5TH FEBRUARY SAMBHAV LAW CLAT PG

2022 MOCK PAPER

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 2

Para 2

This gargantuan pendency of complaints filed under Section 138 of the Act has had an
adverse effect in disposal of other criminal cases. There was an imminent need for remedying
the situation which was addressed by the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment and
Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 2002. Sections 143 to 147 were inserted in the Act, which
came into force on 06.02.2003. Section 143 of the Act empowers the court to try complaints
filed under Section 138 of the Act summarily, notwithstanding anything contained in the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter, ‘the Code’). Sub-section (3) of Section 143
stipulates that an endeavour be made to conclude the trial within six months from the date of
filing of the complaint. Section 144 deals with the mode of service of summons. Section 145
postulates that the evidence of the complainant given by him on affidavit may be read as
evidence in any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under the Code. Bank's slip or memo
denoting that the cheque has been dishonoured is presumed to be prima facie evidence of the
fact of dishonour of the cheque, according to Section 146. Section 147 makes offences
punishable under the Act compoundable. The punishment prescribed under the Act was
enhanced from one year to two years, along with other amendments made to Sections 138 to
142 with which we are not concerned in this case. The situation has not improved as courts
continue to struggle with the humongous pendency of complaints under Section 138 of the
Act. The preliminary report submitted by the learned Amici Curiae shows that as on
31.12.2019, the total number of criminal cases pending was 2.31 crores, out of which 35.16
lakh pertained to Section 138 of the Act. The reasons for the backlog of cases, according to
the learned Amici Curiae, is that while there is a steady increase in the institution of
complaints every year, the rate of disposal does not match the rate of institution of
complaints. Delay in disposal of the complaints under Section 138 of the Act has been due
to reasons which we shall deal with in this order.

Q1. Which of the following statements is true regarding the provisions of Section 138 of
the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881?

(A) Section 138 is a penal provision which deals with the punishment of dishonor of
cheque.
 3

(B) The objective is to encourage use of cheques and increase the credibility of
transactions through cheques.
(C) The defaulter shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend
to two years or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or
both.
(D) All of the above.
CORRECT OPTION: D
EXPLANATION:
Section 138 of the act talks about punishment for dishonoring of cheques. Section 138 was
introduced as a criminal offence in 1989 by way of an amendment to the Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881.The main objective of introduction of this section was to encourage
the use of cheques and increasing the credibility of transactions through cheques by making
the dishonoring of the cheques as an offence.
Section 138 provides that when the cheque is dishonored for insufficiency of funds or for any
of the prescribed reasons, the one who is at defaulter can be punished with imprisonment for
a term which may extend to two years, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount
of the cheque, or both. This is also a non-cognizable offence.

Q2. Which of the following statements is not true regarding the ingredients of Section
138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881?
A. A cheque shall be drawn to discharge a liability.
B. There shall be a drawee who shall draw the cheque.
C. There shall be a drawer who shall draw the cheque.
D. The drawer shall fail to pay the said amount within 15 days from the receipt of the
said notice.
CORRECT OPTION: B
EXPLANATION:
Section 13 of the Negotiable Instruments Act defines negotiable instruments as “a promissory
note, bills of exchange or cheque payable either to order or to bearer”. A negotiable
instrument is a kind of document that guarantees its bearer a sum of money to be payable on
demand or at any future date. Section 138 of the NI Act is a penal provision that deals with
the punishment of dishonour of cheque. Dishonour of cheque is not an offence in itself but
to become an offence, the following ingredients should be there:
 4

1. There should be a drawer that draws the cheque.

2. The cheque drawn should be in discharge of some liability.
3. Presentation of the cheque to the drawee bank.
4. The cheque returned by the bank unpaid on account of insufficient funds.
5. The cheque should be presented within six months from the date on which it was
drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier.
6. Within thirty days of receiving a memo of return from the bank, a notice should be
served to demand the payment of the said money.
7. The drawer fails to pay the said money within 15 days of the receipt of the said notice.

Q3. In which of the following issues were raised in the In Re: Expeditious Trial Of Cases
under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881?
A. Despite changes brought in the legislative amendment, there are a large number of
cases pending before the Trial Courts.
B. Although the Supreme Court decisions have repeatedly mandated speedy trial and
disposal of cases, there exists a large number of pendency cases in Trial Courts.
C. The Court was concerned with the large number of pending cases under Section 138
of the NI Act, 1881.
D. All of the above.
CORRECT OPTION: D
EXPLANATION:
The dispute has remained pending for the past 16 years. Concerned with the large number of
cases filed under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter 'the Act')
pending at various levels, a Division Bench of this Court consisting of two of us (the Chief
Justice of India and L. Nageswara Rao, J.) decided to examine the reasons for the delay in
disposal of these cases.

Q4. Person A writes a cheque to person B, however, person A has insufficient funds in
his bank account to pay. Based on the given facts, which of the following is correct?
 5

A. When person B deposits the cheque in A’s bank, the bank shall return the cheque
back to person A with a notice of dishonor.
B. Person B’s bank sends a notice to Person A’s bank stating it shall not pay the cheque
due to insufficient funds.
C. Person B shall be liable for the amount of the cheque.
D. All of the above.
CORRECT OPTION: A
EXPLANATION:
Section 138 of the NI Act is a penal provision that deals with the punishment of dishonour
of cheque. Dishonour of cheque is not an offence in itself but to become an offence, the
following ingredients should be there:
1. There should be a drawer that draws the cheque.
2. The cheque drawn should be in discharge of some liability.
3. Presentation of the cheque to the drawee bank.
The cheque returned by the bank unpaid on account of insufficient funds.
4. The cheque should be presented within six months from the date on which it
was drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier.
5. Within thirty days of receiving a memo of return from the bank, a notice should
be served to demand the payment of the said money.
6. The drawer fails to pay the said money within 15 days of the receipt of the said
notice.

5. Which of the following statements regarding ‘non negotiable’ cheque is incorrect:

A. Cheque crossed ‘not negotiable’ does not affect the transferability of the negotiable
instrument in anyway.The cheque still continues to be transferable but only those rights are
conveyed to the transferee which the transferor has.
B. A person taking a cheque crossed generally or specially bearing in either case the
words ‘not negotiable’ shall not have or shall not be able to give a better title to the cheque
than that title the person from whom he took had.
C. In consequence if the title of the transferor is defective, the title of the transferee
would be vitiated by the defect.
D. Non negotiable transfer, makes only one exception and gives good title to transferee
holder in due course if transferor is defective.
 6

CORRECT OPTION: D
EXPLANATION:
Cheque marked “not negotiable”
According to section 130, a person taking a cheque crossed generally or specially bearing in
either case the words ‘not negotiable’ shall not have or shall not be able to give a better title
to the cheque than that title the person from whom he took had. In consequence if the title of
the transferor is defective, the title of the transferee would be vitiated by the defect. But, in
the case of a bill negotiated in the ordinary way, the title of the holder in due course would
not be affected by the defect in the title of the transferor.
Cheque crossed ‘not negotiable’ does not affect the transferability of the negotiable
instrument in anyway. The cheque still continues to be transferable but only those rights are
conveyed to the transferee which the transferor has.
In short non negotiable transfer does not give good title to transferee HDC if transferor is
defective as per the principle of nemo dat quod non habet (nobody can pass on a title better
than what he himself has)
Great Western Railway Co. v. London and Country Banking Co. (1901) A.C. 414

6. Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is a _______ offence.

A. non-compoundable offence
B. non- bailable offence
C. non- cognizable offence
D. none of these.
CORRECT OPTION: C
EXPLANATION:
According to Section 138 of the Act, the dishonour of a cheque is a criminal
offence that is punishable by imprisonment for two years or with a monetary
penalty or with even both. If the payee decides to proceed legally, then the drawer
can be given a chance of repaying the cheque amount immediately.
As per the Schedule 1 of Cr.PC, offences which are punishable with
imprisonment of less than three years or with fine only are non-cognizable
offences.
 7

Para 3
The first and natural home for a right to privacy is in Article 21 at the very heart of “personal
liberty” and life itself. Liberty and privacy are integrally connected in a way that privacy is
often the basic condition necessary for exercise of the right of personal liberty. There are
innumerable activities which are virtually incapable of being performed at all and in many
cases with dignity unless an individual is left alone or is otherwise empowered to ensure his
or her privacy. Birth and death are events when privacy is required for ensuring dignity
amongst all civilised people. Privacy is thus one of those rights ``instrumentally required if
one is to enjoy”.This Court has endorsed the view that “life” must mean “something more
than mere animal existence” as cited in Kharak Singh, (1964). In numerous cases, including
Francis Coralie Mullin v. UT of Delhi , this Court has viewed liberty as closely linked to
dignity. Their relationship to the effect of taking into the protection of “life” the protection
of “faculties of thinking and feeling”, and of temporary and permanent impairments to those
faculties. Every limb or faculty through which life is enjoyed is thus protected by Article 21
and a fortiori, this would include the faculties of thinking and feeling. Now deprivation which
is inhibited by Article 21 may be total or partial, neither any limb or faculty can be totally
destroyed nor can it be partially damaged. Moreover it is every kind of deprivation that is hit
by Article 21, whether such deprivation be permanent or temporary and, furthermore,
deprivation is not an act which is complete once and for all: it is a continuing act and so long
as it lasts, it must be in accordance with procedure established by law. It is therefore clear
that any act which damages or injuries or interferes with the use of, any limb or faculty of a
person, either permanently or even temporarily, would be within the inhibition of Article 21.”
(emphasis supplied) Privacy is, therefore, necessary in both its mental and physical aspects
as an enabler of guaranteed freedoms.

Q1. In which of the cases decided by the Supreme Court, the court recognised the
“fundamental right to privacy of every individual guaranteed by the Constitution,
within Article 21 in particular and Part III on the whole” for the very first time?

A. M.P. Sharma v. Stish Chandra, District Magistrate, Delhi, AIR. 1954 SC 300
 8

B. Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, 2017 SCC OnLine SC 996

C. Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1963 AIR 1295, 1964 SCR (1) 332
D. Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, AIR 2018 SC 4321

CORRECT OPTION: B
EXPLANATION:
On 24th August, 2017 a 9 Judge Bench of the Supreme Court delivered a unanimous verdict
in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy vs. Union of India and other connected matters, affirming that
the Constitution of India guarantees to each individual a fundamental right to privacy.
Although unanimous, the verdict saw 6 separate concurring decisions. Justice Chandrachud
authored the decision speaking for himself, Justices Khehar and R.K. Agarwal and Abdul
Nazeer. The remaining 5 judges each wrote individual concurring judgments.

Q2. In which of the cases, domiciliary visit by the Police without the authority of a
law, was held to be violative of Article 21 of the Indian Constitution assuming that a
right of privacy was a fundamental right derived from the freedom of movement
guaranteed by Article 19 (1) D of the Indian Constitutional as well as personal liberty
guaranteed by Article 21?

A. Dr. Sudesh Jale v. State of Haryana, AIR 2015 SC 518

B. Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1963 AIR 1295, 1964 SCR (1) 332
C. Govind v. State of M.P.,1975 AIR 1378 1975 SCR (3) 946 1975 SCC (2) 148
D. Neera Mathur v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, 1992 AIR 392 1991 SCR

CORRECT OPTION: B
EXPLANATION:

The verdict of Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1963 AIR 1295, 1964 SCR (1) 332
unanimously struck down “domiciliary visits” as unconstitutional. The petitioner was
entitled to the writ of mandamus commanding the respondent to not continue the
domiciliary visits. The court did not recognized right to privacy as a constitutional right,
although many interpretations were made and will continue to be in regards to what
 9

constitutes as privacy and to what extent it shall be binding. This case can be studied as one
of the foremost examples of the Supreme Court’s verdict on right to privacy.

Q3. Which of the following statements is not true regarding Article 21 of the Constitution
of India?
A. The right to privacy is protected as an intrinsic part of the right to life and personal
liberty under Article 21 and as a part of the freedoms guaranteed by part III of the
Constitution
B. Article 21 of the Constitution of India states that no person shall be deprived of his
life or personal liberty except according to procedures established by law
C. Right to equal pay is also the part of Article 21 of the Indian Constitution which is a
fundamental right
D. The article stands as the guardian against the protracted incarceration of undertrials.
CORRECT OPTION: C
EXPLANATION:
The Supreme Court in the case of State of M.P. v. R.D. Sharma, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 94
"Equal Pay For Equal Work" Not A Fundamental Right Vested In Any Employee,
Though A Constitutional Goal To Be Achieved By Govt. (para 9 on page 10)

Q4. Based on the passage provided above which of the following statements is true?

A. Privacy is found only within the meaning of Article 21.

B. A civilized society understands the critical requirement of privacy during times of
births and death.
C. Privacy can be traced to the permanent deprivation of any limb/ faculty.
D. The claim for privacy as a fundamental right becomes necessary in both mental and
physical sense as it disables permanently or even temporarily, the guarantee of freedom.
Answer-Option B.
Explanation- Taken from the passage.
Statement A is incorrect because the passage uses the phrase: The first and natural home for
a right to privacy is in Article 21- Which implies that there can and must be certain other
articles which allow privacy as a fundamental right.
 10

Statement B is true: Birth and death are events when privacy is required for ensuring dignity
amongst all civilised people.
Statement C is an incorrect statement, the passage uses the statement: Moreover it is every
kind of deprivation that is hit by Article 21, whether such deprivation be permanent or
temporary
Statement D is an incorrect statement: Privacy is, therefore, necessary in both its mental and
physical aspects as an enabler of guaranteed freedoms.

Q5. Which of the following is not true regarding the right to privacy?
A. The right to privacy is an absolute right and its violation, in addition to test of any
due process and procedure established by any law, does not factor any other State interests,
it is an individual’s autonomy and choice.
B. Privacy recognises the ability of individuals to control vital aspects of their lives
and safeguards the autonomy exercised by them in decisions of personal intimacies, matters
of home and marriage, the sanctity of family life and sexual orientation, all of which are at
the core of privacy.
C. Liberty and privacy are integrally connected in a way that privacy is often the basic
condition necessary for exercise of the right of personal liberty.
D. Like all fundamental rights, privacy too has its limitations. There must be identified
depending upon the nature of privacy interest claimed

CORRECT OPTION: A
EXPLANATION:
Like other rights in Part III of the Constitution, privacy too cannot be an absolute right and
its violation must, in addition to the test of due process and procedure established by law,
also factor in legitimate State interests.

Option C- Taken from the Source

Q6. Which of the following Articles providing for fundamental rights cannot be
suspended during the Proclamation of Emergency?
A. Article 14 and 21 of the Indian Constitution
B. Article 19 and 21 of the Indian Constitution
C. Article 20 and 21 of the Indian Constitution
 11

D. Article 21 and 22 of the Indian Constitution

CORRECT OPTION: C
EXPLANATION:
Article 359 of our constitution states that articles 20 and 21 of our constitution cannot be
eliminated under any circumstance, even during an emergency. Article 20 and Article 21:
Article 20 states that no citizen can be arrested by force without committing a crime and
without violating the law. It also states that no citizen can be forced to provide witness
against himself and that no citizen can be punished twice for the same offence. Article 21
states that no citizen can be deprived of his right to personal liberty as mentioned in the
constitution

Para 4

Emphasizing the fundamental principles underlying Section 34, the Court held that: “Section
34 does not create a distinct offence, but is a principle of constructive liability; In order to
incur a joint liability for an offence there must be a pre-arranged and premeditated concert
between the accused persons for doing the act actually done; There may not be a long interval
between the act and the pre-meditation and the plan may be formed suddenly. In order to
apply the Section, it is not necessary that the prosecution must prove an act was done by a
particular person; and The provision is intended to cover cases where a number of persons
act together and on the facts of the case, it is not possible for the prosecution to prove who
actually committed the crime.”
In Chhota Ahirwar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, it was observed: “To attract Section 34 of
the Penal Code, no overt act is needed on the part of the accused if they share common
intention with others in respect of the ultimate criminal act, which may be done by any one
of the accused sharing such intention . In the famous case of Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King
Emperor, it was observed “they also serve who stand and wait”. Common intention implies
acting in concert. Existence of a prearranged plan has to be proved either from the conduct
of the accused, or from circumstances or from any incriminating facts. It is not enough to
have the same intention independently of each other.
 12

1. In which of the following cases, the Supreme Court held that non-recovery of the
weapon of offences or the failure to produce a report by a ballistic expert would not
discredit the case of the prosecution which has relied on the eyewitness?

A. Sukhwant Singh v. State of Punjab, 1995 AIR 1380 SCC Supl. (2) 262.
B. Gulab v. State of U.P., 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1211.
C. State of Punjab v. Jugraj Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 234
D. Mohd. Rojali v. State of Assam, (2019) 19 SCC 56

CORRECT OPTION: B
Explanation: In a case where deceased had sustained a gun-shot injury with a point of entry
and exit, the 3-judge bench of Dr. DY Chandrachud*, AS Bopanna and Vikram Nath, JJ
has held that the non-recovery of the weapon of offences or the failure to produce a report by
a ballistic expert would not discredit the case of the prosecution which has relied on the
eyewitness. Gulab v. State of U.P., 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1211.
Para 23 The present case is not one where despite the recovery of a firearm, or of
the cartridge, the prosecution had failed to produce a report of the ballistic expert.
Therefore, the failure to produce a report by a ballistic expert who can testify to the
fatal injuries being caused by a particular weapon is not sufficient to impeach the
credible evidence of the direct eye-witnesses.
2. Which of the following statements is not true regarding constructive liability
under IPC?
A. It renders every member of a group who shares such intention responsible for the
criminal act committed by any of them.
B. Constructive liability is the one where the liability is determined by the existence of
the fundamental elements of crime.
C. Constructive liability’s act shall be done in furtherance of a common intention.
D. Common intention under Section 34 IPC is a species of constructive liability.

CORRECT OPTION: B
 13

Explanation: “Common intention under Section 34 IPC is a species of constructive liability

which renders every member of a group who shares such intention responsible for the
criminal act committed by any of them when such an act is done in furtherance of the common
intention.”
Constructive liability is the one where the liability is not determined by the existence of the
fundamental elements of crime. The liability is based on a Latin maxim “versari in re illicita”
which means a person may also be criminally held liable for any consequences resulting from
his unlawful conduct.

3. In which of the judgements of the Supreme Court, the court stated that it is the
duty of the prosecution to prove by expert evidence that it was likely or at least possible
for the injuries to have been caused with the weapon with which, and in the manner in
which, they have been alleged to have been caused?

A. Gurucharan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1963) 3 SCR 585.

B. Virendra Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2010) 8 SCC 407
C. N. Raghavender v. State of A.P., 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1232
D. State of Punjab v. Jugraj Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 234.

CORRECT OPTION: A
Explanation:
Gurucharan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1963) 3 SCR 585

“It has, however, been argued that in every case where an accused person is charged with
having committed the offence of murder by a lethal weapon, it is the duty of the prosecution
to prove by expert evidence that it was likely or at least possible for the injuries to have been
caused with the weapon with which, and in the manner in which, they have been alleged to
have been caused; and in support of this proposition, reliance has been placed on the decision
of this Court in Mohinder Singh v. State [(1950) SCR 821] .

4. Section 34 of the IPC states about constructive liability and common intention
of a group of people to act in an offensive manner. Is it reasonable to assume that
common intention is the same as similar intention?
 14

A. Yes, if a person or a group share the same intention to act in a similar manner with a
common reason then they are said to have a common or similar intention.
B. No, Common intention and Similar intention are not to be confused with each other
under Section 34 of IPC because unless the pre-requisites of pre-consent, presence
and participation, in respect of each accused are established, it cannot be said that they shared
common intention
C. Yes, it is reasonable to assume that both common intention and similar intention are
the same in objective as for both situations a group of people have to act with a common and
same objective and intention.
D. No, both common intention and similar intention are not the same because they are
dealt with in different sections and are not read together.

CORRECT OPTION: B
Explanation: Regarding “common intention” under Section 34, the Court explained thus:

“Common intention under Section 34 IPC is a species of constructive liability which

renders every member of a group who shares such intention responsible for the criminal
act committed by anyone of them when such an act is done in furtherance of the
common intention.Common intention, however, cannot be confused with similar
intention.”
It was further observed: “Although accused persons may have similar intention to
commit a crime, say murder, until and unless the pre-requisites of:(a) pre-consent, (b)
presence and (c) participation, in respect of each accused are established, it cannot be
said that they shared common intention and
be culpable for the crime committed by any of them in furtherance to such intention.”

5. Which of the following statements are not true about Section 34 of IPC?
A. Section 34 of IPC does not create a distinct offence, but is a principle of constructive
liability.
B. No overt act is needed on the part of the accused if they share common intention.
C. The persons accused of an offence together under section 34 must have entered into
a detailed agreement in order for section 34 to apply.
 15

D. Under this section a person is liable for the criminal act in the same manner as if it
were done by him alone.

CORRECT OPTION: C
Explanation: Emphasizing the fundamental principles underlying Section 34, this Court held
that: (i) Section 34 does not create a distinct offence, but is a principle of constructive
liability; (ii) In order to incur a joint liability for an offence there must be a pre-arranged and
premeditated concert between the accused persons for doing the act actually done;
In Chhota Ahirwar v. State of Madhya Pradesh . Justice Indira Banerjee speaking for the two-
judge Bench observed: “26. To attract Section 34 of the Penal Code, no overt act is needed
on the part of the accused if they share common intention with others in respect of the ultimate
criminal act, which may be done by any one of the accused sharing such intention.
The plan need not be elaborate, nor is a long interval of time required. It could arise
and be formed suddenly, as for example when one man calls on bystanders to help him
kill a given individual and they, either by their words or their acts, indicate their assent
to him and join him in the assault. There is then the necessary meeting of the minds.
There is a pre-arranged plan however hastily formed and rudely conceived. But pre-
arrangement there must be and premeditated concert. It is not enough, as in the latter Privy
Council case, to have the same intention independently of each other, e.g., the intention to
rescue another and, if necessary, to kill those who oppose.”
The well-established principle underlying the above provisions emerges from the
decision of Justice Vivian Bose in Pandurang, Tukia and Bhillia v. The State of
Hyderabad (1955) 1 SCR 1083.

6. What is the quantum of punishment for Murder under Section 302 of the Indian
Penal Code?

A. Death, or imprisonment for life

B. Imprisonment for life, shall also be liable for fine upto Rs. 50,000.
C. Death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable for fine.
D. Death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable for fine upto Rs. 50,000.
 16

CORRECT OPTION: C
Explanation: Section 302 in The Indian Penal Code
302. Punishment for murder.—Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death, or
1[imprisonment for life], and shall also be liable to fine.

ends of justice".