TUMEY vs. Ohio, Tanada vs. Paec Impartial Court Tribunal

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Tumey v. Ohio - 273 U.S. 510, 47 S. Ct.

437 (1927)

RULE:

All questions of judicial qualification may not involve constitutional validity. Thus matters of kinship,
personal bias, state policy, remoteness of interest, would seem generally to be matters merely of
legislative discretion. But it certainly violates the Fourteenth Amendment and deprives a defendant in a
criminal case of due process of law, to subject his liberty or property to the judgment of a court the
judge of which has a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him
in his case.

FACTS:

Plaintiff Tumey was arrested and brought before Mayor Pugh, of the Village of North College Hill,
charged with unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquor. He moved for his dismissal because of the
disqualification of the Mayor to try him, under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Mayor denied the
motion, proceeded to the trial, and convicted plaintiff. The conviction was reversed by the Court of
Common Pleas of Hamilton County. On appeal by the State, the Court of Appeals of the first appellate
district of Ohio affirmed the judgment of the Mayor. The State Supreme Court denied plaintiff’s petition.
In this current petition for certiorari, plaintiff contended that he was denied due process of law when he
was convicted of violating the state's Prohibition Act because the mayor who convicted him had a direct,
pecuniary interest in his conviction. Specifically, the mayor could only be paid for his services as a judge
if he convicted those who were brought before him, and the mayor had an interest in generating
revenue for his village by convicting and fining those before him.

ISSUE:

Under the circumstances, were the plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment rights violated?

ANSWER:

Yes.

CONCLUSION:

The Court held that the plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment rights and due process rights were violated
when his liberty or property was subjected to the judgment of a court the judge of which had a direct,
personal, substantial, and pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him in his case. According
to the court, plaintiff had a due process right to be tried by an impartial judge
Tanada v. Philippine Atomic Energy Commission [GR 70632, 11 February 1986]; also Nuclear Free
Philippines

Coalition v. Napocor [ GR L-68474]

Resolution En Banc, Plana (J) : 5 concur, 2 took no part

Facts: The Official Philippine Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) pamphlet, entitled “The Philippine
Nuclear Power

Plant-1″ was published in 1985 when Commissioners Manuel Eugenio, Quirino Navarro, and Alejandro
Ver Albano had already been appointed to their present positions. Other pamphlets entitled “Nuclear
Power – Safe, Clean, Economical, and Available,” and “Nuclear Power Plant and Environmental Safety”
were issued earlier, but the majority of the Commissioners even then were already occupying positions
of responsibility in the PAEC.

Commissioner Eugenio was Acting Chief of the PAEC Department on Nuclear Technology and
Engineering from June, 1980 to July, 1984; Commissioner Navarro was PAEC Chief Science Research
Specialist from May, 1980 to September, 1984; and Commissioner Albano was PAEC Deputy
Commissioner from March, 1980 to September, 1984. These pamphlets continued to be distributed by
PAEC as late as March 1985. Their official distribution continued after the filing of National Power
Corporation (Napocor)’s motion for conversion on 27 June 1984 and even after PAEC had issued its
order dated 26 February 1985 formally admitting the said motion for conversion.

In GR 70632, the competence of the PAEC Commissioners to pass judgment on the safety of the
Philippine Nuclear Power Plant-1 (PNPP-1) was questioned; (2) the validity of Napocor’s
motion/application for the conversion of its construction permit into an operating license for PNPP-1
was assailed, and (3) PAEC Commissioners were charged with bias and prejudgment.

Issue: Whether the PAEC Commissioner may sit in judgment in determining the safety of PNPP-1.

Held: The PAEC Commissioners would be acting with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction were they to sit in judgment upon the safety of the plant, absent the requisite objectivity
that must characterize such an important inquiry because they already have prejudged the safety of
PNPP-1. The PAEC Commissioners cannot escape responsibility from the official pamphlets, which clearly
indicate the prejudgment that PNPP-1 is safe. The official distribution of the pamphlets continued when
the Commissioners had already been appointed to their present positions and even after PAEC had
issued its order dated 26 February 1985 formally admitting Napocor’s motion for conversion.

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