Constitutional Law by Atty. Adonis Gabriel

JURISTS BAR REVIEW CENTER™
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Atty. Adonis Gabriel
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy
The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must
conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority
administered. Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm
of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive
branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force
and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the
nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. [Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS [G.R. No.
122156, February 3, 1997]
Permanence of the Constitution
The Constitution of a State is stable and permanent, not to be worked upon by the temper of the
times, nor to rise and fall with the tide of events: notwithstanding the competition of opposing
interests, and the violence of contending parties, it remains firm and immoveable, as a mountain
amidst the strife of storms, or a rock in the ocean amidst the raging of the waves. (Vanhorne’s
Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. 304 [1975])
The Constitution is not the source of all rights
What is a constitution, and what are its objects? It is easier to tell what it is not that what it is. It is
not the beginning of a community, nor the origin of private rights; it is not the fountain of law, nor
the incipient state of government; it is not the cause, but the consequence of personal and political
freedom; it grants no rights to the people, but it is the creature of their power, the instrument of
their convenience. Designed for their protection in the enjoyment of the rights and powers which
they possessed before the constitution was made, it is but the framework of the political
government, and necessarily based upon the pre-existing condition of laws, rights, habit, and modes
of thought. (Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations [1871], Boston, Little Brown & Co)
AMENDMENTS AND REVISION
Rules in Interpreting Doubtful Provisions of the Constitution
Self-Executing
In case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-
executing. Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be
considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine
when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the
lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the
needed implementing statute. (Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997)
Tools of Construction
Verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.
Ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the
intent of its framers.
Ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole.
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While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional
convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto
may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the
Constitution when the meaning is clear. (Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261,
November 10, 2003)
Power to Propose Amendments or Revisions is a Constituent Power
The power to amend the Constitution or to propose, amendments thereto is not included in the
general grant of legislative powers to Congress. It is part of the inherent powers of the people - as
the repository of sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours — to make and hence, to amend
their own Fundamental Law. Congress may propose amendments to the Constitution merely because
the same explicitly grants such power. Hence, when exercising the same, it is said that Senators and
Members of the House of Representatives act, not as members of Congress, but as component
elements of a constituent assembly. When acting as such, the members of Congress derive their
authority from the Constitution, unlike the people, when performing the same function, for their
authority does not emanate from the Constitution - they are the very source of all powers of
government, including the Constitution itself. (Gonzales v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-28196, November
9, 1967)
Congress may Directly Propose Amendments or Revisions and at the same time, Call a
Constitutional Convention
Atty. Juan T. David, as amicus curiae maintains that Congress may either propose amendments to
the Constitution or call a convention for that purpose, but it cannot do both, at the same time. This
theory is based upon the fact that the two (2) alternatives are connected in the Constitution by the
disjunctive "or." Such basis is, however, a weak one, in the absence of other circumstances — and
none has been brought to our attention — supporting the conclusion drawn by the amicus curiae. In
fact, the term "or" has, oftentimes, been held to mean "and," or vice-versa, when the spirit or
context of the law warrants it. (Gonzales v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-28196, November 9, 1967)
Congress can provide the implementing details of the Constitutional Convention, either as
a Constituent Assembly or as a legislative body.
Congress, acting as Constituent Assembly pursuant to Article [XVIII] of the Constitution, has
authority to propose constitutional amendments or call a convention for the purpose; Such grant
includes all other powers essential to the effective exercise of the principal power by necessary
implication; Implementing details are within the authority of Congress not only as a Constituent
Assembly but also in the exercise of its comprehensive legislative power so long as it does not
contravene any provision of the Constitution; and Congress as a legislative body may thus enact
necessary implementing legislation to fill in the gaps which Congress as a Constituent Assembly
omitted. (Imbong v. Ferrer, COMELEC, G.R. No. L-32432, September 11, 1970)
The President may Recommend Changes to the Constitution
The President cannot delegate a power that she herself does not possess. While the President does
not possess constituent powers – as those powers may be exercised only by Congress, a
Constitutional Convention, or the people through initiative and referendum – she may submit
proposals for constitutional change to Congress in a manner that does not involve the arrogation of
constituent powers.
Since, under the present Constitution, the people also have the power to directly propose
amendments through initiative and referendum, the President may also submit her
recommendations to the people, not as a formal proposal to be voted on in a plebiscite similar to
what President Marcos did in Sanidad, but for their independent consideration of whether these
recommendations merit being formally proposed through initiative. (Province of Cotabato v. The
Gov’t. of the RP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008)
Right of Initiative to Propose Amendments to the Constitution is not self-executing.
Although this mode of amending the Constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses
congressional action, in the last analysis it still is dependent on congressional action. Bluntly stated
the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of
initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution until Congress provides for its
implementation. Stated otherwise, while the Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the
people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation.
(Santiago v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997)
Difference between Amendment and Revision
Amendment implies such an addition or change within the lines of the original instrument as will
effect an improvement, or better carry out the purpose for which it was framed. Revision broadly
implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering the principle of
separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change
alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions
of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or
deletes without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of
the constitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific provision being amended.
(Lambino v. COMELEC [G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006)
Requirements in proposing Amendments through Initiative
The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" is
that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements
must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or
representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must
be embodied in a petition. (Lambino v. COMELEC [G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006)
Sufficiency of RA 6735 to Implement Initiative on the Constitution
In Santiago vs. COMELEC (March 19, 1997), the Supreme Court ruled that Republic Act No. 6735 is
insufficient to implement the system of initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. In the
resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration in Lambino vs. COMELEC (November 21, 2006), the
Supreme Court noted that ―ten (10) Members of the Court reiterated their position, as shown by
their opinions already given when the Decision herein was promulgated, that Republic Act No. 6735
is sufficient and adequate to amend the constitution thru a people’s initiative.‖
Doctrine of Proper Submission
The ultimate question, therefore, boils down to this: Is there any limitation or condition in [Section 4
of Article XVII] of the Constitution which is violated by the act of the Convention of calling for a
plebiscite on the sole amendment contained in Organic Resolution No. 1? The Court holds that there
is, and it is the condition and limitation that all the amendments to be proposed by the same
Convention must be submitted to the people in a single "election" or plebiscite.
We are certain no one can deny that in order that a plebiscite for the ratification of an amendment to
the Constitution may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample
basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se as well as its relation to the
other parts of the Constitution with which it has to form a harmonious whole. (Tolentino v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. L-34150, October 16, 1971)
INHERENT POWERS OF THE GOVERNMENT
Police Power
Concept of Police Power
The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state
authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote
the general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or
property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has
been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.
"The police power of the State . . . is a power coextensive with self-protection, and it is not inaptly
termed the 'law of overwhelming necessity.'
It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. According to Fernando, it is "rooted in the
conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to
safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of
citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to ensure
communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare." (Philippine Association of Service Exporters v.
Drilon, G.R. No. L-81958, June 30, 1988)
Principles requiring the Exercise of Police Power
Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and
sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to perform the most
vital functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the expression has been credited, refers to it
succinctly as the plenary power of the State "to govern its citizens." (Philippine Association of
Service Exporters v. Drilon, G.R. No. L-81958, June 30, 1988)
However, this power is based on the principles of salus populi est suprema lex (the will of the people
is the supreme law0, and sic utere to out alienium non laedas (use your own property in such a
manner as not to injure that of another).
Tests for a Valid Exercise
Lawful Subject – anything which involves the general welfare. The interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of
the State
Lawful Means – the means employed must have a rational connection with the objective
sought to be satisfied and not unreasonably oppressive upon individuals.
Power of Taxation as an Implement of Police Power
The legislative discretion must be allowed full play, subject only to the test of reasonableness. If
objective and methods are alike constitutionally valid, no reason is seen why the state may not levy
taxes to raise funds for their prosecution and attainment. Taxation may be made the implement of
the state's police power. (Lutz v. Araneta, G.R. No. L-7859, December 22, 1955)
Power of Eminent Domain as a complement to Police Power
The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable taking is
concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for
landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property in
accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to
deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there
is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is
imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required
is the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights
accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the
police power but of the power of eminent domain. (Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989)
Concept of Taking in Police Power
It will be seen from the foregoing authorities that police power is usually exercised in the
form of mere regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of
the general welfare. It does not involve the taking or confiscation of property with the
exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to
destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of promoting the general
welfare as for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and
firearms. (City Government of Quezon City v. Ericta, G.R. No. L-34915, June 24, 1983)
Power of Eminent Domain
Questions on Necessity; Justiceable vs. Political
"The legislature, in providing for the exercise of the power of eminent domain, may directly
determine the necessity for appropriating private property for a particular improvement for public
use, and it may select the exact location of the improvement. In such a case, it is well settled that
the utility of the proposed improvement, the extent of the public necessity for its construction, the
expediency of constructing it, the suitableness of the location selected and the consequent necessity
of taking the land selected for its site, are all questions exclusively for the legislature to determine
and the courts have no power to interfere, or to substitute their own views for those of the
representatives of the people."
"But when the statute does not designate the property to be taken nor how much may be taken,
then the necessity of taking particular property is a question for the courts. Where the application to
condemn or appropriate is made directly to the court, the question (of necessity) should be raised
and decided in limine." (City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, G.R. No. 14355, October
31, 1919)
Public Utility Services may be Expropriated
It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of

right of way. The use of the PLDT's lines and services to allow interservice connection between both
telephone systems is not much different. In either case private property is subjected to a burden for
public use and benefit. If under [Section 18, Article XII], of the Constitution, the State may, in the
interest of national welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership upon payment of just
compensation, there is no reason why the State may not require a public utility to render services in
the general interest, provided just compensation is paid therefor. Ultimately, the beneficiary of the
interconnecting service would be the users of both telephone systems, so that the condemnation
would be for public use. (Republic v. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co., G.R. No. L-18841,
January 27, 1969)
Elements of Taking
First, the expropriator must enter a private property. Second, the entrance into private property
must be for more than a momentary period. Third, the entry into the property should be under
warrant or color of legal authority. Fourth, the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise
informally appropriated or injuriously affected. Fifth, the utilization of the property for public use
must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the
property.
Size Does Not Matter
The propriety of exercising the power of eminent domain cannot be determined on a purely
quantitative or area basis. Not only does the constitutional provision speak of lands instead of landed
estates, but I see no cogent reason why the government, in its quest for social justice and peace,
should exclusively devote attention to conflicts of large proportions, involving a considerable number
of individuals, and eschew small controversies and wait until they grow into a major problem before
taking remedial action. (Sumulong v. Guerrero, G.R. No. L-48685, September 30, 1987)
Public Use in Eminent Domain
The term "public use" has acquired a more comprehensive coverage. To the literal import of the
term signifying strict use or employment by the public has been added the broader notion of indirect
public benefit or advantage. (Sumulong v. Guerrero, G.R. No. L-48685, September 30, 1987)
Just Compensation
Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means a fair and full
equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its
surroundings, its improvements and capabilities, should be considered. All the facts as to the
condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities, should be
considered. (Sumulong v. Guerrero, G.R. No. L-48685, September 30, 1987)
Fixing of Just Compensation is a Judicial Prerogative
The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The
executive department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims
a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use
without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own
determination shall prevail over the court's findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from
looking into the "just-ness" of the decreed compensation. (EPZA v. Dulay, G.R. No. L-59603, April
29, 1987)
Non-Payment of Just Compensation does not entitle the Property Owner to recover
possession of the property expropriated
In summation, while the prevailing doctrine is that ―the non-payment of just compensation does not
entitle the private landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots, however, in cases where
the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the
judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover
possession of their property. This is in consonance with the principle that ―the government cannot
keep the property and dishonor the judgment.‖ To be sure, the five-year period limitation will
encourage the government to pay just compensation punctually. This is in keeping with justice and
equity. After all, it is the duty of the government, whenever it takes property from private persons
against their will, to facilitate the payment of just compensation. In Cosculluela v. Court of
Appeals, we defined just compensation as not only the correct determination of the amount to be
paid to the property owner but also the payment of the property within a reasonable time. Without
prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered ―just.‖ (Republic v. Lim, G.R. No. 161656,
June 29, 2005)
 The above ruling shall only be applied in cases when there is an express or implied
abandonment of public use of the expropriated property
State Immunity cannot be invoked in Eminent Domain Cases
Where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going
through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly
maintain a suit against the government without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental
immunity from suit without its consent. If the constitutional mandate that the owner be
compensated for property taken for public use were to be respected, as it should, then a suit of this
character should not be summarily dismissed. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit
cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the government
followed the procedure indicated by the governing law at the time, a complaint would have been
filed by it, and only upon payment of the compensation fixed by the judgment, or after tender to the
party entitled to such payment of the amount fixed, may it have the right to enter in and upon the
land so condemned, to appropriate the same to the public use defined in the judgment.' If there
were an observance of procedural regularity, petitioners would not be in the sad plaint they are now.
(Amigable vs. Cuenca, G.R. No. L-26400, February 29, 1972)
Power of Taxation
Double Taxation is not Prohibited
The argument against double taxation may not be invoked where one tax is imposed by the state
and the other is imposed by the city (1 Cooley on Taxation, 4th ed., p. 492), it being widely
recognized that there is nothing inherently obnoxious in the requirement that license fees or taxes
be exacted with respect to the same occupation, calling or activity by both the state and the political
subdivisions thereof. (51 Am. Jur., 341.) (Punsalan v. Municipal Board of Manila, G.R. No. L-4817,
May 26, 1954)
Tax Exemption under Section 28, Article VI is only Limited to Propoerty Tax
Section 28(3), Art. VI of the Constitution of the Philippines, exempts from taxation cemeteries,
churches and personages or convents, appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and
improvements used exclusively for religious purposes. The exemption is only from the payment of
taxes assessed on such properties enumerated, as property taxes, as contra-distinguished from
excise taxes.
Actual, Direct and Exclusive Use includes Incidental Purpose
Moreover, the exemption in favor of property used exclusively for charitable or educational
purposes is 'not limited to property actually indispensable' therefor (Cooley on Taxation, Vol.
2, p. 1430), but extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of said purposes, such as in the case of hospitals, 'a school for training
nurses, a nurses' home, property use to provide housing facilities for interns, resident
doctors, superintendents, and other members of the hospital staff, and recreational facilities
for student nurses, interns, and residents' (84 CJS 6621), such as 'Athletic fields' including 'a
firm used for the inmates of the institution.'" (Abra Valley College vs. Aquino [G.R. No. L-
39086, June 15, 1988)
BILL OF RIGHTS
Section 1. Due Process
It is in the art of Constitution making that provisions of the Constitution must be specifically defined.
Along this line, there was an attempt in the 1934 Constitutional Convention to give a specific
definition to the concept of due process, but the Convention was prevailed upon by Delegate Jose
Laurel, the Chairman of the Committee on Bill of Rights, to maintain its general and broad scope.
Flexibility remains to be the best virtue of this fundamental principle. (Ynot v. IAC, G.R. No. 74457,
March 20, 1987)
Not only does the Constitution or the laws refused to give a specific definition to due process, but
our courts as well. Justice Frankfurther would go no further than characterizing due process as
―nothing more and nothing less than the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play‖. Our very
own Justice Fernando defines due process as the ―responsiveness to the supremacy of reason and
obedience to the dictates of justice‖.
The concept of due process traces its origin from the principle of the ―law of the land‖ Magna Carta
Libertatum. In Dartmouth College case, Daniel Webster defined the law of the land as ―the general
law. A law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only
after trial‖.
Two Aspects of Due Process
1. Substantive due process, which deals with the intrinsic validity of the law; and
2. Procedural due process, which requires observance of the procedures mandated by the
Constitution, law or rules and regulations.
Minimum Requirements of Due Process
1. Notice; and
2. Hearing.
Hearing as an element of due process does not require trail type hearing
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. Where, as in the instant case, petitioner PHILPHOS agreed to file its
position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter and to consider the case submitted for decision on the basis
of the position papers filed by the parties, there was sufficient compliance with the requirement of
due process, as petitioner was afforded reasonable opportunity to present its side. (Philippine
Phosphate Fertilizer Corp. v. Torres, G.R. No. 98050, March 17, 1994)
The right to Notice and Hearing in Exercising Rate Fixing Power
The necessity of notice and hearing in an administrative proceeding depends on the character of the
proceeding and the circumstances involved. In so far as generalization is possible in view of the
great variety of administrative proceedings, it may be stated as a general rule that notice and
hearing are not essential to the validity of administrative action where the administrative body acts
in the exercise of executive, administrative, or legislative functions; but where a public
administrative body acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter, and its acts are particular and
immediate rather than general and prospective, the person whose rights or property may be affected
by the action is entitled to notice and hearing. (Philippine Communications Satellite Corp. v. Alcuaz,
G.R. No. 84818, December 18, 1989)
Void for Vagueness Rule
The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. However, this Court has
imposed certain limitations by which a criminal statute, as in the challenged law at bar, may be
scrutinized. This Court has declared that facial invalidation or an "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal
statutes is not appropriate.
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed
for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First
Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute.
With respect to such statute, the established rule is that 'one to whom application of a statute is
constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be
taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be
unconstitutional.' As has been pointed out, 'vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context,
like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a
matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant.'"
(underscoring supplied)
Preliminary Investigation is an Essential Element of Criminal Due Process
While the right to preliminary investigation is statutory rather than constitutional in its fundamental,
since it has in fact been established by statute, it is a component part of due process in criminal
justice. The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for a
criminal offense and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty is not a mere
formal or technical right; it is a substantive right. (Aniag v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 104961, October 7,
1994)
Elements of Criminal Due Process
Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in particular, require (a) that
the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the
matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c)
that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon
lawful hearing. (Alonte v. Savellano, G.R. No. 131652, March 9, 1998)
Cardinal Primary Rights in Administrative Due Process
There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character. The
first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or
affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. Not only must the party be
given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights
which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. While the duty to deliberate
does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be
disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. Not only must there be some
evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. The decision must
be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and
disclosed to the parties affected. The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore,
must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not
simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. The Court of Industrial Relations
should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The
performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it. (Ang Tibay v. Court of
Industrial Relations, G.R. No. 46496, February 27, 1940)
Administrative Due Process in School Investigations
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against
them; (2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance of
counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the
right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the
investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
(Ateneo de Manila v. Capulong, G.R. No. 99327, May 27, 1993)
Equal Protection of Laws
Definition and Concept
Persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike, both as to the rights conferred and as to
the responsibilities imposed.
The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair
discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate
clause, however, to provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or
hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due
process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice,
the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause. (Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth
Commission, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010)
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well
as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation,
which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate.
It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and
reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and
those who do not. (Ichong v. Hernandez, G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957)
There is no difference between a law that discriminates and a law that only allows
discrimination
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if applied and administered
by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal
discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal
justice is still within the prohibition of the constitution. (Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth
Commission, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010)
Equal Protection Clause is violated if the law failed to recognize the material differences of
persons and things
Equal protection does not require universal or uniform equality. Equal application of the law to
persons and things that are not similarly situated offends the equal protection guarantee. (see
Villegas v. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, G.R. No. L-29646, November 10, 1978)
Requisites of Reasonable Classification
Classification is the grouping of persons and things which are similar in certain particulars, and
different from others in the same particulars.
1. The classification must be based on substantial distinction;
Citizenship is a substantial distinction – [Ichong vs. Hernandez]

Sex is substantial distinction [PASEI vs. Drilon]
Age is substantial distinction [Dumlao vs. COMELEC]
Degree of Civilization of minority group is a substantial distinction [People vs. Cayat]
(Fernando says: "Where the classification is based on such distinctions that make a real difference
as infancy, sex, and stage of civilization of minority groups, the better rule, it would seem, is to
recognize its validity only if the young, the women, and the cultural minorities are singled out for
favorable treatment.) [Philippine Association of Service Exporters v. Drilon, G.R. No. L-81958, June
30, 1988]
2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law;
3. It must not be limited to existing conditions only;
4. The law must apply equally to all the members of the same class.
Section2. UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
Definition
The term "unreasonable search and seizure" is not defined in the Constitution or in General Orders,
No. 58, and it is said to have no fixed, absolute or unchangeable meaning, although the term has
been defined in general language. All illegal searches and seizures are unreasonable while lawful
ones are reasonable. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure in any
particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances
involved, including the purpose of the search, the presence or absence of probable cause, the
manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of
the articles procured. (Alvarez v. CFI, G.R. No. 45358, January 29, 1937)
Characteristics
Personal Right
It is clear that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose rights have
been invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the constitutional rights of
defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes had not been
disturbed. (Stonehill vs. Diokno [G.R. No. L-19550, June 19, 1967)
Applies only against searches and seizures made by law enforcement officers
In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be
invoked against the State. The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures
therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with
the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint
against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. (People vs. Marti [G.R. No. 81561,
January 18, 1991)
Elements of a Valid Warrant
1. It must be based on probable cause;
Generally, probable cause refers to such facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of a
warrant that in themselves are sufficient to induce a cautious man to rely on them and to act in
pursuance thereof.
With particular reference to search warrant, probable cause refers to such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the object sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched.
Different Probabilities
The issuance of a search warrant and of a warrant of arrest requires the showing of probabilities as
to different facts. In the case of search warrants, the determination is based on the finding that (1)
the articles to be seized are connected to a criminal activity and (2) they are found in the place to be
searched. It is not necessary that a particular person be implicated. On the other hand, in arrest
cases, the determination of probable cause is based on a finding that a crime has been committed
and that the person to be arrested has committed it. (Mantaring v. Judge Roman, A.M. No. RTJ 93-
964, February 28, 1996)
2. The probable cause must be determined personally by the judge;
Personal Examination of the Complainant and Witnesses not required in Warrants of Arrest
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to
satisfy himself the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1)
personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the
existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the
basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the
existence of probable cause. (Soliven v. Makasiar [G.R. No. 82585, November 14, 1988)
Personal Examination of the Complainant and Witnesses required in Search Warrants
The purpose of the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures is to prevent
violations of private security in person and property, and unlawful invasion of the sanctity of the
home, by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction, and to give remedy against
such usurpations when attempted.
Based on the aforecited constitutional and statutory provisions, the judge must, before issuing a
search warrant, determine whether there is probable cause by examining the complainant and
witnesses through searching questions and answers. (Silva v. Presiding Judge of RTC, Negros
Oriental, G.R. No. 81756, October 21, 1991)
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge
has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to
attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able
to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury
the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false. (Mata vs. Bayona, G.R. No.
50720, March 26, 1984)
Government Officers other than a judge may issue a warrant for the enforcement of a final
and executory decision
Section [2], Article III of the Constitution, we perceive, does not require judicial intervention in the
execution of a final order of deportation issued in accordance with law. The constitutional limitation
contemplates an order of arrest in the exercise of judicial power as a step preliminary or incidental
to prosecution or proceedings for a given offense or administrative action, not as a measure
indispensable to carry out a valid decision by a competent official, such as a legal order of
deportation, issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, in pursuance of a valid legislation.
(Morano v. Vivo, G.R. No. L-22196, June 30, 1967)
3. The determination of probable cause must be made under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and witness he may produce;
Oath; Definition
In its broadest sense, an oath includes any form of attestation by which a party signifies that he is
bound in conscience to perform an act faithfully and truthfully; and it is sometimes defined as an
outward pledge given by the person taking it that his attestation or promise is made under an
immediate sense of his responsibility to God. (Alvarez v. CFI, G.R. No. 45358, January 29, 1937)
 In an affirmation, the affiant is also required to tell the truth, the whole truth and
nothing but the truth, and this obligation is grounded on law.
Test of Sufficient Oath or Affirmation
The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner
or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the
individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable
cause. The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether
it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable
for damages caused. (Alvarez v. CFI, G.R. No. 45358, January 29, 1937)
4. The warrant must specifically describe the place to be searched or the persons or
things to be seized.
Law Enforcement Officers cannot apply Discretion in Serving Warrants
A search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing
expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime. The
Constitution itself (Section 2, Article III) and the Rules of Court (Section 3, Rule 126) specifically
mandate that the search warrant must particularly describe the things to be seized. (People v. Del
Rosario, G.R. No. 109633, July 20, 1994)
Warrantless Arrest
Section 5, Rule 113

Section 13, Rule 113
Section 23, Rule 23
Warrantless Seizures
Stop and Search
Requires the existence of probable cause;

More extensive as it includes areas within the immediate control of the accused. (see Posadas
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89139, August 2, 1990)
Stop and Frisk
Does not require the existence of probable cause, as long as in the belief of an experience
and seasoned police officer, he believes that an offense has been committed;
Covers only a bodily search and the outer clothing of the accused. (see Malacat v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 123595, December 12, 1997)
Search incident to a lawful arrest
Includes bodily search and the outer clothing of the accused, together with the areas within
his immediate control (within his reach) [see People vs. Musa, G.R. No. 96177, January 27,
1993]
Apprehension for violation of law, rules or regulations does not constitute arrest if the penalty
for such violation is only fine. As such, warrantless search cannot be effected as an incident
thereto. (see Luz v. People, G.R. No. 197788, February 29, 2012)
Seizure of evidence in plain view
Objects, articles or papers not described in the warrant but on plain view of the executing
officer may be seized by him. However, the seizure by the officer of objects/articles/papers
not described in the warrant cannot be presumed as plain view. The State must adduce
evidence, testimonial or documentary, to prove the confluence of the essential requirements
for the doctrine to apply, namely: (a) the executing law enforcement officer has a prior
justification for an initial intrusion or otherwise properly in a position from which he can view
a particular order; (b) the officer must discover incriminating evidence inadvertently; and (c)
it must be immediately apparent to the police that the items they observe may be evidence
of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. (United Laboratories vs. Isip, G.R.
No. 163958, June 28, 2005)
Customs Search
Applies only to dutiable goods, that is, imported goods or articles for export;
Does not apply to dwelling. (see Papa vs. Mago, G.R. No. L-27360, February 28, 1968)
Consented Search
To be considered as a consented search, the consent must be specific, categorical,

intelligently given and unvitiated by duress or coercion. (see Luz v. People, G.R. No. 197788,
February 29, 2012)
Section 3. PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION
Categories of Privacy
Decisional privacy involves the right to independence in making certain important decisions, while
informational privacy refers to the interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters. It is the latter
right—the right to informational privacy—that those who oppose government collection or recording
of traffic data in real-time seek to protect.
Informational privacy has two aspects: the right not to have private information disclosed, and the
right to live freely without surveillance and intrusion. (Disini vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No.
203335, February 11, 2014)
Tests in Determining Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
In determining whether or not a matter is entitled to the right to privacy, this Court has laid down a
two-fold test. The first is a subjective test, where one claiming the right must have an actual or
legitimate expectation of privacy over a certain matter. The second is an objective test, where his or
her expectation of privacy must be one society is prepared to accept as objectively reasonable.
(Disini vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 11, 2014)
Zones of Privacy
The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in
itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly
apt: 'The concept of limited government has always included the idea that governmental powers
stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic
distinctions between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the
individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of
limited government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing
it from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private sector — protection,
in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual — has become increasingly important as
modern society has developed. All the forces of a technological age — industrialization, urbanization,
and organization — operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern
terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference between
a democratic and a totalitarian society. (Ople vs. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998)
Requisites to Allow the Government to require disclosure of Personal Information
A law may require the disclosure of matters normally considered private but then only upon showing
that such requirement has a rational relation to the purpose of the law, that there is a compelling
State interest behind the law, and that the provision itself is narrowly drawn. (Disini vs. Secretary of
Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 11, 2014)
Privacy of Communication can be invoked even against a Private Individual
The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be]
inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her
husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced.
The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or
when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision
renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers
and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A
person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an
individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. (Zulueta v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996)
Section 4. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Concept
Free speech, like free press, may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any
matter of public concern without censorship or punishment. (Reyes v. Bagatsing, G.R. No. L-65366,
November 9, 1983)
It was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom of speech and of the press were
coupled in a single guarantee with the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the
government for redress of grievances. All these rights, while not identical, are inseparable. (Reyes v.
Bagatsing, G.R. No. L-65366, November 9, 1983)
The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition are included among the
immunities reserved by the sovereign people, in the rhetorical aphorism of Justice Holmes, to
protect the ideas that we abhor or hate more than the ideas we cherish; or as Socrates insinuated,
not only to protect the minority who want to talk, but also to benefit the majority who refuse to
listen. And as Justice Douglas cogently stresses it, the liberties of one are the liberties of all; and
the liberties of one are not safe unless the liberties of all are protected. (PBM Employees Association
v. Philippine Blooming Mills, G.R. No. L-31195, June 5, 1973)
The constitutional guarantee of free expression is applicable only to matters of public concern, and
extends to matters which touch the heart of existing order. (Justice Cruz)
Public opinion should be the constant source of liberty and democracy. (United States vs. Bustos,
G.R. No. L-12592, March 8, 1918)
Back of the guaranty of free speech lay faith in the power of an appeal to reason by all the peaceful
means for gaining access to the mind. It was in order to avert force and explosions due to
restrictions upon rational modes of communication that the guaranty of free speech was given a
generous scope. For if the peaceful means of communication cannot be availed of, resort to non-
peaceful means may be the only alternative. (Reyes v. Bagatsing, G.R. No. L-65366, November 9,
1983)
Coverage
Criticisms of Public Officials
Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech.
The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer
under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear
conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official
acts. (United States vs. Bustos, G.R. No. L-12592, March 8, 1918)
The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct.
Attempted terrorization of public opinion on the part of the judiciary would be tyranny of the basest
sort. (United States v. Bustos, G.R. No. L-12592, March 8, 1918)
Motion Pictures are protected speeches
Motion pictures are important both as a medium for the communication of ideas and the expression
of the artistic impulse. The importance of motion pictures as an organ of public opinion lessened by
the fact that they are designed to entertain as well as to inform. There is no clear dividing line
between what involves knowledge and what affords pleasure. If such a distinction were sustained,
there is a diminution of the basic right to free expression. This freedom is available in our country
both to locally-owned and to foreign-owned motion picture companies. Furthermore, the
circumstance that the production of motion picture films is a commercial activity expected to yield
monetary profit, is not a disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and of expression. (Ayer
Productions PTY Ltd. v. Capulong, G.R. No. L-82380, April 29, 1988)
Public Figure
A public figure has been defined as a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living,
or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his
affairs, and his character, has become a 'public personage.' He is, in other words, a celebrity. Three
reasons were given, more or less indiscrimately, in the decisions" that they had sought publicity and
consented to it, and so could not complain when they received it; that their personalities and their
affairs had already become public, and could no longer be regarded as their own private business;
and that the press had a privilege, under the Constitution, to inform the public about those who
have become legitimate matters of public interest. (Ayer Productions PTY Ltd. vs. Capulong [G.R.
No. L-82380, April 29, 1988])
Private Persons involved in Public Issues
But even assuming ex-gratia argumenti that private respondent, despite the position he occupied in
the FNCLT, would not qualify as a public figure, it does not necessarily follow that he could not
validly be the subject of a public comment even if he was not a public official or at least a public
figure, for he could be, as long as he was involved in a public issue. If a matter is a subject of public
or general interest, it cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is
involved or because in some sense the individual did not voluntarily choose to become involved. The
public's primary interest is in the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the participant and the
content, effect and significance of the conduct, not the participant's prior anonymity or notoriety.
(Borjal v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126466, January 14, 1999)
Privileged Communication
Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. — Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious,
even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the
following cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal,
moral or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial,
legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any
statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by
public officers in the exercise of their functions.
To be sure, the enumeration under Art. 354 is not an exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged
communications since fair commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise privileged. The
rule on privileged communications had its genesis not in the nation's penal code but in the Bill of
Rights of the Constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the press. (Borjal v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 126466, January 14, 1999])
The guarantees of freedom of speech and press prohibit a public official or public figure from
recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that
the statement was made with actual malice, i.e., with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not. (Borjal vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 126466, January 14,
1999])
Truth is not relevant in the exercise freedom of speech
The best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competiti on of the
market, where truth is the only ground upon which their wishes can safely be carried out. (US vs.
Abrams)
The raison d'etre for the New York Times doctrine was that to require critics of official conduct to
guarantee the truth of all their factual assertions on pain of libel judgments would lead to self-
censorship, since would-be critics would be deterred from voicing out their criticisms even if such
were believed to be true, or were in fact true, because of doubt whether it could be proved or
because of fear of the expense of having to prove it. (Borjal v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126466,
January 14, 1999)
Clear and Present Danger Test; for Content Based Regulations
Free speech, like free press, may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any
matter of public concern without censorship or punishment. There is to be then no previous
restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution
for sedition, or action for damages, or contempt proceedings unless there be a "clear and
present danger of a substantive evil that [the State] has a right to prevent." (Reyes v. Bagatsing,
G.R. No. L-65366, November 9, 1983)
Men feared witches and burned women. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of
irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that
serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that
the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be
prevented is a serious one. (Primicias vs. Fugoso, G.R. No. L-1800, January 27, 1948)
Intermediate Approach Test (O’Brien Test) for Content Neutral Regulations
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified [1] if it is within the constitutional power of the
Government; [2] if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; [3] if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [4] if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms [of speech, expression and press] is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. (Social Weather Stations, Inc. vs. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001)
Freedom of Assembly and Petition
The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions and the
complement of the right of free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet
peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person or group of
persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch or office of the government for
a redress of grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume
responsibility for the charges made. (United States v. Bustos, G.R. No. L-12592, March 8, 1918)
The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances
is, together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, a right that enjoys primacy in
the realm of constitutional protection. For these rights constitute the very basis of a functional
democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected. (Bayan
v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006)
The right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress
of grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the
constitutions of democratic countries. But it is a settled principle growing out of the nature of well-
ordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated that
it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the
rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other
constitutional rights is termed the sovereign "police power," which is the power to prescribe
regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general
welfare of the people. This sovereign police power is exercised by the government through its
legislative branch by the enactment of laws regulating those and other constitutional and civil rights,
and it may be delegated to political subdivisions, such as towns, municipalities and cities by
authorizing their legislative bodies called municipal and city councils to enact ordinances for the
purpose. (Primicias vs. Fugoso, G.R. No. L-1800, January 27, 1948)
Freedom of Assembly vs. Property Rights
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred
position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions;
and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious
intrusions."
The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere
reasonable or rational relation between the means employed by the law and its object or purpose —
that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive — would suffice to validate a law
which restricts or impairs property rights. On the other hand, a constitutional or valid infringement
of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate
danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. (PBM Employees Association
vs. Philippine Blooming Mills, G.R. No. L-31195, June 5, 1973)
Campus Free Assembly
Petitioners invoke their rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. They are entitled to do so.
They enjoy like the rest of the citizens the freedom to express their views and communicate their
thoughts to those disposed to listen in gatherings such as was held in this case. They do not, to
borrow from the opinion of Justice Fortas in Tinker v. Des Moines Community School District, "shed
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." While,
therefore, the authority of educational institutions over the conduct of students must be recognized,
it cannot go so far as to be violative of constitutional safeguards. (Malabanan vs. Ramento, G.R. No.
62270, May 21, 1984)
Such right however must be exercised without 'materially and substantially interfering with the
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school' and without colliding with the
rights of others. Assembly which materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or
invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of speech. (Malabanan vs. Ramento, G.R. No. 62270, May 21, 1984)
BP 880 is Content Neutral
It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a
restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. A fair and impartial
reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would
use public places. The reference to "lawful cause" does not make it content-based because
assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be "peaceable" and entitled
to protection. Neither are the words "opinion," "protesting" and "influencing" in the definition of
public assembly content based, since they can refer to any subject. The words "petitioning the
government for redress of grievances" come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot
be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is
independent of the content of the expressions in the rally.
For this reason, the so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal
firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our
people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. On the other hand, B.P. No. 880 cannot
be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it merely
regulates the use of public places as to the time, place and manner of assemblies. Far from being
insidious, "maximum tolerance" is for the benefit of rallyists, not the government. The delegation to
the mayors of the power to issue rally "permits" is valid because it is subject to the constitutionally-
sound "clear and present danger" standard. (Bayan v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006)
Section 5. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
Religion, Definition
Religion is the profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator.
(Aglipay vs. Ruiz, G.R. No. 45459, March 13, 1937)
A creed must meet four criteria to qualify as religion under the First Amendment. First, there must
be belief in God or some parallel belief that occupies a central place in the believer’s life. Second,
the religion must involve a moral code transcending individual belief, i.e., it cannot be purely
subjective. Third, a demonstrable sincerity in belief is necessary, but the court must not inquire into
the truth or reasonableness of the belief. Fourth, there must be some associational ties, although
there is also a view that religious beliefs held by a single person rather than being part of the
teachings of any kind of group or sect are entitled to the protection of the Free Exercise Clause.
(Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, June 22, 2006)
Non-Establishment Clause
The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of the principle of separation of church and
state. Without the necessity of adverting to the historical background of this principle in our country,
it is sufficient to say that our history, not to speak of the history of mankind, has taught us that the
union of church and state is prejudicial to both, for occasions might arise when the state will use the
church, and the church the state, as a weapon in the furtherance of their respective ends and aims.
(Aglipay v. Ruiz, G.R. No. 45459, March 13, 1937)
Public Funds may be used for activities with religious color as long as the activity has
secular legislative purpose
Not every governmental activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some
religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state,
freedom of worship and banning the use of public money or property. (Garces vs. Estenzo, G.R. No.
L-53487, May 25, 1981)
The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring
the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering
with religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was the mass.
Consequently, the image of the patron saint had to be placed in the church when the mass was
celebrated. If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint
for the barrio, then any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the
acquisition and display of his image) cannot be branded as illegal. As noted in the resolution, the
barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair. Its celebration is an ingrained tradition in rural communities.
(Garces vs. Estenzo, G.R. No. L-53487, May 25, 1981)
Free Exercise of Religion Clause
It should be stated that what is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty, not mere religious
toleration. Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound
reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. (Aglipay vs. Ruiz, G.R.
No. 45459, March 13, 1937)
The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship
carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can only be
justified like other restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds that there is a clear and
present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent". In the case at bar
the license fee herein involved is imposed upon appellant for its distribution and sale of bibles and
other religious literature. It is one thing to impose a tax on the income or property of a preacher. It
is quite another thing to exact a tax from him for the privilege of delivering a sermon. The tax
imposed by the City of Jeannette is a flat license tax, payment of which is a condition of the exercise
of these constitutional privileges. The power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power to control
or suppress its enjoyment. . . . Those who can tax the exercise of this religious practice can make its
exercise so costly as to deprive it of the resources necessary for its maintenance. Those who can tax
the privilege of engaging in this form of missionary evangelism can close all its doors to all 'those
who do not have a full purse. Spreading religious beliefs in this ancient and honorable manner would
thus be denied the needy. (American Bible Society v. City of Manila, G.R. No. L-9637, April 30,
1957)
Two Aspects of Religious Freedom
(1) Freedom to Believe
The individual is free to believe (or disbelieve) as he pleases concerning the hereafter.
He may indulge his own theories about life and death; worship any god he chooses, or
none at all; embrace or reject any religion; acknowledge the divinity of God or of any
being that appeals to his reverence; recognize or deny the immortality of his soul — in
fact, cherish any religious conviction as he and he alone sees fit. However absurd his
beliefs may be to others, even if they be hostile and heretical to the majority, he has
full freedom to believe as he pleases. He may not be required to prove his beliefs. He
may not be punished for his inability to do so. Religion, after all, is a matter of faith.
'Men may believe what they cannot prove.' Every one has a right to his beliefs and he
may not be called to account because he cannot prove what he believes.
(2) Freedom to Act on One's Beliefs
But where the individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions that affect the public, his
freedom to do so becomes subject to the authority of the State. As great as this liberty may
be, religious freedom, like all the other rights guaranteed in the Constitution, can be enjoyed
only with a proper regard for the rights of others. It is error to think that the mere invocation
of religious freedom will stalemate the State and render it impotent in protecting the general
welfare. The inherent police power can be exercised to prevent religious practices inimical to
society. And this is true even if such practices are pursued out of sincere religious conviction
and not merely for the purpose of evading the reasonable requirements or prohibitions of the
law. (Iglesia Ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119673, July 26, 1996)
Religious Freedom does not exempt the act from Governmental Regulation
The constitutional provision on religious freedom terminated disabilities, it did not create new
privileges. It gave religious liberty, not civil immunity. Its essence is freedom from conformity to
religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of religious dogma. (Iglesia Ni Cristo
vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119673, July 26, 1996)
Aspects of Religion that cannot be regulated by the Government
In disputes involving religious institutions or organizations, there is one area which the Court should
not touch: doctrinal and disciplinary differences. (Taruc vs. De la Cruz, G.R. No. 144801, March 10,
2005)
Tests in Determining Valid Regulation
Clear and Present Danger Test (Religious Freedom exercised with Freedom of Expression)
The Court iterates the rule that the exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when
it will bring about the clear and present danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty
bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public health, public
morals, or public welfare. . For sure, we shall continue to subject any act pinching the space for the
free exercise of religion to a heightened scrutiny but we shall not leave its rational exercise to the
irrationality of man. For when religion divides and its exercise destroys, the State should not stand
still. (Iglesia Ni Cristo vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 119673, July 26, 1996])
Compelling State Interest Test (only Free Exercise of Religion is involved)
The compelling state interest test involves a three-step process.
First, ―[H]as the statute or government action created a burden on the free exercise of religion?‖
The courts often look into the sincerity of the religious belief, but without inquiring into the truth of
the belief.
Second, the court asks: ―[I]s there a sufficiently compelling state interest to justify this infringement
of religious liberty?‖ In this step, the government has to establish that its purposes are legitimate
for the state and that they are compelling. Government must do more than assert the objectives at
risk if exemption is given; it must precisely show how and to what extent those objectives will be
undermined if exemptions are granted.
Third, the court asks: ―[H]as the state in achieving its legitimate purposes used the least intrusive
means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the
legitimate goal of the state?‖ The analysis requires the state to show that the means in which it is
achieving its legitimate state objective is the least intrusive means, i.e., it has chosen a way to
achieve its legitimate state end that imposes as little as possible on religious liberties
To paraphrase Justice Blackmun’s application of the compelling interest test, the State’s interest in
enforcing its prohibition, in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim,
cannot be merely abstract or symbolic. (Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, June 22, 2006)

Constitutional Law by Atty. Adonis Gabriel

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JURISTS BAR REVIEW CENTER™

Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy

Permanence of the Constitution

The Constitution is not the source of all rights

AMENDMENTS AND REVISION

Rules in Interpreting Doubtful Provisions of the Constitution

Ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole.

Power to Propose Amendments or Revisions is a Constituent Power

The President may Recommend Changes to the Constitution

Right of Initiative to Propose Amendments to the Constitution is not self-executing.

Difference between Amendment and Revision

Requirements in proposing Amendments through Initiative

Sufficiency of RA 6735 to Implement Initiative on the Constitution

Doctrine of Proper Submission

INHERENT POWERS OF THE GOVERNMENT

Concept of Police Power

Principles requiring the Exercise of Police Power

Tests for a Valid Exercise

Power of Taxation as an Implement of Police Power

Power of Eminent Domain as a complement to Police Power

Concept of Taking in Police Power

Power of Eminent Domain

Questions on Necessity; Justiceable vs. Political

Public Utility Services may be Expropriated

It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of

Size Does Not Matter

Public Use in Eminent Domain

State Immunity cannot be invoked in Eminent Domain Cases

Double Taxation is not Prohibited

Actual, Direct and Exclusive Use includes Incidental Purpose

Section 1. Due Process

Two Aspects of Due Process

Minimum Requirements of Due Process

The right to Notice and Hearing in Exercising Rate Fixing Power

Void for Vagueness Rule

Preliminary Investigation is an Essential Element of Criminal Due Process

Elements of Criminal Due Process

Cardinal Primary Rights in Administrative Due Process

Administrative Due Process in School Investigations

Equal Protection of Laws

Definition and Concept

Requisites of Reasonable Classification

1. The classification must be based on substantial distinction;

Citizenship is a substantial distinction – [Ichong vs. Hernandez]

2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law;

3. It must not be limited to existing conditions only;

Section2. UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

Elements of a Valid Warrant

1. It must be based on probable cause;

Personal Examination of the Complainant and Witnesses required in Search Warrants

Test of Sufficient Oath or Affirmation

Law Enforcement Officers cannot apply Discretion in Serving Warrants

Section 5, Rule 113

Stop and Search

Requires the existence of probable cause;

Stop and Frisk

Search incident to a lawful arrest

Seizure of evidence in plain view

To be considered as a consented search, the consent must be specific, categorical,

Section 3. PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION