Justice - Curso Completo e Exercícios - Michael Sandel

QUIZZES – (1) 80% (5% of grade), (2) 60% (5% of grade), (3) 100% (5% of grade), (4) 80%
(5% of grade), (5) 100% (5% of grade), Quiz Average: 84% = 21% of possible 25%, (Final
Exam) 76% (75% of grade)
How to Navigate the Course

Overview
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Testing yourself
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Lecture 1 - Doing the Right Thing
Video and Poll
Self-Test 3 of 3 possible points(3/3) 100%
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Discussion Prompt: Ethics of Torture
Reading: Justice: What's the Right Thing to Do?
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Lecture 2 - The Lifeboat Case
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Discussion Prompt: Do Numbers Matter?
Reading 1: The Queen vs. Dudley and Stephens (1884) (The Lifeboat Case)
Reading 2: Justice: What's the Right Thing to Do?
Lecture 3 - Utilitarianism: Jeremy Bentham
Video and Poll
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Discussion Prompt: Ethics of Putting a Price Tag on Life
Reading 1: Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation (1780)
Lecture 4 - Utilitarianism: J.S. Mill
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Discussion Prompt: Throwing Christians to Lions?
Reading: J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism (1863)
Quiz 1
Questions 4 of 5 possible points(4/5) 80%

Quiz due Jul 31, 2013 at 23:00 UTC
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Lecture 5 - Libertarianism: Free-market philosophy
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Discussion Prompt: Are Taxes a Form of Forced Labor?
Lecture 6 - Libertarianism: Do we own ourselves?
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Discussion Prompt: Legislating Morality?

Live Question and Answer Session with Professor Sandel
Questions
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Lecture 7 - John Locke: Property Rights
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Discussion Prompt: A Right to Kill Yourself?
Reading: John Locke, Second Treatise of Government (1690)
Lecture 8 - John Locke: Individual rights and majority rule
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Discussion Prompt: Majority Rule vs. Property Rights
Lecture 9 - Markets and Morals: Military service
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Discussion Prompt: Army of Mercenaries or Conscription?
Lecture 10 - Markets and Morals: Surrogate motherhood
Video and Poll
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Discussion Prompt: Markets and Their Limits
Reading: In the Matter of Baby "M" (1988)
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Quiz 2
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Lecture 11 - Immanuel Kant: What is freedom?
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Discussion Prompt: Moral Character
Reading 1: Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785)

Lecture 12 - Immanuel Kant: The supreme principle of morality
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Discussion Prompt: Morality's Foundation

Lecture 13 - Immanuel Kant: A lesson in lying
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Discussion Prompt: Moral Status of Misleading Truths
Quiz 3
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Lecture 14 - The Morality of Consent
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Discussion Prompt: Voluntary Consent
Recommended Reading: John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971)
Lecture 15 - John Rawls: The case for equality
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Discussion Prompt: Justice as Fairness
Lecture 16 - Distributive Justice: Who deserves what?
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Discussion Prompt: Fairness of Inheritance Tax
Global Perspectives: Global Classroom - Distributive Justice
Quiz 4

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Lecture 17 - Arguing Affirmative Action
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Discussion Prompt: A Matter of Moral Desert?
Reading 1: Hopwood v. State (1996)
Reading 2: Grutter v. Bollinger (2003)

Lecture 18 - Aristotle: Justice and virtue
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Discussion Prompt: Moral Significance of Merit
Reading: Aristotle, The Politics

Lecture 19 - Aristotle: The good citizen
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Discussion Prompt: Politics and Telos

Reading 1: Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics
Reading 2: PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin (2000)
Lecture 20 - Aristotle: Freedom vs. fit
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Discussion Prompt: Ability, Disability, and Access
Quiz 5
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Lecture 21 - Justice, Community, and Membership
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Discussion Prompt: Enslaved by Our Circumstances?
Recommended Reading: Alasdair MacIntyre, "The Virtues, the Unity of a Human Life and the
Concept of a Tradition"
Lecture 22 - Dilemmas of Loyalty
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Discussion Prompt: Obligations of Solidarity and Membership
Reading: No New Reading for this Lecture
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Lecture 23 - Debating Same-Sex Marriage
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Discussion Prompt: Marriage Law Without Moral Controversy?
Reading: Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health (2003)

Lecture 24 - Conclusion: Justice and the good Life
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Discussion Prompt: Moral Argument and Public Sphere
Reading: No New Reading

Final Exam
Final Exam due Jul 31, 2013 at 23:00 UTC
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Global Perspectives: The Global Classroom Experiment
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Justice - ER22x
March 12, 2013 – June 4, 2013
LECTURE 1 - Doing the Right Thing
Moral Principles
1. Depends on the consequences that will result from your action – [Run-Away trolley
car steered to kill 1 rather than 5]
a. Consequentialist Moral Reasoning – locates morality in the consequences of
an act
b. Jeremy Bentham – “Utilitarianism” Philosopher 18th C. British
2. Intrinsic quality of the act itself [Pushing fat man onto trolley tracks from crossover killing
1 rather than 5]
a. Categorical Moral Reasoning – locates morality in certain categories of moral
duties and rights
b. Emmanuel Kant – 18th C. German Philosopher
Why does the principle that seems right in the first question –
sacrifice one life to save five – seem wrong in the second?
● Which principle has greater weight, or
● Which principle is more appropriate?
The Evasion of Skepticism

● Why reflect on Moral Principles when many of them have been unresolved for millennia?
● Who are we to think we can solve them here and now?
Response: These questions persisted for a very long time, but the very fact that they have
recurred and persisted may suggest that though they’re impossible in one sense they’re
unavoidable in another. The reason they’re unavoidable – they’re inescapable, is that we live
some answer to these questions everyday.
Emmanuel Kant on skeptism
“Skepticism is a resting place for human reason, where it can reflect on its dogmatic wanderings,
but it is no dwelling place for permanent settlement. Simply to acquiesce in skepticism can never
suffice to overcome the restlessness of reason.”
SELF-TEST – Lecture 1
QUESTION 1 A consequentialist is likely to approach the trolley car case by focusing on:
 a) The number of lives that would be saved by diverting the trolley car.
 b) The rights of the people who would be killed if the trolley car is diverted.  
c) A moral rule, telling us not to kill under any circumstances.
 d) Whether the people on the tracks consented to be there, and consented to being put at risk.
 e) The inherent evil in killing one person in order to save a greater number of people.
EXPLANATION
a) Correct.b) Incorrect. A consequentialist is concerned with numbers and consequences, not individual rights.c) Incorrect. A
consequentialist is concerned with numbers and consequences, and permits killing if killing brings about the best consequences.
d) Incorrect. A consequentialist is concerned with numbers and consequences, regardless of who consented to being put at risk.
e) Incorrect. A consequentialist is concerned with numbers and consequences, and would accept that it is permissible to kill one
person in order to save several people.
QUESTION 2 One who engages in categorical moral thinking is likely to approach the trolley car case by focusing on: 
a) Whether the trolley car driver can maximize the number of lives saved by diverting the trolley.
 b) Whether the trolley car driver can minimize the amount of suffering by diverting the trolley.
 c) Whether diverting the trolley car leads to the best consequences.  
d) Whether more people are made happy if the trolley car is diverted.  
e) Whether diverting the trolley car would violate people’s rights.
EXPLANATION
a) Incorrect. Those who engage in categorical moral thinking believe that we ought to follow certain principles or respect certain
rights regardless of the number of people that would be saved.b) Incorrect. Those who engage in categorical moral thinking
believe that we ought to follow certain principles or respect certain rights regardless of the number of people that would be saved.
c) Incorrect. Those who engage in categorical moral thinking believe that we ought to follow certain principles or respect certain
rights regardless of the number of people that would be saved.d) Incorrect. Those who engage in categorical moral thinking
believe that we ought to follow certain principles or respect certain rights regardless of the number of people that would be saved.
e) Correct.
QUESTION 3 Someone who argues that the trolley car driver should divert the trolley because more lives would be saved by
doing so would be engaging in:
 a) Categorical moral reasoning.  
b) Consequentialist moral reasoning.  
c) Both categorical moral reasoning and consequentialist moral reasoning.  
d) Neither categorical moral reasoning nor consequentialist moral reasoning.  
e) Immoral reasoning.
EXPLANATION
a) Incorrect. Those who engage in categorical moral reasoning locate morality in duties and rights, not in the consequences of an
action.
b) Correct.
c) Incorrect. Those who engage in categorical moral reasoning locate morality in duties and rights, not in the consequences of an
action, and so the person would be engaged in consequentialist moral reasoning but not categorical moral reasoning.
d) Incorrect. Those who engage in consequentialist moral reasoning locate morality in the consequences of an action, and so
a person concerned with the number of people killed would be engaged in consequentialist reasoning.e) Incorrect. Those who
engage in consequentialist moral reasoning locate morality in the consequences of an action, and so a person concerned with the
number of people killed would be engaged in consequentialist reasoning.
LECTURE 2 – The Life Boat Case

Review Lecture 1
● The way we argued
○ CASE 1 (Trolley) - Our judgments in particular cases
■ The reasons or principles behind those judgments
○ CASE 2 (Organ stealing) - Re-examined those principles
■ Revising each in the light of the other
● We noticed the built-in pressure to bring into alignment our judgments on particular cases, and
the principles we would endorse upon reflection
● We noticed something about the substance of the argument that emerged.
○ Consequential Moral Reasoning - We noticed that sometimes we were tempted to locate the
morality of an act in the consequences, the results or the state of the world it brought about.
○ Categorical Moral Reasoning In some cases, not just consequences, but the intrinsic quality of
the act mattered. An act can be immoral even if it brings about a good consequence.
READING
This way of conceiving moral argument, as a dialectic between our judgments about particular situations and
the principles we affirm on reflection, has a long tradition. It goes back to the dialogues of Socrates and the
moral philosophy of Aristotle. But notwithstanding its ancient lineage, it is open to the following challenge:
If moral reflection consists in seeking a fit between the judgments we make and the principles we affirm, how
can such reflection lead us to justice, or moral truth? Even if we succeed, over a lifetime, in bringing our moral
intuitions and principled commitments into alignment, what confidence can we have that the result is anything
more than a self-consistent skein of prejudice?
The answer is that moral reflection is not a solitary pursuit but a public endeavor. It requires an interlocutor—
a friend, a neighbor, a comrade, a fellow citizen. Sometimes the interlocutor can be imagined rather than real,
as when we argue with ourselves. But we cannot discover the meaning of justice or the best way to live through
introspection alone.
In Plato’s Republic, Socrates compares ordinary citizens to a group of prisoners confined in a cave. All
they ever see is the play of shadows on the wall, a reflection of objects they can never apprehend. Only the
philosopher, in this account, is able to ascend from the cave to the bright light of day, where he sees things
as they really are. Socrates suggests that, having glimpsed the sun, only the philosopher is fit to rule the cave
dwellers, if he can somehow be coaxed back into the darkness where they live.
Plato’s point is that to grasp the meaning of justice and the nature of the good life, we must rise above the
prejudices and routines of everyday life. He is right, I think, but only in part. The claims of the cave must be
given their due. If moral reflection is dialectical—if it moves back and forth between the judgments we make in
concrete situations and the principles that inform those judgments—it needs opinions and convictions, however
partial and untutored, as ground and grist. A philosophy untouched by the shadows on the wall can only yield a
sterile utopia.
● Utilitarianism – 18th C. British Political Philosophy

○ Jeremy Bentham – first to give clear theoretical expression to this philosophy
■ Essential idea – The right thing to do, the just thing to do is to maximize utility
● What is Utility? = The balance of pleasure over pain, joy over sadness.
● Bentham observed – We all like pleasure over pain, joy over sadness.
○ So we should act in a way, either individually or collective, as to
maximize the overall pleasure.
○ Utilitarianism Summed up = “The greatest good for the greatest number.”
○ Tests for Utilitarianism
■ CASE 1 (Queen vs. Dudley and Stevens) 19th C. Law case
● Summary – “Minuet” floundered 1300 miles off the coast of Cape
○ Captain was Dudley, 1st mate was Stevens, sailor was Brooks, Richard
Parker was the cabin boy - orphan on1st voyage
○ Minuet went down and 4 crew members escaped to lifeboat with only 2
cans of preserved turnips, and no water
○ 1st 3 days they ate nothing,
○ 4th day they ate 1 can of turnips,
○ 5th day they caught a turtle and with the can of turnips they subsisted,
○ Then for 8 days, no food and no water
○ Parker appears to be dying
○ On the 19th day Captain suggests a lottery to see who should die to save
the rest
■ Brooks said NO to lottery, and no lottery
○ Dudley stabs Parker with pen knife in jugular
○ Brooks shares in body and blood of cabin boy for 4 days
○ Then they were rescued on 24th day
○ Arrested and tried in Falmouth, England
■ Brooks turned state’s witness
■ Dudley and Stevens stood trial acting out of necessity 1 for 3 lives
○ Morally justified:
■ Morally and legally are different
■ Utility matters – balance of happiness and suffering
■ Numbers matter
○ Morally unjustified
■ We don’t have power to take lives for any purpose
■ Cannibalism is wrong morally
■ Lack of consent (i.e., all didn’t decide)
● Does a fair procedure justify any result?
○
What is the moral work of consent?
● What would be allowing the most benefit to the most people (utility)
○ Raises questions:
1. Do we have certain fundamental rights?
● Pleasure
● Happiness
2. Does a fair procedure justify any result? (i.e., lottery)
3. What is the moral work of consent? (i.e., martyr gives consent
QUESTION 1 Someone who objected to killing the cabin boy by saying, “It is always wrong to take an innocent life in order to save
a greater number of lives” seems to be objecting on the basis of: 
a) The fact that the cabin boy has rights.  
b) The fact that proper procedure was not followed.
 c) The fact that the cabin boy did not consent.
 d) a and b.  
e) b and c.
EXPLANATION
a) Correct. b) Incorrect. The objection says that it is always wrong to take the life of an innocent, not that it is wrong only when
proper procedure isn’t followed. c) Incorrect. The objection says that it is always wrong to take the life of an innocent, not that it
is wrong only when there is no consent. d) Incorrect. The objection is concerned with the wrongness of killing the cabin boy under
any circumstances, and is not concerned with the fact that proper procedure was not followed. e) Incorrect. The objection says
that it is always wrong to take the life of an innocent, not that it is wrong only when proper procedure is not followed, or that it is
wrong only when the person does not consent.
QUESTION 2 Someone who objected to killing the cabin boy by saying, “It is morally wrong to kill an innocent person unless he
agrees to be killed ” seems to be objecting on the basis of:
●  a) The fact that the cabin boy has rights.
 b) The fact that proper procedure was not followed.
 d) a and c.
 e) b and c.
● EXPLANATION
● a) Incorrect. While the objection implies that the cabin boy has a right not to be killed, it also implies that he can relinquish the right
by consenting to be killed. b) Incorrect. The objection implies that the cabin boy has a right not to be killed, and that he can only
relinquish this right through consent. It says nothing about proper procedure. c) Incorrect. While the objection implies that it would
be morally permissible to kill the cabin boy if he consented, it also implies that he has a right not to be killed unless he consents. d)
Correct. e) Incorrect. The objection implies that the cabin boy has a right not to be killed, and that he can only relinquish this right
through consent. It says nothing about proper procedure.
QUESTION 3 Someone who objected to killing the cabin boy by saying, “A lottery should have been held to determine who would
be eaten” seems to be objecting on the basis of:
a)The fact that the cabin boy has an inviolable right not to be killed.
 b) The fact that proper procedure was not followed.
 d) a and b.
 e) b and c.
● EXPLANATION
a) Incorrect. The objection implies that it would be permissible to kill the cabin boy so long as a lottery is held, and says nothing
about a right not to be killed. b) Correct. c) Incorrect. The objection says nothing about consent. The objection is that a lottery
should have been held—which is a concern about fair procedure. d) Incorrect. The objection implies that it would be permissible
to kill the cabin boy so long as a lottery is held. So the objection does not appeal to a right against being killed. e) Incorrect.
The objection says nothing about consent. The objection is that a lottery should have been held—which is a concern about fair
procedure.
LECTURE 3 – Utilitarianism: Jeremy Bentham (1748 – 1832)
Jeremy Bentham – Child prodigy of intelligence, admitted to the bar at 19 years of age, but
became a philosopher of JURISPRUDENCE (the science or philosophy of law)
‘The Principles of Morals and Legislation’ 1780

Utilitarianism – The highest principle of morality, whether personal or political
morality, is to maximize the general welfare or the collective happiness for the overall
balance of pleasure over pain.
In a phrase – maximize utility
READINGS on Utilitarianism in “JEREMY BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF MORALS

AND LEGISLATION (1780)”
. . . the value of pleasure or pain will be greater or less, according to seven
circumstances; viz.,
1. Its intensity.
2. Its duration.
3. Its certainty or uncertainty.
4. Its propinquity or remoteness.
5. Its fecundity. The chance it has of being followed by sensations of the opposite
kind: that is, pains, if it be pleasure: pleasures, if it be pain.
6. Its purity, or the chance it has of not being followed by sensations of the opposite
kind: that is, pains, if it be pleasure: pleasures, if it be a pain.
7. It extent; that is, the number of persons to whom it extends; or (in other words)
who are affected by it.
V. To take an exact account then of the general tendency of any act, by which the
interests of a community are affected, proceed as follows. Begin with any one person
of those whose interests seem most immediately to be affected by it: and take an
account, 
1. Of the value of each distinguishable pleasure which appears to be produced by it in
the first instance. 
2. Of the value of each pain which appears to be produced by it in the first instance. 
3. Of the value of each pleasure, which appears to be produced by it after the first. This
constitutes the fecundity of the first pleasure and the impurity of the first pain.
 4. Of the value of each pain, which appears to be produced by it after the first. This
constitutes the fecundity of the first pain, and the impurity of the first pleasure. 
5. Sum up all the values of all the pleasures on the one side, and those of all the pains
on the other. The balance, if it be on the side of pleasure, will give the good tendency of
the act upon the whole, with respect to the interests of that individual person; if on the
side of pain, the bad tendency of it upon the whole. 
6. Take an account of the number of persons whose interests appear to be concerned;
and repeat the above process with respect to each. Sum up the numbers expressive
of the degrees of good tendency, which the act has, with respect to each individual, in
regard to whom the tendency of it is good upon the whole: do this again with respect
to each individual, in regard to whom the tendency of it is good upon the whole: do
this again with respect to each individual, in regard to whom the tendency of it is bad
upon the whole. Take the balance which if on the side of pleasure, will give the general
good tendency of the act, with respect to the total number or community of individuals
concerned; if on the side of pain, the general evil tendency, with respect to the same
community.
VI. It is not to be expected that this process should be strictly pursued previously to
every moral judgment, or to every legislative or judicial operation. It may, however, be
always kept in view: and as near as the process actually pursued on these occasions
approaches to it, so near will such process approach to the character of an exact one.
Path Bentham takes to this line of reasoning:

● We are all governed by pain and pleasure. They are our sovereign masters.
● Any moral system has to take account of pain and pleasure.
○ How to take account of Maximizing happiness (utility)
■ In deciding what’s just, what the law should be, what’s best:
■ If we add up the benefits, and subtract the costs, the right thing to do
is the one that maximizes the balance of happiness over suffering.
In a phrase – cost-benefit analysis
Placing a dollar value on the cost-benefits of various proposals.
Phillip Morris Study in Czech Republic
The Utilitarian would add to this analysis a measure for the cost of the value of a
life.
The Ford-Pinto Case (1970s)
Background:
● Pinto’s fuel tank was at the back of the car and in rear-end collisions it
exploded.
● Ford had done a cost-benefit analysis about whether to put in a protective
wall:
○ The cost per part would have been $11.00 per part.
○ Assigning costs for deaths and injuries.
They decided not to make the adjustment
Objections to Utilitarianism:
READINGS on Utilitarianism in “Justice”

Objection 1
The most glaring weakness of utilitarianism, many argue, is that it fails to respect
individual rights. By caring only about the sum of satisfactions, it can run roughshod
over individual people. For the Utilitarian, individuals matter, but only in the sense
that each person’s preferences should be counted along with everyone else’s. But this
means that the Utilitarian logic, if consistently applied, could sanction ways of treating
persons that violate what we think of as fundamental norms of decency and respect.
(e.g., Throwing Christians to the Lions, Is torture Ever Justified?, The City of Happiness)
Objection 2
Utilitarianism claims to offer a science of morality, based on measuring, aggregating,
and calculating happiness. It weighs preferences without judging them. Everyone’s
preferences count equally. But in order to aggregate preferences, it is necessary to
measure them on a single scale. Bentham’s idea of utility offers one such common
currency. According to this objection, all values can’t be captured by a common currency
of value. (e.g., Cost-Benefit Analysis tries to bring rationality and rigor to complex
social choices by translating all costs and benefits into monetary terms – and then
comparing them.)
Thorndike runs a survey asking what price each person would ask to:
2nd - Eat a 6 inch worm - $100,00
Cut off a small toe
3rd - Have a front tooth pulled - $4500
Choke a stray cat to death
1st - Live the rest of your life on a farm in Kansas - $300,000
Conclusion: Any want or satisfaction that exists, exists in some amount and is
therefore measurable.
● QUESTION 1 Bentham’s utilitarianism says that in any situation, the right act for me to perform is: 
● a) The one that maximizes my own happiness.  
● b) The one that satisfies my own preferences.
●  c) The one that saves the most money.
●  d) The one that maximizes the total amount of happiness across all people.  e) a and b.
● EXPLANATION
● a) Incorrect. Bentham says that the right act is the one that maximizes the total amount of happiness across all people, not the one
that maximizes one’s own happiness.
● b) Incorrect. Bentham says that the right act is the one that maximizes the total amount of happiness across all people, not the one
that satisfies one’s own preferences.
● c) Incorrect. Bentham says that the right act is the one that maximizes the total amount of happiness across all people. Saving money
is only relevant insofar as it affects the total amount of happiness.
● d) Correct.
● e) Incorrect. Bentham says that the right act is the one that maximizes the total amount of happiness across all people, not the one
that maximizes one’s own happiness or satisfies one’s own preferences.
●
● QUESTION 2 In lecture, the example of the Ford Pinto was meant to raise questions about:
●  a) whether there is such a thing as happiness that can actually be measured.  
● b) whether utilitarians fail to respect minority rights.
●  c) whether it is possible to assign a dollar value to human life.  
● d) whether all persons should be equal in the eyes of the law.  
● e) whether it makes sense to say that death contributes to unhappiness.
● EXPLANATION
● a) Incorrect. In the Pinto example, the point was not that happiness cannot be measured, but that it might be impossible to assign a
dollar value to a human life.
● b) Incorrect. In the Pinto example, the point was not that anyone’s rights were violated, but that it might be impossible to assign a
dollar value to a human life.
● c) Correct.
● d) Incorrect. In the Pinto example, the point was not that people need to be equal in the eyes of the law, but that it might be
impossible to assign a dollar value to a human life.
● e) Incorrect. In the Pinto example, the point was not to question whether it makes sense to say that death can contribute to
unhappiness, but to suggest that it might be impossible to assign a dollar value to a human life.
QUESTION 3 In the lecture, the discussion about how much people would have to be paid in order to eat an earth worm, to live in
Kansas, to have a tooth pulled, and so on, was meant to raise questions about: 
a) whether all goods can be accounted for using a single uniform measure of value, as the utilitarian suggests.
 b) whether maximizing the total amount of happiness is just.  
c) whether it makes sense to say that some things make us happier than others.
 d) whether most things that we think will make us unhappy really will.  
e) whether we are good at predicting what will really make us happy.
EXPLANATION
a) Correct.
b) Incorrect. The concern is about whether all goods can be accounted for using a single uniform measure of value, not about the
justice of maximizing happiness.
c) Incorrect. The concern is about whether all goods can be accounted for using a single uniform measure of value, not about whether
it is possible to say that some things make us happier than others.
d) Incorrect. The concern is about whether all goods can be accounted for using a single uniform measure of value, not about how
much we know about what makes us happy.
e) Incorrect. The concern is about whether all goods can be accounted for using a single uniform measure of value, not about how
good we are at predicting what will really make us happy.
LECTURE 4 – Utilitarianism: John Stuart Mill (1863) Child Prodigy
Two Books: “Liberty” (1859) and “Utilitarianism” in 1861
The two objections to Bentham’s Utilitarianism:
1. Fails to respect individual rights
a. J. S. Mill’s response, concerned with humanitarian concerns of Utilitarianism, still finds
that -
i. Utility is the only standard of morality in long term social utility
ii. Justice is higher, and Individual rights are privileged, but not for reasons that
depart from Utilitarianism for the long-term interests of humankind (sacred or
specially important rights 26:32)
2. Not possible to aggregate all values and preferences

a. Using a single measure like $$
b. Isn’t there a distinction between higher and lower pleasures?
i. For Bentham,
1. Places no judgments on peoples’ values; therefore, non-judgmental and
egalitarian
2. All that matters are the intensity and the duration of the pleasure or the
pain (e.g., the more the intensity or duration the higher or nobler the
pleasure or the pain). “The quantity of pleasure being equal,
Pushpin (a child’s game) is as good as poetry.”
c. J. S. Mill’s response concerned with humanitarian concerns of Utilitarianism
i. It is possible to distinguish higher from lower values
ii. TEST = If you try both values, irrespective of moral obligations, you will always
prefer the higher one
a. 3 experiences
i. Hamlet soliloquy – highest pleasure
ii. Fear factor
iii. The Simpsons – enjoyed the most
b. Yes, certain values are higher or lower. You need
cultivation and education to enjoy (to engage higher human
faculties) a higher value.
Self-Test Lecture 4
QUESTION 1
Which of the following best characterizes the difference between Bentham and Mill with respect to their views on individual natural
rights?
 a) Bentham thinks that natural rights must be respected, whereas Mill does not.
 b) Bentham thinks that natural rights are supported by his utilitarian theory, whereas Mill does not.
 c) Bentham thinks that there are no natural rights, whereas Mill thinks there are natural rights and that utilitarian moral theory cannot
accommodate this.  
d) Bentham thinks that there are no natural rights, whereas Mill thinks that utilitarian moral theory supports the idea that we should
recognize individual rights.
 e) Bentham and Mill agree that that utilitarian moral theory supports the claim that we should recognize individual rights, but disagree
about which rights individuals have.
EXPLANATION
a) Incorrect. Bentham rejects the notion of individual natural rights, whereas Mill thinks that utilitarian moral theory supports the idea
that we should recognize individual rights.
b) Incorrect. Bentham rejects the notion of individual natural rights, whereas Mill thinks that utilitarian moral theory supports the idea
c) Incorrect. Bentham rejects the notion of individual natural rights, whereas Mill thinks that utilitarian moral theory supports the idea
d) Correct.
e) Incorrect. Bentham rejects the notion of individual natural rights, whereas Mill thinks that utilitarian moral theory supports the idea
QUESTION 2 Which of the following best characterizes the difference between Bentham and Mill with respect to the issue of the
“quality” of certain pleasures?
 a) Bentham thinks we should only concern ourselves with the quantity of pleasure, and remain nonjudgmental about the quality. Mill
believes that some pleasures are of a higher quality than others.  
b) Bentham believes in higher and lower pleasures, whereas Mill thinks we should be nonjudgmental.  
c) Bentham believes that we should only maximize the highest quality pleasures, whereas Mill thinks we should maximize all
pleasures.
 d) Both agree that some pleasures are higher than others, but they disagree about which pleasures are the higher ones.  
e) Both agree that some pleasures are higher than others, but they disagree about how to determine which pleasures are the higher
ones.
EXPLANATION
a) Correct.
b) Incorrect. Bentham thinks we should only concern ourselves with the quantity of pleasure, and remain nonjudgmental about the
quality. Mill believes that some pleasures are of a higher quality than others.
c) Incorrect. Bentham thinks we should only concern ourselves with the quantity of pleasure, and remain nonjudgmental about the
d) Incorrect. Bentham thinks we should only concern ourselves with the quantity of pleasure, and remain nonjudgmental about the
quality. Mill believes that some pleasures are of a higher quality than others
e) Incorrect. Bentham thinks we should only concern ourselves with the quantity of pleasure, and remain nonjudgmental about the
QUESTION 3
Given two pleasurable experiences, how does Mill believe that we determine which is the higher pleasure?
 a) By asking people which pleasure they think is the higher pleasure.  
b) By taking a poll of the general public.
 c) By asking people which experience produces the highest quantity of pleasure.
 d) By doing cost-benefit analysis.  
e) By asking those who have experienced both pleasures which they prefer.
EXPLANATION
a) Incorrect. Mill says that to determine which pleasure is the higher pleasure, we ask those who have experienced both pleasures
which they prefer, not that we ask people to judge which pleasure is the highest.
b) Incorrect. Mill says that to determine which pleasure is the higher pleasure, we ask those who have experienced both pleasures
which they prefer, not that we take a poll.
c) Incorrect. Mill says that to determine which pleasure is the higher pleasure, we ask those who have experienced both pleasures
which they prefer, not that we ask people which experience produces the highest quantity of pleasure.
d) Incorrect. Mill says that to determine which pleasure is the higher pleasure, we ask those who have experienced both pleasures
which they prefer, not that we should do cost-benefit analysis.
e) Correct.
QUIZ 1 - Quiz 1 counts for 5% of the overall grade for the course.
Instructions
Quiz 1 consists of 5 multiple choice questions. Be sure to read each question carefully before you select your response.
You have one and only one attempt to answer each of the five questions. Once you click "Final Check" your response
will be submitted for grading. If you are unsure, you can save your answer to a question and come back to it later to
submit it for grading; you can change an answer that you have saved simply by clicking a different response. Always
make sure that the response that you want to submit for grading is checked before you click "Final Check."
Quiz 1 counts for 5% of the overall grade for the course.

As stated on the syllabus, while you are encouraged, throughout the semester, to discuss the topics of the course with
your friends and fellow students, you must do Quiz 1 (as well as quizzes 2-5 and the final exam) on your own, without
consulting others; you are also not permitted to share responses to the quiz questions with others or post them in the
course discussions.
We strongly recommend that students take Quiz 1 after completing the material of lectures 1, 2, 3, and 4, to assess their
progress. For those who want to earn a certificate of mastery, all graded work, including Quiz 1, must be completed by
June 4th at 7 pm EDT (Eastern Daylight Time).
Good Luck!
QUESTION 1 According to utilitarianism, the morally right act is the one that …  
a) … contributes to my own happiness.  
b) … maximizes my own happiness.
 c) … contributes to the total amount of happiness across all those affected by the act.  
d) … maximizes the total amount of happiness across all those affected by the act.
e) … minimizes the total amount of happiness across all those affected by the act.
EXPLANATION
a) Incorrect. According to utilitarianism, what matters, morally speaking, is the maximized total amount of happiness across all those
affected by the act and not only my own happiness.
b) Incorrect. According to utilitarianism, what matters is the maximized total amount of happiness across all those affected by the act
and not only my own happiness.
c) Incorrect. According to utilitarianism, what matters, morally speaking, is that the act under evaluation not only contributes to the
total amount of happiness across all those affected by the act but that it be the one that maximizes aggregate happiness.
d) Correct.
e) Incorrect. According to utilitarianism, what matters, morally speaking, is not the minimization of aggregate happiness, but rather
the maximization of aggregate happiness.You have used 1 of 1 submissions
QUESTION 2 One key difference between Bentham’s and Mill’s respective versions of utilitarianism is that … 
a. … Bentham draws a distinction between higher and lower pleasures while Mill does not.
b) … Mill believes that the principle of utility applies both to the actions of individuals and government policies while Bentham
believes that it applies only to the actions of individuals.
c) … Bentham believes that the principle of utility applies both to the actions of individuals and government policies while Mill
believes that it applies only to the actions of individuals.
d) … Mill draws a distinction between higher and lower pleasures while Bentham does not.
 e) … Bentham but not Mill believes that morality requires the maximization of aggregate happiness. EXPLANATION
a) Incorrect. Mill draws a distinction between higher and lower pleasures. Bentham believes that there are no qualitative differences
between pleasures (e.g. the quality of the pleasure derived from playing push pin is the same as the quality derived from reading
Shakespeare).
b) Incorrect. Both Bentham and Mill believe that the principle of utility applies to the acts of individuals and government policies.
c) Incorrect. Both Bentham and Mill believe that the principle of utility applies to the acts of individuals and government policies.
d) Correct.
e) Incorrect. Both Bentham and Mill believe that the right act is the one that, among those acts available, maximizes aggregate
happiness. You have used 1 of 1 submissions
QUESTION 3 According to Bentham, … 

a) … every person has a natural right to life, liberty, and property.  
b) … every person has an unalienable natural right to life, liberty, and property.  
c) … the idea of natural rights is essential to understanding the idea of social justice and moral rightness.
 d) … the idea of natural rights does not make sense.
 e) … the idea of natural rights is central to utilitarianism.
EXPLANATION
a) Incorrect. Bentham believes that the idea of natural rights is "nonsense on stilts."
b) Incorrect. Bentham believes that the idea of natural rights (alienable or unalienable) is "nonsense on stilts."
c) Incorrect. Bentham believes that the idea of natural rights is "nonsense on stilts," and, as such, it cannot be essential to
understanding the idea of social justice and moral rightness.
d) Correct.
e) Incorrect. Bentham believes that the idea of natural rights is "nonsense on stilts," and, as such, cannot be central to utilitarianism.
You have used 1 of 1 submissions
QUESTION 4 According to Mill, … 

a) … individuals have natural rights.  
b) … the ideas of justice and individual rights are central to common sense morality and utilitarianism can account for that
status.
 c) … utilitarianism is a doctrine for swine.  
d) … the idea of maximized aggregate happiness is incoherent.
 e) … all pleasures are qualitatively equal.
EXPLANATION
a) Incorrect. Mill does not believe that there is such a thing as natural rights (rights people have by nature). He does, however, believe
that the idea of individual rights as a protection from the government and other people is central to common sense morality. And
he also believes that utilitarianism can account for individual rights in the sense that granting people certain protections is what
maximizes happiness overall. In other words, according to Mill, individual rights are grounded in maximized aggregate happiness
rather than in nature.
b) Correct.
c) Incorrect. Mill introduces the distinction between higher and lower pleasures precisely to show that utilitarianism is a doctrine
worthy of human beings.
d) Incorrect. Mill believes that the idea of maximized aggregate happiness is central to understanding morality.
e) Inccorrect. Mill believes that there are higher and lower pleasures.You have used 1 of 1 submissions
QUESTION 5 In ancient Rome, Christians were fed to the lions in a public spectacle intended to entertain the masses. Which of the
following sounds most like something that Mill might say about this situation?: 
a) Since all pleasures are of the same quality, all that matters, morally speaking, is the quantity of pleasure that the crowd derives
from the spectacle minus the quantity of pain experienced by the Christians who are being fed to the lions.
 b) The principle of utility is a good theory in most situations. But in extreme situations like this, we need to do what is moral rather
than what the principle of utility tells us to do. For this reason, it is wrong to feed the Christians to the lions.  
c) Some pleasures, because they are of a low quality, do not deserve to be given equal weight or priority when deciding what
to do. The pleasure obtained from watching someone being fed to a lion is likely to be one such pleasure. So the pain suffered
by the Christians should factor into my deliberations more heavily than the pleasure enjoyed by the spectators.
 d) b and c.  
e) a and c.
EXPLANATION
a) Incorrect. Mill believes that some pleasures, because they are of a low quality, do not deserve to be given equal weight or priority
when deciding what to do. The pleasure obtained from watching someone being fed to a lion is likely to be one such pleasure. So the
pain suffered by the Christians should factor into my deliberations more heavily than the pleasure enjoyed by the spectators.
b) Incorrect. According to utilitarians, including Mill, there is no standard of morality that is independent of the principle of utility.
In other words, to do what is moral is to do what the principle of utility prescribes, namely to maximize aggregate happiness. To
say that "one needs to do what is moral rather than what the principle of utility tells you to do" is nonsensical, as far as utilitarians,
including Mill, are concerned.
c) Correct.
d) Incorrect. Mill believes c) but not b).
e) Incorrect. Mill believes c) but not a).You have used 1 of 1 submissions
LECTURE 5 – Libertarianism: Free-Market Philosophy
Two Objections to Mill’s defense of Utilitarianism
1. Higher or worthier pleasures
a. “Are there theories of the ‘good life’ that can provide independent moral standards for the
worth of pleasures.
b. If so, what do they look like?
2. Justice and individual rights
a. If we suspect Mill is leaning implicitly on notions of human dignity or respect for a person
that are not strictly speaking utilitarian, then are there stronger theories of rights
that explain the intuition, which even Mill shares, that the reason for respecting individual
and not using them goes beyond utility, in the long run.
Strong Theory of Rights
1. Individuals matter, not just for a larger social purpose, or for the sake of maximizing utility.
2. Individuals are separate beings living separate lives worthy of respect; therefore it’s mistake to
think about justice or law by adding up preferences and values.
Libertarianism Believes:
1. The fundamental individual right is the right to liberty.
2. On Government - We have the right to choose freely to live our lives as we wish provided we
respect the rights of others to do the same.
a. Robert Nozick writes – “Individuals have rights. So strong and far reaching are these
rights, that they raise the question that ‘What if anything the state may do?’”
b. Three things that modern states do that are (according to
Libertarianism) are illegitimate or unjust:
i. Paternalist legislation – i.e., laws that protect people from themselves (e.g., seat-
belt laws, motorcycle helmet laws)
ii. Morals Legislation – i.e., laws that give moral values to the society as a whole
(e.g., laws that prevent sexual intimacy between gays and lesbians)
iii. No Redistribution of Income from the Rich to the Poor – It is coercion (use
of force or intimidation to obtain compliance) - it amounts to theft from people
who happen to do well and earn a lot of money
1. Liberalism does allow for a minimal state that taxes people for the sake of
what everybody needs (e.g., military, police, judicial system)
Is it just that, in America, 10% of the [population has 70% of the nation’s
wealth?
Nozick: What are the libertarian principles of just income distribution?
1. Justice in Acquisition (initial holdings) – Did people get the things they used to make their
money fairly?
2. Justice in Transfer (free market) – Did the acquisition arise from free consent?
Example 1: Bill Gates $40 Billion wealthiest man
● A good utilitarian would redistribute some of his wealth for the benefit of the many needy.
● A good libertarian would say we can’t just add up and aggregate preferences that way. We have to
respect individuals fairly, and if he earned that fairly, without disrespecting any others’ rights, according
to the two principles of Justice in Acquisition and Justice in Transfer, it would be wrong – a form of
coercion to take it away.
Example 2: Michael Jordan $31,000,000 + $47,000,000 Nike ads in 1 year
Nozick arguments against taxation:
●Taxation = taking of earnings, but isn’t that the same, according to the state, to take a
portion of my labor?
● Taking of earnings = forced labor
● Forced labor = slavery (I don’t own myself)
● The fundamental moral principle that underlies Libertarian case for rights:
Violates Principle of self-possession
SELF-TEST Lecture 5
QUESTION 1 A libertarian like Nozick believes that:
 a) The government should adopt policies that promote the greatest good for the greatest number.
 b) Public policy should aim to make people happier.
 c) Society’s laws should leave people free to choose how to live their lives, so long as they do not violate anyone else’s rights.  
d) We ought to recognize rights in order to make people happy.  
e) Each person has a right to have her interests advanced by the laws.
QUESTION 2 Nozick thinks which of the following types of laws are unjust: 
a) Laws that restrict people’s liberty for the sake of their own good.
 b) Laws that restrict people’s freedom in the name of a particular moral code.
 c) Laws that redistribute wealth.  
d) Neither a, b, nor c.
 e) a, b, and c.
QUESTION 3 For Nozick, the distribution of wealth in a particular society is just if: 
a) It is roughly equal.  
b) The hardest workers are the wealthiest.  
c) The most morally deserving people are the wealthiest.  
d) All property was initially acquired justly, and then was transferred to others through free exchange.  
e) All of the above.
LECTURE 6 – Libertarianism: Do We Own Ourselves?
Minimal State – arguing for by Milton Freidman
● Many of the functions, that we take for granted as properly belonging to government, don’t. They are
paternalist.
○ Social Security – it is wrong for the gov’t. to force people to save for their retirement – whether
they want to or not.
○ Public Goods Can be made Exclusive to Those Who Pay- Subscription- Fee fire services, etc. to
avoid free-riders in society
Is Coercion Wrong?
● Libertarian says: To use some person for the sake of the general welfare, is wrong because it calls into
question the fundamental question, “Do we own ourselves?” (Self-Possession).
● Nozick says: If society taxes Gates or Jordan, they are asserting a collective property right in Bill Gates
or Michael Jordan. That violates the fundamental principle that we belong to ourselves.
Main Objections to Libertarianism:
1. The poor need the money more therefore coercion via taxation is just
■ Libertarian Answers:
● Does not justify the initial violation of the property right
● People have property rights extrapolated from agreed upon principles that
people own themselves
● Why is it wrong to steal a loaf of bread for your starving family?
○ Libertarian1 says: The benefits of an act do not make it just.
○ Libertarian2 says: It’s OK because the starving person also has self-
ownership and must take care of herself.
2. Taxation by consent of the government is not coerced – You are choosing to live in a
democratic society where majority rules.
● Democracy is fine except where fundamental rights are involved.
● Personal rights trump what the majority wants.
○ Personal Property Rights
○ Religious Liberty
○ Freedom of Speech
■ Objection to Libertarians’ Answers
● The successful owe a debt to society for their success
The reason Gates and Jordan were able to accumulate property is because we
live in an economically and socially stable environment
● Not caring for the poor 10% might cost society taxes for crime prevention
3. The successful owe a debt to society for their success
● The successful have by definition provided something to society that it already
has valued. So, the obligation is cancelled out.
■ Answer to Libertarian: Self-possession exists only to a certain extent when you live in
a society.
● Nozick borrows self-possession from John Locke, who accounted the rise of
private property from the state of nature
○ Locke ”Private property arises because when we mix our labor with
unknown things, when come to acquire a property right in those things.”
The reason is we own our own labor. And the reason for that is we are the
proprietors of our own person.
4. Wealth depends partly on luck so it isn’t deserved.
● They have received what they have through the free exchange from people who
have given them their holdings for a service or product.
QUESTION 1 A libertarian like Nozick objects to most types of coercion because: a) being coerced makes people unhappy.  b)
coercion is economically inefficient.  c) coercing people makes it less likely that people’s preferences will be satisfied.  d) To coerce
people calls into question the fundamental notion that people own themselves.  e) All of the above.
QUESTION 2 Nozick objects to taxation for the purpose of redistributing wealth. How might he respond to the objection that
redistribution is permissible because the poor need the money more than the wealthy? a) Despite needing the money more, the poor are
not entitled to it.  b) The wealthy have a right to spend their money as they choose.  If some people are poor, it is because they did not
work as hard.  d) a and b.  e) a, b, and c.
QUESTION 3 Nozick objects to taxation for the purpose of redistributing wealth. How would he respond to the objection that
democratically implemented taxes are not really coercive? a) He would say that they are coercive because democracy is unjust.  b) He
would say that they are coercive because such taxes still make people unhappy.  c) He would say that they are coercive, because those
who did not vote for the taxes are still forced to pay them against their will.  d) None of these.  e) a, b, and c.
LECTURE 7 – John Locke: Property Rights
John Locke believes:
● There are some rights so fundamental that no government can over-ride them
○ Those fundamental rights include the “Natural Rights” of Life, Liberty, and Property
■ The right to property is not just a right given by government, it is a “Natural Right”
in the sense that it is PRE-POLITICAL
■ It is a right that attaches to individuals, as human beings, even before government
and law come on the scene (HENCE THAT IS WHAT LOCKE MEANS BY THE
WORD ‘NATURE’)
● The state of Nature is the state of liberty
● Human beings are free and equal beings
● There is no natural hierarchy, we’re free and equal in the state of nature
● And yet, there is a difference between a state of liberty and a state of license, because there is
a law of nature constraining what we can do – even though we’re free, even though we’re in a
state of nature
○ Constraints: Basically, not free to violate the law of nature
■ The rights we have, we can’t give up nor can we take them from someone else –
life, liberty or property.
■ Nor can we take my own life, liberty, or property
● Example: I cannot take my own life or sell myself into slavery.
● Example: I cannot give to somebody else absolute arbitrary power over me.
○ Where does this constraint come from? Locke gives 2 answers.
■ Religious Argument:
■ Rational Argument: If we properly reflect on what it means to be free, we will
conclude that freedom does not mean doing whatever we want
Religious Rational
This leads to conflicting ideas:

1. Our natural rights are unalienable (i.e., I own them, but in a limited
sense in that I cannot give them up or sell them.)
a. If I the right is unalienable that makes something I own less fully mine,
but
b. For a right to be unalienably mine makes it is more profoundly mine.
(LOCKE’s VIEW)
● How can there be a right to property before there is Law?

○ Moving from we own ourselves, or have property in our persons to we own our own
labor.
○ Whatever we mix our labor with becomes our property.
○ Why?
○ We not only acquire a property in the fruits of the earth, but also, if we till and plow
and enclose the land, we own the land and its plants.
● So in believing in unalienable rights, Locke is distancing himself from Libertarians, but when it
comes to property rights he begins to look Libertarian again
○ That is: we are the proprietor of our own labor and the fruits of our labor and in the
land that we enclose and improve
■ Recent Drug-Patent Laws Dispute -
● U.S. wants all countries to respect the patents on pharmaceuticals
● Aids crisis in Africa – American aids drugs hugely expensive, so South
Africa began buying a generic version of the drug at much less cost
● U.S. says generic manufacturer must get a license or U.S. will sue South
Africa
● U.S. Drug Company gave in
● What is wrong with Locke’s argument that private property can arise before Laws?
○ If the right to private property is natural and not conventional, if it’s something that
we acquire even before government, how does that right constrain what a legitimate
government can do?
○ To determine if Locke is a critic or supporter of Libertarianism, we must ask, “What
becomes of our natural rights once we enter into society (to leave the state of nature
and be governed by the majority and a system of human laws)?“
■ Pro-Libertarian: The Law of Nature persists once government arrives. For
those human laws are only legitimate if they respect our “natural rights” –
our unalienable rights to life, liberty, and property. Believes in a very limited
government.
■ But what counts as my property, what counts as respect for my life and
liberty, are for the government to define. That there be property, that there
be respect for life and liberty, is what limits government. But what counts as
respecting my life and property – that is for governments to decide and define.
■ CONTRADICTION? TO DETERMINE, WE MUST LOOK AT WHAT DOES
LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT LOOK LIKE FOR LOCKE?
In his (John Locke’s) Second Treatise of Government, John Locke (1632-1704) argues that legitimate
government is a limited government based on consent, in which the majority rules but may not violate
people’s fundamental rights. At first glance, Locke’s theory may seem familiar, but it also conceals
some puzzling questions. On Locke’s view, a legitimate government may not violate our natural right
to life, liberty, and property. But Locke allows that government may legitimately take our property
through taxation and require citizens to sacrifice their lives in war. If government may do these things,
then what counts as a law that violates our rights?
SELF-TEST
QUESTION 1 What does it mean for a right to be unalienable?
 
a) Others can take it away from me whenever they want.  b) Others cannot take it away from me, but I can give it up or trade it
away.  c) Others can take it away from me whenever they want, but I cannot give it up or trade it away.  d) Others cannot take
it away from me and even I cannot give it up or trade it away.  e) Others cannot take it away from me as long as protecting it
maximizes overall happiness.
QUESTION 2 According to Locke, in the state of nature there is a law of nature that puts constraints on what individuals can
do even though they are free. What are these constraints? 
a) In the state of nature, individuals are not free to enforce the law of nature.  b) In the state of nature, individuals are not free to
acquire property.  c) In the state of nature, individuals are not free to give up their right to their own life, liberty, and property,
but they are free to take other people’s life, liberty, and property.  d) In the state of nature, individuals are not free to take other
people’s life, liberty, and property, but they are free to give up their right to their own life, liberty, and property. e) In the state
of nature, individuals are not free to take other people’s life, liberty, and property nor are they free to give up their right
to their own life, liberty, and property.
QUESTION 3 According to Locke, can there be a right to private property even before there is any government?
 a) No. Since mankind was given the earth in common, there cannot be a right to private property before there is any
government.  b) No. The law of nature explicitly prohibits private property. c) Yes. If someone mixes his labor with
something then he can claim it as his property, at least where there is enough and as good left for others.  d) Yes. Mixing
one’s labor with something is sufficient for claiming ownership in it.  e) Yes. According to the law of nature, every person owns
a piece of land privately simply in virtue of being alive.
LECTURE 8: John Locke: individual Rights and Majority Rule

Locke’s two big ideas:
● Private Property (last lecture)
○ Locke claims property can be defined w/o consent, before law and government some on
the scene to define property
● Consent
○ Legitimate government is founded on consent
○ What can a legitimate gov’t., founded on consent, do according to Locke.
■ The state of nature is that condition that we decide to leave, and that gives rise
to consent. That gives rise to government.
■ But, why leave that state? Locke: There are inconveniences:
● Everyone can enforce the law of nature – is the “executor (enforcer) not
nature”.
● If someone violates the law of nature, he is an aggressor and you can
punish him.
● There are no gradations of punishment, and everyone is the judge of their
own case – you can kill any aggressor (a murderer, any thief). So many
will overshoot his rights and this will lead to insecurity in the state of
nature.
● How do you escape the state of nature?

○ You consent to give up the enforcement power, and to create a government or
community where there will be a legislature to make laws, and everybody who
enters agrees to abide by whatever the majority decides.
■ What can the majority decide, given that Locke’s unalienable rights (life,
liberty and property) do not go away when people decide to join a civil society?
■ How limited is the government created by consent?
● It’s limited by the obligation on the part of the majority to respect and
to enforce the fundamental, natural rights of the citizens.
Taxation of Bill Gates or Michael Jordan

Locke: “The supreme power cannot take from any man any part of his property without his own
consent.”
Here’s what’s illusive.
● On the one hand, Locke says the gov’t. can’t take your property w/o “your” consent.
● On the other, what counts as property is not natural but conventional (defined by government).
So, Locke really means is property is natural in one sense and conventional in another.
● There is a fundamental, natural right that there be property, that the institution of property exist,
and it be respected. So an arbitrary taking of property would be a violation of nature.
● But, it’s a further question, what counts as property (how it’s defined) and what counts as taking
property. That’s up to the gov’t., and that’s the conventional aspect of property.
So, the government is not all that limited.
● It’s not what we consent to that limits gov’t., but what we, ourselves, lack the power to give away,
that limits gov’t. (our lives, our property).
Bottom Line:
● It’s not your personal consent, but the consent of the majority, which you consented to govern you
would you emerge from the state of nature to join society.
● Further, it’s the picking out of individuals the arbitrary taking for army or taxation, v.s. having a
general law, such that the law is non-arbitrary, it doesn’t really amount to an invasion of people’s
basic rights.
SELF-TEST LECTURE 8
QUESTION 1
According to Locke, in consenting to leave the state of nature and to create a government, individuals …
a) … agree to give up their natural rights to life, liberty, and property. b) … agree to give up their
power to enforce the law of nature. c) … agree to transfer the power to enforce the law of nature from
God to the majority. d) … agree to do whatever the majority tells them to do. e) … agree to enforce the law
of nature themselves.
QUESTION 2
According to Locke, are there limits to the power of the government created by consent?
a) There are no limits to the power of the government created by consent. b) The majority can do
whatever it wants as long as it respects and enforces the natural right of citizens to property. c) The
government is limited by an obligation on part of the majority to respect and enforce the
natural rights of citizens to life, liberty, and property. d) The majority can do whatever it wants
as long as the minority has the opportunity to become the majority some day. e) The government is limited by
an obligation on part of the majority to respect and enforce the natural rights of citizens to life, work, and happiness.
QUESTION 3
According to Locke, is the government permitted to ask citizens to give up part of their property or even their lives?
a) Locke argues that the government is not permitted to ask citizens to give up part of their property or even
their lives because doing so would violate their unalienable natural rights to life, liberty, and property. b) Locke
argues that the government is permitted to ask citizens to give up their property and even their lives because
their natural rights to life and property are alienable. c) Locke argues that the government is permitted to ask
citizens to give up their property and even their lives because doing so is necessary to protect the state. d)
Locke argues that the government is permitted to ask citizens to give up their property and even their lives because
the government is the executer of God’s will and God has the power to take rights away from people since he gave
the rights to them in the first place. e) According to Locke the only limit on the government’s
taking property and life is that it may not do so arbitrarily; however, if there is a general
law such that the government’s choice is non-arbitrary it does not amount to a violation of
people’s natural right to life, liberty, property.
LECTURE 9: Markets and Morals: Military Service
What are the limits on government that even the majority cannot override?
○ Any rule cannot be arbitrary
Problem: US has trouble filling recruitment targets
US Civil War System – Hybrid

● Conscription + Buy-out (you could pay someone to take your place)
Patriotism vs. Outsourcing gives us better soldiers
OBJECTIONS TO: MARKET EXCHANGE IN THE ALLOCATION OF MILITARY SERVICE

1. Coercion, Inequality, and Unfairness – Letting the market determine it may be unfair, if there is
inequality in the society so that people who buy their way in military service do so because they
have so few other economic opportunities.
2. Military service is not just another job for pay because it is bound up in patriotism and civil
obligation.
ASSESSING OBJECTIONS:
1. What inequalities, in the background conditions of society, undermine the freedom of choices
people make to buy and sell their labor?
2. What are the obligations of citizenship? Is military service one of them or not? What is the
source of political obligation?
SELF-TEST
1. QUESTION 1
Which of the following considerations speak against letting the market allocate military service?
a) It is coercive. b) It severs the tie between military service and patriotism. c) It

undermines the idea of military service as civic obligation. d) All of the above. e) None of
the above.
2. QUESTION 2
In what sense could letting the market allocate military service be coercive?
a) Those who buy their way into military service do so because they want to. b) Due to
severe inequality in society those who buy their way into military service do so not because they
want to but because they have so few economic opportunities that military service is their best
choice. c) Market allocation of military service creates economic opportunities for those who
lack other marketable talents but are willing to risk their lives. d) Market allocation of military
service ensures that those who are willing to risk their lives are properly rewarded. e) None of
the above.
3. QUESTION 3
Which of the following represents an objection to allocating civic obligations and rights by the
market?
a) It weakens patriotism. b) It weakens solidarity among citizens because only some

experience the burdens of civic obligations (e.g. fighting in a war) while others can buy their way
out. c) It undermines political equality among citizens, in the sense that it gives wealthy citizens
an opportunity that is not open to poorer citizens, namely the opportunity to buy their way out of
civic obligations. d) None of the above, e) (a), (b) and (c).
LECTURE 10: Markets and Morals: Surrogate Motherhood
Egg Donor Ad in UNEQUAL Sperm Donor Offices
The Harvard Crimson SERVICES (Stanford and Harvard/MIT)
Question: Should eggs and sperm be bought and sold for money?
Commercial surrogate motherhood $10,000 and all expenses

Moral question:
1. The right thing to do would have been to uphold the contract. Lower court supported contract
a. A deal is a deal.
b. Birth mother’s emotions should not come into argument.
2. The right thing to do would have been not to uphold the contract. Supreme Court of NJ said not
enforceable (Stern got custody, but mother would have access)
a. Tainted or Flawed Consent due to:
i. Coercion
ii. Lack of Information - The surrogate mother did not have all the information
before the child was born. She did not know how she would feel about that
baby.
NJ Supreme Court
b. Dehumanizing –
i. Surrogacy is dealing in human beings. It’s de-humanizing. You’re buying some
else’s right to their child. So contract should not be enforceable in a court.
NJ Supreme Court
Elizabeth Anderson – Certain goods should not be open to use (utility) or to profit. Certain goods are
valued in ways other than use. (respect, appreciation, awe, etc.)
SELF-TEST
1. QUESTION 1
Which of the following is an objection against enforcing a surrogacy contract in a case where the
birth mother changes her mind and wants to keep the baby once it is born?
a) The contract is based on tainted or flawed consent. b) Viewing reproductive capacities

as the object of an enforceable contract is dehumanizing. c) A deal is a deal. d) (a) and
(b). e) (a), (b), and (c).
2. QUESTION 2
Which of the following factors could potentially make consent tainted or flawed?
a) The consenting party was coerced. b) The consenting party lacked relevant
information. c) The consenting party no longer feels like living up to the agreement. d) (a)
and (b). e) None of the above.
3. QUESTION 3
Which of the following capture Elizabeth Anderson’s objection to enforcing surrogacy contracts?
a) Requiring a biological mother to repress whatever emotions she feels for her child is
tantamount to converting women’s labor into a form of alienated labor. b) Certain objects are
not properly valued if they are simply treated as objects of use; a woman’s reproductive capacity
is such an object. c) Certain goods are properly valued in ways other than use (e.g. respect,
appreciation, love, honor, awe, sanctity); a woman’s reproductive capacity is such a good. d)
(b) and (c). e) (a), (b), and (c).
QUIZ 2
QUESTION 1
According to Robert Nozick, the state is justified to tax a citizen (even against his or her will) if:
a) the revenues support things like healthcare and education, which improve the life-
prospects of all citizens. b) all citizens are required to pay the same percentage of their
income. c) the majority enacts the taxation. d) doing so leads to the greatest happiness
of society as a whole. e) the taxes are used to support nothing more than a minimal state.
EXPLANATION
a) Incorrect. According to Nozick, the criterion for the justice of taxation is not whether it improves
the life-prospects of all citizens. Rather, the state is justified to tax a citizen (even against his or
her will) if the taxes are used to support nothing more than a minimal state.
b) Incorrect. According to Nozick, the criterion for the justice of taxation is not equal percentage of
income. Rather, the state is justified to tax a citizen (even against his or her will) if the taxes are
used to support nothing more than a minimal state.
c) Incorrect. According to Nozick, the criterion for the justice of taxation is not whether it is
enacted by the majority. Rather, the state is justified to tax a citizen (even against his or her will)
if the taxes are used to support nothing more than a minimal state.
d) Incorrect. According to Nozick, the criterion for the justice of taxation is not whether it leads
to the greatest happiness of society as a whole (Nozick is not a utilitarian). Rather, the state is
justified to tax a citizen (even against his or her will) if the taxes are used to support nothing more
than a minimal state.
e) Correct.
QUESTION 2
Nozick’s Wilt Chamberlain example (updated by Professor Sandel to the Michael Jordan example) is
supposed to illustrate that …
a) … liberty upsets patterns and, therefore, patterned conceptions of justice require

illegitimate restrictions of liberty. b) … liberty upsets patterns and, therefore, the entitlement
conception of justice (justice in holdings and justice in transfer) requires illegitimate restrictions of
liberty. c) … liberty does not upset patterns and, therefore, patterned conceptions of justice
are more plausible than the entitlement conception of justice (justice in holdings and justice in
transfer). d) … no matter how just an initial distribution may be, voluntary interaction among
free agents will always lead to injustice. e) … there is no such thing as a just distribution of
goods.
EXPLANATION
a) Correct.
b) Incorrect. Since the entitlement conception of justice (justice in holdings and justice in transfer)
is not patterned but historical, it does not require illegitimate restrictions of liberty.
c) Incorrect. According to Nozick, liberty (free exchange of goods) does indeed upset patterns of
distribution of goods (e.g. equal distributions), and, therefore, patterned conceptions of justice
require illegitimate restrictions of liberty and should, therefore, be rejected.
d) Incorrect. Nozick believes that as long as goods were acquired and transferred justly (i.e.
without a violation of natural rights), voluntary exchanges of goods are just.
e) Incorrect. Nozick believes that a distribution of goods is just as long as it came about in a just
manner, i.e. the goods were acquired and transferred in a just manner, i.e. without a violation of
natural rights.
QUESTION 3
Locke’s purpose in examining the “state of nature” is:
a) to show how primitive human beings lived before they formed societies. b) to
determine the natural rights of human beings and, thereby, the legitimate extent of political
power. c) to show that all governments represent at least marginal improvements to the
state of nature. d) to show why the state of nature is inadequate for determining what our
fundamental rights should be. e) to show that the right to property obtains in the state of
nature but not in civil society.
QUESTION 4
According to Locke, is private property possible in the state of nature?
a) Yes. According to Locke, anyone can lay claim on something without having to do anything.
b) No. According to Locke, the earth is given to men in common. c) Yes. According to
Locke, mixing one’s labor with an unowned thing is a sufficient condition for coming to own it.
d) No. According to Locke, the idea of private property is conceptually dependent on a conception
of justice. e) Yes. According to Locke, one can come to own something by mixing one’s labor
with it and provided there is enough, and as good, left for others.
QUESTION 5
Which of the following best characterizes the difference between Locke and Nozick on the issue of
unalienable rights?
a) Nozick thinks that I own myself, and that this means I may do whatever I want with
myself — including, for instance, selling myself into slavery. Locke agrees, but warns that selling
myself into slavery is unlikely to make me happy. b) Nozick thinks that I own myself, and that
this means I may do whatever I want with myself — including, for instance, selling myself into
slavery. Locke disagrees. He thinks there are certain rights that I may not alienate, no matter how
badly I might want to. c) Nozick, as a libertarian, thinks that my right to liberty is the most
important right, and so I could never alienate my liberty for any reason. Locke, on the other hand,
thinks I can alienate my liberty for the purpose of protecting my life and property. d) Both
Nozick and Locke admit that there are unalienable rights. They disagree only about which ones
are unalienable. e) Nozick thinks that because our rights are a gift from God, we could never
alienate them. Locke thinks we should sometimes alienate them, since they were given to us by
God to use as we please.
QUIZZES – 80% (5% of grade), 60% (5% of grade) = 70%,
Progress as of April 18, 2013
LECTURE 11: Immanuel Kant: What is freedom?

Kant’s Case for Rights
Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) offers an alternative account of duties and rights, one of the most
powerful and influential accounts any philosopher has produced. It does not depend on the idea that
we own ourselves, or on the claim that our lives and liberties are a gift from God. Instead, it depends
on the idea that we are rational beings, worthy of dignity and respect.
Five years after Jeremy Bentham’s Principles of Morals and Legislation (1780), Kant’s Groundwork
launched a devastating critique of utilitarianism. It argues that morality is not about maximizing
happiness or any other end. Instead, it is about respecting persons as ends in themselves.
Kant’s Groundwork appeared shortly after the American Revolution (1776) and just before the French
Revolution (1789). In line with the spirit and moral thrust of those revolutions, it offers a powerful
basis for what the eighteenth-century revolutionaries called the rights of man, and what we in the
early twenty-first century call universal human rights.
What is the supreme principle of morality? And in the course of answering that question, it
addresses another hugely important one: What is freedom?
I distinguished three approaches to justice

1. One approach, that of the Utilitarians, says that the way to define justice and to determine the
right thing to do is to ask what will maximize welfare, or the collective happiness of society as
a whole.
2. A second approach connects justice to freedom. Libertarians offer an example of this
approach. They say the just distribution of income and wealth is whatever distribution arises
from the free exchange of goods and services in an unfettered market. To regulate the market
is unjust, they maintain, because it violates the individual’s freedom of choice.
3. A third approach says that justice means giving people what they morally deserve—allocating
goods to reward and promote virtue. As we will see when we turn to Aristotle (in Chapter 8),
the virtue-based approach connects justice to reflection about the good life.
Kant rejects approach one (maximizing welfare) and approach three (promoting virtue). Neither, he
thinks, respects human freedom.
So Kant is a powerful advocate for approach two—the one that connects justice and morality to
freedom. But the idea of freedom he puts forth is demanding—more demanding than the freedom
of choice we exercise when buying and selling goods on the market. What we commonly think of as
market freedom or consumer choice is not true freedom, Kant argues, because it simply involves
satisfying desires we haven’t chosen in the first place.
Kant rejects utilitarianism. By resting rights on a calculation about what will produce the greatest
happiness, he argues, utilitarianism leaves rights vulnerable. There is also a deeper problem: trying
to derive moral principles from the desires we happen to have is the wrong way to think about
morality. Just because something gives many people plea sure doesn’t make it right. The mere fact
that the majority, however big, favors a certain law, however intensely, does not make the law just.
Kant argues that morality can’t be based on merely empirical considerations, such as the interests,
wants, desires, and preferences people have at any given time. These factors are variable and
contingent, he points out, so they could hardly serve as the basis for universal moral principles—
such as universal human rights. But Kant’s more fundamental point is that basing moral principles
on preferences and desires—even the desire for happiness—misunderstands what morality is about.
The utilitarian’s happiness principle “contributes nothing whatever toward establishing morality, since
making a man happy is quite different from making him good and making him prudent or astute in
seeking his advantage quite different from making him virtuous.”2
Basing morality on interests and preferences destroys its dignity. It doesn’t teach us how to
distinguish right from wrong, but “only to become better at calculation.”3
Kant argues instead that we can arrive at the supreme principle of morality through the exercise
of what he calls “pure practical reason.” Kant argues that every person is worthy of respect,
not because we own ourselves but because we are rational beings, capable of reason; we are also
autonomous beings, capable of acting and choosing freely. He means only that we have the capacity
for reason, and for freedom, and that this capacity is common to human beings as such.
Kant readily concedes that our capacity for reason is not the only capacity we possess. We also have
the capacity to feel plea sure and pain.
Kant recognizes that we are sentient creatures as well as rational ones. By “sentient,” Kant means
that we respond to our senses, our feelings. So Bentham was right—but only half right. He was
right to observe that we like plea sure and dislike pain. But he was wrong to insist that they are
“our sovereign masters.” Kant argues that reason can be sovereign, at least some of the time.
When reason governs our will, we are not driven by the desire to seek pleasure and avoid pain.
Our capacity for reason is bound up with our capacity for freedom. Taken together, these
capacities make us distinctive, and set us apart from mere animal existence. They make us more than
mere creatures of appetite.
What is freedom? Freedom is the opposite of necessity.

Kant reasons as follows: When we, like animals, seek pleasure or the avoidance of pain, we aren’t
really acting freely. We are acting as the slaves of our appetites and desires.
Kant doesn’t say it’s wrong to satisfy our preferences. His point is that, when we do so, we are not
acting freely, but acting according to a determination given outside us. After all, I didn’t choose my
desire for espresso toffee crunch rather than vanilla. I just have it.
Whenever my behavior is biologically determined or socially conditioned, it is not truly free. To act
freely, according to Kant, is to act autonomously. And to act autonomously is to act according
to a law I give myself—not according to the dictates of nature or social convention.
Contrasting autonomy with its opposite
One way of understanding what Kant means by acting autonomously is to contrast autonomy with its
opposite. Kant invents a word to capture this contrast—heteronomy. When I act “heteronomously”,
I act according to determinations given outside of me (something I haven’t chosen for
myself). Here is an illustration: When you drop a billiard ball, it falls to the ground. As it falls, the
billiard ball is not acting freely; its movement is governed by the laws of nature—in this case, the law
of gravity.
Here, then, is the link between freedom as autonomy and Kant’s idea of morality. To act freely
is not to choose the best means to a given end; it is to choose the end itself, for its own
sake—a choice that human beings can make and billiard balls (and most animals) cannot.
Heteronomous determination—doing something for the sake of something else, for the sake of
something else, and so on. When we act heteronomously, we act for the sake of ends given outside
us. We are instruments, not authors, of the purposes we pursue.
Kant’s notion of autonomy stands in stark contrast to this. When we act autonomously,
according to a law we give ourselves, we do something for its own sake, as an end in itself. We cease
to be instruments of purposes given outside us. This capacity to act autonomously is what gives
human life its special dignity. It marks out the difference between persons and things. For Kant,
respecting human dignity means treating persons as ends in themselves.
What’s Moral? Look for the Motive

According to Kant, the moral worth of an action consists not in the consequences that flow from it,
but in the intention from which the act is done. What matters is the motive, and the motive must
be of a certain kind. What matters is doing the right thing because it’s right, not for some
ulterior motive.
“A good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes,” Kant writes. It is good
in itself, whether or not it prevails. “Even if . . . this will is entirely lacking in power to carry out
its intentions; if by its utmost effort it still accomplishes nothing . . . even then it would still shine like
a jewel for its own sake as something which has its full value in itself.”4
For any action to be morally good, “it is not enough that it should conform to the moral law—it
must also be done for the sake of the moral law.”5 And the motive that confers moral worth on
an action is the motive of duty, by which Kant means doing the right thing for the right
reason.
. . . once we glimpse the motive of duty, we can identify the feature of our good deeds that gives
them their moral worth—namely, their principle, not their consequences.
Question: Once you’re conscious of morality, you can alter your motive. You
might say, “I want to be moral.”
Kant speaks of a different kind of incentive to moral action than inclination or self-interest. He
speaks of reverence for the moral law. Here, the person has formed his will to the moral law, and
once he has formed his will, conformed it to the moral law – once he has seen the importance of
it, that is his incentive to moral action out of duty.
Question: What stops morality from becoming completely subjective?
Autonomously means that I am acting morally according to a law I give myself. That’s how I
escape the chain of cause and effect and the “laws of nature”. But what’s to guarantee that the
law I give myself is the same as the law you give yourself? How many moral laws can there be?
Kant says: There is only one moral law. The reason that leads us to the law we give
ourselves (autonomously) is a kind of practical reason that we share as human beings. It’s not
idiosyncratic. The reason we need to respect the dignity of all human beings is that we are
all rational beings. We all have the same capacity for reason, and it’s that exercise of reason
that exists, undifferentiated, in all of us that makes us worthy of dignity. It’s that same
universal capacity in all of us that delivers a moral law – it turns out that to
act autonomously is to act according to a moral law we give ourselves by
exercising our reason (but it’s the reason we share with all human beings)
as rational beings. It is not the particular reasons we give ourselves (my values, my
interests). It’s pure practical reason that legislates a priori, which operates regardless of any
particular contingent or empirical ends.
What kind of law would that kind of reason deliver? What is the content?
SELF-TEST
QUESTION 1 According to Kant, what sets us (human beings) apart from other creatures is …
a.
● … our capacity to experience pleasure. b) … our capacity to experience pain. c) …
our capacity for reason. d) … a and b. e) … none of the above.
●
QUESTION 2 According to Kant, what it means to act freely is to …
a.
b. … act heteronomously. b) … act according to a law I give myself. c) … be able to

do what one wants. d) … act according to desires or inclinations that I have not chosen for
myself. e) … (a) and (d).
c.
QUESTION 3 According to Kant, what gives an action its moral worth?
1. According to Kant, what gives an action its moral worth is the quality of its
consequences. b) According to Kant, what gives an action its moral worth is the
quality of the motive from which the act is done. c) According to Kant, what gives
an action its moral worth is simply its conformity with the laws of one's country.
d) According to Kant, what gives an action its moral worth is simply its conformity to
the moral law. e) According to Kant, what gives an action its moral worth is the
strength of the desire from which it springs.
EXPLANATION
a) Incorrect. According to Kant, what gives an action its moral worth is the quality of the motive from
which the act is done and not the quality of its consequences.
b) Correct.
c) Incorrect. According to Kant, what gives an action its moral worth is the quality of the motive from
which the act is done.
d) Incorrect. According to Kant, it is not sufficient for an action to conform to the moral law. For an
action to be morally worthy it has to be done for the sake of the moral law.
e) Incorrect. According to Kant, an action’s moral worth has nothing to do with the strength of the
desire from which it springs; an action only has moral worth if it is done from the motive of duty.
LECTURE 12: Immanuel Kant: The Supreme Principle of Morality
https://www.edx.org/c4x/HarvardX/ER22x/asset/Chapter_5_-_Immanuel_Kant__124-129_.pdf
“Groundwork” is about two questions:
1. What is the supreme principle of Morality?
2. How is Freedom possible?
What is the supreme principle of morality?

Kant’s Three Parallel Contrasts
Morality Motive: duty (rise above inclination) vs. inclination (self-interested motives)
Freedom - Determination of will: autonomously (according to a law I give myself by
reason) vs. heteronomously
Reason – Imperatives (an ‘ought’): hypothetical (if (means) . . . then (ends) . . .) vs.
categorical (good in itself, w/o reference to any other purpose - independent of nature, and
circumstance)
Kant’s 1st Test of the Categorical imperative
Maxim (a principle) = a rule that explains the reason for what you are doing.
Example of the Test to Determine if an Imperative is Categorical

You promise to pay me back next week, knowing you can’t do that. Is that false promise
consistent with the categorical imperative? Kant says “No.”
The test would be to try to universalize it. Universalize the maxim upon which you’re about to
act (i.e., giving a false promise). That is, “If everybody made false promises when they needed
money, then nobody would believe those promises. There would be no such thing as a promise.
Therefore, the maxim, universalized, would undermine itself. You do this test (universalize the
maxim) to see if you are privileging your particular needs and desires over everyone else’s.
Kant’s 2nd version of the Categorical imperative Test
Kant: “We can’t base the categorical imperative on any particular interests, purposes, or ends,
because then it would be only relative to the person whose ends they were.”
Kant: “Rational beings are persons. They don’t just have a relative value with us. But if
anything has, they have an absolute value, and intrinsic value: that is, rational beings have
dignity. They are worthy of reverence and respect.”
Kant’s 2nd Formulation of the categorical Imperative – Humanity as an End
When I make a false promise to you, I’m using you as a means to my ends. And so, I’m
failing to respect your dignity. I’m manipulating you.
Murder and suicide are at odds with the categorical imperative. If I murder someone, I
have a particular purpose (money, hate, etc.) for the sake of which I’m using him. Suicide is
on a par with murder. When we take a life (even our own) we use that person, we use a rational
being, we use humanity as an end. And so, we fail to respect humanity as an end. That reason
lies, undifferentiated, in all of us.
The reason we have to respect the dignity of other people has not to do with anything particular
about them. Respect is unlike love, sympathy, solidarity, or fellow feeling because those have to
do with who those people are in particular. But, respect is for humanity, which is universal, for a
rational capacity, which is universal. And that’s why violating iit in my own case (suicide) is just as
objectionable as violating it in any other.
SELF-TEST
QUESTION 1
Which of the following best captures Kant’s distinction between the motive of duty and the motive
of inclination?
a) What Kant has in mind is the difference between doing the right thing for the right
reason and doing the right thing because one feels like it. b) What Kant has in mind is
the difference between doing the right thing for the right reason and doing the right thing
because one is forced to do so. c) What Kant has in mind is the difference between
doing the right thing for the wrong reason and doing the wrong thing for the right reason.
d) All of the above. e) None of the above.
QUESTION 2
Which of the following capture the difference between a hypothetical and a categorical imperative?
(a) A hypothetical imperative commands with reference to or dependence on another

purpose, while a categorical imperative commands without reference or dependence on
any other purpose. b) A hypothetical imperative has the form: If you want X, then
do y; a categorical imperative has the form: Do y. c) A hypothetical imperative is
an expression of means-end reasoning; a categorical imperative is not an expression of
means-end reasoning. d) None of the above. e) (a), (b), and (c).
QUESTION 3
Which of the following best captures the Formula of Universal Law formulation of the Categorical
Imperative?
(a) “I say that man, and in general every rational being, exists as an end in himself
not merely as a means for arbitrary use by this or that will.” b) “Act only on that
maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.”
c) “Act only on that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should guide
those who feel like being moral.” d) All of the above. e) None of the above.
QUIZ 3 100%
QUESTION 1
Which of the following best captures Kant’s Formula of Humanity as End?
a) “I ought never to act in such a way that I could not also will that my maxim should
become a universal law.” b) “Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your
own person or in any other person, only as an end, never as a means.” c) “Never make
an exception for yourself.” d) “Act only on that maxim by which you can at the same time
will that it should become a universal law.” e) “Act in such a way that you treat humanity,
whether in your own person or in any other person, always at the same time as an end, never
merely as a means.”
QUESTION 2
“I am to make a deceitful promise in circumstances in which my situation is such that I am in real
need of money and I know that I will never be able to pay it back in order to further my own personal
advantage.” Kant claims that the universalization of this maxim results in a contradiction. What does
Kant mean?
a) Kant means that a world where everyone makes deceitful promises would be a bad one.
b) Kant means that we cannot imagine a world where everyone makes deceitful promises, because
the practice of promising presupposes trust and no one would trust anyone in a world where everyone
makes deceitful promises. c) Kant means that it is pointless to make a deceitful promise.
d) Kant means that it is impossible to conceive of a world in which all promises are offered with the
intention of being broken, because a promise will only be accepted if all promises are kept. So, if one
promise is broken, none will be accepted. e) Kant means that on pains of irrationality we must
never keep our promises.
QUESTION 3
In Kant’s time, peasants would sometimes sell their teeth to wealthier individuals who needed them.
Kant objected to this, and he would presumably, for similar reasons, object to selling organs (like
kidneys) in the present day. Which of following most accurately characterizes Kant’s reasons for
objecting to selling parts of one’s body?
a) The pain caused by having a tooth or an organ extracted is severe — severe enough to
outweigh the pleasure that the recipient will enjoy. b) Extracting teeth and organs is digusting,
and, therefore, morally wrong. c) Extracting teeth and organs inherently involves a certain
amount of risk. Something could go wrong, and the procedure could result in infection, further illness,
or death. Kant says that we are not allowed to take risks with our lives. d) By selling part of her
body, a person would be treating herself as a mere means, and not as an end in herself. e) An
individual’s body is owned by God, and so she is not free to do with it whatever she wishes. God has
ultimate ownership over her body, and so selling a tooth or an organ would require selling something
that one does not actually own.
QUESTION 4
Which of the following most accurately expresses Kant’s view about the relationship between freedom
and duty?
a. To be truly free, a person must not be constrained in any way. To have a duty is
to be required to act in a particular way, and thus to be subject to a constraint. Thus, freedom
and duty are incompatible. b) To be truly free, a person must not follow any laws at all. To
be free is to be lawless. But acting from duty involves acting from laws. So the moral person is
necessarily unfree. c) To be truly free, a person must not follow any laws. However, it is
impossible to avoid acting from laws altogether. So a person should act from moral laws because
moral laws are good. And because they are good, a person who acts from them is mostly free.
d) To be truly free, a person must not act on laws that are imposed on her by another, but
only on laws that she gives to herself. The moral law is the law that a rational being gives to
herself. Therefore, the person who acts from the moral law is truly free. e) To be truly free,
a person must do only what she wants. A rational person will always have a strong desire to do
moral things. So when she acts on that desire, she will be
QUESTION 5
Kant offers an example of an honest shopkeeper who refuses to cheat his customers. Kant imagines
one motive that the shopkeeper might have: a worry that if he is dishonest, word will get out and he
will lose business. Why does Kant discuss this example?
a) He wants to argue that honesty is the best policy, because if the shopkeeper does what is
right, he is also likely to thrive as a businessperson. b) He wants to demonstrate that an honest
action can sometimes lack moral worth if it is done from the wrong motive. c) He wants to show
us that there are many motives that have moral worth, and that the honest shopkeeper deserves
our praise. d) He wants to show that if everyone acted the way that the shopkeeper does, no
one would be able to conduct business anymore. Therefore, the shopkeeper’s actions violate the
categorical imperative. e) He wants us to see the inherent moral dilemma faced by those who run
a business.
LECTURE 13: Immanuel Kant: A lesson in Lying
Sex: An ethic of unfettered consent vs. an ethic of respect for the autonomy and dignity of
persons.
Kant concludes that only sex within marriage can avoid “degrading humanity.” Only when
two persons give each other the whole of themselves, and not merely the use of their sexual
capacities, can sex be other than objectifying. Only when both partners share with each other
their “person, body and soul, for good and ill and in every respect,” can their sexuality lead to “a
union of human beings.”
Lies: Suppose a friend was hiding in your house, and a murderer came to the door looking
for him. Wouldn’t it be right to lie to the murderer? Kant says no. The duty to tell the truth holds
regardless of the consequences.
“Truthfulness in statements that cannot be avoided is the formal duty of man to everyone,
however great the disadvantage that may arise there from for him or for any other.” Admittedly,
helping a murderer carry out his evil deed is a pretty heavy “disadvantage.” But remember,
for Kant, morality is not about consequences; it’s about principle. You can’t control the
consequences of your action—in this case, telling the truth—since consequences are bound up
with contingency.
Kant states, is not that the murderer is entitled to the truth, or that a lie would harm him. It’s that
a lie—any lie—“vitiates the very source of right . . . To be truthful (honest) in all declarations is,
therefore, a sacred and unconditionally commanding law of reason that admits of no expediency
whatsoever.”
Kant says: You can’t tell an outright lie “My friend is not here.” But you can say, “An hour ago, I
saw her down the road, at the grocery store.”
What, morally speaking, is the difference between a technically true but misleading statement
and an outright lie? Unlike a white lie (on receiving an ugly gift tie, you say, “It’s so nice.”) the
latter statement might give the murderer the false impression that your friend is not in your house.
But it would nonetheless be true.
On Kant’s moral theory, it’s the intention, or motive, that matters. A

misleading truth includes two motives, not one. If I simply lie to the murderer, I act out
of one motive—to protect my friend from harm. If I tell the murderer that I recently saw my friend
at the grocery store, I act out of two motives—to protect my friend and at the same time to uphold
the duty to tell the truth. In both cases, I am pursuing an admirable goal, that of protecting my
friend. But only in the second case do I pursue this goal in a way that accords with the motive of
duty.
Kant’s point is rather that a misleading statement that is nonetheless true does not coerce or
manipulate the listener in the same way as an outright lie.
JUSTICE: The political theory he favors rejects utilitarianism in favor of a theory of justice based
on a social contract.
Political Theory:
1. A just constitution aims at harmonizing each individual’s freedom with that of everyone
else.
a. Resting rights on utility would require the society to affirm or endorse one
conception of happiness over others. To base the constitution on one particular
conception of happiness (such as that of the majority) would impose on some the
values of others; it would fail to respect the right of each person to pursue his or her
own ends.
2. It derives justice and rights from a social contract—but a social contract with a puzzling
twist.
a. Although legitimate government must be based on an original contract, “we need
by no means assume that this contract . . . actually exists as a fact, for it cannot
possibly be so.” Kant maintains that the original contract is not actual but imaginary.
b. Why insist it’s imaginary? –
i. Practical reason - It’s often hard to prove historically, in the distant history of
nations, that any social contract ever took place.
ii. Philosophical reason - Moral principles can’t be derived from empirical facts
alone.
1. Just as the moral law can’t rest on the interests or desires of
individuals, principles of justice can’t rest on the interests or desires of
a community. The mere fact that a group of people in the past agreed
to a constitution is not enough to make that constitution just.
What kind of imaginary contract could possibly avoid this problem?
Kant simply calls it “an idea of reason, which nonetheless has undoubted practical reality; for it
can oblige every legislator to frame his laws in such a way that they could have been produced
by the united will of a whole nation,” and obligate each citizen “as if he had consented.” Kant
concludes that this imaginary act of collective consent “is the test of the rightfulness of every
public law.”
Making Sense of Kant’s Moral Theory

Answer 3 Questions:
1. How can duty and autonomy (freedom) go together?
a. Kant: Duty is compatible with freedom because acting out of duty is following a
moral law that you author and will on yourself.
2. How many moral laws are there? What’s to guarantee that my law (conscience) will be the
same as yours?
a. Kant: Moral law is not dependent on particular conditions, and it would be a
universal law. The reason that wills the law in me is the same reason that
operates when others choose the moral law.
3. How is a categorical imperative possible?
a. Kant: We need to make a distinction between two standpoints from which we can
make sense of our experience.
i. Object of experience – I inhabit the sensible world, where my actions are
determined by the laws of nature, and by the regularities of cause and effect.
ii. Subject of experience – (Due to the notion of freedom), I inhabit an
intelligible world, where I am independent of laws of nature and capable
of autonomy. Here I am free. I am not wholly an empirical being (Utilitarian)
subject to the delivery of my senses, we would be conditioned by our senses
and all choice would be heteronomous choice.
b. Because we inhabit both realms (standpoints), there is always potentially a gap
between what we do and what we ought to do.
i. Morality is not empirical. Moral law stands at certain distance from the world
(science, etc.).
Murderer at the door or Clinton’s “I never had sexual relations with that woman”:
Using a misleading truth is not a lie.
Unlike a falsehood – unlike a lie – a misleading truth pays a certain homage to the dignity of
moral law (duty). The homage it pays to duty is what justifies even the work of evasion.
SELF-TEST Lecture 13
QUESTION 1
What is the relation between duty and autonomy in Kant’s moral philosophy?
a) The concepts of duty and autonomy have no relation in Kant’s moral philosophy. b)
Duty limits one’s autonomy by disallowing one to act in immoral ways. c) Acting from duty and
acting autonomously are one and the same. d) Acting from duty does not always require acting
autonomously because sometimes we may simply feel inclined to do the right thing in certain cases.
e) (c) and (d).
UESTION 2
What is the difference between the sensible and the intelligible realm?
a) Human beings only inhabit the intelligible realm. b) Human beings only inhabit the
sensible realm. c) Only as a member of the sensible realm can I make sense of myself as
autonomous. d) Only as a member of the intelligible realm can I make sense of myself as
autonomous. e) None of the above answers are correct.
QUESTION 3
On Kantian grounds, is there a moral difference between a lie and a misleading truth?
a) Yes, there is a difference because a misleading truth will often have better consequences than
an outright lie. b) Yes, there is a difference because a misleading truth at least pays homage to
the moral law, whereas a lie does not. c) No, there is no difference because the motive behind
a lie is the same as the motive behind a misleading truth. d) No, there is no difference because
a misleading truth will often have the same consequences as a lie. e) None of the above are
correct.
LECTURE 14: The Morality of Consent
Just laws arise from a certain kind of just contract. But this contract is of an exceptional
nature. A contract that generates justice is an idea of reason.
[This is not a contract created by a meeting of people, who have differing ideas and special
interests and abilities to debate their reasons.]
What is the moral force of a hypothetical contract, that never happened. First, what is the
moral force of actual contracts?
Answer to Question 2 – How do they justify the terms they produce?

They don’t justify the terms that they produce, at least not on their own. Actual contracts
are not self-sufficient moral contracts. It can always be asked, “Is it fair?” The fact of the
agreement never guarantees the fairness of the agreement.
Example: Our own constitution agreed to allow slavery to exist.
Answer to Question 1 - How do they bind or obligate? What is the moral

force of actual contracts?
Example Consent-Based – Autonomy Contract - I promise to give to you $100, if
you harvest and bring to me 100 lobsters. But I call you back before you’ve done any work
and say I don’t want the lobsters.
Example Benefit-Based – Reciprocity Contract – I promise to give to you $100, if
you harvest and bring to me 100 lobsters. I eat the lobsters and serve them to my friends and
then don’t pay.
To the extent that they bind us, they obligate in two ways:
The Moral Limits of Actual Contracts
● Because two people agree to the terms of an agreement does not mean that the
agreement is fair. Therefore, an actual agreement (contract) is not a sufficient condition of
there being an obligation.
● An actual agreement (contract) is not even a necessary condition of there being an
obligation. If there is an act of reciprocity (an exchange), even w/o a contract, there can be
an obligation.
David Hume (18th C. Scottish philosopher)– As a young man, he argued
against Kant’s idea of an original social contract – calling it a philosophical
fiction (that consent as the basis of obligation). At 62 years of age Hume
experienced renting his home to a friend who sublet it to another, who
decided the house needed repairs and paint. The bill was sent to Hume,
and he refused to pay on the grounds that he had not consented. But he
had to pay.
Examples of the distinction between the consent-based aspect of obligations and the benefit-
based aspect, and how they can run together.
Example 1: On a road trip across country, car breaks down. Up comes a mobile car repair Van.
He offers $50 for an hour or a part of hour’s work, repaired or not. He lifts hood and starts to
examine, and does nothing more. Car owner says stop, and man says, “You owe me $50.”
● How can we be sure there has been a fair exchange, if consent has not been received?
Example 2: Every year on trip across country, wife is having an affair with another. Wouldn’t
husband have two different reasons for moral outrage?
1. Husband and wife had an agreement, and she broke her promise. – Her consent at
marriage?
2. Husband had been so faithful for his part, is this what he deserves in return? –
Reciprocity?
Each reason has an independent moral force.
But every actual contract may fall short (may fail to realize) the ideals that give
contracts their moral force, in the first place.
● The ideal of autonomy may fail because there is a difference in the bargaining power of
the parties.
● The ideal of reciprocity may not be realized because there is a difference of knowledge,
and so they may misidentify what counts as having equivalent value.
What kind of contract would it have to be to have guaranteed ideals of

autonomy and reciprocity?
● Contract among parties who were equal in power and knowledge, and
identically situated rather than differently situated.
Rawl’s Idea of Justice – The way to think about justice is from the
standpoint of a hypothetical contract behind a veil of ignorance that
creates a condition of equality that rules out, or enables us to forget
for a moment, the differences in power and knowledge that could
(even in principle) lead to unfair results.
SELF – TEST
QUESTION 1
According to Professor Sandel, how do actual contracts bind or obligate us?
a) Actual contracts obligate us in part because they are instruments of mutual benefit. b)
Actual contracts obligate us because the fact that we have agreed to the contract means the terms
of the contract are fair. c) Actual contracts obligate us in part because we voluntarily consent to
them. d) Actual contracts do not obligate us. e) Answers (a) and (c) are both correct.
QUESTION 2
In the example of the Sam the repairman, Sam begins working on Professor Sandel's car without his
consent. After 15 minutes of work (and no luck in fixing the car), Sam informs Professor Sandel that
there is nothing wrong with the ignition system, but he has 45 minutes left in his hour of hired labor.
Professor Sandel objects that he has not yet hired the repairman, and that, therefore, he owes him
nothing. Which of the following responses offers a consent-based line of argument?
a) “Had I fixed the car, you surely would have owed me payment.” b) “Even though I was
unable to fix the car, you owe me payment because now you know that the ignition system is not the
problem” c) “If you didn’t want me to look at your car, you could have told me to stop at any
point during the last 15 minutes!” d) Each of the above responses offers a consent-based line of
argument. e) None of the above responses offers a consent-based line of argument.
QUESTION 3
In contrast to Locke, Rawls and Kant argue that the social contract that generates the principles of
justice is not an actual contract. Rather, it is a purely hypothetical contract that would be agreed upon
by parties with no information about their particular place in society. According to Professor Sandel,
why might a hypothetical contract be preferable to an actual contract in determining the principles of
justice?
a. A hypothetical contract better represents the ideals of autonomy and reciprocity that give
contracts their moral force. b) A hypothetical contract relies on tacit consent, which is much
easier to obtain than actual consent. c) A hypothetical contract is more efficient because it does
not require everyone to attend a meeting or sign a document. d) Each of the above responses is
correct. e) None of the above answers are correct.

LECTURE 15: John Rawls – The Case for Equality
READING
Behind the veil of ignorance, we don’t know where we will wind up in society, but we do know that we
will want to pursue our ends and be treated with respect In order to protect against these dangers, we
would reject utilitarianism and agree to a principle of equal basic liberties for all citizens, including the
right to liberty of conscience and freedom of thought. And we would insist that this principle take priority
over attempts to maximize the general welfare. We would not sacrifice our fundamental rights and
liberties for social and economic benefits.
Behind a veil of ignorance we would recognize that Utilitarianism does not sufficiently
take into consideration the differences between individuals.
Principle 1 – We wouldn’t trade off our fundamental rights and liberties for any economic advantages.
Principle 2 - Social and economic policies would be based on the “difference principle”. Rawls calls “the
difference principle”: only those social and economic inequalities are permitted that work to the benefit
of the least advantaged members of society.
Principle 3 - But Rawls’s case for the difference principle doesn’t rest entirely on the assumption that
people in the original position (behind the veil of ignorance) would be risk averse (i.e., that people
choosing principles to govern their fundamental life prospects wouldn’t take chances.) Underlying the
device of the veil of ignorance is a moral argument that can be presented independent of the thought
experiment. Its main idea is that the distribution of income and opportunity should not be based on
factors that are arbitrary from a moral point of view.
Rival Theories of Justice:

● Feudal Aristocracies or Caste Systems
○ These systems are unfair, Rawls observes, because they distribute income, wealth,
opportunity, and power according to the accident of birth.
○ But the circumstances of your birth are no doing of yours. So it’s unjust to make your life
prospects depend on this arbitrary fact.
● Market Societies
○ Citizens are assured equal basic liberties, and the distribution of income and wealth is
determined by the free market.
○ Legally, it allows everyone to strive and to compete. In practice, however, opportunities
may be far from equal (e.g., a supportive family and good education gives you advantages).
○ The most obvious injustice of this libertarian system “is that it permits distributive shares
to be improperly influenced by these factors so arbitrary from a moral point of view.”
● A Fair Meritocracy – Meritocratic Conception
○ Goes beyond merely formal equality of opportunity. It removes obstacles to achievement
by providing equal educational opportunities, so that those from poor families can
compete on an equal basis with those from more privileged backgrounds.
○ “Even if it works to perfection in eliminating the influence of social contingencies,” Rawls
writes, the meritocratic system “still permits the distribution of wealth and income to be
determined by the natural distribution of abilities and talents.”
○ If Rawls is right, even a free market operating in a society with equal educational
opportunities does not produce a just distribution of income and wealth. The reason:
“Distributive shares are decided by the outcome of the natural (athletic prowess, for
instance) lottery; and this outcome is arbitrary from a moral perspective. There is no more
reason to permit the distribution of income and wealth to be settled by the distribution of
natural assets than by historical and social fortune.”
CONCLUSION: Free Market (Libertarian) and Meritocratic Theories of Justice
Rawls concludes that the meritocratic conception of justice is flawed for the
same reason (though to a lesser degree) as the libertarian conception; both base
distributive shares on factors that are morally arbitrary. “Once we are troubled by
the influence of either social contingencies or natural chance on the determination of
the distributive shares, we are bound, on reflection, to be bothered by the influence
of the other. From a moral standpoint the two seem equally arbitrary.”
Although the difference principle does not require an equal distribution of income and
wealth, its underlying idea expresses a powerful, even inspiring vision of equality:
The difference principle represents, in effect, an agreement to regard the

distribution of natural talents as a common asset and to share in the benefits of
this distribution whatever it turns out to be. Those who have been favored by
nature, whoever they are, may gain from their good fortune only on terms that
improve the situation of those who have lost out. The naturally advantaged are
not to gain merely because they are more gifted, but only to cover the costs of
training and education and for using their endowments in ways that help the less
fortunate as well. No one deserves his greater natural capacity nor merits a more
favorable starting place in society. But it does not follow that one should eliminate
these distinctions. There is another way to deal with them. The basic structure of
society can be arranged so that these contingencies work for the good of the least
fortunate.
Consider, then, four rival theories of distribution justice:

1. Feudal or caste system: fixed hierarchy based on birth.
2. Libertarian: free market with formal equality of opportunity.
3. Meritocratic: free market with fair equality of opportunity.
4. Egalitarian: Rawls’s difference principle.
Rawls argues that each of the first three theories bases distributive shares on
factors that are arbitrary from a moral point of view—whether accident of birth, or
social and economic advantage, or natural talents and abilities. Only the difference
principle avoids basing the distribution of income and wealth on these contingencies.
Although the argument from moral arbitrariness does not rely on the argument
from the original position, it is similar in this respect: Both maintain that, in thinking
about justice, we should abstract from, or set aside, contingent facts about persons
and their social position.
SELF-TEST
QUESTION 1
Why does Rawls think that the people behind the veil of ignorance would not choose utilitarian
principles to govern their society?
a) The people behind the veil of ignorance are denied knowledge of the doctrine of utilitarianism.
b) The people behind the veil of ignorance know that, whatever their aims, they will each want
to possess certain fundamental rights. c) The people behind the veil of ignorance would reach
the conclusion that certain pleasures are qualitatively better than others, and therefore, reject
utilitarianism. d) (a) and (b). e) None of the above answers are correct
QUESTION 2
What kind of social and economic inequalities does Rawls believe the people in the original position
would agree to permit?
a. The people in the original position would not permit any social and economic inequalities:
they would require strict equality of income and wealth. b) The people in the original position
would permit only those social and economic inequalities that work to the benefit of the least
well-off members of society. c) The people in the original position would permit only those
social and economic inequalities that work to increase the overall well-being of the society. d)
The people in the original position would permit any social and economic inequalities that do not
violate individuals' rights to self-ownership. e) None of the above answers are correct.
QUESTION 3
Which of the following distributive systems does Rawls favor (holding constant equal basic liberties for
all)?
a. A feudal aristocracy in which the division of distributive shares is determined by the family
into which one is born. b) A libertarian system with careers open to talents in which one
is permitted to apply to any job regardless of the family into which one was born. c) A
meritocratic system with fair equality of opportunity in which everyone is given the same
opportunity to develop their talents and rewards are distributed based on natural talent. d)
A system with fair equality of opportunity in which rewards are distributed in a way that works to
the advantage of the least well-off. e) None of the above answers are correct
Lecture 16 – Distributive Justice: Who Deserves What?
Objections to difference principle:

1. Incentives - If the talented can benefit from their talents only on terms that help the least
well off, what if they decide to work less, or not to develop their skills in the first place?
a. Rawls: The Difference Principle permits income inequalities for the sake of incentives,
provided the incentives are needed to improve the lot of the least advantaged.
i. Paying CEOs more or cutting taxes to increase GDP is not enough. Incentives
only to generate economic growth for the least.
ii. Income inequalities are just only insofar as they call forth efforts that
ultimately help the disadvantaged.
2. Effort - Rawls rejects the meritocratic theory of justice on the grounds that people’s natural
talents are not their own doing. But what about the hard work people devote to cultivating
their talents? Notwithstanding their talents and gifts, don’t they deserve the rewards their
efforts bring?
a. Rawls: Even effort may be the product of a favorable upbringing. “Even the
willingness to make an effort, to try, and so to be deserving in the ordinary sense is
itself dependent upon happy family and social circumstances.”18 Like other factors
in our success, effort is influenced by contingencies for which we can claim no credit.
“It seems clear that the e! ort a person is willing to make is influenced by his natural
abilities and skills and the alternatives open to him. The better endowed are more
likely, other things equal, to strive conscientiously . . .” [Birth order argument]
b. The claim that people deserve the rewards that come from effort and hard work is
questionable for a further reason: although proponents of meritocracy often invoke
the virtues of effort, they don’t really believe that effort alone should be the basis of
income and wealth. Consider two construction workers. One is strong and brawny, and
can build four walls in a day without breaking a sweat. The other is weak and scrawny,
and can’t carry more than two bricks at a time. Therefore, it is contribution not effort
that should be and is rewarded. And that takes us back to natural talents.
3. Libertarian - Nosick - Self-ownership. If you tax someone against his/her will, you are
stealing. It’s coercion. Then you are using people, if they own their talents.
a. Rawls: Maybe we don’t own ourselves in that thorough going way. The only respect in
which the ownership of self must give way is when we ask whether I own myself in the
sense that I have a privilege claim on the benefits that come from the exercise of my
talents in a market economy.
Rejecting Moral Desert
If Rawls’ argument about the moral arbitrariness of talents is right, it leads to a
surprising conclusion: Distributive justice is not a matter of rewarding moral desert.
It’s about moral deserts, on the one hand, and entitlements to legitimate
expectations on the other.
What is the difference between moral deserts and entitlements?

● One is a game of chance (like a lottery) - If I win, I’m entitled to my winnings,
but there is no sense in which I morally deserve to win in the first place.
That’s an entitlement.
● One is a game of skill (Red Sox win World Series) They are entitled to
the trophy according to the rules. But did they deserve to win? That’s an
antecedent standard moral desert.
Rawls: A just scheme answers to what men are entitled to; it satisfies their
legitimate expectations as founded upon social institutions. But what they are
entitled to is not proportional to or dependent upon their intrinsic worth.
The principles of justice that regulate the basic structure . . . do not mention moral
desert, and there is no tendency for distributive shares to correspond to it.
What morally is at stake? What are the contingencies, sources of moral

arbitrariness?
1. Effort - (c.f. above)
2. I live in a society that happens to prize my talents. Is it to my credit that
I have the talents that enable me to get ahead? No. It is dependent on the law
of supply and demand, which is not my doing.
a. What counts as contributing depends on what a society wants.
b. Those with less of these prized talents are no less worthy than we.
c. The moral import of the distinction between moral deserts and
entitlements to legitimate expectations - We are entitled to the benefits
that the rules of the game promise for the exercise of our talents; but it
is a mistake and a conceit to suppose, in the first place, that we deserve
a society that values the talents that we happen to have in abundance.
3. What about opportunities and honors? What about the distribution of
access and distribution of seats in an elite colleges and universities?
a. What is the moral status of your claim (to your seat at Harvard)?
i. Are seats an honor or reward for those who worked so hard to get
them?
ii. Or are those seats entitlements to legitimate expectations that
depend for their justification on those of us who enjoy them doing
so, in a way, that works to the benefit of the least advantaged in
society.
That is the question that Rawls’ difference principle poses.
SELF-TEST
QUESTION 1
How would Rawls respond to the following incentives objection: if we raise taxes
too high, Michael Jordan will refuse to play basketball, and CEOs will go into less
productive lines of work?
a) Rawls would respond that, as a psychological fact, individual workers do not

respond to incentives, and therefore changing the tax rate will have no effect on
productivity.b) Rawls would respond that, even if it is a psychological fact that
individual workers will be more productive given certain incentives, such incentives
are unjust because no one deserves to have a greater share of goods than anyone
else.c) Rawls’s difference principle takes into account the effect of incentives: if
raising the marginal tax rate on the wealthy would discourage talented individuals
from pursuing productive lines of work that are necessary to increase the overall
economic production of a society, then Rawls would object to raising taxes.d)
Rawls’s difference principle takes into account the effect of incentives:
if raising the marginal tax rate on the wealthy would discourage talented
individuals from pursuing productive lines of work that are necessary for
the benefit of the least well-off, then Rawls would object to raising taxes. e)
None of the above answers are correct.
QUESTION 2
How would Rawls respond to the following meritocratic objection: people who work
hard and exert effort deserve to receive greater benefit?
a) Rawls would argue that his two principles of justice are aimed at rewarding
effort, and therefore, the objection does not undermine his theory.b) Rawls would
argue that even the willingness to strive conscientiously depends on family
circumstances and contingencies for which one can claim no credit. c) Rawls would
argue that effort is not an appropriate moral basis of distributive shares.d) Both
(b) and (c) are correct. e) None of the above answers accurately describe how
Rawls would respond to the meritocratic objection.
QUESTION 3
How would Rawls respond to the following libertarian objection: the difference
principle, by treating our natural talents as common assets, violates the right to self-
ownership?
a) Rawls would argue that we do not own ourselves in the way that the
libertarians think we do. b) Rawls would argue that the difference principle
would not require redistribution through taxation, and therefore does not oppose the
idea of that we own ourselves.c) Rawls would argue that the idea of individual
rights is nonsense.d) Rawls would argue that individual rights are only justified
insofar as they increase the overall well-being of society, and that the right to self-
ownership may, in certain instances, lower the overall well-being of society.e)
None of the above answers are correct.
QUIZ 4
QUESTION 1
What is the original position?
a) A time in the past when people lived behind a veil of ignorance that covered up their
knowledge about who in particular they are (e.g. their social status and natural talents).b) A utopian
society in which people live behind a veil of ignorance that covers up their knowledge about who in
particular they are (e.g. their social status and natural talents).c) A hypothetical scenario in
which people who are temporarily placed behind a veil of ignorance that covers up their knowledge
about who in particular they are (e.g. their social status and natural talents) choose the principles of
justice for their society. d) A utopian society in which everyone acts in accordance with Rawls’
principles of justice.e) A time past when people acted in accordance with Rawls’ principles of
justice.
QUESTION 2
What is the main function of the veil of ignorance?
a) To ensure that people are not biased by knowledge about particular facts about themselves
(e.g. how strong or intelligent they are) when thinking about matters of justice. b) To ensure
people’s anonymity when choosing principles of justice.c) To ensure that people are just as
biased when they choose principles of justice as they are in real life.d) To ensure that people are
keenly aware of differences in bargaining power when choosing principles of justice.e) To
ensure that, when choosing principles of justice, individuals are keenly aware of their distinguishing
features.
QUESTION 3
Why, according to Rawls, is a hypothetical contract between people of equal standing who are placed
behind a veil of ignorance morally more significant than an actual contract?
a) Because it is not tainted by asymmetries in bargaining power (e.g. differences in people's
wealth or intelligence or strength). b) Because it is more thoughtful.c) Because people often
do not know what they want.d) Because an actual contract is not tainted by asymmetries in
bargaining power (e.g. differences in people's wealth or intelligence or strength).e) Because tacit
consent is more informative than a hypothetical contract.
QUESTION 4
Individuals who use their talents to earn an income on the free market sometimes claim that they
ought to be allowed to keep all of that income because they morally deserve it. How would Rawls
respond to this?
a) “While you might think that your talents are your own, this is merely an illusion. A person’s
talents are the property of the entire society, and so the wealth created through the use of a person’s
talents is also collective property that we need to distribute fairly.”b) “The fact that you were born
with the talents you have is a morally arbitrary fact. You do not morally deserve your talents, and so
the claim that you deserve the wealth that your talents attract is dubious.”c) “The fact that you were
born into a society in which your particular talents are in high demand or in low supply is a morally
arbitrary fact. The fact that your particular talents are in high demand or in low supply is what allows
you to use those talents to become wealthy. So the claim that you deserve the wealth that your
talents attract is dubious.”d) (a) and (b).e) (b) and (c).
QUESTION 5
Rawls thinks that people are justified in owning the objects and wealth that they do when:
a) They acquired those objects by mixing their labor with them, and they acquired other wealth
by engaging in free exchange with others.b) They acquired those objects and wealth through a
system that rewards them for the moral excellence they exhibit when they work hard and show
initiative.c) The objects and wealth were acquired within a market regulated by principles of justice
that protect individual liberties and fair equality of opportunity for all and then work to the benefit of
the least well-off members of society. d) a and c. e) b and c.
EXPLANATION
a) Incorrect. According to Rawls, people are justified in owning the objects and wealth that they do
when the objects and wealth were acquired within a market regulated by principles of justice that
protect individual liberties and fair equality of opportunity for all and then work to the benefit of the
least well-off members of society.
b) Incorrect. According to Rawls, people are justified in owning the objects and wealth that they do
when the objects and wealth were acquired within a market regulated by principles of justice that
protect individual liberties and fair equality opportunity for all and then work to the benefit of the
least well-off members of society.
c) Correct.
d) Incorrect. Only (c) is correct.
e) Incorrect. Only (c) is correct.
Lecture 17 - Arguing Affirmative Action

Arguments for Affirmative Action
1. Corrective - For differences in educational background
a. That argument is consistent in principle that only academic promise
scholarly practice should count in admissions, and we just need to go
beyond test scores and grades alone to get a true estimate of academic
promise and scholarly practice.
2. Compensatory - As a way of compensating for past wrongs, and historic
injustices
a. Objections
i. Is it fair for s potential student today to pay the price for an
injustice of the past in which she had no part.
ii. Is there such a thing as collective responsibility that reaches over
time.
3. Diversity -
a. Educational experience of everyone - Different from compensatory,
because it makes an appeal to the social mission of the university
b. A common good is served for society as a whole, if there is an ethnically
and racially diverse student body.
i. Harvard’s argument in 1970s Supreme Court Case: Diversity has
always been a part of the Harvard entrance criteria. 15 years ago
it meant: from all states and and with all talents, etc. The only
difference now, is that we are adding Racial and Ethnic criteria to
our long list of diversity considerations.
c. Objections
i. Is there an individual right that is being violated? Shouldn’t we
be considered for our accomplishments, our effort? Isn’t that the
right that is being violated?
ii. Rawls: (No Moral Desert) No one has the right to say that a school
should design its admission goals to include your capacities (scores
or effort or minority status).
Is moral desert is/is not the basis for distributive justice?

Lecture 18 - Aristotle - Justice and Virtue
ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS
A short overview of the reading: Many rights-oriented philosophers believe that

distributive justice is not a matter of rewarding virtue or moral desert, and that the
measure of a just society is not whether it produces virtuous citizens, but whether
it provides a fair framework of rights within which individuals can pursue their own
values. Aristotle (384-322 BC) rejects both of these beliefs. He believes that justice
consists in giving people what they deserve, and that a just society is one that
enables human beings to realize their highest nature and to live the good life.
For Aristotle, political activity is not merely a way to pursue our interests, but an
essential part of the good life.
BOOK ONE
Part I - Politics to be divided into simplest elements
But all this is a mistake; for governments differ in kind, as will be evident to any one
who considers the matter according to the method which has hitherto guided us. As in
other departments of science, so in politics, the compound should always be resolved
into the simple elements or least parts of the whole. We must therefore look at the
elements of which the state is composed, in order that we may see in what the different
kinds of rule differ from one another, and whether any scientific result can be attained
about each one of them.
Part II - Woman and Man, Woman and Slave, Family
In the first place there must be a union of those who cannot exist without each other;
namely, of male and female, that the race may continue (and this is a union which is
formed, not of deliberate purpose, but because, in common with other animals and with
plants, mankind have a natural desire to leave behind them an image of themselves),
and of natural ruler and subject, that both may be preserved. For that which can
foresee by the exercise of mind is by nature intended to be lord and master, and that
which can with its body give effect to such foresight is a subject, and by nature a
slave; hence master and slave have the same interest. Now nature has distinguished
between the female and the slave. For she is not niggardly, like the smith who fashions
the Delphian knife for many uses; she makes each thing for a single use, and every
instrument is best made when intended for one and not for many uses. But among
barbarians no distinction is made between women and slaves, because there is no
natural ruler among them: they are a community of slaves, male and female.
The family is the association established by nature for the supply of men’s everyday
wants.
The Village - when several families are united, and the association aims at something
more than the supply of daily needs, the first society to be formed is the village. And
the most natural form of the village appears to be that of a colony from the family,
composed of the children and grandchildren, who are said to be suckled ‘with the
same milk.’ And this is the reason why Hellenic states were originally governed by
kings; because the Hellenes were under royal rule before they came together, as the
barbarians still are. Every family is ruled by the eldest, and therefore in the colonies
of the family the kingly form of government prevailed because they were of the same
blood.
The State - When several villages are united in a single complete community, large
enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state comes into existence, originating
in the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life. And
therefore, if the earlier forms of society are natural, so is the state, for it is the end of
them, and the nature of a thing is its end. For what each thing is when fully developed,
we call its nature, whether we are speaking of a man, a horse, or a family. Besides, the
final cause and end of a thing is the best, and to be self-sufficing is the end and the
best.
Hence it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a
political animal. And he who by nature and not by mere accident is without a state, is
either a bad man or above humanity;
Man is a Political Animal above the rest - Now, that man is more of a political
animal than bees or any other gregarious animals is evident. Nature, as we often say,
makes nothing in vain, and man is the only animal whom she has endowed with the
gift of speech. And whereas mere voice is but an indication of pleasure or pain, and is
therefore found in other animals (for their nature attains to the perception of pleasure
and pain and the intimation of them to one another, and no further), the power of
speech is intended to set forth the expedient and inexpedient, and therefore
likewise the just and the unjust. And it is a characteristic of man that he
alone has any sense of good and evil, of just and unjust, and the like, and the
association of living beings who have this sense makes a family and a state.
The State is a creation of nature and prior to the individual - But things are
defined by their working and power; and we ought not to say that they are the same
when they no longer have their proper quality, but only that they have the same name.
(A hand without a body is but a stone hand.) The proof that the state is a creation
of nature and prior to the individual is that the individual, when isolated, is not self-
sufficing; and therefore he is like a part in relation to the whole. But he who is unable
to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be
either a beast or a god: he is no part of a state.
Principle of order in a political society - If man have not virtue, he is the most
unholy and the most savage of animals, and the most full of lust and gluttony. But
justice is the bond of men in states, for the administration of justice, which is the
determination of what is just, is the principle of order in political society.
Part III - Woman and Man, Woman and Slave, Family
The parts of household management correspond to the persons who compose the
household, and a complete household consists of slaves and freemen. Now
we should begin by examining everything in its fewest possible elements; and the
first and fewest possible parts of a family are master and slave, husband and
wife, father and children. We have therefore to consider what each of these three
relations is and ought to be: I mean the relation of master and servant, the marriage
relation (the conjunction of man and wife has no name of its own), and thirdly, the
procreative relation (this also has no proper name). And there is another element of a
household, the so-called art of getting wealth, which, according to some, is identical
with household management, according to others, a principal part of it; the nature of
this art will also have to be considered by us.
Let us first speak of master and slave, looking to the needs of practical life and
also seeking to attain some better theory of their relation than exists at present. For
some are of opinion that the rule of a master is a science, and that the management
of a household, and the mastership of slaves, and the political and royal rule, as I was
saying at the outset, are all the same. Others affirm that the rule of a master over
slaves is contrary to nature, and that the distinction between slave and freeman exists
by law only, and not by nature; and being an interference with nature is therefore
unjust.
Again, the male is by nature superior, and the female inferior; and the one rules, and
the other is ruled; this principle, of necessity, extends to all mankind.
Part IV - Property and Slaves
Property is a part of the household, and the art of acquiring property is a part of the
art of managing the household; for no man can live well, or indeed live at all, unless
he be provided with necessaries. And as in the arts which have a definite sphere the
workers must have their own proper instruments for the accomplishment of their work,
so it is in the management of a household. Now instruments are of various sorts;
some are living, others lifeless; in the rudder, the pilot of a ship has a lifeless, in the
look-out man, a living instrument; for in the arts the servant is a kind of instrument.
Thus, too, a possession is an instrument for maintaining life. And so, in the
arrangement of the family, a slave is a living possession, and property a number of
such instruments; and the servant is himself an instrument which takes precedence of
all other instruments.
As production and action are different in kind, and both require instruments, the
instruments which they employ must likewise differ in kind. But life is action and not
production, and therefore the slave is the minister of action. Again, a possession
is spoken of as a part is spoken of; for the part is not only a part of something else, but
wholly belongs to it; and this is also true of a possession. The master is only the master
of the slave; he does not belong to him, whereas the slave is not only the slave of his
master, but wholly belongs to him. Hence we see what is the nature and office of a
slave; he who is by nature not his own but another’s man, is by nature a slave; and he
may be said to be another’s man who, being a human being, is also a possession. And a
possession may be defined as an instrument of action, separable from the possessor.
Part V - Intended by nature to be a slave

But is there any one thus intended by nature to be a slave, and for whom such a
condition is expedient and right, or rather is not all slavery a violation of nature?
There is no difficulty in answering this question, on grounds both of reason and of

fact. For that some should rule and others be ruled is a thing not only necessary, but
expedient; from the hour of their birth, some are marked out for subjection, others for
rule.
Again, the male is by nature superior, and the female inferior; and the one rules, and
the other is ruled; this principle, of necessity, extends to all mankind.
Part VI
In some sense virtue, when furnished with means, has actually the greatest power
of exercising force; and as superior power is only found where there is superior
excellence of some kind, power seems to imply virtue, and the dispute to be simply
one about justice (for it is due to one party identifying justice with goodwill while the
other identifies it with the mere rule of the stronger). If these views are thus set out
separately, the other views have no force or plausibility against the view that the
superior in virtue ought to rule, or be master. Others, clinging, as they think, simply
to a principle of justice (for law and custom are a sort of justice), assume that slavery
in accordance with the custom of war is justified by law, but at the same moment they
deny this. For what if the cause of the war be unjust? And again, no one would ever
say he is a slave who is unworthy to be a slave. Were this the case, men of the highest
rank would be slaves and the children of slaves if they or their parents chance to have
been taken captive and sold. Wherefore Hellenes do not like to call Hellenes slaves,
but confine the term to barbarians. Yet, in using this language, they really mean the
natural slave of whom we spoke at first; for it must be admitted that some are slaves
everywhere, others nowhere. The same principle applies to nobility. Hellenes regard
themselves as noble everywhere, and not only in their own country, but they deem
the barbarians noble only when at home, thereby implying that there are two sorts of
nobility and freedom, the one absolute, the other relative.
We see then that there is some foundation for this difference of opinion, and that all are
not either slaves by nature or freemen by nature, and also that there is in some cases
a marked distinction between the two classes, rendering it expedient and right for the
one to be slaves and the others to be masters: the one practicing obedience, the others
exercising the authority and lordship which nature intended them to have. The abuse of
this authority is injurious to both; for the interests of part and whole, of body and soul,
are the same, and the slave is a part of the master, a living but separated part of his
bodily frame. Hence, where the relation of master and slave between them is natural
they are friends and have a common interest, but where it rests merely on law and
force the reverse is true.
Part VII
The previous remarks are quite enough to show that the rule of a master is not a
constitutional rule, and that all the different kinds of rule are not, as some affirm,
the same with each other. For there is one rule exercised over subjects who are by
nature free, another over subjects who are by nature slaves. The rule of a household
is a monarchy, for every house is under one head: whereas constitutional rule is a
government of freemen and equals. The master is not called a master because he has
science, but because he is of a certain character, and the same remark applies to the
slave and the freeman. Still there may be a science for the master and science for the
slave.
There is likewise a science of the master, which teaches the use of slaves; for the
master as such is concerned, not with the acquisition, but with the use of them. Yet this
so-called science is not anything great or wonderful; for the master need only know
how to order that which the slave must know how to execute. Hence those who are in
a position which places them above toil have stewards who attend to their households
while they occupy themselves with philosophy or with politics. But the art of acquiring
slaves, I mean of justly acquiring them, differs both from the art of the master and the
art of the slave, being a species of hunting or war.
Lecture 18
“Can a University define its social purpose any way it wants to, and then define
admissions policy to meet that criteria?”
Challenge: Is there a principle distinction between the invocation of the social purpose
of the university today, in the diversity rationale, and the invocation of the social
purpose of the university (Texas in the 1950s - “We prepare lawyers for law firm jobs,
and no law firms are hiring Negroes.”) or (Harvard in 1930s - “We prepare students for
Presidency and political careers, and no Jews go into those types of jobs.”).
Answer: In the 1950s and 1930s it was about exclusion, and today it is about
inclusion. The earlier policies had an element of malice or judgment built into them
about blacks and Jews. So, as long as an institution uses people as valuable to its
social purpose, and so long as it doesn’t judge them maliciously as intrinsically less
worthy .
But, doesn’t that concede that all of us, when we compete for positions, are we not
being used (not judged) in a way that has nothing to do with moral desert?
Question: Who wants to detach justice from moral desert that goes well beyond
equality? Kant and Rawls
Question: What is their reason? Tying justice to moral virtue is going to lead
away from freedom (from respect of people as free beings).
To assess their shared assumption we turn to a political philosopher who disagrees
with them - (who explicitly ties justice to virtue and merit and moral desert) -
Aristotle.
Aristotle’s Questions: What is justice? It is giving people their just deserts, proper
due or fit. It’s a matter of figuring out a person’s virtues and their appropriate social
roles.
Aristotle’s Questions: What is a person’s due? What are the relative grounds of merit
or desert?
Aristotle: That depends on the sort of things being distributed.
“Justice involves two factors: things and the people to whom the things are assigned.
In general, we say that persons who are equal should have equal things assigned to
them”.
But equals in what respect?
Aristotle: That depends on the sort of thing we’re distributing.
Question to Aristotle: To whom should the best flutes go? The best flute
players, the richest man, the music lover, etc. ?
Answer from Aristotle: The best Flute Player
Question 1 to Aristotle: Why?
Answer 1 from Aristotle: Because they are the best in the relevant sense
- he/she can make the best use of the flute’s purpose.
Question to Aristotle: Is it just to discriminate in allocating flutes?
Answer from Aristotle: Yes, all justice involves discrimination. What

matters is that the discrimination be according to the relevant excellence-
according to the virtue relevant to having flutes. It would be unjust to
discriminate on some other basis.
Question 1 again to Aristotle: Why should the best flutes go to the best
flute players?
Answer 1 again from Aristotle: The best flutes should go to the best
flute players because that’s what flutes are for - to be played well. The
purpose of flute playing is to produce the best music, and those who can
produce the best music should have the best flutes.
Looking to the goal or end - in Greek goal or end = telos of the “thing”.
TELEOLOGICAL REASONING: Reasoning from the telos, goal or end
All of nature was understood to be a meaningful order, and what it meant

to understand nature, to grasp nature , to find our place in nature was to
inquire into and read out the purpose or telos of nature.
Affirmative Action disagreement from the telos: What the proper,

appropriate end of a university education consists in.
SELF-TEST
QUESTION 1
Which of the following philosophers hold that justice is a matter of rewarding or honoring virtue or moral
desert?
a) Rawls.b) Nozick.c) Aristotle. d) All of the above.e) None of the above.
EXPLANATION
a) Incorrect. Rawls distinguishes between moral desert and legitimate expectations (what one has a right
to expect once the rules of society are in place) and argues that justice should not be based on virtue or
moral desert.
b) Incorrect. Nozick argues that justice is a matter of respecting rights, not rewarding or honoring virtue
or moral desert. For example, if you become rich because your wealthy uncle decided to leave his fortune
to you, Nozick would say that you are entitled to that money, even if there is no sense in which you
deserve it.
c) Correct. For Aristotle, justice is a matter of giving people what they deserve, a matter of figuring out
the proper fit between persons with their virtues and their appropriate social roles.
d) Incorrect. Answers (a) and (b) are incorrect. Neither Rawls nor Nozick believes that justice should be
based on virtue or moral desert.
e) Incorrect. Answer (c) is correct.
QUESTION 2
Imagine that you are a parent trying to determine to which of your three children you should give a flute:
Child A says that the flute should be given to her because she is the best flute player. Child B says the
flute should be given to him because he will get the most enjoyment from it. Child C says that the flute
should be handed to him because he has no other toys to play with. According to Aristotle’s account of
distributive justice, who should have the flute?
a) Child A. b) Child B.c) Child C.d) Child A or B.e) The answer is indeterminate.
QUESTION 3
What does it mean to engage in teleological reasoning?
a) You reason from behind the veil of ignorance to determine the just allocation of that good.b)You
reason about justice by working back and forth between your considered convictions about particular
cases and moral principles that seem reasonable.c) You reason from the purpose or telos or goal of a
thing to define a just allocation of that good. d) All of the above answers are correct.e) None of the
above answers are correct.
LECTURE 19 - Aristotle - The Good Citizen
After studying modern theories of justice that tried to detach considerations of justice
and rights from questions of moral desert and virtue. Aristotle disagrees with Kant and
Rawls, and he argues that justice is a matter of giving people what they deserve.
Aristotle’s central Idea of Justice: In reasoning about justice and rights, we have
unavoidably to reason about the purpose or end or telos of social practices and
institutions. Yes, justice requires giving equal things to equal persons, but equal in
what respect? Aristotle says to answer this we must look to the end or telos or essential
purpose of the thing we are distributing.
But it’s not so easy to dispense with teleological reasoning when we think of political
practices and social institutions. It’s hard to do without teleology when we think of
Ethics, Justice, and Moral argument.
Examples to bring out the force of Aristotle’s claim:
1. Politics - How should offices, how should political rule be distributed?

2. PGA case as to whether a disabled golf player should be allowed to use a golf cart
during a tournament.
Both case bring out another feature of Aristotle’s Teleological way
of thinking about justice. When we use teleology, we sometimes
argue about the end purpose of a social situations, and when we have
those disagreements, we are not just disagreeing about who gets
what (distributive questions), but also an honorific question. What
excellences of persons will be honored. Debates about teleologic
ideas are also debates about honor.
Politics
○ When we discuss distributive justice these days, we’re mainly concerned with
the distribution of income, and wealth and opportunity. Aristotle took distributive
justice to mean the distribution of honors and offices. These are Aristotle’s
questions.
● Who should be a citizen?
● Who should rule?
● How should political authority be distributed?
○ How did he answer these questions? In line with his teleological reasoning,
Aristotle says we first have to look into the purpose or telos of politics.
■ Politics, for Aristotle, is about forming good character.
■ It’s about cultivating the virtue of good citizens.
■ It’s about the good life.
The end (telos) of the state, the end of the political community is not mere life,
it’s not economic exchange ONLY, or security ONLY. It’s realizing the good life.
If this is the end (telos) of the polis, then we can derive from that distributive
justice, and who should have the greatest measure of authority.
Those who contribute the most to an association of this character,
namely an association that aims at the good, should have a greater
share in the rule and the honors of the polis because they are in a
position to contribute most to what a polis is all about.
But why does he say that participation in politics is somehow essential to
living a good life? Why isn’t it possible for people to live perfectly normal lives,
moral lives without participating in politics?
Aristotle’s Answers:
1. It’s by living in a polis, and participating in politics do we fully realize our
nature.
a. It’s only in a polis that we can exercise our distinctly human capacity of
language (to deliberate about right and wrong, the just and the unjust).
b. The political community exists by nature, and is prior to the individual - not
prior in time, but in purpose. Human beings are not self-sufficient living by
themselves, outside a political community.
But why can we only exercise our faculty of language in political

community?
2. Political deliberation, being a citizen, ruling and being ruled, all of this is
necessary to virtue.
a. For Aristotle happiness is an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue.
b. Every student of politics must study the soul, because shaping the soul is
one of the objects of legislation in a good city.
c. Why is it necessary to live in a good city to live the virtuous life? Aristotle
says, virtue can only be learned by practicing (by exercising) the virtues.
You can’t learn virtue by reading a book, as you can’t learn cooking by
reading a recipe book. By doing, one gets in the habit of discerning
the particular features of a situation.
i. Aristotle says: The only way we can acquire the virtues that
constitute the good life, is to exercise the virtues, to have certain
habits inculcated in us. And then, to engage in deliberations with
other citizens about the nature of the good. That’s what politics is
ultimately about. Thus, Pericles, earns the honorific of having the
dominant say because he has this virtue well-established as does the
finest flute player have his necessary virtues.
d. The link between:
i. Right and justice on the one hand, and figuring out the telos or the
purpose of a social practice on the other.
ii. The purpose of a social practice or a game is, and the question of
what qualities should be honored.
iii. The link between teleology and honor-based principles of distributive
justice.
SELF-TEST
QUESTION 1
According to Aristotle, distributive justice is mainly about the distribution
of ...
a) ... income.b) ... wealth.c) ... offices and honors. d) ... opportunities.e)
None of the above.
QUESTION 2
According to Aristotle, what is politics about (what is the purpose or telos of
politics)?
a) According to Aristotle, politics is about forming good character/
cultivating the virtue of citizens/realizing the good life. b) According to
Aristotle, politics is only about accumulating wealth.c) According to
Aristotle, politics is only about ensuring security.d) According to Aristotle,
politics is only about protecting individual natural rights.e) All of the above
are correct.
QUESTION 3
Aristotle's argument about the distribution of offices/political authority ...
a) ... has a teleological character.b) ... has an honorific dimension.c) ...
makes use of the idea of the veil of ignorance.d) a) and b). e) b) and c).
LECTURE 20: Aristotle: Freedom vs. fit
Aristotle: Debates about teleologic ideas are also debates about

honor.
Part of the purpose of golf is not just to amuse spectators. It’s recognizing and
rewarding a certain kind of athletic excellence.
Whereas, Justice Scolia says,
There is a difference between a sport and a mere spectacle. A sport, a real

athletic sport, is about appreciation and not just amusement. The difference is
that a sport is a practice that calls forth, and prizes, and honors certain
virtues, certain excellences. The people who appreciate those virtues are the
true fans, and for them it is not a mere amusement, and that means it is always
possible to make sense of a debate about what feature of a sport is essential to it.
If justice is about fit, fitting persons to roles, matching virtues to the

appropriate honors and roles, does it leave room for freedom?
Main Objection to Aristotle’s Teleological Argument for Justice

If certain social roles are fitting or appropriate to me, where does that leave my
right to choose my roles, my life purposes for myself?
Rawls rejects teleological reasons for social justice because they threaten the
equal basic rights of citizens.
Aristotle’s defense of slavery - for slavery to be just two conditions have to be

met.
1. It has to be necessary for the community as a whole to function.
i. In his society, he said, it was necessary, because if some citizens
must go to the assembly and debate social issues and thus realize
their true natures, then there must be some who take care of their
menial tasks. Therefore, slavery is necessary for the life of the polis.
2. There also have to be some people who are fit and it is just that they be the
slaves.
i. Aristotle says that there are some people who are meant to be ruled.
They can recognize reason in others but they can’t partake of it.
ii. But some argue that some of the Athenian slaves were put into
slavery because they were captured in a war, and not because
that lack reasoning skills. Aristotle agrees that these slaves have
been coerced. Coercion is an indicator that it’s wrong because it’s
unnatural.
Arguments to Aristotle
1. What if we can’t agree on the fundamental purpose or telos of our shared
public life? Then how can we base social justice on the telos, or end that it
consists in?
i. So, modern political views and constitutions believe that justice and
rights should not be based on any conception of the good or the
purposes of the social life, but should create a framework of rights
that should leave people free to live by their conceptions of the good,
their conceptions of the purposes of life.
2. What if a person is well suited to a role, but wants to go in a different
direction? This goes back to the notion of freedom.
i. Kant and Rawls think that precisely because people disagree in
pluralist societies about the nature of the good life, we shouldn’t try to
base justice on any particular answer to that question.
ii. If you tie justice to a particular conception of the good, if you
see justice as a matter of fit between a person and her roles,
you don’t leave room for freedom.
iii. To be free is to be independent of any particular roles, or traditions,
or conventions that may be handed down by my parents or my
society.
To decide between Aristotle and Kant/Rawls (these two broad positions), we need
to determine:
1. Whether the right is prior to the good.
2. What it means to be a free person (a free moral agent). Does freedom
require that I stand toward my roles, my ends and my purposes, as an
agent of choice or as someone trying to discover what my nature really is?
SELF-TEST
QUESTION 1
According to Aristotle’s teleological way of thinking, which of the following considerations would be of
primary importance for determining whether Casey Martin should receive a golf cart?
a) Will giving Martin a golf cart be pleasing to spectators who can now watch him play?b) Will
giving Martin a golf cart encourage more handicapped people to play the sport?c) Is it just for the
state to dictate the rules of private institutions, such as the PGA?d) Does the majority of PGA officials
oppose granting Martin the cart?e) Is walking the golf course an essential feature of the sport?
QUESTION 2
How might Aristotle respond to the claim that people should be free to choose their own ends rather than
be guided to being virtuous by the political community?
a) Even though most people can learn virtue by themselves, certain people need guidance from
others.b) Even though good families can inculcate virtue, some families fail. For this reason, the state
should step in to guide citizens in good life choices.c) If people live together peacefully while following
their own desires, then the need never arises for the state to say what is virtuous and what is not.d)
In order to exercise meaningful choice, citizens must acquire virtues made possible only by
participation in politics. e) The regime in which one lives has the final say about the true nature of the
good life. Therefore, people should not be free to decide for themselves what counts as virtuous.
QUESTION 3
According to Aristotle, under which condition(s) is slavery just?

a) The slaves were aggressors in an unjust war.b) Slavery is necessary for the community as a
whole to function and there are some people for whom being a slave is the just or the fitting or the
appropriate condition. c) The slaves do not rebel or manifest dissatisfaction with their condition.d)
The slaves are non-Greeks, treated decently, and treated according to law.e) All of the above.
QUIZ 5
QUESTION 1
According to Aristotle, the cultivation of moral virtue arises through ...
a) ... nature.b) ... practice. c) ... luck.d) ... prayer.e) All of the above are correct.
QUESTION 2
Which of the following best represents Aristotle’s view about the role of morality in politics?
a) “Morality has no place in politics. Not only is it immoral to try to legislate morality, but it is impossible
to do so. Morality is about intention or motive, and the state cannot affect the motives of its citizens. Only
the individuals themselves can determine their motives.”b) “Morality will always play some role in politics,
but only regarding questions about basic rights.”c) “Encouraging and fostering a virtuous citizenry is
the primary purpose of the state.” d) “While it is always best to have virtuous citizens, the state itself
should remain non-judgmental and take no position on which ways of living are best.”e) All of the above
are correct.
QUESTION 3
Sometimes we disagree and argue about what the telos or the purpose of a social practice really consists
in. According to Aristotle, when we have those disagreements what's at stake is ...
a) ... only who will get what.b) ... whether the social practice helps maximize pleasure overall.c) ... only
what excellences of persons will be honored.d) ... not just who will get what but also what qualities,
what excellences of persons will be honored. e) None of the above.
QUESTION 4
According to Aristotle, ...
a) … the individual is prior to the polis (the political community).b) … morality is about the maximized
aggregate of pleasure minus pain.c) … the polis (the political community) exists by nature
and is prior to the individual. d) … distributive justice is a matter of what would be chosen behind a veil
of ignorance.e) All of the above.
QUESTION 5
Casey Martin was a golfer on the PGA Tour who, due to an illness, needed a golf cart to move around the
course. After being denied permission to use a cart, Martin sued the PGA. Many of the players on the tour
objected to the suggestion that Martin should be allowed to use a cart. Which of the following objections
to Martin’s being allowed to use the cart is an expression of teleological reasoning?
a) “Walking the course is part of the game. If you allow Martin to ride a cart, he really isn’t
playing the game anymore.” b) “If Martin does not have to walk the course, he will have an unfair
advantage.”c) “The PGA is a private organization. The courts should not tell a private organization what to
do.”d) (a) and (b).e) (a), (b), and (c).

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QUIZZES – (1) 80% (5% of grade), (2) 60% (5% of grade), (3) 100% (5% of grade), (4) 80%

How to Navigate the Course

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Reading 2: Justice: What's the Right Thing to Do?

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Lecture 3 - Utilitarianism: Jeremy Bentham

Video and Poll

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Self-Test 3 of 3 possible points(3/3) 100%

Discussion Prompt: Ethics of Putting a Price Tag on Life

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Reading 1: Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation (1780)

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Reading 2: Justice: What's the Right Thing to Do?

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Lecture 4 - Utilitarianism: J.S. Mill

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Self-Test 2 of 3 possible points(2/3) 67%

Discussion Prompt: Throwing Christians to Lions?

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Reading: J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism (1863)

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Reading 2: Justice: What's the Right Thing to Do?

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Questions 4 of 5 possible points(4/5) 80%

Lecture 5 - Libertarianism: Free-market philosophy

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Discussion Prompt: Are Taxes a Form of Forced Labor?

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Reading: Justice: What's the Right Thing to Do?

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Lecture 6 - Libertarianism: Do we own ourselves?

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Discussion Prompt: Legislating Morality?

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Reading: Justice: What's the Right Thing to Do?

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Lecture 7 - John Locke: Property Rights

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Discussion Prompt: A Right to Kill Yourself?

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Reading: John Locke, Second Treatise of Government (1690)

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Lecture 8 - John Locke: Individual rights and majority rule

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Discussion Prompt: Majority Rule vs. Property Rights

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Lecture 9 - Markets and Morals: Military service

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