(Do not write above this line.

)
ORIGINAL
State Bar Court of California
Hearing Department
Los Angeles
ACTUAL SUSPENSION

Counsel For The State Bar Case Number(s): For Court use only
16-C-13196-DFM
Alex Hackert 16-C-13197
Deputy Trial Counsel
845 S. Figueroa St.
]’UBLIC MATTE
Los Angeles, CA 90017
213-765-1498
FILED
Bar # 267342
OCT 3 1 2016
Counsel For Respondent STATE BAR COURT
CLERK’S OFFICE
Anthony Radogna LOS ANGELES
Law Offices of Anthony Radogna
1 Park Plaza, Suite 600
Irvine, CA 92614
949-852-7312
Submitted to: Assigned Judge

Bar # 261859 STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND

DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING
In the Matter of:
WILLIAM ANDRAI ACOSTA
ACTUAL SUSPENSION

Bar # 207377 [] PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED

A Member of the State Bar of California

(Respondent)

Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the
space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts,"
"Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.

A. Parties’ Acknowledgments:

(1) Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted June 6, 2000.

(2) The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or
disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.

(3) All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are entirely resolved by
this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The
stipulation consists of 14 pages, not including the order. ~ ....

(4) A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included
under "Facts."

kwiktag ® 211 096 420

(Effective July 1, 2015)
Actual Suspension
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(5) Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of
Law".

(6) The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading
"Supporting Authority."

(7) No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any
pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.

(8) Payment of Disciplinary CostsmRespondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 &
6140.7. (Check one option only):

[] Until costs are paid in full, Respondent will remain actually suspended from the practice of law unless
relief is obtained per rule 5.130, Rules of Procedure.
[] Costs are to be paid in equal amounts prior to February 1 for the following membership years: Two
billing cycles immediately following the effective date of the Supreme Court order in this matter.
(Hardship, special circumstances or other good cause per rule 5.132, Rules of Procedure.) If
Respondent fails to pay any installment as described above, or as may be modified by the State Bar
Court, the remaining balance is due and payable immediately.
[] Costs are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs".
[] Costs are entirely waived.

B. Aggravating Circumstances [Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional

Misconduct, standards 1.2(h) & 1.5]. Facts supporting aggravating circumstances are
required.

(1) [] Prior record of discipline

(a) [] State Bar Court case # of prior case 14-O-02844. See page 10.

(b) [] Date prior discipline effective July 23, 2016.

(c) [] Rules of Professional Conduct/State Bar Act violations: Rules of Professional Conduct rule 4-
100(A) and Business and Professions Code section 6106.

(d) [] Degree of prior discipline Two year stayed suspension, two years of probation and a 60-day
actual suspension.

(e) [] If Respondent has two or more incidents of prior discipline, use space provided below.

(2) [] Intentional/Bad Faith/Dishonesty: Respondent’s misconduct was dishonest, intentional, or surrounded

by, or followed by bad faith. ~.~ ~ ~.: ~i ~ "

(3) [] Misrepresentation: Respondent’s misconduct was surrounded; by, or followed by, misrepresentation.

(4) [] Concealment: Respondent’s misconduct was surrounded by, or followed by, concealment.

(5) [] Overreaching: Respondent’s misconduct was surrounded by, or followed by, overreaching.

(6) [] Uncharged Violations: Respondent’s conduct involves uncharged violations of the Business and
Professions Code, or the Rules of Professional Conduct.

(Effective July 1,2015)

Actual Suspension
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(7) [] Trust Violation: Trust funds or property were involved and Respondent refused or was unable to account
to the client or person who was the object of the misconduct for improper conduct toward said funds or
property.

(8) [] Harm: Respondent’s misconduct harmed significantly a client, the public, or the administration of justice.

(9) Indifference: Respondent demonstrated indifference toward rectification of or atonement for the
[]
consequences of his or her misconduct.
(10) [] Candor/Lack of Cooperation: Respondent displayed a lack of candor and cooperation to victims of
his/her misconduct, or to the State Bar during disciplinary investigations or proceedings.

(11) [] Multiple Acts: Respondent’s current misconduct evidences multiple acts of wrongdoing.

(12) [] Pattern: Respondent’s current misconduct demonstrates a pattern of misconduct.

(13) [] Restitution: Respondent failed to make restitution.

(14) [] Vulnerable Victim: The victim(s) of Respondent’s misconduct was/were highly vulnerable.

(15) [] No aggravating circumstances are involved.

Additional aggravating circumstances:

C. Mitigating Circumstances [see standards 1.2(i) & 1.6]. Facts supporting mitigating
circumstances are required.

(1) [] No Prior Discipline: Respondent has no pdor record of discipline over many years of practice coupled
with present misconduct which is not likely to recur.

(2) [] No Harm: Respondent did not harm the client, the public, or the administration of justice.

(3) [] Candor/Cooperation: Respondent displayed spontaneous candor and cooperation with the victims of
his/her misconduct or "to the State Bar during disciplinary investigations and proceedings.

(4) [] Remorse: Respondent promptly took objective steps demonstrating spontaneous remorse and recognition
of the wrongdoing, which steps were designed to timely atone for any consequences of his/her misconduct.

(5) [] Restitution: Respondent paid $ on in restitution to without the threat or force of

disciplinary, civil or criminal proceedings.

(6) [] Delay: These disciplinary proceedings were excessively delayed. The delay is not attributable to
Respondent and the delay prejudiced him/her.

(7) [] Good Faith: Respondent acted with a good faith belief that was honestly held and objectively reasonable.

(8) [] Emotional/Physical Difficulties: At the time of the stipulated act or acts of professional misconduct
Respondent suffered extreme emotional difficulties or physical or mental disabilities which expert testimony
would establish was directly responsible for the misconduct. The difficulties or disabilities were not the

(Effective July 1, 2015)

Actual Suspension
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product of any illegal conduct by the member, such as illegal drug or substance abuse, and the difficulties
or disabilities no longer pose a risk that Respondent will commit misconduct.

(g) [] Severe Financial Stress: At the time of the misconduct, Respondent suffered from severe financial stress
which resulted from circumstances not reasonably foreseeable or which were beyond his/her control and
which were directly responsible for the misconduct.

(10) [] Family Problems: At the time of the misconduct, Respondent suffered extreme difficulties in his/her
personal life which were other than emotional or physical in nature.

(11) [] Good Character: Respondent’s extraordinarily good character is attested to by a wide range of references
in the legal and general communities who are aware of the full extent of his/her misconduct.

(12) [] Rehabilitation: Considerable time has passed since the acts of professional misconduct occurred
followed by convincing proof of subsequent rehabilitation.

(13) [] No mitigating circumstances are involved.

Additional mitigating circumstances:

Pretrial Stipulation, see page 10.

Good Character, see page 10-11.

D. Discipline:

(1) [] Stayed Suspension:

(a) [] Respondent must be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two years.

and until Respondent shows proof satisfactory to the State Bar Court of rehabilitation and
fitness to practice and present learning and ability in the general law pursuant to standard
1.2(c)(1) Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct.

ii. [] and until Respondent pays restitution as set forth in the Financial Conditions form attached to
this stipulation.

iii. [] and until Respondent does the following:

(b) [] The above-referenced suspension is stayed.

(2) [] Probation:

Respondent must be placed on probation for a period of two years, which will commence upon the effective
date of the Supreme Court order in this matter. (See rule 9.18, California Rules of Court)

(3) [] Actual Suspension:

(a) [] Respondent must be actually suspended from the practice of law in the State of California for a period
of 120 days.

and until Respondent shows proof satisfactory to the State Bar Court of rehabilitation and
fitness to practice and present learning and ability in the general law pursuant to standard
1.2(c)(1), Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct

(Effective July 1, 2015)

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ii. [] and until Respondent pays restitution as set forth in the Financial Conditions form attached to
this stipulation.

iii. [] and until Respondent does the following:

E. Additional Conditions of Probation:

(1) [] If Respondent is actually suspended for two years or more, he/she must remain actually suspended until
he/she proves to the State Bar Court his/her rehabilitation, fitness to practice, and present learning and
ability in the general law, pursuant to standard 1.2(c)(1), Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional
Misconduct.

(2) [] During the probation period, Respondent must comply with the provisions of the State Bar Act and Rules of
Professional Conduct.

(3) Within ten (10) days of any change, Respondent must report to the Membership Records Office of the
State Bar and to the Office of Probation of the State Bar of California ("Office of Probation"), all changes of
information, including current office address and telephone number, or other address for State Bar
purposes, as prescribed by section 6002.1 of the Business and Professions Code.

(4) Within thirty (30) days from the effective date of discipline, Respondent must contact the Office of Probation
and schedule a meeting with Respondent’s assigned probation deputy to discuss these terms and
conditions of probation. Upon the direction of the Office of Probation, Respondent must meet with the
probation deputy either in-person or by telephone. During the period of probation, Respondent must
promptly meet with the probation deputy as directed and upon request.

(5) Respondent must submit written quarterly reports to the Office of Probation on each January 10, April 10,
July 10, and October 10 of the period of probation. Under penalty of perjury, Respondent must state
whether Respondent has complied with the State Bar Act, the Rules of Professional Conduct, and
conditions of probation during the preceding calendar quarter. Respondent must also state whether there
are any proceedings pending against him or her in the State Bar Court and if so, the case number and
current status of that proceeding. If the first report would cover less than 30 days, that report must be
submitted on the next quarter date, and cover the extended period.

In addition to all quarterly reports, a final report, containing the same information, is due no earlier than
twenty (20) days before the last day of the period of probation and no later than the last day of probation.

(6) Respondent must be assigned a probation monitor. Respondent must promptly review the terms and
conditions of probation with the probation monitor to establish a manner and schedule of compliance.
During the period of probation, Respondent must furnish to the monitor such reports as may be requested,
in addition to the quarterly reports required to be submitted to the Office of Probation. Respondent must
cooperate fully with the probation monitor.

(7) Subject to assertion of applicable privileges, Respondent must answer fully, promptly and truthfully any
inquiries of the Office of Probation and any probation monitor assigned under these conditions which are
directed to Respondent personally or in writing relating to whether Respondent is complying or has
complied with the probation conditions.

(8) [] Within one (1) year of the effective date of the discipline herein, Respondent must provide to the Office of
Probation satisfactory proof of attendance at a session of the Ethics School, and passage of the test given
at the end of that session.

[] No Ethics School recommended. Reason: Respondent is required to complete Ethics School as

part of his discipline in Case No. 14-O-02844.

(Effective July 1,2015)

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(9) [] Respondent must comply with all conditions of probation imposed in the underlying criminal matter and
must so declare under penalty of perjury in conjunction with any quarterly report to be filed with the Office
of Probation.

(10) [] The following conditions are attached hereto and incorporated:

[] Substance Abuse Conditions [] Law Office Management Conditions

[] Medical Conditions [] Financial Conditions

F. Other Conditions Negotiated by the Parties:

(1) [] Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination: Respondent must provide proof of passage of
the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination ("MPRE"), administered by the National
Conference of Bar Examiners, to the Office of Probation during the period of actual suspension or within
one year, whichever period is longer. Failure to pass the MPRE results in actual suspension without
further hearing until passage. But see rule 9.10(b), California Rules of Court, and rule 5.162(A) &
(E), Rules of Procedure.
[] No MPRE recommended. Reason: Respondent is required to take the MPRE as part of his
discipline in Case No. 14-O-02844.

(2) Rule 9.20, California Rules of Court: Respondent must comply with the requirements of rule 9.20,
California Rules of Court, and perform the acts specified in subdivisions (a) and (c) of that rule within 30
and 40 calendar days, respectively, after the effective date of the Supreme Court’s Order in this matter.

(3) Conditional Rule 9.20, California Rules of Court: If Respondent remains actually suspended for 90
days or more, he/she must comply with the requirements of rule 9.20, California Rules of Court, and
perform the acts specified in subdivisions (a) and (c) of that rule within 120 and 130 calendar days,
respectively, after the effective date of the Supreme Court’s Order in this matter.

(4) [] Credit for Interim Suspension [conviction referral cases only]: Respondent will be credited for the
period of his/her interim suspension toward the stipulated period of actual suspension. Date of
commencement of interim suspension:

(5) [] Other Conditions:

(Effective July 1,2015) Actual Suspension

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 ATTACHMENT TO

STIPULATION RE FACTS~ CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION

IN THE MATTER OF: WILLIAM ANDRAI ACOSTA

CASE NUMBERS: 16-C-13196-DFM and 16-C-13197

FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

Respondent admits that the following facts are true and that the facts and circumstances surrounding the
offense for which he was convicted involved other misconduct warranting discipline.

Case No. 16-C- 13196 (Conviction Proceedings)

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND IN CONVICTION PROCEEDING:

1. This is a proceeding pursuant to sections 6101 and 6102 of the Business and Professions Code
and rule 9.10 of the California Rules of Court.

2. On October 19, 2015, the Los Angeles County District Attorney filed a criminal complaint in
the Los Angeles County Superior Court, case no. 5JB07648, charging respondent with one count of
violation of Vehicle Code section 14601.2(a) [driving when privilege suspended or revoked for a driving
under the influence conviction], a misdemeanor, one count of violation of Vehicle Code section 22350
[driving at an unsafe speed], an infraction, and one count of violation of Vehicle Code section 23247(e)
[driving a vehicle not equipped with an ignition interlock device when privilege restricted], a
misdemeanor.

3. On March 21, 2016, the count of violation of Vehicle Code section 22350 [driving at an
unsafe speed] was dismissed on motion of the prosecution.

4. On March 21, 2016, a jury trial began.

5. On March 23, 2016, the case was submitted to the jury.

6. On March 23, 2016, the jury found respondent guilty on one count of violation of Vehicle
Code section 14601.2(a) [driving when privilege suspended or revoked for a driving under the influence
conviction], a misdemeanor, and one count of violation of Vehicle Code section 23247(e) [driving a
vehicle not equipped with an ignition interlock device when privilege restricted], a misdemeanor, as
charged in the complaint.

7. On March 23, 2016, the court suspended imposition of sentencing and placed respondent on 3
years of summary probation, including conditions that respondent serve 30 days in county jail, complete
10 days of community labor within 1 year, not drive a motor vehicle without a valid driver’s license or
the minimum amount of liability insurance set by law, and not operate a motor vehicle without an
installed ignition interlock device for a period of 1 year.

8. Thereafter, respondent’s conviction became final.

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 9. On July 15, 2016, the Review Department of the State Bar Court issued an order referring the
matter to the Hearing Department for a heating and decision recommending the discipline to be imposed
in the event that the Hearing Department finds that the facts and circumstances surrounding the offenses
for which respondent was convicted involved moral turpitude or other misconduct warranting discipline.

FACTS:

10. On February 28, 2014, respondent was convicted of one count of violation of Vehicle Code
section 23152(b) [driving under the influence with a blood alcohol content of.08% or higher], a
misdemeanor, in Los Angeles County Superior Court case no. 3PK04461. The underlying incident
occurred on August 30, 2013. The court sentenced respondent to three years of summary probation. As a
result of the conviction, the Department of Motor Vehicles suspended respondent’s driver’s license and
imposes the requirement that any vehicle he drives be equipped with an ignition interlock device.

11. On the afternoon of August 25, 2015, a Los Angeles County Sherriff’s Deputy observed
respondent driving 52 MPH in a 35 MPH zone, and initiated a traffic stop. When the deputy pulled
respondent over and asked for respondent’s license and registration, respondent admitted that his
driver’s license was suspended. The deputy ran a record check and confirmed that respondent’s license
was suspended.

12. The vehicle respondent was driving did not have an ignition interlock device.

13. The deputy issued respondent a citation for violations of Vehicle Code sections 14601.2(a)
[driving when privilege suspended or revoked for a driving under the influence conviction] and 22350
[driving at an unsafe speed].

14. On March 23, 2016, at the conclusion of the trial in this matter, the court found respondent to
be in violation of his probation in case nos. 2PK04986 (see below) and 3PK04461, based upon
respondent’s conviction and thereby ordered respondent’s probation revoked. The court reinstated
respondent’s probation on the same terms and conditions, with the modification that respondent serve an
additional 60 days in county jail, to be served consecutively with the sentence imposed in the present
matter.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

15. The facts and circumstances surrounding the above-described violations did not involve
moral turpitude but did involve other misconduct warranting discipline.

Case No. 16-C-13197 (Conviction Proceedings)

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND IN CONVICTION PROCEEDING:

16. This is a proceeding pursuant to sections 6101 and 6102 of the Business and Professions
Code and rule 9.10 of the California Rules of Court.

17. On October 22, 2012, the Los Angeles County District Attorney filed a criminal complaint in
the Los Angeles County Superior Court, case no. 2PK04986, charging respondent with one count of
violation of Penal Code section 243(b) [battery upon a peace officer or other designated persons], a
misdemeanor, and one count of violation of Penal Code section 273.5(a) [inflicting corporal injury to
spouse], a misdemeanor.
 18. On February 3, 2014, a jury trial began.

19. On February 6, 2014, on motion of the prosecution, the complaint was amended by
interlineation to add one count of violation of Penal Code section 242 [battery], a misdemeanor.

20. On February 6, 2014, the court entered respondent’s plea of nolo contendere to the count of
violation of Penal Code section 242 [battery], a misdemeanor, and based thereon, the court found
respondent guilty of that count. The remaining counts were dismissed pursuant to plea negotiations.

21. On February 6, 2014, the court suspended imposition of sentencing and placed respondent on
three years of summary probation, including conditions that respondent serve 3 days in county jail, stay
100 yards away from Ms. X, and within 30 days enroll in and then complete a 52-week domestic
violence treatment program.

22. Thereafter respondent’s conviction became final.

23. On July 15, 2016, the Review Department of the State Bar Court issued an order referring the
matter to the Hearing Department for a hearing and decision recommending the discipline to be imposed
in the event that the Hearing Department finds that the facts and circumstances surrounding the
offense(s) for which respondent was convicted involved moral turpitude or other misconduct warranting
discipline.

FACTS:

24. On the night of September 29, 2012, respondent was driving home with his wife, Ms. X,
when the couple got into an argument. At some point during the argument, Ms. X called 911, reporting
that respondent had hit her and that he had been drinking.

25. Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Deputies responded to respondent’s residence. Upon arrival,
they found respondent outside the house. The deputies observed scratches to respondent’s cheek and
forearm, from being struck by Ms. X, and that respondent’s breath smelled of alcohol. Respondent
declined to speak with the deputies and declined medical attention. The deputies detained respondent,
placing him the back seat of a patrol car, while they conducted their investigation.

26. Ms. X was also outside, and was crying. The deputies observed some swelling and small
lacerations to her lips, and that her breath smelled of alcohol. She refused medical attention and declined
to obtain an Emergency Protective Order against respondent. She then refused to cooperate any further
with the deputies.

27. While respondent was handcuffed and seated in the back of a patrol car, he began to
complain of difficulty breathing. A Fire Department medical unit was summoned to attend to
respondent. While a fire fighter was attending respondent, respondent spat in the fire fighter’s face
without any warning or provocation.

28. The deputies arrested respondent for violations of Penal Code sections 243(b) [battery upon a
peace officer or other designated persons] and 273.5(a) [inflicting corporal injury to spouse].
 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

29. The facts and circumstances surrounding the above-described violation(s) did not involve
moral turpitude but did involve other misconduct warranting discipline.

AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.

Prior Record of Discipline (Std. 1.50)): Respondent has one prior record of discipline, consisting of a
two year stayed suspension, two years of probation and a 60-day actual suspension, which went into
effect on July 23, 2016 (State Bar case no. 14-O-02844). In that matter, respondent was found culpable
after trial of one count of violating Rules of Professional Conduct rule 4-100(A) [failure to maintain
client funds in trust] and one count of violating Business and Professions Code section 6106 [moral
turpitude - misappropriation by gross negligence]. The misconduct took place between November 2013
and January 2014. Respondent opened a marker account with a Nevada casino. In November 2013
respondent updated the account to connect it to respondent’s client trust account. In January 2014,
respondent obtained $10,000 in casino chips on the marker account. After he did not repay the casino,
the casino presented the marker to respondent’s bank to collect payment for the $10,000. This resulted in
settlement funds belonging to two ofrespondent’s clients being withdrawn from the client trust account
for payment to the casino. The clients would receive their funds after respondent quickly replenished his
CTA. Respondent was given mitigating credit for having no prior record of discipline in 13 years of
practice, lack of real harm to the clients, entering into a pretrial stipulation of facts and "compelling
mitigation based on his extraordinary good moral character".

As discussed in detail below, since there is an overlap between the misconduct at issue in this case and
respondent’s prior record of discipline, the effect of respondent’s prior discipline is properly analyzed
under the totality analysis from In the Matter of Sklar (Review Dept. 1993) 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr.
602, 619. Here, although respondent’s prior record of discipline factors into the analysis below, because
of the reasoning set forth in Sklar, its aggravating weight is diminished. (See Analysis section, below.)

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.

Pretrial Stipulation: By entering into this stipulation, respondent has acknowledged misconduct and is
entitled to mitigation for recognition of wrongdoing and saving the State Bar significant resources and
time. (Silva-Vidor v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1071, 1079 [where mitigative credit was given for
entering into a stipulation as to facts and culpability]; In the Matter of Spaith (Review Dept. 1996) 3 Cal.
State Bar Ct. Rptr. 511, 521 [where the attorney’s stipulation to facts and culpability was held to be a
mitigating circumstance].)

Good Character: As discussed above, in respondent’s prior record of discipline he received mitigating
credit based on evidence of 20 witnesses who attested to their belief in respondent’s good moral
character. However, that evidence was only balanced with the misconduct in the prior matter and there is
no evidence to show that these witnesses are aware of respondent’s criminal convictions. (See In the
Matter of Song (Review Dept. 20 13) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 273, 280 [limited weight was assigned to
good character evidence where attorney failed to establish that his witnesses knew the full extent of his
misconduct].) Thus, the weight of respondent’s previously presented mitigation is tempered. (See
generally In the Matter of Snyder (Review Dept. 1993) 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 593,600 [mitigation
evidence similar to that which had been presenting a attorney’s prior discipline case and was found
sufficiently mitigating to avert an attomey’s disbarment for prior misconduct, was not sufficient to

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justify a recommendation short of disbarment in a subsequent matter in view of additional, serious
misconduct and the need for protection of the public].)

AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE.

The Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct "set forth a means for determining
the appropriate disciplinary sanction in a particular case and to ensure consistency across cases dealing
with similar misconduct and surrounding circumstances." (Rules Proc. of State Bar, tit. IV, Stds. for
Atty. Sanctions for Prof. Misconduct, Std. 1.1. All further references to Standards are to this source.)
The standards help fulfill the primary purposes of discipline, which include: protection of the public, the
courts and the legal profession; maintenance of the highest professional standards; and preservation of
public confidence in the legal profession. (See Std. 1.1; In re Morse (1995) 11 Cal.4th 184, 205.)

Although not binding, the Standards are entitled to "great weight" and should be followed "whenever
possible" in determining level of discipline. (ln re Silverton (2005) 36 Cal.4th 81, 92, quoting In re
Brown (1995) 12 Cal.4th 205,220 and In re Young (1989) 49 Cal.3d 257, 267, fla. 11.) Adherence to the
standards in the great majority of cases serves the valuable purpose of eliminating disparity and assuring
consistency, that is, the imposition of similar attorney discipline for instances of similar attorney
misconduct. (In re Naney (1990) 51 Cal.3d 186, 190.) Ifa recommendation is at the high end or low
end of a standard, an explanation must be given as to how the recommendation was reached. (Std. 1.1 .)
"Any disciplinary recommendation that deviates from the Standards must include clear reasons for the
departure." (Std. 1.1; Blair v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 762, 776, fla. 5.)

In determining whether to impose a sanction greater or less than that specified in a given Standard, in
addition to the factors set forth in the specific standard, consideration is to be given to the primary
purposes of discipline; the balancing of all aggravating and mitigating circumstances; the type of
misconduct at issue; whether the client, public, legal system or profession was harmed; and the
member’s willingness and ability to conform to ethical responsibilities in the future. (Stds. 1.7(b) and
(c).)
While Standard 1.8(a) provides that if respondent has a record of one prior discipline, the discipline
imposed for the current misconduct must be greater than the previous discipline unless the prior
discipline was remote in time and the offense was of minimal severity, the timing of the underlying
events in the current matter and respondent’s prior record of discipline create a situation where the
courts have indicated that Standard 1.8(a) should not strictly apply. Instead, a "totality analysis" from In
the Matter of Sklar, supra, 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. at 619, is instructive. Under this analysis one
should considered "the totality of the findings in the two cases to determine what the discipline would
have been had all the charged misconduct in this period been brought as one case." (ld. See also In the
Matter of Hansen (Review Dept. 2016) _ Cal. State Bar. Ct. Rptr. ~, case no. 11-O-17874 at 12-14
[Standard 1.8(b) not applicable where misconduct at issue predated filing of disciplinary charges in
attorney’s two prior records of discipline].) Here, there is an overlap in the two criminal cases, and the
misconduct and prosecution from respondent’s prior discipline. The incident underlying the battery
conviction occurred in September 2012, with respondent’s guilty plea entered in February 2014. The
events in the prior discipline occurred between November 2013 and January 2014. The prosecution of
such commenced in June 2015, with the Hearing Department’s decision issued in February 2016. The
incident underlying the DUI conviction occurred in August 2013, with the conviction entered in
February 2014. The incident underlying the driving on a suspended license conviction occurred in
August 2015, with the jury rendered its verdict in March 2016. The total scope of this misconduct
occurred between 2012 and 2015, and thus Sklar’s totality analysis should apply.

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Thus, the question becomes what discipline is appropriate for all misconduct considered together.
Standard 1.7 (a) requires that where an attorney acknowledges two or more acts of misconduct, and
different sanctions are prescribed by the Standards that apply to those acts, the sanction imposed shall be
the most severe prescribed in the applicable standard. To determine the appropriate level of discipline
under Sklar’s totality analysis, the Standard with the most severe sanction applicable amongst all the
acts of misconduct must be identified.

For the purposes of these proceedings, respondent’s convictions are conclusive evidence of guilt of the
elements of the crimes committed. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6101(a); In re Duggan (1976) 17 Cal.3d 416,
423; In the Matter of Stewart (Review Dept. 1994) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 52, 60.) Neither of
respondent’s two convictions involve moral turpitude. Respondent’s convictions for driving when
privilege suspended or revoked and driving a vehicle not equipped with an ignition interlock device do
not involve moral turpitude, as analogously, driving under the influence of alcohol is not a crime that
involves moral turpitude per se. (In re Kelley (1990) 52 Cal.3d 487.) DUI convictions have been held to
constitute other misconduct warranting discipline. (Id. at 496 [attorney convictions for two DUI’s, where
the second incident occurred while the attorney was on probation for the first conviction showed a "lack
of respect for the legal system"].) Thus, respondent’s convictions for driving while his license was
suspended and driving without an ignition interlock device, both of which were conditions imposed due
to a prior DUI conviction, warrant discipline. As to respondent’s battery conviction, a criminal
conviction involving assaultive behavior does not, in itself, involve moral turpitude, and that is the case
here. (See In the Matter of Stewart (Review Dept. 1994) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 52, 60 [intoxicated
attorney committed battery upon a police officer, held not to involve moral turpitude].) The appropriate
level of discipline for this misconduct is found under Standard 2.16(b), which indicates that suspension
or reproval is the presumed level of discipline for a misdemeanor conviction not involving moral
turpitude, but involving other misconduct warranting discipline.

In respondent’s prior discipline, his misconduct was analyzed under Standard 2.1 (b), which provides
that the presumed sanction for misappropriation of client funds involving gross negligence is actual
suspension. Between the instant cases and the prior discipline, Standard 2.1 (b) is the applicable sanction,
as it is the most severe.

Respondent’s total misconduct includes misappropriation by gross negligence in connection with his
obtaining casino markers with repayment connected to his client trust account, and his convictions for
battery, driving while his license was suspended, and driving a vehicle without an ignition interlock
device. The totality of the misconduct occurred between 2012 and 2015. Respondent’s criminal conduct
reflects poorly on his judgment, respect for the law, fitness to practice and the legal profession. (See In
re Kelley, supra, 52 Cal.3d at 495-496.) Coupled with the misconduct for misappropriation by gross
negligence, respondent has exhibited a lengthy pattern of unethical behavior, necessitating a significant
period of actual suspension in keeping with Standard 2. l(b).

Respondent previously received a 60-day actual suspension for the misconduct involving the
misappropriation. As discussed above, respondent received mitigating credit under several factors, but
that evidence was only balanced with the misappropriation, and not the criminal convictions. Thus, the
weight of respondent’s previously presented mitigation is tempered. (See In the Matter of Song, supra, 5
Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 273 at 280; In the Matter of Snyder, supra, 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. at 600.)
Also, the mitigation respondent previously received for having 13 years of discipline free practice is
slightly reduced since the battery incident occurred about two years before the casino marker incident.
Therefore, had all three discipline cases been brought against respondent together in the same

12
proceeding, and weighing the misconduct with respondent’s mitigation and aggravation, the appropriate
level of discipline would have included a six-month actual suspension. This result will sufficiently
protect the public, the courts, and the legal profession, maintain high professional standards for
attorneys, and preserve public confidence in the legal profession.

Since a 60-day actual suspension has already been imposed upon respondent, the recommended level of
discipline in this matter is a 120-day actual suspension, with a 2-year stayed suspension and 2 years of
probation. This will have the practical effect of achieving a six-month actual suspension.

COSTS OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.

Respondent acknowledges that the Office of Chief Trial Counsel has informed respondent that as of
October 13, 2016, the prosecution costs in this matter are $3,568. Respondent further acknowledges that
should this stipulation be rejected or should relief from the stipulation be granted, the costs in this matter
may increase due to the cost of further proceedings.

EXCLUSION FROM MINIMUM CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION ("MCLE") CREDIT

Respondent may not receive MCLE credit for completion of State Bar Ethics School, and/or any other
educational course(s) to be ordered as a condition of discipline. (Rules Proc. of State Bar, rule 3201.)

13
(Do not write above this line.)

In the Matter of: Case number(s):

WILLIAM ANDRA! ACOSTA 16-C-13196-DFM and 16-C-13197

SIGNATURE OF THE PARTIES

By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the
recitations and each of the te ,,--~ Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Disposition.

Date Print Name

Respond~’-~E;ig natu re
Anthony Radogna
R es l~n’.d.e n t~’~C o u n s e I Signature Print Name

io Alex Hackert
Date Deput~rial ~unsel s signature Print Name

(Effective July 1,2015)

Signature Page
Page 14
JDo not write above this line.)

In the Matter of: Case Number(s):

WILLIAM ANDRAI ACOSTA 16-C-13196-DFM and 16-C-13197

ACTUAL SUSPENSION ORDER

Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the
requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any, is GRANTED without prejudice, and:

The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the
Supreme Court.

The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the
DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.

[] All Hearing dates are vacated.

The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed
within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved
stipulation. (See rule 5.58(E) & (F), Rules of Procedure.) The effective date of this disposition is the effective date
of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California Rules of
Court.)

Date DONALD F. MILES

Judge of the State Bar Court

(Effective July 1, 2015)

Actual Suspension Order
Page
 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]

I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen
and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and
County of San Francisco, on October 31, 2016, I deposited a true copy of the following
document(s):

STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSION OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND

ORDER APPROVING

in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:

by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal
Service at San Francisco, California, addressed as follows:

ANTHONY P. RADOGNA
LAW OFFICES OF ANTHONY RADOGNA
1 PARK PLZ STE 600
IRVINE, CA 92614- 5987

by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California
addressed as follows:

ALEX J. HACKERT, Enforcement, Los Angeles

I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in San Francisco, California, on
October 31, 2016.

Mazie Yip
Case Administrator
State Bar Court