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Evolution of a theory of mind?

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Evolution of a theory of mind?

Simon Baron-Cohen

Departments of Experimental Psychology and Psychiatry

University of Cambridge

Downing St, Cambridge, CB2 3EB, UK

email: [email protected]

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Acknowledgements: The author was supported by the Medical Research Council, the
Wellcome Trust, and the Gatsby Foundation, during the period of this work. I am grateful
to Steve Mithen and Andy Whiten for their comments on the first draft of this chapter.

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Homo sapiens sapiens is arguably the only species which possesses a developed ‘theory

of mind’. By this I mean the ability to attribute the full range of mental states (both goal

states and espistemic states) to ourselves and to others, and to use such attributions to

make sense of and predict behaviour. ‘Theory of mind’ is the phrase coined by (Premack

& Woodruff, 1978), and there are a set of synonyms for this ability: mind-reading

(Whiten, 1991), mentalizing (Morton, Frith & Leslie, 1991), folk psychology (Wellman,

1990), and the Intentional stance (Dennett, 1987). In this chapter, I will use the term

theory of mind, for convenience, whilst assuming that any of these alternative synonyms

would be equally applicable.

There is considerable interest in tracing the evolution of a theory of mind, because of its

central importance in modern human behaviour. Like language or bipedalism, a theory of

mind can be taken as a major milestone in primate evolution. The importance of language

and bipedalism is in some sense easier to see, or at least, the arguments are more familiar.

Among other things, language enabled primates to manipulate the behaviour of

conspecifics at a distance (a form of remote control), to obtain information about events

that they had not directly witnessed, to inform others about events they had not directly

witnessed, and to act co-operatively. Bipedalism enabled primates to use their forelimbs

for other things than just locomotion, such as carrying, throwing, and transforming

objects. It also enabled foraging into new niches by reducing water loss. For at least

these reasons, language and bipedalism have been justifiably the subject of considerable

research. But what is the equivalent enormous importance of a theory of mind? In what

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way did the evolution of a theory of mind transform primate evolution? Is it really

justifiable to equate the importance of a theory of mind with language or bipedalism?

In this chapter I try to do two things. First, I want to persuade you that that actually the

evolution of a theory of mind is not only as important as these other developments, but in

some respects, is more important than them. The main argument I will use here is that

without a theory of mind, having the ability to speak or perceive speech would have been

of little value. You can guess therefore that I will be arguing that a theory of mind must

have preceded any ability to use language in the communicative way in which it is used

today. Secondly, I want to question the claim by (Mithen, 1996) that a theory of mind

evolved around 6 million years ago. This claim is made on the basis that existing species

of ape have a full theory of mind, and our common ancestor with modern apes would

have lived around 6 million years ago. My reason for questioning this date is that recent

experimental evidence throws doubt on the idea that modern apes have a full theory of

mind. Instead, from available evidence, I will argue that all we can conclude is that a

theory of mind proper was certainly evident 40,000 years ago, but beyond then there is

no substantive evidence for its existence.

1. The importance of a theory of mind

To grasp the importance of a theory of mind, consider the following list of 8 behaviours

that depend on it: For each behaviour, I spell out the reason why each depends on a

theory (or concept) of mind.

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i. Intentionally communicating with others

We can define intentional communication as requiring a theory of mind, if we restrict it

to those communicative acts that are produced in order to change the knowledge state of

the listener. Thus, when a dog barks at a cat, this is not intentional communication

because the dog is not intending to update the knowledge state of the cat. The effect of

the bark may well be that the cat becomes aware (i.e. comes to know) that there is a dog

nearby, but the dog’s intention might have been far simpler: to make the cat run away. If

there was an intention behind the bark, it was simply to change the cat’s behaviour,

without any necessary reference to changing the cat’s knowledge state or mind.

In contrast, when I tell you that Liverpool won the football match, I am doing so in order

to give you new information that I believe you do not have, and that you might be

interested in or want. I am trying to change your knowledge state. Boring as it may be,

this little utterance counts as intentional communication, and necessarily requires a

theory of mind.

So, to intentionally inform others, one needs a concept that others have minds that can be

informed or uninformed. Indeed, one needs a concept of information, which is itself

intrinsically mentalistic. At least, as long as one defines the goal of intentional informing

as being to change the other animal’s knowledge state. Two more examples should

serve to clarify why this definition is needed. If a person shouts “watch out!”, to inform

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the listener of an impending danger, the intention is to change the other person’s

knowledge about the current state of the environment. Equally, if a person produces a

bus-timetable to inform another person about the times of future events, the intention is

to change another person’s knowledge about the future state of the environment.

Whereas intentionally informing others necessarily requires a theory of mind,

unintentionally informing others does not. For example, if a trail of footprints in the sand

was left unintentionally, the animal producing the footprints was probably not thinking

about how another animal’s knowledge state might be changed by this information.

Indeed, the animal producing the footprints was probably not thinking about the

footprints as information at all. In contrast, if a trail of footprints in the sand was left

intentionally, the animal producing the footprints was probably thinking about another

animal’s thoughts - for example, wanting to make it possible for the other animal to know

how to find him or her, or wanting to make the other animal believe the footprints lead to

where the prey is.

ii. Repairing failed communication with others

Conversational repair is another good index of a speaker’s theory of mind. If one animal

is attempting to communicate to a listener, but is failing, the speaker can do one of two

things: repeat the utterance in an identical fashion, or try to communicate the same

message in a different way. The latter strategy is likely to indicate that the speaker

6
believes the listener has not understood the intended message, and that the speaker is

trying a different method to get the listener to understand.

Thus, if I say “Have you seen it?”, you are likely to either look at me quizzically, or ask

me what on earth I’m talking about. If I simply repeat the utterance, you’ll probably

repeat your last response. If however I rephrase the utterance to “Have you seen my

wallet?”, you’ll probably answer usefully. My rephrasing of the utterance depended on

me assuming that my first attempt at communication failed because it was ambiguous in

some way, and that by using less ambiguous words, you (the listener) would then

understand it. All very mentalistic.

iii. Teaching others

Teaching others also necessarily requires a theory of mind. Again, this assumes we are

restricting the definition of teaching to those behaviours produced by a more

knowledgeable animal, with the intention of changing the knowledge state of a less

knowledgeable listener. For example, a mother showing her juvenile daughter how to use

a tool would count as an instance of teaching.

iv. Intentionally persuading others

Persuasion is an aspect of intentional communication, and as such it necessarily requires

a theory of mind. But it is worth special mention here, because it is produced with the

7
specific intention of changing someone else’s belief about the value of something. I

might try to persuade you to buy A rather than B, or to go down route x rather than route

y, or to choose me rather than him. Admittedly all of these also are produced with the

intention of changing your behaviour, but the means to doing this is by changing your

beliefs about the value of the different options.

In contrast, if a deer grows a huge pair of antlers, this may make a doe choose him over

the deer with the smaller antlers, but this does not count as an act of intentional

persuasion, according to the above definition. The deer’s body did not set out to change

the beliefs of the doe. Equally, a male gorilla beating his chest may have the effect of

making another male gorilla turn and run away, but this again does not count as an act of

intentional persuasion. It may be no more complex than the earlier example of the dog

barking, causing the cat to run away. There is no evidence that the animal is considering

the mental states of the audience.

v. Intentionally deceiving others

Intentional deception also requires a theory of mind. Indeed, we will define intentional

deception as occurring when one animal attempts to place false information in the mind

of another, or attempts to withhold true information from the mind of another. Thus,

making a trail of footprints lead from locations A to B, and then swinging through the

trees (thereby leaving no footprints) to hide in location C, would count as an instance of

intentional deception. Rubbing out the trail of footprints from A to B would also count as

8
intentional deception. In both cases, the first animal is attempting to influence the

knowledge state of another animal.

In contrast, a stick insect, whose appearance saves it from being eaten by a predator, is

not engaging in a deception that requires any theory of mind. Indeed, the stick insect may

not be thinking about anything, let alone the mind of its predator. The same applies to an

animal with camouflage. True, by staying still, it may not be seen by its predator, but it

was probably not aiming to make other animals think it was not there. It was not

necessarily thinking about what other animals were thinking at all.

vi. Building shared plans and goals

Sharing a plan or goal with another animal requires a “meeting of minds”. Both animals

must recognise the intention of the other animal, and subsequently work out how to mesh

their actions with those of the other animal to achieve the shared goal. Take this example:

A troop of chimpanzees are hunting a baby monkey, to eat it. The goal is to get the infant

monkey away from its mother, scare off the adult monkeys, and kill the baby. They hunt

as a team, and achieve the goal. This may not be evidence of building a shared plan in

that each individual chimpanzee may simply be pursuing their own individual goals,

which just happen to coincide. Thus, an infant monkey comes into sight, adult male

chimpanzees love the taste of baby monkeys, so all the adult male chimps in the troop

recognise the reward and aim for it. The adult male chimps’ goals all coincide because

9
they all share the same taste or food preference. They mesh their actions with those of the

other chimps, in the sense that as one chimp attempts to grab the infant monkey and gets

beaten off, the next one jumps in and tries to do the same thing. Each chimp may even

recognise the intentions of the others, representing for example that “He is trying to get

the infant monkey”. But this still falls short of being an example of building shared plans,

in that a shared plan involves both animals recognising that they are both holding the

same goal.

In contrast, consider another example: Two chimps carry a log, then lean it up against a

high wall. One holds it still whilst the other scrambles up it. When the climber reaches

the top, he then turns and holds the log whilst the other chimp scrambles up it. This

counts as a convincing example of building a shared plan in that the goal is not

achievable without the help of the other animal, and both animals cannot help eachother

without realising what both are aiming at. With this joint plan in mind, they can

recognise why the other is taking the different role that they are (e.g.: the holder of the

log, versus the climber up the log).

vii. Intentionally sharing a focus or topic of attention

The same argument applies to the sharing of a focus on attention. Two animals can

coincidentally look at the same target. This is not shared attention, if each animal is

simply aware only of his or her own viewpoint. Shared attention is necessarily

mentalistic in that both animals must be aware of the other animal being aware of looking

10
at the same target at they are. Thus, I see you turn to look out of the window. If I then

look out of the window, this is not shared attention. If I see you have looked back and

have seen me looking out of the window, then this probably is. More convincing is when

you point out the window, and keep pointing until I turn to look out the window. Chances

are that if this is genuine shared attention, then I will acknowledge in some way that I

have seen what you were trying to get me to see. I will turn back to look at you, and

smile, or nod, etc.,

viii. Pretending

Last on this list is pretending. This is different from intentional deception in that the

intention is not to mislead or plant a false belief in an audience, but simply to pretend.

The intention is to temporarily treat one object as if it is another, or as if it had attributes

that it clearly does not have. Pretending necessarily requires a theory of mind in that one

has to be able to switch between thinking about one’s knowledge of the real identity of

the object, and its current pretend identity. Pretending only exists in the mind of the

pretender. It is not an intrinsic part of the object.

The empirical contribution of studying autism

Let’s take stock. We have surveyed 8 behaviours which are claimed to all require a

theory of mind. The reason for this brief survey was to illustrate quite how important a

theory of mind is. Without a theory of mind, none of these behaviours would be seen.

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This is true by definition, if the analysis of the above 8 behaviours is correct. But it is

also true empirically: children with autism are a natural test of this in that many of these

children fail the standard test of understanding false beliefs, suggesting they have

difficulties in the development of a theory of mind, and they fail to show the above

behaviours in the normal way (see (Baron-Cohen, 1995), for a review of the evidence;

this is summarized in Table 1). Indeed, autism is a clear illustration of what human life

would be like if one lacked a theory of mind. The most devastating effect is on the ability

to socialize, communicate, and use imagination. It is hard to think of aspects of our

psychology that are more central or important than these. Certainly, I hope you agree, at

least as important as language (syntax), or bipedalism.

insert Table 1 here

Language without a theory of mind

These children also show us quite how useless a language capacity is without a theory of

mind. Strip out a theory of mind from language use and you have an individual who may

have some syntax, the ability to build a vocabulary, and a semantic system. Crucially,

what would be missing from their language use and comprehension is ‘pragmatics’ -

being able to decipher the speaker’s communicative intentions, decipher non-literal

language, read “between the lines”, understand jokes, and tailor one’s speech to fit the

12
listener’s background mental states (their knowledge, interest, expectations, etc.,). This is

the aspect of language that is missing from the language of most children with autism

(Baron-Cohen, 1988a; Baron-Cohen, 1988b; Paul & Cohen, 1985; Surian, Baron-Cohen

& Van der Lely, 1996; Tager-Flusberg, 1992; Tager-Flusberg, 1993).

The relationship between language and theory of mind is likely to be a very complex one,

for several reasons. First, understanding that words refer presumes a concept of intention

or goal. Second, mapping reference correctly, in language acquisition, is massively

facilitated by joint attention (Baldwin, 1991), itself an early form of mind-reading

(Baron-Cohen, 1995). These two points imply that normal 12-18 months old language

learners benefit by first having the mental state concepts of intention and attention.

Without this, the infant would be left with the puzzle of what people are doing when they

are talking. Third, language serves as a virtual “print-out” of a speaker’s mind, for the

listener, giving the listener access to a description of the speaker’s thoughts. Fourth,

syntax can serve to disambiguate a speaker’s intended meaning; that is, syntax is used for

the informing function (Cheyney, personal communication). Given this set of

connections between language and theory of mind it may be no surprise that children

with autism (who are impaired in theory of mind) invariably show language delay.

2. When did a theory of mind evolve?

Existing primatological evidence

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Let’s turn to the question of most relevance to this book: the evolutionary question. Here

things are necessarily speculative, as we attempt to peer into the mists of time, but there

are two strategies available for us to answer this question. First, do existing monkey and

ape species have a full theory of mind? If so, we can assume a theory of mind evolved as

early as the common ancestor between us and these existing primate species. Secondly,

what clues does the palaeo-archeological record give us? Mithen (1996) calls this second

strategy “cognitive archeology” - inferring their behaviour (and thence their cognitive

abilities) from fossil records of early hominids, and from their tool use, cave painting,

etc.,

The 6 million years hypothesis

Using the first strategy, of looking at extant species of monkey and ape, has led field

observers to conclude that monkey species show little if any theory of mind, but that

modern apes do. That is, they show signs of deception, in their natural behaviour, which

is one hallmark of a theory of mind (Byrne & Whiten, 1991). This leads Byrne and

Whiten to conclude that the common ancestor of modern humans and apes, who lived

around 6 million years ago, had elements of a theory of mind. This is not “very very old”

in evolutionary terms (for example, the common ancestor between modern humans and

monkeys lived around 35 million years ago - see Figure 1), but it is still very old

compared to the alternative hypothesis, reviewed next.

insert Figure 1 here

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The 40,000 years hypothesis

There is reason to doubt the 6 million year old hypothesis is correct. This is because

experimental tests of a theory of mind in modern apes have found it hard to obtain

convincing evidence of the ability to attribute beliefs to others. Even Premack and

Woodruff, who first asked the question about whether chimpanzees could attribute false

beliefs (Premack & Woodruff, 1978) finally concluded they could not, when their chimps

failed a better controlled test of the same ability (Premack, 1988). In fact, (Povinelli &

Eddy, 1996) have found it hard to obtain evidence that chimpanzees even understand

gaze as an indicator of the mental state of attention, in the way human children do.

There is a second reason to doubt the 6 million year old hypothesis. If modern apes

(chimpanzees, oran utans, and gorillas) have a theory of mind, why don’t we see signs of

the 8 behaviours listed above in their natural behaviour? (Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990) put

forward some interesting data suggesting monkeys may have ‘words’ but they conclude

that monkeys use such ‘words’ to change the behaviour (rather than the mental state) of

the listener. Equally, to take the last item on the earlier list, why don’t we see evidence

of pretend play in monkeys or apes - a behavior which in human children emerges very

early, around 18 months of age (Leslie, 1987)?

Palaeo-archeological evidence

15
We can then turn to the alternative strategy for dating the evolution of a theory of mind,

namely, the palaeo-archeological evidence. This tells us that tool use was evident from 2-

3 million years ago, and became more sophisticated over time. By itself, this is not

evidence that these hominid ancestors had a theory of mind.

Around 30,000 years ago one sees the earliest examples of cave paintings, but again, this

is not evidence that the artist had a theory of mind. Some people might be intially drawn

to conclude that any animal capable of art must have a theory of mind. But recall that

many children with autism, who fail tests of a theory of mind, and who show none of the

8 behaviours listed earlier, are able and even gifted artists (Charman & Baron-Cohen,

1992; Charman & Baron-Cohen, 1993; Selfe, 1977). Art clearly requires an ability to

represent representations, but not necessarily an ability to represent mental states like

beliefs. (For more on this distinction, see (Charman & Baron-Cohen, 1995; Leekam &

Perner, 1991; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992).

The first fiction

Mithen (1996) has performed an invaluable service to cognitive neuroscience in

reviewing some much more relevant evidence from palaeo-archaeology. Around the

same time, 30,000 years ago, we see the first evidence of special forms of art: statues of

impossible entities, such as the half-man-half lion ivory statuette from Hohlenstein-

Stadel, southern Germany, dated around 30-33,000 years ago (Figure 2), and the painting

16
of the half-man-half-reindeer, from Trois-Freres, Ariege, in France, dated around 30,000

years ago (Figure 3).

insert Figures 2 and 3 here

These are of interest because they are representations of fictions. They are necessarily

representations of the artist’s mind, of the artist thinking about his or her own thoughts.

They are also, incidently, direct evidence of the capacity for pretend play. Animals that

are half-man-half-lion have never existed, except in the world of the imagination, of

pretence. (I am happy to be corrected on this point). So, here we can say with some

confidence that a full theory of mind must be at least as old as 30-40,000 years.

Supporting evidence: adornment

There is further evidence that at this time, early Homo sapiens sapiens had a theory of

mind. The archeological record shows the existence of burial at this time, which implies

that our ancestors then were concerned about death. By itself, this does not tell us that

they could think about the mind. But Mithen points out that burials around 28,000 years

ago also include the dead person being adorned with jewelry. For example, at Sungir, in

Russia, a 60 year old man was buried with an adolescent male and female. All three

individuals were decorated with thousands of ivory beads, necklaces, and bracelets (see

Figure 4).

17
 insert Figure 4 here

Now why would someone adorn themselves, or adorn their dead relative? This behaviour

can be taken as evidence that the decorator cared about how other people perceived the

adorned person - they wanted an audience to think the person was beautiful, or of high

status, or worthy of an after-life, or whatever. If this is not an excessively rich

interpretation of jewelry-use, then this is an additional strand of evidence that around 30-

40,000 years ago, our ancestors had a theory of mind.

Is early religion relevant?

If the archeological evidence from these burials also indicates the existence of religion,

then this might also be supportive evidence for the existence of a theory of mind 40,000

years ago. This is because anthropological evidence (Boyer, 1990) suggests that the

common feature of all current religions is that a supernatural agency is postulated - a god,

a spirit - who can communicate with you, possibly judge (i.e. think about) you, and who

can be appeased by ritual acts. The idea of a supernatural agency of this kind would be

impossible without a theory of mind. Indeed, the idea that ritual actions might cause good

outcomes or ward off bad ones is itself a belief in intentional causation rather than purely

physical causation.

But let’s leave religion out of it, since adorned skeletons in graves are not clear evidence

of religion. Let’s stick to our two strong clues: art of a purely fictional kind (Figures 2

18
and 3) and adornment (Figure 4). Here we can jump back to ask about these behaviours

in autism, since children with autism who lack a theory of mind should also not produce

art of a purely fictional kind, or bother with adornment. What does the evidence show?

Back to autism

Consistent with this idea, children with autism do draw, but tend to draw objects they

have seen (buildings, cars, electricity pylons, train-stations, etc). When challenged to

draw purely fictional entities, like a “man that could never exist”, whilst normal 4 year

old children produce sketches of men with two heads or three arms (Karmiloff-Smith,

1990), children with autism do not (Scott & Baron-Cohen, 1996). Those children with

autism who are more able, and who can pass first-order theory of mind tests, can draw

such fictional entities (Craig, Baron-Cohen & Scott, submitted). This is empirical

evidence that the kind of art we think of as involving pretend play, and is a good

indicator of whether the artist has a theory of mind. There is no systematic evidence

about adornment in autism, but it is widely noted that such children pay little attention to

how they appear to others, for example, showing little if any signs of embarrassment

(Baron-Cohen, Spitz & Cross, 1993) or interest in fashion (Baron-Cohen, 1993).

3. Conclusions

Mithen (1996) clearly supports the 6 million year old hypothesis:

19
 “ A specialized domain of social intelligence first appeared in the course of

human evolution after 55 million years ago. This gradually increased in

complexity with the addition of further mental modules, such as that for a theory

of mind between 35 and 6 million years ago” (p.94)

He bases this conclusion on the evident “social intelligence” of monkeys and apes today.

However, there is a danger of confounding social intelligence with theory of mind. It is

clear that many monkey species and the apes show social intelligence in that they form

alliances, keep track of social status, and behave tactically in grooming those allies they

depend on (De Waal, 1989; Whiten, 1991). Whilst this is fascinating, and may be

evidence of social intelligence evolving independently of general intelligence, it is not

necessarily evidence of the possession of a theory of mind. For the latter, one needs signs

of one or more of the 8 behaviours listed in Section 1, above. For that reason, in this

chapter I remain more cautious in concluding that a theory of mind had in all likelihood

evolved by 40,000 years ago - but that before this, there is as yet no clear evidence for it.

Mithen’s conclusions are also based on his claim that “both monkeys and apes also

engage in intentional communication” (p. 161). Here again one sees a potential confound.

Clearly monkeys and apes vocalize or gesture intentionally, but this is not the same as

“intending to communicate”, as defined in Section 1 above. Monkeys and apes may be

vocalizing or gesturing with the intention to alter the behaviour of the listener or

audience, but there is no compelling evidence yet that they are vocalizing or gesturing

20
with the intention to alter the mental states of their listener or audience (Cheney and

Seyfarth 1993).

Using a model of the mindreading system shown in Figure 5, there is better evidence for

the ability to attribute goal states (ID, or the Intentionality Detector) being as old as

Mithen suggests, in that chimpanzees can clearly recognize goal states (Premack &

Woodruff, 1978). They are also acutely aware of gaze direction (EDD, or the Eye

Direction Detector), suggesting they are monitoring when they might be the target of

another’s perception (Chance, 1967). Less clear cut is whether they show shared

attention (SAM, or the Shared Attention Mechanism) (Povinelli & Eddy, 1996). This

means that elements of mindreading may be as old as 6-35 million years, and evolution

may have “tinkered with old parts” under selection pressure, to produce a theory of mind

mechanism (ToMM) more recently.

insert Figure 5 here

Finally, we might consider that the presence of a Broca’s area in the brain 200,000 years

ago (as inferred from cranial evidence - (Mithen, 1996) implies a theory of mind may be

at least this old, in that language without a theory of mind would be functionally very

limited. But this is only indirect evidence for the existence of a theory of mind.

Conclusions

21
A theory of mind is a powerful means of making sense of the social world. It enables

explanations and prediction of the behaviour of agents, and communication (beyond

animal signalling). Given its centrality to what makes the human mind essentially

human, its evolution needs investigation. Palae-oarchaelogical evidence shows it was in

place at least 40,000 years ago, and comparative data from studies of existing primates

shows that aspects of a theory of mind may be as old as 6 million years. Specifically,

recognising volitional states and a sensitivity to eye-direction may be a skill we share

with the apes, and therefore with our common ancestor 6 million years ago. In contrast,

shared attention and recognising epistemic states may be unique to Homo Sapiens and

may therefore have evolved more recently. In terms of the model of the “mindreading

system” shown in Figure 5, ID and EDD may be phylogenetically older (at least 6 million

years) than the more recent SAM and ToMM. This leads to the idea that a theory of

mind did not necessarily evolve all at once, but by degrees.

22
Figure Legends

Figures 1-4 are reproduced from Mithen (1997) with kind permission.

Figure 1: Simplified model of primate evolution

Figure 2: Statuette from Hohlenstein-Stadel, 30-33,000 years old

Figure 3: Painting from Trois-Fieres, 30,000 years old

Figure 4: Skeleton from Sringir, 30,000 years old

Figure 5: The Mindreading System (Baron-Cohen, 1995)

23
Table 1: Evidence for theory of mind impairments in autism

First-order mind-reading tests

(i) the mental-physical distinction (Baron-Cohen, 1989a; Wellman & Estes, 1986)

(ii) The functions of the mind test (ibid).

(iii) The appearance-reality distinction (ibid); (Flavell, Green & Flavell, 1986)

(iv) First-order false belief tasks (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985; Baron-Cohen,
Leslie & Frith, 1986; Leekam & Perner, 1991; Perner, Frith, Leslie & Leekam, 1989;
Reed & Peterson, 1990; Swettenham, Baron-Cohen, Gomez & Walsh, 1996; Wimmer &
Perner, 1983).

(v) The "seeing leads to knowing" test (Baron-Cohen & Goodhart, 1994; Leslie & Frith,
1988; Pratt & Bryant, 1990)

(vi) Recognising mental state words test (Baron-Cohen et al., 1994).

(vii) simple causes of emotion (such as situations and desires) vs complex causes of
emotion (such as beliefs) (Baron-Cohen, 1991; Baron-Cohen et al., 1993); (Harris,
Johnson, Hutton, Andrews & Cooke, 1989)

(x) Recognizing the eye-region of the face as indicating when a person is thinking and
what a person might want (Baron-Cohen, Campbell, Karmiloff-Smith, Grant & Walker,
1995; Baron-Cohen & Cross, 1992).

(xi) The accidental-intentional distinction (Phillips, 1993).

(xii) Deception (Baron-Cohen, 1992; Sodian & Frith, 1992; Yirmiya, Solomonica-Levi &
Shulman, 1996), premised on understanding that people's beliefs can differ and therefore
can be manipulated.

(xiii) Tests of understanding metaphor, sarcasm, and irony - these all being intentionally
non-literal statements (Happe, 1993).

(ix) Pragmatics (Baron-Cohen, 1988b); see also (Tager-Flusberg, 1993), e.g. recognizing
violations of pragmatic rules, such as the Gricean Maxims of conversational cooperation
(Surian et al., 1996). Since many pragmatic rules involve tailoring one's speech to what
the listener needs to know, or might be interested in, this can be seen as intrinsically
linked to a theory of mind.

Second-order mind-reading tests

24
 (i) second-order false belief tests (Baron-Cohen, 1989b); (Perner & Wimmer, 1985), that
is, tests of understanding what one character thinks another character thinks. Such
second-order reasoning is usually understood by normal children of 5-6 years of age
(Sullivan, Zaitchik & Tager-Flusberg, 1994),

(ii) bluff and double bluff (Happe, 1994).

(iii) decoding complex mental states from the expression in the eye-region of the face
(Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore & Robertson, in press; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright &
Jolliffe, in press).

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