EN BANC

G.R. No. 142840 May 7, 2001

ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner,

vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C.
CRUZ, respondents.

CONCURRING OPINION

DISSENTING OPINION

KAPUNAN, J.:

The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the
constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of
Representative unless he is a natural-born citizen."1

Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San
Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The f undamental law then
applicable was the 1935 Constitution. 2

On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine
Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of
allegiance to the United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship f or
under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship
by, among other, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed f orces of
a f oreign country." Said provision of law reads:

SECTION 1. How citizenship may be lost. – A Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship in any of the f ollowing ways and/or events:

xx x

(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed of a f oreign
country: Provided, That the rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such
commission in, the armed f orces of a f oreign country, and the taking of an oath
of allegiance incident thereto, with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines,
shall not divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either of the f ollowing
circumstances is present:
 (a) The Republic of the Philippines has a def ensive and/or of f ensive pact of
alliance with said f oreign country; or

(b) The said f oreign country maintains armed f orces on Philippine territory with
the consent of the Republic of the Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen
concerned, at the time of rendering said service, or acceptance of said
commission, and taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that he
does so only in connection with his service to said f oreign country; And provided,
finally, That any Filipino citizen who is rendering service to, or is commissioned
in, the armed f orces of a f oreign country under any of the circumstances
mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), shall not be Republic of the Philippines during
the period of his service to, or commission in, the armed f orces of said country.
Upon his discharge f rom the service of the said f oreign country, he shall be
automatically entitled to the f ull enjoyment of his civil and politically entitled to
the f ull enjoyment of his civil political rights as a Filipino citizen x x x.

Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by
his naturalization as a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with his service in the
U.S. Marine Corps.

On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through
repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. 3 He ran f or and was elected as the
Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He
won by a convincing margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who
was then running f or reelection. 1âwphi1.nêt

Subsequently, petitioner f iled a case f or Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent

House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was
not qualif ied to become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a
natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution. 4

On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision 5 dismissing the petition f or quo
warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative of the Second District of
Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections. The HRET likewise denied petitioner's motion f or
reconsideration of the decision in its resolution dated April 27, 2000. 6

Petitioner thus f iled the present petition f or certiorari assailing the HRET's decision on
the f ollowing grounds:

1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, a mounting
to excess of jurisdiction, when it ruled that private respondent is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines despite the f act that he had ceased being such in view
of the loss and renunciation of such citizenship on his part.

2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting
to excess of jurisdiction, when it considered private respondent as a citizen of
the Philippines despite the f act he did not validly acquire his Philippine
citizenship.
 3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship was
invalid, the HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it dismissed the petition despite the
f act that such reacquisition could not legally and constitutionally restore his
natural-born status. 7

The issue now bef ore us is whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who
became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be considered a natural-born

Filipino since he lost h is Philippine citizenship when he swore allegiance to the United
States in 1995, and had to reacquire the same by repatriation. He insists that Article
citizens are those who are f rom birth with out having to perf orm any act to acquire or
perf ect such citizenship.

Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired his status as natural-born
citizen when he was repatriated since the phrase "f rom birth" in Article IV, Section 2
ref ers to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.

The petition is without merit.

The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as f ollow:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution;

(2) Those whose f athers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

(3) Those born bef ore January 17, 1973 of Filipino mother, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, and

(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. 8

There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization.
These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-
born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a
citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof . 9

As def ined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the
Philippines f rom birth without having to perf orm any act to acquire or perf ect his
Philippine citezenship."10

On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens
through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known
as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the f ormer Naturalization Law (Act
No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530. 11 To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove
that he possesses all the qualif ications 12 and none of the disqualif ication13 provided by
law to become a Filipino citizen. The decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes
executory only af ter two (2) years f rom its promulgation when the court is satisf ied that
during the intervening period, the applicant has (1) not lef t the Philippines; (2) has
dedicated himself to a lawf ul calling or prof ession; (3) has not been convicted of any
of f ense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act
prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced
policies. 14

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the
manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three
modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a f ormer citizen: (1) by
naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress. 15

Naturalization is mode f or both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As

a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode
f or reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63. 16 Under
this law, a f ormer Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must
possess certain qualif ications 17 and none of the disqualif ication mentioned in Section 4
of C.A. 473. 18

Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost
their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed f orces; 19 services in the armed
f orces of the allied f orces in World War II; 20 (3) service in the Armed Forces of the
United States at any other time, 21 (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; 22 and
(5) political economic necessity. 23

As distinguished f rom the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists

of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering
said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or
last resided.

In Angat v. Republic, 24 we held:

xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [ref erring to RA Nos. 965 and 2630],
the person desiring to reacquire Philippine citizenship would not even be required
to f ile a petition in court, and all that he had to do was to take an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register that f act with the civil
registry in the place of his residence or where he had last resided in the
Philippines. [Italics in the original. 25

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. 26 This means
that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen
bef ore he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his f ormer status as a
natural-born Filipino.

In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in
the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine
citizenship under R.A. No. 2630, which provides:
 Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service
to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or af ter
separation f rom the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States
citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil
Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said
oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered
the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the
af orecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status
as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino
f ather.27 It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return
to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.

Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he

had to perf orm an act to regain his citizenship is untenable. As correctly explained by
the HRET in its decision, the term "natural-born citizen" was f irst def ined in Article III,
Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as f ollows:

Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines f rom birth
without having to perf orm any act to acquire or perf ect his Philippine citizenship.

Two requisites must concur f or a person to be considered as such: (1) a person must
be a Filipino citizen birth and (2) he does not have to perf orm any act to obtain or
perf ect his Philippine citizenship.

Under the 1973 Constitution def inition, there were two categories of Filipino citizens
which were not considered natural-born: (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those
born bef ore January 17, 1973, 38 of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of
majority, elected Philippine citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were not considered
natural-born obviously because they were not Filipino at birth and had to perf orm an
act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Those born of Filipino mothers bef ore the
ef f ectively of the 1973 Constitution were likewise not considered natural-born because
they also had to perf orm an act to perf ect their Philippines citizenship.

The present Constitution, however, now consider those born of Filipino mothers be f ore
the ef f ectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the majority age as natural-born. Af ter def ining who re natural-born citizens,
Section 2 of Article IV adds a sentence: "Those who elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born
citizens." Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born
citizens. It is apparent f rom the enumeration of who are citizens under the present
Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born
and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a
naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain
Philippine citizenship, necessarily is natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in
said enumeration of a separate category f or persons who, af ter losing Philippine
citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason theref or is clear: as to such pe rsons,
they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons f or the loss
of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law f or the reacquisition
thereof . As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization
proceeding in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perf orce a natural-born Filipino.
As such, he possessed all the necessary qualif ications to be elected as member of the
House of Representatives.

A f inal point. The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge"
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualif ications of the members of the
House. 29 The Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to check "whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the
part of the latter. 30 In the absence thereof , there is no occasion f or the Court to
exercise its corrective power and annul the decision of the HRET nor to substitute the
Court's judgement f or that of the latter f or the simple reason that it is not the of f ice of
a petition f or certiorari to inquire into the correctness of the assailed decision. 31 There is
no such showing of grave abuse of discretion in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, and JJ., concur.

Melo, Vitug, Mendoza, no part.

Panganiban, concurring opinion.

Quisumbing, Buena, De Leon, Jr., on leave.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, dissenting opinion.

Pardo, Gonzaga-Reyes, concur on this and the concurring opinion of J. Panganiban

Ynares-Santiago, certif y majority opinion of J. Kapunan.

Footnote

1
1987 Constitution, Article IV, Section 6.

2
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution states:

The f ollowing are citizens of the Philippines:

1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution;
 2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of f oreign parents who, bef ore the
adoption of this Constitution had been elected to public of f ice in the
Philippine Islands;

3) Those whose f athers are citizens of the Philippines;

4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching
the age of majority, elected Philippine citizenship; and

5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

3An Act Providing f or Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost

Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the
Armed Forces of the United States (1960).

4 Said provision reads:

No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is

a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is
at least twenty-f ive years of age, able to read and write, and except the
party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he
shall be elected, and a resident thereof f or a period of not less than one
year immediately preceding the day of the election.

5 Rollo, p. 36.

6 Id., at 69.

7 Id., at 13.

8
Article IV, Section 1.

9TOLENTINO, COMMETARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE OF THE

PHILIPPINES 188, 1990 Ed.

10 1987 Constitution, Article IV, Section 2.

11During the period under Martial Law declared by President Ferdinand E.

Marcos, thousands of aliens were naturalized by Presidential Decree where the
screening of the applicants was undertaken by special committee under Letter of
Instructions No. 270, dated April 11,1975, as amended.

12
Section 2, Act 473 provides the f ollowing qualif ications:

(a) He must be not less than 21 years of age on the day of the hearing of
the petition;

(b) He must have resided in the Philippines f or a continuous period of not

less than ten years;
 (c) He must be of good moral character and believes in the principles
underlying the Philippine Constitution, and must have conducted himself
in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his
residence in the Philippines in his relation with the constituted government
and well as with the community in which he is living;

(d) He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than f ive
thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have some known lucrative
trade, prof ession, or lawf ul occupation;

(e) He must be able to speak and write English or Spanish and any of the
principal languages; and

(f ) He must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the
public schools or private schools recognized by the Bureau of Private
Schools of the Philippines where Philippine history, government and civic
are taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during the
entire period of the residence in the Philippines required of him prior to
the learning of his petition f or naturalization as Philippine citizen.

13 Section 4, Act 473, provides the f ollowing disqualif ications:

(a) He must not be opposed to organized government or af f iliated with

any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines
opposing all organized governments;

(b) He must not be def ending or teaching the necessity or propriety of

violence, personal assault, or assassination f or the success and
predominance of their ideas;

(c) He must not be polygamist or believer in the practice of polygamy;

(d) He must not have been convicted of any crime involving moral
turpitude;

(e) He must not be suf f ering f rom mental alienation or incurable

contagious diseases;

(f ) He must have, during the period of his residence in the Philippines (of
not less than six months bef ore f iling his application), mingled socially
with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and
embrace the customs, traditions and ideal s of the Filipinos;

(g) He must not be a citizen or subject of a nation with whom the

Philippines is at war, during the period of such war;

(h) He must not be citizen or subject of f oreign country whose laws do not
grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof .
14 Section 1, R.A. 530.

15 Section 2, C.A. No. 63.

16
An Act Providing f or the Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or
Reacquired (1936).

171. The applicant must have lost his original Philippine citizenship by
naturalization in a f oreign country or by express renunciation of his citizenship
(Sec. 1 [1] and [2], C.A. No. 63);

2. He must be at least twenty-one years of age and shall have resided in the
Philippines at least six months bef ore he applies f or naturalization (Sec. 3[1],
C.A. No. 63);

3. He must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner

during the entire period of his residence (of at least six months prior to the f iling
of the application) in the Philippines, in his relations with the constituted
government as well as with the community in which he is living (Sec. 3[2], C.A.
No. 63);

4. He subscribes to an oath declaring his intention to renounce absolutely and

perpetually al f aith and allegiance to the f oreign authority, state or sovereignty
of which he was a citizen or subject (Sec. 3[3], C.A. No. 63).

18
See note 13.

19
Sec 4, C.a. No. 63.

20
Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 965 (1953).

21 Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 2630 (1960).

22
Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 8171 (1995).

23 Ibid.

24 314 SCRA 438 (1999)

25
Id., at 450.

26 Jovito R. Salonga, Private International Law, p. 165 (1995)

27
See Art. IV, Sec. 1, 1935 Constitution.

28
The date of ef f ectivity of the 1973 Constitution.

29
Article IV, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides thus:
 Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representative shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualif ications of their respective Members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members three of whom shall
be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice,
and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate of the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation f rom the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein.
The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.

30Garcia vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 312 SCRA 353, 364
(1999).

EN BANC

G.R. No. 142840 May 7, 2001

ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner,

vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C.
CRUZ, respondents.

CONCURRING OPINION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

I concur in the ponencia of Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan, holding that the House
Electoral Tribunal did not gravely abuse its discretion in ruling that Private Respondent
Teodoro C. Cruz remains a natural-born Filipino citizen and is eligible to continue being
a member of Congress. Let me just add a f ew points.

The Facts in Brief

It is undisputed that Congressman Cruz was born on April 27, 1960 in San Clemente,
Tarlac, to Filipino parents. He was, theref ore, a Filipino citizen, pursuant to Section 1
(2),1 Article IV of the Constitution. Furthermore, not having done any act to
acquire or perfect the Philippine citizenship he obtained from birth, he was a
natural-born Filipino citizen, in accordance with Section 2 2 of the same Article
IV.

It is not disputed either that private respondent rendered military service to the United
States Marine Corps f rom November 1958 to October 1993. On June 5, 1990, he was
naturalized as an American citizen, in connection with his US military service.
Consequently, under Section 1 (4) 3 of CA No. 63, he lost his Philippine citizenship.
Upon his discharge f rom the US Marine Corps, private respondent returned to the
Philippines and decided to regain his Filipino citizenship. Thus, on March 17, 1994,
availing himself of the benef its of Republic Act (RA) No. 2630, entitled "An Act Providing
f or Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such by Rendering
Service to, or Accepting Commission in, the Armed Force of the United States," 4 Cruz
took his oath of allegiance to the Republic and registered the same with the Local Civil
Registry of Mangatarem, Pangasinan. On the same day, he also executed an Af f idavit of
Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship.

Main Issue

The main question here is: Did the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
commit grave abuse of discretion in holding that, by reason of his repatriation,
Congressman Teodoro C. Cruz had reverted to his original status as a natural-born
citizen? I respectf ully submit that the answer is "No." In f act, I believe that the HRET
was correct in its ruling.

1. Repatriation Is Recovery of Original Citizenship

First, repatriation is simply the recovery of original citizenship. Under Section 1 of RA

2630, a person "who ha[s] lost his citizenship" may "reacquire" it by " taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines." Former Senate President Jovito R.
Salonga, a noted authority on the subject, explains this method more precisely in his
treatise, Private International Law. 5 He def ines repatriation as "the recovery of
the original nationality upon f ulf illment of certain condition." 6 Webster buttresses this
def inition by describing the ordinary or common usage of repatriate, as "to restore or
return to one's country of origin, allegiance, or citizenship; x x x." 7 In relation to our
subject matter, repatriation, then, means restoration of citizenship. It is not a grant of
a new citizenship, but a recovery of one's f ormer or original citizenship.

To "reacquire" simply means "to get back as one's own again." 8 Ergo, since Cruz, prior
to his becoming a US citizen, was a natural-born Filipino citizen, he "reacquired" the
same status upon repatriation. To rule otherwise – that Cruz became a non-natural-
born citizen – would not be consistent whit the legal and ordinary meaning of
repatriation. It would be akin to naturalization, which is the acquisition of a new
citizenship. "New." Because it is not the same as the with which he has previously been
endowed.

In any case, "the leaning, in questions of citizenship, should always be in f avor of [its]
claimant x x x."9 Accordingly, the same should be construed in f avor of private
respondent, who claims to be a natural-born citizen.

2. Not Being Naturalized, Respondent Is Natural Born

Second, under the present Constitution, private respondent should be deemed natural-
born, because was not naturalized. Let me explain.

There are generally two classes of citizens: (1) natural-born citizens and (2) naturalized
citizens. 10 While CA 63 provides that citizenship may also be acquired by direct act of
the Legislature, I believe that those who do become citizens through such procedure
would properly f all under the second category (naturalized). 11

Naturalized citizens are f ormer aliens or f oreigners who had to undergo a rigid
procedure, in which they had to adduce suf f icient evidence to prove that they
possessed all the qualif ications and none of the disqualif ications provided by law in
order to become Filipino citizens. In contrast, as stated in the early case Roa v.
Collector of Customs, 12 a natural-born citizen is a citizen "who has become such at the
moment of his birth."

The assailed HRET Decision, penned by Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, explains clearly
who are considered natural-born Filipino citizens. He traces the concept as f irst def ined
in Article III of the 1973 Constitution, which simply provided as f ollows:

"Sec 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines f rom birth
without having to perf orm any act to acquire or perf ect his Philippine
citizenship."

Under the above def inition, there are two requisites in order that a Filipino citizen may
be considered "natural-born": (1) one must be a citizen of the Philippines f rom birth,
and (2) one does not have to do anything to acquire or perf ect one's Philippine
citizenship. 13 Thus, under the 1973 Constitution, excluded f rom the class of "natural-
born citizens" were (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those born bef ore January
17, 1973, of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine
citizenship. 14

The present Constitution, however, has expanded the scope of natural-born citizens to
include "[t]hose who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3),
Section 1 hereof ," meaning those covered under class (2) above. Consequently, only
naturalized Filipino citizens are not considered natural-born citizens. Premising
theref rom, respondent – being clearly and concededly not naturalized – is, theref ore, a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines. 15

With respect to repatriates, since the Constitution does not classif y them separately,
they naturally reacquire their original classif ication bef ore the loss of their Philippine
citizenship. In the case of Congressman Teodoro C. Cruz, upon his repatriation in1994,
he reacquired his lost citizenship. In other words, he regained his original status as a
natural-born Filipino citizen, nothing less.

3. No Grave Abuse of Discretion on the Part of HRET

Third, the HRET did not abuse, much less gravely abuse, its discretion in holding that
Respondent Cruz is a natural-born Filipino citizen who is qualif ied to be a member of
Congress. I stress that the Court, in this certiorari proceeding bef ore us, is limited to
determining whether the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its assailed Decision. The Court has no power to
reverse or modif y HRET's rulings, simply because it dif f ers in its perception of
controversies. It cannot substitute its discretion f or that of HRET, an independent,
constitutional body with its own specif ic mandate.
The Constitution explicitly states that the respective Electoral Tribunals of the chambers
of Congress "shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications their respective members."16 In several cases, 17 this Court has held
that the power and the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals are original and exclusive,
as if they remained in the legislature, a coequal branch of government. Their judgment
are beyond judicial interf erence, unless rendered without or in excess of their
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. 18 In the elegant words of Mr. Justice Hugo
E. Gutierrez Jr.:19

"The Court does not venture into the perilous area of trying to correct perceived
errors of independent branches of the Government. It comes in only when it has
to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an abuse of discretion so grave or
glaring that no less than the Constitution calls f or remedial action."

True, there is no settled judicial doctrine on the exact ef f ect of repatriation. But, as
earlier explained, the legal and common def inition of repatriation is the reacquisition of
the former citizenship. How then can the HRET be rebuked with grave abuse of
discretion? At best, I can concede that the legal def inition is not judicially settled or is
even doubtf ul. But an interpretation made in good f aith and grounded o reason one way
or the other cannot be the source of grave abuse amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. The HRET did not violate the Constitution or the law or any settled judicial
doctrine. It was def initely acting within its exclusive domain.

Be it remembered that our Constitution vests upon the HRET the power to be
the sole judge of the qualif ications of members of the House of Representatives, one of
which is citizenship. Absent any clear showing of a manif est violation of the Constitution
or the law or nay judicial decision, this Court cannot impute grave abuse of discretion to
the HRET in the latter's actions on matters over which f ull discretionary authority is
lodged upon it by our f undamental law. 20 Even assuming that we disagree with the
conclusion of public respondent, we cannot ipso facto attribute to it "grave abuse of
discretion." Verily, there is a line between perceived error and grave abuse. 21

By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of

judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough.
"It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and
so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual ref usal to perf orm
the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law." 22

That the HRET, af ter caref ul deliberation and purposef ul study, voted 7 to 2 to issue its
Decision upholding the qualif ications of Congressman Cruz could not in any wise be
condemned as gravely abusive. Neither can I f ind any "patent or gross" arbitrariness or
despotism "by reason of passion or hostility" in such exercise.

4. In Case of Doubt, Popular Will Prevails

Fourth, the court has a solemn duty to uphold the clear and unmistakable mandate of
the people. It cannot supplant the sovereign will of the Second District of Pangasinan
with f ractured legalism. The people of the District have clearly spoken. The y
overwhelmingly and unequivocally voted f or private respondent to represent them in
the House of Representatives. The votes that Cruz garnered (80, 119) in the last
elections were much more than those of all his opponents combined (66, 182). 23 In
such instances, all possible doubts should be resolved in f avor of the winning
candidate's eligibility; to rule otherwise would be to def eat the will of the people. 24

Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the doctrine that in case of doubt, political laws
must be so constructed as to give lif e and spirit to the popular mandate f reely
expressed through the ballot. 25 Public interest and the sovereign will should, at all
times, be the paramount considerations in election controversies. 26 For it would be
better to err in f avor of the people's choice than to be right in complex but little
understood legalisms. 27

"Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of giving ef f ect to the
sovereign will in order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In any action involving
the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost
ef f ort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give ef f ect to the will of the
majority, f or it is merely sound public policy to cause elective of f ices to be f illed by
those who are the choice of the majority. To successf ully challenge a winning
candidate's qualif ications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrative that the ineligibility
is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such
ineligibility and thereby giving ef f ect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately
create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that
our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote."28

5. Current Trend Towards Globalization

Fifth, the current trend, economically as well as politically, is towards

globalization. 29 Protectionist barriers dismantled. Whereas, in the past, governments
f rowned upon the opening of their doors to aliens who wanted to enjoy the same
privileges as their citizens, the current era is adopting a more liberal perspective. No
longer are applicants f or citizenship eyed with the suspicion that they merely want to
exploit local resources f or themselves. They are now being considered potential sources
of developmental skills, know-how and capital. 1âwphi1.nêt

More so should our government open its doors to f ormer Filipinos, like Congressman
Cruz, who want to rejoin the Filipino community as citizens again. They are not "aliens"
in the true sense of the law. They are actually Filipino by blood, by origin and by
culture, who want to reacquire their f ormer citizenship.

It cannot be denied that most Filipinos go abroad and apply f or naturalization in f oreign
countries, because of the great economic or social opportunities there. Hence, we
should welcome f ormer Filipino citizens desirous of not simply returning to the country
or regaining Philippine citizenship, but of serving the Filipino people as well. One of
these admirable Filipino is private respondent who, in only a year af ter being absent
f rom the Philippines f or about eight (8) years, was already voted municipal mayor of
Mangatarem, Pangasinan. And af ter serving as such f or just one term, he was
overwhelmingly chosen by the people to be their representative in Congress.
I reiterate, the people have spoken. Let not a restrictive and parochial interpretation of
the law bar the sovereign will. Let not grave abuse be imputed on the legitimate
exercise of HRET's prerogatives.

WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the petition.

Footnote

1
"Section 1. The f ollowing are citizens of the Philippines:

(2) Those whose f athers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

xx x x xx x x x"

2
"Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens f rom birth without
having to perf orm any act to acquire or perf ect their Philippine citizenship. x x
x."

3 "Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. – A Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship in any of the f ollowing ways and/or events:

xx x x xx x x x"

(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed

f orces of a f oreign country: x x x ."

4 Sec. 1 thereof provides:

"Sec. 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering
service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United
States, or af ter separation f rom the Armed Forces of the United States,
acquired U.S. citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking
an oath allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the
same with the Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides of last
resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a
renunciation of any other citizenship.

5 1995 ed.

6
Ibid., p. 165; cited in the assailed HRET Decision, p. 13. (Italics ours.)

7
Webster's Third New International Dictionary: Unabridged, 1993 ed.

8
Webster's, ibid., def ines reacquire as "to acquire again", and acquire as "to get
as one's own."

9
Roa v. Collector of Customs, 23 Phil 315, 338 (1912), per Trent, J.; citing Boyd
v. Thaye, 143 US 135.
10Ronaldo P. Ledesma, An Outline of Philippine Immigration and Citizenship
Laws, 1999 ed., p. 354. See also 14 CJS S1, 1128; 3A Am Jur 2d aliens and
Citizens, s1411.

11
See Ledesma, ibid., p. 355.

12
Supra.

13
Assailed Decision, p. 8.

14
Ibid.

15 Ibid., p. 9.

16
Sec.17, Art. IV. (Emphasis ours.)

17Lazatin v. HRET, 168 SCRA 391, December 8, 1988; Co v. Electoral Tribunal of

the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692, July 30, 1991; citing Angara v.
Electoral Commission, 63 Phil 139 (1936).

18
Co v. HRET, ibid., citing Robles v. HRET, 181 SCRA 780, February 5, 1990;
and Morrero v Bocar, 66 Phil 429 (1938). See also Libanan v. HRET, 283 SCRA
520, December 22, 1997.

19 Co. v. HRET, ibid.

20 Santiago v. Guingona Jr., 298 SCRA 756, November 18, 1998.

21
Ibid.

22
Tañada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997, per Panganiban, J.

23 "The f ollowing were the results of the election:

Teodoro C. Cruz 80,119

Antonio E. Bengson 53,448

III

Alberto B. Zamuco 11,941

Manuel R. Castro 622

Mariano A. Padlan 171"

(HRET Decision, pp. 2-3; rollo, pp. 37-38.)

24 Sinaca v. Mula, 315 SCRA 266, September 27, 1999.

 25 Frivaldo v. Comelec, 257 SCRA 727, June 28, 1996; per Panganiban, J.

26 Olondriz v. Comelec, 313 SCRA 128, August 25, 1999.

27
Frivaldo v. Comelec, supra.

28
Ibid

29See Pacif ico A. Agabin, "Globalization and the Judicial Function," Odysey and
Legacy: The Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa Centennial Lecture Series, complied
and edited by Atty. Antonio M. Eliciano, published by the Supreme Court Printing
Services, 1998 ed. See also Artenio V. Panganiban, "Old Doctrines and New
Paradigms," a lecture delivered during the Supreme Court Centenary Lecture
Series, on February 13, 2001.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 142840 May 7, 2001

ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner,

vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C.
CRUZ, respondents.

DISSENTING OPINION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

With due respect, I disagree with the ponencia of Justice Santiago M. Kapunan. I am
convinced that private respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is not natural born citizen and,
theref ore, must be disqualif ied as a member of Congress.

Who are natural-born citizens?

The laws on citizenship – its acquisition or loss, and the rights, privileges and
immunities of citizens – have given rise to some of the most disputations and visceral
issues resolved by this Court. The problem is taken up connection with the sovereign
right of voters to choose their representatives in Congress.

In this petition f or certiorari, petitioner Antonio Bengson III asks this Court of
Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan because he does not posses the
constitutional requirement of being a natural-born citizen of this country. Respondent,
on the other hand, insists that he is qualif ied to be elected to Congress considering that
by repatriation, he re-acquired his status as a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Records show that Teodoro Cruz was born in the Philippines on April 27, 1960 to Filipino
parents, spouses Lamberto and Carmelita Cruz. On November 5, 1985, he enlisted in
the United States Armed Forces and served the United States Marine Corps. While in
the service f or almost f ive years, he applied f or naturalization with the US District Court
of Northern District of Calif ornia and was issued his Certif icate of Naturalization No.
14556793 as an American citizen. On October 27, 1993, he was honorably discharged
f rom the US Marine Corps. He then decided to return to the Philippines.

Cruz availed of repatriation under R.A. No. 2630, an act providing f or reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship by persons who lost such citizenship by rendering service to or
accepting commission in the Armed Forces of the United States. On March 17, 1994, he
took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. The oath was registered
with the Local Civil Registry of Mangatarem, Pangasinan. On the same date, he
executed an Af f idavit of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship. Thus, on April 11, 1994,
the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation ordered the cancellation of his Alien
Certif icate of Residence (ICR No. 286582) and issued him an Identif ication Certif icate.

The cancellation of his ACR and ICR was af f irmed by the Justice Department. On
January 18, 1995, the United States Embassy in Manila issued to him a Certif icate of
Loss of Nationality of the United States.

In the local election of 1995, Cruz f iled his certif icate of candidacy f or mayor of
Mangatarem, Pangasinan, declaring himself to be a naturalized Filipino citizen. He won
and served as mayor f or one term.

Thereaf ter, Cruz f iled his certif icate of candidacy f or a seat in Congress, this time
declaring himself as a natural-born Filipino. Again, he won with a lead of 26,671 votes
over candidate Antonio Bengson, III.

On September 3, 1998, Cruz was proclaimed winner in the congressional race in the
Second District of Pangasinan.

Bengson then f iled a petition f or Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with the House of
Representative Electoral not being a natural-born Filipino citizen when he f iled his
Certif icate of Candidacy on March 15, 1998, is not qualif ied to run as a member of the
House of Representatives. That he should be a natural-born citizen is a qualif ication
mandated by Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution which provides: "No person shall
be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines."

Af ter oral arguments and the submission by the parties of their respective memoranda
and supplemental memoranda, the HRET rendered a decision holding that Cruz
reacquired his natural-born citizenship upon his repatriation in 1994 and declaring him
duly elected representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998
elections, thus:

"WHEREFORE, the petition f or quo warranto is DISMISSED and Respondent

Teodoro C. Cruz is hereby DECLARED duly elected Representative of the Second
District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections.
 "As soon as this Decision becomes f inal and executory, let notices and copies
thereof be sent to the President of the Philippines; the House of Representatives,
through the Speaker, and the Commission on Audit, through its Chairman,
pursuant to Rule 76 of the 1998 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal. Costs de oficio."

On March 13, 2000, Bengson f iled a motion f or reconsideration of the said Decision but
the same was denied by the HRET in Resolution No. 00-48.

Bengson now comes to us via a petition f or certiorari assailing the HRET Decision on
grounds that:

"1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting
to excess of jurisdiction, when it ruled that private respondent is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines despite the f act that he had ceased being such in view
of the loss and renuciation of such citizenship on his part.

"2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting
to excess of jurisdiction, when it considered private respondent as a citiz en of
the Philippines despite the f act that he did not validly acquire his Philippine
citizenship.

"3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship was

invalid, the HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to excess of despite the f act that such reacquisition could not legally
and constitutionally restore his natural-born status."

The sole issue raised in this petition is whether or not respondent Cruz was natural-
born citizen of the Philippines at the time of the f iling of his Certif icate of Candidacy f or
a seat in the House of Representatives.

Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution1 provides:

"Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines f rom
birth without having to perf orm any act to acquire or perf ect their Philippine
citizenship. xxx."

Petitioner and respondent present opposing interpretations of the phrase "f rom birth"
contained in the above provisions.

Petitioner contends that the phrase "f rom birth" indicates that citizenship must start at
a def inite point and must be continuous, constant and without interruption. The
Constitution does not extend the privilege of reacquiring a natural-born citizen status to
respondent, who at one time, became an alien. His loss of citizenship carried with it the
concomitant loss of all the benef its, privileges and attributes of "natural-born"
citizenship. When he reacquired his citizenship in 1994, he had to comply with
requirements f or repatriation, thus ef f ectively taking him out of the constitutional
def inition of a natural-born Filipino. For his part, respondent maintains that the phrase
"f rom birth" ref ers to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of being a "natural-
born". Since he was born to Filipino f rom birth. His reacquisition of Philippine citizenship
under Republic Act No. 2630 results in his reacquisition of his inherent characteristic of
being a natural-born citizen.

For his part, respondent maintains that the phrase "f rom birth" ref ers to the innate,
inherent and inborn characteristic of being a "natural-born". Since he was born to
Filipino parents, he has been a natural-born Filipino f rom birth. His reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 2630 results in his reacquisition of his
inherent characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.

The state of being a natural-born citizen has been regarded, not so much in its literal
sense, but more in its legal connotation.

The very f irst natural-born Filipinos did not acquire that status at birth. They were born
as Spanish subjects. In Roa vs. Collector of Customs, 2 the Supreme Court traces the
grant of natural-born status f rom the Treaty of Paris, and the Acts of Congress of July
1, 1902 and March 23, 1912, which is a reenactment of Section 4 of the f ormer with a
proviso which reads:

"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law

f or the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine
Islands who do not come within the f oregoing provisions, the natives of other
Insular possessions of the United States and such other persons residing in the
Philippine Islands who could become citizens of the United State under the laws
of the United State, if residing therein."

It was f urther held therein that under the said provision, "every person born the 11th of
April, of parents who were Spanish subjects on that date and who continued to reside in
this country are at the moment of their birth ipso facto citizens of the Philippine
Islands."

Under the April 7, 1900 Instructions of President William McKinley to the Second
Philippine Commission, considered as our f irst colonial charter of f undamental law, we
were ref erred to as "people of the Islands," or "inhabitants of the Philippine Islands," or
"natives of the Islands" and not as citizens, much less natural-born citizens. The f irst
def inition of "citizens of the Philippine Islands" in our law is f ound in Section 4 of the
Philippine Bill of 1902. 3

Philippine citizenship, including the status of natural-born, was initially a loose or even
non-existent qualif ication. As a requirement f or the exercise of certain rights and
privileges, it became a more strict and dif f icult status to achieve with the passing of the
years.

Early decisions of the Supreme Court held that Philippine citizenship could be acquired
under either the jus sanguinis or jus soli doctrine. 4

This liberal policy was applied even as the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law of
the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 appear to have limited "citizens of the Philippine
Islands" to resident inhabitants who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899, their
children born subsequent thereto, and later, those naturalized according to law by the
Philippine legislature. Only later was jus sanguinis f irmly applied and jus
soli abandoned.

Hence, the status of being a natural-born citizen at its incipient is a privilege conf erred
by law directly to those who intended, and actually continued, to belong to the
Philippine Island. Even at the time of its conception in the Philippines, such perso ns
upon whom citizenship was conf erred did not have to do anything to acquire f ull
citizenship. 5

Respondent wants us to believe that since he was natural-born Filipino at birth, having
been born in the Philippines to Filipino parents, he was automatically restored to that
status when he subsequently reacquired his citizenship af ter losing it.

Public respondent HRET af f irmed respondent's position when it pronounced that the
def inition of natural-born citizen in Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution ref er s to the
classes of citizens enumerated in Section 1 of the same Article, to wit:

"Section 1. The f ollowing are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution;

(2) Those whose f athers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

(3) Those born bef ore January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and

(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."

Thus , respondent HRET held that under the above enumeration, there are only two
classes of citizens, i.e., natural-born and naturalized. Since respondent Cruz is not a
naturalized citizen, then he is a natural-born Filipino citizen.

I do not agree. I reiterate that Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution def ines natural-
born citizens as " those who are citizens of the Philippines f rom birth without having to
perf orm any act to acquire or perf ect their Philippine citizenship."

Pursuant to R.A. No. 2630, quoted as f ollow:

"Republic Act No. 2630. AN ACT PROVIDING FOR REACQUISITION OF

PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY PERSONS WHO LOST SUCH CITIZENSHIP BY
RENDERING SERVICE TO, OR ACCEPTING COMMISSION IN, THE ARMED FORCES
OF THE UNITED STATES, provides:

Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship be rendering service
to, or accepting commission in the Armed Forces of the United States, or af ter
separation f rom the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States
citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance
 to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with the Local Civil
Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said
oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship."

respondent Cruz had perf orm certain acts bef ore he could again become a Filipino
citizen. He had to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
register his oath with the Local Civil Registry of Mangatarum, Pangasinan. He had to
renounce his American citizenship and had to execute an af f idavit of reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship.

Clearly, he did not reacquire his natural-born citizenship. The cardinal rule in the
interpretation and constitution of a constitution is to give ef f ect to the intention of the
f ramers and of the people who adopted it. Words appearing in Constitution are used
according to their plain, natural, and usual signif icance and import and must be
understood in the sense most obvious to the common understanding of the people at
the time of its adoption.

The provision on "natural-born citizens of the Philippines" is precise, clear and

def inite. Indeed, neither HRET nor this Court can construe it other than what its plain
meaning conveys. It is not phrased in general language which may call f or construction
of what the words imply.

In J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure Administration, 6 this Court held:

"Ascertainment of meaning of provisions of Constitution begins with the

language of the document itself . The words used in the Constitution are to be
given their ordinary meaning, except where technical terms are employed, in
which case the signif icance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is
not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential f or the rule of law to obtain
that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its language as
much as possible, should be understood in the sense they have in common use.
What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels
acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the
postulate that the f ramers and the people mean what they say."

The def inition of a natural-born citizen in the Constitution must be applied to this
petition according to its natural sense.

Respondent HRET likewise ruled that the "reacquisition of Philippine citizenship through
any of these modes: (naturalization, repatriation and legislation under Section 3, C.A.
No. 63) results in the restoration of previous status, either as a natural-born or a
naturalized citizen" is a simplistic approach and tends to be misleading.

If citizenship is gained through naturalization, repatriation or legislation, the citizen

concerned can not be considered natural-born. Obviously, he has to perf orm certain
acts to become a citizen.

As expressed in the Dissent of Justice Jose C. Vitug 7 in the instant case, concurred in by
Justice A.R. Melo: 8
 "Repatriation is the resumption or recovery of the original nationally upon the
f ulf illment of certain conditions. While an applicant need not have to undergo the
tedious and time consuming process required by the Revised Naturalization Law
(CA 473, s amended), he, nevertheless, would still have to make an express and
unequivocal act of f ormally rejecting his adopted state and reaf firming his total
and exclusive allegiance and loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. It bears
emphasis that, to be of section 2, Article IV, of the 1987 Constitution, one should
not have to perf orm any act at all or go through any process, judicial or
administrative, to enable him to reacquire his citizenship. willoughby opines that
a natural-born citizen is one who is able to claim citizenship without any prior
declaration on his part of a desire to obtain such status. Under this view, the
term 'natural born' citizens could also cover those who have been collectively
deemed citizens by reason of the Treaty of Paris and the Philippine Bill of 1902
and those who have been accorded by the 1935 Constitution to be Filipino
citizens (those born in the Philippines of alien parents who, bef ore the adoption
of the 1935 Constitution had been elected to public of f ice.)"

The two dissenting Justice correctly stated that the "stringent requirement of the
Constitution is so placed as to insure that only Filipino citizens with an absolute and
permanent degree of allegiance and loyalty shall be eligible f or membership in
Congress, the branch of the government directly involved and given the dedicate task
of legislation."

The dissenting opinion f urther states:

"The term 'natural-born' Filipino citizen, f irst constitutionally def ined in the 1973
Charter, later adopted by the 1987 Constitution, particularly in Section 2, Article
IV thereof , is meant to ref er to those ' who are citizens of the Philippines f rom
birth without having to perf orm any act to acquire or perf ect their citizenship,'
and to those ' who elect Philippine citizenship.' Time and again, the Supreme
Court has declared that where the laws speaks in clear and categorical language,
there is no room f or interpretation, vacillation or equivocation – there is only
room f or application. The phrase 'f rom birth indicates that there is a starting
point of his citizenship and this citizenship should be continuous, constant and
without interruption."

Thus, respondent is not eligible f or election to Congress as the Constitution requires

that a member of the House of Representative must be a "natural-born citizen of the
Philippines."

For sure, the f ramers of our Constitution intended to provide a more stringent
citizenship requirement f or higher elective of f ices, including that of the of f ice of a
Congressman. Otherwise, the Constitution should have simply provided that a
candidate f or such position can be merely a citizen of the Philippines, as required of
local elective of f icers.

The spirit of nationalism pervading the 1935 Constitution, the f irst charter f ramed and
ratif ied by the Filipino (even as the draf t had to be approved by President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt of the United States) guide and governs the interpretation of
Philippine citizenship and the more narrow and bounden concept of being a natural-
born citizen.

Under the 1935 costitution, 9 the requirement of natural-born citizenship was applicable
to the President and Vice Persident. 10 A person who had been a citizen f or only f ive (5)
years could be elected to the National Assembly. 11 Only in 1940,12 when the f irst
Constitution was amended did natural-born citizenship become a requirement f or
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives. 13 A Filipino naturalized f or at
least f ive (5) years could still be appointed Justice of the Supreme court or a Judge of a
lower court. 14

The history of the Constitution shows that the meaning and application of the
requirement of being natural-born have become more narrow and qualif ied over the
years.

Under the 1973 Constitution, 15 the President, members of the National Assembly,
Prime Minister, Justices of the Supreme Court, Judges of inf erior courts, the chairmen
and members of the Constitutional Commission and the majority of members of the
cabinet must be natural-born citizens. 16 The 1987 Constitution added the Ombudsman
and his deputies and the members of the Commission on Human Rights to those who
must be natural-born citizens. 17

The questioned Decision of respondent HRET reverses the historical trend and clear
intendment of the Constitution. It shows a more liberal, if not a cavalier approach to
the meaning and import of natural born citizen and citizenship in general.

It bears stressing that we are tracing and enf orcing a doctrine embodied in no less that
the constitution. Indeed, a deviation f rom the clear and constitutional def inition of a
"natural born Filipino citizen" is a matter which can only be accomplished through a
constitutional amendment. Clearly respondent HRET gravely abused its discretion.

Respondent Cruz has availed himself of the procedure whereby his citizenship has been
restored. He can run f or public of f ice where natural-born citizenship is not mandated.
But he cannot be elected to high of f ices which the Constitution has reserved only f or
natural-born Filipino citizens.

WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition. 1âwphi1.nêt

Footnote

1
1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.

2
23 Phil 315 (1912).

3Section 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside

therein who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen
hundred and ninety-nine and then resided in said Islands, and their children born
subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine
Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such
as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provision of the treaty of peace between the United States
and Spain signed at Paris, December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety -eight.

4Roa vs. Collector of Customs, supra; Lim Teco vs. Collector, 24 Phil 84; (1913)
United State vs. Lim Bin, 36 Phil 924 (1917).

5
Roa vs. Collector of Customs, ibid.

6
31 SCRA 413 (1970).

7
Member of the HRET.

8
Chairman, ibid.

9
This ref ers to the 1935 Constitution as adopted by the Philippine Constitution
Convention on February 8, 1935, signed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt on
March 23, 1935 and ratif ied by Filipino voters in a plebiscite held on May 14,
1935.

10 Section 3, Article VIII. 1935 Constitution.

11
Section 2, Article VI, ibid.

12The 1935 Constitution was amended by Resolution Numbered Seventy-three,

adopted by the Second National Assembly on the 11 th day of April 1940, and
approved by the President of the United Sates on December 2, 940.

13 Section 4 and 7, Article VI, 1935 Constitution, as amended.

14
Section 6 and 8, Article VIII, ibid.

15This ref ers to the 1973 Constitution as approved by the Filipino people in a
ref erendum held between January 10, 1973 and January 15, 1973 and which
became ef f ective on January 17, 1973.

16
Section 2, Article VII; section 4, Article VIII; Section 3 and 4, Article IX;
Section 3 (1) and (2), Article X; Section 1 (1) Article XII-B, Section 1(1), Article
XIII-C; Section 1(1) Article XII-D, 1973 Constitution.

17
Section 8, Article XI; and Section 17(2), Article XIII, 1987 Constitution