Mckinsey 2007 Global Persspectives On Indian Health Ins

Healthcare Payors and
Providers Practice
Sustainable Health Insurance
Global perspectives for India

November 2007
This report is furnished to the recipient for information purposes only. Each recipient should
conduct its own investigation and analysis of any such information contained in this report. No
recipient is entitled to rely on the work of McKinsey & Company, Inc. contained in this report
for any purpose. McKinsey & Company, Inc. makes no representations or warranties regarding
the accuracy or completeness of such information and expressly disclaims any and all liabilities
based on such information or on omissions therefrom. The recipient must not reproduce,
disclose or distribute the information contained herein without the express prior written consent
of McKinsey & Company, Inc.
Contents
Foreword 4
Introduction 7
Opportunities and challenges in the individual health insurance market:

Lessons from the U.S. 12
Health insurance for the poor: Leveraging India’s unique strengths 28
Beyond hospitalisation benefits: The role of preventive care 44
Emerging medical value management approaches 56

Foreword
India is on the cusp of becoming an economic giant powered by its favourable

demographics. A young workforce and rapidly growing service economy have the
potential to keep the country on the path to achieving high GDP growth.
Ensuring that our young population remains healthy and continues to operate at
maximum productivity is an important imperative. Adequate and equitable healthcare
financing is critical in meeting this imperative as most of the healthcare expenditure
in India today is paid out of pocket by individuals, which too often results in either
financial distress or inadequate care. Given the current financing mix, there is a clear
need for a rapid increase in access to health insurance.
Rising affluence and urbanisation have also brought rich-world lifestyle diseases like
diabetes, chronic heart disease, and cancer to India. This has resulted in a two-
pronged healthcare problem for India. On the one hand, India has a long way to go in
improving primary healthcare and tackling diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis and
polio. On the other, a growing proportion of the population is showing alarming trends
of lifestyle diseases. As a result, preventive care in plan design and chronic disease
management techniques will play an important role in the sustainable development
of the entire healthcare ecosystem.
Apart from improving coverage, we need to ensure that access to health insurance
is inclusive. The recent announcement by the government in this regard is very
encouraging, and private–public partnerships can play a significant role in improving
access to the underprivileged.
While we focus on improving inclusive access to healthcare financing, we need to

recognise that lack of customer and provider engagement, an inadequate regulatory
framework and inappropriate plan designs have led to escalating costs in other
countries and made their systems financially unsustainable.
4 Sustainable Health Insurance : Global perspectives for India

As we look ahead, India has the opportunity to leapfrog and develop unique healthcare
financing solutions which are inclusive, economically viable, and provide appropriate
care to its people. I hope the FICCI Conference, “Sustainable Health Insurance - Need
of the Hour,” will help us find pragmatic solutions towards better health insurance
access and broader coverage. I would like to thank McKinsey & Company for agreeing
to provide thought leadership for this conference.
Shikha Sharma
Chairperson, Insurance and Pensions Committee – FICCI
New Delhi, 29 November 2007
Sustainable Health Insurance : Global perspectives for India 5

Introduction
Policy makers and industry leaders agree that providing health insurance coverage
to many more Indians than today is an important economic and social imperative. As
income levels and awareness rise, the emerging Indian middle class will seek better
underlying medical services and mitigation of the financial risks that come with the
better, more sophisticated, but also more expensive medical care available today. At
the same time, hundreds of millions of Indians at the base of the economic pyramid
remain extremely vulnerable to unexpected healthcare expenditures, which often force
them to sell the few assets they may have or push them deep into indebtedness.
Today, only about 30 million Indians and an estimated 2 to 3 per cent of total
healthcare expenditures are covered by some form of private health insurance (Exhibit
1).1 Existing private health insurance is typically provided by large-group employers
and focuses on hospitalisation benefits with a limited sum assured. To dramatically
improve health insurance coverage, India will need to find financially sustainable ways
to increase access for the majority segments of the population and develop insurance
plans that cover preventive care interventions and drugs.
Given its size and stage of development, India faces both the opportunity and
challenge to develop its own approach to providing health insurance coverage to a
significantly larger number of people, learning from relevant international lessons, but
also avoiding some of the costly mistakes made by others. To help advance the debate
on potential solutions for the FICCI Conference on “Sustainable Health Insurance - Need
of the Hour”, we have assembled four background papers drawing on the expertise of
our Global Healthcare Payors and Providers Practice. These background perspectives
do not purport to have the answers for India, but are intended to provide helpful ways
to think about some of the key issues the conference organisers have laid out in their
agenda.
1 In addition, approximately 80 million Indians benefit from social welfare or healthcare directly
provided by typically public sector employers.
7
Exhibit 1: Two-thirds of healthcare delivery spend is paid for by private households
“out of pocket”
Break up of healthcare delivery* spend by source, 2006-07 (estimated)

Percentage of total spending
100% = Rupees 1.4 trillion
Private health Social/community

insurance (~2%) insurance (~1%)
Employer direct spend

(government, PSU
and private sector) 12
Central and state 20-25

government
Direct household
healthcare budget 60-65 spending (out of
pocket expenses)
* Excludes pharma spends

Source: McKinsey-CII Healthcare Report 2001; WHO; National Accounts Statistics; annual reports; McKinsey analysis
1. OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES IN THE INDIVIDUAL HEALTH

INSURANCE MARKET: lessons from the u.s.
While relatively well penetrated, the employer-based group health insurance market is
small, covering less than 10 per cent of the workforce and reflecting the small size of
the organised economy in India (Exhibit 2). At the same time, government insurance
coverage is limited and a planned expansion is focused on the poor at the base of the
economic pyramid. As such, providing the growing Indian middle class with privately
provided and individually purchased health insurance represents a big opportunity
and challenge in expanding health insurance coverage in India.
Based on the experience of the U.S., the world’s largest private health insurance
market, our first background paper looks at the requirements for success in a retail
health insurance environment and lays out a few design principles for market-based
private health insurance. The key requirements for success in a retail environment
include product innovations combining financing mechanisms, elements of managed
care and advice; the ability to manage multi-channel distribution; and capabilities for
risk-based pricing. To be cost-effective, market-based health insurance should focus
on improving health status, engaging consumers, aligning funding instruments with
health risk, minimising supply-side distortions, and allowing for value-based pricing.

Exhibit 2: In India, less than 10% of the workforce is in the organised sector
Share of workforce in organised

and unorganised economy Organised workforce employment by sector
Per cent, million Per cent; 100% = 30 million
PSU
employees*
10
~370
~400 Private
sector
employees 35 55
~30
Government
Total Indian Workforce in Workforce
employees
workforce unorganised in organised
sector sector
* PSUs are public sector units with majority government stake

Source: CSO; Planning Commission; NASSCOM; interviews; team analysis
2. HEALTH INSURANCE FOR THE POOR:

LEVERAGING INDIA’S UNIQUE STRENGTHS
The Government of India has announced plans for subsidised health insurance for
the country’s poorest citizens in the unorganised sector. If successfully implemented,
such a system could provide better access and a higher standard of healthcare to a
significant portion of the Indian population.
Based on an analysis of global experiences and India’s own experiments with

grassroots micro-health insurance schemes, our second paper believes that a
successful national health insurance model for India would proactively leverage
three unique strengths of the country: its strong civic institutions, its active and
entrepreneurial healthcare markets, and its tradition of decentralisation. In such a
model, the government acts as a market maker and regulator. To lay the ground work
for a dynamic, service-oriented model of subsidised health insurance for India’s poor,
the government would have to allocate appropriate funding and build the supporting
institutional infrastructure critical to long-term success.

3. BEYOND HOSPITALISATION BENEFITS: THE ROLE OF PREVENTIVE CARE
Today, private sector group and individual coverage in India, as well as the Central
Government’s plan to subsidise health insurance for the poor, focus on hospitalisation
benefits with a limited sum assured. While this provides valuable coverage, preventive
care and chronic disease management techniques are important components of
improving medical outcomes and the overall cost-effectiveness of healthcare provision
and insurance. A number of these techniques fall into the domain of public sector and
government health spending, but international examples suggest that private sector
insurance can make important contributions.
Our third paper provides a framework as well as some basic facts about preventive
care, screening and disease management programs adopted in other countries. The
scope for improvements from relatively simple primary preventive healthcare measures
in India remains huge and could prevent or delay millions of premature deaths every
year. India’s private sector can pick up a number of secondary and tertiary preventive
measures such as screening for cancer or diabetes, and preventive health check-ups
as well as disease management programs for conditions such as congestive heart
failure or asthma.
4. EMERGING MEDICAL value management approaches
The combination of rising income levels and awareness, increased access to

health insurance, and broader coverage in India is bound to grow overall healthcare
expenditure. This is the experience in nearly every developed country, where healthcare
costs have been growing at a rapid rate for decades, for most years well in excess of
aggregate inflation.
In the U.S., medical cost inflation has in the past led to a number of health insurance
innovations such as the open-access Health Management Organisation (HMO). Our
fourth paper describes how health insurers in the current era of rapid healthcare
cost increases focus on an approach that integrates the formerly siloed functions of
benefit design, network management, claims management, and care management. In
addition, incentive structures are changing to shift decision making from centralised,
payor-directed control to a consumer and provider self-directed approach. A number
of the tools developed in this context, such as benefit and network tiering, consumer
decision support tools as well as pay-for-performance and episode contracting for
providers, appear relevant for an emerging market setting.
* * *

Dramatically expanding health insurance coverage in India is an important social and
economic imperative. To do so, India needs to find financially sustainable ways to
increase access for the large, emerging middle class in an individual market context
and for poorer citizens at the base of the pyramid, and adopt health insurance plans
that go beyond the currently narrow focus on hospitalisation benefits. While there are
lessons from international experience, India will have to develop a unique approach
given its huge size and stage of development. We would like to thank the FICCI
Insurance and Pensions Committee and its Chairperson, Shikha Sharma, for the
opportunity to provide our perspectives. We hope they offer a helpful background to
advancing the debate on potential solutions at the FICCI Conference, “Sustainable
Health Insurance - Need of the Hour.”
Tilman Ehrbeck Gautam Kumra

Partner, McKinsey & Company Director, McKinsey & Company
New Delhi New Delhi

Opportunities and challenges in the
individual health insurance market:
Lessons from the U.S.
Opportunities and challenges in the
individual health insurance market:
Lessons from the U.S.
Shubham Singhal
India’s accelerating economic growth is transforming the average Indian citizen into a
discerning consumer with significant disposable income. In addition to substantially
benefiting the country’s poorest citizens, this growth will create a sizeable and largely
urban middle class of over 500 million people by 2025. This middle class, with annual
disposable household income of 200,000 to 1,000,000 Indian rupees ($25,000 to
$120,000 at PPP), will control almost 70 per cent of India’s urban consumption
power in 2025 (Exhibit 1).
Exhibit 1: Rapidly growing middle class will represent 70% of India’s urban
consumption in 2025
Share of urban consumption by income class Household income class
Per cent, Trillions, Indian rupees Thousands, Indian rupees
100% = 2 4 7 17 44
2 0 2
6 6 12 18
10 26 Upper (>1,000)
8
28 10
17
33 Upper middle (500 - 1,000)

56
53
64 55
Middle (200-500)
37
26 17
7 2 4 Lower middle (90-200)
1
1985 1995 2005 2015E 2025E Deprived (<90)
Note: Figures are rounded to the nearest integer and may not add up to 100
Source: McKinsey Global Institute

As Indian incomes rise, the consumption of different products and services is likely
to evolve. While consumption is expected to increase in nearly all categories, some
will grow faster than others. Five product categories—food, transportation, housing
and utilities, healthcare and personal products/services—will account for over 80
per cent of total cumulative spending in India over the next 20 years. Over the past
20 years, healthcare consumption has been growing rapidly at 8 per cent, faster
than the overall consumption growth rate of 4.7 per cent. This strong growth trend
is expected to accelerate over the next 20 years creating a nearly 9 trillion rupee
healthcare market (Exhibit 2).
Exhibit 2: Healthcare consumption growth will be most rapid in urban India
Annual spending on healthcare CAGR
Billions, Indian rupees 1985-2005 2005-25

Per cent Per cent
8,903 8 11
11 13
5,409
3,076
1,491
1,147 7 8
3,494
447
1,585
Urban 247 360
126 700
Rural 58 234
189
1985 1995 2005 2015E 2025E
Source: McKinsey Global Institute
Today, healthcare consumption in India is largely funded by household expenditure.

In 2005, the private consumption of healthcare represented more than two-thirds
of total healthcare spending compared to 10 to 12 per cent in most developed
countries. While relatively well penetrated, the employer-based health insurance
market is small, covering less than 10 per cent of the workforce, reflecting the small
size of the organised economy in India. Government insurance coverage is limited
and any expansion is likely to focus on the poor at the base of the pyramid. As such,
providing the growing Indian middle class with privately provided and individually
purchased health insurance represents both a big opportunity and the main challenge
in expanding health insurance coverage in India.

Based on the U.S. experience, we discuss below the key competencies and capabilities
required to succeed in a retail health insurance market and lay out key principles for
market-based private sector health insurance that might be helpful for the ongoing
debate in India.
Winning competencies in retail health insurance
Success in a retail health insurance world requires seven key capabilities and
competencies. Crucial among them are product innovation, retail multi-channel
distribution, value-added consumer experience (beyond just service), consumer-
oriented medical management, and risk management. Each of these capabilities and
competencies stands on a foundation of deep consumer insight and an IT-enabled
administrative platform (Exhibit 3). In this section, we provide our perspectives on
three of these competencies—product innovation, retail multi-channel distribution,
and risk management—which seem particularly important in the Indian context.
Exhibit 3: Competencies required to win in retail health insurance
Retail health insurance strategy
Consumer-
Retail multi- Value-added
Product oriented Risk
channel consumer
innovation medical management
distribution experience
management
Deep consumer insights/segmentation
IT & Operations infrastructure

A. Product innovation
In a retail-oriented world, health insurers need straightforward, segment-tailored,
quick-to-market products. Consumer industries gain only fleeting advantages from
any single innovative offering, as rivals are quick to copy. However, competency in
developing distinctive products faster than competitors delivers a substantial edge.
To achieve leadership, health insurers must focus on building a broad product portfolio
and managing products more effectively.
Broad product portfolio

Health insurers in a retail context need an innovative set of core health insurance
products and an array of ancillary products and services. Breadth is important to
realising economies of scope (e.g., in distribution) and covering the range of risks
and expenses that consumers face. There are eight broad categories of exposures
driven by health and health-related events and costs: low ticket-size expenses (e.g.,
for routine care), higher ticket-size discretionary expenses (e.g., for elective surgery),
catastrophic expenses (e.g., due to major illness, accident), end-of-life care expenses
(e.g., due to life-threatening illness), expenses related to chronic diseases and the
related risk of becoming uninsurable, medical inflation risk, income risk (e.g., disability),
and the risk of being unable to afford health services or insurance. Consumers have
varying ability to bear these risks.
New categories of products combining three pillars of successful innovation—financing

mechanisms, elements of managed care, and advice—will probably emerge to help
consumers deal with the health risks and address these eight exposures (Exhibit 4).
In the U.S., traditional products have focused on mainly providing insurance as the
financial vehicle with select managed care elements. Recently introduced consumer-
directed health plans combine savings and insurance vehicles. However, a significant
gap remains in using financial mechanisms beyond insurance. Exhibit 5 portrays the
full landscape of financial products that could help consumers address the exposures
that they face.
A choice of financial mechanisms is essential to meet the needs of diverse consumer

segments but also to exploit financing efficiency. For example, many consumers are
unwilling to purchase long-term care insurance when they are young, as they view it
as an unnecessary expense. Younger consumers are more concerned about meeting
mortgage payments and expenses related to raising a family while the threat of long-
term care seems distant. On the other hand, as consumers age and recognise the
need for long-term care coverage, they often find the premiums unaffordable or are
denied coverage due to medical underwriting. Products that combine investment with
long-term care insurance could help.

Exhibit 4: Pillars of product innovation
Financial Managed
1 mechanisms 2 care elements 3 Advice
Elements of
traditional
Payments Network access Preventive health products
(debit, prepaid) health advice
Financing/ Case/use management

Treatment advice
credit
Medical policy/ Health-related

Savings
technology financial advice
evaluation
Investments
Concierge
Annuitisation Provider services
assessment
Insurance
Disease
Illiquid asset management
monetisation
Wellness
Structured financial
products
Incentives
Government subsidy
Discount programs
Exhibit 5: Aligning financial mechanisms with risks
US EXAMPLE
Points of alignment
Health-related financial exposure/risks
High-dollar Chronic
Low dollar Catastrophic End-of-life care Medical Unaffordability
discretionary condition Income risk
expenses expenses expenses inflation risk
expenses expenses
Debit, prepaid, Debit, prepaid,

Payments from
discount/value discount/value
current income
cards cards
Financing/
Credit cards Installment loans
credit
Savings
Medical inflation
Financial mechanisms
Investments
indexed funds
Impaired risk
Accelerated
annuity,
Annuitisation payout on
Financial mechanisms
accelerated
annuity
benefit riders
Health, critical Accelerated Disability,
Chronic Level-term Unemployment
Insurance illness, accident, payout on life income
conditions health insurance insurance
LTC insurance insurance, LTC protection
Reverse
Illiquid asset Reverse mortgage, Reverse
monetisation mortgage viaticals, senior mortgage
settlements
Structured Medical inflation
financial protection
products (derivatives)
Government-
Mandates with
Government Subsidy, high- backed
possible tax Subsidy
subsidy risk pools secondary
incentive
markets

More effective product management
Health insurers in a retail context need to have skills to effectively integrate and
bundle the different aspects of the product—financial and value-added managed care
and advice services. A simple-to-communicate value proposition and product features
will be critical to facilitate consumer sales. Sophisticated bundling approaches will
be needed to combine product distribution synergies, consumer preferences, and
ease of communication. One such approach is one U.S. insurer’s attempt to bundle
individual health insurance, dental, and life insurance. Insurers must design, launch,
and manage products quickly, from concept through to commercialisation, in a way
that satisfies the needs of all constituents. This will require a strong connection
between efforts to gain consumer insights and the product development process.
B. Retail multi-channel distribution

Health insurers must build expertise in managing retail channels and bolster their
approach to distribution by improving their branding and marketing. Whether they
distribute directly to consumers or through intermediaries, they will also need
distinctive brands and an overall brand communication strategy that gains the
consumer’s trust. A strong consumer brand can deliver significant value by way of
price premiums, positive risk selection, and lower distribution costs. Insurers will also
have to manage their marketing spend effectively because distribution approaches
will become more complex and the amount spent could be significant.
Building and managing new retail channels

Reaching individuals requires a host of channels and sales approaches. Five types
hold promise:
zz Direct-response channels. These include a captive salesforce, call centres, the

Internet, direct mail, and television commercials. Wellpoint primarily uses the
Internet, for example, to sell a product aimed at consumers aged 18 to 29 (“young
invincibles”) who think they do not need health insurance. The online channel
is also gaining in importance—web agencies sold roughly 10 per cent of new
individual policies in 2006. Applications to eHealthInsurance.com, for example,
grew by more than 30 per cent in 2005–06, with 80 per cent of their customers
never requiring “live” help. The online channel has the added benefit of attracting
younger and healthier customers.
zz Retail stores. Health insurers are offering health benefit products through Costco
and Wal-Mart, and pharmacies such as Walgreens. One of the biggest success
stories for payors has been in selling Medicare-related products to the elderly
through bricks-and-mortar retailers. Humana staffed kiosks in 3,600 Wal-Mart and
affiliated stores to become the second-largest Medicare supplement player in 2006.
Some 80 per cent of nearly 3.5 million members were voluntary enrollees.

zz Affinity-marketing relationships. Health insurers that have used such relationships
successfully include Humana (with Virgin) and United Healthcare (with the American
Association of Retired Persons, or AARP).
zz Partnerships with financial institutions. As consumers pay more for healthcare and
health-oriented financial products (such as HSAs and health-focused credit cards),
these two areas will naturally converge. Assurant, for instance, has employed
partnerships with AXA, Lincoln Financial, MetLife, and State Farm, among others.
Assurant derived about 20 per cent of its 2005 individual revenue from State
Farm-sold business, suggesting that State Farm has accounted for as much as
half of Assurant’s net growth since 2000.
zz Worksites. The worksite provides an attractive channel as it garners a natural trust

among employees that the carrier has been vetted by their employer. In addition,
it provides access to payroll deductions as well as opportunities to implement
wellness programs. Individual insurance carriers are, for example, working to
partner with small employers to offer individual products at the workplace, with or
without financial contribution from the business.
Choosing channels
Different consumer segments have different preferences and attitudes, and payors
must understand them. Some consumers, for example, want a trusted adviser who
can make decisions for them, while others desire information and tools to make
their own decisions. Preferences also vary by demographics; for example, most
retirees like greater support. Understanding such preferences is important when
companies decide whether to use direct channels or channels that provide for human
intervention. Because a consumer’s risk profile (that is, health status) is correlated
with demographics, the choice of channels can be a significant driver of profitability.
Health insurers should look for opportunities to use channels and sales to build their
brands. Offering a product through value-oriented retailers, for instance, may reinforce
the perception that its cost is competitive, while offering it through a high-end financial
adviser may support its positioning as a rich set of benefits with superior service.
Finally, health insurers face a strategic choice about whether or not to own direct
relationships with consumers. In similar industries, such as asset management,
many players that just create products thrive thanks to superior performance and
brands. Retail distributors, by contrast, gain more power from the relationships they
build with consumers. However, distribution and direct trust-based relationships
with consumers are typically hard to create. Payors that want to follow this route
should think about building a stronger captive salesforce; many companies that focus
on health products for individuals already have one. Although a captive force can

come into conflict with independent agents and is often costly, it offers big benefits,
including the alignment of incentives, superior pricing, a salesforce that knows a lot
about products, and greater brand equity.
Stronger, consumer-oriented branding

Whether health insurers distribute directly to consumers or through intermediaries they
will need to develop distinctive brands and an overall brand communication strategy.
At a minimum, health insurers must gain the trust of consumers which frequently does
not exist. If done well, a strong consumer brand can deliver significant value in the way
of price premiums, positive risk selection, and lower distribution expenses.
Over time we expect many health insurers to develop multiple sub-brands under an
umbrella brand to provide more targeted support to different products, channels,
and/or customer segments. We also expect continued experimentation with affinity
marketing and co-branding, both of which can be effective.
Building a new brand or strengthening an existing brand can be a long, expensive

journey. Health insurers need to understand the time and cost required to develop or
strengthen a consumer brand or brands. Given these requirements, many may decide
to pursue niche strategies such as promoting a particular brand to a very well-defined
segment of the population.
Marketing effectiveness
In a retail context, health insurers need to effectively manage their marketing spend
because their distribution approaches will become exponentially more complex and
the nominal amounts in play could be significant.
Health insurers will need to develop an understanding of the “purchase funnel”

(Exhibit 6), a term that describes the path a consumer takes from being “aware” of
a product, to “considering” the product, to “purchasing” the product, to “retaining”
the product. Health insurers will need to understand the extent to which marketing
levers affect each stage and the investment required. To this end, they will also need
to improve substantially their ability to track and measure the performance of each
marketing spend, such as the impact on the response rate of changing the type of
envelope used for a direct mail piece.
Lastly, health insurers will need segment-specific targeting and positioning. Consumers
have dramatically different needs and preferences and therefore will respond to
messages, media, and positioning very differently. Health insurers will use deep
appreciation for these differences to develop segment-specific approaches for each
targeted consumer micro-segment.

Exhibit 6: Consumer purchasing funnel
Consid- Retention/
Awareness Trial Repertoire
eration loyalty
Brand A 100% 52% 52% 65% 34% 59% 20% 39% 8%
Funnel stage value Conversion rate

Indicates what % of total target Indicates what % of people on the given
group has reached the funnel stage funnel stage make it to the next stage (e.g.,
(e.g., 34% of the target group has 65% of those that consider Brand A have
tried Brand A) also purchased it)
Ensure marketing spend is aligned with marketing priorities

Systematically compare spending by vehicle (e.g., TV, radio, print, promotion, word-of-mouth) to key
bottlenecks across purchasing funnel to identify opportunities to improve effectiveness
C. Risk management
Historically, most U.S. health insurers have relied on somewhat simple underwriting
and rating approaches. Although the use of actuarial science and other more
sophisticated approaches has grown in recent years, we believe that health insurers
frequently leave a substantial amount of value on the table by pricing both too high
and too low. In some states, the loss ratio for health insurers can vary by 30 to 40
per cent, indicating that some payors are maximising price much more than others. To
price effectively in an individual market, health insurers need to understand not only
the risk profile of an individual, but also their willingness to pay, which often varies
by segment and channel. Marrying insights into consumer behaviour with actuarial
science could create competitive advantage, if, for example, actuaries could recognise
how consumer behaviour would change a priori and build that into product pricing
rather than wait years to study observed behaviour. Progressive transformed the auto
insurance industry by leveraging detailed data to build sophisticated actuarial models
that are more powerful by a factor of over 1,000 relative to competitors. This allowed
Progressive to gain share broadly as well as profitably play in high-risk markets (e.g.,
young drivers, motorcyclists).
We also believe that health insurers have not fully utilised all the levers available to
grow and improve their risk pool. As illustrated in Exhibit 7, developing an attractive

Exhibit 7: Potential levers to grow and improve risk pools
Harder
E
Underwriting
D • Exclusions
• Renewable
Rating policies
• Basic medical
• Age rating underwriting
C • Modified • Full medical
Pricing strategy community rating
Easier underwriting
• Price level • File and use
B • Rating renewal
• Accounting for
Product design product variation limits
A • Level and in pricing (e.g., • Defining risk
Marketing and structure of cost considering pools
distribution sharing positive risk
• Target market • Coverage selection into
selection • Programs (e.g., HDHPs)
• Channels wellness)
• Product • Services
positioning
Frequently under-leveraged Governed by legislation and regulation
risk pool starts by ensuring all marketing, distribution channels, and product
designs target attractive segments. We also believe more health insurers should
systematically work to shape the regulations and laws that govern technical elements
of risk management such as underwriting and rating methodologies.
Key principles for market-based private health insurance
The U.S. is the largest private sector health insurance market in the world without
government-mandated coverage, and thus provides relevant learnings for the
development of India’s market. However, the U.S. market is also evolving from its
own legacy, for example, trying to instill more self-discipline on insured consumers
who over decades had become accustomed to generous coverage of expenses with
little skin in the game. India has the opportunity to put in place the right regulatory
environment and competitive industry structure to allow for a well-functioning private
health insurance market.
As industry participants, regulators and policy makers discuss the future evolution of
the India private health insurance market, they may want to consider the some of the
core principles for a market-based health insurance system:

1. Make improving health status the system objective. Underlying costs in the health
system are driven by the health of the population. For health insurance to be
broadly accessible and affordable, improving health status is critical. The U.S. life
insurance experience has shown that a secular improvement in life expectancy
has kept the market profitable. Improving health status would deliver the same in
health insurance. Often the system’s objectives centre on either returning people
to good health or, increasingly, sustaining them while in poor health. Instead, the
focus needs to be squarely on encouraging better lifestyle choices to maintain
good health. An important aspect of such a system is that people who choose
to ignore the message by putting themselves at risk of lifestyle-induced diseases
should incur more of the related financial costs.
2. Engage the individual. The U.S. health insurance experience has shown that
individuals with little skin in the game continue to make economically ill-informed
and sub-optimal decisions. Optimisation requires two important elements.
First, healthcare purchase decisions need to be squarely in the realm of other
discretionary economic trade-offs. Second, once individuals decide to consume
health services rather than another discretionary alternative, they should have
the information and tools to evaluate a range of supply-market alternatives. In
genuine consumer markets, suppliers strive to deliver segment-tailored value
propositions leading to innovations that, at once, enhance benefits at one end
of the spectrum and commoditise to reduce costs at the other. The result in
both cases is much higher value per unit cost to deliver. Designing health benefit
packages to encourage value consciousness is the starting point. Transparency of
prices and benefits needs to follow quickly.
3. Align funding instruments with health risks. Insure only what is insurable: major
healthcare expenses that are unpredictable in nature and outside the control
of the individual, such as hospitalisation for random health conditions or critical
care for costly diseases like cancer. Savings, rather than insurance, is the more
appropriate funding source for more predictable needs, such as increased health
expenditure in retirement or first-level routine care expenses. As we discussed in
the product innovation section above, a range of financial mechanisms are needed
to align with the different types of risks. Regulatory policy should encourage
more innovation and better alignment in this regard. For example, reforms could
include ways to enable or assist individuals in planning for predictable healthcare
expenditures and beginning to save for health-related expenses earlier in life.
Options for this type of savings plan include a wide range of approaches: from
voluntary measures, to tax incentives, to compulsory savings programs. For
example, in the U.S., the biggest beneficiaries of high-deductible health plans
(HDHPs) and Health Savings Accounts (HSAs) have been the previously uninsured,
who have flocked to these plans at a disproportionate rate (recent data suggests

that close to 40 per cent of all HDHP enrolment over the last three years has
come from the ranks of the uninsured).
Of course, this system would only work for those with the means available to save,
but that would include a large portion of the population—and steps could be taken
to provide coverage for those with more limited means. Policy makers also need
to ensure adequate incentive for the use of preventive care.
4. Minimise distortions in the supply market. The U.S. healthcare delivery system
provides a case study in supply market distortions. It is riddled with overcapacity
on the inpatient and outpatient side, although it varies greatly by geography.
Many hospitals have high fixed costs but achieve only 55 per cent occupancy.
However, this overcapacity does not exit the market as it should over time, given
government and other interventions to keep capacity online (e.g., government
loans and subsidies, community activism). In addition, the still predominantly
nonprofit delivery system is often prone to irrational capital investment decisions.
Policy makers in India must avoid these misaligned provider incentives (i.e., by
avoiding subsidies or tax benefits) and instead subject the supply side to the force
of market-based mechanisms.
5. Foster value-based, dynamic pricing. Pricing is the primary mechanism through which
a market-based economic system best aligns supply and demand, and through
signals the value ascribed by consumers to the services delivered by suppliers.
As such, dynamic market-based pricing is often the key enabler of innovation in
any given industry. In the U.S. healthcare system, this linkage of prices to value,
and the incentives that should create for “productive innovation” on the services
and/or product side of the supply market, does not really exist. For many covered
medical services (as opposed to elective services like laser eye surgery or cosmetic
procedures), the government essentially sets prices with little assessment of, or
connection to, the actual value provided, as Federal or State governments buy
roughly half of the total provider services delivered in the U.S. through Medicare
and Medicaid. Their position allows them to define the prices at which providers
sell their services to them—often based on a cost-plus philosophy. Many providers
in turn negotiate their contracts with commercial payors indexing off the Medicare
rates for many services—with a lag in when these rates are adjusted. In the U.S.,
largely “fixed” prices—combined with the aforementioned supply side distortions
and a largely disengaged consumer—have arguably led to unnecessary growth in
healthcare consumption while at the same time limiting innovation towards more
cost efficiency. A well-designed system should encourage a more dynamic market of
“free-floating” prices for all healthcare services, drugs, and devices, thus delivering
a clearer linkage to value provided and rewards for productive innovation.
* * *

With a relatively small employer-based group market and Government intervention
likely focus on the poor citizen at the base of the pyramid, providing the growing Indian
middle class with privately provided and individually purchased health insurance
represents both a big opportunity and the main challenge in expanding health
insurance coverage in India. Experience from the U.S., the largest private health
insurance in the world, suggest a set of competencies and capabilities required to
succeed in retail health insurance and several key principles for a market-based
private health insurance sector that might be helpful for the ongoing debate in India.
Shubham Singhal is a Partner in McKinsey & Company’s Detroit office.

Health insurance for the poor:
Leveraging India’s unique strengths
Health insurance for the poor:
Leveraging India’s unique strengths
Amanda Cowley and Tilman Ehrbeck
The Government of India has announced plans for subsidised health insurance for
the country’s poorest citizens in the unorganised sector. If successfully implemented,
such a system could provide better access and a higher standard of healthcare to a
significant portion of the Indian population.
Based on an analysis of global experiences and India’s own experiments with micro-
health insurance schemes that have sprung up around the country (Exhibit 1), we
believe that a successful national health insurance model for India would proactively
leverage three of the nation’s unique strengths: strong civic institutions, active and
Exhibit 1: M
any health insurance programs for the unorganised sector are spread
across india today
Community-based health Existing

Government schemes
insurance schemes CBHI scheme
~ 8-10 million people covered Schemes with nationwide coverage

• Universal Health Insurance Scheme: ~1 million people covered
through 4 public sector insurance companies
Jammu Kashmir • Ministry of Textiles: Comprehensive coverage through ICICI for
300,000 handloom weavers
Himachal Pradesh
Punjab
Arunachal Pradesh
Assam
Uttranchal
Delhi
Sikkim Jibon Jyoti scheme
Haryana
Meghalaya launched in July 2005
aims to cover entire
Rajasthan population of 30,000,000 Assam
Bihar Assam
Uttar Pradesh
Jharkhand Nagaland
Gujarat Madhya Pradesh
Manipur
Mizoram
West Bengal
Tripura
Orissa
Maharashtra Chhattisgarh
Andhra Andhra Pradesh
Pradesh
Andhra Pradesh
ArogyaSri in pilot
Goa
stage aims to cover
86% state population
Karnataka
Kerala Kerala
Tamil Nadu A & N Islands
Kerala
Arogya-shree launched
in 2006 with ICICI
Lombard for BPLs
Lakshadweep

entrepreneurial healthcare markets, and the tradition of decentralisation. For its
planned health insurance scheme, the Central Government could engage NGOs, the
private sector and states to build a system with the following characteristics:
zz Civic institutions act as social aggregators to educate, enrol and empower households
in the healthcare marketplace. India’s active communities are uniquely capable of
rapidly bringing large numbers of citizens into a health insurance system. They
can act as informed consumers on behalf of their members, while simultaneously
improving risk sharing and reducing the likelihood of fraud and moral hazard.
zz NGO and private sector players integrate risk management, administrative and
provision services to offer complete insurance products to enrolled communities.
The NGO and private sector institutions active in healthcare and health insurance
today are best positioned to deliver a health insurance product to India’s citizens.
They have the managerial and institutional capacity to most efficiently assemble
the required risk bearing, administrative and claims management, and healthcare
services.
zz State-based independent regulators catalyse NGO and private sector activity

through positive incentives and targeted regulation. The Central Government should
define a set of limited national regulations, within which state-based independent
regulators can manage local systems. These local regulators will use demand-
side subsidies and targeted regulation to encourage competition in the provision
of health insurance services and extension of services to lower income citizens.
zz A central data institution standardises, collects, analyses and publicises health

information to continuously improve the system’s performance. Data will be essential
to the future growth of India’s health insurance and healthcare markets, as well as
for ensuring well-tailored future government policies and investments.
Below, we describe the proposed model in more detail and propose steps the Central
Government could take towards implementing such a model. For a summary of lessons
learned from expanding healthcare coverage in other countries see Exhibit 2.

Exhibit 2: Lessons learned from experiences in health insurance system reform
1 Benefits package contents should be epidemiologically necessary, attractive to participants,

and reduce impoverishment
Offering
2 When access is equitable, competition between public, private and nonprofit providers
improves overall quality of health services
3 Investments in education and mindset change are essential to enrolling the poor
Participation and disadvantaged
and risk sharing
4 Scale is critical for effective risk sharing
5 Incentives encouraging near-universal coverage can reduce problems of cream skimming

and moral hazards
6 In the context of a large unorganised sector, system subsidisation must avoid placing a
Financing and burden on the organised sector
contributions Whenever possible, all enrollees should contribute, even if only symbolically, to premium
7
and co-pay to increase perceived ownership and manage utilisation
8 Demand-side subsidy levels must reflect varying cost of service for different populations,
particularly the historically underserved
9 Reimbursement systems should be reformed and monitored to encourage efficiency and

Administration avoid over-utilisation
10 Data collection systems are critical to long-term development of health markets and
improvements in health services
11 Regulation of minimum standards, in insurance and provision, is necessary to avoid fraud

Governance/ and improve outcomes
safeguarding
12 Fraud control mechanisms should be commensurate with value of services
A UNIQUE MODEL FOR INDIA
In the proposed model, the Central Government would engage states, NGOs, and
private sector players to build a system in which four key types of institutions interact
to provide poor households with a choice of cost-effective health insurance and thus
access to better quality healthcare services (Exhibit 3).
Exhibit 3: Overview of proposed model

Multiple players in a
competitive market
A Education, enrolment, and

National National data collection of nominal contributions
oversight institute
body
towards premiums from households
B Competitive selection of
F
service integrator
State
regulator C In-house operation or contracting
services for risk pooling,
administrative functions (e.g., claims
Riskpooler
pooler
Risk processing) and provision of care
D Risk poolers
D Certification for and competitive

disbursement of demand-side
Social B Service subsidies; targeted development
Social Service Risk pooler
Social
Aggregator Integrator Risk pooler
Administrators
Aggregator Service
Integrator • Claim processing
grants to build system capacity
bc bc b
aggregators C
bcbcb integrators • Reimbursement
bcbcb
• Network management Benefit package of
E
healthcare services
A Risk pooler
Risk pooler
Providers
bcbcb
• Clinics
F Data standardisation, collection
E • Hospitals
• Pharmaceuticals and publication through a
Citizens
bc bcb
dedicated autonomous public
bcbcb
institution for health information

Civic institutions to act as social aggregators
Civic institutions are an essential feature of India today. The proposed national
health insurance model would leverage the considerable strength of thousands of
these institutions to be ‘social aggregators’—institutions charged with two critical
activities. First, social aggregators lead education about, enrolment in and collection
of symbolic premiums for health insurance. Second, they are responsible for the
competitive selection of a service integrator to provide a complete health insurance
product to their community.
1. Education, enrolment and collection. In the proposed model, social aggregators

drive household-level enrolment in health insurance through active outreach to
their members. International experience in both the Philippines (PhilHealth) and
Tanzania (UMASIDA), as well as the enrolment experience of domestic micro-
health insurance schemes such as SKS Microfinance’s scheme, makes clear
that local community organisations are best positioned to launch the education
and enrolment campaigns essential for success, due to their unique trust-based
relationships with the communities they represent.
In addition to education and enrolment, social aggregators should also be

responsible for collecting nominal/symbolic premiums from most participants,
to build participant understanding of the full concept of insurance and lay the
ground work for future contributions as both the households and the country grow
in affluence.
2. Competitive selection of insurance integrators. In the proposed model, social

aggregators will select a service integrator based on the quality of healthcare and
insurance services delivered to their enrolled communities. Designating the service
integrator for their community in a competitive marketplace, social aggregators
purchase on behalf of the households they enrol. The ability of the social aggregators
to select among integrators will limit profit taking and encourage innovation, as well
as improve the access to, and responsiveness and quality of, healthcare.
Such a choice does not exist for most civic institutions playing aggregator roles
today, due to the limited number of active insurance service integrators. However,
the advent of competitive subsidies from the government should stimulate new
entrants and increase competition among integrators.

NGO and private sector players to offer a complete insurance product
As envisioned, service integrators are private sector or not-for-profit institutions
responsible for the delivery of a complete health insurance product, by in-house
operation or the contracting of necessary services, including risk pooling, administrative
functions (e.g., claims processing, network management), and ultimately the provision
of healthcare (e.g., through contracting public, not-for-profit and/or private sector
healthcare providers). In this capacity, their primary activity resembles that of many
community-based micro- and private-health insurers active today. However, under a
national insurance scheme, service integrators would receive the majority of their
payments via demand-side subsidies from the state-based independent regulators.
Delivering a complete insurance product requires relatively sophisticated and active

operation or contracting of risk management capacity, administrative services, and
healthcare providers. As independent not-for-profit and private institutions, service
integrators will be able to make flexible and competitive choices about the most
effective mechanisms to accomplish these tasks. On many occasions, this will involve
contracting with other institutions, from large risk-bearing institutions with a national
footprint to small, local healthcare providers. Occasionally, a service integrator may
independently operate the full set of services. A diverse set of illustrations of this
flexible model exist today in India. For example:
zz SEWA contracts with a private insurance company for risk-pooling services as well
as a network of public and private providers, but manages its own administration
(Exhibit 4)
zz Yeshasvini manages its own risk, but contracts with a TPA (Family Health Plan
Ltd.) as well as a network of largely private providers (Exhibit 5)
zz Arogya Sri contracts with an insurance company but manages a large network of
providers on its own (Exhibit 6).
In exchange for work in compiling the essential risk management, administrative and
healthcare provision services, service integrators are compensated through demand-
side subsidies allocated through the state-based regulators.

Exhibit 4: Micro health insurance today: Vimosewa, Gujarat
CASE STUDY
1 Education, enrolment, and

VimoSEWA
collection occurs through
community-based self-help groups in
coordination with district teams
2 Competitive selection of service

4 integratoris limited by exposure of
SHGs to other players
3 Administration is managed by
VimoSEWA so they are able to
Contract: control costs and fraud, while
NGOs’ ICICI Lombard;
partners providing better services. Bidding for
National Insurance
Company re-insurer is conducted on a regular
Sister SEWAs basis for exclusive rights to a
specified region
SEWA in 2
Gujarat VimoSEWA 3 Operate: Provision of healthcare services
VimoSEWA
4
bcbcb is handled through a network of
private and public hospitals that
VimoSEWA contracts with
1
Contract:
bcbcb Network of public 5 Data standardisation, collection
5 and private hospitals and analysis is completed centrally
Citizens
bc bcb
by VimoSEWA through self-
bcbcb
developed software
Exhibit 5: M
icro health insurance today : Yeshasvini farmers’ cooperative, Karnataka
CASE STUDY

collection occurs through
established trade cooperatives
2 Integrator selection is limited

by exposure of cooperatives to
other schemes
3 Administration is managed
Yeshasvini entirely by Family Health Plan
operates Limited. Yeshasvini self-insures
through the Yeshasvini Trust
Social 2
Social
Cooperatives
Aggregator Contract:
Aggregator Yeshasvini
b cbcb
inbKarnataka
cbcb Trust
3 Family Health Plan 4 Provision of healthcare services
bcbcb Limited is handled through a network of
150 high-quality private and public
hospitals throughout the State
1 Contract:
Network of 150
bcbcb
4 private and public
Citizens
bc bcb hospitals
bcbcb

Exhibit 6: Micro health insurance today: Arogya Sri program, Andhra Pradesh
CASE STUDY

Central and collection occurs through
state
governments
community-based self-help groups in
coordination with district teams
2 Integrator selection is limited by

exposure of SHGs to other players
3
3 Subsidy disbursement on behalf of

the state and central government is
Contract: done by the insurance company
ICICI Lombard
4 Administration is managed entirely

Social 2 by district teams or Mandals. Bidding
Social
Self-help
Aggregator Operate: for insurer is conducted by the State
Aggregator
bc bc b
groups
bcbcb Arogya Sri 4 Mandals/district through a combination of an open
bcbcb teams tendering process and negotiation to
get a competitive rate
1
Operate:
bcbcb Mandals’ network of 5 Provision of healthcare service is
5 hospitals handled through a network of private
Citizens
bc bcb
and public hospitals determined by
bcbcb
each Mandal
State-based independent regulators to catalyse activity

State-based independent regulators should be created to oversee the implementation
of the system, to catalyse growth by providing incentives to regulate the activity of
NGOs and the private sector. While a central government institution will be essential
for formulating broad guidelines and preventing fraud, state-based regulators will be
responsible for the ultimate implementation of the scheme. They are responsible for
three critical system activities: certifying service integrators and disbursing demand-
side subsidies; defining the essential elements of the benefit package and symbolic
premium levels; and targeting development grants to increase management capacity
and enrolment in the system.
1. Certifying service integrators and disbursing demand-side subsidies. State-based

regulators are the ultimate ‘market maker’ for the subsidised health insurance
product. They are responsible for distributing these subsidies competitively to
certified service integrators, based on the integrators’ ability to cost-efficiently
deliver a defined benefit package to enrolled households.
Most significantly, state-based independent regulators must certify service

integrators as fit for receiving government subsidies. The basic elements
of certification for service integrators should include the ability to efficiently
administer claims and payments, whether through its own operations or
contractual relationships, and to deliver a basic package of health services to
its enrollees. Additionally, regulators should be responsible for certifying that
a service aggregator has achieved or will achieve sufficient scale and is non-
discriminatory in enrolling (regardless of health status) any social aggregators
within their geographic footprint.

Regulators are also responsible for setting subsidies at levels that most accurately
reflect the costs required to serve households in a given region, and, ultimately,
within given communities. Significantly, to ensure that social aggregators have
choice, government subsidies must be allocated on a non-exclusive basis, e.g.,
integrators should not be granted exclusive rights to a given region.
While a number of approaches to setting subsidy levels are possible, auctions/

bidding are an efficient means to this end, particularly when the government has
limited information about appropriate subsidy levels and costs of service are
likely to vary widely, e.g., to populations in more impoverished and isolated areas.
State regulators may auction off the right to serve a state (and access associated
government subsidies) through a bidding process open only to certified service
integrators. Regulators would select winning service integrators based on the size
of the subsidy level that they would need to provide for a given population. Notably,
the auction should offer only the right to compete for a certain portion of enrollees
in a given geographic area, not exclusive rights of service. As an example of such
a model, Chile’s Sercotec program competitively allocates subsidies for providing
microcredit through competitive, non-exclusive auctions.
Once sufficient data has been accumulated, the government must independently
estimate appropriate subsidy levels to monitor the effectiveness of the auctions
(e.g., for possible collusion).
2. Defining the benefit package and symbolic premium levels. State-based independent
regulators are also responsible for defining the specific elements to be included in
the subsidised health benefit package and the nominal/symbolic premiums to be
charged to enrollees.
Ultimately, this package should cover not only hospitalisation, but also essential
primary and outpatient care as well as pharmaceuticals. While such a broad
package is envisioned by the funding guidelines of the Central Government, it is
ultimately very valuable because enrolment is more likely when non-emergent care
is included, primary interventions are highly cost-effective, and global experience
suggests that a broader, more continuous package is associated with improved
satisfaction and outcomes. However, in most areas of India, such a package will
only be possible after administrative systems, such as claims processing and
fraud prevention, have significantly evolved.
Simultaneous to defining the benefit package, the regulator should identify

appropriate symbolic premium levels for the Below Poverty Line (BPL) community.
These should not be based on the expected cost of the package, but, instead,
set at a level that will encourage optimal levels of education, enrolment, and
utilisation of services.

3. Targeting development grants. Finally, state-based independent regulators are
responsible for releasing development grants to social aggregators and service
integrators to increase enrollee education and build managerial capacity so they
can deliver within the system, particularly in underserved areas.
Central data institution to standardise, collect, analyse and publicise

health information
The data institute should be an autonomous public institution that helps ensure future
market growth and government policy via the standardisation, collection, analysis
and publication of health system data. In support of this objective, the institute
may be involved in developing standards and software for accredited institutions.
Regular collection and publication of system data will be an important tool for cost
control, fraud reduction, and the long-term development of the health insurance and
care markets in India. The data institute activities should also help set/increase
standards for healthcare provision and introduce comprehensive criteria for provider
accreditation in the long run.
In this way, the data institute will support the development of all other critical aspects
of the proposed model: more effective service of enrolled communities by social
aggregators; more efficient provision of offerings by service integrators; and increased
transparency and accuracy of subsidies from state-based regulators.
STEPS TOWARDS IMPLEMENTATION
As the Central Government lays the ground work for a dynamic, service-oriented
model of subsidised health insurance for India’s poor, it will need to allocate appropriate
funding; build new institutional infrastructure; test key elements by running pilots and
reform supporting systems critical to long term success.
Allocate appropriate funding

Implementing and monitoring a successful subsidised health insurance scheme will
require substantial financial support from the Central Government. Three separate
pools of funding would need to be allocated:
zz Funding for subsidies. Subsidy monies must be distributed to state-based

independent regulators on the basis of local need. The current government
proposal envisions relatively narrow hospitalisation coverage with a sum assured
limit of Rs. 30,000 per family, and thus limits total costs to an initially estimated
Rs. 10,000 crores to the Central Government. A broader benefit package, while
considerably more expensive, would nonetheless be affordable to the government,
given its stated objective to increase healthcare spending by 1 to 2 percentage
points of GDP over the next five years.

zz Funding for capacity-building grants. The government should also allocate a pool
of funds to provide capacity-building grants for social aggregators and service
integrators. In early years, these monies can be targeted at implementing system
pilots, as well as managerial and administrative training and fellowships. Such a
program is likely to require an annual minimum investment of at least Rs. 5,000
crores annually beyond subsidies.
zz Funding for data institute. Finally, a dedicated pool of additional funds will be
required for tactical investments and grants in developing common data standards,
software and systems. The National Commission on Macroeconomics and Health
(NCMH) estimates the cost for use of IT technology at ~Rs. 500 crores per year.
This would cover not only hardware and software for patient record-keeping,
inventory control, monitoring, data collection and reporting, but also potentially
telemedicine and electronically linked facilities for training.
Build new institutional infrastructure

Essential to the success of a new subsidised health insurance system will be the
creation of strong, independent institutional infrastructure for implementation:
zz National oversight body. A small, independent and autonomous institution, the

national oversight body should be responsible for crafting the broad guidelines
for system management and liaising with the state-based independent regulators
to ensure effective implementation and prevent fraud. Because its effective
functioning will ensure the efficiency and integrity of the rest of the system,
it should be staffed by a limited number of trained professionals, paid highly
competitive salaries.
zz State-based independent regulators. Similar to the national oversight body,

these state-based institutions should be leanly staffed with dedicated professionals.
Employees should be trained and on the payroll of the national oversight body
to reduce incentives for fraud and encourage performance to a consistent
national standard.
zz Data institute. This institute must be independent from regulators to increase

transparency, reduce fraud, and objectively demonstrate scheme effectiveness
on improving health outcomes. It should employ a core group of statisticians
and public health experts to measure and monitor health outcomes and scheme
performance measures. In addition, they may choose to contract-in skills for data
collection and analysis as needed.

Begin testing and pilots
Tailoring and testing any model will be critical to a successful rollout across diverse
regions. To do so, the government should engage existing schemes as partners in
pilots as well as define new pilots. Carefully selected pilots with established partners
will allow the government to begin immediate monitoring and modification. New pilots
offer a chance to experiment with a ‘complete’ version of the selected model.
Creativity and flexibility will be required in any model. In both pre-established and new
pilots, the government should carefully monitor and seek innovations in delivering
four specific features that are most likely to generate complexity and challenges in
any national rollout:
zz Subsidy auctions, specifically the creation of competitive risk-pooling markets
zz Comprehensive benefit packages, specifically the administration of a package that

includes primary and outpatient services
zz Management capacity of service integrators, specifically the support that they

require to effectively risk-pool and administrate their systems
zz Fraud control, specifically those mechanisms that prove effective at minimising

system leakage.
In addition, pilots should also be targeted at geographies requiring special modification

or supplementation. (e.g., certain states may have limited aggregator and provider
capacities and therefore require supplemental strategies and funding to formalise or
establish community-based groups to serve as social aggregators).
Monitoring the results of such pilots will be critical. Key metrics to track during the
pilots include: rates and levels of enrolment, effectiveness of education campaigns,
efficacy of fraud control, health outcomes, enrollee satisfaction levels, and timeliness
and accuracy of claims reimbursement.
With flexible partnerships and careful monitoring, the government can learn a great
deal about the proposed model and its rollout in a relatively short period of time.
Launch reform of supporting systems

A number of supporting systems need to be changed for a subsidised health insurance
system to be effective. Many of these supporting systems will require time and
significant focus to reform. Therefore, as the government is building new institutional
infrastructure and testing possible approaches to a health system, it must also begin
long-term planning for the improvement of these supporting systems. Specifically:

zz Planning for coordination with other government insurance programs. Today, a
number of government-run programs exist to provide health insurance to specific
groups of people. A long-term strategy for the coordinated governance and
productive co-existence of these programs with the proposed subsidised health
insurance scheme is necessary.
zz Improving quality and competitiveness of public healthcare facilities. The Indian

government has already established a vast network of public healthcare facilities to
serve the rural population. However, to compete effectively in the health insurance
scheme, currently underutilised public provider facilities will need to be reformed.
In particular, the lack of accountability and responsiveness to the public, as well
as the incongruence between available funding and coverage commitments, must
be addressed. International experience has shown that the transformation of
public sector providers into more flexible and responsive institutions frequently
takes decades.
zz Gradually introducing minimum standards for providers. Setting clear standards

for the quality of care and service that providers are required to adhere to will
improve consistency of healthcare delivery in the country—and will become
increasingly important as the health insurance system grows. In India today,
voluntary accreditation through the National Accreditation Board for Hospitals and
Healthcare (NABH) has resulted in the accreditation of only 7 out of 15,000+
hospitals. Health insurance subsidies create the opportunity for the government to
introduce and gradually raise minimum standards at provider institutions included
in any service integrator network (e.g., requiring that provider networks have
at least 50 per cent of their hospitals meeting minimum standards for service
integrators to receive subsidies).
zz Identifying BPL households. The greatest challenge to a demand-driven subsidy

system like the one proposed will be appropriately identifying eligible participants.
Identifying below poverty line (BPL) families today in India can be challenging and
expensive. The effectiveness of a subsidised health system will ultimately require
improvements in this area. Therefore, the government must begin the reforms as
soon as possible: re-surveying the population, requesting income certificates as
evidence, and distributing biometric or photo identification cards. In the medium
term, as part of the health insurance scheme, social aggregators could be
leveraged to assist BPL families in obtaining appropriate documentation.
* * *

The Government of India has announced plans for a subsidised health insurance
scheme for the poorest citizens in the unorganised sector. By leveraging the country’s
civic institutions and vibrant private healthcare markets, and by building the right
support infrastructure, the Central Government has an exciting opportunity to truly
improve access to higher quality healthcare services for a significant portion of the
Indian population.
Amanda Cowley is a consultant in McKinsey & Company’s Washington, DC office and

Tilman Ehrbeck is a Partner in McKinsey & Company’s New Delhi office. The authors
wish to acknowledge the contributions of their colleagues Vivek Shukla, Bong-Seok
Song, Sathya Sriram, and Adil Zainulbhai.

Beyond hospitalisation benefits:
The role of preventive care
Beyond hospitalisation benefits:
The role of preventive care
Viktor Hediger
Today, private sector group and individual health insurance coverage in India, as well
as the Central Government’s plan to subsidise health insurance for the poor, focus
on hospitalisation benefits with a limited sum assured. While this provides valuable
coverage, preventive care and chronic disease management techniques are important
components of improving medical outcomes and the overall cost-effectiveness of
healthcare provision and insurance. A number of these techniques fall into the domain
of public sector and government health spending, but the private sector can make
important contributions as well.
Below we provide a framework and some basic facts about preventive care, highlight
select examples of screening and disease management programs adopted in other
countries, and tee up some of the key questions to facilitate the debate in India on
expanding coverage beyond the currently narrowly provided hospitalisation benefits.
A FRAMEWORK AND BASIC FACTS ABOUT PREVENTIVE CARE
In assessing the cost-benefit equation of a number of techniques and determining

who is best positioned to provide these services, it is helpful to distinguish between
three levels of preventive care:
zz Primary prevention is the reduction of the level of one or more identified macro risk
factors to reduce the probability of the initial occurrence of a disease. Examples
include road safety, clean water, food fortification and vaccinations, which are
typically government-led
zz Secondary prevention aims at detecting a disease at a very early stage to prevent

or delay its progression. Examples include screening programs for cancer and
diabetes, which could be provided and funded by the private sector
zz Tertiary prevention consists of ongoing interventions aimed at decreasing or

delaying the severity and frequency of recurrent events of chronic or episodic

diseases. Examples include family-oriented disease management therapies for
cardio-vascular diseases, or disease management programs for diabetes patients,
where again the private sector can play an important role.
Against this framework, the decision on where to focus healthcare resources will
always be relative to what is technically possible. Healthcare professionals around
the world typically use the potential positive impact on healthcare outcomes per
dollar spent, where the health benefit is measured as disability-adjusted life years
(DALY) saved through intervention.
Not surprisingly, types of the most costly diseases when measured by DALY differ
across countries (Exhibit 1). Using data from the World Health Organisation we
found that for a set of 30 developed countries, 9 of the top 10 diseases as ranked
by DALY in 2002 were chronic non-communicable diseases, which require more
sophisticated early detection and ongoing intervention to lower prevalence and costs.
By contrast, for a set of 30 developing countries, the top 3 diseases ranked by DALY
were communicable, which suggests that there remains significant potential to lower
prevalence of the total number of diseases and overall healthcare costs via more
elementary primary and secondary prevention measures.
Exhibit 1: Top 10 diseases in developed vs. developing countries, 2002
Ranked by number of DALYs per 100,000 population (weighted average)

Easily preventable
Developed countries* Developing countries**
Lower respiratory
Malignant neoplasms 1,878 NC 1,745 C
infections
Unipolar depressive
1,137 NC HIV/AIDS 1,606 C
disorders
Ischaemic heart disease 803 NC Diarrhoeal diseases 1,211 C
Cerebrovascular disease 614 NC Malignant neoplasms 1,098 NC
NC Unipolar depressive
Alcohol use disorders 592 1,069 NC
disorders
Alzheimers and other NC
439 Ischaemic heart disease 967 NC
dementias
NC Other unintentional
Hearing loss 425 873 I
injuries***
Chronic obstructive NC C
418 Low birth weight 866
pulmonary disease
Diabetes mellitus 333 NC Cerebrovascular disease 821 NC
Road traffic accidents 332 I Road traffic accidents 671 I
* 30 countries according to the IMF classification (excl. Hong Kong and Taiwan)
** All other countries, WHO members
*** Unintentional injuries excl. road traffic accidents, fires, poisonings, falls, and drownings
Note: C = communicable diseases, NC = non-communicable diseases, I = injuries
Source: WHO; McKinsey

Interestingly, developed and developing countries alike spend disproportionally on
curative in-patient care versus preventive care. In both sets of countries, curative
in-patient care accounts for more than 30 per cent of health expenditure. While the
expenditure on curative care in developed countries is higher than in developing
countries by a factor of 10 adjusted for purchasing power parity, the same ratio is
only 5 for preventive care expenditures (Exhibit 2).
Exhibit 2: Expenditure on preventive vs. curative care, 2004
Comparison developing* vs. developed** countries (weighted average)
Expenditure per capita

Percentage of total health expenditure US$ at PPP
Preventive care Developing 5.4 Developing 16 x 5

and public
health (primary
prevention only) Developed 3.0 Developed 80
x 10
Developing 31.0 Developing 114
Curative
in-patient care
Developed 31.7 Developed 1,182
* Developing countries: sample of 30 countries

** Developed countries: 30 countries according to the IMF classification (data available for 23 countries)
Source: WHO; OECD; Global Insight; McKinsey
In India, we found that 8 million people die every year from diseases that are
preventable by certain primary preventive measures. If preventive measures were in
place solely for the top 10 diseases ranked by their cost-effectiveness in terms of
U.S.$/DALY, more than 5 million premature deaths could be avoided or significantly
delayed (Exhibit 3).

Exhibit 3: Top 10 primary prevention measures
Ranked by US$/DALY averted* (sum of measures)

Number of deaths
Prevention measures** in India, 2002 (est.)
1 Measles 4 • 2nd opportunity vaccination in a fixed facility 125,600
• Intermittent preventive treatment in pregnancy, insecticide treated bed 9,400

2 Malaria 54 nets, residual household spraying
3 HIV/AIDS 203
• Education programs for high-risk groups, condom promotion and 361,300
distribution, blood and needle safety
Nutritional
4
deficiencies
416 • Sustained child health and nutrition programs, food fortification 129,100
Maternal • Improved quality of comprehensive emergency obstetric 133,100

5 558
conditions care, increased primary care coverage and care quality
6 Tuberculosis 593 • BCG vaccine, management of drug resistance 364,900
7
Perinatal
2,248 • Family, community, or clinical neonatal packages 762,100
conditions
Road traffic
• Regulation of speeding (penalties, speed bumps), enforcement of 189,000
8 2,470 seatbelt laws, random driver breath testing
accidents
Cardiovascular • Legislation substituting trans fat with polyunsaturated fat, 33% price increase 2,810,000
9 5,815 on tobacco (taxes), legislation with public education to reduce salt content
disease
Diarrhoeal
8,174
• Water sector regulation, construction and promotion of basic sanitation, 456,400
10 diseases breastfeeding promotion, cholera or rotavirus immunisation
5,340,900
* Cost of intervention in US$ per disability-adjusted life year averted
** Measures as reviewed by DCP2 published by the World Bank and the Bank for Reconstruction and Development
Source: Disease Control Priorities Project (DCP2); WHO; McKinsey
EXAMPLES OF SCREENING PROGRAMS
A number of countries have recognised the benefits of health insurance packages

that cover not only acute, curative expenses but also focus on secondary prevention
measures, such as health screening. Germany and the Netherlands are two examples
of publicly mandated and largely publicly funded health insurance systems that are
covering such preventive healthcare expenses and actively encouraging usage by
insured members.
The extent of coverage and utilisation varies. In Germany, statutory health insurance
covers 5 programs with utilisation relatively low for early cancer diagnosis (17 per
cent) and highest for children’s check-ups (more than 90 per cent) (Exhibit 4). The
Netherlands provides for a more comprehensive set of screenings and check-ups
across 6 programs that are paid for either by government funds to the ministry of
healthcare, local government funds to local healthcare services, or through private
healthcare insurance (Exhibit 5).
Private health insurers in Germany are complementing the statutory screening

program. One of the leading German private health insurers, for example, offers a
special tariff on prevention and screenings designed as supplementary non-obligatory
health insurance for Statutory Health Insurance members. Policies cover up to 27
different screenings (depending on age) that are not already covered and cost up to
€20.50 per month (Exhibit 6).

Exhibit 4: S
creenings and check-ups: Germany
Utilisation of
Program
eligible population
Early diagnosis
M/F: 17%
of cancer
Preventive M: ~20%
Social Code Book health check-
5 (SGB V) ups F: ~50% Statutory health
The SGB V insurance
regulates, which Full reimbursement of
health screening Youth check- costs, no co-payments
programs are seen M/F: 15-25% for patients
ups
as necessary and
thus have to be fully
reimbursed by
statutory health Dental check-
insurance M/F: 40-48%
ups for children
Check-ups and
screenings for M/F: >90%
children
Source: McKinsey Research
Exhibit 5: Screenings and check-ups: The Netherlands
In the Netherlands, screening programs are coordinated by the National Institute for Public Government
Health and Environment (RIVM). RIVM actively advises the target group to go to a screening PHI
at the recommended frequency
Screening Target group Description Funding
• Mammography
Breast cancer F: 50 - 75 years • Every 2 years US$ 53.5m
• At local screening organisations
• Cytological research, coloposcopy

Cervical cancer F: 30 - 60 years • Every 5 years US$33.5m
• In GP offices
• Blood type, infectious diseases, Down syndrome

Pre-natal/ newborn F: after 3rd month of
• Once US$22.3m
checks I pregnancy
• Three options: GP, midwife or gynecologist
• Heel prick, blood test to detect extremely serious diseases,
Pre-natal/ newborn F: within a few weeks e.g., phenylcetonuria
US$22.3m
checks II after birth • Once
• Babycare clinic or midwife
• Injection against the flu

Flu prevention M/F: 60+ years US$45.4m
• In GP offices
Familial hypercholes- • DNA test

terolemia (FH) M/F • Once n. a.
prevention • FH prevention team visits the patient at home
Source: RIVM; Dutch Association for Healthcare and Dutch Ministry for Healthcare
Source: RIVM; Dutch Association for Healthcare and Dutch Ministry for Healthcare

Exhibit 6: Private health policy for prevention
GERMANY EXAMPLE
Product Supplementary health insurance for prevention/screenings not covered by SHI

Target group SHI insureds (entering age up to 70 years)
Monthly payments Children: €5.00-8.50, adults: €11.00-20.50
Birth–18 years
• Hardness of hearing for
newborns: once within
18–35 years
the first 3 months, €37.30
• Examination before • Pulmonary function:
entering a kindergarten: every 4 years, €35.94
once, €20.98 • Skin cancer: every 3 35–45 years
• Lipid metabolism: once years, €30.07 • Major health check-up:
between 10 and 16 years, • Consultation on every 4 years, €131.57
€4.69 prevention and life style: • Cancer screening for From 45 years*
• Skin type: once, €13.06 once a year, €10.73 women: every 3 years, • Glaucoma: every 3 years,
• Blood type: once, €35.67 €59.98 €27.87
• Brain capacity: every 3
years, €5.78
9 screenings 8 screenings 3 screenings 7 screenings

in total in total in total in total
* Including 2 tests for people aged 55 and more

Source: Company website
For India, based on our analysis of publicly available data, 3 million premature deaths
could be avoided every year via early screenings, most of them in diabetes and
malignant neoplasms. Screenings for the top 10 diseases ranked by cost-effectiveness
could prevent or significantly delay 1.9 million premature deaths in India per year
(Exhibit 7).
Exhibit 7: A selection of secondary prevention measures
Ranked by cost-effectiveness* (sum of measures)

Number of deaths
Prevention measures in India, 2002 (est.)
1 African trypanosomiasis 15
(US$/DALY) • Identification and treatment using the card agglutination n.a.
trypanosomiasis test with parasitological confirmation
2 HIV/AIDS
(US$/DALY)
296 • Voluntary counselling and testing, sexually transmitted infection 361,300
diagnosis and treatment, mother-to-child transmission prevention
3 Lower acute respiratory

527 • Case management package at community, facility, and hospital levels 1,107,900
infections (US$/DALY)
• Improved case management, e.g., early recognition of symptoms, 5,400

4 Dengue (US$/DALY) 587 supportive treatments include fluid replacement and electrolytic therapy
Cervical cancer • Conventional or liquid-based cytology testing, nationwide pap 74,600

5 1,536 screening program based on 5 year intervals, 1-visit VIA, 2-visit
(US$/LYS)
HPV testing, 3-visit cytology
Breast cancer
6 1,996 • Clinical breast exam, screening mammography 57,300
(US$/LYS)
7
Diabetes
7,390
• Annual eye examination, annual screening for 189,000
(US$/QALY) microalbuminuria, screening
Lung cancer
8
(US$/LYS)
60,000 • Early detection screening 110,700
9
Colorectal cancer
64,916 • Colonoscopy every 10 years, double-contrast barium enema every 30,100
(US$/LYS) 5 years, fecal occult blood test, flexible sigmoidoscopy every 5 years
1,936,300
* US$/DALY = US$ per disability-adjusted life year averted; US$/QALY = US$ per quality-adjusted life year saved;
US$/LYS = US$ per life year saved
Source: Disease Control Priorities Project (DCP2), WHO, McKinsey

EXAMPLES OF CHRONIC DISEASE MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS
Disease management programs (DMPs) are for chronically ill patients and require
patients to change their behaviour and the way they interact with providers. Key
success factors for disease management programs include:
zz Developing appropriate clinical guidelines based on the best scientific evidence,

updated regularly as necessary
zz Educating and involving physicians and other providers in the effective

implementation of these guidelines
zz Conducting repeated evaluations
zz Sharing results with providers and patients
zz Using incentives for patients and providers to participate in disease management

programs
zz (Co-)promoting local healthcare providers
zz Leveraging medical information on computer systems to identify patients for

intervention and measure clinical and financial outcomes.
Germany introduced DMPs in 2002. These programs funded by statutory health

insurance cover 6 diseases (type I and II diabetes, breast cancer, coronary heart
disease, asthma and chronically obstructive lung diseases) and more than 3 million
patients. To make these programs successful, a number of incentives were created:
zz Health funds receive additional premium payments as financial incentives for each
patient enrolled in a disease management program as part of the industry-wide
risk-balancing scheme; these payments currently range from €2,300 for asthma
at the lower end and €6,700 for breast cancer at the higher end of the spectrum
zz Patients are given incentives through lower co-payments and reduced premium
payments
zz Providers get ongoing fee-for-service compensation. In addition, there are incentives to

encourage enrolment and process efficiency, for example, €20 for consulting a patient
and introducing them to the program, or a €200 one-time payment for investments into
electronic data transmission from physician’s office to data centre.
The cost-benefit equation from a long-term health insurance perspective is different

by disease. A number of research studies suggest that the cost-benefit ratios are
highest and clearly positive for diseases like congestive heart failure, asthma and
potentially diabetes (Exhibit 8). A series of interventions for diabetic patients, for

Exhibit 8: Cost-benefit analysis of disease management programs
Medical costs only*
Cost Benefit
Benefit-to-cost ratio US$ per patient US$ per patient Comments on studies
Congestive heart
2.8
1,399 3,884 • 12 studies, average of
failure (CHF) 170 subjects, 1 year
268 729 • 12 studies, average of

Asthma 2.7 449 subjects, 1.3 years
• Findings not consistent
611 434 • 8 studies, average of

Diabetes 0.7 2,011 subjects, 2.5 years
1,479 -511 • 8 studies, average of

Depression -0.4 289 subjects, 1.1 years
* Direct savings from medical costs; other possible savings, e.g., through reduced absence and disability, reduced
on-the-job productivity losses, are not considered
Source: Ron Z. et al. “Return on Investment in Disease Management: A Review” in Health Care Financing Review,
Summer 2005, 26:4
example, can result in 10 to 15 per cent savings in the first year of implementation.
This is only true if all possible levers are implemented at the same time. For other
diseases like depression, the cost-benefit analysis is negative.
SOME QUESTIONS TO ADVANCE THE DEBATE IN INDIA
Clearly, public authorities have to play a critical role in providing and funding preventive
healthcare measures. Forty per cent of the disease burden in India is caused by
infectious and parasitic diseases, nutritional deficiencies, prenatal and maternal
conditions, and respiratory conditions (Exhibit 9). These are relatively easily preventable
and arguably a matter of public health programs. India’s expenditure on primary
prevention and public health is low by international standards (US$13 per capita on
a purchasing-power-adjusted basis compared to, for example, US$17 per capita in
Vietnam, US$22 per capita in Mexico, and US$25 per capita in Egypt) and can be
significantly increased in line with the Central Government’s declared intentions.

Exhibit 9: Disease burden in India by cause, 2002
Million DALYs Easily preventable

Generally preventable
Infectious and parasitic diseases 63.9

Prenatal conditions 29.2
Communicable
Respiratory infections 26.1
diseases: 136.0
Maternal conditions 8.7
Nutritional deficiencies 8.1
Neuropsychiatric conditions 32.7
Cardiovascular diseases 30.5
Sense organ diseases 13.6
Non-communicable
Respiratory diseases 10.8
diseases: 124.1
Digestive diseases 9.5
Neoplasms 8.8
Other non-communicable 18.2
Unintentional injuries 32.2
Intentional injuries 7.6 Injuries: 39.8
Total 299.9
Source: WHO; McKinsey
At the same time, India’s private sector is more aware of the need and opportunity
to step up their own contributions. Companies have recognised the importance of
preventive care and the linkage between their employees’ health status and company
performance (e.g., through higher productivity, fewer sick days, lower medical costs).
As a result, they have started to offer a number of preventive healthcare measures
for their employees, including regular health screenings, lifestyle-related advice, and
facilities for physical exercise at the workplace in addition to the traditional Mediclaim
hospitalisation benefit (Exhibit 10). ICICI Prudential’s recent diabetes and cancer care
products are incorporating some of the leading-edge thinking in disease management.
Patients will benefit from a holistic disease management program only if they stay
with one insurer for a long period of time. This is not necessarily in the interest of the
insurer, as the patient becomes much more expensive in later stages of a disease.
Key questions for debate include:
zz What is the scope and depth of preventive care provision that can be realistically
expected from public authorities?
zz What can policy makers, regulators, and industry participants do, to increase the
likelihood of success and benefits of more advanced preventive health measures
(e.g., creating better publicly available data; funding joint development of clinical
guidelines)?

Exhibit 10: Preventive care in the Indian corporate sector
In % of answers (n = 81 well-established companies*)
Does preventive healthcare increase the Which preventive healthcare measures do you
productivity and profitability of a company? offer for employees in your company?
Preventive health
52
check-ups
No N.a.
31 Regular health
Not sure 32
screening
14
Lifestyle-related
32
advice
Stress-relieving
31
techniques
Facilities for exercising 17
82
All of above 7
Yes
* Respondents included well-known different sized companies in manufacturing and services, e.g., Coca-Cola,
Infosys, Sun Life, Tata Consulting Services
Source: Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER), September 2007
zz What screening and disease management programs can and should be insured?
zz How can you give incentives to patients and health insurers to partner throughout
the whole life cycle of a disease?
* * *
Preventive care and chronic disease management techniques are important

components of improving medical outcomes and the overall cost-effectiveness of
healthcare provision and insurance. A number of these techniques fall into the domain
of public sector and government health spending, but the private sector can also make
important contributions. We hope that the framework, facts, and examples provided
in this paper can help advance the debate in India on how to expand coverage simply
beyond hospitalisation benefits.
Dr. Viktor Hediger is a Partner in McKinsey & Company’s Dubai office. The author
wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Uma Deepika Khan and Saule Serikova.

Emerging medical value
management approaches
Emerging medical value
management approaches
Vishal Agrawal

expenditure. This is the experience of nearly every developed country, where
healthcare costs have been increasing at a rapid rate for decades, for most years well
in excess of aggregate inflation. Periodically in the U.S., when medical cost inflation
accelerated, demand for new solutions emerged—often met by a wave of innovation
from existing industry players as well as from new entrants. Today’s open-access
health maintenance organisations (HMOs) are the result of such periods; as was
the earlier managed-care revolution (centred around point-of-service products) of the
early 1990s.
In the current era of healthcare expenditure increases, a new approach is emerging.

This time, innovation is focused on creating a holistic approach to manage medical
value that integrates the formerly siloed payor functions of benefit design, network
management, claims management, and care management. In addition, incentive
structures are changing to shift the decision making from “payor-directed” centralised
control to “self-directed” approaches that are initiated by consumers and providers.
Here we provide an overview of the major medical value-management activities
currently being deployed in the U.S. market, how these are evolving, and a set of
“deep dives” into those that could have the greatest impact in an emerging market
setting.
COMPONENT DRIVERS OF MEDICAL COST TREND
Medical cost trend is a function of utilisation volume and unit cost changes, less
any member cost-sharing variance (e.g., benefit buydowns). Leading payors break
down each of these variables into what underpins their operations, i.e., eight
component drivers of trend, to understand how medical costs are changing (Exhibit 1).
For example, a shift in the mix of hospital versus outpatient-based diagnostic imaging

Exhibit 1: Payors typically impact 8 component drivers of medical cost trend
Volume of services
Managing disease
Member risk Care management
(utilisation)
Service mix
“severity measure”
Charge per unit
Medical cost Changing provider Network management +

Provider mix
drivers productivity (unit cost) claims management
Network discounts
Coverage
Aligning demand
Plan design
(cost sharing)
Benefit level
will have a significant impact on unit costs given the three to five times dispersion in
pricing across these settings.
Typically, U.S. payors are organised with different functional heads for each component
of the payor value chain. The executive in charge of medical management is distinct
from the head of provider networks who is different from the manager in charge
of benefit design. Consequently, the operational objectives of managing disease
(utilisation), improving provider productivity (unit cost), and aligning consumer demand
(cost sharing)—all critical functions to managing medical cost—are fragmented
across the organisation.
Realising the shortcomings of such a fragmented approach, payors are beginning to

take a holistic, cross-functional approach to functional siloes from plan design, to
network, claims, and care management (Exhibit 2). This type of integration enables
consistent, reinforcing approaches across major medical cost drivers. For example, an
approach like provider network tiering can be embedded in aligning consumer demand
(e.g., reducing copays to steer members to top providers), improving provider quality
and productivity (e.g., varying provider reimbursement levels), as well as managing
disease (e.g., utilisation limits for inefficient providers). Typical and emerging medical
value management tools are defined in Exhibit 3.

Exhibit 2: A
ctivities span clinical and non-clinical approaches
Non-clinical Clinical
interventions interventions
Claims Care
Plan design Network management
management management
• Consumer incentives/ • Primary/ • Code editing • Utilisation review

risk sharing secondary networks
(e.g., deductibles,
• Subrogation • Care continuum
co-insurance, copays)
• Tiered networks • Fee negotiation
innovations
• Provider profiling – Prevention and
• Transparency and • Hospital audit wellness
decision support • Reimbursement – Disease management
innovations
– Case management
– Episode contracting
– Pay-for-performance
Exhibit 3: Description of medical value management tools
Cost-control approaches Description

Consumer risk sharing • Benefits that promote value-conscious utilisation (e.g., coinsurance)
Primary/secondary networks • Provider contracts for preferred rates/discounts
Tiered networks • Provider categorisation based on efficiency and quality information
Provider profiling • Feedback evaluation for providers
Episode contracting • Reimbursement model based on the estimated total cost of a health event
Pay-for-performance • Financial or other incentives/based on provider performance
Code editing • Pre-adjudication revision of claim codes (e.g., bundling of charges)
Subrogation • Identification of third-party insurance liability (e.g., auto insurance)
Fee negotiation • Negotiation of discounts with providers after services rendered/claims filed
Hospital audit • Examination of billed charges with the provider to verify claim accuracy
Prevention and wellness • Avoidance/hindrance of disease and promotion of healthy lifestyles
Utilisation review • Examination of clinical services provided to assess medical necessity
Disease management • Promotion of compliance with evidence-based guidelines
Case management • Intensive support for high-risk, high-cost patients

CREATING A HOLISTIC MEDICAL VALUE PROGRAM
The approach to creating a holistic medical value program is likely to vary across
developed and developing economies.
Developed economy approach

Leading U.S. payors create medical value by influencing provider and member behaviour
through multiple approaches. These programs will vary by who is engaged: provider or
member; and who initiates the engagement: the health insurer (i.e., “payor-directed”)
or provider/consumer (i.e., “self-directed”) (Exhibit 4).
The historical emphasis in the U.S. has been on payor-directed approaches focused
on engaging the provider (e.g., hospital utilisation review and case management). We
expect that these approaches will continue to be predominant over the foreseeable
future. However, a confluence of factors: 1) the failure of payor-directed approaches
alone to manage trend; 2) recognition of broad disparities in provider performance;
3) the increasing proportion of chronic and discretionary care on total medical
costs; and 4) new regulations and “ownership” mindsets, have led to medical
cost-control innovations that are more self-directed. Given these factors, payors
are supplementing traditional payor-directed approaches with those incentives that
stimulate consumerism and provider-driven change. Over the long-term, self-directed
Exhibit 4: H
olistic medical value program components vary along
2 primary dimensions
Focus area
Consumer incentives/risk sharing
Transparency/
Consumer
decision support
Disease Prevention
management and wellness
• A holistic program
Tiered integrates functional
Who is engaged
networks capabilities (across

contracting, product
Case Episode innovation and medical
management Provider contracting management) to
profiling optimise utilisation and
Claims medical outcomes
management • “Self-directed”
approaches are likely to
Provider
Utilisation have the greatest impact

review in emerging markets
Pay-for-
Primary/secondary
performance
networks
“Payor-directed” Provider/consumer “self-directed”
Who initiates engagement

approaches will accelerate as individuals assume greater ownership and financial
stake in their healthcare decisions and with greater accountability and transparency
in provider performance (both efficiency and quality).
Likely approach in developing economies

We believe that self-directed approaches are also well suited for retail-oriented
emerging markets. In fact, given widespread variability in coding and clinical standards,
these may even create more value than more traditional payor-directed approaches.
In many of these markets, consumers bear significant medical risk and providers
actively compete for patients. Developing economies have the opportunity to leapfrog
by deploying self-directed approaches that would promote competition, innovation,
and ultimately higher quality care and greater market efficiency through appropriate
stakeholder incentives.
DETAIL ON MEDICAL VALUE TOOLS
We highlight six specific medical value tools with a potential for strong impact in
emerging markets to discuss in more depth. Two focus on influencing providers: pay-
for-performance and episode contracting, and four focus on influencing consumers:
network tiering, transparency/decision support, prevention/wellness, and disease
management.
Influencing providers
The market is moving toward a more self-directed provider model, where providers
are prompted to optimise medical outcomes and utilisation through increased
transparency of efficiency/quality information and appropriate economic incentives.
Programs to achieve this include:
zz Pay-for-performance: Provide financial or other incentives to high-performing

providers at the hospital and physician level. This tool requires cooperation and
agreement between payors and providers on the key performance indicators that
determine compensation for physicians and facilities. Initial experiments in place
today are largely based on process metrics (e.g., did the heart attack patient
receive an aspirin) with more true clinical outcomes-based metrics likely to emerge
in the future (e.g., what is the morbidity rate after a heart attack). Given the small
margins many providers operate with, even small revenue bonuses or penalties
can have a strong material impact (Exhibit 5).

Exhibit 5: P
ay-for-performance: provider reimbursement variation to prompt
improved quality and efficiency
Medicare Pay-For-Performance Demonstration Project
Payment
adjustment Top 10% performance on CABG measures
2% $4,250
Top decile 10 $25,000 15%
+2% revenue EBITDA
CABG EBITDA
bonus (17%)
10 +1%
25-35% difference
in profit based
60 0% on quality of
performance
Bottom 10% performance on CABG measures

10 -1% 2% $3,250
$25,000 15%
revenue EBITDA
Bottom decile 10 -2% CABG EBITDA
penalty (13%)
Performance decile
Source: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)
zz Episode contracting: Reimburse based on the estimated total cost of an end-

to-end set of expenses for a clinical condition. Typically includes all inpatient,
outpatient, drug, and diagnostic expenses and is risk-adjusted by several health
and demographic factors (e.g., co-morbidities, age, sex). A total care cost estimate
that is personalised to the specific consumer and bundles treatment costs over
multiple visits for a given illness is the end-game for this approach (Exhibit 6).
Local market scale provides a strong competitive advantage in executing these

programs. Indeed, many U.S. Blue Cross Blue Shield organisations are in the forefront
of pay-for-performance. Medicare has pilot programs underway to test the effect and
potential unintended consequences of episode contracting.
Both of these self-directed provider approaches essentially shift incentives away from
a fee-for-service reimbursement model to one that is more value-based. Providers
are more at risk for attaining results. In emerging markets, these approaches might
help prompt provider optimisation in the absence of rigorous claims management
protocols.

Exhibit 6: E
pisode contracting: greater personalisation and bundling of services to
help consumers shop for value
Most helpful
Personalised to consumers
OOP estimate,
specific
to physician Itemised Total care
estimate estimate
Personalised
cost estimate,
specific
to physician
Degree of
personalisation
Average cost,
specific
to physician
Unit Bundled
benchmarking benchmarking
Average cost,
generalised
to region
Item-based Case-based Case-based, Episode-based

(e.g., per (e.g., DRG) including fees (e.g., all costs
CPT code) (e.g., DRG for treatment of
and physician illness over
fees) multiple visits)
Degree of bundling
Influencing consumers
For consumers too, the market is moving toward a more self-directed approach
whereby members are engaged and have greater incentives to make utilisation,
cost, and quality decisions. This shift impacts how payors influence consumers and
includes:
zz Consumer decision support tools: Offer consumer tools to empower patients in

healthcare decisions. When consumers have financial stake in their healthcare
decisions, they will seek more information on their expected liability in advance
of receiving care. Early evidence in the U.S. suggests that consumers prefer
perceived better - value for money solutions.
zz Care networks/benefit tiering: Select providers based upon efficiency/quality

information (at the hospital/physician and procedure level), and develop incentives
to channel patients to high-performing providers. These care networks are typically
more restrictive than traditional PPOs but can create a “value-based” network
based on performance outcomes versus simply seeking discounts in exchange for
patient volume and prompt payment (Exhibit 7).

Exhibit 7: C
are networks: network tiers that differentiate provider effectiveness to
steer members to high value providers
Network access spectrum, by type of health plan

Tiered networks
Very restrictive Unrestricted
HMO EPO POS PPO

Health Exclusive Point of Preferred
Name maintenance provider service provider
organisation organisation organisation
“Gatekeepers” No gatekeeper Deductibles for Cost sharing on

Defining out-of-network nearly all care
feature care only
Tiered network overview
• Based on belief that provider performance dispersion is both significant and identifiable
• Currently wide variation in performance assessment criteria for provider selection across
U.S. payors
• Patient steering incentives include tiered copayments and/or deductibles
• Has provided additional leverage to payors in hospital negotiations
Source: Literature review
Exhibit 8: W
ellness/lifestyle: clinical programs across the full continuum of care
to slow/prevent disease progression
Healthplan programs across the continuum of care
Chronic illness/ Acute illness/

Stage Healthy At-risk
disease disease
Program Wellness/lifestyle programs
Disease management
Case management
Care cost
Member
enrolment

zz Wellness/lifestyle programs: Prevent occurrence of disease through increased
consumer awareness (e.g., general health education, health club memberships,
health screenings, weight loss and smoking cessation programs) and point
members toward healthier lifestyles. Shifting from “sick care” to true healthcare
with programs and benefits across the entire care continuum can minimise
downstream costs (Exhibit 8).
zz Disease management: Identify and group patients with chronic diseases and
prompt patient behaviour to comply with evidence-based guidelines. As the health
burden increasingly shifts away from acute, random events to chronic conditions
that are driven by member behaviours, low-cost programs to influence behaviours
can have successful outcomes.
U.S. payors are actively pursuing programs to influence consumer behaviour, and
some are supplementing traditional payor-directed approaches with a more consumer-
directed mindset. For example, many are beginning to introduce tiered benefits,
especially across specialty physicians, and several have recently expanded their
wellness programs and consumer tools.
Consumer-driven approaches have the opportunity to be implemented effectively in

emerging markets. These markets do not have the legacy of healthcare paternalism
that we see in many developed economies and are therefore ripe for adopting such
approaches. In addition, perhaps even more so than the self-directed provider
approaches, these do not rely on sophisticated claims management protocols. In
fact, many of the core skillsets to implement them could be leveraged from service
vendors/carveouts emerging in other geographies.
QUESTIONS FOR INDIAN PRIVATE HEALTH INSURERS
In this context of a shifting medical value management emphasis in the U.S., India has
an opportunity to leap ahead. It is unconstrained by a patchwork paternalistic health
insurance legacy, and its reference point is already based on a deeply retail-oriented
health economy. However, stakeholders interested in adopting these approaches
must address several critical questions:
zz Which component drivers of medical cost trend are the most important to medical
value management in the Indian context?
zz What is the right mix of payor-directed versus self-directed and provider versus
consumer approaches?
zz Which specific programs could be the most effective self-directed approaches?

zz What are the pre-conditions for program success? What capabilities are needed
to support these programs?
zz How can Indian stakeholders best develop or access these capabilities?
* * *

expenditure. In their attempt to manage medical costs, U.S. payors are increasingly
focused on creating a holistic approach to manage medical value that integrates
the formerly siloed payor functions of benefit design, and network, claims, and care
management. In addition, incentive structures are changing to shift decision making
from a payor-directed centralised control to self-directed approaches influencing
consumers and providers. A number of these approaches could help improve medical
outcomes and cost effectiveness in an emerging market like India.
Dr. Vishal Agrawal is an Associate Partner in McKinsey & Company’s Washington,

DC office.

Healthcare Payors and Providers Practice
Copyright © 2007 McKinsey & Company
McKinsey & Company, Inc.
Designed by New Media Australia

Mckinsey 2007 Global Persspectives On Indian Health Ins

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Mckinsey 2007 Global Persspectives On Indian Health Ins

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Mckinsey 2007 Global Persspectives On Indian Health Ins

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Healthcare Payors and

Sustainable Health Insurance

Global perspectives for India

Opportunities and challenges in the individual health insurance market:

Health insurance for the poor: Leveraging India’s unique strengths 28

Beyond hospitalisation benefits: The role of preventive care 44

Emerging medical value management approaches 56

India is on the cusp of becoming an economic giant powered by its favourable

While we focus on improving inclusive access to healthcare financing, we need to

4 Sustainable Health Insurance : Global perspectives for India

New Delhi, 29 November 2007

Sustainable Health Insurance : Global perspectives for India 5

Break up of healthcare delivery* spend by source, 2006-07 (estimated)

100% = Rupees 1.4 trillion

Private health Social/community

Employer direct spend

Central and state 20-25

* Excludes pharma spends

1. OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES IN THE INDIVIDUAL HEALTH

8 Sustainable Health Insurance : Global perspectives for India

Share of workforce in organised

Per cent, million Per cent; 100% = 30 million

* PSUs are public sector units with majority government stake

2. HEALTH INSURANCE FOR THE POOR:

Based on an analysis of global experiences and India’s own experiments with

Sustainable Health Insurance : Global perspectives for India 9

4. EMERGING MEDICAL value management approaches

The combination of rising income levels and awareness, increased access to

10 Sustainable Health Insurance : Global perspectives for India

Tilman Ehrbeck Gautam Kumra

Sustainable Health Insurance : Global perspectives for India 11

Share of urban consumption by income class Household income class

Per cent, Trillions, Indian rupees Thousands, Indian rupees

33 Upper middle (500 - 1,000)

14 Sustainable Health Insurance : Global perspectives for India

Exhibit 2: Healthcare consumption growth will be most rapid in urban India

Annual spending on healthcare CAGR

Billions, Indian rupees 1985-2005 2005-25

Source: McKinsey Global Institute

Today, healthcare consumption in India is largely funded by household expenditure.

Sustainable Health Insurance : Global perspectives for India 15

Winning competencies in retail health insurance

Exhibit 3: Competencies required to win in retail health insurance

Retail health insurance strategy

Deep consumer insights/segmentation

IT & Operations infrastructure

16 Sustainable Health Insurance : Global perspectives for India

Broad product portfolio

New categories of products combining three pillars of successful innovation—financing

A choice of financial mechanisms is essential to meet the needs of diverse consumer

Sustainable Health Insurance : Global perspectives for India 17

Financing/ Case/use management

Medical policy/ Health-related

Exhibit 5: Aligning financial mechanisms with risks

Debit, prepaid, Debit, prepaid,

18 Sustainable Health Insurance : Global perspectives for India

B. Retail multi-channel distribution

Building and managing new retail channels

zz Direct-response channels. These include a captive salesforce, call centres, the

1. OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES IN THE INDIVIDUAL HEALTH

2. HEALTH INSURANCE FOR THE POOR:

4. EMERGING MEDICAL value management approaches

Exhibit 2: Healthcare consumption growth will be most rapid in urban India

Exhibit 3: Competencies required to win in retail health insurance

Exhibit 5: Aligning financial mechanisms with risks