FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 249410. July 6, 2022.]

MARIA TERESA DINO BASA-EGAMI, petitioner, vs. DR. LISA

GRACE BERSALES, in her capacity as the Administrator and
Civil Registrar General, HIROSHI EGAMI, THE LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF SAN MIGUEL, BULACAN, REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, AND THE FORMER FOURTH DIVISION, COURT
OF APPEALS, respondents.

DECISION

ZALAMEDA, J : p

This is a Petition for Certiorari (Petition) 1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of

Court, seeking to nullify and set aside the Decision 2 dated 25 March 2019
and Resolution 3 dated 22 July 2019 issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA G.R. CV No. 109890. The CA reversed and set aside the Decision 4 dated
07 December 2016 and Resolution 5 dated 26 June 2017, rendered by Branch
86, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, in Civil Case No. R-QZN-14-
11882.
Antecedents
On 18 May 1994, petitioner Maria Teresa Dino Basa-Egami (petitioner),
a Filipina, married Hiroshi Egami (Egami), a Japanese national. However,
their union did not last long, as they eventually parted ways in October
2006. Not long after, Egami begot a child with another woman, prompting
him to ask for divorce from petitioner. Petitioner was initially averse to
Egami's idea, After Egami's relentless prodding, however, petitioner relented
and agreed to sign the divorce papers. 6
On 03 April 2008, petitioner and Egami were issued a Japanese Divorce
Decree, 7 which was duly recorded in the Family Register at Nakagawa-ku,
Nagoya City. A Certificate of Receiving 8 was also issued by the Head of
Nakagawa-ku, Nagoya City, stating that petitioner and Egami's Divorce
Decree was duly reported to the said office on 03 April 2008. Subsequently,
petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Recognition of Foreign
Judgment/Final Order, 9 to be able to remarry. 10
During trial on the merits, petitioner testified and submitted the
following documents as her evidence: 1) certified copy of the Notification of
Divorce/Report of Divorce, duly authenticated by Consul Jerome John O.
Castro (Consul Castro), Consul for the Philippine Consulate General, Osaka,
Japan; 2) Family Register of Egami, stating the fact of divorce between him
and petitioner, as certified by Hirchika Hyase, Head of Nakagawa-Ku, Nagoya
City on 04 August 2014, and duly certified and authenticated by Naomi
Asano, an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Consular Service
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 Division) and Consul Castro; 3) a Certificate of Acceptance of
Divorce/Certificate of Receiving which states that the Divorce obtained by
Egami and petitioner were reported on 03 April 2008, similarly certified and
authenticated by Naomi Asano, an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(Consular Service Division) and Consul Castro; and 4) excerpts from the Book
"The Civil Code of Japan," as certified and notarized by Kenji Sugimori, a
notary from the Osaka Legal Affairs Bureau, and duly authenticated by
Consul Castro. 11 caITAC

The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor

General (OSG), sought the dismissal of the petition, arguing in the main that
a consensual or mutual divorce, such as the divorce obtained by petitioner;
is not contemplated by Article 26 (2) of the Family Code; 12 hence, it cannot
be recognized by Philippine courts. 13
Ruling of the RTC
In due time, the RTC issued its Decision 14 dated 07 December 2016,
granting the petition. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, finding the
petition to be meritorious, this Court declares and rules that:
1. The Divorce Decree as stated in the Notification of
Divorce and Certificate of Acceptance of Divorce issued
between the petitioner and Hiroshi Egami is hereby
recognized, given credence and ordered enforced.
2. The marital bond between petitioner Maria Teresa
Dino Basa-Egami and respondent Hiroshi Egami
celebrated on May 18, 1994 in San Miguel, Bulacan which
was registered at the Office of the Civil Registrar General
under Registry No. 94-00382 is declared deemed
dissolved by virtue of the aforesaid divorce.
3. The Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City is hereby
directed to accept the filing, recording and/or annotation
[of] the Order dissolving the marriage of herein parties on
the corresponding Certificate of Marriage of the petitioner
and Hiroshi Egami together with the copy of this
judgment and thereafter forward a copy thereof as
annotated to the Office of the Administrator of the Civil
Registrar General of the National Statistics Office (NSO)
for proper filing and recording with the said office.
SO ORDERED. 15

The RTC found that petitioner was able to comply with all the
requirements of Article 26 (2). 16 It gave credence and weight to the
Notification of Divorce and Acceptance of Divorce as proof of the fact of
divorce, the documents being certified as genuine and duly authenticated by
the officials from the Philippine Consulate in Japan. 17 Citing Articles 728 and
732 of the Civil Code of Japan, the RTC stated that the divorce between the
couple dissolved their marriage and restored them to the state of an
unmarried persons, which thus capacitated petitioner to remarry. 18

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 In addition, the trial court rejected the argument of the OSG that a
Filipino's divorce by agreement abroad cannot be recognized here, as the
RTC held that the evidence of petitioner showed that the divorce was, in
fact, not mutual but was forced upon the petitioner by her former husband.
19

The OSG moved for reconsideration 20 but the same was denied.
Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the CA issued the assailed Decision, 21 reversing the RTC
ruling. The dispositive portion reads:
THE FOREGOING DISQUISITIONS CONSIDERED, the Appeal
is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated 7 December 2016 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 86, in Civil Case No. R-
QZN-14-11882, is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Perforce, the Petition
for Recognition of Foreign Judgment/Final Order a quo is ORDERED
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. 22

Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, she filed

the present Petition for Certiorari before this Court. ICHDca

Issues
In this Petition, the Court is asked to determine whether:
1) The instant Petition may be given due course and duly
considered by the Court;
2) Philippine courts should recognize a divorce by mutual consent;
3) Petitioner was able to sufficiently comply with the Rules of Court
in proving the fact of divorce and the national law on divorce of
her foreigner husband; and
4) The Petition is meritorious.
Ruling of the Court
The present recourse could have
merited an outright dismissal for
being an improper remedy to assail
the adverse ruling of the CA
Indubitably, the assailed rulings of the CA is final in nature, as nothing
remained for the appellate court to do in the proceedings before it. It is
explicit under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court that a judgment or a
final order or resolution of the CA may be appealed with this Court via a
verified petition for review on certiorari. 23 The availability of the right to
appeal in this case is a bar to petitioner's resort to a petition under Rule 65
for the apparent reason that a special civil action for certiorari may be
pursued only when there is no appeal that may be resorted to. Certiorari is
not and cannot be a substitute for a lapsed or lost appeal, which loss was
due to a party's fault or negligence or where a person, fails, without
justifiable ground, to interpose an appeal despite its accessibility. Indeed,
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 where the rules provide for a specific remedy for the vindication of rights,
the remedy should be availed of. 24
Further, it is settled that a writ of certiorari may be issued only for the
correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. 25 The issues and arguments raised by
petitioners touch on the wisdom of the CA's decision to reverse the RTC
ruling, granting the petition in favor of petitioner, and asks this Court to re-
examine the evidence on record. But, certiorari will issue only to correct
errors of jurisdiction and not errors or mistakes in the findings and
conclusions of the court. 26 In certiorari proceedings, judicial review does not
go as far as to examine and assess the evidence of the parties and to weigh
the probative value thereof. It does not include an inquiry as to the
correctness of the evaluation of evidence. It is not for this Court to re-
examine conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, or
substitute the findings of fact of the court a quo. 27
Petitioner's reliance on Cruz v. People 28 is also misplaced. Certiorari,
as a remedy, was allowed to prevail therein because of the manifest
disregard of the basic rules and procedures by the trial court. As explained in
that case, the trial court blatantly and whimsically refused to follow a simple,
yet categorical, rule on the release of cash bond under Section 22, Rule 114
of the Rules of Court. In this case, however, petitioner can hardly accuse the
CA of blatant disregard of the Rules. On the contrary, the appellate court
displayed marked obedience to the laws and rules in this case.
It is not lost to this Court that while it may dismiss a petition outright
for being an improper remedy, it may, in certain instances where a petition
was filed on time both under Rules 45 and 65, and in the interest of justice,
proceed to review the substance of the petition and treat it as having been
filed under Rule 45. 29 As averred by petitioner, however, she received a
copy of the CA's Resolution on 16 August 2019 and filed the Petition at bar
on 15 October 2019, 30 which was clearly beyond the 15-day period to file
the appropriate petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is
axiomatic that certiorari under Rule 65 cannot be availed of as a substitute
for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal, including that under Rule 45. 31 TCAScE

Given the foregoing, the Court clearly has a sufficient reason to dismiss
this Petition outright. Verily, when a party adopts an improper remedy, the
petition may be dismissed outright. 32
In the interest of substantial justice,
and given the existence of compelling
reasons in this case, the Court
brushes aside this otherwise fatal
defect and gives due course to the
petition to decide on the merits
thereof
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine
courts may extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse
without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the
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 marriage. 33 The noble objective of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation
where a Filipino remains married to his or her alien spouse, whereas the
latter is no longer married to the former because he or she had obtained a
divorce abroad that is recognized by his or her national law. The aim was to
solve the problem of many Filipinos who, under the Civil Code, are still
considered married to their alien spouses even after the latter have already
validly divorced them under their (the spouses') national laws and perhaps
have already married again. 34
However, a revisit of the stream of jurisprudence on this issue shows
that the lofty aim of the framers of the Family Code is put to naught in some,
if not most instances brought to courts. This is all because of the ambiguity
in the law and the unfathomably strict requirements of the Rules of Court in
proving the fact of divorce and the foreign law. In most cases in the past, the
Filipino spouse, after going to court to ask for the recognition of the divorce
decree obtained abroad, actually ended up being continuously locked up in
the unfair situation that Article 26 (2) seeks to avoid.
This is exactly the misery confronting petitioner, whose divorce from
her foreign spouse was not recognized by the appellate court. To date, she
remains married under Philippine laws even though her former husband, a
Japanese citizen, has long been freed from the shackles of a failed marriage
in view of the more lenient laws of his country. To see the unjustness, if not
ludicrousness of petitioner's situation, it only needs to be pointed out that
petitioner is still incapacitated to remarry under Philippine laws even after
the lapse of a little over 12 years from the time of her or her divorce abroad
in 2008.
Put in a crucible of analysis, the factual milieu of this case shows a
compelling reason for the Court to brush aside technicalities and give due
course to the petition. In the broader interest of substantial justice, the Court
decides to eschew the dismissal of the present petition to delve into the
merits thereof. To be sure, under exceptional circumstances, as when
stringent application of the rules will result in manifest injustice, the Court
may set aside technicalities and proceed with the appeal. An appeal may be
given due course even if it was a wrong mode of appeal and was even filed
beyond the reglementary period provided by the rules to maintain a healthy
balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the
guarantee that every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just and
proper disposition of his cause. 35cTDaEH

Contrary to the OSG's posture, the

divorce by mutual consent between
petitioner and her foreigner spouse
may be recognized in this jurisdiction
The OSG is adamant that petitioner's case does not fall under Article 26
(2) of the Family Code. It postulates that the foreign divorce by mutual
agreement between petitioner and Egami cannot be given recognition here
because only a divorce obtained through a court judgment or adversarial
proceeding could be recognized by Philippines courts, insisting that the only
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 divorce contemplated under Article 26 (2) is the one validly obtained by the
alien spouse, without the consent or acquiescence of the Filipino spouse. 36
The Court does not agree.
If We are to follow the OSG's interpretation of the law, petitioner would
sadly remain in limbo — a divorcee who cannot legally remarry — as a result
of the ambiguity in the law, particularly the phrase "divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse." This perfectly manifests the
dire situation of most of our kababayans in unsuccessful mixed marriages
since, more often than not, their divorces abroad are obtained through
mutual agreements. Thus, some of them are even constrained to think of
creative and convincing plots to make it appear that they were against the
divorce or that they were just prevailed upon by their foreigner spouse to
legally end their relationship. What is more appalling here is that those
whose divorce end up getting rejected by Philippine courts for such a flimsy
reason would still be considered as engaging in illicit extra-marital affairs in
the eyes of Philippine laws if ever they choose to move on with their lives
and enter into another relationship like their foreigner spouse. Worse, their
children in the subsequent relationship would be legally considered as
illegitimate.
The myopic understanding of Article 26 (2), as incessantly advocated
by the OSG, would have been sound and successful in the past, since the
Court repeatedly upheld this ultra-conservative view by relying on the letter
of the law that killeth, instead of choosing that spirit of the law whichgiveth
life. Fortunately, Republic v. Manalo 37 (Manalo), a landmark ruling by the
Court En Banc, finally put an end to this iniquitous interpretation of the law
as it gave due regard to the sad consequences a strict and literal
construction of the law brings, thus:
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained"
should be interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding must be
actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the
letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent
of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent
with the general purpose of the act. Laws have ends to achieve, and
statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such
ends and purposes.
xxx xxx xxx
A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more
harm than good. If We disallow a Filipino citizen who initiated and
obtained a foreign divorce from the coverage of Paragraph 2 of Article
26 and still require him or her to first avail of the existing
"mechanisms" under the Family Code, any subsequent relationship
that he or she would enter in the meantime shall be considered as
illicit in the eyes of the Philippine law. Worse, any child born out of
such "extra-marital" affair has to suffer the stigma of being branded
as illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a few of the adverse
consequences, not only to the parent but also to the child, if We are
to hold a restrictive interpretation of the subject provision. The irony
is that the principle of inviolability of marriage under Section 2, Article
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 XV of the Constitution is meant to be tilted in favor of marriage and
against unions not formalized by marriage, but without denying State
protection and assistance to live-in arrangements or to families
formed according to indigenous customs.
This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the
present time. With the advancement of communication and
information technology, as well as the improvement of the
transportation system that almost instantly connect people from all
over the world, mixed marriages have become not too uncommon.
Likewise, it is recognized that not all marriages are made in heaven
and that imperfect humans more often than not create imperfect
unions. Living in a flawed world, the unfortunate reality for some is
that the attainment of the individual's full human potential and self-
fulfillment is not found and achieved in the context of a marriage.
Thus, it is hypocritical to safeguard the quantity of existing marriages
and, at the same time, brush aside the truth that some of them are of
rotten quality. 38 cSaATC

Manalo was indeed a salutary paradigm shift in jurisprudence,

eliminating a huge hurdle often faced by Filipino divorcees in their quest to
obtain a recognition of their divorce from Philippine Courts. Notably, this
breakthrough decision was serendipitously rendered in Manalo, a word which
meant to win in the vernacular. The ruling was, no doubt, a big win for our
kababayans who, for a long time, had received the proverbial short end of
the stick from their own country, no less, in view of such ambiguity in the
law.
The OSG should now take note that Manalo is the prevailing
jurisprudence on the matter. As it was clearly spelled out in Manalo, Article
26 (2) only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad, without
regard as to who initiated it. 39 This felicitous ruling was echoed in yet
another seminal case of recognition of a divorce of mixed marriage. In Racho
v. Tanaka 40 (Racho), rendered only a few months after Manalo, the Court
squarely dealt with the divorce by mutual consent of a marriage involving a
Filipina and a Japanese national, the same situation in the petition at bar.
Therein, the Court unambiguously declared that pursuant to Manalo, a
foreign divorce may be recognized in this jurisdiction as long as it is validly
obtained, regardless of who between the spouses initiated the divorce
proceedings. 41 Since then, there have been many other iterations of Manalo
in jurisprudence.
Contrary to the posture taken by the OSG, therefore, the CA correctly
held that the divorce obtained by petitioner abroad against her foreign
husband, whether at her behest or acquiescence, may be recognized as
valid in this jurisdiction so long as it complies with the documentary
requirements under the Rules of Court.
The pieces of evidence submitted by
petitioner are sufficient to prove the
fact of divorce
Like in Manalo, however, the CA correctly stressed that before such
foreign divorce decree can be recognized by Philippine courts, petitioner, as
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 the party pleading it, is charged with the burden of proving it as a fact, and
demonstrating its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. 42
This rather stringent requirement springs from the fact that our courts
do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. 43 Accordingly, a
foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our
rules on evidence, together with the alien's applicable national law, to show
the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. 44
Following this vein, petitioner is thus obligated to submit into evidence
a copy of the divorce decree itself, along with a copy of the foreign law
which, under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, may be
proven by either of the following: (1) official publication; or (2) copies
attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies
of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. 45
In petitioner's case, she submitted into evidence the following
documents to prove the fact of divorce between her and her former spouse:
1) Notification of Divorce or Report of Divorce; 2) Certificate of Acceptance
of Divorce, and 3) the Family Register of Hiroshi. As aptly found by the CA,
however, ubiquitously absent from petitioner's list of evidence is the divorce
decree itself. 46 cHDAIS

On this score, the OSG is right in pointing out that inRacho, it was
stated that such certificate only certified that the divorce decree, or the
acceptance certification of notification of divorce, exists. It is not the divorce
decree itself. 47 In the same breadth, however, Racho was categorical in
holding that an authenticated Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of
Divorce is admissible as evidence of the fact of divorce, thus:
The Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce was
accompanied by an Authentication issued by Consul Bryan Dexter B.
Lao of the Embassy of the Philippines in Tokyo, Japan, certifying that
Kazutoyo Oyabe, Consular Service Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Japan was an official in and for Japan. The Authentication further
certified that he was authorized to sign the Certificate of Acceptance
of the Report of Divorce and that his signature in it was genuine.
Applying Rule 132, Section 24, the Certificate of Acceptance of the
Report of Divorce is admissible as evidence of the fact of divorce
between petitioner and respondent. 48 (citation omitted)
As adverted to earlier, Racho's facts closely parallel the factual milieu
herein. Petitioner was also previously married to a Japanese national and
their divorce was by mutual agreement. Furthermore, instead of proving the
fact of divorce by presenting the divorce decree itself, petitioner submitted,
inter alia, a Certificate of Acceptance of Divorce, certified and authenticated
by the proper officials of the Philippine Consulate in Japan. Apropos herein is
the additional elucidation on this issue by the Court in Moraña v. Republic: 49
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, nonetheless,
declined to consider the Divorce Report as the Divorce Decree itself.
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 According to the trial court, the Divorce Report was " limited to the
report of the divorce granted to the parties." On the other hand, the
Court of Appeals held that the Divorce Report " cannot be considered
as act of an official body or tribunal as would constitute the divorce
decree contemplated by the Rules."
The Court is not persuaded. Records show that the Divorce
Report is what the Government of Japan issued to petitioner and her
husband when they applied for divorce. There was no "divorce
judgment" to speak of because the divorce proceeding was not
coursed through Japanese courts but through the Office of the Mayor
of Fukuyama City in Hiroshima Prefecture, Japan. In any event, since
the Divorce Report was issued by the Office of the Mayor of
Fukuyama City, the same is deemed an act of an official body in
Japan. By whatever name it is called, the Divorce Report is clearly the
equivalent of the "Divorce Decree" in Japan, hence, the best evidence
of the fact of divorce obtained by petitioner and her former husband.
50

Following judicial precedents, there is thus no reason why the Court

should not consider similar evidence in this case as proof of the fact of
divorce in favor of petitioner. Indeed, the principle of stare decisis requires
that once a case has been decided one way, any other case involving exactly
the same point at issue should be decided in the same manner. It simply
means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case
should be applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same,
even though the parties may be different. 51
Petitioner failed to prove foreign law
The CA, in reversing the RTC, also clarified that the divorce in this case
cannot be given recognition by the Philippine courts because petitioner failed
to properly plead and prove the Japanese law on divorce. ISHCcT

The Court sustains the CA.

Even as the Court declares the evidence of petitioner to be sufficient in
proving the fact of divorce, the OSG is correct in pointing out that as a
settled rule, mere presentation of the divorce decree is insufficient. A
divorce obtained abroad may be recognized in our jurisdiction only if the
decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. 52 Accordingly,
both the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse
must be proven. 53
The CA found that the Civil Code of Japan submitted by petitioner does
not comply with the attestation requirements under Sections 24 and 25 of
the Revised Rules of Court. 54 Also, the OSG argued that the Civil Code
submitted by petitioner is a mere photocopy of a book published by a private
company, Elbun-Horei-Sha, Inc. It is not even authenticated, and neither is a
statement or proof that the library of the Japanese Embassy is an official
repository or custodian of Japanese public laws and records. 55
Petitioner, on the other hand, counters that her evidence should be
considered as sufficient evidence of the national law of Japan as the Court
did in Racho. She posits that like in Racho, the trial court herein duly
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 admitted the evidence of the national law of Japan which, as stated in the
RTC Decision, were excerpts from the book The Civil Code of Japan, certified
as true copy and notarized by Kenji Sugimori, notary of the Osaka Legal
Affairs Bureau and duly authenticated by Consul Castro of the Philippine
Consulate General, Osaka, Japan. 56
In the face of these conflicting assertions, the Court's appropriate
recourse is to peruse the subject document in order to arrive at the correct
conclusion. However, petitioner shot herself in the foot by failing to attach
any evidence to her petition. Accordingly, the Court is constrained to sustain
the CA's ruling on this issue. To stress anew, our courts do not take judicial
notice of foreign laws and judgment; our law on evidence requires that both
the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and
proven and like any other fact. 57 Hence, any declaration as to the validity of
the divorce can only be made upon petitioner's complete submission of
evidence proving the divorce decree and the national law of her alien
spouse. 58
Petitioner's argument that this Court should apply Racho under the
circumstances herein deserves scant consideration. This time around, Racho
differs from the present case. In Racho, the Court dealt mainly, if not
exclusively, with the issue of proving the fact of divorce. The sufficiency of
evidence relative to the national law of Japan was only discussed in passing.
Herein, though, both the proof of divorce and proof of national law are
squarely put in issue by the CA and the OSG. It should be noted on this score
that in Racho, petitioner therein went directly to the Court after her petition
was denied by the trial court. In this case, however, while the RTC duly
admitted the evidence of Japan's national law on divorce, the CA rejected the
same. Moreover, in Racho, the OSG admitted that the petitioner therein was
able to prove that the national law of Japan allows absolute divorce, albeit
the petitioner therein supposedly failed to point to a specific provision in said
law relative to a spouses' right to remarry after the divorce. Herein,
however, the OSG is explicitly assailing the ruling of the trial court that the
petitioner was able to prove the national law of her former spouse.
Clearly, unlike in Racho, there are contending views herein which
should be threshed out by the Court. Relative to this, it should be noted also
that in Racho, the Court was able to rule in favor of the petitioner therein
because the records before it were already sufficient to fully resolve factual
issues therein. Such is not the case here. The Petition at bar is bereft of any
relevant attachments except for the decisions and resolutions of the CA and
the RTC.
For what it is worth, the Court does not subscribe to petitioner's
contention that this Court should already take exception of the law of Japan
on divorce since it had already been discussed in Racho. Laws are dynamic
and evolving so much so that the Court must take caution in taking judicial
notice of the Japanese law pleaded by petitioner. And since questions
relating to the national law of other countries are essentially factual in
nature, the better rule is for petitioner to plead and prove it as any other
fact. In this vein, it bears noting that while the Court discussed Japanese
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 laws in Racho, subsequent jurisprudence still required the presentation of
the pertinent Japanese laws on divorce, and the failure of the petitioner to
properly plead and prove the foreign law would be taken against him or her.
The 2019 case of Arreza v. Toyo 59 is apropos: CAacTH

Here, the Regional Trial Court ruled that the documents

petitioner submitted to prove the divorce decree have complied with
the demands of Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25. However, it found the
copy of the Japan Civil Code and its English translation insufficient to
prove Japan's law on divorce. It noted that these documents were not
duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul in Japan, the Japanese
Consul in Manila, or the Department of Foreign Affairs.
Notwithstanding, petitioner argues that the English translation
of the Japan Civil Code is an official publication having been published
under the authorization of the Ministry of Justice and, therefore, is
considered a self-authenticating document.
Petitioner is mistaken.
xxx xxx xxx
The English translation submitted by petitioner was published
by Eibun-Horei-Sha, Inc., a private company in Japan engaged in
publishing English translation of Japanese laws, which came to be
known as the EHS Law Bulletin Series. However, these translations
are "not advertised as a source of official translations of Japanese
laws"; rather, it is in the KANPO or the Official Gazette where all
official laws and regulations are published, albeit in Japanese.
Accordingly, the English translation submitted by petitioner is
not an official publication exempted from the requirement of
authentication.
Neither can the English translation be considered as a learned
treatise. Under the Rules of Court, "[a] witness can testify only to
those facts which he knows of his [or her] personal knowledge[.]" The
evidence is hearsay when it is "not . . . what the witness knows
himself [or herself] but of what he [or she] has heard from others."
The rule excluding hearsay evidence is not limited to oral testimony
or statements, but also covers written statements.
The rule is that hearsay evidence "is devoid of probative
value[.]" However, a published treatise may be admitted as tending
to prove the truth of its content if: (1) the court takes judicial notice;
or (2) an expert witness testifies that the writer is recognized in his or
her profession as an expert in the subject.
Here, the Regional Trial Court did not take judicial notice of the
translator's and advisors' qualifications. Nor was an expert witness
presented to testify on this matter. The only evidence of the
translator's and advisors' credentials is the inside cover page of the
English translation of the Civil Code of Japan. Hence, the Regional
Trial Court was correct in not considering the English translation as a
learned treatise. 60 (Citations omitted) IAETDc

Remand of the case to the RTC

is in order
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 At this point, the benevolent stance of this Court can no longer come to
petitioner's aid. The Court addressed all matters which it can act upon to
serve the interest of justice. The only thing left for this Court to do is remand
this case to the RTC, as current jurisprudence allows the same whenever the
fact of divorce was duly proved but not the national law on divorce of the
foreigner spouse. 61
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is GRANTED.
The Decision dated 25 March 2019 and Resolution dated 22 July 2019 of the
Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 109890 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
The case is REMANDED to Branch 86, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
for further proceedings and reception of evidence on the pertinent Japanese
law on divorce and the document proving Hiroshi Egami is now
recapacitated to marry.
SO ORDERED.
Gesmundo, C.J., Hernando, Rosario and Marquez, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Rollo , pp. 18-42. Captioned as petition for Review on certiorari under Rule 65, id.
at 18.
2. Id. at 47-58; penned by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao (now a Member of
this Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Manuel M. Barrios and
Maria Filomena D. Singh (now a Member of this Court).

3. Id. at 44-45; penned by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao (now a Member of

this Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Manuel M. Barrios and
Maria Filomena D. Singh (now a Member of this Court).
4. Id. at 72-78; penned by Presiding Judge Roberto P. Buenaventura.

5. Id. at 69-70; penned by Presiding Judge Roberto P. Buenaventura.

6. Id. at 73, 90.

7. Id. at 48.

8. Id. at 73.
9. Id. at 72.

10. Id. at 73, 90.

11. Id. at 74.

12. Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with
the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there
as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), [36, 37] and 38.
13. Id.

14. Id. at 72-78.

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 15. Id. at 78.
16. Id. at 77.

17. Id.
18. Id.

19. Id.

20. Id. at 69.

21. Id. at 47-58.

22. Id. at 57.

23. See Oliveros v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 240084, 16 September 2020.

24. Id., citing Malayang Manggagawa ng Stayfast Phils., Inc. v. NLRC, et al., 716
Phil. 500, 512 (2013).

25. See Pendoy v. Court of Appeals (18th Division)-Cebu City, G.R. No. 228223, 10
June 2019.

26. See Villareal v. Aliga , 724 Phil. 47, 58-59 (2014), citing Bautista v. Cuneta-
Pangilinan, 698 Phil. 110 (2012).
27. Id.

28. 812 Phil. 166 (2017).

29. See Ortega v. Social Security Commission, 578 Phil. 338, (2008).
30. Rollo , p. 19.

31. See Mercado v. Valley Mountain Mines Exploration, Inc. , 677 Phil. 13 (2011),
citing Leynes v. Former Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals, 655 Phil. 25
(2011).
32. Id.

33. Moraña v. Republic, G.R. No. 227605, 05 December 2019.

34. Id., citing Republic of the Philippines v. Marelyn Tanedo Manalo, 831 Phil. 33
(2018).

35. See Philippine Bank of Communications v. Court of Appeals, 805 Phil. 964, 974
(2017).
36. Rollo , pp. 98-100.

37. 831 Phil. 33 (2018).

38. Id. at 57, 72-73.

39. Id. at 51.

40. 834 Phil. 21 (2018).

41. Id.

42. Rollo , p. 55.

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 43. See Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, 642 Phil. 420, 432 (2010).

44. Rollo , p. 55.

45. Id. at 55.

46. Id. at 56.

47. Id. at 100.

48. 834 Phil. 21, 34-35 (2018).

49. G.R. No. 227605, 05 December 2019.

50. Id.

51. See University of the East v. Masangkay , 831 Phil. 228 (2018).
52. See Ando v. Department of Foreign Affairs, 742 Phil. 37 (2014).

53. Id.

54. Rollo , p. 57.

55. Id. at 103.

56. Id. at 74, 121.

57. See Ando v. Department of Foreign Affairs, 742 Phil. 37 (2014).

58. Id.

59. G.R. No. 213198, 01 July 2019.

60. Id.

61. Moraña v. Republic, G.R. No. 227605, 05 December 2019.

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