GR Writ of Amparo
GR Writ of Amparo
GR Writ of Amparo
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF AMPARO AND WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
IN FAVOR OF ALICIA JASPER S. LUCENA;
RELISSA SANTOS LUCENA AND FRANCIS B. LUCENA, PETITIONERS, VS. SARAH ELAGO,
KABATAAN PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE; ALEX DANDAY, NATIONAL SPOKESPERSON
OF ANAKBAYAN; CHARY DELOS REYES, BIANCA GACOS, JAY ROVEN BALLAIS
VILLAFUENTE, MEMBERS AND RECRUITERS OF ANAKBAYAN; AND ATTY. MARIA
KRISTINA CONTI, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PERALTA, C.J.:
At bench is a petition for the issuance of the writs of amparo and habeas corpus1 filed by petitioners
Relissa and Francis Lucena.
Petitioners are the parents of Alicia Jasper S. Lucena (AJ)-a 19-yearold lass born on July 24, 2001.
Sometime in 2018, AJ enrolled as a Grade 11 student at the Far Eastern University (FEU).2 There,
AJ was enticed to join the FEU Chapter of Anakbayan — a youth organization supposedly
advocating ideals of national democracy.
On February 2, 2019, AJ informed petitioners that she had joined and was now an official member
of Anakbayan.
The next day, AJ left the family home without any explanation. She did not return until three (3) days
later.
On March 10, 2019, AJ once again left the family home. This time, she did not return until more than
two (2) months later, or on May 25, 2019. Petitioners learned that during the time AJ was not at
home, AJ was in the custody of respondents Charie Delos Reyes (Reyes),3 Bianca Gacos (Gacos)
and Jay Roven Ballais Villafuente (Villafuente)4 - national leaders of Anakbayan. AJ was then
conducting recruiting activities on behalf of Anakbayan and was also campaigning for the Kabataan
Partylist and Neri Colmenares.
On July 10, 2019, AJ left the family home for the third time and never came back. She has since
dropped out from FEU.
On August 7, 2019, the Senate Committee on Public Order and Dangerous Drugs conducted a
hearing amidst reports that Anakbayan had been recruiting students and inducing them to abandon
their homes. Among those invited in the committee hearing was petitioner Relissa, who testified
about her experience with AJ.
Seeking mainly to regain custody of AJ, petitioners instituted the present petition for the issuance of
the writs of amparo and habeas corpus. Impleaded along with Reyes, Gacos and Villafuente as
respondents in the petition are: Sarah Elago, who is a representative of the Kabataan Party-list; Alex
Danday, who is the spokesperson of Anakbayan; and Atty. Maria Kristina Conti, who is a known
counsel of Anakbayan.11
The petition, in particular, prays the Court to issue the following reliefs:12
d. An order immediately placing AJ under the custody and care of the petitioners.
e. An order requiring the conduct of a medical and psychological examination on, and the
conferment of medical and psychological assistance to AJ in order to determine the extent
and gravity of the abuse, exploitation and prejudice to her mental, physical, emotional and
psychological state.
The petitioners concede that AJ is already at the age of majority — eighteen (18) years old to be
precise. However, they argue that AJ's decision to stay with the Anakbayan cannot be considered to
have emanated from a valid and informed consent as the same had been a product of the
radicalization and indoctrination AJ received from Anakbayan when she was still a
minor.13 According to petitioners, this radicalization and indoctrination at such a young age
prejudiced AJ's "mental, psychological, emotional or spiritual development" 14 which, in tum,
hindered her ability to freely give consent even after reaching the age of majority.15 Hence, for all
intents and purposes, AJ
Hence, for all intents and purposes, AJ cannot be considered to have freely consented to joining the
Anakbayan, to participating in the activities of Anakbayan and, ultimately, to staying with the
Anakbayan.
On May 19, 2020, the Court issued a Resolution16 requiring the respondents to show cause —
within ten (10) days from their receipt of said resolution -why the peremptory writs of amparo and
habeas corpus should not be issued. All respondents filed their compliance with the resolution on
time.17
OUR RULING
Petitioners' plea for the issuance of a writ of amparo is not proper. The remedy of amparo, in its
present formulation, is confined merely to instances of "extralegal killings" or "enforced
disappearances" and to threats thereof. As illuminated in Agcaoili v. Fariñas:18
SECTION 1. Petition. -The petition for a writ of Amparo is a remedy available to any person whose
right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
In the landmark case of Secretary of National Defense, et al. v. Manalo, et al., the Court
categorically pronounced that the Amparo Rule, as it presently stands, is confined to extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof, and jurisprudentially defined these two
instances, as follows:
[T]he Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and
"enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to
threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without
legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand, enforced disappearances are attended
by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government
official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of
the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person
concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside
the protection of law. (Citations omitted)
The above definition of "enforced disappearance" appears in the Declaration on the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearances and is as statutorily defined in Section 3 (g) of R.A. No.
9851. Thus, in Navia, et al. v. Pardico, the elements constituting "enforced disappearance," are
enumerated as follows:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or
a political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization's refusal to acknowledge or give
information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the Amparo petition; and,
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the
law for a prolonged period of time.
In Lozada, Jr., et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, et al., the Court reiterates that the privilege of
the writ of Amparo is a remedy available to victims of extra-judicial killings and enforced
disappearances or threats of a similar nature, regardless of whether the perpetrator of the unlawful
act or omission is a public official or employee or a private individual. (Citations omitted; emphasis
supplied).
Here, there is not much issue that AJ's situation does not qualify either as an actual or threatened
enforced disappearance or extralegal killing. AJ is not missing. Her whereabouts are determinable.
By all accounts, she is staying with the Anakbayan and its officers which, at least insofar as AJ's
case is concerned, are not agents or organizations acting on behalf of the State. Indeed, against
these facts, petitioners' invocation of the remedy of cannot pass.
II
Petitioners' prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is, moreover, dismissible for lack of
merit.
The Rules of Court envisions the writ of habeas corpus as a remedy applicable to cases of illegal
confinement or detention where a person is deprived of his or her liberty, or where the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.19 Section 1, Rule 102 of the
Rules of Court states:
SECTION 1. To what habeas corpus extends.— Except as otherwise expressly provided by law,
the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any
person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the
person entitled thereto.
thereto.
In this case, however, it did not at all appear that AJ had been deprived of her liberty or that
petitioners had been excluded from their rightful custody over the person of AJ.
First. The petitioners failed to make out a case that AJ is being detained or is being kept by
the Anakbayan against her free will. To start, there was never any accusation that
the Anakbayan employed violence, force or threat against AJ that would have influenced her in
deciding to stay with the Anakbayan. Neither is there an allegation that the Anakbayan is employing
such violence, force or threat so as to prevent AJ from eventually changing her mind and from
possibly leaving the Anakbayan in the future.
The only argument raised by the petitioners to support the view that AJ is being detained — i.e., AJ's
decision to stay with the Anakbayan is not a product of free and informed consent but of the
indoctrination and brainwashing she endured from the group when she was still a minor — fails to
persuade for it rests on pure speculation and assumption. If anything, such an argument has been
discredited by the established facts and even by AJ herself.
As mentioned, AJ already categorically denied being abducted by the Anakbayan during a press
conference20 conducted by the representatives of the Kabataan, Bayan Muna, ACT Teacher
and Gabriela Party-lists on August 14, 2019.
xxxx
5. Pinasisinungalingan ko ang mga paratang ng mommy kong si [Relissa] Santos Lucena laban sa
mga kasamahan ko sa Anakbayan na sina Ate Charie, Bianca Gacos, Jayroven Villafuente at Alex
Danday at laban kina Cong. Sarah Elago ng Kabataan Partylist at Atty. Neri Colmenares.
6. Hindi totoo at gawa-gawa lang niya ang mga paratang niyang ako raw ay kinidnap, ayaw pauwiin
sa aming bahay at bine-brainwash ng mga kasama ko sa Anakbayan para maging isang NPA.
7. Ang totoo, tumakas talaga ako sa poder ng aking mga magulang at nanatiling kasapi ng
Anakbayan dahil hindi ko na kaya [ang] ginagawa nilang pagmamalupit at pananakit sa akin.
xxxx
47. Hindi ako "missing." Umalis talaga ako sa bahay dahil hindi ko
47. Hindi ako "missing." Umalis talaga ako sa bahay dahil hindi ko na kinakaya ang ginagawa
niyang pang-aabuso, pagkulong at pangrerepress sa akin. Hindi niya rin alam na dahil sa ginagawa
niya, mas lalo lang niya akong nilagay sa panganib.
xxxx
51. Inuulit ko. Hindi alm nawawala. Hindi ako kinidnap ninuman. Hindi totoong kinukumbinsi ako ng
mga kasamahan ko sa Anakbayan, ni Cong. Sarah Elago at Atty. Neri Colmenares na maging
kasapi ng NPA. Gawagawa lang ang lahat ng paratang na ito at sa tingin ko ay kailangan na itong
ibasura.
Against these explicit submissions, petitioners' claim that AJ is being held against her will certainly
cannot stand.
Second. It also cannot be said that petitioners were being excluded from their rightful custody over
the person of AJ. As it was established, AJ has already reached the age of majority and is, thus,
legally emancipated.23 The effect of such emancipation is clear under the law. It meant the
termination of the petitioners' parental authority — which include their custodial rights over the
person and property of AJ, who is now deemed qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life save
for certain exceptions provided by law.24
As she has already attained the age of majority, AJ — at least in the eyes of the State -has earned
the right to make independent choices with respect to the places where she wants to stay, as well as
to the persons whose company she wants to keep. Such choices, so long as they do not violate any
law or any other persons' rights, has to be respected and let alone, lest we trample upon AJ's
personal liberty — the very freedom supposed to be protected by the writs of amparo and habeas
corpus. While we understand that petitioners may feel distressed over AJ's decision to leave their
home and stay with the Anakbayan, their recourse unfortunately does not lie with the Court through
the instant petition. The writs of amparo and habeas corpus were never meant to temper the
brashness of youth. The resolution of the conflict besetting petitioners and their daughter AJ is
simply beyond the competence of the writs applied for.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the prayers for the issuance of the writs of amparo and habeas corpus are
hereby DENIED. The instant petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Caguioa, Gesmundo, Reyes, J., Jr., Hernando, Carandang, Lazaro-Javier,
Inting, Zalameda, Lopez, Delos Santos, and Gaerlan, JJ., concur.
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that on September 15, 2020, a Decision, copy attached herewith, was rendered
by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on
October 7, 2020 at 3:50 a.m.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 3-17.
2 See Annex "G" of the Petition; id. at 76.
10 Id.
11 Rollo, p. 7.
12 Id. at 16.
13 Id. at 13-14.
14 Id. at 4.
15 Id. at 14.
16 Id. at 231.
17 Id. at 257-284 for the Compliance of respondents Jayroven Balais, Chary Delos Reyes
and Bianca Gasos. The Compliance of respondent Sarah Jane Elago, and the
Compliance of respondents Alexis Diane S. Danday and Maria Kristina Conti were
electronically submitted.
21 Annex "2" of the Compliance of respondents Jayroven Balais, Chary Delos Reyes and
Bianca Gasos, rollo pp. 287-292.
22 The affidavit of AJ was executed in connection with the criminal complaints filed before
the Department of Justice (DOJ) by petitioner Relissa Lucena against herein respondents
and others for violation of RA No. 9208, as amended by RA 10364; violation of Section 9(b)
(5) of RA 11188; Sections 10(a) and 10(c) of RA 7610; violation of Article 270 of the Revised
Penal Code; and violation of RA No. 9851; The complaints were docketed as NPS Nos. XVI-
INV-19H-00283 andXVI-NVI-191-00337, and are still pending resolution. (Rollo, p. 258).
23 Article 234 of Executive Order No. 209, s. of 1987 as amended by RA No. 6809.
24 Article 234 of Executive Order No. 209, s. of 1987 as amended by RA No. 6809. See also
In Re: Lopez v. Garon, 160-A Phil. 922, 925 (1975).