Fort Bonifacio Vs Yllas
Fort Bonifacio Vs Yllas
Fort Bonifacio Vs Yllas
FACTS:
In 2002, Yllas Lending Corporation caused the sheriff of the trial court to serve an alias
writ of seizure against FBDC. FBDC found out that in 2001, respondents filed a
complaint for Foreclosure of Chattel Mortgage with Replevin, against Tirreno, et al. In
their complaint, Yllas alleged that they lent a sum of money to Tirreno et al and in 2000
executed a Deed of Chattel Mortgage in favor of Yllas as security for the loan. The
Chattel Mortgage covered properties of the Tirreno’s restaurant and bar.
On the same day, FBDC served on the sheriff an affidavit of title and third party claim.
Despite FBDC’s service upon him of an affidavit of title and third party claim, the sheriff
proceeded with the seizure of certain items from FBDC’s premises. The sheriff delivered
the seized properties to Yllas.
FBDC questioned the propriety of the seizure and delivery of the properties to
respondents without an indemnity bond before the trial court, which decided against
FBDC. It stated that:
1. Section 22 of the lease contract between FBDC and Tirreno is void under Article
2088 of the Civil Code.
2. FBDC should have filed a separate complaint against respondents instead of filing a
motion to intervene. (The trial court quoted Bayer Phils. v. Agana )
FBDC filed a MR, which was denied. Hence this petition to review pure questions of
law.
ISSUE:
1. WON FBDC has no right of ownership over the subject properties because Section
22 of the contract of lease is void for being a pledge and a pactum commissorium;
HELD
1.NO. Respondents, as well as the trial court, contend that Section 22 constitutes
a pactum commissorium, a void stipulation in a pledge contract. FBDC, on the other
hand, states that Section 22 is merely a dacion en pago.
Section 22 of the Lease Contract between FBDC and Terrano states:
Upon the termination of this Contract or the expiration of the Lease Period without the
rentals, charges and/or damages, if any, being fully paid or settled, the LESSOR shall
have the right to retain possession of the properties of the LESSEE used or situated in
the Leased Premises and the LESSEE hereby authorizes the LESSOR to offset the
prevailing value thereof as appraised by the LESSOR against any unpaid rentals,
charges and/or damages. If the LESSOR does not want to use said properties, it may
instead sell the same to third parties and apply the proceeds thereof against any unpaid
rentals, charges and/or damages.
Articles 2085 and 2093 of the Civil Code enumerate the requisites essential to a
contract of pledge:
(1) the pledge is constituted to secure the fulfillment of a principal obligation;
(3) the persons constituting the pledge have the free disposal of their property or have
legal authorization for the purpose; and
(4) the thing pledged is placed in the possession of the creditor, or of a third person by
common agreement. Article 2088 of the Civil Code prohibits the creditor from
appropriating or disposing the things pledged, and any contrary stipulation is void.
Section 22, as worded, gives FBDC a means to collect payment from Tirreno in case of
termination of the lease contract or the expiration of the lease period and there are
unpaid rentals, charges, or damages. The existence of a contract of pledge, however,
does not arise just because FBDC has means of collecting past due rent from Tirreno
other than direct payment.
The fourth requisite, that the thing pledged is placed in the possession of the
creditor, is absent. There is non-compliance with the fourth requisite even if Tirreno’s
personal properties are found in FBDC’s real property. Tirreno’s personal properties are
in FBDC’s real property because of the Contract of Lease, which gives Tirreno
possession of the personal properties. Since Section 22 is not a contract of pledge,
there is no pactum commissorium.
On the other hand, Article 1245 of the Civil Code defines dacion en pago, or dation in
payment, as the alienation of property to the creditor in satisfaction of a debt in
money. Philippine National Bank v. Pineda held that dation in payment requires delivery
and transmission of ownership of a thing owned by the debtor to the creditor as an
accepted equivalent of the performance of the obligation. There is no dation in payment
when there is no transfer of ownership in the creditor’s favor, as when the possession of
the thing is merely given to the creditor by way of security.