CASES

1. ep royappa vs state of tamil nadu 1973

FACTS OF THE CASE

1. 1. The petitioner, E..P. Royappa was a member of Indian administrative service in Tamil Nadu, where he was
elected for the post of chief secretary and was promoted accordingly but later, his position got shifted to
temporary post of officer on special duty.
2. 2. The petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the constitution for mandamus and other appropriate
writs.
3. 3. The petitioner has three contentions, firstly that the post created for the petitioner i.e post of office of special
duty is not validly created under rule 4 of the Indian administrative serve( cadre ) rules, 1954
4. 4. Secondly, under rule 9 of the Indian administrative service (pay) rules, 1954, no post shall be appointed until
it is specified in schedule III unless the concerned authority I.e state or central government makes a declaration
that said post is equivalent in status and responsibility to a post specified, it is, therefore, the case with
petitioner, the concerned authority did not make any declaration for the cadre post holder.
5. 5. Thirdly, the petitioner post is inferior in status and responsibility to that of chief secretary violating articles 14
and 16. of the Indian constitution.
6. 6. Fourthly, the creation, appointment, and transfer of the post is Mala fide exercise o power, not on account of
necessities of administration or public service, but because the second respondent was annoyed with the
petitioner and wanted him out of his way.
DECISION OF THE COURT
1.  1. The Supreme Court held that the two posts were created for discharging functions requiring very high
caliber and specialized experience and were not to be counted as any less responsible than the topmost cadre
posts for which the petitioner was selected. Thus the wide experience of the petitioner in the field of
commercial taxes made the Government post him as Officer on Special Duty.
2. 2. The affidavit evidence indicated that the government in all circumstances accepted the advice of the
petitioner
3. 3. The chief minister cannot be said to commit acts of violence and intimidation thus the petitioner’s
allegations were baseless.
4. 4. The state of Tamil Nadu could not, therefore, add the posts of deputy chairman, state planning commission
and officer on special duty under the second provision, as these posts did not exist in the cadre as constituted
by the central government thus no application and the challenge based on it must fail
5. 5. There was no compliance with the requirements of rule 9, sub-rule (1) and the appointment f the petitioner
to the post of officer on special duty was accordingly liable to be held invalid for contravention of the sub-rule
but no relief can be granted as this rule does not infringes any fundamental right.
6. 6. The petition was thus dismissed with no order as to costs.
REASONS FOR THE DECISION OF THE COURT
1. The court took its view and decided equality is a dynamic concept thus it cannot be cribbed, cabined, and
confined within traditional and doctrinaire limits. From a positivistic view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness,
this equality and arbitrariness are sworn, enemies. Thus any act which is arbitrary constitutes inequality in
political logic and constitutional law.
2.  The chief minister is answerable for all political and administrative actions thus he may shift chief secretary position to
another for any valid administrative reason, along with not violating his legal or constitutional right.

2. maneka gandhi vs union of india 1978

ummary of Facts

The petitioner (Maneka Gandhi) was a journalist whose passport was issued on June 1, 1976, under the
Passport Act, 1967. Later on July 2nd, 1977, the Regional Passport Officer, New Delhi, had ordered the
petitioner to surrender her passport by a letter posted.

On being asked about the reasons for her passport confiscation, The Ministry of External Affairs declined to
produce any reasons “in the interest of the general public.”

Therefore, the petitioner had filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India stating the seize
of her passport as the violation of her fundamental rights; specifically Article 14 (Right to Equality), Article 19
(Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression) and Article 21 (Right to Life and Liberty) guaranteed by the
Constitution of India.

The respondent counterfeited stating that the petitioner was required to be present in connection with the
proceedings which was going on, before a Commission of Inquiry.

To know more about Maneka Gandhi v Union of India, 1978 in brief, please refer to the video below:

Identification of Parties (including the name of the judges)

 Petitioner: Maneka Gandhi

 Respondent: Union Of India And Other

 Date Of Judgment: January 25, 1978

 Bench: Before M.H. Beg, C.J., Y.V. Chandrachud, V.R. Krishna Iyer, P.N. Bhagwati, N.L. Untwalia,
S. Murtaza Fazal Ali and P.S Kailasam.

Issues before the Court

 Whether the Fundamental Rights are absolute or conditional and what is the extent of the territory
of such Fundamental Rights provided to the citizens by the Constitution of India?

 Whether ‘Right to Travel Abroad’ is protected under the umbrella of Article 21.

 What is the connection between the rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the
Constitution of India?

 Determining the scope of “Procedure established by Law”.

 Whether the provision laid down in Section 10(3)(c) of the Passport Act, 1967 is violative of
Fundamental Rights and if it is, whether such legislation is a concrete Law?

 Whether the Impugned order of Regional Passport Officer is in contravention  of principles of
natural justice?

Contentions by Parties on issues

 Petitioner’s Contention

1. The ‘Right to Travel Abroad’ is a derivative of the right provided under ‘personal liberty’ and no
citizen can be deprived of this right except according to the procedure prescribed by law. Also, the
Passports Act, 1967 does not prescribe any procedure for confiscating or revoking or impounding
a passport of its holder. Hence, it is unreasonable and arbitrary. 

2. Further, The Central Government acted in violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India by not
giving an opportunity to the petitioner to be heard. Hence, the true interpretation of Article 21, as
well as its nature and protection, are required to be laid down. 

3. Any procedure established by law is required to be free of arbitrariness and must comply with the
“principles of natural justice”.

4. To upkeep the intention of the Constituent Assembly and to give effect to the spirit of our
constitution, Fundamental Rights should be read in consonance with each other and in this case,
Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India must be read together.
 5. Fundamental rights are entitled to every citizen by virtue of being a human and is guaranteed
against being exploited by the state. Hence, these fundamental rights should be wide-ranged and
comprehensive to provide optimum protection.

6. To have a well-ordered and civilized society, the freedom guaranteed to its citizens must be in
regulated form and therefore, reasonable restrictions were provided by the constitutional
assembly from clauses (2) to (6) in Article 19 of the Constitution of India. But, the laid restrictions
do not provide any ground to be executed in this case.

7. Article 22 confers protection against arrest and detention in certain cases. In this case, the
government by confiscating the passport of the petitioner without providing her any reasons for
doing so has illegally detained her within the country.

8. In Kharak Singh v. the State of U.P, it was held that the term “personal liberty” is used in the
constitution as a compendium including all the varieties of rights in relation to personal liberty
whether or not included in several clauses of Article 19(1).

9. An essential constituent of Natural Justice is “Audi Alteram Partem” i.e., given a chance to be
heard, was not granted to the petitioner.

10. Passports Act 1967 violates the ‘Right to Life and Liberty’ and hence is ultra virus. The petitioner
was restrained from traveling abroad by virtue of the provision in Section 10(3)(c) of the Act of
1967.

 Respondents contentions

1. The Attorney General of India argued that the ‘Right to Travel Abroad’ was never covered under
any clauses of article 19(1) and hence, Article 19 is independent of proving the reasonableness of
the actions taken by the Central Government. 

2. The Passport Law was not made to blow away the Fundamental Rights in any manner. Also, the
Government should not be compelled to state its grounds for seizing or impounding someone’s
passport for the public good and national safety. Therefore, the law should not be struck down
even if it overflowed Article 19.

3. Further, the petitioner was required to appear before a committee for an inquiry and hence, her
passport was impounded.

4. Reiterating the principle laid down in A.K Gopalan, the respondent contended that the word law
under Article 21 cannot be comprehended in the light fundamental rules of natural justice.

5. Further, the principles of natural justice are vague and ambiguous. Therefore, the constitution
should not refer to such vague and ambiguous provisions as a part of it.

6. Article 21 is very wide and it also contains in itself, the provisions of Articles 14 & 19. However,
any law can only be termed unconstitutional to Article 21 when it directly infringes Article 14 & 19.
Hence, passport law is not unconstitutional.

7. Article 21 in its language contains “procedure established by law” & such procedure need not pass
the test of reasonability.

8. The constitutional makers while drafting this constitution had debated at length on American “due
process of law” & British “procedure established by law”. The conspicuous absence of the due
process of law from the Constitutional provisions reflects the mind of the framers of this
constitution. The mind and spirit of the framers must be protected and respected.         Click here

Judgement 

It was held that:

1.
1. Before the enactment of the Passport Act 1967, there was no law regulating the
passport whenever any person wanted to leave his native place and settle abroad.
Also, the executives were entirely discretionary while issuing the passports in an
unguided and unchallenged manner. In Satwant Singh Sawhney v. D
Ramarathnam, the SC stated that – “personal liberty” in its ambit, also includes the
right of locomotion and travel abroad. Hence, no person can be deprived of such
 rights, except through procedures established by law. Since the State had not made
any law regarding the regulation or prohibiting the rights of a person in such a case,
the confiscation of the petitioner’s passport is in violation of Article 21 and its grounds
being unchallenged and arbitrary, it is also violative of Article 14.

2. Further, clause (c) of section 10(3) of the Passports Act, 1967 provides that when the
state finds it necessary to seize the passport or do any such action in the interests of
sovereignty and integrity of the nation, its security, its friendly relations with foreign
countries, or for the interests of the general public, the authority is required to record
in writing the reason of such act and on-demand furnish a copy of that record to the
holder of the passport. 

3. The Central Government never did disclose any reasons for impounding the
petitioner’s passport rather she was told that the act was done in “the interests of the
general public” whereas it was found out that her presence was felt required by the
respondents for the proceedings before a commission of inquiry. The reason was
given explicit that it was not really necessarily done in the public interests and no
ordinary person would understand the reasons for not disclosing this information or
the grounds of her passport confiscation. 

4. “The fundamental rights conferred in Part III of the Constitution are not distinctive
nor mutually exclusive.” Any law depriving a person of his personal liberty has to
stand a test of one or more of the fundamental rights conferred under Article 19.
When referring to Article 14, “ex-hypothesi” must be tested. The concept of
reasonableness must be projected in the procedure.

5. The phrase used in Article 21 is “procedure established by law” instead of “due

process of law” which is said to have procedures that are free from arbitrariness and
irrationality.

6. There is a clear infringement of the basic ingredient of principles of natural justice

i.e., audi alteram partem and hence, it cannot be condemned as unfair and unjust
even when a statute is silent on it. 

7. Section 10(3)(c) of the Passports Act 1967, is not violative of any fundamental rights,
especially Article 14. In the present case, the petitioner is not discriminated in any
manner under Article 14 because the statute provided

8. unrestricted powers to the authorities. the ground of “in the interests of the general
public” is not vague and undefined, rather it is protected by certain guidelines which
can be borrowed from Article 19.

9. It is true that fundamental rights are sought in case of violation of any rights of an
individual and when the State had violated it. But that does not mean, Right to
Freedom of Speech and Expression is exercisable only in India and not
outside. Merely because the state’s action is restricted to its territory, it does not
mean that Fundamental Rights are also restricted in a similar manner.

10. It is possible that certain rights related to human values are protected by
fundamental rights even if it is not explicitly written in our Constitution. For example,
Freedom of the press is covered under Article 19(1)(a) even though it is not
specifically mentioned there.

11. The right to go abroad is not a part of the Right to Free Speech and Expression as
both have different natures and characters. 

12. A.K Gopalan was overruled stating that there is a unique relationship between the
provisions of Article 14, 19 & 21 and every law must pass the tests of the said
provisions. Earlier in Gopalan, the majority held that these provisions in itself are
mutually exclusive. Therefore, to correct its earlier mistake the court held that these
provisions are not mutually exclusive and are dependent on each other.

3. R.D. Shetty vs International Airport Authority1979

4. SUBJECT:  The judgment revolves around the question of whether the International Airport Authority is “State” under
Article 12 of the Constitution and the validity of a tender accepted by the respondents.  FACTS: The International Airport
Authority called for tenders to put up a second-class restaurant and two Snack bars at the International Airport Bombay. 
The tender of the 4th respondent was accepted by the authorities; however it was later found that he did not satisfy the
condition of having at least 5 years’ experience as a registered second class hotelier as mentioned in the tender invitation.  
Therefore, the Airport authorities called the 4th respondent to submit his documents and evidence for reconsideration. 
However, his tender was reconfirmed as he had sufficient experience with reputed clients though not a registered as a
 second-class hotelier.  The appellant who desired to offer his quotation to the tender dropped his thoughtas he did not
fulfil certain conditions as mentioned in the invitation of the Airport authorities.  Upon hearing that, the 4th respondent
was a successful bidder despite of him not fulfilling the required conditions, the appellant filed a case before Bombay the
High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution but the case was dismissed.  Therefore, he appealed to the SC under
Article 136 of the Constitution.   IMPORTANT PROVISIONS: The Indian Constitution: Article 14: The State shall not deny to
any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India Article 136(1):
Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special leave to appeal from any
judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the
territory of India ISSUES: Whether the International Airport Authority is State under Article 12 of the Indian Constitution?
Whether the tender confirmed by the respondents is constitutionally valid? ANALYSIS OF THE JUDGEMENT: The petitioner
contended that, The tender granted to the 4th respondent is not valid as he did not completely fulfil all the conditions
mentioned under the tender invitation. It was mandatory for the Airport authorities to abide by the invitation Had he
known that compulsory adherence to the rules was not mandatory he would have also given his tender offer.   The
arbitrary procedure followed by the Airport authorities is violative of Article 14 to the Constitution.  The respondents
contended that, The Bombay Municipal Corporation ranks a hotel or restaurant depending on the ability of the
organisation and not the owner being a registered hotelier or not. Since the invitation given by the respondents do not
have statutory force a deviation from the conditions would not hamper the process As per the invitation the decision of
the Airport authorities would be final as they reserved the authority to accept or reject the offers made.  Upon hearing the
parties to the case, the Court held that, the first question to be considered is whether the respondent is State within the
meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution.  This question comes into picture to determine the maintainability of the
petition, as a remedy for fundamental right violation can be claimed only against the State and not private authority.  The
Court upon verifying the International Airport Authority Act, 1971was clarified that, the Central government exercises deep
and pervasive control over the administrative affairs of the respondent therefore it is State within the ambit of Article 12 of
the Constitution.  Moving on with the validity of the concluded tender, the Court held that it was a clear violation of
equality under Article 14.  The Court justified its stand on the following grounds:  The tender never mentioned about the
capability of running a second-class hotel but laid down conditions to be fulfilled which is the basic eligibility criteria and
the same cannot be disregarded by the Airport authorities.  The power reserved by the authorities was only to completely
reject the tender offers and enter into a direct negotiation with a dealer.  But in the present case the tender offers were
taken for consideration out of which 4th respondent was selected.  Therefore, the power reserved in the invitation does
not apply.  Hence the concluded tender was invalid.  

Read more at: https://www.lawyersclubindia.com/judiciary/whether-the-international-airport-authority-is-state-under-

article-12-of-the-indian-constitution-4526.asp

5. Ajay Hasia vs Khalid Mujib Sehravardi1980

Facts

The facts of the case are as follows: Petitioners applied for admission to the B.E. Course of engineering and appeared in the
written test and viva voce test. When the admissions were announced, the petitioners found that though they had obtained very
good marks in the qualifying examination, they had not been able to secure admission to the college because the marks
awarded to them at the viva voce examination were very low and candidates who had much less marks at the qualifying
examination, had succeeded in obtaining very high marks at the viva voce examination and thereby managed to secure
admission in preference to the petitioners.

Petitioners filed writ petition challenging the validity of the admissions made to the college contending that the society adopted
an arbitrary procedure for selecting candidates for admission to the college, which resulted in denial of equality to the
petitioners in the matter of admission and was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Respondent contended that the
impugned college was run by society which was not a corporation created by a statute but was a society registered under 1898
Act and it was therefore not an ‘authority’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and no writ petition could be
maintained against it.

Also Read  Independent Thought v. Union of India

Issues

The main issue in the case was: Whether or not a society registered under the Societies Registration Act was an ‘authority’
falling within definition of ‘State’ in Article 12 of the Constitution and procedure adopted by society for selecting candidates for
admission to the college was arbitrary.

Summary of court decision and judgment

The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that with regard to the Memorandum of Association and the Rules of the Society, the
respondent college was a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. The composition of the Society was
dominated by the representatives appointed by the Central Government and the Governments of Jammu & Kashmir, Punjab,
Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh with the approval of the Central Government. The money required for running the college were
provided entirely by the Central Government and the Government of Jammu & Kashmir and even if any other money was to be
received by the Society, it could be done only with the approval of the State and the Central Governments. The Rules to be
made by the Society were also required to have the prior approval of the State and the Central Governments. The State
Government and by reason of the provision for approval, the Central Government also, had full control of the working of the
Society. Hence, the Society was an instrumentality or agency of the State and the Central Governments and it was an
‘authority’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution.Analysis

6. OM kumar vs union of india 2000

7.
8.  Internet and Mobile Association of India v Reserve Bank of India 2020
9. Chiranjit kal chowdhuri, vs union of india 1950Facts

This is an application presented by one Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri under Article 32 of Constitution of India. The petitioner is a shareholder in
Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company limited (Company) having a registered office in the State of Bombay and governed by the
provisions of Indian Companies Act. The petitioner is the holder of three ordinary shares and eight preference shares which is pledged in the
name of Bank of Baroda. Whereas the company has the authorised capital of 48 lakhs and paid up share capital of 32 lakhs. The petition is
filed for the issue of writ of mandamus and declares the Act and Ordinance as ultravires.

The mills were closed in August 1949 and the government through the ordinance mentioned the how the mills were closed due to the
improper management and the need to produce the essential commodity and the unemployment created due to the closure. § 3 of the
ordinance gives power the government to appoint any number of members as the directors of the company and with respect to § 4 of the
Ordinance deems that the existing company members and managing directors will be deemed to be terminated from the posts and the
agreement with the company among these members. § 5 of the Ordinance gives powers to the members including the powers to modify or
even terminate the agreements. § 12 of the Ordinance says that in case of premature termination of the members, compensation is not
allowed. The Ordinance was repealed by the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company (Emergency Provisions) Act in April, 1950 (herein
called the Act). The provisions were recreated and validated the actions taken under the Ordinance.

Procedural history

The case was filed differently as a writ petition under Article 32 of Constitution of India which invokes the Original Civil Jurisdiction of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court.

Issues 

Whether the petition is maintainable?

Whether the impugned legislation amounts to acquisition or taking possession of private property within the meaning of the Article 31 of the
Constitution of India?

Whether the Act is in contravention with Article 14, 19(1)(f) and 31 of Constitution of India?

Whether the property belongs to shareholders or company?

Whether the shareholder be allowed to file a petition for infringement of company’s rights?
Arguments

Contention of the Petitioner:

 The pith and substance of the Act is to possess and control the mills of the companies which are valuable assets of the
company, which is beyond the powers of the legislature.

 The government having the control and possession of the property of the company, results in deprivation of the property
of the Company and the shareholders which is against Article 31 of the Constitution of India.

 Moreover the restrictions in holding the shares by the shareholders result in unjustifiable interference and violates Article
19(1)(f) of the Constitution of India.

 There is no public purpose which invalidates the possession of the personal property and thus it is in violation of Article
31(2) of the constitution of India.

 The enactment denies equality before law and equal protection of the laws and thus it is against Article 14 of the
Constitution of India.

 The legislation is passed without any legislative competence and is not covered by any of the legislative lists under Seventh
Schedule.

 The property is given to the government which leads to dispossession of the property as now the agents are working not
for the principal but to the exterior authority.

 The impugned Act affects only one company and its management of affairs and does not apply generally to all companies,
shareholders and their affairs. Thus, it is violative of Article 14 of Constitution.

Contention of the Respondent:

 The property was not dispossessed by the company or shareholders and thus it will not attract Article 31 of the
Constitution of India. Here the directors act as the agents of the company whose beneficial interest in the valuable assets
are not touched or disposed. It is accepted that the management is controlled by the directors appointed by the state but
it does not lead to dispossession of the property.

 The word property in Article 31 connotes full property and thus it is a combination of all the rights linked with the
property. (Totality of rights)

 The power described under Article 31(1) is different from the power that was granted under Article 31(2).

Judgment:

Ratio Decidendi

 Under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution, anyone can approach the Hon’ble Supreme Court if their fundamental rights
are violated and the Court is having the power to issue any orders or directions or writs or decisions in the nature of
prerogative writs in the English nature.

 The fundamental rights are not only pertained to natural persons but even the incorporated company can approach the
court for enforcement of the fundamental rights. Similarly the shareholders are allowed to approach the court when their
fundamental rights are affected but it does not authorize the shareholders to plead for the fundamental rights of the
company. The shareholder can do so only to the extent where their rights are personally affected. The company holds a
distinctive identity from that of the shareholders and the only exception being habeas corpus where the individual can
approach the court for illegal detention of other individual.

 To make a case maintainable under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner must show that the legislature
not only lacks the legislative competence but it violates the rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution of India.
  The court allowed the petition as the application cannot be denied only on the ground that the writ made was improper,
as the mandamus was asked along with the prayer to declare the Act and the Ordinance as invalid.

 Doctrine of Eminent Domain is applied here, where the State/ Sovereign is having the power to take possession of the
property and use it for the public purpose is allowed without the permission of the owner even against the wish of the
owner.

 For the possession of the private property only two conditions are considered, property to be used for public use and the
payment of the compensation to the owner.

 The acquisition is the complete takeover of the property where the owner has no interest but in case of possession, only
the possession is with the other party whereas the owner has the right/ interest over the property. The acquisition and
possession are differentiated in Article 31 itself, but for the purpose of payment of compensation by the state, both the
terms are placed in same footing.

 The rights of the shareholders are not thrown away but are in abeyance like the voting in elections of the directors,
passing resolutions and participating in the winding up of the company. The rights can still be exercised with the sanction
of the Central Government even in the presence of the statutory directors or members of the company and thus the
property and their rights are not dispossessed.

 The reliance to the police powers was not entertained as the “police powers” under American law is of wide connotation.
The contention regarding Clause 1 of Article 31 of the constitution is irrelevant to the present case.

 There is no restriction on the part of the petitioner to buy, acquire or dispose of his property and hence there is no
violation of Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution of India. The petitioner “holds” the property which connotes that the party
is allowed to enjoy the benefits of owning the property and it is also affirmed that there is no dispossession or deprivation
of the property.

 Even though for arguments sake if we say that it violates the fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(f), the efforts of the
State fall within the reasonable restrictions under Article 19(5). The impugned Act is enacted for the production of an
important commodity in the society and to alleviate the unemployment caused by the closure of the mills of the company
and these measures are taken in the interests of general public.

 Equal protection of laws does not mean that identically the same rules of law should be made applicable to all persons
within the territory of India in spite of differences of circumstances and conditions. There should be no discrimination
between one person and another if as regards the subject-matter of the legislation their position is the same.

 The laws can apply to single person, family or body corporate if it is not discriminatory in nature and the laws cannot be
held discriminatory for its narrow application.

 No evidence was provided by the petitioner that the companies of same nature have been missed out by the legislature
and it is not submitted that the classification is made on arbitrary or unreasonable grounds. The judiciary will favour the
constitutionality of the legislations and it is up to the person accusing the legislation has to prove that the provisions are
unconstitutional. Thus the petitioner has failed to satisfy the essential burden of proof placed on him.

 The union government is having the power to make such an act under List 43 of the Central list “incorporation, regulation
and winding up of trading corporations” and here the closing of the mills of company falls within the ambit of this entry
10.

11. Anuradha Bhasin v/s Union of India

12. Shrilekha Vidyarthi Etc. ... vs State Of U.P

13. ak gopalan vs state of madras
14. Chintaman Rao vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh