Cut Card Case Japan Aff

Conflict is based on vulnerabilities - japan vulnerable rn

Kinkaid affirms - Resolved: Japan should revise Article 9 of its Constitution to develop offensive
military capabilities.

The US is like an overinflated balloon - it’s an overstretched hegemon that can pop anytime
soon.

Indeed - Golub 22’ confirms: with COVID, the withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Ukrainian
invasion, and tensions with Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Venezuela, the United States is facing
too many perceived threats at once.

Crabtree continues - “ Washington risks damage to its credibility as their efforts look
insubstantial”

Schuman 22 concludes — the perception around the world that America is too divided and
overstretched to sustain its far-flung commitments has taken hold as Xi and Putin intensify their
efforts to roll back America”

Because inaction means incapacitation - Kinkaid affirms and:

Our Sole Contention is Deflating the Balloon

Scenario 1 is Russia
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is part of expansionist goals and risks global war. Hirsh on April 10th
confirms - Putin resurrected the threat of conquest and war, defying America with the invasion
of Ukraine. Putin is aiming to install a dark world order.

This PROVES the need for Japanese offense. Just a week ago, Lendon writes (April 28) - Russia
has been flexing muscles around Japan for years [with] numerous military drills, stepping up
military activities in the Far East. Flights by nuclear capable Russia near Japan airspace validates
Japan’s strategy to enhance deterrence.

Boosting offense through counter-strike capabilities is key. Takashi explained just last month - a
capability to attack an enemy’s command systems is now key due to the worsening security
environment around Japan, with China’s armed forces rapidly growing and Russia’s invasion and
encroachment. Thus, Japan needs to acquire strike capabilities, as rapid advances in tech, such
as hypersonics, make it extremely difficult for Japan to defend itself.

Thankfully, Lendon found just last week that Japanese offensive capabilities could be
implemented into the larger NATO framework, deterring Russian expansion.

Without affirming, the world is under threat. Sagan wrote just weeks ago that the threat that
Russia uses nuclear weapons to achieve their expansionist goals cannot be taken lightly,
concluding that Putin is the most dangerous man in the world.

Even one tactical nuke kills millions

Mosher concludes - even a single Russian nuclear strike would kill 91 million in 3 hours through the
direct impact, and it would escalate - drawing in the US and other countries, resulting in even more
deaths through nuclear winter, famine, and conflict.

Scenario 2 is China

China is using the war in Ukraine as a distraction for greater expansionist policies in
Eastern Asia.

Mosher 22 confirms Xi Jinping is sitting on a mountaintop watching tigers fight. Xi hopes to

launch his own attack against Taiwan while America’s attention shifts from Asia to Europe.

Dutton 22 confirms - China is ramping up Taiwanese aggression, flying 39 warplanes into the
country, due to U.S distraction with Russia and Ukraine, the largest convoy sent this year.

Overall, Guyoncourt 22 warns- The Russian invasion raised further unrest with China and
Taiwan, , providing the perfect opportunity for China to take Taiwan. How the West’s responds is
being watched Beijing considers Taiwan to be its territory it will retake by force.

Unfortunely, Fairless 21 explains- A9 prevents ICBMs and long range bombers from being
posesed by Japan.

Thankfully, A9 revision solves vulnerabilities

Chang from a day ago finds - The U.S DoD lacks adequate logistics capacity in Asia. China’s
increasingly accurate missiles can target military logistics networks - it will be vital for the U.S to
lean on indo-pacific allies, such as Japan, to shore up logistics in future conflict.

Caverley 20 confirms - Japan needs to consider a long-range strike option because

ground-based missiles are best to degrade China’s capabilities. Even if Japan’s defenses are
damaged, if China’s offensive is damaged, then the “theory of victory” will collapse.

Fish quantifies - A Taiwanese war would independently kill millions

And, Payne 16 concludes - both Russia and China, armed with chemical and biological weapons,
pursuing expansionist policies could lead to a war w/ death levels far beyond 100 million.

Extensions
Remember, Inaction means incapacitation, because if we don’t do anything, the world is likely to fall into
darkness. Right now, the US is extremely overstretched and is dealing with too many threats. Because of
this, our adversaries are now increasingly viewing the US as weak.

Russia Scenario
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is only the beginning of Putin’s expansionist plan. Russia has been flexing its
military muscle for years - stepping up military activity in the far East and in Japan’s airspace. Japanese
offense through counter-strike capabilities is key, as it would deter Russia by better equipping Japan to
face modernized technology. And, through NATO integration, Japan would help the west too. If we don’t
do anything, the threat of nuclear weapon use is high as Putin is willing to use nukes to achieve his
expansionist policies, and even just one nuke could kill more than 91 million people in three hours.

Zhong Guo Scenario

China is on the brink of invading Taiwan - as the world is focused on the embarrassing western response
to Ukraine - China has the perfect opportunity to invade Taiwan, which they see as Chinese territory.
Thankfully, A9 revision deters China, as their theory of victory collapses if Japan has the capability to
destroy their command systems using ICBMs. Japan is key - the US lacks capabilities in the indo-pacific
region and needs to have strong allies such as Japan. Without a deterrent, a Taiwan war independently
kills millions.

Payne -
And, Payne concludes that because of bio and chemical weapons, a war with China or Russia could kill
100 million people.

Extension
Russian ideology requires expansionist intervention, Ukraine proves. This is existential
risk. Russia has activated nuclear arsenal and will use it ---Proves Impact non-unique.

Aslan 2022 (Murat Aslan, graduated from the War College in 1991 and assumed varying tasks in the Turkish Armed Forces.
Aslan holds a PhD in International Relations from the Middle Eastern Technical University, areas of interest cover intelligence,
propaganda, defence, and security studies, currently a faculty member of Hasan Kalyoncu University and Researcher in Security
Studies Directorate at SETA Foundation. “The Urge to Kill to Survive: Russia’s Imperialist Expansionism Explained”
https://politicstoday.org/russia-putin-imperialist-expansionism-ukraine-war/ March 18th, 2022)//RJG

Russian political thinking praises Russian pride, but it is also concerned with survival. Russia needs a
story to keep its continent-sized territory functioning and to make its multiethnic yet Russified
demography resilient. The danger for the Russian leadership is to experience a further retreat that could
make Russia a loose state on the path of collapse. Such a concern makes Putin more assertive and
expansionist, mainly across Russia’s perceived sphere of influence.

For instance, Russia gained leverage after the Second Karabakh War by asserting its military presence
at the heart of Karabakh for an extendable five-year period. The Kazakhstan stalemate at the beginning
of 2022 presented another chance where Russia intervened in the Central Asian states in order to
maintain stability. Furthermore, these regions have energy reserves satisfying the appetite of energy
seekers as Russia indirectly prepared itself to challenge the energy demand of the broader globe.

Putin’s statements indicate a “nationalist imperialism,” which could have destructive consequences for
regional and global orders—let alone Russia itself. Putin’s inclination is nationalist since Russia is at the
core of his argument. On the other hand, nationalism in Russian thinking carries the risks of provoking
ultranationalism or Slavophobia once a success story is concluded by tangible gains.
The revisionism and irredentism of Russia reveal the limits of expansion over the borders of former USSR states, with minor alterations. The first
group of states are the ones that became NATO members after 1997, that were once the former “Allies of the Soviet Union” and that proceeded
with their democratic transition.

The second group are still struggling for a stable regime, like Belarus. Russia coerces these countries to have pro-Russian regimes. The final
group are countries squeezed between NATO and Russia, and not yet NATO member states, mainly Ukraine and Georgia.

Putin has employed strategies to destabilize these states through smart moves, which rest on five
political and military strategies. Russia successfully achieves these strategies by being more discreet in
terms of international law, at least, until the aggression against Ukraine, and exploiting strategic gaps and
vulnerabilities in those countries.

First, Russia does not hesitate to intervene militarily and support a pro-Russian regime through
political and military means, such as the case of Syria.

Second, Russian private military companies such as the Wagner Group are sent to war zones to
support pro-Russian figures such as Khalifa Haftar of Libya and attempt to encircle NATO for strategic
leverage such as the Russian military presence in Africa.

Third, mediation has become a primary effort to obtain political and military initiative, as was the case in
the Karabakh war and Syria.

Fourth, the Collective Security Treaty Organization has become the platform to inject Russian interests
and military presence.

Last, Russia has kept third parties silent through defense sales and military cooperation such as the
cases of China, India, and Egypt.
These cases show that Putin successfully employs political and military means by well-planned
strategies, the ultimate goal being the survival of Russia through nationalism and expansionism over
the Slavic states, and building a sphere of influence in its near abroad.

The Russian political goals in Ukraine are threefold. These are the fundamental tenets of the Russian
quest for domination: (1) Repelling the West, unified under the NATO umbrella, from Russia’s “borders”;
(2) Making the Russian identity dominant over Slavic nations, setting Ukraine as a lesson for the rest;
(3) Show the “able” Russia to the former members of the Soviet Union.

Russia needs a success story to achieve its goals and, as a result, Russia’s possible failure on the ground
may create undesirable consequences for the Russian identity, once Russians realize their country’s
weakness.

This may cause both a disillusionment and a subsequent dissolution in the pro-Russian regimes,
including Putin’s Russia. In this context and at this point, Russia’s coercive strategy over Ukraine and its
current war with Ukraine have turned to a matter of life and death.

Putin’s order to activate the Strategic Nuclear Forces escalated the military and political tension with
the West. Russia regularly updated its nuclear doctrine after 1993 so as to be able to use nuclear
weapons if it was not the first to do so. In this sense, Russia challenged the concepts of deterrence and
mutually assured destruction (MAD) for atomic warfare. The reason for such a preference would be the
following.

Russia knows that its conventional military inventory is aged and cannot win a a full-scale traditional
war despite its numeric superiority. Modern warfare, including proxy, hybrid, and asymmetric, defy the
Russian conventional capabilities, but the West, or NATO, may hesitate to respond to a nuclear threat.

Nuclear warfare includes tactical and operational assets other than strategic assets. The slow pace of the
Russian advance may need a tactical nuclear attack to create a gap in the defense lines of the weaker
but stubborn Ukrainian forces. Urban warfare is costly for the Russian conventional forces.

A tactical or operational nuclear attack may clear the cities and push the Ukrainian leadership to
accept Russian terms. In short, Russian aggression over Ukraine is related to its expansionism inspired
by a political logic based on nationalist imperialism. The primary motivation is to revive Russia’s
modern imperialism across its sphere of influence. However, despite Putin’s imperial quest, Russia lacks
capacity to sustain a full-scale expansionism due to limited economic diversity, ageing weaponry, and an
inconsistent strategy-making process.

Extension
Putin’s invasion is an attempt to re-establish Russian empire over all Slavic peoples.
Wang 2022 (Jack Wang, Editor of News and Content for the University of Chicago, BA
from UC Berkeley in English. “How Putin’s invasion of Ukraine connects to 19th-century
Russian imperialism”
https://news.uchicago.edu/story/putin-invasion-ukraine-russian-empire-19th-century-i
mperialism-history March 7th, 2022)//RJG
In late February, Vladimir Putin sent Russian troops into Ukraine, sparking a humanitarian crisis that,
according to many scholars and analysts, has upended a decades-old global order.

But while some have characterized the conflict as a return to the Cold War, one University of Chicago
historian has argued that we must look further back. According to Prof. Faith Hillis, Putin doesn’t seek to
resurrect the Soviet Union, but rather 19th-century imperialism—a threat made even more dangerous
by modern surveillance technology.

“I think he wants to reconstitute the Russian Empire and its guiding ideologies, which were orthodoxy,
autocracy and nationality—except now, under the power of a very sophisticated police state,” said Hillis,
a professor of modern Russian history.

She examined the ongoing crisis in Ukraine during a March 4 discussion with UChicago political scientist
Monika Nalepa. In an event hosted by the University’s Graham School, the two scholars analyzed the
historical and political context for Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine.

Hillis emphasized that the current invasion is a result of Putin’s intolerance for Ukrainian
sovereignty—not the inevitable outcome of historical or cultural trends. Yet history can help us
understand why the Russian president is so “obsessed” with Ukraine, she said.

People in modern Ukraine and Russia both trace their countries’ origins to ninth-century Kyiv—a legacy
Hillis explores further in her book Children of Rus’. Although Ukraine produced a number of notable
communist leaders, and served as a major center of Soviet agriculture and industry, the region has also
been resistant to Soviet rule. Ukraine’s recent efforts to strengthen its Western alliances, Nalepa added,
have also threatened Putin’s view of the country as “a buffer between himself and the West.”

Putin has criticized the USSR in his speeches, Hillis noted, and his ideology seems to fall more in line
with those of 19th-century Slavophiles—a group that championed Russia’s differences from the West
while flattening differences among Slavic peoples. “It’s often put in a kind of condescending way, that
Ukrainians’ differences are kind of cute or childlike, but Russia is the big brother,” Hillis said. “It preaches
essentially that all the Slavs are a single nation.”

Ext
Russia will use nuclear weapons
Sagan, Prof. Political Science – Stanford, and DeWitte, April 20, 2022
[Sagan is also the Caroline S.G. Munro Professor in Political Science in the School of Humanities and Sciences, the Mimi and Peter Haas
University Fellow in Undergraduate Education, and a senior fellow at CISAC and the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford
University. APRIL 20, 2022, https://news.stanford.edu/2022/04/20/u-s-must-can-prevent-russian-military-crossing-nuclear-threshold/ BY
MELISSA DE WITTE]
Is Putin’s nuclear threat working?
Only in part. President Joe Biden did rule out direct engagement when he said the U.S. and NATO would
not enforce a “no-fly zone” over the Ukraine. That policy would have meant that NATO aircraft would be
shooting down Russian aircraft, which of course is an act of war, creating the risk of escalation.
But Putin’s threats did not deter Washington and many NATO governments from “interfering” in Moscow’s attempt to
overthrow the Zelensky government in many other ways, short of direct combat with the Russians. We have given the
Ukrainian government millions of dollars’ worth of weapons, including air defense systems and advanced anti-tank
missiles, and have provided intelligence support. Without such rapid resupply of military equipment, the Ukrainians might well have
lost the war already. Now they have turned back the Russian assault on Kyiv and Putin appears to have shifted his war
aims from overthrowing the elected Ukrainian government to “liberating” the Donbas in Eastern Ukraine and
possibly annexing it into Russia as he did with Crimea in 2014.
CIA director William Burns recently said, “None of us can take lightly the threat posed by a potential [Russian] resort
to tactical nuclear weapons or low-yield nuclear weapons.” Are you worried about the Russians using nuclear weapons against the
Ukrainians if the war continues to go badly for Moscow?
Yes. I recently argued in Foreign Affairs that Putin is the most dangerous man in the world. Putin could order the Russian
military to drop a single nuclear bomb on a Ukrainian city to try to coerce the Zelensky government into immediately surrendering. This
frightening scenario is not fanciful. It is, after all, effectively what the United States did to Japan in 1945.

AT: Japan will go imperial

Offensive capabilities would require US agreement – no risk imperial japan
However, even if Japan were to acquire such counterattack capabilities, it seems unlikely that, in the case
of a conflict, the JSDF would attack enemy missile sites and/or mobile launchers without first getting
support from the United States. Without its own sufficient intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) capabilities, cooperation with the U.S. military would therefore continue to be of the utmost
importance for Japan to gather intelligence and detect potential targets.

I-Law
Russian invasion of Ukraine proves I-Law dead. Ignored in squo and states always defer
to regional hegemons meaning enforcement impossible.

Alexander 2022 (Atul Alexander, Atul Alexander is an Assistant Professor (Law) at the
West Bengal National University of Juridical Sciences, Kolkata, and a member of the
European Society of International Law. “International law’s failure to halt Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine reflects hegemony wielded by powerful nations”
https://www.nationalheraldindia.com/india/international-laws-failure-to-halt-russias-inv
asion-of-ukraine-reflects-hegemony-wielded-by-powerful-nations March 1st,
2022)//RJG
The ongoing Russian aggression in Ukraine has captured the spotlight in the past weeks, with
condemnation pouring from all corners. However, Russia seems least concerned and is going on a
rampage, capturing major cities of Ukraine.

International organisations and nations have registered their outcry. For instance, the United Nations
Secretary-General’s [UNSG] statement reflected the gravity of the crisis: the UNSG termed the whole
crisis as a ‘…moment of peril’.

Nevertheless, attempts to halt Russia’s unabated attack appear futile. The unilateral sanctions of the
US and its western allies targeting Russia have made very little inroads in terms of deterring Russia’s
attitude. The United Nations [UN] Security Council failed to pass an effective resolution courtesy the
Russian veto.

States are, moreover, reluctant to pre-empt any measures as Russian President Vladimir Putin has
warned that “anyone who would consider interfering from the outside – if you do, you will face the
consequences greater than any you have faced in history”.
Because of the ideological split, States are less eager to intervene as they did in previous instances, namely, Libya, Iraq and Afghanistan, among others. The president of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, criticised the lackadaisical mindset of the UN as “international inaction over Russian aggression in Ukraine would fuel the rise of instability and authoritarianism around the world”.
Ukraine has always been a nation of strategic interest for Russia as it bridges Russia and Europe. The disputed region of Donbas, located in Eastern Ukraine bordering Russia, is predominantly populated with Russian ethnic groups with a shared Russian cultural identity. According to Ukraine, Russians are behind the training of armed rebels in Eastern Ukraine. After Ukraine became a
separate country on August 24, 1991, its policy as late as 2014 was influenced by Russia. The former president of Ukraine, Victor Yanukovych, hailing from the communist party, had a strong Soviet leaning. In 2010, Yanukovych’s move to extend its naval base to Russia in the Black Sea in exchange for Russia’s offer to cut the price of natural gas was widely perceived as Ukraine stooping
to the demands of the Russian Federation, and the Constitutional amendment pertaining to the removal of the president did not go well with the people. Yanukovych mulled over the European Union [EU] association agreement to recapture the public trust. With mounting pressure from Russia, Yanukovych opted out of the agreement; the decision snowballed into the ‘Euromaidan
movement’, and subsequently, Yanukovych fled the country. In 2014, Petro Porasheko took over as president, his credentials being pro-American. The pro-American stance exasperated the Russians to fuel rebels in the Ukrainian territory of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. With a controversial referendum, Russia captured Crimea on March 16, 2014 and created a division in Eastern
Ukraine, that is, the region of Donbas, where the battle is presently waged. In the meantime, the United States, since Ukraine became a separate State, was curious in its affairs: for instance, the US immediately recognised Ukraine post the disintegration of the Soviet Union, assisted Ukraine and Russia in reaching an agreement on the elimination of the Soviet weapon system in
Ukraine, and by 1997, the NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]-Ukraine partnership started emerging. Despite exuding interest in Ukraine, the paradox is that NATO has displayed mixed signals to Ukraine regarding NATO membership. The NATO Charter provides for collective security measures if one of the NATO members is attacked; by this logic, if Ukraine is allowed to join
NATO, the latter is required to wage a full-fledged war with Russia, which because of their trade ties with Russia, NATO member States it wants to avoid. The US is less keen as it does not want a repeat of the Afghanistan fiasco. Therefore, it is evident that although most powerful States have expressed concern, solidarity and enforced unilateral sanctions targeting Russia, there is an
absence of tangible push from the NATO member States because of the larger geopolitical dividends. With the two Minsk Agreements failing to achieve consensus, the Russian aggression was a matter of time.

The escalating tensions led the Russians to launch a full-blown attack on Ukraine. This raises the
question of violations of international law. Under the UN Charter’s Article 2(4), States are proscribed
from the threat or use of force.

The two exceptions to this are, a) Security Council authorisation under Chapter VII of the Charter, which
requires explicit authorisation from the Security Council, including its Permanent members, which in the
current scenario is unlikely courtesy the Russian Veto, b) Self-Defence under Article 51 of the Charter,
which has to meet the parameters of necessity and proportionality.

Interestingly, Russia has taken the defence of self-defence, claiming that Ukraine may acquire nuclear
weapons with the aid of western allies: in short, a case of pre-emptive self-defence. The burden is upon
Russia to justify force in the pretext of self-defence; this contention may be untenable considering that
the unabated attacks don’t qualify the requirement of proportionality or necessity.

To curb the violations of international law, the Security Council passes resolutions authorising measures
like economic blockade and, in extreme cases, authorising the ‘use of force’.

For instance, the Security Council adopted Resolution 680 in 1990 in the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion
of Kuwait, which endorsed ‘all necessary means’ to force Iraq out of Kuwait.

On expected lines, the US and Albania sponsored a resolution on Ukraine on February 25: the resolution
in substance required the complete withdrawal of Russian military forces within Ukraine, full
implementation of the Minsk Agreements, and respect for human rights and humanitarian law.
During the Security Council negotiations, the divide amongst the States was obvious: China
recommended a less coercive Chapter VI resolution and thereby abstained in the voting process, and
India stuck to its customary neutral stance.

The resolution was further watered down, as the primary focus was on ‘constructive engagement and
dialogue’ rather than any expeditious actions. The resolution eventually was blocked by Russia.

Australian international law researcher Rebecca Barber makes an intriguing contention on the role that
United Nations General Assembly [UNGA] could play in line with the Uniting for Peace Resolution [UPR].
The UPR, introduced in 1950 in the backdrop of the Korean War, was aimed at circumventing the Security
Council’s permanent members’ Veto. The invocation of UPR implies that if the Security Council fails to
discharge its primary function of maintaining international peace and security, the UNGA can intervene
and recommend collective measure (such as the 2010 Kosovo Advisory Opinion). However, it is to be
noted that the UNGA’S opinion forms a mere recommendation.

Moreover, Ukraine in 2017 instituted proceedings at the International Court of Justice [ICJ] ‘with regard
to alleged violations of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism
(ICSFT) and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD).’

Although it has been nearly five years since the filing of the application, very little progress has been
made since. Even if the decision of the ICJ turns out in favour of Ukraine, the enforcement of the
judgment necessitates the backing of the UN Security Council.

Additionally, on February 27, Ukraine approached the ICJ alleging that Russia must be held accountable
for manipulating the notion of genocide to justify aggression. Whatever the outcome of these cases is,
the endgame seems miles away.

International law’s structural failure to arrest Russia’s progress in Ukraine reflects the hegemony
wielded by powerful States. If there ought to be everlasting peace in the region, the international
community should rally behind Ukraine.
(DON'T READ) First Contention is US Overstretch

Golub 22’ finds: “with COVID, the withdrawal from Afghanistan, [and] tensions with Cuba, Iran,
North Korea and Venezuela, the United States is an overstretched hegemon facing too many
perceived threats at once.”

Shuman 22’ continues: “the perception around the world that America is too divided,
overstretched, and weary to sustain its far-flung commitments seems to have taken hold within
the Chinese leadership”

For a revisionist China, this opens the door to violent expansion. Sidaras 18’ continues that “PRC
expansion will continue, and the South China Sea is just the beginning. The security
environment will continue to destabilize until a regional actor like Japan can offset the PRC”

The ONLY solution to prevent war is to rely on strong allies. Cordesman 22’ finds that “to
address strategic competition, the U.S. needs to exercise ‘strategic triage’ to balance spending
and create real-world strategic partnerships with allied states.” Article 9 reinterpretation
represents this solution in two ways,

However, the aff allows the US to retrench, consolidate troops, and provide strong deterrence in
regional theaters. Bandow 22’ finds that “Adjusting foreign policy to reflect available resources
is the only way to avoid catastrophic failure. The US is juggling the possibility of at least four
wars at once in Europe, Taiwan, Iran, [and] North Korea by mistake as well as intent. However,
great powers can prosper from retrenchment – by incrementally shifting burdens to regional
allies and multilateral institutions, the United States can strengthen the credibility of its core
commitments while accommodating the interests of a rising China.”

Secondly, Fostering Regional Alliances

US overstretch risks disintegrating the US alliance system, as Shuman 22’ continues that “the
mere perception of weakness could unravel the strained networks and alliances that support
the American world order and usher in a new era of global conflict and instability.”

However, an offensive Japan that is able to offer security commitments to others could bolster
regional alliances in Southeast Asia. Suzuki 20’ finds that “economic support over a half century
ha[s] helped maintain a high level of confidence in Japan among Southeast Asian countries.
Japan should take the lead in strengthening security cooperation – it is necessary to build a
network of middle powers and carefully engage China with an eye toward shaping a multipolar
Indo-Pacific.”

Indeed, Leaf 14’ corroborates that “Japan’s military normalization portends the creation of a
new alliance system in Asia. Countries may oppose Chinese ascendancy if a waning U.S. has
sufficient support, such as a stronger and more flexible Japan anchoring multilateral alliances in
Asia.”

Crabtree 21(James Crabtree, 27 June 2021, "A Confused Biden Team Risks Losing Southeast Asia," Foreign Policy,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/06/27/southeast-asia-asean-china-us-biden-blinken-confusion-geopolitics/, DOA: 3-11-2022) //SM
May 25 was hardly a bravura day for U.S. diplomacy in Southeast Asia. Foreign ministers from the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) gathered for their first virtual meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken. Having waited the best part of an hour, they
learned a technical snafu would stop Blinken from participating in the call, which he had been due to join from his airplane as he flew off to the
Middle East. A few weeks later, the same group of ASEAN ministers flew off to enjoy red carpet treatment and a productive, snafu-free,
in-person meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi. The contrast between the two episodes was not hard to spot. Southeast Asia is an
important front line in a new era of geopolitical competition between China and the United States. U.S. President Joe Biden took office with
plenty of goodwill across the region. Its leaders hoped Biden would be less erratic than former U.S. President Donald Trump and more willing to
six months into Biden’s tenure, and that goodwill is
commit time to economic and diplomatic engagement. Yet

ebbing away. In its place, a sense of disappointment is taking hold amid talk about a lack of
U.S. focus and confused objectives. If Biden cannot soon find that focus again, Washington risks damage to
its credibility in the region—and further creeping Chinese influence. The region should matter in
Washington. It contains two U.S. allies: the Philippines and Thailand. There are other major partners too, including Indonesia, Singapore, and
Vietnam. Yet economic ties in all these countries have shifted toward China as of late. Closer diplomatic ties are likely to follow in many cases,
absent concerted U.S. action. Few regional policymakers relish a possible future under China’s sway and mostly want to maintain a balance
between the two superpowers—which means they want the United States to stay closely engaged in regional affairs. But it is for precisely this
reason that Southeast Asia is so attuned to signs of distraction or muddled thinking in Washington. Blinken’s technical snafu hardly helped.
Beyond the show of sheer incompetence, the fact that Blinken couldn’t participate in the ASEAN meeting as he was heading to Israel only acted
as a reminder that U.S. commitments elsewhere distract attention from Asia. Despite more talk of a new focus on the Indo-Pacific, the U.S.
Defense Department also moved its only aircraft carrier in the western Pacific region last month back to support U.S. troops leaving Afghanistan,
sending an equally confusing signal. Individual countries have similar stories, including Indonesia, the region’s largest economy. Its foreign
minister, Retno Marsudi, recently headed to the United States for a United Nations meeting on Palestine. While there, she failed to secure a
meeting with Blinken, causing embarrassment in Jakarta. Biden’s problems are not all of his own making. Southeast Asia is littered with U.S.
ambassadorial postings that have been unfilled since the Trump years. Pandemic restrictions also mean there are few big diplomatic gatherings
U.S. leaders can actually attend in person to demonstrate their commitment to the region. U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin had planned to
lead a large delegation in June to the annual Shangri-La Dialogue convened by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in Singapore
(which I helped organize)—until the resurgent COVID-19 pandemic forced its cancellation. Other problems, however, are self-inflicted. Biden has
put little effort into calling Southeast Asian leaders. Those empty ambassadorial posts are not being filled in any hurry. There have been other
opportunities to show leadership too—for instance, after the coup in Myanmar. But the U.S. response to the Myanmar crisis has been muted,
with Washington playing a relatively minor diplomatic role. At a wider regional level, there has been nothing close to Washington’s
demonstration of its commitment to Europe at the recent G-7, NATO, and U.S.-European Union summits. U.S. strategists are not blind to these
problems. In the absence of visits from more senior figures, the administration dispatched U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman to
visit Jakarta, Bangkok, and Phnom Penh in late May and early June—a low-profile trip that seemed to go well enough. Elsewhere, the
confirmation of Daniel Kritenbrink as the State Department’s top official for East Asia should help improve policy coordination, not least given
Kritenbrink’s background as a recent ambassador to Vietnam. Yet these efforts look insubstantial compared to China’s
more energetic regional courtship.

Michael Schuman, January 13, 2022, “China Is Watching Ukraine With a Lot of Interest,” The Atlantic,
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2022/01/china-ukraine-putin-xi-jinping/621206//

That makes the Ukraine crisis a crucial test of American global power. Four years of Donald Trump’s “America First” chaos abroad, combined
with political and social polarization and a failed response to the coronavirus pandemic at home, have fueled the
perception around
the world that America is a superpower on its last legs—one too divided, overstretched, and just plain weary to
sustain its far-flung commitments. This narrative, which Biden’s botched withdrawal from Afghanistan only reinforced, seems
to have taken hold within the Chinese leadership and has become a regular theme of official propaganda. As Xi, Putin,
and other autocrats intensify their efforts to roll back American power, the U.S. is facing the stiffest challenge to its
global primacy since the fall of the Soviet Union.
[https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/27/asia/russia-threat-japan-naval-exercises-intl-hnk-ml/index.html By Brad Lendon and Emiko Jozuka, CNN
Updated 2:54 AM ET, Thu April 28, 2022]

Russia has been flexing its military muscles around Japan for the past few years, analysts said. Satoru Mori,
professor of contemporary international politics at Keio University in Japan, said there had been numerous Russian
provocations in the past few months, like military drills on the disputed islands and tests of submarine-launched cruise missiles in the
Sea of Japan. Analysis: Japan's tough talk on Russia is really about China "Russia has been stepping up military activities in the

vicinity of Japan probably to demonstrate its ability to operate in the Far East even in the midst of invading Ukraine," Mori
said. Thompson says the Russian threats go back further, noting over the past several years flights by nuclear-capable Russian
bombers near Japanese airspace and cooperation with China in aviation and naval exercises, including a joint Russian-Chinese naval
circumnavigation of Japan's main island of Honshu in 2021. "This is Japan responding to dynamics that began with the strengthening of
Russia-China military cooperation," Thompson said. "That's the change that's driving Japanese defense planning and political resourcing, rather
than a direct response to these latest Russian threats," he said. "If anything it validates Japan's strategy to enhance its own
ability to deter[ence] the use of military force against it."
CNN's Jorge Engels contributed to this article.

Cut Card Case

Contention - Russian Expansionism

Russian invasion of Ukraine is part of Russian expansionist goal that destroys

international law and the liberal world world order risking global nuclear war

Hirsh April 10th (Michael Hirsh, a senior correspondent at Foreign Policy. “The Month That Changed a Century”
https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/10/russia-ukraine-war-postwar-global-order-civilization/ April 10th, 2022)//RJG

In little more than a month, Russian President Vladimir Putin has changed the
course of this young and already troubled century.
He has resurrected the threat of territorial conquest and nuclear war. He has jolted Western Europe awake from its long
postwar torpor, raising the prospect of rapid German rearmament. He has put the capstone on two decades of U.S. misdirection by defying
American power and influence.
Above all, with his invasion of Ukraine, Putin is trying to complete work on a vast project of destruction implicitly supported by
several other world leaders, especially Chinese President Xi Jinping. Together, these leaders want to break what they see as U.S.
hegemony over the international system and undermine the notion that the world is bound by a
common set of values embodied in international law and upheld by institutions such as the United Nations.
The new world order they are aiming to install is dominated by competing—and increasingly
autocratic—civilizations, each controlling its own geopolitical space. Putin plainly intends that a greater
Russia encompassing at least part of Ukraine will be one of these, giving brutal resonance to his 2020 declaration that
“Russia is not just a country. It’s really a separate civilization.”
“This struggle should be viewed in civilizational, not just geopolitical, terms,” said Charles Kupchan, a former senior U.S. official and now scholar
at Georgetown University. “It is at once and the same time sui generis, particular to Putin and Russia, but also is part of a broader increase in
ethnonationalism and its role in global politics, as well as the backlash to globalization.”
Can Putin still succeed—despite the bloody shambles he has made of his would-be conquest so far? The outcome remains up in the
air and, with it, the shape of a post-World War II world that many experts believed was, prior to Putin’s invasion, still functioning in spite of the
many failures of globalization and democracy in the last two decades.

Russian expansion PROVES need for Japanese offense –critical to deterrence against
expansionist nuclear russia

Lendon & Jazuka, April 28, 2022.

[https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/27/asia/russia-threat-japan-naval-exercises-intl-hnk-ml/index.html By Brad Lendon and Emiko Jozuka, CNN
Updated 2:54 AM ET, Thu April 28, 2022]

Russia has been flexing its military muscles around Japan for the past few years, analysts said. Satoru Mori,
professor of contemporary international politics at Keio University in Japan, said there had been numerous Russian
provocations in the past few months, like military drills on the disputed islands and tests of submarine-launched cruise missiles in the
Sea of Japan.

Analysis: Japan's tough talk on Russia is really about China

"Russia has been stepping up military activities in the vicinity of Japan probably to demonstrate its ability
to operate in the Far East even in the midst of invading Ukraine," Mori said.
Thompson says the Russian threats go back further, noting over the past several years flights by
nuclear-capable Russian bombers near Japanese airspace and cooperation with China in aviation and
naval exercises, including a joint Russian-Chinese naval circumnavigation of Japan's main island of
Honshu in 2021.
"This is Japan responding to dynamics that began with the strengthening of Russia-China military
cooperation," Thompson said.
"That's the change that's driving Japanese defense planning and political resourcing, rather than a direct
response to these latest Russian threats," he said. "If anything it validates Japan's strategy to enhance its
own ability to deter the use of military force against it."
CNN's Jorge Engels contributed to this article.

And, boosting offense key because of counter-strike capabilities – now critical

Takahashi, April 22, 2022.

[https://thediplomat.com/2022/04/defense-panel-within-japans-ruling-party-urges-tokyo-to-acquire-counterattack-capability/
Defense Panel Within Japan’s Ruling Party Urges Tokyo to Acquire ‘Counterattack Capability’ The proposal, which stretches the
limits of Japan’s defense-oriented security policy, will inform the government’s long-term National Security Strategy. Kosuke
Takahashi By Kosuke Takahashi April 22, 2022, Kosuke Takahashi is Tokyo Correspondent for Janes Defence Weekly.]

A special panel on national security within Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has drawn up a draft proposal urging Tokyo to provide
the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) with what they call a “counterattack capability,” including the capability to attack an
enemy’s command and control systems [and] military bases.
If adopted by the administration of Prime Minister Kishida Fumio, such a new counterforce strike capability would be a big
departure from Japan’s exclusively defense-oriented policy in the post-war period defined by the nation’s pacifist constitution.
The move comes amid the worsening security environment surrounding Japan, forcing Tokyo to look more deeply at its
military preparedness. In short, China’s armed forces are rapidly growing in power at a time when Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine has raised renewed security concerns in the Pacific. Russia is a Pacific nation as well, with a Pacific coastline
and a longstanding territorial dispute with Japan.
In addition, the growing nuclear and missile threats from North Korea, as exemplified by its intercontinental ballistic missile
test-launch last month, have inevitably forced Tokyo to pursue the capability to hit back at enemy bases to respond to a ballistic
or cruise missile attack.
Panel members, including former defense minister and panel chairman Onodera Itsunori, spoke to reporters on April 21 at LDP headquarters in
Japan’s exclusively defense-oriented security policies, they said that the government needs to improve
Tokyo. While stressing the limits of
deterrence by acquir[e]ing strike capabilities, because rapid advances in missile technology, such as
hypersonic[s] glide vehicles, make it extremely difficult for Japan to defend itself with its current interception
systems. Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month.
However, even if Japan were to acquire such counterattack capabilities, it seems unlikely that, in the case of a conflict, the JSDF would attack
enemy missile sites and/or mobile launchers without first getting support from the United States. Without its own sufficient intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, cooperation with the U.S. military would therefore continue to be of the utmost importance
for Japan to gather intelligence and detect potential targets.
The panel, the LDP’s Research Commission on Security, also called for Tokyo to increase defense expenditure to over 2 percent of gross domestic
product within five years, up from the long-standing cap of around 1 percent of GDP.
“With the defense spending target of more than 2 percent of GDP for NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) nations in mind, our country
also aims to realize that the budget meets a level necessary to fundamentally reinforce defense capabilities in five years,” the draft proposal
said. Defense Minister Kishi Nobuo said in January that Japan’s ratio of defense spending to GDP in fiscal year 2021 already reached 1.24 percent
based on NATO standards. For the first time, the panel described China as a “grave threat” and Russia as a “real threat” in
Japan’s security, in addition to existing threats from North Korea. The proposal will be submitted to Kishida next week,
so it can be reflected in both the party’s campaign manifesto for the upper house election in July and the government’s review of the long-term
National Security Strategy. The latter is scheduled to be finalized by the end of the year.

Japan would integrate offensive capabilities into larger, unified NATO framework –
critical to checking Russian expansion
Lendon & Jazuka, April 28, 2022.
[https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/27/asia/russia-threat-japan-naval-exercises-intl-hnk-ml/index.html By Brad Lendon and Emiko Jozuka, CNN
Updated 2:54 AM ET, Thu April 28, 2022]

Drew Thompson, a senior research fellow at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore,
echoed those thoughts, saying increased military cooperation with the US is the sensible thing for Tokyo to do.
"Japan is slowly awakening to the security threats on its periphery, and it's doing so in a predictable and transparent way
consistent with a democracy," Thompson said.
Cmdr. Hayley Sims, spokesperson for the US 7th Fleet based in Japan, described the joint exercises in the Sea of Japan in early April as "routine
bilateral operations."
"Our trainingenhances the credibility of conventional deterrence by demonstrating the strength of our
bilateral partnerships," Sims said.
But Russia has a different viewpoint.
"I think it really does show the increased jumpiness of the Russian side, their tendency now to view actions in their vicinity as always being
potentially offensive," Brown said. He said increased Japanese cooperation with NATO allies including Britain and France,
countries with which Russia has disputes in Europe, exacerbate tensions in the Pacific.
"One thing that the Russians really dislike is that Japan in recent years has been strengthening
cooperation with other countries beyond the United States," Brown said.
Russian provocations
Russia has been flexing its military muscles around Japan for the past few years, analysts said.
Satoru Mori, professor of contemporary international politics at Keio University in Japan, said there had been numerous Russian
provocations in the past few months, like military drills on the disputed islands and tests of submarine-launched cruise missiles
in the Sea of Japan.
Russia will use nuclear weapons
Sagan, Prof. Political Science – Stanford, and DeWitte, April 20, 2022
[Sagan is also the Caroline S.G. Munro Professor in Political Science in the School of Humanities and Sciences, the Mimi and Peter Haas
University Fellow in Undergraduate Education, and a senior fellow at CISAC and the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford
University. APRIL 20, 2022, https://news.stanford.edu/2022/04/20/u-s-must-can-prevent-russian-military-crossing-nuclear-threshold/ BY
MELISSA DE WITTE]

Is Putin’s nuclear threat working?

Only in part. President Joe Biden did rule out direct engagement when he said the U.S. and NATO would not enforce a “no-fly zone” over the
Ukraine. That policy would have meant that NATO aircraft would be shooting down Russian aircraft, which of course is an act of war, creating the
risk of escalation.

But Putin’s threats did not deter Washington and many NATO governments from “interfering” in Moscow’s attempt to
overthrow the Zelensky government in many other ways, short of direct combat with the Russians. We have given the
Ukrainian government millions of dollars’ worth of weapons, including air defense systems and advanced anti-tank
missiles, and have provided intelligence support. Without such rapid resupply of military equipment, the Ukrainians might well have
lost the war already. Now they have turned back the Russian assault on Kyiv and Putin appears to have shifted his war
aims from overthrowing the elected Ukrainian government to “liberating” the Donbas in Eastern Ukraine and
possibly annexing it into Russia as he did with Crimea in 2014.
CIA director William Burns recently said, “None of us can take lightly the threat posed by a potential [Russian] resort
to tactical nuclear weapons or low-yield nuclear weapons.” Are you worried about the Russians using nuclear weapons against the
Ukrainians if the war continues to go badly for Moscow?
Yes. I recently argued in Foreign Affairs that Putin is the most dangerous man in the world. Putin could order the Russian
military to drop a single nuclear bomb on a Ukrainian city to try to coerce the Zelensky government into immediately surrendering. This
frightening scenario is not fanciful. It is, after all, effectively what the United States did to Japan in 1945.

China is using the war in Ukraine as a distraction for greater expansionist policies in
Eastern Asia.

Mosher 22

[With US distracted by Ukraine, Xi is plotting his own invasion, Steven W. Mosher, March 5, 2022
https://nypost.com/2022/03/05/with-us-distracted-by-ukraine-china-plots-its-own-invasion/] /cw
Xi Jinping is acting out an ancient Chinese stratagem. It’s called “Sitting on the mountaintop watching the tigers
fight.” Or, as we say in the US, albeit much less poetically: “Let’s you and him fight.” From his perch on the mountaintop, Xi is closely following
the fighting in Ukraine and the world’s reaction. There is no doubt Xi hopes that Russian President Vladimir Putin succeeds in taking the former
Xi hopes one day soon to launch his own [attack] “special military action” against the island of
Soviet country. After all,
Taiwan. China’s strategic alliance with Russia has already begun to pay dividends for Xi: Putin’s Ukrainian adventure has diverted
America’s attention from Asia to Europe. President Biden’s State of the Union address on Tuesday night hammered Russia on
Ukraine for minutes on end. China, where a deadly virus originated that killed millions across the world, was scarcely mentioned.

Dutton 22 confirms -
Dutton 22 [Chinese Military Jets Fly Near Taiwan As U.S. Distracted By Ukraine
JACK DUTTON 1/24/22 https://www.newsweek.com/chinese-military-jets-fly-near-taiwan-u-s-distracted-ukraine-1672155] /cw
While the U.S. is distracted with trying to avert a war between Russia and Ukraine, China is ramping up its
aggression towards Taiwan, flying 39 warplanes into [Taiwan] the island's air defense identification zone (ADIZ) on
Sunday night. The Chinese sortie included 24 J-16 fighter jets, 10 J-10 fighter jets, two Y-9 transport aircraft, two Y-8 anti-submarine
warning aircraft, and one nuclear-capable H-6 bomber, Taiwan's Defense Ministry said in a statement on Sunday. It was the largest
convoy of aircraft China had sent towards the island this year. The statement said that Taiwan scrambled its own military
aircraft in response tomonitor the sortie's activities and the Taiwanese Air Force tracked the People's Liberation Army planes on its radar.

Overall, Guyoncourt 22 warns-

Guyoncourt 22, "US shows support for Taiwan amid tensions with China after Russian invasion of Ukraine,”
https://inews.co.uk/news/china-invade-taiwan-will-russia-ukraine-war-smokescreen-invasion-explained-1493621
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has caused turmoil in the West and raised the spectre of further unrest in Asia with the focus
turning to China and Taiwan. How the West responds to the Ukraine situation is being closely watched in both
Beijing and Taipei, as the sovereign state fights to defend its independence. Some fear [with the] world focus[ed] on the
Russia-Ukraine war could provide[s] the perfect opportunity for China to take on Taiwan. Here is what we
know so far. What is the situation between China and Taiwan? China sees Taiwan as a breakaway province which will eventually be reunited with
the mainland. At the end of the Second World War, the Republic of China (ROC) took control of Taiwan. When the ROC lost mainland China to
Beijing
the Chinese Community Party in 1949, it retreated to Taiwan. Since then the political status of Taiwan has remained contentious.
considers Taiwan to be a territory it will ultimately retake, by force if necessary. But Taiwanese people disagree and
the current president Tsai Ing-wen and her party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), lean towards official independence from China with
Taiwan arguing it is a sovereign state. The United States has become one of the main providers of arms and support to Taiwan. Why are there
fears China may invade Taiwan? In recent months, China has increased its military activity around Taiwan. [and] On the day Russian troops
invaded Ukraine, nine Chinese aircraft were reported to have entered Taiwan’s air defense zone. President Tsai Ing-wen put Taiwan’s military and
intelligence services onto high alert. Ties between Russia and China continue to grow. China’s President Xi Jinpoing and Russian President
Vladimir Putin signed a joint statement in February, in which Russia reiterated its opposition to Taiwan independence in any form. And last week
China appeared to throw Russia a lifeline, by lifting wheat import restrictions while the West began imposing sanctions on Putin. Now amid
concerns over tensions in the region, US President Joe Biden has sent a delegation of former senior US defence and security officials to bolster
support for the island. Mike Mullen, former chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, arrived with the delegation on Tuesday. He said: “The
United States will continue to oppose any unilateral changes to the status quo and will continue to support a peaceful resolution of cross-strait
issues, consistent with the wishes and best interests of the people of Taiwan. “I do hope by being here with you, we can reassure you and your
people, as well as our allies and partners in the region, that the United States stands firm behind its commitments.” Mike Pompeo, former US
Secretary of State, is also due to arrive in Taiwan on Wednesday.

Affirming solves for Chinese aggression through ICBMs.

Fairless 21 [Taylor Fairless, “America and Japan Should Prepare for a Contingency with China over
Taiwan”, 2021,
http://oxfordpoliticalreview.com/amp/2021/03/05/america-and-japan-should-prepare-for-a-contingency
-with-china-over-taiwan/] //mx
For the time being, Article 9 remains in place. This prevents Japan from possessing weapons that could provide critical
such as ICBMs and long-range bombers. Despite doctrinal disagreements over what
assistance in regional contingencies,
resources Japan could use in a military escalation with China, Article 72 grants the prime minister authority over decisions relating to the SDF,
which means Yoshihide Suga’s interpretations of adversarial aggression influences what resources the SDF could mobilize in conflict.

Fortunately, revising Article 9 removes China’s advantage, deterring conflict from ever starting.
Murano 21 explains,

Murano and Iwama 8-15-2021 (Masashi Murano and Yoko Iwama, Japan Chair Fellow at the Hudson Institute and Professor, National Graduate
Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS)): 15 Oct 2021, “Thinking about Deterrence for Japan and Stability in Asia”,
https://www.hudson.org/research/17338-thinking-about-deterrence-for-japan-and-stability-in-asia DOA 3/10/21)KJR
The second type of strike capability to consider is ballistic missiles or hypersonic glide vehicles that can for a time
neutralize some of China’s airbases located in its coastal areas. The Chinese have built up overwhelming numerical superiority in
their land-based mobile missiles, making it impossible to sweep out this threat in the opening stages of a conflict. However, for China to
maintain the safety of its transport and landing vessels in the East China Sea and the area surrounding Taiwan, it will also need to follow up its
missile strikes with deployment of fighter aircraft to achieve air superiority. This needs to be followed on by naval control of the sea and achieve
a blockade of Taiwan. On the other hand, even if China can inflict damage on the Japanese and US forces with its missile attacks,
if [China]
suffers damage to its own offensive counter air capability, it will find itself unable to achieve its
military goals.

Caverley 20 confirms -

Caverley 20 warrants,

Caverley et al 10-1-2020(Jonathan D. Caverley, professor of strategy at the United States Naval War College and research scientist at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Peter Dombrowski, professor of strategy at the United States Naval War College, Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi,
Benjamin Schreer, Masashi Murano, Saadia M. Pekkanen): "Policy Roundtable: The Future of Japanese Security and Defense," Texas National
Security Review, https://tnsr.org/roundtable/policy-roundtable-the-future-of-japanese-security-and-defense/
In light of this threat, Japan needs to fully consider the possibility that some of its air-based tactical fighters will be neutralized early in the
conflict. Japan needs to consider a long-range strike option with another attack platform that utilizes the existing
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and has high survivability. The best option is ground-based
missiles to attack enemy fixed targets on the ground. The specific tactical objective here is to mission-kill and degrade some of
China’s offensive counterair capability. As mentioned earlier, China will attempt to degrade the defensive counterair capabilities of
Japan and the United States using a variety of missiles. However, China would need more than missiles to secure air and maritime superiority
over the first island chain. Ultimately, that would require continuous deployment of air and naval power. The PLA would be hard-pressed to
maintain air and sea superiority in the region even after a preemptive strike. With escalation likely, and the outlook for victory dim, the
even if the United States and
argument for a preemptive strike weakens, and the threshold for armed conflict rises. In other words,
Japan’s air operations and air defense capabilities are damaged, if China’s offensive counterair capability is also
damaged, its “theory of victory” will collapse. Specific targets include runways, aircraft and bomber hangars and bunkers,
ammunition depots, fuel storage, radar facilities, communications facilities, and command and control system nodes.

And, payne 16 concludes -

Payne 16 Payne, Keith. July 6th, 2016. Real Clear Defense. “Once Again: Why a “No-First-Use” policy is a bad, very bad
idea”.https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2016/07/06/once_again_why_a_no-first-use_policy_is_a_bad_very_bad_idea_109520.html
//JD+JZ+AS

Promising potential aggressors that they can use modern conventional, chemical or biological weapons against us or our allies without fear of
possible US nuclear retaliation will encourage some to perceive greater license to do precisely that. Numerous historical case studies
demonstrate without a doubt that some aggressors look for such openings to undertake their military moves to overturn a status quo they
deem intolerable. They do not need to see a risk-free path to pursue aggression, only a path that allows them some vision of success, however
improbable that vision may seem to others. The great advantage of current US nuclear policy is that the US nuclear deterrent helps to shut

down the possibility that would-be aggressors contemplate such paths. A US NFU policy would be particularly dangerous at a time when

both Russia and China may be armed with chemical and biological weapons and are
pursuing expansionist policies in Europe and Asia, respectively, to overturn the status
quo.[3] Russia is by far the strongest military power in Europe. It has moved repeatedly against neighboring states since 2008, forcibly
changing established borders in Europe for the first time since World War II and issuing explicit nuclear first-use threats in the process. Only
several months ago, Russia reportedly rehearsed the invasion of Norway, Finland, Sweden and Denmark in a military exercise involving 33,000
troops.[3] In Asia, China is the strongest military power and is expanding its reach against US allies, including by building and militarizing islands
in the South China Sea. At a time when key US allies face unprecedented threats from powerful neighbors, the US should not reduce the
calculation of risks Russia and China must confront in their respective expansionist drives by adopting a US NFU policy. Indeed, saying so should
be considered a breathtaking understatement in a world in which aggressors still exist, as do advanced conventional, chemical and biological

weapons, and another world [such] war using “only” such modern non-nuclear weapons could cause death levels far
beyond the 80-100 million souls lost in World Wars I and II.

Extension