Justifications For The KMT-CCP Enmities
Justifications For The KMT-CCP Enmities
Justifications For The KMT-CCP Enmities
Dr. Stockton
CCP, which ultimately led to two separate states, respectively the Republic of China (Taiwan)
and the People’s Republic of China (mainland China). From the viewpoint of an outside
observer, the struggle of ideology is a mainstay which has led to animosities even unto this very
day. The clash between rightists and leftists ultimately led to a civil war which had culminated
into two separate states in 1949. With Kaishek becoming the heir under Sun Yat-sen, the KMT
tried to consolidate its power by strongman tactics, which ultimately engendered enmity among
the Chinese populace. Mao Zedong, who was ultimately the champion of the Chinese peasants,
had the mantle when it came to the formation of the new Chinese mainland state, the People’s
Republic of China. Both Zedong and Kaishek were notorious despots, and certain austerity
The clash between rightists and leftists has had global ramifications, obviously in the
Occident, as well as in the world at large. Convergence of national unity was only during a
period of nationalism in China. But the general climate among the Chinese elite was that of
disdain for those on the left, with warlords and entities such as the “Green Gang” and the
“Triads’ purging leftists. With the KMT consolidating its clout mostly in urban areas where
economical and political formations were, many in the left were left to the wayside, usually in
the countryside. However this paper wouldn’t even be written had the CCP been castigated only
to that.
My intent on writing about the clash of ideologies in China is a formative step towards
sensibilities have been formalized by exchanges with others on all sides of the political spectrum.
Dialogue can and should be a mainstay in politics. As political “game theory” would have it,
there’s never been a better time to defuse tensions among the hegemony already in place and the
aspiring nation that is China, in order to maintain a sort of balance so as to stop things from
My knowledge about this topic has been influenced by the lectures of this class. I’ve
already been apprized of the political turmoil of the Orient in previous classes. Ultimately what
had occurred in China has set the template for what has gone on in surrounding areas such as
Indochina. What I would like to learn is the predisposition that the Chinese had when it came to
their personal politics and whether private political sensibilities were truly emblematic when it
came to the banners of ideology that they had been subject to.
Annotated Bibliographies
Ku, Hung-Ting. 1979. “Urban Mass Movement: The May Thirtieth Movement in
Shanghai”. Modern Asia Studies. pp. 197-216.
In this article, Ku first cites the KMT’s Constitutional reform of enlisting organizations into
the ranks of the KMT, such as labor unions, schools and city councils. Merchants were
especially endeared to not be complicit in the imperialist commerce. Ku cites the death of a
Chinese worker by the Japanese during a strike by Chinese workers at a Japanese cotton mill.
This elicited a response by Chinese students who mobilized a demonstration against the
occupying coalition, which led to the arrest of 2 students who were sent to trial on May 30th,
1925. The KMT and CCP decided to organize a demonstration in solidarity with striking
workers against the imperialist powers. 2,000 in all were enlisted to give public speeches to the
public denouncing these actions on May 30th. In an effort to quell these speeches, the Settlement
police made many more arrests which led violence to ensue. On that day, police fired on the
Ku cites the student mobilization as particularly tentative when it came to the unification of
the country against the imperialists during China’s entry into nascent statehood. Whereas the
KMT and the CCP have had a history of enmity, the May 30th Movement had the effect of
cohesion. This in turn bolstered the workers’ unions and sent vast parts of urban areas to form a
coalition against the imperialists. Since labor unions were largely a socialistic enterprise, CCP
labor organizers like Li Li-san were outlawed and a certain Liu Hua was executed.
Ku states that this was one of the prime examples of comity the CCP and the KMT had. A
broad coalition of the willing joined forces and this elicited empathy into the hearts of the
common Chinese.
Bedeski, Robert E. April-June 1971. “The Tutelary State and National Revolution in
In this article, Bedeski conjectures that the militarization of the PRC harkens back to a time
of KMT one-party military rule. He however states that Mao is absolutely not the sort of
Generalissimo that Kaishek cultivated himself to be. This segues to the comparison Bedeski
makes in terms of the likeness of the KMT in the mainland and the CCP’s rule thereafter. The
tutelary state that Bedeski writes about states that the KMT really did see itself as having a
mandate to usher in statehood for China. “The KMT leadership viewed the act of founding a
new political order as an enterprise of regeneration rather than creation. The resources to build a
modern Chinese state were within the existing boundaries of the country, but desperately needed
was the spirit and leadership to proceed with the revivification of China” (Bedeski, 1971, 317).
With Dr. Sun Yat-sen deemed the “Father of Modern China”, and with Kaishek
envisaging himself to be the heir apparent, it seemed to the KMT as if a mandate for one-party
rule without the CCP was justifiable. The ossification of ideology was obviously not partial by
Kuo-tai, Hu. June 1989. “The Struggle Between the Kuomintang and the Chinese
Communist Party on Campus during the War of Resistance, 1937-45”. The China
Quarterly. pp 300-323
In this article, Kuo-tai emphasizes the struggle between the KMT and the CCP when it
came to wooing intellectuals into their respective sides. The necessity of having an
population. He emphasizes that during the war, one way to vicariously engage in warfare
was the intellectual debate between the KMT and the CCP students on university campuses.
Using the annals of both Taipei and the mainland, he asserts that in terms of sloganeering and
propaganda, the KMT found itself in an ambiguous position of not deftly adjusting to the
regimen with which the CCP was dominating the rhetoric. Since the KMT was the party in
power, all CCP methods of dispersal first had to be approved by the KMT, and this in turn
As war between the two sides escalated, a focus of Mao was the intellectuals whom he
readily accepted as being beneficial to winning the war at large. With insurrection in the
making, the CCP had decided to go underground after the New Fourth Army Incident of
1941, leaving it to pursue clandestine activities. This didn’t mean CCP students were being
banished from campuses, however. Without exposing oneself as a CCP affiliate, students
Countermeasures by the KMT were intended to curb CCP expansions on campus. Where
the CCP was bound to the confines of the underground, the KMT had absolute discretion to
be in the public forefront. There were many in the People’s Political Council who were
against the politicization of the universities. Kaishek went against the Council as not
wanting to squash this dissent as being antithetical to the desired motives of the nation-
building that was going on in China. In a series of strategies designed to curb CCP
expansion, leftist staff and administration were banned, KMT party guidelines were
indoctrinated to the students, and any possible dissent among the students who were deemed
“reactionary” was to be met swiftly with a visit to the concentration camps. In all of this
Kuo-tai sums up that the KMT looked incredibly domineering and the burgeoning of
intellect could not possibly occur under it’s auspices. The CCP had the youth “en masse”,
and since the KMT was the party in power and held the reins when it came to authority, the
CCP, stymied as it was, had years of experience behind them to subvert activities on campus.
Since this was a civil war, vicariously matching wits with the enemy on an academic level
Bedeski, Robert E. July 1975. “The Evolution of the Modern State in China: Nationalist
In this article, Bedeski conjectures on the very concept of statehood itself and imprints into
the reader’s mind how key concepts such as political system and state applies to the Nationalist
and ultimately the Communist regime. According to him, political systems are the “patterns” by
which entities such as “empires, labor unions, and international alliances, as well as nation-
states” have a sense of purpose and their respective “scope of coverage” (Bedeski, 1975, 542).
Within the confines of this term, he makes it analogous to “organism” as it relates to biology; in
that its incredibly broad. “State … refers to a set of elements that describe both objective
phenomena and subjective aspirations in the political world”. Sovereignty is the “concentration
of power”; that of a state to exercise its jurisdiction within its borders. As the “Century of
Humiliation” would have it, China at a time was not at all privy to these concepts. There was no
dispute between the KMT and the CCP when it came to procuring sovereignty for China, which
was the ultimate goal. The dispute was over which political banner China would become a
sovereign nation. Since the KMT was nominally the party in power, all avenues of life when it
came to the harmonization of political statehood achieving its basic requirements for the average
Chinese, the KMT simply could not formalize a true statehood. Kaishek, in his consolidation for
power, (albeit to maintain China’s fledgling integrity), used methods which accrued enmity
among the populace. Bedeski does defer to Kaishek and the KMT that they did procure for
China certain sensibilities which were conducive for laying the foundations of a state.
Wu, Tien-Wei. November 1969. “A Review of the Wuhan Debacle: The Kuomintang-
In this article, Wu says that CCP members after the May 4th Movement, were nationalists
first and communists secondly and readily joined the KMT under that distinction. He cites not
only ideology and class distinction as being the catalysts for the KMT and CCP split, but cites by
stating which group would control the great commission, ultimately leading to that dichotomous
split. Kaishek was beleaguered by left-wing KMT members and the CCP at Wuhan. This led to
3 provinces – Hunan, Hupeh, and Kiangsi – privy to “agrarian revolution” (Wu, 1969, 126). The
CCP was feeling its oats and openly defied him. In strongholds partial to the CCP, proletarian
organizations such as labor unions announced strikes. In Wuhan, all of this was bolstered by
anti-British resentment, and this led to mob violence there and involved running over a British
concession. Since foreigners still had financial clout in China, anti-imperialists and entities such
as labor unions were antithetical to Chiang’s interests in the long run. Not only did foreign firms
leave, but many established Chinese merchants left in exodus. This culminated into vast swaths
of the Chinese economy laying dormant and spiraled the country into a bigger deficit. It would
have been all too easy for Chiang to deem these instances as being reactionary. However in
Wuhan and in the 3 provinces, the pendulum swung towards left-leaning KMT and the CCP,
who were able to mobilize the peasant population into their stead. Land nationalization, which
was ultimately the CCP goal, was accruing enmity among the army as many of them were
landholders. Infighting among these entities who were at times erstwhile allies led to civil strife
and the call for de-escalation. Ultimately the Wuhan debacle was doomed to failure for the CCP.
What was initially successful for them and the indoctrination of the peasants ultimately led to an
economic standstill. Getting rid of the petty bourgeois in Wuhan was a great disservice. The rift
between Kaishek and the leftist KMT led to the CCP being victorious. However upon entreating
Shanghai, Kaishek was able to recoup and staged a purge against the communists. This was
preceded by infighting between leftist KMT and the CCP. What was once a harmonization of
these 2 groups turned into a rivalry. Getting the go-ahead from Moscow by Stalin for the CCP to
acquisitions for places such as Wuhan and instilling its mindset over there. With the leftist KMT
still under the authority of Kaishek, this had brought about an insurrection with the CCP
eventually. Ultimately the year 1927 was a formative year in China’s history, as the rift between
the KMT and the CCP widened and a rivalry being formalized officially.
After receiving formal statehood of the mainland in 1949, the CCP was able to indoctrinate
the masses. Mao, as has been mentioned earlier, sought out the intellectuals and conceded the
point that revolution could not at all been successful had it not been for their collective intellects.
As Harrison puts it, the teaching of history was one of the avenues in which the CCP could show
the success of the revolution, and giving the Chinese population a dose of Marxist ideology. The
teaching of history, done in an indoctrinating manner, showed the rationale of communism, the
justification of ridding China of feudalism and imperialism, and the liquidation of class
stratification. The studying of history ultimately was to give credence to the communist regime
in China. Also by learning history, one would be able to avoid the mistakes of the past. History
“is a social science devoted primarily to researching the class struggle. Because it is a science in
the service of the class struggle, therefore the development of historical science cannot be
separated from the class struggle (in contemporary life)” (Harrison, 1965, 494). Serving as
subjects of inquiry were capitalistic leanings since the Ming dynasty, the West’s naked
aggression when it came to imperialism, and of course the ruinous legacy of the rightist KMT.
Harrison points out that during the “Hundred Flowers” campaign, many scholars were purged as
rightists.
In his conclusion, Harrison stresses the need of the CCP to show history in line with that of
the communist dialogue. The term class viewpoint is at the forefront of this work because it
shows the intent of the CCP to reframe China’s history in order to achieve a consensus in the
population of China to show why the CCP has the people’s mandate.
Ching-yao, Yin. Hune 1981. “The Bitter Struggle Between the KMT and the CCP”.
This article by Yin Ching-yao is highly partisan and one can tell that it is written from the
viewpoint of a Taiwanese. He states that this rivalry is “beyond compromise” and makes the
distinction between “Free China and Communist China” (Ching-yao, 1981, 622). “Free China”
according to him, champions the prestige of Chinese culture and tradition, while the latter is
largely a governing entity that is revising China according to Marxist and Leninist ideology. He
recounts Dr. Sun Yet-sen’s thinking as per his “San Min Chu I” (Three Principles of the People).
The “Principle of Nationalism” emphasizes the rights of nationals to be equals, the “Principle of
the People’s Rights” places an emphasis on political rights, and the “Principle of Livelihood”
emphasizes equal economic rights, according to the author. Taiwan is emblematic of these
Principles. The mainland regime has disregarded them and thus been not privy to the same
opportunities and wealth that the Taiwanese enjoy. He cites the Soviets as being a lesser evil in
terms of the Western world in the eyes of many Chinese, specifically the intelligentsia. What
had gone on in Russia could also be applicable to the case of China, hence the allure of Marxism.
Since the Soviets were lobbying Yat-sen, many communists joined the KMT. However Ching-
yao makes it a point to say that Yat-sen only accepted the Communists in an effort to swell the
ranks of the Alliance. He says that it was the intent of the CCP to infiltrate the KMT to influence
it and to instill its values. Citing the Sino-Japanese War, the CCP under the leadership of Mao
were opportunists who had caused a fissure in the army so as to grab power, weakening the
resolve of the country to engage in battle with the Japanese. By engaging in this perfidy, Ching-
yao regards them as treacherous and cites the Battle of Pinhsingkwan as the only CCP
engagement with the Japanese. Seemingly, he bristles at the concept of “reunification” with the
mainland based upon the duplicitous manner in which the KMT was treated in China.
In closing, the author emphasizes the need of a nation to maintain the integrity of its culture,
and rails the CCP as not having this feature. The author can envision reunification, but conveys
the feeling that the mainland first needs to manage its own affairs, and can learn the lesson from
Communist Party in the Shanghai Underground: 1931-34”. The China Quarterly. pp. 78-
97.
In this article, Sullivan points out to the reader the case of expatriate students who were at
one time deemed counterrevolutionary by Mao in regards to the factionalism that was going on
in the CCP during the civil war. Being forced underground led to seeking opportunities for
visibility and relevance while facing the common enemy of the KMT. Mao’s quarrel with them
he faults them with failure in procuring the interests of the CCP, specifically in urban areas.
After the dissolution of the Jiangsu Party Headquarters by the KMT in 1934, the viability of
the CCP at large at the time was highly debatable. The expatriate students were free to return to
the mainland from Russia only after Mao’s death. As a question of strategy, what led to a
demoralizing defeat at the hands of the KMT, almost singlehandedly placed victory into the
hands of the KMT. The point of contention here in this article is the insistence of Mao to view
Summation
These articles largely show the relationship between the KMT and the CCP from the
inception of the modern Chinese state to the mutual enmity that is shared by Taiwan and China
up to this present day. From forming a coalition during the May 30th Incident, the KMT and the
CCP relationship ultimately turned into a rivalry in which the ideology of sovereign China would
have to be decided. Conniving collectively to regard the other as irrelevant or lacking in the
necessary drive to land the commission of sovereignty was practiced by both the KMT and the
CCP. I’ve provided in the literature many perspectives of these intricacies; Western academics
The struggle to win hearts and minds is key when it comes to enshrining a brand new
structure of government. This prompted both parties to endear themselves toward the people in
intellectual debates over ideology. Procuring the support from the intelligentsia in alignment
with dogmatic ideology was tantamount. The KMT methods of coercion on college campuses
absolutely did not foster any sort of dialogue or debate. Since they were the party in power,
assigning blame when it came to the impediment of progress in securing China’s future was very
simple to do. If one contemplates Kaishek, who had no intention on democratizing and was
concerned with keeping China’s rudimentary economy afloat, then antipathy towards leftists
would indeed make sense. So ultimately, the politicization of the universities was a given. Mao
also sought the justification of the CCP among intellectuals as key. One point of consensus is
assured: both Kaishek and Mao tyrannized intellectuals. Kaishek did so because they were
leftists and thus reactionary. And as has been evidenced by the “Hundred Flowers” campaign,
Vying for power in periodic instances of intrigue simply did not go well for the CCP.
Kaishek had at his disposal not only a regimented army, but had the benefit of complicit
warlords as well. The swelling of the ranks of the army by the CCP was largely to secure
interests, as has been recounted by Ching-yao. But as has been stated by Wu is that national
identity was the pivotal factor in all aspects of Chinese society at the time. He has stated that
they were nationalists firsts and communists secondly. According to Ching-yao, by engaging in
perfidy, the Nationalist Army suffered heavy losses at the hands of the Japanese, and this
ultimately led to a decimated and demoralized force that engaged with the CCP in combat only
to lose to them. By being shunned into the underground harbored contempt on the behalf of the
CCP after taking compromised advice from Stalin. Ultimately, when a country is in its
inception, very little wiggle room is sought out for debates over ideology. This is very
The literature is evident of the intricate and delicate nature of the CCP and the KMT
relationship. It is hotly contested even unto this very day between China and Taiwan. What was
a vision of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who envisioned the Republic as his child, had turned into a travesty.
There is a point of contention when it comes to agreeing with others if China could suddenly
become a nation-state modeled upon Western values right after leaving the Qing dynasty. Since
China was privy to the West on that grand of a scale, it should come as no surprise that Western
ideals and motifs would take hold in China. With the intensity and the velocity of the world
changing, China could look with a certain affinity towards a country such as Russia that was just
as archaic and make the collective destiny of progress their goal. Whenever any country has
gone through the throes of revolutions, there has always been clashes when it came to ideology.
It is a given. But in a country such as China, going through the motions of monarchy and then
rightist and leftist political pursuits all within the first half of the 1900’s is an incredible portion
What I’ve learned is that the average Chinese citizen is the one who has paid the ultimate
price in terms of freedoms and amenities being taken away in the name of political dogma.
Kaishek pilfered many Chinese merchants and had left them destitute all in order to fund his
army. Mao’s ruinous economic redistribution policies can only be described as negligibly
malthusian. The divide over ideology is going to be a mainstay in Chinese politics for years to
come. What I’ve learned is that authoritarianism during a time of national crisis is simply
untenable for the populace to even function from this literature review. Both Kaishek and Mao
had developed personality cults in order to show the personification of the state as being for the
people. Kaishek, I imagine, was the one who was probably the most haggard by it.
Indoctrination, incessantly, is the daily regimen with which despotic regimes rule, whether
rightist or leftist.
I hope that writing this assignment has elicited in me that by studying history, one is able