Pollution Control

Environmental Regulation
ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS
Pollution Control
Mrinal Kanti Dutta

[email protected]
Department of Humanities and Social Sciences

Indian Institute of Technology Guwahati
Guwahati – 781039
Environmental Regulation 2
What is Pollution?
 Those residual flows, arising from human behaviour

that enter environmental systems
 Not all of the mass of inputs is combined into useful

output; some of the input is converted into
unwanted or residual outputs.
 Pollution through materials balance model

Economic activity
Emission flows into

environmental media
Absorption of some
proportion of flow into Non-absorbed emission flows
harmless forms
Accumulation of
pollutant stock
Degradation of stock Stock pollution Flow pollution

into harmless forms damage damage
Pollution damage
What is Pollution? -two more things

 Pollution flows may not exist as material wastes
from economic activities (they may not be residual)
 Noise due to open-air orchestra
 Light pollution from urban lighting
 Economist is ultimately interested in the impacts of

production and consumption processes upon
welfare
 Thus, pollution may be defined as the net flows-
those exceeding the absorptive capacity of the
environment and which have damaging effects on
human welfare or upon ecological system in
general
What is Pollution? –depletion of quantity and

quality
 Sometimes, pollution affects the quantity of an

environmental resource
 Magnitude of plant and timber growth,
 Size of marine population,
 Quantity of cleaning capacity of the environment is

affected by quantity of waste emissions
What is Pollution? –depletion of quantity and

quality
 Pollution affects the quality of an environmental

resource
 Extent of biological diversity, the health of
animal or plant population, air quality, etc.
 Changes in the quality of environmental resources

may have effects upon welfare even more profound
than changes in the quantity
 Health damage due to air pollution

Forms of Pollution
 Flow pollution
 When damages result from the level of flow of
residuals (i.e. the rate at which they are
discharged into the environment)
 Noise
 Stock pollution
 When damages are functions of the stock of the
residuals in the relevant environment at any
point in time.
 Emissions are produced at a rate higher than
the absorptive capacity (lead, pcbs, ddt, etc.)
 Also from a mixture of flow and stock effects
Forms of Pollution
 Horizontal Zone of Influence:
 Local (sound, light, etc.), regional (sulphur and
nitrogen oxides) and global pollution damage
 Degree of atmospheric mix of pollutants:

 Surface pollutant (water pollution) and global
pollutant damage (in the upper atmospheric
levels, e.g. CO2, CFC, etc.)
 Mobility of emission sources:

 Stationary (power stations, pesticide use in
agriculture) and mobile source of pollution
(vehicle traffic pollution)
The efficient level of Pollution
 Efficiency in terms of Pareto efficiency
 Society’s costs or damages of pollution and the social
cost of controlling or abating pollution are to be
considered
 Environmental damage- cost (should be as low as
possible)
 Production or consumption of goods and services are
associated with generation of residuals
 Output should be as high as possible
 An efficient output level would be one that maximises
the net output (pollution)
Net benefit of pollution (NB)= Benefit of the output with
which the pollution is associated (B) - Damages
resulting from pollution (D)
Regulating Pollution
Rationale for Regulation:
 Economic Regulation: refers to government

intervention in private actions of firms and
individuals.
 Two theories of regulation:

Public Interest Theory and Interest Group Theory
Public Interest Theory: main purpose of

regulation is the promotion of public interest.
Rationale for Regulation:

Interest Group Theory: main purpose of regulation is
the promotion of narrow interest of particular groups in
a society such as individual industries.
Major point of distinction between these two
approaches is:
Public Interest Theory is the normative Theory (which

seeks to explain what should happen in an ideal world)
while the Interest Group Theory is the positive theory
(which seeks to explain why the world works as it
does)
Under Public Interest Theory three general reasons
justify for government regulation:
a.Imperfect competition
b.Imperfect information
c.Externalities
Imperfect Competition or Natural Monopoly:

Role of the government, in the presence of natural
monopoly, is to control prices in order to protect the
consumers and prevent collusion and restrict mergers
that may create excessive market power in the hands
of the monopolists.
Imperfect Information:
Here the role is to establish a set of liability rules to

encourage the provision of safety-related quality.
Direct intervention in the market specifying

acceptable levels of quality.
Externalities:
Main problem is with the provision of public goods
and bads because private provision of these goods
(with the element of publicness: non-rivalry and non-
excludability) is inefficient.
In the case of public bads, the usual approach is for

government to define a set of institutions and
regulation to govern provision of these public bads,
e.g., the government establishes a set of regulations
to restrict the production of pollution.
Externalities:
Interest Group Theory of regulation maintains that

rent-seeking is the primary rationale for regulation.
Rent-seeking involves private individuals or firm using

the government to guarantee extra profits (rent)
through government mandated restrictions on
economic activity.
A Political Economy Model of Regulation:
The basic problem of environmental regulation involves
the government trying to induce a polluter to take socially
desirable actions, which ostensibly are not in the best
interest of the polluter.
The main problem, therefore, is determination of exact
level of pollution which is best for the society.
In reality the government faces pressures from consumers
and polluters.
Figure 1 presents a highly stylized schematic diagram of
the interactions among government, polluting firms and
consumer citizens.
Regulating Pollution A
$, £ Votes
Legislature (State
Ownerships) $, £
B Stock, Bond
Holders
$, £
$, £
Board of
Regulators Directors Wage, payments for goods
Managers Goods
Consumers
Judiciary
/Citizens
Employees
Bads/Poll
ution
Government The Firm Polity
Figure 1
The Government as shown in figure 1, consists of
three branches: the Legislature, the Judiciary and the
Regulators
Legislature passes laws defining what the regulators

are to do in controlling pollution.
Regulators are charged with the responsibility of

implementing the legislature's laws
Judiciary: the actions of the regulators are tempered

by the judiciary.
The firm consists of several pieces:
the Board of Directors, Managers, Employees,
Stock and Bond Holders.
The Board issues directives to the managers; the

managers issue directives to employees who produce
the product of the firm as well as pollution.
The key point is that regulators direct the Board to take

certain actions, but the Board is removed, by several
steps, from the employees who actually generate the
pollution.
There arises Principal-agent problem due to inability
of the regulator (the principal) to completely control
the polluter (the agent).
The firm may not be a passive entity but may in fact

influence legislation, through lobbying or financial
incentives (shown by the line B)
The third component of the figure, the consumers

direct votes and other influence to the legislature (line
A) while at the same time sending money to the firm in
exchange for the goods consumed.
Two important lessons can be drawn from the figure:
1. There are many imperfect links between the

legislature and the pollution generating process.
2. The legislation does not necessarily act as an

efficient benevolent maximizer of social well being.
• Inclusion of Line B: indicates regulation with
endogenous politics.
• Omission of Line B indicates regulation with

exogenous politics.
• Positive interest group theory is consistent with

endogenous politics model of regulation
• Environmental regulation is susceptible to interest

group theory
Basic Regulatory Framework: Command and Control

A. Command and Control:
Under this method the regulator specifies the
steps that individual polluters must take to solve a
pollution problem.
The essence of this method is:

1. The regulator collects the information necessary to
decide the physical actions to control pollution
2. The regulator then commands the polluter to take

specific physical steps to control the pollution.

Command and Control can take several forms.
1. The specific pollution control equipments requirement
can be specified or alternatively the regulation may
specify an emission limit for particular types of plants
and particular pollutants.
2. Command and Control may be combined with

significant fines and penalties associated with non-
compliance. This, however, differs from the economic
incentives to abate pollution on two salient points.
2.a. Restricted choice for the polluters as to what

means will be used to achieve an appropriate
environmental target
2.b. A lack of mechanism for equalizing marginal
control costs among several different polluters.
3. The best analogy for Command and Control is the

system of central planning (existed in the former
Soviet Union).
However major problem of this is the enormous

requirement of information.

Advantages:
a. More flexibility in regulating complex environmental

process and much greater certainty in how
much pollution will result from regulations.
b. It simplifies monitoring of compliance with a

regulation.
Disadvantages:
a. The regulatory system may be very costly to administer
as informational costs are high.
b. It may reduce incentives to find better ways to control
pollution
c. Difficulty in satisfying the equi-marginal principle, i.e. it is
almost impossible for command and control regulations
to ensure that the marginal costs of pollution are
equalized among different polluters generating the
same pollution.
d. Finally, the greatest problem with the Command and
Control principle is that the polluter pays only for
pollution control, not residual damage form the pollution
that is still emitted even after controls are in place
Basic Regulatory Framework: Economic Incentives

Economic incentives provide rewards for polluters to
do what is perceived to be in the public interest.
Three basic types of economic incentives include:

fees, marketable permits and liability.
Fees:
Fees involve the payment of charge per unit of
pollution emitted. When a polluter must pay for
every unit of pollution emitted, it becomes in the
polluter’s interest to reduce emission.

Marketable Permit:
A marketable permit allows polluter to buy and sell the
right to pollute.
Trading induces a price or value on a permit to
pollute, thus, causing firms to see polluting as an
expensive activity.
Less pollution means fewer permits need be bought.
Similarly, there is an opportunity cost of emitting, i.e.
by not emitting the firm can sell more permits.
A graphical illustration of the marketable permit is
shown in figure 2.

Marketable Permit:
Assume a situation where two polluters exist and we
are interested in allowing 100 units of pollution in total.
Let’s start by giving each firm 50 permits.
The equilibrium price of permit is p*.


Figure 2: Marginal savings from polluting functions for two firms. MS1, Marginal
savings from emitting, firm 1; MS2 Marginal savings from emitting, firm 2; e*,
equilibrium holding of permits; p*, equilibrium price of permits.
Firm 1 Firm 2
MS1
MS2
P*
0 e* 100
100 50 0
Firm 1 holdings 50 Firm 2 holdings
Starting Point

Liability: The basic idea is that if you harm someone,
you must compensate that person for damage.
Let us take an example of Hazardous waste storage
facility (‘dump’). The dump can do things to minimize
the risk of hazardous wastes leaking in to the
environment through ‘Precaution’. (i.e. if the dump
takes a great deal of precaution the risk of a leak will
be low).
But precaution is expensive and ceteris paribus, the
dump would prefer to take little precaution. Damage to
society also depends upon the level of precaution.
(this is illustrated in Figure 2).

Liability:
In figure 2, both costs to dump and damage to society
are shown as functions of the level of precaution. The
socially desirable level of precaution is x*, at which the
marginal costs of taking more precaution are just offset
by the reduction in marginal damage from taking more
precaution.
Here, negligence liability works in the sense that the

threat of being held responsible from accident
damages is often a sufficient incentives for firms to
take the socially desirable amount of precaution.
Figure 3: An Illustration of precaution and liability

Firm
Costs of precaution
C(x)
Expected
accident cost
from precaution
D(x)
x* Precaution (x)
MC (x*) = - MD (x*)
Basic Regulatory Framework:

Economic Incentives
Advantages:
 Informational requirements are less significant
 Economic incentives provide an incentive for a
polluter to innovate, finding cheaper ways of
controlling pollution.
 Economic incentives involve the polluter paying for
control costs as well as pollution damage.
Therefore, there is no implicit subsidy to the
industry.
 For many economic incentives the equi-marginal
principle holds true.
Disadvantages of EI
Developing an economic incentive that
efficiently and perfectly takes complexities in
environmental transformation into account can
be very difficult. (air pollution)
Given the political conditions, it is very difficult to
adjust the level of incentives (level of fee, no. of
marketable permits) when there is great deal of
uncertainty associated with the environmental
problem.
Instituting tax (on emission) may be very difficult
(it involves transfer of massive amount of wealth
from firms to the government).
Complication for Environmental Regulation

A.Space and Time
Pollution regulation is complicated by the physical
environment that interposes itself between polluters
and consumers (illustrated in figure 4).
There are differences between pollution and ambient
concentration of the pollution.
Generally, it is the ambient concentration that causes
damages not the pollution.
However, ambient concentration are imperfectly
connected with the emission, which need to be
regulated.

A.Space and Time
This brings space and time into concern of the
regulators. Generally, sources of pollution nearby
will generate more damage than sources located in
distant suburbs.
Time, though less important than space, also exert
significant influence in environmental
transformation. There is hour-to-hour, day-to-day
and season-to-season variation in pollution.
Capturing these time and space factors in to decision
making is a bit difficult.

Natural Environment
Environmental Regulator
Producers Consumers
Emissions Emissions
Environmental transformation
(transport, decay, combination and deposition)
Ambient levels of pollution
Damage
(to producers, consumers and ecosystems)
Figure 4
B. Efficiency versus Cost Effectiveness

Efficiency (with regulation) calls for emissions that
balance the costs of emissions control with the
damage from ambient pollution, fully taking into
account the complexities relating emissions to
damage.
Cost effectiveness with regulation refers to a set of

environmental regulation that can achieve emission
target at the least cost possible.
C. Ambient-Differentiated versus Emission-
Differentiated Regulation:
Targets of the regulator may be ambient targets or
emission targets. Choosing out this is a bit complicated.
Typically, a unit of pollution form one polluter will have a
different effect on ambient concentrations than a unit of
pollution from another polluter. An ambient-differentiated
regulation will control these two polluters differently,
based on their different contributions to ambient
concentrations.
An emissions-differentiated regulations will ignore the
differences between the two polluters, though the overall
level of emissions will still be controlled in such a way as
to achieve the ambient target.
Basic Issues in Environmental Regulation

1. Debate over whether command and control or
economic incentives
2. Public sources of pollution and controlling them
3. Information, particularly private information polluters
may have that regulator needs
4. Risk and how to deal with the problems of risk. What
sort of regulations are appropriate?
5. Growing competition between jurisdiction vis-à-vis
environmental regulations
6. Incidence of regulations: who bears the burden (either
in cost or pollution damage)? Who reaps the benefits?
7. Innovations and technical change.
Basic Regulatory Framework: Emission Fees and Marketable Permits

Several issues complicate using incentives to control
pollution: Space, Time and Imperfect competition
I. Space :
A.Sources, Receptors and Transfer Coefficients:
Let us take an example of a river.
Two factories discharge organic waste (sewage) in to the
river
A municipal water supply takes water from the river
Factories are in the upstream of the municipal waste
supply
Further one goes downstream the smaller the effects from
pollution.

A. Sources, Receptors and Transfer Coefficients:
Now to correctly regulate the two factories their individual
effects on the municipality have to be taken into account.
At this point, to take space in to account, let’s consider
two points: sources and receptors. A source is a point of
discharge of pollution (e.g. a factory). A receptor is a
point at which people care about the level of ambient
pollution.
Although there are several receptors, in practice, we will

identify a small set of receptors where pollution levels
will be measured. Receptors are scattered over space
and serve as a good proxies for overall level of pollution.
In general, there is some relationship between emission
at various sources, e1, e2 . . . ei and concentration of
pollution at any receptor j.
pj = fj (e1, e2, . . .,ei) + Bj (1)
where, Bj background level of pollution at j (perhaps
zero).
In many environmental problems, the physical
environment is linear,
pj = ∑i aij ei + Bi (2)
The coefficient aij is called the transfer coefficient. We

assume Bj = 0. In equation (2), if we change emission at
some source i by a little amount (∆ei), pollution will
change by aij∆ei
The transfer coefficient between the source i and the

receptor j is defined as the ratio of the change in
pollution at j to the change in emission at i .
aij = ∆ pj/ ∆ei (3)
Equation (3) gives the conversion rate for emission to

ambient concentration.
Basic Regulatory Framework: Emission Fees and Marketable

Permits
B. How much Pollution do we want?

Let’s start with what is the efficient level of pollution?
Efficiency involves equating marginal damage with

marginal savings to the firm from pollution
generation.
To link these we express marginal damage of a firm

as marginal damage per unit of emissions.
Permits
B. How much Pollution do we want?
Let us term marginal damage per unit of emissions
from source I as the function MDEi (ei) which is in
contrast to marginal damages per unit of ambient
pollution, MD(p)
MDEi is the ratio of the change in damage {D(p)} to the

change in emission at source i.
MDEi (ei) = {D (p + ∆p) – D (p)}/ ∆ei

= MD (p). ∆p/ ∆ei (4)
= ai MD (p)

Permits
As stated above, efficient amount of pollution requires
equating marginal savings from emission with marginal
damage. If there are i = 1, 2, …I sources of pollution,
then following must hold:
-MCi (ei) = MDEi (ei) = ai MD (p), for all i = 1, …, I

(5)
Now for any two sources m and n
MCm(em)/am= MCn(en)/an = MD (p) (6)

MC/a is marginal cost per unit of ambient pollution.

i.e. marginal cost in terms of ambient pollution must be
equal to the negative of marginal damage.
Thus efficiency calls for all sources to have the same

marginal costs of emissions, normalized by the source’s
transfer coefficients.
If ‘a’ is high, MC of emissions should be larger.
Two conditions for efficiency:

1.Marginal cost of emission, normalized by the transfer
coefficient must be equalized for all sources
2.Normalized marginal cost must equal the negative of
marginal damage.
C. Emission Fees:
We seek emission fees, ti, one for each firm i that yields
efficiency.
These are ambient differentiated fees. Whatever fee is
used, the firms will respond by minimizing direct costs
plus fee payments. This is equivalent to setting
marginal cost equal to negative of the fee:
MCi (ei) = - ti, for all sources i (7)
Thus the condition for efficiency can be re-written as,

tn/an = tm/am for all firms n and m (8)
And, tn = an MD (p) for any firm n (9)
C. Emission Fees:
Equation (8) implies that emission fees levied on the

firms must be equal after normalizing by the transfer
co-efficient or control costs across firms are equal.
Equation (9), the second condition, implies that for any

firm marginal damage in emission units (MDE) must be
equal to the emission fee (t), or marginal pollution
damage and control costs are equalized.
Alternatively all firms face same emission fee per unit of

ambient pollution but to convert it to emission units, it
must be multiplied by appropriate transfer coefficient.
Thus, it can be concluded that, ambient differentiated
emission fees can achieve efficiency.
However, it is too complicated to let emission fee vary

from location to location.
Normally most emission fees do not depend upon location

even though damages do.
Thus, is applying uniform emission fee inefficient when

damages depend on location?
Let us consider the following illustration (with the help of

figure – 5).
In figure 5, marginal savings curve is assumed same for
every firm. As well as marginal damages, normalized by the
transfer coefficient.
t*1, t*2 are efficient taxes

e*1, e*2 are emissions from the two firms (which are
efficient)
uniform emission fee
emissions from firm 1 or firm 2
the shaded area are deadweight loss.
The optimal uniform tax is one that minimizes the total area
of the two triangles.
The loss from a uniform fee depends on the nature of the

marginal cost and damage functions.
t Fig. 5.a
MDE1 (e1)
t*1 MDE2 (e2)
t*2
MS (e)
0 e*1 e*2 e
t Fig. 5.b
MDE1 (e1)
MDE2 (e2)
t*1
t*2
MS (e)
0 e*1 e*2
e
D. Marketable Ambient Permit:
An ambient pollution permit for a receptor “j” gives the
holder the right to emit at any location, provided the
incremental pollution at receptor ‘j’ does not exceed the
permitted amount.
Thus an ambient pollution permit system is a set of

permits, distributed to sources in a well-defined way of
computing the effects of emissions on ambient pollution at
receptors along with a right to buy and sell these permits.
Two Firms: Let’s consider the case of two firms and one
receptor. Suppose EPA issues L1 amount of permits to firm
1 and L2 ambient permits to firm 2 for a total of L = L1 + L2
permits.
D. Marketable Ambient Permit:
Now after trading of permits, let l1 and l2 be the

number of permits eventually held by the firms.
i.e. L1 +L2 = l1 + l2 (1)
Equation (1) raises many questions:
a. What will the price of permits be?

b. How much will each firm emit?
Answering the second question first - a firm can emit

whatever is allowed by its permit holdings.
Emission and ambient pollution levels are connected by
transfer coefficient.
i.e. a1e1 = l1 (2)

and a2e2 = l2 (3), provided all permits are used.
Suppose, the price of permits is π (an unknown). Then

how much pollution will be emitted?
However many permits a firm may hold, if the price of

permits is greater than the marginal savings from emitting
the firm will want to sell some permits and emit less.
If the price of permit is less than the firms’ marginal
savings form polluting, buying permits is easier than
controlling emissions.
We try to find the price for which the desired emission

levels for each of the two firms corresponds to the number
of permits issued.
Total costs for each firm are:

TC1 (e1) = C1(e1) + π (l1 – L1), where Ci (ei) is the
direct cost to firm i,
= C1 (e1) + π (a1e1 – L1) (4)
And,
TC2 (e2) = C2 (e2) + π (l2 – L2)
= C2(e2) + π (a2e2 –L2) (5)
In order to Minimize total costs each firm sets the marginal
total costs (MTC) to Zero, i.e.
MTC1(e1) = MC1 (e1) + a1π = 0 (6)

MTC2(e2) = MC2(e2) + a2π = 0 (7)
Which implies: MC1(e1)/a1 = MC2 (e2)/a2 = - π
Or, MS1(e1)/a1 = MS2(e2)/a2 = π (8)
Equation (8) says that marginal savings normalized by the

transfer coefficient should equal to the permit price. This is
analogous to the working of ambient emission fee which
states that marginal savings normalized by the transfer
coefficient equals the same number for all firms.
There is one additional equation that gives us

information.
Combining equations (1), (2) and (3) we get,
a1e1+a2e2=L (9)
Equations (8) and (9) constitute three separate

equations in three unknowns (e1, e2 and π) and thus
can be solved.

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Environmental Regulation

Mrinal Kanti Dutta

Department of Humanities and Social Sciences

 Those residual flows, arising from human behaviour

 Not all of the mass of inputs is combined into useful

 Pollution through materials balance model

Emission flows into

Degradation of stock Stock pollution Flow pollution

What is Pollution? -two more things

 Economist is ultimately interested in the impacts of

What is Pollution? –depletion of quantity and

 Sometimes, pollution affects the quantity of an

 Quantity of cleaning capacity of the environment is

What is Pollution? –depletion of quantity and

 Pollution affects the quality of an environmental

 Changes in the quality of environmental resources

 Health damage due to air pollution

 Degree of atmospheric mix of pollutants:

 Mobility of emission sources:

Rationale for Regulation:

 Economic Regulation: refers to government

 Two theories of regulation:

Public Interest Theory: main purpose of

Rationale for Regulation:

Public Interest Theory is the normative Theory (which

Imperfect Competition or Natural Monopoly:

Here the role is to establish a set of liability rules to

Direct intervention in the market specifying

In the case of public bads, the usual approach is for

Interest Group Theory of regulation maintains that

Rent-seeking involves private individuals or firm using

Government The Firm Polity

Legislature passes laws defining what the regulators

Regulators are charged with the responsibility of

Judiciary: the actions of the regulators are tempered

The Board issues directives to the managers; the

The key point is that regulators direct the Board to take

The firm may not be a passive entity but may in fact

The third component of the figure, the consumers

Two important lessons can be drawn from the figure:

1. There are many imperfect links between the

2. The legislation does not necessarily act as an

• Omission of Line B indicates regulation with

• Positive interest group theory is consistent with

• Environmental regulation is susceptible to interest

Basic Regulatory Framework: Command and Control

The essence of this method is:

2. The regulator then commands the polluter to take

Basic Regulatory Framework: Command and Control

2. Command and Control may be combined with

Basic Regulatory Framework: Command and Control

2.a. Restricted choice for the polluters as to what

3. The best analogy for Command and Control is the

However major problem of this is the enormous

Basic Regulatory Framework: Command and Control

a. More flexibility in regulating complex environmental

b. It simplifies monitoring of compliance with a

Basic Regulatory Framework: Economic Incentives

Three basic types of economic incentives include:

Basic Regulatory Framework: Economic Incentives

t1, t2 are efficient taxes