Issue 55 Issue 55

Every Mil Matters: One Battalion’s Fight Against Error Every Mil Matters ...Continued from Page 5
Characteristics that Effect Interior Ballistics
By LTC Jim Collins, Former Commander, 1st Battalion, achieved and in turn reduce the compounded error. In October 2015, B/1-7 Field Artillery deployed in
that culminated with a rotation at the National Training After a deliberate equipment reset and centralized fire
7th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Armored Brigade Com- support of Operation Inherent Resolve. Over a period
bat Team, 1st Infantry Division and CPT Joshua Center prepared us for the aforementioned mission support training program, all leaders and Soldiers were of four months 2/B/1-7 FA fired over 1,500 rounds
Herzog, Commander, Bravo Battery, 1st Battalion, 7th but the latter is more complex. Not only did it require trained to maximize system capabilities, to include the in an environment where accuracy is of the upmost
Field Artillery Regiment and previously, Brigade Fire additional training, but it required a renewed culture of loading of global positioning satellite (GPS) communi- importance. As the months progressed, the platoon
Support Officer, 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st exacting standards. cation security (COMSEC) keys into the Lightweight observed increased dispersion along the gun-target line
Infantry Division. First, through training and education, we all had to Laser Designator Rangefinder (LLDR), loading preci- – an “anomaly” that was isolated to only one platoon.
acknowledge that “good enough” is no longer accept- sion imagery on the Ruggedized Handheld Computer
Troubleshooting is a complicated task that re- Unmanned aerial surveillance (UAS) platforms al-
able and inculcate three principles: (RHC) and Standalone Computer Unit (SCU), target
quires an understanding of ballistics, firing tables, and lowed us to observe and record the spotting from every
1. Accuracy. The Precision Guided Kit (PGK) mensuration to refine target location, bore-sighting the
the automated systems. Due to the wide breadth of mission (in some cases refine the impact grid using
and Excalibur have given the Field Artillery an un- Fire Support Sensor System (FS3) and calibration of all
knowledge and experience required for proper trouble- near-mensuration). This real-time feedback enabled
precedented degree of precision. However, this does target location devices.
shooting, it remains a leader centric task that many troubleshooting.
not replace the requirement for accurate HE/PD. We The fire support tactical standard operations pro-
are reluctant to embrace. Training Circular 3-09.81, We initiated troubleshooting associated with range
must resist the tendency to default to PGK/Excalibur cedures (TACSOP) was updated and operations on the
Field Artillery Gunnery, states “unit leaders or In- errors. First, we compared the firing solution in the
because all other munitions are “inaccurate”. observation post were refined to an exacting standard:
vestigating Officers need to be able to evaluate firing Fire Direction Center as well as the command deflec-
2. In the 1st Infantry Division, training and Leader observers self-locate using GPS with COMSEC, lase
data and supervise corrective action for inaccuracies.” tion/quadrant and actual deflection/quadrant in the
Development are synonymous. While we train to a target with a fully mission capable and calibrated
While absolutely true, the degree to which leaders Paladin Digital Fire Control System (PDFCS). We
deliver rounds on target, we must develop leaders that device, refine that target location using Precision Strike
evaluate firing data can be generalized: noticed an irregularity in the muzzle velocities on the
are capable of understanding the variables that cause Suite – Special Operations Forces (PSS-SOF) software,
1. Insufficient Troubleshooting. The practice of PDFCS record of fire. The following chart outlines the
inaccuracies, then isolate and perform trouble-shooting and obtain a height above ellipsoid (HAE) altitude
theorizing the cause of the error then concluding the data for one mission. The blue and red boxes highlight
procedures. and process the mission over the digital fires network.
solution is beyond the control of the firing unit: incon- where the muzzle velocity increase or decrease directly
Accuracy is not subjective – in most cases the In the end, TLE was greatly reduced, thus allowing
sistent propellant burns or incorrect metrological data. affected the range. The standard muzzle velocity is
tabular firing tables define error. For example, at troubleshooting to focus on fire direction and cannon
2. Elementary Troubleshooting. Isolating an error highlighted in green for comparison.
14,000 meters acceptable error for a M795 projectile operations.
using logic but unable to support it with a mathemati- with M232A1 charge 4 is between 27 and 107 me- Continued on Page 7, See Every Mil Matters
cal solution: muzzle velocity is causing the range error. ters due to dispersion and based off the percentage of
3. Adequate Troubleshooting. Isolating errors rounds that will land within one to four probable errors
using logic then validating the logic with mathematical M232A1 Lot GDB07-031014
in range. A round 108 meters off target is unaccept-
computation(s). able. The following vignettes describe scenarios where Standard MV 682 Elevation (15800m) 475.6 1 x Per (50%) 2 x Per (82%) 3 x Per (96%) 4 x Per (100%)
Over the past eighteen months the leaders of 1st Range per 1m/s 26 Range per 1 mil EL 15 30 m 60m 90m 120m
we identified and solved inaccuracies, but more im-
Battalion, 7th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Armored portantly junior leaders received a renewed sense of Gun MVV -11.9
Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, have Redleg professionalism. Expected MV 670.1
empathized troubleshooting and gradually impressed a Standard TFT values (verify
culture of accuracy by analyzing every mission when a
Target Location Error computation procedures)
round impacts outside of three probable errors in range RNG CHG QE MV ADJ Adjusted Range QE ADJ ADJ vs QE MV Range Adjusted MV-ADJ from
First, to “simplify” troubleshooting, we attempted Range from QE Range Range from MV Range from MV AVG MV Historical
and/or deflection. “Check-firing” no longer has the
to minimize the number of nodal variables that contrib- Measured MVV
context of negligence, but a context of professionalism. 15800 4H 497.9 665.6 -50 15800 0 15800 0 N/A N/A N/A 0 -4.5
ute to inaccuracies: fire support, fire direction and can-
1st Battalion, 7th Field Artillery Regiment is cur- 494.5 667.8 0 15750 -51 15749 -1 2.2 57.2 15807 3 -2.3
non operations. We focused on the technical aspects of
rently deployed to Southwest Asia in support of Opera- 494.5 658 200 15750 0 15749 -1 -9.8 -254.8 15495 -7 -12.1
reducing target location error. Fire support equipment, 508.3 664.8 EOM 15950 207 15956 6 6.8 176.8 16127 0 -5.3
tion Spartan Shield and Operation Inherent Resolve.
when used to its full capabilities within the Armored
The current mission requires a Field Artillery Battalion
Brigade Combat Team’s modified table of organiza- AVGMV 664.1 3 667.1 ADJAVGMV 665.2
ready to suppress, neutralize or destroy the enemy in
tion and equipment (MTOE), minimizes target loca-
support of decisive action operations, while simulta- -3 667.1
tion error. Understanding system capabilities is critical
neously operating autonomous platoons in support of
to understanding the degree of accuracy that can be *Note: Some values extracted from the TFT are not exact for the sake of speed and efficiency for this example, but the results accurately reflect the point of the table.
Joint and Multinational partners in a very complex op- -9.8 m/s change in MV = 254.8 m decrease in range
erational environment. Mission essential task training Continued on Page 6, See Every mil Matters 6.8 m/s change in MV = 176.8 m decrease in range

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 Issue 55 Issue 55

Every Mil Matters ...Continued from Page 6 Every Mil Matters ...Continued from Page 7
The AFATDS was operating using the enhanced howitzer accounted for all variances within each spe- 12. Tube conditioning. Tube temperature is corre- Through our efforts to analyze the error and
muzzle velocity (MV) mode, actively collecting and cific cannon tube. Additionally, the MVV caused by lated to a predictable range dispersion. Tube condition- account for every meter of inaccuracy outside of the
applying muzzle velocity data to the muzzle velocity inconsistencies in tube manufacture remains constant ing does not explain unpredictable range dispersion. probable error in range, we were able to improve accu-
variation (MVV) database. Therefore, range dispersion throughout the life of the tube. 13. Tube memory and tube jump. The preponder- racy, achieve higher rates of battle damage, and prove
should have decreased with each mission fired. How- 4. Tube wear. Tube wear results in a decrease ance of missions were fired with charge 4H eliminating to young artilleryman that the science of gunnery can
ever, over seventy percent of the missions displayed in muzzle velocities, however does not contribute to the likeness of tube memory. Additionally, the discrep- explain every variable of ballistics.
erratic muzzle velocities that varied from 5-20 meters inconsistent muzzle velocities. ancy was not limited to the first round of the mission.
per second between rounds, resulting in errors in the 5. Non-uniform ramming. Non-uniform ramming Additionally, since we were obtaining random er- Firing Unit Location
range of 120-380 meters, increasingly outside of four can result in increased dispersion along the gun-target ratic muzzle velocities we were able to eliminate other Also while firing in Support of Operation Inherent
probable errors in range. line and therefore was identified as a potential factor. factors that could result in range errors: Resolve, 1/B/1-7FA noted an abnormal range devia-
The first step was to acknowledge this was not an However, the hydraulic rammers in the M109A6 were 1. MET: Metrological data was verified in accor- tion. The Platoon was meeting the five requirements
unexplainable phenomenon. Our ability to correct the fully mission capable and the replenisher gauge read- dance with TC 3-09.81. for accurate fire, the rounds were within two probable
dispersion is not limited by science, but by our under- ings were within tolerance. Additionally, the video of 2. Looseness in the mechanics of the carriage: errors in range but one M109A6 was out of sheaf due
standing. Gunnery can explain the dispersion. The the crew drills validated a consistent four-second ram. We surged a team of mechanics to the firing point to to a range error. The Battery and Platoon leadership
Battery and Platoon leadership began to examine the 6. Rotating bands. Lands being excessively worn execute the annual service two months prior to the due began troubleshooting procedures. According to Ap-
14 sub-categories of interior ballistics that can account and not imparting the proper spin on a projectile would date. No abnormalities were identified. pendix B “Troubleshooting” of TC 3-09.81, the factors
for non-standard velocities: velocity trends, ammu- result in dangerously erratic round performance. 3. Limitations of setting values for deflection and that can affect range error are site, target/observer loca-
nition lots, tolerances in new weapons, tube wear, 7. Propellant and projectile temperatures. Am- quadrant: Although a Fire Control Alignment Test tion, projectile square weight, propellant temperature,
non-uniform ramming, rotating bands, propellant and munition was stored, handled and prepared correctly to (FCAT) had not been done within 6 months the offsets muzzle velocity variation, air temperature, air pressure,
projectile temperatures, moisture content of the propel- ensure uniform propellant temperatures. Temperatures were input in accordance with the DA Form 2408-4. howitzer location, meteorological datum plane (MDP)
lant, position of the propellant in the chamber, weight were updated each hour and there was never a devia- After detailed analysis and an unscheduled bore- altitude, wind direction, wind speed, quadrant eleva-
of the projectile, coppering, propellant residue, tube tion greater than three degrees between thermometers. scope, coppering of the tube, the thin film of copper tion, and charge.
conditioning, and two additional effects that include In addition, according to Firing Table 155-AR-2, Table deposited in the tube when high charges are fired and In order to eliminate errors we again collected and
tube memory and tube jump. 11 E for Charge 4H, M232A1, a 50 degree change in tem- high velocities, was identified as a possible explana- analyzed data:
In order to eliminate as many variables as possible perature is required for a 10 meter per second variance. tion. The previous ~1000 rounds were fired exclu- 1. Recorded MV data from the AFATDS and PD-
we established a deliberate process to collect data: 8. Moisture content of propellant. All propellant sively with 4H and 5H. Initially, coppering was not FCS;2. Ammunition data including lots, square weight
1. Recorded muzzle velocity (MV) readings from increments were inspected for abnormalities and mois- considered due to the daily tube maintenance which in- and propellant temperature;
the PDFCS. ture damage prior to uploading into the turret. cludes cleaning the tube with the basic issue brush. The 3. Documented the AFATDS firing solution and
2. Video recorded crew drills. 9. Position of propellant in the chamber. Video borescope proved that the bore evacuators were clean the actual and command deflection/quadrant from the
3. Verified ammunition data including lots, square recording of crew drills validated propellant was posi- and that there were no signs of cracks or fractures, but PDFCS along with the firing data from the PDFCS
weight, and temperature of propellant. tioned flush against the swiss groove prior to closing did present initial signs of a residue. Approximately “record of fire”; and
Through our analysis and logic, we considered the breech. one month later, an Ammunition Information Notice 4. Howitzer firing location and altitude.
then subsequently ruled out 13 variables of interior bal- 10. Weight of the projectile. Only four square
2
was published warning of residue build-up in tubes Because the issue was isolated to one howitzer
listics that account for non-standard velocities: projectiles were on-hand in the turret. All other pro- after expending a high volume of M232A1, charge 5. and not the entire platoon, we were immediately able to
1. Velocity trends. The general increase of MV as jectiles were removed from the turret and stored in the The message stated routine tube maintenance cannot discount issues that would result in the error across the
additional rounds are expended does not explain posi- AHA. extract or dissolve this residue. Firing a low charge of platoon.
tive and negative muzzle velocity fluctuations of this 11. Propellant residue. Video recordings validated M231 is the only method to burn or “clean” the resi- 1. All MET related issues: air temperature, air
magnitude. the #1 cannoneer swabbed three times to the forcing due. After the publication of this message, we obtained pressure, MDP altitude, wind direction and speed.
2. Ammunition lots. Only one lot of propellant cone and around the obturator spindle group until clean authorization to execute fire missions at a reduced 2. Target location and observer location error.
was on-hand in the turret. All other lots were removed between each round. In addition, the tube was punched range with M231.3 Since then, the muzzle veloc- Additionally, after collecting and verifying data
from the turret and stored in the ammunition holding according to the technical manual after each mission ity variations are now within +/- 4 m/s, leading us to from the PDFCS and AFATDS we were able to elimi-
area (AHA). or at a minimum each day, and bore evacuators were conclude that the firing of the lower charge effectively nate other potential causes of error:
3. Tolerance in new weapons. Calibration of each cleaned weekly. burned away the residue deposited in the cannon by 1. Projectile square weight. Only 4 square projec-
repeatedly firing M232A1. tiles were on-hand in the turret. ll others were removed
1 See Chapter 3, “Ballistics” of Training Circular 3-09.81 to the AHA.
“Field Artillery Manual Cannon Gunnery” Continued on Page 8, See Every Mil Matters 2 Ammunition Information Notice 024-16A
Continued on Page 9, See Every Mil Matters
3 M231 Charge 2
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 Issue 55 Issue 55

Every Mil Matters ...Continued from Page 8 Every Mil Matters ...Continued from Page 9
~100 meters left of the target along the gun-target line.
2. Propellant temperature. The deviation between mode, the problem will be bound to an acceptable
range to target increases. Trouble shooting procedures were initiated to discover
thermometers was less than three degrees for the same level.” In light of this known issue, all troubleshoot-
Given this, if a howitzer reports its position at the cause of the deflection error.
propellant when tested with various thermometers. Ad- ing procedures outlined in TM 9-2350-314-10-2 were
the upper limit within its tolerance (20m) for altitude Again we collected the following data:
ditionally, propellant temperature was updated prior to followed, but were unsuccessful in identifying a solu-
and an easting and northing that are both ~10 meters 1. Howitzer locations.
each mission. tion to the issue. Additionally, all M109A6s had black
off from the actual location, the total error for M231 2. Azimuth of Lay.
3. Quadrant Elevation. All M109A6s were dry fire cryptographic keys loaded in order to be precision
charge 2 would be approximately 45 meters. Since we 3. Command deflection from the AFATDS and
verified. Command quadrant elevation matched actual guided munitions capable and no warning messages
were trying to achieve the highest level of accuracy PDFCS, which was compared to the actual deflection
quadrant elevation on the PDFCS record of fire for were observed regarding the GPS.
possible, this error, although within tolerance, can be recorded on the record of fire in the PDFCS for the
each Paladin and each mission. To verify the issue, we relied on the science of
minimized. missions fired.
4. Charge. Ammunition counts were conducted gunnery. 10 meters of error in the easting and northing
The leadership determined an immediate and a Since the issue was isolated to one howitzer and
for each howitzer section after the missions in ques- equates to less than 14 meters of dispersion (regardless
subsequent solution. First, three DAGRs operating not the platoon, we were able to discount issues that
tion to verify the correct charge was fired. In addition, of range to target). The error associated with altitude
in averaging mode established a firing unit location. would result in the error across the battery.
the FDC calculated the mission for a higher and lower is more pronounced – a 20 meter change in altitude
The FDO, who was Target Mensuration Only (TMO) 1. All MET related issues: wind direction and
charge, discovering the magnitude of the error did not contributes to error in the vertical interval and therefore
qualified and trained on PSS-SOF, mensurated the speed.
match. site, which is a function of range. It was determined
location of the M109A6 based on the precision imag- 2. Target location and observer location error.
Therefore, the error was isolated to site and/or through calculations by the FDC (see tables below) that
ery available and real time video feed from a surveil- Upon further investigation of PDFCS and AF-
howitzer location. Since the AFATDS calculates the a difference of 19 meters in altitude from the howitzer
lance platform, then compared the results to the DAGR ATDS data we eliminated numerous factors associated
site data based on the vertical interval, range and the produced an error of 42 meters at a range of 5,000 me-
locations. Once verified through multiple means, this with a deflection error:
complementary site factor, the only factors that could ters (M231 charge 1) and 31 meters at a range of 9,000
location was input into PDFCS. The Battalion Head- 1. Deflection. All M109A6s were dry fire veri-
vary between howitzers is the vertical interval and meters (M231 charge 2). The error decreases as the
quarters then deployed the Battalion’s organic survey fied. Command deflection matched actual deflection
range. First, we verified firing unit
assets into theater to achieve a greater order of survey. on the PDFCS record of fire for the Paladins.
location for each M109A6 with a Projectile M795
Once the corrections were made, the range error effect- 2. Azimuth of Lay (AOL). All M109A6s were
Defense Advanced GPS Receiver Charge (M231) 1L
TGT ALT (M) 42 ing the sheaf was eliminated. confirmed to be laid on the proper azimuth of lay using
(DAGR). All howitzers were within
an M2 compass as well as the tube to tube verification.
the prescribed tolerances.4 However, Range(m) 5000
Azimuth Offsets Additionally, the AOL was verified to be correct in the
although the howitzers were station- Elevation (mils) 379.1
In January 2015, 1-7 FA replaced the M284 can- AFATDS for each howitzer.
ary, the FDO identified deviations
Firing Unit ALT (m) SI (mils) non tubes on all eighteen M109A6 Paladins. After 3. Howitzer location. All M109A6s locations
of the howitzer location (reported QE (mils) Actual Range from
Range (m) Actual FU the tubes were replaced a Fire Control Alignment Test were surveyed using the Battalion’s organic survey as-
using the digital piece statuses). 5 location (m)
(FCAT) was conducted. Once complete, all DA Form sets and the correct easting, northing and elevation was
According to the M109A6
Upper Limit 100 14.1 393.2 5129 42
2408-4 and PDFCS offsets were updated accordingly. verified in the PDFCS and AFATDS.
technical manual,6 “the PDFCS Actual Location 81 9.5 388.6 5087 0
position has been observed to drift Lower Limit 62 4.9 384.0 5045 -42 Approximately two weeks later, the Battalion went to
while the howitzer is stationary” the field to seat the tubes. Multiple observers were em-
and “these problems have been Projectile M795 ployed to record the
traced to errors in communications Charge (M231) 2L
spottings. After the AZ Offset (mils) DF w/offset
Projectile M795
between the PDFCS and PDCU.” 7 TGT ALT (M) 42 initial volleys and Applied (mils)
Charge (M232) 3H
It continues to state, “with the GPS subsequent mainte-
Range(m) 9000 Range (m) 11024 FCAT 1.2 3363.6
receiver (DAGR) installed and the nance adjustments
Elevation (mils) 446.0 Command Deflection 3362.4 PDFCS 11.2 3373.6
PDFCS operated in a GPS-aided were complete, each
4 10 meters on easting and northing platoon conducted DF Due to AZ Offset Error (mils) L10
Firing Unit ALT (m) SI (mils) QE (mils) Actual Range from
and 20 meters in altitude Range (m) Actual FU three mass missions Calculated Error (m) 108.0

5 Of note, each location that was re- location (m) to verify sheaf. The
ported remained within tolerance when Upper Limit 100 8.0 454.0 9095 31 observer team noti-
verified by the Platoon Leader with his Actual Location 81 5.4 451.4 9064 0 fied the Battalion Fire Direction Center that during
Lower Limit 62 2.8 448.8 9033 -31
DAGR. one platoon iteration, one of the howitzers was out-
Continued on Page 11, See Every Mil Matters
6 TM 9-2350-314-10-2 of-sheaf and was consistently landing approximately
Continued on Page 10, See Every Mil Matters
7 Paladin Digital Computer Unit
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Every Mil Matters ...Continued from Page 10

Of course, logic is important for effective trouble- Conclusion
shooting, specifically, to focus the data collection – These vignettes outline incidents that are specific
what has changed since the last live fire? Since we to 1st Battalion, 7th Field Artillery in which senior
had just completed tube replacement then subsequently non-commissioned officers and junior officers identi-
FCAT on all the howitzers, all units were directed to fied, isolated then subsequently resolved errors. Our
verify PDFCS maintenance offsets to compare data in efforts were not hindered by expertise but initially
PDFCS and 2408-4. Upon verification of the offsets, it hindered by the reluctance to acknowledge error. We
was identified that the azimuth offset was input incor- have matured to an organization that once defined suc-
rectly into the PDFCS. The chief of section entered cess as “round observed safe” to an organization that
11.2 instead of 1.2 into the azimuth offset. The math- examines every mission outside of a predetermined
ematical calculation confirmed that the discrepancy probable error in range/deflection. We continue to
accounted for 108 meters of error which is well outside further our efforts to create a culture of leader develop-
of 4 probable errors in deflection for the propellant ment and professionalism that tries to account for every
type and charge. mil and every meter of error.

If a Soldier or leader uses a social networking site where he or

she is or may be identified or associated with the U.S. Army,
they must remember how they appear to represent their
organization and the United States of America. UCMJ and other
guidelines and regulations still apply.

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