FM Global

Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets 7-16

June 1990
Revised December 1998
Page 1 of 4

BARRICADES

Table of Contents
Page

SCOPE ............................................................................................................................................................ 2
DISCUSSION .................................................................................................................................................. 2

List of Figures
Fig. 1. Magazine (igloo type). Used for storage of explosives and explosive materials. ............................... 2
Fig. 2. Blast resistant shelter (hardened structure). ..................................................................................... 3
Fig. 3. Blast resistant cell (cubicle). Used to conduct tests or operations of potentially explosive nature. ... 4

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7-16 Barricades
Page 2 FM Global Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets

SCOPE
Over the years, a great deal of misunderstanding and misconception has arisen concerning blast resistant
structures and their use. This data sheet (previously identified as Technical Advisory Bulletin 7-16) is to explain
what barricades are, their purposes and limitations, and to compare them with other explosion-resistant
structures.

DISCUSSION
When explosives were first developed, military organizations quickly learned that, in order to prevent loss
of their entire supply of explosives in a single incident, they had to divide and separate the explosives. It was
soon discovered that the separation distances being used were well beyond the sympathetic detonation dis-
tances (the limiting distance at which the shock wave generated by one detonating mass can initiate
detonation in another mass). The separating distances could be reduced if missiles from the detonating area
could be prevented from hitting, and thereby detonating, other areas. It became the practice to erect missile-
resistant barricades around each storage site and to reduce the normal separating distance by one half.
The barricades, to be practical, had to be able to prevent penetration by missiles, and had to withstand the
expected shock or blast wave: the military did not want the barricade to topple over onto otherwise usable
explosives, nor did they want to rebuild several barricades after one site detonated. Barricades therefore had
to be ‘‘blast resistant.’’ The barricade at the site of detonation was (and is) expected to fail and was (and
is) considered expendable because it is not economical to build them strong enough to withstand the nearby
explosion. In many cases, the barricade is the walls and roof of the storage structure; such a structure is
called a magazine (Fig. 1).

Fig. 1. Magazine (igloo type). Used for storage of explosives and explosive materials.

Over the years, this concept of reducing the distance between explosive storage areas by the use of bar-
ricades intended for missile protection was applied to reduce the distance between high-explosion potential
areas and areas of completely different occupancy, and of ordinary construction, without much consider-
ation as to the placement of the barricade with respect to either structure or the strength of the protected
structure. This is where the misunderstanding and misconception have arisen.
A simple barricade has length, height, and thickness, but is essentially a one-plane figure. It will not prevent
shock waves going over and around it unless it is extremely large in relation to the detonating mass. At a dis-
tance of several barricade heights or lengths beyond the simple barricade, the shock wave will act as though
the barricade had hardly existed.
All the unbarricaded distances recommended by various authorities (military, American Table of Distance,
etc.) for separation of explosives and explosive materials from buildings and structures of normal construc-
tion are made with the expectation of some minor damage to the exposed structure (glass windows, light
structural members and membranes, plaster, etc.). The pressure of a shock wave is inversely proportional
to approximately the cube of the distance from the point of origin. This means that if the distance is halved,

©1990 Factory Mutual Insurance Company. All rights reserved.

Barricades 7-16
FM Global Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets Page 3

the pressure will be eight times greater, and will result in essentially total destruction of ordinary buildings.
If a building or structure is to be located at less than the recommended unbarricaded distances, the entire
structure should be built to resist the expected shock wave. Such structures are termed blast-resistant
shelters or hardened structures, and are often designed to resist overpressures as high as 20 psi (1.4 bars)
throughout the entire structure (Fig. 2).

Fig. 2. Blast resistant shelter (hardened structure). Used for observation or control of potentially explosive processes or
tests out-of-doors or in another building.

To be most effective in directing a shock wave, a ‘‘barricade’’ must be parabolic in shape, and the explo-
sive material must be located at the focal point. Under certain conditions, barricades can contain and direct
shock waves and missiles from an explosion in an interior volume. Parabolic barricades are generally imprac-
tical because of cost, but they can be approached in designing ‘‘blast resistant cells or cubicles.’’ These are
structures where: a. one or more of the exterior surfaces designed to be explosion-venting; b. the remain-
ing surfaces are made resistant to explosion pressures of 20-100 psi (1.4-6.9 bars); c. the volume of the
structure is in the order of 1 cu ft per 100 Btu of explosive energy available (one cu m per 3.73 MJ); and d.
the explosive material is located at some minimum distance such as 10 ft (3 m) from the resistant walls.
This type of structure is often used for processing and testing of explosives and explosive materials (Fig. 3).
The requirement that the amount of explosive material be small in relation to the volume, and that it be located
well away from the walls, makes this type of structure impractical for storage.
Explosion resistant construction for room vapor-air or dust-air combustion explosions is considerably differ-
ent from construction used where the hazard is detonation of an explosive material or failure of high pressure
vessels.
In room combustion explosions, experience has shown that generally only a small portion of the volume is
in the explosive range and burning velocities rarely ever approach sonic velocity where high intensity shock
waves are generated. The explosion energy release in these circumstances is about 10 Btu/cu ft of room vol-
ume (0.37 Mjoules/cu m). For these reasons, explosion-resistant construction members designed for 3⁄4 to
11⁄2 psi (0.05 to 0.1 bars) overpressure, when accompanied by appropriate venting members, will limit the
damage of combustion-type explosions such that the essential integrity of the building and its equipment
will be preserved.
Pressure development of combustion-type explosions in small enclosures (such as dust collectors or vapor
space of vessels) can approach pressures attained in test apparatus (approximately eight times initial abso-
lute pressure). This is because the concentration of the combustion material can be more easily near
stoichiometric (combining proportions) and more uniform throughout the volume than in a room. Where other
means to prevent explosion are not used (inerting, explosion suppression systems, etc.), the enclosure or
vessel must be designed to withstand the explosion; in other words, it must be explosion resistant to the extent
that explosion venting is available.

©1990 Factory Mutual Insurance Company. All rights reserved.

7-16 Barricades
Page 4 FM Global Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets

Fig. 3. Blast resistant cell (cubicle). Used to conduct tests or operations of potentially explosive nature.

Missile shields (fragment barriers) are another form of ‘‘barricade.’’ These are used where there is a poten-
tial for machinery (especially high-speed rotating equipment) to disintegrate and to propel metal fragments at
a high velocity without an accompanying shock wave.
Design data for blast-resistant barricades are available in Structures to Resist the Effects of Accidental Explo-
sions, Department of the Army, Navy and Air Force (TR 5-1300, NAVFAC P-397, AFM 88-22), U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1990. Appropriate separation distances from these struc-
tures to other structures can be determined from this manual.
Design guidelines for rooms and equipment having combustible-type explosion potential are found in a num-
ber of Factory Mutual Engineering loss prevention data sheets. One source of basic data for dust-air
explosions are in Data Sheet 7-76 Prevention and Mitigation of Combustible Dust Explosions and Fires.

FM Engr. Comm. Dec. 1972

©1990 Factory Mutual Insurance Company. All rights reserved.