Columbia Accident Investigation Board Volume Five Book One

COLUMBIA
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD
Note: Volumes II VI contain a number of conclusions and recommendations, several of which were adopted by the Board in Volume I. The other conclusions and recommendations drawn in Volumes II VI do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Board, but are included for the record. When there is conflict, Volume I takes precedence.
Report Volume V Appendices G.1 G.9 October 2003
COLUMBIA
On the Front Cover

This was the crew patch for STS-107. The central element of the patch was the microgravity symbol, g, flowing into the rays of the Astronaut symbol. The orbital inclination was portrayed by the 39-degree angle of the Earths horizon to the Astronaut symbol. The sunrise was representative of the numerous science experiments that were the dawn of a new era for continued microgravity research on the International Space Station and beyond. The breadth of science conducted on this mission had widespread benefits to life on Earth and the continued exploration of space, illustrated by the Earth and stars. The constellation Columba (the dove) was chosen to symbolize peace on Earth and the Space Shuttle Columbia. In addition, the seven stars represent the STS-107 crew members, as well as honoring the original Mercury 7 astronauts who paved the way to make research in space possible. The Israeli flag represented the first person from that country to fly on the Space Shuttle.
On the Back Cover

This emblem memorializes the three U.S. human space flight accidents Apollo 1, Challenger, and Columbia. The words across the top translate to: To The Stars, Despite Adversity Always Explore
The Board would like to acknowledge the hard work and effort of the following individuals in the production of Volumes II VI.
Maj. Gen. John L. Barry Dennis R. Jenkins Lt. Col. Donald J. White Lt. Col. Patrick A. Goodman Joshua M. Limbaugh Joseph A. Reid Christine F. Cole Jana T. Schultz Lester A. Reingold Christopher M. Kirchhoff Ariel H. Simon Jennifer L. Bukvics Donna J. Fudge Susan M. Plott Ellen M. Tanner Matthew J. Martin Frances C. Fisher Executive Director to the Chairman Investigator and Liaison to the Board Technical Editor Technical Editor Layout Artist Graphic Designer Administrative Assistant Administrative Assistant Lead Editor Editor Assistant Editor Lead Project Manager Senior Paralegal, Group II Coordinator Project Supervisor, Group III Coordinator Project Supervisor Government Relations Consultant ANSER Liaison
Limited First Printing, October 2003, by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board Subsequent Printing and Distribution by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Government Printing Office Washington, D.C.
REPORT VOLUME V OCTOBER 2003
COLUMBIA
VOLUME I
PART ONE
Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter 1 2 3 4 The Evolution of the Space Shuttle Program Columbias Final Flight Accident Analysis Other Factors Considered
THE ACCIDENT
PART TWO
Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter 5 6 7 8
WHY THE ACCIDENT OCCURRED
From Challenger to Columbia Decision Making at NASA The Accidents Organizational Causes History as Cause: Columbia and Challenger
PART THREE
Chapter 9 Chapter 10 Chapter 11
A LOOK AHEAD
Implications for the Future of Human Space Flight Other Significant Observations Recommendations
Appendix A Appendix B Appendix C
PART FOUR
APPENDICES The Investigation Board Member Biographies Board Staff

CAIB TECHNICAL DOCUMENTS CITED IN THE REPORT
Readers Guide to Volume II Supplement to the Report Corrections to Volume I of the Report STS-107 Training Investigation Payload Operations Checklist 3 Fault Tree Closure Summary Fault Tree Elements Not Closed Space Weather Conditions Payload and Payload Integration Working Scenario Debris Transport Analysis Data Review and Timeline Reconstruction Report Debris Recovery STS-107 Columbia Reconstruction Report Impact Modeling STS-107 In-Flight Options Assessment Orbiter Major Modification (OMM) Review Maintenance, Material, and Management Inputs Public Safety Analysis MER Managers Tiger Team Checklist Past Reports Review Qualification and Interpretation of Sensor Data from STS-107 Bolt Catcher Debris Analysis
VOLUME II
Appendix Appendix Appendix Appendix Appendix Appendix Appendix Appendix Appendix Appendix Appendix Appendix Appendix Appendix Appendix Appendix Appendix Appendix Appendix Appendix Appendix Appendix D.a D.b D.1 D.2 D.3 D.4 D.5 D.6 D.7 D.8 D.9 D.10 D.11 D.12 D.13 D.14 D.15 D.16 D.17 D.18 D.19 D.20
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VOLUME III
Appendix E.1 Appendix E.2 Appendix E.3 Appendix E.4
OTHER TECHNICAL DOCUMENTS
Readers Guide to Volume III CoFR Endorsements STS-107 Image Analysis Team Final Report An Assessment of Potential Material Candidates for the Flight Day 2 Radar Object Observed during the NASA Mission STS-107 Columbia Early Sighting Assessment Team Final Report
VOLUME IV
Appendix Appendix Appendix Appendix Appendix F.1 F.2 F.3 F.4 F.5
OTHER TECHNICAL DOCUMENTS
Readers Guide to Volume IV Water Absorption by Foam Follow the TPS MADS Sensor Data ET Cryoinsulation Space Shuttle STS-107 Columbia Accident Investigation, External Tank Working Group Final Report Volume 1
VOLUME V
Appendix Appendix Appendix Appendix Appendix Appendix Appendix Appendix Appendix G.1 G.2 G.3 G.4 G.5 G.6 G.7 G.8 G.9
Readers Guide to Volume V ............................................................................ 5 Requirements and Procedures for Certification of Flight Readiness ...................... 7 Appendix R, Space Shuttle Program Contingency Action Plan .......................... 27 CAIB Charter, with Revisions .......................................................................... 55 Group 1 Matrix Brief on Maintenance, Material, and Management ................. 69 Vehicle Data Mapping (VDM) Team Final Report, Jun 13, 2003 .................... 281 SRB Working Group Presentation to CAIB .................................................... 319 Starfire Team Final Report, Jun 3, 2003 ....................................................... 351 Using the Data and Observations from Flight STS-107... Exec Summary .......... 389 Contracts, Incentives, and Safety/Technical Excellence .................................. 453 Detailed Summaries: Rogers Commission Report, ASAP Report, SIAT Report Foam Application and Production Chart Crew Survivability Report Aero/Aerothermal/Thermal/Structures Team Final Report, Aug 6, 2003
OTHER SIGNIFICANT DOCUMENTS
Appendix G.10 Appendix G.11 Appendix G.12 Appendix G.13
VOLUME VI
Appendix Appendix Appendix Appendix Appendix Appendix Appendix Appendix Appendix Appendix H.1 H.2 H.3 H.4 H.5 H.6 H.7 H.8 H.9 H.10
TRANSCRIPTS OF BOARD PUBLIC HEARINGS
Readers Guide to Volume VI March 6, 2003 Houston, Texas March 17, 2003 Houston, Texas March 18, 2003 Houston, Texas March 25, 2003 Cape Canaveral, Florida March 26, 2003 Cape Canaveral, Florida April 7, 2003 Houston, Texas April 8, 2003 Houston, Texas April 23, 2003 Houston, Texas May 6, 2003 Houston, Texas June 12, 2003 Washington, DC
GUIDE
Readers Guide to Volume V

Volume V of the Report contains appendices that were not cited in Volume I. These consist of documents produced by NASA and other organizations, which were provided to the Columbia Accident Investigation Board in support of its inquiry into the February 1, 2003 destruction of the Space Shuttle Columbia. The documents are compiled in this volume in the interest of establishing a complete record, but they do not necessarily represent the views of the Board. Volume I contains the Boards findings, analysis, and recommendations. The documents in Volume V are also contained in their original color format on the DVD disc in the back of Volume II.
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THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
Volume V Appendix G.1

Requirements and Procedures for Certification of Flight Readiness
This Appendix contains NASA NSTS 08117 Revision L, December 13, 1995 document Space Shuttle, Requirements and Procedures for Certification of Flight Readiness.
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I_I/LSA
National Aeronautics and Space Administration Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center Houston, Texas 77058
REVISION
Nsts 0_1,7
L
DECEMBER 13, 1995
SPACE SHUTTLE
REQUIREMENTS AND PROCEDURES FOR CERTIFICATION OF FLIGHT READINESS
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FOREWORD
Efficient management of the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) dictates that effective control of program activities be established. Requirements, directives, procedures, interface agreements, and system capabilities s-hall be documented, baselined, and subsequently controlled by SSP management. Program requirements controlled by the Manager, Space Shuttle Program, are documented in, attached to, or referenced from Volumes I through XVlII of NSTS 07700. NSTS 08117, Requirements and Procedures for Certification of Flight Readiness Requirements, establishes a standard approach to be used jointly by contractors and NASA to incrementally review flight preparation of the Space Shuttle Vehicle (SSV). The requirements and procedures herein provide a means for assuring a uniform flight readiness assessment of all SSV elements. All elements of the SSP must adhere to these baselined requirements. When it is considered by the Space Shuttle Program/Project Managers to be in the best interest of the SSP to change, waive, or deviate from these requirements, an SSP Change Request (CR) shall be submitted to the Program Requirements Control Board (PRCB) Secretary. The CR must include a complete description of the change, waiver, or deviation and the rationale to justify its consideration. All such requests will be processed in accordance with NSTS 07700, Volume IV, and dis positioned by the Manager, Space Shuttle Program, on a Space Shuttle PRCB Directive (PRCBD).
Loren d. Manager, Launch Integration,KSC
NSTS 08117 Revision L
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VOLUME V OCTOBER 2003
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CONTENTS
NETS 08117 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 2.0 3.0 4,0 4.1 5.0 6.0 6.1 INTRODUCTION PURPOSE .............................................. 1-1 1-1 1-1 1-1 1-2 2-1 3-1 4-1 4-1 5-1 6-1 6-1
....................................................
SCOPE ....................................................... PROCESS DESCRIPTION RESPONSIBILITIES APPLICABLE MILESTONE ......................................
........................................... .................................... .......................
DOCUMENTS
AND FRR REVIEW ACTIONS REQUIREMENTS
DOCUMENTATION DEPOSITORY PROCEDURES
............................
REQUIREMENTS
...............................
................................................ .............................. .................
PROJECT MILES:I'ONE REVIEWS ELEMENT ACCEPTANCE 6.1.1 6.1.2
REVIEW PROCESSES
Element Acceptance Reviews for Hardware Provided as Government Furnished Property .......................................... 6-1 Element Acceptance Reviews for Hardware Provided as Contractor Furnished Property .......................................... 6-2 REVIEW (PRR) .......................... 6-3 6-3 6-4 6-5 6-5 6-6 7-1 7-1 7-1 7-1 7-3 7-5 7-5 7-5
6.2
PAYLOAD READINESS 6.2.1 6.2.2
Responsibilities ............................................. Review Requirements ........................................ READINESS REVIEW (SRR) ........................
6,3
SOFTWARE 6.3.1 6.3.2
Responsibilities ............................................. Rev ew Requirements :.. ................................... MILESTONE REVIEWS REVIEWS ..............................
7.0 7.1
PROGRAM
PRE-MATE MILESTONE 7.1.1 7.1.2 7.1.3
Responsibilities ............................................. ET/SRB Mate Milestone Review ............................... Orbiter Rollout/ET Mate Milestone Review ...................... MILESTONE REVIEW ...............
7.2
FERRY FLIGHT READINESS 7.2.1 7.2.2
Responsibilities ............................................. Organization ................................................
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CONTENTS
NSTS 08117 7.2.3 8.0 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 Review Requirements ........................................ REVIEW (FRR),.,. .......................... "............................................ REQUIREMENTS .............................. ................... ................ 7-6 8-1 8-1 8-1 8-1 8-2 8-3 8-3 8-4 8-7 8-9 8-10 8-10 8-12 8-12B 8-13 8-14 8-14 8-16 8-16 8-17 8-19 8-20 8-21 8-22 8-22 8-28 8-28 8-29 9-1 I
FLIGHT READINESS POLICY ..........
CERTIFICATION 8.2.1
Flight Preparation Process Plans ............................. REVIEW PREPARATION
FLIGHT READINESS
FLIGHT PREPARATION RESPONSIBILITIES 8.5.1 8.5.2 8.5.3 8.5.4 8.5.5 8.5.6 8.5.7 8.5.8 8.5.9 8.5.10 8.5.11 8.5.12 8.5.13 8.5.14 8.5.15 8.5.16 8.5.17 8.5.18 8.5.19
PROCESS EXCEPTIONS
...........................................
Space Shuttle Vehicle Engineering ............................ EVA Project Office ........................................... SSME ...................................................... External Tank ............................................... Reusable Solid Rocket Motor ................................. Solid Rocket Booster ......................................... Mission Operations Directorate (MOD) ........................ Shuttle Processing ............................................ (Deleted) ................................................... ISS/Payloads Processing .................................... Flight Crew Operations ....................................... Space Shuttle KSC Integration ................................ Space Shuttle Systems Integration ............................ Space Shuttle Customer and Flight Integration ................. Space and Life Sciences ..................................... Ferry Operations ............................................ Space Shuttle SR&QA ....................................... Space Flight Operations Contractor (SFOC) .................... SSP Safety and Mission Assurance ........................... .............................................. ..................................... ............................
8.6 8.7 9.0
ORGANIZATION
REVIEW REQUIREMENTS ACRONYMS
AND ABBREVIATIONS
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APPENDICES
NSTS 08117 A B C D E F G H H ORBITER FLIGHT PREPARATION PROCESS ......................... EVA PROJECT FLIGHT PREPARATION PROCESS PLAN ............... SPACE SHUTTLE MAIN ENGINE (SSME) PROJECT FLIGHT PREPARATION PROCESS PLAN .................................. EXTERNAL TANK PROJECT FLIGHT PREPARATION PROCESS PLAN .. REUSABLE SOLID ROCKET MOTOR PROJECT FLIGHT PREPARATION PROCESS PLAN .................................. SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER FLIGHT PREPARATION PROCESS PLAN ... MISSION OPERATIONS FLIGHT PREPARATION PROCESS PLAN ...... SHUTTLE PROCESSING FLIGHT PREPARATION PROCESS PLAN ....... ATTACHMENT 1, SHUTTLE LOGISTICS FLIGHT PREPERATION PROCESS PLAN ................................................... (DELETED) ....................................................... A-i B-i C-i D-i E-i F-i G-i H-i H-11 I-i
I J J K L M N
ISS/PAYLOADS PROCESSING FLIGHT PREPARATION PROCESS PLAN .. J-i ATTACHMENT 1, ISS/PAYLOADS LOGISTICS FLIGHT PREPERATION PROCESS PLAN .................................. FLIGHT CREW OPERATIONS FLIGHT PREPARATION PROCESS PLAN . KSC INTEGRATION FLIGHT PREPARATION PROCESS PLAN .......... SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS INTEGRATION OFFICE FLIGHT PREPARATION PROCESS PLAN ................................... SPACE SHUTTLE CUSTOMER AND FLIGHT INTEGRATION AND THE PAYLOAD SAFETY REVIEW PANEL FLIGHT PREPARATION PROCESS ........................................ SPACE AND LIFE SCIENCES FLIGHT PREPARATION PROCESS PLAN FERRY OPERATIONS FLIGHT PREPARATION PROCESS PLAN ........ SPACE SHUTTLE SAFETY, RELIABILITY, AND QUALITY ASSURANCE FLIGHT PREPARATION PROCESS PLAN .............. ............. SPACE FLIGHT OPERATIONS CONTRACTOR FLIGHT PREPARATION PROCESS PLAN ................................................. J-7 K-i L-i M-i
N-i O-i P-i Q-i R-i
O P Q R
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1.0 1.1
INTRODUCTION PURPOSE
The purpose of this document is to define the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) Flight Preparation Process (FPP). It defines the procedures for the Project Milestone Reviews, the Program Milestone Reviews and the Flight Readiness Review (FRR). It also defines the endorsement documentation required at the completion of the FRR which provides the Certification 1.2 SCOPE of Flight Readiness (CoFR) for a specific flight.
This document is applicable to JSC, KSC, MSFC, Stennis Space Center (SSC), and SSP NASA and contractor organizations and personnel involved in the conduct of Space Shuttle operations. The FPP consists of the required preparations for a S pace Shuttle mission, from the baselining of the processing requirements to acceptance of the major hardware elements through processing, mating, launch, and ferry when required. The major elements of the FPP are the Project Milestone Reviews, three Program Milestone Reviews, and the FRR where the CoFR endorsement is signed. Reviews of the activities that support the FPP are considered part of the CoFR process. This Revision L identifies the processes and requirements for all milestone reviews and the FRR for STS-78 and subsequent flights. Revision K applies to prior flights. 1.3 PROCESS DESCRIPTION
The FPP is structured to baseline a set of ;)rocessing requirements through a series of requirements reviews and to incrementally review and status progress towards readiness for flight (reference Figure 1). It represents a commitment by each of the SSP element and project managers (NASA and contractor) certifying that their organizations have satisfactorily completed the requirements and their respective portions of the effort required to safely support each flight. The FPP is incrementally implemented through milestone reviews and an FRR which ensures the readiness of all organizations for the operational phase following each review. The FPP consists of Project Milestone Reviews, three Program Milestone Reviews and the FRR. The Project Milestone Reviews are the DD 250/1149-Element Acceptance Reviews, the Payload Readiness Review (PRR), the Software Readiness Review (SRR), and the organizational Pre--FRR Reviews. The three Program Milestone Reviews are the Pre-Mate Milestone Reviews, consisting of the External Tank (ET)/Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) Mate Milestone Review and the Orbiter RolloutJET Mate Milestone Review, and a Ferry Flight Readiness Milestone Review which is conducted when a ferry is required. The CoFR endorsement is signed at the FRR. A Prelaunch Mission Management Team (PMMT) Review will be conducted on the Launch Minus Two (L-2) Day or Launch
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Minus One (L-l) Day when the Mission Management Team (MMT) is activated to status the launch countdown and address any issues remaining from the FRR (reference Figure 2). (Reference NSTS 07700 Volume III, Flight Definition and Requirements Directive; NSTS 07700, Volume IV, Configuration Management Requirements; and NSTS 07700, Volume VIII, Operations, Appendix D.) 1.4 RESPONSIBILITIES The Manager, Launch Integration shall manage the FPP. SSP organizations and their respective contractors are responsible for implementing the FPPs as outlined in the appendices of this document. The implementation will be done by certifying that the required work under their purview, as defined in the Flight Preparation Process Plans (FPPPs) for each certifying organization, has been satisfactorily completed and will safely support the specified flight. The review secretariat function for Program Milestone Reviews and the FRR shall be the responsibility of the Space Flight Operations Contract (SFOC) Program Integration Office at KSC. The secretariat function for the Project Milestone Reviews, shall be the responsibility of the review Chair. |
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16
FIGURE 1 FLIGHT PREPARATION PROCESS
;0z
_<.-_
5" o
r'_
"M
FDRD
CARGO INTEGRATION REVIEW _
ASCENT FLIGHT DESIGN REVIEW
-_ I AND STOWAGE REVIEW INTEGRATED " =_ LAUNCH SITE REQUIREMENTS REVIEW _
FLIGHT PLAN
LAUNCH SITE FLOW REVIEW
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_l
_ _
DELTA LAUNCH SITE FLOW REVIEW
MILESTONE REVIEWS *
C) I
rn z
*NOTE: See Figure 2 for expansion.
C)
j_
NOTE: For specific timeline information, see JSC 25187, Flight Production Generic Template, Appendix A.
B2-000089 CTF017-0403
B2-89 FLT PRP PRESENTATION 3-12-03-1.pdf
FIGURE 2-. MILESTONE REVIEWS PROCESS

t ""
:_z ,_(/)
DD 250/1149 I DD2 011149 EAR I I READINESS I REVIEW SOFTWARE I
_<.--4 _. (./) o o
co
",4
SSME
I I EARl _ DD 250/1149
ORBITER [MATE REV EWJ t
oo250,1149 L,," ORB,TER

EAR ROLLOUT/ET I _' EAR _r MMTACTIVATED REVIEW FORPMMT , II EAR DD250/1149 t ET/SRB MATE REVIEW " ORBITER READINESS REVIEW PAYLOAD I VERTICAL PAYLOADS HORIZONTAL PAYLOADS i PROGRAM/PROJI PRE-FRR REVIEWS EAR FRR .... [_ = ELEMENT ACCEPTANCE REVIEW = FLIGHT READINESS REVIEW = AS REQUIRED = PROJECT MILESTONE REVIEWS = PROGRAM MILESTONE REVIEWS = FRR/CERTIFICATION of FLIGHT READINESS (CoFR) REVIEW FERRY
TANK
I REUSABLE SOLID ROCKET MOTOR
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ROCKET BOOSTER AND SOLID HARDWARE
PAYLOADS
I o > Z G) rn z O
LEGEND:
&
' co.c_
B2-000089 CTF017-0404
17
B2-89 FLT PRP PRESENTATION 3-12-03-1.pdf
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8.0 FLIGHT READINESSREVIEW(FRR) Approximately two weeks prior to launch, a FRR will be conducted that will determine the readiness of the SSV, flight crew, and payloads. At the review, organizations identified in Paragraph 8.7b will certify the completion of all tasks and planned work required to prepare the flight/ground hardware/software_support facilities, and operations personnel to safely support a specific mission. Readiness for flight shall be determined through the review of necessary data to ensure satisfactory closeout of all FRR certification requirements, exceptions, and launch constraints, and be in sufficient detail to provide the Associate Administrator (AA), Office of Space Flight with the information needed to make a decision as to flight readiness. 8.1 POLICY The FRR is an integrated senior management review chaired by the AA, Office of Space Flight who is supported by a review board. It is the policy of the AA, Office of Space Flight to make an assessm ant of mission readiness prior to each flight. This will be accomplished by a comprehensive review of all activities/elements necessary for the safe and successful conduct of all operations from prelaunch through post-landing and recovery operations. Government and contractor representatives will certify readiness in their areas of responsibility. 8.2 CERTIFICATIONREQUIREMENTS The CoFR endorsement certifies all organizations (NASA and contractor) have successfully completed their FPPs and products per their Flight Preparation Process Plans (FPPPs). During the transition period for the SFOC contract the transition plans and PDPs document the transfer of responsibilities from NASA to the contractor and should be referenced for complete CoFR accountability. 8.2.1 Flight Preparation Process Plans I I
Each organization's FPPP defines the Processesand products the organization will complete for a each mission. The FPPP ensures the successful assembly, launch and completion of the flight. As applicable for each organization, the process plans shall encompass all major and critical operations, design, certification, analyses, testing, documentation, and requirements definition required for the each mission. The major processes involved are as follows: a. Vehicle processing b. Payload processing c. Configuration management/requirements definition
NSTS08117 Revision L
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d.
Flight certification (including Launch Commit Criteria [LCC], flight rules, etc.)
e. Facility/equipment/GSE certification f. g. Personnel certification Special testing/analyses
h. Material review i. j. k. I. Hazard analyses Failure Modes and Effects Analysis/Critical Items List (FMEA/CIL) Crew training/medical certification Validation that external inputs are appropriate for this specific flight
In addition, the following products and processes which organizations participate in, but are not their unique responsibilities, shall be completed in support to external organizations: a. b. c. Develop/validate/deliver products requested by external organizations Delivery of hardware or software and support data Operations and Maintenance Requirements and Specifications Document (OMRSD)/LCC requirements definition
d. Configuration drawings e. Anomaly/discrepancy resolution f. Flight rules requirements
g. Crew procedures requirements h. i. j. k. I. Flight design definition Flight constraints definition Ferry requirements Time, cycle, age life, interval inspection, and maintenance requirements Flight Data File (FDF) requirements
8.3 FLIGHT READINESS REVIEW PREPARATION Each organization shall be responsible for conducting a Pre-FRR in preparation for the SSP FRR which ensures their project FPPPs are satisfied. The program/projects shall
NSTS08117 Revision L
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CTF017-0406 19
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FIGURE 3 CoFR ENDORSEMENT STS-ELEMENT

ORBITER
CoFR ENDORSEMENT
PAYLOAD
SERIAL NUMBER
ET
RSRM
SSME
SRB
Projects having exceptions to this CoFR document are as follows (see Exception Log for details):
SSPForm 4042 (RevSep02) NSTS 08117 Revision L
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FIGURE 3 CoFR ENDORSEMENT - Continued STSCoFR ENDORSEMENT
The Flight Preparation Process Plans documented in NSTS 08117, Requirements and Procedures for Certification of Flight Readiness, have been satisfied. Required products and other responsibilities for each project (NSTS 08117, Section 8) have been or will be produced or completed. a. b. c. d. Certified flight hardware elements have been delivered to the SFOC at the Kennedy Space Center. Required hardware element processing specifications and requirements have been delivered to the SFOC. All identified "out-of-family" events that occurred after delivery of hardware for launch processing/ assembly/testing have been resolved. For"out-of-family" conditions detected during manufacturing, testing, or post-mission tear down and analysis, notification to the Space Shuttle Program has been made, and corrective action, if any, identified. The as-built flight element configuration satisfies the released requirements and engineering, based on data compiled and reviewed by SFOC. For the Space Shuttle Main Engine Project: Certified main engine controller software has been delivered for this mission.
e. f.
CONTRACTOR
SSME
(8.5.3,1, 8.5.3.2, Apx. C) PROGRAM MANAGER, ROCKETDYNE DATE
NASA
MANAGER, SSME PROJECT, MSFC DATE
ET (8.5.4.1, 8.5.4.2,
PROGRAM MANAGER,_ LMMSS
DATE
MANAGER, ET PROJECT, MSFC
DATE
Apx.D) RSRM
(8.5.5.1,8.5.5.2, Apx, E) PROGRAM MANAGER. THIOKOL DATE MANAGER, RSRM PROJECT, MSFC DATE
CONCURRENCE
MSFC MANAGER, MSFC SHU3-rLE PROJECTS DATE
SHUTTLE PROJECTS
N/A
SSP Form 4042 (Rev Sep 02)
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The Flight Preparation Process Plans documented in _STS 08117, Requirements and Procedures for Certification of Flight Readiness, have been satisfied. Required products and other responsibilities for each organization (NSTS 08117, Section 8) have been or will be produced or completed. a. For Payload Processing: Flight and ground requirements, payload logistics, and configuration requirements provided by the flight projects, have been maintained, performed, or are planned to be performed per approved TOPs. For EVA project: Audit, insight, and surveillance of SFOC activities have been completed or are planned for completion, and all discrepancies have been resolved. Oversight functions have been conducted in conjunction with Hamilton Sundstrand.
b.
NASA
FLIGHT CREW OPERATIONS 8.5.11.1, 8.5.11.2, Apx. K) -'ERRY FERRY OPERATIONS MANAGER DATE DIRECTOR, FLIGHT CREW OPERATIONS DATE
OPERATIONS
(8.5.16.1, 8o5.16.2, Apx. P) SPACE AND LIFE SCIENCES (8.5.15.1, 8o5.15.2, Apx. O) SPACE SHUTTLE SR&QA (8.5.17.1.8.5.17.2, Apx. Q) MANAGER, SPACE SHUTTLE SR&Q A DATE DIRECTOR, SPACE AND LIFE SCIENCES DATE
CONTRACTOR
PAYLOAD PROCESSING (8.8,10.1, 8.5.10,2, Apx. J) EVA (8.5.2.1, 8.5.2.2, Apx. B) PROGRAM MANAGER, HAMILTON SUNDSTRAND DATE MANAGER, PROGRAM MANAGER, CAPPS BOEING, KSC DATE
NASA
DIRECTOR OF ISS/PAYLOAD PROCESSING DATE
DATE
EVA PROJECT OFFICE
SSP Form 4042 (Rev Oct 02)
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The Flight Preparation Process Plans documented in NSTS 08117, Requirements and Procedures for Certification of Flight Readiness, have been satisfied. Required products and other responsibilities (shared or independent) for each organization (NSTS 08117, Section 8) have been or will be produced or completed. a. The following NASA organizations have completed or plan to complete audit, insight, and surveillance of contractor activities, and have resolved all discrepancies.
NASA
CUSTOMER AND FLIGHT INTEGRATION (8.5.14.1, 8.5,14.2, Apx. N) MANAGER, SPACE SHU'I-I'LE CUSTOMER AND FLIGHT INTEGRATION DATE
KSC INTEGRATION (8.5.12.1, 8.5.12.2, Apx. L)
MANAGER, SPACE SHUTTLE KSC INTEGRATION
DATE
SHUTTLE PROCESSING (8,5.8,1, 8.5.8.2, Apx, H)
DIRECTOR OF SHUTTLE PROCESSING, KSC
DATE
MISSION OPERATIONS (8.5.7.1, 8.5.7.2, Apx. G)
DIRECTOR, MISSION OPERATIONS
DATE
SRB (8.5.6.1.8.5.6.2, Apx. F}
MANAGER, SRB PROJECT, MSFC
DATE
"
SSP S&MA
MANAGER, SSP S&MA
DATE
,4
SYSTEMS INTEGRATION (8,5.13.1, 8.5.13.2, Apx. M)
MANAGER, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS INTEGRATION
DATE
VEHICLE ENGINEERING (8.5,1.1, 8.5.1.2. Apx, A)
MANAGER, SPACE SHUTTLE VEHICLE ENGINEERING
I DATE
SSP Form 4042 (Rev Sep 02)
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The Space Shuttle Flight Preparation Process Plans (shared or independent) documented in NSTS 08117, Requirements and Procedures for Certification of Flight Readiness, have been satisfied. Required products and other responsibilities (shared or independent) for the SFOC (NSTS 08117, Section 8) have been or will be produced or completed. a. b. All out-of-family conditions have been identified and resolved with the NASA. The SSV has been processed in accordance with requirements and policies baselined by the SSP.
UNITED SPACE ALLIANCE

SFOC SQ&MA VICE PRESIDENT, SAFETY, QUALITY AND MISSION ASSURANCE, SFOC DATE I
CONCURRENCE SFOC SSP.PROGRAM MANAGER, SFOC (8.5.18.1, .5.18.2, 8 Apx.R)
DATE
Boeing endorses that the requirements for CoFR documented in SSP 50108 and the Boeing Flight CoFR Implementation Plan have been satisfied in accordance with the Boeing specific responsibilities for this flight, Any issues that have arisen since the Stage Operations Readiness Review (SORR) have been resolved or have been presented at the Flight Readiness Review. This certification is subject to clause H.43 of NAS 15-10000 (for ISS Missions).
BOEING
ISS PRIME I VICE PRESIDENT AND PROGRAM MANAGER, ISS, BOEING
, I CONCURRENCE SSP Form 4042 (Roy Oct 02)
DATE Page 5 of 7
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FIGURE 3 CoFR ENDORSEMENT - Continued STSNASA
CoFR ENDORSEMENT
SSP READINESS
The preparation of all Space Shuttle Program and Pr_ect organizations for this mission has been reviewed. All required processes, products, and responsibilities are complete or will be completed prior to launch. Deviations, exceptions or waivers have been reviewed and will be dispositioned by the Prelaunch MMT Review for this mission. The Space Shuttle Program is ready to proceed with the conduct of this mission.
MANAGER, SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM INTEGRATION
DATE
MANAGER, LAUNCH INTEGRATION
DATE
MANAGER, SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM
DATE
NASAISS PROGRAM READINESS

All necessary activities required to support the flight, stage and increment have been accomplished or are planned. All deviations, waivers, and exceptions have been reviewed and satisfactorily dispositioned. The International Space Station Program is ready to proceed with launch and on-orbit operations. Any issues that have arisen since the SORR have been resolved or have been presented at the Flight Readiness Review (for ISS Missions).
MANAGER. INTERNATIONAL STATION PROGRAM
SPACE
DATE
CONCURRENCE
I concur that the Space Shuttle Program and the International Space Station Program (for ISS Missions) are ready to proceed with this mission.
DEPUTY ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION AND SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAMS ssP Form4042(RevOct02) NSTS 08117 Revision L
DATE
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FIGURE 3 CoFR ENDORSEMENT - Concluded STSCoFR ENDORSEMENT CONCURRENCE

As a member of the FRR Board, I concur that, pendino completion of planned work, the Space Shuttle Program and International Space Station Program (for ISS Missions) are ready to execute this mission. I
DIRECTOR, JOHNSON SPACE CENTER
DATE
DIRECTOR, KENNEDY SPACE CENTER
DATE
DIRECTOR, MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER
DATE
DIRECTOR, STENNIS SPACE CENTER
DATE I
As a member of the FRR Board, I concur that, pending completion of planned work, the Prime Mission is ready to execute this mission (for non-ISS missions).
ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR PRIME MISSION
FOR
DATE
NASA S&MA has reviewed the status of preparations for this mission and has performed an independent assessment of the readiness of the Space Shuttle Program for the conduct of this mission, and the readiness of the International Space Station for launch and on-orbit operations (for ISS missions). We are in concurrence with proceeding with this mission.
ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR, SAFETY AND MISSION ASSURANCE
DATE
APPROVAL
The FRR Board has conducted a comprehensive assessment of the readiness of all flight and ground systems and supporting personnel. For ISS missions, the FRR Board has also conducted a hardware/software support facilities and personnel to support the flight, stage and increment including the comprehensive assessment of theaccept the LP/CE Launch Package/Cargo Certificate (LP/CE), ground readiness of the on-orbit stage to readiness of the and return items. The Element of Flight Readiness has been endorsed by each program element. I have concluded, with the concurrence of the FRR Board, that pending completion of planned work, the Space Shuttle Program is ready to execute this mission and the International Space Station Program is ready for launch and on-orbit operations (for ISS missions).
i '"
ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR, (CHAIR, FRR BOARD)

SSP Form 4042 (Rev Oct 02)
OFFICE OF SPACE FLIGHT
DATE
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Appendix R, Space Shuttle Program Contingency Action Plan
This Appendix contains NASA NSTS 07700, Volume VIII, Revision E, Appendix R; Space Shuttle Program Contingency Action Plan.
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APPENDIX R SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM CONTINGENCY ACTION PLAN
NSTS 07700, Volume VIII CA-000061 Revision E vol8.pdf
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APPENDIX R SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM CONTINGENCY ACTION PLAN
1.0 1.1
INTRODUCTION PURPOSE
The purpose of this document is to serve as an integrated plan to predetermine the program response in the event of a Space Shuttle contingency. This plan will be implemented in concert with the OSF SFO Contingency Action Plan, and field center contingency plans. It has been written to augment each of these by providing the anticipated, integrated timelines of the formalized program response.
1.2 SCOPE
The Manager, Launch Integration, KSC has overall responsibility for contingency planning during flight preparation, launch ascent, and post-landing operations. During ascent, this responsibility continues until the Shuttle is established in a stable orbit or until landing, should a stable orbit not be achieved. The Manager, Launch Integration will hold a Mishap Response Teleconference (MRT) approximately one hour and 30 minutes after the contingency where specific actions will be levied by the MMT. Normal program elements will execute those actions along with this plan. The Manager, Space Shuttle Program will determine when the MMT no longer has operational oversight for this plan. The Manager, Launch Integration, KSC will retain responsibility for contingency operations until a formal investigation board is established, and/or until the Orbiter is returned to KSC.
1.3 DEFINITION
For the purpose of this plan, a program contingency is defined as any SSP-related failure, accident, or incident (involving SSP-controlled flight or test hardware, support equipment, or facilities) that significantly delays or jeopardizes the SSP or a flight, prevents accomplishment of a major objective, or terminates a flight prematurely. NPD 8621.1G, NASA Policy Directive on NASA Mishap Reporting and Investigating Policy, defines six mishaps/contingencies in which the AA-OSF may become involved. They include Type A, B, and C Mishaps, mission failures, incidents, and close calls, all of which are defined in Table 1. The AA-OSF or delegated agent is the final authority in determining if an actual or suspected mission failure, accident, or incident constitutes a SSP contingency. All probable contingency situations will be reported to the AA-OSF or delegated agent for a final decision.
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1.4
APPLICABILITY
This plan applies to any contingency situation during Space Shuttle operations where a multi-center response may be required. It applies to all SSP organizations and those agencies that support the SSP during a contingency operation. Use of this plan assumes the AA-OSF has declared, or will declare, an SSP contingency.
1.5 REFERENCED DOCUMENTS
This plan is intended to be consistent with the documents listed in Attachment 10 of this appendix.
1.6 NOTIFICATION
Those witnessing a potentially significant Shuttle Program incident will notify the appropriate element/project manager who in turn will notify the Manager, Space Shuttle Program. The Manager, Space Shuttle Program will be responsible for notifying the Deputy AA for International Space Station and Space Shuttle.
1.7 CONTINGENCY READINESS
Space Shuttle Program and Project personnel will participate in contingency response exercises that demonstrate the programs effective response. These will consist of exercises prescribed by NASA Headquarters Office of Safety and Mission Assurance and as outlined in the OSF SFO Contingency Action Plan.
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TABLE R.1 CONTINGENCY CRITERIA SUMMARY

Classes of Unexpected Events
Type A Mishap
Damage to Property, Facilities, or Equipment and/or Personnel Injury/Death

Greater than $1M Death
Investigation/Analysis
AA-OSF appoints investigation board or Administrator chooses to appoint investigation board and board investigates mishap* AA-OSF or Deputy AA appoints investigation board and board investigates mishap* Deputy AA appoints investigator or investigation team depending on significance of mishap* Same as Type C mishap*
Type B Mishap
Equal to or greater than $250K but less than $1M Equal to or greater than $25K but less than $250K Equal to or greater than $1K but less than $25K
Permanent disability of 1 or more persons, or hospitalization of 3 or more persons. Occupational injury or illness that results in a lost workday case. Personal injury of less than Type C Mishap severity but more than first-aid severity.
Type C Mishap
Incident
Mission Failure
A mishap of such severity that it prevents the achievement of primary NASA mission objectives as described in the Mission Operations Report or equivalent document. No equipment/property damage equal to or greater than $1K No injury or significant interruption of productive work
An investigation board is required and Type A or B Mishap investigation procedures are followed* Investigated in accordance with its potential*
Close Call**
*If event involves more than one Center or has significant public interest, the AA-OSF, or delegated agent, may order an investigation board or recommend to the Administrator that the Space Shuttle Mishap Interagency Investigation Board be activated. **Event which possesses high severity potential for any of the previous types of mishaps.
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2.0 2.1
RESPONSIBILITIES MANAGER, SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM
In accordance with the OSF SFO Contingency Action Plan, the Manager, Space Shuttle Program is responsible for ensuring that: a. SSP contingency response actions are included in the OSF centers contingency plans. b. The program is ready to manage appropriate actions to minimize losses, and preserve evidence, should a contingency occur. c. The program is prepared to manage the contingency situation until a formal investigation board is established.
2.2
MANAGER, LAUNCH INTEGRATION, KSC
The Manager, Launch Integration, KSC is directly responsible for management of contingency activities after a suspected launch or EOM landing contingency has been reported. Immediately following a suspected contingency, the Manager, Launch Integration, KSC will implement this plan anticipating that the AA-OSF will declare the incident a program contingency. The Manager, Launch Integration, KSC, will chair the MRT within one hour and 30 minutes after a contingency has been reported. The MMT will provide direct support to the Manager, Launch Integration, KSC. The Manager, Launch Integration, KSC appoints the Chair of the Mishap Investigation Team (MIT), and activates the MIT, as necessary, with the approval of the AA-OSF.
2.3 MANAGER, SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM INTEGRATION
The Manager, Space Shuttle Program Integration is responsible for chairing the MMT during on-orbit activities. If a suspected mission contingency occurs, it is the responsibility of the Manager, Space Shuttle Program Integration, to coordinate and chair the MRT from JSC, and to inform the MMT. Immediately following a suspected mission contingency, the Manager, Space Shuttle Program Integration, JSC will implement this plan anticipating that the AA-OSF will declare the incident a program contingency. Responsibility for contingency operations will be transitioned back to the Manager, Launch Integration, KSC, after landing has occurred.
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2.4
SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM ELEMENTS (MSFC PROJECTS/EVA/FCOD/PAYLOADS PROCESSING/SHUTTLE PROCESSING/SYSTEMS INTEGRATION/VEHICLE ENGINEERING)
In the event a failure, accident, or incident occurs involving SSP hardware or facilities, it is the responsibility of the respective element manager to take the following actions: a. Assure that all possible action is taken to prevent injury to personnel, and damage or loss of equipment; b. Notify, by the most expeditious means, the Manager, Space Shuttle Program; the respective Center Director; AA-OSF; and the Deputy AA-OSF; c. Assure that the scene is secured against action that could impair investigation;
d. Protect records, logs, data books, film, etc. e. Initiate preliminary on-site assessment to determine scope of potential contingency; f. Initiate their respective center contingency action plans;
g. Support investigations of SSP contingencies under its own direction or under the direction of the lead center, a Headquarters Mishap Investigation Board (MIB), or any board established by the NASA Administrator or the President of the United States; and h. Prevent sabotage and provide security.
2.5 MISSION OPERATIONS
When a potential contingency situation arises during mission operations, the Flight Director, as specified in JSC 12805, Flight Control Operations Handbook, will put contingency procedures into effect. All flight control and support personnel will be required to complete these procedures. Logs of each individuals equipment status prior to and at the time of the potential contingency will be completed. JSC Form 1441, Flight Directors Mission Log, will be used and completed as soon as possible after a mission contingency and prior to the release of the individual from the MCC or his/her support area. These logs will be collected by each area/specialty supervisor or lead flight controller, and forwarded to the Flight Director, who will provide the data to the MIB. A roster of all mission personnel will be provided in addition to the logs. At the time a contingency is suspected or declared, all personnel will immediately verify that their logs are up-to-date and will institute a hands-off policy with regard to switches, push-button indicators, knobs, recorders, etc., as is appropriate to continued flight safety. The MCC will remain active in support of the potential contingency until released by the AA-OSF
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or the Manager, Space Shuttle Program. Upon release of the MCC, its functions in support of the contingency will be transferred to the Technical Action Center.
3.0 3.1 REQUIREMENTS PERSONNEL NOTIFICATION
All Space Shuttle program elements shall provide predefined notification lists within their respective center contingency action plans to address any failure, accident, or incident involving program resources. These predefined notification lists will be executed within 60 minutes of the suspected incident. The notification shall include a description of the potential contingency; its cause, if known; associated information leading up to the potential contingency; any actions that have been initiated or are planned; and recommendations for a course of action. The manning of action centers and communication networks also shall be predefined to ensure an organized and timely response. Attachment 2 describes the NASA Action Centers at NASA HQ, MSFC, KSC, JSC, and SSC. 3.1.1 Launch Notification Sequence
The Manager, Launch Integration, KSC will notify the members of the MMT who, in turn, will notify their respective organizations. The Flight Director shall notify the JSC MCC, and the LSO shall notify specific NASA and other government personnel. 3.1.2 Mission Notification Sequence
During SSP mission activities, officials will be notified through normal missionmonitoring activities. The SSP Manager will notify the Deputy AA for International Space Station and Space Shuttle or delegated agent of the potential contingency.
3.2 TEAM NOMINATIONS
The Manager, Launch Integration, KSC, or his designee shall be responsible for publishing a list of the qualified personnel two weeks prior to the FRR for each flight. This includes membership of the NASA MRT, MIT, RRT, and the Crew Recovery Team (CRT). MIT personnel will be on alert to depart for the contingency scene as soon as a contingency has been declared. A list of the positions to be filled for each team is included in Attachment 1. The travel of all NASA personnel to an overseas landing site shall be approved by the AA-OSF, with responsibility delegated to the Manager, Launch Integration, KSC. All personnel deployments and manifests will be provided to the Office of External Rela-
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tions at NASA HQs approximately two weeks prior to each mission to ensure timely visa requests. 3.2.1 Mishap Investigation Team
The MIT shall be responsible for immediately traveling to the contingency site to gather first-hand information, take witness statements, and preserve material, which could be valuable to the formal investigation board. The turnaround/ salvage teams shall not begin their operations until the Orbiter is released by the MIT. The MIT shall comply with NPD 8621.1G and the NASA Headquarters OSF SFO Contingency Action Plan. The MIT Chair is appointed by the Manager, Launch Integration, KSC and approved by the AA-OSF. Once deployed, all MIT members are considered on detail from their field centers and are responsible only to the Chair. If the Orbiter should land undamaged, a decision not to deploy the MIT may occur at the MRT. Reference Attachment 5 for the detailed MIT Operations Plan. 3.2.2 Rapid Response Team
KSC shall prepare a KSC Off-site Transportation Plan for TAL site deployment. The RRT will arrive at the contingency site within approximately 18 hours. These plans shall be modified realtime to reflect the actual condition of the Orbiter. The activation of the airlift shall begin when the LRD calls the DDMS Operations SOC to request airlift. The SOC shall then notify the Air Mobility Command (AMC) Tanker Airlift Control Center for actual aircraft deployment. KSC, in conjunction with the AMC Tanker Airlift Command Element (TALCE) (once in place), shall coordinate support for arriving aircraft at NASA and TAL facilities. The RRT shall consist of personnel under the direction of the KSC GOM who will evaluate the condition of the Orbiter and determine any additional requirements to prepare the Orbiter for ferry. The RRT will modify existing contingency planning to accommodate the realities of the Orbiter configuration and landing site facilities. If Orbiter towing equipment is not available at the landing site, the RRT will transport towing equipment to the site, if possible. Most of the RRT shall be deployed from KSC. For a TAL, the aircraft will pick up personnel and equipment at the KSC SLF approximately six hours after the TAL declaration. Estimated deployment timelines are in Attachment 6 of this appendix. a. Augmented Landing Site Rapid Response - Three landing sites in the European and African continents shall have personnel trained to participate in an Orbiter recovery. Personnel from the sites at which the Orbiter did not land will be utilized at the actual landing site. The aircraft used for transportation will be the SAR or MEDEVAC aircraft (C-130) stationed at the TAL sites. The KSC GOM shall identify the personnel, and the request for transportation will be coordinated with the DDMS and the DOD/SOC at PAFB.
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b. Non-augmented Landing Site Rapid Response - Unscheduled Orbiter landings will likely occur at ALS where NASA and DOD personnel will be trained and equipped to take care of an Orbiter that has landed. However, the possibility remains that the landing of an Orbiter may occur at an airfield other than an ALS. If such a landing should occur, the capability may exist for equipment and personnel at the ALS to reach the Orbiter before any response aircraft from CONUS. The aircraft used will be the SAR or MEDEVAC aircraft stationed at Zaragoza Air Base (AB), Banjul, and/or Ben Guerir. 3.2.3 Crew Recovery Team
In the event of a non-CONUS landing, the JSC FCOD will send the KC-135 aircraft containing the CRT from JSC EFD to the location of the flight crew. The purpose of this aircraft is to return the flight crew to the U.S. Transportation of other JSC personnel on the KSC RRT will be provided to the KSC SLF. A DDMS provided aircraft will be used as a backup aircraft in the event that the NASA KC-135 is unavailable. The DOD, using available SAR/MEDEVAC aircraft, will provide evacuation for uninjured flight crew members to the nearest U.S. military base, if necessary. The estimated typical TAL timeline for the KC-135 deployment is in Attachment 6 of this appendix.
3.3 MISHAP RESPONSE TELECONFERENCE
A MRT will be established within one hour and 30 minutes after a suspected launch, onorbit, or EOM landing contingency occurs. a. Launch MRT - The KSC Launch Integration Staff Office will be responsible for coordination and set-up of the teleconference in Room 1R29 of the Launch Control Center. The teleconference will be effected by MCI communications. The Chair shall be the Manager, Launch Integration, KSC. The teleconference shall cover a review of pertinent facts, statements of contingency actions, and a review of deployment schedules of response teams. Access to the MRT will be predefined, and approved by the Manager, Launch Integration, KSC prior to the prelaunch MMT review. b. Mission MRT - Upon notification of a suspected contingency, the Manager, Space Shuttle Program Integration will chair the MRT from JSC. The Space Shuttle Customer and Flight Integration Office, JSC will coordinate the teleconference. A complete description of the MRT is included in this appendix in Attachment 3.
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3.4
SEARCH AND RESCUE REQUIREMENTS
SAR capabilities will be provided through the DDMS on a per site basis. Given 24-hour advanced notice, Air MEDEVAC will be available at the primary CONUS EOM sites and the TAL sites. ELSs will have no prepositioned Shuttle support resources and the DOD SAR and MEDEVAC effort will be on a best effort basis. 3.4.1 Kennedy Space Center
KSC will have the following resources available for launch, RTLS, EOM, and near coastal bailout: Required: a. DOD HH-60 helicopters on standby at the SLF b. One UH-1 NASA helicopter c. One DOD HC-130 positioned 175 nm downrange (excluding EOM support)
d. One DOD HC-130 and KC-130 positioned at PAFB (excluding EOM support) If available: a. One E-2C positioned at PAFB (excluding EOM support) b. One U.S. Navy ship with helicopter (excluding EOM support) c. One Coast Guard cutter with helicopter
Each DOD helicopter will carry one medical doctor and two pararescuemen and have the capability to transport two astronauts in litters. Each HC-130 will have two 3-man pararescue teams with motorized inflatable rafts. 3.4.2 Edwards Air Force Base
When given 24-hour advanced notice, EAFB will have DOD UH-60 or UH-1 MEDEVAC helicopters available for EOM landings. Each UH-60 helicopter will carry one medical doctor, three Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs), and up to three flight crew members. Each UH-1 helicopter will carry one medical doctor, one EMT, and two flight crew members. 3.4.3 White Sands Space Harbor
WSSH will have UH-1 MEDEVAC helicopters available for EOM landings, given 24-hour notice. Each helicopter will carry one medical doctor, one EMT, and two flight crew members.
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3.4.4
TAL Sites
TAL sites will have available the following SAR/MEDEVAC resources to support a landing: a. One DOD fixed-wing aircraft (C-130) at Banjul, The Gambia, for low inclination launches b. One DOD fixed-wing aircraft (C-130) at Ben Guerir, Morocco c. One DOD fixed-wing aircraft (C-130) at Zaragoza AB, Spain, for high inclination launches
The C-130 aircraft at Ben Guerir, Banjul, and Zaragoza will have two flight surgeons and nine pararescue specialists onboard. Each aircraft will be capable of transporting the entire flight crew. Fixed-wing assets along with equipment to support landing activities will be transported to Moron, Spain as needed.
3.5 EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES
The Director, Space and Life Sciences Directorate, JSC has overall management responsibility for EMS operations. This will be implemented by the Medical Operations Branch through the FCR surgeon and through the respective site EMS coordinators. The on-scene physician is responsible for making realtime trauma treatment decisions until such times as the flight crew member is under the care of an Intermediate Medical Care Facility (IMCF) or Definitive Medical Care Facility (DMCF). Patient information will be relayed from the on-scene physician to the site EMS coordinator. EMSs are described more fully in Attachments 7 and 9 of this appendix.
3.6 COMMUNICATIONS
In the event of an unscheduled landing, all operational communications will remain in their landing support configuration until direction to do otherwise is obtained from the MMT or other appropriate site managers. Any other predefined communications in support of unscheduled landings will be activated after crew egress. It can be expected that the support role of some facilities will change to support this unscheduled event. For any unscheduled landings associated with the launch phase, the MMT will exercise its management role while still at the KSC LCC. Landings occurring after the MMT has arrived at JSC will be supported using the Action Center in the MCC. Landings at any non-CONUS bases with U.S. military presence will have telephone capability in place and active to either the tower or airport managers facility. This phone line capability is provided by the DOD SOC. For landings at non-CONUS sites without U.S. military presence, the LSO in the MCC will utilize a hotline to the State Department. The State Department will contact the embassy in the country where the landing occurred. The
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embassy will contact to the airport tower or airport managers office. Within three days of a landing at a TAL site or non-CONUS ELS, DDMS will provide a 24-channel voice communications capability to handle non-secure communications with the DOD SOC and KSC. 3.6.1 MCC Communications
Handover of the Orbiter from the JSC FCT to the KSC turnaround team occurs at flight crew egress. At this time, the FCT and communication lines are nominally released. If a contingency landing should occur, continuing communications between the flight crew and the MCC Capsule Communicator (CAPCOM) and Flight Director will be required. This may occur via telephone or by leaving the flight communication channels active. It is to be expected that all communication channels will remain active until the MMT convenes. For an unscheduled landing, the voice control element and the LSO would remain on console in the MCC to provide support to those elements, which are involved in evaluating the situation. 3.6.2 TAL Sites
The primary TAL sites will have three International Maritime Satellite (INMARSAT) terminals available for use prior to launch. These circuits will provide primary communications to the MCC and LCC. The channels are: a. Landing Field Prime 1 b. Weather Observer, which is time-shared between voice and data transmissions The following circuit reallocations will occur after the landing: c. The Landing Field Prime 1 circuit will be left to its normal functions and additional JSC/DDMS coordination, as necessary.
d. The Weather Observer circuit will be reconfigured to the Convoy Commander net, to be used for local UHF communications with units around the TAL site. e. The Weather Aircraft circuit will be used for initial MCC communications including medical status, flight crew debrief, flight crew family conversations, and recording the flight crews statement. Should a bailout occur, this circuit would be used by DDMS to communicate with the SAR aircraft. In addition, each flight crew member will have a PRC-112 UHF handheld radio in his flight suit, capable of transmitting and receiving on 282.8 MHz and 243.0 MHz. Attachment 8 describes the communications available at each TAL site. 3.6.3 Daily Status Teleconference
A daily status teleconference will be established from the landing site to KSC to report the progress of turnaround operations. The time will be established after the MRT.
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Participants will vary according to the condition of the Orbiter and the recovery and turnaround progress.
3.7 AVAILABLE LANDING SITES
There are a variety of landing sites loaded into the Orbiter software available for flight crew selection during flight by item execution on the horizontal situation display. High and low inclination launches have different sites defined in the software. In addition, landing sites are defined as either (1) augmented, with Shuttle-specific landing aids and NASA personnel available or, (2) emergency, with 8,500 feet of available runway and a TACAN. The sites available are listed in NSTS 07700, Volume X - Book 3. Personnel at DOD ALSs and overseas ELSs have received rescue training. Attachment 6 of this appendix lists the types of landings that could occur and a nominal contingency response timeline for each site. Annex 1 to Appendix R will be published as a separate document for each mission to specify the configuration and operations for each landing site. This document will assist KSC and DDMS in planning and staffing for required support. 3.7.1 Return to Launch Site
The RTLS scenario will return the Orbiter to the SLF within 25 minutes. The RTLS may be declared between approximately T+2:30 and T+4:05 minutes. A convoy will be located at the SLF with purge, towing, fire, and rescue capabilities. Attachment 6, Table R6.1, of this appendix details an estimated RTLS timeline. 3.7.2 Transoceanic Abort Landing
A TAL may result in the Orbiter landing at the prime TAL sites of Ben Guerir, Morocco; Moron AB, Spain; Zaragoza AB, Spain; or Banjul, The Gambia. The TAL may be declared between approximately T+2:30 minutes and MECO. The primary TAL site will be manned by approximately 40 predeployed people to provide landing aids and weather operations. Fire and rescue capabilities will be present. The DOD MEDEVAC aircraft will evacuate the flight crew to Naval Station Rota, Spain if uninjured, or to appropriate medical facilities if injured. The flight crew will remain together unless medical circumstances dictate otherwise. The USA Transportation Office has developed airlift schedules for RRT personnel and equipment. All TAL sites are downgraded after launch day, with most of the personnel support released. If a TAL occurs, the NASA GOM will have a prepared press statement for release to the local media thanking the local government and explaining the nature of the landing. Attachment 6, Table R6.3, of this appendix details a typical TAL timeline. 3.7.2.1 Support Requirements Available at Each TAL Site
Different TAL sites are governed by different international agreements and may have site-unique support personnel and facilities available. A synopsis of the support
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provided is included in Attachment 8 of this appendix on those sites that have a high probability of a TAL occurring. 3.7.3 Abort Once Around
The AOA will result in a landing at either EAFB, California; WSSH, New Mexico; or KSC, Florida. It may be declared from MECO to approximately T+30 minutes. There will be personnel at each location to support convoy operations. This convoy does not allow the vehicle to remain powered up, but has adequate equipment for purge (excluding WSSH) as well as fire and rescue operations if needed. KSC ground operations personnel will be immediately dispatched for ground turnaround activities. The vehicle will remain on the runway until KSC personnel arrive if it is damaged; otherwise, the Orbiter will be secured and towed to the deservice area. Warm air purge (excluding WSSH) and around the clock surveillance will be provided until the turnaround team arrives. Attachment 6, Table R6.4, of this appendix describes a typical AOA timeline. 3.7.4 3.7.4.1 Emergency Landing Sites Primary Landing Site (PLS)
Daily PLSs are identified for each mission. These are the sites that provide the best opportunity for an emergency deorbit to a NASA-supported facility (EAFB, WSSH, KSC). It is also possible to have a Rev 3 Deorbit if the Orbiter is not cleared to continue to orbit. These landings will have minimal convoy support including purge, (excluding WSSH), fire, and rescue. The Orbiter will not remain powered up. The flight crew will return to JSC on the STA as soon as possible. 3.7.4.2 Non-NASA Supported Facility
For an emergency landing at a CONUS site, KSC personnel will be airlifted and equipment will be loaded and shipped by rail or truck from EAFB and KSC. It is estimated to take at least 72 hours to begin equipment deployment. The flight crew will be picked up by the JSC STA, as soon as possible, and returned to JSC. The response timeline will be similar for the AOA up through the teleconference and press conference. 3.7.4.3 Emergency Landing at Non-CONUS Site
For an emergency landing situation where the Orbiter lacks sufficient time or energy to reach a PLS, the software loads onboard the Orbiter provide guidance to a variety of landing sites. These sites will not have personnel predeployed, and if they are nonDOD airfields, they may not have received any Shuttle-unique rescue training. Some non-U.S. sites may not have been notified by NASA that they are in the software loads.
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The profiles of the facilities available at each local U.S. Embassy are available through the U.S. State Department. The Embassies have been sent an Airgram giving pertinent details of an Orbiter landing, and actual notification of an impending Orbiter landing will be accomplished by the State Department via a flash message and telephone call. In these instances, the flight crew will retain responsibility for the Orbiter until either (1) they are evacuated out or, (2) a U.S. citizen with a secret clearance arrives at the landing site. The flight crew will carry onboard letters of explanation to the local officials giving simple precautionary instructions and telephone contacts. In the timeline, a C-130 is shown arriving at the site at L+5H. This assumes a landing has occurred at a site that could be reached by the SAR or MEDEVAC C-130 from an ALS within two hours. This time could vary significantly depending on how close to the ELS a U.S. presence is and on the suitability of the airfield. The RRT will arrive in a minimum of 25 hours, assuming the Landing Operation Team is already deployed to DFRF. Aircraft support from the AMC will be best effort. A typical timeline is described in Attachment 6, Table R6.5, of this appendix.
3.8 BAILOUT
Preparations for flight crew bailout will be initiated by starting cabin depressurization to equalize cabin pressure with the altitude. A nominal bailout will begin at 20,000 feet taking approximately two minutes to egress all flight crew members. A bailout may be declared at any time when it is known that there is insufficient energy to reach a runway. The Commander may declare a bailout without MCC knowledge if there is a loss of communications. DOD SAR forces are prepositioned at KSC and TAL sites to locate and/or retrieve the flight crew as soon as possible. Initial DOD SAR forces are under the control of the DOD SOC at PAFB, FL. The progress of the SAR effort shall be reported to the DOD LSO. The LSO will report efforts to the Flight Director and appropriate officials. A typical timeline is described in Attachment 6, Table R6.6, of this appendix.
3.9 CREW CHECKLISTS
The flight crew will carry onboard the Orbiter a series of checklists to aid in post-landing operations after a contingency landing at a non-EOM site. These will be located in the Flight Data File Maps and Charts book. The Initial Flight Crew Response is included in this appendix as Attachment 7.
3.10 ORBITER TURNAROUND
After the RRT begins initial safing and towing of the Orbiter, approximately 400 more personnel will be deployed for turnaround operations. These operations will be controlled by the TAL Orbiter Recovery Plan, which describes the responsibilities for the
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management and conduct of the preparation and return of an Orbiter from a TAL site. The detailed plan for TAL Orbiter Recovery is included in this document as Appendix S.
3.11 SALVAGE OPERATIONS
In the event that the Orbiter/payload cannot be returned to KSC via normal ground turnaround and ferry procedures, SFOC-GO-0014, KSC NSTS Salvage Plan, will be implemented. This plan establishes the structure of the Shuttle salvage organization, the assignment of responsibilities, and management procedures to be used in conducting Orbiter/payload salvage operations. Salvage operations requirements under the direction of KSC Shuttle Processing are as follows: a. Develop, prepare, and implement the Space Transportation System (STS) Transportation and Salvage Plans. b. Provide the organization and staffing of KSC/contractor personnel for recovery and salvage operations. c. Coordinate with applicable government and commercial agencies for services, equipment, and personnel required to effect recovery and salvage operations.
d. Identify support hardware and equipment required for recovery and salvage operations. e. Coordinate with and advise the Department of Defense (DOD) regarding the transportation of personnel and equipment and/or salvaged items of the Orbiter and its payload. Salvage Operations will be conducted in support of and under the direction of the designated mishap investigation team or accident investigation board until the scene/hardware has been released from further investigation.
3.12 ACTING WORKING GROUPS
Activation - The MIB Chair will activate working groups appropriate to the contingency situation. The Manager, Space Shuttle Program, may also activate the working groups either prior to the appointment of a MIB Chair, or at the request of the AA-OSF or delegated agent or at the request of another Center Director. The appropriate center will provide personnel to support any working group established to evaluate the contingency including those specified in this plan. As a basis for the selection of working groups for a specific contingency investigation, a description of various working groups is provided in the following paragraphs. Any or all
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of the working groups may be activated. There is no limit to the number of specialized working groups that may be appointed. The MIB Chair may rearrange the working group structures and define their roles as required. Maximum use should be made of government and contractor experts as consultants or advisors to the working groups and the MIB. Responsibilities - Each activated working group is responsible to the MIB for performing the following functions within the scope of the groups assigned investigation activities: a. Take all possible action to prevent injury to personnel and damage or loss of equipment, property or data. b. Obtain and review contractor and NASA records pertaining to receipt, inspection, configuration control, assembly, reliability, quality control and checkout, as well as any other records pertinent to the investigation. c. Obtain and review contractor and NASA procedures associated with the activity taking place at the time the contingency occurred.
d. Reconstruct the circumstances under which the contingency could have been initiated. e. Perform interviews and obtain witness statements as soon as practical after the occurrence of the contingency. f. Review all data, which may have a bearing on the contingency.
g. Report progress to the MIB on a periodic basis (daily, weekly, etc.) as required by the Board Chair. h. Participate in MIB meetings when working groups of overlapping interest are reporting. i. 3.12.1 Perform other services as directed by the Chair of the Board of Investigation. Impoundment/Classified Data Working Group
The Impoundment/Classified Data Working Group will review all data, information and findings to determine if security classification guidance is applicable, and where applicable, will ensure proper classification handling is implemented. This group will also have the overall responsibility for ensuring proper data impoundment procedures are followed and impoundment records are maintained. 3.12.2 Systems Integration Working Group
The Systems Integration Working Group is responsible for the analysis of the integrated Space Shuttle Launch Vehicle data which includes the environment, aerodynamics, flight dynamics, and total vehicle loads.
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3.12.3
Vehicle Engineering Working Group
The Vehicle Engineering Working Group is responsible for all of the Orbiter systemsassociated instrumentation, prelaunch and post-launch data applying to those systems, and associated support not covered by the Facilities and Ground Support Working Group. 3.12.4 Propulsion and Power Working Group
The Propulsion and Power Working Group examines Orbiter propulsion and power subsystems such as reaction control subsystem, auxiliary power unit, orbital maneuvering subsystem, and hydraulics, pyrotechnics, fuel cells and power reactant storage and distribution subsystems. This group will also assess the integrated main propulsion system for conditions that may have contributed to the contingency. 3.12.5 Navigation, Control, and Aeronautics Working Group
The Navigation, Control, and Aeronautics Working Group will analyze and document the performance of the integrated avionics system, define requirements and compare these data to preflight predictions and post-flight history, and reconstruct flight dynamics, as required. 3.12.6 Avionics and Software Working Group
The Avionics and Software Working Group will analyze and document the performance of the integrated avionics system (includes all essential onboard electronics and software). Coordinate the retrieval and interpretation of data from recovered avionics units. The group will interface with the Navigation, Control, and Aeronautics Working Group as appropriate. 3.12.7 Structures and Mechanics Working Group
The Structures and Mechanics Working Group will analyze the Orbiter structural integrity, loads, structural dynamics, materials, thermal protection system, thermal control system and the purge, vent, and drain system. Orbiter mechanical systems, including interfaces between the Orbiter and External Tank, and their performance will also be reviewed. 3.12.8 Crew and Thermal Systems Working Group
The Crew and Thermal Systems Working Group will examine Shuttle environmental control and life support systems and EVA equipment. 3.12.9 Mission Operations Working Group
The Mission Operations Working Group is responsible for the MCC, network control center, network stations, and the associated data which may have a bearing on
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the contingency. Responsibilities may include a review of the flight plan, MCC, NCC, and network configurations and procedures, flight control, communications with the launch site and flight vehicle, and commands (including spurious signals) to the SSV or attached payload. This working group is also responsible for reviewing the adequacy of all operating procedures and actions. Adequacy pertains to the adherence to and compliance with the procedures, the effectiveness of the procedures, and the flight controller training and certification processes. 3.12.10 Flight Crew Operations Working Group
The Flight Crew Operations Working Group is responsible for analyzing any flight crew procedures, training, or other factors involving crew participation which may have a bearing on the contingency. 3.12.11 Payloads/Cargo Working Group
The Payloads/Cargo Working Group is responsible for all payloads, including payload support equipment and consumables. This responsibility also includes examining prelaunch and post-launch data, payload integration, engineering, hardware safety, checkout and payload status at the time of the contingency. 3.12.12 Photographic and TV Analysis Working Group
The Photographic and TV Analysis Working Group is responsible for analyzing all available photographic and video data which may have a bearing on the contingency. This working group will also be responsible for processing, screening, and analyzing optical products. The working group will define and manage all imagery enhancement required and will perform the intercenter coordination required for all photographic investigation products. 3.12.13 Records and Witnesses Working Group
The Records and Witnesses Working Group is responsible for obtaining and reviewing contractor and NASA records pertinent to the contingency, including records on receipt, inspection, configuration control, assembly, reliability, quality control, checkout, and modification. Records may be impounded, if required. This group will accumulate and review statements of witnesses as soon as possible after the contingency. 3.12.14 Timeline Working Group
The Timeline Working Group will analyze all data (telemetry, photographic, etc.) concerning the contingency and will correlate the chronological timeline which will be used by other working groups in their analyses.
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3.12.15
Public Affairs Working Group
The Public Affairs Working Group is responsible for the coordination and release of information in accordance with the NASA management instructions and the operational procedures outlined in the Center support plans. The PAO representative will develop and coordinate all public releases with the MIB Chair and will also effect coordination through normal PAO channels. 3.12.16 Fire, Explosives, and Radiological Working Group
The Fire, Explosives, and Radiological Working Group is responsible for locating, identifying, and plotting the position of any fire, explosive, or radiological hazard patterns and the associated debris. This working group is also responsible for reconstructing the circumstances under which such hazards could have been initiated. 3.12.17 Medical and Toxicological Working Group
The Medical and Toxicological Working Group will analyze all medical factors which may have a bearing on the contingency and assess any actual or potential health hazards or stress associated with the mission. In the formation of this working group, reference should be made to the Medical Contingency Action Working Group, defined in Paragraph 3.12.18, established immediately following the contingency. 3.12.18 Medical Contingency Action Working Group
The Medical Contingency Action Working Group responsibilities are to identify the relevant circumstances under which an injury or death occurred, considering those factors which may have led to the injury or death; review all relevant medical documents including autopsy reports; and formulate recommendations concerning corrective action as appropriate.
3.13 OTHER WORKING GROUPS
In addition to the working groups listed above, the lead center for the investigation will support the following working groups. 3.13.1 Facilities and Ground Support Working Group
The Facilities and Ground Support Working Group will evaluate launch and landing facilities, test support systems, and ground support equipment that includes servicing and deservicing equipment at the primary, backup, secondary and contingency landing sites and at ground test sites. 3.13.2 Launch, Landing, and Retrieval Operations Working Group
The Launch, Landing, and Retrieval Operations Working Group is responsible for reviewing all flight, ferry, launch, landing, and ground service operations associated with
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the contingency. This includes landing operations and deservicing at secondary and contingency landing sites, and at ground test sites. 3.13.3 Search, Recovery, and Reconstruction Working Group
The Search, Recovery, and Reconstruction Working Group is responsible for performing the search for and recovery of critical vehicle flight components for determination of the exact cause of the contingency. Upon recovery of the hardware, the working group will take precautions to maximize the use of the recovered components for failure analysis. These steps will include photographic documentation, preservation and sampling.
3.14 CONSULTANTS
The following consultants should be assigned by the MIB Chair and approved by the Center Director: a. Counsel from the legal office will be available whenever witnesses are being questioned or when legal problems arise, or when legal advice is needed by the MIB. b. The PAO will provide advice and assistance regarding news releases or public information. c. A safety official; and
d. Others as required.
3.15 SPECIALISTS
As many specialists as necessary will be appointed by the Chair of the MIB. Specialists will participate in the MIB meetings and be available, at the request of the Chair, to assist the working groups. These specialists can be selected from outside NASA; however, non-government employees or non-full-time government employees will not be voting members of the MIB.
4.0 4.1 INVESTIGATION GUIDELINES GENERAL
The investigation is conducted to determine the cause of the contingency and to recommend steps to prevent recurrence of such a contingency. If the MIT is activated following the MRT, all evidence and data collected will be turned over to the formal MIB, once established. The MIB and each working group involved in the investigation will
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document their findings, determinations, conclusions, recommendations, and the procedural methods used during the investigation. Various guidelines for conducting an investigation are provided in the following paragraphs.
4.2 SUPPORT FACILITIES
The centers will support any investigation that may be required. Necessary resources to conduct the investigation - administrative, facilities, secretarial support, communications, data access and security systems - will be made available to the MIB. To the extent possible, the respective center will utilize existing facilities, organizations, and procedures for data handling and analysis.
4.3 SECURITY
Security, as it pertains to this plan, applies not only to classification of data, but also to restricting access to accident-sensitive areas to approved personnel only. NASA security regulations do not apply to the DOD supporting facilities, except for those specified instances where joint DOD/NASA agreements are available. Security coordination with contractor security services will be provided.
4.4 ACCIDENT SITE PRESERVATION
Those resources committed to support the SSP at the time of the contingency will be preserved in their operational state and configuration until released by the AA-OSF or MIT Chair. Space vehicle and launch or impact-site debris will be moved only as authorized by the AA-OSF or MIT Chair, except when mandatory for rescue personnel, firefighting, or removal of explosives. The DOD forces and equipment that are available for location and removal of salvageable components are responsible to the DOD for command and control. The AA-OSF or MIT Chair is responsible for requesting the DOD to utilize salvage equipment or move debris in the vicinity of KSC or adjacent shallow water areas, if required. The term vicinity applies to the Florida mainland and shallow waters of the Atlantic Ocean for which 45th Space Wing (45SW) agreements exist. The DOD Manager for Space Shuttle Support may be required to provide salvage/retrieval on a world-wide basis. Arrangements will be made to store damaged hardware, equipment, debris, etc., in controlled facilities, if necessary. Duties listed for the AA-OSF or MIT Chair in this paragraph will be assumed by the MIB Chair when investigation responsibility has been turned over to that board. Exceptions to this policy will be justified when equipment or actions are necessary to ensure personnel safety.
4.5 NETWORK INSTRUMENTATION
The Flight Director will make timely recommendations to the Manager, Space Shuttle Program, regarding equipment and network instrumentation to be released from further
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flight or test support. The Manager, Space Shuttle Program, should reach early agreement with the DOD Manager on the appropriate status of configuration control for any pertinent DOD equipment. GSFC will be kept informed through the Network Director of all decisions involving the network and recorded data requirements.
4.6 DATA HANDLING
4.6.1
General
Data designated in the implementing message, such as realtime recordings of telemetry, plotboard charts, trajectory data, tape recordings, weather reports, digital command system and tone command tapes, acquisition aid data, signal-strength records, photographs, etc., will be reduced into legible format as soon as possible and distributed as required to support the investigation. The MIB Chair may specify any special data requirements for use by the investigating authority. All other mission data may be processed in a normal manner on a noninterference basis with data in support of the investigation. 4.6.2 Records
The Director of Mission Operations, the Manager, Space Shuttle Program, the Manager, Launch Integration, and the Manager, Space Shuttle Vehicle Engineering, may impound applicable/appropriate records and protect NASA records pertinent to the contingency. These may include records of receipt, inspections, modifications, reliability and quality control, assembly and checkout, configuration control, and resolutions of significant technical problems. A custodian within each working group will be designated for these records and will retain the records for use by the MIB. 4.6.3 Security of Data
Data associated with the contingency will not be reclassified. To ensure all data are available to the MIB, the distribution of these data will be restricted and accorded special handling procedures as specified in this plan. Except for direct support of continued flight operations, and to the extent permitted by law, no information or data will be released to any person without a need-to-know, as designated by the Manager, Space Shuttle Program until such time as the MIB Chair is appointed. To the extent provided by law, access to the processed and reduced data associated with the investigation will be limited to personnel involved with the failure investigation until the data are released by the MIB Chair. 4.6.4 Public Release
Any public release of information relating to a contingency is the responsibility of the PAO. The Manager, Space Shuttle Program, in consultation with the AA-OSF or
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designated agent, will provide guidance to the Manager, Launch Integration and the Director of Public Affairs, Flight Director, DOD Representative, and other appropriate personnel until a duly appointed MIB assumes investigative responsibilities.
4.7 REPORTS
The Mishap Investigation Board Report shall consist of five volumes which are entitled: a. Volume I: The Report b. Volume II: Appendices c. Volume III: Proposed Corrective Action Implementation Plan
d. Volume IV: Lessons Learned Summary e. Volume V: Witness Statements/Recordings/Transcripts The convening authority may also require the MIB to prepare intermediate reports. The MIB reports will be submitted to the convening authority and to other organizations as appropriate. The working groups will report their progress periodically or at prearranged intervals as established by the MIB. Preliminary investigative reports will be reviewed at a time designated by the MIB Chair. Time-lost reports will be filed for cases in which hospitalization for more than five days or death occurs. The MIB will assemble lessons learned in the form of a summary of corrective actions. 4.7.1 Minority Reports
If a MIB member disagrees with the findings, conclusions, or recommendations of a majority of the MIB, a non-concurrence statement will be appended to the report and become a part of the report.
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Volume V Appendix G.3 CAIB Charter with Revisions
This Appendix contains the Columbia Accident Investigation Board Charter.
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National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Office of the Admlnlstrator Washington, DC 20546-0001
February 6,2003 Admiral Hal Gehman 3725 Lynnfield Drive Williamsburg, VA 23081 Dear Admiral Gehman: Please find, attached to this letter, a revised Charter for the Columbia Accident Investigation Board. I am pleased to make the changes you requested, which are incorporated in this new text. I thank you for your efforts, and those of the entire Board, as we all dedicate ourselves to determining the cause of the accident. Respectfully,
Sean 0 'Keefe- 1 Administrator Enclosure
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Columbia Accident Investigation Board Charter

1. GUIDELINES
In the case of a high-visibility, mission-related Shuttle mishap, the NASA Administrator may activate an International Space Station and Space Shuttle Mishap Interagency Investigation Board (the Board). Board activation is anticipated for events involving serious injury or loss of life, significant public interest, and other serious mishaps. The Board should consist of at least seven members, and be supported by the Office of Space Flight Headquarters and technical consultants as required.
2. ACTIVATION
The recommendation for the NASA Administrator to activate this Board will normally be made at either the Associate Administrator for the Office of Space Flight-directed Mishap Response Teleconference or as a decision at the Administrators HCAT meeting and/or teleconference. For this case, the NASA Administrator has determined effective at 10:30 am February 1, 2003, to convene such a Board and to name it the Columbia Accident Investigation Board.
3. MEMBERSHIP
Chairman of the Board Admiral Hal Gehman, USN Board Members Commander, Naval Safety Center, Rear Admiral Stephen Turcotte Director, Plans and Programs, Headquarters Air Force Materiel Command, Maj. General John Barry Commander, HQ USAF Chief of Safety, Major General Kenneth W. Hess Chief, Aviation Safety Division, Department of Transportation, Dr. James N. Hallock Director of Accident Investigation, Federal Aviation Administration, Mr. Steven B. Wallace Commander, 21 st Space Wing, USAF, Brig. General Duane Deal Director, NASA Ames Research Center, Mr. Scott Hubbard
4. BOARD SUPPORT
Standing Board Support Personnel Ex-Officio Member: Mr. Bryan 0Connor, Associate Administrator for Safety and Mission Assurance Executive Secretary: Mr. Theron Bradley, Jr., NASA Chief Engineer Additional Support Personnel. The Board may designate consultants, experts, or other government or non-government individuals to support the Board as necessary. Task Force Team Support. Within 72 hours of activation of the Interagency Board, the ANOSF, the ANSMA, the NASA Field Center Director or NASA Program Associate Administrator (NonOSF or Non Mission Related), and the NASA Chief Engineer will meet to select and recommend
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Task Force Team members to the Mishap Board Chairman. Upon approval by the NASA Administrator, the Task Force Team members will convene and meet with the appropriate Working Group Team leads. The Task Force Team will support the Board and they will:
1. Be the formal interface between the Board and the activated Working Groups: 2. Monitor, collect, document, and file the reports of the Working Groups activated to support the mishap investigation; 3. Provide the Board members with requested information and reports from the Working Groups; and 4. Assist the Board in the preparation of interim and final reports as required.
5. COLUMBIA ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD RESPONSIBILITIES

The Independent Board will: 1. Conduct activities in accordance with the provisions of applicable NASA policies and procedures. 2 . Schedule Board activities, interim Board reports, and submission of the final Board report in coordination with the NASA Administrator. 3. Determinc the facts, as well as the actual or probable causes of the Shuttle mishap in terms of dominant and contributing root causes and significant observations and, recommend preventive and other appropriate actions to preclude recurrence of a similar mishap. The investigation will not be conducted or used to determine questions of culpability, legal liability, or disciplinary action. 4. Use the established NASA support structure of working groups, NASA Field Center support, and supporting facilities to conduct the investigations. This includes staff advisors as required for expertise in areas such as public affairs, legal, medical, safety, and security. 5 . Activate the working groups appropriate to the mishap. 6. Obtain and analyze whatever facts, evidence, and opinions it considers relevant by relying upon reports of studies, findings, recommendations, and other actions by NASA officials and contractors or by conducting inquiries, hearings, tests, and other actions it deems appropriate. In so doing, it may take testimony and receive statements from witnesses. All elements of NASA will cooperate fully with the Board and provide any records, data, and other administrative or technical support and services that may be requested. 7. Impound property, equipment, and records to the extent that it considers necessary. 8. Release mishap information and mishap investigation reports in accordance with applicable NASA policies. 9. Develop recommendations for preventative and other appropriate actions. A finding may warrant one or more recommendations or may stand alone. 10. Provide a final written report to the NASA Administrator not later than 60 days.
February 1,2003 Revised: February 6, 2003
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National Aeronautics and Space Administration Office of the Adrninlstrator Washington, DC 20546-0001
rebruary 18,2003
Admiral Hal Gehman, USN (Ret) Chairman Columbia Accident Investigation Board 16850 Saturn Lane Houston, Texas 77058 Dear Admiral Gehman, Thank you for your comments on the charter changes proposed last week. Pursuant to your request, I have made further changes to the charter derived from our collective efforts to consult with Members of Congress. The enclosed charter reflects all revisions to this date. The revised charter also reflects the appointments of Roger Tetrault and Sheila Widnall as members of the Board. You have advised that you are considering a recommendation to me for another appointment. In accord with our discussions, I am prepared to make such appointments you feel would contribute to the Boards work.
m I a also in receipt of a copy of a letter addressed to you from NASAs Inspector General, Robert Cobb, on February 14,2003, asking you to acknowledge your independence in certain respects. Please feel free to advise of any aspects of your charge you feel needs particular further emphasis. Of particular note relative to the Inspector Generals views, you are charged in the charter to obtain and analyze whatever facts, evidence, and opinions it (the Board) considers relevant to determine the facts, as well as the actual or probable causes of the Shuttle mishap.. . and recommend preventative and other actions to preclude recurrence of a similar mishap.
These charter provisions and others clearly demonstrate that your Board can and must act independently. Your Board is entitled to receive any information that NASA has. If there is any resistance, please let me know and we will assure cooperation. It is within your charter to determine causes, including whether NASA budget or management or any other factors created an environment which caused or contributed to the cause of this accident.
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Page 2 Admiral Gehman February 18,2003 For these and other factors we have discussed several times over the past two weeks, I find the Inspector Generals views and advice to be completely consistent with our mutual understanding of the Boards responsibility and conduct of operations for this important investigation. Cordially,
Administrator
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Group 1 Matrix Brief on Maintenance, Material, and Management
This Appendix contains a working matrix of slides on maintenance, material, and management. These slides were used by Group I in tasking NASA to respond to requests for information or specific issues. Each matrix subject addresses an action/ issue, background/facts, findings, recommendations and source documentation. By using this tool, Group I was able to engage NASA on potential final report inclusions.
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Vehicle Data Mapping (VDM) Team Final report, Jun 13, 2003
This Appendix contains NSTS-37383 Vehicle Data Mapping Team Final Report in Support of the Columbia Accident Investigation, 13 June 2003.
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NSTS-37383
Vehicle Data Mapping (VDM) Team Final Report

in support of the Columbia Accident Investigation
June 13, 2003
Prepared by: ___________________________________ John D. Albright NASA-JSC-EP4 VDM Team Data Manager
Approved and Submitted by: ___________________________________ Gene Grush NASA-JSC-EP VDM Team Lead
OVE Final Reports $_VDM Team Final Report_Rev8_6-13-03.doc

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Table of Contents
Executive Summary ...................................................................................................... 1 1.0 INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................... 2 2.0 PURPOSE AND SCOPE ....................................................................................... 3 3.0 PRODUCTS AND SPECIAL ACTIVITIES ............................................................. 3 3.1 VDM-P01: 3D Full Animation Event Sequence Playback .................................... 4 3.2 VDM-P02: Physical Mockup ................................................................................ 7 3.3 VDM-P03: 3D Graphical Events Sequence......................................................... 8 3.4 VDM-P04: 2D Static Storyboard.......................................................................... 8 3.5 VDM-P05: 2D Graphical Events Sequence ....................................................... 10 3.6 VDM-P06: 3D CAD Modeling ............................................................................ 11 3.7 VDM-P07: Wire Routing / Sensor Placement Reconstruction ........................... 13 3.8 VDM-P08: Events Timeline ............................................................................... 14 3.9 VDM-P09: Instrumentation Listing and Sensor Location ................................... 15 3.10 VDM-P10: Sensor Signal Characterization For Failure Scenario ................... 16 3.11 VDM-P11: Structure / Installation Drawings ................................................... 17 3.12 VDM-P12: Wire Routing Details ..................................................................... 17 3.13 VDM-P13: Closeout Photos............................................................................ 18 3.14 VDM Team ASA4 Anomaly Assessment........................................................ 19 3.15 VDM Team Testing ........................................................................................ 20 3.16 VDM Team Leading Edge Wire Run Assessment .......................................... 24 3.17 VDM Team Miscellaneous Tasks ................................................................... 25 4.0 CONCLUSIONS AND SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS ................................................ 25 APPENDIX A: VDM Team Product Flow Chart .......................................................... 28 APPENDIX B: VDM Team Roster and Action List..................................................... 29 APPENDIX C: VDM Product Files for the Final Report............................................. 30 APPENDIX D: Acronyms and Abbreviations ............................................................ 31
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NSTS-37383 Executive Summary The Vehicle Data Mapping (VDM) Team was created to support the Orbiter Vehicle Engineering Working Group (OVEWG) investigation of the OV-102/Columbia accident that occurred during the STS-107 mission on February 1, 2003. The VDM team charter included the creation of unique and innovative data display products that aid in understanding the hardware configuration, sensor response data, and complex sequence of events during Columbias entry. In meeting this charter, approximately 125 personnel from NASA, Boeing, USA, and multiple support contractors from around the country produced seven major products and six supporting products in accordance with the VDM team product flowchart contained in Appendix A. Four special activities related to these products and encompassed by the VDM team charter were also pursued. All of these products and activities are discussed in detail in this report, along with related findings generated by the VDM team during this effort. Due to the large volume of data produced by the VDM team, this report is best reviewed from the VDM team share drive or a compact disk (CD) containing all related product files, thus enabling embedded hyperlinks to work properly and maximizing data availability and organization. Accordingly, the planned method of distribution for this report is a CD. Note that a readme file is included to explain the general content and provide key usage instructions for the final report.

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NSTS-37383 1.0 INTRODUCTION
The Vehicle Data Mapping (VDM) Team, headquartered at Johnson Space Center (JSC) and lead by NASA-JSC-EP/Gene Grush, was created to support the Orbiter Vehicle Engineering Working Group (OVEWG) investigation of the OV-102/Columbia accident that occurred during the STS-107 mission on February 1, 2003. The VDM team charter was as follows: To perform data collection, organization, and analysis for select vehicle parameters during entry. To research sensor installation details, wire routings, and power and signal conditioning configurations for associated instrumentation. To perform testing as required to anchor analytical models and define failure modes/signatures for associated instrumentation. To create unique and innovative data display products that aid in understanding the hardware configuration, sensor response data, and complex sequence of events during entry.
In general, the VDM team did not provide detailed interpretation of the flight data. Instead, the existing Problem Review Team (PRT) for each Orbiter subsystem performed this task with oversight from the Data Review and Timeline Reconstruction Team, who then used the results as an input to the master entry timeline. One exception, discussed later in this report, involved analyzing the timing and failure signatures of certain Orbiter sensors to identify trends and patterns in the data. In meeting the VDM team charter, seven major products and six supporting data generation/gathering products were produced in accordance with the VDM team product flowchart contained in Appendix A. Four special activities related to these products and encompassed by the VDM team charter were also pursued. All of these products and activities are discussed in this report. To maximize efficiency and accountability, the VDM team structure and action tracking system were product oriented, including the assignment of a lead engineer for each product. To organize and control VDM team products and inputs, a VDM team headquarters (building 15, room 131) was established for meetings/telecons and display/storage of hardcopy data. A VDM team share drive was also established on a JSC server for display/storage of electronic files. Over a 4-month period, approximately 125 personnel from NASA, Boeing, and United Space Alliance (USA) at JSC, Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), and Huntington Beach (HB), plus technical support personnel from Analytical Graphics, Inc., GHG Inc., IMC Incite, Lockheed Martin, Muniz Engineering, Inc. (MEI), Information Dynamics, Inc. (IDI), and SAIC, Inc., responded to action items and produced the products described in this report. A comprehensive list of VDM team members, action items (98 total), and action item response files is contained in Appendix B. During this process, the VDM team provided regular status briefings to the OVEWG, records of which are contained on the VDM team share drive. Similar or

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NSTS-37383 supplemental information was also provided directly to the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) in several instances upon request. 2.0 PURPOSE AND SCOPE
This report is intended to provide final documentation of the VDM team products and findings. Due to the large volume of data produced by the VDM team, this report is best reviewed from the VDM team share drive or a compact disk (CD) containing all related product files, thus enabling embedded hyperlinks to work properly and maximizing data availability and organization. Accordingly, the planned method of distribution for this report is a CD. 3.0 PRODUCTS AND SPECIAL ACTIVITIES
In accordance with the VDM team product flowchart contained in Appendix A, seven major products, six supporting data generation/gathering products, and four special activities were created and pursued to help document, visualize, and comprehend the data associated with Columbias entry on STS-107. The major source of flight data used for this effort included telemetry data from the Operational Instrumentation (OI) sensors and Orbiter Experiment (OEX) recorder data from the Modular Auxiliary Data System (MADS) sensors. This data was obtained in hardcopy and/or electronic form directly from the Mission Evaluation Room (MER) via formal data requests. Also, as mentioned previously, a key input to many VDM team products and activities was the master entry timeline from the Data Review and Timeline Reconstruction Team, which was used for identification and annotation of key events. Unless otherwise specified for individual products or activities, ending times for OI sensor data include loss of signal (LOS) at Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) 2003/032:13:59:32.136 (data set referred to as 107 data) and post-LOS at GMT 2003/032:14:00:31.102 (data set referred to as 107-edit data). Similarly, the ending time for MADS sensor data is GMT 2003/032:14:00:14.290 (data set referred to as OEX data), with entry interface (EI) occurring at GMT 2003/032:13:44:09.000 (frequently used as a point of reference). VDM team efforts initially focused on OI sensor data from the vehicle. The first OI indications of off-nominal performance involved a hydraulic line temperature on the inboard sidewall (Yo-105) of the left wheel well (V58T1703A, LMG Brake Line Temp D) at GMT 2003/032:13:52:17. Subsequently, other OI sensors began showing off-nominal trends. Of these, particular attention was given to the following 14 OI sensors (seven left wing, seven left wheel well) that went off-scale low (OSL) or unexpectedly changed state (starting at GMT 2003/032:13:52:56) prior to LOS:
Failure Order 1 2 3 MSID V09T1006A V58T0157A V58T0394A Description LH Inbd Elev Lwr Skin Temp Hyd 1 LH Inbd Elvn Actr Rtn Ln T Hyd Sys 3 LOE Rtn Ln T Sensor Location Wing Wing Wing Panel/ Connector Glove/P105 Glove/P105 Glove/P105 Mode OSL OSL OSL

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4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 V58T0257A V58T0193A V09T1002A V09T1024A V51P0570A V51P0571A V51T0574A V51P0572A V51T0575A V51P0573A V51X0125E Hyd 2 LH Inbd Elvn Actr Rtn Ln T Hyd Sys 1 LOE Rtn Ln T LH Lwr Wing Skin Temp LH Upr Wing Skin Temp MLG LH Outbd Tire Press 1 MLG LH Inbd Tire Press 1 MLG LH Outbd Wheel Temp MLG LH Outbd Tire Press 2 MLG LH Inbd Wheel Temp MLG LH Inbd Tire Press 2 LH MLG Downlock Prox Wing Wing Wing Wing W-well W-well W-well W-well W-well W-well W-well Glove/P105 Glove/P105 Glove/P105 Glove/P105 W-well/P87 W-well/P87 W-well/P89 W-well/P89 W-well/P87 W-well/P89 W-well/P59 OSL OSL OSL OSL OSL OSL OSL OSL OSL OSL State
After the OEX recorder was recovered, attention was shifted to the MADS sensor data that provided 600+ additional pressure, temperature, and strain measurements of interest to the investigation, the first of which (V12G9921A, Left Wing Front Spar Strain) began showing signs of off-nominal performance at GMT 2003/032:13:48:39, approximately 3:38 sec before the first off-nominal OI sensor reading was detected. The following sections in this report describe each VDM team product and special activity in detail. A complete list of these items is as follows: 3.1 VDM-P01: 3D Full Animation Event Sequence Playback VDM-P02: Physical Mockup VDM-P03: 3D Graphical Events Sequence VDM-P04: 2D Static Storyboard VDM-P05: 2D Graphical Events Sequence VDM-P06: 3D CAD Modeling VDM-P07: Wire Routing / Sensor Placement Reconstruction VDM-P08: Events Timeline VDM-P09: Instrumentation Listing and Sensor Location VDM-P10: Sensor Signal Characterization for Failure Scenario VDM-P11: Structure / Installation Drawings VDM-P12: Wire Routing Details VDM-P13: Closeout Photos VDM Team ASA4 Anomaly Assessment VDM Team Testing VDM Team Leading Edge Wire Run Assessment Miscellaneous Tasks VDM-P01: 3D Full Animation Event Sequence Playback
Product VDM-P01 is a digital video disk (DVD)-based movie/animation displaying telemetry data from select OI pressure and temperature sensors in the left wing, wheel well, and fuselage areas during entry. As of this writing, rev 2 is the latest version of the DVD, which conforms to rev 15 of the master entry timeline and rev 5 of product VDMP05 (2D Graphical Events Sequence). As such, all animation sequences run from GMT 2003/032:13:51:00.000 to GMT 2003/032:14:00:31.000. In addition, a total of 39 OI 4

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NSTS-37383 sensors are depicted in the CAD model used to create this product. A complete list of these sensors is contained in Appendix C. Note that this product does not attempt to visualize specific failure scenario sequences (e.g. hot gas plumes, structural deflections, debris shedding, etc.) due to the complex and speculative nature of these details, although similar computer graphics techniques could be employed for this purpose if desired. The following key inputs were used to generate this product: Product VDM-P04: 2D Static Storyboard (including OI sensor data from the MER) Product VDM-P05: 2D Graphical Events Sequence Product VDM-P06: 3D Orbiter CAD models Product: VDM-P07: Wire Routing/Sensor Placement Reconstruction Product VDM-P12: Wire Routing Details Master entry timeline
The product contains the following main computer graphics sequences: A "flythrough" of the left wing and wheel well areas allowing user familiarization with the vehicle physical configuration and geometry. Wing structure, wire runs and sensors, and wheel-well contents are all depicted in detail. Due to their small size, the sensors called out in the master entry timeline are represented as "balloons." Minor license was taken in the X-Y-Z positioning of the sensor balloons to ensure that they would be visible with the camera angles selected. Callouts and highlighting are employed to identify relevant features. A wing plan-form sequence showing the left side of the vehicle, including the fuselage sidewall. When selected, this sequence progresses in real time from a point prior to the onset of anomalous sensor indications during the STS-107 entry. A digital clock supplemented by an analog timeline display indicates current time. Sensor temperature and pressure indications are represented by color changes of the balloons: green representing nominal indications, yelloworange-red representing increasingly above-nominal indications, and lightmedium-dark blue representing below-nominal indications. White and black are used to indicate off scale high (OSH) and OSL, respectively, while gray indicates a sync/data loss. A side view of the Orbiter in an inset window illustrates vehicle attitude and Reaction Control System (RCS) thruster and aerosurface activity (aerosurface positions are exaggerated for visibility), and a simplified ground track plot indicates geographic location. Captions are superimposed to call out significant events from the entry timeline. A wheel well close-up sequence providing an enlarged view of the left wheel well, including the landing gear structure, hydraulic lines, and wire runs. The same balloon color change conventions used in the wing plan form sequence are employed here.

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NSTS-37383 A trajectory/ground track sequence with four sub-windows: one for timeline and caption data, an Orbiter side view comparable to the plan form view, a "gun camera" (camera trailing behind the Orbiter) view to further enhance visualization of Orbiter attitude, and an augmented ground track in aeronautical map format.
A menu on the DVD allows the user to select between these various animation sequences. Standard DVD angle functions allow the user to switch between the wing plan form, wheel well, and trajectory sequences in real time. The first three sequences described above were created in the Integrated Graphic Operations and Analysis Laboratory (IGOAL) at JSC using an in-house developed application called Enigma, with 3D solid models of the Orbiter created in Pro/Engineer under product VDM-P06 (3D CAD Modeling). The fourth sequence was also created at JSC (with significant technical support from Analytical Graphics, Inc.) using Satellite Tool Kit (STK) software. Special graphics features and unique data intervals related to the use of STK are as follows: Animations of the Orbiter's attitude and trajectory over the Earth surface, including RCS and aerosurface activity. Separate "gun camera" and "right wingtip" (camera looking towards the Orbiter right side) views. Ground track views ranging from simplified maps showing only the Pacific coastline and U.S. state borders to fully detailed aeronautical maps. Special captions denoting significant events from the master entry timeline.
Note that all STK features/views are terminated at LOS+5 sec (GMT 2003/032:13:59:37.396), with interpolation used to represent sensor data during the brief communication dropout periods included in the master entry timeline. The Enigma and STK output files were originated in AVI format. The individual caption, aeronautical map ground track, and STK gun camera and wingtip windows were integrated into one "quad view" window using Discrete Logic Combustion software. Subsequent compression and reformatting to MPEG2 format was performed to support DVD authoring using Spruce Maestro software (with significant technical support from IMC Incite for nonlinear editing). One of two known issues with the current rev 2 version of the VDM-P01 DVD is that captions were inadvertently omitted from the wing plan form sequence. These captions are present on all other sequences. The other issue is that the color-coding for the Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS) nozzle temperature sensors on the forward fuselage was erroneously scaled. Rev 3 of the DVD is in now in work to correct these two issues, begin earlier in the entry profile (GMT 2003/032:13:48:00.000), and conform to rev 16 of the master entry timeline. However, it still will not contain any MADS sensor data.

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NSTS-37383 An organized list of all electronic files on the VDM team share drive related to product VDM-P01 and applicable to this report is contained in Appendix C. Collectively, these files constitute the product itself, or they represent the product if not computer-based or not available in a compatible electronic format. They also contain supplemental information that describes or explains important product content, inputs/outputs, observations, and results/conclusions in much greater detail than this report. In the case of product VDM-P01, the product itself is a DVD and all files contained therein are duplicated on the VDM team share drive. As of this writing, the large number of intermediate source files used in creating the DVD are managed individually and do not reside in either location. 3.2 VDM-P02: Physical Mockup
Product VDM-P02 is 1/10 scale physical mockup of the Orbiter left wing that includes major structural components such as wing ribs and spars, wing leading edge (WLE) spars, partial fuselage bulkheads, wheel well and landing gear elements, and wire harnesses associated with select OI sensors. A total of 28 OI sensors are depicted in the mockup, including 8 pressures and 9 temperatures associated with the tires and hydraulic system lines/components in the wheel well; 2 skin temperatures in the wing; 1 bondline temperature on the mid-fuselage sidewall; and 8 hydraulic line/component temperatures in the elevon coves. A complete list of these sensors is contained in Appendix C. Despite structural elements being present, the mockup does not attempt to present a highly accurate and detailed structural model of the wing. It also does not include wing skin, Thermal Protection System (TPS) components, aerosurface or landing gear actuators, fluid lines, or any MADS sensors and associated wire runs. Instead, the mockup was built early in the investigation when detailed drawings were first becoming available and OI sensor data was initially being analyzed. Therefore, the mockup represents a quick-response solution to providing a reasonably detailed physical model that could be used as an aid to the visualization of major components and key wire harnesses, along with the physical relationships between them. Several key inputs were used to generate this product: Product VDM-P06: 3D CAD Modeling Product VDM-P12: Wire Routing Details Product VDM-P13: Closeout Photos
The mockup was constructed as follows: Prints of the major structural spars and cross sections at the ribs were plotted at 1/10 scale. These prints were applied to 3/16 foam-core single-sided adhesive board. This was cut to finished size using the prints as a guide for their outer shape. Slots were cut at each intersection to allow the ribs and spars to slip together. As updated versions of a spar or rib cross section became available,

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NSTS-37383 the part was re-plotted and affixed to a new board. Then the new part would replace the older part. A functional landing gear assembly was also fabricated using plastic and foam to provide realistic structure for the attachment of select OI sensors. Wire runs for OI sensors shown were modeled with a variety of materials, including multicolored micro-gauge wires formed into bundles and 20 gauge insulated wires with color coding that matched the color scheme in use at the time of model construction. The OI sensors depicted on the mock-up include the mockup are referenced in Appendix C. For ease of transport, the wing model was built in two sections: from the 1365 spar at the elevon cove to the 1009 spar in the wing glove just forward of the wheel well, and from the 1009 spar to the 807 bulkhead at the wing chine interface.
The resulting mockup was used routinely during meetings, discussions, briefings, and throughout the VDM team investigation process to better visualize physical relationships and potential fluid flow paths through the left wing. The mockup was also provided to the CAIB upon request for temporary use while more detailed and accurate versions were being built to CAIB specifications. These improved mockups used similar construction techniques but slightly different materials, including clear polycarbonate backing for the wing rib sections to improve appearance, fidelity, and handling tolerance. They also included numerous TPS elements and many more sensors, had better internal vent path representations, and went further forward on the vehicle. An organized list of all electronic files on the VDM team share drive related to product VDM-P02 and applicable to this report is contained in Appendix C. Collectively, these files constitute the product itself or they represent the product if not computer-based or not available in a compatible electronic format. They also contain supplemental information that describes or explains important product content, inputs/outputs, observations, and results/conclusions in much greater detail than this report. 3.3 VDM-P03: 3D Graphical Events Sequence
Product VDM-P03 no longer exists in the VDM team product flowchart. Its intent is captured by products VDM-P04 (2D Static Storyboard) and VDM-P05 (2D Graphical Events Sequence). 3.4 VDM-P04: 2D Static Storyboard
Product VDM-P04 refers to plots of relevant sensor data coupled with maps of vehicle hardware that emphasize the communication of overall vehicle status information during the last hour of the STS-107 mission. Above all, this product attempts to present the flight data in an unbiased and non-timeline format that is unrelated to any given failure scenario. The finished product consists of the following sub-elements:

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A five-sheet E-size (34 in x 44 in) poster displaying relevant sensors and associated data plots to illustrate performance trends. The first two sheets (S1, S2), created early in the investigation, contain OI pressure and temperature sensor locations, data plots, and a comparison between left and right sides of the vehicle on STS-107 through LOS. The last three sheets (S3, S4, S5), created later in the investigation after the OEX recorder was recovered, contain MADS pressure, temperature, and strain sensor locations, data plots, wire routings, and a comparison between STS-107 and three other Columbia missions (STS-073, 090, -109) through EI+1000 sec. All five sheets use a common color-coding scheme to represent sensor status (nominal, off-nominal, off-line). They also contain one or more applicable vehicle drawings/schematics to aid in visualizing sensor locations and wire runs as known at the time of product release. A 40-page booklet (a.k.a. quantitative report) containing similar OI and MADS sensor information to the poster but with more detail including closeout photos, sensor information spreadsheets, 3D CAD model pictures, cable burnthrough timing plots, and data plot grouping based on future analysis efforts. Presentation charts containing similar OI sensor information to the poster and booklet but in a concise presentation format. Two sets of charts exist, the first involving various OI sensors through LOS and the second involving the same OI sensors through the post-LOS time period.
Several key inputs were used to generate this product: Raw OI and MADS sensor data from the MER Product VDM-P06: 3D Orbiter CAD Modeling Product VDM-P07: Wire Routing/Sensor Placement Reconstruction Product VDM-P09: Instrumentation Listing and Sensor Location Product VDM-P12: Wire Routing Details Product VDM-P13: Closeout photos Master entry timeline
The raw OI and MADS sensor data used to create the P04 product was acquired in electronic form (CSV format) directly from the MER as soon as it became available. The data was then manipulated and plotted (i.e. reduced) by the P04 product team while concurrently identifying/verifying all active sensors on the vehicle. This process was repeated multiple times until confidence in the data sets reached a high level and the product reached its final state of maturity. To ensure accuracy, results were spotchecked by independent reviewers from other VDM product teams through comparison to hardcopy plots created in the MER. In addition to being used directly in the P04 product, the raw and reduced sensor data was also distributed to the following recipients/teams to save time, ensure consistency, and minimize data processing overhead in the MER:

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NSTS-37383 Product VDM-P01: 3D Full Animation Event Sequence Playback Product VDM-P05: 2D Graphical Events Sequence Data Review and Timeline Reconstruction Team Failure Scenario Team Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB)
As of this writing, rev 6 is the latest version of the poster and booklet, and rev 5 is the latest version of the presentation charts, all of which correspond to rev 15 of the master entry timeline. An organized list of all electronic files on the VDM team share drive related to product VDM-P04 and applicable to this report is contained in Appendix C. Collectively, these files constitute the product itself, or they represent the product if not computer-based or not available in a compatible electronic format. They also contain supplemental information that describes or explains important product content, inputs/outputs, observations, and results/conclusions in much greater detail than this report. 3.5 VDM-P05: 2D Graphical Events Sequence
Product VDM-P05 is a set of presentation charts depicting the overall sequence of events during Columbias entry in a graphical step-by-step manner. The heart of the product is a top-level drawing of the Orbiter, with sensors of interest shown highlighted in their approximate X-Y-Z location and color-coded according to their readings relative to nominal values. Sensor color-coding is as follows, with nominal values defined by the individual subsystem PRTs (with oversight from the Data Review and Timeline Reconstruction Team): Green = good sensor with nominal readings Yellow = sensor off-nominal high (for temperature, 0F<T<15F) Orange = temperature sensor is off-nominal high, 15F<T <30F Shaded Red = temperature sensor is off-nominal high, 30F<T <100F Solid Red = temperature sensor is off-nominal high, T >100F Light Blue = temperature sensor is off-nominal low, T <0F Shaded Blue = sensor has experienced wire damage, readings no longer represent reality Solid Blue = sensor has experienced wire damage, readings have gone off scale and no longer represent reality
To provide a more complete view of the Orbiter, the product is separated into two distinct parts. Each part can stand-alone or be combined for greater insight. Part 1 shows the vehicle from above (plan view looking at the X-Y plane), including all sensors and wire runs as viewed from that perspective for each event depicted. It also includes a ground track map to show the exact location of the Orbiter above the earth, corresponding altitude and Mach number information, and an indication of how many sensors went offline in each of the three main wire bundles routed through the left wing (i.e. those running down the outboard and forward walls of the wheel well, sometimes 10

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NSTS-37383 referred to as bundles A, B, and C). Part 2 shows the vehicle from the port side (side view looking at the X-Z plane), including all sensors and some wire runs for each event depicted in part 1. It also includes an embedded plot of the highlighted sensors output during a longer portion of the entry profile to give a broader view of trending at that sensors location. Finally, a three dimensional perspective is shown from behind the vehicle to illustrate vehicle attitude. Several key inputs were used to generate this product: Product VDM-P04: 2D Static Storyboard Product VDM-P09: Instrumentation List and Sensor Location Product VDM-P10: Sensor Signal Characterization (including the MADS sensor signature database) Product VDM-P13: Wire Routing Details Master entry timeline
This product went through many revisions, being continually updated as new information became available. Initial versions contained only a few sensors, all of which were OI measurements in the left wing and wheel well showing anomalous behavior during entry. As time passed and more information was obtained, additional sensors and other details were added, eventually expanding the scope of the product to include MADS and OI sensors, key wire runs, aerodynamic events, communication events, and debris events. As of this writing, rev 7 is the latest and intended final version of this product. It utilizes information from master entry timeline rev 17, MADS sensor signature database rev 4, and wire routing details through May 20, 2003. In its final form, this product provides valuable insight into the sequence of events during entry by allowing a quick flip-through of the charts to visualize: (1) initial heating on the left wing leading edge, (2) heating/burnthrough of the sensor cables routed on the back side of the WLE spar, (3) heating/burnthrough of the sensor cables routed on the outboard and forward walls of the wheel well, (4) temperatures increasing inside the wheel well, and (5) heating/burnthrough of sensor cables routed inside the wheel well. An organized list of all electronic files on the VDM team share drive related to product VDM-P05 and applicable to this report is contained in Appendix C. Collectively, these files constitute the product itself, or they represent the product if not computer-based or not available in a compatible electronic format. They also contain supplemental information that describes or explains important product content, inputs/outputs, observations, and results/conclusions in much greater detail than this report. 3.6 VDM-P06: 3D CAD Modeling
Product VDM-P06 is a complete solid model representation of Columbias left wing, including wing structure, wheel well structure, main landing gear, hydraulic lines, select OI sensors and associated wire runs, and leading edge reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC) panels. Some areas and features of the mid fuselage are also included. Note that this
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NSTS-37383 model represents the as-designed vehicle and does not attempt to recreate the asbuilt configuration, with the exception of certain OI sensor locations that were modified according to inputs from key KSC personnel with first-hand knowledge of the vehicle hardware configuration. Several key inputs were used to generate this product: Product VDM-P07: Wire Routing/Sensor Placement Reconstruction Product VDM-P12: Wire Routing Details Engineering drawings from the Shuttle Drawing System (SDS) Hardcopy engineering drawings
NASA-JSC personnel coordinated the modeling effort. Additional inputs were provided from a variety of different NASA and Boeing organizations as follows:
Contributing Organization NASA-JSC Structural Engineering Division (ES), with assistance from Lockheed Martin support contractors NASA-KSC Shuttle Engineering Group Boeing-Huntington Beach Structures Group Boeing-KSC Structures Group Boeing-KSC Design Visualization Group NASA-JSC Energy Systems Division (EP) NASA-MSFC Models Created/Provided RCC Panels Spar Fittings Wing Spars Wing Ribs Main Landing Gear Wing Wiring Main Landing Gear Mid Fuselage Structure Main Landing Gear Door Wing Glove Ribs Elevon Ribs and Actuators Wheel Well Hydraulics Wing Tile Carrier Panels Main Landing Gear Uplock Mechanism Mid Fuselage Tanks and Fluid Lines RCC Panel Fittings
The master model exists in Pro/Engineer format and resides in an Intralink database at JSC (Root Folder\Space Shuttle\Accident Investigation\Top Level\V070000002_012_gen_assy.asm). Mirror sites exist at KSC, MSFC, and Boeing-HB. The overall assembly currently contains over 2000 individual components, models of which have different levels of fidelity. Early on, envelope models approximating basic component geometry were built. In some cases these models were sufficient. However, in most cases additional details were later added at the request of the model end-users. Models are named using their part numbers, and the assembly is structured to match the Orbiter drawing tree. As part of the overall CAD modeling effort, detailed models were created for much of the fluid systems hardware located in the mid fuselage region of the Orbiter. This effort
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NSTS-37383 was undertaken to develop a better representation of the vehicle in areas of potential interest, particularly those that may have been affected by off-nominal port fuselage sidewall temperatures. Models were developed for the Power Reactant Storage and Distribution (PRSD) tanks and select feedlines, in addition to the Main Propulsion System (MPS) gaseous helium (GHe) tanks and the ECLSS gaseous nitrogen (GN2) tanks located on the port side of the vehicle in mid-fuselage bays 7 though 11. These models were originally intended for integration into the overall vehicle assembly model. However, as it turns out, these components and areas were not of sufficient interest to warrant inclusion of these models. Another aspect of the CAD modeling effort involved displaying the X-Y-Z locations of numerous OI and MADS sensors on the vehicle. Initial interest focused on OI sensors in the left wing, wheel well, and mid-fuselage areas. A total of 37 OI sensors were modeled as part of this activity, including the 14 sensors (seven left wing, seven left wheel well) that went OSL or unexpectedly changed state during entry prior to LOS. Later, additional OI temperature sensors from area 40 on the vehicle were modeled after being identified as relatively sensitive external measurements that might provide additional insight into the local thermal environment. A total of 58 OI temperature sensors were modeled as part of this activity. Finally, after the recovery of the OEX recorder, a large number of MADS sensors were modeled based on relevance to the investigation. A total of 615 sensors were modeled as part of this activity, including pressure, temperature, and strain measurements throughout the vehicle. However, seven more sensors of interest were not modeled due to lack of location information. For both OI and MADS sensors, X-Y-Z locations were obtained from a variety of sources, some of which were incomplete or in conflict with others. Best attempts were made to determine accurate locations when conflicts were present, and multiple checks were made to maximize accuracy of the final product. Although this was a CAD modeling task, the results of the effort relate directly to product VDM-P09 (Instrumentation Listing and Sensor Location) discussed in section 3.9. Accordingly, all files summarizing the sensors modeled and the associated X-Y-Z locations are kept with other VDM-P09 documents. An organized list of all electronic files on the VDM team share drive related to product VDM-P06 and applicable to this report is contained in Appendix C. Collectively, these files constitute the product itself, or they represent the product if not computer-based or not available in a compatible electronic format. They also contain supplemental information that describes or explains important product content, inputs/outputs, observations, and results/conclusions in much greater detail than this report. In the case of product VDM-P06, all electronic files are in Pro/Engineer format and are maintained in a separate JSC Intralink database. 3.7 VDM-P07: Wire Routing / Sensor Placement Reconstruction
Product VDM-P07 consists of three sets of charts intended to organize and consolidate the large volume of design, installation, functionality, and performance information
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NSTS-37383 related to the Columbia investigation that resides on the VDM team share drive. These files emphasize graphical display methods (3D CAD models, wire routing drawings, closeout photographs, etc.) to aid in visualizing hardware installation. Initially, key information was posted on the walls of the VDM team headquarters and incrementally provided to the OVEWG. Subsequently, this information was organized into a set of more detailed hardware description charts for distribution to the OVEWG and CAIB. Several key inputs were used to generate this product: Product VDM-P06: 3D CAD Modeling o Pro-E integrated CAD model of OV-102 (pulled from JSC Intralink 3/11/03_8:00am) Product VDM-P12: Wire Routing Details o Boeing-HB plan view wire routing stick drawings (wing1_Rev4.ppt) o Boeing-HB wire routing blacklines (wing2part1_rev0.ppt, wing2part2_rev0.ppt, WIRE RUN SKETCH.ppt) o P105 Pinout Rev0_Galvez.ppt o Boeing-HB wheel well isometric (wheel well isometric-Rev4.ppt) o Boeing-HB wire routing blacklines (V070-796051 LMLG Dark Line Rev4 Pt 1 of 3.ppt) o Boeing-HB Wheel Well Plan View (Wing-wheelwell-Rev4.ppt) Product VDM-P13: Closeout Photos o OV-102 photographs from the Palmdale Orbiter Major Modification (OMM) o OV-102 KSC close-out photographs from SIMS Left wing and wheel well vent and leak path information provided by BoeingHouston (Maingearwellvent_info3.xls)
An organized list of all electronic files on the VDM team share drive related to product VDM-P05 and applicable to this report is contained in Appendix C. Collectively, these files constitute the product itself, or they represent the product if not computer-based or not available in a compatible electronic format. They also contain supplemental information that describes or explains important product content, inputs/outputs, observations, and results/conclusions in much greater detail than this report. In the case of product VDM-P07, no further revisions of the hardware description charts are planned even though several key inputs, particularly those related to product VDM-P12 (Wire Routing Details), have already been appended or revised. 3.8 VDM-P08: Events Timeline
Due to the importance of the master entry timeline as an input to many of the VDM team products, this product consisted of assigning a VDM team member to be a liaison to the Data Review and Reconstruction Timeline Team. Although no electronic files were created, this product ensured a thorough understanding of the timeline teams products and conveyed VDM team needs, questions, and comments directly to the timeline team.
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NSTS-37383 3.9 VDM-P09: Instrumentation Listing and Sensor Location
Product VDM-P09 consists of instrumentation system schematics and master measurement lists (MMLs) for all OI and MADS sensors on Columbia during STS-107. This information was used as a basic and critical input to many VDM team products, particularly those that involved data plotting, sensor signature characterization and trending analysis, and commonality assessment between measurements. Attributes of primary interest for each measurement included MSID, description, sensor type and XY-Z location, power supply and signal conditioner assignments, engineering units and range, sample frequency and most/least significant bit, etc. Since all of this information cannot be found in a single source for OI or MADS sensors, numerous files are used to capture the intent of this product. Several key inputs were used to generate this product, some of which became part of the product itself due to complexity associated with file and database consolidation: For OI sensors: o Orbiter Instrumentation Program and Components List (ICPL), Orbiter 102, Flight 28, STS-107, dated 10/29/01 Volume one (Equipment List) Volume two (Signal Conditioner and Telemetry Loading List) Volume three (PCM MUX and downlink formats) o Electronic database version of the IPCL maintained at Boeing-HB o JSC 18366: Operational Instrumentation, Space Shuttle Orbiter, Temperature Measurement Locations, revised January 1992 o Electronic MML Notebook on Boeing-KSC, NASA Systems website (http://p51.ksc.nasa.gov/aps/mml/) For MADS sensors: o JSC 23560 Modified for STS-107 (OV-102) Investigation: Modular Auxiliary Data System (MADS) / Orbiter Experiments (OEX) Measurement Locations, dated 4/16/03 For all sensors: o Shuttle drawing system (SDS)
Inconsistencies exist between the items listed above, particularly with respect to sensor X-Y-Z location. Despite this conflict, an attempt was made to document the exact X-Y-Z locations used for sensor placement in product VDM-P06 (3D CAD Modeling) and correlate these placements to their respective sources. As of this writing, a supplemental action external to the VDM team exists to resolve any conflicts and consolidate all attributes mentioned above into a single source. An organized list of all electronic files on the VDM team share drive related to product VDM-P09 and applicable to this report is contained in Appendix C. Collectively, these files constitute the product itself, or they represent the product if not computer-based or not available in a compatible electronic format. They also contain supplemental information that describes or explains important product content, inputs/outputs,
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NSTS-37383 observations, and results/conclusions in much greater detail than this report. In the case of product VDM-P09, some of the files are just electronic versions of the documents mentioned above. 3.10 VDM-P10: Sensor Signal Characterization For Failure Scenario
Product VDM-P10 consists of a failure mode assessment for various OI and MADs sensors and associated signal conditioners on the vehicle. As such, the intent of this product was met through a combination of analysis and testing. Analysis, described in this section, involved predicting sensor/signal conditioner outputs for a variety of fail-open and fail-short conditions based on a detailed knowledge of instrumentation system hardware configuration and functionality, along with past experience. In this case, efforts focused on a subset of the 14 OI sensors (seven left wing, seven left wheel well) that went OSL or unexpectedly changed state prior to LOS. This subset included five hydraulic system line/component temperatures in the wing and two tire pressures in the wheel well. For the temperatures, OSL readings were only predicted to be possible under certain fail-short conditions. For the tire pressures, OSL readings were predicted to be possible under both fail-short and fail-open conditions. Testing, described in section 3.15, involved non-destructive open/short tests with actual sensors and flight-like signal conditioners to confirm analytical predictions. It also involved wire burnthrough tests with flight-representative cables, bundles, and harnesses in a variety of environments and configurations to recreate sensor output signatures observed during entry. As also mentioned in section 3.15, testing showed that breakdown in the Kapton insulation on the sensor wires at temperatures beginning at 750 F produces a gradual decrease in resistance between adjacent conductors in a cable and adjacent cables in a bundle, eventually creating a hard-short condition that results in the predicted and observed OSL outputs. An important extension of this product involved analyzing and interpreting/characterizing MADs sensor signatures to explain erratic behavior and address concerns about data validity. The primary objective was to establish a single point in time beyond which (or a range of time during which) the data for each relevant MADS sensor can be considered unreliable (a.k.a. unphysical). This was accomplished by first segregating the data according to measurement and sensor type. Examples include resistance temperature devices (RTDs) vs. thermocouples for temperature, Statham vs. Kulite transducers for pressure, and full-bridge gauges for strain. Then, failure modes and commonalities between the sensors were examined to explain the data observed. The result of this activity was a spreadsheet (referred to as the MADS sensor signature database) and set of charts to describe and categorize sensor signatures, define sensor commonalities, and identify the point (or range) in time where sensor data is considered invalid. A further development of this effort involved using the MADS sensor signature database, instrumentation and sensor location data from product VDM-P09, and wire
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NSTS-37383 routing information from product VDM-P12 to correlate MADS sensor failure timing with wire run locations, particularly along the WLE spar. This activity is described in detail in section 3.16. An organized list of all electronic files on the VDM team share drive related to product VDM-P10 and applicable to this report is contained in Appendix C. Collectively, these files constitute the product itself, or they represent the product if not computer-based or not available in a compatible electronic format. They also contain supplemental information that describes or explains important product content, inputs/outputs, observations, and results/conclusions in much greater detail than this report. Note that all files related to testing are contained in section 3.15 and all files related to the WLE wire run assessment are contained in section 3.16. 3.11 VDM-P11: Structure / Installation Drawings
Product VDM-P11 no longer exists in the VDM team product flowchart. Its intent is effectively captured by products VDM-P06 (3D CAD Modeling) and VDM-P07 (Wire Routing / Sensor Placement Reconstruction (Drawings/Photos)). 3.12 VDM-P12: Wire Routing Details
Product VDM-P12 consists of simplified two-dimensional stick drawings and detailed three-dimensional blackline drawings to document sensor installation, wire routing, and connector pin-out details for all failed and non-failed OI and MADS sensors in the left wing and wheel well. Blackline drawings were created from engineering drawings and engineering orders (EOs) residing in the SDS. Closeout photos taken during Columbias third and most recent OMM (J2) at Boeing-Palmdale were also used to confirm sensor placements and wire routing details. The task of gathering all the necessary information was broken down into areas and functions. Initial assessment involved the following items: Failed and non-failed OI sensors and wiring in the wing Failed and non-failed OI sensors and wiring in the wheel well Failed and non-failed end-effector power and control wires in the wing Failed and non-failed end-effector power and control wires in the wheel well
Significant findings of this initial effort included a determination that all seven OI measurements failing OSL in the wing were contained in a common wire bundle routed along the outboard and forward walls of the wheel well (one of three major bundles, sometimes referred to as A, B, and C). It was also determined that wires for these same sensors were routed through a common connector (P105) in the midbody interface connector panel located in the wing glove area (on the Yo-105 bulkhead between the Xo980 and Xo1009 spars). Other OI sensors not lost but located nearby did not share common wire routings with the failed OSL sensors. Additional indications were that six of the seven affected measurements in the wheel well shared common wire runs to the
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NSTS-37383 wheel well interface connector panel. The seventh measurement shared portions of the same wire run but went to a different connector on the panel. After the OEX recorder was recovered, the product scope was expanded to include stick drawings for all remaining sensors in the wing plus select blackline drawings of sensor installations and wire routings near the left WLE spar. This last task was necessary to support the Failure Scenario Team. The investigation of MADS sensors was by far the biggest effort of the wire routing team. Upon completion, it consisted of eleven batch files of strain gauge measurements (147 measurements total), seven batch files of wing pressure measurements (80 total), two batch files of wing and Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) pod temperature measurements (23 total), and one acoustic sensor. The total effort was divided among numerous engineering groups at KSC, JSC and Boeing-HB. Wire routing information was also used by KSC Orbiter Electrical (OEL) personnel for incorporation into their Pro/Engineer model that depicted key OI sensor wire runs, which was eventually incorporated into product VDM-P06 (3D CAD Modeling). One interesting observation was that some of the blackline drawings conflict with the closeout photos taken during Columbias last OMM. This is most likely due to flexibility in the way the wiring is installed in the vehicle, which pertains to the accessibility of the intended wire routing and the amount of wire the supporting fixtures (cable clamps, aluminum tape, etc.) can handle. An organized list of all electronic files on the VDM team share drive related to product VDM-P12 and applicable to this report is contained in Appendix C. Collectively, these files constitute the product itself, or they represent the product if not computer-based or not available in a compatible electronic format. They also contain supplemental information that describes or explains important product content, inputs/outputs, observations, and results/conclusions in much greater detail than this report. 3.13 VDM-P13: Closeout Photos
Product VDM-P13 consists of an organized collection of photos, some available electronically and some not, to help define or confirm structural configurations, sensor locations and installation details, and wire runs applicable to other VDM team products. Where possible, OV-102 closeout photos taken just prior to the STS-107 mission or just after the last OMM (J2) were used as the preferred source of information for this purpose. However, OV-102 original build photos and other vehicle photos were also used as needed, with an acknowledged sense of uncertainty regarding the applicability to OV-102. The overall photo collection created under product VDM-P13 includes some photos that are available in electronic form and some that are not. Sources of electronic photos include:
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The USA-KSC Still Image Management System (SIMS) website (http://kscgrndtsk1/SIMS/sims.htm) The NASA-KSC Investigation Links website (http://wwwlaunchops.ksc.nasa.gov/etd/Investigation/Links.shtml)
Local copies of particularly relevant photos from these websites also reside on the VDM team share drive. Other photos are available electronically on CD or are available in hardcopy form only. An inventory of all photo items generated and tracked by the VDM team as part of product VDM-P13 is contained in Appendix C. As of this writing, all relevant photos have been retrieved and distributed so no additional work is planned on this product. 3.14 VDM Team ASA4 Anomaly Assessment
The aerosurface servoamplifier assembly #4 (ASA4) anomaly was discovered during review of the OI sensor pre-LOS data, which showed that the channel 4 position feedback signal on the speedbrake began to rise unexpectedly in the last three data samples before LOS, indicating speedbrake opening. However, the commanded and expected position of the speedbrake during entry is closed, as observed prior to this time. Post-LOS data showed the following additional anomalous events: Speedbrake position indication was bleeding off towards null. Right and left inboard and outboard elevon channel 4 isolation valves went to bypass A force fight occurred between channels 1-3 and channel 4 on the left outboard elevon for approximately 2 seconds Remote power converters (RPCs) that provide main power (bus A & C) and isolation valve power (bus B) to ASA4 both tripped
Upon discovering these events/conditions, a small group of VDM team members with expertise in flight control hardware, hydraulics, and electrical power distribution and control (EPDC) system hardware performed a root cause assessment for this anomaly. The first task was to gain a thorough understanding of the power/control circuits and functionality of the channel 4 flight control actuators. This was accomplished by mapping the wire routing for these signals and investigating the inner workings of the ASA4 box and associated actuator sensors/transducers. During this process, the following significant details were discovered: ASA4 receives DC power from three separate RPCs. Primary power is supplied by main buses A and C ORd together through a diode logic circuit. Isolation valve power is supplied to ASA4 by main bus B. Excitation power (26 VAC) to the actuator position feedback and delta pressure transducers is derived internal to ASA4 from the main bus A and C feeds.
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NSTS-37383 Loss of DC power to ASA4 will cause the fail flags to be raised on all channel 4 actuators, thus causing the isolation valves to bypass (i.e. release channel 4 hydraulic pressure within the actuator power valve). Loss of excitation power to the actuator position feedback and delta pressure transducers will cause a transition in output to the null value Loss of DC power to the isolation valves will prevent valve bypass. Excitation wiring to the actuator position feedback and primary delta pressure transducers is separate from equivalent wiring to the secondary delta pressure transducer
After several detailed review meetings and discussions, the team concluded that the most likely events explaining the ASA4 anomaly were as follows: Two shorts occurred at approximately the same time due to burning wires between ASA4 and the left outboard elevon actuator o The first short involved the AC excitation power wires to the actuator position feedback sensor o The second short involved the DC power wires to the isolation valve The current-limiting feature of the RPCs feeding the shorts reduced the bus voltage to ASA4 with a corresponding degradation in ASA4 performance and eventual RPC trip The shorts combined with degraded performance of ASA4 and tripped RPCs resulted in a loss of AC power to the actuator position sensor and DC power to the isolation valve o Position feedback output transitions to null state starting a force fight o Isolation valve fails to bypass and end the force fight before RPC trip
In the end, these events were considered credible and consistent with the behavior of Kapton-insulated wires when exposed to a high heating environment. However, these events occurred very late in the entry timeline, had no negative effects on flight control performance at the time, and were a symptom of a larger problem involving hot plasma flow into the left wing. An organized list of all electronic files on the VDM team share drive related to the ASA4 anomaly assessment and applicable to this report is contained in Appendix C. Collectively, these files constitute the product itself, or they represent the product if not computer-based or not available in a compatible electronic format. They also contain supplemental information that describes or explains important product content, inputs/outputs, observations, and results/conclusions in much greater detail than this report. 3.15 VDM Team Testing
The VDM team conducted nine separate test programs in support of the Columbia investigation. All nine test programs are summarized in this report, with additional test set-up details and test data available in separate reports and briefings contained on the
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NSTS-37383 VDM team share drive and referenced in Appendix C. Important observations and/or conclusions resulting from each test program are also summarized below. 1. Main Landing Gear Uplock Release Cartridge Auto Ignition Test ESTA This test was conducted at the Energy Systems Test Area (ESTA) at JSC. A class III main landing gear uplock release cartridge was placed in a thermal chamber and subjected to increasing temperature at 25 to 30 F per minute until propellant ignition occurred. Results showed autoignition at 598 F, far above any temperatures observed in the wheel well during entry. 2. Main Landing Gear (MLG) Proximity Sensor Failure Test NSLD This test was conducted at the NASA Shuttle Logistics Depot (NSLD) at KSC. Proximity sensors in each wheel well detect uplock vs. downlock position of the main landing gear. Entry data from these sensors, included in the OI telemetry stream, showed an unexpected change of state from uplock to not-uplock on the left main gear uplock proximity sensor prior to LOS. To examine the failure modes of this sensor and its proximity box signal conditioner, a series of tests was run to characterize the output for simulated failures of the sensor cabling. Test conditions included various combinations of hard open circuits, hard short circuits, and soft short circuits for various combinations of conductors in the sensor cabling. Results showed which conditions provide a gear uplock vs. not uplock output. Furthermore, it was determined that a soft short within a particular resistance range could cause a change in indicated output for a target far sensor like the one in question, but not for target near sensors like those that did not change state in flight. For this reason, it is presumed that the change of state in the left MLG downlock sensor is a false indication resulting from local heating/burning of the sensor wires. 3. Sensor / Signal Conditioner Failure Test SAIL This test was conducted in the Shuttle Avionics Integration Laboratory (SAIL) at JSC. Entry data for numerous OI pressure and temperature sensors from before LOS showed unexpected output changes from nominal to OSL, some decaying quickly and others much more slowly. To examine the failure modes of these sensors (or equivalent electric circuits) and the associated signal conditioners, a series of tests was run to characterize the output for simulated failures of the sensor cabling. Test conditions included hard open circuits, hard short circuits, and soft short circuits for various combinations of conductors in the sensor cabling. Results showed those cable failures / combinations of failures that produce a normal, off scale high (OSH), or OSL output. More importantly, it was determined that multiple hard short and hard open combinations could produce an OSL output but always with a step-function signature. A smooth decay as seen in flight could only be produced under variable resistance conditions similar
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NSTS-37383 to those generated in the wire burnthrough tests (to be described in the following sections). 4. Initial Cable Burnthrough Characterization Test (oxygen-acetylene torch) ESTA This test was conducted at ESTA at JSC. Early in the STS-107 investigation, evidence from OI sensors indicated a left wing overtemperature condition. Accordingly, a quick test was performed to determine the behavior of Kaptoninsulated cables when subjected to localized heating from a small oxygenacetylene torch. Although this heat source was recognized to be very different than the flight plasma environment, the objective of the test was simply to provide generic data on the behavior of Kapton-insulated cables when rapidly heated. Individual twisted shielded cables and small harnesses consisting of multiple twisted shielded cables were all heated with the torch. Temperature and resistance between conductors within a single cable were measured and recorded. Results from single cable testing showed that a short gradually develops between conductors when heated, with some finite time required for the short to propagate. Based on available literature for Kapton insulation, this behavior is caused by breakdown of the insulation at high temperature as it transitions to being a conductor. Results from the harness testing showed that there can be a significant time delay in the onset of a short circuit for different cables depending on the location within a harness. These factors are presumed to explain the variability in signal decay profile (i.e. time from nominal to OSL) and times at which signal decay began for each sensor. 5. Hot Oven Cable Overtemperature Test (GN2 Environment) ESTA This test was conducted at ESTA at JSC. To supplement the initial cable burnthrough test, a hot oven test was performed to characterize the behavior of a longer section of a Kapton-insulated twisted shielded cable when uniformly heated. Single cables were individually subjected to heating in a 12 in long tube oven. Temperature and resistance between the conductors in the cable were recorded. A nitrogen purge was implemented to minimize potential reaction between oxygen and the cable materials at elevated temperature. Heating of the test cables was performed at various rates by adjusting oven settings. Results showed that the short circuit between conductors in a cable initiates at 750 to 950 F. Results also showed that the propagation time for the short (from essentially infinite resistance to some very low value) was a strong function of heating rate; higher heating rates produced a shorter propagation time. Although this result was qualitative in nature, since heating rates were not actually measured, the observed behavior did relate to the Columbia flight data where sensor failures showed varying times to decay from a nominal reading to OSL. The conductor-to-conductor resistance data from this test was subsequently applied to the sensor calibration curves and results of the SAIL testing to show the predicted vehicle signal conditioner output if the sensor cables were subjected to an overtemperature condition like that simulated in the oven. The
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NSTS-37383 resulting plots of these simulated flight measurements showed a very similar profile to the flight data. 6. Hot Oven Cable Overtemperature Test (Vacuum Environment) WSTF This test was conducted at the White Sands Test Facility (WSTF). Since the offnominal sensor signatures were observed with the vehicle at such a high altitude, portions of the hot oven GN2 test were repeated at vacuum conditions to evaluate any effects of ambient pressure. Again, single Kapton-insulated twisted shielded cables were individually subjected to heating in a long vacuum oven with temperature and resistance between conductors measured and recorded. As expected, results showed the same resistance decay profile as seen during the hot oven tests in GN2, thus supporting previous conclusions. 7. Cable Burnthrough Thermal Model Calibration Test (small propane torch) ESTA This test was conducted at ESTA at JSC. Early on in the investigation, the analysis team developed detailed thermal models of Orbiter cables, harnesses (multiple cables), and bundles (multiple harnesses) being impinged upon by hot gas flow. Cable and harness burnthrough testing was subsequently performed to provide engineering data to correlate/calibrate these thermal models. Various Kapton-insulated twisted shielded cables and 40-cable harnesses were heated with a small propane torch from various distances and incident angles to vary the local heat rates. Instrumented metal specimens, consisting of steel rods and tubes to simulate the size and shape of the flight cables and harnesses, were also heated with the torch and used as a calorimeter. Temperature and resistance between conductors within the cables and harnesses were recorded, as were numerous temperatures within the calorimeters. Results were used to support initial development and correlation of the thermal models. However, the small torch size was insufficient to allow testing of a large bundle similar in size to those carrying the sensor signal and excitation wires in the wing and wheel well areas. Therefore, complete thermal model calibration was not yet possible. 8. ESTA Cable and Bundle Burnthrough Test (large propane torch) To enable additional burnthrough testing on a large wire bundle representative of those being modeled/analyzed on the vehicle, a larger propane torch was used. Test bundles of 1.75 in diameter, consisting of 290 Kapton-insulated twisted shielded cables, were also built from flight spare inventory to simulate the wire bundles routed along the forward and outboard walls of the wheel well. Within each test bundle, temperature and resistance between conductors were measured and recorded on 33 individual cables. These bundles, along with instrumented metal calorimeters built to simulate the size and shape of large bundles, were then individually heated with the torch. Results were used to complete development and correlation of the thermal models.
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NSTS-37383 9. Arc Jet Cable Bundle Failure Test This test was conducted in the Atmospheric and Reentry Materials Structural Evaluation Facility (ARMSEF) at JSC. During STS-107, many OI and MADS sensors showed anomalies in their output signals, likely related to localized cable heating. In this test, cable bundles simulating those carrying numerous OI and MADS sensor wires on the Orbiter were subjected to hot plasma impingement representative of the entry environment through various sized holes in an aluminum plate. The test bundles were approximately 1.75 in diameter and consisted of 290 separate 24 AWG, Kapton-insulated, twisted, shielded cables secured with flight-like aluminum cable clamps. Within each bundle, 33 separate cables were monitored for changes in conductor-to-conductor resistance as a function of temperature and time. The general purpose of the test was to gain an understanding of the convective heating environment and associated thermal failure mechanism for the cable bundles routed inside the left wing. The specific objective was to obtain the failure mechanism characteristics, failure initiation time, failure rate, and burnthrough time for a cable bundle subjected to a representative plasma environment. Test results showed that arc jet plume heating could produce the same cable failure mechanism seen in previous torch tests (but much more quickly and dramatically) and the same sensor output signatures seen in flight. They also showed a very rapid erosion of the hole in the aluminum plate with a corresponding increase in cable failure rate. Finally, test-derived heating rate and cable failure rate data can be used to validate thermal models of the vehicle to support failure scenario development for the Columbia investigation. 3.16 VDM Team Leading Edge Wire Run Assessment
As an extension of product VDM-P10 (Sensor Signal Characterization for Failure Scenario), a detailed assessment was performed to examine the correlation between MADS sensor failure timing and sensor wire routing. The MADS sensor signature database from product VDM-P10 and wire routing information from product VDM-P12 were both used as inputs to this assessment. Results of the assessment indicate that all 18 MADS sensors with wires contained in one of the five separate harnesses routed along the left WLE spar (sometimes referred to as A, B, C, D, and E) were lost. Furthermore, 17 out of 18 of these events occurred during a 10 sec time interval (EI+487 sec to EI+497 sec) preceding the loss of any other MADS sensors with different wire routings. The only exception involved four unrelated MADS sensors sharing a common power supply with the failed WLE-routed sensors. These four sensors are presumed to have been lost due to electrical commonality, not wire heating/burning away from the left WLE spar. Finally, wire routing geometry and sensor failure order (top to bottom, outboard to inboard) suggest specific boundaries for left WLE spar burnthrough behind RCC panel 8.
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NSTS-37383 Based on engineering drawings and closeout photos, some uncertainty still exists regarding which sensor wires are contained in which of the five main WLE harnesses. The most notable example involves the WLE spar temperature sensor behind RCC panel 9, which was the last of the 18 WLE-routed sensors to fail and did so even after other MADS sensors in the three main wheel well wire bundles began to fail. Despite this uncertainty, confirmed information about the wire routing still provides strong evidence that a breach in the WLE spar occurred at RCC panel 8, allowing hot plasma to enter the wing. The product resulting from this assessment is a set of presentation charts containing a tabular summary of all WLE-routed MADS sensors, a 3D CAD picture showing sensor locations and cable routings, closeout photos confirming these routings to the extent possible, and relevant plots of sensor data. This information is kept on the VDM team share drive and is also referenced in Appendix C. 3.17 VDM Team Miscellaneous Tasks
Several miscellaneous tasks were performed by select VDM team members based on expertise in Orbiter propulsion and power subsystems, including the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU); Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPDC) System; Fuel Cells (FC); Hydraulics/Water Spray Boiler (Hyd/WSB); Main Propulsion System (MPS); Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS); Power Reactant Supply and Distribution (PRSD) System; Pyrotechnic Devices (Pyro); and Reaction Control System (RCS). In particular, hardware inventories and hazard assessments applicable to STS-107 were created to aid the debris recovery teams with hardware identification and handling safety. In addition, pre-flight data records that are not controlled (i.e. organized and stored) in any other configuration management system were identified and impounded, including Pyro acceptance data packages (ADPs) and Space Shuttle Engineering Integration (SSEI) flight readiness statements (FRSs). An organized list of all electronic files on the VDM team share drive related to the miscellaneous tasks and applicable to this report is contained in Appendix C. Collectively, these files constitute the product itself, or they represent the product if not computer-based or not available in a compatible electronic format. They also contain supplemental information that describes or explains important product content, inputs/outputs, observations, and results/conclusions in much greater detail than this report. 4.0 CONCLUSIONS AND SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS
The VDM team charter included the creation of unique and innovative data display products that aid in understanding the hardware configuration, sensor response data, and complex sequence of events during Columbias entry. Accordingly, the team focused on producing the products defined by the VDM team product flowchart in Appendix A and responding to all related action items listed in Appendix B. All VDM team products have been described in this report. Action items were not discussed but
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NSTS-37383 relate directly to the VDM team products as indicated by the action tracking number and associated closeout files in Appendix B. Since the VDM team was not formally tasked with detailed interpretation of the flight data, significant findings are limited to those areas in which testing or analysis took place to create a product, pursue a special activity, or respond to an action. The resulting list of conclusions and findings is shown below. Most of these items have previously been discussed in this report. The VDM team produced seven major products and six supporting data generation/gathering products. Four special activities related to these products and encompassed by the VDM team charter were also pursued. Finally, the VDM team worked 98 formal action items. The content, revision status, and findings of each VDM team product and special activity were previously discussed in this report. As of this writing, only two action items remain open. The first involves plasma impingement testing of flight-representative cable bundles under VDM Team Testing (section 3.15). The second involves production of the latest and expected final revision of product VDM-P01 (3D Full Animation Event Sequence Playback, section 3.1). The first OI indications of off-nominal system performance involved a hydraulic line temperature on the inboard sidewall (Yo-105) of the left wheel well (V58T1703A, LMG Brake Line Temp D) at GMT 2003/032:13:52:17. Subsequently, other OI sensors began showing off-nominal trends. Of these, a total of 14 OI measurements went OSL or unexpectedly changed state (starting at GMT 2003/032:13:52:56) prior to LOS, as listed in section 3.0. Seven of these sensors were located in the left wing and seven were located in the left wheel well. All seven in the left wing shared a common wire bundle routed along the outboard and forward walls of the left wheel well. They also shared a common connector panel and connector in the wing glove area (midbody interface connector panel located on the Yo-105 bulkhead between the Xo980 and Xo1009 spars, connector P105). Six of the seven in the wheel well shared a common wire run along the aft wall (Xo1191 spar), ceiling, and forward wall (Xo1040 spar) of the wheel well, with the seventh signal sharing portions of this same run. All seven of these signals shared a common connector panel in the wheel well (wheel well interface connector panel located on the Y-105 bulkhead) but they did not all share a common wire bundle or connector. Recovery of the OEX recorder provided 600+ additional MADS pressure, temperature, and strain measurements of interest to the investigation, the first of which (V12G9921A, Left Wing Front Spar Strain) began showing signs of offnominal performance at GMT 2003/032:13:48:39, approximately 3:38 sec before the first off-nominal OI sensor reading was detected. Based on analysis and testing performed by the VDM team, nearly all notable OI and MADS sensor signatures observed during entry (OI sensors lost OSL or unexpectedly changing state before LOS, MADS sensors showing erratic behavior then failing OSL or OSH, OI sensors indicating the ASA4 anomaly, etc.)
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NSTS-37383 are consistent with plasma-induced heating/burnthrough and progressive shorting of the associated Kapton-insulated cables, rather than actual events occurring at the location of each sensor. Propagation of the short, as manifested in failure start time and signal decay time, is dependent on cable location within a harness/bundle and local heat flux, with arc-jet plasma impingement tests showing the greatest similarity to flight data. Product VDM-P05 (2D Graphical Events Sequence) provides an excellent overall view of the sequence of events that occurred during entry. The format and content of this product allow a quick flip-through of the charts to visualize: (1) initial heating on the left wing leading edge, (2) heating/burnthrough of the sensor cables routed on the back side of the WLE spar, (3) heating/burnthrough of the sensor cables routed on the outboard and forward walls of the wheel well, (4) temperatures increasing inside the wheel well, and (5) heating/burnthrough of sensor cables routed inside the wheel well. When combined with product VDMP04 (2D Static Storyboard), a comprehensive view of all events and sensor data observed during entry is obtained. A comprehensive 3D solid model representation of the Orbiters left wing was created in Pro/Engineer under product VDM-P06 (3D CAD Modeling). The toplevel assembly file contains over 2000 individual components, including wing structure, wheel well structure, main landing gear, hydraulic lines, OI sensors and associated wire runs, and leading edge RCC panels. Additional modeling was performed to show fluid systems hardware located in the mid fuselage area adjacent to the left wheel well, in addition to 37 OI sensors in the left wing, wheel well, and mid-fuselage areas; 58 OI temperature sensors in area 40; and 615 MADS pressure, temperature, and strain sensors throughout the vehicle. An extension of product VDM-P10 (Sensor Signature Characterization for Failure Scenario, section 3.10) involved analyzing and interpreting/characterizing MADs sensor signatures to explain erratic behavior and address concerns about data validity. The result of this activity was a comprehensive sensor signature database representing MADS sensor failure signatures and timing. Related work on the leading edge wire run assessment (section 3.16) indicated that all 18 MADS sensors with wires contained in one of the five separate harnesses routed along the left WLE spar were lost. Furthermore, 17 out of 18 of these events occurred during a 10 sec time interval (EI+487 sec to EI+497 sec) preceding the loss of any other MADS sensors with different wire routings. The only exception involved four unrelated MADS sensors sharing a common power supply with the failed WLE-routed sensors. These four sensors are presumed to have been lost due to electrical commonality, not wire heating/burning away from the left WLE spar. Finally, wire routing geometry and sensor failure order (top to bottom, outboard to inboard) suggest specific boundaries for left WLE spar burnthrough behind RCC panel 8.
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APPENDIX A: VDM Team Product Flow Chart
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APPENDIX B: VDM Team Roster and Action List
NOTE: Closeout files referenced in the VDM team action list are available in the final report folder on the VDM team share drive and on the final report CD. However, unlike the product document list in Appendix C, embedded hyperlinks to the action closeout files are not present. Instead, base filenames and file extensions are given without regard to revision or date. This was done to minimize action list upkeep as response files were continually being revised. For those files that are common to both lists, hyperlinks to the revision available at the time of this writing can be accessed from the product document list in Appendix C. For those that are not common (with the exception of 100+ MB raw data files associated with product VDM-P04), the base filenames and file extensions can be used to locate a particular document of interest in the final report folder on the VDM team share drive or on the final report CD (or better yet, the related product folder on the VDM team share drive where the latest revisions of all VDM files are kept).
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APPENDIX C: VDM Product Files for the Final Report Product/Activity VDM-P01: 3D Full Animation Event Sequence Playback VDM-P02: Physical Mockup VDM-P03: 3D Graphical Events Sequence VDM-P04: 2D Static Storyboard VDM-P05: 2D Graphical Events Sequence VDM-P06: 3D CAD Modeling VDM-P07: Wire Routing / Sensor Placement Reconstruction (Drawings/Photos) VDM-P08: Events Timeline VDM-P09: Instrumentation Listing and Sensor Location VDM-P10: Sensor Signal Characterization For Failure Scenario VDM-P11: Structure / Installation Drawings VDM-P12: Wire Routing Details VDM-P13: Closeout Photos VDM Team ASA4 Anomaly Assessment VDM Team Testing VDM Team Leading Edge Wire Run Assessment Files Applicable to VDM Final Report? YES YES NO YES YES YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES YES YES YES
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NSTS-37383 APPENDIX D: Acronyms and Abbreviations Acronym/Symbol 2D 3D AC Actr ADP APU ARMSEF ASA AVI AWG CAD CAIB CD CSV DC DVD ECLSS EI Elev EO EP EPDC ES ESTA FC FDM FRS GHe GMT GN2 HB Hyd/WSB IDI IGOAL Inbd IPCL JPEG JSC KSC Definition Delta 2-Dimensional 3-Dimensional Alternating Current Actuator Acceptance Data Pack Auxiliary Power Unit Atmospheric and Reentry Materials Structural Evaluation Facility at JSC Aerosurface Servo Amplifier Audio Video Interleave American Wire Gauge Computer Columbia Accident Investigation Board Compact Disk Comma Separated Variable Direct Current Digital Video Disk Environmental Control and Life Support System Entry Interface Elevon Engineering Order Energy Systems Division at JSC Electrical Power Distribution and Control Structures and Mechanics Division at JSC Energy Systems Test Area at JSC Fuel Cell Frequency Division Multiplexer Flight Readiness Statement Gaseous Helium Greenwich Mean Time Gaseous Nitrogen Huntington Beach, CA Hydraulics / Water Spray Boiler Information Dynamics, Inc. Integrated Graphic Operations and Analysis Laboratory at JSC Inboard Instrumentation Program and Components List Joint Photographic Experts Group Johnson Space Center Kennedy Space Center 31

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NSTS-37383 LH LMLG LMG Ln LOE LOS Lwr MADS MEI MER MLG MML MPEG MPS MSFC MUX NASA NSLD OEL OEX OI OMM OMS OSH OSL Outbd OVEWG PCM Press Prox PRSD PRT Pyro RCC RCS RPC RTD Rtn SAIL SDS SIMS SSEI STK T TPS Left Hand Left Main Landing Gear Left Main Gear Line Left Outboard Elevon Loss of Signal Lower Modular Auxiliary Data System Muniz Engineering, Inc. Mission Evaluation Room Main Landing Gear Master Measurement List Moving Pictures Experts Group Main Propulsion System Marshall Space Flight Center Multiplexer National Aeronautics and Space Administration NASA Shuttle Logistics Depot at KSC Orbiter Electrical Orbiter Experiments Orbiter Instrumentation Orbiter Major Modification Orbital Maneuvering System Off-Scale High Off-Scale Low Outboard Orbiter Vehicle Engineering Working Group Pulse Code Modulation Pressure Proximity Power Reactant Storage and Distribution Problem Review Team Pyrotechnic Reinforced Carbon-Carbon Reaction Control System Remote Power Controller Resistance Temperature Detector Return Shuttle Avionics Integration Laboratory Shuttle Drawing System Still Image Management System Space Shuttle Engineering Integration Satellite Took Kit Temperature Thermal Protection System 32

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NSTS-37383 Upr USA VAC VDC VDM WLE WSTF Upper United Space Alliance Volts AC Volts DC Vehicle Data Mapping Wing Leading Edge White Sands Test Facility
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This Appendix contains the SRB Working Group Presentation to Columbia Accident Investigation Board, 28 May 2003.
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Starfire Team Final Report, Jun 3, 2003
This Appendix contains NSTS-37379 Starfire Team Final Report in Support of the Columbia Accident Investigation, 3 June 2003.
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NSTS-37379
Starfire Team Final Report

in support of the Columbia Accident Investigation
June 3, 2003
Submitted by: /s/ Douglas White Douglas White, USA Team Leader Dewey Houck, Boeing Karen Watts, USA Julian Christou, CFAO Robert Fugate, SOR /s/ Kandy Jarvis Kandy Jarvis, LMSO Team Member Maj. Robert Johnson, USAF Rick Cleis, SOR Roger Petty, SOR Rich Rast, SOR
This information is being distributed to aid in the investigation of the Columbia mishap and should only be distributed to personnel who are actively involved in this investigation.
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Table of Contents
Executive Summary.......................................................................................................3 1.0 INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................4 2.0 PURPOSE & SCOPE ...............................................................................................4 3.0 DATA........................................................................................................................5 4.0 DATA ANALYSIS.....................................................................................................6 5.0 RESULTS .................................................................................................................6 Table 1 Anomalous Optical Signature (AOS) Results .............................................7 Fig. 1: Turbulence near the nose/left wing/WLE. .......................................................7 Fig. 2: Asymmetric Gas Trail. ......................................................................................7 Fig. 3: WLE Bulges....................................................................................................8 Fig. 4: Asymmetric Bulge at Nose...............................................................................8 Fig. 5: Asymmetric Streaming of Gas from Aft of Orbiter. ........................................8 Fig. 6: Flare 1.................................................................................................................9 Fig. 6A: Flare 1. ...........................................................................................................10 6.0 CONCLUSIONS .....................................................................................................10 7.0 RECOMMENDATIONS ..........................................................................................10 APPENDIX A.................................................................................................................12 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ..........................................................................12 APPENDIX B.................................................................................................................13 TEAM MEMBER BIOGRAPHIES..................................................................................13 APPENDIX C.................................................................................................................15 CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION AND SUMMARY .......................................................15 APPENDIX D.................................................................................................................18 Presentation 1 ..............................................................................................................19 Presentation 2 ..............................................................................................................21 APPENDIX E .................................................................................................................36 DEFINITIONS ................................................................................................................36
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Executive Summary
The Starfire Team was created in support of the STS-107 Orbiter Vehicle Engineering (OVE) investigation effort. The teams charter was to review imagery, both still photography and video taken at the Starfire Optical Range (SOR) at Kirtland Air Force Base in New Mexico, in order to determine the state of the orbiter at that time in its re-entry. As part of this investigation about 18,800 video frames and 3 digital stills were reviewed and a small portion of these were processed and analyzed. All were categorized as to potential return of information regarding the condition of the orbiter. A total of ten anomalous optical signatures (AOS) were identified and images associated with these signatures were processed to some degree. An AOS here is considered to be a visual appearance of the orbiter containing a characteristic that appears irregular; i.e., lack of symmetry, pulsation, scintillation. Difficulties arose due to motion blur related to the relative motion of the orbiter and camera, failure to track due to relative angular velocity, lack of comparative nominal condition images, saturation of images, and lack of resolution. In some cases these difficulties were prohibitive in determining a conclusion regarding the condition of the orbiter. Of the ten AOS, two were concluded to be nominal (with the understanding an off-nominal condition contribution was indeterminate for one image), two were not classifiable as nominal or off nominal, and six were considered off nominal. See Table 1 for a summary. Of the six AOS identified as off nominal, the Wing Leading Edge (WLE) bulge(s) is the single AOS for which a nominal condition is least likely. Other AOS have a possibility of finding a nominal condition, albeit one not currently understood, as the source. The lack of comparative nominal condition data precludes any conclusion to the one hundred percent certainty level. If all ten AOS are compared, five provide for the possibility of an event occurring relating to the left wing. Recommendations for the future, in the event such imagery is requested, would require that higher resolution video be obtained at high magnification, such as that taken through a telescope that is capable of tracking an object with a high angular velocity. The digital stills proved useful, but a greater number would be desired, with minimal saturation. Nominal condition re-entry imagery is deemed necessary for future studies of this type of orbiter condition analysis upon re-entry.

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1.0 INTRODUCTION The Starfire Team was formed in support of the Orbiter Vehicle Engineering Working Group (OVEWG) to aid the NASA community in the investigation of the STS-107 accident. The team was formed with members of various organizations, some associated with NASA, some not. A short biography of each member can be found in Appendix B of this report. The Starfire Optical Range (SOR), a part of the Air Force Research Lab, acquired three still digital photographs and four videos of the Columbia as it passed over Albuquerque, New Mexico on re-entry. This was the first attempt by SOR to capture imagery of a shuttle on reentry. SOR acquired color video through a handheld digital camera operated in movie mode, one video through a camera mounted on the elevation gimbal of the coelostat used to track the orbiter and two videos with different fields of view obtained with two telescopes looking through the 1.0-m clear aperture coelostat consisting of two flat mirrors that rotate to view different parts of the sky. Three still digital photographs were also acquired with a 3.5inch telescope and CCD camera, also looking through the coelostat, though one of the stills imaged only a small fraction of the orbiter/plasma trail. These images were obtained by engineers at SOR volunteering their time and using available equipment. The data collection was not an official tasking. Tracking of the orbiter had never before been attempted with this equipment. The degree of potential object brightness was unknown and that, coupled with a brightening sky due to imminent sunrise, made gain adjustments (to prevent saturation) on the instruments difficult. There was no opportunity to compensate for errors in the supplied vectors of the orbiter as the orbiter was obscured by cloud during the first 20 degrees of the pass; this compounded the difficulty of tracking a rapidly moving object in a small field of view (FOV). The Starfire Team was formed to process and evaluate the resulting imagery for indications of the orbiter condition at that time in the re-entry path. The Starfire Team reviewed all images and identified those stills or frames of the videos that appeared most probable to achieve this goal. The team focused on the identified video frames and stills and performed various levels of image processing and analysis. The Starfire Team provided regular status briefings to the OVEWG. 2.0 PURPOSE & SCOPE This report defines and documents the Starfire Team investigation: determination of important stills and video frames, problems encountered, data analysis techniques, and data interpretation results. The scope of the data interpretation included a limited number of the available video frames and two of the three stills. While other video frames were available, those of the orbiter with AOS were judged the most potentially revealing and only those were examined in detail. Classification of priority resulted in four categories:

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1) 2) 3) 4)
High potential of information return from analyses Moderate potential of information return from analyses Low potential of information return from analyses No expected information return from analyses
After review of all available data, two of the three stills and one set of frames from the 5millirad field-of-view (FOV) video were considered to be Category 1. A set of frames here is defined as a sequential subset of video frames extracted from the complete video, wherein the number of frames in a set varies according to the content. The remaining still, one set of frames from the 5-millirad FOV video, and one set of frames from the 700-microrad FOV video were classified to be Category 2. The remaining video frames that contained views of the orbiter, as well as the two remaining videos were considered to be Category 3. Any set of video frames that failed to capture the orbiter in its field of view was classified to be Category 4. Several problems were encountered. The primary difficulty with analysis was the lack of nominal-condition comparative data. Other problems were unknown plate scales (i.e. size of objects), motion blurring, saturated images, unknown orientation (rotation), and resolution. Techniques for analyzing this type of imagery existed only in a limited fashion; this specific type of data did not previously exist. Plate scales and orientation of a few images were determined by imaging starfields at the known elevation and azimuth of the image and calculating the scale and degree of rotation. Data analysis techniques and interpretation required drawing on assorted personnel with backgrounds in image data reduction and analysis, astronomical data reduction and analysis, wire cad modeling, aerothermal modeling, and extrapolation of aerothermal conditions to visual results. 3.0 DATA All video and stills were reviewed by the Starfire Team as well as independently reviewed by the STS-107 Image Analysis Team creating the timeline for the Columbias re-entry. The review by the timeline team was used as a metric against category classification. The approximate Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) coverage encompassing all of the videos and stills wherein the orbiter is visible is 13:56:31 13:58:12. The two videos that were not acquired through a telescope were considered of no value for the purpose of this teams work other than to confirm or deny possible changes in appearance of the orbiters luminosity. These were videos EOC2-4-148-2 and EOC2-4-1486. They were reviewed for possible changes in luminosity and no changes were seen that correlated with any AOS. Video EOC2-4-148-4 is a 5 millirad FOV (~1/3 degree) digital video taken through a 14 Celestron telescope looking off two 1.5-m diameter flat mirrors positioned at 45 degrees to the line of sight that rotate about vertical and horizontal axes: a configuration known as a 1m clear aperture coelostat. This arrangement causes images in the focal plane of a camera

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to rotate as the mount tracks objects across the sky. Sets of frames ranged from Category 1 through Category 4. The orbiter was in the FOV intermittently. Video EOC2-4-148-3 is a 700 microrad FOV video taken through a 7 Questar telescope also looking through the 1-m coelostat. Sets of frames ranged from Category 2 through Category 4. The orbiter was in the FOV infrequently. Digital stills consist of JSC2003e03394 (GMT 13:57:14) and JSC2003e03395 (GMT 13:57:59). These were acquired with a 3.5-inch telescope and CCD camera, also looking through the coelostat. Both of these stills were classified Category 1. The third still (GMT 13:57:51) has been submitted for inclusion in the JSC Columbia Accident stills database, but as of yet has no JSC number. It was classified a Category 2. All three stills were taken with a CCD camera attached to a 3.5-inch Questar telescope looking through the 1.0-m coeleostat. Appendix C identifies categorization of this data in both pre- and post- analysis status. 4.0 DATA ANALYSIS After preliminary review and classification, those stills or sets of video frames in Categories 1 and 2 were examined. Sets of video frames were captured via two different programs ISEE & DPS Reality. Late in the analysis it was recognized that some small degree of signal was lost if video frames were taken from a second-generation copy rather than a digital clone or digital copy of the original. Video frames taken from a digital copy were examined and while slightly higher in quality, appeared to add no significance to the final results, thus the data were not reprocessed. Adobe Photoshop was used to enhance contrasts, rotate images as required to correct to proper orientation due to the rotation of the mirror, and crop images. (Adobe resamples an image when it rotates an image; resampled images were not used in for final analysis.) Preliminary interpretation was performed. Stills and some single frames of video were processed with an iterative blind deconvolution method (Center for Adaptive Optics, Christou). Two of the stills were also processed using a regularized maximum likelihood method (Veridian, Thelen). Only the stills and frames processed by the blind deconvolution method were interpreted and then reviewed by the entire team. After a detailed review, many images were reclassified. See Appendix C for details regarding classification/reclassification and a brief summary of results. 5.0 RESULTS The Starfire Team reviewed about 18,800 frames of video and three digital stills. Ten possible AOS were identified and investigated. Due to the lack of comparative nominal condition imagery, in no case can an apparent AOS be confirmed to the one hundred percent level of certainty. One event not addressed here is Debris 16, a debris event noted

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Anomaly
Turbulence near the nose/left wing, WLE Asymmetric gas trail WLE bulges Asymmetric bulge at nose Asymmetric streaming of gas from aft of orbiter Flare 1 Flare 2 Flaring/Streaming Brightening of left wing Nose or Tail brightening
NASA # Video/Still
EOC2-4-0148-3 JSC2003e03394 JSC2003e03394 JSC2003e03394 EOC2-4-0148-4 EOC2-4-0148-4 EOC2-4-0148-4 EOC2-4-0148-4 JSC2003e03395 EOC2-4-0148-4 JSC2003e03395 EOC2-4-0148-4
Conclusion
Unknown if off-nominal Nominal Off-nominal Nominal Unknown if off-nominal Off-nominal Off-nominal Off-nominal Off-nominal Off-nominal
Table 1 Anomalous Optical Signature (AOS) Results

by the STS-107 Image Analysis Team constructing the timeline. The debris event is difficult to see and was not part of the scope of this task. Of all the AOS identified as off nominal, the Wing Leading Edge (WLE) bulge(s) is the AOS for which a nominal condition is least likely. Other AOS have a greater possibility of finding a nominal condition, albeit one not currently understood, as the source. See Table 1 for a list of the ten AOS, video/still the AOS is associated with, and conclusions. A brief discussion follows, identifying possible causes of the AOS identified and the conclusions drawn. Some additional information is contained in Appendix D.
Plasma Disturbance?
Right Wing
Left Wing
Fig. 1: Turbulence near the nose/left wing/WLE. NASA video EOC2-4-0148-3. It is unknown what a nominal optical signature of the flowfield at these specific conditions (speed, orientation, etc.) would look like. The signature is not overt nor does telemetry provide additional insight. No conclusion can be drawn regarding a nominal or off nominal condition.
Bottom
Fig. 2: Asymmetric Gas Trail. NASA Image JSC2003e03394. The processed image revealed structure in the gas trail. This structure could be correlated to specific source locations on the orbiter. Damage to the left wing could create additional enhancement of the gas trail that could not be distinguished from known sources. This optical signature is considered to represent a nominal condition with the caveat that an off-nominal condition could not be identified as such with this image.

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Fig. 3: WLE Bulges. No currently understood nominal condition can support this optical signature. Possibilities for sources of this optical signature are: localized increase in temperatures (hot spots), local increase in reflectivity (unlikely), tile damage (unlikely), and damage to WLE. Viewing geometry and refraction could contribute. See Appendix D for some additional explanation. This is considered to represent an offnominal condition.
Fig. 4: Asymmetric Bulge at Nose. The nose is known to be the hottest spot and could produce an optical signature representative of a localized intensity increase. As the image displays the bottom of the orbiter (the wirecad model is see-through and somewhat misleading due to that), orientation and viewing angle is considered the most likely source of this optical signature. This is not inconsistent with Sandias Plasma models. This is considered to represent a nominal condition. Fig. 5: Asymmetric Streaming of Gas from Aft of Orbiter. NASA video EOC2-4-0148-4. This is apparent in the video and not well represented by a still image. In the video, the image of the orbiter is highly saturated and is lemon-shaped in appearance. The image shown at the left has been rotated into its approximate correct orientation and would appear similar to the above digital still were it not so badly saturated. A tail of gas/plasma is evident at the aft of the orbiter (identified as streams). This tail appears to stream and pulse over time. One of the three digital stills is acquired during this period of time and shows an asymmetric gas trail (see Fig. 2). This streaming is likely related to the asymmetric gas trail seen in the still and the explanation for the asymmetric gas trail potentially applies to this streaming/pulsing tail. The asymmetric gas trail in the still is thought to be nominal (with consideration of the caveats mentioned in Fig. 2) and this suggests that this streaming effect may also represent a nominal case. Without nominal comparative data, no conclusion can be drawn regarding if this is a nominal or off nominal condition. The last five AOS are to some degree interrelated. The five signatures are Flare 1, Flare 2, Flaring/Streaming, Brightening of Left Wing, and Nose or Tail Brightening. The Brightening of the Left Wing and Nose or Tail Brightening occurs simultaneously with Flare 1 and visually may help create the optical signature of Flare 1. Flare 1 shows brightening of the

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left wing, the nose/tail, and a streaming signature (hot gas?) possibly located around the tail region. This does not imply tail damage, but rather one possibility presented is that normal tail interaction with the flowfield generates this optical signature. The general optical signature of Flare 1 persists (in time) and Flaring/Streaming is seen. The orbiter passes out of the FOV, then returns. As it leaves the FOV again, Flare 2 is seen. Flare 2 is merely a brightening with no significant change in the general optical signature associated with Flare 1, other than the increase in brightness. Only the imagery of Flare 1 is shown as all five optical signatures are essentially represented by the three images shown below. Fig. 6: Flare 1. NASA video EOC2-4-0148-4. Flare 1 is noted on the timeline for Columbias reentry and its AOS may in part be a brightening of the upper portion of the canopy and left wing of the orbiter. Images taken from the video are shown. To the left is the pre-flare appearance of the orbiter; to the right is Flare 1. The checkerboard pattern to the left of both images is the edge of the FOV. These images are approximately half a second apart in time. They have not been rotated to the proper orientation. Diffraction was considered as a possibility; diffraction is an effect of the optics seen as a brightening of an object as an object leaves the FOV of the telescope. This was tested for by SOR. Jupiter was used to represent the orbiter, as Jupiter was approximately the same visual size as the orbiter; the telescope was moved rapidly to simulate the orbiters motion through the FOV. No similar brightening was noted. Although phase angle cannot be simulated (the orbiter was in daylight at the time), diffraction as the source of brightening is considered unlikely. The streaming of what is thought to be hot gas is not well represented by a still, but the aspect of the elongation of what may be hot gas can be seen in the digital still (Fig 6A), and contributes to the optical signature of Flare 1. Viewing angle may contribute to the signature seen in that the camera is viewing the aft of the orbiter. It is unknown to what degree the view is looking through a plasma trail, the opacity of the plasma trail, and if the plasma trail contributes to the flare signature. Additionally, shadowing due to phase angle of the sun may contribute to the signature.

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Fig. 6A: Flare 1. NASA image JSC2003e03395. The second digital still analyzed was taken at about the same time as the right-hand image in Figure 6. The still is shown here after a blind deconvolution has been applied to the image and its contrast enhanced. It has been properly oriented and displays a wireframe overlay of the orbiter. The wireframe overlay has been approximately scaled. Exact placement relative to the image is unknown. See Appendix D for more details regarding these images and others. The flare image and the digital still are considered to represent an off-nominal condition, and all five AOS listed in the paragraph above Fig. 6 are considered off nominal.
6.0 CONCLUSIONS Of the ten AOS identified in the Starfire datasets, two were classified as nominal, two were inconclusive and six were considered potentially off-nominal, with one of those six having no currently identifiable possibility of a nominal condition. If all ten AOS are compared, five provide for the possibility of an event occurring relating to the left wing. Based upon the AOS with no currently identifiable possibility of a nominal condition, the left wing WLE appears to be in an off-nominal state. 7.0 RECOMMENDATIONS Recommendations for the future, in the event such imagery is requested, would require that higher resolution video is obtained at high magnification, such as that taken through a telescope that is capable of tracking an object with a high angular velocity. Resolution, saturation, and tracking were three keys issues that reduced the usefulness of the videos. An additional issue was that, due to the rotating coelostat, the orientation (rotation) of each frame of video was unknown and each processed frames rotation had to be determined by acquiring starfield images at a later date. The digital stills proved useful, but a greater number would be desired, with minimal saturation. Nominal condition re-entry imagery is deemed necessary if future comparative studies of this type of orbiter condition upon re-entry analysis is requested or planned.
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APPENDICES
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APPENDIX A ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AOS FOV GMT OVE OVEWG SOR WLE Anomalous Optical Signature Field of View (telescope) Greenwich Mean Time Orbiter Vehicle Engineering Orbiter Vehicle Engineering Working Group Starfire Optical Range Wing Leading Edge
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APPENDIX B TEAM MEMBER BIOGRAPHIES

Starfire Team Biographies Julian Christou Dr. Christou has over twenty years experience with image processing of both astronomical and artificial satellites. He obtained a Ph.D. in Astronomy from New Mexico State University and has worked at the National Optical Astronomy Observatories and Steward Observatory both in Tucson, Az., as well as the Starfire Optical Range. He is presently a research scientist with the Center for Adaptive Optics at the University of California, Santa Cruz. Rick Cleis Mr. Cleis works at the SOR. No Bio provided. Robert Q. Fugate Dr. Fugate is the Air Force Senior Scientist for Atmospheric Compensation and serves as the Technical Director, Starfire Optical Range, Directed Energy Directorate, Air Force Research Laboratory, Kirtland Air Force Base, N.M. The Range operates 1.5- and 3.5meter telescopes, and a 1.0-meter beam director. Dr. Fugate conducts a research program on atmospheric propagation physics; atmospheric compensation using laser guide star adaptive optics; the acquisition, tracking and pointing of lasers to earth-orbiting satellites; and the development of sensors, instrumentation and mount control of large-aperture, ground-based telescopes. He has worked for the U.S. Air Force since 1970 in the fields of atmospheric propagation, electro-optical sensors and detection, space surveillance and adaptive optics. Dewey Houck Mr. Houck is currently a Senior Technical Fellow working in the Space and Intelligence Systems Division of IDS for Boeing/Autometric. He chairs Boeing/Autometrics Engineering Review Board that acts in an oversight capacity for Product Development and Program initiatives. He also chairs the Technology Steering Group responsible for commercial product investment decisions. Prior to the Boeing acquisition (of Autometric), he served as a member of the senior management team as Vice President for Technology development for Autometric. During that time, he administered all Research and Development activities including several geospatial, photogrammetric and visualization initiatives. Mr. Houck has Masters and Undergraduate degrees in Civil Engineering from Virginia Tech with specialization in Photogrammetry and Geodesy. Kandy Jarvis Ms. Jarvis has seven years experience at NASA, all with Lockheed Martin Space Operations. Her position is Senior Research Scientist as Lead for the Planetary Astronomy Group and Optical Lead for the Orbital Debris Program Office. In both positions she works with a variety of telescopic data, including the acquisition, data reduction, analysis, and interpretation of spectrophotometry and video and short exposure (5 20 seconds) images of starfields containing orbital debris.
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Robert Johnson Major Johnson is with the USAF and has a PhD. He works with cameras and optics. No Bio provided. Roger Petty Mr. Petty works at the SOR. He is an optical engineer. He performed as outdoor spotter and operated the handheld camera. No Bio provided. Rich Rast As an Air Force civilian, Mr. Rast served as chief orbital analyst at NORAD before coming to JSC in 1986. He left JSC after six years to become operations manager of SOR. He now works at AFRLs Satellite Assessment Center. He proposed that SOR image Columbias reentry to JSC-DM4s Gilman on December 9, 2002. Karen Watts Ms. Watts has six years of experience in the Space Shuttle Program, all with the United Space Alliance. Her current position is Pointing Operations Engineer in the Attitude and Pointing Office. The Pointing Office is responsible for manned spacecraft attitude determination and line-of-sight analysis. R. Douglas White Mr. White is currently the Director for Operations Requirements in the United Space Alliance Orbiter Element department. He began work on the space shuttle program in 1979 as an employee for Rockwell International in Downey, California. Mr. White has held increasingly responsible positions within the space shuttle program focusing on the areas of turnaround test requirements, engineering flight support, anomaly resolution, and Orbiter certification of flight readiness preparation. He joined United Space Alliance as a director in 1996. He holds a BS and MS in physics from UCLA. Other Contributors: Gil Carman: JSC NASA Sina Farsiu: Engineering Department, Univ. of CA, Santa Cruz Dr. Peyman Milanfar: Electrical Engineering Department, Univ. of CA, Santa Cruz Scott Murray: JSC NASA Dr. Brian J. Thelen: Veridian Systems Ann Arbor Research and Development Center
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APPENDIX C CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION AND SUMMARY

Type: Digital Still Photograph NASA Number: JSC2003e03394 GMT Time: 13:57:14 Initial Classification: Category 1 Post Analysis: Category 1 Description: Saturated image of the underside of the orbiter. Results: Image was analyzed, interpreted, and results presented. See Appendix D. NASA Number: JSC2003e03395 GMT Time: 13:57:59 Initial Classification: Category 1 Post Analysis: Category 1 Description: Partially saturated image of the orbiter looking at the aft end. Results: Image was analyzed, interpreted, and results presented. See Appendix D. NASA Number: JSC2003exxxx (Still #3) GMT Time: 13:57:51 Initial Classification: Category 2 Post Analysis: Category 3-4 Description: Plasma trail directly aft of orbiter. Results: Image was analyzed and interpreted. Little to no information obtained. Type: Video NASA Number: EOC2-4-0148-2 Field of View: 5 degree Frame Subset or Full Video?: Full Video GMT Timespan: 13:56:47.22 13:58:11.29 Initial Classification: Category 3 Post Analysis: Category 3 Results: Video was reviewed. No significant anomalies seen other than those identified by the STS-107 Image Analysis Team. One piece of debris identified by the STS-107 Image Analysis Team: Debris 16. No further processing performed. Possibility of identifying additional debris with extensive processing of video. NASA Number: EOC2-4-0148-6 Field of View: ~5 degree, RGB (color) Frame Subset or Full Video?: Full Video GMT Timespan: ~13:56:47 13:58:12 Initial Classification: Category 3 Post Analysis: Category 4
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Results: Video was reviewed. No anomalies seen. No further processing performed. Type: Video (cont.) NASA Number: EOC2-4-0148-3 Field of View: 700 rad Frame Subset or Full Video?: Frame Subset GMT Timespan: 13:57:23.0 13:57:23.3 Initial Classification: Category 2 Post Analysis: Category 2 Results: Video frame set = 7 fields (2 fields per frame, 29 frames per second). Video frames show motion-blurred orbiter. Effort was made to re-integrate images but relative velocity of orbiter and movement of camera prevented this effort. Field b, at GMT 13:57:23.1 was analyzed and interpreted. Results presented. See Appendix D. NASA Number: EOC2-4-0148-3 Field of View: 700 rad Frame Subset or Full Video?: Full Video GMT Timespan: 13:56:45.29 13:58:57.5 (excluding previously listed times) Initial Classification: Category 3 Post Analysis: (Predominantly) Category 4 Results: Video was reviewed. In most frames, orbiter is not in the FOV. Occasional streaks of light suggest orbiter presence in or near the FOV. No further processing performed. NASA Number: EOC2-4-0148-4 Field of View: 5 mrad Frame Subset or Full Video?: Frame Subset GMT Timespan: 13:57:11.14 13:57:18.3 Initial Classification: Category 2 Post Analysis: Category 3 Results: Video was reviewed. Includes time coverage of still JSC2003e03394. Orbiter is badly over-saturated; orbiter appears lemon-shaped. An undefined asymmetric streaming is seen at aft of orbiter; may relate to tail of orbiter; unknown if nominal or off nominal. Severe saturation prevents further analysis at this time. No further processing performed. NASA Number: EOC2-4-0148-4 Field of View: 5 mrad Frame Subset or Full Video?: Frame Subset GMT Timespan: 13:57:49.23 13:58:01.11 Initial Classification: Category 1 Post Analysis: Category 2-3 Results: Video was reviewed. Includes time coverage of still JSC2003e03395. Orbiter is partially over-saturated; orbiter appears horseshoe-shaped. Aft of orbiter is toward camera. Two brightening events are seen to occur; these events are termed Flare 1 and Flare 2 in the timeline. Three hundred plus frames were extracted and processed with various methods by the CFAO. The orbiter is in and out of the FOV during this timespan. Two frames (13:57:54.14, 13:57:54.22) at the beginning of Flare 1 and peak of Flare 1 were analyzed and results presented; see Appendix D. No significant improvement was achieved
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on most processed frames. Possibility of determining if the Flares are an optical effect related to the tail or nose with further study. Type: Video (cont.) NASA Number: EOC2-4-0148-4 Field of View: 5 mrad Frame Subset or Full Video?: Full Video GMT Timespan: 13:56:48.26 13:58:01.11 (excluding previously listed times) Initial Classification: Category 2-4 Post Analysis: Category 3-4 Results: Video was reviewed. Orbiter is in the FOV intermittently. Excluding previously noted framesets, orbiter is motion blurred due to relative velocity of orbiter and motion of camera. No further processing performed.
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APPENDIX D Presentation 1: Select slides taken from first presentation to OVEWG Presentation 2: Second presentation to OVEWG
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Presentation 1
SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM
NASA Johnson Space Center, Houston, Texas
Space Shuttle Vehicle Engineering Office

Presenter
Starfire Optical Range Location
Doug White
Page
Date
Mar 3, 2003
Preliminary
Location: Kirtland Airforce Base, NM GMT coverage for the 5 deg fov: 13:56:47.22 13:58:11.29 (+/- 2 secs)


Presenter
Still at 13:57:14
Doug White
Page
Date
Mar 3, 2003
11
Columbia observed from SOR, 1 Feb 2003, 13:57:14 UTC with Orbiter Attitude Overlay
Solid 3-D Model of Orbiter Attitude at 1 Feb 2003, 13:57:14 UTC (provided by E. Cross and A. Wheaton/SF5)
Preliminary
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Presenter
Stills at 13:57:51 and 13:57:59 13:57:51
Doug White
Page
Date
Mar 3, 2003
13
13:57:59
Preliminary
Flare Left Wing
Left Wing Is Visible in 13:57:59 Image Further Processing Is Underway Potential to Enhance Left Wing Chine and Left Wing Glove Flare Is Visible in Both Orientation Provided But Not Confirmed; these images are not yet corrected for orientation.

Image Taken from 700 Rad Video, GMT 13:57:23

Plasma Disturbance?
Presenter Date
Doug White
Page
Mar 3, 2003
21
Right Wing
Left Wing
Bottom
Image has been cropped and pixel intensity modified to bring out detail Orientation unknown Viewing bottom of orbiter
Colors represent pixel values No processing was performed other than the intensity highlighting Left wing chine and glove are not visible at this viewing angle Apparent disturbance seen in leading plasma Indeterminate significance at this time No nominal shuttle re -entry images exist for comparison
Preliminary
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Presentation 2
STS-107 Investigation Kirtland Photo Tiger Team 4/21/03


Presenter
Objective and Team Members
Kandy Jarvis
Page
Date
April 21, 2003
The Objective of This Tiger Team Was to Analyze the Still and Vi deo Images Taken at the Starfire Optical Range (Kirtland AFB, NM) During the STS-107 Entry
Preliminary
Tiger Team Members Doug White, USA Kandy Jarvis, Lockheed Martin Dewey Houck, Boeing Karen Watts, USA John Neer, Lockheed Martin Scott Murray, NASA
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Presenter
Starfire Optical Range Team and Media
Kandy Jarvis
Page
Date
April 21, 2003
Preliminary
Starfire Optical Range Team Major Robert Johnson, PhD, camera and optics Mr. Rick Cleis, software and coelostat control Mr. Roger Petty, optical engineer, outdoor spotter and handheld camera operator Mr. Rich Rast, liaison with NASA to get vectors Dr. Robert Q. Fugate, Senior Scientist and Technical Director, S OR (Unable to be there during the event) Media 4 videos 3 stills A total of 5 cameras were used, some utilizing telescopes, some not


Presenter
Images Analyzed
Kandy Jarvis
Page
Date
April 21, 2003
Revised Analyses of Starfire Optical Range Stills
Preliminary
13:57:14 13:57:59 Two Frames Taken from 5-mRad Video for Analyses 13:57:54.14 13:57:54.22
Stills and frames have been processed by Dr. J. Christou, Center for Adaptive Optics, UCSC using a blind deconvolution technique
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Presenter
Starfire Optical Range Stills & Frames
Kandy Jarvis
Page
Date
April 21, 2003
Stills: 3.5 telescope looking through a computer controlled 1.0 -m coelostat (rotating mirror) The plate scale is known for these images
Preliminary
~ Measurements of object can be done Re-processing has altered plate scale
Orientation (rotation) is known The stills have an ~5 mRad (~1/3 degree) field of view ( fov) Video Frames: 5 mRad fov: intensified CCD camera attached to a 14 telescope, looking through the 1.0 -m coelostat
Orientation for every frame will change Approximate Orientation known
Plate scales have been estimated

Re-processing has changed the plate scale


Presenter
Still at 13:57:14
Kandy Jarvis
Page
Date
April 21, 2003
Preliminary
Notes Regarding Attitude Comparison at Time: 1 Feb 2003, 13:57:1 4 UTC Models account for 8 degree rotation (per 24 -Feb. SOR e-mail) Elevons, body flap, and engines are modeled in neutral position Groundsite observer viewing from slightly port, slightly forward of normal to orbiter belly Model scales were done visually
Approximations were calculated based on wingtip to wingtip dista nce and nose to tail distance Plate scale of original known; compared to deconvolved image and plate scale approximated Model fit visually based upon approximated scale and compared ag ainst SORs model
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Presenter
Still at 13:57:14
Kandy Jarvis
Page
Date
April 21, 2003
Preliminary
Raw Image
Re-Processed Image


Presenter
Still at 13:57:14
Kandy Jarvis
Page
Date
April 21, 2003
Mathematically scaled wireframe model overlain on re-processed image
Preliminary
Model scaling based on telemetry Image scaling based on starfield measurements
The side of the orbiter and the tail were decreased in brightness in this overlay
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Presenter
Still at 13:57:14
Kandy Jarvis
Page
Date
April 21, 2003
3 Areas of Interest
Asymmetric (A) Gas Flow Pattern Left wing more elongated in vertical wake (A1) Greater area brightened in aft wing area (A2) Asymmetry (B) of Wing (Left vs. Right) Convex in region (Xo-1100, Yo -256), leading edge of left wing. Asymmetry (C) of Nose
Preliminary
C B
A1
A2
Wire frame 3-D Model of Orbiter Attitude at 1 Feb 2003, 13:57:14 UTC overlaid on still Solid 3-D model provided as inset


Presenter
Still at 13:57:14
Kandy Jarvis
Page
Date
April 21, 2003
10
Asymmetric Gas Flow (A1) When the re-processed image is adjusted to brighten the fainter pixels, details of the asymmetric gas are definable Correlation between portions of the orbiter and the gas are possible The most probable correlations are presented Other possibilities are not precluded and should be investigated by Modeling Wind tunnel testing Specifics of correlations follow
Preliminary
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Still at 13:57:14 Gas correlation
Presenter Date
Kandy Jarvis
Page
April 21, 2003
11
Preliminary
Gas (elliptical circles) seen behind right wing Assumed nominal Assumed symmetric w/respect to left wing
Gas flow from the tail identified

Still at 13:57:14 Gas Correlation
Presenter Date
Kandy Jarvis
Page
April 21, 2003
12
Preliminary
Gas flow from the body flap identified
Gas flow from the OMS pods suggested as explanation See next page for additional options
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Presenter Date
Kandy Jarvis
Page
April 21, 2003
13
Flow from split between inboard and outboard elevons? Symmetry expected but not seen Unlikely Elevon position Right and left elevons are between 0.3 and 0.7 degrees different in position between 13:57:14.0 13:57:14.99 Unlikely but could contribute Bulges in leading edge create turbulence and/or hot gas This possibility cannot be ruled out Potential resultant gas flow should be modeled Viewing geometry and refraction could contribute
Preliminary

Presenter Date
Kandy Jarvis
Page
April 21, 2003
14
Preliminary
Correlation of Gas
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Presenter
Still at 13:57:14
Kandy Jarvis
Page
Date
April 21, 2003
15
Greater area is brighter behind trailing edge of left wing (A2) Both wings show a gas flow pattern that is rounded; however, left wing has an additional bulge in area near elevon gap This brightened zone appears to correlate with the tail and left OMS pod/stinger Some contribution could be from either the elevon, or from the bulges along the leading edge of the wing
Preliminary


Presenter
Still at 13:57:14
Kandy Jarvis
Page
Date
April 21, 2003
16
Bulges
Two Bulges on Wing (B) Clearly outboard of wing structure Shape is inconsistent with wing leading edge Inconsistent with flow pattern on right wing Possible Causes Localized intensity increase Anomalous gas flow pattern
Preliminary
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Presenter
Still at 13:57:14
Kandy Jarvis
Page
Date
April 21, 2003
17
Localized intensity increase Local increase in temperature; hot spots Local increase in reflectivity (orbiter is in sunlight at this t ime) Exposure of metal This is considered unlikely, but is possible Anomalous gas flow pattern in front of wing Tile damage? Possible, but unlikely to change bow shock and wing shock shape (per aerothermo team) Damage to wing leading edge? Could change local bow shock and wing shock shape (per aerothermo team) Viewing geometry and refraction could contribute
Preliminary


Presenter
Still at 13:57:14
Kandy Jarvis
Page
Date
April 21, 2003
18
Preliminary
Bulge
Asymmetry of Nose (C) Unknown if nominal Localized intensity increase Could be normal canopy shock seen from this angle Viewing geometry could hide symmetry
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Presenter
Still at 13:57:14 Final Conclusions
Kandy Jarvis
Page
Date
April 21, 2003
19
Asymmetric gas behind left wing (A1)/brightened aft region(A2)

Can be accounted for with structure of Orbiter Contribution from leading edge bulges can not be ruled out Contribution from elevon can not be ruled out
Preliminary
Bulges (B)
Caused by either local increase in intensity or anomalous gas fl ow Some possible causes of anomalous gas flow presented
Modeling and wind tunnel testing investigations should aid in understanding and/or generate new theories Some measurements of angles of bulges in relation to orbiter may be possible if so requested by other teams
Nose asymmetry (C)

Likely nominal condition Flight data (OI and OEX) show no anomalous readings at the chin panel or vent nozzles at this time
Analyses of This Still is Considered Complete Unless Otherwise I nstructed


Presenter
Frames at 13:57:54.14 & 13:57:54.22
Kandy Jarvis
Page
Date
April 21, 2003
20
Preliminary
Notes Regarding Attitude Comparison at Time: 1 Feb 2003, 13:57:5 4 UTC Telemetry exists for 13:57:54.14 UTC; 13:57:54.22 was interpolat ed. Elevons, body flap, and engines are modeled in neutral position Ground observer viewing from vertical tail and slightly to port Model scales were done visually
Approximations were calculated based on wingtip to wingtip dista nce Plate scale of still (5 secs later) known; compared to deconvolved image and plate scale approximated Model fit visually based upon approximated scale.
Orientation (rotation) of frames with overlays were estimated ba sed upon known orientation of wireframe.
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Presenter
Frames at 13:57:54 13:57:54.14 Raw Re-Processed
Kandy Jarvis
Page
Date
April 21, 2003
21
Preliminary
Note the blocky nature of the frames; this will generate some artifacts in the deconvolution process
13:57:54.22 Raw Re-Processed


Presenter
Frame at 13:57:54.14
Kandy Jarvis
Page
Date
April 21, 2003
22
Tail
Preliminary
Artifacts?
Re-processed, rotated
Faint pixels enhanced
Only wings clearly visible Nose or SILTS pod/tail faintly visible

Currently unknown if the enhanced pixels represent artifacts or flow features, etc. Modeling, wind tunnel testing, and processing of video should help determi ne this
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Presenter
Frame at 13:57:54.22 (Flare Event #1)
Kandy Jarvis
Page
Date
April 21, 2003
23
Preliminary
Re-processed, rotated
Increased intensity/visual blooming of nose or SILTS pod/tail Increased intensity/visual blooming of left wing
There are still multiple questions regarding the event seen here ; See discussion


Presenter
Frames at 13:57:54.14 & 13:57:54.22 Current understanding of video images The left wing appears to brighten The nose/tail then appears to brighten Possible causes
Kandy Jarvis
Page
Date
April 21, 2003
24
Preliminary
Changes in the flow field for the left wing and tail An event in the left wing generates a flow field that, at this v isual aspect, appears to intersect with the tail Flow field is generally too faint to see but when additive with nose/tail brightness, appears to cause an overall brightening of the nose/ tail region The tail passes through the flow field as the orbiter moves forw ard and this enhances the brightening An illumination of the wing illuminates area(s) previously in sh adow (nose or tail) There are no overt indications in information from the orbiter t hat suggests the tail underwent any change at this moment in time. Newly acq uired MADS data has not yet been compared against these times. Diffraction (see next page)
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Presenter
Frames at 13:57:54.14 & 13:57:54.22
Kandy Jarvis
Page
Date
April 21, 2003
25
Diffraction: As a bright object exits the field of view of a telescope, diffr action of the optics can create a brightening of that object
Both flare events in the time line occur at the edge of the fi eld of view SOR has taken video of Jupiter at the same angular size as the o rbiter, and moved the telescope so Jupiter left the field of view at the sam e approximate location as the orbiter No flash or flare was seen to occur Can not re -create phase angle of the sun at that time (no stars in daylight) There does appear to be a distinct visual change in the orbiter between pre flare and post flare. Still at 13:57:59 shows brightened nose/t ail region
Preliminary
This suggests diffraction is not a cause of the events seen


Presenter
Still at 13:57:59
Kandy Jarvis
Page
Date
April 21, 2003
26
Preliminary
Notes Regarding Attitude Comparison at Time: 1 Feb 2003, 13:57:5 9 UTC Telemetry unavailable for 13:57:59 UTC; interpolated. Orientation known (rotation) Elevons, body flap, and engines are modeled in neutral position Ground observer viewing from vertical tail and slightly to port Model scales were done visually
Approximations were calculated based on wingtip to wingtip dista nce Plate scale of original known; compared to deconvolved image and plate scale approximated Model fit visually based upon approximated scale
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Presenter
Still at 13:57:59
Kandy Jarvis
Page
Date
April 21, 2003
27
Preliminary
Raw Image in proper orientation
Re-Processed Image in proper orientation


Presenter
Still at 13:57:59
Kandy Jarvis
Page
Date
April 21, 2003
28
Preliminary
Shadowing due to relative location of sun
Re-processed
The scale and exact placement of the wireframe overlay is still approximated
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Presenter
Photo Still at 13:57:59 Current understanding of still The left wing has increased intensity The nose/tail has increased intensity Improved resolution (vs. video frames) suggests
Kandy Jarvis
Page
Date
April 21, 2003
29
Preliminary
An event in the left wing generates a flow field that, at this v isual aspect, appears to intersect with the tail Flow field is generally too faint to see but when additive with nose/tail brightness, appears to cause an overall brightening of the nose/ tail region An illumination of the wing illuminates area(s) previously in sh adow (nose or tail) There are no overt indications in information from the orbiter t hat suggests the tail underwent any change at this moment in time


Presenter
Next Steps
Kandy Jarvis
Page
Date
April 21, 2003
30
SOR-AFRL Will Provide video for plate scaling Determine orientation of video frames of interest Acquiring Slightly Better Resolution Video Frames from Digital R ecording for Deconvolution First set of frames have been acquired and will soon be processe d Continue Interpretation of Still 13:57:59 and Video Frames from 5 mRad Video Video Processing Will Search for Additional Signs of Debris Events Will Be Submitted for Entry Event Timeline as Confirmed
Preliminary
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APPENDIX E DEFINITIONS
Anomalous Optical Signature A visual appearance of the orbiter containing a characteristic that appears irregular such as a lack of expected symmetry, pulsation of signal, or outline not matching the expected configuration. Frames, Set of A sequential subset of video frames extracted from the complete video, wherein the number of frames in a set varies according to the content. Nominal All conditions within normal expected parameters. Off Nominal A condition or conditions outside of normal expected parameters. Orientation The known compass direction of an image. This may be unknown due to the rotation of the imaging apparatus. Pixel A contraction of picture elements; a single energy flux detector. Plate Scale The ratio of a measurement on an image to the equivalent measurement of the imaged object. Resample An averaging of nearby values to generate a new value. Resolution The ability to separate closely spaced objects on an image. Saturation When the energy flux exceeds the sensitivity range of a detector or set of pixels. This overflow can also spread to adjoining pixels, altering their values. Starfield An image of a collection of identifiable stars at a known time that permits calculation of plate scale and compass orientation of an image.
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Using the Data and Observations from Flight STS-107... Exec Summary
This Appendix contains the report Using the Data and Observations From Flight STS-107 to Explain the Fatal Reentry of the Columbia Orbiter OV-102, Bertin, John J., Smiley, James W. This report develops possible scenarios that were considered by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board.
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USING THE DATA AND OBSERVATIONS FROM FLIGHT STS-107 TO EXPLAIN THE FATAL REENTRY OF THE COLUMBIA ORBITER OV-102 By DR. JOHN J. BERTIN DR. JAMES W. SMILEY CONSULTANTS, CAIB SUPPORT GROUP
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY In our role as Aerothermodynamic Consultants to the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB), we are documenting our interpretation of the key events, which led to the demise of OV-102 during Flight STS-107. In order to develop an understanding of aerothermodynamic environment and of the sequence of critical events that led to the demise of the Orbiter, meetings were held with NASA personnel and their contractors and with other consultants to Group 3 (Engineering and Technical Analysis) of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB). During these meetings, we obtained film clips, timelines, basic data, interpretations of the data, and figures from power-point presentations. In these meetings, we exchanged ideas on what we thought were key events, about what was possible, what was likely, what was not possible, and what was not likely. The authors would like to acknowledge the inputs (verbal and written) that we received from Rick Barton, Charles Campbell, Joe Caram, Ray Gomez, Dave Kanipe, Steve Labbe, Gerald J. Lebeau, Chris Madden, Fred Martin, Scott Murray, et al. [all of the Johnson Space Center (NASA)]; Stan Bouslog of Lockheed-Martin; and Jim Arnold, Howard Goldstein, Pat Goodman, Robert Hammond, Jim Mosquera, and Donald J. Rigali from the CAIB Technical Support Team. The authors have benefited from discussions with and from presentations made by the Group 3 members of the CAIB, Dr. James Hallock, G. Scott Hubbard, Dr. Doug Osherhoff, Roger Tetrault, and Dr. Sheila Widnall. The following text offers our interpretation of the significance of and the relationship between data and observations that are currently known about the fatal aerothermodynamic environment of flight STS-107 for the Columbia Orbiter, OV-102. It is the intent of the authors to document a summary of key data and provide a realistic scenario that would explain the aerothermodynamic environment during the demise of Columbia OV-102. In this effort, we have attempted to match what we consider to be twelve critical events or observations that were determined from data gathered from the persons mentioned in the previous paragraph. The word data has been placed in quotes, since some data represent flight measurements whose time and magnitude are well known, other data represent debris whose origin and timing is somewhat subjective, and still other data are from computations and wind-tunnel tests and, thus, are dependent on the simulation models (numerical or experimental) used. Therefore, some of the observations based on our interpretation of the data may differ from the demise scenarios proposed by others using the same data. For instance, some of the information gleaned from the recovered debris may be in error, because the debris was misidentified or because the damage to the recovered debris may have occurred at a different time during the reentry. Furthermore, new information (in the form of additional recovered debris, analysis, etc.) may become available at some point in the future. For instance, data from the MADS recorder that was recovered after initial
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investigations provided information over a longer time frame and from additional sensors. To allow for such uncertainties in the existing data and for the probability of new, additional data providing an improved understanding of the aerothermodynamic environment, most of the observations that the authors deem to be critical represent several pieces of information rather than a single datum point. Furthermore, by matching the information from twelve critical data/events, it is hoped that a reasonably accurate and coherent description of the evolving damage will be presented in this report. We will describe how the following sequence of events can be used to define a demise scenario, which is judged to be consistent with all of the data. 1. The observation that foam particles from the external tanks impinged on the wing leading edge during the launch. 2. Radar signatures from the second day of the mission that showed a piece of debris drifting away from the Orbiter. 3. The strain-gage reading (beginning at EI + 270) and the temperature rise at two thermocouples located in the vicinity of RCC Panel 9 (beginning at EI + 290), as indicated by MADS data. 4. The perturbations to the heating and to the surface pressures due to the interaction between the bow shock wave and the wing-leading-edge shock wave are most severe in the region of RCC Panels 8 and 9. 5. Start of off nominal temperature histories at four sensors on left OMS Pod (beginning with lower than expected temperatures at EI + 340, followed by higher than expected temperatures at EI + 460). 6. The anomalous temperature increases that occurred at various locations in the main left-landing-gear wheel well (beginning at EI + 488). 7. The increase in temperatures at points located on the vertical side of the fuselage, as indicated both in thermocouples on the Orbiter itself and in the temperature sensitive coatings on the wind-tunnel models tested at the Langley Research Center (beginning at EI + 493). 8. Loss of all measurements from the wire bundle running along the backside of the wing spar (beginning at EI + 487) followed by the loss of measurements from the wire bundle running along the left main-landing gear wheel well, which included elevon measurements (beginning at EI + 527) 9. The observations regarding the damage to the wing leading edge, as determined from the recovered debris. 10. The modifications to the shock/shock interaction flow field that was described in critical data/event #4, as developed based on the developing damage scenario and correlated against the Kirtland photograph, i. e., observations by personnel from the Starfire Optical Range (at EI + 830.5/832.5).
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11. Comparing selected histories showing that the actual flight was close to the planned flight up to EI + 900. 12. Using the rolling-moment-coefficient history to support findings for some of the previous eleven points. It is recognized that there are other data (facts) and that some of these facts may become critical as an improved and more complete understanding of the demise is achieved. However, based on our understanding at this time, we believe that these twelve critical data/events are very important and that a demise scenario that incorporates all twelve has some credibility. The time-dependence of these twelve events will be based on the Relation of Reentry Parameters that are contained in the table presented in Table 1 and in Appendix A. Entry Interface (EI) occurred at GMT 13:44:09. Referring to Table 1, the reader can identify three, related early events that indicate anomalous behavior: the strain gage reading and the high temperatures for two thermocouples on the spar behind RCC Panel 9 (one on the clevis and one on the back face of the spar. These foreboding signs occurred by 13:49:00, with the Orbiter still approximately 1000 miles west of the California coast. The Orbiter was flying at altitudes in excess of 260,000 feet, where non-continuum effects are important in modeling the flow field and the peak convective heating has not been reached. Thus, it is believed that the initial damage that compromised the thermal protection system and that led to the demise of OV-102 was in place at the EI. To readily access the figures and appendices of this report click on the hyperlinks located on the last page of this document.

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GENERAL DISCUSSION (1) The observation that foam particles from the external tanks impinged on the wing leading edge during launch. A large piece of foam (debris) from the bipod area of the external tank (ET) is evident in the film of the STS-107 during launch. The trajectory of the debris, which is shown in Figure 1, indicates that the ET foam debris struck the wing leading edge 82 seconds after launch. Based on this trajectory, the likeliest area of impact was on RCC Panel 6, or slightly downstream. See Figure 2. As shown in Figure 3, RCC Panels 1 through 4 are located on the glove, which has a sweep angle of 81o. RCC Panels 5 through 7 are located on the intermediate spar, a. k. a., the transition spar. RCC Panels 8 through 19 are located on the wing spar, which is swept 45o, Post-flight analysis of the MADS data indicated a small temperature rise in the measurement from a temperature sensor that was located behind the wing spar of RCC Panel 9. This is a possible additional piece of evidence that the damage occurred during the launch phase. The authors believe that significant damage to the RCC panels in the vicinity RCC Panel 6 is consistent with the early thermal anomalies that were observed both in the sensors on and/or near the spar at the back of RCC Panel 9 and in some of the sensors in the left main-landing-gear wheel well. The anomalies that occurred in these two regions did not occur simultaneously, but were close in time. Thus, damage somewhere in the vicinity of RCC Panel 6 would be strategically placed to deliver hot gases that could both damage the wires on the back of the wing spar near these RCC panels and the wires on the main left-landing-gear wheel well. The hot gases from the breech in the wing leading edge would also flow down the chunnel (channel/tunnel) that exists between the RCC panels and the spar that follows the wing leading edge, producing the anomalous readings on the sensors at the spar at RCC Panel 9. The wing-leading-edge subsystem (LESS) is shown in the sketch of Figure 4. The impact of the debris with a leading-edge RCC panel could have removed (all or part of) a T-seal or produced a hole or a crack in the RCC panel itself. In an attempt to further define the location and the extent of the debris-induced damage, NASA personnel and their contractors have been using computational fluid dynamic (CFD) codes. Additional work is needed to complete and to validate the analysis efforts, e. g., use the direct simulation Monte Carlo (DSMC) computational tools to provide an independent validation of the flow field at these low-density gas conditions. The modeling of the internal flow through the chunnel, starting with a breech of the leadingedge TPS (using the location and the nature of the breech to define the boundary conditions for a few likely initial conditions), and proceeding into the wing is a very complex task that should be completed. Of special interest is matching the computed results to the observed times for (1) the burn through of the MADS wires behind the spars, (2) the burn through of the bundle of wires that ran along the wall of the main leftlanding-gear, and (3) the anomalous temperatures measured at various points inside the left main-landing-gear wheel well.

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(2) Radar signatures from the second day of the mission that showed a piece of debris drifting away from the Orbiter. Radar signatures from the second day of the STS-107 mission indicated that there was an object drifting away from the Orbiter, disappearing after a few orbits. The radar signature and the ballistic coefficient of the object were analyzed to determine what the object might be. Recent communications from personnel from the Lincoln Lab (as provided to Dr. Sheila Widnall) indicate that, in their judgment, the best match to the data would be a piece of a T-seal. However, the possibility exists that the impinging ET foam caused a piece of an RCC panel to be broken off. The exact configuration of the initial damage is not known. (3) The strain-gage reading (beginning at EI + 270) and the temperature rise at two thermocouples located in the vicinity of RCC Panel 9 (beginning at EI + 290), as indicated by MADS data. As shown in Figure 5, three sensors were located in the vicinity of RCC Panel 9: two thermocouples and a strain gage. AT GMT 13:48:39, the strain gage on the left wing spar at RCC Panel 9 starts an off-nominal increase, as indicated in Appendix A. This is only 270 seconds after EI. At this point in time, the Orbiter is located about 1000 miles west of the California coast, flying at 23,000 feet/second at an altitude in excess of 270,000 feet. Refer to Table 1. Referring to Table 1 and to Figure 6, the temperature sensed by the thermocouple on the Spar 9 Clevis starts to increase by (approximately) GMT 13:49:00, which is less than 300 seconds after EI. According to Table 1, the temperature sensed by the thermocouple on the back of Spar 9 starts to increase very rapidly with time beginning at GMT 13:51:09. Refer now to Figure 7. Signal is lost from the thermocouple on the clevis at (approximately) 55 deg F, 490 seconds after EI. At approximately 522 seconds after EI, signal is lost from the thermocouple on the back face of the spar at a temperature exceeding 240 deg F. The authors believe that the increase in temperature of the two thermocouples that are located on or near Spar 9 was caused by hot gases entering through a breech in the thermal protection system (TPS), which occurred when the impingement of the ET foam debris damaged the leading-edge TPS. Based on the information currently available to the authors, the critical, it is their opinion that the initial damage probably occurred in the vicinity of RCC Panel 6. Hot gases from the shock layer entered through the breech in the TPS and flowed down the chunnel. Although the density of these gases is relatively low, their temperature is very high. If this is indeed the case, then these hot gases flowing through the chunnel also were destroying the intermediate spar, a. k. a., the transition spar, and parts of the wing spar. Assuming this model to be correct, the hot gases would flow through the gaps and around the edges of the insulative wrap that surrounds the sensors. Thus, convection would be added to conduction and radiation, as mechanisms contributing to the rate at which the measured temperature increases. Based on the computed flow-field solutions by NASA and on the engineering experiences of the authors, the flow path of the ingested hot gases depends on the location and on the shape of the breech in the thermal protection system. If the initial damage were a hole in the RCC panel itself, there would be a strong component of flow outward along the chunnel and parallel to the wing leading edge, following the external streamlines. If the initial damage were a piece of T-seal, the ribs of the bounding RCC

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panels would constrain the flow to the channel bounded by the ribs. This flow path is initially perpendicular to the wing leading edge. However, the high temperature gases flowing in this channel could quickly ablate the downstream rib, at which time the damage would function as a hole. Some Observations at This Point (A) The destruction of the spar is not the only problem caused by the hot gases flowing down the chunnel. Under normal circumstances, the locally high convective heating rates to the external surface of the RCC panels along the wing leading edge are balanced by radiation into the relatively cool cavity behind the curved RCC panels, i. e., into the chunnel volume. In addition, under normal circumstances, some energy is conducted away from the leading edge through the high temperature gradients in the reinforced carbon/carbon shell. But this is no longer possible. These hot gases flowing in the chunnel not only prevent the mechanisms for relief of the energy from the RCC panels, they create a situation where the panels are being heated from both sides. The hot gases in the chunnel prevent the energy relief from the high convective heating rates to the external surface of the RCC panels. This will strike first at the RCC panel where the convective heating from the flow in the shock layer is the greatest. As will be discussed, the shock/shock interaction pattern produced the highest convective heating rates in the vicinity of RCC Panel 9. This will be discussed in critical data/event #4. The destruction of the intermediate (or transition) spar somewhere behind RCC Panels 6 through 8 provides a source for the problems soon to affect objects in the left main-landing-gear wheel well (critical data/event #6) and the early loss of the elevon signals, which is attributed to the wire burn through (critical data/event #8). (4) The perturbations to the heating and to the surface pressures due to the interaction between the bow shock wave and the wing-leading-edge shock wave are most severe in the region of RCC Panels 8 and 9. The bow shock wave intersects the wing-leading-edge shock wave, creating a shock/shock interaction, such as shown in Figure 8 [Ref. 1]. The interaction between the bow shock wave and the wing-leading-edge shock wave depends (among other parameters) on the gas chemistry, on the angle-of-attack, and on the sweep angle of the wing. The bow shock wave is relatively weak, so that flow in the shock layer near the wing root is supersonic and the pressure is relatively low. Far outboard, the wingleading-edge shock wave depends on the sweep of the wing leading edge. If the leading edge is only slightly swept (as was the case for some of the early Orbiter concepts), the wing-leading-edge bow shock wave will be strong with high pressures in the downstream, subsonic flow. The low-pressure, supersonic flow inboard of the interaction adjusts to the high pressure, subsonic flow outboard of the interaction through a complex flow that contains regions of subsonic flow, of supersonic flow, impinging jets, and imbedded shock waves. See Figure 8(b). The surface of the wing leading edge that is subject to the impingement of this strong viscous/inviscid interaction may see heating rates more than an order-of-magnitude greater than the heating rates that would exist if there were no shock/shock interaction. However, in actuality, the wing-leading-edge sweep angle (for RCC Panels 8 through 18) is 45o. See Figure 3. Since the wing is highly swept, the wing-leading-edge shock wave will be relatively weak with low pressures in the downstream, supersonic flow. See Figure 8(c). Both the jet and the free-shear layer that are contained in the shock/shock interaction diffuse rapidly.

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As a result, the shock/shock-induced perturbation to the heating in the region affected by impinging flow is relatively small for the current Orbiter configuration, i. e., approximately twice the heating that would exist if no shock/shock interaction were present. Convective heating rates in the interaction region of the wing leading edge have been computed for the Shuttle Orbiter. The computed heat-transfer rates that are presented in Figure 9 indicate that the interaction between bow shock wave and the wing-leading-edge shock wave causes the heating to the surface in the interaction to be approximately twice the undisturbed value and that RCC Panel 9 experiences the highest heating. Because the Orbiter is operating at an angle-of-attack of 40-degrees, the stagnation line is on the windward surface just below the apex of the leading edge. Thus, the highest convective heating to the wing-leading-edge region affects RCC Panel 9, on the lower surface, just below the leading edge. As noted in the previous paragraphs, under normal circumstances, these incident heating rates would be accommodated by radiation from the back surface of the RCC panel into the cavity and by conduction through the reinforced carbon/carbon shell, away from the stagnation line. However, as shown in the sketch of Figure 10, the hot gases flowing up the chunnel not only eliminate the ability to transfer energy away from the wing leading edge, but they produce a situation where energy is added to the RCC panel from the inside as well as from the outside. It doesnt take long before the material near the stagnation line (on the lower surface) fails, leaving relatively sharp RCC plates, exposed to the flow. Thus, the authors believe that a second breech of the thermal protection system has occurred. The authors believe that this one is most likely to be on the lower surface of RCC Panel 9 one panel. The authors belief that there are two breeches to the RCC panels along the wing-leading edge is based upon not only the sensor data, but upon the Kirtland photograph, which will be discussed as critical data/event #10. Gases quickly flow from the high pressure region in the shock layer near the stagnation line into the chunnel, causing the destruction of the lower surface of the panel. The authors believe that this is a significant change in the Orbiter Mold Line (OML). The changes in the OML of the wing leading edge modify the vortices that emanate from this region and that impinge on the leeward fuselage. Therefore, it is associated with the start of off-nominal temperature histories at the four sensors on the left OMS Pod, which are described in critical data/event #5. (5) Start of off nominal temperature histories at four sensors on left OMS Pod (beginning with lower than expected temperatures at EI + 340, followed by higher than expected temperatures at EI + 460). Refer to The STS-107 Mishap Investigation Combined Master Timeline, Baseline Corrected that is presented in Appendix A. It is noted that, at GMT 13:49:49, which is EI + 340, Start of off-nominal temperature trends for 4 Left OMS Pod Surface Temps. Initially, the rise rate is cooler, when compared to previous flights of the same inclination. That is followed by a warmer-than-expected temperature trend, beginning at EI + 460. It is noted in Appendix A that the Sensor sees a sharp increase at EI + 910 and goes erratic at EI + 940. Even for the baseline configuration, i. e., for the configuration without any damage to wing leading edge, free-vortex-layer types of separation are produced by the flow around the fuselage chine, around the highly swept glove (sweep angle of 81o) and around the transition section from the glove to the majority of the wing, which is swept 45o. The resultant viscous/inviscid interactions cause locally high heating rates and high

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shear forces to act on the orbital maneuvering system (OMS) pod. However, as is evident in the data presented by Neumann [Ref. 2] and reproduced in Figure 11, the heating to the OMS Pod is a function of the angle-of-attack. The correlation between the local heating and the angle-of-attack is important, since the Space Shuttle Orbiter employs ramping during entry. That is, the angle-of-attack of the Orbiter during entry is initially high, i. e., approximately 40-deg. until Mach twelve is reached. Then, it is ramped down, reaching approximately 20-deg., when the flight Mach number is four. The reader should note that there are significant differences between the heat-transfer correlation based on the wind-tunnel data and that based on the flight data. These differences can be traced, at least in part, to real-gas effects, to Reynolds-numberrelated effects, and/or to low-density effects. The first author had a similar experience involving a difference between viscous/inviscid correlations based on wind-tunnel data and those based on flight-test data from the Gemini program. During the design phase of the Gemini capsule, it was assumed that the reentry aerothermodynamic environment for Gemini capsule was similar to that for the Mercury capsule. Thus, the wind-tunnel test program that was conducted during the design phase of the Gemini was somewhat limited. However, the Mercury capsule flew at an angle-of-attack of zero degrees, while the Gemini capsule reentered at an angle-of-attack of approximately 20-deg. Because the Gemini capsule flew at non-zero angle-of-attack, a vortex-induced viscous/inviscid interaction produced locally high heating rates on the conical surface in the vicinity of the umbilical fairing. The locally high heating rates produced numerous, small holes in the surface of the conical frustum of the capsule that was made of Rene 41. Once the inspection of the recovered capsule revealed the damage, a post-flight wind-tunnel test was conducted with instrumentation specifically located to obtain information about the aerothermodynamic environment in the region of perturbed flow. The wind-tunnel data revealed that locally high heating rates due to the viscous/inviscid interaction caused by the presence of the flow over the umbilical fairing. Although the wind-tunnel tests revealed the presence of and the approximate strength of the perturbations, there were considerable differences between the severity and the locations of the flight-observed damage and those based on the wind-tunnel tests. The results were similar to those of Figure 11. By EI + 290, anomalous readings have occurred at the three sensors near Spar 9, as discussed in section relating to critical data/event #3. By EI + 493, anomalous data will be evident in the data from sensors in the left main-landing-gear wheel well and on the vertical side of the Orbiter. There will be a loss of the measurements from wire bundles at various locations in the wing box, beginning at EI + 487. These anomalous data indicate there was a considerable mass flow of hot gases through a large fraction of the internal wing volume. The off-nominal temperature trends that were discussed in the first paragraph of this section (first slightly below the expected values, then above the expected values) are attributed to changes in the free-vortex shear-layer pattern that dominates the leeward flow field. The changes in the vortex pattern are due to the changes in the Outer Mold Line and to hot gases that are flowing from the internal wing volume through the vents that are located on the upper surface of the wing. The specific location of the perturbations to the surface heat-transfer and surface pressure are sensitive to the angle-of-attack, to the Reynolds number, to the density ratio across the shock wave, etc.

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Flow-field computations for an Orbiter with RCC Panel 6 removed that were presented by Labbe et al. [Ref. 3] are reproduced in Figure 12. The computations that were made with the FELISA code at the Langley Research Center (NASA) assume an inviscid flow with equilibrium air in a Mach 23.8 stream. Three principal observations are associated with the removal of RCC Panel 6: (1) Produces negative roll and yaw moments w/small magnitude (2) Streamlines for the damaged vehicle track inboard of baseline (3) Resultant shock raises pressures in proximity to temp measurements. (6) The anomalous temperature increases that occurred at various locations in the main left-landing-gear wheel well (beginning at EI + 488). The first sign that hot gases had reached the main left-landing-gear wheel well showed up in the brake-line temperature measurements. A bit flip in the LMG BrakeLine Temp D occurred at GMT 13:52:17 [Ref. 3]. This is temperature trace M in Figure 13. Thus, this event occurred 488 seconds after EI, which is approximately three minutes after the anomalous readings in the vicinity of Spar 9 (critical data/event #3). While a bit flip may well be within the experimental uncertainty and, therefore, will not be truly indicative of a problem, the LMG Brake-Line temp D was only one of many anomalous measurements that occurred in this time frame at sensors in the vicinity of the left main-landing-gear wheel well. Referring to Table 3, three LMG Brake Line Temps began unusual temperature increases in the time frame GMT 13:52:17 to GMT 13:52:41. Both the temperature measurement for LMG Brake-Line Temp C, which is trace I in Figure 13, and the temperature measurement for LMG Brake-Line Temp A, which is trace G in Figure 14, exhibit anomalous increases starting at GMT 13:52:41. These three gages cover X0 coordinates from approximately 1100 through 1200. Thus, all three sensors are aft of the tires of the LMG. Because the rate of increase for the temperatures sensed in the wheel well was relatively slow, the hot gases didnt impinge directly on these sensors. Instead, the authors believe that the hot gases entered the cavity away from the sensors and gradually heated the volume of air that resided in the wheel well. Because of the severe damage on the tire and of the aluminum residue splattered on a door latch, the authors believe that the plume of hot gases could have entered that area through a breech near RCC Panel 6. (7) The increase in temperatures at points located on the vertical side of the fuselage, as indicated both in thermocouples on the Orbiter itself and in the temperature sensitive coatings on the wind-tunnel models tested at the Langley Research Center (beginning at EI + 493). It is noted in Appendix A that, by GMT 13:52:52, i. e., EI + 493, unusual temperature shifts were observed in five thermocouples on the fuselage and on the upper left wing. It is noted in Table 1 that Mid fuse bond temp starts up at GMT 13:54:22. The location of this sensor is noted in Table 3 as X0 = 1410. Hasselback [Ref. 4] reports that, at GMT 13:53:29, Fuselage side surface temp increase at X0 1000.7. Because these anomalous fuselage side-wall temperatures were given a separate mention in the time line of Appendix A, it is given a separate data/event number in this report. However, the flow phenomena that cause these anomalous are essentially those associated with the anomalous heating to the left OMS Pod, i. e., critical data/event #5. Wind-tunnel data from the 20-inch Mach 6 (Air Wind Tunnel) at the Langley Research Center (NASA) that are reproduced in Figure 15 show increased heating rates

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on the side of the Orbiter fuselage both for only RCC Panel 6 removed and for only RCC Panel 9 removed. (8) Loss of all measurements from the wire bundle running along the backside of the wing spar (beginning at EI + 487) followed by the loss of measurements from the wire bundle running along the left main-landing gear wheel well, which included elevon measurements (beginning at EI + 527). Several of the wires carrying signals from the MADS sensors (including the two temperature measurements behind RCC Panel 9, one on the clevis and one behind the spar) run behind the RCC Panel 9 area wing spar along the back of the spar, forward to the front of the wheel well (about RCC Panel 5). See Figures 16 and 17. At EI + 487, the sensors whose wires run on the back of the left wing front spar begin going off-line, indicating a burn through of the spar. Over the next 10 seconds most of these signals go off line. The last one, the bottom-most wire, goes off-line at EI + 522. Since these wires are separated by about eighteen inches in most locations, the breech, at least its vertical dimension, had to be quite large. Beginning at approximately GMT 13:52:59, which is equivalent to EI + 530, the wires in the large bundles that run along the top of the wheel well (See Figure 17 and 18) begin to go off line. The first signal to go off line was the elevon lower skin temperature. Over the next minute or so most of the signals in these wire bundles go off line. See Figure 19. This would indicate a significant amount of heat was impinging on the wires and wheel well wall. NASA has performed a number of tests to investigate the burning of wire bundles. These test demonstrated that the rapid loss of the entire wire bundle requires very hot gases, with local heat rates of 80 to 90 Btu/ft 2-sec. It is likely that the wheel well wall had been penetrated at this time, since anomalies were showing up in the temperature measurements in the left mainlanding-gear wheel well. Recall that the first observed bit flip in the wheel well was at EI + 488. While this single bit flip may or may not be significant by itself, within the next one to two minutes most of the temperature sensors on the landing gear in the wheel well began to increase. Refer to the discussion of critical data/event #6. This sequence raises some dilemmas that need to be addressed. First, how do we get enough heat on the wheel well to burn the wires, but yet the sensors in the wheel well stay on line until the loss of the Orbiter and the temperatures only go up about 40oF. Second, the hole through the spar has to be large enough (> 18 inches tall) to take out all the wires, creating a large path for the hot gases to go into the wing interior, yet much of the aluminum wing structure stays intact for another 8 minutes. One explanation could be that a T-seal (or portion of a T-seal) missing. With a T-seal the impinging jet would be narrow, but tall enough to cut all the MADS wires. It could take out the vertical array of wires without the massive heat a circular hole would deliver. Also, it would seem that the breech in the spar should be near where the wire bundles (MADS and OI) are close together so the required heat would be minimized. This would favor a breech through a lower number RCC panel. However two strain gages on the front of the wheel well did not go off-line (See Figure 18). This would tend to rule out RCC Panel 5, which is ahead of the front wheel well wall. If the initial damage were to a T-seal (or maybe created a hole just upstream of an RCC rib), the hole through the spar could be smaller and still burn a vertical array of wires. Interestingly enough, such a damage configuration would result in initial flow perpendicular to the spar and cut wires. After 2 to 3 minutes, the very hot gases impinging on the downstream edge of the slot would burn through the RCC rib. At this point the hot gases would tend to flow down the chunnel, damaging the downstream RCC panels and the spar.
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(9) The observations regarding the damage to the wing leading edge, as determined from the recovered debris. Many members of the Board and support staff have spent considerable time in Florida examining the recovered debris. Experts such as Jim Arnold, Howard Goldstein, Pat Goodman, Greg Kovacs, Mark Tanner, and Don Rigali have spent considerable time and effort analyzing the recovered debris. The present authors are not as knowledgeable as many others on the detailed interpretation of the reconstructed wing leading edge. Therefore, our conclusions rely on the photographs, reports, and oral feedback from these experts. Photographs of the reconstructed wing-leading-edge panels, RCC Panels 5 through 11, are presented in Figures 20(a), 20(b), and 20(c). Note that very little of the bottoms (windward surfaces) of RCC Panels 6 through 9 have been recovered. The authors interpret the damage pattern to RCC Panels 6 through 9, as supporting their belief that the foam-induced damage was centered on RCC Panel 6 and the subsequent damage caused by the blockage-of-relief/additional-heating from the chunnel gases led to the loss of most of RCC Panel 9. Because RCC Panel 9 is in the most severe region of the baseline shock/shock interaction region, it would be expected to suffer the most damage. Thus, we believe that the subsequent loss of RCC Panel 9 left two regions where substantial damage had occurred to the wing-leading-edge RCC panels relatively early. Of course, the absence of debris could mean simply that the debris has not been found. It appears that significant fractions of the upper section of RCC Panels 7 and 8 have been recovered. Thus, it appears that there was a surviving section of RCC panel(s) between the two gaps. This is consistent with the authors belief that, by the time of the Kirtland photograph, there were two distinct notches in the wing leading edge, which were caused by the loss of a substantial amount of RCC Panel 6 (+/- one panel) and RCC Panel 9 (+/- one panel). Between these missing panels, a piece of the wing leading edge (what we believe to be the surviving pieces of RCC Panels 7 and 8) remains in place. The experts report that there is a lot of unique damage in the vicinity of RCC Panels 8 and 9, noting that there is considerable slag deposited on the inner surfaces of the upper portions of the recovered panels. The relative metallic deposition on left wing materials is presented in Figure 21. Note that the metallic deposition is heavy to very heavy behind RCC Panels 7, 8, 9, and 10. Since the predominate flow stream will be up and out along the chunnel, this pattern would be consistent with an initial breech in the vicinity of RCC Panel 6 +/-1 panel with the hot gas plume impinging on the spar behind RCC Panels 7 and 8, causing splatter on the material in this area. The authors believe the recovered portions of RCC Panels 6 through 10 are reasonably consistent with the demise history of the panels that will apply to critical data/event #10. Moving circumferentially around the wing leading edge in an x-y plane, the most severe convective heating occurred in the vicinity of the stagnation line in the shock/shock-interaction region, which is most severe for RCC Panel 9 one panel. See Figure 9. The burn through started at the stagnation line and proceeded to eat away the RCC shell in either direction. Thus, it is not surprising that the lower surface has not been found for any of these RCC panels. The hot gases flowing through the chunnel from the original ET foam-induced breech to the thermal protection system (TPS), which occurred in the vicinity of RCC Panel 6 +/-1 panel, ate away at numerous metal surfaces, depositing the residue as slag on the surviving inner surfaces of the leading edge TPS elements.
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It would be reasonable to expect that, if any portion of an RCC panel were recovered, it would be upper portion of the panel. The lower portion (which is the windward portion and, therefore subjected to the greatest convective heating) of the panel may be destroyed during the expanding destruction of the reinforced carbon/carbon shell. Referring to Table 2 and Figure 20(c), the upper portions of RCC Panels 7 and 8 on the left wing have been recovered. Only the edges of the upper portion of RCC Panel 9 have been recovered. As of the date of this writing, the lower portions of these three RCC panels have not been found. Some Observations at this Point (B) Referring to the timeline record presented in Table 1 for the flight STS-107 of OV-102, the first debris was seen leaving the Orbiter at GMT 13:53:44. Hot gases have been entering through a breech, or breeches, that occurred in the vicinity of RCC Panels 6 though 10. Sensor measurements on the spar behind RCC Panel 9 indicate anomalies starting at approximately GMT 13:48:39, which is 270 seconds after EI. Temperatures sensed at various points in the LMG brake line exhibit anomalous behavior, starting at GMT 13:52:17 (or slightly later). Thus, the anomalous temperature measurements from the main left-landing-gear wheel well started approximately 488 seconds after EI. Note that critical data/events # 3 and #5 through #9 take place over several minutes in time, affecting first sensors at the spar behind RCC Panel 9, which is relatively close to the wing leading edge, and then, approximately three minutes later, affecting brake line temperatures in the LMG wheel well. This pattern is consistent with a damage model that starts with a foam-impact-induced breech near RCC Panel 6 one panel. Hot gases flowing through the chunnel not only block the path for relieving the relatively high heating rates to the external surface of the RCC panels in the vicinity of the shock/shock interaction, but cause these critical panels to be heated from both sides. Because the shock/shock interaction to the baseline configuration produces relatively high heating rates centered in the vicinity of RCC Panel 9 (refer to Figure 9), the internal flow next creates catastrophic damage to the TPS in this region. Thus, the RCC panels in this region undergo growing damage, providing a second breech to the TPS. As noted earlier, at this point in time during reentry, there has been a significant change to the Orbiter Mold Line (OML). Note that it is the authors opinion that the limited data available to the authors at this time does not rule out the possibility that the initial foam-impact-induced breech might have affected an RCC panel downstream of RCC Panel 6. However, the Kirtland photograph, which will be discussed in the next section, indicates to us that there are two gaps in the wing leading edge. Regardless of where the initial breech of the wing leading edge occurred, the locally high pressures due to the shock/shock interaction that exist for the baseline Orbiter configuration are greatest on the surface of RCC Panel 9 +/- one panel. These pressures drive the hot gases into the wing volume, contributing to the heating to those gages on the spar behind RCC Panel 9. Then, within a few minutes, the gases break through the spar and the LMG wheel-well wall. Damage to the Orbiter is growing rapidly. The first five debris events (refer to Table 3) occurred in the time GMT 13:53:44 to 13:54:11. The demise of one or more RCC panels changes the Orbiter Mold Line (OML) geometry of the wing leading edge. Instead of encountering a rounded leading edge with gradually changing wing-leading-edge sweep angles, the
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oncoming flow sees cavities or notches in the wing leading edge, flat faces of (what is left of) the spars, metal surfaces of high catalycity, etc. See Figure 22. Locally strong shock waves that are imbedded in the viscous/inviscid interaction change the nature of the interaction to one more like that of Figure 8(b). A significant increase occurs to the perturbations in heating to the erose leading edge formed by the damage to/loss of those RCC panels in the transition zone, e. g., RCC Panels 6 through 9. All of this, occurs with the Orbiter flying at velocities in excess of 22,000 feet/second (Mach 22.5) and at an altitude of 227,000 feet where the flow is a continuum and the aerothermodynamic environment is severe. The scenario now becomes one in which the damage accelerates dramatically. (10) The modifications to the shock/shock interaction flow field of critical data/event #4, as developed based on the developing damage scenario and correlated against the Kirtland photograph, i. e., observations by personnel from the Starfire Optical Range (at EI + 830.5/832.5). As noted in the previous paragraphs, debris events 1 through 5 take place from GMT 13:53:44 to GMT 54:11. See Tables 1 and 3. A number of tiles and/or pieces of individual RCC panels along the leading edge have been ablated, or lost. See Figures 20(a) through 20(c) and the The Content of Left RCC Panels in Table 2. Consistent with our premise, let us assume that there are at two gaps due to missing RCC panels from the wing leading edge. Missing is in quotes because parts of the panels are probably still in place. Furthermore, each notch may represent one or more RCC panels. Recall from the previous discussion that the initial, critical, foam-impingementinduced damage possibly affected RCC Panel 6 one panel. The early and rapid responses of the three sensors near the spar behind RCC Panel 9 led to the postulation that hot gases were flowing through the chunnel. The significant amount of metallic deposits on left-wing materials presented in Figure 21 further supports the contention that damage to RCC Panel 6 was the initial breech. Downstream, leading edge RCC panels were being heated from both sides, with disastrous effects. The most disastrous were to the RCC panels located where the shock/shock interaction heating was the greatest, RCC Panel 9. Thus, based on the previous discussion, we will assume that the two notches are centered on RCC Panel 6 and on RCC Panel 9. Refer to Figure 22. As shown in the sketch of Figure 23, the loss of these segments along the wing leading edge present the oncoming flow with notches that contained flat faces, forwardfacing corners, etc., instead of the gradually changing sweep angle and the rounded nose of the undamaged wing leading edge of the Orbiter. Locally strong shock waves, i. e., shock waves that are perpendicular to the oncoming flow, occur for each notch. A portion of each shock wave is normal to the oncoming flow, but only for a short distance. The notch-induced shock waves quickly curve away as the flow follows the RCC surface downstream of the corner. Thus, the shock shape has a bubble-like appearance in the plane of the paper. The shock-layer structure postulated for each notch in the sketch of Figure 23 is similar to that obtained during the Mach 6 wind-tunnel tests that were conducted at the Langley Research Center. See Figure 24. Consider the curved shock wave associated with the notch created by the removal of RCC Panel 9 from the wind-tunnel model. The trace of the shock wave nearest the wing root, i. e., the trace that extends into the notch produced by the missing RCC Panel 9 is normal to the oncoming flow. Thus, the flow
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immediately downstream of the normal shock wave is subsonic. As the shock wave curves, it becomes weaker and the flow immediately downstream of the shock wave is supersonic. Because the shock wave is curved, there is considerable vorticity in the shock layer flow approaching the wing leading edge. The curved shock wave associated with the notch of RCC Panel 6 would exhibit similar features. Furthermore, when these two curved shock waves intersect for this high angle-of-attack configuration, they create an extremely complex flow field. Consider next the flow of the air in the shock layer just ahead of the wing leading edge. The density of the air in the shock layer will be greatest in the shock-layer flow downstream of the normal portions of the shock wave. The large density gradients that occur in the shock layer flow would cause light rays from a distant source on the far side of the vehicle to be bent as they pass through the shock layer. Light rays would bend due to the large second derivatives in the density of the air in the shock layer, producing dark areas in a photograph of the flow. This phenomenon is similar to the shadowgraph technique, which is used to visualize the shock-wave structure in a wind-tunnel flow. The stand-off distance from the shock wave to the vehicle surface is relatively small for these hypersonic flows. Thus, the shock layer flow in the shadowgraph may appear as a dark region in the plane of the photograph. The reader should note that this is a twodimensional trace of a three-dimensional phenomenon. A photograph of the Orbiter in flight was taken by personnel at the Starfire Optical Range is presented in Figure 25. This is called the Kirtland photograph. It was taken at EI + 830.5/832.5, which is just less than two minutes before the loss of signal. Note the similarity between the notch-induced shock-wave structure that the authors postulate for the flow near the wing root (refer to Figure 23) and the darkened area in the Kirtland photograph (refer to Figure 25), which contains two bubbles in the darkened area near the intersection of the wing with the fuselage. Many investigators have tried to define the place of the Orbiter within the darkened area. Two examples of these attempts are presented in Figures 26 and 27. Although the present authors do not necessarily agree with the phenomenological models proposed for these two figures, they do support our belief that damage to the wing-leading edge in the form of missing RCC panels produces a multiply-curved shock structure. The existence of two notches along the wing leading edge produces a shock-layer structure, which is consistent with the present authors interpretation of the Kirtland photograph. Assume that the breech of the wing leading edge through the loss of two RCC panels occurred near GMT 13:54:00, i. e., the time of debris events one through five. Two is in quotes, because the possibility exists that portions of adjacent RCC panels may also be missing during this time frame. Why does the darkened region in the Kirtland photograph, which was taken at GMT 13:57:59.5, which was approximately 240 seconds later, still correlate with the authors model of the notch-induced perturbed flow? The authors believe that, while there is a considerable mass of hot gases flowing through the wing box, there is a considerable thermal mass available to absorb the energy in these hot gases. Thus, it takes awhile for the damage to the structures in the internal wing volume to reach the critical limit, where the left wing will break off. This occurs somewhere between the time of the Kirtland photograph (EI + 830.5/832.5) and the LOS (EI + 923).
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(11) Comparing selected histories showing that the actual flight was close to the planned flight up to EI + 900. Beginning at EI + 270 and continuing through EI + 923, which corresponded to LOS, the damage to OV-102 grows continuously. Breeches along the wing leading edge allow hot gases to flow through large portions of the internal wing volume, destroying structures in its path. Venting gases and the changes to the OML modify the vortical flow over the leeward surfaces of the Orbiter. Nevertheless, the actual, or as flown trajectory was very close to the planned trajectory. Referring to Figure 28, the velocity history for the actual trajectory follows closely that for the planned trajectory through EI + 923. A similar comparison for the altitude history would produce the same degree of agreement. It is noted in Appendix A that angle-of-attack modulation becomes active at EI + 562. Entry Guidance enables limited delta angle of attack commands from the reference angle of attack to promote improved convergence to the reference drag profile. Referring to Figure 29, the reader can see that the actual, or as-flown angleof-attack history follows reasonably well the planned angle-of-attack history until after EI + 900. The actual angle-of-attack was usually within one degree of the planned flight angle-of-attack. Thus, despite the growing damage, many of the flight performance parameters remain close to nominal up to this time. At some time after (approximately) EI + 860, with the Orbiter over Texas, a substantial portion of the left wing probably broke away. From then on, there were a plethora of indicators of trouble. (12) Using the rolling-moment-coefficient history to support findings for some of the previous eleven points. The delta rolling moment history is presented in Figure 30. The strong oscillatory variations of the delta rolling moments that occur before GMT 13:50:00 were attributed to experimental uncertainty from the outset, as noted by Labbe et al. [Ref. 3]. From GMT 13:50:00 through GMT 13:53:00, the delta rolling moment was relatively constant and negative. The magnitude is within the experimental uncertainty. Furthermore, additional review of these data indicated that there had been flight-to-flight variations of similar magnitude from previous flights. Winds were offered as another factor that could have affected the data in this time frame. Because of these three factors, the authors have assumed that none of the delta rolling moment data for times before GMT 13:53:00 are definitive. From GMT 13:53:00 to GMT 13:54:00, the delta rolling moments are negative (left-wing down) and becoming more negative with time. See Figure 30. In the same time frame are the first five debris events. Recall that, for the flow field that was computed for the Orbiter with RCC Panel 6 missing, there were negative rolling moments of small magnitude. See Figure 12. Research activities have been conducted by personnel at the Langley Research Center (NASA) to determine the flow field of the Shuttle Orbiter at an angle-of-attack of 40o. Notches in the wing leading edge simulated missing RCC panels. The Mach 24.2 flow field was computed assuming that the Orbiter was missing RCC Panel 9 and that the air was in thermochemical equilibrium. Surface pressures for this computed flow
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field are presented in the lower right-hand figure of Figure 31. Streamwise streaks of high pressure are associated with the vortices from the shock interactions and from the flow around the notches. The effect of the vortices are also exhibited in the streamwise streaks of high heating that bound the large area of lower left wing surface where the notch has perturbed the heating. See the lower left-hand figure of Figure 31. High pressures act at the notch left by the loss of RCC Panel 9. The probable loss of a good portion of the spar behind that RCC panel provides a path for the hot gases to create devastation to the structures in large areas of the internal wing volume. Although temperature measurements in the LMG wheel well have been indicating problems for over two minutes, the damage to the wing front spar and internal struts is increasing. The timeline presented in Table 1 indicates that, during the same time frame that first five debris events occur. It is likely the upper interior wing honeycomb surface is being heated above the RTV (tile bonding adhesive) failure limit and the tiles are coming off. It is also possible a larger section of the honeycomb aluminum burns or comes lose which could correspond to the flash (burning of the vaporized aluminum) observed in this time period. As the internal wing structure (spar and struts) melts, the dynamic pressure on the lower wing surface would likely cause some wing flexure, bending up or dimpling of the lower wing. Loss of the internal wing structure would put added loading on the remaining RCC panels causing them to break, consistent with observed panel tops cracked at the apex. A bent spanner beam was also found. These phenomena also contribute to the explanation of the increasingly positive rolling moment observed.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS This document develops a plausible scenario for the demise of the Shuttle Columbia based on what the authors judge to be 12 critical pieces of data. While there is lot still unknown and much well never know, the authors believe there is sufficient collaborating evidence to support the following conclusions: 1. At 82 seconds into the launch, the ET-foam debris strikes the wing, damaging the leading edge. For reasons discussed in the main body of the report, the authors believe the initial breech was in the vicinity of RCC Panel 6 one panel. This also would mean the breech was present at start of reentry. 2. Hot gases entering a breech near RCC Panel 6 have several negative effects. First, hot gases flow down the chunnel, causing the MADS sensors near spar 9 to have anomalous responses early in the entry. The slag and other melting metallic components are splattered onto the surfaces behind RCC Panels 7 through 10. See Figure 21. Second, the incoming plume impinges on the spar, eventually burning a hole. Third, the hot gases in the chunnel reduced the heat rejection capability of the RCC panels downstream (outboard) of RCC Panel 6. Since these RCC panels are in the region where the baseline shock/shock interaction pattern is most severe, a second breech in the TPS occurs near RCC Panel 9 one panel. Soon other RCC panels in the vicinity experience significant ablation. See Figure 20(c). 3. The hole through the spar has some defining characteristics. It has to burn all 4 MADS wire bundles on the back of the spar (making it about 18 inches high), yet focus enough heat on the OI (telemetry) wire bundles several feet away on the top of the wheel well to burn them quickly. A missing T-seal (or a portion thereof) near RCC Panel 6 one panel would allow a concentrated slit of hot gases to cut the wire bundles, without depositing heat to a large internal volume in the wheel well. Since the temperature sensors in the wheel well all increase together, but at a very slow rate (about 8 degrees per minute), the plume cant be impinging directly on these temperature sensors. Within a few minutes, the slit jet will change to a circular hole as the downstream rib burns through. The change in the geometry of the breech causes more of the hot gases to flow down the chunnel. 4. Damaged panels near RCC Panels 6 and 9 would explain the OMS-Pod heating transients because of the perturbation to the flow over the wing. This behavior is consistent with studies being conducted at the Langley Research Center (LaRC). Notches at two locations along the wing leading edge appear as a double hump in the leading edge flow field that is captured in the Kirtland photograph, which was taken when the Orbiter was visible to the Starfire Optical Range, 5. The debris damage shows a lot of unique damage in the region of RCC Panels 8 and 9. This is consistent with a secondary burn through in this max-heat area after hot gases get in the chunnel. The fact that much of the bottom panels in region 6 to 10 are missing would be consistent with burn through on the bottom high heat area. Probably first occurring at the shock-shock interaction centered on RCC Panel 9, but eventually affecting RCC Panels from 6 to 10. The tire in
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the left wheel well shows unique burning, as does one of the main gear up-lock parts. This would be consistent with a jet originating behind RCC Panel 6 and burning through the wheel well near the tire. The tire would protect the temperature sensors in the wheel well from being directly hit and, as a good insulator, help diffuse the heat for a while giving in a more uniform heat up rate in the wheel well. 6. The small initial decrease in rolling moment is consistent with LaRC wind tunnel test with missing RCC panels. The hot gases will penetrate into the wing front spar region and the wing internal structure. As this wing support structure is destroyed the lower wing surface will begin to flex upward under the increasing dynamic pressure load as the atmospheric density increases. The changing shape could explain the continuing increase in roll moment up until the loss of signal at about EI + 923. While there is much that will never be known about the demise the authors judge the scenario developed in this paper is reasonable and may best correlate with the available aero, thermal, debris, and timeline. At the time of this report, NASA has not yet completed an integrated Aerothermal-structural analysis starting with a breech in the vicinity of RCC Panel 6.
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REFERENCES [1] J. J. Bertin, Hypersonic Aerothermodynamics, AIAA Education Series, Washington, D. C., 1994. [2] R. D. Neumann, Defining the Aerothermodynamic Methodology, J. J. Bertin, R. Glowinski, and J. Periaux (eds.), Hypersonics, Volume I: Defining the Hypersonic Environment, Birkhaeuser Boston, Boston, 1989. [3] S. Labbe, J. Caram, and C. Madden, CAIB Public Hearing, Tuesday, 18 March 2003. [4] M. Hasselbeck, Preliminary Conclusions Based on MADS Data, April 2003.
To link to the figures and appendices please click on the following hyperlinks: To see figures click on 2 Fatal Reentry of STS107 Data and Observations.ppt To see appendix click on 3 Timeline-STS-107-REV17-BASELINE.xls
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Figures for
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Using the Data and Observations from Flight STS-107 to Explain the Fatal Reentry of the Columbia Orbiter OV-102
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2 Fatal Reentry of STS107 Data and Observations.ppt
Table 1
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Content of Left RCC Panels

Upper RCC Panel Upper Closeout Panel X X X X X X X X X X X X Edges Only
Table 2
Lower Closeout Panel Lower RCC Panel X X X X X X X Tiles Only X Tiles Only X X X X
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X X X X
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
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Table 3
STS-107 SUMMARY ENT RY TIMELINE

32:13:50 to 32:13:54 G.m.t.
GMT 32:
This material is PREL IMINARY informa tion only. It is for lim ited distribution. DO NOT FORWARD.
13:44
q = 15 psf M = 24.4 q = 22 psf M = 23.7 q = 29 psf M = 22.7
:45
:46
:47
:48
:49
:50
:51
:52
:53
:54
:55
:56
:57
:58
:59
14:00
:01
:50
EI + 411 sec 50:42 Comm 6 Comm 4 Comm 5 1 st clear indication of off -nominal aero increments delta yawing moment at 52:44, delta rolling moment at 52:50 51:09 (EI+420) Left wing lower surface TC (V07T9666A) experiences an unusual temp increase followed by temp spike 4 Left OMS Pod Surface temps - change in existing off-nominal temp trend - rise rate becomes significantly warmer than expected 52:09 (EI+480) 52:17 (EI+488) 52:32 / 55 (EI+503 / 526) 51:49 (EI+460) Left inboard elevon lower skin temperature fails OSL 52:39 / 53:09 (EI+510 / 540) 52:44 / 50 (EI+515 / 521) Comm 7 & 8 Comm 9 52:09 / 15 52:25 / 31 52:49 / 55 53:31 (EI+562) EI + 471 sec EI + 531 sec
:51
:52
:53
Start of alpha modulation
:54
EI + 591 sec
EI + 351 sec
50:00 / 06
50:16 / 22 50:25 / 28
53:45 / 53:58 (EI+576 / 589) Debris Events 1 thru 3 53:38 (EI+569)
Comm dropouts 1&2
Comm 3
Inertial sideslip angle (beta) exceeds flight history
50:19 (EI+370)
50:09 (EI+360)
53:29 (EI+560) Several left fuselage sidewall and PLBD surface temp eratures start off -nominal temperature trends 52:49 (EI+520) Nose Cap RCC Attach OB Clevis (Chin Panel) off -nominal temporary change in temperature rise rate LMG brake line temperatures (3) 52:41 (EI+512) begin unusual temp increase Supply water dump nozzle and vacuum vent nozzle temperatures start temporary increase in rise rate 52:59 (EI+530)
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Left OMS pod surface temperature (V07T9223A) starts an of off -nominal trend
Left PLBD Surface TC - start of off -nominal temperature trend - cooler rise rate when comp ared to previous flights of same inclination 51:14 (EI+425) Left Wing Front Spar at RCC Panel 9 - starts an off -nominal increasing temperature trend followed by the measurement starting to fail at EI+520 seconds 51:14 (EI+425) Left Wing RCC Panel 9 Low er Attach Clevi s (between RCC 9 and 10) rate change in off -nominal temperature increase
At EI+487 seconds, 2 left wing and 1 right wing surface pressure measurements show signs of failure (unreal signature) At EI+487 to EI+ 548 seconds, all of the measurements running in the wire bundle along the left wing leading edge show signs of failure (unreal signature) The vast majority of left wing OEX me asurements show signs of fa ilure (unreal signature) during this entire time period (EI+487 to EI+ 735 seconds) - this includes all left wing temp erature and pressure measurements and all strain measu rements aft of Xo 1040 with the exception of three strain measurements on the upper surface of the LMLG compartment
53:10 / 36 (EI+541 / 567) Left outboard/inboard 52:18 hydraulic return line (EI+489) temperatures (4) fail OSL Left Wing Spar Lower Cap (Xo 1040 Spar) off -nominal increase in strain indication followed by gradual decrease over approx 53:37 330 second interval (EI+568) Left wing spar upper (Xo 1040 spar) - start of off -nominal Left OB Elevon W ide Band Accels 52:25 / 31 increase in strain indication off -nominal vibration responses (EI+496 / 502) followed by sudden decrease measurement beg ins to fail at EI+534 52:16 (EI+487) Continued on next page
Start of Peak Hea ting (13:50:53 GMT)
Grd Location: Pacific Ocean 52:17
Grd Location: CA coast 53:26
PAGE 12
Rev 17; 5/7/03
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Figure 1
Ascent Debris Trajectory
Solid cylindrical protrusions were created through the debris locations in each view
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Trimetric
View
ET208 Camera Frame
ET208 Camera View
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Figure 2
Projection of Debris Trajectory onto Left Wing
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Centerline of one-foot diameter trajectory pipe intersects the wing at approximately RCC panel 8, with the most likely foam impact predicted along panels 7 and 8
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Figure 3
Left Wing Orientation
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Left Wing Orientation
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Figure 4
Left Wing Leading Edge
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418
Figure 5
RCC Panel 9 Sensor Locations
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Figure 6
#5 - LMG Brake Line Temp C #6 Brake Sw Vlv Fwd #8 - Brake Sw Vlv Return
Forward D 4 7
#1 Brake Line Temp D #2 Strut Actuator #3 Hydraulic Sys Uplink Actuator
180
300 miles California Calif Coast NV/UT Border Roll Reversal 56:30
#4 LMG Brake Line Temps A & B

New Mexico
4 7
160
H2O Nozzle Jump
140
V58T1700A Brake Line Temp A
120
V58T1701A Brake Line Temp B RCC 9 Back of Spar V58T1703A Brake Line Temp D Tire OSL
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Temperature In Wheel Well
100
80
V58T1702A Brake Line Temp C
Mins Secs
13:46 13:48
2 120
4 240
6 360
13:50
8 480
10 600
Time from EI 13:52 Debris Events: #1
Flash
60
RCC 9/10 Clevis
Elev OSL
id M
6A 10 T1 34 sV Fu
1 2 6 8 3
D & E Tire Temps
40
V58T0405A Main Gear Strut Actuator
V51T0475 / 474 Wheel Temp
V58T0125A Hydraulic Uplock Actuator Sys 1
12 720
13:54 13:56 #15
14 840
13:58 #16
16 960
14:00
18 1080
13:44
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Temperature (F)
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100
-200
-400
50
-600
-800
0 240 300 360
420
EI - seconds
480
540
-1000 600
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Strain (uin/in)
420
Figure 7
STS-107 RCC Panel 9 Spar Temperature & Strain Clevis Temperature

1000
250
V09T9895A RCC Panel 9 Spar Xo1103.1 Yo-225.5 Zo302.1 800
V09T9910A RCC Panel 9 Clevis Xo1105.8 Yo-243.0 Zo289.3
V12G9921A RCC Panel 9 Spar Xo1106.0 Yo-229.0 ZoMID 600 400
200
150
200 0
Figure 8
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Figure 9
Surface Temperatures Radiation Equilibrium CFD Point #6

NASA ARC GASP CFD Solution
Temperatures, F
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Temperatures, F CFD Point #1
NASA LaRC LAURA CFD Solution
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Figure 10
Hot gases enter the chunnel
Flow behind RCC Outward through Chunnel
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Jet of hot gases coming down the chunnel
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424
Figure 11
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Figure 12
Orbiter OML Sensitivity CFD Analysis

Orbiter with RCC Panel 6 Removed Mach 23.8
Blue Baseline Red Missing RCC 6
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Results and Observations (CFD analysis)
Produces negative roll and yaw moments w/small m agnitude
Streamlines for damaged vehicle track inboard of baseline

17
Resultant shock raises pressure in proximity to temp measuremen ts
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426
Figure 13
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Figure 14
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Figure 15
Wind Tunnel Testing of Orbiter OML Deltas
Effect of RCC Panel Cutout Position on Orbiter Fuselage Nondimensional Heating, Panel 6 vs. Panel 9
Side fuselage heating 2 to 10 times nominal configuration heating.
Panel #6
Panel #9
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h/href 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 Run 85
Run 80
CA-000112 CAB068-0218
MADDS Wires on Back of Spar RCC 9 and 8
Figure 16
COLUMBIA
CA-000112 CAB068-0219
429
430
MADDS Wires on Back of Spar RCC 7 and 6 and IO Wires on Wheel Well
Figure 17
COLUMBIA
CA-000112 CAB068-0220
Figure 18
RCC Spar 5 on MADDS and OI Wires on Front of Wheel Well
COLUMBIA
CA-000112 CAB068-0221
431
432
Figure 19
COLUMBIA
CA-000112 CAB068-0222
Figure 20a
Left RCC Panels 5-8
There is no RCC from panel 6 Only upper RCC sections of 5, 7, and 8 Interesting T Seal between 5 and 6
Panel 8
Panel 7
Panel 6
Panel 5
COLUMBIA
Predecisional Working Draft

CAB068-0223
CA-000112
433
Figure 20b
434
COLUMBIA
CA-000112 CAB068-0224
Virtual 3-D Reconstruction of Debris
Figure 20c
COLUMBIA
CA-000112 CAB068-0225
435
Very Heavy
Very Light
436
Relative Metallic Deposition on Left Wing Materials
Figure 21
COLUMBIA
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21
Panel Number
Distribution of metallic deposition volume Distribution of metallic deposition volume was centered around panels 88& 99 was centered around panels &
CAB068-0226
CA-000112
Figure 22
View From Bottom of Left-Wing (Similar to Kirtland Photography)
RCC Panel 6 missing RCC Panel 9 missing
COLUMBIA
CA-000112 CAB068-0227
437
438
Figure 23
Shock-Shock Interaction for Left Wing, as Modified by Missing RCC Panels (RCC Panel 6 and RCC Panel 9)
Bow shock wave Locally high pressures on the wing
COLUMBIA
Locally strong shock Waves (perpendicular) To the on coming flow)
Shaded region represents high-density air flows in the shock layer
CA-000112 CAB068-0228
Figure 24
Orbiter Leeside Heating and Corresponding Shock Pattern

eff = 1.4
External UV light
Mach 6 Air
= 40 deg
Re, L = 2.4 x 106 = 0 deg
Note scale change
OMS pod heating increase Missing RCC panel #9
COLUMBIA
Orbiter wing
Leeside heating pattern
Shock patterns (path integrated)

CAB068-0229
CA-000112
439
440
Figure 25
COLUMBIA
CA-000112 CAB068-0230
Figure 26
COLUMBIA
CA-000112 CAB068-0231
441
442
Figure 27
Kirtland AFB Photo at 13:57:19
COLUMBIA
Wing Penetration?
Hot Spot
Hot Spot
CA-000112 CAB068-0232
Figure 28
Ve locity history for the ST S-107 flight of O V-102
30000
25000
20000
15000
Actua l fligh t data Plan ne d flight da ta
Velocity (ft/s)
COLUMBIA
10000
5000 0 0 200 400 600 800 1000

Tim e from EI (se conds)
CA-000112 CAB068-0233
443
Alpha (with wind) (degrees)
444
Figure 29
Ang le-of-attack (with wind) h istory for the STS107 flight of th e OV-102
45.0 44.0 43.0 42.0 41.0 40.0 39.0 38.0 37.0 36.0 35.0 0 200 400 600 800 1000 Time from EI (secs ) Planned flight data Actual flight da ta
COLUMBIA
CA-000112 CAB068-0234
Sharp Change in Rolling Moment

Timeline Events vs. Roll Aero Model Key Correlations
STS-107 Po st Flight Aerodynamic Reconstruction Moment Imbalance Model - Res idual Roll Moment (Cl) versus Time
200.0 300.0 400.0 500.0 600.0 700.0 800.0 900.0
Figure 30
0.0
100.0
0.004 NASA Model Boeing-HB Simulator - Preliminary
0.003
0.002
Start of Peak Heating (13:50:53) First Roll Reversal (13:56:30) Start of Alpha Modulation (13:53:24)
* Start of 2 yaw jets firing, R2R and R3R at (13:59:30) * Max Elevon Deflection Left=-8.11 deg up, Right=1.15 deg up at (13:59:31) * Speedbrake CH-4 readings =19,20, then 24 degs (should be 0 deg) * Max Aileron (-2.3 deg) at (13:59:32) * LOS=13:59:32
0.001
Residual Cl
COLUMBIA
-0.001
LMG Brake Line temps start of off-nominal trend Start of Initial Roll (13:49:32) Start of sharp Aileron Trim Increase (13:58:03) *Start of slow Aileron Trim Increase (13:54:20) * Mid Fuselage temp offnominal trend begins
-0.002
-0.003
Debris 1-6 (13:53:44-13:54:34)
-0.004
13:48:09 13:50:09 13:52:09 13:54:09 13:56:09 13:58:09 14:00:0
13:44:09
13:46:09
Time (sec from EI (top), GMT (bottom))
CA-000112 CAB068-0235
445
Figure 31
446
Missing RCC Panel 9 Surface Flow Features
COLUMBIA
CA-000112 CAB068-0236
Page 1 of 6
5/8/2003 11 AM
STS-107 Mishap Investigation - Combined Summary Time Line -BASELINE-
Integ Time Line Team - REV 17 BASELINE
Note: Rev 17 BASE integrates the OEX data timeline with the Baselined Rev 16 timeline plus IEE aero event changes (accounted for wind effects in aero increment derivation process). Rev 17 was baselined by the OVE Working Group Team as of 5/7/03. EI Remarks Sum GMT OEX Milestone Entry Event sec No. GMT Day 32 data EI+2010 APU 2 Start 1 13:10:39 TIG-5 EI-1719 OMS TIG 2 13:15:30 TIG EI-1561 OMS End of Burn 3 13:18:08 EI-764 APU 1 Start 4 13:31:25 EI-13 EI-760 APU 3 Start 5 13:31:29 EI-280.4 X Start of OEX PCM Data Block 5.5 13:39:28.559 EI+0 Entry Interface (400,000 ft) Mach 24.57 6 13:44:09 EI EI+90 / EI+290 13:45:39 / X 16 Temperature Sensors on the lower surface to the left of or at the centerline 6.1 48:59 experience off-nominal early temperature trends (warmer temperature rise rate compared to previous flights of OV-102 at the same inclination) MSID V09T9849A V07T9666A V07T9468A V07T9470A V07T9711A V07T9713A V07T9784A V07T9786A V07T9787A V07T9788A V07T9478A V07T9480A V09T9845A V07T9489A
X1106.0 Y-229.0 ZMID
6.15
13:48:39
EI+270
Left Wing Front Spar at RCC Panel 9 - initiation of off-nominal trend in strain (small The measurement began to fail at approximately EI+495 sec increase) followed by a more significant off-nominal signature to failure at EI+495 secs
V07T9785A V09T9231A V12G9921A
6.2
13:48:59
EI+290
V09T9910A
X1112.0 Y-239.0 Z289.0
Left Wing RCC Panel 9 Lower Attach Clevis (between RCC 9 and 10) - initiation of an The measurement began to fail at approximately EI+492 sec off-nominal temperature trend (early temperature increase compared to previous flights of same inclination) Start of initial roll Left Wing Front Spar Caps Strain Gage shows early off nominal downward trend
13:49:32 X
EI+323
6.3 6.4
~13:49:39*
~EI+330*
*Note: PCM3 entry data is in snapshot format (not continuous).

Time indicated is at start of data segment where off-nominal signature is first observed, therefore event may have started earlier than noted.
V12G9169A
X1107 Y232 Z?
6.45
13:49:49 / 49:59
EI+340 / EI+350
4 Left OMS Pod Surface temps - Start of off-nominal temperature trend - cooler rise rate when compared to previous flights of same inclination
Followed by the start of a warmer-than-expected temperature trend beginning in the EI+510 to EI+540 sec range
V07T9976A V07T9220A
V07T9978A V07T9972A
EI + 351 sec; WLE Stagnation Temp: ~2520 F (STS-107 Nom EOM Design Pred)
QBAR = ~15 psf (~0.10 psi); Mach 24.4
------ 32:13:50:00 -----Five events of unexpected return link comm drop-out (Comm events 1-5)
6.5
13:50:00 / 43
EI+351 / EI+394
COLUMBIA
6.7
13:50:09
EI+360
On upper left aft antenna (TDRS 171/W). Appears off-nominal based on previous flt data. Comm loss not continuous thru period indicated. Left PLBD Surface TC BP3703T - Start of off-nominal temperature trend - cooler rise Followed by large increase in temperature at EI + 570 seconds rate when compared to previous flights of same inclination
V07T9925A
X1138.5 YLH Z441.4
6.9
13:50:19
EI+370
V07T9666A
X1121.1 Y-235.5 ZLWR

Start of Peak Heating Determined by analysis
Left Wing Lower Surface Thermocouple BP2510T begins off-nominal temp increase The measurement subsequently fails at approximately EI+496 sec from ~2000 deg F to ~2200 deg F over approx 50 seconds followed by a momentary 100 deg F temperature spike
EI+404 7 13:50:53 QBAR = ~19 psf (~0.13 psi); Mach 24.1
------ 32:13:51:00 -----X X Left Wing Front Spar at RCC Panel 9 - start of off-nominal increasing temperature trend Left Wing RCC Panel 9 Lower Attach Clevis (between RCC 9 and 10) - start of a more rapid off-nominal increasing temperature trend
EI + 411 sec; WLE Stagnation Temp: ~2650 F
7.2
13:51:14
EI+425
Increasing trend continues until the measurement starts to fail at approximately EI+520 sec Increases until the measurement starts to fail at approximately at EI + 492 secs
Rationale for deletion: Upon further evaluati on of the data, it was determined that the remote sensor signatures had been seen in previous flights and/or could be explained by known events. Rationale for deletion: Moved to seq # 11.37 after further analysis.
V09T9895A
X1102.2 Y-239.0 Z239.0
7.25
13:51:14
EI+425
V09T9910A
X1112.0 Y-239.0 Z289.0
7.3
deleted
7.35
deleted
7.37
13:51:49
EI+460
OMS-L Pod HRS1 Surf T3-AFT - Start of off-nominal higher-than-expected temperature trend when compared to previous flights of same inclination
Sensor sees a sharp temp increase at EI+910 and goes erratic at EI+940
V07T9223A
X1437.2 Y-126 Z422
QBAR = ~22 psf (~0.15 psi); Mach 23.7
------ 32:13:52:00 -----Rationale for deletion: Moved to seq # 8.75 after further analysis.
7.4
deleted
7.45
13:52:09 / 52:55
EI+480 / EI+486
Four events of unexpected return link comm drop-out (Comm events 6-9)
On upper left aft antenna (TDRS 171/W). Appears off-nominal based on previous flt data. Comm loss not continuous thru period indicated.
OVE 05-07 CTF038-0303
447
Timeline-STS-107-REV17-BASELINE.xls
Page 2 of 6
5/8/2003 11 AM
448
MSID V09T9889A
X262.0 Y-23.0 LWR
Note: Rev 17 BASE integrates the OEX data timeline with the Baselined Rev 16 timeline plus IEE aero event changes (accounted for wind effects in aero increment derivation process). Rev 17 was baselined by the OVE Working Group Team as of 5/7/03. EI Remarks Sum GMT OEX Milestone Entry Event sec No. GMT Day 32 data X
7.46
13:52:09 / 52:49 X First OEX data to show signs of failure
EI+480 / EI+520
7.47
13:52:16
EI+487
Nose Cap RCC Attach OutBoard Clevis (Chin Panel) - Temporary change in slope, then returns to "nominal" Note: Adjacent sensor V09T9888 (on centerline) does not show this signature Two Left Wing and 1 Right Wing Surface Pressure measurements show signs of failure All of the measurements running in the wire bundle along the left wing leading edge show signs of failure The vast majority of left wing OEX measurements show signs of failure during this time period - this includes all left wing temperature and pressure measurements and all strain measurements aft of Xo 1040 with the exception of three strain measurements on the upper surface of the LMLG compartment Additionally, 30 right wing pressure measurements show signs of failure
7.48
13:52:16 / 53:17 X
EI+487 / EI+522
7.49
13:52:16 / 56:24
EI+487 / EI+735
V07P8038A V07P8086A V07P8151A 15 of 15 measurements Multiple measurements
7.5
13:52:17
EI+488
Approx Vehicle Ground Location: 39.0 N / -129.2 W LMG Brake Line Temps (D) - small increase in temperature ("bit flip up") X Left Wing Spar Cap Lwr L103 (Xo 1040 Spar - Lower Cap) - off-nominal increase in strain indication followed by gradual decrease over approx 330 seconds interval until measurement failure at ~EI+935 Left Wing Front Spar at RCC Panel 9 - strain gage goes erratic for approximatly 20 second - measurement appears to be failing Subsequent data is suspect
Altitude 236,800 ft / Mach 23.6 - Over the Pacific Ocean, approx 300 miles West of California Coastline
Approx vehicle position when first off-nominal data was seen; Data source: STS-107 GPS Trajectory Data Initiation of temp rise ("bit flip up") - may be nominal based on rise rate comparison w/ flight experience V58T1703A V12G9048A
7.7
13:52:17
EI+488
7.75
13:52:18
EI+489
7.77 X
13:52:24
EI+495
V12G9921A
X1106.0 Y-229.0 ZMID
7.8
13:52:25
EI+496
V08D9729A
7.85 X Left Outboard Elevon Wide Band Accelerometers - off-nominal vibration response (approximately 3G peak-to-peak) V08D9729A - L OB Elevon Z-Vib (MUX1B Ch 2)
13:52:29
EI+500
Left Outboard Elevon Wide Band Accelerometers - off-nominal vibration response (approximately 2G peak-to-peak) V08D9729A - L OB Elevon Z-Vib (MUX1B Ch 2) OMS-L Pod HRSI Surf T1-AFT - Start of slightly off-nominal erratic trend when compared to previous flights of same inclination
Followed by drop in temperature at EI + 570 seconds and subsequent erratic temperature changes
V07T9219A
X1507.1 Y-126.0 Z422.0
COLUMBIA
7.9
13:52:31
EI+502
V08D9729A
deleted
Rationale for deletion: moved to seq #8.7

Supply H2O Dump Nozzle Temps (A, B) (2) and Vacuum Vent Temp (1) - transient (15 and 23 seconds, respectively) increase in typical rise rates. X X OMS-L Pod HRS1 Surf T2-AFT - Start of off-nominal lower-than-expected temperature trend (compared to previous flights of same inclination) until sensor sees a sharp temp increase at EI+910 and goes erratic at EI+940 4 Left OMS Pod Surface temps - Change in existing off-nominal temperature trend (following a cooler rise rate than expected, the temperature trend that is significantly warmer when compared to previous flights of same inclination) LMG Brake Line Temps (A, C) (2) - start of off nominal trend First clear indication of off-nominal aero increments X 2 Left Wing temperature sensors begin an off-nominal (typically erratic) response that appears to be an indication of the measurements (sensors/wiring) failing Left INBD Elevon Lower Skin Temp (1) - OSL Unusual Temperature Increase
8.5
13:52:32/55
EI+503
GMT shown indicates initial rise duration. Supply H2O Dump Nozzle V62T0440A temps took additional 48 secs to return to nominal temp rise, vacuum V62T0551A vent temps took additional 40 secs to return to nominal rise. V07T9222A
X1486.9 Y-126 Z422.0
V62T0439A
8.6
13:52:34
EI+505
8.65
13:52:39 / 53:09
EI+510 / EI+540
V07T9976A V07T9220A
V07T9978A V07T9972A
8.7
13:52:41
EI+512
V58T1700A Delta yawing and rolling moment coefficients indicate off-nominal trends. Derived by analysis. n/a V09T9895A V09T9849A Began trending down 3 secs earlier V09T1006A
V58T1702A
8.75
13:52:44 / 52:50
EI+515 / EI+521
8.8
13:52:49.5 / 52:51.4
EI+520.5 / EI+522.4
deleted
EI+530 10 13:52:59 QBAR = ~25.5 psf (~0.18 psi); Mach 23.2
------ 32:13:53:00 -----Rationale for deletion: Merged with seq # 8.75 after further analysis.
10.5
deleted
10.6
13:53:03
EI+534
Left Outboard Elevon Wide Band Accelerometers - onset of signal saturation indicating likely measurement failure (approximately 10G peak-to-peak - off-scale) Hydraulic System Left Outbd / Inbd Elevon Return Line Temps (4) - OSL OSL was preceded by Nominal Temp rise.
V08D9729A
11
13:53:10 / 36
EI+541 / EI+567
V58T0394A V58T0157A
V58T0193A V58T0257A
OVE 05-07 CTF038-0304
Page 3 of 6
5/8/2003 11 AM
Note: Rev 17 BASE integrates the OEX data timeline with the Baselined Rev 16 timeline plus IEE aero event changes (accounted for wind effects in aero increment derivation process). Rev 17 was baselined by the OVE Working Group Team as of 5/7/03. EI Remarks Sum GMT OEX Milestone Entry Event sec No. GMT Day 32 data MSID
Rationale for deletion: alpha modulation time tag updated - moved to seq #11.25
11.1
deleted
11.2
13:53:26
EI+557
Approx Veh Grd Location: 38.7 N / -123.5 W X X Left PLBD Surface TC BP3603T - Start of slightly off-nominal erratic temperature trend when compared to previous flights of same inclination Left Fuselage Side Surface Temp BP3605T - start of off-nominal increasing temperature trend from ~180 deg F to 400 deg F Trend followed by temperature drop and rise V07T9253A
X1000.7 Y-105 Z354.5
Altitude 231600 ft / Mach 23.0 - Crossing the California Coastline
Data source: STS-107 GPS Trajectory Data
11.21
13:53:29
EI+560
11.22
13:53:29
EI+560
V07T9913A
X1003.8 YLH Z441.3
11.23
13:53:29
EI+560
V07T9925A
X1138.5 YLH Z441.4
Left PLBD Surface TC BP3703T - start of off-nominal temperature rise, peaking at EI+625, followed by temperature drop and subsequent off-nominal higher-thanexpected temperature signature Left Fuselage Side Surface TC BP3604T - Start of slightly off-nominal erratic temperature trend when compared to previous flights of same inclination Alpha Modulation Two events of unexpected return link comm drop-out (Comm events 10-11) Angle of attack (alpha) modulation active On upper left aft antenna (TDRS 171/W). Appears off-nominal based on previous flt data. Comm loss not continuous thru period indicated.
11.24
13:53:29
EI+560
V07T9903A
X1006 Y-105 Z398.4
11.25
13:53:31
EI+562
V90H0803C
11.3
13:53:32 / 54:22 X
EI+563 / EI+565
11.35
13:53:37
EI+568
V12G9049A
X1040 Y-135 ZUPR
Xo 1040 Spar (MLG Forward Wall Spar) Strain Gage - Upper Cap - start of offnominal increase in strain indication (over an approximate 115 second interval) followed by sudden decrease Inertial sideslip angle (Beta) exceeds flight history. The steady state navigation derived sideslip angle becomes out-offamily as compared to previous flight data at this point in the trajectory.
11.37
13:53:38
EI+569
V90H2249C
11.4
13:53:44
EI+575
OMS-L Pod HRSI Surf T1-AFT - Start of off-nominal lower-than-expected temperature Sensor goes erratic at EI+940 trend when compared to previous flights of same inclination
V07T9219A
X1507.1 Y-126.0 Z422.0
11.5
13:53:45 / 54:11
EI+576 / EI+602
1st reported debris (5) observed leaving the Orbiter just aft of Orbiter envelope (Debris # 1 thru 5)
EOC video # EOC2-4-0055, 0056, 0064, 00136 & 0201. No evidence of jet firings near events.
n/a
COLUMBIA
QBAR = ~29 psf (~0.20 psi); Mach 22.7
------ 32:13:54:00 -----Left Main Gear Brake Line Temp B (1) / Strut Actuator Temp (1) / Sys 3 LMG Brake Sw Vlv Ret Line Temp (FWD) (1) - start of off nominal trend Unusual Temperature Increase
12
deleted

Start of slow aileron trim change; Reversal in trend of derived rolling moment coefficient. Mid Fuselage LT BondLine Temp at x1215 (1) & LH Aft Fus Sidewall Temp at x1410 (1) - start of off nominal trend X Left Fuselage Side Surface temp BP3605T peaks and starts downward trend X X Left Fuselage Side Surface temp BP3703T peaks and starts downward trend
13
13:54:10 / 55:12
EI+601 / EI+663
V58T1701A V58T0405A
V58T0842A
14
13:54:20
EI+611
n/a
(roll moment)
The aileron trim setting observed in flight first deviates from the V90H1500C predicted trim setting at this pt in trajectory (GMT is approximate (+/- (aileron trim) 10 sec) for aileron). Also, observed roll moment changed from a negative to positive slope (derived by analysis). Unusual increase in temperature rise rate V34T1106A V09T1724A V07T9253A
X1000.7 Y-105 Z354.5
15
13:54:22
EI+613
15.2
13:54:29
EI+620
15.3
13:54:33.3 / 54:37
EI+624.3 / EI+628
Flash #1 - Orbiter envelope suddenly brightened (duration 0.3 sec), leaving noticeably EOC video # EOC2-4-0026, 0034, & 0009B. R3R and R2R jet luminescent signature in plasma trail; plus Debris # 6 - report of very bright debris firings occurred near events. Debris events 6 & 14 are visually the observed leaving the Orbiter just aft of the Orbiter envelope. biggest, brightest events & therefore may indicate the most significant changes to the Orbiter of the western debris events.
n/a
15.32
13:54:34
EI+625
V07T9925A
X1138.5 YLH Z441.5
13.33
13:54:39
~EI+630
Strain Gages Centered on the Upper Surface of the Left MLG Wheel Wheel - Higher- Note: PCM3 entry data is in snapshot format (not continuous), than-expected strain indications observed in these gages therefore event may have occurred earlier than noted
V12G9156A, V12G9157A, V12G9158A
OVE 05-07 CTF038-0305
449
Page 4 of 6
5/8/2003 11 AM
450
MSID X Left Wing X1040 Spar Web - shows increase in strain Note: Adjacent sensor V12G9165A did not show similar "off-nominal" V12G9166A signature at this time, also, PCM3 entry data is in snapshot format V12G9167A (not continuous), therefore event may have occurred earlier than noted (V12G9165Anominal)
Note: Rev 17 BASE integrates the OEX data timeline with the Baselined Rev 16 timeline plus IEE aero event changes (accounted for wind effects in aero increment derivation process). Rev 17 was baselined by the OVE Working Group Team as of 5/7/03. EI Remarks Sum GMT OEX Milestone Entry Event sec No. GMT Day 32 data
13.34
13:54:39
~EI+630
QBAR = ~34.5 psf (~0.24 psi); Mach 22.1
------ 32:13:55:00 -----Debris # 7, 7A, & 8 thru 10 observed leaving the Orbiter just aft of Orbiter envelope. Debris 8, 9, & 10 were seen aft of the Orbiter envelope inside Debris Shower A (next event listed). EOC video # EOC2-4-0005, 0017, 0021, 0028, 0030, 0098 & 0161. No evidence of jet firings near events except 7A where analysis still pending. n/a
15.35
13:55:04 / 55:29 EI+655 / EI+680
15.37
13:55:22 / 55:28
EI+673 / EI+679
Debris Shower A - Report of debris shower seen just aft of Orbiter envelope.
Seen just aft of Orbiter envelope. Over the course of these four seconds a luminsecent section of plasma trail is observed which appears to contain a shower of indefinite particles and multiple, larger discrete debris that includes Debris 8, 9, and 10.
Saw debris: EOC2-4-0098, 0161, 0005, 0030 Saw shower: EOC2-4-0017, 0021, 0028
15.4
deleted
Rationale for deletion: Upon further evaluati on of the data, it was determined that the remote sensor signatures had been seen in previous flights and/or could be explained by known events.
15.43
13:55:33 / 56:03
EI+684 / EI+714
Two events of return link comm drop-outs (Comm events 12 & 13)
On upper right aft antenna (TDRS 171/W). Uncertain if off-nominal based on previous flight data. Comm loss not continuous thru period indicated. V12G9049A
X1040 Y-135 ZUPR
15.44
13:55:34
EI+685
Xo 1040 Spar (MLG Forward Wall Spar) Strain Gage - Upper Cap - sudden drop in strain followed by gradual increase until erratic signature at approximately EI+930
COLUMBIA
15.45
13:55:35 / 56:13
EI+686 / EI+724
Debris # 11, 11A, 11B, 11C & 12 thru 15 observed leaving the Orbiter just aft of Orbiter envelope. Debris #11B & #11C events were both seen at the head of a parallel plasma trail aft of the Orbiter envelope. Debris #12 event was preceded and followed by secondary plasma trails. Debris #13 event was followed by momentary brightening of plasma trail adjacent to debris. Debris #14 event consisted of very bright debris observed leaving the Orbiter.
EOC video # EOC2-4-0005, 0017, 0021, 0028, 0030, 0050, & 0098. No evidence of jet firings near events. (Nearest jet firings occur at 56:17.) Debris events 6 & 14 are visually the biggest, brightest events & therefore may indicate the most significant changes to the Orbiter of the western debris events.
n/a
15.5
13:55:41
EI+692
Mid Fuselage Port (Left) Sill Longeron Temp at X1215 - start of off nominal trend
Unusual Temperature Increase
V34T1118A
QBAR = ~40 psf (~0.28 psi); Mach 21.4
------ 32:13:56:00 -----Left Lower/Upper Wing Skin Temps - Trending down (2) Hyd Sys 1 LMG Uplock Actuator Unlock Line Temp; Sys 3 LMG Brake Sw Vlv Ret Line Temp (FWD); LMG Brake Line Temp C; LMG Brake Line Temp B; Sys 3 Left Main Gear Strut Actuator Temp - all show a temp rise rate change. Indication of potential measurement failures Significant increase in temp rise rate on all four lines
16
13:56:03 / 56:24
EI+714 / EI+735
V09T1002A V58T0125A V58T0842A V58T1702A
V09T1024A V58T1701A V58T0405A
16.5
13:56:16 / 56:53
EI+727 / EI+764
16.55
13:56:30 / 56:55
EI+741 / EI+766
First Roll Reversal initiation / completion

Rationale for deletion: Comm dropout (event 14) is deleted since probably nominal due to completion of roll reversal resulting in elevation angle nearing 60 deg's (vertical tail interfence w/comm).
V90H1044C
16.6
deleted
QBAR = ~42 psf (~0.29 psi); Mach 20.7
------ 32:13:57:00 -----X X Fuselage Side Surf Thermocpl BP3976T - start of off-nominal trend (temp increase followed by temp drop / rise) Fuselage Lower Surface BF Thermocpl BP220T - start of off-nominal trend (shallow temp drop) MLG LH Outbd Tire Pressures 1 & 2 - start of small increase in pressures Not seen in previous flights
16.65
13:57:09
EI+780
V07T9270A
X1486.1 Y-124.8 Z307.1
16.67
13:57:09
EI+780
V07T9508A
X1560 Y-111.1 Z LWR
16.7
13:57:19 / 24
EI+790 / EI+795
V51P0570A
V51P0572A
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Note: Rev 17 BASE integrates the OEX data timeline with the Baselined Rev 16 timeline plus IEE aero event changes (accounted for wind effects in aero increment derivation process). Rev 17 was baselined by the OVE Working Group Team as of 5/7/03. EI Remarks Sum GMT OEX Milestone Entry Event sec No. GMT Day 32 data MSID Debris # 16 (very faint debris) observed leaving just aft of Orbiter followed by two Debris #16: EOC video # EOC2-4-00148-2. Flares #1 & 2: EOC2-4- n/a events of assymmetrcial brightening of the Orbiter shape (Flares 1 and 2). (Occurred 00148-4. Observations by personnel from the Starfire Optical Range over eastern AZ and NM.) (Kirtland Air Force Base, NM). Left Lower/Upper Wing Skin Temps (2) - OSL V09T1002A V09T1024A
16.8
13:57:19 / 58:01.5
EI+790 / EI+832.5
17
13:57:28 / 57:43 Sys 2 LH Brake Sw Vlv Return Temp (1) Unusual Temperature Increase GMT is approximate (+/- 10 sec) V58T0841A
EI+799 / EI+814
18
deleted
19
13:57:54
QBAR = ~52.5 psf (~0.36 psi); Mach 19.8
------ 32:13:58:00 -----X Increase in off-nominal aero increments. Start of sharp aileron trim Increase Left fuselage side surface temp BP3605T starts off-nominal temperature increase Substantial increase in rate of change of rolling and yawing moment increments and initial indication of off-nominal pitching moment increment. Derived by analysis.
20 20.3
13:58:03 13:58:04
EI+835
V90H1500C V07T9253A
X1000.7 Y-105 Z354.5
20.5
13:58:04 / 58:19
EI+835 / EI+850
n/a
21
deleted
22
deleted
EI+847
Significant increase in temp rise rate.
22.5 23 MLG LH Inbd/Outbd Wheel Temps (2) - OSL BFS Fault Msg (4) - Tire Pressures - 1st Message BFS Fault Msg (4) - Tire Pressures - Last Message
13:58:16 13:58:32 / 58:54
EI+863 / EI+885
LMG Brake Line Temp D - Temp rise rate change MLG LH Inbd / Outbd Tire Pressures (4) - Decay to OSL
V58T1703A V51P0570A V51P0571A V51T0574A
V51P0573A V51P0572A V51T0575A
24
deleted
25
EI+871 25.5 EI+887 26 QBAR = ~63.5 psf (~0.44 psi); Mach 18.7
13:58:39 / 58:48 13:58:40 13:58:56
EI+870 / EI+879
------ 32:13:59:00 -----X Left Main Gear Downlocked Indication - Transferred ON Several left side temperature measurements show a rapid increase in temperature followed by erratic behavior and subsequent loss of the measurements at approximately EI+940
27 27.3
13:59:06 13:59:09 / 59:39
EI+900 / EI+930
V51X0125E V07T9925A V07T9972A V07T9976A V07T9903A V07T9913A Abrupt increase in rate of change of pitching, rolling, and yawing n/a increments. Magnitude of aero increments starting to exceed ability of aileron to laterally trim the vehicle. Derived by analysis. Fired continuously until end of data at 13:59:37.4 V79X2634X
V07T9976A V07T9978A V07T9222A V07T9223A
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27.5 27.7
13:59:23 13:59:26 / 59:28
EI+914
EI+917 / EI+919
Loss of MCC real-time data to the workstations in the FCR and MER Abrupt increase in off-nominal aero increments.
28
Start of two yaw jets firing (R2R and R3R)
V79X2638X

Observed aileron trim at LOS -2.3 degrees Altitude ~200700 ft / Mach ~18.1 - Near Dallas TX Approx Veh Grd Location: 32.9 N / -99.0 W LOS Last valid downlink frame accepted by ODRC - OI / BFS / PASS. Start of reconstructed data. Sideslip on vehicle changes sign. Growth in Bank attitude error Aerojet DAP Requests Third Right Yaw RCS Jet (R4R) Aerojet DAP Requests Third Right Yaw RCS Jet (R1R)
29 29.3
13:59:30.66 / 59:30.68 13:59:31 13:59:31.4 / 59:34.5
EI+921.66 / EI+921.68 EI+922 EI+922.4 / EI+925.5
Observed elevons deflection at LOS Left: -8.11 deg (up) Right: -1.15 deg (up) Several events and PASS and BFS FSM messages during this time period all indicate ASAs responded appropriately. However, signature is indicative of the failure signature of ASA 4 failure of ASA 4.
V57H0253A (5 Hz)
29.5
13:59:32
EI+923
30
deleted
31
deleted
32
deleted
32.5
13:59:32
EI+923
Approximate Vehicle Ground Location at Loss of Signal based on GMT; Data source: STS-107 GPS Trajectory Data Nominal loss of comm at this GMT (for ~15 sec max based on previous flt data) The event occurred between the two times listed. Aerodynamic forces due to sideslip are now reinforcing aerodynamic asymmetry. Up until this time the flight control had been able to maintain the Bank error around 5 deg. This additional jet is required to counteract the increasing aerodynamic moments on the vehicle. Fired continuously until end of data at 13:59:37.4 This additional jet is required to counteract the increasing aerodynamic moments on the vehicle. Fired continuously until end of data at 13:59:37.4
n/a
33
13:59:32.136
EI+923.136
34
deleted
35
13:59:35/36
EI+926 / EI+927
n/a
36
13:59:36
EI+927
37
13:59:36.8
EI+927.8
38
13:59:37.3
EI+928.3
OVE 05-07 CTF038-0307
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Page 6 of 6
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452
MSID Last aileron data The aileron position is now approx -5.2 deg with approx -2.5 deg of aileron trim. The rate of change of aileron trim had reached the maximum allowed by the flight control system. GMT derived by MER data personnel n/a End of 5-second period of reconstructed data X Beginning at EI+930 and continuing until the loss of sync on OEX data (EI+964.4 for PCM and EI+970.4 for FDM), essentially all of the OEX data for the entire vehicle becomes erratic and fails PASS Fault Message annunciation - ROLL REF PASS Fault Message annunciation - L RCS LEAK BFS Fault Message annunciations - L RCS LEAK (2) *Time info corrupted on some of the events. End of first 5-seconds of the 32-second period of post-LOS data. Start of approximately 25 seconds of no data available
Note: Rev 17 BASE integrates the OEX data timeline with the Baselined Rev 16 timeline plus IEE aero event changes (accounted for wind effects in aero increment derivation process). Rev 17 was baselined by the OVE Working Group Team as of 5/7/03. EI Remarks Sum GMT OEX Milestone Entry Event sec No. GMT Day 32 data
39
13:59:37.n
EI+928.n
40
13:59:37.396
EI+928.396
40.5
13:59:39 / 14:00:19
EI+930 / EI+970
41
13:59:46.347 / 14:00:01.900*
EI+937.347 / EI+952.900
QBAR = nn psf; Mach nn
------ 32:14:00:00 -----Debris A observed leaving the Orbiter - Large debris seen falling away from the Orbiter envelope. PASS Fault Message annunciation - L RCS LJET Beginning of 2-second Start of last 2-seconds of the 32 second period of post-LOS data. period of reconstructed data
42
14:00:02/06
EI+953 / EI+957
EOC videos # EOC2-4-0024, EOC2-4-0018 & EOC2-4-0118
n/a
43
14:00:02.654
EI+953.654
44
14:00:02.660
EI+953.660
During this final 2 second period of reconstructed data, the data indicates the following systems were nominal: APUs were running and WSB cooling was evident. MPS integrity was still evident. Fuel cells were generating power and the PRSD tanks/lines were intact. Comm and navaids systems in the forward fuselage were performing nominally. RSB, Body Flap, main engine, and right wing temps appeared active. ECLSS performance was nominal. During this final 2 second period of reconstructed data, the data indicates the following systems were off-nominal: All three Hyd systems were lost. The left inbd/outbd elevon actuator temps were either OSL or no data exists. Majority of left OMS pod sensors were either OSH or OSL or no data exists. Elevated temps at bottom bondline centerline skin forward and aft of the wheel wells and at the port side structure over left wing were observed. EPDC shows general upward shift in Main Bus amps and downward shift in Main Bus volts. AC3 phase A inverter appeared disconnected from the AC Bus. GNC data suggests vehicle was in an uncommanded attitude and was exhibiting uncontrolled rates. Yaw rate was at the sensor maximum of 20 deg/sec. The flight control mode was in AUTO. (Note that all Nav-derived parameters (e.g., alpha) are suspect due to high rates corrupting the IMU state.) BFS Fault Message annunciation - L OMS TK P BFS Fault Message annunciation - Indeterminant BFS Fault Message annunciation - SM1 AC VOLTS PASS Fault Message annunciation - L RCS PVT PASS Fault Message annunciation - DAP DOWNMODE RHC * Time info corrupted on some of the events.
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45
14:00:03.470 / 14:00:03.637*
EI+954.470 / EI+954.637

End of 2-second period of reconstructed data X Debris B and C observed leaving the Orbiter X OEX PCM loss of sync Last identifiable OI Downlink frame FDM1 A end of data Vehicle Main Body break-up End of Peak Heating
= Nominal/Expected Event or Performance
46
14:00:03.637
EI+954.637
The s/w process which logs the PASS message runs every 1.92 seconds, so this event could have occurred as early as 14:00:01.717 GMT. However, during the 2 sec period, available vehicle data indicates RHC was in detent and DAP was in AUTO. n/a
47
14:00:04.826
EI+955.826
47.5
14:00:13.439
EI+964.439
48
EI+968 / EI+973
EOC videos # EOC2-4-0024 & -0118 (for both B and C)
n/a
EI+970.44
48.5 49
14:00:17 / 14:00:22 14:00:19.44 14:00:21 / 14:00:25
EI+972 / EI+976
EOC videos # EOC2-4-0024, -0018 &-0118 Determined by analysis
n/a
50
14:00:53
EI+1004
OVE 05-07 CTF038-0308

Contracts, Incentives, and Safety/Technical Excellence
This Appendix contains a Report to Columbia Accident Investigation Board: Contracts, Incentives, and Safety/Technical Excellence, Olson, Gary, Foster, Tim; 27 May 2003.
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Contracts, Financial Incentives, and Safety / Technical Excellence
Report to CAIB: Contracts, Incentives, and Safety / Technical Excellence
Submitted by: Gary Olson and Tim Foster 27 May2003
C2-000031 Contracts, Financial Incentives, and Savety-Technical Excellence .DOC

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Summary NASA efforts to enhance contractor performance have resulted in complex contracts with multiple incentives. The assumptions are: The opportunity to increase corporate profits motivates management and workers more than devotion to astronaut safety, to program success, and to their own livelihood; Contractors so motivated will act always in the governments interest with minimal oversight; These incentives enhance NASA leverage with sole source, non-competitive, costreimbursement contractors.
The extensive use of incentives, particularly award fees (the principal one) detracts from technical excellence and safety. For example, they: Make fee dollars, not technical excellence and safety, the primary focus for program oversight and review. Encourage complacency through high scores, emphasis on contractor strengths, and loophole-ridden metrics that often stipulate tolerance for errors and lateness. Devalue the contributions of many by assigning relative weights to work areas. Because the outcome of incentive fee processes has become predictable high fees (near or above the normal limit) NASA probably will be unable to regain leverage and avoid contractor complacency absent competition. Conventional wisdom in NASA presumes that only aerospace firms can manage shuttle work. The people and facilities at NASA sites, not corporate logos, are critical to program requirements. NASAs shuttle work is based on NASA-owned technology, done for the most part at NASA-owned facilities by a workforce trained by NASA and dedicated to the facility. Department of Energy, in similar situation, has had no shortage of reputable bidders for management and operating contact work. The U.S. Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program is evidence that a technical program of comparable complexity and risk can be managed successfully without extensive reliance on contract financial incentives and without being beholden to incumbent contractors. Recommendation: Rather than hoping to motivate contractors to manage the NASA shuttle program through cumbersome financial incentives, NASA should: Develop a strong, stable, self-sufficient Shuttle Program Office of experienced, expert technical personnel capable of effective program management and oversight. Establish leverage over contractors by opening to competition by aerospace and nonaerospace companies what are in effect management and operating contracts.
Contract Environment The NASA Space Shuttle Program relies predominantly on Lockheed Martin and Boeing, either as direct component suppliers or, for operations, through their joint venture creation, United Space Alliance (USA). Lockheed Martin and Boeing formed USA as a 1
C2-000031 Contracts, Financial Incentives, and Savety-Technical Excellence .DOC REPORT VOLUME V OCTOBER 456 CAB089-0062
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limited liability corporation in 1996 in response to NASA desires to consolidate work under the Space Flight Operations Contract (SFOC).1 For SFOC and for major shuttle component work, which NASA decided not to incorporate into SFOC as originally planned, NASA has relied on sole source, noncompetitive, cost-reimbursement contracts since shuttle program inception in the early 1970s. These contracts indemnify the contractors against third party claims for injury, loss of life, and property damage arising from shuttle operations. Progress payments ensure these contractors substantial, positive cash flow. 2 In addition, the contractors are realizing fees for this work averaging about 10% of incurred cost, the limit prescribed by the Federal Acquisition Regulation for cost-reimbursement contracts.3 Without the discipline of competition or fixed priced contracting, NASA provides multiple contract financial incentives to motivate shuttle program contractors. The theory is that since contractors are in business to make money, the best way to promote excellence is to tie fee payments to performance. The emphasis on contract financial incentives extends beyond NASA; it tends to be government-wide. When the budget process generates fewer dollar and manpower resources than program managers request, the differences are often attributed to inefficiencies and lead to calls for better forms of contracting. The goal is to so effectively structure contract incentives that contractors, looking to their own financial interests, will act in the Governments best interest with little need for oversight. In evaluating the NASA financial incentives and possible impact on safety, the following sections discuss each contract financial incentive that NASA uses in major shuttle program contracts as they pertain to technical excellence and therefore safety. Cost Incentive Fees All major shuttle program contracts are, in part, cost-plus-incentive-fee contracts. From a negotiated target cost and target fee, contractors get more fee dollars if costs at completion underrun the negotiated target cost, but less fee if they overrun the negotiated target cost. The percentages of underrun and overrun sharing are defined in the contract. Cost-plus-incentive contracts may or may not significantly motivate contractors to reduce cost, depending on the situation: In the case of the reusable solid rocket motor contract, NASA program managers became concerned that the contract provisions overly motivated contractor management to reduce personnel, potentially to the programs detriment. NASA officials, therefore, eliminated the contract underrun sharing provision.4 Cost incentives, on the other hand, can equally motivate contractors to negotiate higher target costs and higher prices for contract changes, or to submit claims for contract price adjustments in the case of potential overruns.
Boeing and Lockheed Martin each put up $1M to form USA. They appoint top USA management and share profits 50/50.
2
Contractor billings, submitted every two weeks and paid within seven days, include incurred costs, accrued costs, and provisional fees.
3 4
FAR 15.903 NASA and the contractor agreed to redirect the equivalent fee potential to other areas.

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For repetitive, non-competitive contracts, a contractor might conclude that the longterm benefits of sustaining a high cost base for future contract negotiations outweigh the near-term advantages of driving down costs.
Determining whether these cost incentive contract provisions actually save money is difficult. However, to outsiders they seem to satisfy the feeling that contractors that spend less should get more fee. On the plus side, cost-plus-incentive-fee provisions generate little, if any, additional effort or distraction for workforce or management. Beyond a possible tendency towards more aggressive contract price negotiations, these provisions should involve little, if any, additional administrative effort beyond that required for any other cost reimbursement contract; i.e., Government validation of costs incurred. Conclusion Cost Incentive Fees Regardless of the extent to which they may or may not actually reduce costs, cost incentives as used in major shuttle program contracts do not seem likely to detract significantly from technical excellence and safety. Performance Incentive Fees Performance incentive arrangements pay fixed sums for meeting prescribed program milestones and impose penalties for failure to meet selected milestones. Performancebased contracting is not uniquely a NASA concept. Rather, the approach arose government-wide as a way to motivate contractors. NASA policy ties performance incentive fees to objective milestones, either schedular or successful completion of specific tasks or events; e.g., delivery of a product, successful launch, or successful flight. Since successful completion often demonstrates safe operation, these performance standards also fall into the category of safety incentives. These performance incentive fees are all-or-nothing payments. A contractor either earns the performance fee for that event or gets nothing or may have to pay a penalty. Whether tying fee payments to performance milestones provides any additional motivation to workers and management is not clear. These performance incentives did not preclude USA from missing milestones that resulted in fee forfeiture of from $1M to $3M each on five different occasions. Moreover, shuttle program managers note that contractor / customer relations become more contentious when a contractor might miss an incentivized milestone. In such situations, fee forfeiture can be avoided if the contractor can successfully blame the delay on others. Whether or not these performance incentives provide added incentive, administration of performance-incentive-fee contract provisions does not seem to impose substantial additional workload on management and workers. The contract milestones tend to be ones that would be the focus of any effective program management system. ConclusionPerformance Incentive Fees There appears to be little evidence, one way or the other, that performance incentive fees enhance shuttle program contractor performance. However, they seem to pose little risk of burdening or distracting technical effort from primary functions beyond the possibility of inserting contractor financial and contract specialists more deeply into technical and production work. 3
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Award fees Background In addition to having cost-plus-incentive-fee provisions, all major shuttle program contracts also have cost-plus-award-fee provisions. This means that every six months a performance evaluation board subjectively evaluates contractor performance, assigns a numeric performance grade, and recommends to a fee-determining official an award fee as a percentage of available fee assigned for that period. Award Fee Process and Scoring The purpose of the award fee is to make contractors more responsive to customer needs. Since contractors are in business to make money, the theory is people who actually manage and execute the work can best be motivated if they see a connection between their work and corporate profits. According to NASA policy, the award fee process is designed to promote ... more effective communications among Government and contractor personnel, at management levels where decisions can be made and results achieved.5 The award fee process seems inevitably to result in high scores and realized fee levels near or above the normal 10 percent maximum limit for cost reimbursement contracts.6 The question is whether the high scores actually reflect exceptional performance across the board or are they largely a predictable outcome. Also, if the performance is as good as indicated, should the success be attributed primarily to the award fee process? NASA policy specifies a contractor that satisfactorily meets contractual commitments will fall into the good range (score: 71-80). However, overall ratings for shuttle program contractors tend always to fall in the mid-80s to low-90s on a scale of 100. For the period preceding the Columbia accident, all major shuttle program contractors rated excellent, which NASA policy defines as exceptional performance. The complexity of the performance evaluation process varies by contract. For SFOC, NASA contract monitors, called Technical Manufacturing Representatives, assess contractor strengths and weaknesses against nearly 400 elements grouped within thirteen functional areas. Some eighty of these elements are stated in the SFOC along with measures of performance, referred to as metrics, for each one. Each monitor assigns a numerical grade for his or her area of oversight. These scores, after weighting for relative importance and budget significance, determine the recommended overall contractor performance rating. Interestingly, the grades assigned by three of the twelve monitors determine 75 percent of the proposed SFOC award fee score. For major shuttle program contracts other than SFOC, NASA managers also list strengths and weaknesses, and assign weights to perhaps a dozen areas of performance. However, the award-fee provisions are much simpler than the elaborate process followed in the SFOC. In essence, program managers for these contracts are not so constrained by metrics in arriving at their subjective evaluations of contractor performance.
5 6
NASA Award Fee Contracting Guide section 3.7.1 Under the Federal Acquisition Regulation, NASA may approve individual and class deviations from this limit.

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The award fee process, occurring every six months with interim assessments at the midpoint, seems to have become the principal forum for reviewing work. But the process differs from more traditional reviews in that issues are translated into fee dollars. To reduce performance evaluation to a score, the award fee process compares contractor strengths and weaknesses. This balancing of good with bad might be useful for rationalizing performance scores, but is of little value in accomplishing work. In the absence of these incentives, traditional reviews would emphasize problems, potential problems, actions needed on critical path items, and areas that need management attention. Overall performance scores vary within a relatively small range from period to period. There are reasons, aside from possible performance, why ratings tend to be much higher than good. NASA policy encourages high awards, stating: ...an award fee contract should provide the contractor with a reasonable opportunity to earn the maximum award fee available. The NASA managers who have day-to-day responsibility for each area assign grades for contractor performance in that area. Poor contractor grades might reflect adversely on their own performance. Poor contractor performance scores could strengthen the hand of program critics and jeopardize program support for the budget arena. When contractors respond to a customer-identified area of emphasis, performance evaluators may feel obliged to increase the score, which over time can lead to rising grades. Higher grades are less subject to contractor rebuttal in front of the performance evaluation board. Corporate Profit Maximization Is Not The Best Focus and Motivator for Those Who Actually Do the Work The risk with award fees is that both customers and contractors begin focusing on the award fee process rather than on the work itself. It is hard to imagine that, for all those involved in shuttle program work, the prospect of influencing in some small way corporate profits could surpass the incentives inherent in the work itself. They are contributing to a nationally recognized, prestigious program the fate of which (not to mention their own livelihood) depends upon public confidence and safety. The importance of their work to the safety of the astronauts they see working around them is certainly well recognized and to suggest the opportunity to earn the company a little extra fee would enhance their concern would be to do them a great disservice. NASA policy requires grading based on evaluation factors weighted as to relative importance. This is not conducive to technical excellence. For example, does it promote technical excellence to assign, as NASA has in the SFOC, a 20 percent weight factor to Operational Safety, which includes industrial safety? Or, does it inspire technical excellence to assign Quality the same 15 percent weighting as contractor performance in awarding contracts to small, minority, or disadvantaged business?
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In a similar vein, the SFOC, as previously noted, defines more than 80 performance elements with associated metrics, the apparent result of a procurement initiative to demonstrate commitment to performance-based contracting. From a practical standpoint, the metrics run counter to the pursuit of excellence. Many of the contract metrics stipulate customer tolerance for errors or lateness. Others include loopholes that render them largely irrelevant. The following are examples of expected levels of performance. The contract also identifies for many items an even lower level of acceptable performance called maximum error rate. Safety, Mission Assurance, and Product Assurance: Expectation: 85% of risk packages presented to the Government are accepted. Expectation: 85% of items correctly assessed as no increased risk validated through use, Government audit, or Government surveillance. Expectation: 15 mishaps per year. (Mishaps are injury to non-SFOC contractor personnel or damage to NASA property by accidents / incidents during processing.) Quality Assurance: Expectation: 95% of all mandatory Government inspections are accepted.... Success rate of SFOC work volume greater than 90%. Orbiter Logistics: Expectation: 96% of all reparable Orbiter hardware requirements satisfied by the negotiated need dates. Backup Flight System (and Pass Flight Software): Slips or redelivery caused by BFS not meeting negotiated schedules or due to a redelivery to correct an error are allowed if no additional resource impact to outside organizations is incurred. Launch Readiness: Expectation: 97% of all items on the initial launch countdown constraints list completed and closed prior to Launch Countdown Call-to-Stations. Engineering, Maintenance, and Operations Support for Flight Operations System: Expectation: 5% late, but in no case impact safety, mission success, or major program schedule milestones.
Finally, the award fee process tends to result in making engineering and other technical personnel more accountable to financial and contracting people whose job is to try to win as large an award fee as possible. The rewards for portraying contractor performance in its best light are inconsistent with prompt and candid problem reporting and performance self-assessment, which is vital to successful management of complex technical programs. Conclusions -- Award-fee contracts: Continued reliance on award-fee provisions would significantly detract from emphasis on technical substance and problem resolution. An environment that, in effect, tries to make engineers and technical people their own corporate profit centers is not conducive to technical excellence. Other Contract Financial Incentives Major shuttle program contracts include other, less significant, financial incentives. These include: Performance Plus incentives. These are relatively small amounts program managers are able to use at their discretion to focus contractor attention on near-term actions. 6

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Value Engineering incentives. These are standard government contract provisions designed to encourage contractors to recommend cost-saving modifications to specification requirements. If accepted by the government, the contractor shares in the estimated savings. Employee Incentives. USA, for example, makes a flat payment to all nonsupervisory employees each year depending on USA success in earning award fee. NASA, however, is not involved in these incentive payments except that NASA, not USA, bears the full cost of this program.
Conclusion Other Contract Financial Incentives. Whether or not these incentives are effective, they seem to impose little or no additional effort or adverse impact on those who perform the work. The Program Plus incentive, however, further reinforces the notion that the customer, in effect, must tip the contractor to get its work done. Fee Reduction for Catastrophic Loss. The most prominent, safety-related contract financial incentive in all current major shuttle program contracts is a clause entitled Fee Reduction for Catastrophic Loss. As explained earlier, the government indemnifies shuttle program contractors from liability for such loss, whether loss of life, damage to government property, or other third party liability. The Catastrophic Loss clause, however, allows NASA to reduce contractor fee by a prescribed amount if NASA determines that the accident was due to that contractors actions or failure to act. 7 The clause requires the NASA finding to be based on an accident boards finding. Interestingly, only the most recent external tank contract contains the Catastrophic Loss clause. The contract under which Lockheed Martin delivered the external tank used on the last Columbia flight has no such clause. 8 From a practical standpoint, the Catastrophic Loss clause or any other clause of that sort, regardless of amount is unlikely to enhance contractor management or workforce attention to safety. Even at $10M or more in forfeited fees, the damage to the corporate image due to loss of life and technical failure in such a highly visible program would be incomparably greater. Nor is there reason to believe the clause would stimulate managers and workers to apply higher standards than they would otherwise apply. Their connection to the program, to the astronauts, and to their own jobs is no doubt stronger than their devotion to corporate finance. Conclusion Catastrophic Accident Penalty. The effect of the Catastrophic Accident clause on contract performance seems minimal certainly not negative. However, having the provision is helpful to demonstrate a measure of recompense where a contractor is responsible. This provision, which
7
The SFOC specifies no fee for the six-month period in which the accident occurred. The most recent external tank contract stipulates a $10M penalty. The Space Shuttle Main Engine and Reuseable Solid Rocket Motor contracts specify a $10M penalty and forfeiture of all fees for the six-month period in which the accident occurred. 8 According to NASA officials, Lockheed Martin was unwilling to accept the clause without a corresponding increase in contract fee.
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predetermines the forfeiture amount, is preferable to leaving the question open for possible litigation. Overall Conclusion NASA relies very extensively on contract financial incentives to motivate major shuttle program contractors. There is no evidence these contract provisions directly contributed to the Columbia accident. Nor is there evidence they actually motivate contractors and enhance excellence. To the extent financial incentives might help focus additional attention on cost reduction and key milestones, they can be positive. If instead financial incentives encourage contractor personnel to try to game the system by initially inflating contract prices or by setting the stage constantly to be able to blame others for missed milestones, they can be counterproductive. Overall, however, the cost incentive and performance incentive processes demand little, if any, additional effort or distraction on the part of those actually doing the work. The cost incentive is based on incurred costs; the performance incentives on events or tasks most likely to be tracked in any event. In contrast to the cost and performance incentives, the contract award fee provisions are cumbersome and counterproductive. The award fee process in practice results almost inevitably in high grades and near maximum fees for major shuttle program contractors. These high grades, together with an award fee process that emphasizes contractor strengths as well as weaknesses, can encourage complacency. The assignment of relative weights to elements of contract performance based on several factors, including budget share, although required for award fee purposes, can do more harm than good. It tends to diminish the importance of the contributions that all must make in contract execution. The award fee process now seems to be the primary forum for program oversight and review. That this forum must translate technical and production issues into fee dollars sends a message that money, not technical excellence, is the important objective. The metrics, which the NASA procurement community apparently required to be included in SFOC, tend to undermine excellence, not encourage it. The standards are filled with loopholes that make many of them useless. They concede customer tolerance for errors and late deliveries.
The Catastrophic Loss contract provision bears most directly on safety by prescribing that a contractor must forfeit $10M or more in cases where NASA determines that contractor is responsible for the accident. However, that management and the workforce would view this forfeiture of corporate fee as a more powerful incentive for safety than their inherent commitment to the safety of the astronauts, to the well being of the program, and their own livelihoods is unlikely. Overall, the extensive use of contract financial incentives in the space shuttle program seems more a reaction to government-wide procurement policies than something NASA managers invented as an important program management tool. The award fee structure in the SFOC seems to have been primarily the work of procurement personnel, not technical program managers. 8

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In a budget-constrained environment and under pressure to reduce its federal payrolls, NASA contracting efforts focus on trying to structure incentives so effective that the contractor, pursuing its own financial interests, will automatically work to the governments benefit with limited NASA oversight. Consequently, management attention on both sides tends to focus on dollars vice technical excellence. Financial incentives are no substitute for oversight by experienced, expert technical customer representatives. To this end, NASA should ensure that the Space Shuttle Program Office becomes a strong, stable, and self-sufficient entity capable of performing that function. Contract financial incentives, such as NASA uses for shuttle program work, are not the only path to technical excellence and safety. NASAs Administrator has characterized the highly successful Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program as perhaps the most similar to NASAs space shuttle program in terms of engineering challenge. Both must apply complex and demanding technologies in a hostile environment with the lives of crewmembers as well as National interests at stake. The Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, however, goes about the task much differently insofar as contracting. The Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program avoids financial incentives in contracts with its major prime contractors opting instead for close oversight by relatively small, but technically competent, headquarters and field organizations. Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program prime contractors operate under low-fee, cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts that include no contract financial incentives. The theory behind this approach is that the best way to sustain an environment conducive to technical excellence and objectivity is to free those doing the work from corporate pressures to maximize profits. Program decisions with respect to assigning work and whether to extend or re-compete management and operating contracts provide ample business leverage to ensure contractor responsiveness to program needs. NASA, in efforts to focus more clearly on technical substance, might be well advised to consider the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program approach. With nearly 30 years of cost-plus-award-fee contracting tradition for major shuttle program work, incumbent contractors have no doubt become accustomed to high profit, no-risk, no investment, and generous cash flow associated with these contracts. With this background, effecting any substantive change in contracting approach through sole source negotiations with incumbent contractors may be impossible. Should NASA consider significant change, it should reevaluate conventional NASA wisdom that only aerospace firms are candidates to compete for what in most cases amounts to management and operating contracts similar to the contracts the Department of Energy uses for nuclear weapons and naval nuclear propulsion work. As with the Department of Energy, to a large extent, critical NASA resources are governmentfinanced technology, government-owned facilities, and workforces largely acquired, trained, and supported for decades at government expense. NASA has historically concluded that only aerospace firms can be considered for NASA shuttle program work a conclusion most recently reinforced by the NASA Space Shuttle Competitive Sourcing Task Force study published last fall. In contrast, the Department of Energy solicits competitive bids for management and operating contracts with the result that nationally know construction firms, component manufacturers, non profit institutions, universities, and even aerospace firms regularly vie for the work at a fraction of the fee NASA pays for these services. If they can design nuclear weapons and 9
2003
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naval nuclear propulsion plants for the Department of Energy why cannot NASA overcome its attachment to the aerospace industry to seek management and operating support from a broader base? The transition of SFOC work to USA demonstrated that change of operating contractors at NASA -sites could be effected with minimum impact without adverse effect on personnel retention or on pensions. Under the circumstances, no valid reason seems to exist beyond tradition that NASA should remain principally beholden to two contractors, or to the aerospace industry, for work at NASA sites. Department of Energy experience suggests no shortage of firms willing to assume responsibility for managing and operating complex work at its government sites. The challenge to NASA in effecting significant change may be less formidable once the agency realizes that the people and facilities at NASA sites, not corporate logos, are critical to program requirements.
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CAB089-0071 465

Columbia Accident Investigation Board Volume Five Book One

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COLUMBIA

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD

Report Volume V Appendices G.1 G.9 October 2003

On the Front Cover

On the Back Cover

REPORT VOLUME V OCTOBER 2003

WHY THE ACCIDENT OCCURRED

Appendix A Appendix B Appendix C

APPENDICES The Investigation Board Member Biographies Board Staff

REPORT VOLUME V OCTOBER 2003

OTHER TECHNICAL DOCUMENTS

OTHER TECHNICAL DOCUMENTS

OTHER SIGNIFICANT DOCUMENTS

Appendix G.10 Appendix G.11 Appendix G.12 Appendix G.13

TRANSCRIPTS OF BOARD PUBLIC HEARINGS

REPORT VOLUME V OCTOBER 2003

Readers Guide to Volume V

REPORT VOLUME V OCTOBER 2003

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

REPORT VOLUME V OCTOBER 2003

Volume V Appendix G.1

REPORT VOLUME V OCTOBER 2003

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

REPORT VOLUME V OCTOBER 2003

DECEMBER 13, 1995

REQUIREMENTS AND PROCEDURES FOR CERTIFICATION OF FLIGHT READINESS

B2-000089 B2-89 FLT PRP PRESENTATION 3-12-03-1.pdf

Loren d. Manager, Launch Integration,KSC

NSTS 08117 Revision L

B2-000089 B2-89 FLT PRP PRESENTATION 3-12-03-1.pdf REPORT 10 CTF017-0397

SCOPE ....................................................... PROCESS DESCRIPTION RESPONSIBILITIES APPLICABLE MILESTONE ......................................

........................................... .................................... .......................

AND FRR REVIEW ACTIONS REQUIREMENTS

DOCUMENTATION DEPOSITORY PROCEDURES

................................................ .............................. .................

PROJECT MILES:I'ONE REVIEWS ELEMENT ACCEPTANCE 6.1.1 6.1.2

PAYLOAD READINESS 6.2.1 6.2.2

Responsibilities ............................................. Review Requirements ........................................ READINESS REVIEW (SRR) ........................

SOFTWARE 6.3.1 6.3.2

PRE-MATE MILESTONE 7.1.1 7.1.2 7.1.3

FERRY FLIGHT READINESS 7.2.1 7.2.2

Responsibilities ............................................. Organization ................................................

NSTS 08117 RevisionL

B2-000089 B2-89 FLT PRP PRESENTATION 3-12-03-1.pdf

FLIGHT READINESS POLICY ..........

Flight Preparation Process Plans ............................. REVIEW PREPARATION

8.6 8.7 9.0

REVIEW REQUIREMENTS ACRONYMS

NSTS 08117 RevisionL

B2-000089 B2-89 FLT PRP PRESENTATION 3-12-03-1.pdf REPORT 12 CTF017-0399

N-i O-i P-i Q-i R-i

NSTS 08117 RevisionL

B2-000089 B2-89 FLT PRP PRESENTATION 3-12-03-1.pdf

NSTS 08117 RevisionL

B2-000089 B2-89 FLT PRP PRESENTATION 3-12-03-1.pdf REPORT 14 CTF017-0401

NSTS 08117 Revision L

B2-000089 B2-89 FLT PRP PRESENTATION 3-12-03-1.pdf

FIGURE 1 FLIGHT PREPARATION PROCESS

CARGO INTEGRATION REVIEW _

ASCENT FLIGHT DESIGN REVIEW