GE 8 Ethics Learning Guide Midterm

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GE 8 – ETHICS

GE 8 – ETHICS

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CHRISTINE TOME MORGADO


GE 8 – ETHICS

Learning Guide 1: The Ethical


Dimension of Human Existence
Learning Objectives:
1. Identify the ethical aspect of human life and the scope of ethical thinking;
2. Define and explain the terms that are relevant to ethical thinking; and
3. Evaluate the difficulties that are involved in maintaining certain commonly-held notions on
ethics.

INTRODUCTION
In August 2007, newspapers reported what seemed to be yet another sad incident of
fraternity violence. Cris Anthony Mendez, a twenty-year-old student of the University of the
Philippines (UP), waws rushed to the hospital in the early morning hours, unconscious, with large
bruises on his chest, back, and legs. He passed away that morning, and the subsequent autopsy
report strongly suggests that his physical injuries were most probably the result of “hazing” (the
term colloquially used to refer to initiation rites in which neophytes may be subjected to various
forms of physical abuse). What exactly happened remains an open question, as none of those
who were with him that night came forward to shed light on what had transpired. Needless to say,
none of them came forward to assume responsibility for the death of Cris.

Even as the leaders of the Sigma Rho fraternity publicly denounced the death of Cris,
those members of theirs who had been with him that night vanished, avoiding and refusing to
cooperate with legal authorities. Meanwhile, UP students and the general public clamored for
justice. In a move that surprised the student body, the UP chancellor called on all fraternities to
justify their continued existence. Meanwhile, the case of the tragic death of Cris Anthony Mendez
was left unresolved. It remains that way up to this day.

No one knows just what exactly happened. No charges have been filed, no definite
testimony has been forthcoming. But there is more to this for us than just a criminal mystery.
Pondering on the death of Cris, we may find ourselves asking questions such as “What is the
value of one’s life?” “What exactly were the wrongs done to Cris by his so-called fraternity
brothers?” or perhaps even “Is there any good to fraternities?”. These questions that concern
good and bad, or right and wrong – and these are questions concerning value – are the kind of
questions that we deal with ethics.

VALUE
Ethics, generally speaking, is about matters such as the good thing that we should pursue
and the bad thing that we should avoid; the right ways in which we could or should act and the
wrong ways of acting. It is about what is acceptable and unacceptable in human behavior. It may
involve obligations that we are expected to fulfill, prohibitions that we are requires to respect, or

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ideals that we are encouraged to meet. Ethics as a subject for us to study is about determining
the grounds for the values with particular and special significance to human life.

CLARIFICATIONS AND TERMINOLOGY


Recognizing the notions of good and bad, and right and wrong, are the primary concern
of ethics. In order to start, it would be useful to clarify the following points.

Kinds of Valuation
Our first point of clarification is to recognize that there are instances when we make value
judgments that are not considered to be part of ethics. For instance, I could say that this new
movie I had just seen was a “good” one because I enjoyed it, or a song I had just heard on the
radio was a “bad” one because it had an unpleasant tone, but these are not part of a discussion
of ethics. I may have an opinion as to what is the “right” di (sawsawan) for my chicken barbeque,
or I may maintain that it is “wrong” to wear a leather vest over a Barong Tagalog, and these are
not concerns of ethics. These are valuations that fall under the domain of aesthetics. The word
“aesthetics” is derived from the Greek word aisthesis (“sense” or “feeling”) and refers to the
judgments of personal approval or disapproval that we make about what we see, hear, smell, or
taste. In fact, we often use the word “taste” to refer to the personal aesthetic preferences that we
have on these matters, such as “his taste in music” or “her taste in clothes”.

Similarly, we haves a sense of approval or disapproval concerning certain actions which


can be considered relatively more trivial in nature. Thus, for instance, I may think that it is “right”
to knock politely on someone’s door, while it is “wrong” to barge into one’s office. Perhaps I may
approve of a child who knows how to ask for something properly by saying “please” and otherwise,
disapprove of a woman that I see picking her nose in public. These and other similar examples
belong to the category of etiquette, which is concerned with right and wrong actions, but those
which might be considered not quite grave enough to belong to a discussion on ethics. To clarify
this point, we can differentiate how I may be displeased seeing a healthy young man refuse to
offer his seat on the bus to an elderly lady, but my indignation and shock would be much greater
if I were to see a man deliberately push another one out of a moving bus.

We can also consider how a notion of right and wrong actions can easily appear in a
context that is not a matter of ethics. This could also be when learning how to bake, for instance.
I am told that the right to do would be to mix the dry ingredients first, such as four or sugar before
bringing any liquids, like milk or cream; this is the right thing to do in baking, but not one that
belongs to a discussion of ethics. This could also be when learning how to play basketball. I am
instructed that it is against the rules to walk more than two steps without dribbling the ball; again,
obeying this rule to not travel is something that make sense only in the context of the game and
is not an ethical prohibition. We derive from the Greek word techne the English words “technique”
and “technical” which are often used to refer to a proper way (or right way) of doing things, but a
technical valuation (or right and wrong technique of doing things) may not necessarily be an
ethical one as these examples show.

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Recognizing the characteristics of aesthetic and technical valuation allows us to have


enough guide as to what belongs to a discussion of ethics. They involve valuations that we make
in a sphere of human actions, characterized by certain gravity and concern the human well-being
or human life itself. Therefore, matters that concern life and death such as war, capital
punishment, or abortion and matters that concern human well-being such as poverty, inequality,
or sexual identity are often included in discussions of ethics. However, this general description is
only a starting point and will require further elaboration.

One complication that can be noted is that the distinction between what belongs to ethics
and what does not is not always so clearly defined. At times, the question of what is grave or
trivial is debatable, and sometimes some of the most heated discussions in ethics could be on
the fundamental question of whether a certain sphere of human activities belongs to this
discussion. Are clothes always just a matter of taste or would provocative clothing call for some
kind of moral judgment? Can we say that a man who verbally abuses his girlfriend is simply
showing bad manners or does this behavior deserve stronger moral condemnation?

Ethics and Morals


Our second point of clarification is on the use of the words “ethics” and “morals”. This
discussion of ethics and morals would include cognates such as ethical, unethical, immoral,
amoral, morality, and so on. As we proceed, we should be careful particularly on the use of the
word “not” when applied to the words “moral” or “ethical” as this can be ambiguous. One might
say that cooking is not ethical, that is, the act of cooking does not belong to a discussion of ethics;
on the other hand, one might say that lying is not ethical, but the meaning here is that the act of
lying would be an unethical act.

Let us consider those two words further. The term “moral” may be used to refer to specific
beliefs or attitudes that people have or to describe acts that people perform. Thus, it is sometimes
said that an individual’s personal conduct is referred to as his morals, and if he fails short of
behaving properly, this can be described as immoral. However, we also have terms such as
“moral judgment” or “moral reasoning”, which suggest a more rational aspect. The term “ethics”
can be spoken of as the discipline of studying and understanding ideal human behavior and ideal
ways of thinking. Thus, ethics is acknowledged as an intellectual discipline belonging to
philosophy. However, acceptable and unacceptable behavior are also generally described as
ethical and unethical, respectively. In addition, with regard to the acceptable and unacceptable
ways of behaving in a given field, we have the term “professional ethics” (e.g., legal ethics for the
proper comportment of lawyers and other people in the legal professional; medical ethics for
doctors and nurses; and media ethics for writers and reporters).

Therefore, various thinkers and writers posit a distinction between the terms “moral” and
“ethics” and they may have good reasons for doing so, but there is no consensus as to how to
make that distinction. Ordinary conversation presents a much less rigid distinction between these
terms, and in this book, we will lean in that direction as we do not need to occupy ourselves here
with the questions of how different thinkers and writers construe that distinction. So, in this book,
we will be using the terms “ethical” and “moral” (likewise, “ethics” and “morality”) interchangeably.

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Philosophy is commonly thought of today as a particular discipline in a college


curriculum, perhaps a subject that one could take, or a course in which one could get a degree.
The word “philosophy” is rooted in the Greek words that translate to “love of wisdom” (philia
is the noun often translated into English as some form of “friendship” or “love”, while Sophia
is the noun often translated into English as “wisdom”). More specifically, the word
“philosophy” had been first used by thinkers to refer to their striving to better understand
reality in a maintained and systematic manner. Historically speaking, it can be said that
philosophy started among the ancient Greeks around two and half thousand years ago, when
certain people in the Mediterranean made the mental effort of trying to make sense of the
world and of human life in a unique way. As time passed, asking certain specific questions
would develop into specific methods; these particular topics and the ways of addressing them
established themselves as disciplines in their own right, which is why we now have the
empirical sciences such as biology or the social sciences such as psychology. Philosophy remains
as the unique discipline that asks significant questions that other fields are unable to address.
The different branches or areas of philosophy correspond to some of theses questions,
generally stated as follows: metaphysics wonders as to what constitutes the whole of reality;
epistemology asks what is our basis for determining what we know; axiology refers broadly to
the study of value and is often divided into aesthetics, which concerns itself with the value of
beauty, and ethics, which concerns itself with the value of human actions.

Descriptive and Normative


Our third point of clarification is to distinguish between a descriptive and a normative study
of ethics. A descriptive study of ethics reports how people, particularly groups, make their moral
valuations without making any judgment either for or against these valuations. This kind of study
is often the work of the social scientist: either a historian (studying different moral standards over
time) or a sociologist or a sociologist or an anthropologist (studying different moral standards
across cultures). A normative study of ethics, as is often done in philosophy or moral theology,
engages the question: What could or should be considered as the right way of acting? In other
words, a normative discussion prescribes what we ought to maintain as our standards or bases
for moral valuation. When engaging in a discussion of ethics, it is always advisable to recognize
whether one is concerned with a descriptive view (e.g., noting how filial piety and obedience are
pervasive characteristics of Chinese culture) or with a normative perspective (e.g., studying how
Confucian ethics enjoins us to obey our parents and to show filial piety).

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We need to go further. A philosophical discussion of ethics goes beyond recognizing the


characteristics of some descriptive theory; also, it does not simply accepts as correct any
normative theory. A philosophical discussion of ethics engages in a critical consideration of the
strengths and weaknesses of these theories.

Issue, Decision, Judgment, and Dilemma


As the final point of clarification, it may be helpful to distinguish a situation that calls for
moral valuation. It can be called a moral issue. For instance, imagine a situation wherein a person
cannot afford a certain item, but then the possibility presents itself for her to steal it. This is a
matter of ethics (and not just law) insofar as it involves the question of respect for one’s property.
We should add that “issue” is also often used to refer to those particular situations that are often
the source of consideration and inconclusive debate (thus, we would often hear topics such as
capital punishment and euthanasia as moral “issue”).

When one is placed in a situation and confronted by the choice of what act to perform, she
is called to make a moral decision. For instance, I choose not to take something I did not pay for.
When a person is an observer who makes an assessment on the actions or behavior of someone,
she is making a moral judgment. For instance, a friend of mine chooses to steal from a store, and
I make an assessment that it is wrong.

Finally, going beyond the matter of choosing right over wrong, or good over bad, and
considering instead the more complicated situation wherein one is torn between choosing one of
two goods or choosing between the lesser of two evils: this is referred to as a moral dilemma. We
have a moral dilemma when an individual can choose only one from a number of possible actions,
and there are compelling ethical reasons for the various choices. A mother may be conflicted
between wanting to feed her hungry child, but then recognizing that it would be wrong for her to
steal is an example of a moral dilemma.

REASONING
Why do we suppose that a certain way of acting is right and its opposite wrong? The study
of ethics is interested in question like this: Why do we decide to consider this way of acting as
acceptable while that way of acting, its opposite, is unacceptable? To put it in another way, what
reasons do we give to decide or to judge that a certain way of acting is either right or wrong?

A person’s fear of punishment or desire for reward can provide him a reason for acting in
a certain way. It is common to hear someone say: ”I did not cheat on the exam because I was
afraid that I might get caught,” or “I looked after my father in the hospital because I wanted to get
a higher allowance.” In a certain sense, fear of punishment and desire for reward can be spoken
of as giving someone a “reason” for acting in a certain way. But the question then would be: Is
this reason good enough? That is to say, this way of thinking seems to be a shallow way of
understanding reason because it des not show any true understanding of why cheating on an
exam is wrong or why looking after a member of a family is in itself a good thing. The promise of
rewards and the fear of punishments can certainly motivate us to act, but are not in themselves a
determinant of the rightness or wrongness of a certain way of acting or of the good or bad in a

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particular pursuit. It is possible to find better reasons for finding a certain way of acting either
acceptable or unacceptable?

I am in a situation wherein I could obtain a higher grade for myself by cheating. I make the
decision not to do so. Or I know that my friend was in a position to get a better grade for herself
by cheating. She refuses to do so; I then make the judgment of praising her for this. In making tis
kind of moral decision or moral judgment, the question can be asked: Why?

Asking the question “why” might bring us to no more than a superficial discussion of
rewards and punishments, as seen above, but it could also bring us to another level of thinking.
Perhaps one can rise above the particulars of a specific situation, going beyond whatever
motivation or incentive is present in this instance of cheating (or not doing so). In other words, our
thinking may take on a level of abstraction, that is, detaching itself from the particular situation
and arriving at a statement like, “Cheating is wrong,” by recognizing proper reasons for not acting
in this way. Beyond rewards and punishments, it is possible for our moral valuation – our decisions
and judgments – to be based on a principle. Thus, one nay conclude that cheating is wrong based
on a sense of fair play or respect for the importance and validity of testing. From this, we can
define principles as rationally established grounds by which one justifies and maintains her moral
decisions and judgments.

But why do we maintain one particular principle rather than another? Why should I
maintain That I should care for fair play and that cheating is, therefore, wrong? Returning to the
case of fraternity hazing where we started this chapter, why is it wrong to cause another person
physical injury or to take another’s life? We can maintain principles, but we can also ask what
good reasons for doing so. Such reasons may differ. So, for example, what makes the death of
Cris such a tragedy? One person may say that life is sacred and God-given. Another person may
declare that human life has a priceless dignity. Still another may put forward the idea that taking
another’s life does not contribute to human happiness but to human misery instead. How exactly
do we arrive at any of these claims? This is where we turn to theory. A moral theory is a systematic
attempt to establish the validity of maintaining certain moral principles. Insofar as a theory is a
system of thought or of ideas, it can also be referred to as a framework. We can use this term,
“framework”, as a theory of interconnected ideas, and at the same time, a structure through which
we can evaluate our reasons for valuing a certain decision or judgment.

There are different frameworks that can make us reflect on the principles that we maintain and
thus, the decisions and judgments we make. By studying theses, we can reconsider, clarify,
modify, and ultimately strengthen our principles, thereby informing better both our moral
judgments and moral decisions.

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Plato (427-347 BCE)

The Greek thinker Plato is credited as one of the pioneers of


philosophy as his various writings bring up and discuss carefully
and creatively some of the questions that later thinkers will fill to
be of lasting significance to humankind, such as “Can virtue be
taught?” “What is beauty?” and “What is love?” He started a
school in Athens which would be known as the Academy and is
believed to be the first institution of higher learning in the
Western world.

In The Apology of Socrates written by Plato, Socrates makes the claim that it is the greatest good
for a person to spend time thinking about and discussing with others these questions on goodness
and virtue. Hopefully, as we pursue these topics, you will come to agree with Socrates that this
effort is indeed a good thing. We will be returning to Plato later in this chapter, as he guides us
though some further difficulties.

SOURCES OF AUTHORITY
Several common ways of thinking about ethics are based on the idea that the standards
of valuation are imposed by a higher authority that commands our obedience.

LAW
It is supposed that law is one’s guide to ethical behavior. In the Philippines, Filipinos are
considered to obey the laws of the land as stated in the country’s criminal and civil codes. Making
this even more particular, in Cebu, residents are constrained to follow any provincial laws or city
ordinances. One can easily imagine this becoming even more localized to the barangay or village
level, where local or municipal layers of obligation are there for residents to follow. The term
positive law refers to the different rules and regulations that are posited or put forward by an
authority figure that require compliance.

At first glance, this seems to make a lot of sense. We recognize that there are many acts
that we immediately consider unethical (e.g., murder or theft), which we also know are forbidden
by law. Furthermore, the law is enforced by way of a system of sanctions administered through
persons and institutions, which all help in compelling us to obey. Taking the law to be the basis
of ethics has the benefit of providing us with an objective standard that is obligatory and applicable
to all. So, we would not be surprised if we were to hear someone say, “Ethics? It is simple. Just
follow whatever the law says.”

However, there are some problems with tis. Of course, we do maintain that, generally
speaking, one should obey the law. However, the idea that we are examining here is a more

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controversial one; the more radical claim that one can look to the law itself in order to determine
what is right or wrong. But the question is: can one simply identify ethics with the law?

One point to be raised is the prohibitive nature of law. The law does not tell us what we
should do; it works by constraining us from performing acts that we should not do. To put it slightly
differently, the law cannot tell us what to pursue, only what to avoid. would we satisfied thinking
about ethics solely from the negative perspective of that which we may not do, disregarding the
important aspect of a good which we could and maybe even should do, even if it were not required
of us by the law?

In line with this, we might find that there are certain ways of acting which are not forbidden
by the law, but are ethically questionable to us. For instance, a company that pads its profits by
refusing to give its employees benefits may do so within the parameters of the law. The company
can do so by refusing to hire people on a permanent basis, but offering them six-month contracts.
Constrained to work under this contractual system, the employees are thus deprived not only of
benefits, but also of job security. Here, no law is violated, yet one can wonder whether there is
something ethically questionable to this business practice. The fact that one can make such a
negative value judgment of the practice where there is no violation of the law is already a hint that
one can look to something beyond the law when making our ethical valuations.

To make this point concrete, recall the story of a toddler who had been run over by a
couple of vehicles. While there were many passers-by who witnesses what had happened, for
quite a long while, no one did anything to help. The child later died in the hospital. The law does
not oblige people to help others in need, so one of these passers-by were guilty of breaking any
law. However, many people reacting to this sad news report share a sense that those passers-by
were somewhat ethically culpable in their negligence. In view of all this, perhaps one should think
of ethics in a way that does not simply identify it with obedience to the law. Later, we shall see
how the concept of law is creatively utilized in the Deontology of Immanuel Kant in a more
ethically significant way.

RELIGION

“Love the Lord, Your God, therefore, and always heed this charge: his statutes, decrees, and
commandments.” (New American Bible)

This verse is the first of Chapter 11 of the book of Deuteronomy. It expresses a claim that
many people of a religious sensibility find appealing and immediately valid: the idea that one is
obliged to obey her God in all things. As a foundation for ethical values, this is referred to as the
divine command theory. The divinity called God, Allah, or Supreme Being commands and one is
obliged to obey her Creator. There are persons and texts that one believes are linked to the
Divine. By listening to these figures and reading these writings, an individual discovers how the
Divine wants her to act. Further, someone maintaining a more radical form of this theory might go

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beyond these instruments of divine revelation and claim that God “spoke” to her directly to instruct
her what to do.

At first glance, this seems to make a lot of sense. Many of us had been brought up with
one form of religious upbringing or another, so it is very possible that there is a strong inclination
in us to refer to our religious background to back up our moral valuations. We are presented with
a more-or-less clear code of prohibitions and many of these prohibitions given by religion – “thou
shall not kill’, “Thou shall not steal”’ and “Thou shall not commit adultery” – seem to intuitively
coincide with our sense of what ethics should rightly demand. In addition, there is an advance
here over the law because religion is not simply prohibitive, but it also provides ideals to pursue.
For instance, one may be called to forgive those who sinned against him or be charitable to those
who have less. Further, taking religion as basis of ethics has the advantage of providing us with
not only a set of commands but also a Supreme Authority that can inspire and compel our
obedience in a way that nothing else can. The Divine can command absolute obedience on one’s
part as the implications of her actions involve her ultimate destiny. Thus, we would not be
surprised if we were to hear someone say, “Ethics? It is simple. Just follow whatever your religion
says.”

However, there are some problems with this. First, on the practical level, we realize the
presence of a multiplicity of religions. Each faith demands differently from its adherents, which
would apparently result in conflicting ethical standards. For instance, certain religions have
prohibitions concerning what food may be consumed, while others do not share the same
constraints. Are we then compelled to judge others negatively given their different morality? Are
we called upon to convert them toward our own faith? how about the problem of realizing that not
everyone is devout or maintains a religious faith? Would we be compelled to admit then that if
religion is the basis of morality, some people would simply have no moral code? Differences,
however, are not confined to being problematic of varying religious traditions. Experience teaches
us that sometimes even within one and the same faith, difference can be a real problem. For
instance, we can easily imagine a number of Christians agreeing that they should read and find
their inspiration from the Bible; but we could also easily imagine them disagreeing on which
particular lines they need to focus on. Which of the passages from the sacred Scriptures are they
supposed to follow? all of them or only some? If so, which one? Which pastor am I supposed to
obey if I find them debating over how to interpret the scriptures, not to mention ethical issues?
The problem of difference thus remains.

Second, on what may be called a more conceptual level, we can see a further problem
where one requires the believer to clarify her understanding of the connection between ethics and
the Divine. This problem was first elucidated in the history of thought by Plato in his dialogue title
Euthyphro.

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Euthyphro
Plato

EUTHYPHRO: But I would certainly say that the holy is what all the gods love,
and that the opposite, what all the gods hate, is unholy.
SOCRATES: Well, Euthyphro, should we examine this in turn to see if it is
true? Or should we let it go, accept it from ourselves or anyone
else without more ado, and agree that a thing is so if only
someone says it is? Or should we examine what a person means
when he says something?
EUTHYPHRO: Of course. I believe, though, that this time what I say is true.
SOCRATES: Perhaps we shall learn better, my friend. For consider: is the
holy loved by the gods because it is holy? Or is it holy because
it is loved by the gods?

In the exchange between Socrates and Euthyphro, the question is raised as to how one
supposed to define “holiness”. Euthyphro puts forward the idea that what is holy is loved by the
gods. Socrates calls this into question by asking for the following clarification: Is it holy only
because it is loved by the gods, or it is holy in itself and that is why it is loved by the gods? the
relevance of these questions to our discussion becomes clear if rephrased this way: Is it the case
that something is right only because God commanded it, or it is the case that something is right
in itself and that is why God commanded it?

If we presume that taking another’s life is wrong, we can ask the question: It is the case
that this is so only because God commanded it, or that killing is in itself wrong, and that is the
reason why God commanded it? If we were to accept that it is wrong to take another’s life because
God commanded it, we are left with the difficult conclusion thar there is nothing inherently wrong
with killing. It is only because God said so – “Thou shall not kill” p that we consider such an act
wrong. It would seem then that there is something arbitrary about it all, in the sense that God
could will whatever He wants. On that basis and nothing further, we have the distinction between
right from wrong. As a further disturbing thought, we may find an occasion wherein we could
believe that God is suddenly commanding us to do otherwise – that killing might now become
acceptable. History reveals many sad instances of people believing that God so wills it, allowing
them to kill their fellow human beings in His name. The Crusades of the Middle Ages are a tragic
case in point. Can we be satisfied with this idea that the divine will could be arbitrary?

If, on the other hand, we were to accept that killing is in itself wrong, then we acknowledge
that perhaps there are standards of right and wrong that we can refer to independently of God.
But if this is the case, then we actually do not obey a command because God commanded it, but
are looking for those objective standards of right and wrong, to which God simply concurs. one
would not even have to think in terms of obeying God – or even believing in Him – in order to
abide by such ethical standards.

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Having said this, we maintain that, generally speaking, it is good thing for a person of faith
to abide by the teachings of her particular religion. But the divine command theory demands more
than this as it requires us to identify the entire sense of right and wrong with what religion dictates.
The conceptual problem we have seen and the practical difficulties of simply basing ethics on the
divine command are reasons enough for us to wonder whether we have to set this way of thinking
aside. Now, let us clarify this point: Our calling into question of the divine command theory is not
a calling into question of one’s belief in God; it is not intended to be a challenge to one’s faith.
Instead, it is an invitation to consider whether there may be more creative and less problematic
ways of seeing the connection between faith and ethics, rather than simply equating what is
ethical with whatever one takes to be commanded by God.

Later, we shall see one way that we can have a more subtle and yet powerful presentation
of how one’s faith may contribute to ethical thought when we look at the Natural Law theory of
Thomas Aquinas.

CULTURE
Our exposure to different societies and their cultures makes us aware that there are ways
of thinking and valuing that are different from our own, that there is in fact a wide diversity of how
different people believe it is proper to act.

Differences in Culture
❑ Aesthetic differences (Japanese art vs. Indian art)
❑ Religious differences (Buddhism vs. Christianity)
❑ Etiquette differences (conflicting behaviors regarding dining practices)
*nudity can be more taboo in one culture than in another
*relationships between men and women can show a wide variety across different cultures,
ranging from greater liberality and equality on one hand, to greater inequality and a relation
of dominance versus submission on the other.
From the reality of diversity, it is possible for someone to jump to the further claim that the sheer
variety at work in the different ways of valuation means there is no single universal standard for
such valuations, and that this holds true as well in the realm of ethics. Therefore, what is
ethically acceptable or unacceptable is relative to, or that is to say, dependent on one’s culture.
This position is referred to as cultural relativism.

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There is something appealing to this way of thinking because cultural relativism seems to
conform to what we experience, which is the reality of the differences in how cultures make their
ethical valuations. Second, by taking one’s culture as the standard, we are provided a basis for
our valuations. Third, this teaches us to be tolerant of others from different cultures as we realize
that we are in no position to judge whether the ethical thought or practice of another culture is
acceptable or unacceptable. In turn, our own culture’s moral code is neither superior to nor inferior
to any other, but they would provide us the standards that are appropriate and applicable to us.
So, we would not be surprised if we were to hear someone say, “Ethics? It is simple. Just follow
whatever your culture says.”

This discussion would not be complete if ewe were to ignore the topic of Filipino values. Early
in our upbringing, we were taught about certain valuable traits that we say are characteristics of
Filipinos, such as respect for the elderly, close family ties, a sense of hospitality, and also of solidarity
with others at times of distress. We proudly say that we value these qualities of Filipinos. These are
indeed laudable qualities, but could we simply identify ethics with the positive valuation that we make
of these qualities?

JAMES RACHELS PRESENTED SOME DIFFICULTIES ABOUT CULTURAL RELATIVISM.


1) The argument of cultural relativism is premised on the reality of difference. Because different
culture has different moral codes, we cannot say that any one moral code is the right one.
But is it a case of the presence of disagreement means there are no right or wrong answers?
Isn’t it a common experience to be confronted by a disagreement between persons and then
to have the conflict clarified later as to who is right or wrong? In other words, disagreement
may mean that the question of who I right or wrong is not immediately evident, but it does not
necessarily mean that there is no correct resolution.
2) Under the cultural relativism, we realize that we are in no position to render any kind of
judgment on the practices of another culture. This seems to be a generous and an open-
minded way of respecting others.
But what if the practice seems to call for comment? What if a particular African tribe thought
it is advantageous and therefore right for them to wipe out a neighboring people through a
terrible practice of genocide? What if some Middle Eastern country was highly repressive
toward women reaching to the point of violence? What about the traditional practice of head-
hunting that is still maintained by certain societies in the Cordilleras? Are we in no position to
judge any of this s wrong? Would we be satisfied with concluding that we cannot judge another
culture? But this is ne of the implications of cultural relativism.
3) Under the cultural relativism, we realize that we are in no position to render judgment on the
practices of even our own culture. If our culture was the basis for determining right and wrong,
we would be unable to say that something within our cultural practice was problematic,
precisely because we take our culture to be the standard for making such judgment.
If we came from a particular society wherein there is a tradition of arranged marriage, we
would simply have to accept that this is how we do things. But what if we are not satisfied by
this conclusion? We may be proud and glad about identifying certain traits, values, and
practices of our culture, but we may not necessarily laud or wish to conform to all of them. It
is possible that we may not be satisfied with the thought of not being able to call our own
culture into question.
4) We can maintain it only by following the presumption of culture as a single, clearly-defined
substance or as something fixed and already determined.

CHRISTINE TOME MORGADO


GE 8 – ETHICS

Now, it is always possible to find examples of a certain culture having a unique practice or
way of life and to distinguish it from other cultures’ practices, but it is also becoming
increasingly difficult to determine what exactly defines one’s culture.

JAMES RACHELS NOTES ON THE INTERESTING BUT NOT SEEMINGLY SCANDALOUS


PRACTICES OF THE ESKIMOS:
➢ They practice infanticide.
➢ They lend their wives to their visitors as a sign of hospitality.
➢ Abandon their old and feeble people in the snow to die.

Is my culture “Filipino”? What if I identify more with a smaller subset within this group, if,
for example, I am Igorot? Is this then my culture? Why not go further and define my culture as
being Kankana-ey rather than Ibaloi? Is this then my culture? The point here precisely is the
question: What am I supposed to take as “my culture?”

We can think of many other examples that reflect the same problem. Let us say that my
father is from Pampanga and my mother is from Leyte, and I was brought up in Metro Manila:
What is my culture? On one hand, let us say that my father is American and my mother is Filipina,
and I was brought up in San Diego, California, but I am currently studying in a university in the
Philippines: What am I supposed to take as “my culture”?

In an increasingly globalized world, the notion of a static and well-defined culture gives
way to greater flexibility and integration. One result of this is to call into question an idea like
cultural relativism, which only makes sense if one could imagine a clear-cut notion of what can be
defined as my culture.

We can conclude this criticism of cultural relativism by pointing out how it is a problem in
our study of ethics because it tends t deprive us of our use of critical thought. On the positive side,
cultural relativism promotes a sense of humility, that is, urging us not to imagine that our own
culture is superior to another. Such humility , however, should go hand in hand with a capacity for
a rational, critical discernment that is truly appreciative of human values. Unfortunately, what
happens in cultural relativism is that it basically renders us incapable of discerning about the
values we may wish to maintain as we are forced to simply accept whatever our culture gives us.
It keeps us from exploring whether there are values that are shared between cultures; it keeps us
from comparing and judging – either positively or negatively – the valuations that are made by
different cultures. As previously mentioned, this presumes that we can determine culture in the
first place, which becomes increasingly questionable in a transcultural world.

As with our earlier discussions on law and religion, this is not to set aside culture entirely
as if it were irrelevant. Instead, we are urged to think more carefully about how one’s
understanding of her belonging to a certain culture could be more fruitful and meaningful for her
ethical discernment.

Returning to the Case of Cris:


Can one claim that fraternities have their own “culture” that deserves respect? What
would be strong and weak points of this claim?

CHRISTINE TOME MORGADO


GE 8 – ETHICS

SENSES OF THE SELF

THREE (3) THEORIES ABOUT ETHICS THAT CENTER ON THE SELF

SUBJECTIVISM
The starting point of subjectivism is the recognition that the individual thinking person (the
subject) is at the heart of all moral valuations. She is the one who is confronted with the situation
and is burdened with the need to make a decision or judgment. From this point, subjectivism leaps
to the more radical claim that the individual is the sole determinant of what is morally good or bad,
right or wrong. A number of clichés familiar to us would echo this idea:

“No one can tell me what is right and wrong.”


“No one knows my situation better than myself.”
“I am entitled to my own opinion.”
“It is good if I say that it is good.”

There is something appealing about these statements because they seem express a
cherished sense of personal independence. But a close look at these statements may reveal
problems and in seeing these, we see the problems of subjectivism.

“No one can tell me what is right and wrong.” In a sense, there is some validity to this.
No one can compel another to accept a certain value judgment if she herself does not concur with
it. However, we know that this statement cannot be taken as absolute. We realize, in many
instances, that we had maintained an idea or an opinion that further discussion reveals it was
actually erroneous. We realize that we can be mistaken and that we can be corrected by others.
Why is this not also possibly applicable when we are speaking of ethics?

“No one knows my situation better than myself.” Once again, in a sense, there is some
validity to this. This particular person who is put in a certain situation, which calls for a decision,
has knowledge of the factors that affect her situation and decision. But to take this fact as a ground
for not listening to others is to have a mentality that imagines that one’s own situation or concern
is so personal and unique that there is no way another person can possibly understand her and
give her any meaningful advice. But does not it make greater sense to recognize the reality that
many human experiences are common and others may have something useful to suggest?

“I am entitled to my own opinion.” Here, once again, is a valid point that is often
misused. Certainly, each person has the right to believe what she believes and has the right to
express this. But this right is often stubbornly misconstrued as some kind of immunity from
criticism and correction. A bigoted racist has an opinion against anyone who is dark-skinned, an
anti-Semite has an opinion against Jews, and a misogynist has an opinion against women. We
realize that these opinions are highly problematic because there is no basis for considering any
of these groups of people as inferior. We would rightly be indignant because he is of the opinion
that women are inferior to men. But isn’t he entitled to his own opinion? To insist on one’s right in

CHRISTINE TOME MORGADO


GE 8 – ETHICS

to having opinions whatever these happen to be is to exhibit a closed-mindedness that rightly


invites censure from someone trying to think more critically about values.

“It is good if I say that it is good.” With this line, we get to the heart of the problem with
subjectivism. The statement implies: “It is my personal consideration of X as good that makes X
good. X is good on the basis of my saying so.” The problem is, “What is my basis for saying X is
good?” This renders subjectivism an untenable view for someone who is interested in ethics. It
takes the fact that I am the subject making the valuation and uses this fact as the very basis for
that valuation. But when “I”, as subject, am asking what is right and wrong, good or bad, with
subjectivism, there is no other basis that I can look toward.

PSYCHOLOGICAL EGOISM

Let us consider another cliché. It would go like this: “Human beings are naturally self-
centered, so all our actions are always already motivated by self-interest.”
This is the stance taken by psychological egoism, which is a theory that describes the
underlying dynamic behind all human actions. As a descriptive theory, it does not direct one to
act in any particular way. Instead, it points out that there is already an underlying basis for how
one acts. The ego or self has its desires and interests, and all our actions are geared toward
satisfying these interests.

This may not seem particularly problematic when we consider many of the actions that we
do on a day-to-day basis. I watch a movie or read a book because I want to, or go for a walk and
do some window shopping in the mall because I enjoy that. I take a certain course in college
because I think it will benefit me, or I join an organization because I will get some good out of it.
we do things in pursuit of our own self-interest all the time.

But what about other types of behavior that we would commonly say are directed
toward the other? Consider, for example, an act of generosity, in which someone helps a friend
with her thesis rather than play videogames or someone makes use of her free Saturday helping
build houses for Gawad Kalinga. The psychological egoist would maintain that underlying such
apparently other-directed behavior is a self-serving desire, even if one does not acknowledge it
or is even conscious of it. Perhaps he only helped his friend with her thesis because he is trying
to impress her. Perhaps she helps out with Gawad Kalinga because this is how she relieves her
sense of guilt at being well-off compared to others. The idea is that whether or not the person
admits it, one’s actions are ultimately always motivated by self-serving desire.

STRONG POINTS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL EGOISM


1. SIMPLICITY. When an idea is marked by simplicity, it has a unique appeal to it; a theory that
conveniently identifies a single basis that will somehow account for all actions is a good
example of this.
2. PLAUSIBILITY. It is plausible that self-interest is behind a person’s actions. It is clearly the
motivation behind many of the actions one performs which are obviously self-serving; it could
very well also be the motivation behind an individual’s seemingly other-directed actions. It is
not only plausible, but also irrefutable.

CHRISTINE TOME MORGADO


GE 8 – ETHICS

3. IRREFUTABLE. Psychological egoism is an irrefutable theory because there is no way to try


to answer it without being confronted by the challenge that, whatever one might say, there is
the self-serving motive at the root of everything. The psychological egoist can and will insist
on his stand no matter how one might try to object. This opens up two questions: first,
“Because they both are imply fulfilling what would serve them, they are of equal moral worth.
In judging these persons and these actions, we can ask ourselves: Do we want to give up on
our moral intuition concerning the goodness and value of generosity versus the wrongness of
selfishness just for the sake of this theory? Most significantly, turning to the nest consequence
when we move from moral judgment to moral decision, the question is: How then are we
supposed to decide? Given psychological egoism, it does not matter. We only think that we
have a choice but actually whatever way that we end up acting, our minds have actually
already determined what serves our interest best.

So psychological egoism, when we look at its consequences, leads us to a cynical view


of humanity, to a gloomy description of human nature, finally to a useless theory for someone
who is concerned with asking herself what is the right thing to do. This is because it ends up
nullifying the possibility of any normative ethics in its view of the already-determined human being.
ETHICAL EGOISM
Ethical egoism differs from psychological egoism in that does not suppose all our actions
are already inevitably self-serving. Instead, ethical egoism prescribes that we should make our
own ends, our own interests, as the single overriding concern. We may act in a way that is
beneficial to others, but we should do that only if it ultimately benefits us. This theory
acknowledges that it is a dog-eat-dog world out there and given that, everyone ought to put herself
at the center. One should consider herself as the priority and not allow any other concerns, such
as the welfare of other people, to detract from this pursuit.

It is clear that we have our interests and desires, and would want them satisfied. Thus,
this question can be asked: Why should I have any concern about the interests of others? In a
sense, this question challenges in a fundamental way the idea of not just a study of ethics, but
also the effort of being ethical: Why not just look after one’s self? To examine ethical egoism, we
will take a look into Plato’s Republic, which is Plato’s response to the assertion that one should
only care about one’s own interests.

The Myth of Gyges


Plato’s Republic (359c-360d)

Now, that those who practice justice do so involuntarily and because they have not the
power to be unjust will best appear if we imagine something of this kind: having given both to
the just and the unjust power to do what they will, let us watch and see whether desire will
lead the,; then we shall discover in the very act the just and unjust man to be proceeding long
the same road, following their interest, which all natures deem to be their good, and are only
diverted into the path of justice by the force of law. The liberty which we are supposing may
be most completely given to them in the form of such power as is said to have been possessed
by Gyges, the ancestor of Croesus the Lydian. According to the tradition, Gyges was a
shepherd in the service of the king of Lydia; there was a great storm, and an earthquake made
an opening in the earth at the place where he was feeding his flock. Amazed at the sight,
CHRISTINE TOME MORGADO
GE 8 – ETHICS

he descended into the opening, where, among other marvels, he beheld a hollow
brazen horse, having doors, at which he stooping and looking in saw a dead body
od stature, as appeared to him, more than human, and having nothing on but a
gold; this he took from the finger of the dead and reascended. Now the shepherds
met together, according to custom, that they might send their monthly report about
the flocks to the king; into their assembly he came having the ring on his finger,
and as he was sitting among them, he chanced to turn the collet of the ring inside
his hand, when instantly he became invisible to the rest of the company and they
began to speak of him as if he were no longer present. He was astonished at this,
and again touching the ring he turned to collet outwards and reappeared; he made
several trials of the ring, and always with the result – when he turned the colt
inwards, he became invisible, when outwards he reappeared. Whereupon he
contrived to be chosen one of the messengers who were sent to the court; whereas
soon as he arrived, he seduced the queen, and with her help conspired against
the king and slew him, and took the the kingdom. Suppose now that there were
two such magic rings, and the just put on one of them and the unjust the other; no
man can be imagined to be of such an iron nature that he would stand fast in
justice. No man would keep his hands off what was not his own when he could
safely take what he liked out of the market, or go into houses and lie with any one
at his pleasure, or kill or release from prison whom he would, and in all respects
be like a God among men. Then the actions of the just would be as the actions of
the unjust; they would both come at last to the same point. And this we may truly
affirm to be a great proof that a man is just, not willingly or because he thinks that
justice is any good to him individually, necessity, for wherever anyone thinks that
he can safely be unjust, there he is unjust. For all men believe in their hearts that
injustice is far more profitable to the individual than justice, and he who argues as
I have been supposing, will say that they are right. If you could imagine any one
obtaining this power of becoming invisible, and never doing any wrong or touching
what was another’s, he would be thought by the lookers-on to be a most wretched
idiot, although they would praise him to one another’s faces, and keep up
appearances with one another from a fear that they too might suffer injustice.

CHRISTINE TOME MORGADO


GE 8 – ETHICS

In the Republic, the characters are engaged in a discussion about justice. Socrates gets
his companions to first consider the question, “What is justice?” and later, “Why should one be
just?” In Book 2 of the text, the character named Glaucon provides a powerful restatement of the
case for egoism by way of a myth. The myth describes a man, a figure named Gyges, who obtains
the power to make himself invisible at will and how he quickly learns how to use this power for his
own desires rather than for any notion of “justice”. Glaucon then asks plaintively, would not we
ourselves act with impunity if we had this power to be invisible? To put it simply, if we would never
be called in order to account for our actions, perhaps we, too, would just choose to do whatever
we want. It seems, Glaucon concludes, that if we are to be honest with ourselves, we would admit
that what we really care for is our own self-interest rather than some notion of justice or moral
goodness.

It will take Socrates the rest of the ten books of the Republic to try to answer this most
important question on whether the pursuit of ethics is worthwhile. Does it make sense to be
ethical? The beginning of Socrates’s answer can be found in Book 4, in which Socrates presents
how the good human life stems from a proper harmony of the part of the soul/. Harmony requires
a certain ordering, a hierarchical system in which reason as the “highest” part is in charge dutifully
followed by the “lower” parts of the soul of will and appetite. The presence of such an internal
ordering that one consciously strives to accomplish is what it means for justice to be present in
the individual. On the other hand, the absence of order or the lack of harmony, with desires and
appetites running rampant, results in acts of injustice. This point is developed in Book 9 with the
portrayal of the tyrant. The presence of internal disorder in a person placed in power turns the
seemingly pleasant prospect of doing whatever one wants – of acting with impunity – into a
terrifying portrait of a character without self-control or self-possession. Being nothing more than
a disordered and nervous jumble of cravings, such a person would be so obsessed with these
longings than to bother caring about how this might affect others. Situating this story into a larger
social and political context, the connection can be made between one’s pursuit of one’s own
interest with abuse of power that may easily result in the misery of millions. The question then
that we can ask is: Do we still want to say, in the face of what history has shown us of tyrants and
dictators, that to act with impunity is desirable?

This is what ethical egoism ultimately translates into – not just some pleasant pursuit of
one’s own desires, but the imposition of a will to power that I potentially destructive of both the
self and of others. One can take on this view, if one wishes, but it is also possible to wonder
whether there is a way of recognizing our being in the world with others, of thinking of our own
well-being concomitantly with the well-being of others. Perhaps this is what the study of ethics is
all about.

Returning to the Case of Cris:


Do you think it is acceptable that those responsible for the death of Cris got away with
murder? Do you think it is right for someone to look after his or her own welfare over any other
concern such as justice?

CHRISTINE TOME MORGADO


GE 8 – ETHICS

Evaluating Myself 1

I. Identification
Directions: Read and understand each question carefully. Write the correct answer.
1. What kind of questions that we deal with in ethics?
2. What refers to the rationally established grounds by which one justifies and maintains her
moral decisions and judgments?
3. What refers to the described acts that people performed?
4. What word concerns itself with the value of human actions?
5. What study of ethics recommends what we ought to maintain as our standards for moral
valuation?
6. What is the valid reason why cheating is wrong based on principles?
7. What branch of philosophy refers to the study of value?
8. What is the first institution of higher learning in the Western world?
9. What theory systematically attempts to establish the validity of maintain certain moral
principles?
10. What kind of valuation use the 5 senses in judging a certain situation or preferences?

II. Essay (15points)


1. Why aesthetics, etiquette, and technical valuation are not part of the discussions of ethics?
Elaborate your answer.
2. We have three sources of authority, the law, religion, and culture. Can we identify ethics by
these authorities? Why? Elaborate your answer.
3. What is/are the difference between psychological egoism and ethical egoism?

Evaluating Tool
Category Exemplary (5) Proficient (4) Apprentice (3) Novice (2)
Ideas Excels in responding Clearly states a Adequate but Does not have a
to assignment. thesis/central weaker and less clear central
Interesting, idea, but may effective, idea or does not
demonstrates have minor possibly respond
sophistication of lapses in responding less appropriately to
thought. Central development. well to the assignment.
idea/thesis is clearly Begins to assignment. Thesis may be
communicated, worth acknowledge Presents central too vague or
developing; limited the complexity idea in general obvious to be
enough to be of central idea terms, often developed
manageable. and the depending on effectively
possibility of platitudes or
other points of cliches
view.

CHRISTINE TOME MORGADO


GE 8 – ETHICS

Organization Uses a logical Shows a logical May list ideas or May have
and structure appropriate progression of arrange them random
Coherence to the subject, ideas and uses randomly rather organization,
purpose, audience fairly than using any lacking internal
and disciplinary field. sophisticated evident logical paragraph
Sophisticated transitional structure. May coherence and
transitional sentences devices; e.g., use transitions, using few or
often develop one may move from but they are inappropriate
idea from the previous least to more likely to be transitions.
one or identify their important idea. sequential (first, Paragraphs
logical second, third) may lack topic
rather than sentences or
logic-based. main ideas, or
While each may be too
paragraph may general or too
relate to central specific to be
idea, logic is not effective.
always clear.
Paragraphs
have topic
sentences but
may be overly
general, and
arrangement of
sentences
within
paragraphs.
Style Chooses words for Generally, uses Uses relatively May be too
their precise meaning words vague and vague and
and uses an accurately and general words, abstract, or very
appropriate level of effectively, but may use some personal and
specificity. Sentence may sometimes inappropriate specific. Usually
style fits paper's be too general. language. contains several
audience and Sentences Sentence awkward or
purpose. Sentences generally clear, structure ungrammatical
are varied, yet clearly well structured, generally sentences;
structured and and focused, corrects, but sentence
carefully focused, not though some sentences may structure is
long rambling may be be wordy, simple or
awkward or unfocused, monotonous.
ineffective. repetitive, or
confusing.
Mechanics Almost entirely free of May contain a Usually contains Usually contains
spelling, punctuation, few errors, several either many

CHRISTINE TOME MORGADO


GE 8 – ETHICS

and grammatical which may mechanical mechanical


errors. annoy the errors, which errors or a few
reader but not may temporarily important errors
impede confuse the that block the
understanding. reader but not reader's
impede the understanding
overall and ability to
understanding. see connections
between
thought
Typical 92-95 87-91 83-86 76-82
Grade (93) (90) (84) (78)

CHRISTINE TOME MORGADO


GE 8 – ETHICS

Learning Guide 2: Utilitarianism


LEARNING OUTCOMES:
1. Discuss the basic principles of utilitarian ethics;
2. Distinguish between two u8tilitarioan models: the quantitative model of Jeremy Bentham and
the qualitative model of John Stuart Mill; and
3. Apply utilitarianism in understanding and evaluating local and international scenarios.

INTRODUCTION
On January 25, 2015, the 84th Special action Force (SAF) conducted a police operation at
Tukanalipao, Mamasapano in Maguindanao. Also known as Plan Exodus, it was intended to serve
an arrest warrant for Zulkifli bin Hir or Marwan, a Malaysian terrorist and bomb-maker who had a
$5 million bounty on his head. This mission eventually led to a clash between the Philippine
National Police’s (PNP) SAF, on the one hand, and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters
(BIFF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) on the other. Although the police operation
was “successful” because of the death of Marwan, the firefight that ensued claimed sixty-seven
li8ves including forty-four SAF troopers, eighteen MILF Fighters, and five civilians. However, the
relatively high number of SAF members killed in this operation caught the attention of many
including the Philippine media and the legislature.

In one of the Congress investigations that followed this tragic mission, then Senate
President Frankin Drilon and Senator Francios Escudero debated the public hearing of an audio
recording of an alleged conversation that attempted to cover up the massacre of the PNP-SAF
commandos. Drilon questioned the admissibility of these recordings as evidence under the Anti-
Wire Tapping Law whereas Escudero cited the legal; brief of the Free Legal Assistance Group
(FLAG) arguing that the Anti-Wire Tapping Law protects only the recording and interception of
private communications. Drilon cited Section 4 of the Anti-Wire Tapping Act (RA 4200) and
explained that “any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance,
purport, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or information therein contained or secured
by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence
in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation”. Senator Grace
Poe, previous chairperson of the Senate committee on public order and dangerous drugs, argued
otherwise. “Sinabi n ani Senator Drilon na ito daw ay illegal, na hindi daw pwede, na ako daw ay
pwedeng maging liable kung ito daw ay ipapakinig ko sa Senado, ako naman, ano bai tong mga
batas na ito?... Ang mga batas na ito ay para malaman natin ang katotohanan at magkaroon tayo
ng hustisiya. Itong mga anti-wiretapping or mga recording nag anito, kung hindi pwedeng ilabas
sa publiko, pwede naming gawing basehan sa executive session.”

Senator Poe’s response leads us ro ask: Can the government infringe individual rights? If
it is morally permissible for the government to infringe individual rights, when can the government

CHRISTINE TOME MORGADO


GE 8 – ETHICS

do so? Does it become legitimate to sacrifice individual rights when considering the greatest
benefit for the greatest number of people?

This case exposes the aftermath of the Mamasapano incident and the Senate
investigations. The Senate inquiry proceedings raised questions on the possibility of wire-tapping
and the intrusion to one’s right to privacy. While the 1987 Philippine Constitution does protect
one’s right to private communication, it did provide some exemptions to its inviolability. These
exemptions include a lawful order of the court and/or issues involving public safety and order. In
fact, RA 4200 (or the Anti-Wire Tapping Law) and RA 9372 (or the Human Security Act of 2007)
both provided exemptions to the inviolability of the right to privacy in instances of treason,
espionage, rebellion, and sedition. While this is certainly a legal issue, can it also constitute a
moral concern? By raising the distinction between moral and legal issues and concerns, do you
think that these two are different? To simplify whether wiretapping is morally permissible or not.
On what instances is wiretapping morally permissible and on what instances is it not morally
permissible?

When considering the moral permissibility of wiretapping, we calculate the costs and
benefits of wiretapping. If we calculate the costs and benefits of our actions, then we are
considering an ethical theory that gives premium to the consequences of actions as the basis of
morality and as such is utilitarianism. Utilitarianism is an ethical theory that argues for the
goodness of pleasure and the determination of right behavior based on the usefulness of the
action’s consequences. This means that pleasure is good and that the goodness of an action is
determined by its usefulness. Putting these ideas together, utilitarianism claims that one’s actions
and behavior are good in as much as they are directed toward the experience of the greatest
pleasure over pain for the greatest number of persons. Its root word is “utility”, which refers to the
usefulness of the consequences of one’s action and behavior. When we argue that wiretapping
is permissible because doing so results in better public safety, then we are arguing in a utilitarian
way. It is utilitarian because we argue that some individual rights can be sacrificed for the sake of
the greater happiness of the many. Jeremy Bentham (1748 – 1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806 –
1873) are the3 two foremost utilitarian thinkers.

Their system of ethics emphasizes the consequences of actions. This means that the
goodness or the badness of an action is based on whether it is useful in contributing to a specific
purpose for the greatest number of people. Utilitarianism is consequentialist. This means that
moral value of actions and decisions is based solely nor greatly on the usefulness of their
consequences; it is the usefulness of results that determines whether the action or behavior is
good or bad. While this is the case, not all consequentialist theories are utilitarian. For Bentham
and Mill, utility refers to a way of understanding the results of people’s actions. Specifically, they
are interested on whether these actions contribute or not to the total amount of resulting happiness
in the world. The utilitarian value pleasure and happiness; this means that the usefulness of
actions is based on its promotion of happiness. Bentham and Mill understand happiness as the
experience of pleasure for the greatest number of persons, even at the expense of some
individual’s rights.

CHRISTINE TOME MORGADO


GE 8 – ETHICS

Jeremy Bentham (1748 – 1832)

Jeremy Bentham was born on February 15, 1748 in London,


England. He was the teacher of James Mill, father of John Stuart Mill.
Bentham first wrote about the greatest happiness principle of ethics and
was known for a system of penal management called panopticon. He was
an advocate of economic freedom, women’s rights, and the separation of
church and state, among others. He was also an advocate of animal rights
and the abolition of slavery, death penalty, and corporal punishment for
children. Bentham denied individual legal rights nor agreed with the natural
law. On his death on June 6, 1832, Bentham donated his corpse to the
University College London, where his auto-icon is in public display up to
this day to serve as his memorial.

THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY


In the book An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789), Jeremy
Bentham begins by arguing that our actions are governed by two “sovereign masters” – which he
calls pleasure and pain. These “masters” are given to us by nature to help us determine what is
good or bad and what ought to be done and not; they fasten our choices to their throne.

In determining the moral preferability of actions, Bentham provides a framework for


evaluating pleasure and pain commonly called felicific calculus. Felicific calculus is a common
currency framework that calculates the pleasure that some actions can produce. In this
framework, an action can be evaluated on the basis of intensity or strength of pleasure; duration
or length of the experience of pleasure; certainty, uncertainty, or the likelihood that pleasure will
occur; and propinquity, remoteness, or how soon there will be pleasure. These indicators allow
us to measure pleasure and pain in an action. However, when we are to evaluate our tendency
to choose these actions, we need to consider two more dimensions: fecundity or the chance it
has of being followed by sensations of the opposite kind. Lastly, when considering the number of
persons who are affected by pleasure or pain, another dimension is to be considered – extent.
Felicfic calculus allows the evaluation of all actions and their resultant pleasure. This means that
actions are evaluated on this single scale regardless of preferences and values. In this sense,
pleasure and pain can only quantitatively differ but not qualitatively differ from other experiences
of pleasure and pain accordingly.

Mill dissents from Bentham’s single scale of pleasure. He thinks that the principle of utility
must distinguish pleasures qualitatively and not merely quantitatively. For Mill, utilitarianism
cannot promote the kind of pleasures appropriate to pigs or to any other animals. He thinks that
there are higher intellectual and lower base pleasures. We, as moral agents, are capable of
searching and desiring higher intellectual pleasures more than pigs are capable of. We undermine
ourselves if we only and primarily desire sensuality; this is because we are capable of higher
intellectual pleasurable goods. For Mill, crude bestial pleasures, which are appropriate for
animals, are degrading to us because we are by nature not easily satisfied by pleasures only for

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pigs. Human pleasures are qualitatively different from animal pleasures. It is unfair to assume that
we merely pursue pleasures appropriate for beasts even if there are instances when we choose
to pursue such base pleasures. To explain this, Mill recognizes the empirical fact that there are
different kinds of pleasures:

It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognize the fact that some kinds of pleasure are
more desirable and more valuable than others. It would be absurd that while, in estimating all other
things, quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasure should be supposed to
depend on quantity alone.

Contrary to Bentham, Mill argues that quality is more preferable than quantity. An
excessive quantity of what is otherwise pleasurable might result in pain. We can consider, for
example, our experience of excessive eating o9r exercising. Whereas eating the right amount of
food can be pleasurable, excessive eating may not be. The same is true when exercising. If the
quality of pleasure is sometimes more important than quantity, then it is important to consider the
standards whereby differences of pleasures can be judged. The test that Mill suggests is simple.
In deciding over two comparable pleasures, it is important to experience both and discover which
one is actually more preferred than the other. There is no other way of determining which of the
two pleasures is preferable except by appealing to the actual preferences and experiences. What
Mill discovers anthropologically is that actual choice of knowledgeable persons point that higher
intellectual pleasures are preferable than purely sensual appetites.

In defending further, the comparative choice between intellectual and bestial pleasures,
Mill offers an imaginative thought experiment. He asks whether a human person would prefer to
accept the highly pleasurable life of an animal while at the same time being denied of everything
that makes him a person. He thinks that few, if any, would give up human qualities of higher
reason for the pleasures of a pig. In the most famous quote in Mill’s Utilitarianism, we read:

It is to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool
satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, is of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side
of the question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides.

While it is difficult to understand how Mill was able to compare swinish pleasures with
human ones, we can presume that it would be better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a pig
satisfied. Simply put, as human beings, we prefer the pleasures that are actually within our grasp.
It is easy to compare extreme types of pleasures as in the case of pigs and humans, but it is
difficult to compare pleasures deeply integrated in our way of life. The pleasures of an Ilonggo
eating chicken inasal and an Igorot eating pinikpikan is an example. This cannot be done by
simple tasting inasal or pinikpikan. In the same way, some people prefer puto to bibingka or liking
for the music of Eraserheads than the APO Hiking Society.

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PRINCIPLE OF THE GREATEST NUMBER


Equating happiness with pleasure does not aim to describe moral agent alone and
independently from others. This is not only about our individual pleasures, regardless of how high,
intellectual, or in other ways noble it is, but it is also about the pleasure of the greatest number
affected by the consequences of our actions. Mill explains:

I have dwelt on this point, as being part of a perfectly just conception of utility or happiness, considered
as the directive rule of human conduct. But it is by no means an indispensable condition to the acceptance
of the utilitarian standard; for that standard is not the agent’s own happiness, but the greatest amount of
happiness altogether; and if it may possibly be doubted whether a noble character is always the happier
for its nobleness, there can be no doubt that it makes other people happier, and that the world in general
is immediately a gainer by it. Utilitarianism, therefore, could only attain its end by the general cultivation
of nobleness of others, and his own, so far as happiness is concerned, were a sheer deduction from the
benefit. But the bare enunciation of such an absurdity as this last, renders refutations superfluous.

Utilitarianism cannot lead to selfish acts. It is neither about our pleasure nor happiness
alone; it cannot be all about us. If we the only one ones satisfied by our actions, it does not
constitute a moral good. If we are the only ones who are made happy by our actions, then we
cannot be morally good. In this sense, utilitarianism is not dismissive of sacrifices that procure
more happiness for others.

Therefore, it is necessary for us to consider everyone’s happiness, including our own, as


the standard by which to evaluate what is moral. Also, it implies that utilitarianism is not at all
separate from liberal social practices that aim to improve the quality of life for all persons.
Utilitarianism is interested with everyone’s happiness, in fact, the greatest happiness of the
greatest number. Mill identifies the eradication of disease, using technology, and other practical
ways as examples of utilitarianism. Consequently, utilitarianism maximizes the total amount of
pleasure over displeasure for the greatest number. Because of the premium given to the
consequences of actions, Mill pushes for the moral irrelevance of motive in evaluating actions:

He who saves a fellow creature from drowning does what is morally right, whether his motive be duty or
the hope of being paid for his trouble; he who betrays the friend that trusts him, is guilty of a crime, even
if his object be to serve another friend to whom he is under greater obligations. But to speak only of
actions done from the motive of duty, and in direct obedience to principle: it is a misapprehension of the
utilitarian mode of thought, to conceive it as implying that people should fix their minds upon so wide a
generality as the world, or society at large. The great majority of good actions are intended, not for the
benefit of the world, but for that of individuals, of which the good of the world is made up; and the thoughts
of the most virtuous man need not on these occasions travel beyond the particular persons concerned,
except so far as is necessary to assure himself that in benefiting them he is not violating the rights – that
is, the legitimate and authorized expectations – of anyone else.

Utilitarianism is interested with the best consequence for the highest number of people. It
is not interested with the intention of the agent. Moral value cannot be discernible in the intention
or motivation of the person doing the act; it is based solely and exclusively on the difference it
makes on the world’s total amount of pleasure and pain. This leads us to question utilitarianism’s

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take of moral rights. If actions are based only on the greatest happiness of the greatest number,
is it justifiable to let go of some rights for the sake of the benefit of the majority?

JUSTICE AND MORAL RIGTHTS


What is right? Mill understands justice as a respect for rights directed toward society’s
pursuit for the greatest happiness of the greatest number. For him, rights are a valid claim on
society and are justified by utility. He explains:

I have, throughout, treated the idea of a right residing in the injured person, and violated by the injury,
not as a separate element in the composition of the idea and sentiment, but as one of the forms in
which the other two elements clothe themselves. These elements are, a hurt to some assignable person
or persons on the one hand, and a demand for punishment, on the other. An examination of our minds,
I thjnk, will show that these two things include all that we mean when we speak of violation of a right.
When we call anything a person’s right, we mean that he has a valid claim on society to protect him in
the possession of it, either by the force of law, or by that of education and opinion. If he has what we
consider a sufficient claim, on whatever account, to have something guaranteed to him by society, we
say that he has a right to it.

Mill expounds that the above-mentioned rights referred are related to the interests that
serve general happiness. The right to due process, the right to free speech or religion, and others
are justified because they contribute to the general good. This means that society is made happier
if its citizens are able to live their lives knowing that their interests are protected and that society
(as a whole) defends it. Extending this concept to animals, they have rights because of the effect
of such principles their interests. It is not accidental, therefore, that utilitarians are also the
staunchest defenders of animal rights. A right is justifiable on utilitarian principles inasmuch as
they produce an overall happiness that is greater than the unhappiness resulting from their
implementation.

Utilitarians argue that issues of justice carry a very strong emotional import because the
category of rights is directed associated with the individual’s most vital interests. All of these rights
are predicted on the person’s right to life. Mill describes:

To have a right, then is, I conceive, to have something which society ought to defend me in the
possession of. If the objector goes on to ask why it ought, I can give him no other reason than general
utility. If that expression does not seem to convey a sufficient feeling of the strength of the obligation,
nor to account for the peculiar energy of the feeling, it is because there goes to the composition of the
sentiment, not a rational only but also an animal element, the thirst for retaliation; and this thirst derives
its intensity, as well as its moral justifications, from the extraordinary important and impressive kind of
utility which is concerned. The interest involved is that of security, to everyone’s feelings the most vital
of all interests.

In this context, our participation in government and social interactions can be explained
by the principle of utility and be clarifies by Mill’s consequentialism. Mill further associates
utilitarianism with the possession of legal and moral rights.

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We are treated justly when our legal and moral rights are respected. Mill enumerates
different kinds of goods that he characterized as rights and are protected by law. Mill understands
that legal rights are neither inviolable nor natural, but rights are subject to some exceptions:

…It is mostly considered unjust to deprive any one of his personal liberty, his property, or any other
thing which belongs to him by law. Her, therefore, is one instance of the application of the terms just
and unjust in a perfectly definite sense, namely, that it is just to respect, unjust to violate, the legal rights
of anyone. But this judgment admits of several exceptions, arising from the other forms in which the
notions of justice and injustice present themselves. For example, the person who suffers the deprivation
may (as the phrase is) have forfeited the rights whi9ch he is so deprived of: a case to which we shall
return presently…

Mill creates s distinction between legal rights and their justification. He points out that when
legal rights are not morally justified in accordance to the greatest happiness principle, then these
rights need neither be obser4ved, nor be respected. This is like saying that there are instances
when the law is not morally justified and, in this case, even objectionable.

…The legal rights of which he is deprived may be rights which ought not to have belonged to him; in
other words, the law which confers on him these rights may be a bad law. When it is so, or when (which
is the same thing for our purpose) it is supposed to be so, opinions will differ as to the justice or injustice
of infringing it. Some maintain that no law, however bad, ought to be disobeyed by an individual citizen;
that his opposition to it, if shown at all, should only be shown in endeavoring to get it altered by
competent authority. This opinion (which condemns many of the most illustrious benefactors of
mankind, and would often protect pernicious institutions against the only weapons which, in the state
of things existing at the time, have any chance of succeeding against them) is defended, by those who
hold it, on grounds of expediency; principally on that of the importance, to the common interest of
mankind, on maintaining inviolate the sentiment of submission to law… When, however, a law is thought
to be unjust, it seems always to be regarded as being so in the same ways in which a breach of law is
unjust, namely, by infringing somebody’s right; which, as it cannot in this case be a legal right, receives
a different appellation, and is called a moral right. We may say, therefore, that a second case on
injustice consists in taking or withholding from any person that to which he has a moral right.

Mill seems to be suggesting that it is morally permissible to not follow, even violate, an
unjust law. The implication is that those who protect over political policies of a morally
objectionable government act in a morally obligatory way. while this is not always preferred, Mill
thinks that it is commendable to endure legal punishments for acts of civil disobedience for the
sake of promoting a higher moral good. At an instance of conflict between moral and legal rights,
Mill points out that moral rights take precedence over legal rights.

While it can be justified why others violate legal rights, it is an act of injustice to violate an
individual’s moral rights. However, Mill seems to provide some extenuating circumstances in
which some moral rights can be overridden for the sake of the greater general happiness. Going
back to the case of wiretapping, it seems that one’s right to privacy can be sacrificed for the sake
of the common good. This means that moral rights are only justifiable by considerations of greater
overall happiness. He qualifies moral rights in this way:

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All persons are deemed to have a right to equality of treatment, except when some recognized
social expediency requires the reverse. And hence all social inequalities which have ceased to be
considered expedient, assume the character not of simple inexpediency; but of injustice, and appear
so tyrannical, that people are apt to wonder how they ever could have been tolerated; forgetful that
they themselves perhaps tolerate other inequalities under an equally mistaken notion of expediency,
the correction of which would make that which they approve seem quite as monstrous as what they
have at least learnt to condemn.

In this sense, the principle of utility can theoretically obligate us to steal, kill, and the like.
We say ‘theoretically’ because this constitutes a though experiment and need not be actualized.
Since what matters in the assessment of what we do is the resultant happiness, then anything
may be justified for the sake of producing the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people.

Thus, to save a life, it may not only be allowable, but a duty to steal or take by force, the necessary
food or medicine, or to kidnap, and compel to officiate, the only qualified medical practitioner. In
such cases, as we do not call justice which is not a virtue, we usually say, not that justice must give
way to some other moral principle, but that what is just in ordinary cases is, by reason of that other
principle, not just I the particular case. By this useful accommodation of language, the character of
indefeasibility attributed to justice is kept up, and we are saved from the necessity of maintaining
that there can be laudable injustice.

While there is no such thing as a laudable and praiseworthy injustice, Mill appeals to the
utilitarian understanding of justice as an act justified by the greatest happiness principle. There is
no right to violate were utility is not served by the social protection of individual interests. While
he recognizes how utilitarian principles can sometimes obligate us to perform acts that would
regularly be understood as disregarding individual rights, he argues that this is only possible if it
is judged to produce more happiness than unhappiness. In short, Mills moral rights and
considerations of justice are not absolute, but are only justified by their consequences to promote
the greatest good of the greatest number.

With these understanding of rights in place, Mill explains his understanding of justice and
it is with this that we end this section. For Mill, justice can be interpreted in terms of moral rights
because justice promotes the greater social good. He explains:

… the idea of justice supposes two things a rule of conduct and a sentiment which sanctions the
rule. The first must be supposed common to all mankind, and intended for their good. The other
(sentiment) is a desire that punishment may be suffered by those who infringe the rule. There is
involved, in addition, the conception of some definite person who suffers by the infringement; whose
rights (to use the expression appropriated to the case) are violated by it. And the sentiment of justice
appears to me to be, the animal desire to repel or retaliate a hurt or damage to oneself, or to those
with whom one sympathizes, widened so as to include all persons, by the human capacity of
enlarged sympathy, and the human conception of intelligent self—interest. From the latter elements,
the feeling derives its morality; from the former, its peculiar impressiveness, and energy of self-
assertion.
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SUMMARY

Bentham and Mill see moral good as pleasure, not merely self-gratification, but also the
greatest happiness principle or the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people. We are
compelled to do whatever increases pleasure and decreases pain to the greatest number of
persons, counting each as one and none as more than one. In determining the greatest happiness
for the greatest number of people, there is no distinction between Bentham and Mill. Bentham
suggests his felicific calculus, a framework for quantifying moral valuation. Mill provides a criterion
for comparative pleasures. He thinks that persons who experience two different types of pleasures
generally prefer higher intellectual pleasures to base sensual ones.

Mill provides an adequate discourse on rights despite it being mistakenly argued to be the
weakness of utilitarianism. He argues that rights are socially protected interests that are justified
by their contribution to the greatest happiness principle. However, he also claims that in extreme
circumstances, respect for individual rights can be overridden to promote the better welfare
especially in circumstances of conflict valuation.

Evaluating Myself

I. TRUE or False
Directions: Read and understand each statement. Write TRUE if the statement is correct and
FALSE if it is not.
1. Utilitarianism do not base its action to the usefulness of the consequences.
2. According to Bentham and Mill, utility refers top the usefulness of the consequences of one’s
action and behavior.
3. When the members of the society are able to live their lives knowing that their interests are
protected, this will make the society happier.
4. Utilitarianism allows the evaluation of all actions and their resultant pleasure.
5. Human pleasures are qualitatively similar from animal pleasures.
6. Mill argues that rights are socially protected interests that are justified by their contribution to
the greatest happiness principle.
7. Bentham recognizes how utilitarian principles can sometimes obligate us to perform acts that
would regularly be understood as disregarding individuals’ rights.
8. Human being prefers the pleasures that are attainable and reachable.
9. Moral value is not be noticeable in the intention of the person doing the act.
10. Utilitarianism is all about decisions for our own benefit and happiness.

II. Essay (5points)


Direction: Answer the following question.
1. Is it justifiable to build a basketball court because there are basketball fans, than to build a
hospital because there are fewer sick people? Why? Elaborate your answer. (3pts)
2. When is it justifiable to torture suspected criminals? (2pts)

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Learning Guide 3: NATURAL LAW


LEARNING OUTCOMES:

1. Recognize how Thomas Aquinas made use of ancient Greek concepts to provide a rational
grounding to an ethical theory based on the Christian faith;
2. Identify the natural law in distinction from, but also in relation to, the other types of law
mentioned by Aquinas: eternal law, human law, and divine law; and
3. Apply the precepts of the natural law to contemporary moral concerns.

INTRODUCTION

In October 2016, newspapers reported that Pantaleon Alvarez, Speaker of the House of
Representatives, was intending to draft a bill which would amend the country’s Family Code,
thereby allowing for the legalization of same-sex unions. This would result in the possibility of two
men together or two women together being identified as a couple with rights guaranteed and
protected by the law. However, as one newspaper report revealed, even before anything could
be formally proposed, other fellow legislators had already expressed to the media their refusal to
support any such initiative.

The reasons given in the news article vary, ranging from the opinion that seeing two men
kiss is unsightly, to the statement that there is something “irregular” about belonging to the
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender (LGBT) community, and to the judgment that two people of
the same sex being together is unnatural.

We are used to hearing people justify done something by making the appeal that what
they maintain is what is “natural,” and therefore acceptable. Likewise, people would judge
something as unacceptable on the basis that it is supposedly “unnatural”. Thus, we are no longer
surprised when we hear people condemn and label many different things as “unnatural”: maybe
receiving blood transfusions, eating meat, r, as our news report shows, engaging in sexual
relations that one might consider deviant. We also realize that sometimes we might find ourselves
astonished or perplexed as to what different people might consider “unnatural”.

In order to proceed, it is therefore necessary to ask: “What do the words natural and
unnatural mean?” Sometimes, the word “natural” seems to be used to refer to some kind of
intuition that a person has, one which is so apparently true to him that it is unquestioned. For
example, a woman may claim that it is simply “unnatural” to eat any kind of insect, and what this
means is that she personally finds herself averse to the idea of doing so. In other instances, the
word is used to try to justify a certain way of behaving by seeing its likeness somewhere in the
natural world. For example, a man might claim that it is okay for him to have more than one sexual
partner, since, in a pride of lions, the alpha male gets to mate with all the she-lions. In yet other

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instances, the word “natural” is used as an appeal to something instinctual without it being directed
by reason. For example, a man may deem it all right if he were to urinate just anywhere because
after all he sees it as “natural” function of humans. Lastly, we also easily find people using the
word “natural” to refer to what seems common to them given their particular environment. For
instance, a Filipina may suppose that eating three full meals of rice and ulam everyday is what is
“natural” because everyone she knows behaves in that way.

Given these varied meanings of the term “natural,” we need to find a more solid and
nuanced way to understand the term. In this chapter, we will explore how Thomas Aquinas
provides this, emphasizing the capacity for reason as what is essential in our human nature. This
understanding of human nature anchored on our capacity for reason will become the basis of the
natural law theory, a theory which will provide us a unique way of determining the moral status of
our actions.

THOMAS AQUINAS

There have been various thinkers and systems of thought emerging throughout history
that could be said to present a natural law theory. Among them, the one we will be focusing on is
the medieval thinker Thomas Aquinas. It has to be recognized, however, that this natural law
theory is part of a larger discussion, which is his moral theory taken as a whole. This moral theory,
in turn, is part of a larger project, which is Aquinas’s vision of the Christian faith. Before we turn
to the natural law theory, let us take a look at these contexts.

THE CONTEXT OF THE CHRISTIAN STORY

The fundamental truth maintained and elaborated by Aquinas in all his works is the
promise right at the center of the Christian faith; that we are created by God in order to ultimately
return to Him. The structure of his magnum opus Summa Theologiae follows the trajectory of this
story.

There are three parts to this voluminous work. In the first part, Aquinas speaks of God,
and although we acknowledge that our limited human intellect cannot fully grasp Him, we
nevertheless are able to say something concerning His goodness, His might, and His creative
power. Recognizing then that we are created by God, we move on to the second part, which deals
with man or the dynamic of human life. This is characterized by our pursuit of happiness, which
we should realize rests ultimately not on any particular good thing that is created by God, but in
the highest good which is God Himself. Our striving for this ultimate happiness, while important,
will not in itself bring us to this blessed state. In other words, salvation is only possible through
the presence of God’s grace and that grace has become perfectly incarnate in the person of
Jesus. Thus, the third part focuses o Jesus as our Savior.

Given that our concern here is the question of ethics, it would seem clear that what would
be of greatest interest to us is the second part or the section of this story that centers on human
life and its striving toward God. However, bringing up the notion that living a good life leads us to

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God could easily be misunderstood as a simple exhortation to obey certain rules as given to us
through Church doctrines or by following certain passages lifted randomly from sacred Scriptures.
In other words, we may fall into the danger of the divine command theory, which we had explored
in the first chapter. Instead, we should hope to find that there is much greater complexity, but also
coherence, to the ethics of Aquinas.

THOMAS AQUINAS (1225-1274)

Hailed as a doctor of the Roman Catholic Church, Thomas Aquinas was a Dominican friar
who was the preeminent intellectual figure of the scholastic period of the Middle Ages, contributing
to the doctrine of the faith more than any other figure of his time. His Summa Theologiae,
Aquinas’s magnum opus, is a voluminous work that comprehensively discusses many significant
points in Christian theology. He was canonized in 1323.

THE CONTEXT OF AQUINAS’S ETHICS

A full consideration of Aquinas’s ethics would require us to explore his discussion of other
matters, such as how, in our pursuit of happiness, we direct our actions toward specific end. We
might explore how emotions – “the passions” - are involved in this process, and therefore require
a proper order if they are to properly contribute to a good life. We might explore how our actions
are related to certain dispositions (often referred to as “habits”) in a dynamic way since our actions
both arise from our habits and at the same time reinforce them. We might explore his discussion
of how we develop either good or bad habits with a good disposition leading us toward making
moral choices. thereby contributing to our moral virtue, and a bad disposition inclining toward
making immoral choices, bringing us to vice. The Christian life, therefore, is about developing the
capacities given to us by God into a disposition of virtue inclined toward the good.

Aquinas also puts forward that there is within us a conscience that directs our moral
thinking. This does not refer to some simple intuition or gut feeling. For Aquinas, there is a sense
of right and wrong in us that we are obliged to obey. However, he also adds that this sense of
right and wrong must be informed, guided, and ultimately grounded in an objective basis for
morality.

So, we are called to heed the voice of conscience and enjoined to develop and maintain
a life of virtue. However, these both require content, so we need something more. We need a
basis for our conscience to be properly informed, and we need a clearer guidepost on whether
certain decisions we make lead us toward virtue or vice. Being told that one should heed one’s
conscience or that one should try to be virtuous, does very little to guide people as to what
specifically should be done in a given situation. Thus, there is a need for a clearer basis of ethics,
a ground that will more concretely direct our sense of what is right and wrong. For Aquinas, this
would be the natural law.

We can recall how the ethical approach called the divine command theory urges a person toward
unthinking obedience to religious precepts. Given the problems of this simplistic approach to

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ethics, we can contrast how the moral theory of Aquinas requires the judicious use of reason. In
doing so, one’s sense of right and wrong would be grounded on something stable: human nature
itself.

We will start by exploring how Aquinas restates the Christian message, making use of a
philosophical vocabulary appropriated from the ancient Greeks. We then look at how Aquinas
speaks of the essence and also the varieties of law. From there, we will be able to explore the
precepts of the natural law.

THE GREEK HERITAGE

NEOPLATONIC GOOD

God creates. This does not only mean that He brings about beings, but it also means that
He cares for, and thus governs, the activity of the universe and of every creature. This central
belief of the Christian faith, while inspired by divine revelation, has been shaped and defined by
an idea stated in the work of the ancient Greek philosopher Plato, which had been put forward a
thousand years before Aquinas. Hi is credited for giving the subsequent history of philosophy in
one of its most compelling and enduring ideas: the notion of a supreme and absolutely
transcendent good.

In his work The Republic, it is often supposed that Plato is trying to envision the ideal
society. But that plan is only a part of a more fundamental concern that animates the text which
is to provide an objective basis and standard for the striving to be moral. In other words, it can be
said that Plato was trying to answer questions such as, “Why should I bother trying to be good?”
and “Why cannot ‘good’ be just whatever I say it is?” His answer, placed in the mouth of the main
character Socrates, is that the good is real and not something that one can pretend to make up
or ignore.

Socrates, in discussing this, elevates the notion of the good to unprecedented heights:

The Idea of the Good


Excerpt from The Republic
Plato

Now, that which imparts truth to the known and the power of knowing to the knower is what I
would have you term the idea of good, and this you will deem to be the cause of science, and of truth in
so far as the latter becomes the subject of knowledge; beautiful too, as are both truth and knowledge,
you will be right in esteeming this other nature as more beautiful than either; and, as in the previous
instance, light and sight may be truly said o be like the sun, and yet not to be the sun, so in this other
sphere, science and truth may be deemed to be like the good, but not the good; the good has a place
of honor yet higher.

You would say, would you not, that the sun is not only the author of visibility in all visible things,
but of generation and nourishment and growth, tough he himself is not generation? In tike manner the
good may be said to be not only the author of knowledge to all things known, but of their being and
essence, and yet the good is not essence, but far exceeds essence in dignity and power.
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Readers of The Republic have long been baffled by this enigmatic passage and are still
trying to figure out how exactly to interpret it. rather than be dismissed, this idea of the good – a
good which is prior to all being and is even the cause of all being – will become a source of
fascination and inspiration to later thinkers even to this day.

In the next centuries after Plato’s time, some scholars turned to his texts and tried to
discipline the wealth of ideas contained there. Because they saw their task as basically clarifying
and elaborating on wat the great thinker had already written, these later scholars are often labeled
as Neoplatonists.

In the hands of the Neoplatonists, Plato’s idea of the good, which is the source of all beings
becomes identified with the One and the Beautiful. This is the ultimate reality, which is the
oneness that will give rise to the multiplicity of everything else in the cosmos. All these beings
have a single goal, which is to return to that unity.

The Good and the One


excerpt from the Enneads
Plotinus

Still, do not, I urge you, look for the Good through any of these other things; if you do, you
will see not itself but its trace: you must form the idea of that which is to be grasped cleanly standing
to itself not in any combination, the unheld in which in which all have hold; for no other is such, yet
one such there must be.

Now it is clear that we cannot possess ourselves of the power of this principle in its
concentrated fullness: so to do one must be identical with it: but some partial attainment is within
our reach.

You who make the venture will throw forward all your beings but you will never tell it entire
– for that, you must yourself be the divine intellect in Act – at your utmost success it will still pass
from you or, rather, you from it. In ordinary vision you may think to see the object entire: in this
intellective act, all, less or more, that you can take to mind you may set down as The Good.

It is The Good since, being a power, it is the cause of the intelligent and intellective life as
of life and intellect; for this grow from it as from the source of essence and of existence, the Source
as being One, simplex and first because before it was nothing. All derives from this; it is the origin
of the primal movement which it does not possess and of the repose which is but its absence of
need; for neither rest nor movement can belong to that which has no place in which either could
occur; center, object, ground, all are alike unknown to it, for it is before all. Yet its Being is not limited;
what is there to set bounds to it? Nor, on the other hand, is it infinite in the sense of magnitude;
what place can there be to which it must extend, or why should there be movement where there is
no lacking? All its infinitude resides in its power; it does not change and will not fail; and in it all that
is unfailing finds duration.

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Through Neoplatonists like Plotinus, the Platonic idea of the good would continue well into
the Christian Middle Ages, inspiring later thinkers and allowing it to be thought anew in a more
personal way as a creative and loving God.

ARISTOTELIAN BEING AND BECOMING

In Aristotle’s exploration of how to discuss beings, he proposes four concepts which


provide a way of understanding any particular being under consideration. Any being, according
to Aristotle, can be said to have four causes.

First, we recognize that any being we can see around is corporeal, possessed of a certain
materiality or physical “stuff”. We can refer to this as the material cause. A being is individuated -
it becomes the unique, individual being that it is – because it is made up of this particular stuff.
Yet, we also realize that this material takes on a particular shape: so, a bird is different form a cat,
which is different from a man. The “shape” that makes a being a particular kind can be called its
form. Thus, each being also has a formal cause.

One can also realize that a being does not simply “pop-up” from nothing but comes from
another being which is prior to it. Parents beget a child. A mango tree used to be a seed that itself
came from an older tree. A chair is built as the product of a carpenter. Thus, there is something
which brings about the presence of another being. This can be referred to as the efficient cause.
Also, since a being has an apparent end or goal, a chair to be sat on, a pen for writing, a seed to
become a tree, or a child to become an adult, one can speak of the final cause of each being.
Identifying of these four causes – material, formal, efficient, and final – gives a way to
understanding any being.

Four Causes
Excerpt from the Physics
Book II Chapter 3; 194b17-195a5
Aristotle

Now that we have established these distinctions, we must proceed to consider causes, their
character; and number. Knowledge is the object of our inquiry, and men do not think they know a
thing till they have grasped the “why” of (which is to grasp its primary cause). So clearly, we too
must do this as regards both coming to be and passing away and every kind of physical change, in
order that, knowing their principles, we may try to refer to these principles each of our problems.

In one sense, then, (1) that out of which a thing comes to be and which persists, is called
“cause”, for example, the bronze of the statue, the silver of the bowl, and the genera of which the
bronze and the silver are species.

In another sense (2) the form or the archetype, that is, the statement of the essence and its
genera are called “causes” (e.g., of the octave the relation of 2:1, and generally number), and the
parts in the definition.

Again (3) the primary source of the change or coming to rest; for example, the man who
gave advice is a cause, the father is cause of the child, and generally what makes of what is made
and what causes change of what is changed.
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Again (4) in the sense of end or “that for the sake of which” a thing is done, for example, health is
the cause of walking about. (“Why is he walking about?” we say. “To be healthy,” and, having said
that, we think we have assigned the cause.) The same is true also of all the intermediate steps
which are brought about through the action of something else as means towards the end, for
example, reduction of flesh, purging, drugs, or surgical instruments are means toward health. All
these things are “for the sake of” the end, though they differ from one another in that some are
activities, others instruments.

This then perhaps exhausts the number of ways in which the term “cause’ is used.

Of course, it is not a case of a being that is something which is already permanently set
as it is and remains forever unchanging. So, in addition to describing a being, Aristotle also has
to explain to us the process of becoming or the possibility of change that takes place in a being.
A new pair of principles is introduced by him, which we can refer to as potency and act. A being
may carry within itself certain potentials, but theses require being actualized. A puppy is not yet a
full-grown dog. These potencies are latent in the puppy and are actualized as the puppy grows
up and achieves what it is supposed to be. The process of becoming – or change – can thus be
explained in this way. Understanding beings, how they are and how they become or what they
could be, is the significant Aristotelian contribution to the picture which will be given to us by
Aquinas.

SYNTHESIS

The idea of a transcendent good prior to all being resurfaces in Aquinas in the form of the
good and loving God, who is Himself the fullness of being and of goodness; as Aquinas puts it,
God is that which essentially is and is essentially good. So, we recognize that all beings are only
possible as participating in the first being. which is God Himself. God’s act, like an emanation of
light, is the creation of beings.

Insofar as God is that from which all beings come, it is possible for us to speak of Him as
the first efficient cause. Insofar as God is that toward which all beings seek to return, it is possible
for us to speak of him as the final cause. We see here the beginning of the synthesis by noting
how the Neoplatonic movement from and back toward the transcendent is fused with the
Aristotelian notion of causes.

It must be noted, though, that this is not some mechanistic unthinking process. It is God’s
will and love that are the cause of all things; to every existing thing, God wills some good. Creation
therefore is the activity of the outpouring or overflowing of God’s goodness. Since each being in
this way participates in God’s goodness, each being is in some sense good.

However, while beings are good because they are created by God, the goodness
possessed by being remains imperfect. “For Aquinas, only God in the fullness of His being and
goodness is perfect; all other beings are participating in this goodness, and are good to that

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extent, but are imperfect since they are limited in their participation”. But, once again, God did not
create us to simply be imperfect and to stay that way as He leaves us alone. Instead, God, in His
infinite wisdom, directs how we are to arrive at our perfection. The notion of divine providence
refers to how beings are properly ordered and even guided toward their proper end; this end,
which is for them to reach their highest good, is to return to the divine goodness itself.

God communicates to each being His perfection and goodness. Every creature the strives
to its own perfection; thus, the divine goodness is the end of all actions. All things come from God
and are created by Him in order to return to Him.

We now need to recall that beings are created by God in a particular way. It is not
accidental how beings emerge into existence; each being is created as a determinate substance,
as a particular combination of form and matter. This applies to all beings, including man. The
particular form determines the materiality which makes a being a certain kind of being; the unique
way that we have been created can be called our nature.

This nature, as a participation in God’s goodness, is both good and imperfect at the same
time. Coming from God, it is good, but in its limitations, it has yet to be perfected. This perfection
means fulfilling our nature the best we can, thus realizing what God had intended for us to be. We
accomplished this by fulfilling or actualizing the potencies that are already present in our nature.

While all beings are created by God in order to return to Him, the way the human being is
directed toward God is unique. Given that we are beings with a capacity for reason, our way of
reaching God is by knowing and loving him. It is of key importance then that the presence of a
capacity for reason is the prime characteristic of the kind of beings we are, and how that capacity
for reason is the very tool which God had placed in our human nature as the way toward our
perfection and return to him.

This applies not only to an individual human being, but also to all humankind. But we
should not forget how the whole community of being, which is the universe itself, is directed toward
its return to God. This is not, as mentioned earlier, an unthinking process, but it is the very work
of divine reason itself or God’s will. We can think, then, of the whole work of creation as divine
reason governing a community toward its end. Under the governance of the Divine, beings are
directed as to how their acts are to lead them to their end, which is to return to him. We shall now
try to understand this dynamic once again, but this time think of it in terms of law.

THE ESSENCE AND VARIETIES OF LAW

ESSENCE

As rational beings, we have free will. Through our capacity for reason, we are able to judge
between possibilities and to choose to direct our actions in one way or the other. Our actions are
directed toward attaining ends or goods that we desire. We work on a project to complete it. We

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study in order to learn. My mother bakes in order to come up with some cookies. Maybe my
brother practices playing his guitar in order to get better at it. It can also be as simple as the fact
that I play basketball because I enjoy doing so. These are goods, and we act in a certain way to
pursue them, so goods are sometimes referred to as the ends of actions.

There are many possible desirable ends or goods, and we act in such ways as to pursue
them. However, just because we think that a certain end is good and is therefore desirable does
not necessarily mean it is indeed good. It is possible to first suppose that something is good only
to realize later that doing so was a mistake. This is why it is important for reason to always be
part of the process. Acts are rightly directed toward their ends by reason. But this does not simply
mean that through reason we can figure out how to pursue something that we already had
thoughtlessly supposed to be good for us; what is necessary is to think carefully of what really is
in fact good for us.

In thinking about what is good for us, it is also quite possible that we end up thinking
exclusively of our own good. Aquinas remind us that this will not do; we cannot simply act in
pursuit of our own ends or good without any regard for other people’s ends or good. We are not
isolated beings, but beings who belong to a community. Since we belong to a community, we
have to consider what is good for the community as well as our own good. This can be called the
common good.

What exactly the common good is might not always be easy to determine as there are
many variables to consider, such as the particular community we are thinking of or the particular
ends that the community is pursuing. But that need not occupy us right now. What is of greater
significance for us here is the recognition that, since we must consider not just our own good but
also that of others, we cannot act in just any which way; there would have to be some kind of
measure to our acts. It is good for us to not simply be free to act in whatever way we like. We
should recognize the proper measure or the limits in our actions that would allow us to direct our
acts in such a way that we can pursue ends, both our own and also that of others, together. The
determination of the proper measure of our acts can be referred to as law.

using a simple example, we can think of traffic rules. A motorist cannot just drive in any
way he likes, but must respect traffic rules. These rules seem to measure or place a limit on his
driving, for example, by placing a maximum speed he can travel on a particular road. Such a limit
or such a rule is something good, for both him and for others as it helps prevent motor accidents.
As Aquinas puts it, the law must regard properly the relationship to universal happiness.

A law, therefore, is concerned with the common good. In a way, making of a law belongs
either to the whole people or to a public person who has care for the common good or is tasked
with the concern for the good of the community or of the whole people.

Consider some of these examples. On a modest scale, imagine a student organization of


twenty members. Together, all the members decide that it would be best if they were to meet on
Friday afternoons or that they all had to contribute for lunch in their meetings. On a large scale, a

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teacher who is in charge of a class of forty students has to put some rules in place so that things
will go smoothly. Perhaps, she would maintain that students may not just walk in and out of the
classroom and that they are not supposed to chatter loudly with their seatmates. The teacher
imposes these rules not on a whim, but for the good of the class. On a still larger scale, city
officials put up ordinances concerning, for example, garbage collection, traffic schemes, or zoning
to control building sites. ideally speaking, these all are done in view of what would be best for the
community.

It is also necessary for rules or laws to be communicated to the people involved in order
to enforce them and to better ensure compliance. This is referred to as promulgation. In an ideal
sense, without considering the reality that sometimes rules are not properly thought out or seem
to favor select persons or groups rather than the common good, we can speak of law as a form
of restriction and direction of human actions in such a way that the common good is promoted.
Aquinas’s own summary of this point is worth citing: “The definition of law may be gathered; and
it is nothing else than an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has care
of the community, and promulgated.

Now, in thinking about a community, what if we thought more grandly, not just a small
group, a class, a city, or even a country? What if we think of vast community which is the entire
universe and everything in it, or in other words, all of being? Is there someone in charge of this
community, guiding all toward their common good and directing all with His wisdom?

VARIETIES

We have noted earlier how God, by His wisdom, is the Creator of all beings. By saying
this, we do not only recognize God as the source of these beings, but also acknowledge the way
they have been created and the way they could return to him, which is the work of His divine
reason itself. this includes the proper measure governing the acts of these beings. Aquinas writes;
“He governs all the acts and movements hat are to be found in each single creature, so the type
of Divine wisdom, as moving all things to their due end, bears the character of law”. This line
involves the assertion that the divine wisdom that directs each being toward its proper end can
be called the eternal law.

Eternal law refers to what God wills for creation, how each participant in it is intended to
return to Him. Given our limitations, we cannot grasp the fullness of the eternal law. Nevertheless,
it is not completely opaque to us. we must recognize that first, we are part of the eternal law, and
second, we participate in it in a special way.

Therefore, irrational creatures (e.g., plants and animals) are participating in he eternal law,
although we could hardly say that they are in any way “conscious” of this law. Aquinas notes that
we cannot speak of them as obeying the law, excerpt by way of similitude, which is to say that
they do not think of the law or chose to obey it, but are simply, through the instinctual following of

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their nature, complying with the law that God has for them. More appropriately, these creatures
are moved by divine providence.

On the other hand, human being’s participation is different. The human being, as rational,
participates more fully and perfectly in the law given the capacity for reason. The unique imprint
upon us, upon our human nature by God, is the capacity to think about what is good and what is
evil, and to choose and direct ourselves appropriately. So, Aquinas writes: “Wherefore it ahs a
share of the Eternal Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act and end: and
this participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called the natural law”.

Therefore, by looking at our human nature, at the natural inclinations given to us by God,
we can determine the rule and measure that should be directing our acts. These are the precepts
of the natural law, which we will study more closely in the next section. however, let us mention
first two more kinds of law provided by Aquinas.

Aquinas points out that while reflecting on our human nature will provide us the precepts
of the natural law, these are quite general and would have a basis for assessing the validity or
invalidity of a human law; whether or not it conforms to the natural law. Insofar as a human law
goes against what nature inclines us toward, it is not properly speaking a law – in the ideal sense
of directing us to the common good – but instead is unjust and can be called a matter of violence.

Finally, Aquinas asks us to recall that there is a certain form of happiness that is
proportionate to our human nature, which we can obtain by means of our natural principles.
However, there also is another, more complete, happiness that surpasses human’s nature, a
supernatural happiness that can be obtained through the power of God alone. To direct us toward
our supernatural end, we had been given further instructions in the form of divine low. This term,
often confused with eternal law, refers specifically to the instances where we have precepts or
instructions that come from divine revelation. For example, we have what is handled down to us
in the sacred Scriptures (e.g., the Ten Commandments in the book Exodus in the Old Testament
or Jesus’s injunction to love one’s neighbor in the Gospels).

while this is necessary for Aquinas as he sees our end as the blessed return to God, it is
not our concern here insofar as, given that our concern is ethics, one need not rely on the divine
law in order to be moral. Of interest then about this natural law theory of Aquinas is that while it
is clearly rooted in a Christian vision, it grounds a sense of morality not on that faith but on human
nature. Aquinas writes: “So then no one can know the eternal law, as it is in itself, excerpt the
blessed who see God in His Essence. But every rational creature knows it in its reflection, greater
or less… Now all men know the truth to a certain extent, at least as to the common principles of
the natural law…”

The statement is a remarkable claim: anyone, coming from any religious tradition, just by
looking at the nature that she shares with her fellow human beings, would be able to determine
what is ethical. The complication one may have over an overly religious presentation is dispelled
when we recognize the universal scope that Aquinas envisions.

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NATURAL LAW

We may now turn to the specifics concerning the natural law.

The Natural Law


Summa Theologiae 1-2, Question 94, Article 2
Thomas Aquinas

Since, however, good has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature of a contrary, hence it
is that all those things to which man has a natural inclination, are naturally apprehended by reasons
as being good, and consequently as objects of pursuit, and their contraries as evil, and objects of
avoidance. Wherefore according to the order of natural inclinations, is the order of the precepts of
the natural law. Because in man there is first of all an inclination to good in accordance with the
nature which he has in common with all substances: inasmuch as every substance seeks the
preservation of its own being, according to its nature: and by reason of this inclination, whatever is
a means of preserving human life, and of warding off its obstacles, belongs to the natural law.
Secondly, there is in man an inclination to things that pertain to him more specially, according to
that nature which he has in common with other animals: and in virtue of this inclination, those things
are said to belong to the natural law, “which nature has taught to all animals”, such as sexual
intercourse, education of offspring and so forth. Thirdly, there is in man an inclination to good,
according to the nature of his reason, which nature is proper to him: thus man has a natural
inclination to know the truth about God, and to live in society: and in this respect, whatever pertains
to this inclination belongs to the natural law; or instance, to shun ignorance, to avoid offending those
among whom one has to live, and other such things regarding the above inclination.

IN COMMON WITH OTHER BEINGS

In reading Aquinas, we have to consider how we, human beings, are both unique and at
the same time participating in the community of the rest of creation. Our presence in the rest of
creation does not only mean that we creatures that are not human, but that there is also in our
nature something that shares in the nature of other beings.

Aquinas thus identifies first that there is in our nature, common with all other beings, a
desire to preserve one’s own being. A makahiya leaf folds inward and protects itself when
touched. A cat cowers and then tries to run away when it feels threatened. Similarly, human
beings have that natural inclination to preserve their being. For this reason, Aquinas tells us that
it is according to the natural law to preserve human life. We can thus say that it would be a
violation of the natural law, and therefore unethical to take the life of another. Murder, for instance,
would be a clear example of a violation of the natural law. On a more controversial note, it seems
that taking one’s own life would be unacceptable, even in the form of physical assisted suicide.
On a more positive note, we can confidently posit that acts that promote the continuation of life
are to be lauded as ethical because they are in line with the natural law.

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IN COMMON WITH OTHER ANIMALS

Aquinas then goes on to say that there is in our human nature, common with other animals,
a desire that has to do with sexual intercourse and the care of one’s offspring. As a matter of fact,
animals periodically engage in sexual intercourse at a specific time of “heat”, and this could result
in offspring. In human beings, too, that natural inclination to engage in the sexual act and to
reproduce exists.

The intrinsic connection between the sexual act and fecundity gives rise to a number of
notions of what is acceptable and unacceptable in varying degrees of contentiousness. An ethical
issue that is hotly contested in some parts of the world is whether abortion is acceptable. From
the stance of the natural law, the act of preventing the emergence of new life would be considered
unacceptable. Not so confidential, perhaps, would be the claims that we could more easily make
about how it is good to care for the young, to make sure that they are properly fed, sheltered, and
educated. On the other hand, it is bad to abuse the young to force children into hard labor or to
deprive them of basic needs or otherwise abuse them in a physical or emotional way,

With regard to the sexual act, the moral judgments get more volatile. This argument seems
to provide ground for rejecting various forms of contraception since these allow for the sexual act
to take place, but inhibit procreation. This also seems to justify the claim that any form of he sexual
act that could not lead to offspring must be considered deviant. One of these is the homosexual
act.

To explain, Thomas writes: “… certain special sins are said to be against nature; thus
contrary to sexual intercourse, which is natural to all animals, is unisexual lust, which has received
the special name of the unnatural crime”. The question can be raised as to whether all animals
“naturally” engage in heterosexual (rather than unisexual or homosexual”) intercourse as Aquinas
(with the much more rudimentary scientific knowledge of his time) believed. Another question is
whether there must be a necessary connection between the act of sexual intercourse and
procreation.

UNIQUELY HUMAN

After the first two inclination, Aquinas presents a third reason which states that we have
an inclination to good according to the nature of our reason. With this, we have a natural inclination
to know the truth about God and to live in society. It is of interest that this is followed by matters
of both an epistemic and a social concern. The examples given to us of what would be in line with
this inclination are to shun ignorance and to avoid offending those people with whom one lives.
We could surmise on this basis that acts of deception or fraud would be unacceptable to Aquinas.
This, as mentioned, is surmise because this is not something we are told directly by Thomas.

In fact, a characteristic of the text which may be frustrating to anyone trying to read
Aquinas is that he does not go into great detail here enumerating what specific acts would be
clearly ethical r unethical. Instead, he gave certain general guideposts: the epistemic concern,

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which is that we know we pursue the truth, and the social concern, which is that we know we live
in relation to others. The question of what particular acts would be in line with these or not is
something that we have to determine for ourselves through the use of reason. Let us elaborate
on this further.

First, we had been presented with these three inclinations as bases for moral valuation.
In light of this, we know that preserving the self is good. Contrary to common misconception, the
sexual inclination and the sexual act are considered good things, not something to be deplored
or dismissed. However, reason is not only another inclination that we have in par with the others.
Instead, reason is the defining part of human nature. Thomas tells us that there is a priority among
the powers of our soul, with the intellectual directing and commanding our sensitive and nutritive
capacities. What this amount to is the need to recognize that while our other inclinations are good,
as they are in our nature, what it means to be human is, precisely to exercise our reason in our
consideration of how the whole self should be comported toward the good. I cannot simply say,
“Sex is natural”, of what I mean by that is that I could just engage in the act in any way I like
without thought or care. Instead, we are enjoined to make full use of our reason and determine
when the performance of our natural inclinations is appropriate.

Second, recognizing how being rational is what is proper to man, the apparent vagueness
of the third inclination that Aquinas mentions is counter-balanced by the recognition that he is not
interested in providing precepts that one would simply, unthinkingly, follow. To say that the human
beings is rational is to recognize that we should take up the burden of thinking carefully how a
particular act may or may not be a violation of our nature. It is to take the trouble to think carefully
about how our acts would either contribute to, or detract from, the common good.

For this reason, in making human laws, additions that are not at all problematic for the
natural law are possible. At first glance, it may seem like there is nothing “natural” about obeying
traffic rules or paying taxes. However, if it has been decided that these contribute to the common
good, then they could, in fact, be proper extensions of the natural law. As Aquinas puts it, nothing
hinders a change in the natural law by way of addition, since our reason has found and can find
many things that benefit individual and communal human life.

Evaluating Myself 1

Identification
Directions: Read and understand each question. Write the correct answer.
___________________ 1. Who intended to draft a bill that will allow the legalization of same-
sex marriage?
___________________ 2. What is the term use when the rules or laws are communicated
to the people involved in order to enforce them and to ensure
compliance?
___________________ 3. In the story written by Aquinas entitled Summa Theologiae, what
is the content of the second part of his story?

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___________________ 4. What is being described when a member of the community also


considered what is good for his/her community as well as his/her
own good?
___________________ 5. What refers to all instances wherein human beings construct and
enforce laws in their communities?
___________________ 6. Tamarin and Apple get married. After one year of their married
life, the couple was blessed to have a child. In what kind of
Aristotle cause of being does this situation belong?
___________________ 7. What is the term used when it involves God wills for creation and
how each life in it is intended to return to Him?
___________________ 8. What do we call the activity of the outpouring or overflowing of
God’s goodness?
___________________ 9. Why is it important for reason to always be part of the action?
___________________ 10. Who stated that there is a priority among the powers of our soul,
with the intellectual directing and commanding our sensitive and
nutritive capacities?

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Learning Guide 4: DEONTOLOGY


Evaluating Myself 1

I. Essay
Directions: Read and understand each question. Write the correct answer.
1. In what way does a rational will distinguish a human being from an animal insofar as the
animal is only sentient? (2)
2. What is the difference between autonomy and heteronomy? What does autonomy have to do
with free will in contrast to animal impulse? (3)
3. How does the method called universalizability work? What are the steps to test if an action is
rationally permissible? (3)
4. What is meant by enlightenment morality as opposed to paternalism? Why is deontology a
kind of enlightenment morality? (2)

II. True or False


Directions: Read and understand each statement carefully. Write TRUE if the statement
is correct and FALSE if it is not.

1. Animals are sentient organisms who have the ability to _______________


perceive and navigate its internal environment.
2. Human beings act only according to their impulses based on _______________
their natural instinct.
3. A maxim is a rule that a person lives by in his day-to-day lives _______________
but does not have the status of a law or a moral command that
binds a person to act in a certain way.
4. Human choice can be affected and determined by sensible _______________
impulses.
5. Rational permissibility is the intrinsic quality of an action that it _______________
is objectively and necessary rational.
6. Deontology is the study of duty and obligation. _______________
7. Autonomy is the simple legislation and imposition of law by an _______________
external authority.
8. Choice is defined as the mental capacity to construct ideas _______________
and thoughts that are beyond one’s immediate surroundings.
9. Human beings have the ability to stop and think about what _______________
they are doing and evaluate actions according to principles.
10. False promising occurs when a person is aware that s/he _______________
cannot fulfill the promise s/he made.

CHRISTINE TOME MORGADO


GE 8 – ETHICS

Group Activity
1st Group (Senses of Self)
Directions: Create a scenario where you can show the difference between psychological
egoism and ethical egoism.

2nd Group (Utilitarianism)


Directions: Create a scenario where you can show utilitarianism theory (principle of utility
and principle of the greatest number.

3rd Group (Deontology)


Directions: Create a scenario where you can show the difference between autonomy and
heteronomy

4th Group (Natural Law)


Directions: Create a scenario where you can show and explain the four (4) causes
identified by Aristotle. (It should be different from the example in the module.)
.

CHRISTINE TOME MORGADO

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