and to that which has been made manifold, but not to those 25
existent things that are unified, and to that which is divisible by nature,
but not with that which exists without division. So where the aim (skopos)
of the whole way of life is uniform, and undivided commonality is
honoured more highly than divided selfhood, and unmixed truth stands
over a fictive and illusory disposition, what contrivance can make multi- 163
form mimêsis at home in such completeness? So let us throw out not only
Homer’s poetry from the very first society but the writing of Plato with
315
The context in the Sophist, if the reader recalls it, is not an entirely happy fit. Socrates is
there beginning his first definition of the sophist (as an animal that hunts rich young
men) and that does its hunting in these ‘unstinting meadows’. The image of meadows
to convey purity and fecundity is, however, common enough that it need not bring the
Sophist very vividly to mind. It is possible that Proclus has conflated this phrase from
the Sophist with the meadow of Phdr. 248c1.
316
Festugière invites us to compare Rep. 472c–d where the emphasis is similarly on the
ideal paradigm to which the flesh-and-blood just person is to conform to the greatest
degree possible.
317
With Festugière and Lamberton we adopt Kroll’s suggestion of a lacuna and his
suggestion (exempli gratia) of καὶ καθαρὰ in 162.20. It is possible to wrestle a similar
sense from the Greek without postulating a lacuna, but the word-order is unchar-
acteristically odd and awkward.
275
Essay 6
5 it, since it draws so heavily on mimêsis. But let us not entirely banish this
mimêsis, on the grounds that it is unfitting for those educated in that
society. For what is not at all suitable for the very first class of good
things is not witheld from the second and third classes.
10 6.2.3 in all his works, plato aspires to

emulate homer’s excellence in style and
treatment of subject matter.
<Introduction: Plato’s emulation of Homer: 163.10–19>
But enough on these topics. We can determine not only that Plato
15 suggested that we should emulate the poetry of Homer, as he wrote in
the Ion (530b), and that we should look closely at his thought, but also
that he himself was truly an emulator of Homer, if we examine for
a moment the form of words that he presents and the knowledge behind
his doctrines, which he pursues at all times.
<Plato’s style: 163.19–164.7>

It is clear to anyone, and has just been discussed above, how [Plato’s]
20 outer form of expression is woven together following the trace of
Homer’s mimetic practice, and how all the characters of those engaging
in dialogue have been unfolded and their dispositions of life handed
down to us with vividness (enargeia) equal to that with which Homer set
out the speeches of heroes, and how he all but puts before us in person
25 each of the characters whom he imitates, speaking his opinions and
fully alive. Truly the mimêsis of these men in every way moves our
164 imagination (phantasia) and alters our opinions and compels them to
transform along with the matters presented, so that many weep in
sympathy with Apollodorus as he cries out aloud (Phaedo 117d3–6), as
many weep with Achilles as he laments his friend, and they experience so
5 much later in time the same things as those who were present then.
We seem to be entirely present at the events narrated because of the
vivid imagining (enargês phantasia) of the imitation of the things
represented.
<Plato’s teaching: 164.8–172.30>

If we move away from these matters and leave agonising over style (lexis)
10 to others, and move quickly to considering the similarity in the intellec-
tual vision (theôria) of these two men, in this too we shall recognise that
276
6.2.3 Plato aspires to emulate Homer
the same irrefutable knowledge shines out in the work of both, and that
Plato at all times pursues likeness to Homer.
<Plato’s teaching 1: the demiurge: 164.13–165.12>

If you wish, then let us recall what is written in the Timaeus, in which he
introduces all the divine races of the cosmos and all of the mortal ones 15
too and he extends one demiurgic providence to all things, and leads up
his contemplation to the creator and father of the universe. But he omits
the ineffable things beyond this first creative principle, except insofar as
he writes of the intelligible paradigm, in the course of writing about the
demiurgic monad. This is because the creator of the universe himself 20
creates perceptible things by reference to the intelligible paradigm
(Tim. 30c–31b).
Well, it seems to me that he takes over all of the method of dealing
with things that are universal from Homeric poetry. When Homer
teaches about encosmic things and the providence of the gods descend- 25
ing into the universe, he continues up as far as Zeus and the demiurgic
cause, and ascribes the origin of all things in the cosmos to this one first
principle (archê), which is unmoved and always securely established, and
he celebrates in song this greatest god as ‘the father of gods and men’
throughout, one might say, the whole of his work. In just the same way 30
the Timaeus also relates how he later generated the gods in the universe, 165
establishing partial souls and sending them for the creation of men (Tim.
41d–e). This is the nature of the very first descent of souls, which he 5
maintains is imposed318 of necessity on all souls by the generative action
of the father. So Homer pursues his enquiry to the single demiurgic
activity and attaches all things to the patriarchal care of Zeus, but he also
makes mention of Cronos and Rhea (Il. 14.203 and 15.187) as causes of
the demiurge, because he wishes, like those who are skilled in dialectic,
that his account (theôria) of the demiurge might proceed from its
proximate cause, thereby becoming as clear as possible. 10
<Plato’s teaching 2: the speech of the demiurge: 165.13–166.11>

So again the divine poet has revealed two speeches by the father of the
universe to the encosmic gods, as we also said earlier.319 One of them is 15
concerned with reversion and brings together those who hear it towards
318
Reading the MS’ προσκεῖσθαι with Festugière and Lamberton rather than Kroll’s
conjecture of προκεῖσθαι.
319
This refers to the discussion above (I 106.21 ff.) of the internal and outward-tending
activity of Zeus.
277
Essay 6
the one demiurgic intellect, rendering the gods separate from all the
subjects of their providence, and rolling together the multiplicity
towards the transcendent monad and gathering them ‘within Zeus’, as
20 the poem says (Il. 20.13).320 The other speech is the leader of providence
and the generative powers and leads out each god towards the super-
vision of the secondary deities (20.24), and moves them to offer a place
(taxis) in their procession [to the secondary deities], so that even the
furthest parts of the universe and the warfare that arises in nature has
25 a share of the intellective oversight of the gods. And Plato on the other
hand, or if you prefer to say it, Timaeus in Plato (41a), himself relates
that the father of the universe, from his intellective vantage point
(periôpê), addresses all of the gods proceeding from him, both those
166 who are eternally revolving and those appearing just as they wish,321
though in the same speech he both turns back the multiplicity towards
himself and rouses them to providence over mortal creatures. While the
first part of the speech grants to the encosmic gods reversion (epistrophê)
5 to the one demiurge, the last part grants them providential power over
lower beings. ‘Imitating’, he says, ‘the power I employed in your own
creation (genesis), produce and begin living things’.322 So in every way
we shall say that he writes following Homer and the poems of Homer in
10 such things, keenly emulating his manner of teaching about universal
matters.
<Plato’s teaching 3: the army of gods in the Phaedrus: 166.12–167.9>

What is more Socrates in the Phaedrus, speaking with divine inspiration
and like a poet,323 leads the gods in the cosmos to the vantage point
15 (periôpê) of the intelligible, under the leadership of greatest Zeus. For
320
The Homeric line (Ὣς οἳ μὲν Διὸς ἔνδον ἀγηγέρατ’) means rather ‘When they (sc. the
gods) were gathered in the house of Zeus’.
321
This closely paraphrases Tim. 41a3–4, though varying the syntax to suit Proclus’
sentence. The terminology of the ‘intellectual vantage point’ comes from the
Statesman myth (272e5), but Proclus sees fit to interpret through this myth the manner
in which the Demiurge in the Timaeus delegates some creative tasks. He combines, in
other words, the imagery of the two texts. Cf. in Tim. III 227.1 ff. where Il. 20.24 is
again invoked as a parallel from Homer.
322
Paraphrasing rather than quoting once more, this time from Tim. 41c4–5 and 42d2.
323
A curious way to describe the palinode. It is at the end of the second speech that
Socrates declares himself inspired by the Nymphs and nearly speaking in dithyrambs
(238d). Hermias’ Commentary (65.19 ff.) interprets the sudden ending of that speech as
a sign that Socrates does not wish to be possessed at that moment by the nymphs
whose association with water links them to the realm of Becoming. Further, Socrates
himself apologises to Eros at the end of his palinode for the poetic expressions that
were intended only to gratify Phaedrus (257a).
278
‘the army of gods and daemones follow him’, he says, ‘ordered into
eleven groups’ (Phdr. 246e), and [Zeus] sets a feast and banquet before
them and inconceivable delights and nectar and ambrosia, these things
that are celebrated in the poets, and he leads them towards his own 20
contemplation (Phdr. 247e).324 It is not possible for one who speaks
‘with raving mouth’ to refrain from words like these, but familiarity with
the daemonic race prepares for the presence of the divine light and stirs
the imagination towards symbolic expression. From where else than the
Homeric poems do you think that Socrates has introduced this method 25
of discourse? Does Homer himself not write such things about greatest
Zeus and the gods following him, for instance:
Zeus went apart to Ocean to the blameless Ethiopians
to feast, and all the gods followed with him (Il. 1.423–4). 30
At any rate it is clear to anyone who has the slightest perception of this 167
type of contemplation (theôria), that one must say that the greatest of the
gods, when he goes to a feast and banquet, is nourishing himself from
above, from the intelligibles, and reverting to his own first principles
and being filled by those transcendent and uniform goods. So there one 5
finds the Ethiopians on whom shines the divine light, and very first
Ocean which flows forth from the intelligible spring, and from there
comes fulfilment to the demiurgic intellect and all the gods dependent
upon it.
<Plato’s teaching 4: the omniscience, omnipotence and

providence of the gods: 167.10–168.2>
What is more, Homer depicts the distinctive characteristics of the gods 10
as goodness, unlimited power that pervades all existent things and
comprehensive understanding of the universe in a unified manner. For
instance he speaks of the gods as ‘givers of good things’ (Od. 8.325) and
says ‘the gods can do all things’ (Od. 10.306) and elsewhere, ‘the gods
know all things’ (Od. 4.379). The Athenian Stranger (Laws 900c, ff.), 15
starting from this point, by adamantine arguments, so to speak, has
furnished proof of the providence proceeding from the gods into all
things. For the gods wish to fill everything with good things and are able
to do this (since they lead all things while being themselves
324
We have opted for this slightly vague translation of ἐπὶ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ μετάγει θεωρίαν (‘he
leads them towards his own contemplation’) as the phrase, and especially its genitive,
is not entirely clear in Greek. It certainly can mean that Zeus leads the other gods to
contemplate himself as Festugière translates, but also (as he remarks in the footnote)
‘la contemplation dont il jouit lui-même’. This latter option is chosen by Lamberton.
Both are equally possible meanings of the Greek.
279
Essay 6
20 undiminished in power) and know what is appropriate for all. So it is

appropriate for those who are causes of all things to exercise providence
over their own creations, and for those who rule all things to put in order
(kosmein) the things ruled by them. One must not deny the existence of
providence because of lack of good things nor because of insufficiency of
25 power (many [human beings] have a desire to do good, but weakness
prevents beneficial activity to others), nor [should one deny it] because
of ignorance of actions that would benefit those [under their care], for
they are ignorant neither of themselves nor of those dependent on them.
So the Athenian Stranger has established these things by irrefutable
30 reasoning, taking the characteristics in common to all the classes of
168 divinity from nowhere else than Homer: a will informed by the good,
uncircumscribed power, complete intellection of what truly exists.
<Plato’s teaching 5: the nekuiai of Plato and Homer: 168.3–169.24>

In addition to what we have said so far, let us also consider the nekuiai in
5 both authors,325 and how Homer has arranged the narrative poetically
and by divine madness in other respects and especially in the account of
the different allocations [of those] in Hades, for he has introduced into
his poem some being punished and judged and others judging and
purifying them, and has varied the diverse forms of punishments and
10 purifications. Plato in turn has dealt with these things in imitation of
Homer. In the Republic and in the Phaedo and in the Gorgias he has
related many astonishing things about the souls in Hades who have
come to number among those under the rulership of Pluto. While in the
Phaedo (110b–115a) he gives an account of the different places there and
15 in general the places of punishment of souls, in the Republic (X 614b–
621b) he goes through all the kinds of punishments inflicted upon those
who are judged and their journey under the earth and the dramatic
events unfolding around them, and in the Gorgias (523a–527a) he prin-
cipally reveals the arrangement of the judges and the differences
20 between them. Although you would find that he has deemed all of
these things worth mention in all of the passages, in one he speaks
more about the places of judgement, in another more about the judges
themselves, and in another about the souls who are judged and the
varied sufferings that befall them.326 As to the fact that Plato laid
325
These nekuiai or ‘journeys to the land of the dead’ are the story of Odysseus’
consultation with the soul of Tiresias in Odyssey 11 and in Plato primarily the Myth
of Er but also the myths in the Gorgias and Phaedo.
326
Damascius in Phd. (§471) gives a similar division of labour among the three dialogues,
though he supposes that the Phaedo tells us principally about the ‘fate’ or ‘allotment’
280
down these things in imitation of Homer, he himself has demonstrated 25

that by using this poet as a witness in these very discussions. The way in
which Minos passes judgement holding a golden sceptre and oversees
the judgement of the other judges, he acknowledges is drawn from
Homer’s nekuia (Gorg. 526c). And he acknowledges that there are
some dynasts and tyrants and kings who pay the greatest penalties for 30
the greatest sins (men like Tityus and Sisyphus and Tantalus, he says, 169
are also punished in Homer (Gorg. 525d)), and that Tartarus is the
greatest of the chasms of the earth and the place of judgement there is
the most horrifying for souls. Socrates speaks of this in the Phaedo and 5
Homer makes mention of it, saying:
far away where lies the deepest pit under the earth (Il. 8.14).327
And he has also drawn from Homer his knowledge of the rivers, for he 10
writes that Oceanus is the furthest of all rivers (Phd. 112e6–7):
First Oceanus, which cannot be crossed (Od. 11.158).
And concerning the rest of them similarly:
There into Acheron flow Pyriphlegethon
and Cocytus, which is an outflowing of the water of Styx (Od. 10.513–14). 15
On the basis of this passage I think Socrates has called the Cocytus
‘Stygian’ (Phd. 113c). And in the Republic (X 614b), when he is beginning
his nekuia, he says that he will give not the speech told to Alcinous, but
the speech of a brave (alkimos) man, Er the son of Armenius, 20
a Pamphylian by birth, all but saying outright that, by setting before
himself the nekuia in Homer and using it as a model,328 he too will
discuss the things presented in that myth.
<Plato’s teaching 6: double names of Plato and Homer:

169.25–170.26>
In addition to this, if we should recall what is written in the Cratylus, we 25
would learn from those things too, that in all of his philosophical
speculations (if one may generalise) Plato looked to Homer’s poetry
and drew from there the first principles (hypotheseis)329 of his discussions.
(leˆxis) accorded to each soul rather than the place (topos) of judgement or punishment.
But since the places correspond to the fates, the effect is much the same.
327
Quoted at Phd. 112a3.
328
The ‘speech told to Alcinous’ (proverbial for a long tale) comprises books 9–12 of the
Odyssey – a stretch of text that includes Homer’s nekuia. Hence Proclus thinks that
Plato puns on Alcinous/alkimos.
329
For the equivalence of hypothesis in this context to archeˆ, see line 16.
281
Essay 6
170 He sets himself, in that dialogue, the task of explicating the truest account
of names. [When arguing] that there are names with a double nature and
which have a double explanation of their cause, some of which explana-
tions are unknown to us, and some known (Cra. 383a–391c9), he employs
5 Homer as a witness to both points. This is because he says that Homer
has very clearly distinguished human and divine names, such as Batieia
and Myrinê, and when he calls the river Xanthus and Scamander, and calls
the bird chalcis the kymindis as well.330 He proposes that the divine names,
10 since they are more intellective and cleave more perfectly to the nature of
the underlying realities, and have a more attractive sensory impact and
a more pleasing sound, are generated by the gods. Names that are inferior
in all of the qualities that we have named he judges to belong to human
beings. Among human names in turn he ascribes some to more intelligent
15 lawgivers, but says that other less intelligent people have been responsible
for establishing others, and he gives as an example what is said about
Astyanax and Scamandrius.331
So Socrates takes from Homer these and all such first principles
(archê) of his account of names, and distinguishes which part of them
exists by nature (physei), and which part by convention (thesei), and what
20 similarity they have to things, and what dissimilarity they have, depart-
ing from likeness to the things they demonstrate, and how the very first
names, those which are divine, have come into being along with truly
existent things, and how secondary names bear some resemblance (apei-
kasia) to the truly existent, and how those which are far removed from
25 truth and from likeness of this type have fallen there.332 In general he
developed the entire discussion following the lead of Homer and the
inspired poets.
330
For the divine name Myrine and human name Batieia see Crat. 392a7–8 and Il. 2.
811–14; Scamander (divine name) and Xanthus (human): Crat. 391e4–392a3 and Il.
20.74; chalkis (divine name) and kymindis (human): Crat. 392a3–7 and Il. 14.289–91.
There are four examples of such double names in the Iliad and two examples of divine
names, though without human equivalents, in the Odyssey (the names of the moly at Od.
10.305 and the Clashing Rocks (Πλαγκταί) at Od. 12.61. The only Iliadic example
missing from Proclus’ list here is the giant Briareus (as the gods call him), who is called
Aigaiôn by mortals (Il. 1.403–4). The origin of this distinction in Homeric epic
remains unclear, and none of the proposed theories have adequately accounted for
it. See Kirk (1985), 94.
331
Crat. 392b1–393b2. As Festugière notes, Socrates’ point is in fact that the true name of
Hector’s son is Astyanax, as he is called by the Trojan men, as opposed to
Scamandrius, as he is named by the Trojan women, since the former are wiser than
the latter.
332
No part of the extant Cratylus Commentary sets out anything quite so programmatic,
but this is unsurprising given that the version we possess is a composite of material
drawn from Proclus’ Cratylus Commentary supplemented with the work of an other-
wise unknown excerptor of the Alexandrian school.
282
<Plato’s imitation of Homer’s arrangement of plot: 170.27–171.17>

Let us not omit from the clearer demonstration of the friendly feeling of
Plato to Homer the fact that Plato wished in many places to imitate 171
Homer’s arrangement of plot (oikonomia). Homer narrated the wander-
ings of Odysseus to us in three parts. That is, he [directly] relates the
wandering itself, and again in the narrative of Odysseus to Alcinous, and
once more he summarises the whole thing in the conversations with 5
Penelope. It is clear that Plato also related his republic three times: he
says that its first presentation was in the Piraeus, and Socrates related it
[a second time] in the city, and he related it a third time in summary
before giving his theory of nature (physiologia) to Timaeus, Critias and 10
others.333 Do you not see clearly how intensely Plato loved Homeric
poetry and the mystical thoughts presented in it, since he imitated even
his surface handling of topics, and was Homeric not only when divinely
inspired and composing myths, but even when he was writing philoso-
phically and rhetorically? The vividness (enargeia) of his imitation and 15
the variability (poikilia) of his characters334 and the beautiful aptness
(hôra) of names and his art of arrangement (oikonomia) and variation of
rhetorical devices are all full of Homeric literary form (idea).
<How Plato develops small starting points in Homer: 171.18–172.30>

It is not only the tragedians who have made complete plays and plots
from things deemed worthy of only a brief mention in Homer, but Plato 20
himself has composed whole discussions and dialogues of many lines on
the basis of small starting points given to him from that source.335
Come, let us recall just one, if you wish, and consider the words of
Socrates in the Alcibiades (I 129b–130c), where he distinguishes that 25
which uses something from the tool. To the latter he allots the role of
servant, but the former transcends the role of the latter. And he says that
each of us does not have our existence in the inferior part, nor are we
composed of both natures (I mean, of the instrument and that which
uses the instrument), but we are, considered in ourselves (kat’ auto) each 30
defined entirely as ‘that which uses’. On this basis he demonstrates that 172
333
See above I 16.2–7 and in Tim. I 8.30–9.1.
334
It is, of course, precisely this variability in the moral characters of the persons depicted
that makes the works of the poets unacceptable for the inhabitants of the ideal city (cf.
above I 49.20–5). Proclus has already made the point that Plato’s Republic would be no
more welcome in the city that it describes than Homer would be (I 163.3–4 above).
The manner in which Plato emulates Homer’s works drives the point home again.
335
Aeschylus is said to have remarked that his own works were portions from the table of
Homer (Ath. VIII 347e). It is in any case obvious that many tragic plots draw heavily
on Homeric epic.
283
Essay 6
one exists on the basis of the soul, which is separate from the bodily
instruments. [And it is not that one exists on the basis of] the soul in
totality, but the intellective form, which he has called in that dialogue
‘the very thing itself’ (auto to auto). This is because while the self is the
5 entire soul [considered] in relation to the oyster-like instrument, that
which is truly the self [considering the soul in itself and not in relation to
the body] is the intellective part of the soul.
So it seems to me that he adopted the entire vision (theôria) behind the
doctrines concerning our nature from the Homeric poems, and estab-
lished them sufficiently by demonstrational arguments. Homer was the
10 first to differentiate each of us from the instruments which are attached
to us and correctly distinguished our phantom images (eidôlon) from our
primordial hypostases. And wisest Odysseus demonstrates this in the
nekuia when he says that he saw Heracles holding ‘a naked bow’
(11.607) and continues that this was his image (eidôlon):
But he himself among the gods
15 rejoices in festivity and has as his wife Hebe of the beautiful ankles.336
In so saying he indicates nothing other than that it is right to acknowl-
edge the true essence (ousia) of Heracles in his soul, but that the image
20 attached to his soul is his instrument and bears a resemblance (apeikasia)
to him, but not to consider that it is he. Therefore it is clear once more
that the Platonic account of the human being is drawn from the sketch
of Homer, and that he does not reject even Homer’s terms (onomata).
Where else would we say that the phrase ‘the very thing itself’ (auto to
25 auto) comes from, other than [the phrase] ‘he himself (autos) among the
immortal gods’? And how is it not clear to anyone that the practice of
calling the bodily nature an ‘image’ (eidôlon) of the true substance is
30 taken over from Homer? And he also clearly distinguishes that each of
us has our true existence in the soul in the lines:
The soul of Theban Tiresias came
holding a golden sceptre.337
336
The passage describing Heracles’ ghost in the Homeric nekuia has attracted some
doubts regarding its authenticity, both in antiquity and in modern scholarship. See the
note in Heubeck and Hoekstra (1990) on Od. 11.601–27 with further bibliography and
Petzl (1969), 28–31. Whatever is the case regarding the origins of these lines, Proclus
plainly considered them both genuine and important to the Homeric understanding
of the soul and its posthumous fate.
337
The thinking behind this somewhat cryptic conclusion is not easy to fathom. It might
be a rejoinder to the following objection. Tiresias in Hades is said to retain under-
standing, while the rest of the souls there flit about as shadows (Od. 10.492–5).
So perhaps Homer does not consistently maintain the distinction between the self
and its instrument. But then Proclus cites this line in reply: the sceptre that Tiresias
284
6.2.4 A defence against the Phaedrus
6.2.4 how should one make a defence against 173

the things said in the PHAEDRUS, in which it
seems that plato judges stesichorus the
greater poet?
By looking at the works of each author, one would discover many
examples of these things. Since this has now been discussed, let us add 5
a few remarks about what is written in the Phaedrus, then let us raise the
discussions of poetics which Socrates presents in the tenth book of the
Republic. Perhaps some would say that Plato very much diminishes the 10
reputation of Homer by what he says about the palinode in the Phaedrus:
‘There is’, he says, ‘an ancient means of purification for those who
make an error in matters of myth, which Homer did not perceive, but
Stesichorus did. When he was deprived of his eyes because of his slander
of Helen he was not ignorant of the cause, as was Homer, but since he 15
was inspired by the Muses (mousikos) he knew the cause and at once
composed the verse “this story is not true”’ (Phdr. 243a), and so on.338
In these words it is clear that he disparages Homer, as those say who
seize upon remarks of this sort, and that Homer is inferior to 20
Stesichorus, both in ability to recognise the cause of the daemonic
anger, and in knowing how to propitiate her through the palinode
when he did know [the cause for anger]. Homer’s slander of Helen,
who is said to be the daughter of great Zeus, and his inability to
holds symbolises ‘that which gets used’ as distinct from the user. Thus Homer does in
fact consistently draw the distinction between the self and its instrument.
338
Socrates introduces his own palinode, correcting his previous speech on the nature of
Eros, by reference to Stesichorus’ palinode, correcting the offensive account of Helen
that was supposed to have caused his blindness. Sheppard (1980), 92–5 compares with
Proclus’ reading of Phaedrus 243a here the interpretation of Syrianus transmitted in
Hermias’ Commentary on the Phaedrus. Proclus’ dependence on Syrianus is clear, as is
also a marked independence in developing his own interpretation along lines sug-
gested by that of Syrianus. Proclus’ teacher had proposed two interpretations, each of
which sees in this passage a presentation of three types of lives, represented by Homer,
Stesichorus and Socrates. In the first Homer understands only sensible beauty,
Stesichorus is led from sensible to intelligible beauty, while Socrates is aware of
both types from the beginning. The second interpretation puts the characters in
reverse order: Homer in perpetual awareness of intelligible beauty, Stesichorus turn-
ing away from intelligible to sensible beauty (ceasing to be physically blind) and
Socrates not yet blind as the dialogue has not yet reached his inspired praise of
Eros. Proclus, interpreting only this passage of the Phaedrus and not the dialogue as
a whole, can reduce the three-way comparison to a simpler one between Homer and
Stesichorus.
285
Essay 6
understand his suffering because of a lack of inspiration from the Muses,

25 seem to constitute a large part of Plato’s abuse of Homer.
<Proclus’ response: 173.25–177.3>

Nonetheless in response to these points it must be said that Stesichorus
of Himera339 understood the entire myth about Helen as a factual
174 account (logos) of events that actually happened and composed his poetry
about it in accordance with that mode of interpretation. So he is
plausibly said to have paid the penalty and recognised his own mistake
with the aid of inspiration from the Muses (mousikê). I believe that
5 Homer, on the other hand, because of a different and more perfect dis-
position of the soul, kept away from the beauties brought to us through
the senses and established his own intellection (noêsis) above all percep-
tible harmony. Extending instead the intellect of his soul towards the
imperceptible and truly existent harmony, he was led away to the true
beauty, and so was said by those who are accustomed to express such
10 things in mythic terms, to have lost his eyes and to suffer such things as
the story says. Similarly he himself says that Demodocus, the bard
among the Phaeacians, suffered this too, since the god who is the
chorus-leader of mousikê
15 deprived him of his eyes, but gave him sweet song (Od. 8.64).
He presented this character explicitly as a paradigm of his own
divinely inspired life, and for this reason says that through possession
by the Muses Demodocus was deprived of all manifest harmony and
20 beauty, but that he richly adorned his performances (energeia) with
intellective and mystical conceptions about the gods.340 This is not
only said about Homer and Demodocus, but Orpheus too is said, in
the myths, in a melodramatic manner,341 to have suffered similar things
because his life was perfect in mousikê. So they say that he was dismem-
25 bered and entirely divided and left the life here, since, I think, his
339
Proclus follows Plato in identifying Stesichorus’ residence as Himera (Phdr 244a).
While this enters into the biographical tradition of Stesichorus, it seems more likely
that this is Plato’s own contrivance which plays with the similarity between the place
name and himeros (desire). Proclus’ use of the place name here justifies the correlation
between Stesichorus and the literal or bodily level which he contrasts unfavourably
with Homer’s symbolic and intellectual poetry.
340
The identification of Demodocus with Homer was a long-standing one: see for
instance Scholia EV ad Od. 8.63: τινὲς δέ φασιν εἰς ἑαυτὸν ταῦτα λέγειν τὸν ποιητήν.
Once more Syrianus’ interpretation of Homer picks up traditional readings and
develops them in a new direction.
341
Both here and at 175.14 ‘tragic’ (τραγικῶς (174.22), οἱ τραγικώτεροι τῶν μύθων
(175.14)) is used as a byword for ‘melodramatic’.
286
6.2.4 A defence against the Phaedrus
contemporaries participated only in a partial and fragmentary way in

his music and were not able to take in his knowledge whole and
complete. But the people of Lesbos received the highest and very
first part of it, and it is evidently for this reason the myth says that
when he was dismembered his head was carried away to Lesbos. Since 30
Orpheus was a leader of Dionysian mysteries, he has been said by the myths 175
to have suffered similar things to his own deity, since dismemberment
(sparagmos) is one of the symbols (synthêma) of the Dionysian mysteries.
Homer, on the other hand, is said to have been deprived of his eyes,
because he has transcended all beauty of the senses and, after investigat- 5
ing the war of souls here, he led himself up to the intellective contem-
plation of beauty. Socrates says this in the Phaedrus: ‘The beauty here
below, which gleams most vividly, we perceive through the most vivid of
the senses. For vision comes as the sharpest of the senses through the 10
body, but it cannot see intelligence (phronêsis)’ (Phdr. 250d). So the more
melodramatic of the myths say that the one who has transcended the
visible beauty, and turned his own activity to intelligence (phronêsis) and
the intellective life, has lost his eyes because of his slander of Helen. 15
I think this is because the myths intend to signify through Helen the
whole beauty established by the activity of the demiurge in the world of
becoming. Over this beauty the war of souls has been waged for all of
time, and always will be until the more intellective forms of life are
victorious over the more irrational, and they are transported to the place 20
from which they set out in the beginning.342
So one writer has said that the period of the war is ten years, the other
ten thousand.343 But it makes no difference to say this one way or the
other. In fact the thousand-year period leads souls from one incarnation
(genesis) to the next. So whether souls are spun about around the earth 25
for nine thousand years and return in the tenth, or whether they struggle
on in war for nine years around the realm of becoming and overcome the
barbarian flood in the tenth, and are said to return to their own allotted 176
dwellings, it is altogether clear that the creators of myths reasonably call
342
Lamberton (2012), 253 n. 284, rightly notes the all-encompassing meaning ascribed
here to the story of the Trojan War, citing his own earlier book (Lamberton (1986),
199–200). See also Hermias in Phdr. 82.19–83.8 Lucarini and Moreschini (= 77.
13–78.9 Couvreur). The Trojans are enmattered forms and the way of life associated
with matter, while the Greeks are rational souls. Helen is identified with intelligible
beauty, but it is an emanation of this intelligible beauty granted by Aphrodite to
matter that the souls fight over.
343
That is, Homer describes the Trojan war as lasting ten years while Plato speaks of
a ten-thousand year journey of souls (Phdr. 248e8). This element is common to the
summary of Syrianus’ teaching given by Hermias, in Phdr. 83.4–8 Lucarini &
Moreschini (= 78.5–9 Couvreur).
287
Essay 6
‘blind’ the man who loves to contemplate344 such realities in the cosmos
and who has been carried up from the manifest and from images to the
5 contemplation which is imperceptible to the senses. Therefore it was
appropriate for those who always through symbols conceal the truth
regarding what truly exists, that the account of their own lives should be
handed down to posterity in a more symbolic manner. Consequently
Stesichorus is not closer to the Muses than Homer, since it was not the
10 same sufferings that occurred to both, except on the surface level of the
myth, nor was there any need of a palinode from Homer, since he had
turned back to the divine beauty, but there was in Stesichorus’ case,
since he had been immoderately devoted to the myth about Helen.
15 If in that passage Socrates employs the surface meaning and says that
Homer has made an error, and that because of this error he suffered the
same things as Stesichorus, it is not surprising, since he says that he
himself had similarly made an error in the previous speech, though it
was not clear that he had made an error:345
—Now I perceive my mistake.
—What mistake do you mean?
—A terrible speech, Phaedrus, a terrible speech it was that you brought along
20 and you forced me to give a terrible one.
—How so?
—It was silly and tending to blasphemy. What could be more terrible than
that? (Phdr. 242d).
Therefore just as he says that he himself has made an error by speak-
ing ill of insolent love – the [kind of love that] the gods have called
‘strangling of true love’ (Or. Chald. 45) – in that instead of contemplat-
25 ing the divine love that leads souls upwards he has turned instead to
love’s last and material image, in just that same way he would also say
that Homer has made an error about Helen, in that he has led down the
intellect of the soul to the sight of visible beauty. It is an error of the soul
177 to consider the lowest manifestations, in contrast to the pure and perfect
vantage point (periôpê) on the things which truly exist.
344
This term (φιλοθεάμων) is common in Proclus. Already in Plato it has a dual sense,
describing both the person inappropriately enamoured of physical sights and sounds
(Rep. V 475d2) and one who is a lover of the spectacle of the truth (Rep. 475e2). Proclus
adopts it in both of these senses.
345
Syrianus’ reading of the relation among the speeches locates Socrates’ first speech as
intermediate between that of Lysias and his second speech (the palinode). The speech
of Lysias is a praise of hybristic or insolent love, while Socrates’ second speech
concerns the self-controlled love oriented, not towards corporeal beauty, but towards
the beauty of virtue and knowledge in the soul. Praise of this intermediate love is an
error only insofar as it ignores the highest, inspired love directed at intelligible beauty.
Cf. in Phdr. 76.4–14 Lucarini and Moreschini (= 71.13–22 Couvreur).
288
6.2.5 The three dispositions of souls
That then is what we can say regarding the things written about
Homer in the Phaedrus.
6.2.5 what are the three dispositions of

souls, and how shall we demonstrate
that the threefold division of poetry 5
is made in accordance with the
three dispositions in us?
Well then, let us turn next to the discussions of poetics and consider
those – what kinds of poetry there are according to Plato, and which of
these he had in mind when he went through the criticisms of poetry in
the tenth book of the Republic, and how consequently Homer is shown in 10
these discussions to be exempted from the criticisms that are appro-
priate to the majority of poets. So in order that these things might
become clear, let us take our starting point from [Plato’s] teaching on
the following points. We say generally speaking that there are three 15
lives in the soul.
<The three types of life of the soul: 177.15–178.5>
(1) The best and most perfect life is that in accordance with which
the soul is connected to the gods and lives a life which is in closest
kinship with them and which is unified through the highest form
of likeness. It is a life that belongs not to the soul itself, but to the
gods. On the one hand it transcends the soul’s own intellect, on
the other it awakens the ineffable symbol (synthêma) of the unitary 20
existence (hypostasis) of the gods. It attaches like to like, its own
light to the light there, the most uniform (henoeidestaton) part of
its being and life to the one beyond all being and life.
(2) The life which is second to this in seniority and power is that
which is a middle life arranged in the middle of the soul, in 25
accordance with which [the soul] reverts upon itself, descending
from the divinely inspired (entheos) life, and, by establishing
intellect and knowledge as first principles of its activity, it unra-
vels the multitude of logoi, and contemplates all of the variations
among the forms. It brings together as one thing that which
thinks (to nooun) and the object of thought (to nooumenon), and it 178
represents the intellective substance, since it encompasses the
nature of the intelligibles in one [unified activity].
289
Essay 6
(3) The third life after these is the one that is carried away by the
lesser powers and has its activity in conjunction with them,
employing irrational imaginings and sense-perceptions, and is
5 altogether filled with lower things.
<Division of poetry in light of the three lives: 178.6–179.32>

So following an arrangement similar to that which we have observed in
the three forms of life in souls, let us consider that the division of poetry,
as it proceeds from the top down, is, by the multiform lives of the soul,
10 diversified into first, middle and last types of activity.
(1) The first of these [types of poetry] is the highest and full of
divine goods. It establishes the soul in the very causes of being
and draws together by some ineffable unification that which is
filled (to plêroumenon) and that which fills it (to plêroun).346
It stretches out, immaterially and without contact, that which
15 is filled towards illumination (ellampsis), and it calls forth that
which fills it to share its light: ‘As the channels are mingled
together [the highest life] perfects the works of imperishable
fire’ (Or. Chald. 66),347 as the oracle says, and produces one
20 divine bond between that which is participated and that which
participates, and a unifying mixture. [This type of poetry] estab-
lishes the lesser part as a whole in the power of the greater, and
brings it about that only the more divine is active, while the
lesser part is subordinated and conceals its own character in the
25 greater. So this is a madness greater than self-control,348 to say
346
The action of this poetry (κατὰ τινά τε ἕνωσιν ἄρρητον εἰς ταὐτὸν ἄγουσα τῷ πληροῦντι
τὸ πληρούμενον) seems to correspond nicely with the way in which the ineffable
synthê ma works in the case of the highest life at 177.19–21 (ἀνεγείρασα δὲ τὸ ἄρρητον
σύνθημα τῆς τῶν θεῶν ἑνιαίας ὑποστάσεως καὶ συνάψασα τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον, τῷ ἐκεῖ φωτὶ
τὸ ἑαυτῆς φῶς). Recall that a synthêma was originally a token, like two halves of a torn
playing card, that can be fitted back together to establish that the party holding each
half is who he claims to be. Something about the soul in its highest state calls forth
from the gods a response whereby they extend their half of the token. Inspired poetry
now seems to be a kind of telestic signal and extension of the recipient’s credentials for
divine checking.
347
The terminology of ‘channels’ (ochetoi) is common in the Oracles (frr. 2, 61, 65, 66, 110,
189) and seems to symbolise the connections between higher causes and lower effects.
Thus at Or. Chald. 65 ‘life-bearing’ fire descends to material things through a channel.
Importantly, however, telestic ritual allows the soul to go back up the channel from
which it has descended. Or. Chald. 110 urges us to seek the channel by which the soul
descended and to raise it up again by ritual action and sacred word.
348
The claim is drawn from Socrates’ palinode in the Phaedrus 244a, ff. Here he argues
that there are four forms of madness or mania that are superior to sanity or self-control
290
6.2.5 The three dispositions of souls
it briefly, and is defined in accordance with the divine measure

itself. Just as different [types of poetry] lead up to different
qualities (hyparxis) of the gods, so this type fills the inspired
soul with proportion (symmetria). It is for this reason that it
has put into order even the lowest activities of the soul by means
of metres and rhythms. In the same way that we say prophecy 30
correlates with truth and erotic madness with beauty, so too we 179
say that divine poetry is defined by reference to divine
proportion.349
(2) The next type of poetry is lower than that which is most divinely
inspired and most primary, and is observed in the middle of the
soul, and evidently has its existence in accordance with the soul’s
knowing and intellective disposition. While it recognises the 5
essence of the things that truly exist, and it loves to contemplate
the beautiful and the good, both in words and in deeds, it also
brings each of the subjects that it treats into an interpretation
(hermêneia) in metre and rhythm. You would find many of the
creations of good poets to be of this type, worthy of emulation 10
by those who are right-minded, full of advice and of the best
counsels, and abounding in intellective proportion. They hold
forth a share of intelligence (phronêsis) and the other virtues to
those with a suitable nature, and provide a recollection of the
cycles of the soul and of the eternal logoi and diverse powers in 15
them.
(3) The third type of poetry in addition to these is mingled with
opinions and imaginings, and since it is constituted through
nothing but mimêsis, it both is, and is rightly called, ‘mimetic’.
Sometimes it only employs representation (eikasia), but at other
times it projects an apparent likeness (aphomoiôsis) which is
apparent but not real. It magnifies inconsequential passions 20
and astonishes (ekplêttein)350 by means of suitable words and
(sô phrosunê ). The first two are treated by Syrianus as prophecy (mantikê ) and ritual
(telestikê ). The third of these is the inspiration of the Muses that produces poetry,
while the fourth is of course inspired love. Proclus will go on to discuss the Phaedrus
passage in greater detail shortly.
349
Proclus correlates three of the forms of divinely inspired madness from Phaedrus with
the much-discussed ‘three monads’ of Philebus 65a. See Sheppard (1980), 100–1 for
discussion.
350
The notion of ekplê xis had by Proclus’ time a long and contested history. For Aristotle,
this had been a desirable artistic effect, exemplified by Achilles’ pursuit of Hector
around the walls of Troy (Po. 1460b25) and Oedipus’ recognition of his own actions in
Sophocles (Po. 1454a). Hellenistic poets largely followed Aristotle in seeing ekplê xis as
a laudable goal for poetry, recognising that a fearful reaction could also be an
aesthetically pleasurable one (see for instance Plutarch Quomodo adolescens poetas audire
291
Essay 6
expressions those who listen to it, and by alterations of harmo-

nies and variations of rhythms it alters at the same time the
dispositions (diathesis) of souls. It displays the natures of its
25 subject matter not as they are but as they would appear to the
majority. It is a shadow-painting of what really exists, but not an
accurate [form of] knowledge, and establishes as its goal the
entertainment (psychagôgia)351 of the audience, and to that end it
looks especially to the emotional part of the soul, disposed by
nature as it is to rejoice and to grieve.
30 There are, as we said, two varieties of this type of poetry: one is
realistic, and strives for correctness of imitation; the other is as we
have described, dealing in illusion and providing only an apparent
mimêsis.
180 6.2.6 we shall demonstrate that

according to plato the three forms of
poetry are of the kind that we have
described and that they are in fact three.
In summary then, there are this many types of poetry. One must also
5 demonstrate that Plato makes mention of these and go through his
opinions about them. Firstly, let us move on to speak about the many
astonishing conceptions which one reading the texts [of Plato] atten-
tively would find, concerning divinely inspired (entheos) poetry. When
debeat 25d, developing and reporting such ideas). For the Stoics, however, ekplê xis is
not a quality to be cultivated but is defined rather as ‘fear arising from an unaccus-
tomed phantasia’ (ἔκπληξις δὲ φόβος ἐκ φαντασίας ἀσυνήθους πράγματος (D.L. VII 112).
It is frequently associated in Greek literature of the Roman era with myth and
falsehood: see Strabo I 2.17, who writes that ‘pleasure and astonishment are the goal
of myth’ ([τέλος] μύθου δὲ ἡδονὴν καὶ ἔκπληξιν) or Philostratus’ Heroicus where the
Phoenician merchant is astonished at Homeric poetry (43.2). For Proclus such
astonishment is certainly not desirable, but is rather misleading for improperly
educated readers.
351
Modern scholarship on Neoplatonism understands the kind of psychological trans-
formation on the part of the student that the philosophical curriculum was meant to
effect and often describes this element of the commentary tradition as ‘psychagogic’.
While the Neoplatonists themselves would doubtless acknowledge the role of reading
Plato with a master in turning the soul from Becoming to Being, they would probably
disavow the term psychagogic. It is used throughout Proclus in a negative sense. At in
Alc. I 18.14 Plato’s prologues to his dialogues are said not to be simply psychagogic –
they do not aim to seduce the audience. See also in Tim. I 59.28, 83.23 and 129.21. See
below 191.21, 195.23, 198.11, and 203.3.
292
6.2.6 The three forms of poetry
these things are first clearly defined, it will be easier, I think, to give the 10
account required of the next topics.
<1. Inspired poetry: 180.10–186.21>
<Inspired poetry 1: the Phaedrus: 180.10–182.20>

He has said in the Phaedrus (245a) that this inspired poetry is ‘possession
by the Muses’ and ‘madness’, and that it is given into ‘a gentle and
innocent soul’ from above. And he says that its activity is to awaken the
soul and rouse it to Bacchic madness, by means of songs and other types 15
of poetry, and its goal is to arrange the countless deeds of the ancients in
order to educate future generations.352
In this text it will be obvious to anyone, that he says firstly that the
originative and primordial cause of poetry is the gift of the Muses.
Just as they bring to fulfilment the creations, both invisible and 20
visible, of the father of harmony and of rhythmic motion,353 so too
they shine a trace of divine symmetry into souls possessed by them,
and bring to completion inspired poetry. Since the entire activity of
that which illuminates is in its very divine presence, and that which is 25
illuminated gives itself up to movements from that source and stands
apart from its own character and is subordinated to the activities of
what is divine and uni-form, for these reasons, I think, Plato has
called such an illumination (ellampsis) ‘possession’ and ‘madness’.
Because the illumination takes charge over the whole of those who
are moved by it, he has called it ‘possession’, and because it moves 30
those who are illuminated out of their own activities into its own 181
character, he has called it ‘madness’.
Secondly, he specifies what sort of condition the soul must be in
for it to be possessed by the Muses, when he says ‘taking hold of
a gentle and innocent soul’. The soul that is hard and resistant 5
352
Cf. Phdr. 245a1–5 (ἀπὸ Μουσῶν κατοκωχή τε καὶ μανία, λαβοῦσα ἁπαλὴν καὶ ἄβατον
ψυχήν, ἐγείρουσα καὶ ἐκβακχεύουσα κατά τε ᾠδὰς καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ποίησιν, μυρία τῶν
παλαιῶν ἔργα κοσμοῦσα τοὺς ἐπιγιγνομένους παιδεύει) with Proclus’ summary:
κατοκωχὴν μὲν ἀπὸ Μουσῶν καὶ μανίαν προσείρηκεν, εἰς ἁπαλὴν δὲ καὶ ἄβατον ἄνωθεν
δίδοσθαι ψυχήν, ἔργον δὲ αὐτῆς εἶναί φησιν ἀνεγείρειν τε καὶ ἐκβακχεύειν κατά τε τὰς ᾠδὰς
καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ποίησιν, τέλος δὲ τὸ μυρία τῶν παλαιῶν ἔργα κοσμοῦσαν τοὺς ἐπιγιγνομένους
παιδεύειν. Proclus discerns – not wholly implausibly – implicit distinctions between
the source of this inspiration, the receptivity condition for such inspiration, its function or
ergon, and its end or telos.
353
Sc. Apollo. On the cosmic role of Apollo and the Muses in harmonising creation, see in
Tim. II 197.21 and 208.9.
293
Essay 6
(Tht. 155e)354 and impassive to the divine illumination stands in

opposition to the action of possession, since [this soul] belongs
more to itself than to that which illuminates, and does not easily
take an impression of the gift from that source. [Such a soul],
10 possessed by all kinds of opinions and filled up with reasoning
that is shifting and divorced from the divine, overshadows the
divine inspiration, mixing with the impulses from this its own
ways of life and activities. So it is necessary for this soul, which is
going to be possessed by the Muses, to have taken on beforehand
15 both of these qualities together: to be both gentle and innocent, so
that it may be entirely receptive and sympathetic towards divinity,
but impassive and unreceptive towards all other things and unmixed
with them.
Thirdly then, [Plato] sets out the common action (ergon) of such
a disposition (epitêdeiotês) and the possession by the Muses and mad-
20 ness. The process of awakening and rousing to Bacchic madness is in
the unified action completed by the action of both,355 I mean, that
is, [the action] of that which is illuminated and that which illumi-
nates. The latter moves its object, acting from above, while the
former is prepared to receive its action of giving. The awakening,
on the one hand, is an unsleeping effort of the soul356 and an
25 unyielding activity and a turning back from the fall into becoming
towards the divine. The Bacchic madness, by contrast, is a divinely
inspired movement and an unwearying dance around the divine,
bringing to perfection (telesiourgos) those possessed.357 To say it
once more, there is need of both these things, so that the possessed
may not be inclined to fall towards the worse, but are easily moved
towards the greater.
30 Fourthly, with respect to putting in order the countless deeds of the
182 ancients and educating future generations through these, it is clear in
advance that Plato says this [kind of poetry] renders358 human matters
more perfect and more brilliant through the divine, and that true
education arises from this for those who hear it. So it is far from
354
It is the ‘uninitiated’ (amuê tos) who are resistant in the Theaetetus passage. Those who
are uninitiated are presumably too polluted to be possessed by the gods. In their
insistence on the reality only of what can be touched the uninitiated resemble the
‘giants’ of Sophist 246a and they, in turn, the materialist atheists of Laws X.
355
Adopting Kroll’s conjecture of ἐνεργείας in place of εἰς in line 21, as does Lamberton.
356
Adopting Kroll’s further conjecture of ἄυπνος in place of ὑπὸ in 24 (producing the
meaning ‘an unsleeping effort of the soul’ rather than ‘an effort made by the soul’).
357
Or alternatively, ‘initiating those possessed’.
358
We accept, with Festugière and Lamberton, Kroll’s conjecture of ἀποδεικνύναι for the
manuscript’s δεικνύναι.
294
5 necessary to deprive this inspired poetry of its educative power.359

Rather I think that the requirements of education are not the same for
the dispositions (hexis) of the young and of those who are already
perfected by political virtue and need next the more mystical teachings
about the divinities. Therefore poetry of this type is most of all educa- 10
tive of its audience, when it is divinely inspired and when the divine
becomes manifest for those hearing it. Touching only the surface, one
does not apprehend the mystical truth concealed within it. So it is with
good reason that [Plato] values this poetry established by the Muses in
gentle and innocent souls more highly than any other human art, for he 15
confidently asserts that the poet without such madness is himself incom-
plete and his poetry, that of a self-controlled man, is obscured by the
poetry of madmen, since human understanding is altogether inferior to 20
the divine gift.360
<Inspired poetry 2: the Ion: 182.21–185.7>

These then are the sorts of things that the Socrates of the Phaedrus
taught us about divinely inspired poetry, bringing it especially into
relation with divine prophecy and initiation, and ascribing its first
revelation to the gods. In the Ion, in dialogue with the rhapsode, he 25
says things harmonious with these about poetry. There he shows very
clearly that the poetry of Homer is divinely inspired and is a cause of
divine inspiration for those who spend time on it. I believe that when the
rhapsode says that he has plenty to say about the poems of Homer, but
nothing at all about the poems written by other poets, Socrates 30
identifies in response the cause of this experience. He says, ‘the cause is 183
this: your ability to speak well about Homer is not a skill (technê) but rather
359
Proclus here anticipates a possible objection. The poetry of Homer that he has
interpreted in Essay 6 is divinely inspired and contains insights into theological
matters, but is inappropriate for educating young people in the ideal city. However,
it would be a mistake to suppose that inspired poetry cannot be simultaneously
revelatory of divine truths and suitable for the didactic purposes of character forma-
tion. Conspicuously, when he turns to showing that all three kinds of poetry are
present in Homer, he does not give us an example of inspired and mystagogic poetry
that is simultaneously educative of character. Van den Berg (2014b) has recently
entered into debate with the editor of the remains of Proclus’ commentary on
Hesiod’s Works and Days, Patrizia Marzillo (2010), about whether Proclus regards
this text as inspired or didactic. Marzillo points out that some passages are given
symbolic interpretations of the sort characteristic of Proclus’ treatment of Homer’s
inspired passages. Van den Berg responds that the aim of the symbolic interpretations
is didactic and concerns character formation, not theology (p. 392). The possibility
raised here by Proclus that poetry might be both inspired and educative would show
the disagreement between Marzillo and van den Berg to admit of a happy solution.
360
Cf. Phdr. 245a5–8.
295
Essay 6
some divine power moves you’ (Ion 533d). And that this is true is clear,
5 I suppose, to anyone. Those who do something by skill are in general
able to complete the same task in all similar cases, but those who are able
to do something by means of a divine power do not necessarily have
a commensurate ability for other things. How it is that such a power
10 comes to the rhapsode, joining him especially to Homer, but not with
the other poets, Socrates teaches next, employing, as a very vivid model
for the most complete possession by the Muses, the stone which most
people called Heraclean. What does this stone do? ‘Not only’, he says,
15 ‘does it draw iron rings to itself, but it also puts into them this power
to draw similar things, so that they draw other rings. And often,’ he says,
‘a chain formed of rings or other iron things is made. So in all of these
20 the power depends upon that stone’ (Ion 533d–e). How such great
effects concerning the rings arise and what the power of the stone is,
are topics that are outside the current discussion. But let us listen to
Socrates as he puts forward observations related to these concerning
25 inspired poetry: ‘In this way the Muse makes them [sc. poets] divinely
inspired, and from these is suspended a chain of others who are divinely
inspired.’
In these lines he firstly brought forward the divine cause unitarily,
calling it the Muse, but did not, as he did in the Phaedrus, ascribe
30 possession by the Muses and madness to the whole group of them, so
that he might lead the whole multitude of entities moved by divine
184 inspiration back up to one monad, so to speak, the primordial principle
of poetry. Poetry exists in a uni-form and hidden manner in the first
mover [monad], but in a secondary and articulated manner in the poets
5 who are set in motion by the previous monad. It also exists in its lowest
mode when it is present like an assistant in the rhapsodes, who are led up
towards the single cause [of poetry] through the poets as intermediaries.
Next, when [Plato] extends the divine inspiration from above down to
the final participations in it, he clearly sings in praise of the superfluity
10 (periousia) of the very first moving principle, and equally demonstrates
the very active participation of those who participate in it first.
The capacity to awaken others as well by means of their poems reveals
the very clear presence of the divine in them.
Following these points he adds the next observations about the pos-
15 session experienced by poets: ‘All the good poets of epic do not speak all
these beautiful poems by skill, but because they are divinely inspired and
possessed, and the same is true of the good lyric poets’ (Ion 553e–534a),
and so on. ‘For a poet is a light thing and winged and sacred, and he is
20 not able to create poetry before he is divinely inspired and out of his
mind’ (Ion 534b). And finally, for the following reasons: ‘since it is not by
skill that they create poems and speak many fine things about their
296
subject matter, just like you concerning Homer, but by means of a divine
portion each is able to write fine poems on the topic alone to which the 25
Muse has compelled him’ (534b–c). In all of this discussion he says that
inspired poetry is established simply as an intermediary of the divine
cause, which he has called the Muse. In this too he imitates Homer, by
looking sometimes to the group [of Muses] and sometimes to the
unification of the chain of Muses, as [Homer says both] ‘tell me now, 30
Muses’ and ‘tell me, Muse, of the man’. So he has placed the madness of
the poets as an intermediary, between this very first principle of the 185
movements of divine inspiration and the last echoes of that inspiration
seen among the rhapsodes by [universal] sympathy. This madness is
moved and moves others in turn, and is brought to fullness from above
and relays the illumination from there, and provides one bond to con- 5
nect those who last participate [in the cause] to the participated monad.
<Inspired poetry 3: the Laws: 185.8–186.21>

Let us bring into harmony with these discussions the things that the
Athenian stranger says about poetry in the third book of the Laws and
what Timaeus says about poets. The former says that ‘the race of poets, 10
being divine and inspired, sings along with some Graces and Muses, and
on each occasion takes hold of many things that actually happen’ (Lg. III
682a). The latter bids us to follow the poets seized by Phoebus,361 since 15
they are children of the gods and know the affairs of their ancestors,
even though they speak without plausibility or rational demonstration
(Tim. 40d). From these passages it is easy for anyone to understand what
he considers divinely inspired poetry to be, and what nature the poets
working in this mode have, and how these poets are above all the
messengers (angelos) of divine and mystical conceptions (noêma), 20
since they especially know the affairs of their fathers. Therefore when
[Plato] seizes upon the mythical fictions and corrects the more
361
In fact Tim. 40d7–8 says nothing about poets who are inspired by Apollo. It says only
that ‘we must trust to those before us who said these things since they are the offspring
of the gods’ (πειστέον δὲ τοῖς εἰρηκόσιν ἔμπροσθεν, ἐκγόνοις μὲν θεῶν οὖσιν). Proclus
introduces Apollo into his Timaeus Commentary at this point under the assumption
that the persons whose authority we accept are ‘those who have chosen a life that is
prophetic or dedicated to mystic rites (telestikos bios)’ (III 159.24 ff.). These, of course
are the other two forms of divine possession distinguished from the possession by the
Muses that yields inspired poetry in the Phaedrus. So it appears that there is something
of a mismatch between Proclus’ exegesis of the Timaeus here and that which appears in
the Timaeus Commentary. Rather than seeing this as evidence of change in his position
from the composition of one work to another, we think it is instead indicative of the
way in which his treatment of any Platonic text is responsive to the occasion and the
context – i.e. the performance model alluded to in the introduction to Essay 5.
297
Essay 6
melodramatic of [the poets’] writings – the bindings and castrations and

25 lusts and intercourse and tears and laughter – we may very much have
him as a witness to the worth of these discourses, due to the doctrine
(theôria) hidden in these symbols as if behind screens (prokalymma).
Given that he especially thinks it right to trust in them in subjects
concerning the gods, even if they speak in a manner that is not strictly
demonstrative, because of inspiration from the gods, he will wonder at
30 the truth in the myths through which the poets hand down teachings
186 about divinity. And the man who calls the race of poets divine would not
ascribe to it a godless and gigantic362 subtext regarding divine reality.
And he who has revealed that the poets say what they say with the aid of
5 the Graces and Muses has altogether presupposed that unmusical and
unharmonious and graceless imagining is far removed from their doc-
trine (theôria). Therefore when he decrees that poetry and demonstra-
tion through myth is not to be introduced to the hearing of the young, it
10 is far from necessary that he dishonour poetry itself, but rather he keeps
the disposition (hexis) of the young away from such myth-making, as it is
untrained at hearing these things. As he says in the Second Alcibiades, the
genre of poetry is as follows: ‘as a whole it is by nature riddling (ainig-
matôdês) and not comprehensible to just anyone’ (147b). And he also
15 said the same thing clearly in the Republic: the youth is not able to judge
what is a subtext (hyponoia) and what is not (II 378d). So we shall say that
he entirely accepts divinely inspired poetry, which in fact he names
‘divine’, and he deems it right to honour in silence those who possess
20 it.363 Let that suffice for discussion of the first type of poetry coming
from the gods and arising in gentle and innocent souls.
<Poetry conveying rational knowledge: 186.22–188.27>

<1. The Laws: 186.22–187.24>
After this type, let us next consider the poetry conveying rational knowl-
edge (epistêmê) of existent things, which operates through intellect (nous)
and intelligence (phronêsis). This knowledge has revealed to human
25 beings many conceptions (noêma) about incorporeal nature, and has
362
The equation of giants (gigantes) with materialists comes from Sophist 246a and is
common among the Neoplatonists. See for instance above I 51.11 and I 104.3.
363
Proclus paraphrases Rep. II 378a4–5. The whole passage in Plato, however, does not
commit to the necessity of anyone hearing myths of this type and is concerned rather
with discouraging any exposure to them: τὰ δὲ δὴ τοῦ Κρόνου ἔργα καὶ πάθη ὑπὸ τοῦ
ὑέος, οὐδ᾽ἄν εἰ ἦν ἀληθῆ ᾤμην δεῖν ῥᾳδίως οὕτως λέγεσθαι πρὸς ἄφρονάς τε καὶ νέους, ἀλλὰ
μάλιστα μὲν σιγᾶσθαι, εἰ δὲ ἀνάγχη τις ἦν λέγειν, δι᾽ἀπορρήτων ἀκούειν ὡς ὀλιγίστους,
θυσαμένους οὐ χοῖρον ἀλλά τι μέγα καὶ ἄπορον θῦμα, ὅπως ὅτι ἐλαχίστους συνέβη ἀκοῦσαι
(II 378a1–6).
298
brought to light many reasonable opinions concerning bodily

existence,364 and has hunted out as well the symmetry which is most
beautiful and fitting for human character and the disposition that is
opposite to this, and it has arranged all these teachings in appropriate
metres and rhythms. The Athenian Stranger says, I suppose, that the 30
poetry of Theognis is of this kind (Lg. I 630a), which he praises more 187
highly than that of Tyrtaeus, because Theognis is a teacher of the whole
of virtue, and of virtue that extends throughout the whole of political
life. While Theognis accepts the good faith brought to completion by
all the virtues and casts out from cities the truer evil of factional strife,
and brings the lives of those who heed his advice into a single state of
likemindedness, Tyrtaeus praises a courageous disposition in itself and
urges his listeners to that, neglecting the other virtues. But it is better to
hear this in Plato’s own words: 10
We have as our witness the poet Theognis, a citizen of Megara in Sicily, who
says:
A trustworthy man ought to be valued equally to gold and silver
in harsh discord, Kyrnos. 15
So we say that this man is altogether better than that one in a harsher conflict,
almost to the degree that justice and self-control and intelligence, when they
come together, are better than courage itself alone. For a trustworthy and sound 20
man during factional strife would never be without all of the virtues.
(Lg. 630a3–630b3)
So then here Plato accepts Theognis as a leader and symbol (symbolon),
because Theognis has a share of civic knowledge and the whole of
virtue, which he has called ‘trustworthiness’ (pistotês).
<2. The Second Alcibiades: 187.24–188.27>

In the Second Alcibiades, when he is defining the most correct and safest 25
method of prayer, he sends [Alcibiades] to poetry imbued with wisdom
(emphrôn). ‘At any rate it is likely, Alcibiades,’ he says,
that the poet was wise (phronimos) who seems to have had some foolish (anoêtos) 188
friends, and seeing them both taking action and praying for things that were not
beneficial, but seemed good to them, he made one prayer in common on behalf
of all of them. And he says something like: 5
364
On the one hand, we have ‘conceptions about incorporeal nature’ (νοήματα περὶ τῆς
ἀσωμάτου φύσεως) and on the other ‘reasonable opinions about bodily existence’
(δόγματα περὶ τῆς σωματικῆς ὑποστάσεως) that are merely ‘reasonable’ (εἰκότα). This
reflects the familiar distinction drawn in the Timaeus between Being and Becoming
and the fact that the accounts concerning the latter are merely likely (εἰκότα) since
their object is itself an image (εἰκών) (29c).
299
Essay 6
King Zeus, grant to us the good, whether prayed for or not,

but ward off the bad even if it is prayed for (Alc. 2 142e–143a3).365
Only the person who has knowledge is qualified to discern the distinction
10 between good and bad things and the manner of speaking to divinity
which is appropriate to middle dispositions. And this is why Socrates
called the poet who wrote these lines ‘wise’ (phronimos), because he did
not write through divine inspiration nor through correct opinion, but he
15 judged by knowledge (epistêmê) the natures of the things asked for, and
inferred the disposition of those asking, and confirmed what is appro-
priate for the beneficent powers of the gods. This is because turning
everyone through prayer to the one kingly providence of Zeus, and
demonstrating the dependence of the generation of good things on the
20 power of god, and disproving the existence of true evils through the
benevolence of the greater one, and in general saying that these things
are unknown to those who are praying, but have been judged by the god
through rules that are fitting – all of this is a task for no ordinary
intelligence (phronêsis) and rational knowledge (epistêmê). So we plausibly
25 say that such poetry is intelligent (emphrôn) and imbued with rational
knowledge (epistêmôn). It is able to define right opinions for the middle
dispositions, in accordance with perfect rational knowledge.
<Mimetic poetry: 188.28–192.3>

<1. The Sophist: 188.28–190.2>
Thirdly then, let us speak about mimetic poetry, which, as we said
earlier, sometimes represents reality (pragmata), and sometimes styles
30 itself by reference to appearances. So of the part of this that is realistic,
189 the Athenian Stranger has given a vivid account [in the Sophist], while
Socrates in the Republic has treated the form of it that is illusory. As to
how these differ from one another, I mean the realistic part of mimetic
5 poetry and the illusory, the Eleatic Stranger has given us a sufficient
teaching. He says:
— I think I can discern two forms of mimetic art . . . I see one as a realistic art.
This is especially when someone works at the creation of a copy, reproducing
10 the measurements of the example (paradeigma), in length and width and depth,
and reproducing colour in addition to these things.
365
The verse appears in the Anthologia Palatina, as Kroll notes: Ζεῦ βασιλεῦ, τὰ μὲν ἐσθλὰ
καὶ εὐχομένοις καὶ ἀνεύκτοις | ἄμμι δίδου· τὰ δὲ λυγρὰ καὶ εὐχομένων ἀπερύκοις (Anth. Pal.
10.108) and in the Tübingen Theosophy: see Buresch (1889), p. 107.3–7 (no. 40).
The compiler of the Theosophy adds a prose paraphrase: τούτεστ· καὶ σιωπῶσιν ἡμῖν
χαρίζου, ἅπερ οἶδας χρηστά· εἰ δέ τι τῶν ἀσυμφόρων εὐξόμεθα τὸ μέλλον ἀγοούντες,
κώλυσον ὡς ἀγαθός.
300
— What? Don’t all those creating a representation try to do this?

— Those who sculpt or paint large-scale works do not. If they should 15
reproduce the true measurements of beautiful things, you know that the parts
above would appear smaller than they ought, and those below bigger, because
the former is further away as we look and the latter closer.
— Absolutely.
— So is it not true that present-day craftsmen disregard the real measure- 20
ments and instead depict in their images what is beautiful in appearance? (Sph.
235d1–236a6).366
Having established these distinctions, the Eleatic Stranger, at the end
of the dialogue, proposes, reasonably, I believe, a realistic and an illusory 25
type of image production, when he wishes to pin down the sophist by
means of the method of definition (264c, ff.). One type works to reproduce
a copy that is like the paradigm, the other to prepare an imitation which is
like the appearance of its object. Similarly one part of mimetic poetry is
realistic, with the words taking the impression of the very things that the
discourse deals with, and the other part makes the bigger and smaller 30
appear the same, and possesses the likeness that lies in appearance (phan- 190
tasia), but not that which is contained in the truth.
<2. The Laws: 190.2–25>

So the Athenian Stranger [in the Laws] sees fit to remind us of the type of
mimêsis that is realistic. Proposing to present the type of mousikê that
does not have pleasure as its goal, but aims to display likeness to the 5
paradigm and correctness of imitation, he says something like this:
— What then? In the production of likenesses, is it not true that in all the
representational arts, pleasure arises in [the representations], and if this happens
as a by-product, it is most correct for us to call this ‘grace’? . . . But to propose 10
a general rule: it is equality of measurement (isotê s) that produces the correctness
of such [representations]’ (667c9–667d7). . . . ‘Therefore do we also say that all
of mousikê is representational and mimetic?’ (668a9–10)
And later:
. . . When someone says that mousikê is judged by pleasure, because all of the 15
compositions associated with it are mimê sis and representation, we cannot at all
agree to what is said. Though I suppose that not all of the poets and their 20
audiences would agree with this?
— Certainly. (668b9–c3)367
366
Proclus slightly abbreviates the passage, skipping some lines between 235d2 and 7.
367
There are some minor differences here between the transmitted text of Plato (e.g. the
omission of καὶ ὑποκριταί after ποιηταί τε καὶ ἀκροαταί in 668c2) that are likely due to
quotation from memory.
301
Essay 6
So this type of poetry, which is arranged as part of the mousikê which is

educative of character and is able to judge the various modes (harmonia)
and rhythms, one would justifiably call representational and so
mimetic. Therefore it does not have pleasure as its goal, but correctness
25 of representations.
<3. The Republic: 190.25–191.25>

This then is the nature of the representational type of poetry. Let us
consider the type of poetry that produces illusions on the basis of what is
written in the Republic. When Socrates has demonstrated that the type of
191 poet whom he has proposed to examine is at third remove from the truth
and imitative, he proposes next that [such an artist] imitates in an illusio-
nistic mode (phantastikôs), employing painting as his example (paradeigma).
5 —So we have agreed that he is an imitator. Tell me this about the artist: does it
seem to you that he attempts to imitate each object in nature or the works of
craftsmen?
— The works of craftsmen, he said.
— As they are or as they appear? Define this next.
— How do you mean, he said.
10 — Like this. A bed, if you see it from the side or straight on or from whatever
angle, doesn’t really change, or rather, it doesn’t change but appears different.
And other objects similarly?
— That’s right, he said, it seems different but doesn’t change.
15 — So consider this. With reference to which does visual art produce [its
representations]? Does it attempt to imitate what exists, as it is, or what appears,
as it appears? Is it an imitation of appearance or of truth?
— Of appearance, he said. (Rep. X 597e10–598b5)
In these lines Socrates sets out very vividly that he separates from poetry
20 that part of the mimetic class that produces illusions, and he says that it
aims only at pleasure and the entertainment (psychagôgia) of its audience.
This is because the type of this mimêsis that creates illusions is separated
from the type that is representational, inasmuch as that [representational
kind] considers the correctness of the imitation, but this one considers only
25 the pleasure which the majority experience in illusion (phantasia).
<Mimetic poetry: conclusion: 191.25–192.3>

So this is how the types of poetry have been distinguished in Plato: one is
greater than rational knowledge (epistêmê), another concerned with such
knowledge, another concerned with correct opinion,368 and another
368
English lacks appropriate adjectival forms (unless we translate epistê mê as ‘science’ and
then resort to ‘scientific’) so we have used ‘concerned with such knowledge’ to convey
302
6.2.7 Homer and the three forms of poetry
falls below correct opinion. At any rate let us say clearly about the last of 30
these, that the imitator of this kind, as we have described this poet, will 192
neither know nor have correct opinion, regarding the things which he
imitates, with respect to its beauty or its worthlessness.369
6.2.7 the poetry of homer demonstrates 5

in itself the three forms of poetry.
<192.4–196.13>
<The three types of poetry in Homer: 192.4–195.12>
Now that these [types of poetry] have been distinguished, let us move on
to the poetry of Homer and let us consider how each of the dispositions of
poetry shines forth in his work, and especially those that aim at correct-
ness and beauty. When he works under divine inspiration and is possessed 10
by the Muses, and he teaches mystical conceptions concerning the gods
themselves, then he works in accordance with the most primary and
divinely inspired poetry. When in turn he discusses the life of the soul
and the differences in nature and political duties, then he very much sets
out his discussions in accordance with rational knowledge. When he 15
assigns the appropriate types of mimêsis to both actions and characters,
then he presents them in accordance with realistic mimêsis. And when,
I believe, he tries for the appearance things have to the majority, but not
the truth of what really exists, and in this way entertains the souls of his 20
audience,370 then he is a poet in the mode that is productive of illusions.
To begin from the last type of the poet’s mimêsis, I mean, for example,
the passage where he says that the sun rose from the sea, and he similarly
describes its setting, though he does not speak of either of these as they
are nor how they occur, nor does he imitate them through his words, but 25
he describes how they appear to our senses due to distance. Say then that
I regard this and all such examples as the type of poetry productive of
illusion. Or again when he imitates the heroes making war or taking 193
the idea that these intermediate forms have the character of knowledge or right
opinion: τὸ μὲν ὡς κρεῖττον ἐπιστήμης, τὸ δὲ <ὡς> ἐπιστημονικόν, τὸ δὲ ὡς
ὀρθοδοξαστικόν, τὸ δὲ ὡς καὶ τῆς ὀρθῆς δόξης ἀπολειπόμενον. The important point is
that while inspired poetry transcends the kind of knowing associated with bodies of
knowledge such as geometry, didactic poetry has the character of this knowledge.
Realistic imitative poetry falls short of that standard and aspires only to the correct
opinion that pertains to sensible things. Illusionistic imitative poetry, then, falls short
even of that standard.
369
This last sentence slightly rearranges Rep. 602a8–9: οὔτε ἄρα εἴσεται οὔτε ὀρθὰ δοξάσει ὁ
μιμητὴς περὶ ὧν ἂν μιμῆται πρὸς κάλλος ἢ πονηρίαν.
370
ἐπάγηται ψυχάς (192.20), literally ‘leading their souls’, suggests the notion of psycha-
gô gia, on which see I 179.27 and note.
303
Essay 6
counsel or speaking according to their forms of life, some intelligent,

some brave, some craving honour, I would say that such work belongs to
the representational type of poetry. And again when he plainly knows
5 and teaches the different natures of the parts of the soul, or the alteration
of the image relative to the soul that employs it, or the order of the
elements in the universe (earth, water, air, aether, the heavens), or some
similar piece of information, I would confidently assert that this is the
10 capacity of poetry to convey rational knowledge. In addition to all of
these, when he teaches us about the demiurgic monad371 and the divi-
sion of the universe into three, or when he teaches about the bindings by
Hephaestus, or about the paternal unification of Zeus in relation to the
productive divinity of Hera through an insoluble intertwining, then
15 I would say that he clearly speaks with divine inspiration and sets forth
such mythic narratives by means of possession by the Muses.
And he himself reveals, in the case of Demodocus, the activity coming
from the gods, when he says before the song that ‘he began, set in
motion by a god’372 and that he was divinely inspired and that the
20 Muse loved him or the god who leads the Muses:
Either the Muse, the child of Zeus, taught you, or Apollo did.
You sing in order the hard fate of the Achaeans,
all that they did and suffered and all their struggles (Od. 8.488–90).
25 Moreover it has been thoroughly enough discussed that he presents
Demodocus in a certain manner as himself and as a model (paradeigma)
of his own experiences. The line:
194 [the Muse] deprived him of his eyes, but gave sweet song (Od. 8.64)
5 seems to transfer the myth about Homer directly to Demodocus. He

strongly and clearly asserts that this man speaks what he speaks under
divine inspiration.
It is good that we have touched upon Demodocus and his divinely
inspired song; it seems to me that I should go through the singers whom
Homer has thought worthy of mention by reference to the categories of
10 poetry discussed above. Demodocus was divinely inspired, as has been
said, and taught matters both divine and human, and is said to have put
his own mousikê into dependence on the gods. Phemius, in Ithaca, was
371
Following Kroll’s suggestion we supply μονάδος after ἀναδιδάσκῃ in 193.11, as do
Festugière and Lamberton.
372
Od. 8.499 ὣς φάθ’, ὁ δ’ ὁρμηθεὶς θεοῦ ἤρχετο. It is far from obvious that the line should be
given the interpretation the Proclus gives it. It is equally possible that it means, ‘he
began, starting from the god’ (i.e. starting from the traditional invocation of a god at
the start of a song). See Sheppard (1980), 167.
304
6.2.7 Homer and the three forms of poetry
characterised especially by knowledge (gnôsis) of things both divine and

human:
Phemius, you know many other things that bewitch mortals,
deeds of both gods and men, which the bards sing 15
(Od. 1.337–8)
as Penelope says to him. And another third instance is the bard of
Clytemnestra, who seems to be a mimetic poet and to employ correct 20
opinion, and to hold out songs of self-control to the woman:
There was a bard with her, to whom Atreides had given many instructions
when he left for Troy (Od. 3.267–8).373
While she had his company, Clytemnestra performed no unholy 25
deed, since he restrained her irrational way of life with educative
songs. And the fourth musician, if you like, [who is] arranged analo-
gously to represent the form of poetry productive of illusions, is that
Thamyris whom the Muses are said to have restrained from song: 30
and they in their anger left him maimed (Il. 2.599). 195
This poet attempted a type of music that was too deceptive and too
much based in the senses and pleasing to the majority. For this reason he
is said to have wished to prevail over the Muses, since he is said to have
preferred ambiguous and varied song to the simpler music which 5
belongs to the Muses, and to have fallen from the favour of the god-
desses. For the anger of the Muses does not refer some affect to the
goddesses, but demonstrates the lack of aptitude of this poet for parti-
cipating in their influence.374 So this singer is very far from the truth and 10
calls upon the passions of souls and produces illusion and has neither
correct opinion nor rational knowledge of the things that he imitates.
<Inspired poetry the most prominent in Homer: 195.13–196.13>

So we have seen in Homer all of the types of poetry, and especially the
divinely inspired, by which we say that he is especially characterised. 15
And not only do we say this, but Plato himself everywhere calls him
a divine poet and most divine of poets and most of all worthy of
373
The epistemic deficiency of Clytemnestra’s unnamed bard relative to Phemius is
perhaps to be inferred from the behaviour of the two women. Because Penelope’s
singer had knowledge, she remained loyal, but Clytemnestra – instructed only by
a man with correct opinion – betrayed her husband once Aegisthus removed the bard’s
healthy influence.
374
Cf. Iamblichus, Myst. I 13 on the impassivity of the gods and the correct under-
standing of their ‘anger’.
305
Essay 6
imitation, as we have shown above. Least distinct [in his work] is the
mimetic type of poetry that simultaneously deals in illusion, which he
20 employs to be persuasive to the majority, and because there is no need to
remove this type of poetry entirely. That is how Homer stands in
respect to this mode. But the tragedians, since they are solely poets
who deal in illusion and aim at the entertainment of the majority, go to
25 excess in this form of poetry, as one would expect. It is as if someone
came to a well governed city, as the Athenian Stranger says,375 and saw
there that drunkenness was accepted for some useful purpose, but that
he should emulate not the intelligence (phronêsis) in the city nor its order
30 as a whole but only the drunkenness in and of itself. He would not be
196 able to hold that city the cause of his madness, but his own weakness of
judgement. In the same way I believe the tragedians, in imitating the
lowest type of Homeric poetry, cannot ascribe the cause of their own
5 error to Homer, but to their own inability. Let it be said then that
Homer is the ‘leader of the tragedians’ (Rep. 595c2), inasmuch as the
poets of tragedy have divided up the parts of his poetry, imitating in an
illusionistic mode what was said realistically, and transposing what was
expressed with rational knowledge for the hearing of the majority. But
10 Homer is not merely the teacher of tragedy, since he is its teacher only
through the lowest part of his poetry, but also the teacher of Plato’s
entire treatment of mimêsis and his whole philosophical investigation.
6.2.8 what part of the poetry of homer does

socrates expel in the tenth book of the
15 REPUBLIC and for what reasons? it is not
the whole of his poetry but only its
lowest part that he rejects.
<196.14–199.28>
That is sufficient discussion of the poetry itself and the most perfect
20 poetry of Homer. Let us compare Socrates’ arguments with the results
of this discussion and consider what kind of poetry he censures, and how
we might exempt Homer himself from those many and varied censures.
Firstly, let us demonstrate from the text that he does not chastise poetry
25 as a whole: for at the very beginning of the tenth book he says:
‘Moreover’, I said, ‘I have many other things in mind about it’ (speaking of the
state which has been described), ‘how we were establishing the city as correctly
375
As Festugière notes, Proclus here combines two passages from the Laws, the first of
which (Lg. I 640d–e) imagines an outsider objecting to the alcohol laws of the well-
governed city. The second passage distinguishes good and bad drunkenness (673e).
306
6.2.8 What part of Homer does Socrates expel?
as can be, and I had in mind not least poetry, of which we had decided not to 197
accept any that is mimetic. And it is even clearer now, as it seems to me, that this
is altogether not to be accepted’ (Rep. X 595a1–6).
And later:
‘I say only to you, since you will not inform on me to the poets of tragedy and the 5
other mimetic artists, that all such things seem destructive of the intelligence of
the audience’ (Rep. X 595b3–6).
So his proposition then is this: to expel only the mimetic type of
poetry and, as will be demonstrated, especially the type that deals in 10
illusion. If he considered all poetry to be of this kind, it would follow
that we understand him to censure all poetry equally. But if he sets apart
divinely inspired poetry and the type that produces discourses with
rational knowledge as different from that which is incomplete and
employs mimêsis, we shall consider that his censures relate to this 15
lower kind alone, and we shall exempt the higher kind from the discus-
sions presented. He himself makes this clear, when he says at the
beginning, when he specifies that we should not accept ‘the type of
poetry that is mimetic’ (Rep. X 595a5). It would be superfluous for one
who considered all poetry to be mimetic to add this point, and irrational 20
for one who took the same arguments to apply to all of poetry to apply it
to mimetic poetry alone. It remains then to say that he chastises as much
of poetry as strives only for mimêsis.
In the following discussion he brings out his refutation something
like this: The poet is an imitator. Each imitator is third from the truth. 25
Therefore a poet is third from the truth. Because of this he defined from
the beginning what mimêsis is, saying ‘you call the one who is of the third
generation from nature “an imitator”’ (597e3–4), and bringing together
both premises he says something like this: ‘Therefore this is what the 30
tragedian will be, if he is an imitator: third by nature from the king and 198
the truth, and all the other imitators similarly’. In addition to this he
shows that he does not attack all mimêsis, but rather that which produces
illusions, and concludes: ‘far from the truth is imitative [art]’ (Rep. 5
598b6), and that the imitator in this mode ‘does not have correct
opinion about the things he imitates, in respect of their beauty or
worthlessness’ (602a8–9). So what does this have to do with the poetry
of Homer? These criticisms apply well enough to tragic and comic
poetry, since the whole substance of these is a mimêsis working towards 10
the entertainment of its audience. But it has nothing to do with the
poetry of Homer which takes its impulse from the gods and which reveals
the nature of the really existent. Moreover how would poetry which
interprets divine matters through symbols (symbolon) be called mimetic?
For symbols are not imitations of the things of which they are symbols: 15
307
Essay 6
opposites cannot be imitations of their opposites, for instance ugliness of

beauty or that which is contrary to nature of that which is in accordance
with nature.376 Contemplation through symbols demonstrates the nature
20 of things even through the greatest oppositions. Therefore if a poet is
divinely inspired and shows through symbols (synthêma) the truth of the
really existent, or if a poet employs rational knowledge377 and reveals to
us the very order of things, this one is neither an imitator nor can he be
refuted through the demonstrations presented.
25 Consider, if you will, each of the propositions in itself: The poet is an
imitator. The imitator is third from the truth. Therefore the poet is
third from the truth. However the most primary poet would not
describe himself this way, nor would the most divine of poets (as you,
199 Plato, call him yourself). Rather, inasmuch as he is possessed by the
Muses, he keeps company with the things that truly exist themselves and
contemplates the truth about the really existent, but inasmuch as he is an
imitator, he is third from the truth.
It is necessary to characterise each writer by the greatest type of his
5 activity, not by the lowest, since [judging by the lowest] one would have
to dismiss Plato as well as an imitator and third from the truth. In the
dialogues there is mimêsis of the characters drinking together, and there
is mimêsis of people making war and returning to peace, as we have seen
in the Timaeus and Critias. But this is a mere incidental detail, while the
10 characteristic good of Plato is his philosophical enquiry (theôria).
Likewise the divine inspiration of Homer is the most primary good in
his poetry, and the mimetic aspect is the lowest. Yet this [lowest part]
has been especially imitated by the tragedians, and their whole work
amounts to mimêsis.
15 However if, as Plato says, Homer is capable of imitation and of
directing his intellect to the paradigm and making the things which he
imitates, how is it not strange that he has enlisted himself in the class of
those who create images and established this as the goal of his life? But
20 we will not agree that mimêsis is the goal of life for the divine poet, but
376
Cf. 77.13 ff. The inspired poetry that is characteristic of Homer regularly uses
opposites to generate its allegorical meanings.
377
Proclus’ case for exempting the practitioner of the didactic poetry that proceeds from
knowledge from Plato’s criticisms in Republic X is not as clearly spelled out as the case
for exempting the inspired poet. In a sense, it will be true both of him and of the
inspired poet that they do ‘not have correct opinion about the things he imitates’
(602a8–9). In fact, they have something better than correct opinion and in virtue of
that fact neither is ‘far from the truth’ (598b6). Proclus’ relative lack of interest in
showing that didactic poetry escapes the objections of Republic X is doubtless a result
of the fact that his central task is the vindication of Homer. And while Homer’s poetry
contains some parts that are didactic (above 193.1–9), he is mostly inspired (195.15).
308
6.2.9 The criticisms that Homer is not educational
rather it is incidental, and is a secondary, not a primary characteristic.

And we agree that he imitates many things which he is not able to
produce due to lack of ordinary experience of the things imitated, but
that he also imitates things which he was able to produce. For instance
he represents Odysseus making a boat and another man driving
a chariot, although he was altogether without ability at charioteering 25
and boat-building, since he knew about these things intellectually and
not by practical experience. But he also depicts people taking counsel
and speaking about points of justice, and these actions he was not only
able to imitate, but to perform himself.
6.2.9 what response should one make to 200

the criticisms that homer is not
educational for people nor
generally of civic usefulness?
<200.1–202.6>
Here a profusion of various questions flood in upon us: whom did 5
Homer teach, if he was not merely an imitator, but also a creator of
true education? For which cities did he establish laws? What war was
waged successfully because of him? Who privately received education
from him? So in response to these and similar objections, we shall say
that the length of time has obliterated memory in the successive gen- 10
erations of humanity, and the fact that in those times there were not men
skilled in historical enquiry has deprived us of a tradition about the
things that Homer achieved with regard to education and good govern-
ment, both for individuals and in common for cities. Still we have 15
learned from history that when some cities in later times were in conflict
with each other, they used Homer and the writings of Homer as a judge
of what was just. So why would it be surprising if some established him
as a lawgiver while he lived and made him a teacher of individuals and
used his counsels like magic charms?378 These things have been for- 20
gotten by later generations.
Indeed we have learned from lengthy written texts that have come
down from those times that Pythagoras educated many, and that
Lycurgus gave laws to the Lacedaemonians and Solon to the
Athenians. But the imitator, Plato says, has neither correct opinion 25
about the things which he imitates, as the craftsman does (for he is not
in contact with the one who uses the object created), nor does he have
378
Compare 608a where Socrates likens the critique of poetry in Rep. X to a charm to
counteract the seductive spell of mimetic poetry.
309
Essay 6
rational knowledge, because he is not the one who is going to use the
object. Let us consider, for example, that there are three skills (technê)
concerning the bridle, the skill of using one, of making one, and of
201 imitating one. So it is clear that one skill has rational knowledge of the
use of the bridle, another has correct opinion, having been taught [by
the art of use] what the bridle must be, but the last has no knowledge of
either. This is because the painter paints a bridle without either
5 a horseman or a bridle-maker present. We shall say that these things
are true only of those who are imitators. But if someone should present
imitations only as incidental to his work, and have in addition rational
knowledge (epistêmê) and comprehension (gnôsis) of reality (pragma),
how does it not necessarily follow that this man knows what constitutes
beauty and worthlessness in the things that he represents? The divine
10 poet himself reveals this, in that he everywhere expresses his own
judgement on his characters’ actions, that some are fine and others
shameful, [when he says, for instance] ‘she persuaded him in his
senselessness’(Il. 4.104) or when he calls someone ‘foolish’, or says ‘he
had good intentions’ (Od. 14.421; 16.398) and other such things, defin-
ing what is beauty and what wickedness in people’s actions.
But the imitator, Plato says, and this poet who is a creator of images,
15 directs his activity to the emotional part of the soul and calls forth the
movements of this part of the soul. And we will agree, if he should be
speaking about tragedy and comedy and the type of mimêsis in them. Yet
if he refers to the poetry of Homer, we maintain that the large part of the
function of this poetry is concerned with perfecting379 our intellect
20 (nous) and reasoning (dianoia). And it is not we alone who maintain
this, but also Plato himself, when he says that the audience of the poet
possessed by the Muses becomes divinely possessed along with him and
is raised up with him towards divine madness (Ion 533e). If it is the
emotional part of the mind which becomes divinely inspired, let it be
25 said that Homer also exerts his activity on this part. But if it is intellect
or that which is more divine than intellect,380 we would be far from
saying that the same part is affected by the poetry of Homer and by
tragic mimêsis. So when Socrates says clearly: ‘The mimetic poet is not
by his nature concerned with the rational part of the soul, if he is going
30 to be famous with the masses, but is concerned instead with the irritable
202 and variable character’,381 we shall respond to him by saying: ‘And yet
379
Or perhaps ‘initiating’ as one might be initiated into the Mysteries.
380
See Hermias, in Phdr. 88.15–90.17 Lucarini and Moreschini (=84.18, ff Couvreur).
The highest form of divine inspiration occurs in a part of the soul that is superior even
to the soul’s intellect. Hermias, presumably following Syrianus, calls this the One of
the soul. Cf. Manolea (2013).
381
This paraphrases rather than directly quotes Rep.X 605a.
310
6.2.10 Why is Homer not a competent educator?
the divinely inspired poet directs his words to the divine part of the soul,
and when he checks the emotions with his rebukes,382 how would one
say that he calls forth and nurtures the emotional part?’
This is the case that we plead on behalf of Homer and divinely 5
inspired poetry against Socrates’ attacks.
6.2.10 for what reasons did plato

choose to accuse homer of not being
a competent educator?
<202.7–205.23>
Moving back to the other side of the question, let us consider this: for 10
what kind of reason did Plato choose to say things like this about Homer
and poetry? Certainly the points that we have made and the things that
he himself wrote in other places did not escape him, nor did he create
this conflict in his writings out of some emotion (pathos), since that
would not be lawful for him. So let us add to the discussion so far
what the cause could be. It seems to me that he saw among the people 15
of his time the great and unshakeable neglect of philosophy and of
discussions concerning rational knowledge.383 Some condemned all
those who practised it as useless, others considered that the philosophi-
cal life was to be avoided. [And he saw] that they were in awe of poetry 20
beyond what is reasonable, and keenly sought out its imitation, and
considered poetry alone sufficient for education. [Seeing all this] he
undertook these intellectual contests, in which he demonstrates that
the class of poetry and mimêsis somehow wanders far from the truth, and
that philosophy provides the true salvation of souls. In accordance with 25
this well-motivated intention, he also found fault with the sophists and
demagogues, on the grounds that they could contribute nothing
towards virtue. 203
In this way, I believe, he chastises the poets, especially the craftsmen
of tragedy, and those mimetic artists who have contrived the entertain-
ment of their audiences, but not produced any benefit to virtue, and who
382
κολάζῃ τὰ πάθη διὰ τῶν ἐπιπλήξεων, It seems likely that Proclus has in mind Od. 20.17
(στῆθος δὲ πλήξας κραδίην ἠνίπαπε μύθῳ) where Odysseus strikes his chest, subduing his
desire for revenge until a more opportune moment. Plato quotes the line with
approval at Phdo. 94d, Rep. 390d and 441b.
383
On what basis does Proclus offer this view about the attitude of Plato’s contempor-
aries towards philosophy? Probably on the basis of the dialogues themselves. On the
uselessness (achrê stia) of philosophy, see Rep. 489b. On the wisdom of not making
philosophy a lifetime pursuit, see Gorg. 485a, ff. For Homer as ‘the educator of
Hellas’, see of course Rep. 606e.
311
Essay 6
5 bewitch the multitude, but do not educate them. And he considers

Homer deserving of similar refutations, considering him the founder
of this type of Muse, and the one who provided seeds of mimêsis to the
tragedians. He tried to lead away from their excitement about poetry the
majority who were neglecting true education and spending their time on
10 the poets as if they were experts on everything. It is clear from the text
that it is for this purpose that Plato laid down all of his discussions of the
poets:
Therefore, I said, after this we must consider both tragedy and its leader,
15 Homer, since we hear from some people that these men know all skills, as well
as all human affairs concerned with virtue and vice, and divine matters too. It is
necessary that the good poet, if he is going to create his works well, will write
with knowledge, or he will not be able to write well. So we need to consider
20 whether those encountering these imitators are deceived, and whether when
they see their works they do not perceive that they are at three removes from
what really exists and are easy to produce for one who does not know the truth.
For they produce illusions, not really existing things. Or whether they have
25 a point, and the good poets truly know the things about which they seem to the
majority to speak well. (Rep. 598d7–599a4)
He himself states clearly in these lines the reason why he instituted his
discussion of poetry, namely because he saw that the majority were
captured by mimêsis, and that they considered to be experts on every-
204 thing those who merely imitated everything and made images.
Therefore in order to educate the majority and to correct their irrational
imagining (phantasia) and to turn them to the philosophical life, he
5 brought his refutations against the tragedians, whom his contempor-
aries called their common teachers, on the grounds that they had no
sound conclusions, and he departed from his respect for Homer and put
him in the same category as the tragic poets and chastised him in his
discussion as an imitator. [With this in mind] it is no longer surprising
that the same man is both a divine poet and at three removes from the
10 truth: as one possessed by the Muses he is divine, and as one who
undertakes mimêsis he is at three removes from the truth. On this type
of reasoning Plato both employs him as a witness to his own most
important teachings and throws him out of the state. On the one hand
he has the same knowledge as Plato about truly existent things, on the
15 other he has something in common with the tragedians and is thrown
out from the well-governed city. ‘If it will receive’, says Socrates, ‘a
Muse that is pleasurable in lyric or in epic, pleasure and grief will hold
kingship in the city’ (Rep. X 607a).
It is obvious throughout all of Socrates’ words, generally speaking,
20 that Homer is included in his criticisms to the extent that he is a sort of
origin for the poetry of tragedy, and the principal argument is aimed at
312
6.2.10 Why is Homer not a competent educator?
that kind of mimêsis. ‘Homer seems’, he says, ‘to be the teacher and
leader of all these fine tragic poets. But a man must not be honoured 25
above the truth’ (Rep. X 595b–c). And later, ‘Therefore this is what the
tragedian will be, if he is an imitator: third by nature from the king and
the truth’ (Rep. X 597e). In the first passage he told the reason why he 205
chooses to be so outspoken about Homer in his discussions; in
the second, since he is contending principally about tragedy, he thought
it worth speaking of the tragedian himself, as ‘at third remove from the
truth’. In these passages Plato seems to argue nothing other than what 5
Socrates, when he first met Plato as an enthusiast of tragedy, showed
him: that tragedy is not a good thing for people.384 And he turned Plato
away from this type of mimêsis and in some manner towards writing
those Socratic discussions, in which he demonstrated that tragedy was
neither educative nor beneficial, but third from the truth, and that it had 10
a share neither of rational knowledge nor of correct opinion about the
things which it imitated, and that it did not appeal to our reasoning
(dianoia) but to our irrationality. If these faults are present in Homer, in
a general or prototypical form, let us not censure the poetry of Homer
because of them. Similarly Plato is not to be censured for the beautiful 15
expression in his prose and his concern for style (lexis), even though
others have striven especially to emulate this,385 imitating the lowest
part of Plato’s activity, just as the demiurge himself is not to be blamed
for the origin of mortal troubles and evil, even if divided souls are 20
whirled about within it.
Dear friends, let these thoughts be a memorial of thanks for the
company of our teacher. They have been told by me to you, but are
not to be spoken to the masses.386
384
As Festugière and Lamberton note, the same anecdote appears in Apuleius, de Plat. I 2
and in the Anonymous Prolegomena 3.
385
Plato’s works formed a standard part of the subsequent curriculum in rhetoric, and
writing something in the style of Plato would have been a standard exercise for
students. See Kennedy (2003).
386
This concluding call for secrecy is, as both Festugière and Lamberton note,
a conventional one. Lamberton is certainly right though to see in this an allusion to
Christians, and Festugière to hear in Proclus’ words a hierophantic note. The same
concerns (presentation of hidden wisdom, concealment from Christian hostility)
appear, for instance, in the opening of Porphyry’s On Images: «Φθέγξομαι οἷς θέμις
ἐστί, θύρας δ’ ἐπίθεσθε, βέβηλοι» σοφίας θεολόγου νοήματα δεικνύς, οἷς τὸν θεὸν καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ
τὰς δυνάμεις διὰ εἰκόνων συμφύλων αἰσθήσει ἐμήνυσαν ἄνδρες τὰ ἀφανῆ φανεροῖς
ἀποτυπώσαντες πλάσμασι, τοῖς καθάπερ ἐκ βίβλων τῶν ἀγαλμάτων ἀναλέγειν τὰ περὶ
θεῶν μεμαθηκόσι γράμματα. Θαυμαστὸν δὲ οὐδὲν ξύλα καὶ λίθους ἡγεῖσθαι τὰ ξόανα τοὺς
ἀμαθεστάτους, καθὰ δὴ καὶ τῶν γραμμάτων οἱ ἀνόητοι λίθους μὲν ὁρῶσι τὰς στήλας, ξύλα δὲ
τὰς δέλτους, ἐξυφασμένην δὲ πάπυρον τὰς βίβλους.
313
ENGLISH–GREEK GLOSSARY
able to benefit to dynamenon/dynaton τὸ δυνάμενον/δυνατὸν

ôphelein ὠφελεῖν
able, be dynasthai δύνασθαι
absent self from aphistanai ἀφιστάναι
abundance periousia περιουσία
abuse (noun) blasphêmia βλασφημία
accompanying or being with synousia συνουσία
accomplish eu apergazesthai εὖ ἀπεργάζεσθαι
account theôria θεωρία
account logos λόγος
account paradosis παράδοσις
account phêmê φήμη
Achelous Achelôïos Ἀχελῷος
Acheron Acherôn Ἀχέρων
achieve, fail to apopiptein ἀποπίπτειν
Achilles Achilleus Ἀχιλλεύς
action ergon ἔργον
action or deed pragma πρᾶγμα
action, activity energeia ἐνέργεια
actively, more praktikôteron πρακτικώτερον
activity epitêdeuma ἐπιτήδευμα
activity pragmateia πραγματεία
activity synergia συνεργία
activity or an action energêma ἐνέργημα
actually kat’ alêtheian κατ᾽ ἀληθείαν
adamantine adamantinos ἀδαμάντινος
address (verb) dêmêgorein δημηγορεῖν
Adeimantus Adeimantos Ἀδείμαντος
adorn kosmein, katakosmein κοσμεῖν, κατακοσμεῖν
adorn poikillein ποικίλλειν
adornment kosmos κόσμος
advanced, most akrotatos ἀκρότατος
advancement agôgê ἀγωγή
aether aithêr αἰθήρ
affect or affection, affectively pathêma, pathêtikôs πάθημα, παθητικῶς
affection for, show philophroneisthai φιλοφρονεῖσθαι
affection or affect pathos πάθος
321
English–Greek Glossary
affinity or natural affinity sympatheia συμπάθεια

Agamemnon Agamemnôn Ἀγαμέμνων
Agathon Agathôn Ἀγάθων
agency, lacking in apraktos ἄπρακτος
Agenor Agênôr Ἀγήνωρ
aggression, aggressor hybris, hybristês ὕβρις, ὑβριστής
agile eukinêtos εὐκίνητος
aim skopos σκοπός
air aêr ἀήρ
Alcibiades (book title) or Alkibiadês Ἀλκιβιάδης
Alcibiades
Alcinous Alkinous Ἀλκίνους
Alexander Alexandros Ἀλέξανδρος
alien, alienation allotrios, allotriotês ἀλλότριος, ἀλλοτριότης
all of something ta hola τὰ ὅλα
all-encompassing pantelês παντελής
allegorically, convey or mean ainissesthai αἰνίσσεσθαι
or represent or speak
allegory ainigma αἴνιγμα
allegory hyponoia ὑπόνοια
allocation or allotted sphere lêxis λῆξις
allot tattein τάττειν
allot or allocate diairein διαιρεῖν
allot, that which is allotted klêroun, klêros κληροῦν, κλῆρος
allotment diaklêrôsis διακλήρωσις
allotted synnomos σύννομος
allure epagôgon ἐπαγωγόν
alter at the same time symmetaballein συμμεταβάλλειν
alteration, involving alteration alloiôsis, alloiôtikos ἀλλοίωσις, ἀλλοιωτικός
alteration, not subject to analloiôtos ἀναλλοίωτος
altogether pantelôs παντελῶς
always, at each moment aei ἀεί
ambitious philotimos φιλότιμος
ambrosia ambrosia ἀμβροσία
Amelius Amelios Ἀμέλιος
amount to dynasthai δύνασθαι
analogy analogia ἀναλογία
ancient palaios παλαιός
ancient, the ancients archaios, hoi archaioi ἀρχαῖος, οἱ ἀρχαῖοι
angel angelos ἄγγελος
anger thymos θυμός
animal zôïon ζῷον
anticipate prolambanein προλαμβάνειν
anticipation pronoia πρόνοια
antipathy antipatheia ἀντιπάθεια
antithesis antithesis ἀντίθεσις
322
Aphrodisian or under the Aphrodisiakos Ἀφροδισιακός

influence of Aphrodite
Aphrodite, depending on Aphroditê, Aphrodisios Ἀφροδίτη, Ἀφροδίσιος
Aphrodite
Apollo, Apollonian Apollôn, Apollôniakos Ἀπόλλων,
Ἀπολλωνιακός
Apollo, inspired or seized by phoibolêptos φοιβόληπτος
Apollodorus Apollodôros Ἀπολλόδωρος
apparent or appearing phainomenos, φαινόμενος,
prophainomenos προφαινόμενος
apparition eidôlon εἴδωλον
apparition or vision phasma φάσμα
appearance eidos εἶδος
appearance phantasia, phantasma φαντασία, φάντασμα
appearance or that which to phainomenon τὸ φαινόμενον
appears
appearances, by reference to phainomenôs φαινομένως
appease ekmeilittesthai ἐκμειλίττεσθαι
appetitive orektikos ὀρεκτικός
appointed times, at kata chronous κατὰ χρόνους
tetagmenous τεταγμένους
apprehension epibolê ἐπιβολή
appropriate systoichos σύστοιχος
appropriate or in character, to prepon τὸ πρέπον
what is
appropriate, appropriately oikeios, oikeiôs οἰκεῖος, οἰκείως
appropriately eikotôs εἰκότως
aptitude, lack of anepitêdeiotês ἀνεπιτηδειότης
aptness hôra ὥρα
archetype archetypos ἀρχέτυπος
Ardiaeus Ardiaios Ἀρδιαῖος
Ares, of Ares Arês, Areïkos Ἄρης, Ἀρεϊκός
argue (a case) proïstanai προϊστάναι
argument logos, logismos, λόγος, λογισμός,
syllogismos συλλογισμός
argumentative form, in agônistikôs ἀγωνιστικῶς
arising genesis γένεσις
Aristophanes Aristophanês Ἀριστοφάνης
Aristotle Aristotelês Ἀριστοτέλης
Armenius Armenios Ἀρμένιος
army strateia, stratia στρατεία, στρατιά
arouse, rouse anegeirein ἀνεγείρειν
arrange kosmein, katakosmein κοσμεῖν, κατακοσμεῖν
arrange in cooperation with syndioikein συνδιοικεῖν
arrange, arrangement syntassein, syntaxis συντάσσειν, σύνταξις
arrangement oikonomia οἰκονομία
323
arrangement of cities politeia πολιτεία

arrangement, arrange or taxis, tattein τάξις, τάττειν
organise
arrangement, order diakosmêsis διακόσμησις
art of the Muses mousikê μουσική
art, conforming to art technê, technikos τέχνη, τεχνικός
Artemis Artemis Ἄρτεμις
articulated manner, in an aneiligmenôs ἀνειλιγμένως
ascend anagein ἀνάγειν
ascend anienai ἀνιέναι
ascent agôgê, anagôgê ἀγωγή, ἀναγωγή
ascent anodos ἄνοδος
Asclepius Asklêpios Ἀσκληπιός
ascribe anagein ἀνάγειν
assembly synousia συνουσία
assign syntassein συντάσσειν
assimilate or make like homoioun ὁμοιοῦν
assistance syllêpsis σύλληψις
assistant synergos συνεργός
assistant, like an hypourgikôs ὑπουργικῶς
assume prolambanein προλαμβάνειν
assumed, be keisthai κεῖσθαι
assumed, let it be keisthô κείσθω
assumption lêmma λῆμμα
assumption hypothesis ὑπόθεσις
astonish ekplêttein, kataplêttein ἐκπλήττειν,
καταπλήττειν
Astyanax Astyanax Ἀστυάναξ
asymmetrically asymmetrôs ἀσυμμέτρως
at different times para meros παρὰ μέρος
at first prôtiston πρώτιστον
at the end epi telei, pros tôi telei ἐπὶ τέλει, πρὸς τῷ τέλει
atheist or godless atheos ἄθεος
Athena, of Athena Athêna, Athênaïkos Ἀθηνᾶ, Ἀθηναϊκός
Athenian Athênaios Ἀθηναῖος
Athenian Stranger ho Athênaios xenos ὁ Ἀθηναῖος ξένος
athletics gymnastikê γυμναστική
attach anadeisthai ἀναδεῖσθαι
attach anartan ἀναρτᾶν
attach exaptein, synaptein ἐξάπτειν, συνάπτειν
attached, be exartasthai έξαρτᾶσθαι
attack prosballein προσβάλλειν
attain, fail to apopiptein ἀποπίπτειν
attempt metacheirizesthai μεταχειρίζεσθαι
attendant or one who serves opados ὀπαδός
attentively mê parergôs μὴ παρέργως
324
attraction holkos ὁλκός

attraction prospatheia προσπάθεια
authority exousia ἐξουσία
authority epistasia ἐπιστασία
authority, to possess dynasteuein δυναστεύειν
auxiliary, auxiliary (adj.), as an epikouros, epikourikos, ἐπίκουρος, ἐπικουρικός,
auxiliary epikourikôs ἐπικουρικῶς
avarice, avaricious philochrêmatia, φιλοχρηματία,
philochrêmatos φιλοχρήματος
awaken anegeirein ἀνεγείρειν
axiom axiôma ἀξίωμα
Bacchic frenzy, rouse to ekbakcheuein ἐκβακχεύειν

Bacchic madness bakcheia βακχεία
bad living kakozôïa κακοζωΐα
bad practice diastrophon διάστροφον
bad, badly kakos, kakôs κακός, κακῶς
bad, making things kakopoios κακοποιός
balanced symmetros σύμμετρος
banish dioikizein διοικίζειν
banquet thoinê θοίνη
barbarian, a barbarian barbarikos, barbaros βαρβαρικός, βάρβαρος
Batieia Batieia Βατίεια
battle machê μάχη
battle polemos πόλεμος
be antecedently responsible proeilêphenai tên aitian προειληφέναι τὴν αἰτίαν
be averse aneillein ἀνείλλειν
be done well echein to eu ἔχειν τὸ εὖ
be opposite antidiairein ἀντιδιαιρεῖν
be or being, coming (in)to genesis γένεσις
be or exist hyparchein ὑπάρχειν
be present in eneinai ἑνεῖναι
beautiful, beautifully kalos, kalôs καλός, καλῶς
beauty of the senses to phainomenon kallos τὸ φαινόμενον κάλλος
beauty, producing beauty kallos, kallopoios κάλλος, καλλοποιός
beauty, the Beautiful to kalon τὸ καλόν
becoming genesis γένεσις
bed, go to eis eunên phoitan εἰς εὐνὴν φοιτᾶν
befall synkyreisthai συγκυρεῖσθαι
before or earlier proteron πρότερον
beginning archê ἀρχή
being to einai τὸ εἶναι
being ousia οὐσία
being hyparxis ὕπαρξις
being and non-being to on kai to mê on τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν
being or what really exists to on τὸ ὄν
325
beings that exist in the visible ta phainomenôs onta τὰ φαινομένως ὄντα

mode
beings, greater or higher hoi kreittones οἱ κρείττονες
belief doxa δόξα
belonging oikeios οἰκεῖος
belt (magic) kestos κεστός
Bendis, festival of Bendis Bendis, Bendidia Βένδις, Βενδίδια
beneath katadeesteros καταδεέστερος
beneficence, beneficent agathotês, agathourgos ἀγαθότης, ἀγαθουργὀς
beneficial ôphelimos ὠφέλιμος
benefit eu poiein εὖ ποιεῖν
benefit metadosis μετάδοσις
benefit ôphelein ὠφελεῖν
best aristos ἄριστος
bestow endidonai ἐνδιδόναι
bestower of prizes of victory athlothetês ἀθλοθέτης
better, for the better kreittôn, epi kreitton κρείττων, ἐπὶ κρεῖττον
better, that which is to kreitton τὸ κρεῖττον
bewitch goêteuein γοητεύειν
beyond nature hyperphyês ὑπερφυής
bi-formed dyoeidês δυοειδής
binding (noun) desmos δεσμός
birthday genethlia γενέθλια
birthpang ôdis ὠδίς
blasphemy, blaspheme blasphêmia, βλασφημία, βλασφημεῖν
blasphêmein
blessed makar, makarios μάκαρ, μακάριος
blind, render typhloun τυφλοῦν
bodily existence hypostasis sômatikê ὑπόστασις σωματική
body sôma σῶμα
bond (noun) desmos δεσμός
bond, binding syndesmos, syndetikos σύνδεσμος, συνδετικός
Boreas Borras Βορρᾶς
born, be phyein φύειν
bound metron μέτρον
boundary horos ὅρος
brave alkimos ἄλκιμος
brave, bravely andrikos, andrikôs ἀνδρικός, ἀνδρικῶς
bring (in)to or out proagein προάγειν
bring forth paragein παράγειν
bring into existence synyphistanai συνυφιστάναι
bring into likeness aphomioun ἀφομιοῦν
bring into relation with syntassein συντάσσειν
bringing together synagôgos συναγωγός
brought up properly eu trapheis εὖ τραφεῖς
business epitêdeuma ἐπιτήδευμα
326
by birth to genos τὸ γένος

by-product parypostasis παρυπόστασις
by-product, subsist or be pro- paryphistasthai παρυφίστασθαι
duced as
call upon prokaleisthai προκαλεῖσθαι
Callicles Kalliklês Καλλικλής
calm galênê γαλήνη
capable, be dynasthai δύνασθαι
capacity dynamis δύναμις
capacity epitêdeiotês ἐπιτηδειότης
capacity chôrêtikon χωρητικόν
care epistasia ἐπιστασία
care therapeia θεραπεία
care pronoein προνοεῖν
carry out work telein τελεῖν
carry up anagein ἀνάγειν
casting or hurling out rhipsis ῥῖψις
castration(s) tomai τομαἰ
casually parergôs παρέργως
category genos γένος
category taxis τάξις
cathartic kathartikos καθαρτικός
cause aitia, aition αἰτία, αἴτιον
cause archê ἀρχή
cause, able to parektikos παρεκτικός
celebrate hymnein, anymnein, ὑμνεῖν, ἀνυμνεῖν,
hymnôidein ὑμνῳδεῖν
celebration, celebrating hymnôidia, hymnôidos ὑμνῳδία, ὑμνῳδός
celestial, celestially ouranios, ouraniôs οὐράνιος, οὐρανίως
centre or midst, in the en mesei ἐν μέσει
centre, from the ek mesou ἐκ μέσου
chain seira σειρά
chalcis (a bird) chalkis χαλκίς
Chaldaean Oracles (book title) ta logia τὰ λόγια
change metabasis μετάβασις
change, such as to change metabolê, metablêtikos μεταβολή, μεταβλητικός
changeless atreptos ἄτρεπτος
changeless, without change, ametablêtos ἀμετάβλητος
unchanging
channel holkos ὁλκός
character hexis ἕξις
character prosôpon πρόσωπον
character, ethical or moral êthos ἦθος
character, matter of to êthikon τὸ ἠθικόν
characterise eidopoiein εἰδοποιεῖν
characteristic idiotês ἰδιότης
327
characteristic oikeios οἰκεῖος

charge hormê ὁρμή
charm or magic charm epôidê ἐπῳδή
Cheiron Cheirôn Χείρων
choice hairesis, proairesis αἵρεσις, προαίρεσις
chorus, chorus-leader choros, chorêgos χορός, χορηγός
circumspect sôphrôn σώφρων
circumstance, circumstantial peristasis, peristatikos περίστασις,
περιστατικός
citizen, properly turned into a eu politeuomenos εὖ πολιτευόμενος
city or state polis πόλις
civic knowledge politikê epistêmê πολιτικὴ ἐπιστήμη
clarity, that which has dioratikos διορατικός
clasp periptyssein περιπτύσσειν
class genos γένος
class idea ἰδέα
class plêthos πλῆθος
class taxis τάξις
clear enargês ἐναργής
clearly define first prodiorizein προδιορίζειν
clinging to prospatheia προσπάθεια
closer to the Muses mousikôteros μουσικώτερος
cloud, to tholoun θολοῦν
Clytemnestra Klytaimnêstra Κλυταιμνήστρα
co-creator syndêmiourgos συνδημιουργός
co-extensive, be exisazein ἐξισάζειν
coexist synyparchein, συνυπάρχειν,
synyphistanai συνυφιστάναι
cognitive gnôstikos γνωστικός
collaborator synergos συνεργός
collective reading synanagnôsis συνανάγνωσις
column systoichia συστοιχία
combination mixis μῖξις
come into being with synyphistanai συνυφιστάναι
come or go forth proerchesthai προέρχεσθαι
come to ephêkein ἐφήκειν
comedy kômôidia κωμῳδία
comfort eupatheia εὐπάθεια
coming after or next hepomenos ἑπόμενος
coming together synodos σύνοδος
commensurate, symmetros, symmetrôs σύμμετρος, συμμέτρως
commensurately
commit exaptein ἐξάπτειν
common agoraios ἀγοραῖος
common or in common koinos κοινός
common origin, of a homophyês ὁμοφυής
328
commonality or being in koinônia κοινωνία

common or communion
communicate by signs sêmainein σημαίνειν
community, the whole hoi holoi οἱ ὅλοι
company synousia συνουσία
compare antiparateinein ἀντιπαρατείνειν
comparison apeikasia ἀπεικασία
competent reader kritês κριτής
complete holos ὅλος
complete and utter pantelês παντελής
complete or bring to symplêroun συμπληροῦν
completion
complete or perfect en telei ἐν τέλει
complete, completeness, teleios, teleiotês, teleioun τέλειος, τελειότης,
complete or bring to τελειοῦν
completion
completely teleôs τελέως
completely and utterly pantelôs παντελῶς
complex, what is complex poikilos, poikilia ποικίλος, ποικιλία
composition diathesis διάθεσις
composition poiêma ποίημα
composition or composite systasis σύστασις
comprehend synairein συναιρεῖν
comprehensive perilêptikos περιληπτικός
conceal, concealed apokryptein, apokryphos ἀποκρύπτειν,
ἀπόκρυφος
concealed meaning hyponoia ὑπόνοια
conceit, fill with chaunoun χαυνοῦν
conceive noein νοεῖν
conceive syllambanein συλλαμβάνειν
concentrate, concentrated synairein, synairesis συναιρεῖν, συναίρεσις
form
concept or conception ennoia, epinoia ἔννοια, ἐπίνοια
conception epiblepsis ἐπίβλεψις
conception epibolê ἐπιβολή
conception noêma, dianoêma νόημα, διανόημα
conclude symperainein συμπεραίνειν
conclude or draw a conclusion syllogizesthai συλλογίζεσθαι
conclusion porisma πόρισμα
concord homologia ὁμολογία
condense synairein συναιρεῖν
condense systellein συστέλλειν
condition diathesis διάθεσις
condition hexis ἕξις
conducive ôphelimos ὠφέλιμος
conduct epocheteuein ἐποχετεύειν
329
confidence pistis πίστις

confirm sôzein σώζειν
conflict machê μάχη
conflict polemos πόλεμος
conflict systasis σύστασις
conflict with, be in stasiazein στασιάζειν
conform apeikazein ἀπεικάζειν
confusion aporia ἀπορία
conjoined syzygos σύζυγος
connate symphyês συμφυής
connect synaptein συνάπτειν
connective synektikos συνεκτικός
consecrated hieros ἱερός
consider theôrein θεωρεῖν
consider noein νοεῖν
consider as one’s own oikeiousthai οἰκειοῦσθαι
consider, considering katanoein, katanoêsis κατανοεῖν, κατανόησις
consistent arrangement, kata mian homologian κατὰ μίαν ὁμολογίαν
according to
conspicuous phanos φανός
constitute symplêroun συμπληροῦν
constitution politeia πολιτεία
construct myths mythologein μυθολογεῖν
construction systasis σύστασις
contact synaphê συναφή
contact, without anaphôs ἀναφῶς
contemplate theôrein θεωρεῖν
contemplate, loving to philotheamôn φιλοθεάμων
contemplation through symbolikê theôria συμβολικὴ θεωρία
symbols
contemplation, contemplative theôria, theôrêtikos θεωρία, θεωρητικός
contemplation, object of theama θέαμα
contemplative meaning theôria θεωρία
contend diateinein διατείνειν
content pragma πρᾶγμα
content or matters of content ta pragmatika τὰ πραγματικά
contest agôn ἀγών
continue proïenai προϊέναι
continuous or generating synektikos συνεκτικός
continuity
contrary elements systoichia συστοιχία
contrary to nature para physin παρὰ φύσιν
contrast antidiairein ἀντιδιαιρεῖν
contribute synteinein συντείνειν
contribute synôthein συνωθεῖν
contribution moira μοῖρα
330
contribution synteleia συντέλεια

convention thesis θέσις
conversation logos λόγος
conversation synousia συνουσία
convert antistrephein ἀντιστρέφειν
cooperation sympnoia σύμπνοια
coordinate systoichos σύστοιχος
copy, a mimêma μίμημα
corollary porisma πόρισμα
corporeal sômatoeidês σωματοειδής
correct dikaios δίκαιος
correct opinion, concerned orthodoxastikos ὀρθοδοξαστικός
with
correct opinion, have orthodoxazein ὀρθοδοξάζειν
correct, correctly orthos, orthôs ὀρθός, ὀρθῶς
correction katorthôsis κατόρθωσις
correction kolasis κόλασις
correctional way, in a diorthôtikôs διορθωτικῶς
correctly kalôs καλῶς
correspondence analogia ἀναλογία
corresponding kat’ analogian κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν
cosmos, cosmic kosmos, kosmikos κόσμος, κοσμικός
count among tattein τάττειν
counter-blow antitypia ἀντιτυπία
coupling syzeuxis σύζευξις
courage, courageous andreia, andrikos ἀνδρεία, ἀνδρικός
craft technê τέχνη
craftsman, object of dêmiourgos, δημιουργός,
craftsmanship dêmiourgêma δημιούργημα
create variation poikillein ποικίλλειν
creating likenesses eidôlopoios εἰδωλοποιός
creation gennêma γέννημα
creation dêmiourgia δημιουργία
creation poiêsis ποίησις
creations hai poiêseis αἱ ποιήσεις
creation of mere images hê phainomenê ἡ φαινομένη εἰδωλοποιΐα
eidôlopoiia
creation, created genesis, genêtos γένεσις, γενητός
creation, thing created dêmiourgêma δημιούργημα
creative peri tên poiêsin περὶ τὴν ποίησιν
creator poiêtês ποιητής
creator hypostatês ὑποστάτης
creator or involved in creation dêmiourgos δημιουργός
creator or maker of myths mythoplastês μυθοπλάστης
creature zôïon ζῷον
Crete Krêtê Κρήτη
331
crime adikêma ἀδίκημα

Critias or Critias (book title) Kritias Κριτίας
critic kritês κριτής
criticism epistasis ἐπίστασις
Cronos, of Cronos Kronos, Kronios Κρόνος, Κρόνιος
Cronos, son of Kronidês Κρονίδης
crossroad triodos τρίοδος
cry out aloud anabrychasthai ἀναβρυχᾶσθαι
cunning panourgia πανουργία
Curetes, of the Curetes Kourêtes, Kourêtikos Κούρητες, Κουρητικός
curl bostrychizein βοστρυχίζειν
custom thesmos θεσμός
custom nomos νόμος
cut off from aphistanai ἀφιστάναι
cut open anastomoun ἀναστομοῦν
cycle anakyklêsis ἀνακύκλησις
cycle kyklos κύκλος
cycle periodos περίοδος
dactyl, dactylic daktylos, daktylikos δάκτυλος, δακτυλικός

daemon daimôn δαίμων
daemonic, in a daemonic daimonios, daimoniôs δαιμόνιος, δαιμονίως
mode
damage kakynein κακύνειν
Damon Damôn Δάμων
dance choreia χορεία
dark skoteinos σκοτεινός
dealings with koinônia κοινωνία
death thanatos θάνατος
decay phthora φθορά
deceit or deception, deceive, apatê, apatan, apatêtikos ἀπάτη, ἀπατᾶν,
deceptive ἀπατητικός
decline apoptôsis ἀπόπτωσις
decline hyphesis ὕφεσις
decree kêryttein κηρύττειν
dedicate anienai ἀνιέναι
deed ergon ἔργον
defectiveness kakia κακία
define apereidein ἀπερείδειν
define aphorizein ἀφορίζειν
define diorizein διορίζειν
definition, define, of definition horos, horizein, ὅρος, ὁρίζειν, ὁριστικός
horistikos
deification ektheôsis ἐκθέωσις
deity theos θεός
deliberately proairetikôs προαιρετικῶς
332
delight eupatheia εὐπάθεια

delineation, clear eukrineia εὐκρίνεια
demagogue dêmagôgos δημαγωγός
Demeter Dêmêtêr Δημήτηρ
demiurge, demiurgic activity dêmiourgos, dêmiourgia δημιουργός, δημιουργία
demiurgic or of or by the dêmiourgikos δημιουργικός
demiurge
democratic dêmokratikos δημοκρατικός
Demodocus Dêmodokos Δημόδοκος
demonstrate epideiknynai, ἐπιδεικνύναι,
endeiknysthai ἐνδείκνυσθαι
demonstrate, in order to pros endeixin πρὸς ἔνδειξιν
demonstration, apodeixis/endeixis, ἀπόδειξις/ἔνδειξις,
demonstrational apodeiktikos ἀποδεικτικός
demonstrative, not strictly aneu apodeixeôs ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως
depart this life aperchomai ἀπέρχομαι
departure, depart from apostasis, aphistanai ἀπόστασις, ἀφιστάναι
depend exartasthai έξαρτᾶσθαι
depend, make exaptein ἐξάπτειν
depravity diastrophê διαστροφή
deprive exairein ἐξαιρεῖν
derivative existence parypostasis παρυπόστασις
derivative existence, arise as paryphistasthai παρυφίστασθαι
a or have an
derive from keisthai κεῖσθαι
descend kathêkein καθήκειν
descend katerchesthai κατέρχεσθαι
descend katienai κατιέναι
descend hyphizanein ὑφιζάνειν
descent kathodos κάθοδος
descent hyphesis ὕφεσις
descent or fall ptôsis πτῶσις
deserved or entitled to prepein πρέπειν
designate proballein προβάλλειν
desire epithymia ἐπιθυμία
desire erôs ἔρως
desire, dominated or governed erôtikos ἐρωτικός
by
desiring part to orektikon τὸ ὀρεκτικόν
destruction phthora φθορά
destructive anairetikos ἀναιρετικός
determinate term prosdiorismos προσδιορισμός
determine aphorizein ἀφορίζειν
develop besides a proof proskataskeuazein προσκατασκευάζειν
deviantly diastrophôs διαστρόφως
devoted to, be prospaschein προσπάσχειν
333
devoted to, be philophroneisthai φιλοφρονεῖσθαι

dialectic dialektikos διαλεκτικός
dialogue logos, dialogos λόγος, διάλογος
difference diastasis διάστασις
difference heterotês ἑτερότης
different or differing, diaphoros, diaphorotês διάφορος, διαφορότης
difference
differing metabatikos μεταβατικός
difficulty aporia ἀπορία
Dionysian mysteries Dionysou teletai Διονύσου τελεταί
Dionysus, Dionysian or of Dionysos, Dionysiakos Διόνυσος, Διονυσιακός
Dionysus
direct orthos ὀρθός
directly prosechôs προσεχῶς
dirty epitholoun ἐπιθολοῦν
disagreement enantiôsis ἐναντίωσις
discharge religious duties aphosioun ἀφοσιοῦν
discord diastrophê διαστροφή
discord, be in discord dichonoia, dichonoein διχόνοια, διχονοεῖν
discordant element to plêmmelêsan τὸ πλημμελῆσαν
discourse lexis λέξις
discourse logos λόγος
discriminating properly dioratikos διορατικός
discursive, in a manner that is metabatikos, μεταβατικός,
discursive metabatikôs μεταβατικῶς
discussion logos, dialogos λόγος, διάλογος
discussion prothesis πρόθεσις
disease nosos νόσος
disease pathos πάθος
disease of the soul nosêma psychês νόσημα ψυχῆς
dismember, dismemberment sparattein, sparagmos σπαράττειν, σπαραγμός
disorder ataxia ἀταξία
disorderly plêmmelês πλημμελής
dispassionately apathôs ἀπαθῶς
dispensation dosis δόσις
display epideiknynai ἐπιδεικνύναι
display prophainein προφαίνειν
disposition diathesis διάθεσις
disposition hexis ἕξις
disposition epitêdeiotês ἐπιτηδειότης
dissension stasis, diastasis στάσις, διάστασις
dissimilar, dissimilarity anomoios, anomoiotês ἀνόμοιος, ἀνομοιότης
dissolution, bringing about phthora, phthoropoios φθορά, φθοροποιός
dissolution
distance apostasis ἀπόστασις
distinct, render antidiairein ἀντιδιαιρεῖν
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distinction diaphorotês διαφορότης

distinction, logical antidiairesis ἀντιδιαίρεσις
distinction, that which gener- diakrisis, diakritikos διάκρισις, διακριτικός
ates distinction
distinctive, distinctive feature idios, to idion ἴδιος, τὸ ἴδιον
distinguish diastellein διαστέλλειν
distinguish diorizein διορίζειν
distinguish, distinguish diairein, antidiairein διαιρεῖν, ἀντιδιαιρεῖν
logically
disturbance tarachê ταραχή
disturbed condition diastrophê διαστροφή
diverse, greatly pantodapos παντοδαπός
diversify, diversity, diverse poikillein, poikilia, ποικίλλειν, ποικιλία,
poikilos ποικίλος
divide diarthroun διαρθροῦν
divide syndiairein συνδιαιρεῖν
divide, divided, in a divided merizein, merikos, μερίζειν, μερικός,
manner memerismenôs μεμερισμένως
divide, division diairein, diairesis διαιρεῖν, διαίρεσις
divine depiction theologia θεολογία
divine inspiration, divinely enthousiasmos, ἐνθουσιασμός,
inspired enthousiastikos ἐνθουσιαστικός
divine myth or lore theomythia θεομυθία
divine token synthêma σύνθημα
divine, divinity or god, in theios, to theion, theiôs θεῖος, τὸ θεῖον, θείως
a divine way
divinely inspired along with, synenthousian συνενθουσιᾶν
become
divinely inspired way, in an entheastikôs ἐνθεαστικῶς
divinely kindled fire pyr thespidaes πῦρ θεσπιδαές
divinely possessed soul psychê entheazousa ψυχή ἐνθεάζουσα
divinity theos, theotês θεός, θεότης
divisibly or in a divided meristôs μεριστῶς
manner
division to merikon τὸ μερικόν
division, concerned with diakrisis, diakritikos διάκρισις, διακριτικός
division
division, divided or divisible merismos, meristos μερισμός, μεριστός
division, without ameristôs ἀμερίστως
divorced from allotrios ἀλλότριος
do away with aposkeuazesthai ἀποσκευάζεσθαι
do good eu poiein εὖ ποιεῖν
do one’s own job autopragein αὐτοπραγεῖν
doctor iatros ἰατρός
doctrine dogma δόγμα
doctrine theôria θεωρία
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Dorian, in the Dorian mode Dôrios, dôristi Δώριος, δωριστί

double life dittê zôê διττὴ ζωή
down here below têide τῇδε
draughts-player petteutês πεττευτής
dragged, be ephelkesthai ἐφέλκεσθαι
drama skênê σκηνή
drama or dramatic event, drama, dramatikos δρᾶμα, δραματικός
dramatic
draw away from symptyssein συμπτύσσειν
draw into hypopherein ὑποφέρειν
drawn from, be artêsthai ἀρτῆσθαι
dream, of a oneirôktikos ὀνειρωκτικός
drunkenness or drinking methê μέθη
duties kathêkonta καθήκοντα
dwell within hypoikourein ὑποικουρεῖν
dyad, dyadic dyas, dyadikos δυάς, δυαδικός
Earth Gê Γῆ
earth, earthy, earthly gê, gêïnos, geôdês γῆ, γήϊνος, γεώδης
earthly têide τῇδε
echo apêchêma ἀπήχημα
ecstatic, moving to ecstasy ekstatikos ἐκστατικός
education, educational or paideia, paideutikos παιδεία, παιδευτικός
educative
educator, educationally or in paideutikos, paideutikôs παιδευτικός,
order to educate παιδευτικῶς
effect apotelesma ἀποτέλεσμα
effect pathos πάθος
effective drastêrios δραστήριος
effluence or efflux aporroia ἀπόρροια
effort anatasis ἀνάτασις
effortless eulytos εὔλυτος
Eidothea Eidothea Εἰδοθέα
Eleatic Stranger Eleatês xenos Ἐλεάτης ξένος
element stoicheion στοιχεῖον
elevate, elevating anagein, anagôgos ἀνάγειν, ἀναγωγός
elevation agôgê ἀγωγή
eloquence eulogia εὐλογία
emanation ellampsis ἔλλαμψις
embrace periechein, περιέχειν, περιλαμβάνειν
perilambanein
emetic aperasis ἀπέρασις
emotion, emotional or emo- pathos, pathêtikos, πάθος, παθητικός,
tive, emotionally pathêtikôs παθητικῶς
employ as guiding principles proïstanai προϊστάναι
empower dynamoun δυναμοῦν
336
emulator, to be emulated zêlôtês, zêlôteos ζηλωτής, ζηλωτέος

enamoured with the sight of philotheamôn φιλοθεάμων
encompass periechein, περιέχειν, περιλαμβάνειν
perilambanein
encosmic, encosmically enkosmios, enkosmiôs ἐγκόσμιος, ἐγκοσμίως
encountering prostychês προστυχής
end telos τέλος
end of the range akros ἄκρος
endeavour epitêdeuma ἐπιτήδευμα
endless argument aperantologia ἀπεραντολογία
endpoint apoteleutêsis ἀποτελεύτησις
engage in metacheirizesthai μεταχειρίζεσθαι
engage in factionalism or be stasiazein στασιάζειν
factionalised
enjoyment or good cheer euphrosynê εὐφροσύνη
enlist tattein τάττειν
enmattered, enmattered fire enylos, pyr enylon ἔνυλος, πῦρ ἔνυλον
enoplios enoplios ἐνόπλιος
enquiry zêtêsis ζήτησις
enquiry theôria θεωρία
enquiry skemma σκέμμα
enquiry or object of enquiry or zêtêma ζήτημα
topic
enslave andrapodizein ἀνδραποδίζειν
enslave douloun δουλοῦν
entertaining paidias παιδιᾶς
entertainment psychagôgia ψυχαγωγία
entire holos ὅλος
entirely pantelôs παντελῶς
entirely teleôs τελέως
envelops, that which periblêma περίβλημα
envoy theôros θεωρός
epiphany epiphaneia ἐπιφάνεια
equality isotês ἰσότης
Er Êr Ἦρ
erotic erôtikos ἐρωτικός
err, making errors plêmmelein, plêmmelês πλημμελεῖν, πλημμελής
error hamartêma ἁμάρτημα
error or error in judgement plêmmeleia πλημμέλεια
especially proêgoumenôs προηγουμένως
essence, essential or essentially ousia, kat’ ousian οὐσία, κατ᾽ οὐσίαν
establish hedrazein ἑδράζειν
establish ephistanai, proïstanai ἐφιστάναι, προϊστάναι
establish above hyperidryein ὑπεριδρύειν
establish or settle enidryein ἐνιδρύειν
establish, established hidryein, hidrymenos ἱδρύειν, ἱδρυμένος
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established or establishing histamenos ἱστάμενος

establishing thesis θέσις
eternal, eternally aiônios, diaiôniôs αἰώνιος, διαιωνίως
eternal, eternity, eternally aïdios, aïdion, aïdiôs ἀΐδιος, ἀΐδιον, ἀϊδίως
eternally aei ἀεί
etherial aitherios αἰθέριος
ethical or moral character, at êthos, êthikos ἦθος, ἠθικός
the ethical level
Ethiopian Aithiops Αίθίοψ
Euphrosynê Euphrosynê Εὐφροσύνη
even (number) artios ἄρτιος
event pragma πρᾶγμα
evidence tekmêrion τεκμήριον
evil (adj., noun) kakos, kakia κακός, κακία
evil, free from akakôtos ἀκάκωτος
evocation proklêsis πρόκλησις
exact anechengyos ἀνεχέγγυος
examine katanoein κατανοεῖν
examine skopein σκοπεῖν
example paradeigma παράδειγμα
excellence aretê ἀρετή
excess periousia περιουσία
excitement ptoia πτοία
exempt, exempted exairein, exêirêmenos ἐξαιρεῖν, ἐξῃρημένος
exercise kinêsis κίνησις
exercise providence or provi- pronoein προνοεῖν
dential care
exist einai εἶναι
existence hyparxis ὕπαρξις
existence or mode or sort of hypostasis ὑπόστασις
existence
existence, bringing into hypostatikos ὑποστατικός
expanse platos πλάτος
expect, as one would eikotôs εἰκότως
experience pathêma πάθημα
expertise, expert epistêmê, epistêmôn ἐπιστήμη, ἐπιστήμων
expiation aphosiôsis ἀφοσίωσις
explain epekdidaskein ἐπεκδιδάσκειν
explanation aition/aitia αἴτιον αἰτία
explanation anaptyxis ἀνάπτυξις
explicate anaploun ἀναπλοῦν
explication, by aneiligmenôs ἀνειλιγμένως
expository hyphêgêtikos ὑφηγητικός
expounder exêgêtês ἐξηγητής
expressed, not to be anexoistos ἀνέξοιστος
expression lexis λέξις
338
expression or word rhêma ῥῆμα

extend anateinein, diateinein, ἀνατείνειν, διατείνειν,
proteinein προτείνειν
extended, in a manner that is diastatôs διαστατῶς
extension, lacking adiastaton ἀδιάστατον
exterior or external or outside, to ektos τὸ ἐκτός
that which is
extreme akros ἄκρος
extreme eschatos ἔσχατος
eye omma ὄμμα
eyes, before the hyp’ opsin ὑπ’ ὄψιν
fact or reality pragma πρᾶγμα

factional strife, be in factional stasis, stasiazein στάσις, στασιάζειν
strife
factual character to pragmateiôdes τὸ πραγματειῶδες
fall or fall short apopiptein ἀποπίπτειν
fall, not inclined to aptôtos ἄπτωτος
false, falsely pseudês, pseudôs ψευδής, ψευδῶς
falsehood or lie pseudos ψεῦδος
familiarity oikeiotês οἰκειότης
family genos γένος
family (members) hoi oikeioi οἱ οἰκεῖοι
fantasy phantasia φαντασία
far below elattôtikos ἐλαττωτικός
far from or far removed from pollostos πολλοστός
fate heimarmenê εἱμαρμένη
fate moira μοῖρα
father patêr πατήρ
fearlessness adeia ἄδεια
feeling pathos πάθος
feet, around the peripezios περιπέζιος
female thêlys θῆλυς
fiction or fictional episode plasma πλάσμα
fictive epiplastos ἐπίπλαστος
figurative morphôtikos μορφωτικός
figure schêma σχῆμα
filling, fulfilling apoplêrôtikos ἀποπληρωτικός
final eschatos ἔσχατος
final stage apoteleutêsis ἀποτελεύτησις
finally telos τέλος
finally or last eschatôs ἐσχάτως
fine, be eu echein εὖ ἔχειν
fine, finely kalos, kalôs καλός, καλῶς
finished apêkribômenos ἀπηκριβωμένος
fire pyr πῦρ
339
first proteron πρότερον

first (principle) archêgikos ἀρχηγικός
first principles prôtai hypotheseis πρώται ὑποθέσεις
first principles archai ἀρχαί
first things, the very ta prôtista τὰ πρώτιστα
first, the ta prôta τὰ πρῶτα
fitted/suited, not (well) asymmetros ἀσύμμετρος
fitting themis θέμις
fitting oikeios οἰκεῖος
fitting or appropriate, in prepontôs πρεπόντως
a manner that is
fitting or in keeping with, be prepein πρέπειν
fitting for a symposium sympotikos συμποτικός
fitting, be kathêkein καθήκειν
fixed aplanês ἀπλανής
fleet (of ships) nautikê dynamis ναυτικὴ δύναμις
fleshy sarkôdês σαρκώδης
flood klydôn κλύδων
flow forth aporrein ἀπορρεῖν
follow periepein περιέπειν
follower zêlôtês ζηλωτής
following, following (up)on hepomenos, hepomenôs ἑπόμενος, ἑπομένως
fond of sad things philolypos φιλόλυπος
fond of stories philomythos φιλόμυθος
fondness philia φιλία
foolish anoêtos ἀνόητος
foolishness anoia ἄνοια
foolishness phlyaria φλυαρία
footprint ichnos ἴχνος
force dynamis δύναμις
foreign allotrios ἀλλότριος
foreign xenos ξένος
forerunner prodromos πρόδρομος
forethought promêthia προμηθία
fork schisis σχίσις
form idea ἰδέα
form schêma σχῆμα
form or formal type, formal eidos, eidêtikos εἶδος, εἰδητικός
form, in form or limited by morphê, morphôtikôs μορφή, μορφωτικῶς
form
form, without amorphos ἄμορφος
formative principle logos physikos λόγος φυσικός
formed of, be artêsthai ἀρτῆσθαι
former or previous proteron πρότερον
formless fire pyr atypôton πῦρ ἀτύπωτον
forms, into multiple polyeidôs πολυειδῶς
340
fortunate eudaimôn εὐδαίμων

fortune tychê τύχη
foundational hypokeimenos ὑποκείμενος
founder archêgos ἀρχηγός
founder hêgemôn ἡγεμών
fragment katakermatizein κατακερματίζειν
fragmentary way, in a diêirêmenôs διῃρημένως
freakish teratôdês τερατώδης
free eleutheros ἐλεύθερος
free from age agêrôn ἀγήρων
free from or of, be kathareuein καθαρεύειν
free-ranging aphetos ἄφετος
freely chosen hekousios ἑκούσιος
friendship philia φιλία
from (here) below katôthen κάτωθεν
from above or on high or the anôthen ἄνωθεν
top or up there
from somewhere or ekeithen ἐκεῖθεν
something
from the divine or the god(s) theothen θεόθεν
fulfil or fill (out) symplêroun συμπληροῦν
fulfilment plêrôsis, apoplêrôsis πλήρωσις,
ἀποπλήρωσις
full, be plêthynein πληθύνειν
function ergon ἔργον
fundamental or primary, prôtistos πρώτιστος
most
further pollostos πολλοστός
furthest eschatos ἔσχατος
Gaia Gê Γῆ
game agôn ἀγών
game paidia παιδιά
garment periblêma περίβλημα
gathering syllêpsis σύλληψις
general (milit.) stratêgos στρατηγός
general or common koinos κοινός
general form, in a synêirêmenôs συνῃρημένως
general, generally or in holos, holôs ὅλος, ὅλως
general
general service hagisteia ἁγιστεία
generally speaking hôs to holon eipein ὡς τὸ ὅλον εἰπεῖν
generation, generative or gennêma, gennêtikos γέννημα, γεννητικός
generating
generation, perpetual aeigenesia ἀειγενεσία
generative gonimos γόνιμος
341
generative cause aition genos αἴτιον γένος

genesis or generation, gener- genesis, genêtos, γένεσις, γενητός,
ated, generative genesiourgos γενεσιουργός
genre genos γένος
genre eidos εἶδος
genuinely gnêsiôs γνησίως
genuinely ontôs, tôi onti ὄντως, τῷ ὄντι
genus genos γένος
get right katorthoun κατορθοῦν
Giant, gigantic Gigas, gigantikos Γίγας, γιγαντικός
gift-giving dosis δόσις
girdle zônê ζώνη
girdle zôstêr ζωστήρ
give proxenein προξενεῖν
give, give into endidonai ἐνδιδόναι
given hypokeimenos ὑποκείμενος
giving rise to proxenos πρόξενος
Glaucon Glaykôn Γλαύκων
go phoitan φοιτᾶν
go before proerchesthai προέρχεσθαι
go down katerchesthai κατέρχεσθαι
go out or forth proïenai προϊέναι
go wrong plêmmelein πλημμελεῖν
goal or objective telos τέλος
goat-stag tragelaphos τραγέλαφος
god, goddess ho theos, hê theos ὁ θεός, ἡ θεός
goddess thea θεά
godlessness atheotês ἀθεότης
gods, battle of or conflict theomachia θεομαχία
among
gods, bestowed by theoparadotos θεοπαράδοτος
gods, worthy of theoprepês θεοπρεπής
going around perion περιόν
gold, golden chrysos, chrysous χρυσός, χρυσοῦς
good spoudaios σπουδαῖος
good deed eupragia εὐπραγία
good faith pistotês πιστότης
good things, providing agathopoios ἀγαθοποιός
good works, producer of agathourgos ἀγαθουργὀς
good-in-itself autoagathos αὐτοαγαθός
good, creator or maker of agathourgos ἀγαθουργὀς
good, goodness agathos, agathotês ἀγαθός, ἀγαθότης
good, informed by the agathoeidês ἀγαθοειδής
good, render as agathynein ἀγαθύνειν
good, the act of doing agathopoiein ἀγαθοποιεῖν
Gorgias (book title) Gorgias Γοργίας
342
governance archê ἀρχή

governing intellect in the ho en tôi panti politikos ὁ ἐν τῷ παντὶ πολιτικὸς
universe nous νοῦς
governor or one who governs prostatês προστάτης
or presides over
Graces Charites Χάριτες
graft enkentrizein ἐγκεντρίζειν
grasp piezein πιέζειν
great feat pleonektêma πλεονέκτημα
greater kreittôn κρείττων
greater poet mousikôteros μουσικώτερος
greatest akrotatos ἀκρότατος
greed philochrêmatia φιλοχρηματία
Greek, a Greek Hellênikos, Hellên Ἑλληνικός, Ἕλλην
grief lypê λύπη
group meros μέρος
group plêthos πλῆθος
grow indistinct amydroun ἀμυδροῦν
grow thick pachynesthai παχύνεσθαι
guardian ephoros ἔφορος
guardian phrouros φρουρός
guardian, a phylax φύλαξ
guardian, as a guardian phylakikos, phylakikôs φυλακικός, φυλακικῶς
guide hêgemôn ἡγεμών
guide leading anagôgos ἀναγωγός
guideline typos τύπος
gymnastics gymnastikê γυμναστική
habit epitêdeuma ἐπιτήδευμα

Hades Haïdês Ἅιδης
handling metacheirêsis μεταχείρησις
happiness eudaimonia, to εὐδαιμονία, τὸ
eudaimonein εὐδαιμονεῖν
happy eudaimôn εὐδαίμων
harm, harmful blabê, blaberos βλάβη, βλαβερός
harmful blaptikos βλαπτικός
harmonious, endowed with enarmonios ἐναρμόνιος
harmony
harmonious, in a manner that is emmelôs ἐμμελῶς
harmonising synarmostikos συναρμοστικός
harmony harmonia ἁρμονία
hasten horman ὁρμᾶν
have worth eu echein εὖ ἔχειν
health hygeia ὑγεία
hearing akoê ἀκοή
heart thymos θυμός
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heaven or the heavens ouranos οὐρανός

Hebe Hêbê Ἥβη
Hector Hektôr Ἕκτωρ
Helen Helenê Ἑλένη
Helios Hêlios Ἥλιος
Hellenic, a Hellene Hellênikos, Hellên Ἑλληνικός, Ἕλλην
help ôphelein ὠφελεῖν
Hephaestus Hêphaistos Ἥφαιστος
Hephaestus, built or crafted Hêphaistoteuktos Ἡφαιστότευκτος
by
Hera ‘patroness of marriage’ zygia ζυγία
Hera, of Hera Hêra, Hêraios Ἥρα, Ἥραιος
Heracles, Heraclean Hêraklês, Hêrakleios Ἡρακλῆς, Ἡράκλειος
hereditary patrios πάτριος
Hermes Hermês Ἑρμῆς
hero, heroic or to do with hêrôs, hêrôïkos ἥρως, ἡρωϊκός
heroes
heroic [metre] hêrôïos ἡρῷος
Hesiod Hêsiodos Ἡσίοδος
hidden, in a hidden manner kryphios, kryphiôs κρύφιος, κρυφίως
hide apokryptein ἀποκρύπτειν
hieratic hieratikos ἱερατικός
hierophant hierophantês ἱεροφάντης
highest akrotatos ἀκρότατος
hint ainissesthai αἰνίσσεσθαι
hint at hyponoein ὑπονοεῖν
history historia ἱστορία
hold forth or out proteinein προτείνειν
holiest or most holy hagiôtatos ἁγιώτατος
holistic holikos ὁλικός
holy, in a holy manner hieros, hierôs ἱερός, ἱερῶς
home, at oikeios οἰκεῖος
Homer, of Homer or Homêros, Homêrikos Ὅμηρος, Ὁμηρικός
Homeric
honour, craving philotimos φιλότιμος
horror terateia τερατεία
human anthrôpeios, anthrôpikos ἀνθρωπειος, ἀνθρωπικός
hybris hybris ὕβρις
hymns, compose or say in hymnein ὑμνεῖν
hypercosmic, hypercosmically hyperkosmios, ὑπερκόσμιος,
hyperkosmiôs ὑπερκοσμίως
hypostasis hypostasis ὑπόστασις
hypothesis hypothesis ὑπόθεσις
icon agalma ἄγαλμα

icon eikôn εἰκών
344
Ida Ida Ἴδα

idiosyncrasy idiotês ἰδιότης
ignorance agnoia ἄγνοια
ignorant anoêtos ἀνόητος
illicit athesmos ἄθεσμος
illness nosos νόσος
illness, free from anosos ἄνοσος
illuminate katalampein καταλάμπειν
illuminate, illumination ellampein, ellampsis ἐλλάμπειν, ἔλλαμψις
illusion, illusory or producing phantasia/phantasma, φαντασία/φάντασμα,
illusion phantastikos φανταστικός
illusionistic mode, in an phantastikôs φανταστικῶς
illusory eidôlikos εἰδωλικός
image agalma ἄγαλμα
image eidos εἶδος
image eikôn εἰκών
image production eidôlourgikê εἰδωλουργική
image, imagistic eidôlon, eidôlikos εἴδωλον, εἰδωλικός
images, creation of eidôlopoiia εἰδωλοποιία
images, maker or creator of eidôlopoios εἰδωλοποιός
images, with eidôlikôs εἰδωλικῶς
imagination or imagining, phantasia, phantastikos, φαντασία, φανταστικός,
imaginary or imaginative, phantasma φάντασμα
product of the imagination
imitation, an imitation mimêsis, mimêma μίμησις, μίμημα
imitation, give a good eu mimeisthai εὖ μιμεῖσθαι
imitations or objects of ta mimêta τὰ μιμητά
imitation
imitative, in an imitative mimêtikos, mimêtikôs μιμητικός, μιμητικῶς
manner
imitator mimêtês μιμητής
imitator, imitate or be an mimêtês, mimeisthai μιμητής, μιμεῖσθαι
imitator
immaculate achrantos ἄχραντος
immaterial, immaterially aülos, aülôs ἄϋλος, ἀΰλως
immoderate, immoderately, ametros, ametrôs, ἄμετρος, ἀμέτρως,
immoderation ametria ἀμετρία
immoderately pera tou metrou πέρα τοῦ μέτρου
immortalisation apathanatismos ἀπαθανατισμός
immortality athanasia ἀθανασία
immutability ametablêsia ἀμεταβλησία
immutable ametablêtos ἀμετάβλητος
impassioned empathês ἐμπαθής
impassive, impassivity apathês, apatheia ἀπαθής, ἀπάθεια
impel oneself horman ὁρμᾶν
imperceptible aphanês ἀφανής
345
imperfection to mê teleion τὸ μὴ τέλειον

imperishable fire pyr aphthiton πῦρ ἄφθιτον
impersonation of characters prosôpopoiia προσωποποιία
impetus, have an horman ὁρμᾶν
impiety anosiourgia ἀνοσιουργία
impiety asebeia ἀσέβεια
impression doxa δόξα
impression, easily taking an eutypôtos εὐτύπωτος
impression, take an apotypousthai ἀποτυποῦσθαι
impulse kinêsis κίνησις
impulse hormê ὁρμή
impurity, impure akatharsia, akathartos ἀκαθαρσία, ἀκάθαρτος
in accordance with hepomenos ἑπόμενος
in a different manner allotriôs ἀλλοτρίως
in a mythic manner mythoeidôs μυθοειδῶς
in a variety of ways pantodapôs παντοδαπῶς
in every respect or possible pantodapôs παντοδαπῶς
way
in general haplôs ἁπλῶς
in keeping with oikeiôs οἰκείως
in no way mêdamôs μηδαμῶς
in order to turn protreptikôs προτρεπτικῶς
in parts meristôs μεριστῶς
in turn para meros παρὰ μέρος
inability adynamia ἀδυναμία
inaccessible abatos ἄβατος
inactive apraktos ἄπρακτος
inappropriate plêmmelês πλημμελής
inappropriateness anoikeiotês ἀνοικειότης
incarnation genesis γένεσις
incidental parergos πάρεργος
incidental peristatikos περιστατικός
incidental, be empiptein ἐμπίπτειν
incision tomê τομή
inclination nous νοῦς
include periechein περιέχειν
include periptyssein περιπτύσσειν
include symperilambanein συμπεριλαμβάνειν
inclusiveness to perilêptikon τὸ περιληπτικόν
incompatible asynklôstos ἀσύγκλωστος
incongruous, be apemphainein ἀπεμφαίνειν
incorporeal, in an incorporeal asômatos, asômatôs ἀσώματος, ἀσωμάτως
manner
indefinite aoristos ἀόριστος
indicate endeiknysthai ἐνδείκνυσθαι
indissoluble alytos, adialytos ἄλυτος, ἀδιάλυτος
346
individual atomos ἄτομος

individual, act as an idiazein ίδιάζειν
individual, individually idios, idiôs ἴδιος, ἰδίως
individualised meristos μεριστός
individuals, for/of idiaï ἰδίᾳ
indivisible, indivisibly ameristos, ameristôs ἀμέριστος, ἀμερίστως
indulge philophroneisthai φιλοφρονεῖσθαι
ineffable arrêtos ἄρρητος
ineffective adranês ἀδρανής
inevitably ex anankês ἐξ ἀνάγκης
inexperience apeiria ἀπειρία
inferior katadeesteros καταδεέστερος
inferior hypheimenos ὑφειμένος
inferior cheirôn χείρων
inferiority hyphesis ὕφεσις
infinite anekleiptos ἀνέκλειπτος
informative epistêmonikos ἐπιστημονικός
inheritance ta patria τὰ πάτρια
initially tên archên τὴν ἀρχήν
initiate prokatarchein προκατάρχειν
initiate, an mystês μύστης
initiated teloumenos τελούμενος
initiation, by initiation telestikê, dia telestikês τελεστική, διὰ
τελεστικῆς
initiation, related to telestikos τελεστικός
injurious ponêros πονηρός
injustice adikia ἀδικία
innate symphyês συμφυής
innocent abatos ἄβατος
insolent person hybristês ὑβριστής
insoluble alytos ἄλυτος
inspiration epipnoia ἐπίπνοια
inspiration, with or by divine entheastikôs, entheôs ἐνθεαστικῶς, ἐνθέως
inspired (divinely) entheastikos, entheos ἐνθεαστικός, ἔνθεος
inspired, be, or be under entheazein ἐνθεάζειν
divine inspiration
inspired by the Muses mousikos μουσικός
inspired, be (divinely) enthousiazein ἐνθουσιάζειν
instrument, instrumental organon, organikos ὄργανον, ὀργανικός
insufficiency hyphesis ὕφεσις
insult hybrizein ὑβρίζειν
intellect nous νοῦς
intellect, lack of anoia ἄνοια
intellect, lacking anoêtos ἀνόητος
intellection noêsis νόησις
347
intellective or intellectual, noeros, noerôs νοερός, νοερῶς

intellectively or
intellectually
intellectually gnôstikôs γνωστικῶς
intelligence dianoia διάνοια
intelligence or intellect, act of noêsis νόησις
intelligence, intelligent phronêsis, phronimos φρόνησις, φρόνιμος
intelligent, intelligently emphrôn, emphronôs ἔμφρων, ἐμφρόνως
intelligible noeros, noêtos νοερός
intemperance akolasia ἀκολασία
intensify synteinein συντείνειν
intensity syntonia συντονία
intention boulêma βούλημα
intention dianoia διάνοια
intention ennoia ἔννοια
intention nous νοῦς
intercourse mixis μῖξις
interlocutor prosdialegomenos προσδιαλεγόμενος
intermediary or intermediate mesos, mesotês μέσος, μεσότης
intermediary, as an en mesei ἐν μέσει
interpret aphermêneuein ἀφερμηνεύειν
interpretation exêgêsis ἐξήγησις
interpretation hermêneia ἑρμηνεία
interpretation theôria θεωρία
interpreter exêgêtês ἐξηγητής
intrinsic oikeios οἰκεῖος
introduce paragein παράγειν
introduce proxenein προξενεῖν
introductory proêgoumenos προηγούμενος
intrude parempiptein παρεμπίπτειν
invest with periballein περιβάλλειν
investigation theôria θεωρία
investigation, investigative zêtêsis, zêtêtikos ζήτησις, ζητητικός
invisible, invisibly aphanês, en aphanei ἀφανής, ἐν ἀφανεῖ
Ion (book title) Iôn Ἴων
Ionian mode, in the iasti ἰαστί
Iris Iris Ἴρις
ironic eirônikos εἰρωνικός
irrational alogos, alogistos, tês ἄλογος, ἀλόγιστος, τῆς
alogias ἀλογίας
irrationality, in an irrational alogia, alogôs ἀλογία, ἀλόγως
manner
irrefutable anelenktos ἀνέλεγκτος
Ithaca Ithakê Ἰθάκη
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join or unite anaptein, synaptein ἀνάπτειν, συνάπτειν

journey poreia πορεία
judge, as a judge kritês, kritikos κριτής, κριτικός
judgement, place of dikaiôtêrion δικαιωτήριον
just, by justice kata dikên κατὰ δίκην
just, justly dikaios, dikaiôs δίκαιος, δικαίως
justice dikê, dikaiosynê δίκη, δικαιοσύνη
justice in the city or political politikê dikaiosynê πολιτικὴ δικαιοσύνη
justice
justice, the just to dikaion τὸ δίκαιον
justifiably en dikêi ἐν δίκῃ
juvenile nearoprepês νεαροπρεπής
keen, one who is zêlôtês ζηλωτής

keep away from aphistanai ἀφιστάναι
Kephalus Kephalos Κέφαλος
kind genos γένος
kind eidos εἶδος
kind idea ἰδέα
kind, of all or every pantodapos παντοδαπός
kindred synnomos σύννομος
king, kingly basileus, basilikos βασιλεύς, βασιλικός
kinship syngeneia συγγένεια
knowledge gnôsis γνῶσις
knowledge historia ἱστορία
knowledge, knowing or hav- epistêmê, epistêmôn ἐπιστήμη, ἐπιστήμων
ing knowledge
knows, that which gnôstikos γνωστικός
Kore Korê Κόρη
kymindis (name of a bird) kymindis κύμινδις
labour ôdinein ὠδίνειν

labour, be in locheuein λοχεύειν
labourer thês θής
labouring, in the manner of thêtikos, thêtikôs θητικός, θητικῶς
a labourer
Lacedaemonian Lakedaimonios Λακεδαιμόνιος
lamentation, of thrênêtikos θρηνητικός
lamentation, one who thrênopoios θρηνοποιός
produces
lamentations, lover of philothrênos φιλόθρηνος
land or place chôra χώρα
language onoma ὄνομα
last (grade or rank or stage) eschatos ἔσχατος
latent anenergêtos ἀνενέργητος
laughter gelôs γέλως
349
laughter-loving philogelôs φιλογέλως

law or divine law thesmos θεσμός
law, lawgiver nomos, nomothetês νόμος, νομοθέτης
lawful themis θέμις
lawful, in a manner that is euagôs εὐαγῶς
Laws (book title) Nomoi Νόμοι
lead podêgein ποδηγεῖν
lead proagein προάγειν
lead up/upward, leading anagein, anagôgos ἀνάγειν
upward
Leader (of chorus) koryphaios κορυφαῖος
Leader (of chorus) chorêgos χορηγός
leader, leading hêgemôn, hêgemonikos ἡγεμών, ἡγεμονικός
leading archêgos ἀρχηγός
leading part to hêgemonikon τὸ ἡγεμονικόν
legacy paradosis παράδοσις
Lesbos Lesbos Λέσβος
lesser or lower katadeesteros, καταδεέστερος,
hypodeesteros ὑποδεέστερος
Leto Lêtô Λητὼ
licentiousness akolasia ἀκολασία
lie (in a place) keisthai κεῖσθαι
lie or state falsehood pseudesthai ψεύδεσθαι
life bios βίος
life, life experience, lifestyle or zôê ζωή
way of life
lifelessness azôïa ἀζωΐα
lifelike zôtikos ζωτικός
light phôs φῶς
light that has been given phôs tetypômenon φῶς τετυπωμένον
a form
like-minded homophrôn ὁμόφρων
likemindedness, state of homonoia ὁμόνοια
liken apeikazein ἀπεικάζειν
likeness aphomoiôsis ἀφομοίωσις
likeness homoiôsis, homoiotês ὁμοίωσις, ὁμοιότης
limit eschatos ἔσχατος
limit horos ὅρος
limit peras πέρας
limit case akros ἄκρος
limitation metron μέτρον
limits, not observing aoristos ἀόριστος
line (of verse) rhêma ῥῆμα
live a civic life zein politikôs ζεῖν πολιτικῶς
living being or thing zôïon ζῷον
living well euzôïa, to eu zein εὐζωΐα, τὸ εὖ ζεῖν
350
logos, logical logos, logikos λόγος, λογικός

longed for polyaratos πολυάρατος
loosen anienai ἀνιέναι
lot or place allotted lêxis λῆξις
lot, by kata klêrous κατὰ κλήρους
love erôs ἔρως
love of pain to philolypon τὸ φιλόλυπον
love of the body philosômaton φιλοσώματον
lover erastês ἐραστής
lover of beauty philokalos φιλόκαλος
low or lower or below katô κάτω
lower katadeesteros καταδεέστερος
lower hypheimenos ὑφειμένος
lower cheirôn χείρων
lowest point ptôsis teleutaia πτῶσις τελευταία
lowest, in lowest mode eschatos, eschatôs ἔσχατος, ἐσχάτως
luminous augoeidês αὐγοειδής
lunar selênaios σεληναῖος
lust erôs ἔρως
Lycaon Lykaôn Λυκάων
Lycurgus Lykourgos Λυκοῦργος
Lydian, in the Lydian mode Lydios, lydisti Λύδιος, λυδιστί
madness, madman or raving mania, mainomenos μανία, μαινόμενος

magician goês γόης
main proêgoumenos προηγούμενος
main enquiry prothesis πρόθεσις
mainspring tonos τόνος
maintain diateinein διατείνειν
make sit hidryein ἱδρύειν
maker dêmiourgos δημιουργός
manifest prophainein προφαίνειν
manifest (adj.) emphanês ἐμφανής
manifest, manifestation phainomenos, to φαινόμενος, τὸ
phainomenon φαινόμενον
manifold pantodapos παντοδαπός
manly, render manly andrikos, andrizein ἀνδρικός, ἀνδρίζειν
manner of speaking logos, phêmê λόγος, φήμη
manufacture poiêsis ποίησις
many-headed polykephalos πολυκέφαλος
marvel teratologia τερατολογία
masses, the plêthos πλῆθος
material, materially or in enylos, enylôs ἔνυλος, ἐνύλως
a material manner
maternal mêtrikos μητρικός
351
matter or material, material hylê, hylikos ὕλη, ὑλικός

(adj.)
matter, depending on enylos ἔνυλος
meadow leimôn λειμών
meaning ennoia, dianoia ἔννοια, διάνοια
measure, to measure metron, metrein μέτρον, μετρεῖν
measureless ametros ἄμετρος
measurements symmetria συμμετρία
medical art iatrikê ἰατρική
melodrama, melodramatic, in tragôidia, tragikos, τραγῳδία, τραγικός,
a melodramatic manner tragikôs τραγικῶς
memory or memorial mnêmê μνήμη
Meno (book title) Menôn Μένων
mental impression phantasia φαντασία
mention mnêmê μνήμη
Mentor Mentôr Μέντωρ
messenger angelos ἄγγελος
method methodos μέθοδος
metre rhythmos ῥυθμός
metre, in metre metron, emmetros μέτρον, ἔμμετρος
middle mesos μέσος
midwife locheutikê λοχευτική
might, invincible adamaston ἀδάμαστον
mightier kreittôn κρείττων
mimêsis, mimetic, mimic mimêsis, mimêtikos, μίμησις, μιμητικός,
mimeisthai μιμεῖσθαι
mimetic artist mimêtês μιμητής
mimetic practice or activity mimêsis μίμησις
mind, out of one’s anoêtos, anoêtôs ἀνόητος, ἀνοήτως
mind, out of one’s ekphrôn ἔκφρων
Minos or Minos (book title) Minôs Μίνως
misguided plêmmelês πλημμελής
mist achlys ἀχλύς
mistake planê πλάνη
mistake, make a mistake, plêmmeleia, πλημμέλεια, πλημμελεῖν,
mistaken plêmmelein, πλημμελής
plêmmelês
mixed miktos μικτός
Mixolydian mode, in the mixolydisti μιξολυδιστί
mixture krasis κρᾶσις
model paradeigma παράδειγμα
model typos τύπος
moderate affection, with metriopathôs μετριοπαθῶς
moderation, to moderate metriotês, metrein μετριότης, μετρεῖν
moment kairos καιρός
monad, monadic monas, monadikos μονάς, μοναδικός
352
money chrêma χρῆμα

monograph pragmateia πραγματεία
monstrous, monstrosity teratôdês, teratologia τερατώδης, τερατολογία
moral habit, moral, moral êthos, êthikos, to êthikon ἦθος, ἠθικός, τὸ ἠθικόν
character
mortal thnêtos, thnêtoeidês θνητός, θνητοειδής
mortal affairs or beings or ta thnêta τὰ θνητά
creatures
Mother (of the gods) or mêtêr μήτηρ
mother
motion, be set in hormasthai ὁρμᾶσθαι
motion, capacity to set in kinêsis, to kinêtikon κίνησις, τὸ κινητικόν
motion
motion, self-moving kinêsis autokinêtos κίνησις αὐτοκίνητος
mourning, involving philothrênos φιλόθρηνος
a fondness for
mousikê mousikê μουσική
mouth stomion στόμιον
move forward proerchesthai προέρχεσθαι
move things together homopolein ὁμοπολεῖν
moved easily eukinêtos εὐκίνητος
movement, moving or able to kinêsis, kinêtikos κίνησις, κινητικός
move
multifarious pantodapos παντοδαπός
multiform polymorphos πολύμορφος
multiform or multifarious, polyeidês πολυειδής
having multiple forms
multitude arithmos ἀριθμός
multitude or multiplicity plêthos πλῆθος
Muse, leader of Muses Mousa, mousêgetês Μοῦσα, μουσηγέτης
music, musical mousikê, mousikos μουσική, μουσικός
musical mode harmonia ἁρμονία
musician or musical expert mousikos μουσικός
must, (it) anankê ἀνάγκη
Myrinê Myrinê Μυρίνη
mystagogy or mystical doc- mystagôgia μυσταγωγία
trine or initiation
mysteries mystêria μυστήρια
mysteries, mystical, in mystêria, mystikos, μυστήρια, μυστικός,
a mystical manner mystikôs μυστικῶς
myth-making or concerned mythologikos μυθολογικός
with myth
myth-making, creator of myths mythopoiïa, mythopoios μυθοποιΐα, μυθοποιός
myth, mythology mythos, mythologia μῦθος, μυθολογία
mythic story or construction mythikon plasma μυθικόν πλάσμα
mythic, in a mythic manner mythikos, mythikôs μυθικός, μυθικῶς
353
name onoma ὄνομα

narrative aphêgêmatikos ἀφηγηματικός
narrative historia ἱστορία
narrative logos λόγος
narrative, in diêgêmatikôs διηγηματικῶς
natural or belonging to physikos φυσικός
nature
natural relation syngeneia συγγένεια
naturally or disposed/suited phyein φύειν
by nature, be
nature physis φύσις
nature (of a thing) hypostasis ὑπόστασις
nature, be endowed with symphyein συμφύειν
a shared
nature, in one symphyês συμφυής
nature, in one or in a shared homophyês ὁμοφυής
necessarily, it is necessary anankê ἀνάγκη
necessity, necessitate anankê ἀνάγκη
need anankê ἀνάγκη
negation antithesis ἀντίθεσις
Nekuia nekyia νέκυια
Nestor Nestôr Νέστωρ
non-Greek, a barbaros βάρβαρος
none whatsoever mêdamôs μηδαμῶς
not at all ou pantelôs οὐ παντελῶς
notion ennoia ἔννοια
number plêthos πλῆθος
number among telein τελεῖν
number, numerically arithmos, kat’ arithmon ἀριθμός, κατ᾽ ἀριθμόν
nymphs nymphai νύμφαι
object of intellection or to nöoumenon τὸ νοούμενον

thought
objection or objectionable epistasis ἐπίστασις
point
objective skopos σκοπός
obligations kathêkonta καθήκοντα
obscenity aischrotês αἰσχρότης
observe theôrein θεωρεῖν
observe katanoein κατανοεῖν
obstacle, be an epiprosthein ἐπιπροσθεῖν
obstacle, that which is an empodistikos ἐμποδιστικός
Ocean or Oceanus Ôkeanos Ὠκεανός
odd perittos περιττός
Odysseus Odysseus Ὀδυσσεύς
354
of a universal nature holikos ὁλικός

offend, cause or commit plêmmelein πλημμελεῖν
offence
offer metadosis μετάδοσις
offer proteinein προτείνειν
offspring gennêma γέννημα
old man, as an presbytikôs πρεσβυτικῶς
oligarchic oligarchikos ὀλιγαρχικός
Olympus, Olympian Olympos, Olympios Ὄλυμπος, Ὀλύμπιος
once more anôthen ἄνωθεν
one in charge of kêdemôn κηδεμών
One itself autoen αὐτοέν
one who sits beside synthakos σύνθακος
One, the to hen τὸ ἕν
opening up anastomôsis ἀναστόμωσις
opinion doxa, doxasma, dogma δόξα, δόξασμα, δόγμα
opinion-like, on the level of doxastikos, doxastikôs δοξαστικός, δοξαστικῶς
opinion
opposed or opposite antikeimenos ἀντικείμενος
opposed to the gods antitheos ἀντίθεος
opposed to, would be allotriôs echoi ἀλλοτρίως ἔχοι
opposition antithesis ἀντίθεσις
opposition enantiôsis ἐναντίωσις
opposition or that which is to antikeimenon τὸ ἀντικείμενον
opposite
oracle logion λόγιον
oracular pronouncement chrêsmos, chrêsmôidia χρησμός, χρησμῳδία
oracular shrine manteion μαντεῖον
oracular shrine or site chrêstêrion χρηστήριον
orator rhêtôr ῥήτωρ
orbit kyklos κύκλος
order (noun) diakosmos διάκοσμος
order (noun), put into order katakosmêsis, κατακόσμησις,
katakosmein κατακοσμεῖν
order, in kata kosmon κατὰ κόσμον
order, order or render orderly taxis, tattein τάξις, τάττειν
order, put or bring into kosmein κοσμεῖν
ordering systasis σύστασις
Orestes Orestês Ὀρέστης
oriented towards matter prosylos πρόσυλος
origin genesis γένεσις
origin, original archê, archikos ἀρχή, ἀρχικός
originary, originative archêgos, archêgikos ἀρχηγός, ἀρχηγικός
Orpheus, Orphic Orpheus, Orphikos Ὀρφεύς, Ὀρφικός
Ouranos Oυranos Οὐρανός
out of place allotrios ἀλλότριος
355
outflowing aporroia ἀπόρροια

outline typos τύπος
outspokenness, be outspoken parrêsia, parrêsiazesthai παρρησία,
παρρησιάζεσθαι
outstanding, most akrotatos ἀκρότατος
overcome hyperairein ὑπεραίρειν
overseer ephoros ἔφορος
overseer, presiding over prostatis προστάτις
overshadow episkiazein ἐπισκιάζειν
oversight epistasia ἐπιστασία
own (one’s) idios ἴδιος
own (one’s) oikeios οἰκεῖος
oyster-like ostreïnos, ostreôdês ὀστρέϊνος, ὀστρεώδης
palinode palinôidia παλινῳδία

Panathenaia Panathênaia Παναθήναια
Pandarus Pandaros Πάνδαρος
paradigm paradeigma παράδειγμα
pariambis pariambis παριαμβίς
Paris Paris Πάρις
Parmenides Parmenidês Παρμενίδης
part meris μερίς
part meros μέρος
part moira μοῖρα
partial, in a partial way meristos, meristôs μεριστός, μεριστῶς
partial, partially or in a partial merikos, merikôs μερικός, μερικῶς
manner
participate metalambanein μεταλαμβάνειν
participate metechein μετέχειν
participates, that which metochos μέτοχος
participation metousia μετουσία
participation or participating methexis μέθεξις
particular meros μέρος
particular or parts, at the level merikos μερικός
of the
particular, particular merikos, to merikon μερικός, τὸ μερικόν
individual
particularity idiotês ἰδιότης
particularity, in a manner that meristôs μεριστῶς
involves
parties, proper for or going sympotikos συμποτικός
with
passage in a text logos λόγος
passing away apollymenon ἀπολλύμενον
passion pathos, pathêma πάθος, πάθημα
passion, filled with empathês ἐμπαθής
356
passion, in the grip of empathôs ἐμπαθῶς

passion, in the grip of pathainomenos παθαινόμενος
passionate part pathos πάθος
passions, freedom from apatheia ἀπάθεια
passivity pathos πάθος
paternal patrikos, patronomikos πατρικός, πατρονομικός
path agôgê ἀγωγή
path, steep or upward anantês ἀνάντης
patriarchal patronomikos πατρονομικός
Patroclus Patroklos Πάτροκλος
pattern typos τύπος
pay attention epistrephein ἐπιστρέφειν
peace, peaceful eirênê, eirênikos εἰρήνη, εἰρηνικός
Peirithous Peirithous Πειρίθους
Peleus Pêleus Πηλεύς
penalty dikê δίκη
penalty timôria τιμωρία
Penelope Pênelopê Πηνελόπη
Pentad pentas πεντάς
people, of the dêmotikos δημοτικός
perceptible phainomenos φαινόμενος
perceptible realm ho aisthêtos topos ὁ αἰσθητὸς τόπος
perception, perceptible aisthêsis, aisthêtos αἴσθησις, αἰσθητός
perfect telein, teleioun τελεῖν, τελειοῦν
perfect, perfectly, perfection, teleios, teleiôs, teleiotês, τέλειος, τελείως,
perfecting teleiôsis τελειότης, τελείωσις
perfection, the task of bring- to telesiourgon τὸ τελεσιουργόν
ing to
perfective or bringing to telesiourgos τελεσιουργός
perfection
perfectly teleôs τελέως
performance energeia ἐνέργεια
performance of great deeds to megalourgon τὸ μεγαλουργόν
period periodos περίοδος
perishable epikêros ἐπίκηρος
perishable phthartos φθαρτός
persuasion peithô πειθώ
pervade phoitan φοιτᾶν
Phaeacians Phaiakes Φαίακες
Phaedo (book title) Phaidôn Φαίδων
Phaedrus (book title) or Phaidros Φαῖδρος
Phaedrus
phantasia, on the level of phantasia, phantastikôs φαντασία, φανταστικῶς
phantasia
phantasmagoria teratologia τερατολογία
Phemius Phêmios Φήμιος
357
Philebus (book title) Philêbos Φίληβος

philosopher or philosophical philosophos φιλόσοφος
philosophy, philosophical philosophia, en φιλοσοφία, ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ
philosophiai
Phoebus Apollo Phoibos Apollôn Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων
Phoenix Phoinix Φοῖνιξ
Phrygian, in the Phrygian Phrygios, phrygisti Φρύγιος, φρυγιστί
mode
physical, in a physical way physikos, physikôs φυσικός, φυσικῶς
physician iatros ἰατρός
pile up prosperiballein προσπεριβάλλειν
pious hosios ὅσιος
Piraeus Peiraieus Πειραιεύς
place of mortality thnêtos topos θνητὸς τόπος
place or region or part, of topos, topikos τόπος, τοπικός
place
plan nous νοῦς
plan proairesis προαίρεσις
planet planômenê πλανωμένη
Plato, Platonic or a Platonist Platôn, Platônikos Πλάτων, Πλατωνικός
plausibility, as is plausible eikos, hôs to eikos εἰκός, ὡς τὸ εἰκός
plausibly eikotôs εἰκότως
play skênê σκηνή
pleasure or please hêdein ἥδειν
pleasure, experience of to hêdomenon τὸ ἡδόμενον
pleasure, love of to philêdonon τὸ φιλήδονον
pleasure, pleasurable hêdonê, hêdysmenos ἡδονή, ἡδυσμένος
plot hypothesis ὑπόθεσις
Plotinus Plôtinos Πλωτῖνος
Ploutônê Ploutônê Πλουτώνη
plural, in a manner that has peplêthysmenôs πεπληθυσμένως
been rendered
plurality, pluralise plêthos, plêthynein πλῆθος, πληθύνειν
Pluto Ploutôn Πλούτων
pneumatic being pneuma πνεῦμα
poem, poetry poiêma, poiêmata ποίημα, ποιήματα
poet of Cyrene [Callimachus] ho Kyrênaios poiêtês ὁ Κυρηναῖος ποιητής
poet, poem or poetry poiêtês, poiêsis ποιητής, ποίησις
poetic poiêtikos, para tois ποιητικός, παρὰ τοῖς
poiêtois ποιητοῖς
poetically or like a poet, of poiêtikôs, poiêtikos ποιητικῶς, ποιητικός
poetry
poetics or (the art of) poetry poiêtikê ποιητική
Polemarchus Polemarchos Πολέμαρχος
policy proairesis προαίρεσις
political manner, in an politikôs πολιτικῶς
358
political or of civic usefulness politikos πολιτικός

political order or constitution politeia πολιτεία
Politics (book title) Politikoi Πολιτικοί
politics or that which is to politikon τὸ πολιτικόν
political
politics or the art of politics politikê πολιτική
polity politeia πολιτεία
polyhedron schêma polyhedron σχῆμα πολύεδρον
portion moira μοῖρα
Poseidon Poseidôn Ποσειδῶν
possessed [by the Muses] katochos κάτοχος
possession katokôchê κατοκωχή
possession, a chrêma χρῆμα
possible, as eis dynamin εἰς δύναμιν
possible, as far as kata dynamin κατὰ δύναμιν
possible, as far as kat’ exousian κατ᾽ ἐξουσίαν
possible, be dynasthai δύνασθαι
postulation thesis θέσις
potential dynasthai δύνασθαι
power exousia ἐξουσία
power, hold dynasteuein δυναστεύειν
power, lack of adynamia ἀδυναμία
power, potential or dynamis δύναμις
potentiality
powerful, more kreittôn κρείττων
powerlessness adynamia ἀδυναμία
powers, of or possessing many polydynamos πολυδύναμος
practical praktikos πρακτικός
practice epitêdeuma ἐπιτήδευμα
pre-eminence hyperochê ὑπεροχή
pre-exist proüparchein, προϋπάρχειν,
proüphistanai προϋφιστάναι
precept thesmos θεσμός
precept typos τύπος
precise, be akriboun ἀκριβοῦν
preconception prolêpsis πρόληψις
predicate katêgoroumenon κατηγορούμενον
prefer proïstanai προϊστάναι
premise lêmma λῆμμα
premise protasis πρότασις
premise to hypokeimenon τὸ ὑποκείμενον
present proteinein προτείνειν
present or put forward or out proïstanai προϊστάναι
in front
presentation ekphansis ἔκφανσις
presented hypokeimenos ὑποκείμενος
359
presenting an appearance prophainomenos προφαινόμενος

preservative, preserve sôstikos, sôzein σωστικός, σώζειν
preserver, preservation sôtêr, sôtêria σωτήρ, σωτηρία
prevail against hypertrechein ὑπερτρέχειν
Priam Priamos Πρίαμος
primarily or in a primary mode prôtôs πρώτως
or sense
primary proêgoumenos, προηγούμενος,
proêgoumenôs προηγουμένως
primary (the term) to proêgeisthai τὸ προηγεῖσθαι
primary or primary-effective prôtourgos πρωτουργός
primary subject or object of einai proêgoumenôs εἶναι προηγουμένως
enquiry, be
primary things prôta πρῶτα
primordial prôtourgos, prôtourgikos πρωτουργός,
πρωτουργικός
principal proêgoumenos, προηγούμενος,
proêgoumenôs προηγουμένως
principle (rational formative) logos λόγος
prior proteron πρότερον
prison phroura φρουρά
privately idiaï ἰδίᾳ
privately owned idios ἴδιος
privation sterêsis στέρησις
problem aporia ἀπορία
problem problêma, to problêthen πρόβλημα, τὸ
προβληθέν
proceed proerchesthai προέρχεσθαι
proceed proïenai, symproïenai προϊέναι, συμπροϊέναι
proceeding from, not anekphoitêtos ἀνεκφοίτητος
process of creation, the whole hai holai poiêseis αἱ ὅλαι ποιήσεις
procession proodos πρόοδος
proclaim kêryttein κηρύττειν
Proclus Proklos Πρόκλος
procreative gennêtikos γεννητικός
produce epideiknynai ἐπιδεικνύναι
produce proxenein προξενεῖν
produce with the aid of synapogennan συναπογεννᾶν
productive gennêtikos γεννητικός
productive gonimos γόνιμος
productive oistikos οἰστικός
productive or producing poiêtikos ποιητικός
profane bebêlos βέβηλος
profit ôpheleia ὠφέλεια
profusion plêthos πλῆθος
progress agôgê ἀγωγή
360
project proballein, prosballein προβάλλειν,

προσβάλλειν
project or promote proïstanai προϊστάναι
propensity epitêdeiotês ἐπιτηδειότης
proper oikeios οἰκεῖος
proper condition, in a katorthômenos κατορθωμένος
proper natural aptitude, with a eu pephykôs εὖ πεφυκώς
proper task to idion τὸ ἴδιον
properly defined hôs alêthôs ὡς ἀληθῶς
properly, be proper or prepontôs, prepein πρεπόντως, πρέπειν
appropriate
property idiotês ἰδιότης
property, common koinônia κοινωνία
prophecy chrêsmôidia χρησμῳδία
prophecy, prophetic shrine mantikê, mantikon μαντική, μαντικόν
proportion eumetria, symmetria εὐμετρία, συμμετρία
proportion logos λόγος
proportion, in kata to metron κατὰ τὸ μέτρον
propose or present or put proballein προβάλλειν
forward
proposition logos λόγος
propriety euprepeia εὐπρέπεια
protective manner, in a phrourêtikôs φρουρητικῶς
protector kêdemôn κηδεμών
protector prostatês προστάτης
Proteus Prôteus Πρωτεύς
provide for proxenein προξενεῖν
providence or providential pronoia πρόνοια
activity or care
providential, subject to or pronoêtikos, προνοητικός,
governed by providence pronooumenos προνοούμενος
provider chorêgos χορηγός
province meris μερίς
proximate, proximately prosechês, prosechôs προσεχής, προσεχῶς
proximity syntaxis σύνταξις
prudent sôphrôn σώφρων
psychic wings pteron psychikon πτερόν ψυχικόν
public or general public dêmos δῆμος
public, the koinon κοινόν
punishment kolasis κόλασις
punishment timôria τιμωρία
punishment, place of dikaiôtêrion δικαιωτήριον
pure achrantos ἄχραντος
purification, purificatory, katharsis, kathartikos, κάθαρσις, καθαρτικός,
means of purification katharmos καθαρμός
purify, so as to purify kathairein, kathartikôs καθαίρειν, καθαρτικῶς
361
purity, be pure katharotês, kathareuein καθαρότης, καθαρεύειν

purpose proairesis προαίρεσις
purpose prothesis πρόθεσις
pursuit epitêdeuma ἐπιτήδευμα
put in command proïstanai προϊστάναι
put into the same category syntassein συντάσσειν
Pyriphlegethon Pyriphlegethôn Πυριφλεγέθων
Pythagoras Pythagoras Πυθαγόρας,
Pythagorean Pythagorean Πυθαγόρειος
qualitative alteration alloiôsis ἀλλοίωσις

quality idea ἰδέα
quality hyparxis ὕπαρξις
quality excelled at pleonektêma πλεονέκτημα
question or topic problêma πρόβλημα
quick to change oxyrropos ὀξύρροπος
quiescent êremaios ἠρεμαῖος
race genos γένος

race phylon φῦλον
raise anegeirein ἀνεγείρειν
raised up with, be synepairesthai συνεπαίρεσθαι
rank taxis τάξις
rank, put in a katatassein κατατάσσειν
ranking alongside systoichos σύστοιχος
ranking first prôtistos πρώτιστος
rational logikos, kata logon λογικός, κατὰ λόγον
rational justification logos λόγος
rational knowledge, con- epistêmê, epistêmonikos ἐπιστήμη, ἐπιστημονικός
cerned with rational
knowledge
rational knowledge, conveying epistêmôn ἐπιστήμων
or imbued with
rational part of the soul to logistikon tês psychês τὸ λογιστικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς
rational principle of art technikos logos τεχνικός λόγος
rational principle or rationale logos λόγος
ray augê αὐγή
reach or come to kathêkein καθήκειν
realistic, realistically eikastikos, eikastikôs εἰκαστικός, εἰκαστικῶς
really ontôs, tôi onti ὄντως, τῷ ὄντι
reason aitia, aitios αἰτία, αἴτιος
reason (explanation), logos, logismos λόγος, λογισμός
reasoning
reason (faculty) logos λόγος
reasonable, beyond what is pera tou metrou πέρα τοῦ μέτρου
reasonably, with good reason eikotôs εἰκότως
362
reasoning dianoia διάνοια

reasoning theôrêma θεώρημα
recall anamimnêskein ἀναμιμνήσκειν
receive benefit eu paschein εὖ πάσχειν
receptacle hypodochê ὑποδοχή
receptive eupathês εὐπαθής
recollection anamnêsis ἀνάμνησις
record or historical record historia ἱστορία
reduce systellein συστέλλειν
reject aposkeuazesthai ἀποσκευάζεσθαι
relation systasis σύστασις
relation schesis σχέσις
relationship oikeiotês οἰκειότης
relatively speaking kata schesin κατὰ σχέσιν
relay diaporthmeuein διαπορθμεύειν
release chalan χαλᾶν
remarks or comments logos λόγος
remind, such as to be anamimnêskein, ἀναμιμνήσκειν,
reminded of anamnêstikos ἀναμνηστικός
reminder mnêmê μνήμη
remote, most eschatos ἔσχατος
remove exairein ἐξαιρεῖν
remove or erase, hard to dysekniptos δυσέκνιπτος
removed from, be aphistanai ἀφιστάναι
report rhêma ῥῆμα
represent apeikonizein, ἀπεικονίζειν,
eneikonizesthai ἐνεικονίζεσθαι
represent apotypousthai ἀποτυποῦσθαι
representation apeikasia ἀπεικασία
representation parastasis παράστασις
representation poiêsis ποίησις
representation, represent or mimêsis, mimeisthai μιμεῖσθαι, μίμησις
create a representation
representation, eikasia, eikastikos εἰκασία, εἰκαστικός
representational
reproduction synapogennêsis συναπογέννησις
Republic (book title) Politeia Πολιτεία
repulsion, feel aneillein ἀνείλλειν
reputation doxa δόξα
research zêtêsis ζήτησις
resemblance apeikasia ἀπεικασία
resistant antitypos ἀντίτυπος
responsibility, responsible aitia, aitios αἰτία, αἴτιος
Rest (the form of) stasis στάσις
restoration apokatastasis ἀποκατάστασις
restrain sôphronizein σωφρονίζειν
363
restraint, without aschetôs ἀσχέτως

restrict apostenoun ἀποστενοῦν
return apokathistanai ἀποκαθιστάναι
reunites, that which anaplôtikos ἀναπλωτικός
reveal epideiknynai ἐπιδεικνύναι
revealed phainomenos φαινόμενος
revelation, revealing ekphansis, ekphantikos ἔκφανσις, ἐκφαντικός
revenge timôria τιμωρία
reversion, enabling or con- epistreptikos ἐπιστρεπτικός
cerned with
revert, reversion or turning epistrephein, epistrophê ἐπιστρέφειν, ἐπιστροφή
back
reverting to its source epistreptikos ἐπιστρεπτικός
revolution periphora περιφορά
revolve peripolein περιπολεῖν
rhapsode rhapsôidos ῥαψῳδός
Rhea Rhea Ῥέα
rhetorical device schêma σχῆμα
rhythm rhythmos ῥυθμός
riddling ainigmatôdês αἰνιγματώδης
ridiculous, fondness for the philogelôs φιλογέλως
right themis θέμις
right-minded eu phronôn εὖ φρονῶν
right, rightly orthos, orthôs ὀρθός, ὀρθῶς
rite thesmos θεσμός
rite, initiatory or mystery or teletê, telesiourgia τελετή, τελεσιουργία
sacred
rites ta hiera τὰ ἱερά
ritual pragmateia πραγματεία
ritual offerings hê hosia ἡ ὁσία
river potamos ποταμός
role ergon ἔργον
role meros μέρος
roll (together) synelissein συνελίσσειν
rouse ageirein ἀγείρειν
rule kanôn κανών
rule horos ὅρος
rule or preside over or govern proïstanai προϊστάναι
rule or ruler archê ἀρχή
ruled by the passions kata ta pathê κατὰ τὰ πάθη
ruling ephoros ἔφορος
sacred hieros, hosios ἱερός, ὅσιος

sacrosanct panagês παναγής
sage sophos σοφός
salty halmyros ἁλμυρός
364
salvation, saviour sôtêria, sôtêr σωτηρία, σωτήρ

sameness tautotês ταυτότης
sanctuary abaton ἄβατον
sanctuary, innermost adytos ἄδυτος
Sarpedon Sarpêdôn Σαρπηδών
savagery and wildness of soul ômotês kai agriotês ὡμότης καὶ ἀγριότης
psychês ψυχῆς
save sôzein σώζειν
say phrassein φράσσειν
say earnestly diateinein διατείνειν
say outspoken things parrêsiazesthai παρρησιάζεσθαι
saying phthenxis φθέγξις
Scamander Skamandros Σκάμανδρος
Scamandrius Skamandrios Σκαμάνδριος
science, scientific epistêmê, epistêmonikos ἐπιστήμη, ἐπιστημονικός
screen parapetasma παραπέτασμα
screen prokalymma προκάλυμμα
screen proschêma πρόσχημα
scrutiny, subject to thorough dieukrinein διευκρινεῖν
search zêtêsis ζήτησις
second or secondly or deuteron δεύτερον
secondary
secondarily or in a secondary deuteron, deuterôs δεύτερον, δευτέρως
manner
secrecy, sworn to di’ aporrêtôn δι’ ἀπορρήτων
secret aporrêtos ἀπόρρητος
see theôrein θεωρεῖν
seed sperma σπέρμα
Selênê Selênê Σελήνη
self control, lacking in akolastos ἀκόλαστος
self-controlled, self-control, sôphrôn, sôphrosynê, σώφρων, σωφροσύνη,
with self-control sôphronêtikôs σωφρονητικῶς
self-evident enargês ἐναργής
self-moving autokinêtos αὐτοκίνητος
self-revelation autophaneia αὐτοφάνεια
self-sufficiency, self-sufficient autarkeia, autarkês αὐτάρκεια, αὐτάρκης
semblance, lacking anomoios ἀνόμοιος
send forth or bring out proballein προβάλλειν
sense-perception aisthêsis αἴσθησις
senses, based on the senses aisthêsis, aisthêtikos αἴσθησις, αἰσθητικός
sensory impact kata ton aisthêton typon κατὰ τὸν αἰσθητὸν
τύπον
sensory or sensible aisthêtos αἰσθητός
separate apodiairein ἀποδιαιρεῖν
separate dioikizein διοικίζειν
separate operation idiotês ἰδιότης
365
separate or separated exêirêmenos ἐξῃρημένος

separate, not achôristos ἀχώριστος
separation apostasis ἀπόστασις
separation, separate, to chôrismos, chôristos, χωρισμός, χωριστός,
separate chôrizein χωρίζειν
series seira σειρά
seriously (not casually) mê parergôs μὴ παρέργως
service therapeia θεραπεία
set aside exairein ἐξαιρεῖν
set before proballein προβάλλειν
setting to peristatikon τὸ περιστατικόν
settle enoikizein ἐνοικίζειν
settle hyphizanein ὑφιζάνειν
shadow-painting skiagraphia σκιαγραφία
shadow, shadowy skia, skioeidês σκιά, σκιοειδής
shape schêma σχῆμα
shape, give shape typos, apotypousthai τύπος, ἀποτυποῦσθαι
shape, in a manner that amorphôtôs ἀμορφώτως
involves no
shape, in a manner that morphê, morphôtikôs μορφή, μορφωτικῶς
involves shape
shapeless, free of or without amorphôtos ἀμόρφωτος
shape
share metousia μετουσία
share moira μοῖρα
share or sharing out metadosis μετάδοσις
share, have a metechein μετέχειν
share, that which has a metochos μέτοχος
shed apekdyesthai ἀπεκδύεσθαι
shine out or forth dialampein διαλάμπειν
shine, shine forth katalampein, καταλάμπειν,
prolampein προλάμπειν
shout boan βοᾶν
show epideiknynai ἐπιδεικνύναι
show oneself proballesthai προβάλλεσθαι
shriek or shrill cry trismos τρισμός
shrink from aneillein ἀνείλλειν
Sicily Sikelia Σικελία
side-task parergon πάρεργον
sight thea θέα
sight, into sight opsis, hyp’ opsin ὄψις, ὑπ’ ὄψιν
sign or symbol synthêma σύνθημα
signify sêmainein σημαίνειν
similar condition sympatheia συμπάθεια
similar in substance homöousios ὁμοούσιος
similarity homoiotês ὁμοιότης
366
similitude, in a way that lacks anomoiôs ἀνομοίως

simple, simply or simpliciter haplous, haplôs ἁπλοῦς, ἁπλῶς
simplicity haplotês, to haploun ἁπλότης, τὸ ἁπλοῦν
simplicity, transcending in hyperêplômenos ὑπερηπλωμένος
simply holôs ὅλως
sin hamartêma ἁμάρτημα
sing hymnôidein ὑμνῳδεῖν
sing of or about or in praise of anymnein ἀνυμνεῖν
singer mousikos μουσικός
Siren Seirên Σειρήν
Sisyphus Sisyphos Σίσυφος
situation peristasis περίστασις
skill or technical skill technê τέχνη
slacken chalan χαλᾶν
sleep hypnos ὕπνος
slow brachyporos βραχύπορος
snatch anarpazein ἀναρπάζειν
society politeia πολιτεία
Socrates, Socratic Sôkratês, Sôkratikos Σωκράτης, Σωκρατικός
solicitude kêdemonia κηδεμονία
Solon Solôn Σόλων
song ôidê ᾠδή
soothing katastêmatikos καταστηματικός
Sophist (book title), sophist Sophistês, sophistês Σοφιστής, σοφιστής
sophistic, as a sophist sophistikos, sophistikôs σοφιστικός, σοφιστικῶς
soul, lacking apsychos ἄψυχος
soul, of the soul psychê, psychikos ψυχή, ψυχικός
source pêgê πηγή
speak in the manner of myth mythologein μυθολογεῖν
special monograph (i.e. dedi- proêgoumenê προηγουμένη
cated to a particular topic) pragmateia πραγματεία
specific character idiotês ἰδιότης
specify diorizein, prosdiorizein διορίζειν, προσδιορίζειν
spectacle thea, theama θέα, θέαμα
speculation skemma σκέμμα
speech dêmêgoria δημηγορία
speech logos λόγος
spelling out diarthrôsis διάρθρωσις
Spercheius Spercheios Σπερχειός
sphere sphaira σφαῖρα
spirit or spiritual being pneuma πνεῦμα
splendour aglaïa ἀγλαΐα
spoken, not to be arrêtos ἄρρητος
spring pêgê πηγή
stability stasis στάσις
stable akinêtos ἀκίνητος
367
stable manner, in a monimôs μονίμως

stably statherôs σταθερῶς
stage skênê σκηνή
stand over proïstanai προϊστάναι
standard horos ὅρος
star astron ἄστρον
start out hormasthai ὁρμᾶσθαι
starting point archê ἀρχή
state or city politeia πολιτεία
Statesman (book title) Politikos Πολιτικός
statesman or one who prac- politikos πολιτικός
tices politics
station (verb) tattein, katatassein τάττειν, κατατάσσειν
statue agalma ἄγαλμα
status taxis τάξις
steadfast adiastrophos ἀδιάστροφος
steadfastly monimôs μονίμως
steer kybernan κυβερνᾶν
stern (of a ship) prymnê πρύμνη
Stesichorus Stêsichoros Στησίχορος
stimulation proklêsis πρόκλησις
stipulate horizein ὁρίζειν
storm zalê ζάλη
story logos λόγος
straightforward haplous ἁπλοῦς
straightforward euthyporos εὐθύπορος
straightforward euryprosôpos εὐρυπρόσωπος
stranger xenos ξένος
strengthen rhônnynai ῥωννύναι
stretch out hypostrônnynai ὑποστρωννύναι
strive anateinein ἀνατείνειν
strives, one who zêlôtês ζηλωτής
stronger kreittôn κρείττων
study with syscholazein συσχολάζειν
style, of style lexis, lektikos λέξις, λεκτικός
Styx, Stygian Styx, Stygios Στύξ, Στύγιος
subject ho hypokeimenos ὁ ὑποκείμενος
subject (of discussion) hypothesis ὑπόθεσις
subject matter hylê ὕλη
subject matter, from the pragmatikos πραγματικός
subject or subject term to hypokeimenon τὸ ὑποκείμενον
sublunary selênaios, hypo selênên σεληναῖος, ὑπὸ σελήνην
submerge baptizein βαπτίζειν
subordinate (adj.) hypheimenos ὑφειμένος
subordinate (verb) tattein τάττειν
subordinate (verb) hypostellein ὑποστέλλειν
368
subordinate, being hepomenôs ἑπομένως

subsist hyparchein ὑπάρχειν
substance, substantial ousia, ousiôdês οὐσία, οὐσιώδης
substantial or a substance, be ousiousthai οὐσιοῦσθαι
rendered
subtext hyponoia ὑπόνοια
success, be successful to katorthoun, τὸ κατορθοῦν,
katorthoun κατορθοῦν
successfully kalôs καλῶς
suffering pathos, pathêma πάθος, πάθημα
suffering emotion pathainomenos παθαινόμενος
suffering, free from or without apathês ἀπαθής
suitability epitêdeiotês ἐπιτηδειότης
suitable nature, with a eu pephykôs εὖ πεφυκώς
suitable or suited epitêdeios ἐπιτήδειος
suitable or suited, be prepein πρέπειν
suited to oikeiôs οἰκείως
suitor mnêstêr μνηστήρ
sum up syllambanein συλλαμβάνειν
summarise anakephalaiousthai ἀνακεφαλαιοῦσθαι
summary way, in an synespeiramenôs συνεσπειραμένως
summary, in synêirêmenôs συνῃρημένως
summon or call forth prokaleisthai προκαλεῖσθαι
sun, solar hêlios, hêliakos ἥλιος, ἡλιακός
superficial aspect proschêma πρόσχημα
superfluity, superfluous periousia, perittos περιουσία, περιττός
superior kreittôn κρείττων
superiority hyperochê ὑπεροχή
supersimplified hyperêplômenos ὑπερηπλωμένος
supervise podêgetein ποδηγετεῖν
surface content to probeblêmenon τὸ προβεβλημένον
surface handling hê phainomenê ἡ φαινομένη μεταχείρισις
metacheirisis
surface level proschêma πρόσχημα
surface level, on a or the kata to phainomenon κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον
surface meaning to phainomenon τὸ φαινόμενον
surroundings to periechon τὸ περιέχον
suspended, be exartasthai έξαρτᾶσθαι
sustaining synektikos συνεκτικός
syllogism, present a syllogism syllogismos, syllogizesthai συλλογισμός,
συλλογίζεσθαι
symbol, symbolic, symboli- symbolon, symbolikos, σύμβολον, συμβολικός,
cally or in a symbolic symbolikôs συμβολικῶς
manner
symbolic manner, in a more symbolikôteron συμβολικώτερον
symmetry, in symmetry with symmetria, symmetros συμμετρία, σύμμετρος
369
sympathy sympatheia συμπάθεια

Symposium (book title), Symposion, symposion Συμπόσιον, συμπόσιον
symposium
synoptic vision periôpê περιωπή
synoptically or in summary synoptikôs συνοπτικῶς
Syssiticus (book title) Syssitikon Συσσιτικόν
take on metampischesthai μεταμπίσχεσθαι

take on proballein προβάλλειν
take or gather beforehand prolambanein προλαμβάνειν
take part in metechein μετέχειν
take part in along with synephaptesthai συνεφάπτεσθαι
Tantalus Tantalos Τάνταλος
Tartarus Tartaros Τάρταρος
task or main task ergon ἔργον
teacher (esp. of Syrianus) kathêgemôn καθηγεμών
teaching didaskalia διδασκαλία
teaching dogma δόγμα
teaching paideia παιδεία
teaching paradosis παράδοσις
tear dakryon δάκρυον
tear-loving philodakrys φιλόδακρυς
technical or technically gifted technikos τεχνικός
telos telos τέλος
term horos ὅρος
term, terminology onoma, onomata ὄνομα, ὀνόματα
tetrachord tetrachordon τετράχορδον
text lexis λέξις
text or writing pragmateia πραγματεία
Thamyris Thamyris Θάμυρις
that which comes to be or into genêtos γενητός
being
that which draws holkos ὁλκός
theatrical representation skênê σκηνή
Themis Themis Θέμις
Theognis Theognis Θέογνις
theology, theologian, theologia, theologos, θεολογία, θεολόγος,
theological theologikos θεολογικός
Theomachy theomachia θεομαχία
Theophrastus Theophrastos Θεόφραστος
theoretical consideration theôria θεωρία
theory of nature physiologia φυσιολογία
therapeutic therapeutikos θεραπευτικός
there ekei ἐκεῖ
Thersites Thersitês Θερσίτης
Theseus Thêseus Θησεύς
370
thesis protasis πρότασις

thesis (metrical) thesis θέσις
Thessalian man, Thessalian Thessalos, Thettalikos Θεσσαλός, Θετταλικός
(adj.)
Thetis Thetis Θέτις
theurgist theourgos θεουργός
theurgy, working of hieratikê pragmateia ἱερατικὴ πραγματεία
thick pachys παχύς
thing or matter pragma πρᾶγμα
thing or matter chrêma χρῆμα
thought dianoia διάνοια
thought noêsis, noêma, dianoêma νόησις, νόημα, διανόημα
thoughtful emphrôn ἔμφρων
thoughtless anoêtos ἀνόητος
thoughtlessness anoia ἄνοια
Thracian man, Thracian (adj.) Thraïx, Thraïkios Θρᾷξ, Θρᾴκιος
Thrasymachus Thrasymachos Θρασύμαχος
throughout the land kata dêmon κατὰ δῆμον
throw over periballein περιβάλλειν
thymos thymos θυμός
Timaeus (book title) or Timaios Τίμαιος
Timaeus
time kairos καιρός
timocratic timokratikos τιμοκρατικός
Titan, Titanic Titan, Titanikos Τιτάν, Τιτανικός
title epigraphê ἐπιγραφή
title onoma ὄνομα
Tityus Tityos Τιτυός
to be said in the myths mythologeisthai μυθολογεῖσθαι
tone tonos τόνος
tool organon ὄργανον
topic or subject pragma πρᾶγμα
totality plêrôma πλήρωμα
totally pantelôs παντελῶς
trace indalma ἴνδαλμα
trace ichnos ἴχνος
tradition didaskalia διδασκαλία
tradition paradosis παράδοσις
tragedian tragôidiopoios, ho tês τραγῳδιοποιός, ὁ τῆς
tragôdias poiêtês τραγῳδίας ποιητής
tragedy, tragic, in a tragic tragôidia, tragikos, τραγῳδία, τραγικός,
manner tragikôs τραγικῶς
train gymnazein γυμνάζειν
trait or character trait êthos ἦθος
transcend hypertrechein ὑπερτρέχειν
371
transcend, transcendent, exaireisthai, ἐξαιρεῖσθαι, ἐξῃρημένος,

transcendentally exêirêmenos, ἐξῃρημένως
exêirêmenôs
transcendence hyperochê ὑπεροχή
transcendent chôristos χωριστός
transform along with symmetamorphoun συμμεταμορφοῦν
transformation metabolê μεταβολή
transgression hamartêma ἁμάρτημα
transgression plêmmelês energeia πλημμελής ἐνέργεια
transition metabasis μετάβασις
treatment therapeia θεραπεία
treatment or discussion of pragmateia πραγματεία
a subject
treatment of subject matter ta pragmatika τὰ πραγματικά
triangle trigônon τρίγωνον
troubling tarachôdês ταραχώδης
Troy, Trojans Troia, Trôes Τροία, Τρῶες
true alêthês, alêthinos ἀληθής, άληθινός
truly ontôs, tôi onti ὄντως, τῷ ὄντι
truly or truthfully or in keep- alêthôs ἀληθῶς
ing with the truth
trust or put faith in pisteuein πιστεύειν
trustworthiness pistotês πιστότης
truth alêtheia, τὸ ἀληθές ἀλήθεια
truth or true state, truly alêtheia, kat’ alêtheian ἀλήθεια, κατ᾽ ἀληθείαν
truthful, state or tell the truth alêtheutikos, alêtheuein ἀληθευτικός, ἀληθεύειν
tumultuous thorybôdês θορυβώδης
tune, in emmelês ἐμμελής
turn or turn back epistrephein ἐπιστρέφειν
type genos γένος
type schêma σχῆμα
type typos τύπος
Typhon Typhôn Τυφών
tyranny, tyrannical tyrannis, tyrannikos τυραννίς, τυραννικός
Tyrtaeus Tyrtaios Τυρταῖος
ugliness aischrotês αἰσχρότης

ultimate aim skopimôtaton telos σκοπιμώτατον τέλος
unbidden automatos αὐτόματος
unbounded aoristos ἀόριστος
unceasing akatalêptos ἀκατάληπτος
unchangeable ametablêtos ἀμετάβλητος
unchanged atreptôs ἀτρέπτως
uncircumscribed aperilêptos ἀπερίληπτος
uncontrolled, uncontrollably aschetos, aschetôs ἄσχετος, ἀσχέτως
uncultured, unculturedly amousos, amousôs ἄμουσος, ἀμούσως
372
undefiled achrantos ἄχραντος

undefined adioristos ἀδιόριστος
under pressure of external peristatikôs περιστατικῶς
circumstances
under the leadership hyph’ hêgemoni ὑφ᾽ ἡγεμόνι
underlying hypokeimenos ὑποκείμενος
underlying substrate or sub- to hypokeimenon τὸ ὑποκείμενον
ject or object
understand synginôskein συγγινώσκειν
understanding gnôsis γνῶσις
understanding epibolê ἐπιβολή
understanding theôria θεωρία
understanding katanoêsis κατανόησις
undiminished anelattôtos ἀνελάττωτος
undisciplined akolastos ἀκόλαστος
undistorted adiastrophos ἀδιάστροφος
undisturbed anenochlêtos ἀνενόχλητος
undivided, in an undivided adiairetos, adiairetôs ἀδιαίρετος, ἀδιαιρέτως
way
unequal length, what is of to heteromêkes τὸ ἑτερόμηκες
unexamined adiereunêtos ἀδιερεύνητος
unfold anaploun ἀναπλοῦν
unharmed apathês ἀπαθής
unholy anosios ἀνόσιος
uni-form, in a uni-form monoeidês, monoeidôs μονοειδής, μονοειδῶς
manner
unification or union, unified henôsis, henikos ἕνωσις, ἑνικός
unified manner, in a heniaiôs ἑνιαίως
unified or united, in unity or hênômenos, hênômenôs ἡνωμένος, ἡνωμένως
a united way
uniform, in a uni-form henoeidês, henoeidôs ἑνοειδής, ἑνοειδῶς
manner
unify henizein ἑνίζειν
unifying henopoios ἑνοποιός
unimpeded anempodistos ἀνεμπόδιστος
uninterrupted anekleiptos ἀνέκλειπτος
union koinônia κοινωνία
union mixis μῖξις
union synaphê συναφή
union synousia συνουσία
union, unite syzeuxis, syzeugnynai σύζευξις, συζευγνύναι
unitarily henikôs ἑνικῶς
unitary heniaios ἑνιαῖος
unite symphyein συμφύειν
unite synenoun συνενοῦν
unity henôsis ἕνωσις
373
universal perikosmios περικόσμιος

universal or whole, a being to holon τὸ ὅλον
that is
universal statesman ho en tôi panti politikos ὁ ἐν τῷ παντὶ πολιτικός
universal, a to holon τὸ ὅλον
universal, in a universal holikos, holikôs ὁλικός, ὁλικῶς
manner
universal, universality katholikos, to katholikon καθολικός, τὸ καθολικόν
universal, universally holos, holôs ὅλος, ὅλως
universe to pan τὸ πᾶν
universe, the ta hola τὰ ὅλα
unjust, unjustly adikos, adikôs ἄδικος, ἀδίκως
unlawful athemitos ἀθέμιτος
unlawful ekthesmos ἔκθεσμος
unlike anomoios ἀνόμοιος
unlimited anekleiptos ἀνέκλειπτος
Unlimited, the apeiria, apeiron ἀπειρία, ἄπειρον
unmeasured ametros ἄμετρος
unmixed amiktos ἄμικτος
unmixed achrantos ἄχραντος
unmixed, in an unmixed amigês, amigôs ἀμιγής, ἀμιγῶς
manner
unmixing, in an unmixed asynchytos, asynchytôs ἀσύγχυτος, ἀσυγχύτως
manner
unmoved akinêtos ἀκίνητος
unmusical amousos ἄμουσος
unnaturally para physin παρὰ φύσιν
unpunished anepiplêktos ἀνεπίπληκτος
unravel anelittein ἀνελίττειν
unshakeable or unshaken asaleutos ἀσάλευτος
unsleeping agrypnos ἄγρυπνος
unspoken arrêtos ἄρρητος
unwanted aboulêtos ἀβούλητος
unyielding adiastrophos ἀδιάστροφος
unyielding ameiliktos ἀμείλικτος
unyielding aprospathês ἀπροσπαθής
upbringing agôgê ἀγωγή
utterance rhêma ῥῆμα
utterance phêmê φήμη
vanguard prodromos πρόδρομος

vantage point periôpê περιωπή
vapour atmos ἀτμός
variable, variability poikilos, poikilia ποικίλος, ποικιλία
varied polyeidês πολυειδής
varied or various and sundry pantodapos παντοδαπός
374
variegated poikilos ποικίλος

variety diaphorotês διαφορότης
variety or variation poikilia, to poikilon ποικιλία, τὸ ποικίλον
various or varied or variety of poikilos ποικίλος
kinds
vehicle ochêma ὄχημα
verbal, verbally dia logôn, tôi logôi διὰ λόγων, τῷ λόγῳ
very first prôtistos πρώτιστος
very last position apoperatôsis ἀποπεράτωσις
very well eu mala εὖ μάλα
vessel for containing hypodochê ὑποδοχή
vice, make vicious kakia, kakynein κακία, κακύνειν
violent biaios βίαιος
virtue, virtuously aretê, kat’ aretên ἀρετή, κατ᾽ ἀρετήν
visible emphanês ἐμφανής
visible or showing, visibly phainomenos, φαινόμενος, φαινομένως
phainomenôs
visible universe to phainomenon pan τὸ φαινόμενον πᾶν
vision thea, theama θέα, θέαμα
vision opsis ὄψις
vision phantasma φάντασμα
vision or intellectual vision theôria θεωρία
visitation or epiphany epiphoitêsis ἐπιφοίτησις
vital zôtikos ζωτικός
vital act zôê ζωή
vividness, vivid, vividly enargeia, enargês, ἐνάργεια, ἐναργής,
enargôs ἐναργῶς
waking vision hypar ὕπαρ

wander, wandering planan, planê πλανᾶν, πλάνη
war polemos πόλεμος
warlike or engaged in war polemikos πολεμικός
water hydôr ὕδωρ
wave, great trikymia τρικυμία
way of life eidos zôês εἶδος ζωῆς
weakness astheneia ἀσθένεια
weakness (of will) akrasia ἀκρασία
wear anadeisthai ἀναδεῖσθαι
weave into syndiaplekein συνδιαπλέκειν
weighed down by the past opisthobarês ὀπισθοβαρής
weighted down embrithês ἐμβριθής
weld together synkrotein συγκροτεῖν
well eu εὖ
well kalôs καλῶς
well motivated agathoeidês ἀγαθοειδής
375
well-balanced, in a manner emmetrôs ἐμμέτρως

that is
well-being euzôïa εὐζωΐα
well-functioning orthos ὀρθός
well-ordered eu oikoumenos/ εὖ οἰκούμενος/
dioikoumenos διοικούμενος
well-ordered orthos ὀρθός
wetness hygrotês ὑγρότης
what is said logos λόγος
whole or as a whole, wholly holos, holôs ὅλος, ὅλως
whole, the to holon, ta hola τὸ ὅλον, τὰ ὅλα
wholeness, at the level of the holotês, holikos ὁλότης, ὁλικός
whole
wickedness mochthêria μοχθηρία
wickedness, wicked ponêria, ponêros πονηρία, πονηρός
width platos πλάτος
wife gynê γυνή
will, in accordance with the boulêsis, kata boulêsin βούλησις, κατὰ βούλησιν
will
will, of their own ek tou automatou ἐκ τοῦ αὐτομάτου
willing, willingly hekousios, hekousiôs ἑκούσιος, ἑκουσίως
wind anemos ἄνεμος
wisdom, imbued with emphrôn ἔμφρων
wise phronimos φρόνιμος
wise, wisdom sophos, sophia σοφός, σοφία
wished, much polyaratos πολυάρατος
with all forces passydiêi πασσυδίῃ
without further specification adioristôs ἀδιορίστως
witness autoptein αὐτοπτεῖν
witness emphatically boan βοᾶν
woman gynê γυνή
wonderful aglaos ἀγλαός
word logos λόγος
word onoma ὄνομα
words, choice of lexis λέξις
work ergon ἔργον
work or working pragmateia πραγματεία
work together synapergazesthai συναπεργάζεσθαι
work together to bring order syndiakosmein συνδιακοσμεῖν
work, detailed leptourgia λεπτουργία
working in this mode kat’ autên histamenos κατ᾽ αὐτὴν ἱστάμενος
working, detailed work poiêsis, poiêma ποίησις, ποίημα
world kosmos κόσμος
worse cheirôn χείρων
worship therapeia θεραπεία
worst eschatos ἔσχατος
376
worth serious attention spoudaios σπουδαῖος

worth, of no en oudenos merei ἐν οὐδενὸς μέρει
worthlessness ponêria πονηρία
wrenched away with difficulty dysapospastôs δυσαποσπάστως
write or speak of poieisthai mnêmên ποιεῖσθαι μνήμην
write philosophically philosophein φιλοσοφεῖν
write well eu poiein εὖ ποιεῖν
writing logos λόγος
Xanthus Xanthos Ξάνθος
young person or youth, nat- neos, nearoprepês νέος, νεαροπρεπής

ural for youth
Zephyrus Zephyros Ζέφυρος

Zeus Zeus Ζεύς
zoogonic zôïogonos ζῳογόνος
377
Greek Word Index
This index includes the significant vocabulary in Proclus’ text, along with the domi-
nant translation(s) used in this volume. The page and line numbers are to the Greek
text of Kroll which appear in the margins of our translation.
ἄβατος, inaccessible 74.23, innocent 56.26, ἀ. προηγούμενον, a principal good 149.16

79.21, 159.11, 180.13, 181.4, 181.15, ὁ ἀ., good person 46.1, 58.9–10, 66.12,
182.15, 186.20 66.24, 100.14, 160.25
τὸ ἄ., sanctuary 78.31 τὸ ἀ., [abstract idea] 22.20, 23.15–16,
ἀβούλητος, unwanted 55.25 24.20, 24.22, 25.9, 28.19–20,
ἀγαθοειδής, informed by the good 168.1, 29.14–15, 35.10, 37.18, 38.23, 66.5,
well motivated 202.25 67.23, 67.25, 72.10, 72.24, 73.27,
ἀγαθοποιεῖν, the act of doing good 31.24 76.16, 97.21, 98.24, 116.7, 116.11–12,
ἀγαθοποιός, providing good things 65.22 116.18, 133.20, 159.13, [a particular
ἀγαθός, good [adjective] 27.13–14, 27.20, good] 32.12, 57.19, 57.23, 75.13,
27.27, 28.1, 28.11, 28.19, 28.21–22, 79.22, 80.11, 81.5, 88.19, 116.15,
36.29, 46.13, 61.29, 69.17, 97.7, 134.1, 135.14, 136.25, 139.23, 140.3,
100.15, 105.24, 157.21, 157.26, 158.8, 142.18, 145.11, goodness 29.8, that
179.7, 179.9, 184.15, 184.17, 201.12, which is good 27.12, 29.7, 32.7
203.17, 203.25, great 58.4 τὸ πρῶτον αὐτὸ τἀγαθόν, the first good
ἀληθῶς ἀ., truly good 43.24 itself 28.23
ὄντως ἀ., really good 28.18 πάντα τὰ ἀ., all goods 10.16, 162.7, all
τῷ ὄντι ἀ., really good 28.11, 28.20, that is good 98.1, all things good
28.26, 29.6–8, 29.11, 31.10, 32.6 98.16, all good things 99.19, 127.25
genuinely good 58.25 ἐπ᾽ ἀγαθῷ, for the good of 116.7, 117.3
ἀγαθόν, a good thing 28.25, 31.4, 31.9, κατὰ τὸ ἀ., in accordance with the good
31.21, 32.2–3, 32.9, 32.11, 32.15, 28.18
32.21–2, 37.5, 37.8, 61.11, 87.24, κατ’ αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν, that accords with
96.7, 96.9, 97.24, 98.3, 98.8, 98.28, goodness itself 72.12
99.22–3, 108.27, 163.9, 167.18, πῃ ἀγαθόν, something that is good in
167.23, 188.9, 188.18, 205.6, a thing some respect 29.8, in a way, good
that is good 36.29, a/some good 38.27
35.13, 35.15, 160.3, 161.15, good ἀγαθότης, beneficence 33.6, goodness
38.26, 96.6, 106.7, 135.2, something 27.10, 28.4, 41.11, 96.5, 96.12,
good 38.2 136.22, 167.10
ἀ. ἐξῃρημένoν καὶ ἑνοειδές, a transcendent ἀγαθουργὀς, beneficent 188.16, creator of
and uniform good 167.5 good 97.30, making of what is good
ἀ. θεῖον, a divine good 178.11 41.6, producing good works 109.12
ἀ. ἐξαίρετον, characteristic good 199.9, ἀγαθύνειν, render as good 38.24
special good 74.21 Ἀγάθων, Agathon 42.18
ἀ. πρώτιστον, most primary good 199.11 ἄγαλμα, icon 73.21, image 48.26, statue
ἀ. οἰκεῖον, appropriate good 35.11, 35.27 42.6, 47.25
378
Greek Word Index
Ἀγαμέμνων, Agamemnon 115.5, 115.9, ἀδιορίστως, without further specification

115.15, 115.17, 115.20, 130.11, 114.12
143.26, 144.23, 144.30, 145.4 ἀδρανής, ineffective 20.17, 61.17
ἀγγελικός, angelic 86.7, 91.1, 91.12, 112.28, ἀδυναμία, inability 196.4, lack of power
114.9, 114.23, 147.9 34.15, powerlessness 97.16
ἄγγελος, angel 91.22, messenger 185.20 ἄδυτος, innermost sanctuary 86.2
ἀγείρειν, rouse 107.25 ἀεί, always 27.11, 29.3, 33.6, 35.27, 41.1,
Ἀγήνωρ, Agenor 147.17 65.24, 66.4, 66.13, 66.16, 68.9, 68.13,
ἀγήρων, free from age 68.13 70.12, 87.24, 109.14, 112.20–21,
ἁγιστεία, general service 78.17 113.18, 125.23, 127.8, 127.29, 128.3,
ἁγιώτατος, holiest 80.18, most holy 42.6, 160.15, 164.27, 175.18, 176.6, at each
78.22 moment 112.24, eternally 72.5, 89.7,
ἀγλαΐα, splendour 141.19, 142.8 109.28, 114.20, 135.8, 141.6, 141.22,
ἀγλαός, wonderful 99.27 165.29
ἄγνοια, ignorance 33.2, 35.9, 54.19, 55.29, ἀειγενεσία, perpetual generation 142.24
167.26 ἀζωΐα, lifelessness 28.16
ἀγοραῖος, common 160.24 ἀήρ, air 39.12, 111.4, 193.7
ἄγρυπνος, unsleeping 138.21 ἀθανασία, immortality 9.23
ἀγωγή, advancement 146.3, ascent 81.9, ἀθέμιτος, unlawful 132.18
elevating 123.26, elevation 47.12, ἄθεος, atheist 51.11, 51.13, godless 102.24,
48.16, path 54.11, 80.6, progress 103.24, 105.23, 186.2
49.25, upbringing 84.25 ἀθεότης, godlessness 104.24
ἀγών, contest 16.11, 17.17, 149.2, 149.13, ἄθεσμος, illicit 45.26
156.23, 160.13, 161.2, 202.22, game Ἀθηνᾶ, Athena 17.9, 18.18, 91.26, 95.7,
145.12 100.24, 102.9, 103.14, 103.25, 104.9,
ἀγωνιστικῶς, in argumentative form 16.3 104.23, 104.26, 104.29, 105.2, 105.11,
ἀδαμάντινος, adamantine 167.16 108.19, 112.3, 113.29, 114.4,
ἀδάμαστον, τὸ, invincible might 138.7 114.13–14, 138.13, 146.22, 148.30
ἄδεια, fearlessness 65.9 Ἀθηναϊκός, of Athena 108.25
Ἀδείμαντος, Adeimantus 7.17 Ἀθηναῖος, Athenian 75.28, 98.13, 100.13,
ἀδιαίρετος, undivided 162.28 101.24, 101.30, 105.16, 167.15,
ἀδιαιρέτως, in an undivided way 167.28, 185.8, 186.30, 189.1, 190.3,
10.10 195.26, 200.23
ἀδιάλυτος, indissoluble 135.4 ἀθλοθέτης, bestower of prizes of victory 8.3
ἀδιάστατον, τὸ, lacking extension 77.18 Ἄιδης, Hades 8.1, 15.26, 85.5, 85.11,
ἀδιάστροφος, steadfast 161.28, undistorted 117.23, 118.2, 118.5, 118.12, 118.24,
131.30, unyielding 181.24 119.28, 121.5, 121.24, 148.1, 153.24,
ἀδιερεύνητος, unexamined 6.23, 154.8 153.29, 156.26, 157.2, 157.4, 157.13,
ἀδίκημα, crime 105.26 158.19, 168.6, 168.12
ἀδικία, injustice 10.25, 14.1, 14.4, 20.9, ἀΐδιος, eternal 78.13, 113.4, 179.14
20.11, 20.13, 20.16, 20.22, 21.3, 21.8, τὸ ἀ., eternity 113.6
21.17, 22.27, 23.9, 23.17, 23.19, ἀϊδίως, eternally 78.21, 135.10
24.1–4, 24.6, 24.8, 24.10, 24.24, αἰθέριος, etherial 17.24
26.20, 72.21, 102.2, 103.1, 116.6 αἰθήρ, aether 193.7
πᾶσα ἀ., everything that is unjust 21.1, Αίθίοψ, Ethiopian 167.6
21.4, 21.6 αἴνιγμα, allegory 118.18
ἄδικος, unjust 20.25, 21.9, 21.12, 22.21, αἰνιγματώδης, riddling 186.13
23.28–29, 24.26, 97.9, 102.25, 104.16, αἰνίσσεσθαι, convey/mean/represent/speak
106.8, 130.9, 161.1 allegorically 108.2, 124.30, 132.8,
ἀδίκως, unjustly 105.21 136.19, 140.24, hint 82.18, 83.3, 89.6,
ἀδιόριστος, undefined 43.6, 60.15 93.23
379
Greek Word Index
αἵρεσις, choice 104.19, 104.23, 104.26, ἀκολασία, intemperance 24.13,

108.7 licentiousness 44.12
αἴσθησις, perception 136.3, sense- ἀκόλαστος, lacking in self control 46.10,
perception 59.12, 109.3, 111.21, licentiousness 105.4, undisciplined
135.31, 178.4, the senses 174.5, 97.9, 161.1
175.9–10, 176.4, 192.26 ἀκρασία, weakness 24.13, weakness of will
αἰσθητικός, based on the senses 195.2 24.14, 24.17
αἰσθητός, perceptible 136.4, 136.31, ἀκριβοῦν, be precise 54.12
138.22, 141.8, 141.19, 141.27, 164.21, ἄκρος, end of the range 64.16, extreme 32.5,
sensible 59.13–14, 60.4, 60.6, 77.17, highest 138.2, 177.17, 178.11, limit
82.11, 127.5, sensory 170.10 case 21.24, 22.25
αἰσχρότης, obscenity 76.18, ugliness 78.8, ἀκρότατος, greatest 27.17, highest 15.12,
110.6 34.6, 60.23, 174.27, most advanced
αἰτία, cause 24.1, 26.11–12, 37.25, 37.27, 57.21, most outstanding 145.29
38.4, 40.27, 78.14, 83.2, 88.7, 88.19, Ἀλέξανδρος, Alexander 108.4, 108.18
89.23, 91.11, 93.1, 95.5, 96.8, 98.1, ἀλήθεια, truth 28.6, 28.8, 33.13, 37.18–19,
98.10, 98.19, 98.28, 105.23, 127.24, 40.16, 40.18–19, 41.1, 41.12, 41.18,
133.11, 133.30, 134.19, 134.22, 135.3, 44.15, 44.26, 58.8, 60.3, 65.24, 70.10,
141.28, 143.15, 164.26, 165.10, 170.3, 70.21, 70.27, 71.6, 71.11, 71.16, 73.7,
173.16, 173.20, 180.18, 182.27, 183.1, 73.14, 74.18, 74.25, 83.9, 85.18, 86.2,
183.27, 184.6, 184.27, 195.30, 203.27, 87.2, 90.7, 92.26, 101.19, 116.8,
reason 42.3, 43.9, 43.26, 45.17, 47.23, 116.17, 116.23, 117.7, 118.4, 133.29,
60.21, 79.28, 101.4, 109.10, 122.21, 140.5, 154.13, 154.21, 156.7, 156.21,
126.5, 129.5, 134.26, 159.7, 196.16, 158.1, 159.17, 162.8, 162.29, 170.24,
202.7, 202.10, 204.29, responsibility 176.6, 178.30, 182.13, 186.1, 190.2,
158.20, that which is responsible for 191.1, 191.17, 192.19, 195.10,
32.22, 104.26, 105.2, 116.4 197.25–26, 198.2, 198.21, 198.27,
αἴτιος, cause 103.11, explanation 45.6, 199.2–3, 199.6, 202.24, 203.23, 204.9,
46.19, 47.14, justification 71.19, 204.11, 204.25, 204.28, 205.3, 205.10,
reason 135.13, responsible 28.25, true state 115.29
28.28–29, 30.22, 30.25, 30.29–30, κατ᾽ ἀ., actually 185.13, truly 11.7
31.2, 31.4, 31.8–9, 32.2–3, 32.7, 32.9, ἀληθεύειν, state/tell the truth 41.21
32.15, 32.21, 32.23, 32.30, 36.29, ἀληθευτικός, truthful 33.17, 37.1, 41.8, 41.18
37.6–7, 103.21, 104.5, 105.17, 115.25, ἀληθής, true 12.2, 13.22, 18.29, 19.2, 20.9,
117.11 23.30, 24.6, 24.18, 26.24, 29.30,
τὸ α., cause 26.11, 32.24, 38.9, 38.28, 30.30, 52.7, 53.5, 63.18, 67.17, 70.31,
40.28, 52.25, 74.7, 82.25, 83.3, 84.10, 100.20, 116.12, 150.8, 157.11, 162.24,
88.1, 88.13, 89.2, 89.19, 92.14, 92.17, 170.1, 176.23, 183.4, 187.5, 189.19,
101.21, 112.6, 133.22, 138.8, 139.25, 200.6, 201.5, 202.24
139.29, 140.4, 142.4, 165.8, 167.20, τὸ ἀ., the truth 36.15, 36.18, 40.13, 45.2,
178.12, 202.14 74.21, 161.4, 198.5
αἰώνιος, eternal 77.16, 87.23 ἀληθινός, true 13.3, 100.6, 101.1, 105.16,
ἀκαθαρσία, impurity 138.10 108.24, 116.20, 131.24, 172.17,
ἀκάθαρτος, impure 85.5 172.26, 174.9, 182.3, 188.19, 189.15,
ἀκάκωτος, free from evil 117.15 203.8, truly 108.27
ἀκατάληπτος, unceasing 127.24 ἀληθῶς, truly 41.14, 43.24, 54.29, 57.22,
ἀκίνητος, stable 109.24, unmoved 61.14, 62.16, 64.27, 65.19, 68.23,
164.27 truthfully 47.16
ἀκοή, hearing 59.3, 59.10, 63.4, 82.5, 186.8, ὡς ἀ., in keeping with the truth 13.9,
196.9 properly defined 11.8
380
Greek Word Index
Ἀλκιβιάδης, Alcibiades 149.23, 187.27, ἄμικτος, unmixed 28.13, 106.26, 162.19,

Alcibiades (book title) 8.19, 149.25, 162.29
171.23, 186.11, 187.24 ἄμορφος, without form 109.13
ἄλκιμος, brave 169.20 ἀμόρφωτος, free of shape 114.3, shapeless
Ἀλκίνους, Alcinous 169.19, 171.4 40.1, without shape 40.3
ἀλλοίωσις, alteration 111.13, qualitative ἀμορφώτως, in a manner that involves no
alteration 36.7 shape 40.3
ἀλλοιωτικός, involving alteration 35.29 ἄμουσος, unmusical 54.17, uncultured
ἀλλότριος, alien 49.25, 73.3, 82.8, divorced 60.19, 132.3
from 84.24, 181.10, foreign 142.1, ἀμούσως, uncultured 76.9
144.14, 161.14, out of place 85.14 ἀμυδροῦν, grown indistinct 23.23
ἀλλοτριότης, alienation 92.19 ἀναβρυχᾶσθαι, cry out aloud 164.3
ἀλλοτρίως, in a different matter 40.9 ἀνάγειν, ascend 65.12, 78.27, 121.19, 134.3,
ἀ. ἔχοι, would be opposed to 92.17 136.9, 137.12, ascribe 170.14, carry up
ἁλμυρός, salty 17.25 16.10, 25.7, 176.3, elevate 80.10,
ἀλογία, irrationality 146.24, 205.12 106.18, lead up 24.20, 60.5, 67.27,
τῆς ἀλογίας, irrational 73.4, 73.9, 75.8, 75.6, 82.3, 98.22, 136.20, 139.28,
81.4, 114.25, 121.7 152.11, 154.1, 164.17, 166.13, 175.6,
ἀλόγιστος, irrational 74.15, 75.15 178.27, 184.1, 184.6, lead upward
ἄλογος, irrational 16.13, 25.26, 32.11, 60.9, 77.10, 109.2, 135.7
38.20, 41.18, 56.14, 62.25, 95.4, ἀνάγκη, (it is) necessary 13.7, 20.19, 72.5,
121.22, 123.9, 175.19, 178.4, 194.27, 95.21, 105.6, 112.7, 203.17, (it) must
197.21 123.27, necessarily 7.22, 34.16, 49.24,
ἀλόγως, in an irrational manner 76.12 54.1, 183.8, 201.7, necessitate 20.22,
ἄλυτος, indissoluble 69.9, insoluble 57.14, necessity 24.23, 66.23, 95.9, 97.5,
142.21, 193.14 99.11, 110.2, 119.11, 143.16, 155.18,
ἁμάρτημα, error 43.8, 102.4, 102.22, 165.4, need 195.20
176.18, 176.28, sin 85.10, 105.15, ἐξ ἀ., inevitably 29.25
168.30, transgression 106.7 ἀναγωγή, ascent 81.6
ἀμβροσία, ambrosia 138.4, 138.9, ἀναγωγός, elevating 80.22, 90.2, guide
166.18 leading 18.28, upward leading 58.28,
ἀμείλικτος, unyielding 138.6 59.5, 176.24
Ἀμέλιος, Amelius 24.8 ἀναδεῖσθαι, attach 88.19, wear 149.24
ἀμέριστος, indivisible 77.16, 90.10 ἀναιρετικός, destructive 96.11
ἀμερίστως, in an indivisible manner 89.22, ἀνακεφαλαιοῦσθαι, summarise 10.20
indivisibly 89.11, without division ἀνακύκλησις, cycle 9.1
111.22, 117.4, 162.26 ἀναλλοίωτος, not subject to alteration 36.5
ἀμεταβλησία, immutability 28.7 ἀναλογία, analogy 84.7, 86.19,
ἀμετάβλητος, changeless 33.13, 33.16, correspondence 143.4
33.23, 35.1, 35.3–4, 36.10, immutable κατ᾽ ἀ., corresponding 88.28
39.2, 65.23, unchangeable 35.26, ἀναμιμνήσκειν, recall 164.14, 169.25,
41.7, 109.13, 109.25, unchanging remind 14.18, 59.3, 77.28, 157.18
36.30, 111.25, 112.14, without change ἀνάμνησις, recollection 179.13
114.28 ἀναμνηστικός, such as to be reminded of
ἀμετρία, immoderate 51.23 59.12
ἄμετρος, immoderate 50.22, measureless ἀνάντης, steep path 154.2, upward path
145.22, unmeasured 132.2 82.2
ἀμέτρως, in an immoderate manner 51.4 ἀναπλοῦν, explicate 122.11, unfold 16.18,
ἀμιγής, unmixed 72.26, 159.26, 160.7, 105.28, 155.3, 163.22
181.17 ἀναπλωτικός, that which reunites 90.5
ἀμιγῶς, in an unmixed manner 89.15 ἀνάπτειν, join 18.22
381
Greek Word Index
ἀνάπτυξις, explanation 106.12, 133.16 ἀνοήτως, out of one’s mind 36.25

ἀναρπάζειν, snatch 60.12, 124.10 ἄνοια, foolishness 101.27, 108.28, 117.8,
ἀναρτᾶν, attach 98.6 lack of intellect 28.16,
ἀναστομοῦν, cut open 106.9 thoughtlessness 104.29, 105.2
ἀναστόμωσις, opening up 103.8 ἀνοικειότης, inappropriateness 45.2, 45.4
ἀνάτασις, effort 181.24 ἀνόμοιος, dissimilar 65.30, 142.4, lacking
ἀνατείνειν, extend 77.4, 174.8, strive 179.31 semblance 44.17, 46.2, 53.15, unlike
ἀναφῶς, without contact 178.14 19.8
ἀνδραποδίζειν, enslave 144.28 ἀνομοιότης, dissimilarity 88.27, 97.26,
ἀνδρεία, courage 13.2, 105.4, 187.7, 170.21
187.19 ἀνομοίως, in a way that lacks similitude
ἀνδρίζειν, render manly 55.22 44.3, 44.7, 83.29
ἀνδρικός, brave 64.14, courageous 46.5, ἀνόσιος, unholy 130.8, 151.20, 194.25
manly 61.5, 63.25, 64.2, 64.4, 64.15 ἀνοσιουργία, impiety 74.16, 106.10
ἀνδρικῶς, bravely 45.12 ἄνοσος, free from illness 68.13
ἀνεγείρειν, arouse 56.26, 85.26, 141.6, ἀντιδιαιρεῖν, be opposite 142.3, contrast
awaken 83.15, 134.30, 166.26, 177.19, 133.28, logically distinguish 88.26,
181.20, 184.11, raise 146.9, rouse render distinct 89.1
58.5, 69.3, 77.1, 107.22, 166.3, 180.14 ἀντιδιαίρεσις, logical distinction 93.6, 95.5
ἀνειλιγμένως, by explication 111.22, in an ἀντίθεος, opposed to the gods 103.29
articulated manner 184.3 ἀντίθεσις, antithesis 93.3, 94.29, negation
ἀνείλλειν, be averse 54.23, feel repulsion 29.26, opposition 94.4, 142.10
67.1, shrink from 125.26 ἀντικείμενος, opposed 90.5, 104.2, 161.5,
ἀνέκλειπτος, infinite 127.26, uninterrupted opposite 28.15, 31.3, 95.23, 97.4
88.6, unlimited 167.10 τὀ ἀ., opposition 97.27, that which is
ἀνεκφοίτητος, not proceeding from 90.24 opposite 160.7
ἀνελάττωτος, undiminished 83.3, 167.19 ἀντιπάθεια, antipathy 124.13
ἀνέλεγκτος, irrefutable 70.14, 71.11, 82.4, ἀντιπαρατείνειν, compare 196.20
154.21, 159.3, 164.10, 167.28 ἀντιστρέφειν, convert 29.26, 30.8, 31.28
ἀνελίττειν, unravel 177.27 ἀντιτυπία, counter-blow 91.6
ἄνεμος, wind 152.13 ἀντίτυπος, resistant 181.5
ἀνεμπόδιστος, unimpeded 125.12 ἀνυμνεῖν, celebrate 123.2, 164.30, sing of/
ἀνενέργητος, latent 105.29 about/in praise of 127.3, 134.8, 184.9
ἀνενόχλητος, undisturbed 42.15 ἄνωθεν, from above 19.1, 77.29, 88.29,
ἀνέξοιστος, not to be expressed 69.9 96.19, 103.12, 110.25, 113.27, 127.15,
ἀνεπίπληκτος, unpunished 66.25 131.22, 134.7, 139.3, 139.25, 142.13,
ἀνεπιτηδειότης, lack of aptitude 40.9, 40.18, 147.8, 167.2, 180.13, 181.22, 184.7,
195.8 185.4, from on high 41.1, 82.11,
ἀνεχέγγυος, exact 8.7 92.14, from the top 43.26, 178.8, from
ἀνθρωπειος, human 18.26, 52.17, 114.11, up there 87.30, once more 172.21
170.13, 203.15 ἀξίωμα, axiom 24.19, 27.13, 27.26–7, 28.9,
ἀνθρωπικός, human 47.16, 70.24 28.23, 29.7, 33.19, 36.13
ἀνιέναι, ascend 36.9, 59.9, 136.14, 136.20, ἀόριστος, indefinite 75.9, 113.8, not
164.26 observing limits 76.2, unbounded
ἀνιέναι, dedicate 17.7, 122.3, 138.14, 147.3, 80.25
149.28, 153.10, loosen 69.8 ἀ. δυάς, Indefinite Dyad 93.5
ἄνοδος, ascent 85.9 ἀπαθανατισμός, immortalisation 152.11
ἀνόητος, foolish 104.21, 188.1, ignorant ἀπάθεια, freedom from the passions 66.11,
116.14, lacking intellect 46.10, 75.5, impassivity 28.9
128.20, out of one’s mind 36.17, ἀπαθής, free from suffering 148.11,
thoughtless 76.15, 104.19, 105.1 impassive 33.10, 33.12, 181.16,
382
Greek Word Index
unharmed 147.20, without suffering Ἀπολλόδωρος, Apollodorus 123.2, 164.2

123.23 ἀπολλύμενον, passing away 113.7, 124.27
ἀπαθῶς, dispassionately 105.8 Ἀπόλλων, Apollo 68.29, 69.15, 69.19, 92.5,
ἀπατᾶν, deceive 36.15, 36.20, 36.23, 94.29, 113.30, 146.11, 146.19, 147.7,
36.25–26, 37.1–2, 37.19, 40.8, 41.16, 147.19, 147.28, 148.1, 148.16, 193.21
41.26, 116.7, 117.1–2, 117.17, 133.13 Ἀπολλωνιακός, Apollonian 147.8, 147.23,
ἀπάτη, deceit 33.12, 33.17, deception 148.15
36.21, 115.25, 116.3, 116.6, 116.25, ἀποπεράτωσις, very last position 93.30
116.27, 117.7, 117.11–12, 133.13 ἀποπίπτειν, fail to achieve/attain 34.17,
ἀπατητικός, deceptive 41.22 116.12, fall 170.24, 195.6, fall short
ἀπεικάζειν, conform 72.29, 73.14, liken 63.18, 73.13, 79.25
120.6 ἀποπλήρωσις, fulfilment 22.6
ἀπεικασία, comparison 118.11, ἀποπληρωτικός, filling with 136.25, that
representation 190.18, resemblance which fulfils 98.14
170.22, 172.19 ἀπόπτωσις, decline 34.6
ἀπεικονίζειν, represent 73.22, 76.22, 77.16, ἀπορία, confusion 7.17, 118.20, difficulty
138.1, 177.29 106.14, problem 21.18, 37.25, 71.8,
ἀπειρία, inexperience 115.24, the 132.14
Unlimited 88.6, 134.16 ἀπορρεῖν, flow forth 138.1, 167.7
ἄπειρον, Unlimited 93.4, 133.22 ἀπόρρητος, secret 73.22, 74.17, 78.6, 79.3,
ἀπεκδύεσθαι, shed 16.10 79.22, 80.21, 81.18, 83.8, 84.28, 85.2,
ἀπεμφαίνειν, be incongruous 83.30 85.19, 87.2, 125.22, 128.19, 133.7,
ἀπεραντολογία, endless argument 5.18 140.11, 152.7, 154.6
ἀπέρασις, emetic 50.18 δι’ ἀ., having been sworn to secrecy
ἀπερείδειν, define 52.19 80.14
ἀπερίληπτος, uncircumscribed 168.1 ἀπόρροια, efflux 105.3, effluence 122.4,
ἀπέρχομαι, depart this life 151.18 outflowing 152.27
ἀπηκριβωμένος, finished 6.28 ἀποσκευάζεσθαι, do away with 124.8,
ἀπήχημα, echo 185.1 160.19, reject 73.3, 79.28, 81.25,
ἀπλανής, fixed 135.25 84.19, 108.14, 161.17
ἁπλότης, simplicity 49.29, 159.15, 160.15, ἀπόστασις, departure 52.7, distance 192.26,
162.8 separation 97.30
ἁπλοῦς, simple 46.21, 46.25, 49.26, 61.7, ἀποστενοῦν, restrict 53.2
83.24, 109.14, 160.7, 161.6, 162.3, ἀποτέλεσμα, effect 84.9, 99.14
195.4, straightforward 109.25 ἀποτελεύτησις, endpoint 77.3, 78.2, final
τὀ ἁ., simplicity 48.20, 50.9, 63.12, stage 92.22
66.16, 111.16, 114.23 ἀποτυποῦσθαι, give a shape 39.16,
ἁπλῶς, in a simple manner 57.19, represent 77.18, 160.27, 188.29, take
simpliciter 59.13, 59.18, simply 25.29, an impression 189.30
26.2, 28.11, 67.21, in general 132.11 ἄπρακτος, inactive 23.12, lacking in agency
ἀποδεικτικός, demonstrational 115.8, 172.8 20.11, 23.22, 24.10
ἀπόδειξις, demonstration 154.19, 154.21, ἀπροσπαθής, unyielding 123.1
159.4, 185.16, 198.24 ἄπτωτος, not inclined to fall 181.28
ἄνευ ἀ., not strictly demonstrative 185.28 Ἀρδιαῖος, Ardiaeus 118.27
ἀποδιαιρεῖν, separate 10.13 Ἀρεϊκός, of Ares 142.11, 142.17, 143.9
ἀποκαθιστάναι, return 152.16, 157.14 ἀρετή, excellence 30.3, 30.5–6, 163.12,
ἀποκατάστασις, restoration 120.14 virtue 10.13, 10.16, 12.27, 25.16–17,
ἀποκρύπτειν, conceal 73.15, 103.10, 26.5–9, 26.18, 26.21, 26.23, 26.25–9,
178.23, 182.12, hide 44.26, 185.26 31.25, 33.20, 47.5, 47.7, 49.25–6,
ἀπόκρυφος, concealed 86.1 51.12, 56.7, 58.12–13, 59.22, 62.25,
383
Greek Word Index
65.13, 66.27, 67.8, 68.18, 75.26, 76.8, ἀρχή, beginning 66.7, 101.22, 139.21,
80.3, 80.6, 81.15, 83.27, 84.14, 99.3, 145.5, 156.29, 175.21, 196.24, 197.17,
100.12, 120.11, 123.26, 130.5, 130.11, 197.26, cause 101.9, 196.3,
130.21, 130.24, 130.27, 131.19, governance 12.22, origin 38.5,
131.23, 146.3, 156.24, 157.16, 159.14, 47.21, 88.9, 98.6, 100.26, 155.1,
160.10, 160.22, 179.12, 187.2, 187.4, 204.20, principle 25.7, 37.8, 82.29,
187.9, 187.21, 187.23, 202.27, 203.4, 88.2, 88.15–16, 90.1, 92.30, 95.18,
203.16 96.20, 133.20, 133.26, 164.18, 164.27,
κατ᾽ ἀ., virtuously 67.23 167.4, 170.17, 177.27, 184.2, 184.9,
Ἄρης, Ares 69.2, 95.7, 140.20, 140.26, 184.31, rule 156.30, ruler 99.10,
141.5, 141.23–24, 142.12, 142.23, starting point 32.13, 117.28, 154.16,
142.28, 143.6 171.21, 177.13
ἀριθμός, multitude 184.1, number 90.20, τὴν ἀ., initially 144.8
94.12, 94.14, 94.19, 94.24, 113.4–5, ἀρχηγικός, first (principle) 91.10,
116.3, 137.29, 153.8 originative 180.17
κατ’ ἀ., numerically 113.25 ἀρχηγός, leading 105.18, originary 96.8
ἄριστος, best 9.19, 10.25, 11.3, 11.28, 12.2, ὁ ἀ., founder 161.12, 203.5
12.18, 12.22, 13.11, 13.13, 15.25, ἀρχικός, original 88.29
16.21–2, 22.13, 22.22, 27.23, 34.18, ἀσάλευτος, unshakeable 34.3, unshaken
34.20–2, 35.14, 42.2, 43.11, 43.14, 103.18
47.27, 57.11, 65.2, 65.17, 67.10, ἀσέβεια, impiety 27.28
122.23, 130.18, 158.9, 162.4, 162.16, ἀσθένεια, weakness 23.25, 33.27, 34.9,
177.15, 179.11 34.11, 40.9, 111.26, 167.25, 196.1
Ἀριστοτέλης, Aristotle 8.12, 35.28, 49.17 Ἀσκληπιός, Asclepius 69.7
Ἀριστοφάνης, Aristophanes 42.19 ἄστρον, star 19.16
Ἀρμένιος, Armenius 169.20 Ἀστυάναξ, Astyanax 170.16
ἁρμονία, harmony 42.2, 57.11, 58.29, 59.1, ἀσύγκλωστος, incompatible 63.29
59.8–9, 59.22–3, 60.3, 60.12, 68.21, ἀσύγχυτος, unmixing 89.8
131.25, 141.18, 155.6, 155.10, 155.17, ἀσυγχύτως, in an unmixed manner 89.16
174.6, 174.8, 174.18, 179.22, 180.20, ἀσύμμετρος, not (well) fitted/suited 81.18,
190.22, musical mode 42.22, 43.4, 82.5, 101.14
54.4, 54.8, 54.10, 54.19, 54.26–7, ἀσυμμέτρως, asymmetrically 38.11
55.14, 55.17, 55.20, 55.27, 55.29, ἄσχετος, uncontrolled 126.9
60.1, 60.15, 60.18, 60.28, 61.19, ἀσχέτως, uncontrollably 126.7, 126.12,
62.4–5, 62.17, 62.22, 62.27, 63.3, without restraint 123.5, 127.30
63.8, 63.11, 63.23, 63.28, 64.1, 64.3, ἀσώματος, incorporeal 39.6, 39.19, 39.21,
64.7, 64.9, 64.16, 64.21, 64.26, 65.1, 186.24
66.27, 67.1, 67.4, 67.8, 67.15, 68.18, ἀσωμάτως, in an incorporeal manner 39.21
84.13, 84.20, 84.23 ἀταξία, disorder 73.18, 122.14
ἄρρητος, ineffable 39.16, 72.30, 78.24, 82.1, ἀτμός, vapour 119.11, 121.17
82.25, 84.1, 164.18, 177.19, 178.13, ἄτομος, individual 114.18
not to be spoken 205.23, unspoken ἄτρεπτος, changeless 88.18
114.9 ἀτρέπτως, unchanged 141.7
Ἄρτεμις, Artemis 18.10, 91.27, 95.3 αὐγή, ray 152.18
ἀρτῆσθαι, be drawn from 172.22, be formed αὐγοειδής, luminous 39.9, 119.10
of 183.19 ἄϋλος, immaterial 77.14, 77.18, 162.21
ἄρτιος, even (number) 94.24, 97.22, ἀΰλως, immaterially 116.22, 117.3, 178.14
133.27 αὐτάρκεια, self-sufficiency 162.8
ἀρχαῖος, ancient 8.11, 8.16, 9.10, 173.12 αὐτάρκης, self-sufficient 20.8, 24.21, 35.14
οἱ ἀ., the ancients 58.11 αὐτοαγαθός, good-in-itself 28.22
ἀρχέτυπος, archetype 76.23 αὐτοέν, One itself 25.8
384
Greek Word Index
αὐτοκίνητος, self-moving 35.21 ἄχραντος, immaculate 72.26, 73.5, 73.20,

αὐτόματος, unbidden 37.13 pure 120.13, 134.29, 162.19, 177.1,
ἐκ τοῦ ἀ., of their own will 41.24 undefiled 72.15, 88.18, unmixed
αὐτοπραγεῖν, do one’s own job 23.4, 23.7 138.5, 152.28
αὐτοπτεῖν, witness 37.15, 40.1 ἀχώριστος, not separate 95.4
αὐτοφάνεια, self-revelation 37.9, 39.1 ἄψυχος, lacking soul 32.11
ἀφανής, imperceptible 58.29, 59.9, 153.1,
174.7, 176.4, invisible 18.21, βακχεία, Bacchic madness 181.26
39.23–24, 87.6, 101.19, 142.15, βαπτίζειν, submerge 18.1
180.19 βαρβαρικός, barbarian 175.28
ἐν ἀ., invisibly 85.23 βάρβαρος, barbarian 108.6, 123.8, non-
ἀφερμηνεύειν, interpret 86.22, 87.28, 131.6, Greek 91.21
198.14 βασιλεύς, king 98.30, 130.26, 168.30, 188.6,
ἄφετος, free-ranging 82.27 198.1, 204.28
ἀφηγηματικός, narrative 14.21, 66.20 βασιλικός, kingly 48.18, 108.10, 188.18
ἀφιστάναι, absent self from 75.14, be Βατίεια, Batieia 170.6
removed from 77.22, cut off from βέβηλος, profane 74.22, 86.3
82.28, 108.27, depart from 119.25, Βενδίδια, festival of Bendis 18.8, 18.10,
121.11, 127.19, keep away from 50.2, 18.17, 19.3
107.1, 174.5 Βένδις, Bendis 18.12–13, 18.15
ἀφομιοῦν, bring into likeness 134.17, βίαιος, violent 55.22, 82.26
137.15 βίος, life 26.18, 52.19, 52.22, 56.29, 59.4,
ἀφομοίωσις, likeness 137.27, 164.13, 59.6, 60.10, 60.26, 87.17, 99.6, 100.9,
179.19, 190.5 100.11, 104.19, 104.21, 104.28, 108.2,
ἀφορίζειν, define 10.11, 54.10, 79.12, 88.4, 108.7, 108.10, 108.13, 108.15–16,
88.15, 88.30, 97.24, 98.15, 111.19, 108.20, 118.6, 119.15, 119.23, 120.3,
129.18, 178.26, 187.25, 188.11, 120.19–20, 120.22, 124.3, 129.18,
188.26, 201.13, determine 67.29 131.28, 132.7, 146.4, 149.31, 174.24,
ἀφοσιοῦν, discharge religious duties 78.16 199.18–19, 202.19
ἀφοσίωσις, expiation 42.12, 50.8, 50.23–4, βλαβερός, harmful 28.27, 29.7, 29.16, 29.19,
50.26 29.22, 29.25, 29.27, 31.11, 31.15,
Ἀφροδισιακός, Aphrodisian 109.5, under the 47.6, 47.29, 48.12, 48.19, 49.23,
influence of Aphrodite 108.25 51.19, 76.13
Ἀφροδίσιος, depending on Aphrodite 143.9 βλάβη, harm 30.1
Ἀφροδίτη, Aphrodite 95.23, 108.12, 108.19, βλαπτικός, harmful 29.9, 29.16
109.2, 109.6, 139.1, 139.6, 139.10, βλασφημεῖν, blaspheme 45.16, 51.8
140.20, 140.25, 141.16, 141.21, βλασφημία, abuse 173.25, blasphemy
141.26, 142.12, 142.18, 142.23, 133.17
142.29, 143.6, 143.8 βοᾶν, emphatically bear witness 7.25, shout
Ἀχελῷος, Achelous 149.11 104.17, 125.17
Ἀχέρων, Acheron 169.13 Βορρᾶς, Boreas 152.13
Ἀχιλλεύς, Achilles 46.4–5, 100.17, 114.5, βοστρυχίζειν, curl 65.11
114.12, 115.22, 116.1, 116.5, 120.1, βούλημα, intention 5.24
120.10, 120.18, 121.4, 123.9, 124.16, βούλησις, will 39.23, 40.11, 98.16, 100.23,
129.13, 130.14, 143.24–5, 144.3, 101.20, 102.3, 107.17, 116.27, 117.2,
144.22, 145.10, 146.10, 146.18, 117.13, 135.11, 146.26, 151.10, 168.1,
147.18, 148.4, 148.6, 148.14, 149.10, 202.26
149.12, 149.15, 150.5, 151.15, 152.4, κατὰ β., in accordance with the will
152.9, 152.24, 153.7, 164.3 141.25
ἀχλύς, mist 18.25 βραχύπορος, slow 68.28
385
Greek Word Index
γαλήνη, calm 17.20 Γλαύκων, Glaucon 7.17, 54.6, 55.29

γέλως, laughter 50.14, 78.15, 126.5, 126.9, γνησίως, genuinely 84.27, 100.10, 109.22
126.14, 126.18–19, 127.10, 127.13, γνῶσις, knowledge 15.11, 35.14, 41.11,
127.22, 127.27, 128.2, 128.5, 128.12, 54.6, 147.5, 158.1, 179.26, 194.12,
128.15, 129.4, 185.24 201.7, 204.14, understanding 21.30,
γενέθλια, birthday 69.23 22.18, 28.4, 28.7–8, 53.9, 53.16,
γενεσιουργός, bringing about generation 70.14, 70.31, 73.29, 82.8, 85.19,
18.28, 90.2, 90.17, 91.6, 95.8, 124.10, 95.14, 167.11
143.2, generation-producing 19.12, γνωστικός, cognitive 21.20, 21.30, 22.5,
generative 107.25 22.8, 22.18, 22.23, 23.5, 25.27, 95.13,
γένεσις, arising 10.26, becoming 52.12, that which knows 51.24
91.27, 95.21, 101.5, 101.8, 110.5, γνωστικῶς, intellectually 199.25
116.30, 124.16, 125.13, 142.9, 175.16, γόης, magician 36.12
175.27, 181.25, coming into being γοητεύειν, bewitch 203.4
98.7, 142.27, coming to be 128.14, γόνιμος, generative 82.27, 134.15,
creation 107.23, 128.6, 165.3, 189.11, 137.5, productive 193.13
genesis 17.23–25, 18.5, 18.27, 19.5, Γοργίας, Gorgias (book title) 156.22,
19.18, 38.1, 39.4, 96.26, 105.24, 168.11, 168.18
142.19, 166.7, generation 19.12, γυμνάζειν, train 86.8
78.13, 188.20, 75.40, incarnation γυμναστική, athletics 138.11, gymnastics
175.24, origin 115.13, 164.28, 205.20 59.29
γενητός, created 110.3, generated 142.16, γυνή, wife 102.5, woman 9.20, 15.15,
that which comes to be/into being 63.25, 114.12, 132.28, 194.21
112.29, 142.31
γέννημα, creation 167.21, 179.10, δαιμόνιος, daemonic 41.13–14, 41.17,
generation 197.28, offspring 158.3 41.20, 78.7, 79.2, 86.6, 86.20, 91.1,
γεννητικός, generative 88.17, 134.21, 92.10, 113.2, 113.30, 114.17, 114.24,
165.21, procreative 134.29, 115.8, 147.9, 147.12, 148.19, 149.6,
productive 89.2, that which generates 166.22, 173.20
84.9, 88.5, 137.28 δαιμονίως, in a daemonic mode
γένος, category 194.8, class 11.15, 70.12, 126.2
92.18, 98.5, 114.20, 114.25, 125.24, δαίμων, daemon 41.25–6, 41.29, 65.20,
154.5, 162.4, 167.30, 191.20, 202.23, 86.11, 86.13, 94.15, 109.5, 114.26,
family 52.22, genre 186.12, genus 118.27, 122.5, 148.7, 148.10, 148.21,
51.6, 57.4, 77.2, 78.2, 78.7, 78.16, 166.16
82.20, 86.6, 88.10, 88.22, 88.27, 89.7, δάκρυον, tear 123.2, 123.21, 125.1, 127.30,
90.1, 91.12, 93.2, 93.28, 94.26, kind 128.6, 128.8, 128.13, 185.24
41.23, 43.4, 78.29, 154.8, 162.12, δακτυλικός, dactylic 62.18, 62.21
177.8, race 70.30, 125.1, 128.8, δάκτυλος, dactyl 61.5, 61.8–9, 62.13
128.10, 156.7, 164.15, 166.22, 185.11, Δάμων, Damon 42.27, 54.5, 56.9, 61.2,
186.1, type 96.21, 97.25, 104.1, 142.3, 61.8, 61.22, 62.15
149.4, 178.10, 180.3, 191.26, 195.13 δεσμός, binding 72.22, 82.4, 185.23, 193.12,
τὸ γ., birth 169.20 bond 57.15, 69.9, 82.14, 82.23,
αἴτιον γ., generative cause 138.8 140.21, 140.26, 142.14, 142.19,
γεώδης, earthly 121.17 142.22, 142.28, 142.31, 143.2, 143.14,
Γῆ, earth 121.21, 121.24, 122.3–4, 169.3, 143.16
Gaia 134.9, the element earth 193.7 δεύτερον, second 14.15, 27.7, 27.9, 28.6,
γήϊνος, earthy 119.12, 120.9 31.6, 32.4, 33.8, 33.15, 37.9, 41.5,
γιγαντικός, gigantic 51.11, 74.15, 104.3, 42.10, 49.13, 71.8, 129.10, 133.26,
186.2 149.21, 149.26, 161.15, 186.11,
Γίγας, Giant 90.8 187.24, secondarily 134.15, secondary
386
Greek Word Index
83.2, 88.12, 89.3, 91.8, 94.18, 106.7, διακλήρωσις, allotment 91.3, 156.28
107.23, 135.3, 136.11, 140.3, 165.22, διακόσμησις, arrangement 84.19, 136.31,
170.22, 199.20, secondly 6.4, 7.14, order 19.2, 78.12, 82.17, 88.21, 91.7,
9.17, 104.7, 181.2 92.23, 93.7, 94.13, 96.21, 97.20,
δευτέρως, in a secondary manner 184.3, 113.26, 114.26, 141.8
secondarily 102.8 διάκοσμος, order 133.19, 137.15
δημαγωγός, demagogue 202.26 διάκρισις, distinction 54.26, 82.16, 87.30,
δημηγορεῖν, address 69.5, 165.26 88.26, 89.20, 95.8, 133.26, 188.9,
δημηγορία, speech 106.25, 107.20, 165.13, 191.27, division 83.7, 89.8, 178.8
166.3 διακριτικός, that which generates
Δημήτηρ, Demeter 125.21 distinction 90.3, concerned with
δημιούργημα, creation 128.5, 141.19, 142.9, division 142.2
180.20, object of craftsmanship διαλάμπειν, shine out/forth 164.11,
126.27, thing created 82.11 192.8
δημιουργία, creation 75.20, 82.15, 134.8, διαλεκτικός, dialectic 160.13, 165.9
199.17, demiurgic activity 127.6, διάλογος, dialogue 5.6, 5.24, 6.4, 6.11,
165.6, activity of the demiurge 8.18–19, 8.25, 9.9, 156.14, 160.5,
175.16 170.1, 171.21, 189.23, 199.6,
δημιουργικός, by/of the demiurge 19.17, discussion 6.7
98.11, 116.29, demiurgic 90.11, 90.16, διανόημα, conception 174.20, 180.7,
98.4, 98.27, 107.5, 107.13, 107.28, thought 74.20, 171.12
134.20, 142.30, 156.27, 164.16, διάνοια, intelligence 158.3, 197.7, intention
164.19, 164.26, 165.17, 167.8, 193.10 115.28, meaning 66.20, 79.25,
δημιουργός, craftsman 189.20, 191.7–8, reasoning 201.19, 205.12, thought
200.26, 203.2, creator 42.20, 51.21, 49.22, 51.18, 59.11, 85.25, 110.7,
54.25, 90.9, 109.27, 200.6, demiurge 110.21, 118.26, 158.10, 163.16
16.22, 34.5, 69.4, 98.19, 99.1, 99.5, διαπορθμεύειν, relay 185.4
99.8, 101.5, 106.27, 107.19, 126.20, διαρθροῦν, divide 5.4
135.24, 137.1, 137.11, 138.17, 139.12, διάρθρωσις, spelling out 87.8
139.16, 141.27, 143.3, 143.12, 158.18, διάστασις, difference 93.10, dissension
165.8, 165.10, 166.4, 205.19, involved 87.22
in creation 134.10, maker 82.13 διαστατῶς, in a manner that is extended
Δημόδοκος, Demodocus 174.11, 174.21, 77.18
193.17, 193.26, 194.6, 194.9 διαστέλλειν, distinguish 28.12, 170.5
δημοκρατικός, democratic 13.27 διαστροφή, depravity 75.12, discord 47.10,
δῆμος, general public 11.28, public 12.7 disturbed condition 76.13
κατὰ δ., throughout the land 129.21 διάστροφον, τὸ, bad practice 43.21
δημοτικός, of the people 131.30 διαστρόφως, deviantly 75.25
διάθεσις, composition 72.8, 93.28, διατείνειν, contend 100.14, extend 94.19,
condition 30.19, 96.28, disposition 131.23, 146.24, 156.6, 164.16, 184.8,
97.12, 159.13, 160.10, 179.23, 186.28 187.3, maintain 7.10, 165.5, 201.19,
διαιρεῖν, allocate 97.20, 107.4, allot 97.6, say earnestly 60.26
distinguish 6.15, 14.27, 64.7, 64.17, διάφορος, different 13.17, 37.15, 38.10,
90.22, 107.18, divide 10.9, 15.20, 38.12, 87.2, 111.15, 112.11, 113.24,
33.12, 83.6, 84.24, 87.29, 89.22, 90.1, 122.6, 122.12, 193.4, that which
94.4, 96.20, 126.2, 128.5 differs 12.15, 54.1, 119.5
διαίρεσις, division 88.2, 88.12, 88.29, 92.18, διαφορότης, difference 119.23, 168.18,
93.1, 94.7, 98.5, 106.28, 141.29, distinction 96.23, variety 55.10
161.19, 161.25 διδασκαλία, teaching 70.12, 101.12,
διαιωνίως, eternally 113.18, 119.2, 157.3, 158.27, 159.15, 160.19,
139.30 177.14, tradition 200.13
387
Greek Word Index
διευκρινεῖν, subject to thorough scrutiny teaching 5.22, 71.4, 72.6, 110.17,

51.26 131.29, 154.19, 160.12, 186.26,
διηγηματικῶς, in narrative 16.5 204.12, 204.12
διῃρημένως, in a fragmentary way δόξα, belief 74.6, case 7.8, impression 64.9,
174.25 opinion 12.10, 22.11, 22.16, 51.23,
δίκαιος, correct 190.10, just 7.12, 7.29, 79.30, 80.17, 110.12, 116.15, 127.4,
24.26, 55.9, 75.25, 161.1, 200.17 164.1, 179.16, 188.13, 188.26, 191.29,
τὸ δ., the just 21.11, 102.30, justice 194.20, 195.11, 200.25, 201.1, 205.11,
23.28, 199.27 reputation 173.10
δικαιοσύνη, justice 7.9, 7.14, 7.18, 7.26–7, δόξασμα, opinion 73.4, 181.9
8.2, 8.5, 8.9, 10.14–15, 10.22, 10.24, δοξαστικός, opinion-like 21.31
11.8, 11.13, 11.21, 11.26, 12.1–4, δοξαστικῶς, on the level of opinion 105.7
12.6, 12.11, 12.19, 12.24, 12.28, 13.6, δόσις, dispensation 105.5, 125.10, gift
13.8, 13.10, 13.12, 13.14, 13.19–20, 78.24, 99.24, 180.19, 181.8, 182.19,
14.1–2, 14.5–6, 14.8, 14.12, 17.16, giving 98.17, 144.5, 181.23
20.10, 20.19, 20.26, 21.1–6, 21.17, δουλοῦν, enslave 23.7
23.3, 23.9, 23.12, 23.16, 23.19, 23.23, δρᾶμα, drama 15.13, dramatic
23.26, 24.4–5, 24.7, 24.11, 24.23, event 168.17
26.8, 26.10, 26.12, 26.17, 26.29, 27.3, δραματικός, dramatic 14.20
187.18, 17.18 δραστήριος, effective 39.13, 83.23, 88.23
δικαίως, justly 11.27, 76.14, 105.21 δυαδικός, dyadic 134.22
δικαιωτήριον, place of judgment 117.24, δυάς, dyad 88.30, 93.5, 98.30, 99.1, 134.15
121.24, 157.5, 168.21, 169.4, place of δύναμις, capacity 29.9, 29.15, 30.23, 31.11,
punishment 168.15 193.9, force 64.6, potential 56.3,
δίκη, justice 45.24, 66.5, 72.18, 96.25, 98.7, potentiality 75.13, power 22.8, 22.22,
98.11, 99.8, 101.25, 101.29, 102.3, 24.3, 28.4, 28.8–9, 29.13, 29.18,
102.7, 102.18, 102.22, 102.29–30, 34.4–7, 34.15, 34.17, 38.25, 39.14,
103.1, 103.7, 103.13, 105.13, 105.27, 41.11, 53.4, 56.15, 64.25, 65.23,
106.2, 106.9, 107.22, 107.27–8, 116.5, 68.10, 72.15, 74.14, 76.10, 76.23,
130.9, 136.13, 148.24, 151.8, 151.20, 77.24, 78.8, 82.23, 83.1, 83.18, 85.24,
153.17, penalty 103.15, 151.3, 174.2 86.22, 88.6, 88.13, 88.24, 89.16,
ἐν δ., justifiably 190.23 89.24, 90.12, 91.9, 92.18, 92.23,
κατὰ δ., just 94.18, by justice 98.14 94.11, 95.11, 95.19, 96.22, 97.2,
διοικίζειν, banish 159.20, separate 43.3 106.27, 110.1, 112.17, 112.19, 113.23,
Διονυσιακός, Dionysian 94.6, 175.3, of 127.18, 133.15, 134.26, 134.29, 137.5,
Dionysus 85.9 137.9, 138.2–3, 138.5, 138.10, 139.7,
Διόνυσος, Dionysus 90.8, 175.1 139.12, 141.9, 142.2, 142.11, 143.8,
διορατικός, that which discriminates 148.5, 148.15, 148.22, 148.29, 165.21,
properly 21.23, that which has clarity 166.6–7, 167.10, 167.19, 167.23,
22.23 168.1, 177.24, 178.3, 179.15, 182.5,
διορθωτικῶς, in a correctional way 204.2 183.3, 183.7–9, 183.16, 183.20,
διορίζειν, define 57.7, 60.14, 66.22, 183.22, 188.16, 188.19
191.9, distinguish 29.13, 56.29, εἰς δ., as possible 27.23, 71.25
60.10, 62.24, 64.16, 64.29, 88.11, κατὰ δ., as far as possible 51.5
125.9, 170.18, 172.30, 192.6, specify ναυτικὴ δ., fleet 130.20
197.17 δυναμοῦν, empower 22.17, 68.12
διχονοεῖν, discord 20.14, 21.10 δύνασθαι, amount to 199.14, be able 7.16,
διχόνοια, discord 20.19, 21.14, 23.20, 24.1 20.13, 21.11, 36.16, 39.20, 40.2,
δόγμα, doctrine 6.25, 23.30, 33.9, 83.14, 45.11, 55.10, 59.23, 72.29, 77.1,
84.30, 95.30, 158.16, 163.18, 172.7, 77.11, 79.19, 83.9, 89.17, 106.20,
opinion 20.5, 161.3, 163.25, 186.26, 116.15, 117.21, 119.16, 120.2, 120.12,
388
Greek Word Index
145.15, 148.3, 149.7, 153.2, 167.14, 110.5, 120.24–6, 160.15, 172.11,

167.18, 183.6, 188.26, 190.22, 198.23, 172.14, 172.19, 172.26, 176.26, 189.21,
199.21, 202.27, be capable 20.20, 193.6, 199.17
20.25–6, 21.2–3, 21.5, 22.5, 29.20, εἰδωλοποιΐα, creation of images 161.9
29.24, 30.24, 30.28, 36.18, 41.2, 45.8, εἰδωλοποιός, creating likenesses 158.29,
46.27, 64.11, 67.8, 81.16, 82.2, be maker/creator of images 70.30,
possible 87.22 201.14, 204.2
δυνάμενος, potential 22.15 εἰδωλουργική, image production 189.24
δυναστεύειν, hold power 21.21, possess εἰκασία, representation 179.18
authority 19.1 εἰκαστικός, realistic 179.30, 188.30, 189.4,
δυοειδής, bi-formed 96.20, 133.22 189.7, 189.25, 189.29, 190.3, 192.17,
δυσαποσπάστως, with difficulty wrenched representational 190.8, 190.13,
away 121.12 190.23, 190.25, 191.23, 193.3
δυσέκνιπτος, hard to remove/erase 50.9, εἰκαστικῶς, realistically 196.7
80.1 εἰκός, plausibility 84.3
Δώριος, Dorian 61.23, 61.25, 61.28, 62.17, ὡς τὸ ε., as is plausible 17.15
62.22, 64.1 εἰκότως, appropriately 47.22, 56.6, 124.3,
δωριστί, in the Dorian mode 62.3 127.26, 130.15, 176.4, as one would
expect 44.6, 195.23, plausibly 23.11,
ἐγκεντρίζειν, graft 39.22 24.23, 49.3, 53.26, 63.13, 135.17,
ἐγκόσμιος, encosmic 90.21, 106.19, 107.2, 138.28, 174.2, 188.24, reasonably
126.25, 127.16, 127.23, 134.7, 135.6, 27.5, 80.4, 84.10, 92.22, 109.14,
135.8, 135.29, 136.29, 137.13, 138.20, 132.4, 189.22, with good reason
142.1, 164.24, 165.15, 166.4 16.13, 182.16
ἐγκοσμίως, encosmically 141.24 εἰκών, icon 44.22, 77.14, image 33.1, 59.14,
ἑδράζειν, establish 88.23, 178.21 73.17, 77.21, 84.26, 86.17, 176.3
εἰδητικός, formal 38.4 εἱμαρμένη, fate 98.6, 98.10
Εἰδοθέα, Eidothea 113.1 εἶναι, exist 11.25, 20.10, 22.25, 23.13,
εἰδοποιεῖν, characterise 65.18 68.10, 134.17
εἶδος, appearance 141.13, form 10.17, τὸ ε., being 20.8, 23.17
12.18, 13.16, 16.13, 34.5, 37.28, εἰρήνη, peace 87.16, 142.7
38.12, 39.26, 48.14, 52.13, 54.10, εἰρηνικός, peaceful 61.25, 61.28
56.1, 57.4, 57.7, 58.27, 59.14, εἰρωνικός, ironic 60.27
59.17–19, 62.25, 63.24, 63.29, 64.20, ἐκβακχεύειν, rouse to Bacchic frenzy 56.27,
67.10, 67.26, 77.14, 105.5, 108.17, 180.14, 181.20
108.26, 112.16, 112.24, 112.29, 113.3, ἐκεῖ, [up] there [in the heavens/in the
113.9–10, 113.17, 113.27, 114.11, intelligible] 19.17, 82.24, 122.1,
124.9, 129.10, 141.7, 142.8, 159.11, 137.26, 138.7, 139.2, 177.21, in the
160.14, 160.17, 160.27, 162.9, 163.20, ideal state 160.8, 162.23, in that
168.8, 172.6, 175.19, 177.28, 178.6, passage 114.6, there 122.12, 133.8,
189.4, 189.6, 193.1, 195.24, formal 136.17, 167.6, 195.26, there among
type 12.16, genre 5.21, 6.4, 6.7, 14.16, the gods 35.2, in the underworld
14.19, 14.28, 15.19–20, 15.27, 16.24, 118.22, 168.14
image 162.17, kind 10.13, 42.1, 43.5, ἐκεῖθεν, from divinely inspired poetry which
46.9, 48.18, 55.9, 67.1, 79.26, 81.12, illuminates 180.25, 181.8, 185.5, from
88.26 Hades 153.29, from Homer/Homer’s
εἶ. ζωῆς, way of life 64.7 poetry 169.9, 169.28, 171.21, 172.27,
εἰδωλικός, imagistic 78.28, illusory 163.1 from its immediate cause 165.11,
εἰδωλικῶς, with images 77.21 from Mt Ida [symbol of the place of
εἴδωλον, apparition 118.8, 121.5, image forms and the intelligible] 138.1, from
70.26, 94.6, 108.22, 108.28, 109.6, the god 99.19, 101.9, from the golden
389
Greek Word Index
crater (symbol of the spring of souls) ἐμφανής, manifest 109.4, 153.27, 174.17,
152.27, from the intelligible spring 176.3, visible 36.6, 68.16, 73.21,
167.8, from the monad 90.28, from 152.14, 176.28, 180.20
these [higher causes] 89.15 ἐμφρόνως, intelligently 26.23, 26.25
ἔκθεσμος, unlawful 72.11 ἔμφρων, imbued with wisdom 187.26,
ἐκθέωσις, deification 120.17 intelligent 17.12, 46.10, 157.20,
ἐκμειλίττεσθαι, appease 146.21 158.21, 170.14, 188.24, 193.2,
ἑκούσιος, freely chosen 55.24, willing 33.11 thoughtful 76.3, 76.12
ἑκουσίως, willingly 35.8 ἕν, τὸ, the One 49.27, 94.21, 133.20
ἐκπλήττειν, astonish 179.21 ἐναντίωσις, disagreement 92.21, opposition
ἐκστατικός, ecstatic 61.27, moving to 69.3, 87.28, 88.22, 89.5, 89.14, 89.20,
ecstasy 84.20 90.17, 91.6, 93.4, 93.9, 94.30, 95.21,
ἐκτός, τὸ, that which is exterior 97.1, 98.19, 107.2, 141.6, 141.29, 142.10, 142.17,
that which is external 26.15, that 143.7
which lies outside 45.8 ἐνάργεια, vividness 163.22, 171.15
Ἕκτωρ, Hector 123.18, 143.27, 144.9, ἐναργής, clear 9.5, 9.15, 85.1, 147.6, 159.4,
147.15, 147.29, 149.19, 150.5, 150.17, 170.27, 197.2, self-evident 39.14, vivid
150.23, 151.11 7.19, 155.8, 164.6, 175.8–9, 183.12,
ἔκφανσις, presentation 171.7, revelation 191.18
75.18, 182.24 ἐναργῶς, vividly 189.1
ἐκφαντικός, that which reveals 79.1 ἐναρμόνιος, endowed with harmony 69.1,
ἔκφρων, out of one’s mind 184.20 harmonious 69.15, 121.20, 131.10
ἐλαττωτικός, far below 96.13 ἐνδείκνυσθαι, demonstrate 5.8, 56.3, 99.14,
Ἐλεάτης, Eleatic 189.5, 189.22 99.22, 112.17, 113.6, 124.28, 136.31,
Ἑλένη, Helen 153.24, 153.28, 173.14, 137.29, 149.6, 168.24, 198.19,
173.22, 173.27, 175.15, 175.17, indicate 61.9, 77.25, 79.18, 82.2,
176.13, 176.27 82.12, 82.27, 86.17, 93.14, 94.3,
ἐλεύθερος, free 15.15 114.1, 115.18, 127.14, 154.6, 157.7,
ἐλλάμπειν, illuminate 180.23–5, 181.2, 172.17
181.7, 181.22 ἔνδειξις, demonstration 72.9, 84.12, 84.28,
ἔλλαμψις, emanation 105.4, illumination 170.27, 186.7
75.9, 89.16, 178.15, 180.29, 181.6, πρὸς ἔ., in order to demonstrate 135.30
185.5 ἐνδιδόναι, bestow 101.9, 106.28, give 51.18,
Ἕλλην, Greek 83.27, 91.18, 116.2, Hellene 75.22, 100.16, 134.25, give into 21.31
130.18, 131.15, 131.31, 145.20, ἐνεικονίζεσθαι, represent 39.14
146.21 ἑνεῖναι, be present in 20.22, 21.17
Ἑλληνικός, Greek 62.4, 116.4, Hellenic ἕνεκα, about 164.19, by 10.23, for 97.18,
145.23 195.27, 205.19, for the sake of 7.15,
ἐμβριθής, weighted down 121.17 7.21, 7.23, 38.3, 39.20, 51.23, 98.25,
ἐμμελής, in tune 121.20 in 65.7, on account of 130.5
ἐμμελῶς, in a manner that is harmonious ἕνεκά του, from 8.23
50.21 οὗ ἕ., reason for 8.0, 7.28, 208.0
ἔμμετρος, in metre 179.8 ἐνέργεια, action 35.13, 102.26, 103.28,
ἐμμέτρως, in a manner that is well-balanced 104.11, 104.16, 106.2, 147.24, 181.7,
49.15 activity 29.13, 29.19, 30.23, 31.24,
ἐμπαθής, filled with passion 75.15, 36.16, 38.23, 41.9, 50.25, 52.9, 56.16,
impassioned 44.8, 105.24 65.24, 67.29, 81.4, 82.24, 86.12,
ἐμπαθῶς, in the grip of passion 105.9 97.11, 98.19, 102.23, 103.23, 105.19,
ἐμπίπτειν, be incidental 7.24, 13.21 106.22, 119.25, 125.12, 127.23, 128.4,
ἐμποδιστικός, that which is an 135.4, 136.1, 136.3, 139.16, 141.17,
obstacle 98.18 143.6, 167.25, 175.13, 177.27, 178.10,
390
Greek Word Index
178.28, 180.24, 180.27, 181.12, ἐνταῦθα, (down) here [in the sensible realm]
181.24, 193.17, 201.24, 205.18, 32.31, 38.17, 52.12, 82.26, 95.3,
performance 174.21 120.1, 143.14, 175.5, here 6.14,
ἐνέργημα, action 151.18, activity 102.28, 117.12, 138.8, 187.21, 200.4, on these
105.18, 121.7, 181.1 occasions 97.9, there 157.17
ἐνθεάζειν, be inspired 58.3, 89.29, 171.13, ἔνυλος, depending on matter 72.17, 124.10,
178.28, be under divine inspiration enmattered 36.9, 73.9, 75.6, 78.9,
194.4 78.30, 82.30, 89.21, 90.13, 92.1,
ἐνθεαστικός, divinely inspired 133.6, 185.1, 92.10, 93.11, 94.11, 94.22, 96.23,
inspired 58.28, 76.26, 79.12, 79.23, material 73.19, 116.28, 119.11,
81.30, 84.6, 174.16, 179.3, 185.11, 119.17, 176.25
194.6 ἐνύλως, in a material manner 77.18,
ἐνθεαστικῶς, in a divinely inspired way materially 116.23, 117.4
102.1, with/by divine inspiration ἕνωσις, unification 81.10, 82.14, 82.25,
166.12, 183.30 86.10, 88.12, 90.10, 134.19, 135.4,
ἔνθεος, divinely inspired 157.25, 177.25, 136.8, 136.22, 139.24, 139.28, 142.1,
182.22, inspired 57.16, 57.25, 58.1–2, 178.13, 184.29, 193.13, union 137.7,
60.8, 84.15, 93.27, 110.7, 120.6, unity 65.24, 89.8, 96.11, 133.29, 162.8
120.23, 132.1, 156.5, 157.3, 170.26, ἐξαιρεῖν, deprive 174.19, exempt 196.21,
180.7, 180.11, 180.23, 181.26, 182.5, 197.15, remove 195.21, set aside
182.10, 182.26, 183.23, 183.25, 90.16
184.16, 184.20, 184.26, 185.18, ἐξαιρεῖσθαι, transcend 86.20, 171.26
186.17, 192.12, 193.19, 194.9, 197.12, ἐξῃρημένος, exempted 177.11, separate/
198.20, 202.6 separated 135.27, 138.21, 172.1, that
ἐνθέως, with divine inspiration 112.2 which transcends 91.10, 94.11, 135.6,
ἐνθουσιάζειν, be divinely inspired 159.1, 155.9, transcendent 72.20, 77.28,
192.9, 193.14, 201.23, be inspired 78.31, 93.1, 135.14, 136.15, 160.16,
57.18, 183.26 165.19, 167.5
ἐνθουσιασμός, divine inspiration 182.27, ἐξάπτειν, attach 98.4, 162.20, 165.7, 172.19,
188.13 commit 146.26, make depend 91.22,
ἐνθουσιαστικὸς, divinely inspired 195.14, 105.12, 188.19, 194.11
202.1 έξαρτᾶσθαι, be attached 119.16, 137.29,
ἑνιαῖος, unitary 134.21, 177.20 172.10, be suspended 183.26, depend
ἑνιαίως, in a unified manner 167.12 39.15, 88.4, 89.18, 91.13, 94.1,
ἐνιδρύειν, establish 48.5, 70.25, 75.2, 107.27, 167.9, 183.20
178.12, settle 81.19 ἐξήγησις, interpretation 5.11, 89.29, 132.12
ἐνίζειν, unify 137.19, 139.24 ἐξηγητής, expounder 71.16, 72.5,
ἑνικός, unified 135.15 interpreter 5.12, 86.5, 115.14, 133.29
ἑνικῶς, unitarily 183.27 ἐξῃρημένως, in a manner that is transcendent
ἔννοια, concept 44.21, conception 23.14, 90.26, transcendentally 102.8
23.22, 44.23, 87.5, intention 151.5, ἕξις, character 76.27, 122.12, condition
151.20, meaning 64.24, 85.21, notion 50.8, 75.5, 84.7, 97.10, disposition
66.21 11.25, 21.19, 21.27, 22.7, 22.13,
ἑνοειδής, uniform 72.27, 162.27, 167.5, 22.25, 23.10, 23.12, 23.23, 28.19,
177.22 52.1, 67.7, 75.13, 76.15, 80.12, 81.20,
ἑνοειδῶς, in a manner that is uni-formed 82.7, 101.14, 102.27, 103.3, 104.4,
89.11, in a uni-form manner 89.22 105.29, 117.14, 163.1, 174.5, 179.5,
ἐνοικίζειν, settle 119.6 186.9, 187.8, 188.10, 188.15, 188.25,
ἐνόπλιος, enoplios 61.4, 62.10 192.8
ἑνοποιός, that which unifies 88.4, 90.3, ἐξισάζειν, be coextensive 29.28
unifying 134.30, 178.20 ἐξουσία, authority 9.12, power 65.8
391
Greek Word Index
κατ᾽ ἐ., as far as possible 160.29 ἐπιστήμων, conveying rational knowledge

ἐπαγωγόν, τὸ, allure 50.5 193.8, expert 203.29, having
ἐπεκδιδάσκειν, explain 71.27 knowledge 70.10, 161.2, 188.11,
ἐπεκδιηγεῖσθαι, explain 5.27 204.13, imbued with rational
ἐπίβλεψις, conception 70.5 knowledge 188.25, knowing 179.5,
ἐπιβολή, apprehension 73.1, 74.27, 81.3, 186.22
81.30, 113.19, conception 70.25, 87.9, ἐπιστρεπτικός, concerned with reversion
110.17, 115.28, understanding 182.20 59.5, 136.24, 165.16, reverting to its
ἐπιγραφή, title 8.11, 8.16, 8.22, 9.3, 9.7, source 106.22, that which enables
9.10–11, 9.16, 14.5, 14.10 reversion 135.3
ἐπιδεικνύναι, demonstrate 6.26, 72.8, ἐπιστρέφειν, pay attention 145.10, revert
111.15, 133.17, 172.2, 180.4, 192.5, 19.14, 167.4, 177.25, turn 136.21,
196.24, 202.22, display 179.25, 190.6, 147.27, 188.17, turn back 19.20,
produce 63.9, reveal 184.12, show 106.20, 107.13, 107.21, 166.2, 176.12
69.26, 70.26, 155.9 ἐπιστροφή, reversion 88.13, 140.2, 166.4,
ἐπιθολοῦν, dirty 119.11 turning back 134.22, 181.25
ἐπιθυμία, desire 11.20, 129.11, 129.29, ἐπιτήδειος, suitable 53.24, 56.2, suited
143.29 102.25
ἐπίκηρος, perishable 128.1 ἐπιτηδειότης, capacity 53.2, disposition
ἐπικουρικός, auxiliary 11.17, 12.8 52.24, 181.18, propensity 77.6,
ἐπικουρικῶς, as an auxiliary 11.23 suitability 53.20, 105.10
ἐπίκουρος, auxiliary 11.20, 130.6 ἐπιτήδευμα, activity 47.12, business 49.1,
ἐπίνοια, concept 92.28 endeavour 49.10, habit 15.17, 162.20,
ἐπίπλαστος, fictive 162.29 practice 10.27, 43.21, pursuit 48.17,
ἐπίπνοια, inspiration 47.22, 48.9, 86.14, 50.2, 58.10
131.22, 181.11, 184.7, 185.2, 185.29 ἐπιφάνεια, epiphany 37.13, 110.24, 114.3
ἐπιπροσθεῖν, be an obstacle 97.11 ἐπιφοίτησις, epiphany 36.4, visitation
ἐπισκιάζειν, overshadow 181.11 114.17
ἐπιστασία, authority 92.9, 156.2, care ἑπόμενος, coming after 31.2, coming next
98.22, 161.27, 165.7, oversight 36.1, following 5.9, 18.18, 56.20,
165.25 78.21, 94.14, 114.20, 125.23, 129.12,
ἐπίστασις, criticism 87.14, 101.10, 132.13, 130.20, 146.8, 166.9, 166.27, 170.26,
143.18, 154.15, objection 71.20, in accordance with 127.28
109.12, 130.2, 143.22, objectionable ἑπομένως, being subordinate 66.19,
point 96.10, 126.9 following 49.20, following on 60.15,
ἐπιστήμη, expertise 130.14, knowledge following upon 17.1, 184.13, in a way
22.1, 22.12, 22.15, 22.17, 42.17, 53.2, that follows 77.19
70.4, 70.27, 71.13, 82.4, 128.21, ἐποχετεύειν, conduct 152.27
147.1, 154.22, 155.3, 157.16, 159.3, ἐπῳδή, charm 161.30, magic charm 200.20
159.22, 159.27, 160.23, 163.18, ἐραστής, lover 132.22, 140.10, 153.27
164.11, 174.26, 177.26, 188.14, ἔργον, action 14.29, 16.1, 45.9, 167.26,
rational knowledge 154.7, 187.22, 180.13, 181.18, 181.21, deed 25.12,
188.23, 188.27, 191.27, 192.14, 45.10, 46.13, 58.4, 66.13, 179.7,
195.11, 197.13, 198.21, 200.27, 201.1, 180.16, 181.30, 194.16, 194.25,
201.6, 202.16, 205.10, science 60.2, function 23.5, 24.28, 25.6, 25.11,
80.9 25.15–16, 25.19, 25.21, 25.23, 25.25,
ἐπιστημονικός, concerned with rational 26.1, 26.3–4, 26.30, 27.2–3, 27.6,
knowledge 191.28, informative 158.6, 50.16, 58.6, 201.18, main task 10.25,
scientific 10.14 role 54.10, task 25.26, 146.2, 188.23,
ἐπιστημόνως, with rational knowledge work 37.12, 83.17, 178.17, 189.14,
196.8 191.7, 193.3, 203.21
392
Greek Word Index
ἑρμηνεία, interpretation 179.9 εὐδαιμονία, happiness 26.13–14, 27.1,

Ἑρμῆς, Hermes 69.4, 69.6, 95.12, 113.29 131.8, 131.30, 144.7
ἔρως, desire 132.10, 132.20, 133.14, 135.1, εὐδαίμων, fortunate 132.6, happy 19.10,
136.21, 136.24, 139.22, 140.10, love 24.26, 26.18
176.22–3, 176.25, lust 185.23 εὐζωΐα, living well 26.13, well-being 10.11
ἐρωτικός, dedicated to desire 108.23, εὐθύπορος, straightforward 8.9
dominated by desire 108.20, erotic εὐκίνητος, agile 61.12, easily moved 61.15,
57.10, 59.2, 59.4, 59.7, 59.16, 108.26, 181.29
108.29, 109.1, governed by desire εὐκρίνεια, clear delineation 15.1
108.11 εὐλογία, eloquence 56.11, 56.13
ἔσχατος, extreme 14.1, 14.3, 103.18, 125.7, εὔλυτος, effortless 82.28
final 21.21, 52.8, 92.13, 151.23, εὐμετρία, proportion 179.11
furthest 165.23, last 25.12, 77.3, 78.6, εὐπάθεια, comfort 127.19, delight 166.17
84.8, 114.20, 125.23, 138.1, 149.8, εὐπαθής, receptive 181.15
176.25, 178.10, 191.30, 192.22, last εὐπραγία, good deed 32.7–9, 32.12
grade 23.19, last rank 93.8, last stage εὐπρέπεια, propriety 84.4
38.2, limit 122.13, lowest 21.27, εὐρυπρόσωπος, straightforward 8.9
48.19, 78.29, 176.29, 178.28, 196.2, εὐτύπωτος, easily taking an impression
196.11, 196.17, 199.12, most remote 181.8
120.7, worst 104.12 Εὐφροσύνη, Euphrosynê 18.15
ἐσχάτως, finally 102.12, in lowest mode εὐφροσύνη, enjoyment 87.19, 87.23, 132.1,
184.5, last 185.6 good cheer 129.21, 131.16
ἑτερόμηκες, τὸ, that which is of unequal ἐφέλκεσθαι, be dragged 119.18
length 97.22 ἐφήκειν, come to 139.26, 183.9
ἑτερότης, difference 88.25, 97.25 ἐφιστάναι, establish 56.6
εὖ, good 194.6 ἔφορος, guardian 92.12, 108.8, 108.17,
εὖ ἀπεργάζεσθαι, accomplish 25.15 oversee 127.1, 131.22, ruling 19.18
εὖ διοικούμενος, well-ordered 76.1
εὖ ἔχειν, be fine 118.15, have worth ζάλη, storm 18.1
185.25 Ζεύς, Zeus 18.19, 68.25, 69.6, 90.8, 90.24,
εὖ λέγειν, speak well 183.3, 93.16, 93.19, 93.22, 94.15, 96.14,
203.26 98.27, 100.24, 102.3, 102.7, 102.10,
εὖ μάλα, very well 7.8 103.12, 105.11, 106.11, 106.16,
εὖ μιμεῖσθαι, give a good imitation 80.5 106.19, 106.24, 107.9, 107.15, 108.11,
εὖ οἰκουμένη, well-ordered 11.14 115.5, 115.11, 115.13, 115.16,
εὖ πάσχειν, receive benefit 130.13 115.25–6, 115.29, 117.9, 125.6, 131.3,
εὖ πεφυκώς, with a proper natural 132.8, 132.10, 132.15, 132.26,
aptitude 80.10, with a suitable nature 133.10–11, 134.11–13, 134.15,
179.13 134.27, 134.30, 135.7, 135.11, 136.18,
εὖ ποιεῖν, write well 203.19 136.20, 136.27, 137.4, 138.29, 139.22,
εὖ ποιῆσαι, benefit 36.18, do good 130.12 140.7, 140.10, 141.25, 146.27, 147.2,
εὖ πολιτευόμενος, properly turned into a 147.26, 150.10, 157.1, 164.26, 165.7,
citizen 45.25 165.19, 166.15, 166.27–8, 173.23,
εὖ τραφεῖς, brought up properly 45.23 188.6, 188.18, 193.13, 193.21
εὖ φρονῶν, right-minded 179.10 Ζέφυρος, Zephyrus 152.13
ἔχειν τὸ εὖ, be done well 26.5 ζηλωτέος, to be emulated 157.19
τὸ εὖ, (being) well 46.6 ζηλωτής, emulator 163.12, 163.17, follower
τὸ εὖ ζεῖν, living well 26.6, 26.9–11, 71.24, 155.4, one who is keen 46.28,
26.15, 26.17 one who strives 67.16
εὐαγῶς, in a manner that is lawful 73.29 ζήτημα, enquiry 7.11, 8.8, 9.1, 12.11, object
εὐδαιμονεῖν, τὸ, happiness 26.12, 26.16 of enquiry 13.21, 149.14, topic 7.23
393
Greek Word Index
ζήτησις, enquiry 7.28, 13.12, 14.6, 38.29, ζ. ὀρεκτικὴ καὶ φανταστικὴ ζ., appetitive
40.5, 54.8, 68.4, 100.21, investigation and illusory life 121.23
42.8, 65.16, research 5.16, search ζ. πολιτική, political life 16.15, 67.27,
7.18, 85.19, 86.3 civic life 187.3
ζητητικός, investigative 15.21, 15.23 ζ. σοφιστική, sophistic life 17.19
ζυγία [sc., Hera] ‘patroness of marriage’ ζ. φιλόσοφος, philosophical life 204.4
139.14 ζ. χωριστή, transcendent life 152.11
ζωή, life 8.4, 16.10, 17.5, 17.25, 18.2, ζώνη, girdle 137.24
19.7, 22.2, 22.4, 24.10, 35.14, 48.5, ζῳογόνος, zoogonic 137.27
52.8, 52.20, 55.23, 73.10, 75.16, ζῷον, animal 6.27, 11.9, 11.11, 36.3,
80.26, 88.24, 94.4, 97.17, 100.12, 114.19, 128.7, creature 143.13, living
103.17, 114.26, 117.26, 118.9, 119.24, being 52.16, 52.18, living thing 38.18,
120.5, 121.13, 125.26, 128.23, 129.29, 166.7
135.21, 136.5, 136.7, 137.14, 138.18, ζωστήρ, girdle 137.26
144.20, 149.12, 155.3, 155.12, 159.26, ζωτικός, lifelike 46.9, vital 21.21, 21.29,
160.15, 162.17, 162.27, 163.22, 22.23, 95.13
174.23, 177.15, 177.22–3, 187.7,
192.13, life-experience 53.10, lifestyle Ἥβη, Hebe 120.16, 172.16
50.6, 51.24, vital act 95.15, way of life ἡγεμονικός, leading 112.27
15.11, 16.1, 21.16, 45.12, 47.28, τὸ ἡ., leading part 153.7
49.29, 51.11, 52.28, 53.4, 62.17, 64.8, ἡγεμών, founder 78.15, guide 84.29,
76.28, 158.24, 161.11, 181.12 154.12, 159.27, leader 80.26, 91.13,
εῖδος ζ., form of life 38.12, 48.14, 63.24, 91.20, 91.24, 94.2, 94.27, 128.18,
64.20, 67.26, 105.5, 124.9, 159.11, 158.14, 158.16, 161.11, 175.1, 187.23,
160.27, 175.19, 178.6, 193.1 196.5, 203.13, 204.24
ζωαὶ πολυειδεῖς, multiform lives 178.9 ὑφ᾽ ἡγεμόνι, under the leadership 166.14
ζ. ἄδικος, unjust life 105.5, 106.9 ἥδειν, please 47.2, 67.20, pleasure 47.8
ζ. ἄθεος, atheistic lifestyle 51.13, godless ἡδυσμένος, pleasurable 67.16, 204.16
life 103.25 τὸ ἡδόμενον, experience of pleasure 47.2
ζ. ἄλογος, irrational way of life 194.27 ἡδονή, pleasure 50.4, 67.13, 121.13, 123.16,
ζ. ἀνδρική, courageous way of life 46.5 123.26, 124.6, 124.12, 129.11, 129.28,
ζ. ἀρίστη καὶ τελεωτάτη, best and most 131.15, 132.3, 132.6, 160.3, 190.4,
perfect life 177.18 190.9, 190.15, 190.24, 191.20, 191.25,
ζ. ἀρίστη, best way of life 162.4 204.17
ζ. διττή, double life 135.30 ἠθικός, at the ethical level 12.27, moral
ζ. ἐνθεαστική, divinely inspired life 81.14, representing character 55.12
174.16 τὸ ἠ., matter of character 53.27, moral
ἡ ἔνθεος ζ., the divinely possessed life character 66.4
177.26 ἦθος, character 19.14, 46.12, 46.18, 46.20,
ἡ ἐνταῦθα ζ., the life down here 120.1 46.29, 50.4, 53.20, 53.24, 53.29,
ζ. ἔφρων, prudent life 17.12 60.20, 61.6, 79.21, 83.25, 85.16,
ζ. ἡρωϊκή, heroic life 154.5 86.22, 109.26, 135.26, 160.11, 160.24,
ζ. θεραπευτική, therapeutic life 16.16 161.8, 161.29, 163.21, 171.15, 180.26,
ζ. θνητοειδής, mortal form of life 75.7 186.27, 190.22, 201.30, character trait
ζ. κρείττων, a greater life 152.27 59.24, ethical character 48.16, moral
ζ. λογική, rational life 38.18 character 46.8, 48.11, 49.21, 59.21,
ἡ μετὰ σώματος ζ., the life in company 61.2, 61.16, 64.10, 64.17, 64.20,
with the body 120.11 65.12, 66.17, 76.29, 80.28, 81.7,
ζ. μεταβατική, discursive life 35.25 162.15, moral habit 53.14, trait 44.11
ζ. νοηρά, intellective way of life 139.5, ἡλιακός, solar 34.4, 122.15, 147.27, 152.18
intellective life 175.13 ἥλιος, Helios 125.3, 142.13, sun 192.22
394
Greek Word Index
ἡνωμένος, unified 89.7, 92.14, 134.1, 70.30, 71.18, 72.18, 73.2, 73.17, 73.29,
162.25, 177.18, united 135.9 74.11, 76.20, 77.11, 77.22, 77.25, 78.17,
ἡνωμένως, in a united way 107.20, in unity 78.26, 79.3, 81.6, 81.10, 81.15, 81.19,
99.16 82.12, 82.19, 83.13, 83.18, 83.29, 84.2,
Ἦρ, Er 15.27, 169.20 84.6, 84.12, 84.16, 84.26, 84.28, 88.9,
Ἥρα, Hera 91.26, 95.3, 108.11, 108.19, 89.7, 89.18, 89.28, 90.1, 92.23, 93.2,
132.8–9, 132.16, 132.20, 133.10, 93.30, 96.1, 96.11, 98.13, 101.25,
133.15, 134.11, 134.13, 134.27, 135.7, 103.13, 104.22, 109.2, 109.13, 110.16,
135.13, 136.8, 136.16–17, 136.20, 111.14, 112.15, 113.2, 114.2, 114.23,
136.27, 137.2, 138.28, 139.8, 139.15, 115.3, 115.7, 115.24, 117.1, 117.6,
139.23, 140.8, 193.13 120.26, 123.4, 128.6, 128.23, 131.21,
Ἥραιος, of Hera 137.23 132.11, 133.19, 134.5, 134.25, 134.30,
Ἡράκλειος, Heraclean 183.13 137.15, 138.22, 146.18, 147.9, 148.22,
Ἡρακλῆς, Heracles 120.12, 120.17, 149.10, 152.16, 154.20, 155.19, 155.25,
154.1, 172.13, 172.18 155.27–8, 156.6, 157.12, 158.9, 158.21,
ἠρεμαῖος, quiescent 61.17 159.2, 159.15, 164.15, 165.13, 166.23,
ἡρωϊκός, having to do with the heroes 167.6, 168.5, 170.6, 170.22, 176.11,
44.27, heroic 44.10, 51.6, 124.22, 176.24, 178.11, 178.19, 178.22, 178.25,
145.28, 154.5 179.2, 180.22, 180.25, 180.27, 181.6,
ἡρῷος, heroic [metre] 61.7, 61.9, 62.13 181.10–11, 181.26–7, 182.2, 182.9,
ἥρως, hero 44.7, 44.13, 45.1, 45.3, 45.11, 182.11, 182.19, 182.22, 183.3, 183.6,
51.9–10, 66.9–10, 116.1, 122.22–3, 183.27, 184.7, 184.12, 184.23, 184.27,
122.27–8, 123.5, 124.2, 143.19, 185.11, 185.20, 185.30, 186.1, 186.3,
144.15, 146.7, 146.18, 149.5, 150.1, 186.18, 194.10, 194.12, 195.16, 198.14,
153.27, 156.10, 156.21, 163.24, 198.29, 199.19, 201.9, 201.23, 201.25,
192.28 202.1, 203.16, 204.8, 204.10
Ἡσίοδος, Hesiod 72.2, 77.8, 157.9, 157.20 τὸ θ., divinity 48.27, 71.13, 80.5, 82.8,
Ἥφαιστος, Hephaestus 82.3, 82.10, 91.26, 104.3, 105.17, 123.16, 146.7, 146.10,
92.5, 92.10, 95.16, 126.6, 126.16, 147.5, 148.18, 167.30, 181.15, 188.10,
126.18, 126.20, 126.24, 127.5, 127.11, god 48.4, 66.8
127.14, 137.1, 140.20, 140.26–7, θείως, in a divine way 126.1
141.5, 141.22–3, 142.13–14, 142.22, Θέμις, Themis 106.12, 106.17, 107.14–15,
142.28, 143.5, 143.10, 143.14, 193.12 107.18, 107.25
Ἡφαιστότευκτος, built by Hephaestus θέμις, fitting 42.6, lawful 40.16, 86.3,
136.30, crafted by Hephaestus 142.9 100.11, 107.28–9, 202.14, right 45.24,
132.5
Θάμυρις, Thamyris 194.29 Θέογνις, Theognis 186.30, 187.2, 187.11,
θάνατος, death 55.5, 118.17, 122.29 187.22
θέα, sight 176.28, spectacle 87.19, vision θεόθεν, from the divine 37.30, from the
59.14 god(s) 37.5, 37.25, 38.27, 116.6,
θεά, goddess 123.9, 125.21, 132.28, 150.9, 186.20, 194.11, result of the gods 37.6
153.16 θεολογία, divine depiction 85.15, theology
θέαμα, object of contemplation 82.9, 115.7
spectacle 73.7, vision 19.9, 39.6, θεολογικός, theological 27.8–9, 41.5, 140.6
80.28, 83.24, 112.16, 121.9 θεολόγος, theologian 18.12, 71.19, 83.28,
θεῖος, divine 9.21–2, 18.26, 33.9, 33.16, 87.1, 89.26, 126.21
33.22, 33.26, 34.17, 35.4, 35.13, 35.22, θεομαχία, battle of the gods 87.12, 95.27,
36.29–30, 37.1, 37.6–7, 37.15, 37.28, conflict among the gods 87.1,
39.3, 39.13, 39.19, 41.13, 41.20, 42.8–9, Theomachy 96.11, 149.4
44.24, 48.2, 48.9, 48.18, 51.6, 57.12, θεομυθία, divine myth 45.5, 109.8, 156.29,
59.1, 63.13, 69.13, 70.2, 70.12, 70.20, divine lore 90.14
395
Greek Word Index
θεοπαράδοτος, bestowed by the gods 111.1 147.11, 147.22, 147.27, 148.10,

θεοπρεπής, worthy of the gods 70.5 148.27, 148.29, 149.9, 149.23, 151.9,
θεός, deity 175.2, divinity 71.15, god 8.3, 152.18, 153.10, 153.15, 154.4, 156.28,
9.20, 17.7, 19.18, 27.11, 27.13–15, 158.17, 164.25, 164.29–30, 165.2,
27.20, 27.23, 27.27, 28.1, 28.4, 28.6, 165.15, 165.18, 165.24, 165.29, 166.4,
28.11, 28.17, 28.21, 28.24, 28.26, 166.14–15, 166.27, 166.30, 167.2,
28.28, 29.6, 31.1, 31.4, 31.6–7, 31.10, 167.9, 167.12–14, 167.17–18, 170.11,
32.3, 32.9, 32.16–18, 32.20–1, 172.15, 172.25, 174.12, 174.20,
32.30–1, 33.5, 33.24, 33.28, 34.1, 176.22, 177.16, 177.20, 178.26,
35.14, 35.19, 36.2, 36.5, 36.10, 36.19, 182.24, 185.15, 185.28–9, 188.16,
36.21, 36.24–5, 36.28, 37.10, 37.13, 188.19, 188.22, 192.11, 193.17–18,
37.18, 39.1–2, 39.5, 39.14, 39.23, 193.20, 194.16, 198.12
39.28, 41.1, 41.7, 41.27–8, 42.10, ἡ θ., goddess 15.4, 17.10, 18.13, 106.2,
44.6, 44.14–15, 45.6, 45.14, 45.16, 108.1, 108.3, 108.6, 112.5, 114.7,
45.18, 45.20, 45.28, 48.6, 49.26, 51.9, 132.21, 133.13, 137.17, 138.3, 138.5,
52.11, 65.20, 68.24, 69.3, 69.5, 69.17, 138.16, 139.2
70.25, 70.27, 72.3, 72.20, 72.24, 73.5, θεότης, divinity 116.9, 138.12, 139.4,
73.8, 73.12, 73.20, 73.23, 73.29, 74.6, 193.13
75.2, 75.7, 75.10, 75.14, 77.2, 77.29, θεουργός, theurgist 37.12, 39.18, 91.25,
78.4, 78.19–21, 79.1, 80.10, 80.30, 128.20, 152.10
82.1, 82.3, 82.27, 83.8, 83.18, 86.5–6, Θεόφραστος, Theophrastus 8.15
86.10, 87.5, 87.10, 87.15, 87.18, θεραπεία, care 152.15, 153.4, service 74.13,
87.20, 87.25, 89.4, 89.11, 89.27, 78.21, 151.23, treatment 105.29,
89.30, 90.15, 90.17, 90.19, 90.22, worship 48.4
91.12, 91.22, 92.13, 93.7, 93.12, θεραπευτική, therapeutic 16.16
93.25, 94.1, 94.15, 94.26, 95.1, 96.2, Θερσίτης, Thersites 46.4
96.5, 96.7, 96.9, 96.13, 96.19, 96.21, θέσις, convention 170.19, establishing
98.5, 99.18, 99.25, 99.27, 99.29, 170.15, postulation 121.8, (metrical)
100.6, 100.15, 100.20, 100.26, 100.28, thesis 62.22
101.4, 101.20, 101.22, 102.21, 102.24, θεσμός, custom 79.13, divine law 44.9, law
103.20, 104.6, 105.10, 105.13, 105.20, 74.9, 153.12, precept 83.28, rite
106.1–2, 106.11, 106.16–17, 106.19, 78.14, 85.7, 128.18
106.25, 106.27, 107.1, 107.12, 107.15, Θεσσαλός, Thessalian man 150.14
107.20, 108.8, 108.15, 109.9, 109.17, Θέτις, Thetis 109.20, 123.14, 125.6
110.24, 110.26, 111.16, 111.19–20, Θετταλικός, Thessalian 150.12
112.1, 112.9, 112.25–6, 114.10, θεωρεῖν, consider 6.9, 71.7, 85.23, 87.9,
114.20, 115.2, 116.8, 116.16, 116.24, 100.22, 122.25, 129.13, 171.24, 177.8,
116.26, 117.3, 117.7, 117.10–11, 178.7, 186.23, 192.7, 198.26,
117.13, 118.7, 120.14–15, 122.8, contemplate 13.19, 108.25, 113.22,
122.13, 122.22, 122.24, 122.28, 117.14, 152.8, observe 19.22, 179.4,
123.13, 123.17–18, 124.24, 124.27, see 16.23, 92.28
125.19, 125.24, 126.2, 126.4–5, 126.7, θεωρῆσαι, contemplation 10.24
126.10, 126.14, 126.18, 126.22, τὸ θεωρεῖν, contemplation 26.31
127.6–7, 127.10, 127.12, 127.17, θεώρημα, reasoning 29.4
127.22, 127.26, 127.30, 128.4, 128.10, θεωρητικός, contemplative 13.5, 67.27,
128.15, 129.4, 132.19, 133.26, 133.29, 81.4
134.3, 134.8, 134.17, 134.19, 134.21, θεωρία, account 165.10, 170.2, 170.18,
135.5, 135.9, 135.20–1, 135.31, 137.4, contemplation 13.5, 16.10, 16.16,
137.7–8, 137.23, 138.7, 138.24, 140.1, 16.19, 17.21, 73.16, 74.24, 80.10,
140.12, 141.4, 142.3, 143.11, 146.13, 80.23, 80.30, 82.2, 82.20, 95.29,
146.15, 146.20–21, 146.24–5, 147.1, 101.19, 126.12, 140.11, 154.2, 158.20,
396
Greek Word Index
164.17, 166.20, 167.2, 175.7, 176.4, ἴδιος, distinctive 25.23, 52.27, individual
176.25, 198.18, contemplative 161.20, own 139.27, 181.12, privately
meaning 133.7, doctrine 185.26, owned 9.29
186.6, enquiry 6.21, 6.24, 155.1, ἰδίᾳ, for/of individuals 200.13, 200.19,
199.10, intellectual vision 164.9, privately 200.8
interpretation 153.26, investigation τὸ ἴ., distinctive feature 22.9, 23.3, 27.1,
196.12, meaning 72.7, 73.22, 79.4, proper task 13.5
85.8, 86.1, 106.13, theoretical ἰδιότης, characteristic 18.27, 91.13, 108.16,
consideration 56.10, understanding 111.19, 139.24, 167.12, 167.30,
78.6, vision 134.3, 159.19, 172.7 idiosyncrasy 65.14, own character
θεωρός, envoy 71.13 107.8, 178.23, 181.1, particularity
θῆλυς, female 97.25 125.15, property 78.3, 83.20, 139.9,
θής, labourer 11.20 separate operation 127.9
Θησεύς, Theseus 153.23 ἰδίως, individually 147.29
θητικός, labouring 11.17 ἱδρύειν, establish 79.17, 184.26, make sit
θητικῶς, in the manner of a labourer 11.22 123.16
θνητοειδής, mortal 75.7, 87.16, 119.8, 119.17 ἱδρυμένος, established 40.13, 74.18, 77.19,
θνητός, mortal 52.16, 52.18, 107.22, 83.4, 86.2, 90.19, 111.25, 134.24,
123.13, 124.7, 124.26, 125.24, 131.9, 135.22, 164.27
131.28, 143.13, 146.4, 205.19 ἱερατικός, hieratic 37.11, 48.5, 79.13, 83.17,
θ. τόπος, place of mortality 98.9 83.28, 84.25, 153.12
τὰ θ., mortal affairs 102.22, mortal ἱ. πραγματεία, working of theurgy
beings 38.21, mortal creatures 166.3, 110.22
mortal things 128.1, 164.15 ἱερός, consecrated 149.28, holy 128.10,
θοίνη, banquet 131.10, 166.17, 167.3 128.18, 149.26, sacred 125.2, 47.20,
θολοῦν, cloud 121.16 47.24, 48.27, 62.6, 74.9, 75.15, 78.14,
θορυβώδης, tumultuous 17.5 78.18, 125.4, 184.19, 115.31
τὸ θ., tumult 17.22 τὰ ἱ., rites 19.11, 19.18, 42.6
Θρᾴκιος, Thracian 18.11 ἱεροφάντης, hierophant 71.24
Θρᾷξ, Thracian 18.11 ἱερῶς, in a holy manner 19.11
Θρασύμαχος, Thrasymachus 24.27, 27.4, Ἰθάκη, Ithaca 194.12
110.11, 159.28, 7.13 ἴνδαλμα, trace 121.23
θρηνητικός, of lamentation 64.1 Ἴρις, Iris 150.22
θρηνοποιός, one who produces lamentation ἰσότης, equality 62.14, 62.20, 62.25, 88.27,
61.20 190.11
θυμός, anger 146.23, heart 132.29, 150.24, ἱστάμενος, established 138.29, establishing
150.27, thymos 11.17, 11.20 161.16
κατ᾽ αὐτὴν ἱ., working in this mode
ἰαστί, in the Ionian mode 62.3, 64.11 185.19
ἰατρική, medical art 47.8 ἱστορία, historical record 40.22, history
ἰατρός, doctor 55.3, 67.30, 68.7, physician 14.22, 156.16, 200.17, knowledge
104.4 169.9, narrative 150.3, record 15.8
Ἴδα, Ida 136.16, 136.18, 138.30 ἴχνος, footprint 5.9, trace 20.19, 20.26,
ἰδέα, class 79.11, form 32.17–18, 32.20, 23.19, 23.23, 23.26, 38.26, 74.22,
32.22, 32.25–8, 37.27, 76.22, 110.1, 163.20, 180.22
136.19, 160.20, 163.18, 171.17, 180.1, Ἴων, Ion (book title) 158.4, 163.15, 182.25
192.5, 194.28, kind 77.5, 87.4, 196.21,
quality 15.1 καθαίρειν, purify 85.5, 119.13, 120.13,
ίδιάζειν, act as an individual 125.18 152.16, 168.8
397
Greek Word Index
καθαρεύειν, be free from/of 33.17, 84.5, be 174.9, 174.18, 175.5, 175.7–8, 175.12,
pure 17.6, 17.24, 49.29, 73.1, 133.18, 175.16, 176.12, 176.28, 178.30, 192.2,
160.8, 160.21 198.7, 201.8, 201.13
καθαρμός, means of purification 173.12 καλός, beautiful 29.12, 44.25–6, 54.23,
καθαρότης, purity 88.18, 106.26, 138.7, 59.12, 59.16–17, 59.19, 66.4, 68.17,
152.28 72.10, 72.13, 98.1, 102.30, 108.27,
κάθαρσις, purification 74.26, 122.3, 168.9 108.29, 109.3, 110.1, 110.4, 151.14,
καθαρτικός, cathartic 13.2, purificatory 159.13, 159.17, 161.31, 179.7, 184.16,
122.7 189.15, 189.21, fine 184.22, 201.10,
καθαρτικῶς, so as to purify 124.5 204.23
καθηγεμών teacher (esp., of Syrianus) 71.3, τὸ κ., beauty 59.3, 59.8, 63.12, 174.5,
95.28, 115.27, 123.4, 133.5, 152.7, 192.9, 198.17, the Beautiful 73.26
153.3, 205.22 καλῶς, beautifully 44.24, 44.27, 45.4,
καθήκειν, be fitting 65.19, come to [reach] correctly 172.11, finely 184.24,
125.5, descend 164.25 successfully 200.7, well 61.13, 203.18
τὰ καθήκοντα, duties 192.13, obligations κανών, rule 6.3, 24.27, 25.7, 25.14, 26.2
19.19 καταδεέστερος, beneath 161.15, inferior
κάθοδος, descent 52.14, 85.9, 101.6, 165.4 34.19, 81.9, 82.21, 91.2, 94.3, 97.28,
καθολικός, universal 58.26, 60.4 98.23, 107.4, 173.20, lesser 83.6,
τὸ κ., universality 114.23 112.25, 134.25, 136.12, 178.3, 178.21,
καιρός, moment 40.24, 42.14, time 6.9, lower 88.17, 106.23, 135.8, 135.21,
16.27, 18.7, 19.23, 145.5, 200.11 136.24, 166.6
κακία, defectiveness 75.26, evil 24.14, κατακερματίζειν, fragment 52.3, 53.1
24.16, 99.3, 101.7, 159.26, 187.5, κατακοσμεῖν, adorn 137.26, 141.11, arrange
205.20, vice 24.14–15, 24.17–19, 186.29, put into order 142.16, 178.29
26.28, 68.19, 78.9, 203.16 κατακόσμησις, order 62.16
κακοζωΐα, bad living 120.3 καταλάμπειν, illuminate 139.4, shine 167.6
κακός, bad 38.10, 66.14, 98.1, 98.3, 98.8, κατανοεῖν, consider 104.8, 190.27, examine
98.16, 98.29, 188.9, evil 17.6, 24.9, 87.15, 163.19, observe 78.15, 89.5
24.13, 28.25, 28.27–29, 29.28–30, κατανόησις, considering 176.29,
30.7, 30.9, 30.11, 30.13, 30.15–18, understanding 159.6
30.21–3, 30.25–6, 30.29–30, 31.1–2, καταπλήττειν, astonish 86.7, 104.18, 122.9
31.8, 31.21, 32.16–17, 32.20–3, καταστηματικός, soothing 61.28
32.25–7, 32.30–31, 33.2–3, 33.7, κατατάσσειν, put in a rank 57.1, station
34.9–10, 34.12–13, 34.15, 37.4, 52.28
37.7–8, 37.25, 37.27, 38.4, 38.14, κατέρχεσθαι, descend 59.7, 101.8, 153.24,
38.22, 38.26, 38.29, 50.7, 51.25, go down 15.3
66.29, 96.2, 96.6, 96.9, 97.8, 97.10, κατηγορούμενον, predicate 28.31
97.14–15, 97.17, 97.22–3, 99.18, κατιέναι, descend 36.9
99.23, 99.29, 100.1, 100.6–8, 100.10, κατοκωχή, possession 56.26, 57.23, 62.8,
100.14, 100.26, 101.1, 101.4, 101.9, 70.29, 180.12, 180.28, 180.30, 181.7,
103.4, 103.16, 105.16, 117.16, 188.20 181.19, 183.13, 183.29, 184.14,
κακοποιός, making things bad 38.1 193.15
κακύνειν, damage 30.3, 30.6, make vicious κατορθοῦν, be successful 43.16, 43.20,
33.20 144.27, get right 52.6, (pass.) be in
κακῶς, badly 74.29, 75.23, 115.25 proper condition 22.24
Καλλικλής, Callicles 110.11, 156.24, 160.2 τὸ κ., success 120.18
καλλοποιός, producing beauty 141.28 κατόρθωσις, correction 148.6
κάλλος, beauty 28.15, 59.1, 59.12, 77.27, κάτοχος, possessed [by the Muses] 58.3,
87.19, 96.28, 108.22, 108.24, 109.2, 162.1, 180.22, 181.3, 181.14, 181.29,
109.4, 139.5, 141.19, 142.8, 153.26, 192.10, 198.29, 201.21, 204.10
398
Greek Word Index
κάτω, below 142.9, 146.5, down here κοσμεῖν, adorn 66.13, 137.9, arrange 94.16,
91.26, low 45.23, lower 49.2, 49.9 180.16, bring to order 13.1, order
τὰ κ., lower things 19.7, those below 11.25, 19.4, 19.8, 22.2, 47.13, 56.14,
189.17 57.12, 62.14, 66.5, 95.25, 166.16, put
κάτωθεν, from (here) below 40.28, 73.4, in order 11.27, 16.18, 167.22, 181.30
81.1 κοσμικός, cosmic 52.10, 52.15, 68.8, 68.16,
κεῖσθαι, be assumed 31.22, derive from 9.8, 69.3, 135.26
lie 108.29, 138.27, 190.1 κόσμος, adornment 132.9, cosmos 9.2,
κείσθω, let it be assumed 33.24 16.20, 37.30, 38.16, 57.14, 77.15,
κεστός, (magic) belt 139.1, 139.6, 139.10, 90.9, 96.18, 98.3, 101.20, 125.13,
139.17 127.7, 127.10, 135.12, 135.19, 136.7,
Κέφαλος, Kephalus 7.12, 15.7 138.31, 141.4, 141.7, 141.20, 142.6,
κηδεμονία, solicitude 94.28 143.4, 147.4, 164.15, 164.28, 166.14,
κηδεμών, one in charge of 94.22, protector 176.2, world 136.1
120.28 κατὰ κ., in order 193.23
κηρύττειν, decree 9.29, proclaim 152.23 Κούρητες, Curetes 138.13
κίνησις, exercise 42.14, impulse 181.12, Κουρητικός, of the Curetes 138.12
motion 50.20, 54.14, 68.20, 68.28, κρᾶσις, mixture 155.10
69.14, 78.10, 81.2, 82.26, 88.24, κρείττων, better 48.20, 48.23, 94.16, 98.23,
95.13, 97.23, 121.3, 121.21, 126.28, greater 96.26, 105.6, 117.16, 134.23,
180.21, movement 56.17, 152.15, 146.26, 149.4, 151.10, 152.27, 154.4,
180.26, 181.26, 185.1, 201.16 178.21, 178.23, 178.25, 181.29,
κ. αὐτόματος, self-moving motion 35.22 188.20, 191.27, mightier 73.6, more
κινητικός, moving able to move 84.15, powerful 116.7, 130.15, stronger 27.5,
106.23, 165.22 superior 26.31, 34.8, 34.20, 34.24–5,
τὸ κ., capacity to set in motion 51.4 35.2, 39.15, 74.13, 82.22, 84.16,
κλῆρος, that which is allotted 17.9, 92.16, 91.12
112.28, 161.25 οἰ κρείττονες, higher beings 51.14, 125.6,
κατὰ κ., by lot 10.9 greater beings 136.23
κληροῦν, allot 93.30 ἐπὶ κρεῖττον, for the better 35.7, 35.10,
κλύδων, flood 175.28 35.24
Κλυταιμνήστρα, Clytemnestra 194.19, τὸ κρεῖττον, that which is better 31.7,
194.26 48.23
κοινός, common 10.2, 23.14, 23.22, 32.13, Κρήτη, Crete 156.14
41.28, 52.20, 53.29, 81.17, 118.14, κριτής, competent reader 44.17, critic
135.13, 139.13, 181.18, 200.13, 204.4, 43.11, 65.2, 65.15, judge 108.19
general 33.9, 114.11, 117.22, in Κριτίας, [the Elder] Critias 65.4, 65.15,
common 9.29, 23.7, 161.26–7, Critias 171.10, Critias (book title)
167.29, 188.4, 204.15 199.8
τὸ κ., the public 130.16 κριτικός, as a judge 122.7
κοινωνία, being in common 71.4, common Κρονίδης, son of Cronus 102.11
property 9.19, commonality 10.11, Κρόνιος, of Cronus 82.4, 82.14
62.20, 88.25, 92.2, 162.27, Κρόνος, Cronus 82.15, 93.16, 134.9,
communion 133.30, 134.6, 134.23, 138.19, 138.25, 138.29, 139.4,
135.7, 137.5, 139.14, 141.29, 142.5, 165.8
dealings 36.3, union 137.17, 139.19 κρύφιος, hidden 79.22
κόλασις, correction 105.14, 106.6, κρυφίως, in a hidden manner 184.3
punishment 103.18, 118.21, 122.2, κυβερνᾶν, steer 99.2
168.8 κύκλος, cycle 135.25, 142.25, orbit
Κόρη, Kore 125.21 69.13
κορυφαῖος, leader 52.12 κύμινδις, name of a bird 170.8
399
Greek Word Index
κωμῳδία, comedy 14.20, 42.18, 49.14, 50.3, 108.18, 148.13, narrative 44.4, 114.9,
51.1, 51.29, 52.6, 53.6–7, 53.19, 130.2, (textual) passage 15.24, 129.7,
53.25, 201.17 (rational formative) principle 18.21,
18.28, 60.5, 142.30, proportion 62.23,
Λακεδαιμόνιος, Lacedaemonian 200.22 69.13, 161.18, proposition 198.25,
λειμών, meadow 161.31 rational justification 144.16, rational
λεκτικός, [of] style 43.15, 65.19, 66.19, principle 142.16, rationale 116.24,
163.12 reason (explanation) 117.19, 119.1,
λέξις, choice of words 66.19, discourse reason (faculty) 11.17, 11.19, 11.30,
14.19, expression 160.18, 163.20, 16.17, 17.12, 18.3, 21.11–12, 21.19,
style 164.8, 205.16, text 5.16 21.22–3, 21.26, 21.29, 22.3, 22.7,
λεπτουργία, detailed work 55.15 22.9, 22.15, 22.21, 23.5, 23.11, 24.15,
Λέσβος, Lesbos 174.28, 174.30 56.13, 77.25, 77.27, 158.18, reasoning
λῆμμα, assumption 32.1, premise 29.5 14.7, 99.17, remarks/comments 65.4,
λῆξις, allocation 85.4, 117.24, 122.1, reply 69.26, speech 45.13, 51.10, 55.9,
122.12, 158.19, 168.6, allotted sphere 55.11, 63.23, 101.26, 160.28, 163.24,
152.17, lot 157.13, place allotted 166.1, 176.17, 176.19, story 72.3,
157.7 84.10, 173.17, what is said 10.20,
Λητὼ, Leto 91.27, 95.12 10.28, 10.30, 101.17, 190.16,
λογικός, logical 27.18, 29.4, 38.17, rational word 12.24, 14.29, 15.8, 15.26, 16.1,
25.23, 38.18, 41.17, 95.3, 113.4, 45.10, 46.13, 48.1, 48.7, 63.29, 64.1,
114.25 64.14, 64.25, 65.1, 66.13, 66.16,
λόγιον, oracle 99.2, 178.19 77.21, 87.27, 110.11, 115.16, 131.5,
τὰ λ., [Chaldaean] Oracles (book title) 147.23, 148.4, 148.24, 162.16, 163.18,
27.27, 39.18, 40.21, 111.13 171.24, 179.7, 192.25, 200.2, writing
λογισμός, argument 167.28, reasoning 6.21, 160.12, 202.13
59.11, 110.7 λ. κοσμικός, cosmic logos 52.15
λόγος, account 5.10, 38.30, 41.28, 56.4, λ. νοεροί, intellective logoi 68.14,
60.1, 61.3, 61.8, 97.19, 101.11, 150.7, 162.22
173.27, 180.10, argument 6.20, 8.5, ὁ λόγος, conversation 171.5
10.17, 11.6, 20.4, 24.21, 24.25, 25.28, τῷ λόγῳ, verbally 44.12
31.9, 33.19, 33.30, 35.29, 37.5, 37.21, διὰ λόγων, verbal 92.20
46.29, 49.19, 70.18, 71.22, 79.24, κατὰ λ., rational 68.20
87.7, 99.24, 110.22, 118.15, 131.14, λοχεύειν, be in labour 95.6
155.5, 155.24, 159.22, 161.9, 167.16, λοχευτική, midwife 18.28
172.9, 196.20, 197.20, 204.21, Λύδιος, Lydian [mode] 64.2
dialogue 14.16, 161.31, discourse λυδιστί, in the Lydian mode 62.3
14.28, 15.19, 15.28, 16.24, 27.26, Λυκάων, Lycaon 104.13, 152.3
33.12, 63.25, 72.28, 74.10, 101.7, Λυκοῦργος, Lycurgus 200.22
140.15, 160.20, 166.25, 185.25, λύπη, grief 123.16, 123.22, 123.26, 124.6,
189.30, 197.13, 205.8, discussion 124.12, 204.18
5.14, 5.23, 6.4, 6.9, 6.13, 6.16, 7.13,
7.15, 7.20, 7.28, 8.28, 9.27, 11.10, μαινόμενος, raving 140.16, 166.20
12.12, 13.24, 14.18, 15.28, 16.8, ὁ μαινόμενος, one who is mad/madman
16.15, 17.17, 81.11, 81.26, 154.23, 57.28, 182.18
155.18, 168.26, 169.29, 173.7, 177.7, μάκαρ, blessed 87.20, 126.14
192.15, 197.16, 202.16, 203.11, μακάριος, blessed 157.15
203.28, 204.7, 205.1, logos 52.21, μανία, madness 57.26, 70.29, 84.16, 140.17,
62.20, 62.25, 64.3–4, 64.13, 64.21, 157.25, 168.5, 178.24, 179.1, 180.12,
65.29, 67.7, 73.6, 156.25, 160.7, 180.28, 181.2, 181.19, 182.16, 183.29,
177.27, 179.15, manner of speaking 185.3, 201.23
400
Greek Word Index
μαντεῖον, oracular shrine 40.7 παρὰ μ., in turn 113.18, at different times
μαντική, ἡ, prophecy 178.30 133.12
ἡ θεία μ., divine prophecy 182.22 μέσος, intermediary 101.21, 103.14, 139.4,
μαντικόν, τὸ, prophetic shrine 40.22 184.6, 184.26, intermediate 21.25,
μάχη, battle 142.10, 148.26, 149.3, 21.28, 22.26, 25.13, 48.2, middle 16.5,
conflict 22.13, 23.1, 89.30, 94.4 16.8, 16.11, 16.14, 94.19, 101.23,
μεγαλουργόν, τὸ, performance of great 177.24, 178.9, 179.4, 188.10, 188.25
deeds 124.22 ἐκ μ., from the centre of 147.4
μέθεξις, participating 195.9, participation ἐν μ., in the midst of 145.20, 154.23, in
105.6, 111.15, 111.24, 140.4, 184.7, the centre of 147.3, as an intermediary
184.10 185.3
μέθη, drinking 161.28, drunkenness 76.1, μεσότης, intermediary 38.19, intermediate
76.5, 76.8, 161.21, 195.27, 195.29 21.24
μέθοδος, method 5.11, 84.27, 115.8, 153.18, μετάβασις, change 13.18, 36.6–8, 113.11,
159.3, 164.22, 166.25, 189.24 transition 12.12, 13.15
μεμερισμένως, in a divided manner 90.12, μεταβατικός, discursive 35.24, 35.30,
135.17 differing 112.20
Μέντωρ, Mentor 113.29 μεταβατικῶς, in a manner that is ‘discursive’
Μένων, Meno (book title) 33.3 36.5
μερίζειν, divide 90.21, 93.12, 116.10, μεταβλητικός, such as to change 34.21
133.24, 135.9, 140.1, 147.10, 174.24 μεταβολή, change 13.24, 34.19, 35.7,
μερικός, at the level of the particular 138.17, 35.11–12, 35.22–3, 35.26, 35.30,
at the level of the parts 105.21, divided 41.15, 77.19, 110.4, 111.14, 112.11,
90.5, 92.3, 138.2, 147.22, 152.28, 112.14, 113.11, 113.23, 114.28, 156.1,
partial 36.8, 38.5, 38.7, 38.27, 105.23, transformation 109.8, 109.26, 114.18,
113.9, 114.18, 137.9, partial or 142.25
particular 52.14, particular 52.17, μετάδοσις, benefit 127.20, offer 165.23,
52.23, 58.26, particularised 52.9, share 89.13, 178.16, sharing out
90.29, 92.9, 148.4 127.25, 140.3
τὸ μ., division 114.24, particular μεταλαμβάνειν, participate 31.26, 88.20,
individual 95.2 111.20
μερικῶς, in a manner that is partial 91.14, μεταμπίσχεσθαι, take on 114.9
partially 126.2 μεταχείρησις, handling 171.13
μερίς, part 97.6, province 62.26 μεταχειρίζεσθαι, attempt 43.4, 195.3, engage
μερισμός, division 87.16, 92.13 in 76.14
μεριστός, divided 125.11, 161.26, 162.28, μετέχειν, have a share in/of, share in 9.23,
205.20, divisible 77.26, 82.30, 89.14, 22.17, 38.10, 40.17, 66.24, 80.27,
91.3, 91.8, 92.1, 162.25, 120.13, 141.22, 165.24, 187.22,
individualised 92.20, 94.9, partial 205.11, participate 28.20, 29.10,
70.25, 113.19, 165.2 29.12, 30.10–11, 39.20, 89.13, 89.21,
μεριστῶς, divisibly 117.15, in a divisible 105.7, 111.19–20, 111.23, 111.26,
manner 89.21, in a manner that 111.28, 112.7–8, 116.10, 116.26,
involves particularity 90.4, in a 135.1, 135.16, 136.21, 174.25, 178.20,
manner that is divided 77.16, in a 184.10, 185.6, take part in 19.22
partial way 174.24, in parts 117.5 μετουσία, participation 84.1, 86.8, share
μέρος, group 166.16, part 6.27, 11.11, 179.13
28.30, 52.4–5, 53.11, 90.11, 94.15, μέτοχος, that which participates 29.12, 34.9,
125.13, 174.27, 196.6, role 171.26, that which has a share 131.21
particular 43.25 μετρεῖν, measure 56.18, moderate 54.14
ἐν οὐδενὸς μέρει, of no worth μετριοπαθῶς, with moderate affection 105.9
144.30 μετριότης, moderation 61.18
401
Greek Word Index
μέτρον, bound 67.29, limitation 151.7, 197.25, 197.28, 198.1–2, 198.6,

measure 99.7, 111.18, 153.19, 178.25, 198.23, 198.26, 199.2, 199.5, 200.5,
metre 64.29, 178.29, 186.28 200.25, 201.5, 201.14, 203.20, 204.7,
κατὰ τὸ μ., in proportion 151.17 204.27, mimetic artist 203.2, one who
πέρα τοῦ μ., immoderately 176.12, imitates 15.18, 44.21, 61.2
beyond what is reasonable 202.20 μιμητής ἡγεμών, leader in mimêsis 158.16
μηδαμῶς, in no way 30.29, in no way at all μιμητικός, imitative 50.4, 57.2, 60.11, 84.13,
30.4, whatsoever 30.26 191.1, 198.5, mimetic 14.20, 44.1,
μήτηρ, Mother (of the gods) 137.8, 137.14, 66.23, 67.7, 160.20, 161.12, 162.4,
137.20, mother 134.13, 149.18 179.17, 188.28, 189.4, 189.6, 189.28,
μητρικός, maternal 133.28, 135.15 190.14, 190.23, 191.20, 194.19,
μικτός, mixed 14.24, 14.28, 15.19, 15.21–2, 195.19, 197.1, 197.6, 197.8,
15.27 197.18–19, 197.21, 198.14, 199.12,
μιμεῖσθαι, be an imitator 53.28, create a 201.27, of mimêsis 202.23
representation 189.12, imitate 5.12, μιμητά, τὰ, objects of imitation 49.23,
16.9, 19.4, 19.6, 44.7, 44.18, 45.8–9, imitations 60.12
45.11, 46.9, 46.23, 47.16, 47.18, μ. ἔθνος, race of imitators 45.7, 46.22
53.18, 53.22, 57.13, 63.24, 66.25, ἡ μ., imitation 48.11, 53.20, 196.12
66.29, 83.29, 94.14, 107.28, 138.18, τὸ μ., imitation 49.20, type of mimêsis
143.12, 152.10, 163.26, 166.6, 189.27, 190.2
191.2, 191.6, 191.16, 192.2, 192.25, μιμητικῶς, in an imitative manner
192.28, 196.8, 198.7, 199.14, 199.16, 60.11
199.21–2, 199.27, 200.26, 200.29, Μίνως, Minos (book title) 62.7, 156.9,
204.1, 205.11, 205.18, mimic 137.13, Minos 156.13, 156.15, 156.17, 157.2,
represent 44.3, 46.4, 48.2, 199.24, 168.26
201.8 μῖξις, combination 124.6, intercourse
μίμημα, copy 189.11, imitation 46.14, 185.23, union 135.11
46.16, 46.19, 49.24, 50.11, 68.16, μιξολυδιστί, in the Mixolydian mode 64.12
69.1, 77.15, 179.31, 189.26, 190.6, μνήμη, memorial 205.21, memory 16.11,
191.24, 198.15, 198.17, thing imitated 115.12, 152.8, 200.10, mention
195.12, 199.22 164.20, 168.20, 171.19, 194.8,
μίμησις, imitation 44.6, 44.18, 44.27, 46.2, reminder 190.3
46.7, 46.25, 47.17–18, 48.16, 49.21, ποιεῖσθαι μ., make mention of 180.5,
50.7, 50.29, 51.4, 53.14, 53.24, 67.24, speak of 205.3, write of 157.23
76.20, 162.16, 164.6, 171.15, 191.17, μνηστήρ, suitor 110.9, 110.18
202.20, mimêsis 14.26, 15.9, 15.13, μοῖρα, contribution 76.4, fate 96.27, part
63.1, 63.11, 63.27, 66.13, 66.17, 115.21, 171.27, 173.24, portion
66.21, 66.23, 66.26, 67.15, 123.20, 116.12, 124.20, 184.23, share 78.18
153.20, 154.6, 160.5, 160.22, 162.23, μοναδικός, monadic 134.20
163.1, 163.5, 163.28, 179.16, 179.32, μονάς, monad 90.23, 92.3, 93.4, 106.19,
190.18, 191.22, 192.16–17, 192.22, 134.14, 139.3, 164.19, 184.1, 184.4,
197.14, 197.23, 197.27, 198.3, 198.10, 185.7
199.6, 199.8, 199.14, 199.19, 201.17, μ. δημιουργική, demiurgic monad 90.16,
201.26, 203.6, 203.29, 204.10, 204.21, 98.4, 107.13, 156.27
205.7, mimetic activity 44.3, mimetic μ. ἐξῃρημένη, transcendent monad 165.19
practice 163.21, representation μ. του πέρατος, monad of Limit 88.4
145.30, 160.11, 160.23 μονίμως, in a stable manner 77.19,
κατὰ μ., on the basis of imitating 58.13 steadfastly 111.25
μιμητέον, one must imitate 15.14 μονοειδής, uni-form 111.23, 114.29, 160.6,
μιμητής, imitator 42.21, 44.5, 53.16, 67.12, 162.3, 180.27
67.18–19, 67.22, 76.21, 191.4, 192.1, μονοειδῶς, in a uni-form manner 184.2
402
Greek Word Index
μορφή, form 37.15, 39.17, 109.21, 110.27, μυθολογία, matters of myth 173.12,
110.29, 112.9, 112.19, 114.10, 114.19, mythical account 79.28, mythology
114.29, shape 40.2, 114.7 84.24, 132.11, 140.25
μορφωτικός, figurative 74.27, limited by μυθολογικός, concerned with myth 66.22,
form 121.3 myth-making 68.16
μορφωτικῶς, in form 111.22, in a manner τὸ μ., mythology 65.26
that involves shape 40.1, 40.4 μυθοπλάστης, creator/maker of myths
Μοῦσα, Muse 15.26, 43.10, 47.6, 47.20, 79.10, 85.23, 86.16, 89.5, 124.25,
47.24, 48.26, 56.25, 57.23, 57.26, 127.10, 134.2, 140.5, 176.5
58.3, 63.19, 70.29, 140.16, 156.8, μυθοποιΐα, myth-making 44.20, 72.2, 74.1,
159.1, 162.1, 174.19, 180.12, 180.18, 74.14, 77.13, 79.20, 80.17, 81.24,
181.3, 181.14, 181.19, 182.14, 183.13, 84.4, 85.13, 86.20, 186.11
183.24, 183.28–9, 184.25, 184.27, μυθοποιός, creator of myths 124.29
184.29–30, 185.12, 186.4, 192.10, μῦθος, myth 36.28, 44.9–10, 44.24, 65.25,
193.15, 193.19, 193.21, 194.29, 65.28, 67.7, 69.12, 69.17–18, 71.18,
195.4–5, 195.7, 199.1, 201.21, 203.5, 72.8, 73.13, 73.19, 73.24, 74.5, 74.11,
204.10, 204.17 74.16, 74.28–9, 75.16, 75.24, 76.12,
μουσηγέτης, Leader of the Muses, one who 76.25, 77.5, 77.7, 78.3, 78.25, 78.27,
leads the Muses 57.13, 79.2, 79.5, 79.9, 79.16, 79.26, 80.5,
193.19 80.15, 80.21, 80.27, 81.12, 82.19,
μουσική, art of the Muses 42.29, inspiration 82.22, 83.27, 85.22, 85.27, 86.11,
from the Muses 173.23, 174.3, 86.21, 87.4, 90.6, 90.27, 91.18, 92.23,
mousikê 43.1–2, 56.21–3, 57.3–4, 57.6, 96.1, 101.15, 106.13, 108.1, 108.4,
57.8–9, 57.16, 57.19–20, 57.22, 57.24, 108.15, 113.5, 113.27, 114.28, 117.22,
58.1, 58.27, 59.21, 60.8, 60.25, 63.18, 119.3, 125.15, 126.6, 126.11, 127.29,
63.20, 174.13, 174.23, 190.4, 133.6, 135.9, 135.18, 135.28, 136.15,
190.13–14, 190.17, 190.21, 194.11, 136.27, 137.6, 140.1, 140.22, 142.4,
music 43.3, 54.20, 54.22, 56.5, 59.28, 150.3, 156.24–5, 169.23, 171.13,
84.22, 131.18, 131.21, 132.2, 174.26, 173.27, 174.29, 175.2, 175.14, 175.17,
195.3, 195.5 176.10, 176.13, 185.30, 186.7, 194.3
μουσικός, inspired by the Muses 173.15, Μυρίνη, Myrinê 170.7
musical 54.7, 54.15, 56.29, 57.5, μυσταγωγία, mystagogy 74.22, mystical
57.29, musician 54.9, 54.17, 55.16, doctrine 111.2, mystical initiation
57.21, 59.2, 59.7, 59.15, 59.20, 60.23, 80.22
194.27, singer 194.9 μυστήρια, mysteries 75.6, 75.18, 76.10,
μουσικώτερος, a greater poet 173.3, closer 80.19, 83.22, 110.24, 125.4, 128.16
to the Muses 176.9 μύστης, initiate 83.24
ἡ μ., kind of mousikê 60.7 μυστικός, mystical 73.2, 78.22, 79.17, 79.22,
ὁ μ., musical expert 56.8 80.12, 80.30, 81.10, 81.21, 82.8,
μοχθηρία, wickedness 76.11, 104.26, 84.29, 87.5, 89.26, 171.12, 174.20,
105.28, 106.5, 106.8, 201.13 182.8, 182.13, 185.20, 192.10
μυθικός, mythic 73.30, 74.26, 81.28, 83.9, μυστικῶς, in a mystical manner 73.17,
83.12, 87.27, 114.6, 121.27, 185.21 125.4
μυθικώτερον, more in the manner of a myth
153.25 νεαροπρεπής, juvenile 80.12, 80.24, natural
μυθικῶς, in a mythic manner 81.24 for youth 76.29
μυθοειδῶς, in a mythic manner 15.10 νέκυια, Nekuia 156.11, 168.3, 168.28,
μυθολογεῖν, construct myths 33.5, speak in 169.18, 169.21, 172.12
the manner of myth 99.9 νέος, (the) young 47.12, 51.22, 60.16, 60.30,
μυθολογεῖσθαι, to be said in the myths 62.10, 84.2, 85.14, 101.14, 101.18,
174.22 107.20, 117.14, 117.20, 123.24, 127.7,
403
Greek Word Index
132.17, 140.15, 140.23, 143.12, 159.8, νοῦς, inclination 107.10, intellect 18.29,
160.18, 182.7, 186.8, young person 19.8, 19.20, 28.15, 38.7, 60.5, 68.24,
44.16, 47.3, 49.25, 51.3, 51.10, 54.11, 72.28, 73.7, 73.10, 74.26, 77.1, 79.17,
66.15, 77.8, 79.8, 79.14, 79.20, 79.29, 80.26, 81.3, 83.15, 85.23, 98.27,
80.6, 81.20, 81.26, 82.5, 83.7, 83.11, 99.11, 105.2, 107.29, 108.23, 111.20,
83.25, 84.14, 84.25, 140.13, 146.1, 113.2, 113.8–9, 116.9, 118.8, 120.24,
youth 50.1, 160.8, 186.15 120.26, 121.2, 121.6, 126.27, 135.31,
Νέστωρ, Nestor 110.20, 145.15 154.7, 159.27, 162.21, 174.8, 176.27,
νοεῖν, conceive 93.2, consider 90.14, 99.8, 177.19, 177.26, 186.23, 199.16,
178.8, 200.28 201.19, 201.25, intention 102.11, plan
τὸ νοούμενον, object of intellection 113.12, 103.26
object of thought 177.29 ν. ἀγγελικός, angelic intellect 112.27
νοερός, intellective 18.22, 68.14, 81.7, ν. δημιουργικός, demiurgic intellect
82.19, 98.30, 99.10, 105.7, 111.21, 107.6, 165.17, 167.8
114.24, 116.10, 121.8, 134.29, 139.5, ν. ἡλιακός, Solar Intellect 34.4
162.22, 165.24, 165.27, 170.9, 172.3, ν. κοσμικός, cosmic intellect 135.26
172.6, 174.19, 175.6, 175.13, 175.19, ν. πολιτικός, governing intellect 68.15
178.1, 179.5, 179.11, intellectual κατὰ ν., in accordance with reason 130.9,
37.28, 57.14, 63.12, 70.5, 73.10, 75.9, intellectually 68.17, in accordance
82.15, 93.28, 94.20, 158.6, 161.6, with intellect 70.14, 71.13, 136.5,
intelligible 39.26 conforming to intellect 95.9,
νοερῶς, in an intellectual manner 95.10, according to intellect 98.20
intellectively 19.14, 105.7, 117.5, νύμφαι, nymphs 125.29
intellectually 11.24 Ξάνθος, Xanthus 91.27, 95.17, 146.15,
νόημα, conception 66.8, 73.20, 80.30, 148.25, 149.10, 170.7
185.20, 186.24, 192.11, thought 65.8, ξένος, a stranger 112.8, foreign 19.12
65.11 ὁ Ἀθηναῖος ξ., the Athenian Stranger
νόησις, act of intelligence/intellect 35.25, 75.29, 98.13, 100.13, 101.24, 101.30,
73.3, 79.23, intellection 19.9, 112.21, 105.16, 167.15, 167.28, 185.8, 186.30,
113.3, 113.11, 136.11–12, 168.2, 189.1, 190.3, 195.26
174.7, thought 70.26 ὁ Ἐλεάτης ξ., the Eleatic Stranger 189.5,
νοητός, intelligible 59.14, 60.6, 77.14, 189.22
77.17, 108.22, 134.16, 135.31, 136.13,
136.19, 136.23, 137.12, 162.9, 164.19, Ὀδυσσεύς, Odysseus 110.20, 129.17, 131.5,
164.21, 166.14, 167.3, 167.7, 178.1 171.2, 171.4, 172.12, 199.24
νομοθέτης, Lawgiver 58.24, 76.6, lawgiver οἰκεῖος, appropriate 15.16, 17.15, 19.11,
80.7, 81.29, 100.18, 123.28, 144.18, 19.14, 25.10, 25.15–16, 26.4, 26.6,
146.2, 159.10, 159.25, 161.6, 161.16, 34.5, 35.11, 35.27, 44.21, 52.28,
170.14, 200.18 55.13, 63.24, 83.21, 84.23, 90.23,
Νόμοι, Laws (book title) 8.15, 9.18, 9.22, 94.19, 94.23, 113.2, 152.16, 153.8,
10.5, 10.8, 11.4, 11.30, 14.9, 28.3, 186.29, at home 163.2, belonging
35.21, 41.10, 46.6, 64.27, 67.17, 17.12, 23.5, 72.29, 88.14, 89.1,
155.25, 156.16, 161.18, 185.9 101.21, 127.19, 147.5, 195.5,
νόμος, custom/law 11.4, 18.11, 41.4, 42.7, characteristic 30.2, 30.5, fitting 12.28,
45.24, 47.3, 66.5, 156.20, 200.7 intrinsic 34.3, 75.27, one’s own 25.8,
ν. θεῖος, divine law 72.18, 98.13, 101.26, 34.3, 75.13, 82.28, 84.30, 88.8,
103.14 112.23, 140.3, 144.14, 167.4, 175.13,
πολέμου νόμῷ, by the law of war 177.22, 181.1, 196.1, proper 34.7,
153.18 34.16, 43.23, 99.10
νόσος, disease 38.11, 97.16, illness οἱ οἰ., family (members) 123.2, 123.5,
30.14–15, 101.1 124.18, 151.6
404
Greek Word Index
οἰκειότης, familiarity 166.22, relationship ὅλως, generally 22.14, 22.24, 38.5, 47.20,
79.7, 92.19 62.14, 82.7, 200.3, in general 123.22,
οἰκειοῦσθαι, consider as one’s own 158.25 142.11, 153.2, 156.20, 160.6, 160.25,
οἰκείως, appropriately 15.11, 148.7, in 170.25, simply 44.28, universally
keeping with 66.26, suited to 138.12 31.16, wholly 150.2, 158.29
οἰκονομία, arrangement 171.1, 171.16 Ὁμηρικός, Homer’s 163.21, 171.1, 172.23,
οἰστικός, productive 88.7 Homeric 72.7, 79.5, 80.4, 95.31,
ὀλιγαρχικός, oligarchic 13.27 99.17, 117.22, 118.26, 119.1, 120.23,
ὁλικός, at the level of the whole 105.20, 154.3, 156.29, 159.19, 164.23, 166.25,
holistic 52.23, of a universal nature 171.10, 171.14, 171.17, 172.7, 196.2,
114.11, universal 52.8, 90.4, 91.17, of Homer 90.14, 98.27, 110.17,
92.14, 94.30, 95.1, 147.13 115.28, 172.21
ὁλικῶς, in a universal manner 137.9 Ὅμηρος, Homer 14.24, 69.21, 69.25, 70.6,
ὁλκός, attraction 60.3, channel 85.19, that 70.13, 70.18, 71.5, 71.9, 71.11, 72.2,
which draws 183.16 72.22, 73.23, 74.1, 77.7, 79.19, 81.23,
ὅλος, as a whole 53.3, 53.7, 72.18, 106.27, 87.5, 87.10, 87.12, 95.26, 96.4, 96.10,
178.20, 195.28, complete 153.17, 100.16–17, 101.12, 102.1, 106.16,
entire 37.11, 74.22, 134.28, 141.8, 109.15, 110.7, 110.21, 114.28, 117.11,
180.24, general 78.17, in general 56.4, 121.25, 129.1, 129.8, 130.1, 133.17,
168.15, the whole of 157.18, 187.2, 140.7, 140.12, 142.28, 143.18, 145.17,
187.23, 196.16, universal 48.5, 77.1, 145.30, 146.18, 153.21, 154.12,
78.12, 78.27, 82.15, 84.18, 92.7, 154.14, 154.18, 154.22, 155.19,
94.12, 95.17, 107.19, 107.27, 137.26, 155.21, 156.4, 156.10, 156.15, 156.17,
138.28, 139.10, 143.3, 151.8, 166.10, 156.21, 156.30, 157.3, 157.9, 157.20,
whole 5.22, 6.24, 22.28, 23.2, 27.17, 157.24, 158.9, 158.13, 158.27, 159.7,
51.25, 57.14, 106.10, 106.12, 130.8, 161.7, 161.10, 163.2, 163.11, 163.15,
158.24, 159.27, 162.27, 171.21, 163.17, 163.23, 164.13, 164.24, 165.6,
174.26, 180.30, 196.13, 199.13, whole 166.8–9, 166.26, 167.10, 167.29,
class of 135.27 168.4, 168.10, 168.24, 168.28, 169.2,
αἱ ὅλαι ποιήσεις, the whole process of 169.5, 169.21, 169.27, 170.4, 170.17,
creation 142.14 170.25, 170.28, 171.18, 173.2, 173.9,
οἱ ὅ., the entirety of 127.17, the whole 173.13, 173.15, 173.19, 174.4, 174.21,
community 130.22 175.3, 176.8, 176.11, 176.15, 176.26,
τὸ ὅ., a being that is universal 92.7, a 177.2, 177.11, 182.26, 182.29, 183.3,
being that is whole 102.14, a universal 183.9, 184.23, 184.28, 192.4, 192.6,
114.2, 117.15, a whole 75.21, that 195.13, 195.21, 196.5, 196.15, 196.18,
which is universal 38.2, 38.7, 43.25, 196.21, 198.8, 198.11, 199.11, 199.15,
52.14, 77.10, 88.2, 88.6, 90.1, 90.26, 200.2, 200.5, 200.8, 200.13, 200.16,
92.30, 127.21, 164.22, that which is 201.18, 201.24, 201.26, 202.5, 202.8,
whole 52.10, 52.13, the whole 68.18, 202.10, 203.5, 203.14, 204.6, 204.19,
the whole substance 198.10 204.23, 204.29, 205.13
τὰ ὅ., all of [the booty] 144.29, the ὄμμα, eye 39.10, 129.16, 173.14, 174.10,
universe 128.3, 134.14, 135.23, 175.4, 175.15
164.17, 165.14, 165.27, 167.12, ὁμοιότης, likeness 138.30, 177.17, similarity
193.11, the whole 16.19, 133.20, 50.25, 84.5, 88.26, 164.10, 170.20,
161.19, universals 138.21 170.24
ὡς τὸ ὅλον εἰπεῖν, generally speaking ὁμοιοῦν, assimilate 47.1, 63.13, make like
177.15 34.25
ὁλότης, wholeness 90.11 ὁμοίωσις, likeness 46.9,
Ὀλύμπιος, Olympian 147.26 190.1
Ὄλυμπος, Olympus 62.7, 87.18 ὁμολογία, concord 95.22
405
Greek Word Index
κατὰ μίαν ὁ., according to one consistent 48.10, 65.7, 65.9, 65.13, 72.11, 72.28,
arrangement 11.12 73.25, 74.3, 97.18, 166.21, 179.21
ὁμόνοια, state of likemindedness 187.6 ὀνόματα, terminology 84.5
ὁμοούσιος, similar in substance 35.18 ὄντως, genuinely 42.28, 41.26, 58.8, 62.1,
ὁμοπολεῖν, move things together 75.14, 79.6, 88.10, really 28.12,
57.15 28.14–17, 29.14, 77.12, 104.1, 108.5,
ὁμόφρων, like-minded 131.19 truly 19.16, 52.29, 108.23, 130.7,
ὁμοφυής, in one nature 133.30, in a shared 157.11, 157.15, 161.24, 162.12,
nature 134.23, of a common origin 163.16, 172.5, 174.7, 177.1
88.25 ὀξύρροπος, quick to change 61.16
ὄν, τὸ, being 77.2, 88.21, what really exists ὀπαδός, attendant 78.20, 153.6, one who
192.19, 203.22 serves 91.20
τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν, being and non-being ὀπισθοβαρής, weighed down by the past
8.26 119.17
τῷ ὄντι, genuinely 21.28, 54.15, 58.25, ὀργανικός, instrumental 49.4
really 28.11, 28.20, 28.26, 29.6–8, ὄργανον, instrument 45.28, 62.2, 63.5,
29.11–12, 29.14, 31.10, 32.6, 63.20, 79.17, 119.7, 119.25, 120.19, 121.20,
truly 9.22, 203.24 130.21, 171.29, 172.1, 172.5, 172.10,
τὰ ὄντα, being 79.1, 81.7, 154.8, 178.12, 172.19, tool 171.25
beings 87.29, 88.30, 90.3, 94.21, ὀρεκτικός, appetitive 121.22
existent things 25.12, 37.26, 38.23, τὸ ὀ., the desiring part 23.11, 25.27, the
88.9, 96.20–1, 97.20, 97.28, 101.23, part that desires 51.25
162.25, 167.11, 186.22, existents Ὀρέστης, Orestes 58.18
39.28, really existent things 101.17, ὀρθοδοξάζειν, have correct opinion 192.1,
203.24, the really existent 198.12, 198.6
198.21, 199.2, the things that are ὀρθοδοξαστικός, concerned with correct
71.16, 88.23, 93.9, the things that opinion 191.28
exist 162.10, the things that truly exist ὀρθός, correct 12.5, 14.7, 21.24, 31.5, 42.5,
160.19, 179.6, the truly existent 43.18, 43.21, 47.15, 51.2, 54.11,
154.23, 158.1, 158.25, true realities 63.27, 73.6, 76.3, 81.6, 84.25, 162.6,
13.6, truly existent things 159.6, 187.24, 188.13, 191.29, 192.8, 194.19,
160.7, 170.23, 204.14, what really 195.11, 200.25, 201.2, 205.11, direct
exists 179.26, what truly exists 168.2, 123.25, right 22.16, 80.6, 188.26,
176.6 well-functioning 45.23, well-ordered
τὰ ἀεὶ ὄντα, things that always exist 70.12 131.16
τὰ ὄντως ὄντα, the things that are really ὀρθῶς, correctly 5.4, 26.26, 27.26, 29.13,
existent 77.12, the things that 40.26, 70.8, 79.5, 79.15, 98.26,
genuinely exist/are 79.6, 88.10, the 196.27, rightly 54.16
things which truly exist 177.1 ὁρίζειν, define 13.2, 30.1, 54.29, 78.15,
τὰ φαινομένως ὄντα, beings that exist in the 197.27, stipulate 55.19
visible mode 77.20 ὁριστικός, of definition 189.24
πάντα τὰ ὄντα, all beings 77.10, all that is ὁρμᾶν, hasten 19.23, have an impetus 23.16,
72.14, everything 72.19 impel oneself 21.16
ὀνειρωκτικός, (of a) dream 121.9 ὁρμᾶσθαι, be set in motion 73.4, 193.18,
ὄνομα, language 44.8, 44.15, 44.22, 44.26, start out 167.15
45.5, 45.19, 47.19, 76.19, 84.11, name ὁρμή, charge 148.28, impulse 80.25
14.11, 18.11, 18.13, 62.12, 63.8, ὅρος, boundary 98.12, definition 30.1,
91.15, 91.20, 92.2, 94.10, 118.13, 64.28, 103.17, 144.6, limit 72.26,
118.18, 133.24, 155.27, 170.1–2, 89.1, 99.10, rule 68.1, 188.22,
170.6, 170.18, 170.21, 171.16, term standard 159.14, 160.15, term 30.20,
66.1, 172.23, title 14.8, word 45.22, 31.27
406
Greek Word Index
Ὀρφεύς, Orpheus 72.4, 94.5, 102.12, 50.22, 51.4, 51.23, 59.24, 78.30,
138.15, 157.8, 174.22, 174.30 105.8, 108.27, 124.13, 144.24, 195.10,
Ὀρφικός, an Orphic 93.24 the passionate part 23.8, passivity
ὅσιος, pious 75.23, sacred 85.6 33.11, 33.27, suffering 91.5, 92.26,
ἡ ὁ., ritual offerings 150.16 103.1, 103.9, 123.13, 123.22, 125.28,
ὀστρέϊνος, oyster-like 119.14, 120.4, 120.28 145.21, 173.24
ὀστρεώδης, oyster-like 172.4 κατὰ τὰ π., ruled by the passions 6.17
οὐράνιος, celestial 19.1, 19.13, 35.28, παιδεία, education 42.25, 43.4, 43.7, 43.28,
128.11–12, 142.8, 142.20, 161.24 46.12, 47.9, 47.15, 49.16, 54.11,
οὐρανίως, celestially 141.24 54.19, 54.22, 54.27, 56.3, 56.5, 58.5,
Οὐρανός, Ouranos 82.5, 82.16, 134.9, 139.3 58.7, 58.11, 58.26, 60.17, 60.29,
οὐρανός, heaven 72.21, the heavens 61.14, 62.5, 62.9, 76.4, 77.7, 79.7,
16.21–2, 92.7, 96.22, 121.27, 127.2, 79.15, 80.6, 80.28, 81.7, 81.26, 82.7,
135.24, 141.10, 142.30, 193.8 84.2, 84.18, 84.21, 109.22, 123.24,
οὐσία, being 79.1, 82.1, 134.28, 177.22, 123.26, 130.4, 131.23, 132.2, 144.19,
essence 12.19, 23.20, 84.28, 155.16, 146.2, 156.13, 160.14, 161.21, 162.16,
172.18, 172.26, 179.6, substance 162.22, 182.3, 182.6, 200.6, 200.14,
37.29, 65.23, 73.10, 76.23, 158.19 202.21, 203.8, teaching 200.8
οὐ. νοερά, intellective substance 116.10, παιδευτικός, dealing with education 47.3,
178.1 educational 56.7, 76.25, 79.8, 79.20,
κατ᾽ οὐσίαν, essential 87.30, essentially 80.11, 81.14, 84.23, 85.13, 85.15,
41.17, 155.7, in essence 162.13 200.3, educative 43.27, 57.18, 59.28,
οὐσιοῦσθαι, be rendered a substance 34.10, 61.24, 62.17, 62.28, 68.23, 182.5,
be rendered substantial 28.18, 29.8 182.10, 190.21, 194.26, 205.9, that
οὐσιώδης, substantial 34.11 which educates 56.10, 59.21, 83.26
ὄχημα, vehicle 91.24, 119.15, 121.16, ὁ π., educator 202.8
152.14 παιδευτικῶς, as educational 140.15, in
ὄψις, sight 59.2, vision 175.10 order to educate 204.2
ὑπ’ ὄψιν, before the eyes 5.20, into sight παιδιά, game 127.6, 127.8
6.25 παιδιᾶς, entertaining 62.2
παλαιός, ancient 74.5, 75.17, 97.7, 108.5,
παθαινόμενος, in the grip of passion 66.25, 145.23, 150.12, 180.16, 181.30
suffering emotion 124.4 παλινῳδία, palinode 173.11, 173.21, 176.11
πάθημα, affect 124.10, affection 73.10, πᾶν, τὸ, the universe 38.1, 38.24, 43.22,
81.4, experience 183.1, 193.27, 52.11, 68.5, 68.7, 68.11–13, 68.15,
passion 78.23, 162.18, 179.20, 68.25, 68.27, 69.8, 75.20, 76.27,
suffering 168.23, 176.9 78.11, 84.8, 89.13, 90.12, 90.21, 92.6,
παθητικός, τὸ π., the emotional aspect 98.9, 99.1, 99.3, 100.16, 104.18,
50.16, the emotional part 179.28, 105.19, 107.5, 116.30, 119.6, 120.7,
201.15, 201.23, 202.4, the emotive 122.14, 125.11, 127.23, 128.4, 134.11,
faculty 124.12, 124.23 135.5, 135.11, 135.22, 135.27, 136.30,
παθητικῶς, affectively 111.23, emotionally 137.1, 137.11, 138.17, 138.19, 141.6,
125.8 142.5, 156.28, 164.20, 165.23, 193.7
πάθος, affect 195.8, affection 13.3, disease τὸ φαινόμενον πᾶν, the visible universe
104.5, effect 183.21, emotion 126.8, 126.21
202.3, 202.13, feeling 50.29, passion παναγής, sacrosanct 83.13
16.9, 21.12–13, 21.15, 21.19, 21.22, Παναθήναια, Panathenaia 18.9, 18.17, 19.5,
21.26–7, 21.30–1, 22.1, 22.3–4, 22.6, 19.13
22.14, 22.16, 22.19, 24.15, 42.12, Πάνδαρος, Pandarus 103.24, 103.27,
44.12, 45.3, 47.10, 49.15, 50.8, 50.18, 103.29, 104.9, 104.23, 104.29, 105.12
407
Greek Word Index
πανουργία, cunning 105.3 παρυφίστασθαι, arise as a derivative

παντελής, all-encompassing 137.27, 153.9, existence 117.6, 117.12, be produced
complete 168.1, 174.26, complete and as a by-product 38.11, have a
utter 23.17 derivative existence 40.25, subsist as a
παντελῶς, altogether 132.18, completely by-product 38.22
83.10, completely and utterly πασσυδίῃ, with all forces 115.20
22.21–22, 41.7, entirely 16.10, 85.12, πατήρ, Father 57.13, 68.8, 82.14, 90.13,
144.21, 157.26, 161.29, 163.5, 181.15, 90.22–3, 90.25, 98.19, 137.13, father
totally 155.22 52.26, 66.6, 72.21, 77.13, 78.25,
οὐ π., not at all 122.17 98.15, 99.15, 100.25, 103.26, 107.17,
παντοδαπός, all/every kinds 49.21, 160.26, 134.13, 135.29, 138.22, 143.12,
181.9, great diversity 46.16, manifold 144.10, 156.18, 156.27, 161.27,
160.13, multifarious 63.3, of all kinds 164.17, 164.28, 165.5, 165.14, 165.27,
48.15, 99.13, 129.3, 155.4, varied 180.20, 185.21
46.24, 92.6, 122.1, 196.22, various πατρικός, paternal 82.15, 133.28, 134.12,
and sundry 92.18 135.14, 137.4, 193.12
παντοδαπῶς, in a variety of ways 85.18, in πάτριος, hereditary 19.13, 85.7
every respect 137.8, in every way τὰ π., inheritance 19.16
possible 146.21 Πάτροκλος, Patroclus 119.27, 121.4,
παράγειν, bring forth 106.20, 134.14, 146.16, 150.6, 150.16–17, 151.1,
introduce 37.30, 75.2, 93.1, 94.27, 151.4, 151.25, 152.12, 152.21, 153.4,
99.19, 164.15 153.6
παράδειγμα, example 173.4, 189.8, 191.3, πατρονομικός, paternal 98.21, 102.10,
model 169.22, 183.12, 193.27, patriarchal 156.2, 165.7
paradigm 9.21, 16.21, 32.23–6, 33.1, παχύνεσθαι, grow thick 119.12
58.26, 60.12, 67.19, 76.21, 77.23, παχύς, thick 120.9
86.17, 109.25, 123.21, 143.10, πειθώ, persuasion 69.4, 99.10
162.4–5, 162.9, 162.15, 164.19, Πειραιεύς, Piraeus 15.3, 16.3, 17.2, 18.8,
164.21, 174.16, 189.26, 190.5, 199.15 171.7
διὰ παραδείγματος, by example 58.23 Πειρίθους, Peirithous 153.23
π. γενητόν, created model 110.3 πεντάς, Pentad 94.17
παράδοσις, account 168.6, legacy 70.13, πεπληθυσμένως, in a manner that has been
teaching 120.23, tradition 66.6, rendered plural 91.14
81.21 πέρας, Limit 88.3, 93.4, 133.22,
παραπέτασμα, screen 44.14, 66.7, 73.15, 134.16
74.19, 159.15 περιβάλλειν, invest with 91.24, throw over
παράστασις, representation 15.3 142.14
παρεκτικός, able to cause 88.18 περίβλημα, body which envelopes 39.10,
παρεμπίπτειν, intrude 73.19 garment 119.10
πάρεργος, incidental 199.9, 199.20, 201.6 περιέπειν, follow 109.6
τὸ π., side-task 10.24 περιέχειν, embrace 15.8, 112.22, encompass
παρέργως, casually 5.7, 16.2 33.4, 112.29, include 78.14
μὴ π., attentively 180.8, seriously 93.14 τὸ περιέχον, surroundings 52.26
παριαμβίς, pariambis 61.5 περικόσμιος, universal 106.28
Πάρις, Paris 148.16 περιλαμβάνειν, embrace 113.17, encompass
Παρμενίδης, Parmenides 32.18, 110.15 178.1
παρρησία, outspokenness 130.18 π. συνεσπειραμένως, summarise 171.5
παρρησιάζομαι, be outspoken 205.1, say περιληπτικός, comprehensive 167.11
outspoken things 129.15 τὸ π., inclusiveness 99.13
παρυπόστασις, by-product 38.6, 38.24, περίοδος, cycle 18.4, 179.14, period 68.29,
derivative existence 78.12 78.15, 175.21, 175.23
408
Greek Word Index
περιόν, going 29.19 108.8, 110.11, 110.13, 110.16, 118.4,

περιουσία, abundance 88.17, excess 144.21, 118.23, 120.22, 121.25, 122.29,
superfluity 184.8 131.17, 133.20, 154.13, 154.17,
περιπέζιος, around the feet 138.3 158.14, 158.27, 159.3, 159.21, 160.11,
περιπολεῖν, revolve 165.29 160.26, 161.10, 161.30, 163.4, 163.12,
περιπτύσσειν, clasp 119.23, include 48.17 163.15, 164.12, 165.25–6, 168.9,
περίστασις, circumstance 52.27, 97.4, 168.24, 169.28, 170.28, 171.11,
situation 55.21, 59.25 171.20, 172.22, 173.9, 177.8, 180.1,
περιστατικός, circumstantial 9.8, incidental 180.4, 187.9, 191.26, 195.16, 196.11,
9.14 199.5, 199.10, 201.20, 202.7, 202.10,
τὸ π., setting 8.20 203.10, 204.14, 205.4, 205.15, 205.18
περιστατικῶς, under pressure of external Πλατωνικός, Platonic 5.1, 5.6, 6.3, 117.23,
circumstances 144.16 159.20
περιττός, odd 94.17, 133.27, superfluous ὁ Π., Platonist 15.20
51.19, 197.19 πλεονέκτημα, great feat 31.7, quality
περιφορά, revolution 96.22 excelled at 43.16
περιωπή, synoptic vision 77.11, 81.7, πλῆθος, class 27.18, group 184.28, the
vantage point 136.14, 165.27, 166.14, masses 131.20, 131.26, multiplicity
177.1 99.15, 106.19, 106.22, 106.26, 107.21,
πεττευτής, draughts-player 99.5 112.21, 137.28, 165.19, 166.2,
πηγή, source 99.7, spring 152.26, 167.7 multitude 106.17, 177.27, 183.30,
Πηλεύς, Peleus 99.27, 150.9, 153.16 number 7.1, 113.8, 130.19, 130.24,
Πηνελόπη, Penelope 171.5, 194.18 plurality 63.7, 88.6, 88.14, 90.11,
πιέζειν, grasp 95.28 90.16, 135.2, profusion 145.12, 200.4
πιστεύειν, place trust in 73.6, put faith in πληθύνειν, be full 129.23, pluralise 90.3,
51.10, 51.14, trust in 185.27 135.16
πίστις, confidence 83.17 πλημμέλεια, error 40.25, 148.24, 196.3,
πιστότης, good faith 187.4, trustworthiness error in judgement 51.7, mistake
187.23 74.11, 74.30, 174.3
πλανᾶν, wander 70.28, 202.24 πλημμελεῖν, cause offence 130.17, commit
ἡ πλανωμένη, planet 135.25 offence 102.2, err 63.19, go wrong
πλάνη, mistake 45.21, wandering 85.11, 44.2, 45.18, make a mistake 63.22,
118.20, 131.7, 171.2 offend 147.21
πλάσμα, fiction 44.10, 93.28, 128.21, τὸ πλημμελῆσαν, discordant element 116.28
fictional episode 87.8 πλημμελής, disorderly 76.15, 78.10,
π. μυθικόν, mythic fiction 74.26, 83.12, inappropriate 149.24, making errors
mythic construction 73.30, mythic 104.20, misguided 75.17, mistaken
story 81.28, mythical fiction 74.7, 105.18
185.22 π. ἐνέργεια, transgression 103.20
π. ποιητικόν, poetic fiction 85.17 πλήρωμα, a totality 128.3
π. φαινόμενον, visible fiction 74.12 πλήρωσις, fulfilment 129.29, 167.8
πλάτος, expanse 134.6, 155.3, width Πλούτων, Pluto 157.1, 168.13
189.9 Πλουτώνη, Ploutônê 18.15
Πλάτων, Plato 5.4, 5.17, 6.13, 6.22, 8.18, Πλωτῖνος, Plotinus 105.3, 105.22
9.17, 11.24, 12.9, 17.3, 17.13, 32.5, πνεῦμα, pneumatic being 48.7, spirit 94.10,
37.3, 41.11, 41.19, 41.28, 42.2, 42.4, spiritual being 92.3
43.14, 49.19, 51.1, 51.20, 65.17, ποδηγεῖν, lead 98.20, 167.18
65.26, 66.22, 69.21, 69.23, 70.3, 70.8, ποδηγετεῖν, supervise 82.13
70.14, 70.17, 71.5, 71.10, 71.23, ποίημα, composition 68.2, 190.18, poem
73.16, 79.10, 83.13, 84.30, 99.17, 46.26, 47.11, 65.14, 71.5, 96.10,
99.24, 100.18, 101.12, 101.21, 102.29, 118.12, 118.26, 129.8, 157.24, 161.7,
409
Greek Word Index
166.9, 166.25, 172.8, 182.29, 184.11, ὁ τῇδε π., earthly poet 69.16
184.17, work 69.15 ὁ τῆς τραγῳδίας π., tragedian 195.22,
ποιήματα, poetry 43.13, 65.4 poet of tragedy 196.6, 197.5
ποίησις, creation 90.10, 91.8, 98.10, π. ἀγαθός, good poet 157.21, 157.26,
manufacture 141.16, poem 51.15, 179.9, 184.15, 203.17, 203.25
90.25, 100.19, 100.23, 103.14, 106.11, π. ἔνθεος, inspired poet 58.2, 177.12,
106.24, 107.7, 148.18, 165.20, poetic divinely inspired poet 198.20
representation 146.7, poetry 14.24, π. θεῖος, divine poet 70.20, 117.7, 123.4,
44.24, 49.18, 50.11, 50.21, 51.21, 155.19, 165.13, 195.16, 199.19, 201.9,
52.4, 53.9, 56.27, 57.27, 62.28, 67.16, 204.9
70.6, 87.11, 96.6, 97.18, 99.18, π. θειότατος, most divine poet 155.26,
112.13, 113.7, 121.18, 122.7, 122.21, 155.28, 158.9, 158.21, 195.17, 198.29
122.26, 126.6, 126.15, 127.3, 129.1, παρὰ τοῖς π., poetic 46.8
129.5, 131.13, 140.18, 140.24, 149.2, τῶν π., poetic 44.2
150.2, 154.4, 158.24, 159.8, 163.3, ποιητικός, of poetry 140.17, poetic 57.2,
163.15, 164.23, 169.28, 171.11, 174.2, 57.4, 58.1, 85.16, productive 138.11,
180.15, 182.17, 192.4, 192.6, 192.27, able to produce 84.16, that which
194.8, 194.28, 195.13, 195.21, 195.24, produces 61.10
196.2, 196.7, 196.11, 196.19, 196.28, ἡ ποιητική, poetics 173.7, 177.7, the art of
197.9, 198.9, 199.12, 201.18, 201.26, poetry 42.1, 42.4, poetry 43.2, 43.11,
203.8, 204.19, 205.14, working 43.17, 43.27, 46.20–1, 47.4, 47.15,
102.13 47.20, 47.27, 48.25, 49.3, 49.6, 56.21,
π. ἔνθεος, inspired poetry 120.6, divinely 56.24, 57.5–6, 57.26, 58.6, 60.7,
inspired poetry 182.9, 197.12, 202.6 60.10, 63.2, 64.29, 65.20, 66.18, 67.7,
αἱ π., creation 142.14 67.10, 69.19, 69.21, 70.28, 71.11,
περὶ τὴν π., creative 65.7 177.5, 177.9, 178.8, 179.2, 180.2–3,
ποιητής, creator 164.17, poet 27.16, 27.24, 180.18, 182.15, 184.2, 185.9, 186.7,
43.5, 43.9, 43.14, 43.22, 46.2, 46.23, 186.9, 186.12, 186.30, 187.26, 188.24,
56.24, 57.27, 58.3, 58.14, 60.16, 189.28, 190.20, 191.20, 191.26, 192.5,
60.30, 62.19, 63.10, 63.17, 63.22, 192.7, 193.9, 196.15, 196.18, 196.21,
64.8, 64.19, 65.2, 65.9, 65.17, 196.23, 197.10, 197.17, 197.22, 198.8,
65.27–8, 66.23, 67.12, 67.18, 67.20, 198.12, 202.11, 202.20, 202.23,
67.29, 68.5, 68.15, 68.22, 69.10, 203.28
70.11, 72.23, 73.23, 74.2, 85.8, 87.5, π. ὀρθή, correct poetry 43.18
87.17, 89.28, 92.29, 93.14, 93.27, ἡ ἔνθεος π., divine poetry 182.22, divinely
99.9, 104.17, 107.18, 108.2, 110.10, inspired poetry 180.7, 182.26, 185.18,
110.20, 112.2, 115.5, 115.9, 118.2, 186.17, 192.12, inspired poetry 57.25,
119.21, 123.23, 124.3, 126.1, 126.21, 156.5, 180.11, 180.23, 182.5, 183.23,
127.11, 127.26, 130.11, 137.24, 184.26
140.14, 147.16, 147.30, 150.3, 151.9, τὸ π. γένος, the race of poets 70.30,
152.23, 153.19, 153.23, 155.8, 158.4, 156.6, 185.11, 186.1
158.7, 160.21, 162.1, 166.19, 168.25, ποιητικῶς, like a poet 166.13, poetically
170.26, 182.17, 182.30, 183.11, 184.4, 168.5
184.6, 184.14, 184.18, 185.3, 185.10, ποικιλία, diversity 49.22, 78.11, diversity of
185.15, 185.19, 186.4, 187.10, 188.1, character 49.29, multiplicity 113.23,
188.12, 190.19, 191.1, 192.1, variability 110.6, 111.14, 160.9,
192.21–22, 197.25–26, 198.26–29, 161.8, 171.15, variation 179.23,
201.14, 201.21, 201.28, 203.1, 203.9, variety 46.11, 50.22, 51.24, 60.19,
203.11, poet/creator 69.1 63.1, 66.24, 86.21, 89.3, 93.9, 122.10,
ὁ Κυρηναῖος π., the poet of Cyrene 159.12, 160.20, 161.20, what is
[Callimachus] 150.13 complex 65.11
410
Greek Word Index
ποικίλλειν, adorn 77.15, create variation 14.11, political constitution 6.12,

112.11, diversify 178.10 political order 42.5, 42.9, 54.25,
ποικίλος, complex 66.17, diverse 46.18–19, polity 45.24, society 10.10, 162.2,
122.3, 168.8, 179.15, variable 109.26, 163.3, 163.6, state 109.24, 131.16,
111.16, 141.12, 162.3, 201.30, varied 161.10, 162.6, 162.14, 196.26, 204.12
46.20, 46.24, 46.29, 99.14, 168.23, π. νοερά, rational constitution 161.6
195.5, variegated 17.5, variety of Πολιτικοί, Politics (book title) 8.15
kinds 48.11, various 44.5, 109.21, Πολιτικός, Statesman (book title) 8.28, 9.4,
112.16, 113.20, 181.10 61.15
τὸ π., variety 47.17, 48.12, 48.19, 48.21, πολιτικός, political 84.19, 192.13, of civic
51.3 usefulness 200.3
Πολέμαρχος, Polemarchus 7.13, 15.6 ἡ π., politics 67.3, the art of politics
πολεμικός, engaged in war 124.20, warlike 68.26, political virtue 182.8
61.26–27, 62.11 ἡ τῆς π. ἐπιστήμη, the science of politics
π. τρόπος, way of conducting war 55.1 80.8
πόλεμος, battle 115.23, conflict 68.8, 69.2, ἡ τῆς π. παιδεία, the political stage of
90.15, 95.8, 187.16, war 45.14, 45.21, education 109.22
87.22, 89.6, 89.27, 89.30, 92.17, ὁ π., one who practices politics 49.4,
92.29, 93.22, 93.29, 94.13, 106.1, statesman 9.3, 16.20, 16.22, 50.17,
107.1, 107.24, 107.27, 124.11, 142.6, 54.8, 54.17, 54.24, 54.29, 55.4, 55.15,
153.13, 153.18, 165.24, 175.6, 175.18, 55.28, 56.8, 67.29, 68.6
175.27, 200.7 ὁ ἐν τῷ παντὶ π., the universal statesman
πόλις, city 11.25, 11.27–8, 12.2, 13.8, 68.25
13.25, 14.3–4, 17.3, 17.6–7, 17.13, ὁ ἐν τῷ παντὶ π. νοῦς, the governing
20.12, 20.14, 49.1–2, 49.6, 49.9, intellect in the universe 68.14
52.22, 76.1, 101.29, 109.18, 124.20, ὁ μέγας π., the great statesman 68.23
130.4, 131.18, 131.26, 132.6, 144.27, τὸ π., politics 59.28, that which is
146.5, 156.19, 187.5, 195.25, 195.28, political 67.28
196.28, 200.6, 200.14–15, 204.16, π. ἀγωγή, involved with the political life
204.18, state 11.14, 13.26 81.9
Πολιτεία, Republic (book title) 5.4, 5.8, π. ἀρετή, political virtue 13.1, 13.6
5.26–7, 6.5, 6.8, 7.7, 8.13, 9.5, 10.10, π. δικαιοσύνη, justice in the city 12.18,
11.2, 14.14, 15.22, 20.5, 27.7, 27.10, 13.10, political justice 27.3, 27.6
42.19, 51.29, 53.21, 59.29, 69.12, π. ἐπιστήμη, civic knowledge 187.22
69.20, 69.25, 70.21, 104.17, 117.28, π. εὐδαιμονία, political happiness 27.1
154.15, 158.26, 159.7, 168.11, 168.15, π. ζωή, political life 16.15, 67.26,
169.18, 171.6, 173.8, 177.10, 186.14, political life 187.3
189.2, 190.26, 196.15 πολιτικῶς, in a political manner 102.1
πολιτεία, arrangement of cities 7.14, 7.20, ζεῖν π., live a civic life 11.26
8.7, 8.10, 9.16, 15.28, city 47.23, πολλοστός, far from 195.9, far removed
47.27, 129.19, 130.8, 131.23, 132.5, from 70.31, 170.23, further 90.28
159.23, 162.20, constitution 6.13, πολυάρατος, longed for 121.13, much
6.16, 6.18, 9.19, 9.21, 10.2, 10.6, wished 129.28
10.20, 10.26, 10.29, 11.1, 11.3, 11.7, πολυδύναμος, of many powers 112.15,
11.14–15, 11.21, 11.28, 12.1–2, 113.22, possessing many powers
12.4–5, 12.7, 12.11, 12.18, 12.21, 113.9
12.24, 13.7, 13.9, 13.11–13, 13.18, πολυειδής, having a multiplicity of forms
13.24, 13.30, 14.7, 14.9, 15.25, 16.2, 114.29, multifarious 160.12,
16.8, 16.15, 16.20, 16.22–3, 17.17, multiform 73.24, 89.16, 111.24,
48.13, 48.18, 48.24, 51.2, 54.16, 162.3, 163.1, 178.9, of multiple forms
156.1, 161.16, 161.22, Constitution 112.14, 159.15, varied 119.6
411
Greek Word Index
πολυειδῶς, into multiple forms 147.10 πρακτικός, practical 100.11, 119.24,

πολυκέφαλος, many-headed 17.19, 120.10
160.24 πρακτικώτερον, more actively 119.25
πολύμορφος, multiform 141.12 πρέπειν, be appropriate 15.28, 17.20, 19.3,
πονηρία, wickedness 103.22, 110.19, 19.10, 67.3, 80.8, 101.29, 133.16,
worthlessness 51.23, 192.3, 198.7, 133.25, 145.28, 147.1, 151.3, 152.15,
201.8 153.25, 154.5, 159.24, 160.18, 161.24,
πονηρός, injurious 50.8, wicked 100.14, 188.10, 188.16, be deserving 102.18,
103.4 be fitting 44.23, 45.10, 48.3, 54.24,
πορεία, journey 168.16 65.13, 66.7, 66.11, 72.12, 79.14,
πόρισμα, conclusion 24.7, corollary 32.14, 80.14, 85.3, 116.24, 186.27, be in
35.17 keeping with 131.29, be proper 70.13,
Ποσειδῶν, Poseidon 92.5, 94.28, 112.26, 76.19, 122.12, be suitable/suited
112.28, 114.13–14, 142.24, 148.30, 87.14, 103.27
157.1 τὸ πρέπον, what is appropriate 15.12,
ποταμός, river 91.27, 95.17, 118.13, 118.20, what is in character 160.27
121.25, 122.5, 146.15, 149.27, 152.1, τοῖς φύλαξιν πρέπει, the guardians are
169.9, 170.7 entitled 130.5
πρᾶγμα, action 192.16, content/ subject πρεπόντως, in a manner that is fitting 81.8,
matter (of a text) 8.17, 9.7, 67.14, in a way that is appropriate 19.15,
71.1, 179.24, 184.22, deed 53.14, properly 5.28
difficulty/trouble 17.22, 205.19, event πρεσβυτικῶς, as an old man 15.9
15.2, 16.6, 164.5, 173.28, fact 69.26, Πρίαμος, Priam 123.6, 124.15, 151.22
72.8, 73.15, 73.25, 83.16, matter προάγειν, bring (in)to 90.11, 179.8, 186.26,
89.28, 127.9, 136.7, 164.2, 166.10, bring out 197.24, lead 7.27, 95.6,
reality 114.22, 115.29, 127.28, 102.23, 103.16, 165.21
170.10, 176.2, 186.3, 188.29, 201.7, προαίρεσις, choice 32.11, plan 70.5, policy
subject 12.13, 70.9, 84.12, 179.9, 85.14, purpose 76.25, 203.10
thing 14.25, 44.4, 44.21, 44.27, 45.22, προαιρετικῶς, deliberately 33.21
47.19, 48.10, 64.23, 66.8, 75.26, προβάλλειν, bring out 102.28, designate
77.11, 78.4, 79.6, 82.30, 90.13, 92.1, 92.11, present 163.17, project 39.4,
96.18, 96.24, 101.11, 107.2, 121.10, 39.13, 73.21, 74.17, 87.24, 110.28,
128.1, 132.24, 143.1, 159.2, 164.24, 112.20, 139.7, propose 52.17, put
170.19, 189.29, 198.19, 198.22, forward 39.17, send forth 86.6, set
205.11, topic 8.20 before 71.12, take on 104.28
πραγματεία, activity 44.2, discussion προβάλλεσθαι, show oneself 103.25, 161.29
157.19, 170.25, 171.21, monograph τὸ προβληθέν, problem 68.4, 160.6
133.6, ritual 152.10, 152.24, 153.14, τὸ προβεβλημένον, surface content 78.28,
subject 185.28, text 9.5, 10.1, 10.6, 85.21
16.27, 118.24, 159.21, treatment (of πρόβλημα, problem 5.14, 49.11, 95.31,
subjects) 160.26, 196.12, work 6.28, question 129.6, topic 8.22
8.12, 14.5, 14.8, 14.16, 14.27, 15.18, προδιορίζειν, clearly define first 180.9
158.29, 161.13, 162.2, 164.29, 173.5, πρόδρομος, forerunner 105.13, vanguard
working 110.23, writing 163.4 67.26
πραγματειῶδες, τὸ, factual character 29.5 προέρχεσθαι, come forth 137.8, go before
πραγματικός, from the subject matter 9.13 137.25, go forth 103.25, 104.8, 111.1,
τὸ π., content 66.18 113.24, move forward 156.2, proceed
τὰ π., content 43.15, matters of content 71.15, 88.13, 90.20, 91.17, 94.9,
65.18, treatment of subject matter 94.22, 114.2, 139.4, 165.28
163.12 προηγεῖσθαι, τὸ, the term ‘primary’ 13.22
412
Greek Word Index
προηγούμενος, primary introductory 8.9, 167.21, exercise providential care

main 8.21, 8.28, 7.24, 8.23, 13.21, 107.17, 135.21, 136.7
64.25, principal 37.26, 38.22, 149.15, προνοούμενον, what is governed by/
204.20 subject to providence 87.25, 89.15,
π. πραγματεία, special monograph (i.e. 91.5, 91.11, 92.24, 94.7, 94.23, 107.8,
dedicated to a particular topic) 133.5 124.28, 125.26, 136.13, 148.5, 165.18
τὰ π., primary subjects 9.13 προνοητικός, providential 166.5
προηγουμένως, especially 199.13, primarily πρόνοια, anticipation 97.13, providence
6.21, principally 168.19, 205.1 52.18, 75.21, 87.25, 90.21, 91.3, 91.8,
εἶναι π., be the primary subject/object [of 92.12–13, 95.9, 98.11, 102.10, 105.20,
enquiry] 9.7 107.3, 116.21, 116.29, 117.18, 121.1,
πρόθεσις, discussion 126.3, 133.8, main 124.30, 125.6, 125.11, 125.15, 125.19,
enquiry 9.16, purpose 5.21, 7.9, 7.26, 127.5, 127.9, 127.21, 127.25, 135.13,
8.8, 11.8 135.19, 136.12, 137.4, 138.21, 151.9,
προϊέναι, continue 155.15, go (out/forth) 164.16, 164.25, 165.20, 166.2, 167.17,
82.29, 93.11, 106.22, 138.31, proceed 167.23, 188.18, providential activity
48.9, 77.17, 78.27, 89.15, 90.17, 127.17, providential care 107.22,
90.20, 105.20, 113.27, 133.19, 135.12, 124.26, 128.1
138.19 προξενεῖν, give 38.6, introduce 83.24,
προϊστάναι, argue (a case) 7.8, employ as produce 61.19, provide for 48.8
guiding principles 108.23, establish πρόξενος, giving rise to 60.19
96.26, 98.20, 129.29, 130.8, 159.26, πρόοδος, procession 77.2, 77.20, 78.26,
177.26, 179.27, 199.18, 200.19, 82.12, 82.27, 83.2, 83.5, 87.30, 88.7,
govern 37.29, 78.10, 89.21, oversee 88.11, 88.15, 89.12, 90.4, 92.15,
86.24, 107.26, 127.8, prefer 73.27, 93.30, 96.24, 97.28, 107.5, 107.12,
136.5, present 160.11, 174.17, 192.17, 113.28, 134.6, 135.17, 138.4, 140.2,
193.26, 201.6, preside over 80.9, 147.25, 153.9, 156.28
project 88.8, 179.19, promote 80.26, προσβάλλειν, attack 115.19, project 113.10
put forward 5.20, 160.23, put in προσδιαλεγόμενος, interlocutor 42.24
command 92.8, 94.16, put out in front προσδιορίζειν, specify 181.4
74.18, reflect 78.3, 89.8, rule over προσδιορισμός, determinate term 29.1
78.30, 95.10, stand over 163.1 προσεχής, proximate 52.25, 89.19, 90.13,
προκαλεῖσθαι, call forth 178.15, 201.16, 91.28, 93.10, 94.1, 94.28, 135.15,
202.3, call upon 195.10, summon 165.10
78.24 προσεχῶς, directly 125.24, 133.21, 135.1,
προκάλυμμα, screen 159.18, 185.26 proximately 92.27, 147.14
προκατάρχειν, initiate 135.15 προσκατασκευάζειν, develop besides a proof
πρόκλησις, stimulation 50.23, evocation 160.4
84.26 προσπάθεια, attraction 50.19, clinging to
Πρόκλος, Proclus 5.1, 69.20 119.14
προλαμβάνειν, anticipate 143.15, assume προσπάσχειν, be devoted to 46.17, 49.24
36.13, gather/take (beforehand) as προσπεριβάλλειν, pile up 5.15
27.13, 59.15, 99.16, 143.10, 181.13, προστάτης, governor 93.10, one who
186.6 governs 109.5, one who presides over
προειληφέναι τὴν αἰτίαν, be antecedently 69.2, 90.5, 126.3, 141.29, protector
responsible 116.3 147.29
προλάμπειν, shine forth 142.8 προστάτις, one who presides over 106.2,
πρόληψις, preconception 131.30, 139.13 overseer 18.27, 139.14
προμηθία, forethought 98.15 προστυχής, encountering 86.13
προνοεῖν, care 116.1, 147.29, exercise πρόσυλος, oriented towards
providence 90.26, 125.12, 125.16, matter 89.20
413
Greek Word Index
πρόσχημα, screen 44.20, 114.7, superficial πρώτως, in the primary mode 72.14, in the
aspect 74.25, surface level 176.11 primary sense 57.17, primarily 97.29,
πρόσωπον, character 6.9, 8.18, 9.14, 14.26, 102.7
15.2, 15.14, 16.4–5, 16.27, 19.24, πτερόν ψυχικόν, psychic wings 120.9
53.12, 53.15, 192.16 πτοία, excitement 203.8
προσωποποιία, impersonation of πτῶσις, descent 52.8, 52.24, fall 181.25
characters 14.23 πτ. τελευταία, lowest point 52.29
πρότασις, premise 28.31, 30.21, 32.5, Πυθαγόρας, Pythagoras 200.21
197.29, thesis 25.14, 25.18 Πυθαγόρειος, Pythagorean 97.19
προτείνειν, extend 39.6–7, 74.23, 112.16, πῦρ, fire 18.24, 111.4, 152.2
135.2, hold forth/out 39.15, 104.20, π. ἀτύπωτον, formless fire 111.5
104.22, 108.20, 110.27, 135.8, 162.1, π. ἄφθιτον, imperishable fire 178.17
179.12, 194.20, offer 41.1, 42.25, π. ἔνυλον, enmattered fire 92.10
104.18, 108.13, 127.17, 144.8, 145.4, π. θεσπιδαές, divinely kindled fire 113.15
present 162.18 Πυριφλεγέθων, Pyriphlegethon 169.13
πρότερον, before 56.19, 184.19, earlier
26.19, 52.16, 96.18, 101.15, 135.28, ῥαψῳδός, rhapsode 182.25, 182.28, 183.9,
137.2, 165.14, first 8.8, 31.5, 33.18, 184.5, 185.2
33.24, former 29.18, previous 64.19, Ῥέα, Rhea 134.9, 137.10, 138.16, 138.29,
176.17, prior 30.17, 43.24 139.2, 165.8
προτρεπτικῶς, in order to turn 204.3 ῥῆμα, expression 12.21, 15.17, 123.25,
προϋπάρχειν, pre-exist 72.27, 134.20, 179.22, line (of verse) 203.27, report
137.10 15.27, thing uttered 110.13, word
προϋφιστάναι, pre-exist 89.23, 139.3 51.8, 115.17, 147.11, 155.8, 173.19,
προφαίνειν, display 83.20, manifest 91.25, 187.10, 204.22
113.21 ῥήτωρ, orator 55.7, 67.30, 68.7
προφαινόμενος, apparent 76.18, presenting ῥῖψις, casting/hurling out 72.21, 82.3,
an appearance 112.24 82.10, 82.25
πρύμνη, stern 22.2 ῥυθμός, rhythm 42.2, 42.26, 42.28, 54.5,
πρῶτα, primary things 83.3, the first 149.8, 54.9, 55.28, 56.1, 56.6, 56.9,
184.9 56.17–18, 59.9–10, 59.22–23, 60.1,
Πρωτεύς, Proteus 109.20, 112.23, 113.6, 60.17–18, 60.29, 61.2, 61.10, 61.18,
113.9 62.9, 62.12, 62.16, 62.18, 62.21,
πρώτιστος, most fundamental 78.6, most 62.28, 63.3, 63.12, 63.23, 63.27,
primary 35.22, 88.8, 89.4, 89.18, 90.1, 63.29, 68.21, 178.29, 179.23, 190.22,
91.16, 93.5, 179.3, 192.11, 198.28, metre 64.4, 64.13, 64.21, 64.26, 65.1,
199.11, ranking first 48.25, very first 67.3, 67.8, 67.16, 186.29
60.10, 98.6, 100.26, 112.25, 115.13, ῥ. ἀνδρικός, manly rhythm 64.15
125.19, 133.30, 134.11, 137.30, ῥ. ἐνόπλιος, enoplios rhythm 60.12
138.13, 138.23, 147.12, 147.24, 149.7, ῥωννύναι, strengthen 95.11
159.11, 161.16, 161.23, 162.2, 163.3,
163.7, 165.4, 167.7, 170.21, 174.28, σαρκώδης, fleshy 120.9
184.8, 184.31 Σαρπηδών, Sarpedon 123.19
πρώτιστον, at first 149.15 σειρά, chain 147.23, 184.29, series 71.15,
τὰ π., the very first things 84.8 77.3, 78.2, 78.28, 82.17, 91.24, 92.2,
πρωτουργικός, primordial 180.18 94.9, 94.21, 97.29, 98.11
πρωτουργός, primary 140.4, primary- Σειρήν, Siren 69.10
effective 83.1, 88.1, 89.23, 98.28, σεληναῖος, lunar 121.17, 152.17, sublunary
primordial 134.18, 162.12, 172.11, 19.2
184.1 Σελήνη, Selênê 18.13
414
Greek Word Index
σελήνην, ὑπὸ, sublunary 94.29, 128.11–12, Στησίχορος, Stesichorus 173.2, 173.13,

128.14, 141.12, 141.25, 142.20 173.19, 173.26, 176.8, 176.12, 176.15
σημαίνειν, communicate by signs 117.5, στοιχεῖον, element 69.8, 92.8, 122.4,
signify 31.12, 86.18, 138.8, 175.17 142.10, 143.4, 143.7, 193.7
Σικελία, Sicily 187.11 στόμιον, mouth 118.26
Σίσυφος, Sisyphus 169.1 στρατεία, army 94.15
Σκαμάνδριος, Scamandrius 170.16 στρατηγός, general 54.28, 67.30, 68.7, 69.2
Σκάμανδρος, Scamander 170.7 στρατιά, army 91.1, 166.15
σκέμμα, enquiry 5.17, speculation 8.10, Στύγιος, Stygian 169.17
10.23, 169.27 Στύξ, Styx 169.15
σκηνή, drama 15.26, 124.13, play 171.19, συγγένεια, kinship 86.11, natural relation
stage 160.28, theatrical 94.9, 94.27
representation 162.17 συγγινώσκειν, understand 131.12
σκιά, shadow 118.9, 119.21 συγκροτεῖν, weld together 95.19
σκιαγραφία, shadow-painting 179.25 συγκυρεῖσθαι, befall 97.1
σκιοειδής, shadowy 119.16, 119.20, συζευγνύναι, unite 139.16
121.16 σύζευξις, coupling 134.5, union
σκοπεῖν, examine 13.26 134.11
σκοπιμώτατον τέλος, τὸ, ultimate aim 11.1 σύζυγος, conjoined 162.26
σκοπός, aim 6.1, 6.4, 6.12, 7.4, 7.6, 8.6, συλλαμβάνειν, conceive 139.13, sum up
10.5, 10.8, 11.2, 11.9–10, 13.10, 47.14, 71.6
14.13, 162.27, objective 7.23, 71.9, σύλληψις, assistance 139.1, gathering 16.1
74.14 συλλογίζεσθαι, conclude 198.7, draw a
σκοτεινός, dark 75.10, 120.7 conclusion 56.10, 67.12, 128.14,
Σόλων, Solon 43.13, 65.4, 65.7, 65.14, present a syllogism 67.18
200.23 συλλογισμός, argument 28.24, syllogism
σοφία, wisdom 26.20 20.27, 21.4, 31.1, 31.29, 32.1, 32.4,
Σοφιστής, Sophist (book title) 8.24 32.14, 33.4
σοφιστής, sophist 8.25, 8.27, 110.13, συμβολικός, symbolic 84.26, 85.7, 134.2,
158.28, 159.28, 161.2, 189.23, 202.26 166.24
σοφιστικός, sophistic 17.17, 17.19 σ. θεωρία, contemplation through
σοφιστικῶς, as a sophist 15.10 symbols 198.18
σοφός, wise 131.15, 131.31, 150.10, 157.11, συμβολικώτερον, in a more symbolic
160.1, 160.29, 172.12 manner 131.6, 176.7
ὁ σ., sage 133.24 συμβολικῶς, in a symbolic manner 48.3,
σπαραγμός, dismemberment 175.2 86.12, symbolically 137.29, 152.25
σπαράττειν, dismember 152.3, 174.23, σύμβολον, symbol 39.15, 48.8, 73.12, 78.22,
174.29 83.9, 83.19, 83.30, 84.6, 85.25, 86.18,
σπέρμα, seed 52.26, 203.6 125.5, 135.18, 138.9, 138.16, 176.6,
Σπερχειός, Spercheius 146.16, 149.16 185.25, 198.14
σπουδαῖος, good 63.26, worth serious συμμεταβάλλειν, alter at the same time
attention 67.2 179.23
σταθερῶς, stably 88.23, 90.19 συμμεταμορφοῦν, transform along with 164.1
στασιάζειν, be in conflict with 92.24, συμμετρία, measurement 189.9, 189.15,
engage in factionalism 20.17, be in 189.20, proportion 178.27, 179.2,
factional strife 20.23, be factionalised symmetry 80.29, 180.22, 186.27
20.16 σύμμετρος, balanced 109.1, commensurate
στάσις, dissension 87.15, factional strife 85.15, in symmetry with 95.25
20.22, 187.6, 187.20, [the form of] συμμέτρως, commensurately 183.7
Rest 88.23, stability 78.13 συμπάθεια, affinity 78.24, 83.16, 83.30,
στέρησις, privation 97.24 84.9, 86.19, natural affinity 91.3,
415
Greek Word Index
92.20, 94.3, similar condition 50.5, συνενθουσιᾶν, become divinely inspired

sympathy 124.13, 185.2 along with 201.22
συμπεραίνειν, conclude 27.22, 63.16, 155.16 συνενοῦν, unite 72.24
συμπεριλαμβάνειν, include 204.20 συνεπαίρεσθαι, be raised up with
συμπληροῦν, bring to completion 116.30, 201.22
131.28, 187.4, complete 181.21, συνεργία, activity 135.13
constitute 84.17, 95.21, 179.17, fill συνεργός, assistant 109.6, collaborator
(out) 71.15, 73.26, 78.11, 91.2, fulfil 68.23, 68.27, 106.4
150.16 συνεσπειραμένως, in a summary
σύμπνοια, cooperation 142.4 way 171.5
Συμπόσιον, Symposium (book title) 8.21, συνεφάπτεσθαι, take part in along with
42.17, 51.28, 53.18, 157.17 127.5
συμπόσιον, symposium 64.11, 161.28 συνῃρημένως, in a general form 205.13, in
συμποτικός, fitting for a symposium 42.23, summary 5.22
that which goes with/is proper for σύνθακος, one who sits beside 147.26
parties 55.18, 61.20 σύνθημα, divine token 39.16, 83.22, 84.28,
συμπροϊέναι, proceed 178.8 sign 85.9, 101.18, symbol 85.9–10,
συμπτύσσειν, draw away from 19.7 125.18, 128.2, 138.5, 147.6, 175.3,
συμφύειν, be endowed with a shared nature 177.20, 198.20
89.11, unite 47.2 σύννομος, kindred 19.15, allotted 176.1
συμφυής, connate 83.18, 139.24, innate σύνοδος, coming together 134.9
65.24, in one nature 137.16 συνοπτικῶς, in summary 16.5, 171.9,
συναγωγός, bringing together 133.11, synoptically 16.17
135.2, 142.2, 165.16 συνουσία, accompanying 119.28, assembly
συναιρεῖν, comprehend 83.9, concentrate 15.8, being with 158.22, company
16.16, condense 13.20 156.18, 194.25, 205.22, conversation
συναίρεσις, concentrated form 16.17 16.14, 17.2, 17.15, 18.8, 19.3, 46.1,
συνανάγνωσις, collective reading 5.3 union 132.9–10, 132.16, 133.10,
συναπεργάζεσθαι, work together with 102.9 134.4, 134.27, 136.17, 138.30, 140.7,
συναπογεννᾶν, produce with the aid of 140.20
143.14 σύνταξις, arrangement 64.23, proximity
συναπογέννησις, reproduction 134.9 157.8
συνάπτειν, attach 56.23, connect 75.7, συντάσσειν, arrange 6.27, 11.11, 153.6,
77.12, 84.6, 139.11, 177.16, join 190.21, assign 147.13, bring into
70.22, 137.3, 137.14, 183.10, unite relation with 182.23, put into the
139.22 same category 204.6
συναρμοστικός, harmonising 142.18 συντείνειν, contribute 54.11, 54.21, 54.27,
συναφή, contact 81.15, 82.25, union 132.25 84.2, intensify 50.19, 61.21
σύνδεσμος, bond 178.19, 185.5 συντέλεια, contribution 56.5, 76.8
συνδετικός, binding 141.28 συντονία, intensity 124.14
συνδημιουργός, co-creator 127.13 συνυπάρχειν, coexist 72.17, 140.4
συνδιαιρεῖν, divide 128.13, 177.5 συνυφιστάναι, coexist 72.13, 88.20, 135.10,
συνδιακοσμεῖν, work together to bring order come into being along with 170.22,
68.8 bring into existence 134.15
συνδιαπλέκειν, weave into 114.26 συνωθεῖν, contribute 8.27
συνδιοικεῖν, arrange in cooperation with Συσσιτικόν, Syssiticus (book title) 8.14
52.11 σύστασις, composite 95.17, 119.18,
συνεκτικός, connective 139.3, continuous 142.17, composition 6.28, 92.17, 97.1,
82.17, generating continuity 90.2, conflict 202.13, construction 128.6,
sustaining 78.5 ordering 10.29, 11.1, relation 66.3
συνελίσσειν, roll (together) 88.14, 165.18 συστέλλειν, condense 50.25, reduce 51.5
416
Greek Word Index
συστοιχία, column 82.22, 94.17, 96.18, σωτήρ, preserver 49.6, saviour 130.7,
97.3, 97.20, 98.2, 98.23, 99.21, 130.22
contrary elements 101.2 σωτηρία, preservation 49.2, 92.16,
σύστοιχος, appropriate 124.12, coordinate salvation 125.26, 202.24
25.24, 26.20, 26.27–8, 59.20, 59.29, σωφρονητικῶς, with self-control 45.12
81.20, 94.24, 162.21, ranking σωφρονίζειν, restrain 106.9, 148.24,
alongside 80.19 194.26
συσχολάζειν, study with 5.20 σωφροσύνη, self-control 12.26, 84.17,
σφαῖρα, sphere 147.27 105.4, 129.2, 129.7–8, 156.23, 178.24,
σχέσις, relation 119.8 187.18, 194.20
κατὰ σχ., relatively speaking 41.15, σώφρων, circumspect 148.19, prudent
41.25 150.10, self-controlled 46.10, 116.27,
σχῆμα, figure 113.21, 114.21, form 37.13, 160.2
rhetorical device 171.17, shape 94.12,
110.27, 162.10, type 156.2 Τάνταλος, Tantalus 169.1
σχ. πολύεδρον, polyhedron τάξις, arrangement 7.2, 114.22, 125.11,
141.12 168.18, 178.7, category 56.22, class
σχίσις, fork 85.6 113.24, 134.17, 154.9, 163.8, order
σώζειν, confirm 188.15, preserve 10.27, 16.6, 17.11, 31.5, 34.18, 56.18, 68.27,
23.20, 36.29, 38.21, 95.1, 141.7, 71.7, 72.11, 72.14, 72.27, 72.29,
142.25, 148.5, save 106.1 75.21, 77.10, 77.29, 81.5, 82.29, 83.2,
Σωκράτης, Socrates 7.19, 7.25, 10.18, 86.7, 88.11, 88.28, 91.12, 91.28,
15.24, 17.18, 17.25, 19.21, 42.27, 114.1, 122.5, 138.6, 138.13, 141.18,
53.18, 53.22, 53.26, 54.3, 54.25, 141.22, 147.8, 148.3, 193.7, 195.29,
55.17, 57.16, 59.29, 60.22, 69.25, 198.22, place 157.14, 165.23, rank
71.8, 72.1, 74.1, 79.18, 79.27, 80.13, 38.2, 49.6, 89.17, 90.28, 92.10,
81.5, 81.12, 81.22, 82.6, 83.7, 84.20, 134.14, status 104.24, 125.16
87.7, 87.13, 96.8, 100.25, 104.17, ταραχή, disturbance 18.5, 75.9, 119.9
109.11, 109.15, 110.15, 115.6, 116.13, ταραχώδης, troubling 73.19
117.19, 118.14, 119.19, 121.14, Τάρταρος, Tartarus 118.27, 169.4
122.16, 123.1, 123.23, 126.9, 129.9, τάττειν, allot 131.9, 147.22, 171.26,
130.1, 132.4, 132.13, 132.16, 133.23, arrange 53.12, 97.23, 177.24, 194.28,
140.9, 140.22, 143.17, 143.21, 149.22, count among 130.13, enlist 199.17,
150.9, 154.15, 155.2, 155.15, 157.6, order 56.17, organise 12.7, 99.2,
160.3, 160.17, 162.6, 166.12, 166.24, render orderly 55.22, station 155.11,
169.5, 169.17, 170.17, 171.8, 171.23, subordinate 59.28
173.8, 175.8, 176.13, 182.21, 182.30, κατὰ χρόνους τ., at the appointed times
183.11, 183.23, 188.12, 189.2, 190.27, 128.17
191.19, 196.14, 196.20, 201.27, ταυτότης, sameness 88.25
204.16, 204.22, 205.5 τεκμήριον, evidence 144.4, 147.6, 153.3,
Σωκρατικός, Socrates’ 79.24, 96.3, 153.21, 155.9
202.5, Socratic 205.8 τελεῖν, carry out work 146.5, number
σῶμα, body 23.18, 31.27, 33.21, 35.18, [among the inhabitants] 161.24,
35.20, 36.9, 38.8, 38.10, 38.15, 38.18, 168.13, perfect 178.17
39.5, 39.19, 63.14–15, 68.12, 76.6, τελούμενος, initiated 75.10
96.28, 103.9, 117.25–6, 119.5, 119.14, τέλειος, complete 10.15, 22.20, 24.16,
120.4, 120.11, 120.28, 121.1, 121.5, 38.16, 139.29, 141.7, 171.20, 183.12,
121.12, 121.15, 144.11, 152.2, 153.1, perfect 80.18, 80.21, 94.20, 136.5,
155.6, 155.10, 155.14, 155.17, 175.10 139.25, 141.11, 162.14, 162.20, 174.4,
σωματοειδής, corporeal 39.26 177.1, 177.16, 182.2, 196.18
σωστικός, preservative 125.12 τὸ μὴ τέλειον, imperfection 22.11
417
Greek Word Index
τελεῖν, carry out work 146.5, number τερατολογία, marvel 74.3, monstrosity
[among the inhabitants] 161.24, 86.1, phantasmagoria 72.17
168.13, perfect 178.17 τερατώδης, freakish 66.3, monstrous 85.17
τελούμενος, initiated 75.10 τετράχορδον, tetrachord 62.23
τέλειος, complete 10.15, 22.20, 24.16, τέχνη, art 49.8, 51.29, 78.18, 127.14,
38.16, 139.29, 141.7, 171.20, 183.12, 143.10, 171.16, 182.15, 189.7, 190.7,
perfect 80.18, 80.21, 94.20, 136.5, craft 48.27, 49.2, 53.1, 53.10, 92.12,
139.25, 141.11, 162.14, 162.20, 174.4, skill 183.2, 183.5, 184.15, 184.21,
177.1, 177.16, 182.2, 196.18 200.28, 203.15, technical skill 53.29
τελειότης, completeness 35.25, 163.2, τεχνικός, conforming to art 141.9, technical
perfecting 98.25, perfection 21.20, 53.17, 53.26, technically gifted 48.28
25.17, 28.8, 37.29, 109.1, 137.16, τ. λόγος, rational principle of art 142.16
161.14 τῇδε, down here 60.13, 75.21, 94.28,
τελειοῦν, bring to completion 134.27, 116.29, 119.22, earthly 69.16, here
complete 19.1, 82.13, 103.14, perfect 100.9, 118.6, 138.20, 174.24, here
56.13, 95.14, 138.16, 159.11, 162.16, below 38.18, 43.22, 175.8
182.7 Τίμαιος, Timaeus (book title) 10.18, 43.13,
τελείως, perfectly 25.18 45.7, 46.22, 65.3, 69.12, 107.20,
τελείωσις, perfecting 201.19 135.23, 142.21, 142.29, 164.14, 165.1,
τελεσιουργία, rite 84.29 199.8, Timaeus 10.19, 16.4, 99.11,
τελεσιουργός, bringing to perfection 101.5, 107.30, 110.2, 110.15, 127.1,
127.14, 136.25, 181.27, perfective 127.7, 165.26, 171.9, 185.10
127.21 τιμοκρατικός, timocratic 13.25
τὸ τ., the task of bringing to perfection τιμωρία, penalty 101.28, 168.30,
94.23 punishment 102.13, 103.1, 103.5,
τελεστικός, related to initiations 81.14 103.12, 105.15, 151.5, revenge
ἡ τ., initiation 182.23 148.12
διὰ τελεστικῆς, by initiation 120.12 Τιτάν, Titan 90.8
τελετή, initiation 75.18, 76.10, 85.4, Τιτανικός, of the Titans 85.10, 93.23,
initiatory rite 83.22, 110.23, 125.22, Titanic 82.17
mystery rite 148.20, rite 78.22, 80.18, Τιτυός, Tityus 169.1
sacred rite 75.6, 80.22, 91.21 τομή, incision 104.5
Διονύσου τελεταί, Dionysian mysteries τομαἰ, castration(s) 82.5, 82.16, 82.30,
175.1 185.23
τελέως, completely 21.12, 24.10, 81.19, τόνος, main spring 55.23, tone 62.23–4,
134.7, entirely 119.13, 151.26, 153.20, 69.11
171.30, perfectly 14.14, 22.10, 57.12, τοπικός, of place 36.7
109.1, 170.10 τόπος, part 5.13, place 6.9, 16.27, 17.1,
τέλος, end 43.23, 68.2, 105.25, 142.7, 17.4, 17.23, 18.3, 18.6, 19.4, 40.23,
(adverbially) finally 7.29, 156.4, 52.28, 98.9, 119.5, 121.24, 122.1,
184.21, goal 16.16, 59.16, 67.11, 122.3, 132.9, 136.19, 168.14, 175.20,
67.13, 67.19, 67.21, 67.25, 76.17, region 39.4
79.9, 115.23, 123.28, 129.29, 148.8, ἐν τοῖς τῇδε τόποις, down here
179.26, 180.15, 190.4, 190.24, 199.18, 116.29
objective 43.18–19, 54.28, telos 67.22, ὁ αἰσθητός τ., the perceptible realm
67.27 136.31
τ. σκοπιμώτατον, ultimate aim 11.1 τραγέλαφος, goat-stag 31.8
ἐν τέλει, complete or perfect 35.28 τραγικός, melodramatic 118.13, 175.14,
ἐπὶ τέλει, at the end 115.6, 189.23 185.22, of tragedy 72.16, tragic 198.9,
πρὸς τῷ τ., at the end 118.25 201.26, 204.7, 204.24
τερατεία, a horror 121.27 τὸ τρ., tragic [aspect(s)] 82.19, 85.17
418
Greek Word Index
τραγικῶς, in the tragic manner 53.23, in a ὑμνεῖν, celebrate 33.5, 57.13, 68.25, 137.6,
melodramatic manner 174.22 compose hymns 69.16, say in a hymn
τραγῳδία, melodrama 118.29, tragedy 125.3
14.21, 42.11, 42.18, 49.13, 50.3, 51.1, ὑμνῳδεῖν, celebrate 57.12, sing 156.7,
51.29, 52.3, 53.6–7, 53.19, 53.25, 185.12
196.5–6, 196.10, 197.5, 201.16, 203.2, ὑμνῳδία, celebrating 45.28
203.13, 204.19, 205.2, 205.5, 205.10 ὑμνῳδός, celebrating 58.4, 65.22
ποιητὴς τῆς τρ., tragedian 195.22 ὕπαρ, waking vision 86.13, 110.25
τραγῳδιοποιός, tragedian 158.15, 171.18, ὕπαρξις, being 139.9, existence 28.21,
196.2, 197.30, 199.12, 203.6, 204.4, 72.13, 73.12, 88.8, 96.5, 111.24,
204.14, 204.27, 205.2 159.17, 172.30, quality 178.26
τρίγωνον, triangle 63.6 ὑπάρχειν, be 31.9, 53.21, 62.6, 71.16, 74.21,
τρικυμία, great wave 18.1 80.20, 82.6, 97.10, 112.15, 120.26,
τρίοδος, crossroad 85.6, 85.11, 118.21 127.15, 143.2, 157.14, 163.2, 179.7,
τρισμός, shrill cry 118.11, shriek 121.19, 181.15, 188.25, 205.6, (w. dative)
121.22 belong to 25.10, 25.29, 26.1, 193.3,
Τροία, Troy 147.29, 194.24 exist/have an existence 14.20, 61.17,
Τρῶες, Trojans 103.15, 103.21, 105.12, 89.20, 90.24, subsist 28.15
106.1, 150.20, 151.1 ὑπεραίρειν, overcome 138.10
τύπος, guideline 10.21, 27.8–9, 27.25, 28.5, ὑπερηπλωμένος, supersimplified 77.27,
41.5, 55.14, 65.21, 84.4, 85.15, 115.7, 88.2, transcending in simplicity 73.11
model 5.26, outline 36.27, 43.28, ὑπεριδρύειν, establish above 174.7
54.26, 72.7, pattern 114.7, precept ὑπερκόσμιος, hypercosmic 136.29
27.21, 33.4, 33.15, shape 111.1, type ὑπερκοσμίως, hypercosmically 141.23
192.16 ὑπεροχή, pre-eminence 27.16, superiority
κατὰ τὸν αἰσθητὸν τύπον, sensory impact 72.30, 77.28, 82.16, 130.4, 136.16,
170.10 transcendence 134.21
τυραννικός, tyrannical 13.28–30, 48.13, ὑπερτρέχειν, prevail against 107.7,
48.19 transcend 175.5, 177.18
τ. βίος, life of a tyrant 104.21 ὑπερφυής, beyond nature 95.4, 159.16
τυραννίς, tyranny 14.4, 104.27 ὕπνος, sleep 132.11, 135.17, 135.20,
τύραννος, tyrant 168.29 138.22, 140.1
Τυρταῖος, Tyrtaeus 187.1 ὑποδεέστερος, lesser 96.27, lower 141.23,
τυφλοῦν, render blind 23.11 179.4
Τυφών, Typhon 93.18, 93.20 ὑποδοχή, vessel for containing 82.8,
τύχη, fortune 15.17, 98.14 receptacle 112.11, 113.21, 126.25,
127.16, 135.6
ὑβρίζειν, insult 45.17 ὑπόθεσις, assumption 31.19, hypothesis
ὕβρις, aggression 143.27, hybris 101.27, 30.27, plot 171.1, 171.19, subject (of
151.21 discussion) 5.23, 81.26
ὑβριστής, aggressor 145.7, insolent (one) πρώται ὑ., first principles 169.29
176.22 ὑποικουρεῖν, dwell within 106.8
ὑγεία, health 31.25, 103.11 ὑποκείμενος, foundational 23.22, given
ὑγρότης, wetness 95.20 53.15, presented 164.1, underlying
ὕδωρ, water 113.15, 148.27, 169.15, 193.7 64.19, 170.9
ὕλη, material [realm] 81.1, material ὁ ὑ., subject 29.1
circumstances 5.22, 6.8, 16.26, matter τὸ ὑ., premise 25.28, subject 30.13,
37.27, 37.30, 63.14, 78.7, 107.26, 30.16, 30.18, 31.24, subject term 29.3,
109.4, 116.19, subject matter 12.15 underlying object 13.17, underlying
ὑλικός, material 33.27, 38.4, 73.2, 110.6, subject 30.13, 65.29, underlying
119.9, 121.18, 122.14 substrate 12.17
419
Greek Word Index
κατὰ τὸ ὑ., lying in the objects τὸ φ., appearance 162.24, 192.18,

instantiating the form 13.16 manifestation 159.18, surface
ὑπονοεῖν, hint at 132.19 meaning 131.12, 176.14, that which
ὑπόνοια, allegory 79.29, concealed appears 37.10, 191.16
meaning 131.7, 153.2, subtext 186.3, τὸ φ. κάλλος, beauty of the senses 175.5
186.16 κατὰ τὴν φ. μίμησιν, in keeping with the
ὑπόστασις, existence 88.5, 109.4, 115.15, surface mimêsis 160.5
155.15, 171.28, 179.5, 188.18, κατὰ τὸ φ., on a/the surface level 79.3,
hypostasis 96.21, mode of existence 90.28, 140.13, 151.25, 176.10
86.5, nature (of a thing) 193.4, sort of φαινομένως, by reference to appearances
existence 72.20 188.29, visibly 77.20
ὑ. ἐναία, unitary existence 177.20 φανός, conspicuous 13.20
ὑ. πρωτίστη, primary hypostasis 93.6 φαντασία, appearance 113.22, 122.11,
ὑ. πρωτουργός, primordial hypostasis 190.1, fantasy 51.11, illusion 158.1,
172.11 160.16, 191.25, imagination 80.25,
ὑ. σωματική, bodily existence 186.25 115.15, 163.27, 166.23, imagining
ὑποστάτης, creator 96.9, 164.20 74.7, 86.16, 121.26, 164.6, 178.4,
ὑποστατικός, bringing into existence 78.5 179.16, 186.5, 204.3, mental
ὑποστέλλειν, subordinate 178.22 impression 117.20, phantasia 111.21,
ὑποστρωννύναι, stretch out 178.14 112.12
ὑπουργικῶς, like an assistant 184.5 φάντασμα, appearance 191.17, illusion
ὑποφέρειν, draw into 74.15 72.18, 203.23, product of the
ὑφειμένος, inferior 83.2, 94.21, lower imagination 73.2, 73.19, vision
113.26, 136.26, subordinate 88.16, 119.20
137.11 φανταστικός, creating/dealing in illusion
ὕφεσις, decline 34.10–11, 34.14, descent 70.31, 179.31, 191.22, 195.19, 195.22,
92.14, inferiority 34.7, insufficiency 197.10, illusory 121.23, 189.2, 189.4,
167.23 189.25, imaginary 74.27, imaginative
ὑφηγητικός, expository 15.20, 15.24 121.2, of the imaginative faculty 81.2,
ὑφιζάνειν, descend 78.1, settle 90.29, 113.25 producing/productive of illusions
190.26, 191.19, 192.21, 192.27,
Φαίακες, Phaeacians 131.8, 174.12 194.28, 195.11, 198.4
Φαῖδρος, Phaedrus (book title) 6.26, 108.9, φανταστικῶς, on the level of phantasia
166.12, 173.1, 173.6, 173.10, 175.7, 105.8, in an illusionistic mode 191.3,
177.2, 180.11, 182.21, 183.28, 196.8
Phaedrus 176.19 φάσμα, apparition 115.24, vision 39.3,
Φαίδων, Phaedo (book title) 8.19, 17.24, 39.25
70.19, 85.1, 118.19, 119.19, 155.1, φήμη, utterance 89.26, 110.25, 154.20,
168.11, 168.14, 169.4 156.19, manner of speaking 108.5,
φαινόμενος, apparent 71.9, 79.3, 86.1, 90.28, account 176.7
112.10, 146.6, 150.2, 179.19, 179.32, Φήμιος, Phemius 194.12, 194.14
appearing 44.20, 114.5, 165.29, φθαρτός, perishable 38.16
manifest 74.3, 85.20, 148.27, 152.14, φθέγξις, saying 46.1
152.25, perceptible 58.29, 174.6, φθορά, decay 142.26, destruction 125.14,
revealed 84.4, showing 78.23, visible dissolution 116.30, 128.14
73.15, 74.12, 74.19, 101.18, 108.21, φθοροποιός, bringing about dissolution
108.24, 126.21 92.16
ἡ φ. εἰδωλοποιΐα, creation of mere images Φίληβος, Philebus (book title) 133.23
161.9 φιλήδονον, τὸ, love of pleasure 50.13, 54.14,
ἡ φ. μεταχείρισις, surface handling 171.12 61.21
420
Greek Word Index
φιλία, fondness 50.11, friendship 95.23, φρόνιμος, intelligent 17.8, wise 187.27,
143.5, 143.8, 170.28 188.12
φιλογέλως, involving a fondness for the φρουρά, prison 85.3
ridiculous 53.25, loving laughter φρουρητικῶς, in a protective manner 11.24
50.27 φρουρός, guardian 147.15
φιλόδακρυς, loving tears 122.26 Φρύγιος, Phrygian [mode] 61.23, 61.25,
φιλοθεάμων, enamoured with the sight of 61.27, 84.20
79.1, loving to contemplate 176.2, φρυγιστί, in the Phrygian mode 62.3, 62.6
179.7 φύειν, be by nature/naturally 41.21, 51.16,
φιλόθρηνος, involving a fondness for 52.3, 62.8, 198.2, 201.28, 204.28, be
mourning 53.25, lover of lamentations born 162.15, be disposed/suited by
50.26, 122.26 nature 53.3, 74.24, 179.29
φιλόκαλος, lover of beauty 57.1, 59.1 οἱ εὖ πεφυκότες, those with a suitable
φιλόλυπος, fond of sad things 54.13 nature 80.11, 179.13
τὸ φ., love of pain 50.14, 61.21 φυλακικός, guardian 11.16, 12.8
φιλόμυθος, fond of stories 46.15 φυλακικῶς, as a guardian 11.23
φιλοσοφεῖν, write philosophically φύλαξ, guardian 11.19, 48.28, 49.10,
171.14 116.13, 118.16, 124.17, 130.3
φιλοσοφία, philosophy 17.20, 57.8, 60.24, φῦλον, race 86.11
101.22, 119.13, 159.20, 202.16, φυσικός, belonging to nature 95.4, natural
202.25 66.1, 86.22, 95.11, 96.22, physical
ἐν φ., philosophical 158.16, 161.3, 11.18, 127.18, 141.9
169.27, 202.19 φυσικῶς, in a physical way 11.23
φιλόσοφος, philosopher 52.20, 57.17, 57.22, φυσιολογία, theory of nature 171.9
59.7, 59.20, 70.1, 79.25, 124.5, φύσις, nature 9.21, 12.13, 15.16, 18.21,
124.16, philosophical 79.13, 108.11, 52.2, 52.27, 52.29, 68.12, 75.27, 77.9,
144.19, 196.12, 199.10, 204.4 77.13, 77.20, 82.23, 85.24, 86.21,
φιλοσώματον, lover of the body 122.18 87.26, 94.24, 101.11, 101.17, 111.18,
φιλότιμoς, ambitious 103.24, craving 127.28, 136.11, 144.19, 155.6, 165.24,
honour 193.2 170.9, 171.27, 172.7, 178.1, 179.24,
φιλοφρονεῖσθαι, be devoted to 176.13, 188.14, 191.6, 192.13, 197.28, 198.18
indulge 120.4, show affection for φύσει, by nature 124.28, 170.19, 186.13,
145.14 naturally 46.14, 76.21
φιλοχρηματία, avarice 143.18, 144.23, τὴν φύσιν, by nature 162.26
145.22, greed 44.12 ἡ φ. τῶν πραγμάτων, the natural facts
φιλοχρήματος, avaricious 12.23, 103.24, 69.26
144.5, 145.17 φ. ἀσώματος, bodiless nature 186.24
τὸ φ., avarice 104.30, 143.23 φ. γενεσιουργός, generative nature
φλυαρία, foolishness 119.10, 124.8 107.26
φοιβόληπτος, inspired by Apollo 92.29, φ. γηΐνη, earthly nature 119.12
seized by Phoebus 185.14 φ. δαιμονία, daemonic nature 149.6
Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων, Phoebus Apollo 148.1, φ. ἔνυλος, enmattered nature 93.11
148.16 φ. ἡρωϊκή, heroic nature 124.22
Φοῖνιξ, Phoenix 143.24, 144.2, 145.22 φ. θνητή, moral nature 123.13, 131.9
φοιτᾶν, go 156.17, pervade 167.11 φ. νοητή, intelligible nature 136.20
εἰς εὐνὴν φοιτᾶν, go to bed 133.3, 139.20 φ. σωματική, bodily nature 172.26,
φράσσειν, say 132.23 corporeal nature 39.22
φρόνησις, intelligence 13.5, 18.29, 26.20–1, κατὰ φ., appropriately to one’s nature
26.23, 26.25–7, 105.2, 108.21, 108.23, 40.4, by nature 141.28, 155.13, in a
121.6, 126.28, 175.11–12, 179.12, natural condition 69.7, in accordance
186.23, 187.18, 188.23, 195.28 with nature 22.20, 34.13, 66.1, 66.3,
421
Greek Word Index
68.13, 78.8, 96.28, 97.12, 143.1, χωρητικόν, capacity 99.13

198.18, naturally 68.18 χωρίζειν, separate 61.17, 119.7, 119.26,
παρὰ φ., contrary to nature 30.20, 34.13, 124.7, 124.16, 135.10, 140.6
44.8, 77.24, 85.18, 97.26, 198.13, χωρισμός, separation 83.6, 122.19
unnaturally 159.18 χωριστός, separate 30.15, 72.23, 88.19,
ὑπὲρ φ., beyond nature 77.24 91.11, 92.6, 95.4, 106.27, 120.2,
φῶς, light 18.20, 75.10, 86.9, 87.3, 95.6, 135.5, 135.11, 135.20, 136.8, 137.13,
111.6–7, 137.21, 139.5, 177.21, 138.19, 165.17, transcendent 137.7,
178.16, 186.26 152.11
φ. ἀτύπωτον, formless light 110.28, light
without form 37.10 ψεύδεσθαι, lie 37.17, 37.19, 44.25, 44.27–8,
φ. θεῖον, divine light 39.13, 166.23, 167.6 45.2, state falsehood 41.22
φ. νοερόν, intellective light 18.22 ψευδής, false 37.5, 37.16
φ. τετυπωμένον, light that has been given ψεῦδος, false 24.12, falsehood 33.17, 36.15,
a form 37.10 36.19–20, 40.6, 40.14, 40.25, 41.19,
41.21, 115.1, 116.11, 116.14, 116.17,
χαλᾶν, release 54.13, 61.21, slacken 55.23, 116.20, 116.23, 116.25, 117.6, 117.10,
59.26 lie 44.25, 115.15
χαλκίς, chalcis [a bird] 170.8 ψευδῶς, falsely 47.17, 48.1
Χάριτες, Graces 156.8, 185.12, ψυχαγωγία, entertainment 179.27, 191.21,
186.3 195.23, 198.11, 203.3
χαυνοῦν, fill with conceit 55.26 ψυχή, soul 11.13, 11.16, 12.1, 13.7, 14.7,
Χείρων, Cheiron 150.11, 153.16 16.9, 17.8, 18.1, 18.3, 18.22, 18.25,
χείρων, inferior 28.14, 28.17, 34.24, 35.3, 18.29, 19.4, 19.6, 19.16, 21.15, 21.19,
72.25, 95.6, 171.27, lower 178.5, 22.28, 23.2, 23.14, 23.17, 23.20–1,
worse 21.25, 21.28, 22.7, 23.10, 25.19, 25.21–2, 25.25–6, 26.1, 26.1,
30.2–3, 30.5, 30.19, 31.6, 35.7–8, 26.3–6, 26.9, 26.15, 26.19, 26.29–30,
35.24, 48.14, 48.17, 48.20, 48.22, 27.2, 27.6, 31.27, 33.20, 35.18, 35.20,
68.9, 75.14, 82.21, 94.24, 95.24, 97.4, 35.22, 38.7, 38.12, 38.17, 39.10,
98.17, 99.7, 104.25, 119.8, 181.29 46.14, 47.9, 50.9, 50.12, 51.25, 52.7,
ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον, for an inferior end 76.16 54.13, 54.23, 55.26, 56.12, 57.10–11,
χορεία, dance 181.26 57.25, 59.24, 61.12, 62.2, 62.10,
χορηγός, chorus-leader 18.29, 127.15, 63.14, 67.9, 67.27, 69.13, 69.15, 73.1,
174.13, leader 165.21, (one) providing 75.5, 75.7, 76.6, 79.17, 80.24, 84.14,
88.17, 142.2 84.21, 85.4, 86.23, 87.9, 95.3, 95.13,
χορός, chorus 51.12, 51.20, 61.1, 161.28 96.22, 97.2, 97.10, 97.12, 97.15, 98.7,
χρῆμα, money 9.20, 104.15, 143.28, 144.1, 98.9, 98.18, 98.22, 98.29, 99.5, 99.8,
144.3–4, 144.7–9, 144.26, 145.6, 99.15, 100.10, 101.6, 101.27, 104.4,
145.18, 145.21, 146.3, possession 104.18, 105.1, 105.17–18, 108.9,
118.6, thing 184.18, 204.1 108.12, 112.21, 113.4, 116.21, 117.25,
χρησμός, (oracular) pronouncement 37.16, 118.8, 118.10, 118.20, 118.28, 119.4,
40.24 119.22, 120.21, 120.24–5, 120.27,
χρησμῳδία, oracular pronouncement 40.7, 121.5, 121.11, 121.19, 122.1, 122.10,
40.10, prophecy 41.23 122.19, 129.11, 135.25, 137.28,
χρηστήριος, oracular shrine/site 37.17, 143.23, 144.5, 145.20, 152.10, 152.12,
40.26 152.21, 152.24, 152.26, 153.7, 153.11,
χρυσός, gold 111.10, 187.13 153.13, 155.6, 155.10, 155.16, 155.23,
χρυσοῦς, golden 145.16, 152.20, 152.26, 157.3, 159.12, 165.4, 168.12, 168.15,
156.11–12, 168.26, 172.29 168.15, 168.22, 169.3, 172.1, 172.4,
χώρα, land 144.14, place 48.2, 124.14, 172.6, 172.18–19, 172.28, 172.30,
161.5 174.5, 174.8, 175.5, 175.18, 175.24–5,
422
Greek Word Index
176.25, 176.27, 176.29, 177.4, 177.15, ᾠδή, song 56.27, 57.14, 131.11, 180.15,
177.24, 178.6, 178.9, 178.12, 179.4, 193.18, 194.6, 194.26, 194.30
179.14, 179.23, 179.28, 180.13, ὠδίνειν, labour 103.4
181.24, 192.12, 192.20, 193.5, 193.6, ὠδίς, birthpang 102.28
195.10, 201.15, 201.28, 202.1, 202.24 Ὠκεανός, Ocean 166.28, 167.7, Oceanus
ψ. ἁπαλὴ καὶ ἄβατος, gentle and pure soul 169.10
56.26, 180.12, 181.4, 181.13, 182.14, ὥρα, aptness 171.16, (beautiful) aptness (of
186.20 words) 65.10
ψ. δαιμονία, daemonic soul 113.1 ὠφέλεια, profit 130.16
ψ. ἐνθεάζουσα, divinely possessed soul ὠφελεῖν, benefit 31.13, 31.15–16, 31.18–20,
178.28 31.22, 31.26, 48.23, help 36.18
ψ. κάτοχος, possessed soul 180.22, τὸ δυνάμενον ὠφελεῖν, what is able to
181.3 benefit 81.16
ψ. μερική, partial soul 36.8, 113.10, τὸ δυνατὸν ὠφελεῖν, what is able to benefit
divided soul 152.28 31.20
ψ. μεριστή, partial soul 165.2, divided τὸ ὠφελεῖν, the act of benefitting
soul 205.20 31.23
ψ. νοερά, intellective soul 111.21, ὠφέλιμος, beneficial 31.11–15, 32.6–7,
121.8 48.12, 48.19, 54.16, 66.15, 205.9,
ψυχικός, of the soul 26.7, 120.9, 158.19 conducive 47.5
423
General Index
Abbate, M., x, 10, 12, 54, 56, 58, 59, 64 appetite, 16

Achilles, 167, 171, 176, 187, 223, 227, 229, Apples of the Hesperides, 233
233, 234, 236, 238, 242, 263 Aratus, 140
avarice of, 172, 257–259 Ardiaeus, 232
dragging of Hector, 264–265 Ares, 159, 206, 207, 242, 255–257
impiety, 170–171, 259–263 Aristophanes, 130
lamentation, 243–244 Aristotle, 11, 27, 93, 94, 102, 110, 119, 128,
sacrifice of prisoners, 173–175, 138, 139, 156, 157, 291
265–267 De Caelo, 104
Adeimantus, 48, 50, 56 Metaphysics, 209, 247
Adonis, 58 Nicomachean Ethics, 1, 28, 73, 75
Aegisthus, 305 On Interpretation, 101
Aeschylus, 21, 283 Poetics, 142
Agamemnon, 170, 172, 214, 228–229, 243, Politics, 25, 57
257, 258 Rhetoric, 218
Agathon, 130 Armenius, 281
Aglaia, 255 Armstrong, A. H., 260
aim (skopos) Artemis, 66, 67, 203, 206, 207
of Laws, 58 Asclepius, 159
of Republic, 5, 7, 8, 24, 55–62 Astyanax, 282
Platonic interpretation, 44–45 Athanassiadi, Polymnia, 183
Albinus, 45, 63 Athena, 48, 65, 66, 67, 136, 168, 169,
Alcibiades, 78, 182, 263 170, 203, 206, 207, 213, 214, 215,
Alcinous, 281, 283 216, 217, 220, 221, 225, 227, 252, 262
Alcman, 65 Athenian Stranger, 60, 65, 185, 210, 212,
Alexander, 216, 220, 221 213, 214, 218, 269, 279, 280, 297, 299,
allegorical poetry, 120–121 300, 301, 306
allegorical reading, 165–168 Atlantis, 4, 47, 198, 205
Amelius, 2, 13, 83, 91, 112, 211 Auxiliaries, 128
Ammonius, 102 avarice, 172, 257–259
Analytic philosophy, 27
angels, 200, 202 Baltzly, Dirk, 13, 210
Annas, Julia, 27 Basil of Caesarea, 31
Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Beauty Itself, 17
Philosophy, 5–7, 47, 50, 54, 57, 313 Bendis, 48, 66, 67
Antiphon, 226 bi-formed causes, 166, 209, 247
Aphrodisiac persons, 149, 168 Blondell, R., 52
Aphrodite, 168, 206, 208, 215, 220, 221, Bonazzi, M., 4
242, 253, 255–257, 287 Brown, Peter, 31
Aphthonius, 127 brutalism, 29
Apollo, 147, 159, 170, 180, 187, 203, 204,
206, 207, 227, 244, 260–262, 293, 297 Callicles, 51, 70, 223, 273
Apollodorus, 236, 276 Callimachus, 132, 239, 264
424
General Index
cardinal virtue/s, 3, 15–17, 61 disease

Cartesian dualism, 96 causes of, 113
cathartic virtue/s, 7, 61, 64, 171, 172, 173, impact of, 82
236 divine beneficence, 89–90, 99–106
causation, 29 divine epiphanies, 97–98, 114–115
cave, escape from (analogy), 4, 19–20 divine immutability, 90–91, 100,
celestial republic, 24 107–111
Cephalus, 48, 50, 55, 63, 71 divine myths
Chaldaean Oracles, 9, 12, 100, 115, 178, 202, allegorical interpretation, 191–197
211, 225, 233, 251, 266, 290 as screens, 133, 187
chance events, causes, 93 conflict among the gods, 197–208
Charmantides, 48 evil, gods’ responsibility for, 208–213
Cheiron, 263, 267 good and bad use of, 183–185
Christian Platonists, 31 objections to myth-making by poets,
Christianity, 31, 162, 163 181–183
Christians, 31, 163, 183, 313 obscenity in Homeric myth, 185–189
Chryses, 170 two kinds of, 189–191
civic virtue/s, 3, 191 divine truthfulness, 91–92, 100, 111–112,
Clito, 49 228–231
Clitophon, 19, 48 Dodds, E. R., 96, 163, 225
Clytemnestra, 305 Douris, 132
cognitive dissonance, 79 drunkenness, 185
comedy, 130, 138–143
constitutional virtue. See political Eidothea, 226
virtue/s Eleusinian mysteries, 98, 233
contemplative virtue/s, 3, 16, 61 elite education, 30–31
Continental and Analytic philosophy, 27 encosmic union, 248, 250
courage, 16, 61 Epictetus, 31
Critias, 63, 66, 154, 155, 283 Epicureanism, 2
Cronos (Kronos), 133, 191, 192, 205, 211, epideictic oratory, 128
247, 252, 253, 277 epistemic poetry, 123, 298–300
Equality–Inequality, 198, 199
daemons, 23, 25, 88, 117, 128, 168, 169, Er, Myth of, 4, 5, 10, 11, 12, 20, 24–25, 63,
170, 175, 187, 200, 202 92, 96, 170, 178, 270, 271, 280, 281
Damascius, 30, 183, 195, 205, 235, 242, Eros, 278
245, 251, 260, 280 ethical theory (contemporary), 27
Damon, 131, 143, 146, 151, 152 ethical virtue/s, 61, 191
Demeter, 238, 254 Euboulos, 25
Demiurge, 13, 49, 58, 97, 108, 109, 144, eudaimonia, 8
146, 204, 211, 219, 220, 222, 240, 255, Eukleia, 255
257, 277–278 Euphêmê, 255
demiurgic health, 159 Euripides, 133, 267
Demodocus, 286, 304 Eustathius, 254
didactic poetry, 121, 164–165, 303 Euthenia, 255
Dillon, John, 165 Euthydemus, 48
Diogenes Laertius, 57, 63 Euthyphro, 184
Diomedes, 67 evil
Dionysian mysteries, 287 causes of, 92–95, 112–114
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, 155 gods not responsible for, 101–104
Dionysus, 58, 195, 201, 205 gods’ responsibility for, 208–213
discursive thought, 180 non-existence of Form for, 91, 106–107
425
General Index
factionalism and injustice, 78–79 and the One, 84

Festugière, A. J., 9, 53, 54, 56, 64, 82, 102, as Form, 18
106, 110, 112, 114, 130, 133, 136, 137, goodness of the gods, 89–90, 99–106
139, 141, 142, 147, 150, 153, 158, 163, Graces, 255
185, 186, 189, 190, 193, 195, 201, 207, Greater Panathenaea, 48, 66
211, 213, 216, 218, 219, 222, 223, 225, greatest kinds (cf. Plato’s Sophist), 18, 198
231, 234 Gregory of Nyssa, 31
Form/s Griffin, M., 50
as gods, 106 Grynaeus, 53
of the Good, 18 Guardians, 20, 21, 22, 25, 55, 71, 81, 128,
range of, 18 138, 172, 229, 231, 238, 243, 258
Friedl, A. J., 228, 250
function argument, 8, 16, 28, 73, 75 Hades, 195, 231–236
functionalism, 27 happy life, just life as, 23, 84–87
harmonic proportion, 55
Gaia, 247 Hecate, 67, 224, 251
Gallavotti, Carl, 9, 10, 12, 16, 20, 25, 76, Hector, 167, 170, 187, 237, 257, 258, 261,
118, 120 263, 264–265
genre (eidos) Helen, 267, 285, 286, 287
of Republic, 62–64 Helios, 256
Platonic interpretation, 45–47 Hellenism, 161
geometric proportionality, 55 Hellenistic philosophy, 2, 26, 27, 30, 245
Gerson, L. P., 29 henads, 89, 90, 101, 106
Giants, 183, 201 henotheism, 90–91
Gigantomachy, 183 Hephaestus, 65, 191, 192, 203, 204, 206,
Glaucon, 19, 20, 21, 48, 50, 56, 131, 144, 207, 239–241, 250, 255–257
145 Hera, 133, 167, 168, 192, 197, 203, 206, 207,
gods, 23 218, 220, 221, 242
army of, 278–279 adorning of, 166, 250–253
as Forms, 106 union with Zeus, 166, 167, 245–255
beneficence, 89–90, 100–106 Heracles, 233, 234, 262, 267, 284
conflict among, 197–208, 218–220 Heraclitus, 47
divine epiphanies, 97–98, 114–115 Hermes, 159, 206, 207, 227
do not change themselves, 109–111 Hermias, 24, 46, 50, 65, 92, 110, 121, 252,
evil, responsibility for, 101–104, 254, 278, 285, 287
208–213 Hermocrates, 63, 66
good things, responsibility for, 104–106 Hermogenes, 127
immutability, 90–91, 100, 107–111 heroes
incapability of being changed by avarice of, 172, 257–259
something else, 108–109 impiety, 259–263
judgement of the goddesses, 220–221 lamentations, 236–239
lamentations, 236–239 manner of life, 263–268
laughter of, 239–241 heroic age, 173
omniscience and omnipotence, 279–280 Hesiod, 131, 133, 140, 164, 181, 186, 192,
providence, 201–204, 248, 279–280 247, 271, 295
sublunary gods, 117 hieratic art, 188, 189, 193
transformations of, 175–176, 221–227 hieratic virtue/s, 61
truthfulness of, 91–92, 100, 111–112, Hierocles, 30
228–231 Homer
violation of the oaths, 213–218 as guide to truth, 268–272
Good, the, 2, 17, 88, 101 Iliad, 169, 197, 202, 206, 218, 219, 260
426
General Index
Odyssey, 30, 244, 267, 269, 280, 281 Kaster, Robert, 162
Plato’s emulation of, 276–284 kathartic virtue/s, 3
theology, 12 Kennedy, George A., 127, 128
Homeric characters Kore, 238, 254
and providence, gods and daemons, Kroll, W., 10, 23, 53, 106, 110, 118, 133,
170–171 193, 210, 215, 218, 229
explanation of actions, 171–173
Homeric myth, 176, 178, 232 Lamberton, Robert, 10, 118, 119, 126,
nekuiai, 280–281 137, 142, 143, 182, 185, 186, 188,
objections to manner of myth-making, 190, 193, 196, 197, 207, 222, 234,
181–183 240, 287
obscenity in, 185–189 lamentations, 236–239
revelatory function, 189 Lane Fox, Robin, 89
Homeric poetry laughter of the gods, 239–241
educational value, 272–276 Lesser Panathenaea, 48, 66, 67
inspired poetry, 305–306, 310–311 Leto, 203, 206, 207
mimetic poetry, 306–309 Lévy, C., 4
tragedy, 311–313 Lewy, H., 174, 225, 251
types of poetry, 303–305 Limit–Unlimited, 198–199, 201, 209, 247,
human concepts, 180 248
Hunter, Richard, 189 line, doubly-divided (analogy), 19
hypercosmic / encosmic process, 167 Long, A. A., 29
hypercosmic union, 248, 250 love, 9
luminous body, 96, 97, 98, 114
Iamblichean canon, 3–7 Lycurgus, 309
Iamblichus, 2, 4, 7, 13, 16, Lysias, 46, 48, 221, 288
45, 47, 49, 198, 232, 247, 260, 305
immortalisation, rite of, 173–175 Macrobius, 229
immutability of the gods, 90–91, 100, madness, forms of, 92, 290
107–111 Majercik, R., xii, 225, 249, 251
impiety of heroes, 259–263 Mansfeld, Jaap, 57
individualism, 26 Many, Problem of the, 27–28
injustice, 72 Marcellinus, 127
as vice of the soul, 82–83 Marinus, 43, 183, 191, 209, 224
dissimilar similarity to justice, 76–77 Marzillo, P., 295
factionalism and, 73–74, 78–79 material circumstances (hylê)
goods attached to, 69–70 of Republic, 64–68
inspired poetry, 121, 123, 124–125, 164, Platonic interpretation, 47–51, 53
165, 177, 189, 271, 293–298, 305–306, Maximus of Tyre, 242
310–311 Menelaus, 169, 214, 215, 216
intemperance, 83 Menn, Stephen, 96
intermediate terms, 114 Mentor, 227
Inwood, Brad, 29 metaphysics, Neoplatonic, 27–28
Middle Platonism, 106
just life, as happy life, 23, 84–87 mimetic poetry, 121, 123, 128, 274, 291,
justice, 16, 49, 206 300–303, 306–309
as more powerful than injustice, 73–74, monotheism, 90
78–84 Moon, 17
as virtue, 71–72, 86–87 moral psychology, 27
definition, 69 mousikê, 122–125, 131, 146–150, 244
dissimilar similarity to injustice, 76–77 Muses, speech of the, 5, 21–22, 23, 63
427
General Index
musical modes, 131, 143–146, 151–152, passion/s

172, 194 expiation of, 130, 139, 140
myths. See also divine myths reason and, 74, 79–81
allegorical interpretation, 267 right role for, 130, 139
concerning heroes, 263 Patroclus, 173, 176, 223, 233, 234, 263,
264, 266
names, double nature, 281–282 Peirithous, 267
nekuiai, 280–281 Peleus, 212, 263, 267
neologisms, 209 Penelope, 283, 305
Neoplatonism Persephone, 267
contemporary relevance, 32–33 Pfeiffer, R., 264
cultural projects, 31–32 Phaedrus, 221, 278
educational project, 30–31 Phanes, 211
metaphysics, 27–28 Phemius, 304
psychagogic element of commentary Philophrosunê, 255
tradition, 292 philosophy, uselessness of, 311
‘top down’ approach, 73 Philostratus, 161, 162, 226, 292
Neoplatonists, social identity and piety, 95 Phoenix, 257, 258, 259
Neopythagoreanism, 4, 206 Pichler, R., 174, 177, 178, 220
Nestor, 223, 259 Plato, 11, 30
Niceratus, 48 Alcibiades I, 3, 25, 57, 78, 283
nihilism, 29 Alcibiades II, 263, 298, 299–300
Nonnus, 225 Apology, 271
Numenius, 4 Cratylus, 3, 254, 281
nuptial number, 11, 13, 21, 22, 23 emulation of Homer, 276–284
Nussbaum, Martha, 27 Epinomis, 5, 6
Epistles, 7, 19, 211
O’Meara, Dominic J., 4, 7 Gorgias, 3, 7, 8, 128, 215, 270,
oaths, violation of, 169, 213–218 280–281
Odysseus, 171, 172–173, 223, 234, 242, Ion, 269, 271, 276, 295–297
244–245, 280, 283, 309 Laches, 151
Oedipus, 291 Laws, 5, 6, 7, 19, 55, 57, 58, 59, 100, 134,
Olympiodorus, 8, 50 154, 157, 185, 210, 214, 269, 274,
One, the 297–299, 301–2
and the Good, 84 Minos, 152, 269, 270
dissimilar similarity with matter, 75 Parmenides, 1, 2, 3, 5, 18, 19, 50, 66, 91,
Opsomer, Jan, 92 96, 226
oracles, 115–117 Phaedo, 3, 16, 57, 64, 96, 139, 179, 195,
Orpheus, 66, 181, 214, 240, 252, 271, 286, 233, 236, 268, 280–281
287 Phaedrus, 3, 44, 59, 92, 96, 121, 124, 125,
Ouranos, 133, 191, 192, 211, 247, 253 233, 267, 278–279, 285–289, 290,
oyster body, 96, 97, 232, 234 293–295
Philebus, 3, 18, 19, 20, 247
Pagan Platonists, 31 Republic, passim
Panathenaea, 48, 66, 67 Sophist, 3, 16, 17, 18, 19, 57, 183, 275,
Pandarus, 169, 170, 216, 217 294, 300–301
panegyric, 128 Statesman, 3, 11, 12, 57, 211
pan-psychism, 28 Symposium, 3, 57, 130, 141, 143, 182, 271
Paris, 168, 215, 220, 221 Theaetetus, 3, 294
Parmenides, 51, 91, 106, 223 Timaeus, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 17, 19, 22, 24, 59,
Pass, David, 11 63, 66, 67, 104, 132, 134, 154, 159,
428
General Index
172, 187, 207, 209, 211, 212, 213, 249, Porphyry, 2, 3, 4, 13, 25, 26, 45, 65, 131,
256, 277 160, 161, 163, 167, 228, 252, 260, 263,
Platonic interpretation 313
aim (skopos), 44–45 Poseidon, 49, 203, 204, 206, 207, 226, 227,
genre (eidos), 45–47 256, 262, 270, 272
guide for, 43–44, 53–55 post-Hellenistic philosophy, 2, 26
material background (hylê), 47–51, 53 Praechter, K., 5
Platonic literacy, performance of, 31, 125 Priam, 236, 238
Platonic myth, 176, 177, 232, 280–281 Proclus, 43, 161
Platonism, 4, 30 de Mal., 93, 112
Plotinus, 2, 3, 13, 65, 96, 112, 148, 160, ET, 90
167, 204, 217, 218, 233, 248, 260 in Alc., 9, 10, 25, 54
Enneads, 2 in Crat., 254, 282
Plutarch, 162, 169, 216, 250, 267, 270, 291 in Parm., 7, 10, 50
Pluto, 270 in Remp. passim
pneumatic body, 96, 97 in Tim., 9, 10, 12, 13, 19, 25, 46, 47, 48,
poetry, 23 49, 52, 94, 205, 255, 297
allegorical poetry, 120–121 On Mythic Symbols, 25
and connection to the gods, 98 Plat. Theol., 167
as mousikê, 124 Prodicus, 267
best critic, 154–155 Protarchus, 20
best form, 155–157 Proteus, 222, 225, 226
comedy, 130, 138–141 providence, 169–170, 201–204, 279–280
conveying rational knowledge, 298–300 Pseudo Dionysius, 75
didactic poetry, 121, 164–165, 303 psychic vehicles, 96–97, 203
division in light of lives of the soul, purificatory virtue/s, 3, 7
290–292 Putnam, Hilary, 27
educational value, 121, 132–138, Pythagoras, 66, 210, 309
272–276 Pythagorean table of opposites, 206, 209,
educative modes and rhythms, 150–153 210
epistemic poetry, 123, 298–300 Pythagoreanism, 4, 5, 13, 22, 260
inspired poetry, 121, 123, 124–125, 164, Pythodorus, 226
165, 177, 189, 271, 293–298, 305–306,
310–311 qualifying phrases, 101–102
mimetic poetry, 121, 123, 128, 274, 291,
300–303, 306–309 reason, 16
political purpose, 128 and panegyric, 128
purpose of, 157–158 and passion, 74, 79–81
scientific poetry, 164 reincarnation in animal form, 232
symmetry between production and Renehan, Robert, 270
reception, 165 Rhea, 247, 251, 252, 277
tragedy, 130, 138–141, 195, 232, rhetoric, 30, 126–128, 145, 313
311–313 rhythms, 150, 151
poets ruling art, 71
emulation of Apollo, 158–159 ruling virtues, 16
errors of, 153–155 Russell, Dan, 27
writers of comedy and tragedy, 141–143
Polemarchus, 48, 50, 55, 62, 69, 71 sailors, 65
political virtue/s, 7–8, 15, 16, 47, 61, 64, Sameness–Difference, 209
128, 171, 172, 191 Sarpedon, 237
polytheism, 90 Scamander, 282
429
General Index
Scamandrius, 282 Tarrant, Harold, 2, 4, 47, 49, 57

scientific poetry, 164 telestic rites, 98
sea, 65 teratologia, 181
secrecy, 163, 190, 313 Thamyris, 305
Sedley, D. N., 29 Themis, 218–220
self-control, 16, 61, 172, 241–245 Themis-Anangke, 239
Sextus, 126 Theodore of Asine, 2, 4, 11, 13, 232
Sheppard, Anne, 10, 119, 120, 121, 126, Theognis, 299
161, 163, 166, 228, 229, 230, 253, 254, Theomachia, 197
271, 285 Theomachy, 208, 262
Similarity–Dissimilarity, 198, 199 Theophrastus, 57, 102
Simplicius, 5 Theseus, 267
sin, inheritance of, 92 Thetis, 222, 237, 238
skepticism, 126 theurgic rituals, 115, 173, 265
Socrates, passim theurgic virtue/s, 64
Solar Intellect, 108, 109 theurgy, 173–176, 177, 223–225
Solon, 132, 154, 309 Thrasyllus, 45, 57, 63
Sophocles, 153, 291 Thrasymachus, 19, 43–44, 48, 50, 51, 55,
Sorabji, Richard, 27, 94, 114 69, 73, 81, 86, 223, 273
soul, the Timaeus, 51, 59, 63, 66, 117, 212, 222, 223,
allocations of disembodied souls, 231–236 240, 278, 283, 297
descent into female body, 17 Tiresias, 280, 284
function of, 85–86 Titans, 58, 195, 201, 205
immortalisation, rite of, 173–175, 265 tragedy, 130, 138–143, 156, 157, 195, 232,
immortality of, 23, 24 311–313
incantations to moderate, 260 transcendent metaphysical allegory, 174
incorporeality, 96 Trojan war, 287
injustice as vice of, 82–83 truthfulness of the gods, 91–92, 100, 111–112
irrational soul, 146 Typhon, 205
justice as virtue of, 86–87 Tyrtaeus, 299
nature of, 146
number six and, 206 Ugly Itself, 17
providential care for, 23 unity of the state, 18
psychic vehicles, 96–97, 232 universal doctor, 158
rational soul, 146 universal general, 158
tri-partite division of, 15 universal orator, 158
types of life, 289–290 universal parts, 94, 95
wings of, 233 universal poet/creator, 158
soul–body relationship, 27 universal statesman, 159
spirit, 16 universals, and wholeness, 94–95
Steel, Carlos G., 4, 92
Stesichorus, 285, 286, 288 van den Berg, R., 164, 165, 169, 216, 295
Stoicism, 2, 28, 145, 244, 292 Van Liefferinge, C., 44
sublunary demiurge, 3 virtues, scale of, 171–173
sublunary gods, 117
sublunary realm, 17, 207 Westerink, L. G., 7
Sun, 2, 17, 18, 19, 141 will, weakness of, 83
Syrianus, 11, 24, 47, 92, 110, 117, 118, 120, wisdom, 16
121, 127, 161, 166, 174, 181, 208, 209, women
223, 228, 229–230, 236, 246, 247, 252, souls of, 17
253, 254, 265, 285, 286, 288 virtue/s, 11, 17
430
General Index
Xanthus (river), 170, 203, 206, 207, 208, 262, 213, 214, 215, 217, 218–220,
282 228–229, 238, 242, 270, 277,
278, 279
Zeus, 19, 58, 66, 133, 159, 167, 168, erotic desire of, 166, 253–254
192, 197, 201, 202, 205, 206, 211, sleep of, 249
431

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What is the main topic being discussed in the passage?

What is the main topic being discussed in the passage?

What was Plato's most influential work according to ancient philosophers?

What was Plato's most influential work according to ancient philosophers?

General Introduction

1. the place of the REPUBLIC in the

dialogues established by Iamblichus (born c. 245 ce) and followed by

Iamblichus was the Neoplatonic philosopher who was perhaps most

Pythagorean tradition. So given Iamblichus’ emphasis on mythic pas-

have written the Epinomis. Then, surprisingly, the author of the

rejection of the ‘authenticity’ of the Republic and the Laws immediately

2. the unity of proclus’ REPUBLIC

translated into Italian by M. Abbate in 2004.19 In 2012 Robert

inconsistency between Essays 5 and 6 in the introduction to Essay 6. For

Proclus Book of Plato’s Republic

Proclus Book of Plato’s Republic

While it is true that the level of treatment afforded to each of the

3. looking forward to volumes ii and iii

Psychic part kath’ auto virtue relational virtue

We have seen before that Proclus seeks to justify claims in Socrates’

elucidates the Republic by reference to logical distinctions drawn in the

dialogues – and particularly to the Parmenides where Socrates evinces

Sun. But Proclus supposes that he indicates it only in a veiled manner

heavenly bodies is analogous to the divine light of the Good that is

astrological considerations about the proper interpretation of Plato’s

important matters in the course of his exegesis of the main headings of

republic, the gods correspond to the Guardians. They regulate the

in Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus.35 The work is undoubtedly Proclus’, but it

4. the value of proclus’ REPUBLIC

Richard Sorabji, but in addition to this we now have English translations

implausible. Consider the debates about the extent to which Aristotle’s

Until the emergence of the Problem of the Many in 1980 it is unclear

source books on Hellenistic philosophy.39 Nonetheless, the indirect

We will attempt to provide some observations on the broader pro-

Essay 1 of Proclus’ Republic Commentary introduces itself as a guide to

example. Nonetheless, Proclus presents the essay to follow as a guide to

introduction to the Republic, though unstated, is the view that the

‘mixed’. Proclus’ conclusion to this section appears briefly to bring

This is much more than an incidental observation of the fit between

Proclus’ understanding of the temporal settings, as he notes himself,

interpreted together as ‘all the individual and perceptible reason-

of the Platonic School

I would like to demonstrate to you how one should arrange introductions

6 who is going to understand it properly must distinguish the following

reasoning the types [of constitution] among these numerous

<1. the aim of the REPUBLIC: 7.5-14.14>

(2) Secondly, that the consideration of arrangement of cities (politeia)

arrangement of cities. These readers cite as evidence the most ancient

the commonality which is defined in an undivided way,41 in accordance

class, since it fights on the state’s behalf, is analogous to thymos, the

<2. genre (EIDOS): 14.15–16.25>

<3. material circumstances: 16.26–19.23>

characters, times, places. So let us discuss these points following upon 17

20 to ruling gods. It is necessary for one who has understanding to fulfil

The opening part of Essay 3 is missing from the manuscript in the

(2) Thrasymachus claims that injustice is virtue and good judge-

justice is a virtue at 353e7–8 in the final argument whilst noting that it is

argument in Nicomachean Ethics I 7.1097b25–1098a20, the argument at

whole tiresome exercise to a close. The largest part of Proclus’ discus-