Reasonable doubt

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Beyond a reasonable doubt is a legal standard of proof required to validate a

criminal conviction in most adversarial legal systems.[1] It is a higher standard of
proof than the balance of probabilities (commonly used in civil matters) and is
usually therefore reserved for criminal matters where what is at stake (i.e.,
someone's life and liberty) is considered more serious and therefore deserving of
a higher threshold.
The prosecution in criminal matters typically bears the burden of proof and is
required to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. This means that in order
for a defendant to be found guilty, the case presented by the prosecution must be
enough to remove any reasonable doubt in the mind of the trier of fact (be it the
judge or jury) that the defendant is guilty of the crime with which one is charged.
The term reasonable doubt can be criticised for having a circular definition.
Therefore, jurisdictions using this standard often rely on additional or
supplemental measures, such as a judge's specific instructions to a jury, to
simplify or qualify reasonable doubt (see below for examples). The requirement
that a criminal case be proven beyond a reasonable doubt (as opposed to "on
the balance of probabilities") can be traced to Blackstone's formulation that "[i]t is
better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer". In other
words, if there is any doubt that a person is guilty, it is better that they
be acquitted than risk convicting one whose guilt has not been proved by the
required quantum of evidence.
Legal systems have tended to avoid quantifying the reasonable doubt standard
(for example, as "over 90% probability"),[2] although legal scholars from a variety
of analytical perspectives have argued in favor of quantification of the criminal
standard of proof.[3][4]
Medieval Roman law, followed by the English jurist Edward Coke, expressed a
similar idea by requiring "proofs clearer than light" for criminal conviction. The
formulation "beyond reasonable doubt" is characteristic of Anglophone legal
systems since the eighteenth century.[5]

Contents

 1By jurisdiction
o 1.1United Kingdom
 1.1.1England and Wales
o 1.2Canada
o 1.3New Zealand
o 1.4United States
o 1.5Japan
 2See also
  3References

By jurisdiction[edit]
United Kingdom[edit]
England and Wales[edit]
In English common law prior to the reasonable doubt standard, passing judgment
in criminal trials had severe religious repercussions for jurors. According to
judicial law prior to the 1780s, "the Juryman who finds any other person guilty, is
liable to the Vengeance of God upon his Family and Trade, Body and Soul, in
this world and that to come."[6] It was also believed that "[i]n every case of doubt,
where one's salvation is in peril, one must always take the safer way. ... A judge
who is in doubt must refuse to judge."[6] It was in reaction to these religious
fears[6] that "reasonable doubt" was introduced in the late 18th century to English
common law, thereby allowing jurors to more easily convict. Therefore, the
original use of the "reasonable doubt" standard was opposite to its modern use of
limiting a juror's ability to convict.
Juries in criminal courts in England and Wales are no longer customarily directed
to consider whether there is reasonable doubt regarding a defendant's guilt. A
2008 conviction was appealed after the judge had said to the jury, "You must be
satisfied of guilt beyond all reasonable doubt." The conviction was upheld; but
the Appeal Court made clear their unhappiness with the judge's remark,
indicating that the judge should instead have said to the jury simply that before
they can return a verdict of guilty, they "must be sure that the defendant is guilty".
[7]

The principle of "beyond reasonable doubt" was expounded in Woolmington v

DPP [1935] UKHL 1:[8]
Juries are always told that, if conviction there is to be, the prosecution must
prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. This statement cannot mean that in
order to be acquitted the prisoner must "satisfy" the jury. This is the law as laid
down in the Court of Criminal Appeal in Rex v. Davies 29 Times LR 350; 8 Cr
App R 211, the headnote of which correctly states that where intent is an
ingredient of a crime there is no onus on the defendant to prove that the act
alleged was accidental. Throughout the web of the English Criminal Law one
golden thread is always to be seen, that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove
the prisoner's guilt subject to what I have already said as to the defence of
insanity and subject also to any statutory exception. If, at the end of and on the
whole of the case, there is a reasonable doubt, created by the evidence given by
either the prosecution or the prisoner, as to whether the prisoner killed the
deceased with a malicious intention, the prosecution has not made out the case
and the prisoner is entitled to an acquittal. No matter what the charge or where
the trial, the principle that the prosecution must prove the guilt of the prisoner is
part of the common law of England and no attempt to whittle it down can be
entertained.

Canada[edit]
In Canada, the expression "beyond a reasonable doubt" requires clarification for
the benefit of the jury.[9][10] The leading decision is R. v. Lifchus,[10] where the
Supreme Court discussed the proper elements of a charge to the jury on the
concept of "reasonable doubt" and noted that "[t]he correct explanation of the
requisite burden of proof is essential to ensure a fair criminal trial." While the
Court did not prescribe any specific wording that a trial judge must use to explain
the concept, it recommended certain elements that should be included in a jury
charge, as well as pointing out comments that should be avoided.
The Supreme Court suggested that the concept of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt should be explained to juries as follows: [10]

 The standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is

inextricably intertwined with that principle
fundamental to all criminal trials, the presumption of
innocence.
 The burden of proof rests on the prosecution
throughout the trial and never shifts to the accused.
 A reasonable doubt is not a doubt based upon
sympathy or prejudice and, instead, is based on
reason and common sense.
 Reasonable doubt is logically connected to the
evidence or absence of evidence.
 Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not involve
proof to an absolute certainty. It is not proof beyond
any doubt, nor is it an imaginary or frivolous doubt.
 More is required than proof that the accused is
probably guilty. A jury that concludes only that the
accused is probably guilty must acquit.
The Court also warned trial judges that they should avoid explaining the concept
in the following ways:[10]

 By describing the term reasonable doubt as an

ordinary expression that has no special meaning in
the criminal law context.
 By inviting jurors to apply to the task before them the
same standard of proof that they apply to important,
or even the most important, decisions in their own
lives.
 By equating proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" to
proof "to a moral certainty".
 By qualifying the word "doubt" with adjectives other
than reasonable, such as serious, substantial,
or haunting, which may mislead the jury.
 By instructing jurors that they may convict if they are
"sure" that the accused is guilty, before providing
them with a proper definition as to the meaning of
the words beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Supreme Court of Canada has since emphasized in R. v. Starr[11] that an
effective way to explain the concept is to tell the jury that proof beyond a
reasonable doubt "falls much closer to absolute certainty than to proof on a
balance of probabilities." It is not enough to believe that the accused is probably
guilty, or likely guilty. Proof of probable guilt, or likely guilt, is not proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.[12]
New Zealand[edit]
In New Zealand, jurors are typically told throughout a trial that the offence must
be proved "beyond reasonable doubt", and judges usually include this in the
summing-up.[13] There is no absolute prescription as to how judges should explain
reasonable doubt to juries. Judges usually tell jurors that they will be satisfied
beyond reasonable doubt if they "feel sure" or "are sure" that the defendant is
guilty.[14] In line with appellate court direction, judges do little to elaborate on this
or to explain what it means.[13][14]
Research published in 1999 found that many jurors were uncertain what "beyond
reasonable doubt" meant. "They generally thought in terms of percentages, and
debated and disagreed with each other about the percentage certainty required
for 'beyond reasonable doubt', variously interpreting it as 100 per cent, 95 per
cent, 75 per cent and even 50 per cent. Occasionally this produced profound
misunderstandings about the standard of proof." [13]
In R v Wanhalla, President Young of the Court of Appeal set out a model jury
direction on the standard of proof required for a criminal conviction.
United States[edit]
The cornerstone to American criminal jurisprudence is that the accused is
presumed innocent until guilt is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. [15][16] The US
Supreme Court held that "the Due Process clause protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary
to constitute the crime charged."[16] The US Supreme Court first discussed the
term in Miles v. United States: "The evidence upon which a jury is justified in
returning a verdict of guilty must be sufficient to produce a conviction of guilt, to
the exclusion of all reasonable doubt." [17] The U.S. Supreme Court extended the
reasonable doubt standard to juvenile delinquency proceedings because they are
considered quasi-criminal.[16] "[W]e explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause
protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." [16]
Juries must be instructed to apply the reasonable doubt standard when
determining the guilt or innocence of a criminal defendant. However, courts have
struggled to define what constitutes a reasonable doubt. [3][18] There is
disagreement as to whether the jury should be given a definition of "reasonable
doubt."[19] Some state courts have prohibited providing juries with a definition
altogether.[18] In Victor v. Nebraska (1994), the US Supreme Court expressed
disapproval of the unclear reasonable doubt instructions at issue, but stopped
short of setting forth an exemplary jury instruction.[20] Reasonable doubt came into
existence in English common law and was intended to protect the jurors from
committing a potentially mortal sin, since only God may pass judgment on man.
[18]
 The idea was to ease a juror's concern about damnation for passing judgment
upon a fellow man.[18] Since there is no formal jury instruction that adequately
defines reasonable doubt, and based on the origins of the doctrine and its
evolution, reasonable doubt may be resolved by determining whether there exists
an alternative explanation to the facts seems plausible. [18] If yes, then there is
reasonable doubt and the accused must be acquitted. [18]
Japan[edit]
Since 1945, Japan has also operated by a "reasonable doubt" standard,
including the doctrine of in dubio pro reo, which was instituted by the Supreme
Court during a controversial murder trial in 1975 (the Shiratori case brought
before the Supreme Court of Japan, see for example notes on Shigemitsu
Dandō). However, this is not considered an essential standard in Japan and
lower level judges sometimes disregard it.[21]

See also[edit]
 Critical thinking
 Metacognition
 Moral certainty
 Probable cause
 Reasonable suspicion
  Burden of proof (law)

References[edit]
1. ^ Grechenig, Nicklisch & Thoeni, Punishment Despite
Reasonable Doubt - A Public Goods Experiment with
Sanctions under Uncertainty, Journal of Empirical Legal
Studies (JELS) 2010, vol. 7 (4), p. 847-867 (ssrn).
2. ^ Franklin, James (2006). "Case comment—United
States v. Copeland, 369 F. Supp. 2d 275 (E.D.N.Y. 2005):
quantification of the 'proof beyond reasonable doubt'
standard". Law, Probability and Risk. 5 (2): 159–
165. doi:10.1093/lpr/mgl017. Retrieved 30 June 2021.
3. ^ Jump up to:a b Pi, Daniel, Francesco Parisi, and Barbara
Luppi, Quantifying Reasonable Doubt 72 Rutgers U. L. Rev.
455 (2020)
4. ^ Kagehiro, Dorothy K. and W. Clark Staunton, Legal v.
Quantified Definitions of the Standard of Proof 9 L. Hum.
Behav. 159 (1985)
5. ^ Franklin, James (2001). The Science of Conjecture:
Evidence and Probability Before Pascal. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press. pp. 28, 42, 61, 63, 67. ISBN 0-
8018-6569-7.
6. ^ Jump up to:a b c James Q. Whitman What Are the Origins of
Reasonable Doubt?, History News Network, George Mason
University, February 25, 2008.
7. ^ R v Majid [2009] EWCA Crim 2563 (12 October 2009)
8. ^ Woolmington v DPP [1935] UKHL 1 (23 May 1935)
9. ^ R. v. Brydon, [1995 4 SCR 253] (SCC 1995).
10. ^ Jump up to:a b c d R. v. Lifchus, [1997 3 SCR 320] (SCC
1997).
11. ^ R. v. Starr, [2000 2 SCR 144], 242 (SCC 2000) ("In my
view, an effective way to define the reasonable doubt
standard for a jury is to explain that it falls much closer to
absolute certainty than to proof on a balance of
probabilities.").
12. ^ R. v. Layton, [2009 2 SCR 540] (SCC 2009).
13. ^ Jump up to:a b c Young, Warren; Cameron, Neil; Tinsley,
Yvette (November 1999). Juries in Criminal Trials: Part
Two (PDF). Preliminary Paper 37. Vol. 2. Wellington, New
Zealand: Law Commission. p. 54. ISBN 1-877187-42-9.
Archived from the original (PDF) on 9 February 2013.
Retrieved 14 April 2012.
14. ^ Jump up to:a b Young, William (2003). "Summing-up to juries
in criminal cases – what jury research says about current
rules and practice" (PDF). Crim LR. 665: 674. Archived
from the original (PDF) on 3 November 2012. Retrieved 14
April 2012.
15. ^ Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432 (1895)
16. ^ Jump up to:a b c d In re Winship 397 U.S. 358 (1970)
17. ^ 103 U.S. 304 (1880)
18. ^ Jump up to:a b c d e f Whitman, James Q., The Origins of
"Reasonable Doubt" (2005), Faculty Scholarship Series. 1.
19. ^ Diamond, H. A. (1990). "Reasonable doubt: to define, or not
to define". Columbia Law Review. 90 (6): 1716–
1736. doi:10.2307/1122751. JSTOR 1122751.
20. ^ Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (1994)
21. ^ Goodman, Carl F (2003). Rule of Law in Japan : A
Comparative Analysis - What You See May Not Be What You
Get. Kluwer Law International. p. 253. ISBN 9789041189035.

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