Representation of Cultural Diversity in Urdu Newspapers in Pakistan

Representation of cultural diversity in Urdu newspapers in Pakistan
Jawad Syed
Department of Business
Division of Economic and Financial Studies
Macquarie University, Sydney
NSW 2109, Australia
Email: [email protected]
Research paper to be presented at the 2006 Signature Event

Media: Policies, Cultures and Futures in the Asia Pacific Region
Curtin University of Technology, Australia, 27-29 November 2006
Work in progress
Not to be quoted without permission
Abstract
This paper examines ethnicity/race and religion as represented by the popular print media
in Pakistan with an aim to furthering our understanding of the development of attitudes
towards diversity, and to outline the prospects for multicultural policies in Pakistan. The
paper examines how different ideologies are operative in the media texts and provides
examples of perspectives towards cultural diversity. Newspaper columns related to
ethnicity/ race and religion published in two leading Urdu newspapers during February-
July 2006 were located and analysed. The data reveals that the issues related to
subcultures in Pakistani society remain generally ignored or downplayed. There is an
overwhelming emphasis on Pakistan’s Islamic identity, which serves as a broad melting
pot within which other forms of identity such as race/ethnicity and religious
denomination remain widely invisible. Consequently, there is a significant discrepancy in
the concept of Pakistani identity and how it fits with the realities of a multicultural
society.
Keywords: culture; diversity; ethnicity; Islam; media; Pakistan
Introduction
Pakistan is a multiethnic, multicultural society comprising a population that is diverse in
terms of ethnicity/race, language and religion. The people of Pakistan are generally
considered to be a mixture of Indo-Iranian lineage (Renfrew 1987). The principal ethnic
groups comprise the Punjabi, Sindhi, Pashtun, and Baloch. The population (157.91
million, 2006 estimate) is distributed over the four federating units (called provinces) as
follows: Punjab (55.6 per cent); Sindh (23 per cent); North West Frontier Province -
NWFP (13.4 per cent); Balochistan (5 per cent); and two territories - Federal Capital
territory of Islamabad (0.6 per cent), and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (2.4 per
cent). Punjab, the most populous province, has only 26 percent of the land area but is
home to more than one-half of the population. In contrast, Balochistan, the largest
Representation of cultural diversity in Urdu newspapers in Pakistan 2
province in terms of area covering about 44 percent of total land area, represents less than
5 per cent of the population (GOP 2006a). In the past few decades, Pakistan has hosted
millions of refugees fleeing a series of wars in Afghanistan. In 2003 the number of
Afghan refugees in Pakistan was thought to exceed 1.1 million (UNHCR 2004). A
substantial number of these refugees have permanently settled in Pakistan mainly
concentrated in the NWFP and Balochistan. Accordingly to an estimate, about 60 per
cent of these refugees are born in Pakistan and only 5 per cent are willing to go back to
Afghanistan (Kemal 2006).
The question of minority identity and representation has been an issue of contention in
Pakistani society since Pakistan’s creation in 1947. The Bangalis’ demand for Bangla as
Pakistan’s official language resulted in the street protests in Dacca in 1948. The
continued under-representation of Bangalis in the structures of power culminated in the
separation of East Pakistan in 1971, which transformed itself into Bangladesh as an
independent country on the world map (Zaheer 1994). However the issue of inter-
community tensions is still present in Pakistan, with the smaller provinces concerned
about their under-representation in civil and military bureaucracy, and a lack of cultural
recognition and control over their indigenous resources. Furthermore, several groups
within the population have a history of intolerance and violence towards eachother
because of ethnic, linguistic, religious and sectarian differences.
The present paper examines the representation of ethnic/racial and religious diversity in
Pakistani media, and its implications for managing diversity in Pakistani society and
institutions. The paper is divided into three key sections. In the first section, the paper
offers an overview of ethnic and religious diversity in Pakistani society, and the current
diversity discourse (or the lack thereof) within social and legal contexts. In the second
section, the paper discusses the role of media in the creation of the ‘mainstream’ and the
‘other’ identities in a society, and its implications for diversity and discrimination. In the
third section, an empirical analysis of the representation of cultural diversity in two
leading Urdu newspapers in Pakistan has been offered, which is followed by discussion
and conclusions.
Cultural diversity in Pakistani society

Ethnic and linguistic diversity
Ethnicity of Pakistani population is generally described in terms of the geographically

and administratively defined areas as Punjabis, Sindhis, Pashtuns and Balochis. However
these ethnic groups are further divided into various sub-categories, linguistic groups and
castes. The main languages include Urdu, Punjabi, Pushto, Balochi, Sindhi, Seraiki,
Hindko, Dari and Gujrati. Urdu enjoys the status of the national language, widely spoken
and understood all over the country. Most people are bi-lingual, speaking their regional
language and Urdu with almost equal facility.
The key ethnic groups are generally concentrated in their provinces but significant
numbers are found in other provinces, and also across the borders in neighbouring Iran,
Afghanistan, and India. Within each province, there is considerable ethnic or linguistic
diversity. The Punjab has a large number of Seraiki-speaking people who insist on their
separate identity from Punjabis. Sindh has a significant proportion of Balochis, Bihari
refugees from Bangladesh, Seraikis in the north, and a large concentration of Muhajir
community in the Urban Sindh - the Urdu-speaking migrants who came to Pakistan after
1947. The NWFP has Hindko-speaking people, Hazaras, concentrated in the south-
eastern part, and a Seraiki-speaking community in the south-western part. Balochistan
has a large number of Pashtuns besides Brahui and Dari speaking communities and
Punjabi settlers (Rehman 2003).
Faced with the diversity of ethnic and linguistic groups, Pakistan’s national unity is
mainly based on religious, historical, geographical and political factors. Islam and Urdu
language serve as major unifying factors. Figure 1 presents an overview of ethnic
diversity in Pakistani society, which is generally isomorphous with linguistic diversity.
The variety of languages spoken in Pakistan represents the diverse cultural and ethnic
backgrounds of the people who speak these languages. Most ethnic groups constitute a
majority in their area of origin (province or region) and are indigenous to it but constitute
a minority within other regions, and also in comparison to the entire population (Ali and
Rehman 2002: 3). The linguistic and ethnic identification in Pakistani society has been
traditionally characterised by the power politics, and discrimination in employment and
other societal contexts (Jaffrelot 2002).
Figure 1. Ethnic diversity in Pakistan

(Source: Based on data from CIA 2005 and GOP 2006a)
Pakistan’s constitution does not acknowledge the role of any ethnic and linguistic identity
in the make up and administration of society. The Punjab is the largest province
representing about 56 per cent of the population. However the major ethnic-linguistic
communities dominating three smaller provinces (Sindh, NWFP and Balochistan) do not
accept the label of minorities and instead insist on being accepted as nations or
nationalities. Even the Urdu-speaking Muhajirs in Sindh insist on being recognised as a
distinct nationality. However, all of these communities may be treated as national
minorities as together they are less than the population of the Punjab and their struggles
for their rights have generally revolved around the question of provincial autonomy and
cultural recognition (Rehman 2003).
Pakistan’s first national constitution (1956) largely denied provincial rights, and the
second constitution (1962) repudiated parliamentary democracy. The continued rule by
the military led bureaucracy, and the lack of popular and cultural representation in the
federal government culminated in East Pakistan’s separation as Bangladesh in 1971. The
1973 constitution acknowledged and endeavoured to accommodate the issue of provincial
autonomy. However problems have been arising because of the intermittent suspension of
the constitution and its inadequate enforcement. This has kept the questions of provincial
autonomy unresolved in today’s Pakistan. Rehman (2003: 11-12) identifies five key
autonomy demands of the federating units and ethnic communities in Pakistan. (1) The
Pashtuns in the NWFP demand the right to name their province Pashtunkhwa (the land of
Pashtuns) just as other provinces (Punjab, Sindh and Balochistan) bear the names of their
dominant ethno-linguistic communities. Some of them also assert the unification of
Pashtuns in the NWFP, Balochistan and tribal areas into a single unit through
reorganisation of provinces on ethno-linguistic basis; (2) The Sindhis have been resisting
being turned into a minority through continued influx of Muhajirs into their province.
They are already a minority in the urban areas of Karachi and Haiderabad; (3)
Balochistan, the largest province in terms of its territory and the smallest in terms of the
population, rejects the division of revenues on population basis. Balochistan has
persistently raised serious concerns about the distribution of the royalty in compensation
of its natural gas and other mineral resources; (4) Balochistan and Sindh are aggrieved
because of their under-representation in military and civil services. They also complain
about the emergency provisions of the constitution under which the centre can dismiss
their governments and dissolve their assemblies through its Governors; and (5) The
‘Muhajirs’ demand share in power in Sindh in accordance with their population but
support the demand for provincial autonomy. They also demand the abolition of quota
system, which has impacted urban residents’ employment in provincial and federal jobs.
These findings suggest that ethnic minorities in Pakistan are faced with the challenge of
cultural recognition and adequate representation within legal structures and
administrative institutions
Religious diversity
Pakistan is a predominantly Muslim country with its Muslim population divided into
about 77 per cent Sunnis and about 20 per cent Shiites. There are also a small number of
non-Muslim communities (total number about 3.6 per cent) that remain largely
concentrated in Sindh (Hindu community), and the Punjab (Christian community) (CIA
2005). Other smaller religious minorities include Parsis, mainly in the city of Karachi;
Sikhs in Balochistan and NWFP; indigenous people in Northern Areas; and scheduled
castes in Sindh. In 1974, Pakistan created a new religious minority, Ahmedis (also known
as Qadianis), who assert to be Muslim but were declared non-Muslims through a
constitutional amendment under the influence of the religio-political parties. Attempts
have been made by mainly Sunni parties to get the Zikri sect in Balochistan declared as
non-Muslim but so far these attempts have been unsuccessful. There are also minority
Muslim sects, such as Isna Asharis (commonly known as Shias) and two minor Shiite
sects - Ismailis and Bohras. None of these sects is treated as a religious minority (Rehman
2003) though some Sunni parties have demanded that Shiites be declared non-Muslims.
The inter-religious and inter-sectarian tensions between rival sects such as Sunnis and
Shias, Barelvis, Deobandis and Ahle Hadith (Wahabis), and Sunnis and Ahmedis are not
uncommon in Pakistani society. The differences of beliefs and practices in these sects
have frequently resulted in violence in Pakistani society claiming hundreds of lives in the
last two decades (UNDP 2004). Figure 2 presents an overview of religious diversity in
Pakistani society.
Figure 2. Religious diversity in Pakistan

(Source: Based on data from CIA 2005 and GOP 2006a)
Pakistan has a bicameral system of parliamentary democracy, however the state religion
is Islam. The constitution acknowledges that the sovereignty belongs to God alone and
the parliament exercises authority within the limits prescribed by God. It provides for the
Islamic Ideology Council that has been formed to advise the government on Islamisation
of laws and practices. During the martial law administration of General Zia-ul-Haq,
Hudood laws were enacted which prescribe Islamic punishments for crimes. The Islamic
Court (Federal Shariat Court) has the power to annul any law on the ground of
repugnancy to Islam and also to suggest amendments in statutes (Rehman 2003).
The constitution recognises religious diversity in the population, which has also been
symbolically represented through a one-third white strip in Pakistan’s otherwise green
(with crescent and star) flag. The constitution guarantees religious minorities the freedom
of belief and safeguards for their legitimate interests. Every religious denomination has
the right to maintain its religious institutions. No one can be required to receive
instruction in a religion or join a religious ceremony related to a belief, other than his
own.
Because of Pakistan’s emphasis on its Islamic identity – its raison d' etre – the legal and
institutional structures in Pakistan reflect inherent biases against non-Muslim
communities. For instance, the Hudood laws under which compensation for killing a non-
Muslim is less than that for killing a Muslim; cases against non-Muslims can be heard by
religious courts but they cannot be represented by non-Muslim counsel. Under the
blasphemy law even a non-Muslim faces mandatory death penalty for insulting the
Prophet of Islam or other Prophets including Jesus Christ. The head of state can only be a
Muslim and in practical terms the Prime Minister too can only be a Muslim. The
Ahmedis are prohibited by law to preach their belief, and disallowed to practice their
faith in Muslim style. They can be punished for displaying epithets belonging to Islam.
The constitution does not recognise the right to change one’s belief. While non-Muslims’
conversion to Islam is welcomed, a Muslim converting to any other faith is considered as
‘Murtid’, thus endangering his life because some Islamic schools condemn such person to
death penalty.
There are a number of legislative projects, which act to safeguard minority interests in
Pakistan as envisaged under the 1973 constitution. The Minorities Wing of former
Ministry of Minorities, Culture, Sports, Tourism and Youth Affairs was upgraded as a
full-fledged Ministry in September 2004. Though the current arrangement provides for a
broader mandate, in practice the Ministry has yet to demonstrate a robust role to protect
minority rights and interests. However, the following two projects within the Ministry are
worth mentioning (GOP 2006b).
National Cultural Award. The Government of Pakistan introduced this scheme for
promotion and preservation of culture of minorities since 1976. Under this scheme, a
certificate and cash prize of Rupees 50,000/- are granted to eminent persons from
minorities for their services in the areas of literature, education, medicine, performing
arts, folk arts, fine arts and sports.
National Commission for Minorities. In response to a joint petition by some Minority

parliamentarians, the cabinet decided to establish a high-powered National Commission
for Minorities, in 1993, under chairpersonship of Minister for Minorities Affairs to
protect and safeguard religious, social and cultural rights of the minorities in Pakistan.
The latest commission was re-constituted and notified in June 2004. The commission
consists of thirteen members including official and non-official members with tenure of
three years. The Commission takes care of a wide ranging issues related to religious
minorities including the issues of illegal sale and transfer of communal property by the
land mafia and low rates of scholarships offered to deserving students.
Rehman (2003:15-16) identifies four key issues of importance to religious minorities in

Pakistan, which emerged after a series of consultations held during 2000-2002. First, the
treatment of Muslims as a privileged majority reduces religious minorities to an inferior
category compounding their vulnerability to discrimination. For instance, there are some
positions (top bureaucratic jobs in some public institutions including head of the state and
military) where minorities do not enjoy qual opportunity. In education institutions, non-
Muslims are restricted to nominal quotas and are denied admission on merit. Second,
some laws practically deny the freedom of belief (such as the provisions of the Penal
Code targeting only Ahmedis, and certain clauses of the blasphemy law). Third, there are
instances in which the life and property of religious minorities are treated as less equal to
a Muslim citizen. For instance, it has been reported that sometimes girls belonging to
minority communities are abducted, forcibly converted to Islam, and the state machinery
often denies them justice. Another issue is related to the properties belonging to
minorities’ shrines and trusts, which have been taken over under the pretext that the
owners have migrated to India while only the managers may have gone away and the
community owning these properties is still here. Finally, it emerged that the minorities’
lives and properties are threatened as a reaction to the events abroad. Many communities
including Hindus and Christians have reported increased persecution and harassment in
the aftermath of events such as the demolition of Babri mosque in India and the US-led
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The above discussion suggests that by virtue of the legal emphasis on Pakistan’s Islamic
identity and the inter-group tensions, religious minorities are faced with multiple
challenges resulting in their generally inferior status to the mainstream Muslim
population. Rehman’s (2003) study suggests that state institutions and policy frameworks
are inadequate to guarantee minorities equal rights and redress in the event of violation or
discrimination. This is also verified by other studies, which suggest that despite the ethnic
and religious diversity of its population, diversity management has not been on the
agenda of Pakistani government and corporate sector. Naqvi (2003a) suggests that
contrary to constitutional and international obligations, discrimination continues to exist
on the basis of gender, religion, ethnicity, caste, and a host of other reasons. The lack of
discourse on diversity is evident from the fact that there is no commonly used word for
diversity in Urdu - Pakistan’s national language. The closest Urdu equivalent for
diversity are Tanawwo or Ranga Rangi which are not commonly used and understood by
most Pakistanis; neither are they used to denote the concept of diversity. Accordingly,
there is no concerted institutional effort to implement on a national scale policies related
to managing diversity in Pakistan. The Government and corporate sector have been so far
unable to produce a model for diversity management, and are themselves not conversant
with its philosophy and rationale (Naqvi 2003b).
In addition to ethnic and religious divisions, the issues of class and power are also worthy
of consideration in Pakistani society. In many instances, the issues of ethnic or religious

identity are tightly intersected with the issues related to power and class. Pakistan is a
high power distance society due to strong patriarchal and feudal backgrounds and a deep-
rooted social class division (Hofstede 2001). Pakistan’s feudal history dates back to 200
years of British colonisation of the Indian sub-continent, which was a system of indirect
control. Pakistan’s centuries old caste system is an offshoot of stratification in Indian
society that arose through violent inter-communal struggles relegating the vanquished to
undesirable occupations. The ideology of the caste system moulded the private beliefs
and preferences of many generations of materially disadvantaged people, effectively
sapping their resistance, even ensuring their willing loyalty and compliance (Hutton
1963, Lal 1980). An individual’s sense of self, which is inextricably linked to the social
categories to which one belongs, often contributes critically to one’s personal economic
performance. The identities one develops in the course of socialisation (such as Muslim,
Hindu, Ashraaf, Ajlaaf, Jatt, Irain and Baloch) will shape one’s later experiences,
constrain the pool from whom one chooses one’s friends and trade markets, restrict one’s
opportunities for education, employment and socialisation, and affect one’s life style
(Akerlof and Kranton 2000).
Though Islam as a religion does not allow discrimination on any pretext, in practice
social classification does exist in the Muslims of the subcontinent. For instance, Muslims
of low caste are known as Ajlaaf, and those belonging to Muslim elite are known as
Ashraaf (Engineer 2004). The social classification shapes the pressures one encounters in
everyday life in society. One’s membership in a particular class or tribe may greatly
influence one’s chances of employment and promotion. For instance Smith and
Whitehead (1984) studied the attribution of promotion and demotion in USA and India.
They observed that Indians are more influenced by class, and corporate corruption as
compared to Americans, who are influenced by ability and effort. Since Pakistan and
India share common social and cultural background (with the exception of religion), this
study is also valuable in a Pakistani context. Another study used Hofstede’s model to
measure the formality and social and organisational distance of the Pakistanis and British
(Shackleton and Ali 1990). The study mentions greater reserve and disbelief in social
equity in the work-related values of Pakistanis compared to those of the British. High
power distance as reflected in the social and organisational distance characteristics has
implications for equal opportunity and human rights in Pakistani society and
organisations. In the next section, the paper will offer a theoretical background of the
cultural representation in media, and its implications for managing cultural diversity.
Theoretical background
Media is the primary crucible for representation in the world today (Daley 1997). It is an
arena where ideologies are both produced and transformed, producing “representations of
the social world, images, descriptions, explanations and frames for understanding how
the world is and why it works as it is said and shown to work” (Hall 1995: 19-20). Daley
(1997) suggests that media ideologies work to model the way things are supposed to be.
Media representations often feed into the realm of social myth, “a narrative... that people
collectively believe in independently of its ‘truth’ or ‘falsity’” (Rodman 1996: 30-31).
Such representations are generally revealing about the fears, imagination and desires of
the people that circulate them, revolving around a particular point (or points) of
articulation. Previous research has demonstrated how media can be effective in creating
the fear of the ‘other’ in society by the way it portrays ethnic and religious minorities.
Allen and Seaton (1999) suggest that media representations of ethnic and religious
differences can play a central role in the construction of a particular notion of national
identity. The mainstream version of national identity may be premised on the suppression
or exclusion and criminalisation of ‘the other’ (i.e. non-mainstream) ethnic and religious
groups. However, the dimensions of diversity and the otherness are not limited to
ethnicity or religion, but are simultaneously influenced by Marxian class differences
(Curran and Gurevitch 1996).
A critical perspective is instrumental to examine how media culture articulates the

dominant values and socio-political ideologies in a society. Such examination is
instrumental to understand how national culture and society can become a contested
terrain with various groups and ideologies struggling for dominance (Kellner 1995).
Some scholars suggest that minority groups are regularly excluded and marginalised, and
the dominant culture is reinforced as the norm. In this context, media “constitute a
monopoly of knowledge, and through their practices of selection, editing and production,
they determine the kinds of news we receive about our nation” (Jiwani 1995). It has the
power to choose which images of minorities dominate the public domain, propelling
predominantly negative connotations about minorities whilst downplaying their issues
almost completely from the debate arena (Fleras and Kunz 2001). Representation of
various cultures and subcultures in media provides the materials for constructing views of
the world, behaviour, and group and individual identities (Kellener 1995). Those who
uncritically follow the media discourse tend to ‘mainstream’ themselves, conforming to
the dominant values and behaviour. In contrast, a critical examination helps outline how
sub-cultural groups and individuals resist dominant forms of culture and identity, creating
their own identities and behaviour. Persons who identify with subcultures look and act
differently from those in the mainstream, thus creating oppositional identities, defining
themselves against the ‘norm’.
Multicultural perspectives in media tend to promote multiculturalist politics and media

pedagogy that alerts people to how relations of power are constructed and represented in
the media (Kellener 1995). This understanding is instrumental to know how media
culture manipulates, indoctrinates and empowers individuals to resist or conform to the
dominant socio-cultural discourses. Dunn and Mahtani (2001) have demonstrated how
complex forms of racism can emerge through various media representations of
minorities. This is also verified by Essed (1991: 10) who suggests that the transmission of
racism or exclusion as routine practices “can only mean that racism is not often
recognized, not acknowledged—let alone problematised by the dominant group.” Within
this context, the role of ideological positions is of central importance because dominant
ideologies serve to reproduce social relations of domination and subordination (Kellner
1979, Thomson 1990). Contemporary societies are structured by opposing groups who
have different political ideologies (liberal, conservative, radical, etc.) and cultural studies
specify what, if any, ideologies are operative in a given cultural artefact. Ideologies of
ethnicity and race utilise ethnic and racial representations of various minority groups,
thus causing or regenerating inequalities and subordination, making them appear natural
and thus inducing consent to the relations of power (Kellener 1995).
Method
The products of media culture require multidimensional textual readings to analyse their
various forms of discourses, ideological positions, narrative strategies and image
construction. The analysis is important to dissect and examine the images of ethnic
minorities, and also to unpack the meanings of the texts or to explicate how texts function
to produce meaning. In order to examine the representation of cultural diversity in the
popular print media in Pakistan, newspaper columns related to ethnicity/ race and religion
published in two leading Urdu newspapers were located and analysed. This was done in
order to further our understanding of the development of attitudes towards cultural
diversity and to outline the prospects for multicultural policies in Pakistan. Opinion
columns and policy editorials in Daily Jang and Daily Nawaiwaqt published during
February to July 2006 were content analysed. Jang is Pakistan' s largest national daily
published in Urdu from Karachi, Lahore, Islamabad, Quetta, Multan and London. It has a
circulation of over 800,000 copies per day and a readership of over 7 million. Nawaiwaqt
is the second largest Urdu daily published simultaneously from Lahore, Islamabad,
Karachi and Multan. The circulation figures for Nawaiwaqt were not available.
Newspaper National editions Dates Days Total Theme

columns columns
Daily Jang Karachi, Lahore, 5,15 and 25 2 Mon, 2 Tue, 4 126 37
Islamabad, Quetta, of Feb - Wed, (29%)
Multan July 2006 2 Thu, 1 Fri, 4 Sat,
3 Sun
Daily Lahore, Karachi, 5,15 and 25 2 Mon, 2 Tue, 4 144 36
Nawaiwaqt Islamabad and of Feb - Wed, 2 Thu, 1 Fri, 4 (25%)
Multan July 2006 Sat, 3 Sun
Table 1. A comparison of Jang and Nawaiwaqt and the data analysed
For the sake of consistency and to avoid the provincial or regional biases likely in the
local editions of these newspapers, the columns released on the national circuit only were
analysed. To avoid the day-specific bias (such as Friday or Sunday editions), the columns
(both opinion columns and the newspaper policy editorials) published on the 5th, 15th and
25th of each month were studied to locate the articles related to the issues of
race/ethnicity, religion, sect, and linguistic, regional or provincial identity. Table 1 offers
an overview of the columns analysed and an account of the days on which these columns
appeared. Total 270 columns were analysed out of which 73 columns (27 per cent) were
found to have some relevance with cultural diversity. In a few cases, a newspaper column
in a preceding or following day was also analysed when it was an integral part of a series
of columns by the same writer.
The key Urdu terms used for locating diversity related themes in the columns included
the names of the provinces, regions, racial/ethnic groups, religions, sects, languages, and
tribes present within different regions and provinces in Pakistan. In addition, the
following Urdu terms were used as markers of the key themes related to cultural
diversity. These terms were identified on the basis of a pretest with 20 randomly selected
columns. The list was not treated as exhaustive yet proved helpful in identifying and
analysing the relevant columns (see Table 2). The translation and coding were performed
by the author; later to be re-checked by a bilingual colleague at a university in Sydney,
who is an expert in Urdu and English languages.
Urdu English Urdu English

Aksariat Majority Qomiat Nationality; Ethnicity
Aqeeda or Iman Faith; Religion Rang Colour
Aqliat Minority Ranga Rangi or Diversity; Difference
Tanawwo
Barabari or Musawat Equality Riasat State
Beradri Fraternity; Tribe Riwayat Traditions
Fiqh Islamic jurisprudence Samaji Insaf Social justice
Firqah Sect Saqafat Culture
Ham Ahangi Harmony Sarmayadar Capitalist
Ilaqa Region Sooba Province
Imtiaz or Tafreeq Discrimination; Tabqa Class
Distinction
Jageerdar or Feudal lord Tamaddun Culture; Civilisation
Zameendar
Kafir Non-believers i.e. Tashakkhus or Identity
non-Muslims Shanakht
Lisani or Zuban Language Tassub Prejudice
Markaz Centre; Federation Tehzeeeb or Bood-o- Culture
bash
Mazhab or Deen Religion Ummat Islamic fraternity
Muqami Local; Indigenous Wadaira or Sardar Chief; Tribal chief
Nasal Race Yekjehti or Ittehad Unity
Qabeela Tribe Zat Pat Caste system
Qom Nation
Table 2. Key Urdu terms denoting issues related to cultural diversity
Analysis
Following is an account of the key themes that emerged as a result of this study. The
explanations within the square brackets [] are by the author of this paper.
1. Islamic identity
An overwhelming emphasis on Pakistan’s Islamic identity was witnessed in the columns

analysed. Islam and Islamic identity seem to serve as a broad melting pot within which
other forms of identity such as racial/ethnic or regional identities remain widely invisible.
“We duly associate our movement for independence [Pakistan movement] with the
movement of Syed Ahmed Shaheed… We are proud that in the Indian land of non-
believers, and in the atheist era of the 20th century, we were able to create a new country
to revive God’s [chosen] faith, in the name of His Prophet, and to revise Islamic nation as
Ummat-e-Wusta [the moderate nation]… What was the objective of the independence?
… Its express and implicit objective was that we, the Muslims, who in their composition
are the nation of the Prophet of Islam, needed Pakistan so that we could practice Allah’s
and His Prophet’s religion on this land. To establish a society that is based on the Qur’an
and Sunnat, where we could be able to live our lives according to Islamic historical
culture, civilisation and values, and where in national and everyday affairs, Muslims and
non-Muslims will enjoy equal rights. There will be no compulsion in religion... and
where class disparities, and sectarian or caste based differences will be abolished”
(Muslim, Kia Islam Pakistan main ajnabi hay, Nawaiwaqt, 5 May).
“Kashmiris have not offered their sacrifices [in order to have] a bus services, evacuation
of [Indian] military, self governance, or to have talks about the United States of Kashmir.
Their destiny is Islam and Pakistan” (Ahmed, 5 Farwary - Yom yekjehti Kashmir,
Nawaiwaqt, 5 February).
“Urdu, the national language, is the second greatest symbol of Pakistan’s integrity, after
Islam” (Aali, Naqar khanay main, Jang, 5 February).
“In my opinion, in order to ensure Pakistan’s existence, we must implement its

objectives. The first and the foremost is to implement Islamic system in this country, to
bring peace and prosperity to the entire world…” (Ali, Pakistan aur us kay masail ka hal,
Jang 15 June).
2. Connotations about ethnic or religious sub-identities
Perhaps as a result of the overwhelming emphasis on Pakistan’s Islamic and national

identity, there are generally negative connotations associated with any ethnic or religious
sub-identity – other than Islam and Pakistan. Any groups asserting their rights based on
their ethnic or religious identities remain prone to be treated as ‘others’, associated with a
‘foreign conspiracy’, inconsistent with or injurious to Pakistan’s identity and integrity.
“Whether it is Balochistan issue or the increased activities of regionalists in Sindh, this is

the outcome of a non-democratic era. Whenever popular political forces are pushed to the
wall, then such elements [which otherwise lack popular support] raise their head and
make much noise” (Idaria, Nawaiwaqt, 5 February).
“We have seen that Mr Hameed Nizami in his letter to the father of the nation [Quaid-i-
Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah] dated 5 June 1944 described that ‘Qadianis considers all
Muslims as Kafir [non-believers]’. This is an irrefutable fact that after 62 years [when
that letter was written], the problem is still as grave as it was at that time, rather in my
opinion now its intensity has become manifold, and now this problem [i.e. Qadiani
religion] is spreading fast in the East Africa, UK, USA and Canada.” [Then quoting Iqbal
in the concluding paragraph of his column, the columnist writes] “I have no doubt in my
mind that the Ahmedis [i.e. Qadianis] are ‘traitors’ both to Islam and India” (Shahid,
Qadiani sab musalmanon ko kafir samajhtay hain, Nawaiwaqt, 26 February).
The present unrest in the Balochistan province was the focus of a significant number of
columns studies. Yet, a negative connotation with the ethnic identity is quite noticeable.
“It is worth considering that [Bush government] has condemned Jihad and terrorism in
Kashmir but did not talk about Afghan and Indian sponsored terrorism in Balochistan,
such as their role in the creation of the terrorist group Balochistan Liberation Army,
bomb explosions at government buildings, interruption of railway traffic, and other acts
of terror and destruction. … We are surprised that the movement for greater Balochistan
in the Baloch areas of Iran and Pakistan, and the Baloch leaders in the USA, UK and Gulf
countries are engaged in anti-Iran and anti-Pakistan activities. Irani and Pakistani Baloch
organisations have written letters to President Bush, UN secretary general Kofi Annan,
European Union and Amnesty International, in which they have mentioned the excesses
against Balochs in Iran and Pakistan…in Balochistan, we must beware of our enemies
and their tactics…” (Baqi, Sadr bush ka dora-e-pakistan, and masala kashmiro
Balochistan, Nawaiwaqt, 5 March).
Sometimes there is a subtle but far reaching twist in translation. For instance, following is
the original sentence in English language that appeared in a foreign periodical:
“The (US) administration should call on Musharraf to start negotiations (with

Baloch leaders) immediately, and President Bush should keep up the pressure
when he visits Islamabad in March”
The above sentence was thus translated by a columnist in Nawaiwaqt: “The US should
force President Musharraf to touch the feet of Baloch rebel chiefs.” [The columnist
comments that] “In this last line, Harrison has suggested to Bush to continue the US
pressure to support the separatist chiefs of Balochistan… This American patronage has
resulted in the problem that Ataullah Maingal [a Baloch tribal leader] in his TV interview
justified the killing of Chinese engineers. His arguments on the ARY channel reflected
savagery and barbarism. He questioned the arrival of Chinese engineers in Balochistan
without the permission of the Baloch tribal chiefs, and suggested that the Baloch
terrorists had the right to kill them” (Malik, Balochistan main amreeki sipah-e-danish ki
pesh qadmi, Nawaiwaqt, 15 March).
Newspapers’ official policy editorials are also actively engaged in this debate, thus
representing a widening gap between the Muslims and the West.
“Western imperialism always tried to divide Muslims; encouraging religious racial/ethnic

and linguistic divisions to break the Muslims strength” (Idaria, Musalmanon kay ittehad
aur yekjehti ko todnay kay liay israeli or amreeki sazish, 25 February).
“Indian support for Balochistan’s so-called war of independence or the movement for
separation, and its support for separatists in Balochistan, Sarhad [NWFP] and Sindh, and,
resembling Paki-India border as Berlin wall at the cultural forums are part of the same
campaign” (Baqi, Bharat afghan gath jode, Nawaiwaqt, 25 May).
Some communities remain subject to direct hatred and exclusion. For others the disgust is
rather indirect. For instance, these words of admiration for Abu Musab Zarqawi, the
killed leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, whose hatred for Christians and Jews as well as Shias is
no secret:
“Another flame in Iraqi resistance was extinguished; another thorn in the heart of the
capitalism was taken out... Abu Musab Zarqawi was martyred” (Siddiqui, Istiaary mara
naheen kartay, Nawaiwaqt, 15 June).
“We must consider the fact that Hindu civilisation has never accepted [the creation of]
Pakistan by heart. Ridden in the caste system, the Chankia Hindu psyche has ill intentions
to destabilise and weaken Pakistan so that it becomes an integral part of the mother
India” (Baqi, Bharat afhan gath jode, Nawaiwaqt, 25 May).
“Due to the British and Hindu conspiracy, Kashmir was illegally integrated with India”
(Sarwar, 5 Farwary - Kashmiri awam say yekjehti ka din, Nawaiwaqt, 5 February).
Following excerpt of a policy editorial is particularly value laden in terms of its criticism
of Sikh-Muslim ‘brotherhood’.
“Today, Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz is addressing a seminar on Sikh-Muslim

brotherhood, which is being held in respect of the fifth Guru Arjan Devji’s 400th birthday.
The term ‘Sikh-Muslim brotherhood’ is incomprehensible… The Prime minister can
forget, but the nation can never forget that in 1947, Sikh leadership and people treated
Pakistan with animosity, and massacres unarmed Muslims. Even today thousands of
[kidnapped] Muslim women, not hundreds, are giving birth to children in Sikh families in
the Eastern Punjab, wishing ill for Pakistani rulers, scholars and analysts, who forgot the
rapes [of these women], and are more than willing to extend an ambitious welcome to
every Sikh who arrives in Lahore and Islamabad” (Idaria, Nawaiwaqt, 15 June).
The following is an excerpt from a column in which the columnist has suggested to the
Government of Pakistan that it must not agree to a request by the Bangladesh
Government for the handover of the remains of one of their national heroes. It is worth
noting that Mutiur-Rehman was a Bangali nationalist who is a hero for Bangladesh but a
traitor for Pakistan.
“Mutiur-Rehman is not just a grave, a plaque or some bones… This [issue] is associated
with the confidence and honour of our air force… If we send Mutiur-Rehman’s coffin to
Bangladesh with full honour, then what would be the status of our hero [Rashid Minhas]?
Where will we place Rashid Minhas’s sacrifice and his feat? If we handover the remains
of Mutiur-Rehman to Bangladesh, this would mean that we are certifying the
Bangladesh’s movement for independence. …I have nothing to do with the remains of

Mutiur-Rehman, whether they are taken to Bangladesh or they remain in Pakistan. The
only thing that concerns me, is that, when tomorrow we meet Rashid Minhas, we should
not feel embarrassed. We should not be answerless in response to our Martyr’s questions”
(Chaudhary, Shaheed kay sawal, Jang, 25 April).
3. Democracy and autonomy
Despite the generally negative connotations about sub-cultural identities, there is a visible
emphasis on the need for free and fair elections, strong democratic institutions and
adequate representation of local people in the structures of power.
“Whether it is the Balochistan issue or the increased activities of regionalists in Sindh,

this is an outcome of a non-democratic era. Whenever popular political forces are pushed
to the wall, then such elements (which otherwise lack popular support) raise their head
and make much noise” (Idaria, Nawaiwaqt, 5 February).
“In Pakistan’s present circumstances, it is utmost necessary that autonomy is given to all
provinces. It is not a course to lose but a course to gain, and to strengthen this country.
We have forgotten the objectives of Pakistan. If we had implemented those objectives we
would not have lost East Pakistan [Bangladesh]” (Ali, Pakistan aur us kay masail ka hal,
Jang 15 June).
“Though it is important to safeguard the sensitive installations and restore law and order,
yet Pakistani people expect that government will pursue fair policies, expedite the pace of
progress in the province [Balochistan] and prioritise the interests of the people native to
the province” (Ahsan, Balochistan kay gambhir masail, Nawaiwaqt, 15 February).
There is a noticeable opposition to the present military operation in the NWFP and
Balochistan. The columnists suggest that the government (including the military) must
follow a course of dialogue and negotiations with the local people and their leaders.
“Pakistan’s rulers, politicians, scholars and journalists must consider the factors which
they have ignored in the formulation of democracy. Pakistan was created as an Islamic
democratic parliamentary welfare state so that every Pakistani could practice her life
independently according to her religions, faith, and political perspectives; so that
everyone has the security of life, property, honour and employment; so that health,
education and shelter are provided to everyone. But we have not achieved that objective
as yet. That is because we never implemented the ideologies of Quaid and Iqbal, yet it is
never too late. The present government must ensure that the objectives of Pakistan are
implemented. For that, it is necessary that democratic values be developed in Pakistan;
the military actin in the North and South Waziristan in the NWFP is abolished; dialogue
takes place with the tribal people, senior members and elected leaders; all important
decisions should be made by taking local people into confidence, because the tribal areas
decided to be a part of Pakistan with their willingness and with their majority opinion.
Similarly, in Balochistan, military action must be immediately abolished. All Baloch
leaders, elected representatives and politicians must be engaged in a dialogue and

negotiations, whatever the demands of the local people and their needs, must be accepted
on democratic principles. All important and unimportant matters must be tackled through
consultations with elected representatives (Idaria, Nawaiwaqt, 5 May).
“Balochis must get their due share from Balochistan’s mineral resources… The injustices
of the past must be redressed and if there is a need, we must not hesitate to give
Balochistan more than its due, I don’t think any province will oppose that. It is the need
of the hour that the old feudal and tribal chieftaincies, bureaucracy, and ‘Mullah-cracy’
are abolished” (Fatima, Punjab say aisi nafrat kyun, Nawaiwaqt, 15 February).
“Pakistan’s split into two countries and the creation of Bangladesh was an outcome of the
wrong policies of the past rulers of Pakistan; violation of democracy and the objectives of
Pakistan movement” (Idaria, Pak Bangladesh iqtisadi taawun kay firogh kay liay
iqdamat, Jang, 15 February).
“We must immediately satisfy the masses, in particular the Baloch people, so that they
could themselves take care of the law and order [in their province], and the country could
progress towards development and prosperity” (Haqqani, Pakistan ki siasi aur aeeni
soorathaal kay liay chand tajaweez, Jang, 25 February)
“We must adopt the democratic means to resolve conflict… the only way is to eliminate
them through dialogue. The parties must first examine their position, and then through a
table dialogue must try to eliminate or diminish differences. If the differences are
eliminated and there is solidarity, it is a great thing for the nation and the country. If the
differences are curtailed and there is a spirit of team work, then it is the conquest of the
democratic values” (Yazdani, Jamhooriat main ikhtilafay rai ki ahmiat, Jang, 25 May).
Some columnists suggest that the entire constitution needs to be overhauled in order to
implement the ‘real democracy’ in the country.
“In the imitation of the colonial act, the size of constituencies in the assembly as
prescribed by the 1973 constitution, is enormously large. This means that only feudal
lords, tribal chiefs, and billionaire capitalists can afford to contest the expensive
elections. …Thus, we can never have a real house of commons, the basis of
parliamentary democracy, in this country. The present constitution does not place any
sanctions on the lack of democracy within the political parties. Thus, people in general
remain disenfranchised…. The 1973 constitution does not offer a system for local
governments as the basis for democracy, which should be responsible for local
administration, police, education, health and social services. Consequently, people are
subject to exploitation by the centralised administration. Pakistan is in fact a police state,
which provides the mainstay for the civil and military dictatorship… The colonial pattern
of the constitution refutes provincial autonomy, which adversely impacts on national
integrity and solidarity… As a result of this colonial system, feudalism and tribal
systems have become stronger, their influence ever increasing” (Haqqani, Aik adilana
jamhoori muashray kay qiam kay liay chand tajaweez, Jang, 4 February).
“In order to create the balance between the federal centre and the provinces, the four
provinces of Pakistan should be administratively subdivided to create 11 provinces: (1)
Peshawar or Khaiber province, (2) Hazara, (3) Rawalpindi (Pothwar), (4) Lahore, (5)
Faisalabad, (6) Multan, (7) Bahawalpur, (8) Khairpur, (9) Karachi (southern Sindh), (10)
Quetta (northern Balochistan), and (11) Khuzdar (southern Balochistan)…. The federal
centre should take care of only defence, foreign affairs, transport and treasury/currency.
The provincial autonomy should be modelled according the states in the USA… In order
to provide justice without delay to the people, it is imperative to have an impartial
judiciary…. Similarly in order to have a real democracy, it is imperative to have impartial
and fully independent election commission” (Haqqani, Aik adilana jamhoori muashray
kay qiam kay liay chand tajaweez, Jang, 5 February).
“Practically, the system of democracy that we have [in Pakistan] is a means for the rule
of minority over majority…. The real democracy i.e. a system based on maximum
popular representation is the system of proportionate representation. In a democratic
system it is not the individuals but the parties that are important… If political parties are
to be voted for, then the issues of fraternities, personal confrontations and financial
corruption which are related to individual candidacy may be eradicated” (Ismai, Hamara
intikhabi nizam, aqliat ki hukmarani ka zaria, Jang, 15 April).
Some opinion columns openly challenge the idea of a military-led government, which
they find consistent with the principles of democracy and the ideologies of the founders
of Pakistan.
“First of all, [I would like to mention] the grand public meeting which was held by
Pakistan’s founder party Pakistan Muslim League, at Minar-e-Pakistan. When I saw that
party reviving its commitment to Pakistan under the leadership of an on-duty general
[General Musharraf], I immediately thought of Quaid-i-Azam [the founder of Pakistan].
It is a hard thing to be an orphan, national as well as political. Sadly we are faced with the
both situations at present…. Then I saw another General Ashraf Javed Qazi addressing
students after a bicycle race. He was preaching to children that they must never forget the
purposes that were the basis of the Pakistan resolution presented on 23 March. I first
laughed, then wept, and then found myself extremely angry. I had to immediately switch
to another TV channel to watch a better version of comedy” (Iqbal, Qarardad-e-Pakistan,
jornail aur maqasid, Nawaiwaqt, 25 March).
“In the current global and regional situation, the Government of Pakistan must revive real
democratic parliamentary system in the country in accordance with Iqbal’s and Quaid’s
democratic Islamic ideologies... so that the state and nation and administrators could
spend their energies in the elimination of terrorism, sabotage, and disorder, and to make
this country a real Islamic welfare state; so that we could face those conspiracies which
are being hatched [against Pakistan] at global and regional levels” (Idaria, Nawaiwaqt, 25
March).
“It seems that the rulers want to divide this nation. Many leaders of the government and
the Pakistan Muslim League have said that President Musharraf will be elected once
again as the President while he is in uniform… There seems no chance that in future the
issues of presidential and general elections will be resolved adequately… This means that
we are going to witness more confrontation between the government and the opposition
parties. The country is already in a state of internal turmoil... The situation in Balochistan
and Waziristan is appalling. Even [retired] General Jahangir Karamat, a General of high
calibre, has said that the continued involvement of military in Balochistan and Waziristan
is not in Pakistan’s long-term interest… I would like to suggest to the rulers that they
must not create any further divisions in the country… They must refrain from taming all
the state institutions according to their own wishes, and must not enforce their chosen
decisions through the use of the state power. They must instead follow a course, which
does not bring more division and unrest to this country. This country cannot afford it”
(Haqqani, Kia hukmran qom ko taqseem karnay per tul gaye hain, Jang, 15 June).
4. Class and power
Some newspaper columns mention the increasing class and power gaps in Pakistani
society. The issues of uneven distribution of resources and lack of social accountability
are also discussed. However there is little emphasis on the intersectionality of ethnicity/
race and class.
“We are a nation which is divided because of the political power, [conflicting] economic
interests, geographical divisions, and many other factors. In terms of religion we are
divided into many sects” (Naji, Aalmi qanoon sazi ki zuroorat, Jang, 15 February).
“Islam is a comprehensive revolutionary political system, which started its movement by

bringing down the elite Arabs, and by elevating the oppressed of the world…. At the eve
of the conquest of Makkah, when the founder of the revolution [the Prophet of Islam]
entered Allah’s house [Ka’ba], there was no Arab chief or representative of the powerful
groups accompanying him, it was an ex-slave from Habsha [Ethiopia] who raised the
name of Allah at the roof of the Ka’ba and said to the world…come to the welfare…This
was the first proclamation of a welfare state for all the people…. This country [Pakistan],
which was created in the name of Islam, has neither Islam nor democracy. We are the
slaves of a worse form of the capitalistic system, which does not have any relation to the
Islamic principles [of welfare]” (Hasan, Namoosay risalat aur paighamay risalat, Jang, 25
February).
Some columnists highlight the subtle or visible collusion between different axes of
power, such as between Mullahs and military, or between the feudal lords, Mullahs and
the political parties.
“Mullah politicians are the traditional supporters of the military rule. For both of them,
[military and Mullahs], [remaining in power] government and their own interests is the
first priority” (Naji, Siasat siasat hay, Jang, 15 March).
“Islamic ideology council was a deceitful creation…. The greedy feudal lords of the
Muslim League (the false coins in the Quaid’s pocket) had started their ‘transactions’ in
the exchange market of political shares through false and capitalistic means…Truth had
become a stranger in this country” (Haq, Aur sach ajnabi hota gaya, Jang, 5 July).
“If we examine the present situation and society in Pakistan, we will see that the people
are not at all satisfied with the traditional political parties. The people are now left with
two key ideologies as options. One option involves the adoption of a puritanical Islamic
system. Such party may be termed as the rightist party… Second ideology, which is now
becoming more visible, is the socialist system of equity. This ideology is becoming
popular because of the unleashed prevalence of capitalism in this country… The time is
ripe that either people should have a permanent party based on pure Islamic principles
otherwise people shall support a party that promotes the idea of socialist equity…. All
Islamic parties in Pakistan seem to be incapable of implementing the Islamic system. If
we examine the 60 years of Pakistan’s history, we will see that the religious parties have
only created sectarian grouping in this country. Nevertheless people don’t trust them
anymore. To bring Islamic system, we don’t need a party labelled as Islamic. Every
Pakistani can do that” (Ali, Pakistan aur us kay masail ka hal, Jang 15 June).
The following anecdote cleverly depicts the role of class and power divide in Pakistani
style of democracy.
“Our politicians have become mini gods. Once, Rana Sahib, who was a respected
member in a previous national assembly, was told [by his staff] that his very close servant
Karmoo has been apprehended by the police, for his alleged involvement in the setting on
fire the farms of his (Rana’s) opponents. Rana did not pay any heed. He was retold that
the police has arrested Karmoo; and that Karmoo’s wife and children beg you that
Karmoo be rescued form the police torture. Rana kept on smoking, without paying any
heed. When someone tried to repeat this [urgent] news once again, Rana said, “I have
heard what you told me. Have a bit of patience, which is the greatest blessing of God for
the poor. I will go to the police station to rescue Karmoo. But before that let him have a
bit of bashing [torture/insult] at the police station, otherwise he will not be that grateful to
me” (Bhai, Kyun daray zindan khulta hay, Jang, 5 July).
“A state bereft of ideology is like a drowning man clutching at straws that are but alien
systems or ideologies that can' t keep it afloat. … If they turn away from what is natural to
them and try and be something they are not, they flounder and finally drown. The
graveyards of the world are littered with failed states, and there is room for many more. A
state that fails its people fails humanity and when it fails humanity it fails God. Man is
not only God' s greatest creation, Ashraful Makhlookat; he is also His vicegerent or
Khalifa on earth. To Him belongs all Sovereignty, which He has devolved on his Khalifa.
To fail God' s greatest creation is to fail God. It becomes far worse for a state for the
creation of which people agitated in the name of God and which took upon itself the
mantle of "Islamic republic" and then forgot all about it and became a model of what an
Islamic state ought not to be, instead of a model to be emulated…Which is why I
suggested that our ideology, indeed every Muslim' s and Muslim country' s ideology,
ought to be Haqooqul Ibad and their implementation, central to which is the concept of
adl or balance. Only by doing that can a state become a central community or ummatun
wasata and the Muslims can be justifiably called, "A People Most Balanced" (Gauhar,
Kia tum aql say kam naheen laitay, Nawaiwaqt, 5 June).
“Agricultural reforms must be enacted so that poor farmers and bonder labourers can
have their own lands free from the exploitative occupation of the feudal lords and tribal
chiefs. Such lands owned by the poor must be protected by social cooperative
organisations” (Haqqani, Aik adilana jamhoori muashray kay qiam kay liay chand
tajaweez, Jang, 5 February).
“The history of Islam is a witness that before the Prophethood of the Prophet
Muhammad, nobody was aware of democracy, secularism or judiciary. The entire world
was being ruled by monarchs. Every single world uttered by the monarch was law and
justice… God bestowed the nation of his last Prophet the system of democracy, so that
the deserving could get their due, and so that human beings could get rid of monarchs and
dictators, and have peace on earth…. Because of the virtues of the democratic system,
non-Muslims liked it and adopted it in their countries, whereas Muslims reverted back to
the same monarchy which they had got rid of through God’s religion” (Islahi, Islami
nizamay jamhooriat, Jang, 5 July).
“There has to be a reason why a country is deliberately carved out from another. That
reason is its justification for existence, its raison d'etre. It is that reason that is the raw
material from which its ideology is fashioned and crafted. "Islamic republic" and
"homeland for Muslims" are not ideologies; the first is a description, the other is a reason.
And that is as far as we have gone in nearly sixty years. We couldn' t - or wouldn't - craft
a modern, dynamic and progressive Islamic ideology that was social-democratic and
egalitarian because that would have gone against the interests of the tribal warlord and
the feudal robber baron. But the time has now come that if we don' t give the nation an
ideological anchor and go on pandering to the primitive tribal-feudal combine, it will
either remain in the doldrums celebrating spasmodic rises in economic indicators or its
existence will come under threat. Next week we will look at what that ideological anchor
could be” (Gauhar, Leadership ka fuqdan, Nawaiwaqt, 15 May 2006).
Some columns highlight the past experiences (such as the creation of Bangladesh) as a
way to examine the current inter-province mistrust and tensions in today’s Pakistan.
“In East Pakistan, elections were contested not for the government but as an opportunity
to [challenge and] undo the deprivations. Since Bangalis had been distanced from the
decision making at the national level by denying their majority rights, and even in their
provincial affairs, West Pakistan was playing a dominant role. The Bangali people were
in fact fighting for their freedom [through participation in elections], and Awami League
had transformed the election campaign into the war for independence. … On the one side
there were the rulers of the West Pakistan and their agents, on the other, there was
Bangalis revolt, which was a popular movement against the neo-colonial dictatorship…”
(Naji, Mawazna, Jang, 25 June).
“Pakistani politicians must realise that the acutely dangerous situation in Balochistan is
the greatest challenge for this country after the 1971 tragedy [the separation of East
Pakistan as Bangladesh]. The resolution to this problem lies in an honest and democratic
approach. Semi-military organisations such as the Frontier Constabulary and the colonial
style police and administration are incapable of resolving this conflict” (Haqqani,
Pakistan ki siasi aur aeeni soorathaal kay liay chand tajaweez, Jang, 25 February).
5. Domestic disputes and the inter-group tensions
A number of issues highlighted in the columns relate to the domestic disputes and inter-
group tensions in Pakistanis society such as the conflict on sharing of the river water, the
royalty of natural gas and other mineral resources, Islamisation of laws, and the
representation and recognition of cultural groups within the structures of power. The river
Indus, and a proposal for the construction of Kala Bagh Dam is one of the key inter-
provincial disputes in today’s Pakistan.
“Mr Ghulam Akbar Malik has declared Sindhis as the historical heir and the only owners
of the river Indus, which is completely wrong. This has hurt the feelings of the millions
of Seraikis who live on the both sides of the river and also the people in Pakhtunkhwa
and Pothwar regions. …. We very much acknowledge the right of Sindhis on the Indus
river, but how can we deprive Hindkos of Peshawar, Pothwaris of Islamabad, Pashtuns of
Kohat and Nowshehra, and millions of Seraikis from Kala Bagh to Kashmore to have a
right on this river” (Haqqani, Daryay sindh say taaluq aur ishq kay mazeed dawaydar,
Jang, 15 February).
“There are debates on the renaming of the NWFP…. Punjab has not been named after a
nation or race, but because of the land of five rivers, Sindh has been named after the river
Indus. However Balochistan is named after the Baloch nation, that’s why Sarhad’s
(NWFP) name should be related to it. Gandhara and Waziristan could be two options.
After that the third natural option could be Pathanistan. Generally when someone asks us
who lives in the NWFP, our reply in one word is Pathan” (Ali, Pakistan aur us kay msail
ka hal, Jang, 15 June).
Some columns highlight the complexities of domestic issues such as the issue of religious
madrassahs and religious extremism, which have enormous implications for the sectarian
divisions within Pakistani society.
“President Musharraf is right when he says that it is not possible to close down the
Madrassahs because by doing that one million students will be forced to come on the
streets. I understand that this figure is more than a million because it does not include the
hundreds rather thousands of minor madrassahs which are located in the rural mosques…
According to an estimate, Pakistan has about 14,000 or more madrassahs, out of which
Deobandi school has 9000 madrassahs, Barevli school has 3500, about 300madrassahs
are under the auspices of Jamaat Islami, 700 are affiliated with Ahle Hadith school
whereas 500 are affiliated with Fiqh Jafria…. Any madrassah where they teach Qur’an
and Hadith does not preach violence and hatred against the fellow human beings created
by God. This thing [preaching of violence] is only possible in those madrassahs where
teachers are propagating their personal agendas or opinions” (Yazdani, Deeni madarson
ki ahmiat, Jang, 5 April).
“Let us examine the last ten or fifteen years… Since there have been bomb blasts in
mosques, imam bargahs, graveyards and religious congregations, people have become
afraid of going to the places of worship for worshipping…On the other hand, our official
machinery has completely failed. Whether it is the earthquake [of Kashmir] or the Nishtar
Park bomb blast, it is now confirmed that our administration is uninformed and poorly
equipped” (Chaudhary, Insan insan kay saiy say darta hay, Jang, 15 April).
“In the current times, terrorism has disguised itself within the religious and political
outfit. That’s why it has become more grave and threatening. Thus, it is the need of the
hour to monitor the situation, and remain vigilant without any room for relaxing or
compromise. In these circumstances, it is not only the government but also the family and
society which must keep an eye on their members [to see] if there is any emotional or
attitudinal change taking place in a person which might be harmful to the country or the
society” (Idaria, Khufia idaray aur dehshat gardi ka challenge, Jang, 15 April).
“Hudood laws are such a matter that a person fond of Islam (like me) too thinks (because
of clear cut reasons) that in its current form, the Hudood laws are not only in
contradiction with the spirit of Islam, but they prove Islam’s message based on justice as
discriminatory. Therefore, it is in the interest of Islam that these laws are amended”
(Nadeem, Ab usama say la talluqi kyun, Jang, 5 April).
Some columnists highlight the importance of locally accessible resources and the
representation of local people in the regional projects.
“When President General Musharraf went to Multan, he promised to give Multan a

women’s university and a TV station. We can’t find a TV station as yet, however there is
now a so-called women’s university in Multan. It is a half-made university because the
classes are being conducted in the Girls College and the degree will be awarded by the
Bahauddin Zakria University…. Yet no decision has been made for the Vice Chancellor’s
post. If they were searching for somebody for this post outside Multan, then it would be
unfair with Multan. Everyone knows that there are capable female professors in Multan
whose knowledge and abilities are acknowledged the world over” (Ashar, Munafa bakhsh
ohday aur multan ki khawateen university, Jang, 5 April).
“Wapda has been instructed to explore the possibilities of [providing reliable] electricity
to the people in Karachi, which if Wapda finds them [‘the possibilities’] can rescue the
citizens of Karachi from the harsh summer of June and July. This instruction for
exploring the options has been given to Wapda at a time when three-fourths of
Karachiites, old, children and sick have lost their mental balance. Does Wapda exist
somewhere very far from Pakistan at a heavenly location? Or does not its administration
read newspapers? This is the issue of about fifteen to twenty million human beings; and
also billions of rupees worth of industrial production every day… Karachi expected better
than this treatment by the Prime Minister” (Aali, Naqqar khanay main, Jang, 25 June).
6. International political influences
International politics has further reinforced Pakistan’s Islamic identity; generating a fear
in its people that Muslims all over the world are suffering because of their Islamic
identity.
“The treatment of Muslims at the airports in the Western countries is shameful. Every
Muslim is treated as a terrorist. Even, state delegations are mistreated. Sometime ago
Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz lead a state delegate to the USA; members of his delegation
were mistreated, which everyone saw [on TV], and they were extremely embarrassed”
(Shah, Ghazi ilmuddin shaheed aur halia khakay, Nawaiwaqt, 15 March).
“If the world of Islam is facing humiliation and oppression that is because our rulers
never had a coherent strategy to cope with such circumstances” (Rasheed, Mot aur
zindagi, Nawaiwaqt, 25 July).
Most columnists treat the US-led war on terror and other conflicts involving Muslim
peoples as an extension of the colonial era, and the next generation of crusades against
Muslim countries.
“Western imperialism always tried to divide Muslims and encouraged religious

racial/ethnic and linguistic divisions to break Muslims strength.” (Idaria, Musalmanon
kay ittehad aur yekjehti ko todnay kay liay israeli or amreeki sazish, 25 February)
“American agenda was aimed at creating certain circumstances in Pakistan to achieve the
following objectives: first, Pakistan Afghanistan and Iran troika should not forge an
alliance. If they became together, then according to a Brooklyn institute hypothesis, due
to joint human resources, technology and natural resources in this area, the troika will
become extremely influential; the West will lose its influence in the central Asia and the
Middle East, and it will not be possible for the West to accesses natural resources in this
region. Second, if Iran and Pakistan are engaged in confrontation against eachother it will
enable the US to deal with Iran so that Israel’s security is ensured. Third, Afghanistan’s
natural resources are mostly located in the areas controlled by the Northern Alliance, thus
the US wants to focus its attention on the northern Afghanistan and also wants to get rid
of the Taliban controlled South East Afghanistan. In order to achieve that aim, the US
may instigate the Pakhtunistan issue. Fourth, in order to safely access the Central Asian
natural resources, the US wants to reduce the size of Pakistan, and for that purpose, the
tribes may be instigated to continue their guerrilla activities against the Pakistan
government, including sabotage activities in the Pak-Afghan border ara, Waziristan,
Mehmend agency. Now, military cantonments in Wana and Shabqadr are as much in
danger as they used to be during the British colonial era. Fifth, Balochistan is the second
key barrier [to the US] in accessing the Central Asian resources. Through its
independence it will be possible for the US and the West to coerce the two small
independent states [Pakhtunistan and Balochistan which will be subservient to the
Western interests] by serving as a conduit to ship the Central Asian resources to the West
through the Arabian sea” (Malik, Qomi baqa ka aik hi rasta, Nawaiwaqt, 5 July).
“In Palestine and Lebanon, Israel has devastated everything. The next target is Syria;
civilians - men, women and children are dying. Property is being damaged, no one is
helping the oppressed and the devastated people, no one is asking the Jewish state to
respect the international laws, and peace and civilisation. Nobody is paying attention to
the situation of the oppressed Palestinians. This is an era which is known as an era of the
superiority of civilisations, in which Palestinians are subject to continued oppression,
injustice and violence, which was unprecedented even in the dark ages... Muslim
countries seem to be unable to help” (Rahman, Barbariat ki sarparasti kab tak,
Nawaiwaqt, 15 July).
“The ongoing blasphemy against the Prophet of Islam [in the context of the Danish
cartoons] is a serious incident, which may have far reaching consequences. If the West
did not refrain from this unwise approach, then the growth of the extremist Muslims
within the Islamic world will be attributable to those Western governments and media
which are unaware of Muslims’ sensitivity and utmost regard for Islam and the Prophet
of Islam” (Idaria, Jang, Maghribi mumalik islam kay baray main muanidana rawayon ko
rokain, Jang, 5 February 2006).
“From a realistic perspective, soon the West will need to admit that inter-religious
understanding is not possible unless we learn to respect the founders of the sacred
religions, and respect their sacred books and teachings” (Haq, Bainulmazahib mufahimat
ka wahid rasta, Jang, 15 February).
Pakistan’s long-standing conflict with India over the state of Jammun and Kashmir is
perhaps the most important influence on Pakistani society and politics. Many articles
highlight that Pakistan’s identity is incomplete without Kashmir.
“Kashmir and Pakistan are integral parts of eachother. Without Kashmir Pakistan is
geographically as well in terms of its name incomplete…” (Ahmed, 5 Farwary - yom
yekjehti kashmir, Nawaiwaqt, 5 February).
“To express solidarity with Kashmiris is not just a question of moral support, Kashmir is
the jugular vein of Pakistan. Because of its importance, the British rulers created this pre-
planned problem with the emergence of the two independent states of India and
Pakistan… Kashmiris are not only fighting for their right of self-determination. They are
also flighting for the integrity and strengthening of Pakistan” (Kazemi, Kashmirion say
yekjehti, hamara imani taqaza, Jang, 5 February).
Some articles highlight that the internal unrest in some provinces in Pakistan is caused by
certain foreign forces, which are bent on destabilising Pakistan in order to promote their
own ‘ulterior motives’.
“Ever since the expedition of a process of development in Balochistan, the pace of

destabilisation in Balochistan has also been expedited. One key reason is the construction
of Gawadar Port. When Gawadar Port becomes operational, it will become the largest
commercial, industrial and economic centre of the Middle East, Central Asia and South
Asia, bringing about an economic revolution not only in Balochistan and Sindh but the
entire Pakistan… When Pakistan’s economic circumstances are improved, it will then
become a strong country in terms of defence, and when it will play its due role because of
its political and military influence, the geo-strategic importance of many other countries
will be curtailed in the region… Obviously those countries do not want that, and they are
playing their role in creating destabilisation in Balochistan, and are convincing Balochi
population that Balochistan’s development will make Balochis a minority within their
own province… Those who want to create economic and political destabilisation in
Balochistan and Sindh cannot be the well wishers of Pakistan” (Yazdani, Jamhooriat
main ikhtilafay rai ki ahmiat, Jang, 25 May).
7. The way forward
Some opinion columns and policy editorials highlight the possible way forward to the
issues and challenges faced by Pakistani society. Such approaches underscore the need
for creating harmony and peaceful coexistence through dialogue and negotiations.
“He used to say that Urdu and Hindi literature and these two languages can play a key
role in restoring and maintaining peace in the subcontinent” (Hina, Siah burqay main
kamla das surayya, Jang, 5 April).
In response to the inter-group tensions and violence, there are suggestions that the people
must exercise tolerance and patience to tackle the divisions in society.
“[In response to a terrorist/sectarian incident] I would like to submit that one cannot but
accept the gravity and seriousness of the tragedy…however tolerance, patience and
control can be exercised so that the results and consequences are not adverse…We should
control the emotions in order to save human lives... We must need to take care of the
innocent lives, which become victim of our angst and grief” (Sabzwari, Josh ki bajay
hosh ki zuroorat, Jang, 25 April).
“It is agreed that the entire country is aggrieved and angry because of this blasphemy
[against the Prophet of Islam – in the context of the Danish cartoons], however the
expression should have been different to what was unfortunately adopted. Rampage and
burning [property] is not a civilised way to protesting. The loss of human life is most
deplorable…. Such sabotage activities have no connection with the honour of the
Prophet” (Qureshi, Tazheeki khakay, ihtijaj, intizamia, Jang, 25 February).
“The people who are responsible for this tragedy [a sectarian terrorist incident in Nishtar
Park, Karachi] could be only those who want to defame Islam, Pakistan and Karachi”
(Sabzwari, Josh ki bajay hosh ki zuroorat, Jang, 25 April).
“Geo TV channel has started consultations with Pakistan’s eminent religious scholars
from every school on the issue of the contradictory Hudood Ordinance. This is worth
noticing in the context that it has opened the pathway for the citizens of this country to
speak on those topics openly, which were previously left untouched. In view of the
religious affairs in the world today, and in the backdrop of a process of inter-religious
harmony through dialogue, it is imperative that we are engaged in national debates on
Hudood Ordinance. It is an important step to build a civil society n Pakistan where
religion cannot be used for people’s exploitation. It is encouraging people to think.
‘Think for a while’ movement is a positive step to bring the imperative of logic and
rationality to a society which traditionally experiences an undeclared ban on thinking
about one’s beliefs; where the tribal, feudal, capitalistic cultures have deprived people
from living the way of life they want to live” (Idaria, Hudood ordinance per ulmay karam
ka mutwazan izaharay khyal, Jang, 25 May).
Some articles strongly advocate the importance of a dialogue in order to resolve the inter-
provincial tensions and misunderstandings.
“Today there is no leader in Balochistan, of the calibre of Qazi Isa, who could tell people
and convince them that their culture is not endangered, and nobody is challenging their
cultural traditions…. It is important that those who are negotiating on Balochistan affairs
are from Balochistan, who are aware of the Baloch thoughts, local culture and values, and
their emotions…. Ataullah Maingal and Akbar Bugti are the name of a psychological
position. We must not look at them as tribal chiefs. They are tribal chiefs, but before that
they are Baloch…. It is the need of the hour that the dialogue must take place in their
own language, in view of their own traditions, and through their own people” (Yazdani,
Leader who hay jis ko qom tasleem karay, Jang, 5 July).
“The internal and external forces which want to obstruct Pakistan’s progress are bent on
destabilising the Sindh politically and economically... There is a need to examine the
Balochistan issue in depth. There is a need to think and to act wisely to resolve these
issues. The difference of opinion there has resulted in open clash. There is a history of the
problems and conflicts in Balochistan… No body has given due importance to
dialogue… The solution enforced by gun is never durable. That is why all disputes
should be resolved through negotiations” (Yazdani, Jamhooriat main ikhtilafay rai ki
ahmiat, Jang, 25 May).
“In my opinion, in order to safeguard Pakistan’s existence [integrity], we must implement

its objectives. The first and the foremost is to bring Islamic system in this country, to
bring peace and prosperity for the entire world, and also to strengthen and give due
autonomy to every unit in this country… Provincial autonomy will result in harmony and
affection in this country… In Balochistan, the situation today is a result of the denial of
the objectives of Pakistan Resolution. The time is ripe that we must implement that
resolution, and in the spirit of love, welfare and harmony, must give Balochistan its rights
so that Pakistan is strengthened. Balochistan will then become a strong arm of Pakistan
which will demonstrate better results than other provinces” (Ali, Pakistan aur us kay
msail ka hal, Jang 15 June).
Discussion and conclusions

The data reveals that the issues related to diversity and subcultures in Pakistani society
remain generally ignored or downplayed. The media’s portrayal of cultural diversity is
problematic in several respects: (1) there is an overwhelming emphasis on Pakistan’s
Islamic identity, which serves as a broad melting pot within which other forms of identity
such as race/ethnicity or sect seem to be dissolved or remain widely invisible; (2) there is
evidence of generally negative connotations about ethnic or religious sub-identities. Any
identity other than Pakistan’s national identity or Islam is considered injurious to
Pakistan. Consequently, there is significant discrepancy in the concept of ‘Pakistani
identity’ and how it fits with the realities of a multicultural society. Some communities
remain subject to direct abhorrence and exclusion e.g. Ahmedis, Hindus and Sikhs,
whereas for others the aversion is more indirect e.g. Christians and Shias. Also there is a
lack of understanding of the issues and challenges faced by ethnic and religious
minorities. Information available through the popular media is minimal and insufficient;
(3) there is a frequent emphasis on the need for free and fair democratic institutions and
provincial autonomy. There is noticeable resentment against the issues of a lack of
popular or indigenous representation in the government and administration, uneven
distribution of power and wealth, unchecked police authority, ineffective judiciary, and a
lack of social accountability; (4) class and power gaps are mentioned but the
intersectionality of various forms of identity and class is generally ignored. A noticeable
resentment was there against unchecked policy authority, ineffective judiciary, and the
uneven distribution of resources and power. The powerful groups highlighted by the
media include military, feudal lords, tribal chiefs, and Mullahs; (5) there are a number of
domestic disputes, which are a source of inter-group tensions and mistrust. Such issues
include sharing of water and mineral resources, preservation of sub-cultural identity, lack
of provincial autonomy, and indigenous under-representation in the structures of power;
(6) international politics and Pakistan’s geo-strategic location seem to reinforce the focus
on Pakistan’s Islamic identity, and a widely shared concern in its population that their
fellow Muslims in the neighbouring Muslim countries such as Afghanistan and the
Middle East are suffering because of their Islamic identity. Pakistan’s long-standing
dispute over Kashmir with India has further reinforced this concern; (7) some analysts do
suggest pragmatic resolution to Pakistan multicultural issues and challenges through
dialogue and negotiations. Table 3 offers a summary of the key themes identified in this
paper.
The paper has demonstrated that Islam is the predominant discourse in Pakistan, which
serves as the overwhelming melting pot of any sub-cultures including ethnic and religious
identities. The opinion columns and policy editorials seem to present and perpetuate the
discourses in which any identity other than the Islam or Pakistan is treated as undesirable
or less valued. Issues of ethnic minorities though highlighted at macro-political level lack
thorough understanding and information. For instance, no data and analysis is presented
in terms of issues such as unemployment, indigenous cultural practices and their
protection, local environment, etc. Their perspectives remain hidden, issues and
challenges largely misunderstood.
Theme Description
Islamic melting pot An overwhelming emphasis on Pakistan’s Islamic identity, which
serves as a broad melting pot within which other forms of identity such
as race/ethnicity or sect seem to be dissolved or remain widely
invisible;
Negative connotations Generally negative connotations about ethnic or religious sub-identities.
about diversity Any identity other than Pakistan’s national identity or Islam is
considered injurious to Pakistan. Consequently, there is significant
discrepancy in the concept of ‘Pakistani identity’ and how it fits with
the realities of a multicultural society. Some communities remain
subject to direct abhorrence and exclusion e.g. Ahmedis, Hindus and
Sikhs, whereas for others the aversion is more indirect e.g. Christians
and Shias.
Emphasis on A frequent emphasis on the need for free and fair democratic
democracy and institutions and provincial autonomy. There is noticeable resentment
provincial autonomy against the issues of a lack of popular or indigenous representation in
the government and administration and centralised power structures,
Limited emphasis on An emphasis on class and power gaps, and social justice; but the
class and power gaps intersectionality of various forms of identity and class is generally
ignored. The powerful groups highlighted by the media include
military, feudal lords, tribal chiefs, capitalists, and Mullahs. There is
resentment against the unchecked police authority, ineffective judiciary,
and a lack of social accountability.
Domestic disputes There are a number of domestic disputes, which are a source of inter-
group tensions and distrust. Such issues include sharing of water and
mineral resources, preservation of sub-cultural identity, and indigenous
under-representation in the structures of power;
International politics International politics and Pakistan’s geo-strategic location seem to
reinforce the focus on Pakistan’s Islamic identity, and a widely shared
concern in its population that their fellow Muslims in the world are
suffering because of their Islamic identity. Pakistan’s long-standing
dispute over Kashmir with India has further reinforced this concern
Lack of information Information available through the popular media is minimal and
and understanding of insufficient, and there seems to be little appreciation of the issues and
issues faced by challenges faced by ethnic and religious minorities in Pakistani society
minorities and institutions. For instance, issues related to unemployment, low
literacy rates, access to basic health and education are hardly discussed.
The way forward Some analysts do suggest pragmatic resolution to Pakistan’s
multicultural issues and challenges through dialogue and negotiations.
Table 3. Representation of cultural diversity in Pakistani media
The paper has highlighted the generally negative connotations associated with ethnic,
religious or sectarian identity other than Islam. Any other form of identification remains
prone to the allegations of foreign conspiracy or collusion. Within the political contexts,
the paper has identified two key factors: First, the internal political factors i.e. the lack of
democratic institutions and political participation has further fuelled the resentment
within the population, in particular within the ethnic and religious minorities. Second, the
external political factors, which are an outcome of Pakistan’s pan-Islamic discourse,
influenced in particular by the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. The paper
has demonstrated that despite the diversity of its population, an overwhelming emphasis
on Islam, the negative connotations with the subcultures and a lack of political
participation and representation have meant that in practice Pakistan is pursuing socio-
political policies which are assimilationist, not multicultural in nature. It is important that
the voices, which are calling for a constructive inter-group dialogue and political
participation, are heard and their suggestions implemented. An assimilationist and centre-
focused approach has not proved useful in the past - resulting in the East Pakistan’s
separation from Pakistan in 1971. There is little evidence to suggest that such an
approach will be useful in the future.
In terms of the implications of this study, researchers may like to examine the issues and
challenges faced by the members of various minority groups within the employment
contexts in Pakistan. Kemal (2005) suggests that Pakistan lies in the low level of skill
development, lacking in all three types of skills: creative and cognitive skills, personal
and social skills and most importantly vocational skills. Kemal suggests that skill
development and human resource development are crucial if Pakistan is to make steady
progress in terms of sustained economic growth. Within this context, researchers may
like to examine how employers and managers tackle the socio-political and legal biases
against the ethnic and religious subcultures within an employment market faced with a
dearth of skilled human capital.
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Representation of cultural diversity in Urdu newspapers in Pakistan

Research paper to be presented at the 2006 Signature Event

Keywords: culture; diversity; ethnicity; Islam; media; Pakistan

Cultural diversity in Pakistani society

Ethnicity of Pakistani population is generally described in terms of the geographically

Figure 1. Ethnic diversity in Pakistan

Figure 2. Religious diversity in Pakistan

National Commission for Minorities. In response to a joint petition by some Minority

Rehman (2003:15-16) identifies four key issues of importance to religious minorities in

of consideration in Pakistani society. In many instances, the issues of ethnic or religious

A critical perspective is instrumental to examine how media culture articulates the

Multicultural perspectives in media tend to promote multiculturalist politics and media

Newspaper National editions Dates Days Total Theme

Table 1. A comparison of Jang and Nawaiwaqt and the data analysed

Urdu English Urdu English

Table 2. Key Urdu terms denoting issues related to cultural diversity

An overwhelming emphasis on Pakistan’s Islamic identity was witnessed in the columns

“In my opinion, in order to ensure Pakistan’s existence, we must implement its

2. Connotations about ethnic or religious sub-identities

Perhaps as a result of the overwhelming emphasis on Pakistan’s Islamic and national

“Whether it is Balochistan issue or the increased activities of regionalists in Sindh, this is

“The (US) administration should call on Musharraf to start negotiations (with

“Western imperialism always tried to divide Muslims; encouraging religious racial/ethnic

“Today, Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz is addressing a seminar on Sikh-Muslim

Bangladesh’s movement for independence. …I have nothing to do with the remains of

3. Democracy and autonomy

“Whether it is the Balochistan issue or the increased activities of regionalists in Sindh,

leaders, elected representatives and politicians must be engaged in a dialogue and

4. Class and power

“Islam is a comprehensive revolutionary political system, which started its movement by

5. Domestic disputes and the inter-group tensions

“When President General Musharraf went to Multan, he promised to give Multan a

6. International political influences

“Western imperialism always tried to divide Muslims and encouraged religious

“Ever since the expedition of a process of development in Balochistan, the pace of

7. The way forward

“In my opinion, in order to safeguard Pakistan’s existence [integrity], we must implement

Discussion and conclusions

Table 3. Representation of cultural diversity in Pakistani media

and Organizations Across Nations, London: Sage.

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