P  I

ORIGINAL
July
Blackwell
Oxford,
The
MUWO
©
1478-1913
0
1
3
93
00
2003
Muslim
2003
Hartford
UK ARTICLE
Publishering
WorldSeminary
Ltd

Pakistan since
Pakistan
The Muslim
since
World
Independence
• Volume 93 • July/October 2003

Independence:
An Historical Analysis
Abdullah Ahsan
International Islamic University
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

P
akistan as an independent nation-state came into existence in August
1947, in response to Muslim demand for a separate nation for Muslims
in Hindu majority British India. Prior to the British rule in India, Muslims
had migrated from West and Central Asia and many indigenous Hindustanis,
as they were known at that time, accepted Islam; the community flourished
and established a rule over India that lasted almost a thousand years.1 Muslims
vehemently opposed the British penetration into India, which began around
the middle of the eighteenth century.2 They fought against the British for
almost a hundred years, which culminated in a major conflict in 1857.3 Muslims
fought these wars not to establish a Muslim state in India, but rather to rid
India of British occupation. However, Muslims failed in their effort, and
following the war, the British began to introduce political and legal reforms
in India. Most of these reforms were led by liberal British Utilitarian scholars
and statesmen who used to work for the British East India Company — the
company that had colonized India. Many of the political, social, educational,
and other reforms that were introduced in India had far reaching
consequences for the whole of India. The Muslim demand for Pakistan and
later developments in Pakistan could be explained in light of many of these
reforms. In this essay, I will analyze the history of Pakistan and examine how
and why Pakistan failed to achieve its stated goal to become a progressive,
strong and Islamic welfare state. In doing so, I will pay special attention to
Mawdudi’s contribution in achieving these goals.
This analysis will be divided into three chronological periods:
developments during the pre-independence period, covering major events
under the British rule; progress in independent Pakistan until 1971 when
Bangladesh was created; and developments since then. In analyzing events in

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post-independent Pakistan, particular attention will be paid to challenges

faced by the leadership in the constitution-making process, the role of political
parties, regional differences, the attempts to Islamize Pakistan in the 1980s, and
the problems of democracy there.
Following the war of 1857, the British Indian government decided to
Westernize India, and expected that a strong elite of young Indians would be
equipped with a complete Western and Christian education.4 This seemed to
have become the colonial responsibility of the Victorian Englishman because
of his commitment to the idea of “the white man’s burden.” Indians, however,
responded positively only to the Western aspect of British education; they
totally rejected the idea of converting to Christianity. At the same time, the
British also began to introduce political and legal reforms in India by inviting
representatives of various communities to the Imperial Legislative Council.
This led to the foundation of the Indian National Congress in 1885 under the
leadership of a retired British civil servant. With the introduction of these
reforms, Muslims began to note with considerable concern the growth of
Hindu dominance in government jobs and in other aspects of life. They saw
these developments as threats to their interests in India. One of their leaders,
Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1837–1898), declared in the Imperial Legislative Council
that because of such steps, the “larger community would totally override the
interests of the smaller community.”5 Slowly, Muslims began to legitimize their
claim for a separate identity in India, which eventually took the shape of the
state of Pakistan.

Legitimizing the Claim

The Muslim perception of a separate identity in India began to appear in
the 1860s over the question of language, which was generally known as the
Hindi-Urdu controversy. This controversy originated when Sayyid Ahmad
Khan established a Translation Society to translate books from European
languages into an Indian language for the benefit and growth of Indian youth.
For Khan, the suitable Indian language was Urdu, but some Hindus opposed
his idea and insisted on translating them into the Hindi language.6 For Khan,
the argument for Urdu was simple; Muslims had abandoned the Persian
language, which was the official language under Muslim rule, in favor of Urdu
for the sake of all Indians. However, some Hindus, he thought, were only
interested in wiping out the Muslim identity in India by introducing Hindi,7
which was not extensively used by any Indian community at that time.
The concern of Muslims for safeguarding their interests in Hindu-majority
India was also reflected in the writings and activities of Sayyid Amir Ali
(1849–1928). Ali founded the National Mohammedan Association in 1877 in
order to “promote good feelings and fellowship between the Indian races and

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creeds, at the same time to protect and safeguard Muslim interests and help
their political training.”8 Ali also argued with the British Indian government for
a proper Muslim share in government jobs.9 Sayyid Ahmad Khan, for his part,
concentrated on the establishment of Muslim educational institutions in order
to promote Muslim interests. In December 1906, Indian Muslims established
the All-India Muslim League with a stated goal of safeguarding Muslim political
rights in India. In 1909, the British Indian government recognized the Muslim
demand and introduced a separate electorate system under which the
existence of different communities was recognized and only members of
the respective communities now could vote for their representatives to the
Legislative Council. Although this was perhaps originally intended to support
a small Anglo-Indian community, it helped Muslims acquire an independent
constitutional identity in India.
Both the Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League, the
two major political parties that led India and Pakistan to independence, were
established under the direct patronage of the British. The British colonial
educational policy, as defined by its formulator Thomas Macaulay (1800–
1859), aimed to form “a class who may be interpreters between us and the
millions whom we govern — a class of persons, Indian in blood and color, but
English in taste, in opinions, in morals and in intellect.”10 Indeed, the British
succeeded in creating this elite class in India, both among Hindus and
Muslims. It was not until World War I that Indians demanded independence
from the British. By then, Indians had extensively familiarized themselves
with the Enlightenment and nineteenth century European ideas: they did so
particularly on learning of the idea of nationalism. During the war they received
assurances from the British, and began preparing to demand independence
following the war. Hindus and Muslims also reached an agreement (Lucknow
Pact, 1916) to share power and responsibility in independent India.
The achievement of independence was delayed, however, for two
reasons. First, the British, despite having made promises during the war, were
now reluctant to grant independence; second, Hindus and Muslims failed to
demonstrate their unity in achieving their goal, and the British began to take
advantage of their disunity. Soon Muslims were convinced that if Indian
independence were achieved without safeguarding Muslim interests, they
would eventually lose their identity. The poet-philosopher Muhammad Iqbal
(1873 –1938), originally a supporter of Indian nationalism, now argued in favor
of a separate nation-state with Muslim majority provinces in India. He defined
this new state in the following terms:
It is not the unity of language or country or the identity of economic
interests that constitutes the basic principle of our nationality. It is
because we all believe in a certain view of the universe . . . that we are

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members of the society founded by the prophet of Islam. Islam abhors

all material limitations, and bases its nationality on purely abstract ideas
objectified in a potentially expansive group of personalities. It is not
dependent for its life principle on the character and genius of a
particular people. In its essence, it is non-temporal, non-spatial.11

Iqbal’s view on nationalism might have been influenced not only by the
failure of Indian Hindus and Muslims to reach any workable agreement, but
also by the growth of extreme nationalism in Germany and Italy during this
period.
In a few years time, the All-India Muslim League adopted Iqbal’s idea of
an independent and separate nation for Muslims in India as its official goal. Its
leader Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1875 –1948) further explained the demand just
before the adoption of the resolution for a separate nation for Muslims (known
as the Pakistan Resolution) in 1940 by stating that:
It is extremely difficult to appreciate why our Hindu friends fail to
understand the real nature of Islam and Hinduism. They are not
religions in the strict sense of the word, but are in fact different and
distinct social orders, and it is a dream that the Hindus and Muslims can
ever evolve a common nationality. The Hindus and Muslims belong to
two different religious philosophies, social customs and literature. They
neither intermarry, nor interdine together and, indeed they belong to
two civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and
conceptions. Their aspects on life and of life are different. It is quite
clear that Hindus and Mussalmans derive their inspirations from
different sources of history. They have different epics, their heroes are
different, . . . often the Hero of one is a foe of the other . . . To yoke
together two such nations under a single state, one as a numerical
minority and the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent
and final destruction of any fabric that there may be so as to build up for
the government of such a state.12
Jinnah is also quoted to have argued that, “the Muslims demand Pakistan
where they could rule according to their own code of life and according to
their own cultural growth, traditions and Islamic laws . . . Our religion, our
culture and our Islamic ideals are our driving force to achieve our
independence.”13
Jinnah’s stand on Muslim nationalism in India came to be known as the
“Two-nation theory,” which the Indian National Congress rejected outright.
However, many common Indian Hindus accepted this as a reality in India.
For example, one famous author said, “[t]he so-called two-nation theory was
formulated long before Mr. Jinnah or the Muslim League; in truth, it was not a
theory at all; it was a fact of history.”14 In spite of such recognition of these
historical realities, it was an uphill struggle for Muslims. They continued to

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explain why they could not accept the idea of nationalism envisioned by the
Indian National Congress.15 However, a separate nationhood on the basis of
religious identity raised the question about the relationship between the
proposed Muslim nation in India and Muslims in other parts of the world.
Iqbal explained this relationship saying that:
For the present, every Muslim nation must sink into her deeper self,
temporarily focus her vision on herself alone, until all are strong and
powerful to form a living family of republics. A true and living unity,
according to the nationalist thinkers, is not so easy as to be achieved by
a merely symbolical overlordship. It is truly manifested in a multiplicity
of free, independent units whose racial rivalries are adjusted and
harmonized by the unifying bond of a common spiritual aspiration. It
seems to me that Islam is neither Nationalism nor Imperialism but a
League of Nations which recognizes artificial boundaries and racial
distinctions for facility of reference only, and not for restricting the social
horizon of its members.16

The All-India Muslim League, under the leadership of Muhammad Ali

Jinnah, succeeded in mobilizing the Muslim masses for a separate nation-state
for Muslims in India. It demonstrated their support for Pakistan in the general
elections held in 1945– 46, and the British conceded to the demand. Pakistan
came into being in August 1947. However, those who supported Pakistan were
not well-versed in Islam. W. C. Smith observed just before the emergence of
Pakistan:
A young Muslim fashionably dressed, sits with his friends in the
Lahore coffee house and talks, in English, of Marx or Lenin. He has
perhaps never studied the Qur’an . . . yet intensely conscious about
being a Muslim, he insists that he and his co-religionists in India are a
nation, and he is, he says, ready to fight to establish for them a free
country.17

Most leaders of the All-India Muslim League, which in 1947 became the
Pakistan Muslim League, came from a class of Western educated lawyers,
landowners, merchants, doctors, journalists, and civil servants. A gap existed
between these leaders and the Muslim masses. This gap, to a great extent, was
filled by scores of religious leaders and activists throughout the country.
Yet, to many of the leaders of the Muslim League, according to a Pakistani
historian, “Pakistan meant a state where Muslims would constitute a great
majority and where industries, banks, the army and the bureaucracy would
all be under the control of Muslims.”18 They had little concern about the
social philosophy or political ideology of the new state. Those with a leftist
orientation warned about the future of Pakistan. G. M. Sayed, a leader of Sind
Muslim League, is quoted to have said:

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Do not forget that Islamic society actually in existence is that in which

the religious head is an ignorant Mulla, spiritual leader in immoral Pir,
political guide, a power intoxicated feudal lord and whose helpless
members are subjected to all the worldly forces of money and influence.
If the really important question about abolition of Jagirdari and Zamindari
system crops up or the prohibition of intoxicants becomes the issue,
what would not a rich Jagirdar or an aristocratic member of a sophisticated
club do to use his influence, as also that of the Mulla and the Pir, to resist
this threat to what is essentially an immoral and un-Islamic cause?19

Political developments in independent Pakistan indicate that these

concerns were genuine because the most powerful Muslim League leaders
were trained in the British colonial model formulated by Macaulay, and had
little knowledge about Islam, as has been noted by W. C. Smith. They also had
little contact with common rural Muslims who constituted the majority of the
population. However, they were supported by half-educated Mullahs and Pirs
who had little or no knowledge about modern European ideas. Mainly in the
western part of Pakistan. Many Muslim League leaders mainly in the western
part of Pakistan came from land owning families who had little concern about
the well-being of the common people.
Unlike any other newly independent country of the twentieth century,
Pakistan did not inherit any established government. Comparing Pakistan with
India, one historian says, “India inherited a working federal capital with the
majority of the cabinet and other public servants willing to continue at their
posts. Pakistan had to create a new capital and a new government.”20 It was
a modern nation-state with an historical legacy, but without any immediate
political basis in modern European thought. The British agreed to the idea of
establishing a separate nation for Muslims only because the administration
failed to maintain law and order during the last years of its rule in India. It is
also important to note that before the coming of the British in India, the whole
of India was not a single political entity; it was by force that the British
established a central administration in Delhi with many semi-independent
states throughout India. Muslims for their part claimed to have inherited
a rich intellectual legacy of an Islamic political and legal system. The new
government of Pakistan established its seat in Karachi, which had been the
seat of a provincial government, with no established army or bureaucracy. The
government of India refused to pay the government of Pakistan its share from
the central treasury and its share of arms from the British Indian army. On top
of the responsibility of running every day affairs, the government had to address
two fundamental issues: the making of a new constitution and maintaining a
balance among the diverse groups of people in different parts of the country.21
Let us now discuss the constitution-making process in Pakistan.

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Struggle for an Islamic Constitution

The constitution-making process in Pakistan encountered an extraordinary
challenge: its leaders made a public commitment to an Islamic constitution,
but inherited a British constitutional and legal system where the parliament
was a sovereign institution. Could the parliament in an Islamic state be
absolutely sovereign? It was a challenging question for the Pakistani
leadership, for it needed to draw a balance between the proposed Islamic state
and the British constitutional system, which grew in reaction to the religious
control of society. The idea of an Islamic state created a lot of enthusiasm in
Pakistan, but it was difficult to translate that enthusiasm into reality. According
to a historian of constitutional development, “the phrase ‘Islamic State’ had
been on the lips of almost all the intelligentsia of Pakistan, and had produced
an immense volume of talk and enthusiasm; yet the term had not been
precisely defined . . .”22 This also created confusion on the perceived
role of religious scholars in the interpretation of laws in Pakistan. One
Orientalist mused:
What is Islam? If Islam were but a religion, the Hindus and Christians of
Pakistan would simply be religious minorities. But Islam is not only a
religious or political unity, but an ideology, a religious or a political
ideology or both in one, the position of a religious minority must be
different . . . How can a Hindu accept an Islamic ideology? If he cannot
subscribe to it what will be his position as a citizen?23

On examination, one would find these questions legitimate only from

the perspective of European nationalism, for an understanding of Islamic
history would have made the answers to these questions clear. Pakistan was
destined to be a modern nation-state based on a real historical experience.
Muhammad Ali Jinnah explained the position of non-Muslims in Pakistan in
the First Constituent Assembly, saying:

. . . (every Pakistani is) a citizen of this state with equal rights, privileges
and obligations, there will be no end to the progress you will
make . . . we are starting with this fundamental principle that we are
citizens and equal citizens of one state . . . I think we should keep that
in front as our ideal, and you will find that in the course of time Hindus
will cease to be Hindus and Muslims will cease to be Muslims, not in the
religious sense because that is the personal faith of each individual, but
in the political sense as citizens of the state.24

Jinnah’s statement about “Hindus will cease to be Hindus and Muslims

will cease to be Muslims” created a lot of confusion in Pakistan. If Muslims
were going to cease to be Muslims in the political sense, then what was the
reason to divide India along religious lines? Mawdudi argued:

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We have been ceaselessly fighting for the recognition of the fact that we
are a separate nation by virtue of our adherence to Islam . . . If, now,
after these precious sacrifices, we fail to achieve that real and ultimate
objective of making Islam a practical, social, political and constitutional
reality . . . our entire struggle and all our sacrifices become futile and
meaningless.25

When the Constituent Assembly debated the framing of the constitution,

the questions of the role of Islam in the constitution and the status of minorities
in Pakistan were raised and thoroughly discussed. In March 1949, the
Constituent Assembly adopted a resolution called “the Objectives Resolution”
defining the nature of the future constitution. It declared Pakistan’s
commitments to “the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance
and social justice, as enunciated by Islam” and that “the Muslims shall be
enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in
accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam,” and also that
“adequate provision shall be made for the minorities freely to profess and
practice their religions and develop their cultures.”26 The Objectives Resolution
generally received positive response from all quarters of Pakistani society.
Mawdudi, who actively supported the idea of the two-nation theory through
his writings, said that the Objectives Resolution had declared Pakistan an
ideological state; it had also, in absolute and categorical terms, identified the
ideology on which that state was to be founded.27
Based on the Objectives Resolution, a Basic Principles Committee was
formed to prepare the draft constitution. One of the recommendations of this
committee relating to the Islamic character of the proposed constitution was
the formation of a Board of Islamic Teachings to review legislations so that
nothing against the teachings of Islam was enacted. This recommendation
seems to have been relevant in view of the lack of knowledge about Islam
on the part of the members of the Constituent Assembly. Yet, this was viewed
(by certain quarters) as a force “outside the Parliament which could veto any
legislation.”28 One fails to understand, however, why such a role for religious
scholars could have constituted a veto power when the Board could only
recommend and express their opinions on laws, while the parliament was the
only body authorized to make laws in Pakistan.
On March 23, 1956, the constitution was declared after the approval of the
Assembly. Under the constitution, Pakistan became an Islamic republic with a
federal and parliamentary form of government which had a marked
resemblance to the Government of India Act of 1935. Almost all political
leaders who actively participated in the Pakistan movement welcomed the
constitution. Pakistan was expected to be a welfare state, drawing a middle
path between socialism and capitalism in the then Cold War world. Mawdudi

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expressed the hope that Pakistan would gradually move towards an Islamic
state through the parliamentary system of democracy.29 But Iskandar Ali Khan
Mirza, a military general turned bureaucrat who became Pakistan’s first
president under the new constitution, is reported to have said in his first press
conference after the adoption of the constitution that: [r]eligion and politics
could be, and should be, separated and held out a warning that there
would be “trouble” if the “learned maulanas” tried “to dabble” in politics.
He promised not to touch the Jama‘at-i-Islami if it confined itself to religion.
His views were criticized by the Jama‘at al-‘Ulama-i Islam, and the
Jama‘at-i-‘Ulama-i Pakistan.30
The expectation that Pakistan would become a democracy and eventually
an Islamic welfare state was shattered because of the lack of effective political
parties. The All-India Muslim League, which after 1947 became the Pakistan
Muslim League, lost heavily in the provincial elections in East Pakistan and, as
a result, lost the credibility to form an effective government in the center. No
other party had such credibility either. A chaotic situation existed in the central
government for a while, and this provided the British trained civil and military
administrators with an opportunity to stage a coup, abolish the constitution,
and overthrow the civilian government to declare martial law in Pakistan in
October, 1958. The military government came up with a new constitution in
1962 that was abolished with the restoration of the civilian government in
1970 –71. A new constitution was drafted in 1973 with the declaration of a
“commitment to an Islamic moral standard” (Part II, article 2b). But the
constitutional means failed to translate the “moral standards” into practice. As
a result, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s civilian government had to concede to a number
of Islamic demands because of street demonstrations: the Qadianis (a small but
powerful religious group in the country’s bureaucracy) were declared non-
Muslim, alcohol was prohibited, and Friday was declared a weekly holiday.
However, none of these demands had anything to do with the real well-being
of the common people of Pakistan. Also, no moral standard was maintained
when general elections were held in 1977. The ruling party heavily rigged the
election results, causing street demonstrations. Consequently, the military
again intervened — this time it was not by the British trained officers — but
by “home-grown Islamicists.” Before we discuss the attempts of Islamization
by General Zia ul Haq, we shall discuss the problems of regional differences
in Pakistan.

The Challenge of Regionalism

During the debates on the constitution-making process in the Constituent
Assembly, the question of regional representation and power sharing appeared
as a challenge to the new administration in Pakistan. As early as 1948, it was

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reported in the Constituent Assembly Debates that, “a feeling is growing among

the Eastern Pakistanis that Eastern Pakistan is being neglected and treated
merely as a ‘colony’ of Western Pakistan.”31 A split developed between East
Pakistani politicians and West Pakistani civil servants. Soon, East Pakistani
representatives in the Constituent Assembly identified two issues of
disagreement with West Pakistani representatives. Because the Objectives
Resolution contained the announcement that Urdu would be the national
language of Pakistan, East Pakistanis felt that the importance of their language
(Bengali) was being undermined. East Pakistani leaders also believed that
attempts were being made to transform the numerical majority of the Bengalis
in Pakistan to a minority status. One member in the Assembly declared:
Sir, in East Bengal there is a growing belief — I must say that it is a
wrong impression — that there are principles in the report which, if
adopted, will reduce the majority of East Bengal into a minority and it
will turn East Bengal into a colony of Pakistan.32

The claim for Urdu being the only national language was supported by the
fact that Urdu was the only language that was generally understood in all
regions, while it was not the language of any particular region of Pakistan. On
the other hand, the argument in favor of Bengali was that Bengali was the
language of the majority of the population of Pakistan and in many respects
was a more developed language than Urdu. Therefore, many Bengalis
expected their language to be one of the official languages of Pakistan.
However, most leaders seemed to have been more concerned about the unity
and stability of the new country since it consisted of two separate territories
divided by an enemy territory. They believed that a linguistic division would
only set the two geographically divided territories further apart. Unfortunately,
there was little discussion in the Constituent Assembly on the question of
language, and the bureaucracy-dominated central government attempted to
resolve the issue by force.
In this connection, it is relevant to briefly discuss the background of the
bureaucracy in Pakistan. One Pakistani historian describes the role of civil
servants in Pakistan thusly:
In the early years, at the Civil Service Academy in Lahore, vigilant British
administrators instilled the probationers with the ‘sense of belonging to
a privileged group which had a major responsibility for the future
governing of Pakistan.’ The Academy, ‘the manufacturing laboratory’
created ‘Anglicized officials’ true to Macaulay’s dream, who held political
leaders in contempt. . . . While Jinnah acknowledged the urgency of an
efficient civil service in the young country, he advised the bureaucrats to
adopt a more nationalistic and realistic attitude by functioning as the
‘servants of Pakistan.’33

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Initially, the civil servants did try to be good “servants of Pakistan,” but
most of them had very little or no knowledge of Islamic history and culture.
Therefore, they had little sympathy or understanding for the ideal of an Islamic
system of government or the common people’s attachment to their linguistic
heritage. These issues were not a part of their training, which was formulated
by Macaulay.34 Although these civil servants played a very crucial role in the
country’s survival (under the extraordinary situation that Pakistan was born),
one must agree with the Pakistani historian that, “without understanding the
dilemma of politicians and political parties in a young country like Pakistan,
the public servants have acted as masters and king-makers, missing no
opportunity to malign them among the people.”35 In this connection, one
should also note that when Pakistan was born, only about a hundred British
Indian Civil Service officers opted for Pakistan and, out of this group, only one
came from Eastern Pakistan. This was mainly because the territories belonging
to Eastern Pakistan came under British rule a hundred years earlier than the
territories belonging to Western Pakistan. During the first hundred years of
British rule, the traditional Bengali aristocracy was ruined. This did not occur
in the territories of Western Pakistan.
By early 1950s, people in East Pakistan were already in the streets in
support of their demand for the recognition of their language, but the
government failed to respond positively. Provincial elections were held in
1954 in which the ruling Muslim League party was heavily defeated, yet the
government failed to recognize the gravity of the situation. One historian has
rightly pointed out:

The United Front had just routed the Muslim League at the polls, and
thus indicated that the League had lost the confidence of half the
nation’s population. The election had been fought to a substantial extent
on the desire of Bengal to achieve greater freedom from supervision
by Karachi. This was the first opportunity to show that democracy in
Pakistan was strong enough to allow different parties to control central
and provincial governments without disrupting the state.36

However, the bureaucrats in Karachi, then capital of Pakistan, thought the

new government in East Pakistan was “endangering the maintenance of good
government.” The central government not only issued orders to dismiss the
newly elected government, it also dispatched a bureaucrat, a former army
general who became the first president of the country, Iskandar Ali Khan
Mirza, as the new governor of East Pakistan.
The constitution of 1956 recognized both Bengali and Urdu as the official
languages of Pakistan. The constitution was also able to resolve the question
of representation from East Pakistan in the central legislative assembly.

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But within a few years, the bureaucracy and military, most of who came
from West Pakistan, returned to take total control of politics. By 1971,
East Pakistan separated from Pakistan to create Bangladesh. Since then,
West Pakistan came to be known as Pakistan. Even after the separation of
East Pakistan, regional and ethnic forces are still powerful political forces in
Pakistan today.37

Education and the Process of Islamization

In keeping with its ideology, attempts were made to reformulate the
educational policy in Pakistan.38 Discussions on the role of education began
even before the country achieved formal independence. This indicates the
seriousness of Pakistani leadership on the subject. The first Education Minister,
Fazlur Rahman, emphasized the need for an Islamic ideological foundation for
education in Pakistan.39 The Ministry of Education organized a conference of
leading experts and a number of recommendations were made. None of the
recommendations were implemented because of the reluctance showing on
the part of the Ministry of Finance, whose bureaucrats were not convinced that
the newly born Pakistan should have the “luxury” to spend money on
education.40 Academic institutions continued to operate under the colonial
system, which had been reformed to accommodate “knowledge for economic
welfare.” “Without guidelines,” as the Pakistani activist turned historian–
academician puts it, “the educational system was aimless.”41 The author
continues:

It was the Pakistan Movement that weaned most [Muslim youth] from
Indian nationalism and some from Marxist materialism. The enthusiasm
for Pakistan created the feeling that all was well with the Muslim youth.
Even earlier that was the general sentiment. A generation that had
pursued the aim of economic welfare through the acquisition of the new
education and remained Muslim in sentiment because of tradition and
the influence of its parents and homes thought that what had happened
to it would happen to its children as well, forgetting that the Islamic
influence grew more and more diluted because of the ever increasing
impact of new influences percolating through literature and amoral and
religiously neutral education. The nature of the education was such that
the potentially positive influence that could have been exerted in favor
of the Islamic code of morals and beliefs was eliminated, and subtle
European suggestions conveyed through literature and textbooks were
permitted to play their role unhindered.42

The author maintains that the failure to construct a Pakistani identity in the
educational system led to the growth of Bengali nationalism in East Pakistan,
which eventually led to the disintegration of the country.43 Responsibility for

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this failure, according to the author, squarely lay with the bureaucrats who ran
the country.44
By the middle of 1970s, it became clear that no institutional system was
going to function unchallenged in Pakistan. First, the British parliamentary
system collapsed when the military-bureaucrats staged a coup against the
constitutional government in 1958. By the end of 1960s, the military
dictatorship also collapsed because of popular street demonstrations. The
civilian government that succeeded dictatorial rule, although democratically
elected, became involved in corruptions to the extent that it also became
subject to mass demonstrations. Its leader, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who was
brought to politics by Iskandar Mirza and came from a feudal family of Sind,
had climbed into prominence under the dictatorial rule of Ayub Khan.
Under Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s leadership, Pakistan received its third constitution
in 1973, and he began to refer to the country,45 which by then had lost the
eastern wing as Bangladesh, as “new Pakistan.” Bhutto blamed his former
mentor Ayub Khan for creating the crisis that had divided the country, but he
expressed firm confidence in the future of his new Pakistan and introduced
many “reforms.”46 We have mentioned earlier that Bhutto conceded to some of
the demands of Islamic groups in response to street demonstrations. Yet
rhetoric within Bhutto’s Pakistan Peoples Party against those who pressed for
changes based on Islamic ideas continued. One of its leaders is reported to
have said:

The anti-Pakistan mullahs and monopolists of Islam correctly foresee

that in the new Pakistan when the exploited and the oppressed classes
shall become the ruling classes they will be ruined. Since they will
be ruined, they are crying hoarse that that will be end of Islam . . .
The level of consciousness of the poor and oppressed Pakistani people
has become so high that they are paying no heed to the reactionaries
and a handful of anti-Pakistani elements.47

In order to demonstrate his commitment to Islam or, perhaps, to break the

“monopoly” of Islam by some “anti-Pakistani” elements, Bhutto declared a
program of “Islamic Socialism” for Pakistan. However, his idea of Islamic
Socialism was far from clear, and his fear of being rejected by the people of
Pakistan led him to rig the election results of 1977 in a massive way. This was
followed by huge street demonstrations against Bhutto that created serious
lawlessness throughout the country. As a result, the army intervened, and
Pakistan again went under military rule. The new military leader, General Ziaul
Haq, categorically expressed his strong commitment to Islamic ideas. Several
factors are responsible for such a strong expression to Islam. First, the anti-
Bhutto movement was dominated by pro-Islamic slogans; second, an Islamic

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Revolution had just succeeded in neighboring Iran (1978 –79); and third, the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1980) generated a tremendous amount of
pro-Islamic sentiment throughout the whole region. Ziaul Haq explained
his view of the role of Islam in Pakistan, saying:

The basis of Pakistan was Islam. The basis of Pakistan was that the
Muslims of the subcontinent are a separate culture. It was on the two-
nation theory that this part was carved out of the subcontinent as
Pakistan. And in the last thirty years in general . . . there has been a
complete erosion of the moral values of this society . . . These are the
Islamic values and we are trying to bring these values back.48

Ziaul Haq seems to have echoed Mawdudi’s ideas about Pakistan and
its role in the modern world. For his part, Mawdudi is reported to have
“enthusiastically endorsed Zia’s initiatives.”49 This is an interesting observation,
for Mawdudi always favored parliamentary democracy and worked hard in
producing the constitution in 1956. Although an examination of this question
is not within the scope of this paper, it is true that Mawdudi’s Jama‘at
responded positively to Ziaul Haq’s call for “Islamization” (the process
of the implementation of Islamic ideas) in Pakistan. Nasr observes:

The Jama‘at proved unable to deliver on the claims it had made. Aside
from abstract notions about the shape and working of the ideal Islamic
state, the party had little to offer in the way of suggestions for managing
its machinery. Its notions about the working of Islamic dicta in economic
and political operations provided Zia with no coherent plan of action.
Just as the Jama‘at became disappointed with the politics of Zia’s regime,
so the general became disillusioned with the practical relevance of the
Jama‘at’s ideas.50

It is clear that after Mawdudi’s death in 1979, Zia and the Jama‘at could
no longer cooperate. They seem to have disagreed not only on the
methodology of Islamization, but also on their understanding of the role of
Islam in the modern world. It is also true, perhaps, that Jama‘at failed to deliver
enough capable and committed individuals for the Islamization process in
Pakistan.51 For his part, Ziaul Haq continued to justify his dictatorial rule in the
name of Islam. He argued:

One basic point that emerges from a study of the Qur’anic verses and
the Prophet’s sayings . . . is that as long as the Amir or the head of
State . . . abides by the injunctions of Allah and his Prophet (PBUH)
[“peace and blessings upon him”] his obedience becomes mandatory for
his subjects or the people, irrespective of the personal dislike that
someone may harbour for the Amir or any of his actions. . . . Not only in
my opinion but also in the opinion of legal experts and scholars, my

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Government, too, is a constitutional Government, which has been acting

upon the tenets of Islam. . . . We are . . . devout Muslims. I concede, and
I am proud of it, that the present Government is a military
Government.52

The dictatorial method of imposition of Islam from above by Ziaul Haq turned
out to be counter-productive in Pakistan. One author observes:

‘Islamization’ measures introduced in Pakistan during the Zia regime

became associated with the increasing sectarian tensions because of
their emphasis on Shari “ah laws and fiqhi hair-splitting, rather than
on maqasid al-Shari “ah (objectives of the Shari “ah). This legalistic
approach to ‘Islamization’ naturally raised the question as to which
interpretation of Islamic law is more Islamically authentic and should,
therefore, be incorporated in public policy. Islamic revival has thus
created dissension among various Islamic sects more than it has unified
different social strata of Pakistan society. A different Islamic agenda,
signifying freedom, tolerance and concern for the Islamic principles of
social equality and economic justice would certainly have received
much more enthusiastic popular response and would have enhanced
social harmony and national integration.53

The so-called “Islamization” efforts continued in Pakistan even after

Ziaul Haq. His rule was followed by four democratically elected governments.
In ten years time, two prime ministers, Benazir Bhutto (1988 –1990 and
1993 –1996), and Nawaz Sharif (1990 –1993 and 1997–1999) were each elected
twice, and both accused the other of corruption and vote-rigging. Both prime
ministers, however, maintained their commitment to Islam in public. According
to one author, “Benazir adopted a policy of appeasement towards groups
by covering her head, wearing a chadar, visiting shrines, and avoiding
handshakes with men. She visited Makkah frequently and was shown in the
national media rolling her beads.”54 For his part, Nawaz Sharif is reported to
have followed “the footsteps of General Zia to work in tandem with Islamic
forces.”55 Both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif were accused of being
involved in corruption not only by the Pakistani press but also by institutions
such as the Transparency International. Ten years of so-called “democratic
rule” was again followed by military rule under the leadership of Pervez
Musharraf.
In over fifty years of its history, Pakistan has not been able to develop a
stable political system. A European democratic system was not allowed by the
vested interests created by the British colonial administration. Pakistani Islamic
activists also failed to establish an alternative system suitable to the modern
times. Who is responsible for this failure? We shall analyze this dilemma before
the concluding part of this article.

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Who is to be Blamed?
Pakistan’s most well-known historian, who was an activist in the Pakistan
Movement and who spent most of his life as an educator in Pakistan, Ishtiaq
Husain Qureshi, discussed Pakistan’s failure to achieve its stated goals a few
years before his death in 1979:

What has gone so seriously wrong during the brief period of a quarter of
century of our existence, that we are threatened with annihilation? What
opportunities have we lost? What mistakes have we made? What follies
have we committed to be brought to the brink — not of disaster — but
of total destruction as a nation?56

While Qureshi blames the government bureaucracy for this failure, Fazlur
Rahman, the most well-known Pakistani Islamicist, blames Pakistani Islamic
activists for this failure. Writing around the year 1969, he raises the question
“What has been this nation’s experience over two decades of its existence?
Disappointing. What has been achieved by way of ushering in the new
scientific and technological era through intelligent and confidant social
adjustments under the banner of Islam? Precious little.” The author continues,
“A partial but genuine attempt was made in the ancien regime [a reference
to the rule of Ayub Khan from 1958 to 1969] but an orgiastic chorus of the
politics-mongering mulla and certain Islam-mongering politicians set it at
naught.” He also accused that, “it sloganizes about a ‘nizam of Islam’ which
has not only no trace in the real world, but neither does it exist in its mind,
nor yet in any book which it can lay before the community.” 57
In another essay or few years later, Fazlur Rahman identified Sayyid
Mawdudi as one of the “Islam-mongering” politicians of Pakistan. He says that
Mawdudi,

[d]eclared — in an Urdu treatise composed in the late thirties entitled

“The Political Theory in Islam” (published in English in Islamic Law
and Constitution, 1959) — that modern Western democracy was
incompatible with Islam; and that Muslims should rather elect a head
of state who should, through his own Ijtihad, interpret the Qur’an
and the Sunnah of the Prophet with the aid of an advisory council
(majlis-i-shura) appointed by himself. Some years after the creation
of Pakistan, Mawdudi admitted the Islamic legitimacy of the
parliamentary democracy, and his party participated in elections,
although many believe, probably correctly, that this shift was basically
only a political strategy on his part.58

Fazlur Rahman found contradictions mainly in Mawdudi’s views of the

Islamic concept of sovereignty and parliamentary democracy. However, he
does not seem to have recognized that Mawdudi’s earlier work on the subject

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in Urdu was written in the context of British India, while the later works were
written in the context of independent Pakistan. Mawdudi seemed to have
taken for granted the fact that when a Muslim majority committed itself to an
Islamic constitution, the rest of the government mechanism would naturally
follow. Therefore, Mawdudi’s acceptance of the 1956 constitution and
Jama‘at-i-Islami’s decision to participate in the election might not be just “a
political strategy,” but a deliberate policy in accordance with his stand on
Islam. It might also be incorrect to accuse Mawdudi of “sloganizing” his ideas,
and not producing any literature on the subject. Again, a detailed analysis
of Mawdudi’s intellectual activities is not within the scope of this paper.
Yet one must note that Mawdudi has been credited not only with providing
an intellectual foundation to the movement for Pakistan,59 he has also been
widely acknowledged to be one of the effective revivalist leaders in the
twentieth century.60 However, the issue of Pakistan’s failure to establish a
stable political system remains.

Conclusion
Pakistan has not been able to achieve its stated goal to be a modern,
progressive Muslim nation, as the poet-philosopher Muhammad Iqbal had
envisioned. Before its creation, Pakistani leaders aspired to establish a state
where they could integrate ideas of modern civilization and shape them with
Islamic values. It took nine years to formulate the constitution, which had a
marked resemblance to the British democratic system, but vested interests
abolished it in a military coup. Since then, Pakistan has gone through periods
of military rule and corrupt democratic regimes. The country has already been
divided into two, and the potential exists for further disintegration.
After more than fifty years of independence, many people, particularly
Indian Muslims, have raised the question, “Was it wise to divide British India
and create Pakistan?”61 After all, present Pakistan is far from the Islamic ideal
that many leaders of the Muslim League conceived before partition. So, was it
wise to establish Pakistan? This question itself deserves to be the subject of a
full-length dissertation, but any casual observer of current history cannot
ignore Pakistan’s role in Islamic revival in the twentieth century. Pakistan will
definitely play a significant role in the increasingly polarized Huntingtonian
clash of civilizational world politics.
Undoubtedly, Mawdudi has played the most significant role in the revival
of Muslims in the twentieth century. He couldn’t have achieved this without
Pakistan. As for democracy, one must note that the system will work only if it
is guided by ethical values. Unfortunately, most modern national democracies,
like classical Greek city-states, believe in relativism. As the Greek philosopher
Socrates rightly suggested, human behavior must be regulated in accordance

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with universal values. He also suggested that the highest form of excellence is
taking control of one’s life and shaping it according to ethical values reached
through reflection. But most modern democracies follow the teachings of the
Greek Sophists, rather than those teachings of Socrates. Has Indian democracy
brought any better fruits than Pakistan’s corrupt democratic and military rules?
Hardly. Pakistan has always recorded a higher GDP income than India, even
though Pakistan did not constitute the richest provinces of British India. Any
observer of these two countries will note that in terms of income distribution
within the two countries, Pakistan has done better. According to Transparency
International reports, the scale of corruption in the two countries is much the
same. However, the situation could have been different if Pakistan’s 1956
constitution were allowed to function: the constitution incorporated the
principles of modern democracy and Islamic ethical values. In analyzing the
current history of Pakistan, one must take these questions into account.

Endnotes
1. On the growth of the Muslim community in India, see Ishtiaq H. Qureshi, The
Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Sub-continent (610–1947): A Brief Historical
Survey (S. Gravenhage: Mouton, 1962).
2. It should be noted here that no Indian historian considers the more than thousand
years of Muslim rule of India as colonial rule, and many Hindus joined Muslims in their
struggle against the British.
3. This conflict has been referred as the “War of independence” by Pakistani
historians, and the “Mutiny” by British historians. In addition to these two terms, Indian
historians have used many other expressions such as “revolt,” uprising, etc.
4. See T. R. Metcalf, The Aftermath of Revolt: India 1857–1870 (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1964), 305–323.
5. Quoted in M. Rafique Afzal, Political Parties in Pakistan, 3 vols. (Islamabad:
National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1998), 1: 3.
6. On this controversy, see Ishtiaq H. Qureshi, 246–247.
7. Hindi and Urdu are similar when they are spoken, but Hindi is written in
Devanagri (an old Indian) and Urdu is written in Persian character.
8. Sayyid Amir Ali, Memoirs and other Writings of Ameer Ali, ed. Razi Wasti (Lahore:
Peoples Publishing House, 1968), 44.
9. Sayyid Amir Ali, “Memorial of the National Mohammedan Association Calcutta,” in
Ameer Ali: His Life and Works (Lahore: Publishers United, 1968), 27–32.
10. Christine E. Dobbin, Basic Documents in the Development of Modern India and
Pakistan 1835 –1947 (London: Van Nostrand, 1970), 8.
11. Quoted in S. A. Vahid, Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal (Lahore: Ashraf, 1964), 396.
12. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Speeches and Writings of Mr Jinnah, ed. Jamal ud-Din
Ahmad. 2 vols. (Lahore: Ashraf, 1096), I: 138.
13. See Sayyid Abul A‘la Mawdudi, Islamic Law and Constitution, ed, and tr.
Khurshid Ahmad, 2nd ed. (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1960), 15–16. In fact, one finds that
most of Mr Jinnah’s statements around 1947 were full commitments to Islamic laws and

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principles emphasizing the Islamic universal principles of justice, equality, morality, piety,
and tolerance irrespective of color, caste or creed. See Jamil ud-Din Ahmad, and Constituent
Assembly of Pakistan Debates (Karachi: The Government of Pakistan, 1947–1954.)
14. Nirod C. Chaudhuri, An Autobiography of an Unknown Indian (London:
Macmillan, 1951), 231.
15. Sayyid Abul A‘la Mawdudi, Mas”alaah-i-Qawmiyat, originally published in 1937.
Reprinted (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1967). An English translation is available:
Nationalism in India (Pathankot: Maktabah-i-Jama‘at-e-Islami, 1947).
16. Muhammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, Reprinted
(Delhi: Kitab Bhavan, 1981), 159.
17. W. C. Smith, Modern Islam in India (London: Victor Gollancz, 1946), 85.
18. Khalid B. Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1967), 51.
19. Ibid. 53.
20. Keith Callard, Pakistan: A Political Study (Oxford: Allen & Unwin, 1957), 14.
21. Eastern and Western Pakistan were separated by a thousand miles by the enemy
territory of India.
22. G. W. Choudhury, Constitutional Development in Pakistan (London: Longman,
1959), 65.
23. E. I. J. Rosenthal, Islam in the Modern Nation State (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1965), 70.
24. Quoted in G. W. Choudhury, 63–64.
25. Sayyid Abul A‘la Mawdudi, Islamic Law and its Introduction in Pakistan, tr. and
ed. Khurshid Ahmad (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1955), 5–6.
26. For the complete version of the resolution, see “Appendix 1” in Safdar Mahmood,
Pakistan: Political Roots & Development 1947–1999 (Karachi: Oxford University Press,
2000), 409–410.
27. Abul A‘la Mawdudi, Rasa ’il-o-Masa ”il, 2 vols. (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1970),
II: 410–411.
28. Safdar Mahmood, Pakistan: Political Roots & Development 1947–1999 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000), 41.
29. Most of Mawdudi’s works indicate that he favored British style parliamentary
democracy and, in the process, he believed, Pakistan would emerge as an Islamic state.
30. These were the only national political parties in Pakistan at that time. See, Rafiq
Afzal, I: 251 (note).
31. Quoted in Khalid B. Sayeed, 64
32. This statement was made in the Constituent Assembly on November 21, 1950 by
Nur Ahmad. See, in Keith Callard, 92.
33. Iftikhar H. Malik, State and Civil Society in Pakistan: Politics of Authority,
Ideology and Ethnicity (Oxford: Macmillan, 1997), 60.
34. On the growth of local elite under colonial rule, see Abdullah al-Ahsan,
“Elite-Formation Under Colonial Rule: Capable Administrators or Loyal Servants? A General
Survey of Colonial Rule in Muslim Countries,” in Islamic Studies 37:1 (1998): 29–55.
35. Iftikhar H. Malik, 61.
36. Keith Callard, 161.
37. On this subject see, Tahir Amin, Ethno-National Movements in Pakistan
(Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1988).
38. On education in Pakistan see the personal account of the Pakistani educator
Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, Education in Pakistan: An Inquiry into Objectives and
Achievements (Karachi: M‘aref, 1975).

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39. See his own book on the subject, Fazlur Rahman, New Education in the Making
of Pakistan (London: Cassell, 1953).
40. See, Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, “Educational Policies in Pakistan,” in Perspectives of
Islam and Pakistan (Karachi: Ma’aref, 1979), 45–62.
41. Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi, Education in Pakistan, 49–72.
42. Ibid. 70–71.
43. Ibid. 122–144.
44. Ibid. The author, who was vice-chancellor of a leading Pakistani university, quotes
one bureaucrat as saying to him that, “We should satisfy the hunger of the poor, luxuries
like education will come later.” See, Ibid. 218n. Another bureaucrat suggested he abolish
the departments of Arabic and Persian in order to overcome the university’s financial
burden. See, Ibid. 225 n.
45. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, New Pakistan (Washington DC: Embassy of Pakistan,
1973).
46. A New Beginning: Reforms Introduced by the People’s Government in Pakistan
December 20, 1971–April 20, 1972 (Islamabad: The Department of Films and Publications,
Government of Pakistan, 1972).
47. See, Khalid B. Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Directions of Change.
(New York: Praeger, 1980), 169.
48. See Tahir Amin, 171 quoting President of Pakistan: General Mohammad Zia ul
Haq: Interviews to Foreign Media, 3 vols. (Islamabad: Ministry of Information, Government
of Pakistan, n.d).
49. Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: Jama “at-I Islami
of Pakistan, (London: I. B. Tauris, 1994), 189.
50. Ibid. 194.
51. This is based on the author’s personal observation.
52. Quoted in Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Islam and Human Rights: Tradition and Politics,
2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 33.
53. Mumtaz Ahmad, “Islamization and Sectarian Violence in Pakistan,” in Intellectual
Discourse, Vol. VI, No. 1 (1998), 11–37: 34.
54. Abdul Rashid Moten, Revolution to Revolution: Jama “at-e-Islami in the Politics of
Pakistan (Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Book Trust, 2002), 52.
55. Ibid. 54.
56. Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, “Musings of a Student of History,” in Perspectives of Islam
and Pakistan, 173.
57. Fazlur Rahman, “Why I Left Pakistan: A Testament,” (A typed manuscript at Fazlur
Rahman Collection at ISTAC Library in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia). Only the first two pages of
the manuscript are available. The present author acknowledges his gratitude to ISTAC
authorities for letting him use their library.
58. Fazlur Rahman, “A Recent Controversy Over the Interpretation of Shura,” in
History of Religions, (1981): 291–301.
59. See Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, Ulema in Politics: A Study Relating to the Political
Activities of the Ulema in South Asian Subcontinent from 1566–1947 (Karachi: Ma‘aref,
1972), 339, 351.
60. There are numerous works on this subject. For two personal accounts by leading
Pakistani intellectuals about Mawdudi’s contribution see, Altaf Gauhar, “Mawlana Abul A‘la
Mawdudi — A Personal Account”; and A. K. Brohi, “Mawlana Abul A‘la Mawdudi: The Man,
the Scholar, the Reformer,” in Khurshid Ahmad and Zafar Ishaq Ansari ed. Islamic
Perspectives: Studies in Honour of Mawlana Sayyid Abul A“la Mawdudi (Leicester:
The Islamic Foundation, 1980), 265–312.

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61. Such a question has become relevant in the context of Pakistani attempt to win
the Miss International crown on September 30, 2002 in Tokyo, where a Pakistani organizer
claimed that, “If India can have so many beauty queens, why can’t we? That is like saying
if India can detonate a nuclear bomb, why can’t we?” See “Miss Pakistan’s Troubles, South
Asian Womanhood” in www.Islamonline.net/English/News/2002-09/28/article09.shtml

371