PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO

D E C I S I O N CARPIO MORALES, J p:

Subject of these consolidated cases is the extent of the powers of the President in pursuing the peace
process. While the facts surrounding this controversy center on the armed conflict in Mindanao
between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the legal issue involved has a
bearing on all areas in the country where there has been a long-standing armed conflict. Yet again, the
Court is tasked to perform a delicate balancing act. It must uncompromisingly delineate the bounds
within which the President may lawfully exercise her discretion, but it must do so in strict adherence to
the Constitution, lest its ruling unduly restricts the freedom of action vested by that same Constitution in
the Chief Executive precisely to enable her to pursue the peace process effectively.

Aug 5, 2008 – GRP and MILF were scheduled to sign MOA – Ancestral Domain
MOA – AD is an aspect of the Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur
Long process of negotiation
On early 2000, MILF attacked the Central Mindanao then Joseph Estrada declared “All out war”
Government sought a resumption of Peace Talk in GMA Administration
March 24, 2001 – MILF signed an agreement in resuming Peace talk facilitated by the Malaysian
Government
Several Peace talks were held the parties
August 5, 2008 the MOA AD was signed

MAGALLONA VS. ERMITA

In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046) 2 demarcating the maritime baselines of the
Philippines as an archipelagic State. 

This law followed the framing of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in 1958
(UNCLOS I), 4 codifying, among others, the sovereign right of States parties over their "territorial sea,"
the breadth of which, however, was left undetermined.

In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the statute now under scrutiny. The
change was prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant with the terms of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), 5 which the Philippines ratified on 27 February 1984. 

Among others, UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of baselines of
archipelagic States like the Philippines 7 and sets the deadline for the filing of application for the
extended continental shelf. 8 Complying with these requirements, RA 9522 shortened one baseline,
optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent
territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as "regimes of islands"
whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.
Assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal grounds, namely:

(1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine state's
sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, 10 embodying the terms of the Treaty
of Paris 11 and ancillary treaties, 12 

(2) RA 9522 opens the country's waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels
and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the country's
nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional
provisions. 13

In addition, petitioners contend that RA 9522's treatment of the KIG as "regime of islands" not only
results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen. 

ARIGO VS. SWIFT

The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures (war)ship of the US Navy.

In December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the said vessel
"to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the
purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty." 

On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest
side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No one was
injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.

On January 20, 2013, U.S. 7th Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral Scott Swift, expressed regret over the
grounding incident and assured that the US will provide appropriate compensation for damage to the
reef caused by the ship." 

By March 30, 2013, the US Navy-led salvage team had finished removing the last piece of the grounded
ship from the coral reef. 

On April 17, 2013, the above-named petitioners, filed the present petition

Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS Guardian  cause
and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan,
Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan,
Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology.
Specifically, petitioners cite the following violations committed by US respondents under R.A. No.
10067:
(1) unauthorized entry (Section 19);
(2) non-payment of conservation fees (Section 21);
(3) obstruction of law enforcement officer (Section 30);
(4) damages to the reef (Section 20); and
(5) destroying and disturbing resources (Section 26 [g]).

The numerous reliefs sought in this case are set forth in the final prayer of the petition, to wit:

1. Immediately issue upon the filing of this petition a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO)
and/or a Writ of Kalikasan, which shall, in particular,
a. Order Respondents and any person acting on their behalf, to cease and desist all operations over
the Guardian grounding  incident;
b. Initially demarcating the metes and bounds of the damaged area as well as an additional buffer zone;
c. Order Respondents to stop all port calls and war games under 'Balikatan' because of the absence of
clear guidelines, duties, and liability schemes for breaches of those duties, and require Respondents to
assume responsibility for prior and future environmental damage in general, and environmental damage
under the Visiting Forces Agreement in particular.
d. Temporarily define and describe allowable activities of ecotourism, diving, recreation, and limited
commercial activities by fisherfolk and indigenous communities near or around the TRNP but away from
the damaged site and an additional buffer zone; ISCDEA

2. After summary hearing, issue a Resolution extending the TEPO until further orders of the Court;

3. After due proceedings, render a Decision which shall include, without limitation:
a. Order Respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, following the dispositive portion of Nicolas v. Romulo,
"to forthwith negotiate with the United States representatives for the appropriate agreement on
[environmental guidelines and environmental accountability] under Philippine authorities as provided in
Art. V[ ] of the VFA. . ."
b. Direct Respondents and appropriate agencies to commence administrative, civil, and criminal
proceedings against erring officers and individuals to the full extent of the law, and to make such
proceedings public;
c. Declare that Philippine authorities may exercise primary and exclusive criminal jurisdiction over erring
U.S. personnel under the circumstances of this case;
d. Require Respondents to pay just and reasonable compensation in the settlement of all meritorious
claims for damages caused to the Tubbataha Reef on terms and conditions no less severe than those
applicable to other States, and damages for personal injury or death, if such had been the case;
e. Direct Respondents to cooperate in providing for the attendance of witnesses and in the collection
and production of evidence, including seizure and delivery of objects connected with the offenses
related to the grounding of the Guardian;
f. Require the authorities of the Philippines and the United States to notify each other of the disposition
of all cases, wherever heard, related to the grounding of the Guardian;
g. Restrain Respondents from proceeding with any purported restoration, repair, salvage or post salvage
plan or plans, including cleanup plans covering the damaged area of the Tubbataha Reef absent a just
settlement approved by the Honorable Court;
h. Require Respondents to engage in stakeholder and LGU consultations in accordance with the Local
Government Code and R.A. 10067;
i. Require Respondent US officials and their representatives to place a deposit to the TRNP Trust
Fund defined under Section 17 of RA 10067 as a bona fide gesture towards full reparations;
j. Direct Respondents to undertake measures to rehabilitate the areas affected by the grounding of
the Guardian in light of Respondents' experience in the Port Royale  grounding in 2009, among other
similar grounding incidents;
k. Require Respondents to regularly publish on a quarterly basis and in the name of transparency and
accountability such environmental damage assessment, valuation, and valuation methods, in all stages
of negotiation;
l. Convene a multisectoral technical working group to provide scientific and technical support to the
TPAMB;
m. Order the Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of National Defense, and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources to review the Visiting Forces Agreement and the Mutual Defense
Treaty to consider whether their provisions allow for the exercise of erga omnes rights to a balanced
and healthful ecology and for damages which follow from any violation of those rights;
n. Narrowly tailor the provisions of the Visiting Forces Agreement for purposes of protecting the
damaged areas of TRNP; ADHaTC
o. Declare the grant of immunity found in Article V ("Criminal Jurisdiction") and Article VI of the
Visiting Forces Agreement unconstitutional for violating equal protection and/or for violating the
preemptory norm of nondiscrimination incorporated as part of the law of the land under Section 2,
Article II, of the Philippine Constitution;
p. Allow for continuing discovery measures;
q. Supervise marine wildlife rehabilitation in the Tubbataha Reefs in all other respects; and
4. Provide just and equitable environmental rehabilitation measures and such other reliefs as are just
and equitable under the premises. 7 (Underscoring supplie
|||  (Arigo v. Swift, G.R. No. 206510, [September 16, 2014], 743 PHIL 8-130)

According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of long-
standing policy the US considers itself bound by customary international rules on the "traditional uses
of the oceans" as codified in UNCLOS, as can be gleaned from previous declarations by former
Presidents Reagan and Clinton, and the US judiciary in the case of United States v. Royal Caribbean
Cruise Lines, Ltd.27

The international law of the sea is generally defined as "a body of treaty rules and customary norms
governing the uses of the sea, the exploitation of its resources, and the exercise of jurisdiction over
maritime regimes. It is a branch of public international law, regulating the relations of states with
respect to the uses of the oceans."

The UNCLOS is a multilateral treaty which was opened for signature on December 10, 1982 at Montego
Bay, Jamaica. It was ratified by the Philippines in 1984 but came into force on November 16, 1994 upon
the submission of the 60th ratification. The UNCLOS is a product of international negotiation that seeks
to balance State sovereignty (mare clausum) and the principle of freedom of the high seas (mare
liberum). 29 The freedom to use the world's marine waters is one of the oldest customary principles of
international law. 30 The UNCLOS gives to the coastal State sovereign rights in varying degrees over the
different zones of the sea which are: 1) internal waters, 2) territorial sea, 3) contiguous zone, 4)
exclusive economic zone, and 5) the high seas. It also gives coastal States more or less jurisdiction
over foreign vessels depending on where the vessel is located.
Insofar as the internal waters and territorial sea is concerned, the Coastal State exercises sovereignty,
subject to the UNCLOS and other rules of international law. Such sovereignty extends to the air space
over the territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil.

the petition for the issuance of the privilege of the Writ of Kalikasan is
hereby DENIED

Doctrine of relative jurisdictional immunity

(sovereign immunity)
It is my position that doctrine on relative jurisdictional immunity of foreign state or otherwise referred
to as sovereign immunity should be further refined. I am of the view that immunity does not
necessarily apply to all the foreign respondents should the case have been brought in a timely
manner, with the proper remedy, and in the proper court. Those who have directly and actually
committed culpable acts or acts resulting from gross negligence resulting in the grounding of a foreign
warship in violation of our laws defining a tortious act or one that protects the environment which
implement binding international obligations cannot claim sovereign immunity.
Some clarification may be necessary to map the contours of relative jurisdictional immunity of foreign
states otherwise known as the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity can be understood either as a domestic or an international
concept. 87
As a domestic concept, sovereign immunity is understood as the non-suability of the state. In the case of
the Republic of the Philippines as a State, this is contained in Article XVI, Section 3 of the 1987
Philippine Constitution, which provides that "[the] State may not be sued without its consent."
In  Air Transportation Office v. Spouses Ramos, 88 this court underscored the practical considerations
underlying the doctrine:
Practical considerations dictate the establishment of an immunity from suit in favor of the State.
Otherwise, and the State is suable at the instance of every other individual,  government service may be
severely obstructed and public safety endangered because of the number of suits that the State has to
defend against  . . . . 89 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted) ETDaIC
The textual reference to "[the] State" in Article XVI, Section 3 of the Constitution does not refer to
foreign governments. Rather, as a doctrine in international law, the concept of sovereign immunity is
incorporated into our jurisdiction as international custom or general principle of international law
through Article II, Section 2, which provides:
Section 2. The Philippine renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations. 90
Alternatively, should there be an international agreement or a treaty 91 that articulates the scope of
jurisdictional immunity for other sovereigns, then it can be incorporated through Article VII, Section 21,
which provides:
No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-
thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
In Republic of Indonesia v. Vinzon, 92 this court ruled that "[the] rule that a State may not be sued
without its consent is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of
States." 93 However, it did not make any reference to Article XVI, Section 3 of the Constitution. Instead,
it used Article II, Section 2 94 as basis for its discussion:
International law is founded largely upon the principles of reciprocity, comity, independence, and
equality of States which were adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II, Section 2 of the
1987  Constitution. The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is a necessary
consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. As enunciated in Sanders v.
Veridiano II, the practical justification for the doctrine of sovereign immunity is that there can be no
legal right against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. In the case of foreign
States, the rule is derived from the principle of the sovereign equality of States, as expressed in the
maxim par in parem non habet imperium. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction
over one another. A contrary attitude would "unduly vex the peace of nations." 95 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted) IaECc
|||  (Arigo v. Swift, G.R. No. 206510, [September 16, 2014], 743 PHIL 8-130)

SORIANO VS LAGUARDIA

On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program  Ang Dating Daan,  aired on
UNTV 37, made AN INDECENT remarks

Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by
Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo
(INC), 2 against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast.

Forthwith, the MTRCB sent petitioner a notice of the hearing on August 16, 2004 in relation to the
alleged use of some cuss words in the August 10, 2004 episode of Ang Dating Daan.

After a preliminary conference in which petitioner appeared, the MTRCB, by Order of August 16, 2004,
preventively suspended the showing of Ang Dating Daan program for 20 days, in accordance with
Section 3 (d) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1986, creating the MTRCB, in relation to Sec. 3, Chapter XIII
of the 2004 Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of PD 1986 and Sec. 7, Rule VII of the MTRCB
Rules of Procedure.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, a Decision is hereby rendered, finding respondent Soriano
liable for his utterances and thereby imposing on him a penalty of three (3) months suspension from his
program, "Ang Dating Daan"

Exp:
Administrative agencies have powers and functions which may be administrative, investigatory,
regulatory, quasi-legislative, or quasi-judicial, or a mix of the five, as may be conferred by
the Constitution or by statute.

A perusal of the MTRCB's basic mandate under PD 1986 reveals the possession by the agency of the
authority, albeit impliedly, to issue the challenged order of preventive suspension. And this authority
stems naturally from, and is necessary for the exercise of, its power of regulation and supervision.
PD 1986 - CREATING THE MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD

Sec. 3 of PD 1986 pertinently provides the following:

Section 3. Powers and Functions. —  The BOARD shall have the following functions, powers and duties:
xxx xxx xxx
c) To approve or disapprove, delete objectionable portions from and/or prohibit the . . . production, . . .
exhibition and/or television broadcast of the motion pictures, television programs and publicity
materials subject of the preceding paragraph, which, in the judgment of the board applying
contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard, are objectionable for being immoral, indecent,
contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines or its
people, or with a dangerous tendency to encourage the commission of violence or of wrong or crime
such as but not limited to:
xxx xxx xxx
vi) Those which are libelous or defamatory to the good name and reputation of any person, whether
living or dead;
xxx xxx xxx
(d) To supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or cancel, permits for the . . . production, copying,
distribution, sale, lease, exhibition, and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures, television
programs and publicity materials, to the end that no such pictures, programs and materials as are
determined by the BOARD to be objectionable in accordance with paragraph (c) hereof shall be . . .
produced, copied, reproduced, distributed, sold, leased, exhibited and/or broadcast by television;
xxx xxx xxx
k) To exercise such powers and functions as may be necessary or incidental to the attainment of the
purposes and objectives of this Act . . . . (Emphasis added.)

The issuance of a preventive suspension comes well within the scope of the MTRCB's authority and
functions expressly set forth in PD 1986, more particularly under its Sec. 3 (d), as quoted above, which
empowers the MTRCB to "supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or cancel, permits for the . . . exhibition,
and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials, to the
end that no such pictures, programs and materials as are determined by the BOARD to be objectionable
in accordance with paragraph (c) hereof shall be . . . exhibited and/or broadcast by
television".|||  (Soriano v. Laguardia, G.R. Nos. 164785 & 165636, [April 29, 2009], 605 PHIL 43-193)

To reiterate, preventive suspension authority of the MTRCB springs from its powers conferred under PD
1986. The MTRCB did not, as petitioner insinuates, empower itself to impose preventive suspension
through the medium of the IRR of PD 1986.|||  (Soriano v. Laguardia, G.R. Nos. 164785 & 165636, [April
29, 2009], 605 PHIL 43-193)
SOUTHERN LUZON DRUG CORP VS DSWD

thus, on January 13, 2005, Carlos Superdrug Corporation (Carlos Superdrug), together with other
corporation and proprietors operating drugstores in the Philippines, filed a Petition for Prohibition with
Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Preliminary Injunction before this Court,
entitled Carlos Superdrug Corporation v. DSWD, 5 docketed as G.R. No. 166494, assailing the
constitutionality of Section 4 (a) of R.A. No. 9257 primarily on the ground that it amounts to taking of
private property without payment of just compensation

To recognize the important role of the private sector in the improvement of the welfare of senior
citizens and to actively seek their partnership.

To implement the above policy, the law grants a twenty percent discount to senior citizens for medical
and dental services, and diagnostic and laboratory fees; admission fees charged by theaters, concert
halls, circuses, carnivals, and other similar places of culture, leisure and amusement; fares for domestic
land, air and sea travel; utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants
and recreation centers; and purchases of medicines for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens.

As a form of reimbursement, the law provides that business establishments extending the twenty
percent discount to senior citizens may claim the discount as a tax deduction.

The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has
general welfare for its object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but has been purposely
veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough
room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances, thus assuring the greatest
benefits.

Accordingly, it has been described as "the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers,
extending as it does to all the great public needs." It is "[t]he power vested in the legislature by
the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes,
and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge
to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same."

For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must
bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must
yield to general welfare. 

Verily, it is the bounden duty of the State to care for the elderly as they reach the point in their lives
when the vigor of their youth has diminished and resources have become scarce. Not much because of
choice, they become needing of support from the society for whom they presumably spent their
productive days and for whose betterment they exhausted their energy, know-how and experience to
make our days better to live.

In the same way, providing aid for the disabled persons is an equally important State responsibility.
Thus, the State is obliged to give full support to the improvement of the total well-being of disabled
persons and their integration into the mainstream of society. 32 This entails the creation of
opportunities for them and according them privileges if only to balance the playing field which had been
unduly tilted against them because of their limitations.
The duty to care for the elderly and the disabled lies not only upon the State, but also on the
community and even private entities. As to the State, the duty emanates from its role as parens
patriae which holds it under obligation to provide protection and look after the welfare of its people
especially those who cannot tend to themselves. Parens patriae means parent of his or her country, and
refers to the State in its role as "sovereign", or the State in its capacity as a provider of protection to
those unable to care for themselves. 33 In fulfilling this duty, the State may resort to the exercise of its
inherent powers: police power, eminent domain and power of taxation.

SANGGUNIAN NG PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN VS. QUEZON

Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte to implement a nationwide curfew for minors,
several local governments in Metro Manila started to strictly implement their curfew ordinances on
minors through police operations which were publicly known as part of "Oplan Rody”.

Among those local governments that implemented curfew ordinances were respondents: (a) Navotas
City, through Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 99-02, 4 dated August 26, 1999, entitled "Nagtatakda
ng 'Curfew' ng mga Kabataan na Wala Pang Labing Walong (18) Taong Gulang sa Bayan ng Navotas,
Kalakhang Maynila," as amended by Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13, 5 dated June 6, 2002 (Navotas
Ordinance); (b) City of Manila, through Ordinance No. 8046 6 entitled "An Ordinance Declaring the
Hours from 10:00 P.M. to 4:00 A.M. of the Following Day as 'Barangay Curfew Hours' for Children and
Youths Below Eighteen (18) Years of Age; Prescribing Penalties Therefor; and for Other Purposes" dated
October 14, 2002 (Manila Ordinance); and (c) Quezon City, through Ordinance No. SP-2301, 7 Series of
2014, entitled "An Ordinance Setting for a [sic] Disciplinary Hours in Quezon City for Minors from 10:00
P.M. to 5:00 A.M., Providing Penalties for Parent/Guardian, for Violation Thereof and for Other
Purposes" dated July 31, 2014 (Quezon City Ordinance; collectively, Curfew Ordinances). 8

Petitioners, 9 spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) — an association

of young adults and minors that aims to forward a free and just society, in particular the protection of
the rights and welfare of the youth and minors 10 — filed this present petition, arguing that the Curfew
Ordinances are unconstitutional because they:
 (a) result in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, and thus, fall under the void for vagueness
doctrine; 
(b) suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of minors during curfew
hours; 
(c) deprive minors of the right to liberty and the right to travel without substantive due process; and 
(d) deprive parents of their natural and primary right in rearing the youth without substantive due
process. 11 

In addition, petitioners assert that the Manila Ordinance contravenes RA 9344, as amended by RA
10630. AN ACT STRENGTHENING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN THE PHILIPPINES, AMENDING FOR
THE PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9344, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE “JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE
ACT OF 2006” AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR
More specifically, petitioners posit that the Curfew Ordinances encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement as there are no clear provisions or detailed standards on how law enforcers should
apprehend and properly determine the age of the alleged curfew violators. 13 They further argue that
the law enforcer's apprehension depends only on his physical assessment, and, thus, subjective and
based only on the law enforcer's visual assessment of the alleged curfew violator. 14

While petitioners recognize that the Curfew Ordinances contain provisions indicating the activities
exempted from the operation of the imposed curfews, i.e., exemption of working students or students
with evening class, they contend that the lists of exemptions do not cover the range and breadth of
legitimate activities or reasons as to why minors would be out at night, and, hence, proscribe or impair
the legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours. 15

Petitioners likewise proffer that the Curfew Ordinances: 

(a) are unconstitutional as they deprive minors of the right to liberty and the right to travel without
substantive due process; 16 and 
(b) fail to pass the strict scrutiny test, for not being narrowly tailored and for employing means that
bear no reasonable relation to their purpose. 17

They argue that the prohibition of minors on streets during curfew hours will not per se protect and
promote the social and moral welfare of children of the community. 18

Furthermore, petitioners claim that the Manila Ordinance, particularly Section 4 19 thereof,
contravenes Section 57-A 20 of RA 9344, as amended, given that the cited curfew provision imposes on
minors the penalties of imprisonment, reprimand, and admonition. They contend that the imposition
of penalties contravenes RA 9344's express command that no penalty shall be imposed on minors for
curfew violations. 21

Lastly, petitioners submit that there is no compelling State interest to impose curfews contrary to the
parents' prerogative to impose them in the exercise of their natural and primary right in the rearing of
the youth, and that even if a compelling interest exists, less restrictive means are available to achieve
the same. In this regard, they suggest massive street lighting programs, installation of CCTVs (closed-
circuit televisions) in public streets, and regular visible patrols by law enforcers as other viable means of
protecting children and preventing crimes at night. They further opine that the government can impose
more reasonable sanctions, i.e., mandatory parental counseling and education seminars informing the
parents of the reasons behind the curfew, and that imprisonment is too harsh a penalty for parents who
allowed their children to be out during curfew hours. 22
|||  (Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, [August 8, 2017], 815
PHIL 1067-1174)
LIANG VS PEOPLE

For allegedly uttering defamatory words against a fellow Asian Development Bank (ADB) worker,
petitioner, an economist at ADB, was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) with two
counts of grave oral defamation. The MeTC judge received an "office protocol" from the Department of
Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process under Section 45
of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the
ADB in the country. Based on the said communication, the MeTC judge, without notice to the
prosecution, dismissed the two criminal cases. The motion for reconsideration filed by the respondent
was denied by the MeTC, hence, a petition for certiorari was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
The RTC set aside the MeTC ruling and ordered the enforcement of the warrant of arrest earlier issued.
Thus, petitioner elevated the case to the Supreme Court after his motion for reconsideration was
denied. He argued that he is covered by immunity and that no preliminary investigation was held.
The Supreme Court denied the petition. According to the Supreme Court, slandering a person could not
possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a
crime, such as defamation; the mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the
dropping of the charges; and that preliminary investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by
the MeTC such as the one at bar.
|||  (Liang v. People, G.R. No. 125865, [January 28, 2000], 380 PHIL 673-678)

DOTC

Respondent spouses Vicente and Maria Cleofe Abecina (respondents/spouses Abecina) are the

registered owners of five parcels of land in Sitio Paltik, Barrio Sta. Rosa, Jose Panganiban, Camarines
Norte. The properties are covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-25094, T-25095, T-25096,
T-25097, and T-25098. 3
In February 1993, the DOTC awarded Digitel Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (Digitel) a contract for
the management, operation, maintenance, and development of a Regional Telecommunications
Development Project (RTDP) under the National Telephone Program, Phase I, Tranche 1 (NTPI-1).4
The DOTC and Digitel subsequently entered into several Facilities Management Agreements (FMA) for
Digitel to manage, operate, maintain, and develop the RTDP and NTPI-1 facilities comprising local
telephone exchange lines in various municipalities in Luzon. The FMAs were later converted into
Financial Lease Agreements (FLA) in 1995.
Later on, the municipality of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, donated a one thousand two
hundred (1,200) square-meter parcel of land to the DOTC for the implementation of the RDTP in the
municipality. However, the municipality erroneously included portions of the respondents' property in
the donation. Pursuant to the FLAs, Digitel constructed a telephone exchange on the property which
encroached on the properties of the respondent spouses. 5 SICDAa
Sometime in the mid-1990s, the spouses Abecina discovered Digitel's occupation over portions of their
properties. They required Digitel to vacate their properties and pay damages, but the latter refused,
insisting that it was occupying the property of the DOTC pursuant to their FLA.
On April 29, 2003, the respondent spouses sent a final demand letter to both the DOTC and Digitel to
vacate the premises and to pay unpaid rent/damages in the amount of one million two hundred
thousand pesos (P1,200,000.00).Neither the DOTC nor Digitel complied with the demand.
On September 3, 2003, the respondent spouses filed an accion publiciana complaint 6 against the DOTC
and Digitel for recovery of possession and damages. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 7355.
In its answer, the DOTC claimed immunity from suit and ownership over the subject
properties. 7 Nevertheless, during the pre-trial conference, the DOTC admitted that the Abecinas were
the rightful owners of the properties and opted to rely instead on state immunity from suit. 8
On March 12, 2007, the respondent spouses and Digitel executed a Compromise Agreement and
entered into a Contract of Lease. The RTC rendered a partial decision and approved the Compromise
Agreement on March 22, 2007. 9
On May 20, 2009, the RTC rendered its decision against the DOTC. 10 It brushed aside the defense of
state immunity. Citing Ministerio v. Court of First Instance 11 and Amigable v. Cuenca,12 it held that
government immunity from suit could not be used as an instrument to perpetuate an injustice on a
citizen. 13
The RTC held that as the lawful owners of the properties, the respondent spouses enjoyed the right to
use and to possess them — rights that were violated by the DOTC's unauthorized entry, construction,
and refusal to vacate. The RTC (1) ordered the Department — as a builder in bad faith — to forfeit the
improvements and vacate the properties; and (2) awarded the spouses with P1,200,000.00 as actual
damages, P200,000.00 as moral damages, and P200,000.00 as exemplary damages plus attorney's fees
and costs of suit.
The DOTC elevated the case to the CA arguing: (1) that the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over it due to
state immunity from suit; (2) that the suit against it should have been dismissed after the spouses
Abecina and Digitel executed a compromise agreement; and (3) that the RTC erred in awarding actual,
moral, and exemplary damages against it. 14 The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 93795.
On March 20, 2013, the CA affirmed the RTC's decision but deleted the award of exemplary damages.
The CA upheld the RTC's jurisdiction over cases for accion publiciana where the assessed value exceeds
P20,000.00. 15 It likewise denied the DOTC's claim of state immunity from suit, reasoning that the DOTC
removed its cloak of immunity after entering into a proprietary contract — the Financial Lease
Agreement with Digitel. 16 It also adopted the RTC's position that state immunity cannot be used to
defeat a valid claim for compensation arising from an unlawful taking without the proper expropriation
proceedings. 17 The CA affirmed the award of actual and moral damages due to the DOTC's neglect to
verify the perimeter of the telephone exchange construction but found no valid justification for the
award of exemplary damages. 18
On April 16, 2013, the DOTC filed the present petition for review on certiorari.