Filing # 155308254

155092101 E-Filed 08/15/2022

08/10/2022 11:51:20
06:28:53 AM
PM

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL,

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

STATE OF FLORIDA, ET AL.,

Defendants-Appellants,
RECEIVED, 08/10/2022 10:29:09 PM, Clerk, First District Court of Appeal

V.

PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF Case No. 1D22-2034

SOUTHWEST AND CENTRAL L.T. No.: 2022-CA-912
RECEIVED, 08/15/2022 11:53:23 AM, Clerk, Supreme Court

FLORIDA, ET AL.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees.

NOTICE TO INVOKE DISCRETIONARY JURISDICTION

NOTICE IS GIVEN that Plaintiffs-Petitioners PLANNED

PARENTHOOD OF SOUTHWEST AND CENTRAL FLORIDA, on behalf

of itself, its staff, and its patients; PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF

SOUTH, EAST AND NORTH FLORIDA, on behalf of itself, its staff,

and its patients; GAINESVILLE WOMAN CARE, LLC d/b/a BREAD

AND ROSES WOMEN’S HEALTH CENTER, on behalf of itself, its staff,

and its patients; A WOMAN’S CHOICE OF JACKSONVILLE, INC., on

behalf of itself, its staff, and its patients; INDIAN ROCKS WOMAN’S

CENTER, INC. d/b/a/ BREAD AND ROSES, on behalf of itself, its

staff, and its patients; ST. PETERSBURG WOMAN’S HEALTH

CENTER, INC., on behalf of itself, its staff, and its patients; TAMPA

WOMAN’S HEALTH CENTER, INC., on behalf of itself, its staff, and

its patients; and SHELLY HSIAO-YING TIEN, M.D., M.P.H, on behalf

of herself and her patients, invoke the discretionary jurisdiction of

the Florida Supreme Court to review the decision of this Court

rendered on July 21, 2022. The decision is within the Supreme

Court’s jurisdiction because it expressly and directly conflicts with a

decision of the Supreme Court on the same question of law. See Art.

V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.; Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(a)(2)(A)(iv).

Respectfully submitted this 10th day of August, 2022.

/s/ Daniel Tilley

Daniel Tilley (FL Bar #102882) Nicholas Warren (FL #1019018)
ACLU FOUNDATION OF FLORIDA ACLU FOUNDATION OF
4343 West Flagler St., Suite 400 FLORIDA
Miami, FL 33134 336 East College Ave., Ste. 203
(786) 363-2714 Tallahassee, FL 32301
[email protected] (786) 363-1769
[email protected]
Attorneys for Appellees
Attorneys for Appellees
Whitney Leigh White* (N.Y.
#5687264) Jennifer Sandman* (N.Y.
Jennifer Dalven* (N.Y. #2784452) #3996634)

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Johanna Zacarias* (N.Y. PLANNED PARENTHOOD
#5919618) FEDERATION OF AMERICA
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 123 William Street, 9th Floor
UNION FOUNDATION New York, NY 10038
125 Broad Street (212) 261-4584
New York, NY 10004 [email protected]
(212) 549-2690
[email protected] Attorneys for Appellees Planned
[email protected] Parenthood of Southwest and
[email protected] Central Florida; Planned
Parenthood of South, East and
Attorneys for Appellees Gainesville North Florida; and Shelly Hsiao-
Woman Care, LLC; Indian Rocks Ying Tien, M.D., M.P.H.
Woman’s Center, Inc.; St.
Petersburg Woman’s Health April A. Otterberg* (Ill. #6290396)
Center, Inc.; and Tampa Woman’s Shoba Pillay* (Ill. #6295353)
Health Center, Inc. JENNER & BLOCK LLP
353 N. Clark Street
Autumn Katz* (N.Y. #4394151) Chicago, IL 60654-3456
Caroline Sacerdote* (N.Y. (312) 222-9350
#5417415) [email protected]
CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE [email protected]
RIGHTS
199 Water St., 22nd Floor Attorneys for Appellees
New York, NY 10038
(917) 637-3600 Tassity S. Johnson* (D.C.
[email protected] #1049061)
[email protected] JENNER & BLOCK LLP
1099 New York Ave., NW, Ste 900
Attorneys for Appellee A Woman’s Washington, D.C. 20001
Choice of Jacksonville, Inc. (202) 639-6000
[email protected]

Attorneys for Appellees

* Admitted Pro Hac Vice

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 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a true and correct copy of this Notice to Invoke

Discretionary Jurisdiction has been furnished by electronic service
through the Florida Courts E-Filing Portal, or via email, this 10th day
of August, 2022, to all counsel of record, as well as counsel listed
below, appearing in relation to Defendants-Appellants’ Suggestion for
Certification:

Christopher E. Mills Chad Mizelle (FBN1013927)

Spero Law LLC 801 N. Florida Avenue
557 East Bay St. #22251 Tampa, FL 33602
Charleston, SC 29413 [email protected]
(843) 606-0640
[email protected]

Counsel for Amicus Curiae Florida Pregnancy Centers

Jordan E. Pratt (Florida Bar # 100958)

First Liberty Institute
227 Pennsylvania Ave. SE
Washington, DC 20003
(972) 941-4444
[email protected]

Counsel for Proposed Amicus Curiae First Liberty Institute

/s/ Daniel Tilley

Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellees

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I certify under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.045 that

this motion complies with the applicable font requirements.

/s/ Daniel Tilley

Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellees
 FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
_____________________________

No. 1D22-2034
_____________________________

STATE OF FLORIDA, et al.,

Appellants,

v.

PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF
SOUTHWEST AND CENTRAL
FLORIDA, et al.,

Appellees.
_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.

John C. Cooper, Judge.

July 21, 2022

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO VACATE AUTOMATIC STAY AND

REJECTING SUGGESTION FOR CERTIFICATION

B.L. THOMAS, J.

We review Appellees’ “Emergency Motion to Vacate

Automatic Stay of Temporary Injunction” to determine whether
the trial court abused its discretion in denying Appellees’ same
motion below. In so moving, Appellees carry a heavy burden of
persuasion:

Rule 9.310(b)(2) provides for an automatic stay when

the state or a public officer seeks review of a trial court’s
order. The automatic nature of the stay is grounded in
 judicial deference to governmental decisions. See St.
Lucie [Cnty.] v. N. Palm Dev. Corp., 444 So. 2d 1133, 1135
(Fla. 4th DCA 1984). The rationale for automatically
staying such orders when a public official seeks appellate
review is that “planning-level decisions are made in the
public interest and should be accorded a commensurate
degree of deference.” Id. An automatic stay also seeks to
protect the public against “any adverse consequences
realized from proceeding under an erroneous judgment.”
Id. And so, a trial court may vacate an automatic stay
only “under the most compelling circumstances.” Fla.
Dep’t of Health v. People United for Med. Marijuana, 250
So. 3d 825, 828 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (quoting State, Dep’t
of Env’t Prot. v. Pringle, 707 So. 2d 387, 390 (Fla. 1st DCA
1998)). The party seeking to vacate an automatic stay has
the burden of producing evidence showing “the most
compelling circumstances.” See Pringle, 707 So. 2d at 390.
In deciding whether to vacate the automatic stay, the
court must consider “(1) the government’s likelihood of
success on appeal, and (2) the likelihood of irreparable
harm if the automatic stay is reinstated.” People United,
250 So. 3d at 828. A trial court abuses its discretion by
vacating an automatic stay when the party seeking to
vacate the stay does not make the necessary showing of
compelling circumstances, when the government is likely
to succeed on appeal, or when reinstatement of the stay
is unlikely to cause irreparable harm. See id. at 828–29.

DeSantis v. Fla. Educ. Ass’n, 325 So. 3d 145, 150–51 (Fla. 1st DCA
2020).

In this case, the trial court granted a temporary injunction

enjoining chapter 2022-69, Laws of Florida (2022) (“HB 5”),
entitled an “act relating to reducing fetal and infant mortality.”
The law became effective on July 1, 2022, and was codified in part
as sections 390.011 and 390.0111, Florida Statutes. Absent certain
exceptions for the mother’s health and fatal fetal conditions, the
law prohibits abortions if “the gestational age of the fetus is more
than 15 weeks.” § 390.0111(1)(a)–(c), Fla. Stat. (2022). Under
Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.310(b)(2), as noted above,

2
the order granting the injunction was automatically stayed when
the State of Florida filed its notice of appeal.

After the bill was enacted, Appellees, several abortion clinics

and a single abortion medical doctor, challenged the law as a
violation of article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution, seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief. Art. I, § 23, Fla. Const. (“Every
natural person has the right to be let alone and free from
governmental intrusion into the person’s private life except as
otherwise provided herein.”). No pregnant woman asserted any
claim under the suit. Appellees stated that they recognized “people
of all gender identities, including transgender men and gender-
diverse individuals, may also become pregnant and seek abortion
services, and would thus also suffer irreparable harm under HB
5.” But no such person asserted any claim in the suit either.

In the complaint, the abortion clinics asserted that they sued

on behalf of their staff, including physicians “and patients.” Dr.
Shelly Hsiao-Ying Tien, M.D., M.P.H, sued on behalf of herself and
her patients. The complaint states:

[A]bsent an injunction, Plaintiffs and their staff will be

forced to stop providing care to patients seeking abortions
after 15 weeks . . . contrary to their good-faith medical
judgment and their patients’ needs and wishes. With no
one available to provide such care in Florida, Florida
women will suffer irreparable harm . . . [and thus] [t]he
Act irreparably harms Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs’ staff, and
their patients, and there is no adequate remedy at law for
the Act’s violation of the Florida Constitution.

(emphasis added). The complaint requested as a remedy that the

circuit court issue a “declaratory judgment that Section 4 of HB 5
and the related definitions in Section 3(6) and 3(7) of HB 5 violate
the rights of Plaintiffs, their patients, and Floridians, as protected
by the Florida Constitution, and are therefore void and of no
effect.” The complaint further requested that the circuit court issue
“temporary and final injunctive relief . . . enjoining Defendants . . .
from enforcing, threatening to enforce, or otherwise applying the
provisions of that statute.”

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 To be clear then, Appellees have not asserted a violation of
their own constitutional rights. Instead, they seek to vindicate the
privacy rights of their patients. Yet contrary to the circuit court’s
order ruling that pregnant women cannot adequately challenge
abortion-related legislation, history provides numerous examples
of such legal actions. See, e.g., Renee B. v. Fla. Ag. for Health Care
Admin., 790 So. 2d 1036, 1037 (Fla. 2001); In re T. W., 551 So. 2d
1186, 1189 (Fla. 1989); Burton v. State, 49 So. 3d 263, 264 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2010); see generally, Alterra Health Care Corp. v. Est. of
Shelley, 827 So. 2d 936, 938 (Fla. 2002). Here, Appellees failed to
allege in their complaint that pregnant women cannot assert their
own rights in court. Conversely, the State here and below has
argued that Appellees cannot assert any purported irreparable
harm on behalf of pregnant women.

Furthermore, a temporary injunction cannot be issued absent

a showing of irreparable harm. Hernando Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Rhea,
213 So. 3d 1032, 1040 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (“To obtain an
injunction, the movant must establish four criteria,” including “the
likelihood of irreparable harm.”). As to Appellees themselves, any
loss of income from the operation of the law cannot provide a basis
for a finding of irreparable harm as a matter of law. And the
parties do not dispute that the operation of the law will not affect
the majority of provided abortions. We have unambiguously held
that “case law is clear that economic harm does not constitute
irreparable injury; that is, . . . money damages due to a decrease
in patient volume do not suffice to demonstrate irreparable injury.”
State, Dep’t of Health v. Bayfront HMA Med. Ctr., LLC, 236 So. 3d
466, 476 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (emphasis added).

And we very recently held that a circuit court may not grant
a preliminary remedy in a civil suit, but may only issue a
constitutional writ of injunction, known now as a “temporary
injunction,” which is procedural relief, under the authority of
article V, section 5(b) of the Florida Constitution. Sec’y of State
Cord Byrd v. Black Voters Matter Capacity Bldg. Inst., Inc., 47 Fla.
L. Weekly D1152, 2022 WL 1698353, at *1 (Fla. 1st DCA May 27,
2022) (“The function of the writ is solely preservative or
preventative—to preserve the subject matter in controversy until a
final disposition after a trial.” (emphasis added)).

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 While we do not and need not address Appellees’ standing to
obtain declaratory relief, we do hold that they cannot obtain
temporary injunctive relief as they cannot assert the privacy rights
of pregnant women necessary to substantiate a showing of
irreparable harm, an indispensable requirement of a temporary
injunction: “‘irreparable harm cannot be speculative, but must be
real and ascertainable.’” Mayport Hous. P’ship, Ltd. v. Albani, 244
So. 3d 1176, 1177 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (citation omitted).

As we held in Black Voters Matter:

A temporary injunction is not an adjudication; it does

not decide the merits. See City of Miami Beach v. State ex
rel. Taylor, 49 So. 2d 538, 538 (Fla. 1950) (approving
temporary restraining order because it did not purport to
“decide any material points in controversy, but only to
preserve the status quo pending the litigation”);
Lieberman v. Marshall, 236 So. 2d 120, 125 (Fla. 1970)
(noting that the “purpose of an injunction is not to take
sides”); Naegele Outdoor Advert. Co., 634 So. 2d at 754
(noting that a temporary injunction “does not decide the
merits of the case”); see also Michele Pommier Models,
Inc. v. Diel, 886 So. 2d 993, 995–96 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)
(“The purpose of a temporary or preliminary injunction is
not to resolve disputes, but rather to prevent irreparable
harm by maintaining status quo until a final hearing can
occur when full relief may be given.”); cf. Camenisch, 451
U.S. at 395, 101 S. Ct. 1830 (noting that the findings of
fact made by a court granting a preliminary injunction
are not binding at the trial on the merits, so “it is
generally inappropriate for a federal court at the
preliminary-injunction stage to give a final judgment on
the merits”), cited in Naegele Outdoor Advert. Co., 634 So.
2d at 754; cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(2) (permitting a trial
court to consolidate a hearing on a temporary injunction
with the trial on the merits).

Black Voters Matter, 2022 WL 1698353, at *6 (emphasis added).

Here, Appellees cannot lawfully obtain a temporary

injunction as they cannot assert that they will suffer irreparable
harm unless the trial court preserves the status quo ante. Green v.

5
Alachua Cnty., 323 So. 3d 246, 250 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) (“We read
the supreme court’s jurisprudence on the right to privacy to
require that we make a single, threshold, de novo inquiry when
considering a temporary injunction appeal—Does the challenged
law implicate an individual’s right of privacy?”); see generally,
Alterra Health Care Corp., 827 So. 2d at 941–42 (“[E]ven where a
constitutional right to privacy is implicated, that right is a
personal one, inuring solely to individuals.” (emphasis added)).

Appellees’ claims are based on the allegation that they are in

doubt regarding their ability to provide abortions, not that they
themselves may be prohibited from obtaining an abortion after a
certain time.

Thus, the trial court had no lawful authority to issue a

temporary injunction, because it was indisputably not necessary
to preserve its jurisdiction to address Appellees’ declaratory
claims.

Therefore, Appellees cannot meet the higher burden of

persuasion here to support their motion to vacate the automatic
stay because they cannot show: “(1) the equities are
overwhelmingly tilted against maintaining the automatic stay, (2)
[Appellees] will suffer irreparable harm if the automatic stay is
maintained, and (3) [Appellees are] likely to prevail on the merits
of the appeal.” Dep’t of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Henry & Rilla
White Found., Inc., 317 So. 3d 1168, 1170 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020)
(quotations omitted) (emphasis added). Appellees here cannot
show irreparable harm will occur should a temporary injunction
not issue, which is fatal to their Emergency Motion To Vacate
Automatic Stay. For this reason alone, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in correctly denying the motion to vacate the
automatic stay below. *

* The dissent relies on cases in which the issue we address

here was not raised and therefore could not be decided by the court,
or cases in which the issue itself was not addressed. See Anheuser-
Bush Companies Inc. v. Staples, 125 So. 3d 309, 312 (Fla. 1st DCA
2013) (stating “we are not at liberty to address issues that were

6
 Thus, this Court denies Appellees’ Emergency Motion to
Vacate the Automatic Stay, filed on July 13, 2022.

We also reject Appellants’ “Suggestion for Certification” that

this case requires immediate resolution by the Florida Supreme
Court, filed on July 5, 2022.

Finally, as we noted in Black Voters Matter: “In cases like this,

the stay and the temporary injunction on appeal go hand in hand,
so naturally we consider them together.” 2022 WL 1698353, at *10.
We therefore direct the parties within fifteen days to provide any
further briefing or arguments for our consideration, before the

not raised by the parties,” and issues not raised by parties on

appeal are waived or abandoned) (citations omitted); Bell v. State,
289 So. 2d 388, 391 (Fla. 1973) (“It is the long standing rule of this
Court that when assignments of error are not argued in the briefs
they will be deemed abandoned unless jurisdictional or
fundamental error appears in the record.”). The dissenting opinion
cites no case in which a court addressed a disputed issue of
whether a party could assert the alleged irreparable harm of a
person not present in the litigation and thereby obtain a lawful
temporary injunction. Therefore, the dissenting opinion’s reliance
on those cases is misplaced.

In addition, the dissenting opinion cites to cases decided

before the United States Supreme Court decided Dobbs. Dobbs v.
Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022). We note the
following statements from that opinion: “The Court’s abortion
cases have diluted the strict standard for facial constitutional
challenges. They have ignored the Court’s third-party standing
doctrine.” Id. at 2275. Thus, any former decision from the United
States Supreme Court acknowledging such “standing” of a party to
advocate on behalf of a person not appearing in the case, regarding
that person’s purported irreparable harm is now in question. Id.
And as we noted above, the majority has not “injected” this issue.
Quite the contrary, Appellants specifically presented this precise
argument in their Response to the Emergency Motion to Vacate
the Automatic Stay of the Temporary Injunction.

7
court disposes of the appeal of the non-final order granting the
temporary injunction.

RAY, J., concurs; KELSEY, J., dissents with opinion.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
_____________________________

KELSEY, J., dissenting.

I am constrained to dissent in light of what I can only conclude

is binding precedent from the Florida Supreme Court and this
Court.

In the specific context of abortion regulation, the Florida

Supreme Court has held that even “minimal” loss of the
constitutional right of privacy is per-se irreparable injury.
Gainesville Woman Care, LLC v. State, 210 So. 3d 1243, 1263 (Fla.
2017) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (“[L]oss of
First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time,
unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”)). We applied this
Florida Supreme Court holding in Green v. Alachua County, 323
So. 3d 246 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021), holding that the typical four-part
test for temporary injunctive relief “collapses” into the single
question of whether the challenged law implicates the right of
privacy. Id. at 250 (“We read the supreme court’s jurisprudence on
the right to privacy to require that we make a single, threshold, de
novo inquiry when considering a temporary injunction appeal—
Does the challenged law implicate an individual’s right of
privacy?”). We are therefore required to presume irreparable
harm, and because we held in Green that is the sole question for
injunctive relief in the right-to-privacy context, we must grant
Appellees’ motion to vacate.

Precedent also bars us from relying on Appellants’ supposed

lack of standing to assert the personal right of privacy that
individual patients could assert. Similar institutional parties have
successfully asserted exactly those rights in many earlier cases.

8
We expressly held in another abortion-regulation case that such
plaintiffs had standing to assert the privacy interests of their
patients. State v. N. Fla. Women’s Health & Counseling Servs., 852
So. 2d 254, 259–60 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001), quashed on other grounds,
866 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 2003). We analyzed fully the third-party
standing issue, concluding as follows: “We reject the state’s
contention that none of the plaintiffs has standing to raise the
rights of pregnant minors.” 852 So. 2d at 260. Although the Florida
Supreme Court quashed our decision on the merits, the successful
petitioners in that supreme court proceeding were the same
institutional plaintiffs whose standing we upheld. See N. Fla.
Women’s Health, 866 So. 2d at 615 (listing parties).

With respect to standing in the abortion-regulation context,

the North Florida Women’s decisions do not stand alone in Florida
jurisprudence. See also, e.g., State v. Presidential Women’s Ctr.,
937 So. 2d 114, 115 (Fla. 2006) (involving petitioners Presidential
Women’s Center and Center for Reproductive Rights); Gainesville
Woman Care, LLC, 210 So. 3d at 1244 (listing as petitioners
Gainesville Woman Care, LLC; Center for Reproductive Rights;
and Medical Students for Choice); State v. Presidential Women’s
Ctr., 707 So. 2d 1145, 1145 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (listing as
appellees the plaintiffs below, “Presidential Women’s Center,
Michael Benjamin, M.D., North Florida Women’s Health and
Counseling Services, Inc., The Birth Control Center of Tallahassee
and The Feminist Women’s Health Center on Behalf of themselves
and their patients, Jane Doe”).

The same is true for other jurisdictions’ treatment of the

standing issue in the abortion-regulation context, not least of all
the United States Supreme Court. See June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v.
Russo, 140 S.Ct. 2103, 2118 (2020) (“We have long permitted
abortion providers to invoke the rights of their actual or potential
patients in challenges to abortion-related regulations.”); see also
SisterSong Women of Color Reproductive Just. Collective v. Kemp,
472 F.Supp. 3d 1297, 1318–21 (N.D. Ga. 2020) (explaining
“decades of precedent recognize abortion providers’ ability to raise
claims to protect their patients’ fundamental right to access
abortion”); Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Brnovich, 172
F.Supp. 3d 1075 (D. Ariz. 2016) (analyzing standing of abortion
doctors and abortion providers and finding standing); Planned

9
Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Bentley, 951 F.Supp. 2d 1280, 1282–85
(M.D. Ala. 2013) (finding providers and physicians had standing
“on behalf of themselves, their staff, and their patients” because
“plaintiffs” faced felony charges for violating abortion statute and
“federal courts routinely recognize an abortion provider’s standing
to assert the claims of its patients”).

In short, the majority’s injection of the standing issue is both

wrong and irrelevant to the injunctive-relief analysis as we
ourselves stated it in no uncertain terms in Green. At this
procedural juncture, I believe precedent compels us to reverse the
trial court’s order refusing to vacate the automatic stay. I would
certify this order to the Florida Supreme Court for its immediate
resolution under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.125(a)
(encompassing “any order or judgment of a trial court that has
been certified by the district court of appeal to require immediate
resolution by the supreme court because the issues pending in the
district court of appeal are of great public importance or have a
great effect on the proper administration of justice throughout the
state”). See, e.g., Non-Parties v. League of Women Voters of Fla.,
150 So. 3d 221–22 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (certifying under Rule
9.125(a) “two orders requiring a nonparty to produce certain
documents for use in a lawsuit challenging the constitutional
validity of the 2012 legislative plan apportioning Florida’s
congressional districts”); Bainter v. League of Women Voters of
Fla., 150 So. 3d 1115 (Fla. 2014) (accepting jurisdiction of the order
we certified in Non-Parties under Rule 9.125(a), and resolving case
on its merits).

_____________________________

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Bilal Ahmed Faruqui, Assistant

Attorney General, John Guard, Chief Deputy Attorney General,
Natalie P. Christmas, Assistant Attorney General, James H.
Percival, Deputy Attorney General, Tallahassee; Henry Charles
Whitaker, Solicitor General, Daniel W. Bell, Chief Deputy
Solicitor, Tallahassee, for Appellants.

Jordan E. Pratt and Christine K. Pratt, First Liberty Institute,

Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae First Liberty Institute;

10
Christopher Mills, Spero Law, LLC, Charleston, South Carolina,
and Chad Mizelle, Tampa, for Amici Curiae Florida Pregnancy
Centers, in support of Appellants.

Benjamin James Stevenson, ACLU Foundation of Florida,

Pensacola; Daniel Boaz Tilley, ACLU Foundation of Florida,
Miami; Nicholas L. Warren, ACLU Foundation of Florida,
Tallahassee; Jennifer Dalven, Whitney White, and Johanna
Zacarias, ACLU Foundation of New York, New York, New York;
Autumn Katz and Caroline Sacerdote, Center for Reproductive
Rights, New York, New York; Tassity Johnson, Jenner & Block
LLP, Washington, D.C.; Shoba Pillay and April A. Otterberg,
Jenner & Block LLP, Chicago, Illinois; Jennifer Sandman, Planned
Parenthood Federation of America, New York, New York, for
Appellees.

11
 DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST DISTRICT
STATE OF FLORIDA
2000 DRAYTON DRIVE
TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-0950
(850) 488-6151
KRISTINA SAMUELS DANA SHARMAN
CLERK OF THE COURT CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
August 11, 2022
Re: State of Florida, et al. vs Planned Parenthood of Southwest and Central Florida, et
al.
Appeal No.: 1D22-2034
Trial Court No.: 2022-CA-912
Trial Court Judge: Hon. John C. Cooper
If Crim, LT NOA date: N/A

Dear Mr. Tomasino:

Attached is a certified copy of the Notice Invoking the Discretionary Jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, pursuant to Rule 9.120, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Attached also
is this Court’s opinion or decision relevant to this case.

___ The filing fee prescribed by Section 25.241(2), Florida Statutes, was received by
this court and is attached.

___ The filing fee prescribed by Section 25.241(2), Florida Statutes, was not received
by this court.

___ Petitioner/Appellant has previously been determined insolvent by the circuit court
or our court in the underlying case.

___ Petitioner/Appellant has already filed, and this court has granted,
petitioner/appellant’s motion to proceed without payment of costs in this case.

No filing fee was required in the underlying case in this court because it was:
___ A summary Appeal, pursuant to Rule 9.141
___ From the Unemployment Appeals Commission
___ A Habeas Corpus proceeding
___ A Juvenile case
___ Other ________________________________________________

If there are any questions regarding this matter, please do not hesitate to contact this
Office. A motion postponing rendition pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure
9.020(i) ____ is or ____ is NOT pending in the lower tribunal at the time of filing this
notice.
Sincerely yours,

Kristina Samuels
Clerk of the Court
By:___________________
Deputy Clerk