2 - The Etics of Capitalism
2 - The Etics of Capitalism
2 - The Etics of Capitalism
The Ethics of Capitalism. Daniel Halliday and John Thrasher, Oxford University Press (2020).
© Oxford University Press.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190096205.001.0001
20 The Ethics of Capitalism
Aristotle (384–322 BCE), though worldlier than his teacher in many ways,
did not differ from this essentially zero-sum view of economic exchange.1
It is in his teachings that we find the origin of the idea of the “just price”
that was so influential in the Middle Ages as filtered through the work of
Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274). The basic idea is intuitive enough: the price
of goods should not exceed their value. To charge more than a good is worth
is to swindle and exploit the buyer. This idea is still with us in common-sense
notions of exploitation and “price gouging” but is open to the objection that
it relies on a mistake about value—an objection that took until the 19th cen-
tury to work out fully.
The just price is premised on the idea that goods have objective and rela-
tively fixed values. This value may be the result of the cost of production of
the good or the value of its ultimate use. The key point is that the value of a
good is, on this view, independent of how much someone values it. The me-
dieval view of just price held that economic value and economic valuing are
distinct: something’s price might or might not reflect the actual value of the
good. This disconnect between value and price led to serious puzzles in eco-
nomic thought. One that appears again and again is the “diamond-water par-
adox.” The puzzle is how water, which is necessary for survival and, hence, of
very high value, cannot command as high of a price as diamonds, which are
a mere frippery. This problem led Adam Smith (1723–1790) to later divide
value into two types: value in use and value in exchange. Water, he claimed,
was valuable in its use, while diamonds were valuable in exchange. Smith
presents the puzzle thus:
The things which have the greatest value in use have frequently little or no
value in exchange; and on the contrary, those which have the greatest value
in exchange have frequently little or no value in use. Nothing is more useful
than water: but it will purchase scarce any thing; scarce any thing can be
had in exchange for it. A diamond, on the contrary, has scarce any value in
use; but a very great quantity of other goods may frequently be had in ex-
change for it. (WN I.4.13)
1 “Zero-sum” means that for someone to gain from an exchange or encounter, someone else has
to lose. Many competitive games like football or poker are zero-sum. Market exchanges are typically
positive sum—both parties are able to benefit (but see chapter 9).
22 The Ethics of Capitalism
One popular solution to this problem was to think that value in use could
only really arise from labor: things become more valuable as we add our
labor to them. Raw lumber has some value, but if that lumber is shaped into
a beautiful and useful chair through hours of work, it is reasonable to think
that the chair is now worth more than the lumber precisely because of the
work that went into it. This idea developed, during the 17th and 18th centu-
ries, into what became called the “labor theory of value.” It was endorsed by
all the great political economists of the golden age of political economy until
the “marginal revolution” of the late 19th century.
Although the labor theory of value is false (we’ll explain in chapters 5 and
6), it was nevertheless a dramatic improvement over any alternative around
at the time. The most influential competitor to the labor theory was mercan-
tilism. You might have read The Hobbit (1937) by J. R. R. Tolkein or seen the
film adaptation. If so, you already have a good sense of mercantilism thanks
to the character Smaug the dragon. Smaug had one ambition in life, namely
to accumulate gold. He was willing to kill any number of humans (elves,
dwarves, etc.) in order to acquire it, and contented himself by sleeping on a
big pile of the stuff, having no other use for it.
Real-world mercantilism represents more or less this outlook, as a view
about national prosperity. The chief theorist of the mercantilists, Thomas
Mun (1571–1641), argued that the key to enriching the nation is to focus the
domestic economy for export. The basic idea was that trade can either bring
in finished goods or currency. Finished goods can, for the most part, be made
domestically, so there is no point in importing them. Further, ships bearing
imports will return to their home nations with valuable currency that should
be kept at home. The secret to increasing the currency at home, then, is to
focus on producing exports and to hoard gold at home. Trade, on this view, is
a basically zero-sum interaction. One “wins” at trade by having more exports
than imports. Mimicking Smaug, a nation’s ambition should be to find ways
to get gold off other nations and then hang on to it. The mercantilists argued
that economic value came from holding hard currency like gold or, more
precisely, value came from a positive balance of trade in the manner just
described.
From the point of view of the nation as a whole, this idea is ludicrous.
After all, finished goods can be used or consumed, but bars of gold
cannot. But, from the point of view of a state constantly expecting war,
having substantial liquid currency available to finance warfare, while
simultaneously depleting your potential enemies of their currency, is a
Capitalism Seemed Like a Good Idea at the Time 23
2 It was reissued several times—we’ll be quoting from the seventh and final edition, which appeared
in 1871.
Capitalism Seemed Like a Good Idea at the Time 25
3 That’s our attempt at Marx-style rhetoric. We’re not great at it, but you get the idea.
26 The Ethics of Capitalism
of these people. The specter of Marx will return to haunt later chapters, par-
ticularly those on inequality, labor markets, and exploitation.
Smith, Marx, and Mill are the superstars from the golden age who play the
leading roles in this book. There’s a good reason for this: these three members
of the golden age were most preoccupied with the ethics of capitalism: they
studied political economy in ways that were particularly attentive to
questions of social justice with respect to the core elements of economic life,
such as wages, taxation, economic inequality, workers’ conditions, and so
on. Other writers from the golden age sought to study the economy in a less
moralized way. Partly because of this, their works were often shorter, and
sometimes more technical. Ricardo is something of a co-star, as he had im-
portant things to say specifically about the rise of machines and the nature of
what has since become called globalization. Malthus and some others (such
as Thomas Paine and the Utopian Socialists) will also make cameos.
instance, is the “Law of Demand,” which states that “all things being equal”
individuals will tend to consume more of a good as the price decreases. Once
you know what “consume,” “price,” and “rationality” mean to the economist,
the law of demand follows logically. In this sense, the trend in microeco-
nomics since the early 20th century has been to understand microeconomics
as the study of rational maximization under constraints or, increasingly, as
strategic choice.
The paradox, in economics, is that while microeconomics has a rock-
solid logical and mathematical foundation (notwithstanding some impor-
tant philosophical questions), macroeconomics has no such foundation in
microeconomics. Perhaps even more troubling, while basically all academic
economists agree on the central tenets of microeconomics, though often dis-
agreeing about many of the implications, there is considerable disagreement
about pretty much every aspect of macroeconomics.
Depressions and recessions hobble economies, cause substantial misery,
and promote political upheaval. It is no surprise then that a central question
of macroeconomics would be why and how depressions and recessions occur
and what might prevent or mitigate them. Despite the wealth of attention
paid to this question, however, there is no generally accepted theory of the
business cycle (what economists also call the cycle of boom and bust). Some
believe that the problem is related to excess supply in the economy or over-
production. Others believe that booms and busts are a result of the money
supply expanding or contracting in unpredictable ways. Still others believe
that it has to do with lags in the structure of production and the way that cap-
ital is allocated in the economy. All of these ideas are internally coherent, and
all match the data in some cases but not all. Given that public policy depends
on the truth of one of these views (or others), it is an important question
which is right. Although there is no shortage of defenders of each of these
views, it is telling that unlike, say, the theory of evolution or even microec-
onomics, there is no general agreement between experts on this and many
more crucially important questions.
The split between micro and macroeconomics illustrates an important
point about the fragmentation of economic thought in the 20th century.
As economics has focused on rigor and certainty in the realm of microec-
onomics, many of the more moralized questions that animated political
economists of the golden age were ignored or sidelined.
Along with the fragmentation of economics into specialized subfields with
less emphasis on the big questions of political economy, philosophy took a
28 The Ethics of Capitalism
similar turn. Political philosophy in the 20th century was largely about the
abstract analysis of political concepts, like freedom, equality, and fairness.
But there was a definite shift away from the concrete economic phenomena
and policies to which these concepts have application, like unemployment,
contracts, taxation, and so on. This is not to say that abstract political philos-
ophy can’t inform work in political economy, only that extra effort is needed
to make it do so.
We would venture that the fragmentation of political economy may not
have happened for good intellectual reasons. There are two things we can say
about (academic) working conditions in the golden age that do not apply to
the 20th century and beyond. The first is quite obvious; the stock of relevant
academic knowledge was smaller during the times of Smith, Marx, and Mill.
To put it crudely, they didn’t have to read as much stuff and know as many
different mathematical and statistical techniques to gain competency in their
fields. This is not to say they were lazy or didn’t consume much material—
John Stuart Mill had an incredibly rich life strictly in terms of the material he
absorbed, so much so that he missed out on a proper childhood. But it’s fair
to say that the fragmentation of academic disciplines is partly a consequence
of making an academic career more manageable, in terms of how much ex-
pertise one is supposed to possess in order to be in a position to write any-
thing on top of it.
A second factor, though related, is less obvious. Academic employ-
ment since the late 20th century isn’t what it once was. Broadly speaking,
academics are expected to demonstrate expertise in the discipline they’ve
chosen to locate themselves. We don’t think we’ll offend any of our peers if
we point out that the easiest way to become an expert in one’s field is to pick
a very small field. So this is what people do, in order to achieve job secu-
rity and gain professional esteem. There are other factors, too—small fields
lend themselves to nicely sized intellectual communities, and there are only
so many people that can fit into a conference. One reason we’re writing
this textbook is because we both worked in Australia, where at least some
academics gain a high level of job security early on and where a smaller pro-
fessional community somewhat pushes back against specialization. We can
afford to get into political economy, but not everyone pursuing an academic
career has this luxury.
The good news is that political economy is showing signs of a comeback.
Engaging with the ideas of those thinkers in new ways led several thinkers in
the mid-20th century to develop a basis for a revived political economy at the
Capitalism Seemed Like a Good Idea at the Time 29
beginning of the new century. We will discuss several of these thinkers and
their ideas in greater detail in later chapters.
One was John Rawls (1921–2002), the most influential political philoso-
pher in the 20th century, at least in the Anglophone world. Like Smith, Mill,
and Marx, he was concerned with how a society could be arranged so as to
benefit everyone without leaving anyone behind. Although highly abstract
in the manner of 20th-century philosophers generally, the basic idea he de-
veloped was to think of society as a “cooperative venture for mutual advan-
tage” that could only expect the allegiance of its citizens if it reliably makes
them better off while respecting their basic freedom to live according to their
values. As Rawls put it, justice is a matter of hitting on fair terms of social
cooperation. His ideas, though laid out and defended with practically no ref-
erence to real examples from economic life, provide a useful and enduring
framework for thinking about economic questions and their relations to so-
cial and political life.
Another influential and important thinker during this period was
Friedrich Hayek (1899–1992). An Austrian, Hayek was fortunate to take
a position at the London School of Economics before the Nazi annexa-
tion of his homeland. There, Hayek engaged in a long-running and impor-
tant debate with the greatest economist of the era, John Maynard Keynes
(1883–1946). This debate centered on one of the most important questions
of macroeconomics, the business cycle. Specifically, it was concerned with
what caused the Great Depression and what the government should do to
prevent and end depressions in the future. Keynes argued that depressions
are ultimately caused by a lack of consumer spending. Sellers cannot find
buyers for their goods and are forced to lower their prices or take losses. To
do this, sellers must cut the wages of their workers, who are society’s con-
sumers. This creates a vicious cycle, making it even more difficult to get the
economy going again. Keynes’s solution is that governments could use their
spending and borrowing powers to ensure that general gluts don’t occur. If
an economic downturn does occur, the government can “prime the pump”
economically by literally giving money to people to increase spending.
Hayek believed that Keynes’s diagnosis was mistaken. Instead, he argued
that economic downturns resulted from too many investments in unproduc-
tive resources at one time. Sometimes this can be the result of a mania among
investors or as a result of mistaken government policy. For instance, Hayek
would have argued that the problem in the 2008 financial crisis in the United
Sates was that too many investors put too much money in unproductive
30 The Ethics of Capitalism
assets (in this case, subprime housing), encouraged by low interest rates and
a lack of oversight. Crucially, Hayek’s solution to these problems was not to
have the government spend more. Doing so, he argued, would only make
the problem worse. In his most popular (and provocative) work, The Road to
Serfdom (1944), Hayek warned that continued government intervention in
the economy and the implementation of economic planning would present a
serious danger to democratic government.
We should note that neither Rawls nor Hayek was a political economist in
the guise of Smith or Mill. Rawls was a philosopher whose theory of justice
is explicitly about the distribution of goods associated with social coopera-
tion. He merely assumed that the economy has a productive output whose
distribution matters morally. Hayek, on the other hand, was an economist
who shied away from moralized thinking. He even claimed that the concept
of social justice was a “mirage” and that people when speaking of it didn’t
really know what they were talking about. Although this element of Hayek’s
thinking can be taken too far, it shouldn’t lead us to discount the value of his
thought as a whole.4 In any case, political economy is often about finding the
truth in what seem like opposing points of view.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, the debate about
whether or not we should have democratic and market-based societies ef-
fectively ceased as a practical matter. Capitalism proved better than commu-
nism in virtually every way. Capitalist-leaning societies are happier, richer,
healthier, freer, and better protectors of human rights than any communist
or state socialist society. Although this is no reason to become complacent,
it is nevertheless true. The debate between communism and capitalism that
occupied the second half of the 20th century, however, obscured some of the
core questions of political economy. Instead of comparing capitalism and so-
cialism, now the focus is and should be on the shape of our capitalist society.
Economists and philosophers are concerned again with questions about why
some societies are richer and freer than others and what role institutions and
culture play in that process. Concerns about human rights, for instance, are
importantly connected to questions about economic development.
Going forward, thinking about the ethics of capitalism will involve
thinking about how our democratic capitalist societies can become more
4 A charitable reconstruction of Hayek’s take on justice and why he might have held it is offered by
Joseph Heath in his discussion of a just wage (see further reading section in chapter 6). John Tomasi
(2012) offers an alternative take on this point in his Free Market Fairness.
Capitalism Seemed Like a Good Idea at the Time 31
wealthy, healthy, happy, and free. These are the core questions that we will
tackle in the rest of this book.
In large part, talking about economic justice is like talking about any other
kind of justice. When philosophers argue about justice, often under the
guise of “social” or “distributive” justice, they are concerned to develop the-
ories about what justice requires. This involves developing a view about such
things as what it means to respect freedom, to treat people fairly, as equals,
and so on. When we think about economic justice, we’re trying to develop
views about the same sorts of things. But we’re trying to do this in ways that
have more immediate application to the actual economy. This means that ab-
stract theories of fairness, freedom, and so on might not get us as far as we
want to go. We want theories that tell us what fairness in (say) labor markets
looks like, given the way these markets work and could be made to work.
Similarly, what makes for a just distribution of taxes is going to depend on
what taxes are being designed to do and what is feasible with respect to dif-
ferent implementations. It’s no good trying to argue that an enormously high
tax is just if we take no account of the ease with which people might avoid
paying it by changing their economic behavior.
The concept of economic justice is different from various broader
concepts of justice. A broad concept of justice is something like “fair terms of
cooperation” or a “fair distribution of society’s benefits and burdens.” These
are all quite abstract claims. They may well be plausible, but they’re what
philosophers call idealized. More or less, they aim to say something about
what an ideally just society would like, in the event that it would ever exist.
And they do not engage much with the realities of the status quo. Rawls is a
perfect example of a philosopher whose work was very much in ideal theory.
Theories of economic justice might take some inspiration from ideal theories
of this sort, but they aim to say something about how the economy, as it cur-
rently is, could be made more just. In this sense, theories of economic justice
are to some extent nonideal.
There’s a great deal of philosophical work lately on how to understand
this distinction between ideal and nonideal theory. Rather than endorse any
elaborate theory of exactly what makes for nonideal theorizing about jus-
tice, we’ll just give you an example or two of how actual work on economic
32 The Ethics of Capitalism
justice reveals its tendency not to idealize the economy. Chiefly, this is done
by noting how economic systems are a certain way, but used to be a different
way, and could yet undergo further changes.
One economic practice whose value changes dramatically over time is that
of inherited wealth. Prior to the golden age, feudal European societies had
laws that required large family estates to pass down the family line without
being broken up. This meant that estates couldn’t be sold off or divided among
different heirs. This practice was known as “entail.” It endured for some years
in countries like England, even after feudalism began to give way to a more
market-oriented society. You may have some familiarity with it if you’ve read
the novels of Jane Austen. Laws of entail often included a requirement of pri-
mogeniture, which meant that the lion’s share of the inheritance went to the
eldest son. This explains why Austen’s Bennett sisters had poor prospects,
despite being from a wealthy family. It also explains why Mr. Darcy had so
much wealth, in spite of apparently not doing a single day’s work in his whole
life. Austen’s work is often read as a comment on the injustice of entail, or at
least primogeniture. Adam Smith had much the same view, but he wanted to
suggest that entails had gradually become unjust over time.
When great landed estates were a sort of principalities, entails might not be
unreasonable. Like what are called the fundamental laws of some monar-
chies, they might frequently hinder the security of thousands from being
endangered by the caprice or extravagance of one man. But in the present
state of Europe, when small as well as great estates derive their security
from the laws of their country, nothing can be more completely absurd.
(WN III.2.6)
Nobody, including Smith, has been able to work out the whole story as
to how some societies came to transition from fragmented tribal systems to
larger and more cohesive ones. But a balance of power between a monarch
and the nobility might have been an important early enabler of this kind of
transition. It was, at least, better than a situation in which the king or tribal
leader held absolute power. The presence of entails prior to the 18th cen-
tury helped ensure that the wealth of aristocratic families didn’t fragment as
the family tree expanded, which would have broken up their ability to raise
armies and present credible opposition to the monarch. But, as Smith notes,
times change, and economic and political imperatives change. By Smith’s
day, Britain had become a “constitutional monarchy,” meaning that political
Capitalism Seemed Like a Good Idea at the Time 33
Conclusions
Study Questions
Further Reading
You may want to engage with the “golden age” thinkers directly and, for-
tunately, there are now many excellent and cheap editions of their works
available.
• Adam Smith
The Liberty Fund produces the most commonly used scholarly editions of
the collected work of Adam Smith (a version of the Glasgow edition). They
have affordable and durable copies of An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes
of the Wealth of Nations (in two volumes) as well as the standard version of
The Theory of Moral Sentiments, which are available either individually or as
part of the collected works. There are a number of other mass market and
scholarly editions available as well. Of note is the edition of The Theory of
Moral Sentiments edited by Ryan Hanley with an introduction by Amartya
Sen published by Penguin. The notes in this edition go far beyond the
Glasgow edition, and the commentary by Hanley is valuable. The Cambridge
Texts in the History of Philosophy edition edited by Knud Haakonssen will
also be of interest to those who want to seriously engage with the text.
• David Ricardo
As with Smith, Liberty Fund publishes the collected works of David Ricardo,
all of which are also available online in searchable form at the Online Library
of Liberty (oll.libertyfund.org).
• Thomas Malthus
36 The Ethics of Capitalism
Both the first and the considerably expanded sixth edition of An Essay on the
Principle of Population are available online for free at the Online Library of
Liberty.
The Worldly Philosophers: The Lives, Times and Ideas of the Great Economic
Thinkers by Robert Heilbroner (7th edition, Simon and Schuster, 1999)
Provides an overview of the contributions of the chief figures from the
golden age of political economy, such as Smith, Ricardo, Marx, and Mill.
Goes beyond the golden age to discuss some more recent figures, such as
Veblen and Keynes. Each figure gets his own chapter, and a certain amount
of time is spent on autobiographical details. The presentation of the ideas
of each thinker is, however, outstanding. (Heilbroner’s book went through
seven editions, the same number as Mill’s Principles of Political Economy.)
economy and economic thought. Something to try if you’re still hungry after
getting through Heilbroner and Kishtainy.