Trucker Convoy Lawsuit

Case 1:22-cv-01206 Document 1 Filed 05/02/22 Page 1 of 35
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MATTHEW NOBLE
210 N State St
Poplar Grove, IL 61065
MATTHEW SMITH
17 Odie Lane
Elkins, WV 26241
JONIE SMITH
17 Odie Lane
Elkins, WV 26241
ALLEN KELLY
1802 Clingerman Rd
Clearville, PA 15535
BONNIE KELLY
1802 Clingerman Rd
Clearville, PA 15535
ROBERT BUDZIK Civil Action No.: 1:22-cv-1206

7540 Azalea Cove Cir
Azalea Park, FL 32807
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
ARTUR CZAJKOWSKI
3442 Harpers Ferry Dr
Stockton, CA 95219
RYAN NELSON
33187 Gypsum Dr
Menifee, CA 92584
LELAND SCHMITT, JR.

N8263 County Rd P
Spring Valley, WI 54767
LISA SCHMITT
N8263 County Rd P
Spring Valley, WI 54767
ALVIN ZOOK
209 E Roseville Rd
Lancaster, PA 17601
TRAVIS BEVELHEIMER
109 N East Ave
Oberlin, KS 67749
DANIEL McELWAIN
338 Marsteller Rd
New Park, PA 17352
EDDY JONES
20714 EW 27th Rd
Chelsea, OK 91851
MAREK KOSAREWICZ
137 Richmond Dr
Bolingbrook, IL 60440
PATRICIA GLATTER
2630 Retread Rd
Pahrump, NV 89048
Plaintiffs,
v.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
c/o Office of the Attorney General
400 6th Street NW
Washington, D.C. 20001
Defendant.
VERIFIED COMPLAINT
Plaintiffs Matthew Noble, Matthew Smith, Jonie Smith, Allen Kelly, Bonnie Kelly, Robert
Budzik, Artur Czajkowski, Ryan Nelson, Leland Schmitt, Jr., Lisa Schmitt, Travis Bevelheimer,
Daniel McElwain, Eddy Jones, Marek Kosarewicz, and Patricia Glatter (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)
file this Verified Complaint for injunctive and declaratory relief against the District of Columbia
(the “District”) on the grounds set forth as follows:
2
INTRODUCTION
“Above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” Police Dept. of City
of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). Justice Thurgood Marshall penned these words a
half century ago as the Supreme Court unanimously reaffirmed that the government may not
restrict speech simply because viewpoints differ. The law is no different today.
Plaintiffs are hardworking Americans who value the United States military and the
principles upon which our nation was founded. To express their beliefs, Plaintiffs joined together
and embarked on a journey to the District of Columbia with the intent to lawfully exercise their
First Amendment rights in protest of the current administration’s continued state of emergency
declaration and COVID-19 related policies. Plaintiffs also wanted to honor the thirteen service
members who lost their lives in Afghanistan on August 26, 2021. With both objectives in mind,
Plaintiffs gathered in Hagerstown, Maryland and traveled together in “13 trucks for 13 fallen
soldiers” to Washington, D.C. only to discover the District of Columbia’s Metropolitan Police
Department (“MPD”) had formed blockades at the points of entry into the District.
The blockades were not the result of construction, auto accidents, or even scheduled road
closures. MPD formed the blockades for the sole purpose of preventing American citizens from
entering our nation’s capital to exercise their constitutionally protected right to free speech. Of
course, such action under color of state law violates Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights.
But even worse, MPD’s actions directly and proximately killed two people as their motor
vehicle crashed into the blockades. The two victims were trapped inside their vehicle and spent
their last moments on fire, burning to death. Indeed, their deaths were entirely avoidable and
tragically, foreseeable. The DC Police union spoke out against the blockades, both citing the
3
dangers to the community and the absence of any threat justifying MPD’s presence. In short,
MPD’s presence was solely, proximately, and exclusively due to Plaintiffs’ “potential for First
Amendment activity in the District of Columbia.”1 Because Plaintiffs have fundamental rights to
interstate travel, due process, equal protection, and free speech, this action follows pursuant to the
First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
JURISDICTION & VENUE
1. This Court has jurisdiction to hear this complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and
28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) and (4) because Plaintiffs claims arise under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
2. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1367, because those state claims are so related to the federal constitutional and statutory
claims in this action such that they do not raise novel or complex issues of state law and do not
substantially predominate over the federal claims. There are, further, no exceptional circumstances
compelling declining state law claims.
3. Venue is appropriately vested in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because a
substantial part of the acts or omissions giving rise to the claims herein occurred in the District of
Columbia.
PARTIES
4. Plaintiff Matthew Noble is an adult resident of Illinois.
5. Plaintiff Matthew Smith is an adult resident of West Virginia.
6. Plaintiff Jonie Smith is an adult resident of West Virginia.
1
Stephanie Ramirez, DC police leadership makes changes after union raises serious safety concerns over MPD
trucker response, FOX5 DC, (Mar. 14, 2022) available at: https://www.fox5dc.com/news/dc-police-leadership-makes-
changes-after-union-raises-serious-safety-concerns-over-mpd-trucker-response (last accessed May 2, 2022).
4
7. Plaintiff Allen Kelly is an adult resident of Pennsylvania.
8. Plaintiff Bonnie Kelly is an adult resident of Pennsylvania.
9. Plaintiff Robert Budzik is an adult resident of Florida.
10. Plaintiff Artur Czajkowski is an adult resident of California.
11. Plaintiff Ryan Nelson is an adult resident of California.
12. Plaintiff Leland Schmitt, Jr. is an adult resident of Wisconsin.
13. Plaintiff Lisa Schmitt is an adult resident of Wisconsin.
14. Plaintiff Alvin Zook is an adult resident of Pennsylvania.
15. Plaintiff Travis Bevelheimer is an adult resident of Kansas.
16. Plaintiff Daniel McElwain is an adult resident of Pennsylvania.
17. Plaintiff Eddy Jones is an adult resident of Oklahoma.
18. Plaintiff Marek Kosarewicz is an adult resident of Illinois.
19. Plaintiff Patricia Glatter is an adult resident of Nevada.
20. Defendant the District of Columbia is a District of Columbia municipal corporation
located at 411 4th Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20001, and is the entity responsible for
Washington, D.C.’s governmental operations, which includes inter alia supervising, directing,
and/or controlling its Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
21. In an effort to show solidarity for the thirteen service members who lost their lives
on August 26, 2021, in Kabul, Afghanistan and speak on the administration’s continued state of
emergency declaration and COVID-19 related policies, Plaintiffs banded together in Hagerstown,
Maryland and traveled to Washington, D.C.
5
22. Plaintiffs hoped that, by exercising their First Amendment freedoms, they would
be able to raise awareness that the decisions of the incumbent administration can have – and do
have – real, grave consequences.
23. On or about March 14, 2022, Plaintiffs lawfully traveled in or operated “thirteen
trucks for thirteen fallen soldiers” along I-395 towards the District of Columbia. As Plaintiffs
neared the District, they encountered MPD police officers who had used marked, unmarked, and
various public work vehicles to form blockades and deny Plaintiffs entry into our nation’s capital.
24. MPD’s efforts succeeded, and Plaintiffs returned to Hagerstown, Maryland, for the
evening.
25. The next day, on or about March 15, 2022, Plaintiffs took a different route and
traveled via I-295 towards the District in hopes that this time, the thirteen trucks would be able to
enter Washington, D.C.
26. Plaintiffs’ March 15 efforts were unsuccessful. Upon arrival via I-295, Plaintiffs
again encountered MPD blockades that prohibited their entry into the District. After refusing to let
Plaintiffs into the District, officers stationed at the blockades directed Plaintiffs to disburse via
MD-201. Plaintiffs complied with the MPD directive.
27. On or about March 16, 2022, Plaintiffs attempted to enter the District, this time
hoping to access the capital via I-695 but were again, confronted by a MPD blockade on the I-695
access ramp leading into the District.
28. The I-695 MPD blockade immediately began causing heavy traffic to accumulate.
In an attempt to alleviate the traffic and otherwise exercise their constitutionally protected rights,
Plaintiffs again requested that MPD move their vehicles and allow Plaintiffs to continue onward
6
into the District. MPD officers refused Plaintiffs’ request and informed them that “a supervisor
[was] on the way to speak with them.”
29. MPD Capt. Jason Bagshaw and Sgt. Matthew Mahl arrived shortly thereafter.
30. During their conversation with MPD, Plaintiffs asked Capt. Bagshaw and Sgt. Mahl
why MPD refused to allow them to enter the District. Capt. Bagshaw and Sgt. Mahl both ignored
Plaintiffs’ request and Sgt. Mahl merely advised Plaintiffs “695 is closed.” In threatening fashion,
Sgt. Mahl further stated, “my boss is going to eventually tell me to start arresting people, and I
don’t want to do that.”
31. Reasonably interpreting Sgt. Mahl’s statement as a threat of arrest, Plaintiffs
departed the area and traveled towards the next exit leading into the District only to again,
encountered MPD blocking all access. Plaintiffs returned to Hagerstown, Maryland after being
unlawfully deprived of their fundamental rights for the third consecutive day.
32. On or about March 18, 2022,2 the thirteen trucks returned to the District for what
would be their final attempt to lawfully exercise their First Amendment freedoms. Again, their
efforts were unsuccessful as MPD denied their entry for a fourth time.
33. At all times relevant, Plaintiffs have maintained the intent, and presently do
maintain the intent, to return to the District of Columbia for lawful purposes and to exercise their
First Amendment freedoms.
34. At all times relevant, Plaintiffs satisfied all legal requirements to operate their motor
vehicles and each respective motor vehicle satisfied all requirements to travel into in the District
of Columbia.
2
Plaintiffs remained in Hagerstown, Maryland on March 17, 2022, due to inclement weather.
7
35. To date, Defendants, acting under color of state law, have denied and continue to
deny Plaintiffs and the “thirteen trucks for thirteen fallen soldiers” access to the District of
Columbia in violation of their fundamental and constitutionally protected rights.
COUNT I
(Violation of Due Process, U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV)
36. Plaintiffs incorporate all preceding paragraphs by reference as if fully set forth
herein.
37. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall “be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]”
38. At all times relevant, each Plaintiff had and continues to have a liberty interest in
entering the District of Columbia for purposes of engaging in First Amendment protected activity.
39. At all times relevant, each Plaintiff has qualified and continues to qualify for
protection under the due process clause the Fourteenth Amendment.
40. At all times relevant, MPD acted under color of state law and is deemed a state
actor because it performed a public function.
41. MPD failed to provide Plaintiffs with adequate notice, an opportunity to be heard,
and substantial evidence to support their decision to prohibit Plaintiffs from entering the District
of Columbia and refusal to allow Plaintiffs to exercise their First Amendment rights.
42. Plaintiffs have a fundamental right to ingress and egress to and from neighboring
states, including the District of Columbia. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
43. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, by and through the Fourteenth
Amendment, prohibits the District from regulating interstate travel and speech in a manner that
fails to define the prohibitions with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand
what conduct is prohibited.
8
44. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment also obligates the District to
describe its prohibitions on interstate travel and speech in a manner that does not encourage
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
45. The District has violated—and is continuing to violate—both of these principles.
46. The District has burdened interstate travel and speech without any clear or precise
standards subject to objective measurement or application, but instead are given meaning only
through the exercise of unbridled discretion by those responsible for the enforcement of the
District’s blockade policy, custom, practice, or procedure as complained of herein.
47. The District’s blockade policy, custom, practice, or procedure is unconstitutionally
vague on its face because it allows the District unfettered discretion to refuse to grant Plaintiffs
access to the District, thereby depriving Plaintiffs of their constitutional rights to travel and free
speech.
48. The District’s blockade policy, custom, practice, or procedure is also
unconstitutionally vague on its face because the District does not publish orders of the Board and,
thus, persons of ordinary intelligence have no means of discerning what traditional public forums
in the District are closed to expressive activity, what traditional public forums in the District are
open to expressive activity, and, if open, what expressive activity is prohibited and what expressive
activity is allowed. Further, this lack of clarity encourages arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.
49. The District’s blockade policy, custom, practice, or procedure is also
unconstitutionally overbroad on its face because the District has prohibited and continues to
prohibit interstate travel and a substantial amount of protected First Amendment activity in a
traditional public forum.
9
50. The District’s blockade policy, custom, practice, or procedure is not “narrowly
tailored” to achieving a “compelling governmental interest.”
51. The “interest” of depriving Plaintiffs of their fundamental rights, including travel
and free speech, is not compelling; in fact, depriving Plaintiffs of their fundamental rights is
quintessentially antithetical as to what constitutes a compelling governmental interest.
52. The District’s blockade policy, custom, practice, or procedure does not seek to
effectuate a substantial governmental interest.
and free speech, is not substantial; in fact, depriving Plaintiffs of their fundamental rights is
quintessentially antithetical as to what constitutes a substantial governmental interest.
effectuate an important governmental interest.
and free speech, is not important; in fact, depriving Plaintiffs of their fundamental rights is
quintessentially antithetical as to what constitutes an important governmental interest.
56. The District’s blockade policy, custom, practice, or procedure is not narrowly
tailored because by forming blockades, the District increased traffic.
tailored because it does not promote public health; the only deaths that resulted during all times
relevant were directly and proximately caused by the blockades.
58. The District has imposed an unlawful system of prior restraint in violation of
Plaintiffs’ fundamental rights clearly established under the United States Constitution.
10
59. The District’s blockade policy, custom, practice, or procedure is unconstitutional
on its face.
as applied against Plaintiffs.
61. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law, have suffered, and will suffer serious
and irreparable harm to their constitutional and statutory rights unless the District is enjoined.
62. Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory relief and preliminary and permanent injunctive
relief restraining the District from violating their constitutional and statutory rights.
63. Plaintiffs are entitled to nominal, compensatory, and punitive damages.
64. Plaintiffs found it necessary to engage the services of private counsel to vindicate
their rights under the law. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2412 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
COUNT II
(Equal Protection, U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV)
herein.
66. The District’s refusal to grant Plaintiffs entry into the District and its refusal to grant
Plaintiffs entry into the District in the future—while allowing others to enter the District to engage
in First Amendment protected activity—constitutes a violation of Plaintiffs’ right to equal
protection as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
67. Because interstate travel and speech are fundamental rights, the District must
demonstrate that its restrictions on speech satisfy strict scrutiny.
68. The District has impermissibly discriminated against Plaintiffs on the basis of
speech-related activities in a traditional public forum and will continue to impermissibly
11
discriminate against Plaintiffs, and the District’s actions were not narrowly tailored to serve
compelling governmental interests.
69. The District has further impermissibly discriminated against Plaintiffs, and will
continue to discriminate against Plaintiffs, on the ground of speaker identity, and the District’s
actions were not and are not narrowly tailored to serve substantial governmental interests. The
District has admitted that its “operational tactics” would remain in place only “as long as
necessary” to prevent anyone assumed to be part of the People’s Convoy from entering the District.
Granting those who are not perceived as members of the People’s Convoy access to the District
constitutes impermissible discrimination on the basis of speaker identity.
70. The District has further impermissibly discriminated against Plaintiffs, and will
continue to discriminate against Plaintiffs, on the ground of speaker viewpoint, and the District’s
actions were not and are not narrowly tailored to serve substantial governmental interests. The
District has failed to prohibit protestors from entering the District––despite multiple, weeks-long
records of causing violence and disruption in the District––who share the same viewpoints as
District officials, including Mayor Muriel Bowser, among others. Granting entry to the District for
those who share the same viewpoint as District officials while denying those who share viewpoints
contrary to the viewpoints of District officials constitutes impermissible discrimination on the
basis of speaker viewpoint.
on its face.
12
his rights under the law. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2412 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
COUNT III
(Violation of Free Speech, U.S. Const. amend. I)
herein.
79. The First Amendment of the Constitution prohibits governmental action “abridging
the freedom of speech.” The Free Speech Clause applies “with equal vigor” to the District of
Columbia. Espresso, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 884 F. Supp. 7, 9 (D.D.C. 1995).
80. Under the Free Speech Clause, the District “has no power to restrict expression
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz.,
576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015).
81. Plaintiffs’ protests are quintessential protected expression. See, e.g., Good News
Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (recognizing that forum restriction on an
organization that promoted religious values was a restriction on the freedom of speech).
13
82. Public streets and roadways promoting ingress and egress into and from the District
of Columbia are traditional public forums.
83. The District’s selective enforcement of its blockade policy, custom, practice, or
procedure against entry into the District has created a de facto exemption for mass protests.
84. The existence of a de facto exemption is further evidenced by Mayor Bowser’s
encouragement of (and participation in) protests that promote the viewpoints she shares while
discouraging others, such as Plaintiffs, from engaging in lawful and peaceful protests (unlike the
comparator protests) advocating for viewpoints she does not share.
85. An exemption even from a permissible regulation of speech diminishes the
credibility of the District’s rationale for restricting speech in the first place. See City of Ladue v.
Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 51-53 (1994). When a policy, custom, practice, or procedure is selectively
enforced or subject to exceptions, it suggests that content discrimination is afoot. Id. at 52.
86. A content-based exemption from a ban is no less a content-based distinction
because it is phrased as exempting certain speech from a ban; not as imposing a restriction only
on the burdened class of speech. See City of Ladue, 512 U.S. at 48-53; City of Cincinnati v.
Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 429 (1993).
87. Content-based restrictions “are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified
only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.”
Reed, 576 U.S. at 163.
88. Creating an exception for mass protests and not other types of First Amendment
activities is constitutionally forbidden content-based discrimination and thus violates Plaintiffs’
free speech rights. See Members of City Council of City of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.
789, 816 (1984).
14
89. The District’s blockade policy, custom, practice, or procedure is not “narrowly
tailored” to achieving a “compelling governmental interest.”
and free speech, is not compelling; in fact, depriving Plaintiffs of their fundamental rights is
quintessentially antithetical as to what constitutes a compelling governmental interest.
effectuate a substantial governmental interest.
and free speech, is not substantial; in fact, depriving Plaintiffs of their fundamental rights is
quintessentially antithetical as to what constitutes a substantial governmental interest.
effectuate an important governmental interest.
and free speech, is not important; in fact, depriving Plaintiffs of their fundamental rights is
quintessentially antithetical as to what constitutes an important governmental interest.
tailored because by forming blockades, the District increased traffic.
tailored because it does not promote public health; the only deaths that resulted during all times
relevant were directly and proximately caused by the blockades.
15
on its face.
to 28 U.S.C. § 2412 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
COUNT V
(Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983)
herein.
105. Defendants, acting under color of District of Columbia law, have deprived and
continue to deprive Plaintiffs of their First Amendment rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution
in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by, inter alia:
a. Refusing Plaintiffs to exercise their fundamental right to interstate travel;
b. Depriving Plaintiffs of lawful entry to the District of Columbia;
c. Depriving Plaintiffs of their fundamental right to engage in free speech;
d. Depriving Plaintiffs of their fundamental rights to enter the District of Columbia

and engage in free speech for reasons that are not substantially related to an
important government interest;
16
e. Failing to provide a reasonable basis for denying Plaintiffs entry to the District of
Columbia;
f. Failing to provide a reasonable basis for depriving Plaintiffs of their fundamental

right to engage in free speech;
g. Favoring the viewpoints of other activists and political organizations over the
viewpoint Plaintiffs share; and
h. Expending District funds and resources to deprive Plaintiffs of their fundamental

rights to enter the District of Columbia and engage in free speech.
on its face.
109. Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer irreparable harm as a direct and
proximate result of Defendants’ deprivation of their fundamental rights in violation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and will continue to suffer such irreparable harm unless the District’s unlawful conduct is
enjoined.
to 28 U.S.C. § 2412 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
17
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully pray that this Honorable Court grant the following
judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor and the following relief:
A. Declaratory relief in the form of an order and declaratory judgment holding and
declaring that the District’s blockade policy, custom, practice, or procedure is unconstitutional on
its face under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and
federal law;
B. Declaratory relief in the form of an order and declaratory judgment holding and
declaring that the District, by enforcing its blockade policy, custom, practice, or procedure violated
Plaintiffs’ rights under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution and federal law;
C. Preliminary and permanent injunctive relief requiring the District, its agents
including MPD, its employees, and all persons acting in concert with the District to grant Plaintiffs
entry to the District of Columbia now and in the future for the purpose of lawfully engaging in
their First Amendment right to free speech and to not interfere with such constitutionally protected
activity;
D. Preliminary and permanent injunctive relief preventing the District, its agents
including MPD, its employees, and all persons acting in concert with the District to be restrained
and enjoined from interfering in any manner with Plaintiffs’ fundamental constitutional and
statutory rights of free speech, assembly, and association, religion, due process of law, and equal
protection;
E. That the Court issue the requested injunctive relief without a condition of bond or
surety, or other security being required of Plaintiffs;
18
F. An award of monetary relief in the form of nominal, compensatory, and punitive
damages;
G. An award of Plaintiffs’ reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988;
H. That the Court retain jurisdiction of this matter for the purposes of enforcing the
Court order(s); and
I. Grant Plaintiffs’ any further relief this Honorable Court deems necessary, just, and
proper.
Dated: May 2, 2022
Respectfully submitted,
/S/ MICHAEL A. YODER

Michael A. Yoder
THE LAW OFFICE OF MICHAEL A. YODER, PLLC
2300 Wilson Blvd., Suite 700
Arlington, VA 22201
Tel: (571) 234-5594
Fax: (571) 327-5554
[email protected]
Counsel for Plaintiffs
19
VERIFICATION
I, MATTHEW NOBLE, am over the age of eighteen years and a Plaintiff in this action.
The statements and allegations that pertain to me or which I make in this VERIFIED
COMPLAINT are true and correct, and based upon my personal knowledge (unless otherwise
indicated). If called upon to testify to their truthfulness, I would and could do so competently. I
declare under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States, that the foregoing statements
are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
Dated: May 1, 2022
/s/ MATTHEW NOBLE

MATTHEW NOBLE
(Original Signature retained by Counsel)
20
VERIFICATION
I, MATTHEW SMITH, am over the age of eighteen years and a Plaintiff in this action. The
statements and allegations that pertain to me or which I make in this VERIFIED COMPLAINT
are true and correct, and based upon my personal knowledge (unless otherwise indicated). If called
upon to testify to their truthfulness, I would and could do so competently. I declare under penalty
of perjury, under the laws of the United States, that the foregoing statements are true and correct
to the best of my knowledge.
Dated: May 1, 2022
/s/ MATTHEW SMITH

MATTHEW SMITH
21
VERIFICATION
I, JONIE SMITH, am over the age of eighteen years and a Plaintiff in this action. The
Dated: May 1, 2022
/s/ JONIE SMITH

JONIE SMITH
22
VERIFICATION
I, ALLEN KELLY, am over the age of eighteen years and a Plaintiff in this action. The
Dated: May 1, 2022
/s/ ALLEN KELLY

ALLEN KELLY
23
VERIFICATION
I, BONNIE KELLY, am over the age of eighteen years and a Plaintiff in this action. The
Dated: May 1, 2022
/s/ BONNIE KELLY

BONNIE KELLY
24
VERIFICATION
I, ROBERT BUDZIK, am over the age of eighteen years and a Plaintiff in this action. The
Dated: May 1, 2022
/s/ ROBERT BUDZIK

ROBERT BUDZIK
25
VERIFICATION
I, ARTUR CZAJKOWSKI, am over the age of eighteen years and a Plaintiff in this action.
Dated: May 1, 2022
/s/ ARTUR CZAJKOWSKI

ARTUR CZAJKOWSKI
26
VERIFICATION
I, RYAN NELSON, am over the age of eighteen years and a Plaintiff in this action. The
Dated: May 1, 2022
/s/ RYAN NELSON

RYAN NELSON
27
VERIFICATION
I, LELAND SCHMITT, JR., am over the age of eighteen years and a Plaintiff in this action.
Dated: May 1, 2022
/s/ LELAND SCHMITT, JR.

LELAND SCHMITT, JR.
28
VERIFICATION
I, LISA SCHMITT, am over the age of eighteen years and a Plaintiff in this action. The
Dated: May 1, 2022
/s/ LISA SCHMITT

LISA SCHMITT
29
VERIFICATION
I, ALVIN ZOOK, am over the age of eighteen years and a Plaintiff in this action. The
Dated: May 1, 2022
/s/ ALVIN ZOOK

ALVIN ZOOK
30
VERIFICATION
I, TRAVIS BEVELHEIMER, am over the age of eighteen years and a Plaintiff in this
action. The statements and allegations that pertain to me or which I make in this VERIFIED
Dated: May 1, 2022
/s/ TRAVIS BEVELHEIMER

TRAVIS BEVELHEIMER
31
VERIFICATION
I, DANIEL McELWAIN, am over the age of eighteen years and a Plaintiff in this action.
Dated: May 1, 2022
/s/ DANIEL McELWAIN

DANEIL McELWAIN
32
VERIFICATION
I, EDDY JONES, am over the age of eighteen years and a Plaintiff in this action. The
Dated: May 1, 2022
/s/ EDDY JONES

EDDY JONES
33
VERIFICATION
I, MAREK KOSAREWICZ, am over the age of eighteen years and a Plaintiff in this action.
Dated: May 1, 2022
/s/ MAREK KOSAREWICZ

MAREK KOSAREWICZ
34
VERIFICATION
I, PATRICIA GLATTER, am over the age of eighteen years and a Plaintiff in this action.
Dated: May 1, 2022
/s/ PATRICIA GLATTER

PATRICIA GLATTER
35

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Case 1:22-cv-01206 Document 1 Filed 05/02/22 Page 1 of 35

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

ROBERT BUDZIK Civil Action No.: 1:22-cv-1206

LELAND SCHMITT, JR.

(the “District”) on the grounds set forth as follows:

JURISDICTION & VENUE

Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

compelling declining state law claims.

3. Venue is appropriately vested in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because a

4. Plaintiff Matthew Noble is an adult resident of Illinois.

5. Plaintiff Matthew Smith is an adult resident of West Virginia.

6. Plaintiff Jonie Smith is an adult resident of West Virginia.

7. Plaintiff Allen Kelly is an adult resident of Pennsylvania.

8. Plaintiff Bonnie Kelly is an adult resident of Pennsylvania.

9. Plaintiff Robert Budzik is an adult resident of Florida.

10. Plaintiff Artur Czajkowski is an adult resident of California.

11. Plaintiff Ryan Nelson is an adult resident of California.

12. Plaintiff Leland Schmitt, Jr. is an adult resident of Wisconsin.

13. Plaintiff Lisa Schmitt is an adult resident of Wisconsin.

14. Plaintiff Alvin Zook is an adult resident of Pennsylvania.

15. Plaintiff Travis Bevelheimer is an adult resident of Kansas.

16. Plaintiff Daniel McElwain is an adult resident of Pennsylvania.

17. Plaintiff Eddy Jones is an adult resident of Oklahoma.

18. Plaintiff Marek Kosarewicz is an adult resident of Illinois.

19. Plaintiff Patricia Glatter is an adult resident of Nevada.

20. Defendant the District of Columbia is a District of Columbia municipal corporation

and/or controlling its Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”).

Maryland and traveled to Washington, D.C.

have – real, grave consequences.

enter Washington, D.C.

MD-201. Plaintiffs complied with the MPD directive.

access ramp leading into the District.

[was] on the way to speak with them.”

don’t want to do that.”

31. Reasonably interpreting Sgt. Mahl’s statement as a threat of arrest, Plaintiffs

First Amendment freedoms.

Columbia in violation of their fundamental and constitutionally protected rights.

deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]”

protection under the due process clause the Fourteenth Amendment.

actor because it performed a public function.

what conduct is prohibited.

arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.

45. The District has violated—and is continuing to violate—both of these principles.

District’s blockade policy, custom, practice, or procedure as complained of herein.

47. The District’s blockade policy, custom, practice, or procedure is unconstitutionally

48. The District’s blockade policy, custom, practice, or procedure is also

49. The District’s blockade policy, custom, practice, or procedure is also

traditional public forum.

tailored” to achieving a “compelling governmental interest.”

quintessentially antithetical as to what constitutes a compelling governmental interest.

effectuate a substantial governmental interest.

quintessentially antithetical as to what constitutes a substantial governmental interest.

effectuate an important governmental interest.

quintessentially antithetical as to what constitutes an important governmental interest.

tailored because by forming blockades, the District increased traffic.

relevant were directly and proximately caused by the blockades.

59. The District’s blockade policy, custom, practice, or procedure is unconstitutional

60. The District’s blockade policy, custom, practice, or procedure is unconstitutional

as applied against Plaintiffs.