FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 202618. April 12, 2016.]

CONSULAR AREA RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION, INC., represented by

its President BENJAMIN V. ZABAT, ROMEO JUGADO, JR., and
NANCY QUINO , petitioner, vs. ARNEL PACIANO D. CASANOVA, ENGR.
TOMAS Y. MACROHON, LOCAL HOUSING BOARD OF TAGUIG CITY,
and THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF TAGUIG , respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE , J : p

Before the Court is a petition 1 denominated as one for "Prohibition with plea for
the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction" led by petitioner
Consular Area Residents Association, Inc., an association composed of residents of the
Diplomatic and Consular Area of Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, represented by its
President Benjamin V. Zabat, Romeo Jugado, Jr., and Nancy Quino (petitioner), against
respondents Arnel Paciano D. Casanova (Casanova), President and Chief Executive
Of cer of the Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA), Engr. Tomas
Macrohon 2 (Engr. Macrohon), as well as the Local Housing Board of Taguig City, and
the City Government of Taguig, seeking that the BCDA be enjoined from demolishing
what it claims as the remaining structures in the Joint US Military Army Group
(JUSMAG) Area in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City.
The Facts
In 1992, Congress enacted Republic Act No. (RA) 7227, 3 otherwise known as the
Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992, which, inter alia, created the BCDA in
order to "accelerate the sound and balanced conversion into alternative productive
uses of the Clark and Subic military reservations and their extensions (i.e., John Hay
Station, Wallace Air Station, O'Donnell Transmitter Station, San Miguel Naval
Communications Station, and Capas Relay Station)" and "to raise funds by the sale of
portions of Metro Manila military camps." 4 For this purpose, the BCDA was authorized
to own, hold, and administer portions of the Metro Manila military camps that may be
transferred to it by the President. 5 In this relation, Executive Order (EO) No. 40, Series
of 1992 6 was issued, identifying Fort Bonifacio as one of the military camps
earmarked for development and disposition to raise funds for BCDA projects. 7
Located in Fort Bonifacio are the JUSMAG and Diplomatic and Consular Areas
subject of this case. 8 The JUSMAG Area is a 34.5-hectare area located along Lawton
Avenue where military of cers, both in the active and retired services, and their
respective families, had occupied housing units and facilities originally constructed by
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). 9 Presently, it is being developed by
Megaworld Corporation as the McKinley West. 10 On the other hand, the Diplomatic and
Consular Area was declared as alienable and disposable land by virtue of Proclamation
No. 1725, 11 signed on February 10, 2009. Its administrative jurisdiction, supervision,
and control were transferred to the BCDA, which is likewise responsible for maintaining
the usefulness of the area. 12
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 On July 18, 2012, the Local Housing Board of Taguig City issued a Certi cate of
Compliance on Demolition 13 declaring that the BCDA had complied with the
requirement of "Just and Humane Demolition and Eviction," prescribed under Section
28 of RA 7279, 14 otherwise known as the "Urban Development and Housing Act of
1992," for the demolition of structures within the JUSMAG Area. Consequently,
respondent Casanova, as President and Chief Executive Of cer of the BCDA, sent a
Letter 15 dated July 20, 2012, informing petitioner and its members that they should,
within a seven (7)-day period ending on July 27, 2012, coordinate with BCDA of cials
should they choose to either accept the relocation package being offered to them, or
voluntarily dismantle their structures and peacefully vacate the property.
Petitioner led the present case to enjoin the demolition of their structures which
they claimed are within the Diplomatic and Consular Area, and not the JUSMAG Area.
They averred that the BCDA itself declared in its own website that the Diplomatic and
Consular Area is not its property, 16 and that its members are occupying the Diplomatic
and Consular Area with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines given at the time
of their assignments in the military service, 17 and hence, cannot be demolished,
especially in the absence of a court order. 18 Furthermore, petitioner posited that
Casanova had no authority to act for and in behalf of the BCDA considering his "highly
anomalous and irregular" appointment as President thereof. 19
In their Comment, 20 respondents Casanova and Engr. Macrohon maintained that
the clearing operations undertaken by the BCDA covered only the JUSMAG area, on
which the structures possessed by petitioner's members are located. 21 They also
argued that under Section 28 (b) of RA 7279, eviction or demolition is allowed when
government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented,
even in the absence of a court order. 22 Moreover, they maintained that respondent
Casanova acted with authority as President and Chief Executive Of cer of the BCDA,
having been duly appointed by the President of the Philippines, 23 and in any event, the
instant case has already been rendered moot and academic because the act sought to
be enjoined, i.e., the demolition of the remaining structures in the JUSMAG Area, was
already completed on September 21, 2012. 24
Respondents Local Housing Board of Taguig City and the City Government of
Taguig likewise led their own Comment, 25 substantially adopting the contentions
propounded by respondents Casanova and Engr. Macrohon. Separately, however, they
contended that the instant petition should have been led before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area, instead of the Supreme
Court. 26
The Issue Before the Court
The main issue in this case is whether or not the demolition should be enjoined.
The Court's Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
The Court first resolves the preliminary concerns raised.
For one, respondents Local Housing Board of Taguig City and the City
Government of Taguig seek the outright dismissal of the petition on the ground that it
should have been led before the RTC, and not before the Supreme Court. As basis,
they cite Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which provision applies to, among
others, petitions for prohibition, viz.:
RULE 65
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 Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
Section 4. When and where to file the petition. —
xxx xxx xxx
If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial court or
of a corporation, a board, an of cer or a person, it shall be led with the
Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as de ned by
the Supreme Court. It may also be led with the Court of Appeals or with the
Sandiganbayan whether or not the same is in aid of the court's appellate
jurisdiction. If the petition involves an act or an omission of a quasi-judicial
agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be
filed with and be cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
xxx xxx xxx
While the instant petition is denominated as one for prohibition, a careful perusal
of the same reveals that it is actually a petition for injunction as it ultimately seeks that
a writ of injunction be issued to permanently stop "[r]espondents, or any other person
acting under their orders or authority, from carrying out, or causing to carry out, the
demolition of [p]etitioner's properties." 27 More signi cantly, respondents (with the
exception of Casanova as will be herein discussed) are not asked to be prevented from
exercising any judicial or ministerial function on account of any lack or excess of
jurisdiction, or grave abuse of discretion, which allegation is key in an action for
prohibition. Case law dictates that "[f]or a party to be entitled to a writ of prohibition, he
must establish the following requisites: (a) it must be directed against a tribunal,
corporation, board or person exercising functions, judicial[, quasi-judicial] or
ministerial ; (b) the tribunal, corporation, board or person has acted without or
in excess of its jurisdiction, or with brave abuse of discretion ; and (c) there is
no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law." 28 In his opinion in the case of Nuclear Free Philippine Coalition v. National Power
Corporation, 29 former Chief Justice Ramon Aquino discussed the basic distinction
between an action for prohibition and one for injunction:
Prohibition is not the same as injunction. Lawyers often make the
mistake of confusing prohibition with injunction. Basically, prohibition is a
remedy to stop a tribunal from exercising a power beyond its jurisdiction. . . . .
Prohibition is an extraordinary prerogative writ of a preventive nature, its
proper function being to prevent courts or other tribunals, of cers, or persons
from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction with which they are not vested.
It is a fundamental rule of procedural law that it is not the caption of the pleading
that determines the nature of the complaint but rather its allegations. 30 Hence,
considering the above-discussed allegations, the petition, albeit denominated as one
for prohibition, is essentially an action for injunction, which means that Section 4, Rule
65 of the Rules of Court would not apply.
Instead, it is Section 21 of RA 7227, which solely authorizes the Supreme Court
to issue injunctions to restrain or enjoin "[t]he implementation of the projects for the
conversion into alternative productive uses of the military reservations," that would
govern: 31
Section 21. Injunction and Restraining Order. — The implementation of the
projects for the conversion into alternative productive uses of the military
reservations are urgent and necessary and shall not be restrained or enjoined
except by an order issued by the Supreme Court of the Philippines .
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 (Emphasis supplied)
Notably, while the petition asks in the nal item of its "PRAYER" that a "writ of
prohibition be issued commanding respondents, especially Casanova, from usurping or
exercising jurisdiction with which he has not been vested by law", 32 this relief, when
read together with the pertinent allegations in the body of the petition, 33 is one which is
directed against the title of respondent Casanova as President and Chief Executive
Of cer of the BCDA. Particularly, it is claimed that respondent Casanova's appointment
was "highly anomalous and irregular" as it was made contrary to Section 9 34 of RA
7227, which purportedly mandates that the Chairman of the BCDA shall also be its
President.
The Court observes that the collateral attack on respondent Casanova's title as
President and Chief Executive Of cer, which is a public of ce by nature, 35 is improper
to resolve in this petition. The title to a public of ce may not be contested except
directly, by quo warranto proceedings; and it cannot be assailed collaterally. 36 Also, it
has already been settled that prohibition does not lie to inquire into the validity
of the appointment of a public of cer . 37 In fact, petitioner impliedly recognized
the impropriety of raising this issue herein by stating that "until the nal resolution
regarding the purported authority of [respondent Casanova], he should be prohibited
from acting for and on behalf of BCDA and from issuing notices of demolition." 38 Thus,
at all events, the foregoing characterization of this action as one for injunction, and the
consequent conclusion that it was properly led before the Court remain. That being
said, the Court now proceeds to the main issue in this case.
As earlier mentioned, petitioner ultimately seeks the issuance of a writ of
injunction to enjoin the demolition of the structures which they — as opposed to
respondents' version — claim to be located in the Diplomatic and Consular Area, and
hence, outside of the JUSMAG Area.
Jurisprudence teaches that in order for a writ of injunction to issue, the petitioner
should be able to establish: (a) a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be
protected; (b) a violation of that right; and (c) that there is an urgent and permanent act
and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. In the absence of a clear
legal right, the writ must not issue. A restraining order or an injunction is a preservative
remedy aimed at protecting substantial rights and interests, and it is not designed to
protect contingent or future rights. Verily, the possibility of irreparable damage without
proof of adequate existing rights is not a ground for injunction. 39
In this case, the Court nds that petitioner has failed to prove that the structures
for which they seek protection against demolition fall within the Diplomatic and
Consular Area. Its supposition is anchored on two (2) documents, namely: ( a ) a printed
copy of BCDA's declaration in its website that the Diplomatic and Consular Area is a
non-BCDA property; 40 and ( b ) a map of the South Bonifacio Properties showing the
metes and bounds of the properties of the BCDA as well as the properties contiguous
to them. 41 However, none of these documents substantiate petitioner's claim: the
website posting is a mere statement that the Diplomatic Consular Area is supposedly a
non-BCDA property, whereas the map only depicts the metes and bounds of the BCDA's
properties.
Plainly, none of them show whether or not the structures to be demolished are
indeed within the Diplomatic and Consular Area as petitioner claims. On the other hand,
records show that on the basis of Relocation Survey Plan Rel-00-001297 42 approved
by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), the BCDA came up
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 with a Structural Map of the JUSMAG Area, 43 conducted ground surveys, and tagged
the location of informal settlers whose structures will be affected by the demolition. 44
In this relation, the Urban Poor Affairs Of ce of the City of Taguig assisted the BCDA in
the conduct of house tagging and validation of the affected families in the JUSMAG
Area as well as a joint inspection to verify the boundaries of the JUSMAG and
Diplomatic and Consular Areas. 45 Relying on the prima facie credibility of these
documents as opposed to petitioner's imsy argumentation, the Court nds that
respondents have correctly identi ed petitioner's structures as those belonging to the
JUSMAG Area. Thus, since petitioner's purported right in esse is hinged on the premise
that the structures do not fall within the JUSMAG but within the Diplomatic and
Consular Area, the petition should already fail.
For another, petitioner argues against the legality of the intended demolition,
insisting that there should be a court order authorizing the demolition pursuant to
Article 536 46 of the Civil Code and Section 28 of RA 7279, and not a mere Certi cate of
Compliance on Demolition. 47 However, contrary to petitioner's argument, the Court has
already settled, in the case of Kalipunan ng Damay ang Mahihirap, Inc. v. Robredo , 48
t hat demolitions and evictions may be validly carried out even without a
judicial order when, among others, government infrastructure projects with
available funding are about to be implemented pursuant to Section 28 (b) of
RA 7279 , which reads:
Sec. 28. Eviction and Demolition. — Eviction or demolition as a practice shall be
discouraged. Eviction or demolition, however, may be allowed under the
following situations:
(a) When persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad
tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public
places such as sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds;
(b) When government infrastructure projects with available funding are
about to be implemented; or
(c) When there is a court order for eviction and demolition.
xxx xxx xxx
Records show that the demolition of the properties is the precursory step to the
conversion of the JUSMAG area into a residential and mixed-use development 49 as
provided under the terms of a Joint Venture Agreement dated April 13, 2010 50
between the BCDA and Megaworld Corporation. As such, it falls within the ambit of
Section 28 (b) of RA 7279, which authorizes eviction or demolition without the need of
a court order.
Likewise, there is no merit to petitioner's statement that there was non-
compliance with the parameters of just and humane eviction or demolition under the
same provision, namely:
Sec. 28. Eviction and Demolition. — . . .
xxx xxx xxx
In the execution of eviction or demolition orders involving underprivileged
and homeless citizens, the following shall be mandatory:
(1) Notice upon the effected persons or entities at least thirty (30)
days prior to the date of eviction or demolition;
(2) Adequate consultations on the matter of settlement with the duly
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 designated representatives of the families to be resettled and the affected
communities in the areas where they are to be relocated;
(3) Presence of local government of cials or their representatives
during eviction or demolition;
(4) Proper identification of all persons taking part in the demolition;
(5) Execution of eviction or demolition only during regular of ce
hours from Mondays to Fridays and during good weather, unless the affected
families consent otherwise;
(6) No use of heavy equipment for demolition except for structures
that are permanent and of concrete materials;
(7) Proper uniforms for members of the Philippine National Police
who shall occupy the rst line of law enforcement and observe proper
disturbance control procedures; and
(8) Adequate relocation, whether temporary or permanent: Provided,
however, That in cases of eviction and demolition pursuant to a court order
involving underprivileged and homeless citizens, relocation shall be undertaken
by the local government unit concerned and the National Housing Authority with
the assistance of other government agencies within forty- ve (45) days from
service of notice of nal judgment by the court, after which period the said order
shall be executed: Provided, further, That should relocation not be possible
within the said period, nancial assistance in the amount equivalent to the
prevailing minimum daily wage multiplied by sixty (60) days shall be extended
to the affected families by the local government unit concerned.
The Department of the Interior and Local Government and the Housing
and Urban Development Coordinating Council shall jointly promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations to carry out the above provision.
Particularly, petitioner decries that the demolition is premature as the notice
given to them was not issued thirty (30) days prior to the intended date of the same.
However, records show that the demolition fully — if not, substantially — complied with
all the parameters laid down under Section 28 (b) as above-quoted, including the thirty
(30) day prior notice rule, considering the following unrefuted circumstances: (a) a
Local Inter-Agency Committee consisting of members of the BCDA, local government
of Taguig, the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council, the Presidential
Commission for the Urban Poor, the People's Organization, the Commission on Human
Rights, and various barangays of Fort Bonifacio was convened for the purpose of
conducting meetings and consultations with the affected settlers; 51 (b) after said
meetings and consultations, the said Committee came up with a nancial
compensation and relocation package which it offered to those affected by the
demolition and eviction of the JUSMAG Area; 52 and (c) affected settlers were given
numerous 30-day notices of the impending demolition and eviction activities, with the
warning that their failure to heed the same would constitute a waiver of their right to
claim anything under the aforesaid financial compensation and relocation package. 53
In fact, it is in view of the above-enumerated accomplished acts that respondent
Local Housing Board of Taguig City issued a Certi cate of Compliance on Demolition
dated July 18, 2012 certifying that the BCDA "has complied with the requirement of
'Just and Humane Demolition and Eviction' prescribed under Section 28, pre-relocation
phase of [RA] 7279 or the Urban Development and Housing Act (UDHA) of 1992."
Hence, bereft of any clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, such certi cate
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 should be accorded the presumption of regularity in the performance of the of cial
duties of respondent Local Housing Board of Taguig City. Case law states that "[t]he
presumption of regularity of of cial acts may be rebutted by af rmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption, however, prevails until it
is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
Thus, unless the presumption in rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every
reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption and in
case of doubt as to an of cer's act being lawful or unlawful, construction
should be in favor of its lawfulness ," 54 as in this case.
As a nal note, attention should be drawn to the manifestation of respondents
that the demolition and eviction activities in the JUSMAG Area, on which petitioner's
claimed structures belong, had already been performed and completed on September
21, 2012. 55 Thus, since prayers for injunctive reliefs do not lie to restrain an act that is
already fait accompli, 56 there is no other proper course of action but to dismiss the
petition.
WHEREFORE , the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Bersamin and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 3-15.
2. Engr. Macrohon appears to be an of cer of the BCDA, although his actual
position/designation at the time the acts complained of is not ascertainable from the
records.
3. Entitled "AN ACT ACCELERATING THE CONVERSION OF MILITARY RESERVATIONS INTO
OTHER PRODUCTIVE USES, CREATING THE BASES CONVERSION AND
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY FOR THE PURPOSE, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on March 13, 1992.
4. See id.
5. Republic of the Philippines v. Southside Homeowners Association, Inc., 534 Phil. 8, 14
(2006).
6. Entitled "IMPLEMENTING THE PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7227 AUTHORIZING
THE BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (BCDA) TO RAISE
FUNDS THROUGH THE SALE OF METRO MANILA MILITARY CAMPS TRANSFERRED
TO BCDA TO FORM PART OF ITS CAPITALIZATION AND TO BE USED FOR THE
PURPOSES STATED IN SAID ACT," dated December 8, 1992.
7. Samahan ng Masang Pilipino sa Makati, Inc. v. Bases Conversion Development Authority ,
542 Phil. 86, 105 (2007).
8. Rollo, p. 23.

9. See id. at 21. See also Republic of the Philippines v. Southside Homeowners Association,
Inc., supra note 5, at 14.
10. S ee http://www.bcda.gov.ph/investments_and_projects/show/44 (last accessed March
21, 2016); See also http://www.bcda.gov.ph/investments_and_projects/show/50
(last accessed March 21, 2016).
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 11. Entitled "DECLARING CERTAIN PARCELS OF LAND AS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE
IDENTIFIED AS THE DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR AREA SITUATED IN FORT
BONIFACIO, TAGUIG, METRO MANILA, ISLAND OF LUZON AND TRANSFERRING TO
THE BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (BCDA) THE
ADMINISTRATION THEREOF."
12. Id.
13. Rollo, p. 37

14. "AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR A COMPREHENSIVE AND CONTINUING URBAN

DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING PROGRAM, ESTABLISH THE MECHANISM FOR ITS
IMPLEMENTATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on March 24, 1992.
15. Rollo, p. 20.

16. Id. at 8.
17. Id. at 13.
18. Id. at 10-12.
19. Id. at 9-10.
20. Id. at 40-54.

21. Id. at 42-43.

22. Id. at 46-47.
23. Id. at 44-45.
24. Id. at 51-52.
25. Id. at 148-158.

26. Id. at 148-150.

27. Rollo, p. 14.
28. Montes v. CA, 523 Phil. 98, 107 (2006), citing Longino v. General, 491 Phil. 600, 616
(2005).
29. 225 Phil. 266, 276 (1986), citing 73 C.J.S. 10.
30. Anadon v. Herrera, 553 Phil. 759, 765 (2007).

31. S ee Samahan ng Masang Pilipino sa Makati, Inc. v. Bases Conversion Development

Authority, 542 Phil. 86, 91 (2007).
32. Rollo, p. 14.

33. Id. at 9-10.

34. SECTION 9. Board of Directors: Composition. — The powers and functions of the
Conversion Authority shall be exercised by a Board of Directors to be composed of
nine (9) members, as follows:

(a) A full-time chairman who shall also be the president of the Conversion Authority; and
(b) Eight (8) other members from the private sector, two (2) of whom coming from the
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 labor sector.
The chairman and members shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. Of the initial members of the Board, three (3)
including the chairman, a representative from the private sector and a representative
from the labor sector shall be appointed for a term of six (6) years, three (3) for a
term of four (4) years and the other three (3) for a term of two (2) years. In case of
vacancy in the Board, the appointee shall serve the unexpired term of the
predecessor.
35. "[the] Bases Conversion Development Authority BCDA is a government owned and
controlled corporation (GOCC) created under Republic Act No. 7227 or the Bases
Conversion and Development Act of 1992,3 as amended by Republic Act No. 7917."
(Bases Conversion Development Authority v. Provincial Agrarian Reform Of cer of
Pampanga, G.R. Nos. 155322-29, June 27, 2012, 675 SCRA 7, 8). Hence, the position
of BCDA President and Chief Executive is public in nature.

36. Topacio v. Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan Gregory Santos Ong , 595 Phil. 491,
503 (2008).
37. See id.

38. Rollo, p. 10.

39. Samahan ng Masang Pilipino sa Makati, Inc. v. Bases Conversion Development Authority .
See supra note 7, at 97.
40. Rollo, pp. 21-22.
41. Id. at 23.
42. Id. at 58-60.
43. Id. at 61-64.

44. Id. at 43.

45. Id. at 154. See also id. at 119-128.
46. Art. 536. In no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as
there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or a
right to deprive another of the holding of a thing, must invoke the aid of the
competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing.

47. Rollo, pp. 10-12.

48. G.R. No. 200903, July 22, 2014, 730 SCRA 322, 337.
49. Rollo, p. 70.
50. Id. at 70-113.
51. See rollo, pp. 114-123.

52. Id. at 129.

53. See id. See also id. at 49-51 and 155.
54. Bustillo v. People, 634 Phil. 547, 556 (2010), citing People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 106025,
February 9, 1994, 229 SCRA 795, 799.
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 55. Rollo, pp. 51-52.
56. See Bernardez v. COMELEC , 628 Phil. 720, 732 (2010), citing Caneland Sugar Corporation
v. Alon, 559 Phil. 462, 471 (2007).

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