Contents

Notes on Contributors

Preface to Fifth Edition

Guided Tour

Accompanying Online Resources for Instructors and Students

Chapter 1: Introducing Social Psychology

Introduction: Some Classic Studies
What Is Social Psychology?
How Does Social Psychology Differ from Other Disciplines?
A Brief History of Social Psychology
Social Psychology in Europe
Social Psychology Today

Chapter 2: Research Methods in Social Psychology

Introduction
Research Strategies
A Closer Look at Experimentation in Social Psychology
Data Collection Techniques

Chapter 3: Social Perception and Attribution

Introduction
Social Perception
Attribution Theory
Social Perception and Social Reality
Automatic and Controlled Social Perception

Chapter 4: Social Cognition

Introduction
Jumping to Conclusions or Working Things Out Slowly
The Automatic Pilot Within
 Going the Extra Mile: Regaining Cognitive Control

Chapter 5: The Self

The Self and Its Social Nature
Where Self-Knowledge Comes From
The Organizational Function of the Self: The Self As Mental
Representation
The Motivational Functions of the Self
The Regulatory Functions of the Self: The Self in Control
Self Stability and Change

Chapter 6: Attitudes
Introduction
What Is an Attitude?
The Content of Attitudes
The Structure of Attitudes
Why Do We Hold Attitudes?
Linking Attitude Content, Structure and Function
The Measurement of Attitudes
Do Attitudes Predict Behaviour?

Chapter 7: Strategies of Attitude and Behaviour Change

Introduction
Persuasion
Incentive-Induced Attitude Change

Chapter 8: Social Influence

Introduction
Incidental Social Influence
Why Does Social Influence Occur?
Deliberate Social Influence

Chapter 9: Aggression
Introduction
 Definition and Measurement of Aggressive Behaviour
Theories of Aggression
Personal and Situational Variables Affecting Aggressive Behaviour
Aggression As a Social Problem
Psychological Prevention and Intervention

Chapter 10: Prosocial Behaviour

Introduction
Prosocial Behaviour, Helping and Altruism
Why Don’t People Help?
Why Do People Help?
Issues in Researching Prosocial Behaviour
Does Evolution Make Us Selfish?
The Social Neuroscience of Helping
Helping in the Real World

Chapter 11: Affiliation, Attraction and Close Relationships

Introduction
The Importance of Relationships
Interpersonal Attraction
Romantic Relationships
General Relationship Processes

Chapter 12: Group Dynamics

Introduction
The Phenomenology of Groups
Individuals in Groups: The Individual Level of Analysis
Group Development and Structure: The Group Level of Analysis
Groups in Their Environment: The Intergroup Level of Analysis

Chapter 13: Group Performance and Leadership

Introduction
Some Core Concepts: Actual Group Performance, Group Potential and
Task Type
 Process Losses Versus Process Gains in Group Performance
Group Performance Management
Leadership
Leadership in Groups

Chapter 14: Prejudice and Intergroup Relations

Introduction
Personality Approaches to Prejudice
The Cognitive Approach to Prejudice
Group Approaches to Prejudice
Psychological Interventions to Reduce Prejudice and Improve Intergroup
Relations

Chapter 15: Cultural Social Psychology

Introduction
Culture and Cultural Differences
Culture and Cognition
Culture and Self-Construal
Interpersonal Relations
Group Processes
Intergroup Relations
Intercultural Relations

References

Glossary

Name Index

Subject Index

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data An introduction to social
psychology / Miles Hewstone, Wolfgang Stroebe, Klaus Jonas. – Fifth edition.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-4443-3544-6 (pbk.)
1. Social psychology. 2. Social psychology–Europe. I. Hewstone, Miles. II.
Stroebe, Wolfgang. III. Jonas, Klaus.
HM1033.I59 2012
302–dc23

2012000110
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
Set in 11/12.5pt Dante MT by MPS Limited, Chennai, India Printed in Great
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Senior Commissioning Editor: Andrew McAleer
Assistant Editor: Katharine Earwaker
Marketing Managers: Fran Hunt and Jo Underwood Project Editor: Juliet Booker
 To
The memory of Audrey Cole Hewstone (1929–2010)
Lisa Stroebe
Jessie and Julie Jonas
 Notes on Contributors Felix C. Brodbeck is Chair of Organizational and
Economic Psychology at Ludwig-Maximilians University, Munich, Germany.
His main research interests are leadership, group performance, collective
information processing, economic decision making, diversity and cross-cultural
psychology. He has edited or authored several books, including Culture and
Leadership Across the World, and numerous research papers.
Catrin Finkenauer is Associate Professor at Clinical Child and Family
Studies, VU University Amsterdam, The Netherlands. She is currently associate
editor of Social Psychological and Personality Science. Her research on
interpersonal relationships includes basic research on relationship processes (e.g.
trust, understanding) and applied research on interventions targeting children
who have been witness to or a target of domestic violence and abuse.
Geoffrey Haddock is a Professor of Social Psychology at Cardiff University,
UK. He has published widely on the topics of attitudes and social cognition. His
current research focuses on affective and cognitive processes of evaluation.
Miles Hewstone is Professor of Social Psychology and Fellow of New
College, Oxford University, UK. His main research topic is intergroup relations
and the reduction of intergroup conflict, especially via intergroup contact, and he
has edited or authored many books. He is founding co-editor (with Wolfgang
Stroebe) of the European Review of Social Psychology, and has received
numerous awards for his research.
Klaus Jonas has taught social and organizational psychology at universities in
Germany, Austria and Switzerland. He is Professor of Social and Business
Psychology at the University of Zurich, Switzerland. He has published on
attitudes, stereotypes and human resource management. His current interests
concern the influence of leadership on performance and satisfaction of
subordinates.
Johan C. Karremans is Associate Professor at the Behavioural Science
Institute (BSI) at the Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands. His
research mainly focuses on the processes that benefit or harm interpersonal
relationships, especially in the face of relationship threat (e.g. conflict, attractive
alternatives).
Sander L. Koole is Associate Professor of Social Psychology at the VU
University, Amsterdam. His main research topics are self-regulation and
emotion regulation. He co-edited the Handbook of experimental existential
psychology, which focuses on a new area of psychology that uses experimental
methods to investigate how people are dealing with important life issues.
Barbara Krahé is Professor of Social Psychology at the University of
Potsdam, Germany. Her research focuses on aggression and social cognition
applied to legal decision-making. She is a member of the International Society
for Research on Aggression and associate editor of its journal, Aggressive
Behavior.
Mark Levine is a Professor of Social Psychology at the University of Exeter,
UK. His research focuses on the role of social identity in prosocial and anti-
social behaviour. His recent work has examined the role of group processes in
the regulation of perpetrator, victim and bystander behaviour during aggressive
and violent events.
Andrew G. Livingstone is a Lecturer in Social Psychology at the University
of Stirling, UK, having previously held positions at Cardiff University. His
research focuses on social identity, emotion, and intergroup relations.
Gregory R. Maio is a Professor of Social Psychology at Cardiff University,
UK. He has published widely on the topics of attitudes and social cognition. His
current research focuses on the mental structure of social values.
Rachel Manning is a Senior Lecturer in Psychology at Anglia Ruskin
University, UK. Her research interests include prosocial behaviours such as
intervention in emergencies, charitable giving and volunteering.
Antony S. R. Manstead is Professor of Psychology at Cardiff University, UK,
having previously held positions at the Universities of Sussex, Manchester,
Amsterdam and Cambridge. He has been Editor or Associate Editor of several
journals, the most recent case being Psychological Science. His research focuses
on emotion, attitudes, and social identity.
Robin Martin is Professor of Social and Organizational Psychology at Aston
Business School, Aston University, Birmingham, UK. He has served on the
faculties of the Universities of Sheffield, Swansea, Cardiff and Queensland
(Brisbane, Australia). He conducts research in the area of social influence
processes (especially majority and minority influence), workplace leadership,
innovation and team working.
Carolyn C. Morf is Professor of Personality Psychology at the University of
Bern, Switzerland. Her research focuses on understanding self-regulatory
processes through which individuals construct and maintain their desired self-
views. She has published numerous chapters and articles on the self, self-
regulatory processes, and their expression in personality (in particular
narcissism). Her edited books include the Handbook of Methods in Social
Psychology (Sage, 2004).
Bernard A. Nijstad is Professor of Decision Making and Organizational
Behavior at the University of Groningen, The Netherlands. His main research
interests are individual and group creativity and individual and group decision-
making.
Brian Parkinson lectures at Oxford University, UK. His research focuses on
the interpersonal causes, effects and functions of emotion. His books include
Ideas and Realities of Emotion (1995) and (with Fischer and Manstead) Emotion
in Social Relations (2005). He was editor of the British Journal of Social
Psychology from 2004 to 2009 and is currently associate editor of IEEE
Transactions in Affective Computing.
Louise Pendry is Senior Lecturer in Psychology at Exeter University, UK.
She has published articles on stereotyping and social cognition. More recently,
her research focuses on some applications of social cognition and stereotype
activation/use (e.g. within the field of diversity training).
Stefan Schulz-Hardt is Professor of Industrial, Economic and Social
Psychology at Georg-August-University Göttingen, Germany. He has published
on group decision-making, escalation of commitment, stress in the workplace,
and other topics. He is currently Associate Editor of the Journal of Economic
Psychology.
Peter B. Smith is Emeritus Professor of Social Psychology at the University
of Sussex, UK. His research has mostly been concerned with cross-cultural
aspects of formal and informal influence processes, and with cross-cultural
communication. He is author (with Bond and Kagitcibasi) of Understanding
Social Psychology across Cultures, and a former editor of the Journal of Cross-
Cultural Psychology.
Russell Spears is Professor of Psychology at the University of Groningen,
The Netherlands. His main research interests are in social identity processes with
particular focus on the group emotions that play a role in intergroup relations. He
has edited the British Journal of Social Psychology and (with Anne Maass) the
European Journal of Social Psychology.
Wolfgang Stroebe has taught social psychology at universities in Great
Britain, Germany and the US. He now holds professorial positions at both
Utrecht University and the University of Groningen in The Netherlands. He has
authored many books, chapters and articles in scientific journals on social and
health psychology and is co-editor (with Miles Hewstone) of the European
Review of Social Psychology.
Nicole Tausch obtained her D.Phil at the University of Oxford in 2006. She is
currently lecturer in social psychology at the University of St Andrews, UK. Her
research interests lie broadly in the areas of social identity, intergroup relations,
prejudice, and collective action. She is a recipient of the British Psychological
Society’s Award for Outstanding Doctoral Research Contributions to
Psychology.
Daan van Knippenberg is Professor of Organizational Behavior at the
Rotterdam School of Management, Rotterdam, The Netherlands. His current
research focuses on leadership, diversity, team performance, and creativity.
Daan is Founding Editor of Organizational Psychology Review and an associate
editor of Journal of Organizational Behavior. He is a Fellow of the Society for
Industrial and Organizational Psychology, and of the American Psychological
Association.
Preface to Fifth Edition
This is the fifth, and completely revised, edition of this bestselling textbook,
designed to teach social psychology to an audience of students at universities
throughout Europe and many other parts of the world. When, in 1986, we set out
with the aim of publishing such a book, we certainly did not imagine that we
would be publishing this fifth edition more than a quarter of a century later. This,
and the fact that our book has been translated into nearly a dozen foreign
languages (ranging from Croatian to Japanese), confirmed the success of our
original concept, to have each chapter written by an internationally renowned
scholar with great expertise on this particular topic, while making certain of the
integration of these chapters through tight editorial control.
Notwithstanding the success of previous editions, we have not stood still. This
new volume represents a most thorough revision, both in terms of who the
authors are and what material is covered. Only 10 of the 15 chapters are by the
same authors as in the last edition, and even these chapters have been
extensively revised to integrate new theoretical and empirical developments. The
volume contains chapters dealing with all the core topics one would expect to
find in an introduction to social psychology (methods, social perception and
attribution, social cognition, self and social identity, attitudes, social influence,
aggression, prosocial behaviour, relationships, group processes and intergroup
relations). We have also added an important new chapter on cultural social
psychology, showing that social psychology is a global science, but also
acknowledging the fact that replications of social psychological studies in other
parts of the world often result in somewhat different findings. Drawing on
studies that have been discussed in many of the earlier chapters in this book, this
new chapter shows that cultural variations can benefit social psychologists rather
than handicap them. By identifying the social behaviours that are particularly
salient in different parts of the world, we can take account of causal factors that
have been given insufficient attention within mainstream social psychology. We
can also test which social psychological phenomena are universal and which
occur only in some parts of the world.
There are many didactic improvements and pedagogical aids in this new
edition. Each chapter focuses on the central theories, concepts, paradigms,
results and conclusions. In terms of structure, each chapter contains the
following specific features, designed to improve learning and enhance the
enjoyment of the task:
A short ‘route map’ written in clear English, providing an overview of the
chapter.
A list of key concepts, consisting of the main terms which a student should
know about each topic area. The definitions of each key concept are
provided in the text of each chapter, and gathered together in an
alphabetical glossary at the end of the book.
The body of the text in each chapter is broken down into clear sections, and
the reader is guided by subheadings throughout the chapter, to prevent long,
uninterrupted passages of text. Text is also broken up by figures, tables and
occasional photographs, and key theories are depicted in ‘theory boxes’ to
aid understanding of more complex processes.
Each main section or subsection of the chapter begins with ‘learning
questions’; these are the major questions that the student should be able to
answer having read the chapter.
Each major section of the chapter ends with a summary, and each chapter
ends with a summary and conclusions in the form of bullet points.
A list of further reading is suggested, with a sentence indicating what the
student will find in each source.
Each chapter includes brief biographies of ‘leaders in the field’, both classic
and contemporary scholars from across the globe who have had a major
impact on the research area covered in each chapter.
Each chapter contains boxed features of three different types:
Research close-up Brief summaries of classic and contemporary
research studies, explaining clearly why and how the research was
done, what it found and what its implications are.
Individual differences Illustrative items from scales used to measure
variables discussed in the text.
Social psychology beyond the lab Descriptions of some ‘real life
application’ of theory and research described in the chapter.
Features designed to aid learning and help both instructors and students do not
end with the material inside the book. Extensive online resources are also
provided on the web (www.wiley.com/college/hewstone), including a bank of
over 1500 self-study and instructor test-bank questions, links to other useful
websites, and PowerPoint presentations and flashcards.
As always when we come to the end of an edition, we are grateful that we are
such poor predictors of how much work is involved. Had we known this at the
outset, we might not have agreed so willingly to undertake a major new edition.
As always in such a major enterprise, there are many others to whom we owe
thanks. First and foremost, we thank our authors for their excellent manuscripts
and their willingness to go through repeated revisions in response to our editorial
feedback. We would also like to thank Juliet Booker for her superb work in this
endeavour, and both Zora Schnarwyler and Christian Bucher for their diligence
in checking the references in the list compiled at the back of the book, Steve
Rickaby for his careful work copy-editing this large volume, and Joanna Tester
for her apparently inexhaustible supplies of both attention to detail and patience
in dealing with editors and authors; last but not least, we thank Rachel New for
patiently implementing endless pedantic edits to the final version.

Miles Hewstone, Oxford Wolfgang Stroebe, Utrecht Klaus Jonas, Zürich

Guided Tour
 CHAPTER HIGHLIGHTS
Key Terms are listed on each chapter opening page, highlighting the main topic areas for
students.

Chapter Outline reflects the coverage of each chapter, by main and subsection headings.

A short outline of each chapter, written in clear English, is presented in the Route Map of the
Chapter.
 ENHANCED LEARNING TOOLS
Each main section or subsection starts with a ‘learning question’ (rendered purple in the
printed book), major questions that the student should be able to answer upon completion of
the chapter.
Each main section ends with a Summary to aid memorizing key segments of the content as
students progress through the chapter.
Key Terms listed at the beginning of the chapter are emboldened at the first point of use in the
current chapter and appear with their definition at the first main point of discussion in the
book. All Key Terms and definitions are collated and arranged alphabetically in the Glossary
at the back of the book.
The main chapter text is punctuated by diagrams, graphs, tables and occasional
photographs, all present to improve the reading and learning experience.
Key theories are made accessible in the text by way of Theory Box features to aid the
understanding of more complex processes.

Brief biographies of Leaders in the Field are included, representing both classic and
contemporary scholars from around the world, specific to the research area covered in each
chapter.
Research Close-Ups provide brief summaries of pertinent research studies, both classic and
contemporary, as an aid to explain why and how research was carried out and what the results
implied.
Individual Differences are illustrative items from scales used to measure variables discussed
in the text.
Social Psychology Beyond the Lab are feature boxes that describe various ‘real-life
applications’ of theory and research applicable to the content of the current chapter.
 END-OF-CHAPTER RESOURCES
A list of key learning points are presented in the Chapter Summary to help students
consolidate their knowledge and understanding of the chapter’s content.

Each chapter ends with a list of Suggestions for Further Reading indicating key material
found in each resource.
Accompanying Online Resources for Instructors and Students
 BOOK COMPANION SITE FOR
INSTRUCTORS

The Book Companion Site contains an extensive support package for instructors
and can be found at www.wiley.com/college/hewstone.
On the website instructors will find:
Test bank with over 1000 questions, including true/false, multiple choice
and essay questions.
Computerized test bank allowing instructors to create and print multiple
versions of the test bank, as well as allowing users to customize exams by
altering or adding new questions.
PowerPoint presentations containing a combination of key concepts,
examples, and figures and tables from the book.
Flashcards showing key terms and definitions from the glossary.
Links to the BBC Radio 4 ‘Mind Changers’ series with contributions from
the editors.
 BOOK COMPANION SITE FOR
STUDENTS

The Introduction to Social Psychology student website provides students with

support material that will help develop their conceptual understanding of the
material. The student website contains:
Over 500 Self-Study Quizzes including true/false, multiple choice and ‘fill
in the blank’ questions to aid students’ learning and self-study.
Links to relevant journal articles that are referenced in the text to encourage
further reading and critical analysis of the material.
Flashcards showing key terms and definitions from the glossary.
Links to the BBC Radio 4 ‘Mind Changers’ series with contributions from
the editors.
 Chapter 1

Introducing Social Psychology

Wolfgang Stroebe, Miles Hewstone and Klaus Jonas

Source: © Action Plus. Used under licence from Getty Images.

KEY TERMS

attribution theories
authoritarian personality
autokinetic effect
balance theory
Bennington study
consistency theories
covariation theory
crisis in social psychology
demand characteristics
European Association of Social Psychology
experiment
experimenter expectancy effects
 field experiment
field theory
laboratory experiment
methodological individualism
minimal group paradigm
priming
realistic conflict theory
rebound effect
scapegoat theory
social facilitation
social loafing
CHAPTER OUTLINE
INTRODUCTION: SOME CLASSIC STUDIES
How do social psychologists go about addressing research questions?
WHAT IS SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY?
How do social psychologists define their discipline?
HOW DOES SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY DIFFER FROM OTHER
DISCIPLINES?
What differentiates social psychology from related disciplines such as
personality psychology and sociology?
A BRIEF HISTORY OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
The beginning
The early years
The years of expansion
The crisis years
Overcoming the crisis
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN EUROPE
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY TODAY

ROUTE MAP OF THE CHAPTER

Most textbooks introduce social psychology with examples of everyday
experiences of social behaviour or even with a formal definition. We
thought that a better way of familiarizing you with our discipline was to
present some examples of classic studies. These should give you an
impression of the research questions social psychologists address and of the
methods they use to tackle these questions. Only then do we present a
methods they use to tackle these questions. Only then do we present a
formal definition of social psychology and discuss the differences between
social psychology and related areas. The second part of the chapter is
devoted to the history of social psychology, which we trace from its starting
years around 1900 until today. As our American colleagues like to point out,
much of this history took place in the US. However, as we Europeans like to
point out, this development was strongly influenced by European
researchers, even before the establishment of social psychology in Europe
during the last four decades.
 INTRODUCTION: SOME CLASSIC
STUDIES
How do social psychologists go about addressing
research questions?
In 1954, Muzafer Sherif (see the Leader in the Field, Muzafer Sherif, in Chapter
14), who was then professor of social psychology at the University of Oklahoma
(US), conducted one of a series of classic studies with 11–12 year-old boys, who
had been sent to a remote summer camp at Robbers Cave State Park, Oklahoma.
None of the boys knew each other before the study. They were divided into two
groups, who stayed in cabins far apart from each other and did not know of each
other’s existence. For one week, each of the groups enjoyed the typical summer
camp life, engaging in fun activities like camping out, transporting canoes over
rough terrain to the water and playing various games. They had a great time. It is
therefore not surprising that at the end of the week, group members had grown
very fond of one another and the groups had developed strong group identities.
Each chose a name for itself (the ‘Rattlers’ and the ‘Eagles’), which they proudly
displayed on shirts and flags.
At the end of the week, each of the groups was told that there was another
group in the vicinity. As though acceding to the boys’ requests, the staff
arranged tournaments of games (e.g. touch football, baseball, tug of war)
between the groups. The winning team would receive a cup, and members of the
winning team would each be given a new penknife. The tournament started in
the spirit of good sportsmanship, but as it progressed, hostilities between the
groups began to develop. ‘Soon members of each group began to call their rivals
“stinkers”, “sneaks” and “cheats” . . . Near the end of this stage, the members of
each group found the other group and its members so distasteful that they
expressed strong preferences to have no further contact with them at all’ (Sherif,
1967, p. 82).
What was the point of all of this? What can tales about boys in a summer camp
tell us about real life? The answer is a great deal. These Robber’s cave studies
actually mark a turning point in the study of prejudice (i.e. dislike for members
of an outgroup), because they challenged the then dominant view of prejudice as
either an outflow of a prejudiced personality disposition (authoritarian
personality; see Chapter 14) or as the result of displaced frustration (scapegoat
theory). There was no indication that these boys had prejudiced personalities or
needed scapegoats to displace their aggression. And yet, they developed strong
dislikes for the members of the other group (the ‘stinkers’ and ‘sneaks’), because
they were competing with them for some valued good which only one of the two
groups could attain. Sherif interpreted these findings as support for his realistic
conflict theory, which assumed that intergroup hostility and intergroup
prejudice are usually the result of a conflict of interest between groups over
valued commodities or opportunities. Goals were the central concept in Sherif’s
theory: he argued that when two groups were competing for the same goal,
which only one could achieve, there would be intergroup hostility.

- - - - - - - - - -

scapegoat theory the theory that prejudice is due to aggression displaced towards members of an
outgroup (scapegoats), because the group (or circumstances) that was the source of frustration is
not within reach.

- - - - - - - - - -

- - - - - - - - - -

realistic conflict theory a theory developed by Sherif that holds that conflict and competition
between groups over valued resources can create intergroup hostility and prejudice.

- - - - - - - - - -

Not surprising, you might say. After all, this is the reason why football
supporters beat each other up every so often before and after games between
their clubs. And yet, this is not the full story. Nearly two decades later, Henri
Tajfel (see Leader in the Field, Henri Tajfel, in Chapter 14), then professor of
social psychology at Bristol University (UK), and colleagues conducted a series
of studies that called into question the assumption that competitive goals are a
necessary condition for the development of intergroup hostility (Tajfel, Billig,
Bundy, & Flament, 1971). Participants in these studies were 14-to 15-year-old
schoolboys, who all knew each other well and came to the psychology
laboratory in groups of eight to participate in an experiment (see Chapter 2) on
visual perception. Their task was to estimate the number of dots that were
flashed onto a screen. After completion of this task, they were told that they
would also participate in a second experiment and, for the ease of coding, would
be divided on the basis of the dot estimates they had just made. Half the boys
were then (randomly) assigned to the ‘under-estimators’ group, the other half to
the ‘over-estimators’ group. (In later studies, boys were often divided on the
basis of their alleged preference for paintings by Klee or Kandinsky, an equally
irrelevant criterion for boys of that age.) The boys then had to assign rewards to
other individuals in real money. They did not know the identity of the other
individuals, but only their code numbers and their group membership.
This experimental procedure became known as minimal group paradigm.
These groups were minimal, because they were created using arbitrary criteria,
involved no interaction between members of the two groups, and group members
had no knowledge of who belonged to the group. And yet Tajfel could show that
members of these groups displayed intergroup discrimination. When asked to
divide money between a member of their own group and a member of the other
group, most boys gave consistently more money to members of their own group
than to members of the other group (see Chapter 14). These studies were again
quite innovative, because they showed that intergroup conflict was not an
essential cause of intergroup discrimination (or at least ingroup favouritism).
Apparently, the mere fact of division into groups was sufficient to trigger
discriminatory behaviour.

- - - - - - - - - -

minimal group paradigm a set of experimental procedures designed to create groups based on
essentially arbitrary criteria (with no interaction within or between them, and with no knowledge of
who else belongs to each group) whose members show intergroup discrimination.

- - - - - - - - - -

You might now believe that you have some idea of what social psychology is
all about and how social psychologists conduct their research. You might also
think that the approach of Sherif was more in line with what you had expected,
but that the studies by Tajfel, despite their artificiality, led to some interesting
results. However, you will be somewhat premature in your confidence. A clearer
and more appropriate picture of the field of social psychology will emerge after
considering some additional studies, described below.
In 1994, Neil Macrae (then at Cardiff University) and colleagues studied
people’s ability to suppress their prejudicial thoughts (Macrae, Bodenhausen,
Milne, & Jetten, 1994). After all, there is a great deal of evidence that people
acquire their prejudices quite early and may not be able to get rid of them later in
life, even if these prejudicial thoughts have become inconsistent with their
egalitarian values (Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). Thus, if people cannot
forget their prejudicial thoughts, it would be good if, at least, they could inhibit
them and prevent them from affecting their actions. As the studies by Macrae et
al. (1994; see Chapter 4) show, this may be more difficult than one would think.
Participants in these studies were students. When they arrived at the
laboratory, they were told that they were to participate in an investigation of
people’s ability to construct life event details from visual information. They
were then presented with a colour photograph of a skinhead and were asked to
write a short essay about a typical day in the life of a skinhead (Figure 1.1).
Skinheads were chosen here not only because there is widespread prejudice
against them, but also because, unlike prejudice towards other minority groups,
expressing prejudice towards skinheads is not (yet) politically incorrect. Half of
the participants were asked to suppress their prejudice against skinheads in
writing this essay. They were told to try to write their essay without being
influenced by their stereotypes about skinheads – that is, the beliefs they might
have about the characteristics of skinheads in general. The other half (i.e. the
control group) were not given this instruction.
FIGURE 1.1 How easy is it for people to suppress their prejudice towards
skinheads?
Source: © BROOKS WALKER. Used under licence from Getty Images.
 After the participants had finished the first essay, they were given a photo of
another skinhead and asked to write another essay. This time, however, they
were not given any instructions about suppressing stereotypes. Both essays were
then rated by independent raters, who did not know whether a given essay had
been written by a participant from either the experimental or the control group
and who evaluated the extent to which writers expressed stereotypes about
skinheads. With regard to the first essay, results were not very surprising. As one
would expect of ‘good’ (i.e. obedient) participants, individuals who had been
instructed to suppress their stereotypes in their first essay did so quite
successfully. Their essays were much less stereotypic than the essays of the
control group. However, the analysis of their second essays provided a striking
finding: there was a rebound effect (see Chapter 4). The second essay of these
‘suppressors’ was more stereotypic than that of the control group. Thus, when
people no longer tried to suppress their stereotypes, they showed a higher level
of stereotypical thinking than if they had never tried to suppress their thoughts in
the first place.
Although these are fascinating results, Macrae and his colleagues were not
satisfied with merely showing a rebound effect of stereotype suppression on
thinking (see Chapter 4): they also wanted to know whether attempts to suppress
one’s stereotype would affect people’s behaviour. They therefore conducted a
second study. The first part of this study was identical to that of their first
experiment. However, after having written an essay under either stereotype
suppression or no-suppression instructions, participants were told that they
would now go next door to meet the person depicted in the photograph (i.e. the
skinhead). When they entered the room next door, there was a row of chairs
standing next to each other, but no skinhead. However, on the first chair there
was a denim jacket and bag. The experimenter told the participant that the other
person must just have gone to the toilet and would return shortly and that the
participant should sit down on one of the chairs in the meantime. The measure of
interest in this case was the seating position, that is, how far the participant
would choose to sit away from the skinhead he or she was supposed to meet. We
would all acknowledge that the distance we keep from someone is an indication
of our liking for that person (Macrae et al., 1994). And in line with the findings
of the previous study, participants who had (successfully) suppressed their
stereotype on writing the essay now chose a chair that was significantly further
away from the skinhead than did individuals in the control group. Thus, the
rebound effect of stereotype suppression affected not only thoughts, but also
behaviour (but for some constraints on the general effect, see Monteith,
Sherman, & Devine, 1998).
As surprising as these findings were, the impact of stereotypes on behaviour
was still restricted to the way the individual behaved towards a member of the
group towards whom the stereotype was held. As we will see in the next
experiment, the impact of stereotypes can be even more pervasive. This study
was conducted by John Bargh (see Leader in the Field, John Bargh, in Chapter
4) and his colleagues (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996) at New York University
(US). In the first part of this experiment, participants had to complete a
‘scrambled sentence test’ in which they had to form sentences from scrambled
sets of words. For participants in the experimental group, these sentences
contained words that were part of the (American) stereotype of the elderly, such
as ‘Florida’, ‘Bingo’ and ‘grey’. This procedure is known as ‘priming’ (see
Chapter 4), because these words will bring the elderly stereotype to participants’
minds (i.e. make it more accessible), including characteristics of elderly people
that were not even mentioned in the priming procedure.
One such characteristic that is typically attributed to the elderly, but which was
not mentioned in the priming procedure, is that elderly people move rather
slowly. The researchers assumed that participants who were primed with the
stereotype of the elderly would also think of ‘moving slowly’ as another salient
characteristic of the elderly. It was further assumed that this thought would
affect the participants’ own behaviour. The researchers predicted that
participants primed with the elderly stereotype would move more slowly than
participants in the control condition who had been exposed to neutral primes.
The experimenters then measured the time it took participants to walk from the
experimental room to the nearest lift. In line with the hypothesis, participants
who were primed with the elderly stereotype took significantly longer to reach
the lift than did participants who had been primed with neutral words. It appears
that thinking of the concept ‘slow’ influenced behaviour, and that consciousness
did not play any part in this process, because participants were aware neither that
they had been primed nor that they had been led to walk more slowly (see
Research Close-Up 4.1 in Chapter 4).
We hope that reading about these studies has stimulated your interest in social
psychology. If it has, you can read more about the first two studies in Chapter 14
(Prejudice and Intergroup Relations). The last two studies are discussed in
Chapter 4 (Social Cognition). Given that the research we have discussed so far is
quite varied in its research questions, scope and methods, we now turn to a more
general discussion of the nature of social psychology.
 WHAT IS SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY?
How do social psychologists define their discipline?
When social psychologists are called upon to define their discipline, they usually
refer to the definition given by Gordon Allport (1954a) (see Leader in the Field,
Gordon Allport, in Chapter 14) in his classic chapter on the history of social
psychology, published in the second edition of the Handbook of Social
Psychology: ‘Social psychology is the attempt to understand and explain how
the thoughts, feelings, and behaviours of individuals are influenced by the actual,
imagined, or implied presence of other human beings’ (p. 5). With ‘imagined
presence’ Allport referred to the influence of reference persons (e.g. our parents)
whose expectations might influence our behaviour. With the ‘implied presence’
he acknowledged the fact that much of our behaviour is shaped by social roles
and cultural norms. This is quite a good definition, which can accommodate the
studies that we have described earlier.
One characteristic of social psychology, which Allport implied but did not
mention specifically, is the use of scientific methods. The scientific method of
choice used in the studies we have just described was the experiment. We will
discuss this method only briefly, because you will learn more about the
experimental method in the chapter on methods (Chapter 2). Experiments are a
method in which the researcher deliberately introduces some change into a
setting to examine the consequences of that change. The typical procedure used
in experiments is that conditions in which a change has been introduced (i.e. an
independent variable manipulated) are compared to conditions in which this has
not been the case, the so-called control group. By randomly assigning
participants to either experimental or control group, the researcher can be
reasonably certain that any difference between the two groups was due to the
manipulation of the independent variable.
Thus, Macrae and colleagues asked half their participants to suppress their
stereotype of skinheads, and compared their thoughts and behaviour to those of a
control group of individuals who had not been asked to suppress their stereotype.
Bargh and colleagues compared the walking speed of participants who had been
primed with the elderly stereotype with that of (control) participants who had not
been primed. The study by Sherif is somewhat deficient in this respect, because
he did not really have a proper control group. He compared the impact of the
introduction of intergroup competition on group members’ behaviour over time.
The control conditions in the Tajfel experiment are difficult to explain without a
more detailed description of the study. You may remember that Tajfel and
colleagues assessed how the boys would divide money between a member of
their own group and a member of the other group. As a control for ingroup bias,
they simply reversed the alleged group membership of the two individuals
between whom the money had to be divided.
Another methodological difference between the study by Sherif and those of
the other researchers is that Sherif’s study was a field experiment rather than a
laboratory experiment: he used a natural setting (summer camp) to test his
hypotheses. The other studies were all laboratory experiments which used
settings that were specially created by the experimenter. For example, Macrae
and colleagues led their participants to believe that they were in a study of
people’s ability to construct life event details from visual information. This is
also an example of a darker aspect of social psychology, namely, that we often
have to use deception to test our predictions. But if the participants in the study
by Macrae and colleagues (1994) had known the real purpose of the study, this
would have influenced their thoughts and behaviour and the results of such a
study would have been meaningless. (We therefore often disregard the data of
participants who guess the purpose of our experiments.) Field and laboratory
experiments are not the only scientific methods used by social psychologists to
test their hypotheses. You can read about other methods in Chapter 2 (Research
Methods in Social Psychology).

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field experiment a true randomized experiment conducted in a natural setting.

- - - - - - - - - -

- - - - - - - - - -

laboratory experiment a study, conducted in the laboratory, in which the researcher deliberately
introduces some change into a setting, while holding all other factors constant, to examine the
consequences of that change.

- - - - - - - - - -
 - - - - - - - - - -

Obviously, the use of scientific methods is not a characteristic that allows one
to distinguish social psychology from other social sciences, as by definition all
social sciences use methods they consider scientific, and for many of them,
experiments are the method of choice. A more distinctive characteristic
introduced by Allport is the fact that social psychology is concerned with social
influence, and that it studies the impact of others on individuals’ thoughts,
feelings and behaviours. All the studies we described earlier tried to understand
and explain how the thoughts, feelings and behaviours of their participants were
influenced by the presence of other human beings. In the case of the study by
Sherif, these human beings were mainly the members of the other group with
whom the boys competed, although the members of their own groups also
influenced the behaviour of these boys. In contrast to the Sherif study, where the
others were actually present, the presence of others was imagined rather than
real in the Tajfel study (recall that Allport’s careful definition allowed for the
impact of the imagined presence of others). Finally, in the studies by Macrae and
by Bargh and colleagues, it was not really the presence of others that influenced
participants’ thoughts or behaviour, but the suppression or activation of their
beliefs about other groups.
The studies by Macrae and Bargh are also good examples of an aspect of
social psychological research that is less clearly emphasized in Allport’s
definition, namely, the fact that we are interested not only in the impact others
have on our thoughts, feelings and behaviour, but also in the cognitive processes
by which our thoughts, emotions and goals guide our understanding of the world
around us and our actions. You can read more about this in Chapter 4 (Social
Cognition).
A final characteristic of social psychology emphasized in Allport’s definition
is that social psychologists study the impact that the implied or actual presence
of others has on the thoughts, feelings and behaviours of individuals. Thus, even
when we study social groups, we examine the impact groups have on the
individual group members. For example, in the classic study of conformity with
group majorities, Asch (1956) examined the impact of the majority opinion on
the judgements of individual participants (see Chapter 8). Similarly, Tajfel and
colleagues (1971) studied the impact of the mere categorization of others into
ingroup and outgroup on the way individuals distributed money between them.
This emphasis on the individual is actually a very important point which had
already been made by the elder brother of Gordon Allport, Floyd Allport, in his
classic textbook of social psychology: ‘There is no psychology of groups which
is not essentially and entirely a psychology of individuals. Social psychology
must not be placed in contradistinction to the psychology of the individual; it is a
part of the psychology of the individual, whose behaviour it studies in relation to
that sector of his environment comprised by his fellows’ (F. Allport, 1924, p. 4).
The emphasis on the individual does not deny the importance of the social
context as a determinant of individual behaviour, but it rejects the existence of a
group consciousness or a collective mind as separate from the minds of the
individuals who comprise the group.
 HOW DOES SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
DIFFER FROM OTHER DISCIPLINES?
What differentiates social psychology from related
disciplines such as personality psychology and
sociology?
In addition to using examples of studies as well as a definition to illuminate the
nature of social psychology, it might be helpful to contrast social psychological
research to that of research in related disciplines. As in the previous section, we
will use the example of an experimental study to clarify these differences. This
study was conducted at a small elite college in the United States and was
announced as an experiment on perception. The experimental sessions were held
in a small classroom and eight participants attended each of the sessions. The
participants, who were seated in two rows of four, were presented with sets of
four lines of different length, a standard line and three comparison lines. Their
task consisted of the comparison of the standard line with the three other lines,
one of which was equal to the standard line. The comparison lines were
numbered from 1 to 3, and the participants stated their judgements by calling out
one of the numbers (see Figure 1.2).
FIGURE 1.2 Example of the stimulus pattern used in the conformity studies of
Asch (1955).
Source: Original data from Asch (1955), Scientific American, 193, 31–35.
 Obviously, this was a simple experiment in visual discrimination in which the
experimenter probably wanted to find out how accurately participants could
differentiate between lines of different lengths and where the threshold lay at
which people would begin to make mistakes. However, there is one feature of
the experiment which does not fit with standard procedures in perception
experiments – namely that participants judged these lines in groups. This would
not have been a problem had the experimenter ensured that judgements were
written down, to exclude the possibility that participants would be aware of each
others’ judgements. But in the present experiment, participants were asked to
call out their judgements to the experimenter. This appears to be a serious
methodological fault. Any determination of a difference threshold based on such
data would be flawed, because participants might have been influenced by the
earlier judgements that they overheard. Let us assume that the first participant
calling out his judgements committed an error. The second participant, who
might normally have given a correct response, might now have become
uncertain and given the same erroneous response as the first participant. In this
way, an experiment on perception might, in fact, have become a study of social
influence.
Since we are concerned here with social psychology, it will not come as a
surprise that the experimenter, a professor of social psychology at Swarthmore
College, Pennsylvania, was not really interested in measuring perceptual
thresholds, but in the extent to which individuals would be influenced by a
discrepant majority judgement. In fact, only one of the eight participants in each
session was a ‘naïve’ participant; all the others were confederates of the
experimenter and were instructed to give unanimous but wrong judgements on
12 out of the 18 trials. These judgements were so easy that participants who
judged the stimuli in individual sessions made practically no incorrect
judgements. And yet, when participants were exposed to the incorrect
judgements of a unanimous majority, 36.8 per cent of their judgements were
incorrect (Asch, 1955).
With this experimental setting, Asch created a situation that is familiar to most
of us from everyday life. We have probably all had the experience of members
of our group disagreeing with us on some issue, then having to decide whether
we should go with the group or stick to our own position at the risk of becoming
disliked or of looking foolish. Naturally, we do not usually disagree about the
length of lines, but about some issue of greater importance, and often the
disagreeing majority is not unanimous. However, the setting that was developed
by Asch would allow us to manipulate all these variables, and most of them have
indeed been investigated in subsequent research (for a review, see Allen, 1966).
Our decision to stick to our guns or go with the group will depend very much on
how confident we are of the correctness of our own opinion, on how important a
correct decision is for us and for the group, and on how well we know the other
group members. We are probably also more willing to conform to a majority if
we are confronted with a majority that is unanimous rather than divided. If we
return to Gordon Allport’s definition of social psychology, it is easy to see that
the Asch experiment fits all of the characteristics: Asch used a laboratory
experiment to study the social influence which a (false) majority judgement
would have on the thoughts and behaviours (i.e. judgements) of individuals.
The Asch experiment also allows us to demonstrate the difference between
social psychology and ‘asocial’ general psychology. If Asch had been interested
in studying perceptual thresholds, he would have varied the difference in the
lengths of his standard and comparison stimuli systematically, to assess the
extent to which such variations affected perceptual judgements. The (perceptual)
judgements would have remained the same, but they would now be investigated
in relation to variations in the physical aspects of the stimuli, while keeping the
social context constant. In contrast, Asch kept the physical stimulus constellation
relatively constant and was interested in the effect that varying the social context
(i.e. majority size and unanimity) had on perceptual judgements.
The Asch situation is also useful for demonstrating the difference between
social and personality psychology. As a social psychologist, Asch was interested
in the impact that characteristics of the social situation had on the thoughts and
behaviours of his participants. Does the rate of conformity increase if we
increase the number of majority members who give erroneous judgements? Does
the conformity rate decrease if participants are allowed to give their judgements
anonymously? Asch’s approach is typical of social psychological research,
which usually manipulates important aspects of the social context in order to
assess the impact these changes have on the thoughts, feelings and behaviour of
the target person.
Personality psychologists, on the other hand, might be less interested in the
impact of the social context on behaviour and, instead, ask themselves why some
participants are influenced by the erroneous judgements of the majority while
others remain unaffected. Thus, the personality psychologist would be interested
in the personality traits that are responsible for the fact that different individuals
act differently in what is essentially the same social situation. The personality
psychologist might test whether intelligent individuals are less likely than
unintelligent ones to conform to majorities, or whether conformity is more
prevalent among authoritarian rather than non-authoritarian personalities (see the
discussion of the authoritarian personality in Chapter 14; Adorno, Frenkel-
Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950).
Personality psychologists would not, however, only address the question of
individual differences as determinants of conformity; they would also want to
know how these individual differences came about. Is it possible to relate
differences in authoritarianism to differences in the way parents brought up their
children, and what aspects of a person’s upbringing determine his or her self-
esteem? Thus, one could try to separate the disciplines of social and personality
psychology as follows: individual behaviour is determined by three factors: (1)
the biological constitution of individuals, (2) their acquired traits, and (3) the
social and physical context. Whereas personality psychologists are mainly
interested in studying how particular traits are acquired and how these traits
influence the individual’s behaviour, social psychologists study the impact of the
social situation on individual behaviour.
Unfortunately, such a distinction would oversimplify the differences between
social and personality psychology (for more details, see Krahé, 1992) because
one of the central concepts of social psychology, namely social attitudes, is
defined by many social psychologists (e.g. Eagly & Chaiken, 1993) as a
tendency (i.e. individual disposition) to evaluate an attitude object positively or
negatively (see Chapter 6). Even though social psychologists are mainly
interested in studying how attitudes change in response to social influence
attempts (see Chapters 7 and 8), they also use attitudes to predict individual
behaviour (see Chapter 6). Furthermore, within social psychology, researchers
have often been interested in studying individual difference variables, such as
the degree to which individuals are prone to prejudice and susceptible to Fascist
ideologies (‘authoritarianism’; Adorno et al., 1950; see Chapter 14), or the
degree to which individuals are oriented to situational cues or reactions of others
(‘self-monitoring’; Snyder, 1974).
Since there is a great deal of agreement that individual behaviour is influenced
by personality traits (see Chapter 9 on aggression) as well as the social context,
the two fields of personality psychology and social psychology are, in fact,
difficult to separate. It is therefore not surprising that the leading social
psychological journal is the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, and
that most American social psychologists are members of the Society of
Personality and Social Psychology. However, there are subtle differences in
focus. Social psychologists are typically interested in personality variables as
moderators. They look for the extent to which the impact of an independent
variable on a dependent variable is qualified by, or depends on, the level of an
individual’s score on a personality measure. For example, there is a higher
correlation between attitudes and behaviour for ‘low’ than for ‘high’ self-
monitors (Snyder & Kendzierski, 1982). Many of the chapters in this volume
refer to such personality influences on social behaviour. Social psychologists
also tend to emphasize that the impact of personality variables on social
behaviour is weaker in ‘strong’ compared to ‘weak’ social situations (Mischel,
1977). Thus, social psychologists emphasize the power of strong social
situations to relegate personality influences to the background. This occurs, for
example, in experiments investigating helping in emergencies (Latané & Darley,
1976; see Chapter 10) and obeying an authority figure’s orders to behave in
immoral ways (Milgram, 1974; see Chapter 8).
After the difficulties we experienced in distinguishing social psychology from
personality psychology, distinguishing it from neighbouring social sciences such
as sociology might seem easy. It would appear that sociology differs from social
psychology both in the issues it studies and in the level of analysis at which it
addresses these issues. Unfortunately, things are again not that simple. First,
there is quite a bit of overlap between the issues studied by social psychologists
and those that interest sociologists. Thus, social groups and group norms are
topics that are of equal interest to sociologists and social psychologists (see
Chapter 12). The sociologist George Homans wrote one of the classic
monographs on social groups (Homans, 1950) and the sociologists Hechter and
Opp (2001) edited a volume that summarizes the important work of sociologists
in the area of social norms.
Although there are sociological approaches that, influenced by the work of
Talcott Parsons and Emile Durkheim, emphasize that sociological facts should
not be explained through psychological processes (Vanberg, 1975), most
sociologists would no longer accept this position. In fact, sociologists have made
major contributions to the development of individualistic social psychological
theories. Thus, the sociologists Homans (1961) and Blau (1964) have written
monographs on exchange theory, a theory that has become central in social
psychology through the classic Social Psychology of Groups written by the
social psychologists Thibaut and Kelley (1959), but is now more frequently
referred to as interdependence theory. The central tenet of this theory is that
individuals interact with those others who provide the greatest rewards for the
least costs (see Chapter 11). Thus, most sociologists agree with social
psychologists in espousing what has been called methodological individualism,
namely the assumption that even collective behaviour is essentially behaviour of
the individuals who form the collective and therefore has to be explained in
terms of rewards and costs of this behaviour to the individual (e.g. Klandermans,
1997).

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methodological individualism the assumption that collective action must be explained by showing
how it results from individual decisions and behaviour; collective behaviour is seen as essentially
behaviour of the individuals who form the collective.

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Even though there is a great deal of overlap between sociology and social
psychology, there are also major differences in the way these areas approach
social behaviour. Sociologists are more likely to trace social behaviour upwards
to structural variables such as norms, roles or social class, whereas social
psychologists will trace it downwards to the individual’s goals, motives and
cognitions. For example, both sociologists and social psychologists are
interested in aggression and violence. Social psychologists have studied the
cognitive and affective processes through which anger can, given the right
contextual cues, explode in aggressive behaviour – that is, behaviour performed
with the express intention of hurting another person (Figure 1.3; Chapter 9).
Sociologists, on the other hand, have been more interested in why levels of
aggression are higher in some societies or groups than in others. Why is the
murder rate in the US so much higher than in Canada, even though guns are
widely available in both countries? Since a possible difference could be the type
of guns that are available in the two countries, with hunting rifles being more
prevalent in Canada and hand guns or assault weapons more frequently held in
the United States, the potential answer might lie in the aggressive images that
will be activated by different types of weapons, leading us back to individual
psychological processes. Thus, even though sociologists are more likely to link
individual behaviour to social structural variables, while social psychologists are
more likely to study individual processes, a combination of the two approaches
might often provide a fuller explanation than either discipline can offer on its
own.
FIGURE 1.3 How is the way social psychologists study aggression and violence
different from the approach of sociologists?
Source: © Hurricane. Used under licence from Shutterstock.
 A BRIEF HISTORY OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY
The beginning
Who conducted the first experiment and who wrote the first
textbook?
Authors who write about the history of a scientific discipline usually like to
report dates that mark the origin of that discipline. Often these are the years in
which the first textbooks or handbooks bearing the name of the discipline were
published. In social psychology, 1908 is usually noted as the year when the first
two textbooks of social psychology were published, one by a sociologist (Ross,
1908), the other by a psychologist (McDougall, 1908). However, since both texts
cover very little material that we would consider social psychological these days,
1908 may not be the best choice for the birth year of social psychology.
One could also argue that using the date of the first textbook to mark the
beginning of a discipline is questionable anyway, because it would be difficult to
write a textbook about a discipline that did not already exist. There must first be
relevant theorizing and research available with which to fill the pages of a
textbook. It is probably for this reason that another date has become quite
prominent in chapters on the history of social psychology, namely the date of
(presumably) the first social psychological experiment, a study published in
1898 by Norman Triplett.
Triplett appeared to have been a fan of bicycle races. He was interested in the
phenomenon whereby racing cyclists go faster when racing with others or when
being paced than when riding alone, racing against the clock (Figure 1.4).
Illustrating the research tool of ‘archival analysis’ (see Chapter 2), Triplett
(1898) used records of the average speed of cyclists under these different
conditions; he could indeed demonstrate that cyclists ride faster in competition
or with pacers than when riding alone. However, as Triplett recognized, the
shortcoming of this kind of quasi-experimental evidence is that different racers
participate in different kinds of races and select those in which they do
particularly well. The differences in speed between cyclists racing against the
clock or racing in competition could therefore have been due to self-selection.
To rule out this explanation, Triplett (1898) conducted an experiment in which
schoolchildren performed a simple task (turning a fishing reel) either alone or in
competition with another participant (see Research Close-Up 1.1). The
experiment is usually cited as demonstrating the effects of what later became
known as social facilitation, the phenomenon whereby the performance of
simple tasks is facilitated by the presence of an audience or of others working on
the same task (see Chapter 8). However, if you read the Research Close-Up, you
will realize that his data do not warrant such a strong conclusion.
FIGURE 1.4 It is a well known phenomenon that racing cyclists go faster when
racing with others or when being paced than when riding alone, racing against
the clock.
Source: © AISPIX. Used under licence from Shutterstock.

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social facilitation an improvement in the performance of well-learned/easy tasks and a worsening

of performance of poorly-learned/difficult tasks due to the presence of members of the same
species.

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Although the study by Triplett (1898) had the elegance and clarity that became
the hallmark of experimentation in social psychology, its historical significance
has been challenged by scholars who doubted whether it really was the first
social psychological experiment. For example, Haines and Vaughan (1979) have
argued that there were other experiments before 1898 deserving to be called
social psychological, such as studies on suggestibility by Binet and Henri (1894;
see Stroebe, 2012). But social psychological experiments may have been
performed even earlier by the French agricultural engineer Max Ringelmann,
who between 1882 and 1887 conducted investigations into the maximum
performance of workers pulling a load under different conditions (Kravitz &
Martin, 1986). Although the comparison of individual and group performance
was of only secondary interest to Ringelmann, he found the first evidence of
productivity loss in groups, a phenomenon that was later named social loafing
(see Chapter 13). Ringelmann found that eight men who pull at a rope together
achieve only about 50 per cent of the pulling power that could be expected on
the basis of their pulling measured individually. However, since Ringelmann
only published this research in 1913, Triplett predates him, certainly as far as
publication is concerned.

RESEARCH CLOSE-UP 1.1

TRIPLETT’S CLASSIC STUDY OF

SOCIAL FACILITATION EFFECTS
Triplett, N. (1898). The dynamogenic factors in pacemaking and competition. American Journal
of Psychology, 9, 507–533.

Introduction Triplett suggested several theoretical

explanations for the superiority of cyclists who are
paced or ride in a competition over those who ride
alone. For example, there could be aerodynamic or
psychological advantages for a racer who was paced
or racing in a competition. However, Triplett was
most interested in what he called ‘dynamogenic
factors‘, namely that ‘the presence of another rider is
a stimulus to the racer in arousing the competitive
instinct; that another can thus be the means of
 releasing or freeing nervous energy from him that he
cannot of himself release’ (p. 516). His concept of
nervous energy appears to be similar to the modern
concept of arousal.
Method Participants Forty schoolchildren (14 boys,
26 girls) from 8 to 17 years participated in the study.
Design and procedure The apparatus consisted of two
fishing reels fixed to a wooden frame and placed
sufficiently far apart so that two people could turn
them side-by-side. A cord was looped from each of
the fishing reels through corresponding wheels fixed
to the opposite end of the frame, creating two closed
circuits (like the circuit formed by the chain on a
bicycle). A small white flag was sewn to each of the
cords. By winding the fishing reel the flag traversed
the course from the fishing reel to the wheel at the
opposite end and back again. A trial consisted of four
circuits of the course and the time taken for this
performance was measured by stopwatch. After an
initial practice session, each participant performed six
trials. Triplett created a somewhat complicated but
quite ingenious design, with the sequence of alone
and competition trials differing for Groups A and B in
a systematic way (see Table 1.1).
Table 1.1 Sequence of alone and competition trials for Groups A and B in Triplett’s design.
The rationale behind these two sequences was that it eliminated practice as
well as fatigue effects. Both effects are related to the number of trials
performed by a participant (i.e. trial order). One would expect that during
the first few trials performance improves due to practice. In later trials
fatigue might set in and begin to slow down participants. Triplett controlled
for both of these effects from trial 2 onwards by having the task performed
under both conditions during each of the trials.
Results Triplett categorized his participants into three
groups on the basis of their performance during the
various trials: those who were stimulated positively
by competition and performed faster (N = 20), those
who were ‘overstimulated’ and performed more
slowly (N = 10), and those who were not affected (N
= 10). From visual inspection of his data, Triplett
concluded that his findings showed ‘that the bodily
presence of another contestant participating
simultaneously in the race serves to liberate latent
energy not ordinarily available’ (p. 533). This
conclusion formed the basis of the myth reported in
most textbooks that his study provided the first
evidence for social facilitation. These days
conclusions based on visual inspection of data are no
longer accepted and journal editors require that
researchers conduct (often extensive) statistical
analysis of their results, and test how likely the results
are to be due to chance. When Strube (2005)
reanalysed Triplett’s data more than a century after
the publication of the original study using modern
statistics, he found very little support for the original
conclusion. Only one of several analyses resulted in a
significant effect. This effect disappeared, however,
when Strube eliminated the data of two left-handed
participants, for whom the task would have been more
difficult, as they were instructed to turn the wheel
with their right hand. As you will learn in Chapter 8,
the presence of others facilitates performance only for
easy tasks, but inhibits performance with difficult
tasks. Elimination of the left-handed participants
should therefore have strengthened rather than
weakened the social facilitation effects. Strube
concluded that ‘the analysis of Triplett’s data . . .
indicate barely a statistical hint of the social
facilitation of performance to which his experiment
has been credited’ (2005, p. 280). This is quite
different from the conclusions usually drawn in
textbooks of social psychology.
Discussion If significance tests had already been
available and required by journal editors in 1898,
Triplett’s study might never have been published and
historians of social psychology would have had to
look elsewhere for the first experiment (Stroebe,
2012; Strube, 2005). It is nevertheless puzzling that
Triplett failed to find clear evidence of social
facilitation. After all, turning a fishing reel is a simple
 mechanical task and competition should clearly have
facilitated performance.
It is interesting to note that these early experiments were studies of an applied
nature in areas which later became known as sports psychology and psychology
of work performance. There were other studies of this nature available in other
applied areas (e.g. Mayer, 1903; Moede, 1920) and it needed somebody to
recognize that the study of the impact of the social context on performance was
really a discipline by itself, namely, social psychology. It may then be justifiable
to choose the date of the first textbook or handbook about a discipline as its
‘origin’ insofar as a discipline is characterized not only by its content, but also
by its disciplinary identity. Thus, it is not sufficient that research that is vaguely
social psychological has been conducted in the area of sports psychology or even
agriculture. There needs to be somebody who pulls all this research together and
declares the emergence of a new area (in which, incidentally, this applied
research then becomes fundamental).
In our view, this was first achieved by Floyd Allport (1924), who in his
textbook made several major contributions towards defining the field of social
psychology (see Leader in the Field, Floyd Henry Allport). He declared the
study of social behaviour as the subject of social psychology. He defined social
behaviour as ‘behavior in which the responses either serve as social stimuli or
are evoked by social stimuli’ (p. 148). As mentioned above, he postulated that
social psychology ‘is part of the psychology of the individual, whose behavior it
studies in relation to that sector of the environment comprised by his fellows’ (p.
4). He had noted earlier, in the same volume, ‘For . . . only within the individual
can we find the behavioral mechanisms and the consciousness which are
fundamental in the interactions between individuals’ (p. vi). Another
contribution, which may be less embraced today, was his emphasis on the
experimental method. Although the experimental method is still one of the major
research tools of social psychologists, other research methods have become
equally accepted these days. However, in Allport’s time, the emphasis on
experiments was probably essential for establishing the scientific respectability
of social psychology. It would also have helped to distinguish it further from
sociology, a discipline that still prefers surveys and field studies to conducting
experiments. It is interesting, though, that with the exception of his chapter on
the ‘Response to social stimulation in groups’, Allport (1924) did not review a
great deal of experimental evidence of a social psychological nature.

LEADER IN THE FIELD

Floyd Henry Allport (1890–1978), the elder brother of Gordon
Allport (see Leader in the Field, Chapter 14), received both his
undergraduate degree (1914) and his PhD (1919) from Harvard
University. His dissertation was based on his studies on social
facilitation, a research area that had been suggested to him by Hugo
Münsterberg, then professor of psychology at Harvard. In 1922
Allport obtained a position as Associate Professor of Social
Psychology at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. It was
here that he began writing his Social Psychology, which was widely
praised and adopted as a text. This book and his studies on the
impact of the group on individual cognitive performance are his
major contribution to social psychology. He retired from Syracuse
University in 1956.

Allport’s conception of social psychology derived from his research on social

facilitation (see Chapter 8). His experimental paradigm, which had the defining
characteristics that he attributed to all social psychology research, had been
developed ‘in Germany by August Mayer, Meumann, Moede and others . . .
prior to 1915’; Allport, 1919, p. 304). This strong German influence on his
dissertation research is no coincidence, given that his dissertation supervisor was
Hugo Münsterberg, a German psychologist who was then head of the
psychology department at Harvard. Allport (1924, p. vii) acknowledges
Münsterberg’s influence in the preface to his book, where he writes ‘For the
origins of my interest in social psychology I am indebted to the memory of Hugo
Münsterberg. It was he who suggested the setting for my first experiment and
who foresaw many of the possibilities which have been developed in this book.’
 The early years
What were the key contributions to social psychology during the
first half of the twentieth century?
It would be an exaggeration to claim that the publication of Floyd Allport’s
textbook stimulated an exponential growth in social psychological research
immediately. In fact, not that many milestones are to be reported for the period
before World War II. A rather doubtful one is the publication of the first
Handbook of Social Psychology by Carl Murchison (1935). We call it doubtful
because this handbook covers many topics which nobody would consider social
psychological today, such as ‘Population behavior of bacteria’ or the ‘Social
history of the yellow man’. There are really only three chapters included in this
volume that are truly social psychological in the sense that they would still be
included in social psychology handbooks today: the chapter by Gordon Allport
on attitudes, that by Dashiell on ‘Experimental studies of the influence of social
situation on the behaviour of individual human adults’, and Cox Miles’s chapter
on gender differences. But there are also other chapters that could be part of a
social psychology curriculum, even though they are not included in most modern
handbooks. For example, there is a chapter on language by Esper, on age in
human society by Miles, on material culture by Wissler, and on the physical
environment by Shelford.
Three other significant events during this early period were the publication by
Thurstone (1928) of a paper with the provocative title ‘Attitudes can be
measured’, The Psychology of Social Norms by Sherif in 1936, and Newcomb’s
(1943) Personality and Social Change, a study of attitude formation in the
student community of Bennington College (see Leader in the Field, Theodore
Newcomb). Thurstone’s article was remarkable because he described the first
psychometrically sound method for the measurement of attitudes. Sherif’s study
became a classic, because he devised an experimental paradigm that allowed him
to study the development of group norms in a laboratory situation (see Chapter
8). Participants in his study were repeatedly exposed to a stationary light source
in a darkened room. Sherif made use of the fact that participants perceive this
light source as moving (autokinetic effect) and that, if asked to judge the
movement over repeated trials, they establish relatively stable individual norms.
By putting individuals who had developed widely differing individual estimates
into a group situation, Sherif could demonstrate that individuals in groups
develop a joint and stable group norm, which they then maintain even when they
continue to make their estimates again in individual situations.

- - - - - - - - - -

autokinetic effect perceptual illusion, whereby, in the absence of reference points, a stationary
light appears to move.

- - - - - - - - - -

LEADER IN THE FIELD

Theodore Newcomb (1903–1984) received his undergraduate
degree from Oberlin College in 1924 and entered Union Theological
Seminary in New York intending to become a Christian Missionary
(Converse, 1994). However, more attracted by the psychology
courses taught at Columbia University across the road, he switched
to psychology and received his PhD from Columbia in 1929. He
joined Bennington College in 1934, a newly founded women’s
college that drew its students from the politically conservative ‘upper
crust’ of Vermont’s society, but had a famously liberal atmosphere.
His Bennington study of the change in attitudes that these young
women underwent during their studies became a classic. Not only
was the longitudinal design innovative at that time, but the study
captured the interplay between individual and group processes and
thus supported one of the central assumptions of social psychology.
After a stint of wartime research, he became director of a joint
doctoral program of the departments of sociology and social
psychology at the University of Michigan, where he stayed for the
remainder of his career. Intrigued by the work of Fritz Heider (see
Leader in the Field, Chapter 3), Newcomb developed his own
interpersonal version of balance theory.

Finally, Newcomb’s Bennington study became a classic, because it is an

ingenious longitudinal field study of social influence on a college campus. It
maps out the way in which the political attitudes of students, all women who
came from conservative homes, changed over time towards the liberal attitudes
that were predominant on this college campus. Thus, it illustrates how individual
beliefs and attitudes can be shaped by the group context, and thus supports one
of the basic assumptions of social psychology. The study is particularly
interesting because these students were followed up for 50 years, allowing
researchers to demonstrate the stability of their attitude change over a lifetime
(Alwin, Cohen, & Newcomb, 1991).

- - - - - - - - - -

Bennington study a longitudinal field study of social influence showing how political attitudes of
initially conservative female students changed over time towards the liberal attitudes that were
predominant on this college campus.

- - - - - - - - - -
 The years of expansion
How did Adolf Hitler inadvertently further the development of
social psychology in the US?
Somewhat tongue in cheek, Cartwright once wrote that the one person who most
furthered the development of social psychology in North America was Adolf
Hitler (Cartwright, 1979; Figure 1.5). This observation is correct insofar as
Hitler’s actions had an important impact on the development of social
psychology in the US. World War II greatly stimulated interest in social
psychological research. The Information and Education Branch of the US Army
initiated surveys and experiments to assess the impact of army propaganda films
on the morale of their soldiers. One social psychologist who became heavily
involved in this work was Carl Hovland (see Leader in the Field, Carl Iver
Hovland). Originally a learning theorist, Hovland became fascinated by the
experimental study of the determinants of attitude change. The work he directed
during his army years on experiments in mass communication was eventually
published as one of the volumes of the American Soldier series under the
editorship of the sociologist Stouffer (Hovland, Lumsdaine, & Sheffield, 1949).
FIGURE 1.5 How did Hitler’s actions affect the development of social
psychology?
Source: © Dariush M. Used under licence from Shutterstock.
 After the war, Hovland returned to his academic career and founded the Yale
Communication and Attitude Change programme. This programme attracted
young researchers from a variety of universities and generated a stream of
collaborative studies that defined attitude change research for decades to come
(see Chapter 7). The programme resulted in the publication of four highly
influential volumes on studies of the determinants of persuasion and attitude
change. In the first of these volumes, Hovland, Janis, and Kelley (1953) explored
the impact of communicator variables (e.g. prestige, credibility and expertise),
communication variables (e.g. fear appeals) and context variables (e.g. salience
of reference groups). Although the theoretical perspective of the programme was
eclectic, Hovland himself was most comfortable with the view that attitude
change was a special form of human learning (Jones, 1998).

LEADER IN THE FIELD

Carl Iver Hovland (1912–1961) received his bachelor’s and
master’s degrees from Northwestern University in 1932 and 1933.
He then moved to Yale to work for his PhD under the prominent
 learning theorist Clark Hull. After finishing his dissertation in 1936,
Hovland was invited to join the Yale faculty, of which he remained a
member for the rest of his life. Hovland never abandoned his interest
in learning theory. Even when he became fascinated by persuasion
and attitude change during his wartime leave from Yale in the period
from 1942 to 1945, he used learning theory principles as a
theoretical perspective. His wartime research was published (with
Lumsdaine and Sheffield) in 1949 in Experiments in Mass
Communication. After returning to Yale, Hovland established the
Yale Communication and Attitude Change programme, which he
directed until his premature death in 1961. The research conducted
there by Hovland and 30 students and co-workers over a 15-year
period established the field of attitude change research as we know it
today (Shepard, 1998).

A second action of the Hitler regime that advanced the development of social
psychology in the US was the forced emigration of Jewish (e.g. Koffka, Lewin,
Wertheimer) and even some non-Jewish (e.g. Köhler) academics from Germany.
The most important of these émigrés for social psychology was undoubtedly
Kurt Lewin, considered by many to be the most charismatic psychologist of his
generation (Marrow, 1969). Lewin left the Berlin Psychological Institute in 1933
for the Department of Home Economics at Cornell University, to move in 1935
to the Iowa Child Research Station. In 1945 he established the Research Center
for Group Dynamics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, which, after
his premature death in 1947 at the age of 57 years, was moved to the University
of Michigan (see Leader in the Field, Kurt Lewin).

LEADER IN THE FIELD

Kurt Lewin (1890–1947) studied psychology and philosophy in
Berlin. After fulfilling the formal requirements for a PhD in 1914 (a
degree he received only in 1916), he volunteered for the army and
spent the next four years fighting World War I (Marrow, 1969). He
then returned to the University of Berlin to join the Gestalt
psychologists Köhler and Wertheimer at the Institute of Psychology,
where he stayed until his (permanent) move to the United States in
1933. The time at Berlin University was probably Lewin’s most
productive period. He attracted an international group of students,
 developed his field theory, which argued that behaviour is a function
of both the person and the environment, and supervised a series of
classic studies, mainly conducted by his students as part of their
dissertation. These studies addressed fundamental issues of the
psychology of motivation. Lewin’s interest in social psychology
developed only after his move to the United States (Marrow, 1969).
In the US he first worked at Cornell University, then moved to the
University of Iowa. During his 10 years at the University of Iowa
(1935–1945) Lewin conducted some classic experimental studies in
social psychology, such as the experiment on the impact of
authoritarian and democratic leadership styles on group atmosphere
and performance (Lewin, Lippitt, & White, 1939), which later
stimulated research on participative leadership to overcome
resistance to change (Coch & French, 1948). Lewin became more
and more interested in social processes, and in 1944 he moved to the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where he founded the
Research Center for Group Dynamics.

It is difficult to understand today how and why Lewin became such a key
figure in social psychology. As is the case today, the impact of a researcher in
those days was mainly determined by three factors: (1) a great number of
publications in top journals; (2) the development of a theory, which stimulated a
great deal of research; or (3) training of a stream of outstanding graduate
students, who would later continue the work. Lewin did not score all that well on
the first two criteria. Although Lewin’s students were highly productive, he
himself published only a few empirical studies in social psychology, the most
well known being the study of autocratic and democratic leadership (Lewin et
al., 1939), which initiated interest in the impact of leadership styles on group
atmosphere and performance (see Chapter 13). His field theory provided a
framework for looking at the forces (e.g. positive and negative valences) that
influence the individual in a social situation. However, it did not lend itself
easily to the derivation of testable hypotheses. Even his own empirical work was
only very loosely related to that theory. And as Morton Deutsch (1968), one of
Lewin’s most eminent students, concluded two decades after Lewin’s death: ‘It
cannot be said that field theory as a specific psychological theory has much
current vitality. Nor can it be said that Lewin’s specific theoretical constructs . . .
are central to research now being carried out in social psychology’ (p. 478).
 - - - - - - - - - -

field theory a framework adopted by Kurt Lewin which represented the individual as an element in
a larger system of social forces.

- - - - - - - - - -

So how could Lewin become so influential? As Deutsch (1968) explains,

Lewin’s ‘impact is reflected instead in his general orientation to psychology,
which has left its impression on his colleagues and students.’ (Deutsch, 1968, p.
478). Lewin believed that psychological events must be explained in
psychological terms and that central processes in the ‘life space’ or
psychological field of the individual such as cognition, motivation and goals are
the proper focus of investigation. This theoretical perspective offered an exciting
alternative to the behaviouristic theories that dominated psychology at that time.
Furthermore, Lewin’s approach to social psychology had two characteristics
which were novel at the time. For him, a problem was only worth studying if
addressing it would make a difference with regard to actual problems in the
world (Festinger, 1980). Second, and more importantly, he insisted on studying
such problems experimentally and on creating in the laboratory powerful
situations that made a big difference (Festinger, 1980). Lewin instilled these
ideas in his graduate students, and his impact on social psychology was mainly
due to these graduate students, who, as a group, were highly influential during
the second half of the twentieth century.

LEADER IN THE FIELD

Leon Festinger (1919–1990) completed his undergraduate studies at
City College in New York, and his graduate research at the
University of Iowa with Kurt Lewin (see Leader in the Field,
Chapter 1). After receiving his PhD in 1942, and a stint of wartime
research, he rejoined Lewin and the newly formed Center for Group
Dynamics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1945. In
1948, he moved with the Center to the University of Michigan, from
there to the University of Minnesota in 1951, on to Stanford in 1955,
and finally, in 1968, to the New School for Social Research in New
 York, where he stayed until his retirement (Schachter, 1994). During
his period at MIT, Festinger, Schachter, and Back (1950) conducted
their classic study of friendship patterns and residential proximity
(see Chapter 11). Festinger (1950) published his first theoretical
paper in social psychology on informal social communication and
the process, via social comparison, of establishing the correctness of
one’s beliefs. These ideas were later elaborated in his paper on social
comparison processes (Festinger, 1954). Soon afterwards, Festinger
(1957) published the work for which he is best known, his theory of
cognitive dissonance (see Chapter 7). It marked the end of his
interest in social psychology, which shifted, first to the visual system
and perception, then to archaeology and the history of religion.

All these individuals shaped the field of experimental social psychology in the
post-war period, but the most illustrious among them was undoubtedly Leon
Festinger, whose theory of cognitive dissonance dictated the research agenda in
social psychology during the 1960s and 1970s (Festinger, 1957; see also Chapter
7; Leader in the Field, Leon Festinger). The theory of social comparison
processes, which he had developed earlier (Festinger, 1954), had less of an
immediate impact, but is still influential today (see e.g. Chapters 5, 8, 10 and
12).
Another important émigré was the Austrian, Fritz Heider (see Leader in the
Field, Fritz Heider, in Chapter 3), although in this case Hitler cannot be blamed
for his emigration. Heider came to the US in 1930 to work with Kurt Koffka,
who was then at Smith College in Northampton, Massachusetts. He had initially
planned to stay for only one year, but decided to remain when he fell in love
with Grace Moore, whom he later married. He moved to the University of
Kansas in 1947, where he remained until his retirement. His impact on the field
is intriguing, because he was not a prolific writer, attracted few graduate
students, and published no experimental research in social psychology. Yet he
stimulated two of the theoretical traditions which dominated social psychology
during the second half of the last century, namely consistency theories and
attribution theories.

- - - - - - - - - -

consistency theories a group of theories (see balance theory, cognitive dissonance theory)
proposing that people prefer congruence or consistency among their various cognitions, especially
 among their beliefs, values, and attitudes.

- - - - - - - - - -

- - - - - - - - - -

attribution theories a group of theories about how individuals manage to infer the ‘causes’
underlying the behaviour of others, or even their own behaviour.

- - - - - - - - - -

With his paper on balance theory in 1946, Heider developed the notion
central to consistency theories that inconsistency between our attitudes and
beliefs creates tension in our cognitive system and a tendency to establish
consistency. Although only a limited amount of research has been conducted to
test Heider’s balance theory, the theory stimulated the development of other
consistency theories, most importantly the theory of cognitive dissonance.

- - - - - - - - - -

balance theory a cognitive consistency theory that assumes that individuals strive to maintain
consistency or balance (objects or persons perceived as belonging together are evaluated similarly)
in their social perceptions.

- - - - - - - - - -

With his paper on phenomenal causality, published in 1944, and his

monograph The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations, published in 1958,
Heider initiated another important theoretical perspective, namely attribution
theory (see Chapter 3). Attribution theory is a social psychological theory about
how individuals manage to infer the ‘causes’ underlying the behaviour of others,
or even their own behaviour. In trying to interpret behaviour, we will typically
attempt to disentangle the contribution of internal causes (e.g. personality traits,
motivation) from external causes (e.g. situational factors). For example, if a
mother learns that her son has received a poor grade in his first maths test, she
will wonder whether this poor result is due to lack of ability, lack of motivation
or to an overly zealous maths teacher who gave too tough a test. Deciding
between these alternatives will be important for her, because it will suggest
different strategies to prevent this situation from happening again.
The impact of attribution theory in stimulating a great deal of research in the
1960s and 1970s is intriguing, because neither Heider’s (1958) monograph nor
his 1944 article was written in a way that would make it accessible or appealing
to the average researcher in North America. There was also very little research to
back up Heider’s ideas. It is generally accepted that attribution theory became
influential because three major figures in the field of social psychology –
Edward Jones, Harold Kelley and Bernard Weiner – adopted it and translated it
into a language that was more accessible to social psychologists and yielded
clear, testable hypotheses (Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1967; Weiner, 1986).
Probably most influential was Kelley’s (1967) covariation theory (see Chapter
3). This model was appealing because Kelley argued that, in inferring causes of
behaviour, our inference process would be analogous to conducting an analysis
of variance, a statistical procedure highly familiar to social psychologists. Other
influential adaptations of attribution theory were Jones and Davis’s (1965)
correspondent inference theory and Weiner’s (1986) application of attribution
theory to achievement motivation and emotion.
A final way in which Hitler influenced the development of social psychology
is by stimulating interest in topics such as obedience and authoritarianism. Why
did the German people accept such an authoritarian regime, and why did so
many of them carry out commands they must have perceived as immoral even at
the time? These questions stimulated some of the most influential research in
social psychology: researchers studied the authoritarian personality (Adorno et
al., 1950), the determinants of conformity (Asch, 1955) and obedience
(Milgram, 1963). Lewin’s interest in the effects of authoritarian and democratic
leadership styles can be seen as an attempt to demonstrate the superiority of the
democratic style, an attempt that was only partly effective because in his
research autocratically led groups outperformed the democratic groups with
regard to quantity of production, although democratic leadership produced more
creative groups whose performance did not deteriorate so dramatically when the
leader was removed (White & Lippitt, 1968).
 The crisis years
How and why did the crisis in social psychology develop?
So far the history of social psychology appears to have been one of unmitigated
success. Stimulated by World War II, social psychological research expanded
enormously and there was soon no single psychology department at a top
university that did not also have a strong social psychology unit. But just when
social psychology was on the up and up, a crisis in social psychology developed
that led to years of infighting about the right course one should follow. This
crisis was probably initiated by two critical papers published in 1967 and 1973.

- - - - - - - - - -

crisis in social psychology a short-lived crisis of confidence among social psychologists during the
1960s, when social psychologists questioned the values, the methods and the scientific status of
their discipline.

- - - - - - - - - -

The first of these two papers was a paper by Kenneth Ring entitled
‘Experimental social psychology: Some sober questions about some frivolous
values’, published in the highly respected Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology. In this paper, Ring contrasted the vision of Kurt Lewin of a social
psychology that would contribute to the solution of important social problems
with what he called the ‘fun and games’ attitude of the social psychology of his
days. He argued that: ‘Experimental social psychology today seems dominated
by values that suggest the following slogan: ‘Social psychology ought to be and
is a lot of fun . . . Clever experimentation on exotic topics with zany
manipulations seems to be the guaranteed formula for success . . . One
sometimes gets the impression that an ever-growing coterie of social
psychologists is playing (largely for another’s benefit) a game of “can you top
this?”’ (pp. 116–17). Although Ring did not refer to any specific examples of
this fun and games approach, his criticism was probably directed at some of the
work conducted in tests of dissonance theory.
Ring, although a respected researcher, was not a very central figure in the
social psychology of his days. Therefore, the paper stimulated some discussion
but did not really have a serious impact on the field. However, in 1973, one of
the golden boys of experimental social psychology, Kenneth Gergen, published
an article entitled ‘Social psychology as history’ in the top journal of our
discipline, the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. As the title already
suggests, Gergen’s article was not an attack on the values directing social
psychological research. Much more seriously, he questioned its scientific value.
His two most important arguments were (1) that knowledge of social
psychological principles could change our behaviour in ways which would
negate these principles, and (2) that since the basic motives assumed by many of
our theories are unlikely to be genetically determined, they might be affected by
cultural change.
As an example of the first principle, Gergen argued that once groups were
aware of their tendency to make extreme decisions (i.e. group polarization; see
Chapter 8), they might consciously counteract this tendency in their decision-
making. As an example of the second principle, Gergen used social comparison
and dissonance theory. Social comparison theory assumes that people have a
desire to evaluate themselves accurately and do this by comparing themselves to
others. Gergen argued that one could easily imagine societies in which such a
desire would not exist. Similarly, dissonance theory assumes a need for
consistency, which not everybody might share. Gergen saw these problems as
the main reason why, as he claimed, social psychological research often failed to
be replicable, and hence did not result in a body of cumulative knowledge.
Most researchers these days would accept these arguments without questioning
the scientific status of social psychology. With regard to Gergen’s first point, we
would argue that it would be difficult, even for a trained social psychologist, to
keep in mind all situations in which our behaviour might be affected by others,
to recognize all the relevant cues signalling such situations, and then to
counteract the situational pressures. With regard to his second point, the jury is
still out. There is increasing evidence that repeating the same social psychology
study in different parts of the world often leads to rather different results (see
Chapter 15). However, such variation does not necessarily challenge the
assumption that there are universal social processes. After all, cultural
differences might merely qualify such universal processes. For example, it is
hard to imagine societies in which people do not engage in social comparison,
because the evaluation of one’s own abilities through social comparison is
highly functional and essential for effective action. However, we do know that
there are individual differences in the need for social comparison (Gibbons &
Buunk, 1999), as there are in individual need for consistency (Cialdini, Trost, &
Newsom, 1995). Since there are substantial individual differences within
cultures, differences between cultures would not necessarily imply that the
theories of social comparison or cognitive consistency should not apply to other
cultures.
Gergen’s (1973) critique would probably have been less effective had it not
come at a time when the collective self-esteem of social psychologists had been
undermined by other developments. For one, there was an attack on the
usefulness of a concept that Allport (1935) had hailed as the most central
concept of social psychology. In a review of studies that empirically assessed the
value of social attitudes in predicting behaviour, the sociologist Alan Wicker
(1969) drew the following conclusion: ‘Taken as a whole, these studies suggest
that it is considerably more likely that attitudes will be unrelated or only slightly
related to overt behavior than that attitudes will be closely related to actions.’ (p.
65). This conclusion was highly damaging, since social psychologists were
interested in attitudes mainly because they expected them to predict behaviour.
Since attitude change in most studies is assessed through an individual’s self-
rated position on some attitude dimension, the news that such ratings might be
unrelated to behaviour was devastating.
A second development with a negative impact on the collective self-esteem of
the scientific community of social psychologists was the publication of a series
of papers that were highly critical of the experimental method (see Chapter 2).
Thus, Martin Orne (1962) had suggested that most experimental situations
contained demand characteristics, which would help research participants to
guess the hypothesis to be tested in a given study. Since participants typically
tried to be ‘good subjects’, Orne argued, they would then do their best to support
these hypotheses.1 Even more damaging was the suggestion of Robert Rosenthal
(Rosenthal & Fode, 1963) that the expectations of the experimenter might
influence the behaviour of research participants, even without their knowledge
(experimenter expectancy effects). The impact of these expectations on the
behaviour of research participants could, for example, be mediated by
experimenters’ reacting positively to responses that supported their hypotheses
and negatively to responses that were inconsistent with expectations.

- - - - - - - - - -
 demand characteristics cues that are perceived as telling participants how they are expected to
behave or respond in a research setting; that is, cues that ‘demand’ a certain sort of response.

- - - - - - - - - -

- - - - - - - - - -

experimenter expectancy effects effects produced unintentionally by the experimenter that

increase the likelihood that participants will confirm the experimenter’s hypothesis.

- - - - - - - - - -

The reaction to these critical voices was the organization of numerous

conferences in which the crisis was discussed, sometimes in rather heated
language. Although these conferences resulted in a number of crisis books (e.g.
Strickland, Aboud, & Gergen, 1976), they failed to bridge the theoretical and
methodological chasm that separated the critics from mainstream social
psychology. The critics finally founded their own social psychological schools,
such as social constructionism in the United States (e.g. Gergen, 1999) and
discourse analysis in the United Kingdom (e.g. Potter & Wetherell, 1987), which
developed their own methodologies in an attempt to address these problems.
 Overcoming the crisis
How was the crisis overcome?
In mainstream social psychology a number of developments were initiated,
which over the years helped to alleviate some of the problems highlighted by
these critics:

Social psychologists began to demonstrate their ability to contribute to the

solution of real-life problems by developing several applied areas, which
contributed to resolving important societal problems. To mention only one
such area, health psychology is an application of social psychology. One of
the major research areas in health psychology is aimed at changing health-
impairing behaviour patterns in our society (e.g. smoking, eating too much,
drinking too much alcohol, practising unsafe sex). Social psychologists
have helped to understand the reasons why people engage in these
behaviours as well as to develop interventions aimed at changing them
(Stroebe, 2011). The following chapters in this volume give many
additional examples of how social psychology can be, and has been, applied
to real social issues.
The impression that social psychological research did not result in
cumulative knowledge may have been the result of improper strategies of
reviewing, a problem that was mostly resolved with the development of
meta-analytic procedures (see Chapter 2). When reviewing research areas,
researchers often erroneously concluded that support for a theory was
missing or inconsistent, because few studies supported the theory by
yielding significant results, whereas the majority of studies failed to find
significant results. In the meantime, we have realized as a discipline (as has
science, in general) that the failure to find significant results may simply
have been due to conducting a study with an insufficiently large number of
participants. If the effects we were looking for were small, this might have
resulted in insignificant findings, even though the differences between
conditions might all have been in the predicted direction. Since then, meta-
analytic procedures have been developed which allow us to integrate
statistically the results of independent studies of a given phenomenon, with
a view to establishing whether the findings exhibit a pattern of relationships
that is reliable across studies (Cooper & Hedges, 1994).
We now know that attitudes are predictive of behaviour but that this
relationship is often obscured in studies which employ inappropriate
procedures in measuring the two components (see Chapter 6). As Ajzen and
Fishbein (1977) demonstrated in their classic review, attitudes are related to
behaviour if both components are assessed with measures that are both
reliable and compatible. To be reliable, measures have to consist of
multiple items rather than a single item. To be compatible, attitude and
behaviour have to be assessed at the same level of specificity. Thus, if we
want to predict whether people are likely to engage in physical exercise to
improve their health, we should not measure their attitude towards their
health, but their attitude towards engaging in physical exercise. The latter
attitude is likely to be highly correlated with an aggregate measure of a
variety of exercise behaviours (such as jogging, walking, going to the gym).
If one wanted to predict specific exercise behaviour, such as whether an
individual is likely to jog, one should measure his or her attitude towards
jogging rather than towards physical exercise in general.
Finally, social psychologists have tried to design their experimental
manipulations in ways that would minimize the threat of demand
characteristics and experimenter expectancy effects. Furthermore, the fact
that many research participants do not even meet experimenters any more
(because experiments are often run on the computer by computer programs)
should certainly rule out experimenter expectancy effects. The depressing
fact that most experiments do not work out the way they were expected to
by the experimenter who designed them also appears to suggest that
demand characteristics and experimenter expectancy effects cannot be all
that powerful. Festinger (1980) most aptly expressed these feelings when he
wrote: ‘I’ve always wondered why, if these spurious experimenter effects
were so strong, so many of my own experiments did not show the expected
results.’ (p. 252.)
 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN EUROPE
How did social psychology develop in Europe?
Until the end of World War II, the development of social psychology as a
discipline was restricted to the US. However, even before the influx of academic
refugees in the 1930s, there had been a great deal of European influence on this
development. For example, as mentioned earlier, F. Allport’s (1924) work on
social facilitation had been stimulated by one of his academic teachers at
Harvard, the German Hugo Münsterberg, who in turn was familiar with similar
work that had been done in Germany by Moede (1920). The experimental work
of Bartlett (1932) in Britain on remembering can be viewed as a major precursor
of contemporary research on social cognition. And finally, the theorizing
underlying Sherif’s (1936) studies of norm development is heavily influenced by
Gestalt psychology.
However, even though there were individuals in Europe who conducted
research that could be considered social psychological, there was no unitary
social psychology. This situation continued into the 1960s, even though social
psychology groups had been established at a number of European universities.
But while there was social psychology in Europe, there was no European social
psychology: there was no European collaboration, and most European
researchers had not met each other, nor were they even aware of each other’s
work.
Obviously, a European network was not necessary for the development of a
strong social psychology in some of the European countries where effective
social psychology research groups already existed (e.g. Belgium, Britain, the
Netherlands and Germany). However, in some other countries it would probably
have taken many decades for social psychology to develop. Furthermore, since
most of the European researchers met each other, if at all, only at conferences
held in the US, without the foundation of a European association European
social psychology would probably have remained a minor appendix of North
American social psychology rather than developing its own theoretical
perspective. Thus, the foundation of the European Association of Experimental
Social Psychology was critical.
Given the dominance of North American social psychology at that time, even
in Europe, it is no coincidence that it was again an American, John Lanzetta,
who set things in motion in 1963. During a sabbatical year in London, Lanzetta,
then Professor of Social Psychology at the University of Delaware, visited
various social psychology groups in Europe. He was struck by the fact that many
of these colleagues, though well informed about US social psychology, were not
really aware of what was going on in the social psychology departments of
neighbouring European countries. He decided to change this and raised funds for
a first European Conference on Experimental Social Psychology, held in
Sorrento, Italy, in 1963 (Nuttin, 1990; Moscovici & Marková, 2006). One of the
main initiatives which emerged from this and two follow-up conferences was the
foundation of the European Association of Experimental Social Psychology
(EAESP) in 1966. The European Association engaged in a number of regular
activities, which had great impact on the development of social psychology in
Europe. These included: - - - - - - - - - -
European Association of Social Psychology an association formed by European researchers in
1966 to further social psychology in Europe (originally named the European Association of
Experimental Social Psychology).

- - - - - - - - - -

Summer schools for advanced students, taught by outstanding researchers.

Publication of the European Journal of Social Psychology from 1970,
which included most of the early research thought of (then at least) as
typically ‘European’ (e.g. studies of intergroup relations or minority
influence). Other key European publications were, first, the European
Monographs series and, later, the European Review of Social Psychology.
The first edition of the textbook you are reading now was published in
1988, in part to counteract the tendency of American textbooks to under-
report the work of European social psychologists.
The regular organization of conferences, including plenary meetings of the
whole membership, and special East–West meetings (the latter were
particularly effective forums at a time when travel and currency restrictions
made it extremely difficult for social psychologists from Eastern and
Western Europe to meet).
Membership in the European Association of Social Psychology (EASP), as it
is known now after dropping ‘experimental’ from its name in 2008, has grown at
a phenomenal rate, from less than 100 in 1970 to more than 1,000 members in
2010. During this period, scientific development in social psychology also
changed from being a one-sided enterprise, with American ideas being adopted
in Europe, to a mutual development, with European ideas being taken up
enthusiastically in the United States and ever-increasing collaboration leading to
scientific growth. It is now accepted practice for prominent North American
journals (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology and Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin) to have at
least one European editor, and likewise for the European Journal of Social
Psychology to have non-European editors.
Probably the two most important examples of European ideas influencing
social psychology in the United States are research on intergroup behaviour and
on minority influence. Although Henri Tajfel was not the first to conduct
experimental research on intergroup behaviour (that honour goes to Sherif), he
developed the paradigm (the minimal group paradigm) that turned intergroup
behaviour into a major research area (see Chapter 14). The minimal group
paradigm offered an easy and very economical procedure for the study of
intergroup behaviour, but Tajfel and Turner (1979, 1986) developed from it a
theoretical framework that could account for these findings, social identity
theory (see Chapter 14).
The second theoretical innovation that was started in Europe and then accepted
in the United States is research on minority influence. Social influence research
in North America focused exclusively on conformity, that is, on explaining how
majorities influence minorities. It was Moscovici who first pointed out that this
type of theorizing could hardly explain social or religious innovations, where
powerless minorities influenced powerful majorities (e.g. women’s rights,
Christianity). After Moscovici and his colleagues in Paris (e.g. Moscovici, Lage,
& Naffrechoux, 1969) had published a number of studies demonstrating
minority influence, and again with the development of a theory that could
account for these effects, research on minority influence became a major
research area both in the US and in Europe (Moscovici, 1976; see Chapter 8).
 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY TODAY
What new theoretical perspectives have emerged during the last
few decades?
In the 1980s most of the researchers who had contributed to modern social
psychology, and who, as often as not, had come from the research centres
directed by either Lewin or Hovland, were still alive and active (Cartwright,
1979). In the meantime, not only have many of these pioneers retired or died, but
so also have most of the students whom they, in turn, had trained. The field has
grown at an exponential rate. There are now chairs in social psychology at
practically all major universities in the United States, in Europe, and in
Australasia, and social psychologists number in the thousands rather than a few
hundreds. Social psychology has also become an essential part of the psychology
curriculum in these countries.
Not surprisingly, social psychology has also changed over these decades.
Major scientific perspectives, such as consistency theory or attribution theory,
have faded and new perspectives, such as social cognition, evolutionary social
psychology and social neuroscience, have emerged. Jones (1998) colourfully
described these changing trends in research as ‘band wagons and sinking ships’
(p. 54).
Social cognition research is an application of principles of cognitive
psychology to the area of social psychology (see Devine, Hamilton, & Ostrom,
1994). Unlike other psychological disciplines, social psychology has always
placed a strong emphasis on how individuals internally represent their
environment. Many of our theories have been labelled ‘cognitive’ (e.g. cognitive
dissonance), and central concepts of social psychology (e.g. attitudes, beliefs,
intentions) are cognitive constructs. It would thus appear a small step for social
psychologists to borrow methods from cognitive psychology to study how social
information is encoded and how the information is stored and retrieved from
memory. This perspective has had a widespread influence across the field of
social psychology, but is seen perhaps most clearly in changes to the way we
theorize and do research in person perception (see Chapters 3 and 4), attitude
change (Chapter 7), and prejudice and intergroup relations (Chapter 14).
Evolutionary social psychology (e.g. Burnstein & Branigan, 2001; Buss &
Kendrick, 1998) is an application of evolutionary theory to social psychology.
Evolutionary theory explains human behaviours, including differences in partner
preference according to gender, from their reproductive value, that is, their value
in producing offspring in our evolutionary past. Evolutionary psychology makes
the basic assumption that if a given behaviour is (1) at least partly genetically
determined and (2) increases the probability that an individual will produce
offspring, the gene that determines this behaviour will become more prevalent in
the gene pool of future generations. Evolutionary social psychologists have
made important contributions to the study of interpersonal attraction (Chapter
11), helping and cooperation (Chapter 10) and aggression (Chapter 9). The
development of evolutionary social psychology as an accepted research area in
social psychology is surprising, as talking about genetic determinants of social
behaviour was considered heresy in the decades following World War II and the
defeat of the race ideology of the Hitler regime. However, modern applications
of evolutionary social psychology are less deterministic, less ideological and,
most importantly, more solidly based on evolutionary theory than such earlier
approaches.
Social neuroscience is the study of the neural correlates of social psychological
phenomena (Cacioppo & Berntson, 2005; Ochsner & Lieberman, 2001).
Building on huge recent advances in the use of non-invasive techniques for
examining the functioning of the human brain, social neuroscience studies
participants’ brains while they are engaged in processing social information.
There are two major approaches used by social neuroscience, namely brain
mapping and psychological hypothesis testing (Amodio, 2010). Brain mapping
studies (e.g. by functional magnetic resonance imaging, fMRI; see Figure 1.6a)
attempt to identify the neural substrates of specific psychological processes. The
hypothesis testing approach uses the results of brain mapping to test hypotheses
about psychological variables. ‘For example, a social psychologist, who studies
intergroup prejudice might hypothesize that implicit racial bias is rooted in
mechanisms of basic classical fear conditioning. To test this hypothesis, one
might measure brain activity in the amygdala – a structure implicated in fear
conditioning in many studies – while a participant completes a behavioural
measure of implicit racial bias. In this case, the construct validity of the neural
measure of fear conditioning . . . is already reasonably established . . . and the
question concerns not the meaning of brain activation, but experimental effects
among psychological variables’ (Amodio, 2010, pp. 699–700).
FIGURE 1.6a Functional MRI scanning techniques have already been used to
further our understanding of issues such as self, altruism and racial prejudice.
Source: © Levent Konuk. Used under licence from Shutterstock.

Studies have already used such techniques to further our understanding of such
disparate issues as the self (see Chapter 5), altruism (see Chapter 10), and racial
prejudice (see Chapter 14). Some studies, for example, have examined changes
in blood flow within the brain (using fMRI; Figure 1.6b) while people are shown
race-relevant stimuli under different conditions. Such research has indicated that
there is a link between social categorization and the amygdala. Phelps et al.
(2000) showed, for example, that white participants’ greater amygdala activation
in response to black versus white faces was significantly correlated with their
implicit racial prejudice only when the faces were of unknown black people, but
not when they were of famous and well-liked black and white individuals. These
findings suggest that amygdala activation and behavioural responses of race
evaluation are heavily shaped by social learning, and that familiarity with
members of these groups can modulate bias. Thus, involvement of biological
processes does not imply something fundamental and unchangeable. In fact,
social neuroscience emphasizes that social variables can influence biological
processes (Eberhardt, 2005; Phelps & Thomas, 2003). Furthermore, even if the
neural correlates of prejudice can be identified, prejudice is a psychological
construct and cannot be redefined as the activation of particular brain regions
(Sherman, 2010).
FIGURE 1.6b An fMRI scan shows activation of the amygdala processing
social, fear-related information.
Source: © 2000 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. (Elizabeth A.
Phelps, Kevin J. O’Connor, William A. Cunningham, E. Sumie Funayama, J.
Christopher Gatenby, John C. Gore and Mahzarin R. Banaji, 2000. Performance
on Indirect Measures of Race Evaluation Predicts Amygdala Activation. Journal
of Cognitive Neuroscience, 12:5, 729–738.)

Because brain mapping helps neuroscientists to understand the brain, whereas

psychological hypotheses can usually be tested without using neural indicators,
it can be argued that social psychology is much more useful in helping
neuroscientists to understand the brain than neuroscience is in helping us to
understand social psychological processes (Kihlstrom, 2010). As Kihlstrom
(2010) nicely put it: ‘Psychology without neuroscience is still the science of
mental life, but neuroscience without psychology is just a science of neurons.’
(Kihlstrom, 2010, p. 762.) Social psychology today is an exhilarating and
thriving enterprise. Living up to Lewin’s motto that nothing is as practical as a
good theory, social psychologists are applying the understanding they have
gained from their study of fundamental cognitive, emotional and motivational
processes to the solution of real-life problems. As the chapters in this volume
illustrate, they have contributed importantly to the development of applied areas
ranging from health psychology, to organizational psychology (see Chapters 12
and 13), to resolving intergroup conflict (see Chapter 14). In the absence of
systematic and controlled social psychological research in most areas, F. Allport
(1924) had to rely heavily on speculation in his ambitious road map for social
psychology as an empirical science. We hope that the readers of this textbook
will appreciate the progress social psychologists have made in less than a
century in replacing speculation with theory-guided empirical research.

CHAPTER SUMMARY
How can social psychology be defined? Social psychology is often
defined as the scientific attempt to understand and explain how thoughts,
feelings and behaviours of individuals are influenced by the actual,
imagined or implied presence of other human beings.
How does social psychology differ from other psychological disciplines?
One of the main differences is the focus on the impact of the
characteristics of the social situation on thoughts and behaviour of
individuals. Although social psychologists might also be interested in
individual differences, they are usually concerned with individual
differences in responses to characteristics of the social situation.
When was the first social psychology experiment conducted? There are
several candidates that could claim to have been the first experiment in
social psychology, but all were conducted just before 1900.
When did the first textbook of social psychology appear? The first
textbook that covered topics which would still be considered social
psychology today was written by Floyd Allport (1924).
Was there much social psychological research before World War II?
Although there was some important research conducted before World
War II, most theorizing and research considered part of modern social
psychology has been published since 1945.
What were the unintended effects of Hitler’s actions on social
psychology? World War II created interest in social influence and attitude
change. But the crimes of the Nazi regime also stimulated interest in
issues such as conformity and obedience. Finally, the forced emigration
of Jewish academics strongly shaped the development of social
psychology in the US.
Who were the émigrés with the greatest influence on social psychology?
The most important émigré was Kurt Lewin. He attracted an illustrious
group of students who shaped social psychology in the decades following
World War II. Another influential émigré was the Austrian Fritz Heider,
who left Europe for personal reasons. He stimulated two theoretical
traditions, consistency theory and attribution theory, which dominated
social psychology in the decades following World War II.
What were the causes of the crisis that developed in social psychology?
There were doubts raised about the societal relevance of social
psychological research (i.e. frivolous values) as well as scientific nature
of our methods (i.e. the influence of demand characteristics, experimenter
expectancy effects). These doubts were strengthened by the impression
 that our research did not result in cumulative knowledge and that attitudes
did not predict behaviour. Finally it was questioned whether social
psychological theories developed and tested in Western cultures (i.e.
mainly in the US) would also apply to other cultures.
How was the crisis overcome? Social psychology emerged from the crisis
stronger than it was before. Some of the problems were overcome by
theoretical or methodological improvements. Others resulted in the
emergence of new research areas. For example, cultural social psychology
was developed to assess the extent to which our theories are applicable
across cultures (see Chapter 15). A strong applied social psychology was
developed to demonstrate the societal relevance of social psychological
theories and research.
What new theoretical perspectives have emerged during the last few
decades? Major scientific perspectives such as consistency theory or
attribution theory have faded and new perspectives, such as social
cognition, evolutionary social psychology and social neuroscience have
emerged.

NOTE

1. Early research reports referred to those who took part in psychological

research as ‘subjects’. It is now standard practice to refer to them as
‘participants’.
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING
Berscheid, E. (1992). A glance back at a quarter century of social psychology.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63, 525–533. A personal
reflection by a leading scholar on developments in North America in the 25
years up to its publication.
Cartwright, D. (1979). Contemporary social psychology in historical perspective.
Social Psychology Quarterly, 42, 82–93. A lively attempt to put social
psychology into historical perspective, famous for highlighting the ‘influence’ of
Adolf Hitler.
Farr, R. M. (1996). The roots of modern social psychology: 1872–1954. Oxford:
Blackwell. Scholarly treatment of the background to the modern era, with
special reference to the relationship between social psychology and other social
sciences.
Jahoda, G. (2007). A history of social psychology: From the eighteenth-century
enlightenment to the Second World War. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press. Another book that provides great insights into the history of ideas which
finally led to the development of modern social psychology.
Kruglanski, A. W., & Stroebe, W. (Eds.). (2012). Handbook of the history of
social psychology. New York: Psychology Press. Researchers, who have
substantially contributed to central areas of social psychology, present their view
of the development of their particular research area.
Moscovici, S., & Marková, I. (2006). The making of modern social psychology:
The hidden story of how an international social science was created. Cambridge,
UK: Polity. This book tells the fascinating story of how European Social
Psychology was born.
 Chapter 2

Research Methods in Social Psychology

Antony S. R. Manstead and Andrew G. Livingstone

Source: © René Hendriks (One of the laboratory rooms of the social psychology
laboratory at Utrecht University.)

KEY TERMS

confederate
construct
construct validity
control group
convergent validity
cover story
debriefing
demand characteristics
dependent variable
discourse analysis
experiment
experimental confound
experimental group
experimental scenario
experimenter expectancy effect
external validity
factorial experiment
field experiment
hypothesis
implicit measures
independent variable
interaction effect
internal validity
Internet experiment
main effect
manipulation check
mediating variable
meta-analysis
one-shot case study
operationalization
participant
participant observation
post-experimental enquiry
post-test only control group design
quasi-experiment
quota sample
random allocation
reactivity
reliability
sampling
simple random sample
social desirability
social neuroscience
survey research
theory
triangulation
true randomized experiment
unobtrusive measures
validity
 variable
CHAPTER OUTLINE
INTRODUCTION
Summary
RESEARCH STRATEGIES
Experiments and quasi-experiments Survey research
Qualitative approaches
Summary
A CLOSER LOOK AT EXPERIMENTATION IN SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY
Features of the social psychological experiment Experimental designs
Threats to validity in experimental research Social psychological
experiments on the Internet Problems with experimentation Summary
DATA COLLECTION TECHNIQUES
Observational measures
Self-report measures
Implicit measures
Choosing a measure
Social neuroscience
Summary

ROUTE MAP OF THE CHAPTER

This chapter provides an overview of research methods in social
psychology, from the development of theory to the collection of data. After
describing three quantitative research strategies (experiments and quasi-
experiments, and survey research), the chapter briefly discusses qualitative
approaches, focusing on discourse analysis. There follows a description of
the key elements of experimentation, as this is the most popular research
method in social psychology. We also consider threats to validity in
experimental research, and discuss problems with experimental research in
social psychology. The final section of the chapter contains a description of
three methods of data collection (observation, self-report and implicit
measures).
 INTRODUCTION
How do social psychologists go about testing their theories?
Why should a chapter about the technical aspects of research methods come so
early in this textbook? Why do we need to study research methods, rather than
go directly to the real substance of social psychological phenomena and
explanations for those phenomena? To answer these questions, we need to
consider an even more fundamental question: Why do psychologists conduct
research in the first place?
As social psychologists, we are of course interested in ‘big’ phenomena. What
causes intergroup conflict? Why do people stereotype members of other groups?
How do we form impressions of other people? Why do people behave differently
when they are in a group? What leads people to change their attitudes? What
factors influence whether close relationships succeed or fail? To answer these
questions, we develop theories. For example, we might want to develop a theory
about the causes of intergroup conflict. In the first instance, this involves
identifying constructs (abstract concepts, such as ‘threat’, or ‘prejudice’) or
variables (a measurable representation of a construct, such as scores on
questionnaire measures of threat perceptions or intergroup hostility) that we
think are relevant to the question, and speculating about how these relate to one
another. Crucially, our theories typically consist of propositions about causal
relationships between constructs. In this way, we are not content with simply
describing these ‘big’ phenomena; rather, we seek to explain them by identifying
their antecedents. In developing a theory of intergroup conflict (see Chapter 14),
we are not only interested in what conflict is like, but also in what causes it and
how it might be reduced. For example, we might theorize that intergroup conflict
is caused by feelings that the interests or well-being of one’s own group are
threatened by another group (see Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje,
1999).

- - - - - - - - - -

theory a set of abstract concepts (i.e. constructs) together with propositions about how those
constructs are related to one another.

- - - - - - - - - -
 - - - - - - - - - -

construct an abstract theoretical concept (such as social influence).

- - - - - - - - - -

- - - - - - - - - -

variable the term used to refer to the measurable representation of a construct.

- - - - - - - - - -

We might initially base our theories on observation of real-life events, on

intuition or on existing theories. But coming up with theories is only part of the
story. Many other disciplines – such as philosophy, sociology, and anthropology
– are concerned with the same issues and phenomena that interest social
psychologists. What helps to distinguish social psychology – and psychology as
a whole – from these other disciplines is not simply the type of explanation we
provide, but also a commitment to the scientific method, in which we test our
theories against evidence. This introduces an essential characteristic of a theory:
it must be testable. This means that we should be able to derive specific
predictions (or hypotheses) from the theory concerning the relationship between
two or more constructs, and to gather evidence that could support or contradict
those predictions.

- - - - - - - - - -

hypothesis a prediction derived from a theory concerning the relationship between variables.

- - - - - - - - - -

Consider Janis’s (1982) theory about the poor quality of decision-making that
is apparent even in groups of competent and experienced persons – a
phenomenon he termed ‘groupthink’ (see Chapter 8). Janis’s (1982) theory
consists of one set of concepts representing the antecedent conditions of poor
group decision-making, another set representing the symptoms of groupthink, a
third set representing symptoms of poor decision-making and a final set
representing the process linking antecedent conditions to the symptoms of
groupthink and poor decision-making (see Theory Box 2.1). One of the
antecedent conditions is a ‘cohesive group’, a group whose members are
psychologically dependent on the group. Because they are dependent on their
group membership, they are more likely to conform to what they believe to be
the consensual position in the group. An example symptom of groupthink is the
presence of ‘mind guards’, a term Janis used to describe group members who
take it on themselves to protect the group from information that questions the
correctness or morality of an emerging decision. An example symptom of
defective decision-making is failure to examine the risks of the preferred
decision. Janis also specified how groupthink is brought about (i.e. the mediating
process). In this case, the mediating process is a premature ‘concurrence-seeking
tendency’, a powerful preference for agreement with fellow group members,
before all these issues have been properly discussed. Thus antecedent conditions
are linked to symptoms via a mediating process; we discuss the concept of
mediation in more detail later in this chapter.
A prediction that we can derive logically from Janis’s theory is that groups that
are more cohesive should be more prone to making poor-quality decisions than
groups that are less cohesive (see Research Close-Up 2.1). To the extent that the
evidence is consistent with the prediction, we can be more confident in the
theory from which we derived the prediction. Correspondingly, if the evidence is
inconsistent with the prediction, we should be less confident in the underlying
theory. Evidence might also reveal limits or boundary conditions to a predicted
effect, showing that it only occurs under specific circumstances. An example of
boundary conditions in relation to Janis’s theory comes from research conducted
by Postmes, Spears, and Cihangir (2001), who found that the effect of group
cohesiveness on the quality of a group’s decisions depended upon the norm of
the group. Specifically, the quality of decisions was improved when the group
had a norm of critical thinking compared to when it had a norm of maintaining
consensus. In the light of this sort of evidence, the original theory may need to
be modified, or even rejected entirely in favour of an alternative.
 THEORY BOX 2.1
ANTECEDENT CONDITIONS, MEDIATING
PROCESS AND SYMPTOMS OF GROUPTHINK
IN JANIS’S (1982) THEORETICAL MODEL
Source: Adapted from Janis (1972, 1977, 1982).

Now we can see why research methods are so important. They are the essential
tools of our trade, providing a way of translating our ideas into actions, and of
testing, challenging and improving our theories. The quality of our research
depends not only on the quality of our theories, but on the quality of the research
methods we use to test those theories.
 Summary
Methods are the tools researchers use to test their theoretical ideas. These ideas
can come from a variety of sources, but two that are quite common in social
psychology are observations of real-life events and inconsistencies between
previous research findings. A theory consists of a set of constructs linked
together in a system, and specifies when particular phenomena should occur.

RESEARCH CLOSE-UP 2.1

ARCHIVAL ANALYSES OF
‘GROUPTHINK’
Janis, I. L. (1972). Victims of groupthink: A psychological study of foreign-policy decisions and
fiascoes. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Introduction Janis’s research on groupthink provides

an excellent example of ‘archival research’, a research
strategy that is not described or discussed elsewhere
in the present chapter. In archival research the data
come from archives – that is, from stored records of
facts. ‘Archival data may include such items as
personal documents (letters or diaries), creative
products (poems, paintings, essays), biographies or
autobiographies, and histories or governmental
records’ (Simonton, 1981, p. 218). Janis (1972)
decided to study in detail archival material relating to
four major US foreign policy fiascoes: the Bay of Pigs
invasion of Cuba in 1961; the decision to escalate the
Korean War in 1950; the failure to be prepared for the
attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941; and the decision to
escalate the Vietnam War in 1964. Janis argues that in
the case of each of these disastrous decisions,
information was potentially or actually available to
the policy-making groups that should have led them to
different decisions.
Method Janis’s research took the form of careful
scouring of all the documentary sources of
information on the circumstances in which these
faulty decisions were made. In his 1972 book Victims
of Groupthink, Janis attempted to show how the
archival data on each of these decisions can be
regarded as forming a consistent social psychological
pattern, the essence of which is shown in Theory Box
2.1. Janis (1982) published a second edition of his
book in which he applied the notion of groupthink to
the Watergate incident that ultimately led to US
President Richard Nixon’s resignation in 1974.
Later research Tetlock (1979) conducted a more
quantitative analysis of archival materials. He applied
standardized procedures for analysing the content of
public statements made by key decision-makers
involved in the ‘groupthink’ and ‘non-groupthink’
decisions examined by Janis (1972). Tetlock was
particularly interested in assessing the extent to which
public statements made by key decision-makers
reflected ‘a tendency to process policy-relevant
 information in simplistic and biased ways’ (p. 1317),
and the extent to which these statements reflected ‘a
tendency to evaluate one’s own group highly
positively and to evaluate one’s . . . opponents highly
negatively’ (p. 1317).
To assess these two aspects of groupthink, Tetlock identified six key
decision-makers who were intimately involved in five different foreign
policy decisions, two of which were classified by Janis as ‘non-groupthink’,
while he classified the other three as ‘groupthink’ decisions. He then
randomly selected and analysed 12 paragraph-sized passages from the
public statements made by each decision-maker at the time of each crisis.
He found that the public statements of decision-makers in groupthink crises
were significantly less complex than were the public statements of decision-
makers in non-groupthink crises. He also found evidence that decision-
makers in the groupthink crises gave more positive evaluations of their own
political groups than did decision-makers in crises not characterized by
groupthink. However, contrary to predictions, there was no difference
between groupthink and non-groupthink decision-makers in terms of the
intensity of negative evaluations of their political opponents. With the
exception of this last finding, the results of Tetlock’s study are consistent
with Janis’s conclusions, which were based on a more qualitative analysis of
historical documents.
Discussion A key advantage of the archival research
strategy is that the evidence gleaned from archives is
not distorted by participants’ knowledge that
researchers are investigating their behaviour. The
behaviour took place in natural settings at an earlier
time than that at which the behaviour was studied.
There is, therefore, little or no chance that the
behaviour could have been ‘contaminated’ by the
research process. As Simonton (1981) put it, ‘Because
archival research exploits data already collected by
others for purposes often very different from the
intentions of the researcher, this methodology
constitutes a class of “unobtrusive measures”’ (p.
218). Offsetting this advantage are some
disadvantages. The most obvious of these are (1) that
the researcher is dependent on the quality of the
archival information, which may not contain a good
basis for assessing key variables, and (2) that even
when associations between variables (such as the
quality of a decision and the complexity of statements
made by decision-makers) are found, it is unclear
whether or how they are causally related.
- - - - - - - - - -

participant a person who takes part in a psychological study.

- - - - - - - - - -
 RESEARCH STRATEGIES
What are the strengths and weaknesses of the principal research
strategies available to the social psychologist?
Researchers who want to test their ideas and predictions have a range of
different research strategies available to them. In this section we will consider
experimental and quasi-experimental research, survey research and qualitative
approaches.
 Experiments and quasi-experiments
Experimental research is designed to yield causal information. The goal of an
experiment is to see what happens to a phenomenon when the researcher
deliberately modifies some feature of the environment in which the phenomenon
occurs (‘If I change variable B, will there be resulting changes in variable A?’).
By controlling the variation in B, the researcher who finds that there are changes
in A can draw causal conclusions. Instead of just knowing that more of variable
A is associated with more of variable B, the experimental researcher discovers
whether A increases when B is increased, decreases when B is reduced, remains
stable when B is left unchanged and so on. Such a pattern of results would
suggest that changes in B cause the changes in A.

- - - - - - - - - -

experiment a method in which the researcher deliberately introduces some change into a setting to
examine the consequences of that change.

- - - - - - - - - -

The experimental method is a theme with many variations. Two common

variations are the quasi-experiment and the true randomized experiment.
They differ with respect to the realism of the setting in which the data are
collected and the degree of control that the researcher has over that setting. A
quasi-experiment is typically conducted in a natural, everyday setting, one over
which the researcher does not have complete control. The true randomized
experiment, by contrast, is one in which the researcher has complete control over
key features of the setting; however, this often involves a loss of realism.

- - - - - - - - - -

quasi-experiment an experiment in which participants are not randomly allocated to the different
experimental conditions (typically because of factors beyond the control of the researcher).

- - - - - - - - - -
 - - - - - - - - - -

true randomized experiment an experiment in which participants are allocated to the different
conditions of the experiment on a random basis.

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To grasp the key difference between a quasi-experiment and a true experiment,

we need to consider further what is meant by the term experiment. Experiments
are studies in which the researcher examines the effects of one class of variables
(independent, or manipulated, variables) on another class of variables
(dependent, or measured, variables). In a true randomized experiment the
researcher has control over the independent variable and over who is exposed to
this variable. Most importantly, the researcher is able to allocate research
participants randomly to different conditions of the experiment (random
allocation). In a quasi-experiment the researcher usually cannot control who is
exposed to the independent variable. In a typical quasi-experiment, pre-existing
groups of people are either exposed or not exposed to the independent variable.

- - - - - - - - - -

random allocation (sometimes called random assignment) the process of allocating participants to
groups (or conditions) in such a way that each participant has an equal chance of being assigned to
each group.

- - - - - - - - - -

Examples of each method may help to bring out the points of difference.
Social psychologists interested in aggression have studied whether exposure to
violent film and television material has an impact on the subsequent behaviour
of the viewer (see Chapter 9 and Figure 2.1). This can be done using true
randomized experiments or quasi-experiments. An example of a true experiment
on this issue is the study reported by Liebert and Baron (1972). Male and female
children in each of two age groups were randomly allocated to one of two
experimental conditions, one in which they viewed an excerpt from a violent
television programme and another in which they viewed an exciting athletics
race. Later both groups of children were ostensibly given the opportunity to hurt
another child. Those who had seen the violent material were more likely to use
this opportunity than were those who had seen the non-violent material. Because
children had been randomly allocated to the violent and non-violent conditions,
the observed difference can be attributed to the difference in type of material
seen, rather than any difference in the type of children who saw the material.
FIGURE 2.1 What research method might be used to study the impact of
viewing violent television on subsequent behaviour?
Source: © Edouard Berne. Used under licence from Getty Images.

An example of a quasi-experimental study of the same issue is the study

reported by Black and Bevan (1992). They asked people to complete a
questionnaire measure of tendency to engage in aggressive behaviour under one
of four conditions: while waiting in line outside a cinema to see a violent movie;
while waiting in line to see a non-violent movie; having just seen a violent
movie; and having just seen a non-violent movie. As can be seen in Figure 2.2,
the researchers found that those waiting to see the violent film had higher
aggression scores than those waiting to see the non-violent film; and also that
those who had just seen the violent film scored higher than those waiting to see
the violent film (although there was no difference in aggression scores between
those who had just seen a non-violent movie and those waiting to see a non-
violent movie). These findings are consistent with the notion that viewing a
violent movie increases the tendency to aggress (Figure 2.3), but the fact that
participants were not allocated at random to the different conditions makes it
impossible to rule out alternative explanations. For example, it may be that
violent movies only increase aggressive tendencies among those who are
attracted to view such movies in the first place.
FIGURE 2.2 Self-reported tendency to aggress, as a function of type of movie,
and whether or not the respondent was waiting to see the movie or had just seen
the movie.
Source: Based on data reported by Black and Bevan, 1992. Reproduced with
permission from John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

FIGURE 2.3 Does viewing a violent movie increase the tendency to aggressive
behaviour in us all, or simply increase aggressive tendencies only in those who
are attracted to viewing such movies in the first place?
Source: HOSTEL 2 © 2007 Screen Gems, Inc. and Lions Gate Films Inc. All
Rights Reserved. COURTESY OF SCREEN GEMS.
 Often the only way in which to conduct an experimental study of a social
phenomenon is via a quasi-experiment. Ethical and practical considerations
frequently make it impossible to allocate people randomly to different
experimental conditions. If, like Stroebe, Stroebe, and Domittner (1988), you
wish to study the effects of bereavement, for example, you obviously cannot
randomly allocate research participants to a ‘bereaved’ and a ‘non-bereaved’
condition. The same applies in many other fields of research. Thus, the choice of
research strategy is often a compromise between what is optimal and what is
practicable. Fortunately, the sophistication of some quasi-experimental designs
is such that it is possible to draw conclusions about causality with some
confidence (Judd & Kenny, 1981a, b; West, Biesanz, & Pitts, 2000; see Leader
in the Field, Charles M. Judd).

LEADER IN THE FIELD

Charles M. Judd (b. 1946) is a leading scholar in the field of social
cognition and stereotyping, but also an outstanding methodologist.
He took his BA at Yale University, majoring in French, then studied
 theology at Union Theological Seminary, New York, before
discovering a greater calling and pursuing graduate studies in
psychology at Columbia University, where he obtained his PhD
under Morton Deutsch. He began his teaching career at Harvard
University, then moved to the University of Colorado, Boulder,
where he has remained since 1986 (with the exception of two years
at the University of California, Berkeley), and is now Professor of
Distinction, College of Arts and Sciences. He is an expert on
experimental design and analysis, and evaluation and quasi-
experimental designs. He has contributed numerous highly
influential articles on statistics (notably mediation and moderation
analysis), has served as editor of many of the leading journals in the
field, and received the 1999 Thomas M. Ostrom Award for Lifetime
Contributions to Social Cognition Theory and Research. He was
awarded the degree of Doctor Honoris Causa, Faculté de
Psychologie et des Sciences de l’Education, Université Catholique
de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium, in 2006.

It is also possible to conduct true experiments in field settings, in which case

they are referred to as field experiments (see Chapter 1), which attempt to
combine the control of a laboratory experiment with the realism of a quasi-
experiment. An example of such a field experiment is given in Research Close-
Up 2.2.
 Survey research
The practical and ethical considerations that can make quasi-experiments a
useful strategy also apply more generally to survey research (Oppenheim,
1992; Schwarz, Groves, & Schuman, 1998; Visser, Krosnick, & Lavrakas,
2000). Surveys differ from experiments and quasi-experiments in that they focus
on measuring existing levels of relevant variables, rather than manipulating them
(see Social Psychology Beyond the Lab 2.1). Like experiments, survey designs
are typically concerned with associations and/or cause-and-effect relationships
between variables. However, the lack of control over independent – or predictor
– variables means that it is virtually impossible to be certain about their causal
role. For this reason, surveys often also measure other variables that can be taken
into account in statistical analyses – that is, controlled for – in order to rule out
possible alternative explanations for a relationship between a predictor variable
and an outcome variable.

- - - - - - - - - -

survey research a research strategy that involves interviewing (or administering a questionnaire to)
a sample of respondents who are selected so as to be representative of the population from which
they are drawn.

- - - - - - - - - -

An example of this strategy is provided by Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, and

Malle (1994). They proposed that many different types of intergroup prejudice
are predicted by a personality variable which they call social dominance
orientation, or SDO (see Chapter 14). This variable reflects an individual’s
preference for unequal status relations between social categories. So, someone
who scores high in SDO should be more sexist, and more likely to oppose equal
rights for racial minorities. In support of this prediction, Pratto et al. (1994)
found that SDO was indeed positively correlated with sexism, and negatively
correlated with support for racial equality. However, they were also concerned
that the relation between these variables and SDO could actually be due to the
influence of another variable, such as political conservatism. If so, the argument
that SDO is a unique predictor of prejudice would be greatly undermined. To test
this possibility, Pratto et al. re-examined the correlations between prejudice and
SDO while controlling for (or partialling out) the effect of political
conservatism. The correlations remained significant, increasing their confidence
that the role of SDO is not simply due to political conservatism.
Another strategy that can increase certainty regarding causal relationships in
survey research involves taking measures of relevant variables at several points
in time – a longitudinal survey design. The logic here is that if variable A at time
1 predicts variable B at time 2 (especially when controlling for differences in
variable B at time 1), then we can be more certain that variable A has a causal
effect on variable B.
 Qualitative approaches
Traditionally, social psychological research – including the overwhelming
majority of the research discussed in this book – has involved quantitative data
analysis. That is, the data we analyse are represented as numbers. This makes
our data amenable to statistical analyses, allowing researchers to say something
about the average score on a variable (e.g. the mean, median, and/or modal score
in a sample); the range of scores on a variable (e.g. the variance or standard
deviation); and the strength and reliability of relations between two or more
variables (e.g. through inferential tests such as t-tests, analysis of variance or
regression). These analyses usually provide clear and interpretable outcomes,
and moreover there is broad consensus among researchers about the meaning of
these outcomes.

RESEARCH CLOSE-UP 2.2

A FIELD EXPERIMENT TO STUDY

HELPING BEHAVIOUR
Darley, J. M. & Batson, C. D. (1973). ‘From Jerusalem to Jericho’: A study of situational and
dispositional variables in helping behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 27,
100–108.

Introduction The researchers were interested in

testing the idea that one reason why bystanders do not
come to the assistance of others, even when these
others clearly need help, is that helping is costly. The
particular ‘cost’ they studied in their research was
time. To come to a stranger’s assistance often
involves a departure from your original plan. Such a
departure can throw you off your schedule. The
researchers also wanted to examine whether
reminding people of the parable of the Good
Samaritan, in which a passer-by does come to the
assistance of a stranger in need of help, would
influence willingness to give help. They tested these
notions in a field experiment (see also Chapter 10).
They also measured individual differences in
religiosity, to see whether these would influence
helping.
Method The participants in the study were male
seminary students (i.e. trainee priests) who believed
that they were taking part in a study on ‘religious
education and vocations’. Each participant began the
study in one building and was then asked to proceed
to a second building to complete the study. Before
leaving the first building, the participant was led to
believe one of three things about the speed with which
he should go to the other building: that there was no
special hurry, that there was an intermediate degree of
hurry, or that he was late for the second part of the
study and should hurry up. This was the manipulation
of the first variable, time pressure (no versus medium
versus high degree of hurry). In the second part of the
study, the participant expected to do one of two
things: either talk about the parable of the Good
Samaritan, or talk about job prospects for seminary
students. This constituted the second manipulation:
either having or not having the parable of the Good
 Samaritan made psychologically salient. The design
of the study is shown in Figure 2.4.
FIGURE 2.4 Design of the Darley and Batson (1973) field experiment.
Source: Copyright © 1973 by the American Psychological Association.
Adapted with permission. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 27,
100–108. The use of APA information does not imply endorsement by APA.

On his way to the other building, the participant passed through an alley in
which a person (the ‘victim’, but actually an accomplice of the
experimenters) was sitting slumped in a doorway, head down, eyes closed.
As the participant passed the victim, the latter coughed twice and groaned.
The dependent variable in this field experiment was the extent to which the
participant did anything to help this person apparently in distress. The extent
of the participant’s helping behaviour was observed and coded.
Results Helping was significantly influenced by the
time pressure manipulation. The results are
summarized in Figure 2.5. Those in the ‘no hurry’
condition were more helpful than those in the
‘medium hurry’ condition, who in turn were more
helpful than those in the ‘high hurry’ condition. There
was also a tendency for being reminded about the
parable to have an influence; those who were
reminded were more helpful than those who were not.
Individual differences in religiosity did not predict
 whether or not participants stopped to help, although
they were related to the nature of the help given.
FIGURE 2.5 Mean helping scores as a function of degree of hurry (no,
medium, or high) and anticipated topic of talk (parable of Good Samaritan or
job prospects for trainee priests).
Source: Based on data reported by Darley & Batson (1973). Copyright © 1973
by the American Psychological Association. Adapted with permission. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 27, 100–108. The use of APA
information does not imply endorsement by APA.

Discussion Even those who have chosen to be trained

in a vocation in which helping others is supposed to
play a central role were affected by the time pressure
variable. When they were in a hurry, even those
trainee priests who thought that they were on their
way to a discussion of the parable of the Good
Samaritan were less likely to offer help to a stranger
in need than were their counterparts who were in less
of a hurry (Figure 2.6). From a methodological
 perspective, the neat thing about this field experiment
is that it was conducted in a natural, everyday setting.
Participants were randomly allocated to one of the six
conditions of the experiment, so any differences found
between these six conditions resulted, in principle,
from the experimental manipulations. Thus internal
validity was high (i.e. the researchers could be
confident that changes in the independent variable
caused changes in the dependent variable). But the
fact that the setting of the experiment was such an
everyday one means that this study also scores quite
highly on realism (i.e. it has high external validity
too). It is a good example of a field experiment.
FIGURE 2.6 Would you be more likely to help someone in need after hearing
a sermon on the parable of the Good Samaritan?
Source: © Digital Vision. Used under licence from Getty Images.

However, the quantitative approach is far from universal in social psychology.

An alternative is qualitative analysis, in which data are typically textual rather
than numerical, focusing on the content and meaning of the words and language
used by participants. Qualitative approaches encompass a wide range of analytic
techniques. Some of these are perfectly consistent with the philosophical
assumptions that underpin quantitative research and the scientific method more
generally. Among these assumptions is the belief that the phenomena in which
we are interested represent an objective set of ‘facts’ that exist independently of
the researcher’s (or anyone else’s) perspective on them. According to this view,
the fact that many of the phenomena we study – such as an attitude – cannot be
directly observed or measured simply means that we require sensitive and
sophisticated research methods in order to study them. However, other
qualitative approaches are more radical and explicitly reject these assumptions.
What unifies qualitative approaches is a concern with the limitations of
quantitative research of social phenomena, and the belief that qualitative
techniques can provide additional, or even radically different insights (see
Henwood, 1996).
The supposed limitations of quantitative techniques relate to the ways in which
they potentially misrepresent and/or over-simplify phenomena and participants’
perspectives on them. In particular, quantitative measures – especially self-
report measures, which we discuss later – require the researcher to make
assumptions regarding the range and content of possible responses, not to
mention their meaning to participants. This is important, because a participant’s
understanding of a task or a questionnaire item may be quite different to that of
the researcher. Moreover, the range of possible responses may not allow
participants to communicate responses or perspectives that the researcher did not
anticipate.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BEYOND THE

LAB 2.1
SURVEY RESEARCH
Descriptive survey designs focus on describing overall levels of relevant
variables, such as the characteristics of one or more groups of people.
Examples of descriptive survey designs include political opinion polls,
market research and a census (Figure 2.7). Such descriptions can range from
 the simple (e.g. describing the percentage of people eligible to vote in a
particular constituency who say that they intend to vote for a particular
political candidate) to the more complex (e.g. describing the personal and
social characteristics associated with use of recreational drugs among
school-age children and teenagers).
FIGURE 2.7 One strategy for gathering research evidence is to survey public
opinion by interview.
Source: © pixsooz. Used under licence from Shutterstock.

Descriptive survey research is often concerned with large populations, such

as all adults living in a particular community, region or country. To ensure
that responses are representative, one could interview or collect completed
questionnaires from the entire population in question (as is done in a
census). In most cases, however, collecting data from all members of a
population is simply not possible; even where it is possible, it is typically
not cost-effective. The result is that the researcher has to choose which
members of that population to survey. The process of selecting a subset of
members is known as sampling.

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sampling the process of selecting a subset of members of a population

with a view to describing the population from which they are taken.

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Two main types of sampling are used in survey research: probabilistic and
non-probabilistic. The most basic form of probabilistic sampling is the
simple random sample. A simple random sample is one which satisfies two
conditions: first, each member of the population has an equal chance of
being selected; second, the selection of every possible combination of the
desired number of members is equally likely. To explain the second
condition, imagine that the population size is 10 (consisting of persons
labelled A to J) and the sample size is two. There are 45 possible
combinations of two members of the population (A + B, A + C, A + D, and
so on, to I + J). In simple random sampling, each of these 45 possible
combinations of two members has to be equally likely. In practice, of
course, the sample size of a random sample (e.g. of the whole population of
a country) is much larger than two and the process is much more complex.
Researchers achieve random sampling by allocating numbers to each
member of the population and using computer-generated random numbers to
select a sample of the required size, a feature available on the web.

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simple random sample a sample in which each member of the

population has an equal chance of being selected and in which the
selection of every possible combination of the desired number of
members is equally likely.

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Because probability sampling is expensive and time-consuming, non-

probability sampling is frequently used. The most common form of a non-
probability sample is the quota sample. Here the objective is to select a
sample that reflects basic attributes of the population. Such attributes might
be age and sex. If you know the age and sex composition of the population
concerned, you then ensure that the age and sex composition of the sample
reflects that of the population. The term ‘quota’ refers to the number of
people of a given type (e.g. females between the ages of 55 and 60) who
have to be interviewed. The major advantage of quota sampling is that the
 interviewer can approach potential respondents until the quotas are filled
without needing to recruit a specifically identified respondent. Some
disadvantages of quota sampling are (1) that it is usually left to the
interviewer to decide whom to approach in order to fill a quota, with the
result that bias can enter into the selection process, and (2) that it is
impossible to provide an accurate estimate of sampling error.

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quota sample a sample that fills certain prespecified quotas and thereby
reflects certain attributes of the population (such as age and sex) that are
thought to be important to the issue being researched.

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Several qualitative approaches help to address these concerns. At an early,

exploratory stage of a research project, content analysis or thematic analysis of
open-ended oral or written responses can shed light on potentially relevant
factors. This approach can also be used to follow up quantitative analyses by
exploring unexpected or ambiguous findings (see Livingstone & Haslam, 2008,
for an example of the latter). Indeed, content analysis often ultimately produces
quantitative outcomes, because it allows the researcher to count occurrences of
particular words, phrases or themes and conduct statistical analyses on the
results. Alternatively, grounded theory focuses on systematically generating
theory about a specific phenomenon in an inductive or ‘bottom-up’ manner, for
example on the basis of exploratory interview data. Other techniques (e.g.
interpretative phenomenological analysis) focus on revealing and interpreting
the subjective meaning that participants attach to particular issues or events.
All of these techniques can complement or extend quantitative research. By
contrast, other qualitative approaches such as forms of discourse analysis
involve a more fundamental rejection of the assumptions that underlie
quantitative and much qualitative research. Rather than searching for an
objective, knowable set of ‘facts’ about social psychological phenomena,
advocates of these approaches instead assume that there is no unique, valid
interpretation of the world. Consequently, the focus of their research is on fine-
grained features of everyday talk and interaction to explore how people actively
construct particular interpretations of events. They might seek to show how, for
example, racist or sexist attitudes arise not because of the beliefs or biases of the
individual who expresses them, but rather as evaluations that emerge in the
context of particular social interactions. Rather than being relatively fixed
products of individual cognitive systems, such evaluations arise in the context of
conversations and vary according to the particular cultural setting.

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discourse analysis a family of methods for analysing talk and texts, with the goal of revealing how
people make sense of their everyday worlds.

- - - - - - - - - -

An example of the use of discourse analysis is the study reported by Wetherell,

Stiven, and Potter (1987). These researchers were interested in male and female
university students’ views about employment opportunities for women. They
reasoned that analysing how a group of 17 students talk about these issues would
reveal the practical ideologies that are used to reproduce gender inequalities. The
students were interviewed in a semi-structured way and their responses were
transcribed and analysed. A benefit of this approach is that it enabled the
researchers to identify contradictions in the way ordinary people talk about
issues like gender inequality. Rather than having a single attitude, the students
tended to endorse different positions at different points during the interview.
Some of these positions were inconsistent with each other, but served specific
ideological and strategic purposes at the particular point at which they were
adopted.
This sort of qualitative approach is not represented in the present volume,
where the emphasis is on the strengths of approaches that assume the objective
existence of the phenomena we study. The role played by qualitative research
methods in social psychology largely reflects differences in philosophical belief
about the causation of social behaviour. From the standpoint of the research
represented in the present volume, qualitative research seems to be more focused
on description than explanation, and more concerned with how behaviour is
constructed than with how it is caused.
 One of the most important decisions to be made during the research process is
which of the strategies outlined above to adopt. It is worth pointing out that
although some research strategies will be better suited than others to studying a
given phenomenon, each and every strategy, however sophisticated its
implementation, has its limitations. It is for this reason that one of the great
pioneers of research methodology in the social sciences, Donald Campbell (see
Leader in the Field, Donald T. Campbell), argued for triangulation. By this he
meant that using multiple methods to study a given issue provides a better basis
for drawing conclusions than does any single method. Because each method has
its own strengths and weaknesses, using different methods helps the strengths of
one method to compensate for the weaknesses of another (e.g. Fine & Elsbach,
2000).

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triangulation the use of multiple methods and measures to research a given issue.

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LEADER IN THE FIELD

Donald T. Campbell (1917–1996) is regarded as having been a
master research methodologist. Campbell completed his
undergraduate education at the University of California, Berkeley.
After serving in the US Naval Reserve during World War II, he
earned his doctorate from Berkeley and subsequently served on the
faculties at Ohio State University, the University of Chicago,
Northwestern, and Lehigh. He made lasting contributions in a wide
range of disciplines, including psychology, sociology, anthropology,
biology and philosophy. In social psychology he is best known for
co-authoring two of the most influential research methodology texts
ever published, Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for
Research (1966, with Julian C. Stanley) and Quasi-Experimentation:
Design and Analysis Issues for Field Settings (1979, with Thomas D.
Cook). Campbell argued that the sophisticated use of many
approaches, each with its own distinct but measurable flaws, was
required to design reliable research projects. The paper he wrote with
Donald W. Fiske to present this thesis, ‘Convergent and discriminant
validation by the multitrait–multimethod matrix’ (1959), is one of
the most frequently cited papers in the social science literature.
 Summary
Research strategies are broad categories of research methods that are available to
study social psychological phenomena. We began by noting that it often makes
sense to study a phenomenon using more than one strategy. We identified three
quantitative strategies (experiments and quasi-experiments, and survey research)
before discussing qualitative research strategies.
 A CLOSER LOOK AT
EXPERIMENTATION IN SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY
What are the main elements of a social psychological experiment?
Experimentation has been the dominant research method in social psychology,
mainly because it is unrivalled as a method for testing theories that predict
causal relationships between variables. Standard guides to research in social
psychology (e.g. Aronson, Ellsworth, Carlsmith, & Gonzales, 1990; Aronson,
Wilson, & Brewer, 1998) treat experimentation as the preferred research
method. In fact there are some grounds for questioning the extent to which
experimental studies provide unambiguous evidence about causation, as we shall
see later.
We will first describe the principal features of the experimental approach to
social psychological research. To assist this process of description, we will use
Milgram’s (1965; see Chapter 8) well-known study of obedience as an
illustrative example.
 Features of the social psychological experiment
The experimental scenario is the context in which the study is presented. In
laboratory settings it is important to devise a scenario for which there is a
convincing and well-integrated rationale, because the situation should strike
participants as realistic and involving, and the experimental manipulations and
the measurement process should not ‘leap out’ at the participant. In Milgram’s
study, participants were told that the study was an investigation of the effects of
punishment on learning. The participant was given, apparently at random, the
role of ‘teacher’, while an accomplice of the experimenter posing as another
participant (known as a confederate) took the role of ‘learner’. The learner’s
task was to memorize a list of word pairs. The teacher’s task was to read out the
first word of each pair, to see whether the learner could correctly remember the
second word, and to administer a graded series of punishments, in the form of
electric shocks of increasing severity, if the learner failed to recall the correct
word (which he had been instructed to do from time to time). This scenario was
devised with a view to convincing the participant that the shocks were genuine
(which they were not), and that the learner was actually receiving the shocks.

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experimental scenario the ‘package’ within which an experiment is presented to participants.

- - - - - - - - - -

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confederate an accomplice or assistant of the experimenter who is ostensibly another participant

but who in fact plays a prescribed role in the experiment.

- - - - - - - - - -

The independent variable is the one that is deliberately manipulated by the

experimenter. All other aspects of the scenario are held constant, and the
independent variable is changed systematically.
 - - - - - - - - - -

independent variable the variable that an experimenter manipulates or modifies in order to

examine the effect on one or more dependent variables.

- - - - - - - - - -

Operationalization refers to the way in which the variable is measured or

manipulated in practice. In Milgram’s research a key independent variable was
the proximity of the ‘learner’ to the ‘teacher’. In one condition, learner and
teacher were in separate rooms; in a second condition, the teacher could hear the
learner but could not see him; in a third condition, the teacher could both see and
hear the learner’s reactions; in a fourth condition, the teacher had to hold the
learner’s hand down on a metal plate in order for the shock to be delivered. All
other aspects of the experimental setting were held constant, so that any
variations in the teacher’s behaviour in these four conditions should be
attributable to the change in proximity between teacher and learner.

- - - - - - - - - -

operationalization the way in which a theoretical construct is turned into a measurable dependent
variable or a manipulable independent variable in a particular study.

- - - - - - - - - -

The success of an experiment often hinges on the effectiveness of

manipulations of the independent variable. By effectiveness we mean (1) the
extent to which changes in the independent variable capture the essential
qualities of the construct that is theoretically expected to have a causal influence
on behaviour, and (2) the size of the changes that are introduced. For example, in
Milgram’s study, we should consider how well the four proximity conditions
capture the construct of proximity. What is being manipulated, clearly, is
physical proximity. Then there is the question of whether the changes between
the four conditions are sufficiently large to produce an effect. In this case it is
hard to see how the proximity variable could have been manipulated more
powerfully; an investigator who adopts weaker manipulations runs the risk of
failing to find the predicted effects simply because the variations across levels of
the independent variable are too subtle to have an impact. It has become standard
practice in social psychological experiments to include among the measured
variables one or more measures of the effectiveness of the manipulation; these
are known as manipulation checks.

- - - - - - - - - -

manipulation check a measure of the effectiveness of the independent variable.

- - - - - - - - - -

Assessing whether an independent variable has had an effect requires the

measurement of the participant’s behaviour or internal state. This measured
variable is known as the dependent variable, so called because systematic
changes in this measured variable depend upon the impact of the independent
variable. In Milgram’s study, the dependent variable was the intensity of shocks
in a 30-step sequence that the teacher was prepared to deliver. The results of
Milgram’s experiments are often expressed in terms of the percentage of
participants who gave the maximum shock level (corresponding to 450 volts).
The results of the Milgram (1965) study are shown in these terms in Figure 2.8.
A key question to ask of any dependent variable is the extent to which it is a
good measure of the underlying theoretical construct. In addition to this question
of the ‘fit’ between a theoretical construct and the measured or dependent
variable, the most important issue involved in designing dependent variables is
what type of measure to use. We will discuss this in more detail below.
FIGURE 2.8 Percentage of participants who administered the maximum shock
level, and who were therefore deemed to be fully obedient.
Source: Based on data reported by Milgram, 1965. Reproduction with
permission from SAGE Publications.
 - - - - - - - - - -

dependent variable the variable that is expected to change as a function of changes in the
independent variable. Measured changes in the dependent variable are seen as ‘dependent on’
manipulated changes in the independent variable.

- - - - - - - - - -

Laboratory experiments often involve deception, in the sense that the

participant is misled about some aspect of the research. The extent of this
deception can range from withholding information about the purpose of the
research to misleading participants into thinking that the research is concerned
with something other than its real purpose. The main reason for using deception
is that participants would act differently if they were aware of the true objective
of the study. If Milgram’s participants had known that his was a study of
obedience, we can be sure that the rate of disobedience would have been higher:
the participants would have wanted to demonstrate their ability to resist orders to
harm a fellow human.
Attitudes to the use of deception in social psychological research have changed
during the past 45 years: misleading participants about the nature of an
experiment is now viewed more negatively. The reason for this change is partly
moral (i.e. where possible one should avoid deceiving someone else, whether or
not in the context of an experiment) and partly practical (if participants are
routinely misled about research, they will enter any future research in the
expectation that they are going to be misled, which may influence their
behaviour). Striking an appropriate balance between being completely honest
with participants and wanting to study them free of the influence of their
knowledge of the nature of the experiment is difficult. Psychological research
conducted in universities in Europe, North America and Australasia is typically
subject to prior approval by an ethics committee that evaluates and monitors
research involving human participants, and national bodies such as the American
Psychological Association (APA) and the British Psychological Society (BPS)
have published guidelines concerning research using human participants that
should be followed by researchers (see Table 2.1).
Table 2.1 Summary of ethical principles governing psychological research.
Source: Copyright © 2010 by the American Psychological Association. (2010a).
Ethical principles of psychologists and code of conduct (2002, amended June 1,
2010). Reproduced with permission. No further reproduction or distribution is
permitted without written permission from the American Psychological
Association.
8.01 Institutional approval
When institutional approval is required, psychologists provide accurate
information about their research proposals and obtain approval prior to
conducting the research. They conduct the research in accordance with the
approved research protocol.
8.02 Informed consent to research
(a) When obtaining informed consent, psychologists inform participants about
(1) the purpose of the research, expected duration and procedures; (2) their right
to decline to participate and to withdraw from the research once participation
has begun; (3) the foreseeable consequences of declining or withdrawing; (4)
reasonably foreseeable factors that may be expected to influence their
willingness to participate such as potential risks, discomfort, or adverse effects;
(5) any prospective research benefits; (6) limits of confidentiality; (7) incentives
for participation; and (8) whom to contact for questions about the research and
research participants’ rights. They provide opportunity for the prospective
participants to ask questions and receive answers.
8.03 Informed consent for recording voices and images in research
Psychologists obtain informed consent from research participants prior to
recording their voices or images for data collection unless (1) the research
recording their voices or images for data collection unless (1) the research
consists solely of naturalistic observations in public places, and it is not
anticipated that the recording will be used in a manner that could cause personal
identification or harm, or (2) the research design includes deception, and
consent for the use of the recording is obtained during debriefing.
8.04 Client/patient, student and subordinate research participants
(a) When psychologists conduct research with clients/patients, students, or
subordinates as participants, psychologists take steps to protect the prospective
participants from adverse consequences of declining or withdrawing from
participation.
(b) When research participation is a course requirement or an opportunity for
extra credit, the prospective participant is given the choice of equitable
alternative activities.
8.05 Dispensing with informed consent for research
Psychologists may dispense with informed consent only (1) where research
would not reasonably be assumed to create distress or harm and involves (a) the
study of normal educational practices, curricula, or classroom management
methods conducted in educational settings; (b) only anonymous questionnaires,
naturalistic observations, or archival research for which disclosure of responses
would not place participants at risk of criminal or civil liability or damage their
financial standing, employability, or reputation, and confidentiality is protected;
or (c) the study of factors related to job or organization effectiveness conducted
in organizational settings for which there is no risk to participants’
employability, and confidentiality is protected or (2) where otherwise permitted
by law or federal or institutional regulations.
8.06 Offering inducements for research participation
(a) Psychologists make reasonable efforts to avoid offering excessive or
inappropriate financial or other inducements for research participation when
such inducements are likely to coerce participation.
(b) When offering professional services as an inducement for research
participation, psychologists clarify the nature of the services, as well as the
risks, obligations, and limitations.
8.07 Deception in research
(a) Psychologists do not conduct a study involving deception unless they have
determined that the use of deceptive techniques is justified by the study’s
significant prospective scientific, educational, or applied value and that effective
non-deceptive alternative procedures are not feasible.
non-deceptive alternative procedures are not feasible.
(b) Psychologists do not deceive prospective participants about research that is
reasonably expected to cause physical pain or severe emotional distress.
(c) Psychologists explain any deception that is an integral feature of the design
and conduct of an experiment to participants as early as is feasible, preferably at
the conclusion of their participation, but no later than at the conclusion of the
data collection, and permit participants to withdraw their data.
8.08 Debriefing
(a) Psychologists provide a prompt opportunity for participants to obtain
appropriate information about the nature, results, and conclusions of the
research, and they take reasonable steps to correct any misconceptions that
participants may have of which the psychologists are aware.
(b) If scientific or humane values justify delaying or withholding this
information, psychologists take reasonable measures to reduce the risk of harm.
(c) When psychologists become aware that research procedures have harmed a
participant, they take reasonable steps to minimize the harm.
8.10 Reporting research results
(a) Psychologists do not fabricate data.
(b) If psychologists discover significant errors in their published data, they take
reasonable steps to correct such errors in a correction, retraction, erratum, or
other appropriate publication means.
One way to address the ethical issues that arise from the use of deception is by
carefully debriefing participants. This is done at the end of the experimental
session and involves informing the participant as fully as possible about the
nature and purpose of the experiment, and the reason for any deception. In
Milgram’s study, for example, care was taken to assure participants that the
‘shocks’ they had administered were in fact bogus, and that the learner had not
been harmed in any way; the reason for the deception was also carefully
explained. The debriefing process should leave participants understanding the
purpose of the research, satisfied with their role in the experiment, and with as
much self-respect as they had before participating in the study.

- - - - - - - - - -

debriefing the practice of explaining to participants the purpose of the experiment in which they
have just participated and answering any questions the participant may have.

- - - - - - - - - -
 Experimental designs
When and why is it important to have a control condition in an
experiment?
As we have seen, it is important that participants are allocated randomly to the
different conditions of an experiment. Failure to achieve this goal constrains the
researcher from concluding that observed differences between conditions in the
dependent variable result from changes in the independent variable. We shall
now examine more closely the issue of designing experiments in order to rule
out alternative inferences as far as possible.
First consider a study that may appear to be an experiment but cannot properly
be described as experimental. This is the one-shot case study (Cook &
Campbell, 1979). To take a concrete example, imagine that a researcher wanted
to know the effect of a new teaching method on learning. The researcher takes a
class of students, introduces the new method, and measures the students’
comprehension of the taught material. What conclusions can be drawn from such
a design? Strictly speaking, none, for there is nothing with which the students’
comprehension can be compared, so the researcher cannot infer whether the
observed comprehension is good, poor or indifferent.

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one-shot case study a research design in which observations are made on a group after some event
has occurred or some manipulation has been introduced.

- - - - - - - - - -

A simple extension of the one-shot design provides the minimal requirements

for a true experimental study and is known as the post-test only control group
design. Here there are two conditions. In the experimental condition participants
are exposed to the manipulation (participants in this condition are known as the
experimental group), and possible effects of the manipulation are measured. In
the control condition there is no manipulation (here the participants are known as
the control group), but these participants are also assessed on the same
dependent variable and at the same time point as the experimental group. Now
the observation made in the experimental condition can be compared with
something: the observation made in the control condition. So the researcher
might compare one group of students who have been exposed to the new
teaching method with another group who continued to receive the normal
method, with respect to their comprehension of the course material. An
important point is that participants are randomly allocated to the two conditions,
ruling out the possibility that differences between the conditions are due to
differences between the two groups of participants that were present before the
new teaching method was implemented. So if the measure of students’
comprehension differs markedly between the two conditions, it is reasonable to
infer that the new teaching method caused this difference.

- - - - - - - - - -

post-test only control group design an experimental design in which participants are randomly
allocated to one of two groups; one group is exposed to the independent variable, another (the
control group) is not.

- - - - - - - - - -

- - - - - - - - - -

experimental group a group of participants allocated to the ‘experimental’ condition of the

experiment.

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- - - - - - - - - -

control group a group of participants who are typically not exposed to the independent variable(s)
used in experimental research.

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There are several other more sophisticated and complex designs, each
representing a more complete attempt to rule out the possibility that observed
differences between conditions result from something other than the
manipulation of the independent variable (see Cook & Campbell, 1979). A very
common design in social psychological experiments is the factorial experiment,
in which two or more independent variables are manipulated within the same
study. The simplest case that can be represented is that in which there are two
independent variables, each with two levels. Combining these, you have the
design shown in Figure 2.9. A factorial design contains all possible
combinations of the independent variables. In the design shown in Figure 2.9,
each independent variable has two levels, resulting in four conditions. The main
benefit of a factorial design is that it allows the researcher to examine the
separate and combined effects of two or more independent variables. The
separate effects of each independent variable are known as main effects. If the
combined effect of two independent variables differs from the sum of their two
main effects, this is known as an interaction effect.
FIGURE 2.9 Factorial experimental design involving two factors, each with two
levels.

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factorial experiment an experiment in which two or more independent variables are manipulated
within the same design.

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- - - - - - - - - -

main effect a term used to refer to the separate effects of each independent variable in a factorial
 experiment.

- - - - - - - - - -

- - - - - - - - - -

interaction effect a term used when the combination of two (or more) independent variables in a
factorial experiment yields an effect that differs from the sum of the main effects.

- - - - - - - - - -

To illustrate an interaction effect, let us consider Petty, Cacioppo, and

Goldman’s (1981) study of the effects of persuasive communications on attitude
change. To test Petty and Cacioppo’s (1986a) ‘elaboration likelihood model’, a
theory of persuasion (see Chapter 7), these researchers manipulated two
variables. The first was argument quality, i.e. whether the persuasive
communication the participants read consisted of strong or weak arguments in
favour of making the university examination system tougher. The second
variable was involvement, i.e. whether the participants, who were students,
thought that the university would introduce the tougher exam system next year,
such that it would affect them personally (high involvement), or in the next
decade, such that it would not affect them personally (low involvement).
According to the elaboration likelihood model, argument quality should have a
stronger impact on attitudes when participants are involved with the message
topic than when they are not. Figure 2.10 shows some of the key findings from
the study by Petty et al. (1981). It can be seen that the effect of argument quality
on attitudes was indeed much greater when involvement was high than when it
was low. Because the predicted effect is an interaction, testing this prediction
requires a factorial design.
FIGURE 2.10 Interaction between argument quality and involvement, showing
that argument quality had a much stronger effect on attitudes when involvement
was high.
Source: Based on data reported by Petty, Cacioppo & Goldman, 1981.
 An interaction effect is an instance of what is known more generally as
moderation, in which the effect of one variable on another varies in strength
depending on the level of a third variable. In other words, the role of the third
variable is in determining when (under what conditions) the independent variable
influences the dependent variable. In Figure 2.11, for example, the effect of
variable X on variable O is moderated by variable Z. Specifically, X has an
effect on O, but only when Z = 2 (Figure 2.11b). When Z = 1, X does not affect
O (Figure 2.11a). It is important to distinguish moderation from another type of
statistical relationship between three or more variables: namely, mediation.
FIGURE 2.11(a) and (b) Diagram to illustrate the moderating influence of
variable Z on the relationship between variables X and O. X only has an effect
on O when Z has the value 2 (b). When Z has the value 1 (a), there is no effect of
X on O.
 To understand the concept of mediation, consider that the phenomena of
interest to social psychologists often entail chains of events. If we strip this issue
down to its bare essentials, we can ask whether variable X influences variable O
directly, or whether the relation between X and O is mediated by another
variable, Z. In other words, X may have an effect on O, but this is not a direct
effect. Instead, X affects Z – the mediating variable – which in turn affects O
(so, X affects O via Z). Researchers are therefore not only concerned with if or
when X affects O: they are also concerned with how (through what process) X
affects O.
In modern social psychological research, researchers therefore often attempt to
measure mediating variables and then to conduct mediational analysis, for
which there are well-established procedures (see Judd & Kenny, 1981a, b;
Kenny, Kashy, & Bolger, 1998; Preacher & Hayes, 2004). By conducting an
experiment we may establish that there is a causal relation between X and O; but
we also measure Z, and find that the relation between X and Z is also very high,
as is the relation between Z and O. We can then examine whether, once the X–Z
and Z–O relationships are statistically taken into account, the originally
established relationship between X and O becomes smaller, or disappears. This
is the type of situation in which one can infer that the relationship between X
and O is mediated by Z (Baron & Kenny, 1986; see Leader in the Field, David
A. Kenny). This type of relationship is illustrated in Figure 2.12. In part (a), X
has a direct, positive effect on O. In part (b), when the relationships between X
and Z, and between Z and O, are taken into account, the direct effect of X on O
becomes non-significant. Instead, the indirect effect of X on O via Z is positive
and significant.
FIGURE 2.12(a) and (b) Diagram to illustrate that the effect of variable X on
variable O is mediated by variable Z. When Z is not taken into account, X has a
significant effect on O (a). Here X has a direct effect on O. When Z is taken into
account (b), the effect of X on O is non-significant. Here X has an indirect effect
on O, via Z.
 - - - - - - - - - -

mediating variable a variable that mediates the relation between two other variables.

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LEADER IN THE FIELD

David A. Kenny (b. 1946) took his undergraduate degree at the
University of California, Davis, followed by both his MA and PhD at
Northwestern University, where his adviser was the methodological
pioneer, Donald T. Campbell (see previous Leader in the Field). He
then taught at Harvard University, before moving to the University
of Connecticut, where he is now Board of Trustees Distinguished
Professor. He has published many influential methodological papers
and books, and is interested in the study of naturalistic social
behaviour and models of such behaviour. He has specialized in the
analysis of dyadic processes (where each person’s behaviour affects
the other person’s, with the result that they have to be treated as
inter-dependent, rather than independent, pieces of data). His paper
on moderation and mediation (co-authored with Reuben Baron;
Baron & Kenny, 1986) is one of the most-cited articles in the field.
He was honoured with the Donald T. Campbell Award by the
Society of Personality and Social Psychology in 2006, and is a
Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
 Threats to validity in experimental research
What is the difference between internal and external validity?
In a research context, validity refers to the extent to which one is justified in
drawing inferences from one’s findings. Experimental research attempts to
maximize each of three types of validity: internal validity, construct validity and
external validity.

- - - - - - - - - -

validity a measure is valid to the extent that it measures precisely what it is supposed to measure.

- - - - - - - - - -

Internal validity refers to the validity of the conclusion that an observed

relationship between independent and dependent variables reflects a causal
relationship, and is promoted by the use of a sound experimental design. We
have already seen that the use of a control group greatly enhances internal
validity, but even if one uses a control group there remain many potential threats
to internal validity (Brewer, 2000; Cook & Campbell, 1979). Chief among these
is the possibility that the groups being compared differ with respect to more than
the independent variable of interest.

- - - - - - - - - -

internal validity refers to the validity of the inference that changes in the independent variable
result in changes in the dependent variable.

- - - - - - - - - -

For example, let’s assume that in Milgram’s obedience research a different

experimenter had been used for each of the four conditions described earlier,
such that experimenter 1 ran all participants in one condition, experimenter 2 ran
all participants in another condition, and so on. It might seem efficient to divide
the work among different experimenters, but to do so in this way poses a major
threat to the internal validity of the experiment. This is because the four
conditions would no longer differ solely in terms of the proximity of the
‘victim’; they would also have different experimenters running them. Thus the
differing amounts of obedience observed in the four conditions might reflect the
impact of the proximity variable, or the influence of the different experimenters
(or, indeed, some combination of these two factors). The problem is that there
would be an experimental confound between the physical proximity variable
and a second variable, namely experimenter identity. It is impossible to
disentangle the effects of confounded variables.

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construct validity the validity of the assumption that independent and dependent variables
adequately capture the abstract variables (constructs) they are supposed to represent.

- - - - - - - - - -

Even when we are confident that the relationship between X and O is a causal
one, in the sense that internal validity is high, we need to consider carefully the
nature of the constructs involved in this relationship. Construct validity refers
to the validity of the assumption that independent or dependent variables
adequately capture the variables (or ‘constructs’) they are supposed to represent.
Even if the researcher has reason to feel satisfied with the construct validity of
the independent variable, there remains the question of whether the dependent
variables actually assess what they were intended to assess. There are three main
types of threat to the construct validity of dependent variables in social
psychological experimentation: social desirability, demand characteristics and
experimenter expectancy.

- - - - - - - - - -

experimental confound when an independent variable incorporates two or more potentially

separable components it is a confounded variable. When an independent variable is confounded, the
researcher’s ability to draw causal inferences is seriously compromised.

- - - - - - - - - -
 Social desirability refers to the fact that participants are usually keen to be
seen in a positive light, and may therefore be reluctant to provide honest reports
of anything which they think would be regarded negatively. Equally, participants
may ‘censor’ some of their behaviours so as to avoid being evaluated negatively.
To the extent that a researcher’s measures are affected by social desirability, they
fail to capture the theoretical construct of interest. An obvious way to reduce
social desirability effects is to make the measurement process unobtrusive: if
participants do not know what it is that is being measured, they will be unable to
modify their behaviour.

- - - - - - - - - -

social desirability refers to the fact that research participants are likely to want to be seen in a
positive light and may therefore adjust their responses or behaviour in order to avoid being
negatively evaluated.

- - - - - - - - - -

An alternative strategy is to measure individual differences in the tendency to

make socially desirable responses, and then to control for this statistically.
Paulhus (1984, 1991) has developed a measure known as the Balanced Inventory
of Desirable Responding (BIDR). This is a 40-item self-report questionnaire
designed to measure the tendency to give socially acceptable or desirable
responses. It consists of two sub-scales, one measuring self-deceptive
enhancement and the other measuring impression management. Examples of
items from each sub-scale are shown in Individual Differences 2.1. If scores on a
self-report measure (like attitudes to an ethnic minority group) are correlated
with BIDR scores, this suggests that self-reports are being biased in a socially
desirable direction.
We should note, however, that it is better to try to eliminate completely the
tendency to make socially desirable responses (rather than measuring it, and
controlling for it statistically), simply because we do not know precisely what
scales such as the BIDR measure.
Demand characteristics (see Chapter 1) are cues that unintentionally convey
the experimenter’s hypothesis to the participant. Individuals who know that they
are being studied will often have hunches about what the experimenter is
expecting to find. They may then attempt to provide the expected responses.
When behaviour is enacted with the intention of fulfilling the experimenter’s
hypotheses, it is said to be a response to the demand characteristics of the
experiment. Orne (1962, 1969) suggested ways of pinpointing the role demand
characteristics play in any given experimental situation. For example, he
advocated the use of post-experimental enquiry, in the form of an interview,
preferably conducted by someone other than the experimenter, the object being
to elicit from participants what they believed to be the aim of the experiment and
the extent to which this affected their behaviour. Clearly, researchers should do
all they can to minimize the operation of demand characteristics, for example by
using unobtrusive measures, that is, measures that are so subtle that
participants are unaware of the fact that they are being taken, or by telling
participants that the purpose of the experiment cannot be revealed until the end
of the study and that in the meantime it is important that they do not attempt to
guess the hypothesis. A cover story that leads participants to believe that the
purpose of the study is something other than the real purpose is a widely used
means of lessening the impact of demand characteristics.

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post-experimental enquiry a technique advocated by Orne (1962) for detecting the operation of
demand characteristics. The participant is carefully interviewed after participation in an experiment,
the object being to assess perceptions of the purpose of the experiment.

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unobtrusive measures (also called non-reactive measures) measures that the participant is not
aware of, and which therefore cannot influence his or her behaviour.

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cover story a false but supposedly plausible explanation of the purpose of an experiment; the
intention is to limit the operation of demand characteristics.

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 - - - - - - - - - -

INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 2.1

MEASURING THE TENDENCY TO RESPOND
IN SOCIALLY DESIRABLE WAYS
Paulhus (1984, 1991) has developed a measure known as the Balanced
Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR). On the basis of detailed pre-
testing, and prediction of actual differences in behaviour, Paulhus was able
to create two sub-scales, one measuring self-deceptive enhancement and the
other measuring impression management. Self-enhancement refers to the
tendency to think of oneself in a favourable light, whereas impression
management refers to a deliberate attempt to distort one’s responses in order
to create a favourable impression with others. Below are example items
from each sub-scale.
Self-enhancement
My first impressions of people usually turn out to be right
I always know why I like things
I never regret my decisions
I am a completely rational person
Respondents who agree with such items are deemed to have positively
biased images of themselves (on the grounds that it is unlikely that these
statements are true for most people).
Impression management
I never swear
I never conceal my mistakes
I never drop litter in the street
I never read sexy books or magazines
Respondents who agree with such items are deemed to be motivated to
present themselves in positive ways (again, it is unlikely that these
statements are true for most people).
Scores on these scales can be used to detect respondents who may be
 Scores on these scales can be used to detect respondents who may be
attempting to present themselves in a favourable light. If their scores on self-
enhancement or impression management scales are correlated with their
responses to other measures, it seems likely that the latter responses have
been affected by social desirability, and these effects can be partialled out
using statistical techniques.
Experimenter expectancy refers to the experimenter’s own hypothesis or
expectations about the outcome of the research. This expectancy can
unintentionally influence the experimenter’s behaviour towards participants in a
way that increases the likelihood that they will confirm the experimenter’s
hypothesis. Rosenthal (1966) called this type of influence the experimenter
expectancy effect (see Chapter 1). The processes mediating experimenter
expectancy effects are complex, but non-verbal communication is centrally
involved. An obvious way of reducing these effects is to keep experimenters
‘blind’ to the hypothesis under test, or at least blind to the condition to which a
given participant has been allocated; other possibilities include minimizing the
interaction between experimenter and participant, and automating the
experiment as far as possible. Indeed, in much current social psychological
research, the entire experiment, including all instructions to the participants, is
presented via a computer. This obviously limits the opportunity for
experimenters to communicate their expectancies (either verbally or non-
verbally).
Even if the experimenter manages to avoid all these threats to internal and
construct validity, an important question remains: to what extent can the causal
relationship between X and O be generalized beyond the circumstances of the
experiment? External validity refers to the generalizability of a finding beyond
the circumstances in which it was observed by the researcher. One important
feature of the experimental circumstances, of course, is the type of person who
participates in the experiment. In many cases participants volunteer their
participation, and to establish external validity it is important to consider
whether results obtained using volunteers can be generalized to other
populations. There is a good deal of research on differences between volunteers
and non-volunteers in psychological studies (see Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1975).
The general conclusion is that there are systematic personality differences
between volunteers and non-volunteers. Such findings are explained in terms of
volunteers’ supposedly greater sensitivity to and willingness to comply with
demand characteristics. The external validity of studies based only on
volunteers’ behaviour is therefore open to question, and the solution to this
problem is to use a ‘captive’ population, preferably in a field setting. One factor
that limits the influence of this problem is the use of ‘participant pools’ in many
psychology departments at large universities. Typically, these pools consist of
first-and (sometimes) second-year undergraduate students who have to
accumulate a set number of participant credits as part of their course. Thus,
participants in studies that recruit from these pools are not, strictly speaking,
volunteers.

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external validity refers to the generalizability of research findings to settings and populations other
than those involved in the research.

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Another criticism of social (and indeed other) psychological experiments is

that the participants are often university students. Sears (1986) examined
research articles published in major social psychology journals in 1985 and
found that 74 per cent were conducted with student participants. Although
students are certainly unrepresentative of the general population, being younger,
more intelligent and more highly educated than the average citizen, this in itself
is not a threat to the validity of the research. This is because the goal of much
social psychological research is to understand the process(es) underlying a
phenomenon (such as attitude change or stereotyping), rather than to describe the
general population (a goal for which survey research is much better suited). In
any case, there is often little reason to suppose that the processes underlying a
phenomenon such as attitude change or stereotyping differ in some fundamental
way between students and non-students.
 Social psychological experiments on the Internet
What are the advantages and disadvantages of web-based
experiments?
A relatively new development in psychological research is the use of the Internet
to recruit and conduct experiments (Internet experiments). People are invited
to participate in the research by visiting a website where the server runs the
whole study, from allocating participants to an experimental condition to
debriefing them about the nature and purpose of the study once they have
completed the experimental task. Birnbaum (2000) noted that the number of
experiments listed on sites such as the one maintained by the American
Psychological Society has grown very rapidly, by around 100 per cent per year,
and that many of these studies are social psychological.

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Internet experiment an experiment that is accessed via the Internet; participants access the
experiment via the web, receive instructions and questions on their computer screen and provide
responses via their keyboard or touch screen.

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What are the primary advantages and disadvantages of such web-based

experiments? A major advantage is the ease with which quite large amounts of
data can be collected in a relatively short time. Other advantages are that
participants are recruited from different countries, from different age groups and
– now that access to the Internet is more widespread – from different
socioeconomic backgrounds. An obvious disadvantage is that the researcher
loses a degree of control over the running of the experiment. Participants
complete the study in different physical settings, at different times of the day and
night, and probably with differing levels of motivation and seriousness.
There are three further issues that arise. The first concerns the
representativeness of those who choose to participate in an Internet study (they
tend to be white, to live in the US or Europe, and to be relatively young – but not
as young as those who take part in laboratory experiments). The second issue
concerns the effect of linguistic competence on the reliability and validity of
responses (most studies posted on the web are in English, and although the
majority of respondents tend to be from the US or other English-speaking
countries, some are not). The third issue is that those who choose to participate
in such studies are of course volunteers, raising the possibility that they differ
systematically from the general population with respect to certain personality
attributes. However, it is worth noting that Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava, and John
(2004) examined several preconceptions about web-based studies and concluded
that most of them were myths, without empirical foundation (see Table 2.2).
Table 2.2 How well do some common criticisms levelled at web-based studies stand up to empirical
scrutiny?
Source: Adapted from Table 1 of Gosling et al. (2004). American Psychologist,
59, 93–104. Adapted with permission of APA.
Preconceptions about Internet methods
Preconception Finding
1. Internet samples are Mixed. Internet samples are more diverse than
not demographically traditional samples in many domains (e.g. gender), but
diverse. they are not completely representative of the
population.
2. Internet samples are Myth. Internet users do not differ from non-users on
maladjusted, socially markers of adjustment and depression.
isolated, or depressed.
3. Internet participants Myth. Internet methods provide ways of motivating
are unmotivated. participants (e.g. by providing feedback).
4. Internet data are Fact. However, Internet researchers can take steps to
compromised by the eliminate repeat responders.
anonymity of
respondents.
5. Internet-based Myth? Evidence so far suggests that Internet-based
findings differ from findings are consistent with those obtained using
those obtained using traditional methods, but more data are needed.
other methods.
Gosling and colleagues (2004) compared a large Internet sample (N = 361,703)
with a set of 510 published traditional samples and were led to the conclusions
summarized above.
Despite the potential problems associated with running experiments on the
web, the evidence suggests that Internet studies yield results that parallel those
of conventional experiments (see Gosling et al., 2004). It is clear that this way of
conducting experiments is going to continue to expand very rapidly. Before
embarking on such research it is important to consult sources such as Nosek,
Banaji, and Greenwald (2002) and Reips (2002), who offer advice about how to
avoid the potential pitfalls.
 Problems with experimentation
What are the main criticisms that have been levelled at the use of
experiments in social psychology?
The experimental method is central to social psychology’s status as an empirical
science, largely because it provides the ‘royal road’ to causal inference (Aronson
et al., 1998). Nevertheless, there are numerous critiques of experimentation in
social psychology, some of which relate to the knowledge that experiments
provide, and some that question the assumptions that underlie experimentation.
These assumptions – shared with other disciplines that employ the scientific
method – include that the subject or object under study exists independently of
the researcher, and that the researcher occupies an ‘objective’ and ‘neutral’
stance when it comes to theory and analysis of the subject. Indeed, some radical
critiques of experimentation – such as those that inform discourse analysis, as
discussed above – reject these assumptions entirely, questioning the extent to
which there is an objective, knowable reality that can be studied scientifically
(e.g. Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Other critiques take a less radical stance, but
nevertheless question the role of the researcher in experimental settings, and
emphasize how the broader social context can shape the meaning and value of
experimental findings.
One problem concerns what Gergen (1978) has called the cultural
embeddedness of social events, by which he means that a laboratory
experimental demonstration that independent variable X has an impact on
dependent variable O needs to be qualified by adding that the wider social
circumstances in which X was manipulated may have played a role in producing
the effects on O. Smith, Bond, and (2006) review many social
psychological experiments, including the Milgram obedience experiment, that
have been conducted in different countries. It is not unusual for these
experiments to produce different findings in different cultural settings (see
Chapter 15). More generally, cross-cultural research often highlights how
supposedly universal psychological tendencies are actually linked to cultural
norms and values. For example, Miller (1984) studied the tendency to attribute
other people’s behavior to dispositional factors rather than contextual factors –
known as the fundamental attribution error – among Americans and Indian
Hindus. She found that while American adults did tend to explain others’
behaviour in terms of dispositional factors rather than situational or contextual
factors, Indian adults in contrast offered contextual explanations more frequently
than dispositional explanations. These differences were attributed to cultural
differences in how the self is conceptualized in everyday life.
A second issue is that although the ostensible goal of social psychological
experimentation is the accumulation of scientific knowledge, in the form of laws
or principles of social behaviour that are valid across time, there is some reason
to doubt whether experimentation (or, indeed, any other method) is capable of
generating evidence that could be the basis of such laws. To understand why this
is the case in social sciences but not in natural sciences, bear in mind that the
relationship between researcher and the object of study is radically different in
these two types of science. In contrast to the natural sciences, the objects of
investigation in social sciences are people, who of course attribute meaning and
significance to their own actions. Social psychology cannot therefore be neatly
separated from what it studies. Laypeople are able to acquire social
psychological knowledge and use it to modify their actions in a way that atoms,
elements and particles cannot.
One implication of this fact is that even well-supported social psychological
theories should not be regarded as embodying ‘laws’ that hold good across time:
if learning about a theory leads people to modify the behaviour that the theory
tries to explain, the theory has limited temporal validity. It is also worth noting,
however, that some of the problems of accumulation of knowledge in social
psychology can be addressed through the use of meta-analysis. Meta-analysis is
a technique for statistically integrating the results of independent studies of the
same phenomenon in order to establish whether findings are reliable across a
number of independent investigations (see Cooper, 1989; Hedges & Olkin, 1985;
Johnson & Eagly, 2000). The increasing use of meta-analysis in social
psychology (where relevant, one is cited in every chapter of this book) has
shown, without doubt, that many social psychological claims have, in fact, been
confirmed over multiple experiments, often conducted over many decades.

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meta-analysis a set of techniques for statistically integrating the results of independent studies of a
given phenomenon, with a view to establishing whether the findings exhibit a pattern of
relationships that is reliable across studies.

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 A third controversy concerns the extent to which the values, motives and
behaviour of experimenters influence the research process. This goes beyond our
earlier discussion of validity, demand characteristics and suchlike. Some
critiques suggest that a researcher can never be truly ‘objective’ and detached,
and that every aspect of the research process – including topics, theory and
hypotheses, and the interpretation of research findings – is informed by the
researchers’ value system. Even within a social psychology experiment, a
researcher is rarely uninvolved or detached. Rather, researchers exist in a power
relationship with participants, in which they instruct participants what to do, and
in turn the participant actively interprets the researcher’s actions and infers and
reacts to their intentions, often in complex ways that the researcher may not
recognize, or simply choose to ignore (Spears & Smith, 2001).
What are the implications of these problems for the status of experimentation
in social psychological research? It is important to note that defences of the
experimental method have been every bit as staunch as its critiques (e.g. Tetlock,
1994). Moreover, many critics of the experimental approach do not advocate the
abandonment of experimentation. For example, Gergen (1973) acknowledged
that experiments would continue to play an important role in explaining the
relationship between biological processes (such as physiological arousal) and
social behaviour; that studies such as the Milgram experiment are useful for
raising consciousness about the insidious nature of social influence; that
experiments can increase the impact of theories by providing vivid
demonstrations of conditions under which a theory makes successful predictions;
and that experimentation can be useful to evaluate social reforms, such as the
effectiveness of measures designed to conserve energy. Others (e.g. Spears &
Smith, 2001) point out that recognizing the subjective, involved role of an
experimenter – and the nuanced ways in which participants react – does not
invalidate the experimental method; rather it can actually provide us with a
richer and more complete understanding of the findings that emerge.
 Summary
In this section we examined different aspects of the use of experimentation in
social psychology. We began by describing the principal features of the social
psychological experiment, before going on to discuss some common
experimental designs. We then considered the main threats to validity in
experimental research, such as demand characteristics and experimenter
expectancy effects, before going on to describe how researchers are making
increasing use of the Internet to conduct experiments. Finally, we considered
some possible problems with the use of experiments in social psychological
research.
 DATA COLLECTION TECHNIQUES
What are the strengths and weaknesses of the principal data
collection techniques used in social psychological research?
Assuming that an investigator is conducting quantitative research, he or she will
need to measure one or more variables, regardless of which research strategy has
been adopted. In correlational designs the researcher has to measure each of the
variables that are expected to correlate. In experimental designs the researcher
needs to measure the dependent variable. In either case, the investigator is
confronted with the task of translating a theoretical construct (for example,
aggression) into a measurable variable (for example, willingness to harm
someone). Any psychological measure should be both reliable and valid.
Reliability here refers to the stability of the measure. If you measure an adult’s
height, the measurement will be highly stable from one day to the next and will
also be independent of who is doing the measuring. A reliable measure is one
that is not dependent on the time of measurement or on the person taking the
measurement. However, a measure can be highly reliable yet low in validity. To
pursue the height example, let us imagine that what you really want to measure
is a person’s weight. In the absence of a proper weighing scale you decide to
measure height instead, because you do have a tape measure. Of course, height
and weight are correlated with each other, so height may be a better estimate of
weight than simple guesswork. But clearly, height is not especially valid as a
measure of weight. So validity in this context refers to the extent to which the
measured variable captures the construct you want to measure.

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reliability the degree to which a measure is free from measurement error; a measure is reliable if it
yields the same result on more than one occasion or when used by different individuals.

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In social psychological research the investigator typically chooses to measure a

variable using one or more of the following: observational measures, self-report
measures or (a more recent development) implicit measures.
 Observational measures
If the object of one’s research is to collect information about social behaviour,
an obvious means of doing so is by observation. Many behaviours of interest to
social psychologists are detectable without sophisticated equipment and take
place in public settings, which makes them suitable for observation. Although
observational methods vary in kind from the informal and unstructured to the
highly formal and structured, the object in each case is the same: to extract from
the complex flux of social behaviour those actions that are of potential
significance to the research question, and to record each instance of such actions
over some period (Weick, 1985).
Sometimes the nature of the research setting or topic dictates that observation
is conducted in a relatively informal and unstructured manner, with the
researcher posing as a member of the group being observed. A classic example
of research employing this method is Festinger, Riecken, and Schachter’s (1956)
study of the consequences of blatant disconfirmation of strongly held beliefs.
The investigators identified a religious sect that predicted that the northern
hemisphere would be destroyed by flood on a certain date. By joining that sect,
members of the research team were able to observe what happened when the
predicted events failed to materialize. Under such circumstances, observation
clearly has to be covert and informal: if other sect members suspected that the
researchers were not bona fide believers, the opportunity for observation would
be removed. This type of observation is known as participant observation, and
typically yields qualitative data.

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participant observation a method of observation in which the researcher studies the target group
or community from within, making careful records of what he or she observes.

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More formal methods of observation can be used when it is possible to record

actions relevant to the research question without disrupting the occurrence of the
behaviour. An example is Dixon and Durrheim’s (2003) study of informal
segregation on racial lines on a beach in post-apartheid South Africa. Their
observational study charted the nature and extent of informal segregation by
plotting the distribution of members of different racial categories in different
areas of a Durban beach over time (Figure 2.13). In observing human spatial
distribution on the beach, they noted that pairs and small groups of people tend
to cluster together in areas the researchers termed ‘umbrella spaces’. These
spaces were typically marked by personal possessions and acted as regions in
which typical beach activities took place. They coded the racial composition of a
total of 2654 umbrella spaces during a defined time period. Over 99.9 per cent of
these spaces were racially homogeneous, either exclusively ‘white’ (N = 1949;
73.4 per cent) or exclusively ‘black’ (N = 705; 26.6 per cent). The pattern was
stable across time; during the entire observation period the researchers located
only one integrated grouping on the beachfront. In this instance the failure to
inform people that they were unwittingly participating in a research project is
covered by the ethical code shown earlier (see reference in APA guidelines to
‘naturalistic observations’).
FIGURE 2.13 Racial distribution on Scottburgh’s beachfront at 12.30 p.m. on
25 December 1999.
Note: Each red circle = one ‘black’ person; each blue circle = one ‘white’
person; each yellow circle = one Indian person.
Source: From Dixon and Durrheim (2003), with permission from John Wiley &
Sons. Photograph courtesy of Professor Durrheim.
 What these two examples have in common is the fact that the targets of the
researchers’ observations were unaware that they were being observed. Such
observation overcomes a problem peculiar to any research that uses humans as
participants, namely the tendency for the measurement process itself to have an
impact on participants’ behaviour, a phenomenon known as reactivity. It is well
established that the knowledge that one is being observed can influence
behaviour (see research on social facilitation effects, discussed in Chapter 8).
Awareness of this problem has led many researchers to develop unobtrusive
methods of observing and measuring behaviour. Webb, Campbell, Schwartz, and
Sechrest (2000) compiled a useful sourcebook of methods of unobtrusive
measurement.

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reactivity a measurement procedure is reactive if it alters the nature of what is being measured.

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 The most formal type of observational method is one in which the researcher
uses a predetermined category system for scoring social behaviour. A well-
known example of such a system is Bales’s (1950) interaction process analysis
(IPA), developed to study interaction in small social groups. Here the verbal
exchanges between group members are coded in terms of 12 predetermined
categories (e.g. ‘requests information’; see Chapter 12). The scores of group
members can then be used to determine (among other things) who is the leader
of the group (see Bales & Slater, 1955). Further examples of observational
coding schemes can be found in Bakeman (2000).
Observational methods of data collection have two main advantages over the
self-report methods we shall consider below: first, they can often be made
unobtrusively; second, even where the participant knows that his or her
behaviour is being observed, enacting the behaviour is typically quite
engrossing, with the result that participants have less opportunity to modify their
behaviour than they would when completing a questionnaire. Nevertheless, there
are some types of behaviour that are either difficult to observe directly (because
they are normally enacted in private) or impossible to observe directly (because
they took place in the past). Moreover, social psychologists are often interested
in measuring people’s perceptions, cognitions or evaluations, none of which can
be directly assessed simply through observation. For these reasons, researchers
often make use of self-report measures.
 Self-report measures
The essential feature of data collection using self-report measures is that
questions about issues such as the participant’s beliefs, attitudes and behaviour
are put directly to the participant. The responses are self-report data. Self-report
measurement is usually quicker, cheaper and easier to use than observational
measurement. The researcher does not have to contrive a laboratory setting or
find a natural setting in which to observe a behavioural response; furthermore,
there is typically no need to train observers or to use recording equipment,
because self-reports are usually recorded by the participant. Finally, as noted
above, some of the variables that are of most significance to social psychologists
are not directly observable. For these reasons, self-report measurement is very
common in social psychological research, and it is not unusual for studies to
depend exclusively on self-report data.
There are two principal methods of collecting self-report data: the
questionnaire and the interview. In the questionnaire method, participants are
given a set of questions, along with instructions on how to record their answers
(nowadays, this is often done by means of web-based surveys too). In the
interview method, questions are put to the participant by an interviewer, who
then records the participant’s responses. Interviewing is particularly useful when
there is reason to believe that the questions might be difficult to understand
without clarification. A tactful and sensitive interviewer should be able to
establish rapport and ensure that the respondent fully comprehends a question
before answering. Another advantage of interviewing is that interviews can be
‘semi-structured’, meaning that although the interviewer has a set series of topics
to be covered in the interview, he or she is able to vary the specific questions
that are asked so that they are relevant to the unfolding discussion. However,
interviewing is costly in terms of time and money, and a poorly trained
interviewer can easily bias the respondent’s answers by hinting at a desired or
socially acceptable response. Questionnaires are especially useful for gathering
data from large numbers of participants with minimal expense, and the
comparative anonymity of the process is preferable when the questions touch on
sensitive issues. On the other hand, many people who are given questionnaires
fail to complete and/or return them. Response rates for questionnaires sent by
mail to randomly selected names and addresses vary between 10 and 50 per cent.
Because there is always the danger that non-respondents differ systematically
from respondents in some respect, low response rates are undesirable.
Devising a good questionnaire or interview schedule is a harder task than you
might imagine. As with any psychological measure, the goal is to produce
questions that are reliable and valid. Although there are many potential sources
of unreliability in the construction of questionnaires, the most serious threat to
reliability is ambiguity: if a question is ambiguous, different respondents may
interpret it differently and therefore provide answers to what is in effect a
different question. The most serious threat to question validity is failure on the
part of the investigator to have specific objectives for each question: the hazier
the intent of the researcher in posing a particular question, the greater are the
chances that it will fail to elicit information relevant to his or her objectives.
However, there are other sources of unreliability and invalidity that cannot easily
be controlled. A simple rule-of-thumb is never to assume that answers to a single
question will reliably or validly measure a construct. If two or more items are
used to measure that construct, the factors that decrease reliability and validity of
responses to any single question should cancel each other out, so a measure
based on the average of the responses to the different items will be a more
reliable measure of the underlying construct.
Because it is difficult to envisage all the potential pitfalls in questionnaire
construction, there is no substitute for pilot work in which drafts of the final
questionnaire are administered to participants whose answers and comments
provide a basis for revision. Constructing an entirely fresh questionnaire can
therefore be a time-consuming and painstaking process. Fortunately, there are
collections of previously developed and pre-tested questionnaires, such as the
one edited by Robinson, Shaver, Wrightsman, and Andrews (1991). It is worth
checking such a source before setting out to construct an original questionnaire.
If no suitable questionnaire already exists, the researcher should consult a text on
questionnaire design such as the one by Oppenheim (1992) before devising a
fresh questionnaire.
Self-report measures have several advantages. What are their drawbacks?
Obviously it is not possible to collect self-report data completely unobtrusively:
participants are aware that they are under investigation, and may modify their
responses as a result of this awareness. In particular, there is ample opportunity
for the respondent’s answers to be influenced by motivational factors, such as
social desirability. There is no simple solution to this difficulty, although there
are steps that can be taken which reduce the scale of the problem. First, it is
worth emphasizing to participants whenever possible that their responses are
anonymous. Second, it is worth stressing the point that there are no right or
wrong answers. Third, it is often possible to increase participants’ motivation to
respond truthfully by treating them as research accomplices rather than ‘guinea-
pigs’. Fourth, one could measure individual differences in the tendency to make
socially desirable responses, and then control for these statistically. Fifth, one
can validate self-report measures by checking them against reports provided by
observers, who are unlikely to share the same biases as those making the self-
reports (see Hewstone, Judd, & Sharp, 2011).
 Implicit measures
A recent development in social psychological research methods has been the
increasing use of techniques for measuring perceptions, cognitions and
evaluations that do not rely on the usual type of self-report measure, thereby
avoiding the disadvantages of the latter. These techniques are often referred to as
implicit measures (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Although not previously widely
used, implicit measures have a long history in social psychology: Campbell
(1950) published a classic paper on the indirect assessment of attitudes more
than half a century ago.

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implicit measures measures of constructs such as attitudes that are unobtrusively assessed (e.g. by
reaction times) so that participants are unaware of what is being assessed.

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What is different about the modern use of implicit measures is that they
usually take advantage of computer technology (Figure 2.14). Here computers
are used not only for the presentation of experimental materials but also (and
more importantly) for the precise measurement of various aspects of the
participants’ responses to these materials. An example of an implicit measure is
the use of response latencies (i.e. how long it takes a participant to answer a
particular question). Such measures can provide fresh insights into cognitive
structures and processes.
FIGURE 2.14 Implicit measures usually take advantage of computer
technology.
Source: © Konvex/Franziska Pilz. www.konvex.net. Used with permission.
 For example, Mussweiler (2006) reported a series of studies in which he
investigated whether behaving in a stereotyped way activates the corresponding
stereotype. It is known that activating the stereotype of the elderly induces
people to walk more slowly (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996). Mussweiler
wanted to examine whether the reverse is also true. Would walking more slowly
activate the stereotype of the elderly? In one of his studies participants were
instructed to walk at a speed determined by a metronome while listening to a
story presented through headphones. The pace of walking was manipulated to be
30 paces per minute (slow) or 90 paces per minute (control). Participants then
performed a lexical decision task, in which they had to judge as quickly and as
accurately as possible whether strings of letters presented on a computer screen
were words or non-words. Some of the real words were elderly-stereotypical
(e.g. forgetful, wise) and others were not (e.g. right, unclear). Participants in the
slow walking condition were faster to judge the elderly-stereotypical words than
their counterparts in the control walking condition; however, they were no faster
to make judgments about the non-stereotypical words. The advantage of using an
implicit measure in this context is that participants simply are unaware of what it
is that is being assessed in the lexical decision task, so the findings cannot be
explained in terms of demand characteristics. Examples of the use of implicit
measures to assess attitudes can be found in Chapter 6.
A major advantage of implicit measures is that they are not reactive. That is,
implicit measures are not subject to biases such as social desirability and demand
characteristics, because they tap processes that the respondent cannot control
(and sometimes even operate outside awareness). However, it does not follow
automatically that such measures have high validity. How does one know, for
example, whether a fast reaction time reflects automatic stereotyping, as opposed
to individual or group differences in lexical knowledge? To address questions
such as this, one ideally needs to have other measures (e.g. observational) that
provide evidence that converges with the evidence provided by implicit
measures. In principle such evidence helps to establish the convergent validity
of both types of measure. Convergent validity is established when different
operationalizations of the same construct produce the same results.

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convergent validity established by showing that different measures of the same construct (e.g. self-
report, implicit, observation) are significantly associated with each other.

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Another key advantage of implicit measures is that they can assess constructs
and processes that may be outside the awareness of the individual. If people are
not aware of having certain thoughts or feelings, they will by definition be
unable to report them, even if they are highly motivated to be honest. The study
of ‘automatic’ processes has become a key theme in social cognition research
(see Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). Given that one of the attributes of an automatic
process is that the individual is unaware of it, studying such a process requires
the use of implicit measurement.
 Choosing a measure
All three types of measure considered here have certain advantages and
disadvantages. Although there are no hard-and-fast rules for choosing one type
of measure over another, two points should be borne in mind when judging the
appropriateness of a measure. First, the three types of measure – observational,
self-report and implicit – can be used in conjunction with each other in many
types of research. Second, the three types of measure differ in terms of the type
of information they yield. If observational, self-report and implicit measures of
the same conceptual variable point to the same conclusion, this clearly enhances
confidence in that conclusion. Furthermore, self-report measures often assess the
outcome of a process; by using observational and implicit measures as well, the
researcher can gain insight into the processes responsible for that outcome. A
special quality of implicit measures is that they enable researchers to capture
aspects of the individual’s thoughts, feelings and behaviour that are beyond
conscious control and therefore not susceptible to feigning.
 Social neuroscience
Strictly speaking, social neuroscience is an interdisciplinary field of enquiry
rather than a data collection technique, but we include it here because
researchers who adopt a social neuroscience approach to studying social
behaviour typically measure neural activity, in addition to observational, self-
report, or implicit measures. So although social neuroscience involves much
more than the use of measures of biological processes, it is the measurement of
such processes that is the most distinctive characteristic of the social
neuroscience approach. As Cacioppo and colleagues (2007, p. 101) put it, ‘An
assumption underlying social neuroscience is that all human social behavior is
implemented biologically.’ This assumption leads researchers who adopt this
approach to study the ‘social brain’. The most popular way to do this is by using
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), a technique for studying the
regions of the brain that are activated while people engage in tasks such as
perceiving self and others, regulating their emotions, and thinking about social
groups. The technique works by measuring the changes in blood flow that relate
to neural activity.

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social neuroscience an interdisciplinary field devoted to understanding how biological systems

implement social processes and behaviour.

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Although the use of fMRI to study social behaviour is a new endeavour and
remains expensive in terms of equipment costs and training time, there is no
doubt that its popularity will grow, as social psychologists become more familiar
with the opportunities it affords and neuroscientists become increasingly
motivated to study human social behaviour. To illustrate the potential for using
fMRI to gain a better understanding of social psychological phenomena,
consider a study by Harris and Fiske (2006). These researchers studied neural
responses to ‘extreme’ outgroups, such as drug addicts and homeless people,
groups who in terms of the stereotype content model (see Chapter 14) are seen as
low in both warmth and competence (in contrast, for example, to the elderly,
who are seen as high in warmth but low in competence, or rich people, who are
seen as high in competence but low in warmth). It is known that there is an area
of the brain, the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), which is activated during
social cognition. Harris and Fiske found that the mPFC was activated by
photographs depicting people belonging to all kinds of groups except those
scoring low on both warmth and competence. Instead, viewing photographs of
these groups activated the insula, a brain area associated with disgust. So the
neural evidence from this study is consistent with the view that extreme
outgroups are not thought about in the same way as members of other social
groups (indeed, they may be seen as less than human; see Chapter 14).
 Summary
This section examined the main data collection techniques available to the social
psychological researcher. Three such techniques were identified: observational,
self-report and implicit measurement. We noted that each technique has its own
advantages and disadvantages, and that there is often a case for using more than
one type of measure in a piece of research. We also noted the emergence of
social neuroscience as a new interdisciplinary field of enquiry in which
researchers use techniques such as brain imaging to study the neural bases of
human social behaviour.

CHAPTER SUMMARY
What are research methods, and what is meant by methodology?
Research methods are the procedures a researcher uses to gather
information, and methodology is a term used to refer to all aspects of the
implementation of methods.
How do researchers test their theoretical predictions, and where do these
predictions come from? Information gathered using research methods is
used to test the researcher’s theoretical predictions. These predictions are
derived from a theory. The theory is often generated through observation
of real-life events or by trying to make sense of puzzling findings from
previous research.
What research strategies are available? We described three quantitative
research strategies: quasi-experiments, true randomized experiments and
survey research. Two key ways in which these strategies differ are in
terms of (1) the degree to which one is able to generalize to a population
and (2) the degree to which one can draw inferences about causality.
What are qualitative research methods? These are methods that do not
aim to provide, and indeed cannot provide, numerical data. They tend to
focus on textual and interpretative analysis, and are often used by
researchers who believe that quantitative methods are unsuited to
studying the phenomenon under investigation. Discourse analysis was
identified as a popular qualitative approach. Discourse analysis
emphasizes the importance of how social phenomena are constructed
through discourse.
What are the main features of social psychological experiments? We
singled out the experiment for detailed discussion because of its
prominence as a research strategy in social psychology during the last six
decades. The main features of experimentation are the experimental
scenario; the independent variable; the dependent variable; the
manipulation check; and debriefing.
What is a true experimental design? It is one that enables the researcher
to infer that changes in the independent variable produce changes in the
dependent variable. Such a design must therefore incorporate more than
one condition, allowing the researcher to compare observations made
under different conditions.
What is the minimal true experimental design? It is the post-test only
control group design, in which participants are randomly allocated to one
of two conditions, only one of which involves being exposed to the
manipulation. Several more complex designs are available, and of these
the factorial design is very commonly used, mainly because of its ability
to test predictions concerning interaction effects.
What is ‘validity’ in the context of research methods? Drawing strong
inferences from social psychological research depends on three types of
validity: internal, construct and external. We identified confounding as a
threat to internal validity; social desirability effects, demand
characteristics and experimenter effects as threats to construct validity;
and volunteer/non-volunteer differences as a threat to external validity.
Can the Internet be used as a way of collecting research? The Internet
has provided social (and other) psychologists with a new arena in which
to conduct experiments, enabling them to reach larger and more diverse
groups of participants. The evidence to date suggests that, despite the
potential problems of web-based experiments, their results tend to parallel
those obtained using conventional methods.
What are the possible disadvantages of experiments? Some social
psychologists have questioned the usefulness of experiments. We
identified the cultural embeddedness of social behaviour, the fact that
social behaviour is determined by multiple factors, and the ability of
humans to modify their behaviour in the light of social psychological
theories as grounds for questioning the assumption that experimentation
generates cumulative knowledge of the laws governing social behaviour.
What are the principal ways in which data can be collected in social
psychological research? We identified three principal methods:
 observational measurement, self-report measurement and implicit
measures. Observational and implicit measures have the advantage of
being less susceptible to social desirability effects, and can be made
completely unobtrusive. However, observational measures are obviously
limited to phenomena that can be observed and are not suited to the
assessment of covert cognitive phenomena such as attitudes, causal
attributions and stereotypes (see Chapters 3, 6, 7 and 14).
How can the ‘covert’ phenomena that are often of interest to social
psychologists be studied? To study such covert phenomena, researchers
have traditionally relied on self-report measures, although there has been
an increasing tendency to make use of implicit measures, the goal of
which is to reveal phenomena that may either be outside the awareness of
the individual or be misreported in conventional self-report measures due
to social desirability concerns.
Can the different ways of collecting data be used in conjunction? There
are obvious advantages in using these different types of measure in
conjunction with each other.
Do new ways of imaging brain activity have anything to offer social
psychology? Social psychologists and neuroscientists will make
increasing use of techniques such as brain imaging in the search for a
better understanding of the neural underpinnings of human social
behaviour.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

Aronson, E., Ellsworth, P. C., Carlsmith, J. M., & Gonzales, M. H. (1990).
Methods of research in social psychology (2nd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill. A
comprehensive introduction to research methods in social psychology, with an
emphasis on experimentation.
Cook, T. D., & Campbell, D. T. (1979). Quasi-experimentation: Design and
analysis issues for field settings. Chicago: Rand McNally. An authoritative
account of how to minimize threats to validity by careful research design.
Fiske, S. T., Gilbert, D. T., & Lindzey, G. (Eds.). (2010). Handbook of Social
Psychology (5th ed., Vol. 1). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. The most recent edition of
this essential handbook, containing contributions on experimentation (Chapter
2), non-experimental methods (Chapter 3), and data analysis (Chapter 4).
Greenberg, J., & Folger, R. (1988). Controversial issues in social research
methods. New York: Springer. This book does a good job of presenting the
debates surrounding key issues in research.
Greenwood, J. D. (1989). Explanation and experiment in social psychological
science: Realism and the social constitution of action. New York: Springer. An
interesting, critical treatment of the philosophical background to research
methods.
Haslam, S. A., & McGarty, C. (2003). Research methods and statistics in
psychology. London: Sage. A highly accessible book written by social
psychologists who believe that you cannot understand psychology unless you
understand the process of conducting and interpreting psychological research.
Reis, H. T., & Judd, C. M. (Eds.). (2000). Handbook of research methods in
social and personality psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press.
State-of-the-art coverage of the key methodological issues in social and
personality psychology.
 Chapter 3

Social Perception and Attribution

Brian Parkinson

Source: © Ron Chapple. Used under licence from Getty Images.

KEY TERMS

actor–observer difference
analysis of non-common effects
attributional biases
augmenting principle
averaging
causal attribution
causal power
causal schema
central trait
cognitive algebra
configural model
consensus information
consistency information
correspondence bias
 correspondent inference theory
covariation theory
depressive realism
discounting principle
distinctiveness information
false consensus bias
implicit personality theory
learned helplessness theory
naïve scientist model
peripheral trait
primacy effect
probabilistic contrast
salience
self-fulfilling prophecy
self-serving attributional biases
social perception
summation
CHAPTER OUTLINE
INTRODUCTION
SOCIAL PERCEPTION
Summary
ATTRIBUTION THEORY
Correspondent inference theory Covariation theory
Access to covariation information Knowledge, expectation and covariation
Learning about causation using covariation and causal power Attributions
and achievement Attribution and depression
Misattribution of arousal
Attributional biases
Explaining intentional behaviour The naïve scientist metaphor Attributions
as discourse
Summary
SOCIAL PERCEPTION AND SOCIAL REALITY
AUTOMATIC AND CONTROLLED SOCIAL PERCEPTION

ROUTE MAP OF THE CHAPTER

Other people are so much part of our everyday lives that we take our
Other people are so much part of our everyday lives that we take our
understanding of them for granted. We are so familiar with their
characteristics and activities that we rarely think about how we manage to
make sense of their similarities and differences, and the puzzling or
complicated things they sometimes do. This chapter describes research
designed to address these processes. Studies of how we perceive information
about the social world show that impressions of what others are like depend
on what information is provided and when. Our assumptions about how
personality characteristics fit together also make a difference. Research into
how people explain events shows that people do not see all possible
explanations of behaviour as equally likely. For example, systematic biases
occur when we attach disproportionate importance to personalities and
abilities as causes (especially in individualistic Western societies).
Impressions and explanations also depend on current motivations and goals.
Indeed, we may describe and explain social events in different ways to
different people and under different circumstances. Therefore, both
communication and private interpretation seem to play a role in social
perception and attribution.
 INTRODUCTION
Can you remember first meeting your closest friend? How quickly did you get a
sense of what he or she was like, and of how you would get on together? Did
your impression turn out to be correct, and if not, where and why did you go
wrong?
Now imagine someone telling you about another person instead of you
meeting them face to face. Although you might usually expect to receive
information about appearance, age, occupation and a whole range of other
things, let’s assume that this time (strange as it might seem) you are only told
about the person’s personality characteristics (trait information). Let’s also
assume that you receive the information in the form of single words rather than
complete sentences, and that you are given no opportunity to ask further
questions. Try it now. What kind of person is described by these adjectives?
intelligent – skilful – industrious – warm – determined – practical – cautious
How easy was it to form your impression this time? Did you reach your
conclusions in the same way as when you first met your friend? Are you as
confident that your judgement is correct?
Even when meeting someone for the first time, you usually know something
about what to expect. Even if you haven’t heard anything about the person, the
place you meet (a bar, lecture theatre or supermarket) tells you something about
them. You already know that they must be the kind of person who goes
somewhere like this, and this category information may provide sufficient
evidence for your purposes (see Chapter 4, and Fiske & Neuberg, 1990).
However, it can happen that we start with very few clues and need to construct
impressions from scratch. And we often make up our minds about whom we like
and dislike before any conversation begins.
But people we dislike at first can later become great friends, and people we
think we will like may ultimately prove less congenial. In any enduring
relationship, we get to see how the other person acts in different situations and
may use these observations to draw conclusions about their feelings and
personality. It is rare indeed that all this subsequent information perfectly
matches first impressions.
This chapter is about how we make sense of other people. Because we draw
conclusions about someone else’s personality so readily, and because we usually
have little trouble understanding the meaning of their actions, it may seem that
our social perceptions are straightforward and direct. However, the fact that we
often have to correct initial impressions suggests that matters may be more
complicated. Most social psychologists believe that we piece together and weigh
up available information before arriving at any conclusion, even when we are
not explicitly aware of going through the stages of such a process. And each
additional stage brings another opportunity for bias to creep in.
It is important to understand both how we perceive other people and how we
explain their behaviour, because both these processes make a difference to the
way we act. A teacher who explains poor performance in terms of a pupil’s lack
of ability may devote less effort to coaching that pupil. On a broader scale,
prejudice may lead us to see economic disadvantage as arising from a person or
group’s negative characteristics rather than deeper structural problems in society
(see also Chapter 14). Knowing what biases shape our understanding of others
helps us to guard against their potentially negative influence.
The next section of this chapter will review research into social perception,
focusing on how information is combined when forming impressions of others.
The rest of the chapter concerns attribution theory, which focuses on people’s
causal explanations. After describing general models of how information is
processed in order to infer the causes of behaviour, we consider how attributions
influence our motivations and emotions, and examine evidence for various
attributional biases. Next, we discuss the role of language and conversation in
the attribution process. Finally, we consider how data-driven perceptual
processes might combine with conversational processes in social perception and
attribution.

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social perception the process of collecting and interpreting information about another person’s
individual characteristics.

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 SOCIAL PERCEPTION
How do we form impressions of what other people are like?
Pioneering research conducted by Asch (1946) shaped the way social
psychologists investigate and understand perceptions of other people. What
struck Asch was how quickly we seem to arrive at impressions, despite the
diversity of information that needs to be combined. To investigate this process,
Asch read out personality adjectives to students and instructed them to form an
impression of the person (target) described by these words (just as you were
asked to do at the beginning of this chapter).
One of Asch’s first studies compared two lists of adjectives that were identical
except for a single word. The first list contained the same words that you read
earlier (intelligent, skilful, industrious, warm, determined, practical, cautious).
Think about these words again. Which do you think gave you the most useful
information?
The second list simply replaced the word ‘warm’ with the word ‘cold’. Asch
found that this single change made a big difference. Participants hearing the
‘warm’ list were far more likely to describe the target as generous, wise, and
good-natured. Effects even extended to perception of physical characteristics
concerning whether the target was short, thin, or pale (see Figure 3.1). A typical
description was ‘A person who believes certain things to be right, wants others
to see his point, would be sincere in an argument and would like to see his point
won’ (Asch, 1946, p. 263). By contrast, a typical description of the ‘cold
personality’ was ‘A rather snobbish person who feels that his success and
intelligence set him apart from the run-of-the-mill individual. Calculating and
unsympathetic . . .’ (p. 263).
FIGURE 3.1 Impressions of ‘warm’ and ‘cold’ targets.
Source: Based on Asch, 1946. Copyright © 1946 by the American Psychological
Association. Adapted with permission. Journal of Abnormal and Social
Psychology, 41, 258–290. The use of APA information does not imply
endorsement by APA.
 In the next experiment, Asch assessed the effect of replacing ‘polite’ with
‘blunt’ instead of ‘warm’ with ‘cold’ (as used in the lists above) and found that
these new words did not yield such different impressions. This suggests that
warmth is seen as a central trait that alters the meaning of the target’s whole
personality, whereas politeness is a more peripheral trait that has only specific
and delimited effects. However, Asch found that trait centrality also depends on
what other words are presented, and that no word is central across all possible
contexts (see Zanna & Hamilton, 1972).

- - - - - - - - - -

central trait a dispositional characteristic viewed by social perceivers as integral to the

organization of personality.

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peripheral trait a trait whose perceived presence does not significantly change the overall
interpretation of a person’s personality.

- - - - - - - - - -
 Other experiments showed that the sequencing of adjectives also made a
difference. In particular, earlier information exerted a disproportionate impact on
impressions. For example, a target described as intelligent, industrious,
impulsive, critical, stubborn, and envious was seen as competent and ambitious,
but when exactly the same words were presented in the opposite order (so that
‘envious’ came first), the target was thought to be overly emotional and socially
maladjusted. This greater influence of initial information is generally known as a
primacy effect. Evidently, people do not wait until all evidence is in before
starting to integrate it. Primacy effects can be stronger when perceivers are under
time pressure and motivated to arrive at a conclusion quickly and accurately (i.e.
when their need for closure is higher; see Kruglanski & Freund, 1983).

- - - - - - - - - -

primacy effect the tendency for earlier information to be more influential in social perception and
interpretation.

- - - - - - - - - -

Early information can also have strong effects on judgements of people

actually confronted in person (rather than described in words). In Kelley’s
(1950) study, students rated a guest lecturer’s teaching more positively and
asked more questions when he had been introduced as a ‘warm’ person than
when he had been introduced as a ‘cold’ person. In this study, the first thing that
students learned about the target was that he was either warm or cold, so the
results can be explained by either primacy or trait centrality. It is also worth
noting that most introductions focus on a speaker’s positive rather than negative
qualities, and thus the unexpectedness of the ‘cold’ description of the lecturer
may have given it more impact on ratings and behaviour than under other
circumstances.
The results presented so far suggest that people do not simply add together the
bits of information they receive about a target (summation), but instead actively
construct meaning based on their ideas about how different personality
characteristics hang together. As later theorists concluded, these ideas are
organized in implicit personality theories that help social perceivers make
sense of other people (e.g. Bruner & Tagiuri, 1954). More generally, the notion
that people integrate social information by trying to discern its overall pattern is
referred to as the configural model.

- - - - - - - - - -

summation perceivers add together pieces of information about a person; when other information
is strongly positive, additional mildly positive information yields a more positive impression.

- - - - - - - - - -

- - - - - - - - - -

implicit personality theory an integrated set of ideas held by a social perceiver about how
different traits tend to be organized within a person.

- - - - - - - - - -

- - - - - - - - - -

configural model a holistic approach to impression formation, implying that social perceivers
actively construct deeper meanings out of the bits of information that they receive about other
people.

- - - - - - - - - -

The alternative cognitive algebra model suggests that separate pieces of

information are simply averaged (averaging, e.g. Anderson, 1981). For
example, if a person is described as ‘warm’ and ‘boring’, the overall impression
would be less positive than if he or she were described as ‘warm’ and
‘interesting’, but more positive than if he or she were described as ‘cold’ and
‘boring’. According to this view, disproportionate effects of ‘central’ adjectives
depend on them conveying comparatively more evaluative information than the
other words that are presented. Further, the impact of a word may depend on its
relevance to the judgement being made. For example, we care more about
whether someone is ‘warm’ when selecting a potential friend than a plumber,
and therefore attach more weight to its connotations. Asch’s (1946) configural
model, by contrast, implies that central adjectives change the interpretation of
other words rather than simply attracting greater emphasis.

- - - - - - - - - -

cognitive algebra a proposed process for averaging or summing trait information when forming
impressions of other people.

- - - - - - - - - -

- - - - - - - - - -

averaging perceivers compute the (weighted or unweighted) mean value of pieces of information
about a person; when other information is strongly positive, additional mildly positive information
yields a less positive impression.

- - - - - - - - - -

But do social perceivers always make sense of personality information in

either of these ways? In Asch’s (1946) experiments, participants heard a list of
separate personality adjectives and were explicitly told to construct an
impression based on these words (as in the task at the start of this chapter). As
Asch acknowledged, this is unlike what normally happens when we meet
someone face to face (e.g. getting to know your best friend for the first time).
How then might this particular way of presenting information have affected
processes of impression formation?
Some people get acquainted by e-mail before ever physically meeting (see
Chapter 11). It may take months or even years before they so much as exchange
photographs (not necessarily genuine ones: see Ben-Ze’ev, 2004), assuming that
they ever do (see Joinson, 2003). What happens when these people finally
confront one another in the flesh? Are they surprised by what they see?
Considerations such as this suggest that transmitting information in words
rather than raw sensory data (sights, sounds, and smells) makes a difference to
the content of our impressions. Further, sensory information can carry direct
implications about personality. For example, people with large, round eyes, short
noses, high foreheads, and/or small chins (baby-faced individuals) are typically
perceived as less dominant, more naïve and warmer than people with mature-
seeming features (e.g. Berry & McArthur, 1986; Figure 3.2), and people with
louder or higher-pitched voices are often perceived as more extraverted (e.g.
Scherer & Scherer, 1981). The way that patterns of sensory information change
over time can also carry important information. For example, we are quite good
at judging which of two people is older by observing the way that they both
walk, even when all other evidence is removed. Adults with a younger-seeming
gait are also perceived as more energetic (Montepare & Zebrowitz-McArthur,
1988).
FIGURE 3.2(a) and (b) Adults who possess facial features common in babies,
such as large, round eyes, short noses, high foreheads and/or small chins are
typically perceived as less dominant, more naïve and warmer than people with
mature-seeming features.
Source: (a) © Chepko Danil Vitalevich; (b) © CURAphotography. Both images
used under licence from Shutterstock.

Asch’s procedure also differs from most everyday interactions because it

provides no opportunity for the other person to respond to participants’
judgements of them (or for participants to respond to these responses).
Interpersonal exchange of this kind may make a big difference to the process of
impression formation. For example, when you meet someone, you don’t simply
draw private conclusions and keep them to yourself. Instead, you adjust how you
behave on the basis of what you think the person is like, and they
correspondingly adjust their conduct to their impression of you (which is partly
based on how you are responding to them, and so on). If you think someone is
friendly, you may be more friendly back, leading them in turn to reciprocate
your friendly response (and so on). Thus, our impressions of others can lead to
self-fulfilling prophecies (e.g. Snyder, 1984). However, people are also able to
adjust their impressions when expectations are disconfirmed. Indeed, if you
know that someone has the wrong idea about you, you may deliberately act in
ways that show them that they are mistaken (a self-verification effect, Swann,
1984, and see Chapter 5).

- - - - - - - - - -

self-fulfilling prophecy when an originally false expectation leads to its own confirmation. The
social perceiver’s initially incorrect beliefs about a target cause that target to act in ways that
objectively confirm those beliefs.

- - - - - - - - - -
 Summary
The study of social perception focuses on how social perceivers form
impressions of other people, and how they combine information into a coherent
overall picture. Pioneering studies revealed the importance of the nature and
order of presented information, and how perceivers actively construct meaning,
rather than simply adding information together. But how specific pieces of
information are weighted, integrated and used depends on a variety of factors,
including the nature of the current situation and the form in which information is
presented.
 ATTRIBUTION THEORY
What are the main theories of causal attribution, and what do
they say about processing of causal information?
The familiar logo of the Pixar® animation studio refers to one of their earliest
short films (Luxo Jr.), in which the movements of two Anglepoise® desk lamps
– one large, one small – are accompanied by voice-like sounds containing no
discernible words. Although items of office equipment do not usually have
social relationships, viewers quickly conclude that the larger lamp is the smaller
lamp’s parent, and that the smaller lamp is a rather boisterous child. The lamps’
contractions and extensions soon appear to be goal-oriented actions, and the
noises start sounding like communications or expressions of emotion. A micro-
drama of conflicting desires and thwarted impulses seems to unfold on the
screen, even though we know that every movement has been computer-
generated.
How is this impression of animate personality and intention achieved? Part of
the answer is that our tendency to see motives and dispositions behind human
actions may be so automatic that we sometimes find it hard to override it even in
situations where motives and dispositions don’t really apply. However, the
illusion of human-like agency also depends on the way that the movements of
objects unfold over time, without being rigid, and how one object’s movements
relate to another object’s movements (e.g. Michotte, 1963; Rochat, Morgan, &
Carpenter, 1997). Indeed, neuroscientific research suggests that there may be a
specialized brain region (in the temporo-parietal junction or TPJ) that detects the
movement patterns that typically indicate animate activity or intentional
behaviour (Pavlova, Guerreschi, Lutzenberger, & Krägeloh-Mann, 2010; Puce &
Perrett, 2003).
Attribution theory (e.g. Försterling, 2001; Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1972)
provides a set of ideas about how these kinds of inferences about the causes of
action are made in more usual situations of observing or hearing about a human
being’s actions (rather than those of a desk lamp); this process is termed causal
attribution. It addresses our explanations of our own as well as other people’s
behaviour (see also Chapter 5, which addresses more general questions of self-
perception).

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 - - - - - - - - - -

causal attribution the process whereby social perceivers arrive at conclusions about the causes of
another person’s behaviour.

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Most of the phenomena investigated by attribution researchers involve an

observer explaining an actor’s behaviour towards a human or non-human object
(or entity), but sometimes the actor and observer can be the same person (self-
attribution). Unlike much of psychology, attribution research is not directly
concerned with why actors do what they do, but focuses instead on what
observers conclude about why actors do what they do (e.g. whether they
attribute behaviour to an actor’s or object’s characteristics or ‘attributes’). In the
parlance of the theory, to make an attribution is to assign causality to some
person, object or situation. According to attribution theory, we are all amateur
psychologists trying to explain each other’s behaviour.
For example, imagine a friend (actor) has just spent a substantial proportion of
her student loan on an expensive digital camera with all the latest features
(entity). This might lead you (as observer) to think about what provoked such a
purchase. Was it an ‘impulse buy’ reflecting a failure of your friend’s self-
control? Was she talked into it by a canny sales assistant? Or did her deep-seated
interest in photography motivate her spending? Was the camera so special that
she just had to have it? Or had other friends persuaded her that she couldn’t do
without it? Our answers to these causal questions shape our reactions and our
expectations about her future behaviour.
Heider (1958) is usually credited with inventing attribution theory. He argued
that people are most concerned with identifying the personal dispositions
(enduring characteristics such as ability and personality traits) that account for
other people’s behaviour. In other words, observers want to know what it is
about actors that leads them to act the way they do. Drawing conclusions about a
person’s dispositions helps the social perceiver in two ways. First, it permits
integration of a variety of otherwise disorganized information about others, just
as working out that a larger lamp has a maternal attitude to a smaller lamp makes
sense of an otherwise baffling piece of animation (see also Heider & Simmel,
1944; Michotte, 1963; Leader in the Field, Fritz Heider). Second, it permits
prediction (and, to some extent, control) of future behaviour. For example,
knowing that you are a friendly person means that I can expect a friendly
reaction from you when we meet again.

LEADER IN THE FIELD

Fritz Heider (1896–1988), the ‘founding father’ of attribution
theory, was born in Vienna, Austria. He was invited to the US in
1930 to join the Gestalt psychologist Koffka’s laboratory at Smith
College, then worked at the University of Kansas from 1947, where
his most influential work on attribution was conducted. Heider is
famous for two theories in different areas of social psychology:
attribution theory and ‘balance theory’ (a consistency theory about
how relationships between more than two people are kept in
equilibrium). He was awarded the American Psychological
Association’s Distinguished Scientific Contribution Award in 1965.
 Correspondent inference theory
How do we work out why someone chooses one action rather than
another?
Jones and Davis (1965) tried to make Heider’s ideas about dispositional
attribution more systematic. Like Heider, they argued that observers learn most
from actors’ behaviour when it provides information concerning personal
characteristics. For example, you would probably attribute your friend’s camera
purchase to her specific intention (buying the camera did not just happen to your
friend, she decided to do it), and may in turn attribute this intention to an
underlying disposition, such as enthusiasm for photography. Jones and Davis
called this process of inferring dispositions from behaviour correspondent
inference, because observers infer intentions and dispositions that correspond to
the behaviour’s characteristics.

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correspondent inference theory proposes that observers infer correspondent intentions and
dispositions for observed intentional behaviour under certain circumstances.

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Correspondent inference theory proposes that observers consider the range of

behavioural options that were available to the actor at the time of making a
decision in order to work out the actor’s intention. Each of these behavioural
options would have brought a number of different effects if selected. Some of
these effects are desirable (your friend’s camera has lots of useful features) and
some undesirable (the camera cost a great deal of money). According to Jones
and Davis, observers work out why actions are performed by comparing the
effects of the selected action with those of alternative unselected actions (taking
into account their perceived desirability). In particular, actors are assumed to
have selected their action on the basis of the effects that this action produced, but
alternative actions would not have produced.
For example, think back to when you chose to go to the particular university or
college where you are currently studying. The theory suggests that we could
infer your original intention by comparing the features of your chosen university
and a university you rejected and working out what distinguishes them. For
example, the chosen university might be located in a large city and the rejected
one in a quieter, more rural setting. If the rejected university also had several
advantages over the one you chose (e.g. a higher reputation, a stronger
psychology department, better accommodation), then we might well conclude
that living in a city is important enough to you to outweigh these other
considerations. More generally, correspondent inference theory argues that
people try to work out what it was about a chosen course of action that made it
seem preferable to alternative courses of action. Jones and Davis call this
process the analysis of non-common effects (see Table 3.1).
Table 3.1 Analysis of non-common effects after observed selection of University X.
Source: After Jones & Davis, 1965.

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analysis of non-common effects observers infer intentions behind actions by comparing the
consequences of the behavioural options that were open to the actor and identifying distinctive
outcomes.

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In reality, our analysis may be more complex than implied by this example.
For instance, we might focus on why you chose to go to university at all rather
than why you selected this particular one. How then do observers know what
alternatives to compare when trying to explain a course of action? Research
suggests that people are more interested in explaining unusual than predictable
events, and that they explain them by comparing what actually happened with
what they think would normally have happened (Hilton & Slugoski, 1986). For
example, if a close friend walks past you in the street without saying hello, you
think about what is different this time from the usual times when she stops to
chat. Perhaps she forgot to put on her glasses this morning, or perhaps you have
had such a radical change of hairstyle that you are now almost unrecognizable.
Although correspondent inference theory was only intended to apply when
actors are free to choose their behaviour, an experiment conducted by Jones and
Harris (1967) cast doubt on this assumption. Students at an American university
were asked to assess another student’s opinion about Fidel Castro’s communist
regime in Cuba after reading a pro-Castro essay that the other student had
supposedly written (see Figure 3.3). One group of participants was told that the
writer had freely chosen what position to adopt in the essay, whereas another
group was told that the essay title had explicitly requested pro-Castro arguments
(no-choice condition). According to correspondent inference theory, participants
in the no-choice condition should have ignored the essay’s content when
estimating the writer’s attitudes. However, participants tended to conclude that
the essay-writer had pro-Castro attitudes even when they knew that the essay’s
stance could be explained by the situation, and even though most American
students were strongly anti-Castro at the time when the study was conducted.
FIGURE 3.3 Correspondent inferences of essay-writer’s attitudes.
Source: Adapted from Jones & Harris, 1967, with permission from Elsevier.
 The investigators concluded that people tend to overestimate personal causes
of behaviour but underestimate situational ones, an important phenomenon later
termed the correspondence bias. However, this bias has some limiting
conditions, which we will discuss later.

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correspondence bias the proposed tendency to infer a personal disposition corresponding to

observed behaviour even when the behaviour was determined by the situation.

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Correspondent inference theory describes a set of generally valid principles for

working out someone’s intentions and dispositions when they have deliberately
performed a certain action with prior knowledge of its possible consequences.
However, it is not designed to identify the causes of other kinds of behaviour,
such as impulsive or habitual acts, or of people’s experiences such as emotions
and other feelings. A more general model of attribution that accounts for how
people arrive at conclusions about which aspects of a behavioural episode
caused an observed effect is described in the next section.
 Covariation theory
How do we weigh up different possible causes of behaviour?
Imagine that you know a very conscientious student (Hermione) who always
goes through everything on reading lists well in advance of classes. Before you
had a chance to look at this chapter, she already told you what it was about and
expressed the opinion that attribution theory was a really boring topic. Clearly,
you want to know why she said this. Is it because attribution theory actually is
tedious? Is it because Hermione is rarely excited by anything? Or was her showy
lack of enthusiasm designed to impress your jaundiced roommate Ron, who
happened to be listening in on this particular conversation? Jones and Davis’s
(1965) model would help you to identify Hermione’s possible intentions
(assuming that you knew what alternative actions she was choosing between).
However, it would not lead you directly to a conclusion about the causal role
played by the situation or the object toward which action is directed.
Kelley’s (1967) covariation theory provides a more general account of how
people weigh up different possible causes of an observed action or experience.
In all these cases, an actor (e.g. Hermione) has responded in some way to an
object (e.g. attribution theory) in a particular situation (e.g. while Ron was
listening). The observer wants to know whether what happened was caused by
something about the actor, something about the object or something about the
situation (or some combination of these three factors). According to Kelley,
observers work this out by systematically collecting and processing additional
data. The aim is to discover what factors need to be in place for the effect to
happen.

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covariation theory proposes that observers work out the causes of behaviour by collecting data
about comparison cases. Causality is attributed to the person, entity or situation depending on
which of these factors covaries with the observed effect.

- - - - - - - - - -

As its name suggests, Kelley’s covariation theory argues that observers make
their judgements on the basis of covariations or correlations between effects and
their possible causes. In simpler terms, ‘the effect is attributed to that condition
which is present when the effect is present and which is absent when the effect is
absent’ (p. 194). The idea, then, is that we work out what caused an effect by
observing which factors are, and are not, consistently associated with its
occurrence (see Leader in the Field, Harold Kelley).

LEADER IN THE FIELD

Harold Kelley (1921–2003) was one of two pioneering attribution
theorists working at the University of California at Los Angeles (the
other was Bernard Weiner; see Leader in the Field, this chapter). His
covariation theory of attribution stands as the most influential
general approach to lay causation, although from the start he
acknowledged that it did not apply across all possible situations. His
second, causal schema theory was specifically intended to explain
how people arrive at causal explanations when they are unable to
carry out the systematic collection of data implied by covariation
theory. In addition to these two influential theories, Kelley also
worked on person perception, attitude change and relationships.

Why then did Hermione say that attribution theory was boring? Kelley argues
that you need to consider three kinds of evidence, each corresponding to one of
the possible causes (the object, situation or person). First, you need to know
whether Hermione expresses boredom only about attribution theory (high
distinctiveness) or whether she says that a lot of things are boring (low
distinctiveness). In other words, you collect distinctiveness information by
sampling across objects. Second, you need to know whether Hermione only says
attribution theory is boring in public situations when people she wants to impress
may be listening (low consistency), or makes similar comments across a range of
situations and at different times regardless of who might be listening (high
consistency). In other words, you collect consistency information by sampling
across situations. Third, you need to know whether it is only Hermione who
finds attribution theory boring (low consensus) or if other students on your
course say the same thing (high consensus). In other words, you collect
consensus information by sampling across actors.

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 distinctiveness information evidence relating to how an actor responds to different objects (or
‘entities’) under similar circumstances.

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consistency information evidence relating to how an actor’s behaviour towards an object varies
across different situations and times.

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consensus information evidence relating to how different actors behave towards the same object.

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Having collected all the relevant data, you are now in a position to make your
attribution. For example, if Hermione says lots of things are boring (low
distinctiveness), says that attribution theory is boring regardless of circumstances
(high consistency) and none of your other friends says it is boring (low
consensus), you may conclude that it is something about Hermione that makes
her bored (a ‘person attribution’). You infer this from the close correlation
between Hermione and statements that something is boring (whenever she is
included in a sampled episode, something is described as boring, but whenever
she is absent, nothing is described as boring). Interestingly, Harris, Todorov, and
Fiske (2005) found that presenting participants with covariation information
following this particular pattern (low distinctiveness, high consistency and low
consensus) not only encouraged person attributions (replicating research by
McArthur, 1972 described below), but also produced greater activation of the
superior temporal sulcus (STS) region in the brain. This region is part of the
temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), and is generally thought to be involved in the
detection of biological movement and intentional behaviour (as mentioned
above). Causal implications of some other possible combinations of consensus,
consistency and distinctiveness (CCD) information are presented in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2 Four patterns of consensus, consistency and distinctiveness information, and their perceived
implications.
Source: After Kelley (1967). Reprinted from the Nebraska Symposium on
Motivation Vol. 15 by permission of the University of Nebraska Press.
Copyright 1967 by the University of Nebraska Press.

Covariation theory’s proposals about the implications of different patterns of

CCD information seem generally logical and consistent. However, in some
cases, they lead to conclusions that are not necessarily correct (see Försterling,
2001; Hilton, 1988). For example, knowing that other people don’t find
attribution theory boring (low consensus), that Hermione only says attribution
theory is boring in front of Ron (low consistency), and that she doesn’t say other
things are boring (high distinctiveness) is certainly consistent with a context
attribution (something about Ron is making Hermione say attribution theory is
boring). However, the same pattern of information would also be observed if
something about the specific relationship between Hermione and Ron led to the
effect (a person-context interaction). The only way of being sure which of these
alternative explanations is correct is to collect even more information, this time
relating to how other people behave in front of Ron. If other people behave like
Hermione does in Ron’s presence, then a context attribution is supported. But if
not, that conclusion oversimplifies matters. Setting aside this problem, there is
good evidence that people provided with information specifically relating to
consensus, consistency and distinctiveness can infer many of the predicted
implications (e.g. McArthur, 1972; see Hewstone, 1989, and Kassin, 1979, for
reviews).
Although Kelley’s theory provides a logical basis for attribution, it is difficult
to imagine that people collect evidence so systematically and engage in such
detached processes of analysis every time they make sense of an event’s causes.
That certainly would get boring. Many more recent developments in attribution
theory have therefore involved correcting this limitation of the covariation
approach.
 Access to covariation information
How do we make causal attributions when full covariation
information is not available?
One obvious problem for the covariation approach was soon recognized by
Kelley (1972) himself: often we want to make causal inferences about events
under circumstances when CCD information is either unavailable or too time-
consuming to collect. On these occasions, Kelley argued that we fill in missing
information by reference to our existing ideas about how effects are produced
(causal schemas). In particular, we rule out certain explanations and make
assumptions about the presence of unobserved causal factors on the basis of
single observations.

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causal schema knowledge structure shaping attributions: causal schemas may be either abstract
representations of general causal principles (e.g. multiple necessary and multiple sufficient causes
schemas), or domain-specific ideas about cause and effect.

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For example, imagine that you see a cyclist going very fast down a steep hill.
Because you know that the slope is enough to explain her speed, you are
unlikely to draw strong conclusions about the cyclist’s strength or ability to
cycle fast (see Theory Box 3.1). More generally, Kelley argued that observers
rule out alternative causes when they already know of factors working towards
an observed effect (the discounting principle). However this only happens
when explaining outcomes that may be reached by a variety of alternative
possible routes, each of which would be enough to yield the effect (easily
produced effects). Our ideas about causation under these circumstances are
represented by what Kelley terms a multiple sufficient causes schema. In cases
where outcomes depend on the simultaneous presence of more than one
condition (outcomes that are difficult to produce), observers instead use a
multiple necessary causes schema, which encourages them to continue searching
for causes even when they have found one.
 - - - - - - - - - -

discounting principle the presence of a causal factor working towards an observed effect implies
that other potential factors are less influential. The converse of the augmenting principle.

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The converse of the discounting principle is the augmenting principle. Here,

knowledge of factors working against an effect leads people to conclude that
plausible causes must be stronger than otherwise. For example, if you saw a
cyclist going very fast up a steep hill, you would need to conclude that she was
able to pedal strongly enough to override the slope’s power to slow her down. Of
course, augmenting and discounting also work when the factors working towards
or against the observed effect are psychological rather than physical forces.
Thus, we would be less likely to infer that Hermione’s attitude to attribution
theory was really negative if she said it was boring knowing that Ron also found
it boring, than if she said it was boring despite Ron’s fascination with the topic.

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augmenting principle the assumption that causal factors need to be stronger if an inhibitory
influence on an observed effect is present. The converse of the discounting principle.

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THEORY BOX 3.1

DISCOUNTING AND AUGMENTING
PRINCIPLES
Potential causes are discounted if observers are aware of another factor
working towards an observed effect. For example, a cyclist does not need to
be strong to cycle fast down a steep hill. The thin dotted arrow (above)
indicates that less influence is attributed to cycling power when gravity
already explains speed.
Potential causes are augmented if observers are aware of another factor
working against the observed effect. For example, a cyclist needs to be
strong to cycle fast up a steep hill. The fat bold arrow (below) indicates that
more influence is attributed to cycling power when gravity would normally
slow a cyclist down.
Source: Based on Kelley, 1972.
 Knowledge, expectation and covariation
How do we use domain-specific knowledge to guide our
attributions?
Kelley’s causal schema theory suggests that people take shortcuts to inferential
conclusions when information or resources are limited (as in other contemporary
dual-process models of social cognition; see Chapter 4). However, Kelley still
believed that observers engaged in more systematic analysis of covariation
whenever possible. Partial support for this conclusion is provided by studies in
which participants are explicitly presented with information packaged in terms
of consensus, consistency and distinctiveness. For example, McArthur (1972)
asked participants to explain why John laughed at the comedian, after telling
them whether other people laughed at the comedian, whether John always
laughed at this comedian, and whether John laughed at other comedians.
Participants’ attributions broadly followed covariation theory’s predictions,
except that participants made less use of consensus information than expected
(see Fiske, 2004, for a review). However, these findings only tell us that people
are able to use CCD information sensibly when it is presented to them (and when
it is the only information available); they do not tell us whether people normally
seek out and use CCD information when making attributions in other situations.
In fact, there is little evidence that people spontaneously collect CCD
information even when it is readily available. Lalljee, Lamb, Furnham, and
Jaspars (1984) presented participants with descriptions of events that required
explanation (e.g. ‘John did well on his history essay’; ‘John lied to Mary’).
Participants were asked to write down the questions that they wanted to ask in
order to explain these events. Fewer than 20 per cent of their questions were
specifically related to CCD. Instead, most were designed to evaluate
participants’ specific hypotheses about why the events had occurred (e.g. ‘Did
John try especially hard on this occasion?’).
On reflection, this may not be particularly surprising. A problem with CCD
information is that it can only tell us whether the actor, object, or situation (or
some combination of these) caused the event, and not what it is about the actor,
object, or situation that caused it. As Lalljee and Abelson (1983) pointed out,
knowing that John lied to Mary because of something about Mary begs the
question of what this something might be that makes people want to lie to her.
To work this out, we would need to refer to prior knowledge about why people
might deceive one another based on our experiences of lying and being lied to
(e.g. knowledge that people lie to conceal secrets, to protect other people from
the truth, to escape censure, and so on). But then why not just start by consulting
this useful knowledge instead of first conducting a time-consuming covariation
analysis? If we need to rely on ready-made explanations anyway, and these can
tell us what we really want to know, then there is little point in going through the
preliminary step of collecting and sifting through all possible combinations of
CCD information.
It is now generally accepted that people don’t usually engage in a systematic
data-collection process every time they make an attribution. Because we already
have expectations that events will unfold in a certain way, these can be used as a
reference point for our attributions.
In effect, Kelley’s theory implies that lay perceivers approach explanation
without prior assumptions and ask themselves: ‘why did this happen instead of
not happening?’ (a question that would lead them to weigh up all possible
factors that might have led to the event). By contrast, Hilton and Slugoski (1986)
suggest that people usually want to know the answer to a more specific question:
‘why did this happen instead of what usually happens (under these
circumstances)?’ They call their model the abnormal conditions focus model
because it focuses on identifying the condition that ‘makes a difference’ to what
normally happens (e.g. the bent rail that makes a train come off its track and
causes an accident). Thus, people look for causes among the differences between
actual and anticipated event sequences rather than exhaustively sifting through
all available evidence. Observers know where to look for relevant causes not
only because they understand general principles of causality (as implied by
Kelley’s causal schema model), but also because they have access to cognitive
scripts telling them how particular kinds of event (e.g. conversations, parties,
restaurant visits) ordinarily unfold in the social world (e.g. Cheng & Novick,
1990; Read, 1987). For example, the cognitive script for a restaurant visit
follows a set sequence: a waiter takes you to your seat; gives you the menu; you
order; you eat; you ask for the bill; you pay; you leave.
 Learning about causation using covariation and
causal power
How is causal knowledge originally acquired?
A final limitation of covariation theory is captured by a slogan familiar from
statistics classes: ‘correlation is not causation’. Establishing that factor X
covaries with effect Y can never prove that X caused Y for at least two reasons.
First, it may be that Y caused X rather than vice versa. Second, a third variable
(Z) may have caused both X and Y. For example, covariation between revision
for examinations and fine weather does not show that studying hard can make
the sun shine.
Again, prior knowledge can help us disentangle causal relations of this kind.
Because we are already aware what kinds of factors are likely causes of
particular effects, we can reject certain factors as irrelevant and focus down our
causal search. We know, for instance, that energy is required to induce
movement, pressure to bend or break something, that people sometimes say
things in order to impress others, and that people’s actions don’t immediately
change the weather. However, because much of this specific knowledge needs to
be learned from observation, the question of how people work out what typically
causes what in the first place still remains.
It is not possible to acquire accurate knowledge about causal relations simply
by observing covariations between events for the reasons stated above
(correlation does not imply causation). Cheng (1997) argues, therefore, that
something else needs to supplement covariation learning. According to her, this
extra something is an innate predisposition to attribute observed effects to the
unobservable causal powers (see also White, 1989) of objects or events. In other
words, we naturally assume that associations between perceived occurrences
reflect deeper hidden processes, and seek out the nature of those processes rather
than staying at the level of objective observation. We try to work out what it is
about something that gives it the capacity to influence other things (i.e. its causal
power). For example, seeing a magnet attract metallic objects makes us want to
know what quality (causal power) it possesses that allows it to exert these effects
(its magnetism).

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 causal power an intrinsic property of an object or event that enables it to exert influence on some
other object or event.

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Attempting to uncover causal powers rather than record observable regularities

for their own sake allows us to be more focused in our sampling of covariation
data. According to Cheng (1997), we identify potential causes on the basis of
prior beliefs about causal powers, and then assess their actual causal influence
using a form of covariation analysis termed probabilistic contrast (Cheng &
Novick, 1990). This involves comparing the probability of the effect occurring
when the potential cause is present with the probability of the effect occurring
when the potential cause is absent. For example, a child might find out that
pointing at something can cause parents to bring this object near for closer
inspection; she may do this by comparing what happens when she points, with
what happens when she does not point. Importantly, even infants do not need to
sample from the full range of possible causes in order to work out the effects of
pointing, because they already have implicit awareness of the causal power of
pointing. They know from an early age that activities such as pointing (and
staring intently) are the kind of things that might direct another person’s
attention to something, whereas looking away or lying still are not. This prior
knowledge limits the range of probabilistic contrasts that are required before
arriving at useful conclusions about what causes what. These conclusions in turn
shape subsequent causal reasoning over the course of development.

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probabilistic contrast comparison of the frequency of an effect in the presence of a potential cause
with its frequency in the absence of that cause.

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 Attributions and achievement
What are the consequences of different attributions for success
and failure?
Some of the events that we are most motivated to explain are our successes and
failures. For example, you may wonder if a high exam mark was due to your
particular affinity for the topics covered, your thorough exam revision, or the
fact that exactly the right questions happened to come up. Depending on your
conclusion, you will be more or less confident about maintaining this level of
performance.
The most influential theory of achievement-related attribution was developed
by Weiner (1979, 1985), who argued that inferences about the causes of our
success and failure directly affect future expectations, motivations and emotions.
According to Weiner, perceived causes of success and failure may be classified
as: (1) internal or external (locus); (2) stable or variable (stability); and (3)
controllable or uncontrollable (controllability, see Table 3.3; Leader in the Field,
Bernard Weiner).
Table 3.3 Possible causes of success and failure.
Source: Based on material in Weiner, 1979, 1985.

Attributing your exam success to an internal factor means that you believe that
something relating to you as a person determined the outcome, whereas
attributing performance to an external factor means that something to do with the
situation was responsible. Both internal and external factors can be either
variable or stable. For example, attributing your performance to intelligence
means that you think something internal and relatively unchanging about you led
you to do well.

LEADER IN THE FIELD

 Bernard Weiner (b. 1935) is Professor of Psychology at the
University of California, Los Angeles, where he has worked since
1965. He received his undergraduate degree from the University of
Chicago and his doctorate from the University of Michigan in 1963.
In 1965, following two years at the University of Minnesota, he went
to UCLA. He is most famous for his influential research into
attributions for success and failure, identifying the main types of
attribution, their underlying dimensions and their effects on
motivation and emotion. His classification of perceived causes of
behaviour has had an even greater impact. He received the
Distinguished Scientist Award from the Society for Experimental
Social Psychology in 2010.

Weiner also distinguished between causal factors perceived as either

controllable or uncontrollable. For example, if you believe that your exam
success was due to an internal, stable and uncontrollable factor (your innate
aptitude for this kind of material), then you may feel that there is no need to try
hard in order to repeat your success. On the other hand, if you think that your
good grade was due to an internal, variable and controllable factor (e.g. effort),
you will probably conclude that you need to stay motivated in order to succeed
in future. Thus, attributions about success and failure are not simply intellectual
conclusions about performance, they also make a real difference to our
expectations and motivation (Figure 3.4).
FIGURE 3.4 Do our conclusions about the causes of success and failure, e.g. in
an exam, directly affect future expectations, motivations and emotions?
Source: © Sally and Richard Greenhill. Used under licence from Alamy.
 Mueller and Dweck (1998) showed that receiving different kinds of praise
from other people can affect attributions about the stability and controllability of
the personal causes of success, with consequences for subsequent motivation and
task enjoyment. These investigators found that schoolchildren congratulated for
being smart after correctly answering questions from an intelligence test were
subsequently less likely to choose difficult tasks and less likely to enjoy solving
problems than children congratulated for trying hard.
Continuing exposure to these different kinds of praise from parents and
teachers while growing up may lead to more general mindsets about the causes
of success. Dweck (2006) argues that attributing your own success to internal,
stable and uncontrollable factors is part of a fixed mindset that brings far-
reaching negative consequences for life-long development. By contrast, a growth
mindset that sees abilities and skills as variable and controllable encourages
people to extend themselves and develop their talents (see also Individual
Differences 3.1, and Chapter 5).

INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 3.1

ASSESSING YOUR IMPLICIT THEORY OF
INTELLIGENCE
Read each sentence below and then choose the one number that shows how
much you agree with it. There are no right or wrong answers.

You have a certain amount of intelligence, and you really can’t do much
to change it.
Your intelligence is something about you that you can’t change very
much.
You can learn new things, but you can’t really change your basic
intelligence.
Add together the three numbers you chose. The lower your overall score, the
more you subscribe to an ‘entity’ view of intelligence as something that you
either have or don’t have (part of a ‘fixed’ mindset). The higher your overall
score, the more you subscribe to an ‘incremental’ view of intelligence as
something that may be cultivated and developed (part of a ‘growth’
something that may be cultivated and developed (part of a ‘growth’
mindset). A score of 3 means that you wholly subscribe to an entity theory,
and a score of 18 means that you wholly subscribe to an incremental theory.
Scores between 4 and 10 indicate a less extreme entity theory. Scores
between 11 and 17 indicate a less extreme incremental theory.
Source: Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995.
 Attribution and depression
Can certain patterns of attribution lead to clinical depression?
Weiner’s ideas about the consequences of achievement-related attributions have
broader implications for understanding clinical disorders. One influential
application has been the attributional reformulation of the learned helplessness
theory of depression. Learned helplessness theory (Seligman, 1975) originally
argued that depression results from learning that nothing you do makes any
difference to outcomes. The idea was that if rewards and punishments do not
depend on your actions, you soon learn to give up trying to attain the former and
avoid the latter. However, many uncontrollable situations in everyday life don’t
make people depressed. For example, some people enjoy betting on games of
chance, where the outcomes are completely beyond their influence. Gambling
does not always make people depressed, even when they lose money.

- - - - - - - - - -

learned helplessness theory the proposal that depression results from learning that outcomes are
not contingent on one’s behaviour.

- - - - - - - - - -

This observation suggests that helplessness alone does not automatically lead
to depression; other factors must also be in place. One clue to what these other
factors might be comes from the observation that clinically depressed people
usually have an exaggerated sense of personal responsibility for negative
outcomes. If uncontrollable events cause depression, why should depressed
people think that they have personally brought about these events? Abramson,
Seligman, and Teasdale’s (1978) answer is that helplessness only makes people
feel chronically depressed if it is attributed to intrinsic features of the self. In
other words, a specific pattern of attribution for uncontrollability may determine
clinical depression (see Theory Box 3.2).
In defining this pattern, Abramson and colleagues extended Weiner’s
classification (shown in Table 3.3) to include another distinction between
specific and global causes. Global causes apply across a wide variety of
situations, whereas specific factors relate only to the particular situation at hand.
The quality and persistence of depression depends on whether the cause of
uncontrollability is perceived as internal or external, stable or variable, and
global or specific.
By way of illustration, Abramson and colleagues used the example of a
woman who has been rejected by a man in whom she is romantically interested.
Nothing she does makes any difference to the way he feels about her. According
to the model, the way this woman reacts to this experience of helplessness
depends on her conclusions about the causes of rejection (see Table 3.4).
Table 3.4 Possible causes of romantic rejection.
Source: Based on Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale (1978). Learned
helplessness in humans: Critique and reformulation. Journal of Abnormal and
Social Psychology, 87, p. 57. Adapted with permission of APA.

The least-threatening interpretation would be that her rejection was caused by

something external, unstable, and specific. This man in particular was not
attracted to her at this moment and in this particular situation (e.g. he may
simply not have been in the mood for romance at the time). The consequences of
this conclusion are not too serious for the woman, because she is still able to
anticipate greater success with this man (or other men) in future. Consider,
however, the contrasting attribution to internal, stable, and global causes: the
man finds her unattractive not out of any passing whim, but because of the kind
of person she is. His dislike is permanent and applies across all situations.
Because being disliked is seen as reflecting something about her, other men will
dislike her too and her future chances of romantic happiness are non-existent.
Further, because the causal factors are global, they apply not only to romantic
attraction but to other areas of her life as well. She can only look forward to
consistent and universal bad outcomes that she can do nothing about.
Unsurprisingly, such negative expectations are likely to make her depressed.
The theory proposed by Abramson and colleagues argues that people who
have developed a tendency to attribute uncontrollable events to internal, stable,
and global attributions have a greater risk of subsequently developing chronic
and generalized depression (see Social Psychology Beyond the Lab 3.1 and 3.2
for other applications of attribution theory to clinical disorders). Although some
researchers have suggested that changes in attribution are consequences rather
than causes of depression (Lewinsohn, Steinmetz, Larson, & Franklin, 1981),
most of the subsequent evidence confirms that measures of negative thinking
style (including attribution) help to predict subsequent depressive episodes (e.g.
Rude, Durham-Fowler, Baum, Rooney, & Maestas, 2010).
Having established that depressed and non-depressed people interpret negative
events in different ways, we may wonder whose interpretations are more
accurate. Although it is tempting to assume that depression causes people to lose
touch with reality, some theorists have argued that it is in fact non-depressed
people who protect themselves from unpleasant truths by seeing things in an
unduly positive light (the ‘illusory glow’; Taylor & Brown, 1988). This so-called
depressive realism would mean that depressed people are ‘sadder but wiser’. In
support of this idea, Lewinsohn, Mischel, Chaplin, and Barton (1980) showed
that depressed participants’ ratings of their own social functioning during a
group discussion were more similar to ratings of them made by external
observers than were non-depressed participants’ ratings. Although observers
rated the performance of non-depressed participants more positively than that of
depressed participants, they did not rate it as positively as the non-depressed
participants themselves did.

- - - - - - - - - -

depressive realism the idea that depressed people’s interpretations of reality are more accurate
than those of non-depressed people.

- - - - - - - - - -

However, Campbell and Fehr (1990) found that ratings of own social
functioning made by participants with low self-esteem (a typical feature of
depression) were more different from ratings of them made by their conversation
partners than were ratings made by participants with high self-esteem. The
apparent greater accuracy among depressed participants shown in the study by
Lewinsohn et al. may have been a consequence of using observers who did not
participate in the interaction to provide ‘objective’ ratings of behaviour. In fact,
outside observers are often unduly harsh judges because they think that their task
is to be critical. On balance, it seems that depressed people’s negative outlook
may only seem realistic when they are exposed to situations in which other
people’s judgements are also negatively biased. However, it is also worth
bearing in mind that depressives’ negative judgements can easily turn into self-
fulfilling prophecies. If someone doesn’t even try because they are sure they will
fail regardless of effort, this makes it more likely that they will in fact fail (thus
making their negative prediction more accurate).
Whether the attributional pattern associated with depression is realistic or
unrealistic, reformulated learned helplessness theory suggests that therapy
should focus on changing it in order to alleviate the symptoms of depression. In
practice, current cognitive and psychodynamic therapies for depression attempt
to modify a wide range of negative interpretations, only some of which
specifically relate to attributions. Nevertheless, it seems likely that at least part
of their effectiveness depends on attributional retraining (e.g. Barber et al.,
2005).
 Misattribution of arousal
How do we ascertain what we are feeling?
The previous section suggested that we feel more depressed about unpleasant
events if we conclude that their causes are internal, stable and global. But how
do we then recognize our reaction to this attributional pattern as depression
rather than something else? This may sound a silly question because it usually
seems that we know that depression is depression because of what it feels like
(depressing). More generally, emotions are often assumed to be unambiguous
private states that are available for direct introspection: we just know what we
are feeling without having to think about it. By contrast, misattribution theories
imply that we sometimes need to work out what emotion we are experiencing
and that this inference process is susceptible to social influence.

THEORY BOX 3.2

FIVE STEPS TO DEPRESSION: THE
ATTRIBUTIONAL REFORMulATION OF
LEARNED HELPLESSNESS THEORY
Source: Based on Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale (1978). Learned
helplessness in humans: Critique and reformulation. Journal of Abnormal
and Social Psychology, 87, p. 52. Adapted with permission of APA.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BEYOND THE

LAB 3.1
PERSECUTORY DELUSIONS AND
ATTRIBUTIONAL STYLE
Bentall and Fernyhough (2008) and Bentall, Kinderman, and Kaney (1994)
argue that complex and variable clinical syndromes such as schizophrenia
 argue that complex and variable clinical syndromes such as schizophrenia
and psychotic depression are best understood by investigating their separate
components. One common set of symptoms experienced across a range of
psychotic disorders involves persecutory delusion, where sufferers believe
that other people are deliberately acting against them. Clearly, such a
delusion involves a pattern of attribution in which negative events are seen
as caused by external agents (external-personalizing attributions) rather than
by internal factors as in the attributional style characterizing ‘hopelessness’
depression (Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989). Bentall and colleagues’
influential theory proposes that experiences of victimization during
childhood lead to negative views of the self and a tendency to attribute bad
outcomes to the intentional activities of powerful other people (Bentall &
Fernyhough, 2008). When a negative event threatens to activate
uncomfortable thoughts about personal inadequacy, sufferers defend
themselves by diverting blame to an outside agent (Bentall et al., 1994). An
additional risk factor is a tendency to jump to conclusions, meaning that
sufferers do not check on the validity of their external-personalizing
attributions by considering evidence that might otherwise refute them
(Merrin, Kinderman, & Bentall, 2007). One direct clinical implication of
this analysis is that a range of cognitive beliefs and processes including
those relating to attributions need to be targeted during therapy. More
generally, therapy may alleviate suffering best if each specific component of
a complex mental disorder is treated separately.
One of the earliest psychological theories of emotion was devised by William
James (1884). He argued that each emotion has its own distinctive profile of
bodily changes and that we directly sense our emotion by registering this profile.
However, Cannon (1927) pointed out that the patterns of internal physiological
activity associated with very different emotions are actually rather similar. For
example, both fear and anger involve increases in heart rate, blood pressure, and
other kinds of metabolic activity designed to release energy to the muscles in
preparation for vigorous activity (arousal of the autonomic nervous system,
ANS). This means that we cannot tell these emotions apart simply by checking
what is happening inside our bodies.
Schachter (1964) therefore argued that emotions depend upon the attributions
we make for our internal feelings, rather than directly reflecting these feelings
themselves. Thus, perceptions of arousal (the physiological factor) tell us that
we may be experiencing an emotion, but not what emotion it is. We therefore try
to work out why our bodies are aroused (the cognitive factor) in order to answer
this second question (see Theory Box 3.3; Leader in the Field, Stanley
Schachter). If we conclude that our arousal is caused by the attractive person we
are having coffee with, we may interpret it as a symptom of love (or at least lust;
see Chapter 11). However, if we think our arousal is due to the fact that someone
else keeps butting into our private conversation, we may conclude that it reflects
anger. Finally, if we attribute our symptoms to the caffeine in the strong cup of
coffee we are drinking, we may conclude that our arousal is non-emotional.

LEADER IN THE FIELD

Stanley Schachter (1922–1997) worked with Kurt Lewin (see
Leader in the Field, Chapter 1) at MIT before moving to the
University of Michigan, where Lewin’s ex-student Leon Festinger
(see Leader in the Field, Chapter 1) supervised his dissertation. Most
of his career was spent at Columbia University, where his colleagues
and collaborators included Bibb Latané (see Leader in the Field,
Chapter 10), Richard Nisbett (see Leader in the Field, this chapter),
and Lee Ross. Schachter is probably best remembered for his two-
factor theory, which inspired many cognitive approaches to emotion,
and for his clever experiment with Jerome Singer. His earlier work
on affiliation also provided a forerunner of contemporary
interpersonal approaches to emotion, showing that people seek out
other people in order to make sense of their own feelings.
Throughout his career, Schachter pursued the important idea that
external cues (including social cues) can shape the interpretation of
supposedly internal states such as emotions and feelings of pain and
hunger. He was elected to the US National Academy of Sciences in
1983.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BEYOND THE

LAB 3.2
ATTRIBUTIONS FOR MENTAL SYMPTOMS
Ideas based on attribution theory have been applied not only to the
 explanation of depression and anxiety, but also to other clinical conditions.
Some of the most exotic of these include Capgras Syndrome and Cotard’s
delusion. People suffering from Capgras Syndrome believe that family and
close friends have been replaced by impostors who look exactly like the
people they used to know but are not really them (a scenario uncomfortably
reminiscent of the plot of Invasion of the Body Snatchers, a book and
frequently remade film in which extra-terrestrial plant pods infiltrate
humanity by growing replica people and killing off the originals). People
suffering from Cotard’s delusion believe that they have died or do not really
exist while they carry on their normal lives and interact with other people.
Both disorders are associated with brain damage to similar regions of the
right cerebral cortex that are thought to be associated with the sense of
familiarity attached to faces and other familiar objects. Lesions in these
areas can leave face and object recognition intact but take away the more
emotional feelings that usually go together with recognition. According to
Young and Leafhead (1996), Capgras and Cotard’s sufferers may all
experience this same experience of recognition without familiarity, but
make different attributions for it. Capgras sufferers attribute their symptoms
externally, concluding that something about other people is making them
seem different. By contrast, Cotard’s sufferers attribute the symptoms
internally, concluding that it is they themselves who have lost contact with
others rather than the other way around. Whether or not this turns out to be
the correct explanation for these unusual conditions, it seems clear that
attributions can make dramatic differences to our relations with other people
and the external world.
In a famous experiment, Schachter and Singer (1962) tried to determine
whether an identical physiological state could be perceived as anger or euphoria
(or in non-emotional terms) depending on how participants interpreted its causes
(see Theory Box 3.4). Schachter and Singer manipulated autonomic arousal by
administering an adrenaline injection to some participants and a placebo
injection to others under the guise that the syringe contained a new vitamin
compound (‘Suproxin’) that the experimenters were testing.
The experimenters told one group of adrenaline-injected participants that
Suproxin might lead to side effects such as a pounding heart and shaking hands
(genuine symptoms of arousal). These participants were therefore able to
interpret their bodily symptoms correctly as non-emotional responses to the
injection. However, another group of adrenaline-injected participants received
incorrect information about the effects of Suproxin (i.e. that there would be no
side effects, or that there would be side-effects unrelated to arousal). Participants
in this condition should therefore experience arousal symptoms without knowing
their cause, and consequently seek an emotional explanation.
Schachter and Singer stage-managed the situation to encourage specific
attributions for any unexplained arousal. Each participant was left in a waiting
room with an accomplice of the experimenter posing as another participant who
behaved in one of two ways. In one condition, the accomplice improvised a
basketball game using scrap paper and a wastebasket, and encouraged the other
participant to join in. In the other condition, the accomplice became increasingly
irate while working through an insulting questionnaire that the participant also
had to complete. Its final item read: ‘With how many men (other than your
father) has your mother had extra-marital relationships?’ The only response
alternatives provided were: ‘10 and over’, ‘5–9’ and ‘4 and under’.
According to Schachter’s theory, emotion only occurs when arousal is
attributed to an emotional cause. In other words, emotion should not have been
experienced by either placebo-injected participants (because they were not
aroused) or participants who had been correctly informed about the adrenaline
injection’s effects (because they should attribute arousal symptoms to the non-
emotional injection). However, adrenaline-injected participants who were
unaware that their symptoms were caused by this injection should have
attributed their arousal to euphoric aspects of the situation when with the playful
confederate, but to irritating aspects of the situation when completing the
insulting questionnaire. These two groups, therefore, should have experienced
widely divergent emotional reactions of euphoria and anger respectively.

THEORY BOX 3.3

SCHACHTER’S (1964) TWO-FACTOR THEORY
OF EMOTION
 THEORY BOX 3.4
MANIPULATIONS AND PREDICTIONS OF
SCHACHTER AND SINGER’S (1962)
EXPERIMENT
Source: Copyright © 1962 by the American Psychological Association.
Adapted with permission. Psychological Review, 69, 379–399. The use of
APA information does not imply endorsement by APA.

In fact, results were less clear-cut (see Reisenzein, 1983). For example,
placebo-injected participants did not report significantly less emotion than
participants who were injected with adrenaline but who were not informed about
the injection’s genuine side effects. Further, emotion reports of misinformed
adrenaline-injected participants did not differ substantially between euphoria and
anger conditions (participants reported themselves to be mildly happy in both
conditions; see Zimbardo, Ebbesen, & Maslach, 1977). Observations of
participants’ emotional behaviour (from behind one-way glass) provided some
support for the hypotheses, but the reported behavioural effects may have partly
depended on direct effects of arousal on activity levels (producing apparently
more euphoric behaviour when playing, and apparently more angry behaviour
when filling out an annoying questionnaire).
One significant result obtained by Schachter and Singer (1962) clearly did
accord with predictions, however. Participants injected with adrenaline and
correctly warned of the effects consistently reported less positive emotion in the
euphoria condition, and less negative emotion in the anger condition than
participants misled about side effects. Schachter and Singer’s explanation was
that the informed group correctly attributed their arousal to the injection and
labelled it in non-emotional terms.
Subsequent experiments have suggested that arousal that is actually caused by
emotional events may also be misattributed to non-emotional sources; this
insight has proved useful to clinicians who are trying to minimize otherwise
maladaptive reactions in their clients’ behaviour (e.g. Ross, Rodin, & Zimbardo,
1969). For example, Storms and Nisbett (1970) reported that students with mild
insomnia fell asleep more quickly after taking a placebo that they believed was
an arousal-inducing pill (reverse placebo effect) (see Leader in the Field,
Richard Nisbett). The investigators argued that misattribution of arousal
symptoms to the pill neutralized the mild-insomniac participants’ usual
interpretation in terms of anxiety (see Social Psychology Beyond the Lab 3.1 for
another application of attribution theory to clinical disorders). However, Calvert-
Boyanowsky and Leventhal (1975) demonstrated that supposed misattribution
effects may instead be explained by the correct anticipations set up by symptom
warnings. For example, knowing what is about to happen to your body means
that symptoms are less surprising and less emotionally upsetting when they
arrive.

LEADER IN THE FIELD

Richard Nisbett (b. 1941) obtained his first degree from Tufts
University, and his PhD from Columbia University, where his
advisor was Stanley Schachter (see previous Leader in the Field).
His wide-ranging research not only addresses several topics relating
to attribution (as described in this chapter) but also touches on more
 general issues relating to human judgement (e.g. Nisbett & Ross,
1980; see Chapter 4) and cultural differences (Nisbett, 2003; see
Chapter 15). One of his most influential papers argued that, contrary
to intuition, people do not normally have awareness of the causal
processes that lead to their own judgements or behaviour, and rely
on naïve theories to infer what they must have been after the fact
(Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). He is also a vociferous critic of the idea
that racial differences in IQ have any genetic basis (Nisbett, 2009).
He is currently Theodore M. Newcomb Distinguished Professor of
Psychology at the University of Michigan.

In sum, Schachter and Singer’s clever experiment does not offer conclusive
support for all aspects of two-factor theory. This may be partly because it is
difficult to manipulate arousal and emotional cognitions independently when the
two usually go hand in hand. Subsequent studies have been similarly
inconclusive (e.g. Erdmann & Janke, 1978; Marshall & Zimbardo, 1979;
Maslach, 1979), and many theorists now believe that Schachter overstated how
easily interpretations of own emotion can be modified. Because our attributions
about, and appraisals of, emotional situations usually determine our autonomic
as well as emotional reactions in the first place (e.g. Lazarus, 1991), arousal
symptoms mostly arrive with an unambiguous ready-made emotional
explanation.
 Attributional biases
What are the main types of attributional bias, and how can they
be explained?
According to covariation theory and the correspondent inference model,
observers systematically process all potentially relevant information when
making attributions. However, as we have seen, subsequent research suggests
that causal inferences are shaped by prior knowledge and expectations (e.g.
Hilton & Slugoski, 1986; Read, 1987), or by learned attributional styles (e.g.
Abramson et al., 1978), and that they may be redirected by deceptive
manipulations (e.g. Schachter & Singer, 1962). In general, people seem to attach
more weight to some causes at the expense of others when drawing causal
conclusions. Precisely what kinds of causes are typically favoured under
different circumstances has been the focus of research into various attributional
biases.

- - - - - - - - - -

attributional biases systematic distortions in the sampling or processing of information about the
causes of behaviour.

- - - - - - - - - -

LEADER IN THE FIELD

Daniel Gilbert (b. 1957) is Professor in Psychology at Harvard
University. His academic career started inauspiciously at the age of
19 when his intention of studying creative writing in order to become
a science fiction writer was thwarted because the class was full. The
only available alternative was an Introduction to Psychology course.
He still ended up as a best-selling author, but of non-fiction instead
of fiction. The book in question (Stumbling on Happiness, 2006)
drew on his influential research (with Timothy Wilson) into affective
forecasting, which concerns people’s often inaccurate predictions
 about their own emotional reactions to events (see Wilson & Gilbert,
2003). Of course, he is also famous for his innovative research on
the correspondence bias.

The correspondence bias

In their professional lives, psychologists sometimes disagree about whether
internal or external explanations of human behaviour deserve more emphasis.
For example, most experimental social psychologists focus on situational
influences and often downplay the influence of people’s characteristic
dispositions. By contrast, personality psychologists attach more weight to
personal traits, usually without taking as much account of environmental
influences (see Chapter 1). The correspondence bias suggests that the naïve
psychology practised by laypeople is closer to personality psychology than to
experimental social psychology. Behaviour is often seen as a reflection of an
actor’s corresponding internal disposition (e.g. aggressive behaviour reflects
aggressive personality) even when it is actually caused by situational factors
(e.g. severe provocation). Research Close-Up 3.1 presents a famous example of
this effect (see also Jones & Harris, 1967, described earlier).
Why do people underestimate situational influences? According to Gilbert and
Malone (1995), a number of different processes are involved (see Leader in the
Field, Daniel Gilbert). First, some situational forces are subtle and difficult to
detect. If observers are not aware of these influences in the first place, they can
hardly be expected to factor them into their explanations. Second, our
expectations about how other people will behave may distort our interpretations.
For example, we may mistakenly assume that the prospect of public speaking
terrifies others just as much as it terrifies us (an example of the false consensus
bias). Therefore, when someone appears calm before their turn to speak, we may
conclude that their confident personality must be overriding an otherwise
anxiety-provoking situation.

- - - - - - - - - -

false consensus bias the assumption that other people generally share one’s own personal attitudes
and opinions.

- - - - - - - - - -
RESEARCH CLOSE-UP 3.1

THE CORRESPONDENCE BIAS IN

ATTRIBUTING KNOWLEDGE TO
QUESTIONER OR CONTESTANT
Ross, L. D., Amabile, T. M. & Steinmetz, J. L. (1977). Social roles, social control, and biases in
social-perception processes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35, 485–494.

Introduction People’s social roles shape their

interactions with one another. These influences are
most obvious in situations in which one person has
relatively greater control over an interaction. An oral
examination, for example, permits examiners to
decide what topics should be discussed, while the
student cannot choose which questions to answer and
which not to. One consequence is that examiners have
greater opportunity to display their specialized
knowledge. In accordance with the correspondence
bias, Ross and colleagues argue that people pay too
little attention to these role-conferred advantages
when arriving at attributions for behaviour. As a
consequence, people with relatively greater social
control appear wiser and more able than they really
are (and their social position therefore seems more
justified). To test this hypothesis, the investigators
simulated a quiz game in which participants were
arbitrarily allocated the role of either questioner or
contestant. Questioners were given the opportunity to
devise their own questions, thereby giving them a
clear advantage in demonstrating their own
specialized knowledge. The prediction was that
questioners would be viewed as higher in general
knowledge.
Method Participants Twelve pairs of male students
and 12 pairs of female students from an introductory
psychology class were recruited for a study into
processes whereby ‘people form impressions about
general knowledge’.
Design and procedure The role of questioner or
contestant was allocated to one person in each pair
using an explicitly random procedure. Questioners
were told to devise 10 ‘challenging but not
impossible’ general knowledge questions, which they
then asked contestants in a quiz. For example, one
question was: ‘What is the longest glacier in the
world?’ As soon as the quiz was over, questioners and
contestants separately rated their own and each
other’s general knowledge compared to the average
student at the same university, using a 100-point
scale.
Results On average, contestants got only 4 out of 10
questions right in the quiz. General knowledge ratings
of questioners and contestants were analysed.
 Contestants rated questioners’ general knowledge as
significantly better than their own, but questioners did
not rate their own general knowledge as better than
that of contestants. An additional group of observers
subsequently watched simulations of some of the
original quizzes and, like the contestants, rated
questioners as significantly higher in general
knowledge than contestants (see Figure 3.5 for the
mean ratings of general knowledge made by all three
groups of participants).
FIGURE 3.5 Mean ratings of general knowledge after quiz game.
Source: Copyright © 1977 by the American Psychological Association.
Adapted with permission. Ross et al., Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 35, 485–494. The use of APA information does not imply
endorsement by APA.

Discussion The findings demonstrate that the

situational advantage conferred by being allowed to
devise your own questions led to higher general
knowledge ratings from both contestants and
 observers (who probably attempted to answer the
questions privately). This seems to provide a clear
example of the correspondence bias. Because
participants’ roles were allocated randomly in this
study, it is statistically unlikely that one group (the
questioners) should happen to be genuinely higher in
general knowledge. Indeed, Ross and colleagues
administered brief tests of general knowledge to all
participants after the quiz and found no differences in
performance.
Although some of the contestants’ and observers’ general knowledge ratings
must have been inaccurate, there still remains the issue of whether they
were irrational too (see Hilton, 1990, on the distinction between accuracy
and rationality in attribution). Given only a limited sample of the
questioners’ knowledge, how could contestants make accurate inferences
about other areas? Does it not make sense for them to give questioners the
benefit of any doubt and rate their general knowledge as superior? How else
might they have acknowledged questioners’ apparently superior
performance in this particular context? After all, assessing their own general
knowledge as equal or superior might be seen as being a bad loser.
In a later study, Sumpton and Gregson (1981) asked observers to estimate
questioners’ knowledge of the specific areas covered by the quiz. They
found that observers’ ratings were higher only for these particular topics,
and not for general knowledge. Similarly, Johnson, Jemmott, and Pettigrew
(1984) found that observers believed that contestants would perform as well
as questioners if their roles were reversed. Thus, bias in this setting depends
partly on what information is requested by experimenters, and what these
questions imply about their intentions (e.g. Schwarz, 1994). Participants
evidently try to make sense of what is required of them in the study in
addition to the performance exhibited by questioners and contestants.
The study also carries implications about the limits of the correspondence
bias. Questioners did not conclude that contestants’ inability to answer their
questions meant that they must be inferior in general knowledge,
 presumably because their own role-conferred advantage was extremely
salient to them.

THEORY BOX 3.5

PROCESS LEADING TO CORRESPONDENCE
BIASES
Source: Adapted from Gilbert & Malone (1995). Copyright © 1995 by the
American Psychological Association. Adapted with permission.
Psychological Bulletin, 117, 21–38. The use of APA information does not
imply endorsement by APA.

Finally, Gilbert and Malone suggest that people sometimes fail to correct their
initial inferences about the causes of behaviour, especially when processing
demands are high. The idea here is that people’s automatic reaction to observed
behaviour is to conclude that it reflects an actor’s disposition. Any relevant
situational influences are then factored in using a more deliberate reasoning
process. Because the initial dispositional inference is effortless, it happens
regardless of current circumstances. However, other demands on cognitive
resources may interfere with the situational correction process, leading us to
underestimate the power of external factors. (The different stages at which these
sources of bias may intrude are shown in Theory Box 3.5.) An experiment
conducted by Gilbert, Pelham, and Krull (1988) provides support for this last
explanation. Participants observed a silent videotape (i.e. the sound was turned
right down) of a woman talking nervously to a stranger, and then rated how
anxious she was as a person. Subtitles indicating current conversation topics
informed some participants that the woman was discussing her sexual fantasies
(offering a situational explanation for her nervousness), but others that she was
talking about gardening. Further, some participants were told to memorize the
subtitles, imposing an additional cognitive demand that should interfere with any
situational correction process. As predicted, participants under higher cognitive
demand tended to believe that the woman had an anxious personality regardless
of conversation topic, whereas participants under low cognitive demand rated
her as less dispositionally anxious when they believed she was discussing sex
rather than gardening. Presumably low-demand participants had sufficient
cognitive resources left over to correct for their initial automatic dispositional
inference.
Gilbert and colleagues’ theory suggests that attribution always involves
automatic processes, but only sometimes involves controlled processes as well
(e.g. Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). It is therefore another example of the dual-
process models that are currently popular in research on social perception and
cognition (see Chapter 4).
The argument that we spontaneously and automatically make inferences about
people’s traits is supported by research conducted by Smith and Miller (1983).
In two studies, these investigators demonstrated that participants presented with
sentences describing an actor’s behaviour (e.g. ‘Ted breaks a friend’s expensive
camera that he borrowed’) made judgements about the actor’s traits more
quickly than they made inferences about the specific causes of the action.
Indeed, it may be that we only go to the effort of engaging in a deliberate causal
analysis and check the validity of our automatic trait attributions when we are
specifically motivated to think about why a particular behaviour occurred (e.g.
when the behaviour affects us negatively, or when it is unexpected), and when
we have sufficient cognitive resources to engage in the necessary controlled
processing.
The correspondence bias was once believed to be so pervasive and inescapable
that it was dubbed ‘the fundamental attribution error’ (Ross, 1977). However,
subsequent research suggests that it is more context-dependent than this name
implies (see Gawronski, 2004, for a review). For example, Krull (1993) showed
that asking people to interpret the situation rather than the person led them to
make automatic situational rather than dispositional inferences. Participants were
again exposed to a silent videotape showing a woman talking, and were told that
she was discussing sensitive topics with her therapist. When the task was to
assess how anxiety-provoking the conversation was (rather than how anxious the
woman was), high cognitive load led participants to rate the woman as less
dispositionally anxious, but the situation as more anxiety-provoking. Krull
concluded that automatic dispositional inferences only occur if the inferential
goal is to understand the person rather than the situation that person is in.
An alternative account of this evidence is provided by Trope and Gaunt
(2000), who do not believe that people are predisposed to make automatic
dispositional inferences that are subsequently corrected by more controlled
processing. Their two-stage model instead argues that the initial automatic stage
of behaviour identification already integrates both situational and dispositional
information. According to Trope and Gaunt, behaviour identification is followed
by a controlled and resource-demanding process of hypothesis evaluation in
which possible explanations for the identified behaviour are assessed. For
example, in Krull’s (1993) study described above, participants may have
evaluated the hypothesis that it was the anxiety-provoking nature of the situation
that caused the observed anxiety in the interviewee. When cognitive load is high,
this hypothesis-evaluation process is more cursory and tends to be biased
towards information that is easily available or salient.

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salience attention-grabbing property of objects or events depending on perceptual features such as

vividness, perceiver sensitivity or some combination of the two.

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In many attribution studies, the most salient information relates to the actor,
and participants are directed (implicitly or explicitly) to make sense of the
actor’s behaviour, making dispositional inference more likely under cognitive
load. However, studies such as Krull’s (1993) that orient participants towards the
situation lead to more situational attributions when cognitive load is high. Thus,
according to Trope and Gaunt (2000), cognitive load does not disrupt correction
of an initial automatic inference, but limits the range of information used to
evaluate hypotheses about the cause of the identified behaviour. If situational
information is salient (as it was for the questioners in the quiz-game study of
Ross et al. (1977), reported in Research Close-Up 3.1), then there may be no
automatic dispositional inference and no correspondence bias.
Trope and Gaunt’s (2000) model may also account for Smith and Miller’s
(1983) apparent demonstration of automatic dispositional inference. Like all
other sentences presented in this study, ‘Ted breaks a friend’s expensive camera
that he borrowed’ begins with the name of the actor performing the behaviour,
and uses this name as the subject of the sentence’s main verb. Such sentences
may activate trait information more directly than they activate situational
information (see also Brown & Fish, 1983, discussed later).
Another reason why the correspondence bias is no longer considered
‘fundamental’ is that it varies across cultures (see Chapter 15 for a more
extended discussion of cultural influences). For example, Miller (1984)
compared explanations offered for deviant and prosocial behaviours by children
(aged 8, 11 and 15) and adults from the US and Southern India. She found that
US adults attributed events to dispositional causes significantly more than Indian
adults or children from either country did, suggesting that North Americans but
not Indian Hindus learn over the course of development to favour dispositional
explanations (see Figure 3.6).
FIGURE 3.6 Dispositional attributions in two cultural settings across four age
groups.
Source: From Miller (1984). Copyright © 1984 by the American Psychological
Association. Reproduced with permission. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 46, 961–978. The use of APA information does not imply
endorsement by APA.

Why should members of some societies develop a stronger preference for

dispositional explanations? Many western societies such as the US and most
countries in Europe are said to be characterized by a culture of individualism in
which personal effort and ability combine to produce deserved outcomes. People
socialized into such cultures may learn to be more attuned to actors rather than
their circumstances in a wide range of contexts, so that information relating to
actors tends to be more salient and accessible. However, in some other societies
(e.g. India, Japan), children are socialized to see themselves more as part of
groups that must work together to attain valued outcomes (collectivistic culture;
see Chapter 15). This cultural emphasis may make situations (especially social
situations) rather than individual actors more salient (Figure 3.7).
FIGURE 3.7 Members of collectivistic cultures are more sensitive than
members of individualistic cultures to the power of situations.
Source: © Ryouchin. Used under licence from Getty Images.

Despite their relatively greater use of situational explanations, even

collectivists frequently assume that actors have dispositions corresponding to
their behaviour. For example, Korean participants (like US participants)
assumed that a controversial essay reflected the writer’s opinions even when
they believed that the writer had been told what point of view to defend (Choi &
Nisbett, 1998). However, when the salience of the situational constraint was
increased, Korean participants were better able than American participants to
take its influence into account. Choi, Nisbett, and Norenzayan (1999) argue that
members of collectivistic cultures are more sensitive to the power of situations
than are members of individualistic cultures, enabling them to correct their initial
dispositional inferences more easily under many circumstances.
Cultural differences in dispositional attribution may reflect differences in
automatic or controlled processing (or both). For example, Easterners may be
more motivated to correct initial dispositional inferences and engage in more
controlled processing to achieve this. Alternatively, they may be so well-
practised at correction using situational information that they do it automatically.
Mason and Morris (2010) suggest that cross-cultural comparison of brain
activity during attributional tasks may allow us to determine the relative degree
of involvement of neurological processes underlying automatic and controlled
processing of social information. Preliminary evidence suggests that at least
some of the differences depend on automatic processes (e.g. Kobayashi, Glover,
& Temple, 2006).

The actor–observer difference

The actor–observer difference (or self–other difference) compares attributions
people make about other people with those that they make about themselves.
Although Westerners’ default assumption is often that other people’s behaviour
reflects a corresponding disposition, Jones and Nisbett (1972) argued that, when
explaining our own behaviour, we tend instead to emphasize external, situational
factors.

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actor–observer difference proposed general tendency for people to explain their own behaviour in
more situational terms, but other people’s behaviour in more dispositional terms.

- - - - - - - - - -

Why should there be a difference between these two kinds of attribution? Two
main reasons have been proposed. First, people have access to a wider range of
information about the factors leading to their own actions (Jones & Nisbett,
1972). For example, when explaining your liveliness at a party, you are able to
consider other situations in which you have acted in a less extroverted manner
(e.g. when meeting someone for the first time, or being interviewed), and may
therefore conclude that you are not a consistently lively person (Figure 3.8). By
contrast, most other people only know how you have acted in a restricted range
of situations, and may therefore think that your behaviour is more consistent
than it really is.
FIGURE 3.8 Your behaviour, e.g. being lively at a party, may appear more
consistent to others than it really is.
Source: © Melissa Farlow. Used under licence from Getty Images.

A second possible reason for actor–observer differences concerns direction of

attention. When observing someone else’s behaviour, we tend to focus on that
person rather than their situation. Conversely, our attention tends to be directed
outwards when we are performing behaviours ourselves. Perhaps we simply
assume that whatever is occupying our attention is exerting the most causal
influence (e.g. Taylor & Fiske, 1978; see Research Close-Up 3.2 on Storms,
1973).
Of course, direction of attention can only explain preferences for dispositional
explanations of other people’s behaviour when we are directly observing those
other people acting. However, observers also often attribute behaviour to actors’
dispositions when it is described to them in words. For example, when told that
‘John went to the cinema’, most people tend to think that this behaviour reflects
something about John rather than something about the cinema. According to
Brown and Fish (1983), this is because the English language implies that
subjects of action verbs are responsible for the action described. By contrast, for
experience verbs it is the objects, and not the subjects, that are usually seen as
causal (e.g. we tend to interpret the sentence John liked Angela as John’s liking
for Angela being caused by something about Angela).
Evidence reviewed by Malle (2006) suggests that actor–observer differences
(like correspondence biases) are not consistently found across all contexts. They
are especially likely in studies that imply that the other person whose behaviour
is to be explained is idiosyncratic in some way (thus drawing attention to
distinctive personal characteristics), and when the outcome of the action is
negative (because there are obvious personal advantages to blaming bad things
that happen to you on situational factors, as discussed in the next section).

Self-serving attributional biases

What pushes or pulls our attributions in particular directions? Most of the
examples presented so far in this chapter suggest either that we are drawn
towards salient factors or that we follow generally valid rules of explanation
(e.g. people cause effects) in circumstances where they happen to be less
appropriate (see Nisbett & Ross, 1980). The basic idea is that people’s
attributions are occasionally imperfect approximations of the causal structure of
reality, but at least aim to represent that reality accurately. However, some kinds
of bias are harder to explain in these terms. Self-serving attributional biases
seem to represent a motivated distortion of what has happened in order to serve
personal interests. Instead of being neutral observers of social events, we may
sometimes interpret them in ways that suit us (or suit our ingroup more
generally; Islam & Hewstone, 1993b, and see Chapter 14), allowing us to feel
better about what has happened.

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self-serving attributional biases motivated distortions of attribution that function to maintain or

increase self-esteem.

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RESEARCH CLOSE-UP 3.2

REVERSING THE ACTOR–

OBSERVER EFFECT BY MANIPULATING
PERSPECTIVE
Storms, M. D. (1973). Videotape and the attribution process: Reversing actors’ and observers’
points of view. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 27, 165–175.

Introduction Storms (1973) proposed that differences

between actors’ and observers’ attributions depend
partly on their different physical points of view:
actors’ attention is typically directed outwards
towards the situation (including other actors), whereas
observers’ attention focuses on the observed person
(i.e. the actor). Indeed, one explanation for the related
correspondence bias is that actors are often the most
dynamic and interesting objects in the environment
and therefore attract observers’ attention (and deflect
it from other aspects of the situation; see Heider,
1958; Taylor & Fiske, 1978). The increasing
availability of video technology in the early 1970s
allowed Storms to manipulate actors’ and observers’
perspectives in order to assess the influence of this
factor on situational and dispositional attributions.
Method Participants Thirty groups of four male
students took part in this study. Two members of each
group were randomly assigned the role of observer
and the other two were assigned the role of actor.
Design and procedure Stage 1. Actors were told to
have a conversation to get to know each other while
facing each other across a table. Each observer was
 seated next to one of the actors and told to observe the
actor opposite him across the table. Two video
cameras were positioned so that each pointed at one
of the actors (see Figure 3.9, Stage 1).
FIGURE 3.9 The two stages of Storms’s (1973) procedure.
Source: Copyright © 1973 by the American Psychological Association.
Reproduced with permission. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
27, 165–175. The use of APA information does not imply endorsement by
APA.
Stage 2. Participants in the video condition were shown the videotape of the
recorded interaction, but told that because only one camera had functioned
correctly, they would only be able to see the visual image of one of the
actors (coupled with audio of both sides of the conversation). Thus, one
actor and one observer from each group saw a replay of the conversation
from the same perspective as before, while the other actor and observer saw
the reversed perspective (i.e. the actor now saw his own face instead of the
face of his interaction partner, and the observer saw the face of the actor that
he had not originally observed; see Figure 3.9, Stage 2). In the no-video
condition, participants were told that none of the video equipment had
worked and that the planned video replay would therefore not take place.
Measures After Stage 2, actors rated their own
friendliness, nervousness, talkativeness and
dominance during the conversation, then rated the
extent to which each of these behaviours had been
caused by personal characteristics and by
characteristics of the situation. Observers made
corresponding ratings of the actors they had originally
observed at Stage 1.
Results Storms calculated difference scores by
subtracting summed ratings of situational attribution
for the four key behaviours from summed ratings of
dispositional attribution. These difference scores were
then analysed. In the no-video and same-perspective
conditions, actors’ attributions were less dispositional
(more situational) than observers’ (see Figure 3.10).
But in the reversed-perspective condition, observers’
attributions were less dispositional (more situational)
than actors’.
FIGURE 3.10 Reversing the actor–observer difference following video replay.
Source: Adapted from Storms (1973). Copyright © 1973 by the American
Psychological Association. Adapted with permission. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 27, 165–175. The use of APA information does not
imply endorsement by APA.

Discussion This study demonstrates that actor–

observer differences can be reversed by showing
actors their own behaviour and showing observers the
situation that actors are responding to (in this case, the
other actor). A more general conclusion is also
possible: that actors and observers tend to attribute
greater causality wherever they pay attention. Indeed,
later studies (e.g. Taylor & Fiske, 1978) have shown
that salient (attention-grabbing) factors tend to be
seen as exerting more influence than non-salient
factors.
One criticism of this study is that the usual actor–observer difference was
not demonstrated (e.g. Gilbert & Malone, 1995). For example, analysis of
 not demonstrated (e.g. Gilbert & Malone, 1995). For example, analysis of
the original ratings (separately assessing dispositional and situational
attribution) rather than difference scores shows that actors were rated in
equally dispositional terms by themselves and their observers across all
conditions. However, the reported effect on situational attribution is
theoretically interesting even if dispositional attribution is unaffected. The
general implication is that we can correct for inattention to situational
factors by manipulating attention.
Let’s assume that you have just done well in an exam. Your tendency may be
to conclude that this reflects your innate ability (self-enhancing bias). However,
if you do badly, perhaps you will decide that the questions were unfair or
unusually difficult, or that the person sitting next to you in the examination hall
was distracting you by sharpening his pencils so noisily (self-protective bias).
More generally, you may be inclined to arrive at conclusions that maintain your
positive self-image (e.g. Alicke & Sedikides, 2009, and see Chapter 5).
Johnson, Feigenbaum, and Weiby (1964) provided one of the earliest
demonstrations of self-serving bias. Participants in their study were educational
psychology students and their task was to teach two children how to multiply
numbers via a one-way intercom system (which meant that they never actually
saw or heard their pupils). The first phase involved explaining how to multiply
by 10 and the second phase involved explaining how to multiply by 20. After
each phase, the pupils’ worksheets were returned to participants, allowing them
to assess how successfully the concepts had been conveyed. In fact, the
worksheets were concocted by the experimenters to manipulate whether or not
the answers were correct. In both conditions, pupil A answered the questions on
both worksheets correctly. However, pupil B either did badly on both tasks or
did badly on the first but improved on the second. In other words, participants
either failed or succeeded in teaching pupil B how to multiply. In the condition
where pupil B’s performance improved, participants explained this improvement
in terms of their own teaching abilities. But when pupil B failed to improve, they
attributed this negative outcome to his lack of ability rather than their own
ineffective teaching (Figure 3.11).
FIGURE 3.11 Teacher’s explanation of pupils’ success and failure can show
self-serving bias.
Source: © Golden Pixels LLC. Used under licence from Shutterstock.
 Zuckerman (1979) reviewed a number of apparent demonstrations of self-
serving bias, and concluded that the effect depends on the desire to maintain
self-esteem. However, competing motivations can also reduce self-serving
attributions. For example, self-presentation may not be served by taking undue
credit for positive outcomes in public settings, either because we don’t want to
be seen to show off, or in order to avoid any embarrassment at failing to live up
to the unduly favourable image that this would imply (e.g. Weary et al., 1982).
Further, some situations require accurate self-assessment in order to identify
ways in which performance may be improved in future (e.g. Sedikides & Strube,
1997).
Abramson and colleagues’ (1978) attributional reformulation of learned
helplessness theory discussed earlier implies that depressed people adopt an
attributional style that is the precise opposite of the self-serving pattern (they
take rather than disown responsibility for failure). Indeed, research suggests that
simply being in a bad mood can reverse self-serving biases (e.g. Forgas, Bower,
& Moylan, 1990), perhaps by removing the illusory glow that preserves our
sense of well-being in happier times (Taylor & Brown, 1988). There is evidence
that self-serving biases are weaker for depressed participants (see review by
Mezulis, Abramson, Hyde, & Hankin, 2004), and also for members of
collectivist cultures (Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999; but see
Sedikides, Gaertner, & Toguchi, 2003, for a dissenting opinion), but they are
commonly observed across a wide variety of other contexts.

Motivational or cognitive effect?

In the 1970s, a debate arose about whether so-called self-serving biases were
genuinely self-serving. Miller and Ross (1975) proposed that some personally
advantageous attributions were entirely rational, while others simply reflected
the application of explanatory principles that would normally be valid.
According to this view, people do not distort their thinking to protect self-esteem
(motivational explanation) but rather use rules of thumb that happen to lead to
faulty conclusions on some occasions (cognitive explanation). Take the
educational psychology students in the study by Johnson and colleagues (1964)
described earlier. It would be illogical for them to attribute pupil B’s
improvement on the second exercise to the pupil’s abilities, because the pupil
had done badly on the first sheet. Further, improvement, when it occurred,
followed the teacher’s careful attempt to explain multiplication after the pupil
had done badly at the first attempt. Under these circumstances, it makes perfect
sense to conclude that one’s teaching skills led to success. In the failure
condition, by contrast, the pupil did not improve despite renewed efforts at
explanation, and was consistently worse than pupil A on both exercise sheets.
Thus, failure is associated with pupil B but not with pupil A, or with the person
doing the teaching. According to Kelley’s (1967) covariation principle, even a
detached observer should attribute bad performance to pupil B rather than the
teacher when these conditions hold.
More generally, Miller and Ross (1975) argued that apparently self-serving
biases arise because effort covaries with success but not with failure. If trying
harder does not improve performance, then it is reasonable to conclude that
something about the task is presenting an obstacle. However, if trying harder
does improve performance, then it is logical to attribute one’s success to trying
hard.
Although these are valid points, few contemporary psychologists would deny
that thinking can also be distorted by motivations and emotions (see Alicke &
Sedikides, 2009). Indeed, Miller and Ross’s idea that we adjust our inferences to
match existing positive expectations already sounds rather like an
acknowledgement that we want to make ourselves look good under certain
circumstances (Tetlock & Levi, 1982). Thus, many apparently cognitive
explanations can be translated into motivational terms, and many apparently
motivational explanations can be translated into cognitive terms. Nevertheless,
the fact that brain regions associated with reward and motivation are activated in
association with self-serving biases is consistent with the argument that non-
cognitive motivational factors contribute to the effect (see Blackwood et al.,
2003; Seidel et al., 2010).

Accuracy of attribution
The preceding sections may have given the impression that people’s judgements
about the causes of behaviour are seriously prone to error. Perceivers seem to
distort their processing to suit personal goals and to attach undue importance to
factors that really do not play as much of a role as they believe. However, it is
important to emphasize that people would not be able to function adequately in
the social and practical world if they continually drew wildly incorrect
conclusions about causal processes. The point of finding the cause of something
is to be able to predict and prepare for what will happen when that cause is
present in future, and inaccurate attributions would not help in this regard.
Indeed, Nisbett and Ross (1980) argue that many examples of bias are caused by
the application of cognitive shortcuts which typically lead to valid conclusions,
but can lead perceivers astray under certain special circumstances, such as those
investigated in studies of attributional bias (see discussion of cognitive heuristics
in Chapter 4).
Some theorists (e.g. Funder, 1987) have also argued that the standards against
which lay perceivers are judged when assessing accuracy of attribution may
often be inappropriate, and that attributions are more attuned to reality than the
bias account suggests. In many studies there is no correct answer in the first
place, because causal judgements are applied to fictitious events, so accuracy
assessments ultimately boil down to matters of opinion or belief. Often, different
answers are justifiable on different grounds. In other cases, however, it is clearer
that some error of judgement has occurred. For example, although contestants
rated questioners as higher than them in general knowledge in the quiz-game
study conducted by Ross et al. (1977), described earlier, random allocation of
participants to the different experimental roles made it statistically improbable
that these differences were genuine. Further, the fact that different groups of
participants disagree about attributional conclusions in this and other studies
logically implies that at least one group must be incorrect.
Even when attributions are inaccurate according to valid scientific criteria,
they may still correspond to an individual’s inevitably partial, personal world,
and thus lead to conclusions that are useful for them specifically. For example,
believing that other people’s behaviour is more consistent and caused more by
internal dispositions than it really is may not be disadvantageous in practical
terms. We are only likely to encounter any particular other person in a limited
range of situations (ones in which we too are also present) and these situations
may constrain the range of behaviours that this other person performs (Jones &
Nisbett, 1972). Thus, even if Harry is not really an extravert in all possible
contexts, if we only meet him at times and in places where he is outgoing and
excited, attributing his behaviour to an extraverted disposition is unlikely to be
too problematic.
 Explaining intentional behaviour
Are intentions perceived as special kinds of causes?
Although early theories of attribution such as correspondent inference theory
focused on uncovering the motives behind intentional behaviour, much of the
subsequent research was more concerned with dispositional attributions, and
often focused on involuntary effects on behaviour (e.g. symptoms of anxiety in
the silent videotape procedure described earlier, inability to answer questions in
quiz-games, etc.). Indeed, apparent differences between intentional and
unintentional behaviour were often downplayed.
Reeder (2009) argues that principles of ‘mindreading’ need to be applied when
explaining intentional, motive-driven behaviour, and that these are distinct from
the more simple process of weighing up the relative impact of situational and
dispositional explanations for non-intentional behaviour (as suggested by many
models of trait inference dating back to Heider (1958), and by more recent
theories implying that automatic trait inferences may be corrected after factoring
in alternative situational explanations, e.g. Gilbert and Malone, 1995).
Situational information may be used as the basis for inferring an actor’s motive
(perhaps corresponding to an underlying disposition) rather than as the basis for
discounting dispositional explanations.
For example, participants in Reeder, Kumar, Hesson-McInnis, and Trafimow’s
(2002) experiment were told about an incident in a football match when one
player intentionally dug his boot-studs into the leg of a player from the other
team after a tumble. In one condition, the player had previously been insulted by
the injured player. In another condition, the player believed that the opposing
player’s performance was so good that his own team stood no chance of winning
unless the opposing player was forced to leave the pitch due to injury. In both
scenarios, a strong situational factor encouraged an attack on the other player. If
perceivers only used situational information to discount automatic dispositional
inferences, then both conditions should have discouraged perceivers from
concluding that the actor had a trait of low morality causing his immoral
behaviour. In fact, dispositional low morality was attributed to the offending
player only in the condition in which injuring the other player helped his team
win the game (instrumental condition), and not in the condition in which the
other player had provoked him (reactive condition). This pattern can be
explained by the fact that participants inferred that the player was motivated by
personal gain in the instrumental condition, but by retaliation or self-defence in
the reactive condition. Because the self-defence motive is seen as less immoral
than the personal gain motive, dispositional inferences to low morality were
weaker in the reactive condition. Thus, situational pressures do not necessarily
lead to discounting of dispositional causes when the observed behaviour is
intentional.
The research by Reeder and colleagues suggests that intentional behaviours are
explained according to different principles from non-intentional behaviours. A
separate line of evidence also shows that actors’ intentions are seen as
particularly important when observers are weighing up a variety of possible
causes. In one of the studies in question, Hilton, McClure, and Sutton (2010)
asked participants to state their preferred explanation for effects arising as
outcomes of extended causal chains, in which a sequence of events unfolds with
each event leading to the next. For example, leakage from a water pipe was
described as producing corrosion in a wire to an electricity generator powering
railway signals, whose failure led to a train crash that resulted in injury to the
train driver. In most cases, participants preferred not to attribute outcomes to the
initial event that set off the causal sequence in the first place (i.e. water leakage).
However, when this initial event was produced by the voluntary action of a
person (e.g. a saboteur had damaged the water pipe) it was consistently selected
as the cause. In short, the availability of an actor’s intentional action overrides
other factors in determining attributions for observed events.
 The naïve scientist metaphor
Do lay perceivers always act like scientists when making causal
attributions?
Most of the theory and research considered above assumes that people seek to
understand the social world in a detached, scientific manner, but sometimes get
it wrong. This assumption is generally known as the naïve scientist model (e.g.
Fiske & Taylor, 2008), and, like all metaphors, it has its limits. Perhaps some of
our everyday explanations are not designed to provide a neutral characterization
of reality in the first place. In this case, evaluating attributions against abstract
rules of inference such as Kelley’s (1967) covariation principle is rather like
complaining that someone playing draughts is not following the rules of chess
properly.

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naïve scientist model a metaphor for how social information is processed that likens social
perceivers to academic researchers who formulate theories and use data to test hypotheses in order
to predict and control behaviour.

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If people are not trying to be scientific when making attributions, what are they
trying to do? One possibility is that explanations are generated to solve specific
practical problems (White, 1989). For example, if you have to explain why you
have done well in an examination, you probably don’t weigh up all possible
contributory factors. Instead, you look specifically for those causes that will
further your ends in the current situation. If the explanation is formulated while
talking with a friend who is disappointed by his or her own performance, you
might search your memory for any bits of good luck that aided your success. If,
on the other hand, you are trying to score a point against the other person, you
might try to think of some particularly clever things that you wrote.
Hilton (1990) argues that our explanations are specifically designed to provide
information that is useful to the person we are talking to. For example, when
explaining to a close friend why I got upset during our conversation, I will refer
to the particular thing she said that sparked off my reaction. This is because I
assume that my friend wants to know what topics are more and less likely to
make me distressed. However, if my distress is serious enough, the explanation I
give to my therapist will probably emphasize my personal sensitivity rather than
the emotional content of what was said to me. This is because I know that the
therapist will be interested in what my particular problem is and how it differs
from those of other clients.
Note that these two explanations are mutually compatible and may both be
true, despite the fact that one refers to an external cause (what my friend said)
and the other to an internal cause (my sensitivity to that topic). Typically, a
number of factors need to be in place to cause a given event, and the task of
explanation involves selecting which of these factors should be emphasized in a
particular context. To look at this another way, a number of changes in prior
events could have averted the observed effect of my getting upset (my friend and
I could have been discussing something different, I could have been a less
sensitive person, and so on) and each of these possible changes reflects one of
the causal factors contributing to my outburst (my friend’s remark, my
sensitivity, the existence of our relationship, etc.). Deciding which of these
causes to use in explanation depends on what you think the person to whom you
are explaining the event already knows about its causes, and what you think they
expected would happen.
On some occasions, another person’s expectations about what would normally
happen are not entirely obvious, leading to ambiguity about how to approach the
explanatory task. However, the precise phrasing of the causal question often
helps to clarify matters. For example, if someone asks you ‘Does discussing
work make you upset?’, the question’s implicit emphasis (i.e. ‘discussing work’
as the subject of the action verb) may suggest that the questioner wants to know
about the effects of this topic. By contrast, the question ‘Do you get upset when
discussing work?’ implies an interest in your own causal role in events.
According to Hilton (1990), some apparent cases of bias can be explained by
applying these conversational principles. For example, Nisbett, Caputo, Legant,
and Marecek (1973) found that students explained their own choice of university
course in more situational terms than their best friend’s choice of course,
consistent with their proposed actor–observer difference. However, the emphasis
of the question ‘Why did you choose this university course?’ naturally falls on
the course as the topic about which information is required. By contrast, the
question ‘Why did your best friend choose this course?’ implies that the
investigators want to know about the friend rather than the course (otherwise,
why not directly ask for the participant’s own reasons?). In this study, then, the
reported actor–observer difference may simply reflect a rationally motivated
attempt to provide the kind of information that was implicitly requested.
An experiment by McGill (1989) supports this reasoning. She found that a
simple change in wording reversed the effect found by Nisbett et al. When
participants were asked ‘Why did you in particular choose this course?’ they
tended to offer less situational explanations than when they were asked ‘Why did
your friend choose this course in particular?’
More generally, attribution experiments may be viewed as ‘conversations’
taking place between experimenters and participants in which the participants
are trying to work out what information the experimenter is seeking (Schwarz,
1994). Making sense of questionnaire items often depends on thinking about
who is asking these questions and for what purposes. Adopting this kind of
conversational approach also allows a reinterpretation of other supposed
illustrations of attributional bias. For example, in Jones and Harris’s (1967)
original demonstration of the correspondence bias discussed earlier, participants
were told to gauge another student’s attitudes towards Castro. In order to do this,
they were provided with an excerpt from an essay that this other student had
(supposedly) written. Should participants simply ignore this essay if its writer
had no choice about what position to take on this issue? Surely the experimenter
wouldn’t have gone to the trouble of showing it to them if it provided no
information about the writer’s opinions. Participants probably assumed,
therefore, that the experimenter believed that the essay was relevant and
concluded that they were meant to infer the writer’s opinion on the basis of its
content. Indeed, in another study in which participants were explicitly warned
that some of the material they would see might not be relevant, the
correspondence bias was reduced (Wright & Wells, 1988).
 Attributions as discourse
Are attributions always produced for cooperative reasons?
Hilton’s (1990) working assumption was that people try to provide other people
with information that helps to complete their understanding of events (Grice,
1975). However, conversations are not always cooperative processes in which
information is generously exchanged for mutual benefit. Often, our aim is not to
help someone else understand what has happened, but rather to argue against
them or defend our own point of view against their attack. According to Edwards
and Potter (1993), attributions may be formulated rather differently in these
more antagonistic contexts. As an example, these investigators presented an
excerpt from a transcript of a rape trial (Figure 3.12). In this excerpt, the defence
barrister is cross-examining the victim and trying to imply that she was partly
culpable for the alleged rape:
FIGURE 3.12 Attributions do not always function as part of a cooperative
process between people.
Source: © Jim Arbogast. Used under licence from Getty Images.

Barrister: (referring to a club where the defendant and the victim met) It’s
 where girls and fellas meet isn’t it?
Victim: People go there.
(Edwards & Potter, 1993, p. 30)
Note that the barrister’s description of events on the night in question implies
certain motives and intentions on the part of the victim: that she had gone to this
place specifically to meet members of the opposite sex. Her response is designed
specifically to neutralize this inference. Although neither party is explicitly
presenting explanations, the way that events are formulated already carries
implications for what caused what and who is to blame. Clearly, this isn’t a
cooperative process, but rather one in which attributions are actively contested.
Like White (1984), Edwards and Potter (1993) believe that attributions are
formulated for particular purposes, but these purposes specifically reflect
conversational goals such as persuading, undermining, blaming, or accusing.
Further, a range of alternative tactics and strategies may be improvised online in
response to the other person’s formulations. In this view, attributions do not
function as attempts to explain a separately existing social reality, but instead to
construct a version of reality suited to the current conversational business.
Attributions are not descriptive representations, but rhetorical moves in an
ongoing dialogue.
 Summary
This central part of the chapter has covered a great deal of ground. We reviewed
the major theories of attribution and identified some of their limitations,
including the need to explain how general and specific knowledge is used as part
of the attribution process. We also considered applications of attribution theory,
notably to the understanding and treatment of clinical depression. Next we
considered the key role of attributions in emotion and the misattribution of
arousal, and summarized evidence for the main types of attributional bias.
Finally, we evaluated whether lay perceivers do, in fact, function as naïve
scientists, and the role of causal attributions within the study of conversations
and everyday discourse.
 SOCIAL PERCEPTION AND SOCIAL
REALITY
What are the reality checks on perceivers’ perceptions and
attributions?
Conversational and discursive models of attribution take us some distance from
the classic work of Asch (1946) and Heider (1958) that was designed to find out
how people privately make sense of other people and what they do. More
generally, they unsettle the notion that people are simply naïve scientists trying
to uncover the structure of an independent social reality. Subsequent models
have seen social perceivers as lawyers (Hamilton, 1980), tacticians (Fiske &
Taylor, 2008), pragmatists (White, 1984) or politicians (Tetlock, 2002).
Although there is some truth in each of these characterizations, the bottom line
seems to be that a variety of strategies are available for dealing with social
information, which may be deployed selectively depending on circumstances.
But does this mean that social perceivers are free to construct whatever
formulation suits their current purposes? There are three reasons why not. The
first is that biology and culture do not equip people with infinitely flexible
cognitive resources for understanding other people. At the biological level, we
are innately attuned to certain kinds of social information at the expense of
others (e.g. Fantz, 1963; Johnson & Morton, 1991) and automatically detect
intentionality from certain patterns of observed movement (e.g. Pavlova et al.,
2010). At the cultural level, socialization leads us to interpret the interpersonal
world in ways that are compatible with the ideas of our parents, teachers, and,
more generally, the society to which we belong (e.g. Markus & Kitayama,
1991). Attribution and social perception always take place against the backdrop
of norms of understanding that make some inferences more likely than others. A
related point is that other people often contest any formulation of social reality
that doesn’t match their own (just as their own formulation may be contested in
turn). The upshot is that some degree of consensus tends to emerge among
people who have regular contact with one another.
A final constraint on formulations relates to the content of the social
information itself. Social perception research tends to focus on the interpretation
of verbally represented information or static, sensory stimuli. However, when
people confront each other in everyday life, they often have access to a dynamic
multimodal presentation that is responsive to their own conduct. Some
characteristics of others can be read directly from the available information
(Baron & Boudreau, 1987; Gibson, 1979). For example, we can register where
someone else’s attention is focused from the orientation of their sensory organs.
The dynamic features of some actions even allow us to detect intentions directly.
For example, Morris and Lewis (2010) showed that observers of videotaped
football tackles could reliably and accurately detect when a player was
deliberately diving (in order to get the referee to award a free kick or penalty).
Their judgements were based on the disproportionate momentum of the player’s
fall, its temporal discontinuity with the moment of contact, or the adoption of an
‘archer’s bow’ posture (see Figure 3.13) designed to draw attention to the
supposed loss of control. A final example of directly perceptible causation
occurs in some examples of ‘property transmission’ (White, 2009), where
characteristics corresponding to some features of the causal agent are clearly
visible in the observed effect. For example, pressing a hand into wet concrete, as
film stars are often asked to do, leaves a trace that shows exactly how it was
produced.
FIGURE 3.13 A football player adopting the ‘archer’s bow’ posture, which is
commonly used following a tackle.
Source: From Morris & Lewis, 2010. © Paul Morris.

Many of these data-driven forms of social perception and attribution do not

seem to depend on explicit verbally mediated processes, but instead involve
direct registration of sensory information. An important challenge facing future
research is to specify how these two kinds of process – verbal representation as
shaped by conversational pragmatics and rhetoric, and direct perception
determined by active pick-up of social information – might relate to, or interact
with, one another.
Some of the distinctions between different kinds of attributional process may
also be clarified by evidence derived from brain-scanning. For example, Van
Overwalle (2009) reviewed studies using fMRI to detect neural correlates of
various kinds of social cognition and found that inferences about other people’s
goals, desires and intention were associated with activation of the TPJ brain
region, mentioned earlier, while inferences about longer-term dispositions were
more likely to be associated with medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) activation.
Van Overwalle concluded that goal detection can utilize a ‘where-to system’ (a
mechanism designed to pinpoint the direction taken by an observed action) that
operates at a more perceptual, less abstract level than judgements about
disposition which require integration of information.
 AUTOMATIC AND CONTROLLED
SOCIAL PERCEPTION
How much thought is involved in social perception and
attribution?
Early theories of social perception (e.g. Asch, 1946) and attribution (e.g. Heider,
1958; Kelley, 1967) seemed to imply that people think long and hard before
arriving at conclusions about other people and their behaviour. They apply best
to those occasions when we treat other people’s personalities and behaviours as
puzzles that need to be solved carefully, for instance when actors do something
unexpected or highly consequential. Most everyday encounters with other people
simply do not involve such a great deal of thought, and we often reach
conclusions without really thinking about it. Recent theories correspondingly
emphasize the automaticity and effortlessness of the cognitive processes that are
involved. For example, Gilbert and Malone’s (1995) ideas about automatic
dispositional inference have parallels in accounts of stereotyping that suggest
social categories relating to ethnic or minority groups may be directly activated
in response to simple perceptual cues (e.g. Bargh, 1999, and see Chapter 4).
The idea that initial automatic attributions may subsequently be corrected
using more controlled and effortful processing also relates to research into self-
regulation of prejudice (see Monteith & Mark, 2005, and Chapter 4). Evidence
suggests that stopping ourselves from applying unwarranted prejudices may face
similar problems to adjusting dispositional inferences in response to situational
information. For example, Fiske and Neuberg (1990) argue that automatic
stereotyping is only followed by individuated impression formation when
participants are sufficiently motivated to expend the additional cognitive effort.
Further, Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, and Jetten (1994) showed that
participants who had deliberately avoided thinking about a skinhead in
prejudiced terms reverted to even more strongly stereotypical views once the
requirement for self-control was removed (see Chapter 4). Evidently social
perception and stereotyping depend on interactions and conflicts between
controlled, systematic thinking and more automatic processes. Learning to detect
unwanted effects of automatically activated conclusions is certainly possible if
conditions are right (Monteith & Mark, 2005), but depends on systematic
intervention and cooperative participants. Arriving at accurate and constructive
social perceptions is not always a straightforward matter.

CHAPTER SUMMARY
How do we form impressions of what other people are like? Information
presented early in a sequence tends to be more influential (primacy
effect), especially under time pressure. Information regarding ‘central’
personality traits, such as warmth, is given more weight, especially when
it provides new and distinctive information.
Do the same processes of person perception operate when people meet
face to face? Information transmitted nonverbally can have more direct
effects on impressions. We sometimes behave in ways that encourage
other people to conform to our impressions of them (self-fulfilling
prophecies).
What is attribution theory? Attribution theory tries to explain how people
work out the causes of events, particularly events involving other people.
How do people draw conclusions about the motives and dispositions
guiding deliberate behaviour? According to correspondent inference
theory, observers compare the effects of a chosen option with those of a
rejected option. Non-common effects reveal the actor’s motivation and
corresponding disposition.
How do people weigh up different possible causes? According to
covariation theory, lay perceivers conduct an informal statistical analysis
to work out whether an observed effect correlates with the person, entity,
or context.
What happens when there is insufficient information for covariation
analysis? People make use of prior knowledge about general principles of
causation (causal schemas) or about specific people, objects, and events
when deciding between possible causes.
How do people explain their successes and failures? Weiner classified
perceived causes of success and failure using three dimensions: locus
(whether the cause is internal to the person or external), stability (whether
the cause is stable or variable over time), and controllability (whether the
person can influence the cause). Attributing failure to internal, stable, and
uncontrollable causes reduces achievement motivation.
Are certain patterns of attribution associated with clinical depression?
Clinically depressed people often attribute negative outcomes to internal,
stable and global (widely applicable) factors.
Do attributions shape our own emotions? Schachter believed that
emotions depend on attributing experienced physiological arousal to
emotional situations. Although this is probably not true, the way that we
interpret our emotions may be influenced by manipulating our
explanations for bodily symptoms.
Are people more likely to attribute behaviour to internal or external
causes? In many situations, people from individualistic cultures
underestimate the impact of situational causes of another person’s
behaviour (correspondence bias).
Why do people fall victim to correspondence biases? Situational
information may not be noticed, expectations about behaviour may distort
interpretations, and people may not have the motivation and opportunity
to correct automatic dispositional inferences.
Are correspondence biases inevitable? Asking people to interpret the
situation rather than the person may reverse correspondence biases under
cognitive load. People from collectivistic cultures seem less susceptible to
correspondence biases.
Do people favour internal attributions for their own behaviour?
According to the actor–observer difference, people are more likely to use
external attributions for their own behaviour but internal attributions for
other people’s behaviour.
Are attributions motivated by self-interest? Self-serving biases occur
when people attribute positive outcomes to internal factors and negative
outcomes to external factors.
Are attributions usually inaccurate? Attributions usually lead to
practically useful conclusions. Bias and error are probably restricted to
special situations.
Do people try to be good scientists when making attributions?
Attributions are often motivated by practical concerns or conversational
demands. Scientifically valid conclusions may not always suit our
purposes.
How hard do people typically think about the causes of behaviour? Many
attributions are made automatically. Controlled processing is only
involved when what needs explaining is unexpected and important, and
when there is sufficient motivation and opportunity to think about why
something happened.
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING
Dweck, C. S. (2006). Mindset: The new psychology of success. New York:
Random House. Combines accessible descriptions of research findings from
studies of attributions for success with relevant case studies to make a readable
self-help book.
Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (2008). Social cognition: From brains to culture
(3rd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill. Includes treatment of attribution theory
within an overarching perspective on social cognition.
Försterling, F. (2001). Attribution: An introduction to theories, research, and
applications. Hove, UK: Psychology Press. An accessible overview of
attribution models and findings from Heider to the early twenty-first century.
Gladwell, M. (2005). Blink: The power of thinking without thinking. London:
Penguin. A popular account of how quickly and automatically people reach
conclusions about objects, events, and, of course, other people.
Hewstone, M. (1989). Causal attribution: From cognitive processes to collective
beliefs. Oxford: Blackwell. A wide-ranging view of the field, including
intrapersonal, interpersonal, intergroup and societal aspects of attribution.
Ross, L., & Nisbett, R. E. (1991). The person and the situation: Perspectives of
social psychology. New York: McGraw-Hill. Highly readable introduction to the
cognitive perspective on attributional bias and other aspects of social perception
and inference.
Sloman, S. A. (2005). Causal models: How people think about the world and its
alternatives. New York: Oxford University Press. A (mostly) non-technical
introduction to some sophisticated ideas about causation, intentionality and how
people reason using these concepts.
Weiner, B. (2006). Social motivation, justice, and the moral emotions: An
attributional approach. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Weiner’s latest book applies his
ideas about attribution and motivation to issues relating to justice and to legal
settings.
Zebrowitz, L. A. (1990). Social perception. Belmont, CA: Brooks. A thorough
review of research into social perception that attempts to integrate ecological and
cognitive approaches.
 Chapter 4

Social Cognition

Louise Pendry

Source: © siamionau pavel. Used under licence from Shutterstock.

KEY TERMS

accessibility
accountability
anchoring/adjustment heuristic
automatic process
availability heuristic
base rate information
categorization
cognitive miser
continuum model of impression formation
controlled process
dissociation model
encoding
 goal
goal dependent
heuristic
implicit goal operation
individuating information
lexical decision task
outcome dependency
priming
probe reaction task
rebound effect
representativeness heuristic
schema
social cognition
stereotype
stereotype suppression
CHAPTER OUTLINE
INTRODUCTION
JUMPING TO CONCLUSIONS OR WORKING THINGS OUT
SLOWLY
THE AUTOMATIC PILOT WITHIN
What makes a process automatic?
The pervasive nature of social categorization Schemas: The next step in the
process?
Making judgements when you don’t have all the data: cognitive heuristics
Why do we fall prey to judgemental heuristics?
Schema activation and behaviour
Summary
GOING THE EXTRA MILE: REGAINING COGNITIVE CONTROL
Stereotype? What stereotype? How goals can stop the stereotype being
activated in the first place
Quashing the eff ects of stereotype activation once it has occurred
Summary

ROUTE MAP OF THE CHAPTER

We inhabit a hectic social world. In any one day we can expect to deal with
many other people. We may meet people for the first time, go out with old
friends, find ourselves in a job interview trying to make a good impression
friends, find ourselves in a job interview trying to make a good impression
on our prospective employer, or else queuing in a supermarket to pay for
groceries, or waiting for a train on a busy platform. Even for those of us
professing to live ordinary lives, no two days are exactly alike. So, precisely
how do we navigate this complex social life? What social information grabs
our attention? How do we organize and use it in our interactions with and
judgements about others? These are some of the questions that interest
social cognition researchers, and providing answers to them strikes at the
very heart of understanding human mental life. In this chapter we
investigate some of the ways in which we process social information in
situations such as these. The chapter focuses especially on the distinction
between the social processes and judgements we make that are often speedy
and automatic ‘gut reactions’, such as categorization and heuristic
processing, and those which may require more effort, deliberation and
control (for example, forming more careful impressions of others and
avoiding stereotyping).
 INTRODUCTION
What is social cognition?
A core topic in social psychology is the study of social cognition, which is
concerned with how we make sense of ourselves and others in our social world.
Understanding how we select, store, remember and use social information can
tell us a great deal about how we are able to successfully navigate what is a very
complex social environment. As we go about our daily schedules, we are busy
‘doing’ social cognition for real. So, just what is it? Essentially, the study of
social cognition promotes a deeper understanding of the mental processes that
underlie human social behaviour (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). It sheds light on the
steps people go through when thinking about others (Fiske, 2004).

- - - - - - - - - -

social cognition a large topic within social psychology concerned with understanding how we think
about ourselves and other people and how the processes involved impact upon our judgements and
behaviour in social contexts.

- - - - - - - - - -

If we think about it for just a moment, this has implications for a very broad
range of human social phenomena and domains. What is especially intriguing
about social cognition is that it taps into the kinds of questions we find ourselves
asking. Questions such as:
Why did I assume that the man at the coffee machine in the boardroom was
the company director when he was in fact the secretary?
Why did I assume that Dr Alex James would be male/white?
Why is it that I expected Albert to be elderly?
Why did it surprise me to discover that Hilda, my elderly neighbour, had a
passion for car maintenance?
Why did I take the time to talk to my new female work colleague and find
myself subsequently re-evaluating my initially stereotypic impression of
her?
 The aim of this chapter is to pass on to you a little of what we have learned
thus far about some of the main theoretical issues in the field (for more detail,
see Bless, Fiedler, & Strack, 2004; Fiske & Taylor, 1991, 2008; Kunda, 1999;
Moskowitz, 2005). This chapter will give you a flavour of some of the more
established theories in the field, and consider both the classic and more
contemporary research that such theories have generated in their quest to
understand better the workings of the social mind.
 JUMPING TO CONCLUSIONS OR
WORKING THINGS OUT SLOWLY
Why is it so easy to jump to conclusions when making judgements
about others?
Although the field of social cognition is extremely broad and vibrant, few
researchers would deny that one recurring, overarching theme is the distinction
between social thinking that is fast and furious and social thinking that is more
measured and precise. Since the 1970s, significant developments in theory and
methodology have meant that it is possible for us to now focus independently on
these different types of thinking, that is, the influence of unintentional (i.e.
unconscious) and intentional (i.e. conscious) processes in human thought and
behaviour (Posner & Snyder, 1975). You might see this distinction encompassed
in the term dual-processing theories. Or, to put it yet another way (and the way
we will mainly refer to it hereafter), it refers to the contrast between automatic
and controlled processes.

- - - - - - - - - -

automatic process a process that occurs without intention, effort or awareness and does not
interfere with other concurrent cognitive processes.

- - - - - - - - - -

- - - - - - - - - -

controlled process a process that is intentional, under the individual’s volitional control, effortful
and entailing conscious awareness.

- - - - - - - - - -

In this chapter, we focus primarily upon this distinction. Do we process

information about others carefully and rationally, or do we instead make rash
judgements on the spur of the moment? Understanding when and why we
engage in automatic or controlled processing can tell us a lot about how we view
our social world.
To make this kind of distinction a little clearer, consider the following passage:
Simon tried to put nationalities to faces, according to stereotype. The group of
brawny, over-tanned and over-jewelled men and women who had ordered
Bordeaux rather than local wine should be German – prosperous, large and loud.
Any table giving off a cloud of cigarette smoke should be French, just as a table
of non-smokers, with more water than wine being drunk, should be Americans.
The English loaded butter onto their bread and ordered the heaviest desserts. The
Swiss ate neatly and kept their elbows off the table, alternating sips of wine and
sips of water like clockwork. (Mayle, 1993, p. 234) Simon’s observations, taken
from Peter Mayle’s amusing book Hotel Pastis, may not strike us as particularly
unusual. We may not endorse the national stereotypes conveyed in the passage
quoted above, or we may at least question their accuracy, but somehow, we
know exactly what Simon is talking about. Despite the perils of stereotypical
thinking, it is something that we are apt to find irresistible (e.g. Brewer, 1988;
Devine, 1989; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990).
Did Simon pause for even a moment to consider if his snap decisions were
accurate? Did he stop to consider that in fact several of the French contingent
were not actually smoking? Or that at least two of the English group were
nibbling abstemiously on fruit salad (no cream)? No. The questions for social
cognition researchers are: how and why did Simon respond in this manner?
What processes led him to these conclusions? In social cognitive terms, the
above illustration demonstrates several steps in a process that will be the focus
of the next sections. Simon has:
Categorized each of the people in the restaurant in terms of nationality
(grouped them into discrete sets – here, nationalities – based upon
perceived shared characteristics).
Activated the content of these categories (what we term schemas: our
expectancies about members of a category, here people belonging to such
groups).

- - - - - - - - - -

schema a cognitive structure or mental representation comprising pre-digested information or

knowledge about objects or people from specific categories, our expectancies about objects or
 groups, what defines them.

- - - - - - - - - -

Used a mental shortcut (rule of thumb) to pigeonhole individuals according

to how similar they are to typical members of a particular group (in line
with the common stereotype that a large percentage of the British
population eat unhealthily).
Much of this occurred fairly spontaneously. Simon did not stop to deliberate
more carefully. As we shall see, it is a fundamental tenet of social cognition
research that we often process information in precisely this way, only moving
beyond the obvious stereotype if motivated and able to do so (e.g. Fiske &
Neuberg, 1990). Schemas such as those outlined above have a functional role to
play in facilitating person perception. They are, as Bodenhausen (1990) has
noted, a kind of cognitive shortcut, a simplifying rule of thumb or heuristic that
serves us well a lot of the time, but not always (for more on heuristics, see later
in this chapter, and also Chapter 7).

- - - - - - - - - -

heuristic a well-used, non-optimal rule of thumb used to arrive at a judgement that is effective in
many but not all cases; stereotypes are often said to function as heuristics.

- - - - - - - - - -

In this chapter, we will consider some of the research that speaks to the
distinction between automatic and controlled processes: when, why and how do
we engage in automatic versus controlled processing in person perception? By
the end of this chapter you will be well equipped to provide preliminary answers
to these questions.
 THE AUTOMATIC PILOT WITHIN
Read the following passage:
A father and his son were involved in a car accident in which the father was
killed and the son was seriously injured. The father was pronounced dead at
the scene of the accident and his body taken to a local morgue. The son was
taken by ambulance to a nearby hospital and was immediately wheeled into
an emergency operating room. A surgeon was called. Upon arrival, and
seeing the patient, the attending surgeon exclaimed, ‘Oh my God, it’s my
son!’
Can you explain this?
So, how did you do? Many people find this question impossible to answer
(based on lab class demonstrations over a number of years, often more than 40
per cent of students simply cannot do it). Moreover, they are apt to generate a
wide range of convoluted explanations (for example, the ‘father’ who was killed
is a Catholic priest and the term ‘son’ is therefore being used rather loosely)
other than the most obvious one (the surgeon is the boy’s mother). Why do
people have so much trouble and why do they generate such complex
rationalizations? Essentially, they find it hard to overcome the automatically
activated stereotype (i.e. surgeons are generally men).

- - - - - - - - - -

stereotype a cognitive structure that contains our knowledge, beliefs and expectancies about some
human social group.

- - - - - - - - - -

As we shall see, this tendency to activate stereotypes automatically happens an

awful lot (Figure 4.1). We will now pay some closer attention to why this
occurs.
FIGURE 4.1 Did you assume that these surgeons were men?
Source: © Brasiliao. Used under licence from Shutterstock.
 What makes a process automatic?
For a process to be considered automatic, several criteria are deemed necessary
(e.g. Posner & Snyder, 1975): the process needs to occur without intention, effort
or awareness and is not expected to interfere with other concurrent cognitive
processes. For those of us who have been behind the wheel of a car for a few
years, the act of changing gear would possibly meet these criteria. A controlled
process, on the other hand, is one that is: intentional, under the individual’s
volitional control, effortful and entails conscious awareness. To continue the
driving analogy, deciding whether it is safe to overtake on a busy motorway
should (one would hope!) fulfill these criteria. Let us now consider how this
automatic versus controlled distinction contributes to our understanding of the
process of person perception. We will start by looking at social categorization.
 The pervasive nature of social categorization
- - - - - - - - - -

Almost every doctor who saw and examined me, labelled me a very interesting but also a hopeless
case. Many told my mother very gently that I was mentally defective and would remain so . . .
nothing could be done for me.

- - - - - - - - - -

(Christy Brown, 1955, p. 10) Christy Brown suffered from cerebral palsy and
was considered mentally disabled until one day he snatched a piece of chalk
from his sister and wrote some words with it. He went on to astound and defy
the medical profession by becoming a widely acclaimed author, whose
autobiography was made into a successful film, My Left Foot. Branded from
birth as ‘retarded and useless’, he fought to overcome prejudice and ignorance.
The consequences of categorization can, then, sometimes be rather unpalatable.
Once we assign others to particular social categories, associated stereotypic
information can dominate our judgements to a worrying degree. Nonetheless, it
does seem unlikely that we can view others in total isolation from their obvious
physical and social categories. This is the view adopted by many theorists who
work in the area (e.g. Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Macrae &
Bodenhausen, 2000), and we will now turn our attention to why they endorse
such a position.

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categorization the tendency to group objects (including people) into discrete groups based upon
shared characteristics common to them.

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Categorization refers to the tendency we have to group objects (including

people) into discrete groups, based upon shared characteristics. There are object
categories for furniture, takeaway food and musical instruments, but also social
categories for women, refuse collectors, children, rock stars and so on. It is a
fundamental premise of the social cognition approach that such categories serve
a very useful function (e.g. Allport, 1954b; Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen,
1994). Why do you think this is?
Consider the following thought experiment. Imagine a far-off planet, Zygon, a
place where perceptual mechanisms and inferential strategies have evolved in a
decidedly unearthly manner. One day, an inhabitant from Zygon lands her
spaceship somewhere on planet Earth and begins her journey into the unknown.
She will doubtless be faced with many new objects and life forms that we human
beings would, effortlessly, be able to sort into people, buildings, animals, trees
and so on. Not so the Zygonian. Devoid of the cognitive know-how to parse this
new and complex social landscape into something more intelligible, she would
eventually experience information overload. There would simply be too many
stimuli to process, at least in any meaningful manner.
This ability to separate our social world into discrete social categories is
therefore a vital adaptation that ensures we don’t find ourselves in a similarly
daunting position. Without it, each person we meet (or each object) would be
unique and need to be treated accordingly. Imagine how much time and effort
that would take. Stated simply, categorization favours simplification, which in
turn renders the world a more orderly, predictable and controllable place.
So, having established why categorization is so useful, let’s look in more detail
at the evidence that it is an automatic process. In 1989, Devine published an
influential article in which she argued that (1) knowledge about racial
stereotypes is culturally shared, even by people who do not endorse such
stereotypes, and (2) activation of this knowledge (i.e. stereotype activation) is an
automatic process (see Leader in the Field, Patricia Devine). Recall that the
criteria for a process to be automatic include that it is unconscious and does not
require intention, attention or effort. If stereotype activation is truly automatic,
this should mean that any time the appropriate cues are present (e.g. age, race or
gender), stereotype activation should invariably result. So, how might this be
tested empirically? Devine (1989, Study 2) used what is known as a priming
paradigm (see Bargh & Pietromonaco, 1982). We need to dwell a moment on
what priming is and why the priming paradigm is such a useful research tool to
enable us to test Devine’s hypothesis (and indeed, many other related research
questions within social cognition).

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 priming activating one stimulus (e.g. bird) facilitates the subsequent processing of another related
stimulus (e.g. wing, feather).

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When a construct is triggered in memory and made temporarily accessible,

this is called priming and the stimulus that leads to this construct being triggered
is called the prime (Moskowitz, 2005). In concrete terms, priming or activating
one stimulus (e.g. horse) facilitates the way in which we subsequently process
another related stimulus (e.g. mane, tail) via a process known as spreading
activation (e.g. Neely, 1977; see Figure 4.2 for a schematic representation of this
process).
FIGURE 4.2 Example of spreading activation.

Once a construct is activated, associated concepts are also triggered and attain
a state of heightened accessibility, even if they were not directly primed
initially. Such concepts therefore require some kind of cue to render them
momentarily accessible. To use an analogy proposed by Higgins, Bargh, and
Lombardi (1985), these concepts are like a battery that is running low but can be
recharged in certain circumstances (i.e. when the appropriate environmental
trigger is present). It should be noted that other concepts, such as strongly held
political beliefs, are often perpetually well charged (aided, for example, by
repeated exposure to political arguments in the press, or political debates with
like-minded friends). Being in a state of permanently high charge, they are
routinely more accessible. These are termed chronically accessible concepts (for
a detailed review, see Moskowitz, 2005). Here, though, we focus primarily on
how priming makes concepts temporarily accessible.

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accessibility the extent to which information is easily located and retrieved.

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LEADER IN THE FIELD

Patricia Devine (b. 1959) spent her undergraduate years at the State
University of New York, graduating in 1981, summa cum laude.
This was followed by an MA (in 1983) and a PhD (in 1986) from
Ohio State University. Devine’s research centres around the
intrapersonal and interpersonal challenges associated with prejudice
in contemporary society. Her early work on the automatic and
controlled components of stereotyping (1989) has been extremely
influential in the field. Recent research concerns include the relation
between explicit and implicit prejudice and the processes that
regulate the use of stereotypes.
In one measure of accessibility, known as a lexical decision task, priming
stimuli (e.g. words or pictures) are often presented on a computer, usually very
quickly. Participants are then shown a letter string that may or may not be
associated with the prime (and may or may not be a real word), and asked to
decide if it is a real word or a non-word by pressing one of two computer keys.
A priming effect is obtained when participants are shown to respond
significantly faster to real words preceded by an associated prime (i.e. are
quicker to respond to wing after being primed with bird than when not primed).
The advantage of priming paradigms is that they usually indicate uncontrolled
automatic processing. Participants’ subsequent reaction times are not influenced
by self-presentational strategies (i.e. wanting to show themselves in a certain,
often socially desirable, light), as might be the case, say, with paper and pencil
measures of stereotyping.

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lexical decision task cognitive measure of how quickly people classify stimuli as real words or
nonsense words; quicker responses to certain word categories indicate increased accessibility.

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Now that we are clearer about how priming paradigms work and why they are
so suited to the study of automatic processes within social cognition, let’s return
to Devine’s work. In her experiment, primes related to a stereotype were
presented outside of participants’ conscious awareness. In order to do this, she
presented the primes outside of participants’ parafoveal field (i.e. out of their
direct line of vision). The primes Devine used were terms related to the
stereotype associated with black people (i.e. labels such as blacks, niggers, and
physical or trait characteristics including poor, lazy). The participants had been
pre-tested for prejudice level: half were high in prejudice towards black people,
whereas half were low. This distinction forms an important part of Devine’s
experimental hypotheses, as we shall see later. Devine presented some
participants with a high proportion (80 per cent) of ethnically associated words,
and other participants with a much lower proportion (20 per cent).
Following the prime, in an ostensibly unrelated second experiment,
participants read a brief scenario and were asked to form an impression of a
target person who engaged in ambiguously hostile behaviours (after a paradigm
originally developed by Srull & Wyer, 1980). Why hostile? Because pre-testing
had indicated that hostility was a very strong feature of the black stereotype (see
also Duncan, 1976). None of the words used in the priming phase, however,
were directly related to hostility. This is important, because it suggests that if the
prime exerts the predicted effects upon interpretation of the ambiguous
behaviour, it is due to automatic stereotype activation rather than simple priming
of the hostile construct.
Let’s consider what Devine predicted and found. Devine reported that those
participants who received the high proportion of ethnic primes rated the target
person in the story significantly more negatively (e.g. as more hostile and
unfriendly) than did participants who received the low proportion of ethnic
primes. Recall that Devine’s view is that stereotypes are activated automatically.
If this is so, then we should find that participants activate the black stereotype in
the priming phase of the study (unconsciously) and go on to use it (without
awareness) in the second part of the study (when forming an impression of the
target). This should translate into higher ratings of the target as hostile, following
a black prime.
What about the differing levels of prejudice among participants? This was a
very neat twist: if these results are found in both high-and low-prejudice
individuals, it is stronger evidence still that stereotype knowledge is culturally
shared and that activation is indeed automatic. If the priming effect can be
demonstrated even among individuals who do not endorse the stereotype, this is
pretty good evidence that it happened automatically. If low-prejudice
participants could have found some way of controlling this rather undesirable
response, they surely would have done so, since it is clearly at odds with their
beliefs. In fact, Devine found that participants’ prior level of prejudice made
little difference to how susceptible they were to the ethnic primes (for more on
the studies in this paper, see Research Close-Up 4.3).
This study is one of a number that have investigated the so-called automaticity
of stereotype activation (see also Banaji & Hardin, 1996; Perdue & Gurtman,
1990). The results seem to provide quite compelling evidence. Moreover, during
the 1990s research in this area blossomed and the literature is now replete with
evidence of the seeming automaticity of stereotype activation (for recent reviews
see Bargh, 1999; Bodenhausen, Todd, & Richeson, 2009; Devine & Monteith,
1999).
So should we conclude that the case for the automaticity of stereotype
activation is established beyond question? Perhaps not just yet. The situation
regarding automaticity is actually rather complex, and researchers themselves
are divided in terms of how it is best interpreted (see Bargh, 1999; Bodenhausen
et al., 2009; Devine & Monteith, 1999). Moreover, recent research has provided
some important qualifications to the debate, as we shall see later in this chapter.
For now, we will note that stereotypes are often automatically activated. The
question we now consider is this: once a stereotype category has been activated,
what can happen next?
 Schemas: The next step in the process?
Several years ago a British national daily newspaper ran an advertising
campaign on television. The advertisements featured a skinhead running at speed
towards a businessman. Figures 4.3a and 4.3b show two shots in the sequence;
what do you think happened next?
FIGURE 4.3(a) and (b) Two stills of a skinhead in the Guardian advertising
campaign.
Source: © Guardian News & Media Ltd 1986. Reproduced with permission.

Most people, when asked, assumed the next shot showed the skinhead
mugging the businessman. He was instead rushing to save him from a large pile
of falling bricks (see Figure 4.4).
FIGURE 4.4 Final still of the skinhead in the Guardian campaign.
Source: © Guardian News & Media Ltd 1986. Reproduced with permission.

The newspaper (The Guardian) used this example to illustrate its commitment
to impartial reporting – the need to get the full picture. Here it serves a useful
educational purpose: it potently depicts what can happen once a category has
been activated. Why did people jump to this conclusion? The answer lies in the
spontaneous encoding of the situation. People see the skinhead, readily activate
the pertinent skinhead schema (e.g. anarchic, violent) and arrive at the mistaken
conclusion that he is probably about to behave aggressively. Encoding refers to
how we translate what we see into a suitable format that can be readily stored in
our mind (Fiske & Taylor, 1991).

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encoding the way in which we translate what we see into a digestible format to be stored in the
mind.

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This example illustrates that while it may be a useful strategy to leap to the
first obvious conclusions when perceiving others, it is not always a sound one.
The behaviour was somewhat ambiguous: there are many reasons why a person
may be running in the direction of another. The important point is that, in this
case, the activated schema biased the interpretation of the behaviour in line with
the skinhead stereotype.
 This tendency has been demonstrated in a number of laboratory experiments
(e.g. Correll, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2002; Duncan, 1976; Payne, 2001). In
an example reminiscent of the above real-world scenario, Correll et al. (2002)
had participants play a video game in which they were shown photographs of
young men in a range of settings (at a train station, in a park). Half were black,
half were white. Additionally, half were holding a gun, whereas the other half
were holding harmless objects (mobile phone, camera). In the so-called ‘Shooter
Task’ or ‘Weapons-Identification Task,’ participants had to press a button
labelled ‘Shoot’ if the man in the photo was carrying a gun, or press another
button labelled ‘Don’t shoot’ if he was not. They had just half a second to make
each decision, so it really was a gut-reaction judgement. Points were awarded or
deducted based upon whether participants made the correct judgements. Results
showed that participants were most likely to hit ‘Shoot’ when the person was
black, regardless of whether they were holding a gun. This ‘Shooter Bias’
reveals how accessible schemas can bias the interpretation given to social events,
especially when time (and processing capacity) are in short supply. (We now
suggest you read Social Psychology Beyond the Lab 4.1 to see how this bias has
been demonstrated beyond the laboratory setting.)
Let’s now consider the schema topic in more detail. Once we have activated a
category stereotype, we bring into play the knowledge contained within these
structures: our schemas or stereotypes (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990).
Schemas are – stated simply – packets of pre-digested information we hold in
our heads about objects or people from specific categories: our expectancies
about objects or groups. As an illustration, consider the kinds of information that
come to mind when the category ‘woman’ is activated. Such a person might be
readily described as kind, gentle, nurturing and home-loving. Or perhaps one
might instead consider a subcategory of this broad category, such as ‘business
woman’ (ambitious, assertive, motivated, ruthless, wears designer suits,
unpopular with colleagues). Clearly, several different types of information may
be discerned, including, for example, knowledge about ‘business women’ (what
they typically do and don’t do) and value judgements about them (their
likeability, popularity, etc.). However, a schema should not be misconstrued as a
long list of separate unrelated items and attributes. Rather, it is a cognitive
structure within which attributes are organized and relations between them
perceived. Thus, we might perceive a relationship between the fact that ‘business
women’ are ambitious and assertive, or perhaps between the observation that
they are ruthless and not very popular (see Figure 4.5 for an illustration of such a
schema).
FIGURE 4.5 Example of business woman schema.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BEYOND THE

LAB 4.1
IF THE FACE FITS . . . HOW JEAN CHARLES
DE MENEZES CAME TO BE SHOT DEAD IN
ERROR
In the wake of the London terrorist bombings of July 2005, police were
following up a number of leads about the likely whereabouts of the
bombers. An address found in one of the unexploded bags recovered by
police led to close surveillance of a block of flats near to Stockwell tube
station in London. At 9.30 a.m., Brazilian-born Jean Charles de Menezes, an
electrician, left the building following a call to fix a broken fire alarm.
Believing him to be wearing clothing and behaving in a manner that aroused
suspicions of his being a suicide bomber, and wanting to avert a further
terrorist episode, the police followed him to Stockwell tube station, where
he was shot dead. It was subsequently discovered that Menezes was not
carrying explosives and indeed was not connected in any way to the terrorist
 carrying explosives and indeed was not connected in any way to the terrorist
attack. The facts of the case have been the subject of ongoing debate, and
inconsistencies in police statements have never been entirely resolved.
Subsequent information suggests that the police may have jumped to
conclusions based on the potential match between Menezes and the Muslim
terrorists. The Menezes shooting highlights how schema use (here based
upon physical appearance, clothing and behaviour) can have tragic
consequences.
So, a schema contains many different kinds of knowledge about a particular
category. Armed with this knowledge, the process of impression formation is
greatly facilitated, because schemas affect how quickly we perceive, notice and
interpret available information (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Kunda, 1999). We are apt
to rely upon schemas for a number of reasons. Table 4.1 summarizes some of the
main ones (from Fiske and Taylor, 1991).
Table 4.1 When do we rely upon schemas?
Source: Adapted from Fiske and Taylor (1991) Social Cognition, 2nd Edition ©
The McGraw-Hill Companies, with permission.
Role schemas (that imply jobs or tasks people do) may dominate over traits (role
schemas are more informative because they are richer and imply more
associations)
Subtype schemas (business woman) may be used more than superordinate ones
(woman) because they allow us to reconcile information that contradicts the
broader superordinate level schema (women at work whose assertive behaviour
contradicts their gender role may be viewed as business women)
Information presented early on can cue schemas (primacy) that help organize
subsequent information
We use schemas that attract our attention (salience) because they set a person
apart such as a male nurse in a ward with otherwise all female staff
We use schemas that have previously been primed (accessibility) because such
information comes to mind easily and is readily available to us
We use schemas consistent with our current feelings (mood) because in most
cases, our moods seem to cue mood-consistent schemas
We use schemas relevant to controlling our outcomes (power) because status
hierarchies affect us whether we are high (leader) or low (minority group) in
status
 In the following section we broaden the topic of cognitive shortcuts still
further to see how other kinds of heuristic schematic processing can affect the
judgements and decisions we make about others when there may be demands on
our information processing capacities.
Making judgements when you don’t have all the data:
cognitive heuristics
Imagine that you have just started your degree course at a large London
University. In your first tutorial meeting with your professor, you are introduced
to the other students in your tutor group. One of them, Jez, has a deep tan, sun-
bleached tousled locks, and is asking the tutor what facilities there are to store
large surfing equipment in his hall of residence. Keen to get to know your fellow
students and engage in friendly conversation, you say “Hi Jez. Let me guess . . .
Are you maybe from Newquay or some other surfy place in the South West of
England?” You base this hypothesis upon your knowledge of the common
stereotype for surfers, which Jez seems to fit perfectly. This illustrates what is
called the representativeness heuristic, a mental shortcut (rule of thumb) that
we use in order to pigeonhole something/someone according to how similar it is
to (or how representative it is of) a typical exemplar (here, the surfer stereotype;
Kahneman & Tversky, 1972). It is one of several judgemental heuristics that
allow us to make sense of large amounts of information in a relatively easy way.

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representativeness heuristic a mental shortcut whereby instances are assigned to categories on the
basis of how similar they are to the category in general.

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Yet, if you had access to the profile of students at this particular university,
you would see that students from the South West are not very well represented:
most students are drawn from the counties around London. If you were then told
this, would you revise your initial opinion of Jez’s likely origins? After all, you
now know there are probably not that many students from the South West at this
university. This information about the frequency of certain categories in the
general population is called base rate information. If you were to give it due
weight in your decision-making process, you might conclude that your original
assumption was perhaps a bit hasty. The trouble is, and as decades of research
have shown (see Gilovich and Savitsky, 2002), when we are faced with base rate
information and seemingly conflicting exemplars, we often fail to take account
of base rate information and are more influenced by representativeness
information.

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base rate information information that gives us an idea about how frequent certain categories are
in the general population.

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We don’t only rely upon the representativeness heuristic when taking

judgemental shortcuts. Say you are asked to estimate how many famous
celebrities have succumbed to plastic surgery in the past few years. How would
you go about calculating this? Would you, say, look at some comprehensive list
compiled of the top one hundred celebrities and then systematically search for
evidence about whether each of them had undergone plastic surgery before you
made a cautious estimate? Or would you instead bring to mind (probably with
very little trouble) the instances of celebrities whose faces are regularly splashed
across the pages of the popular press who are well-known to have gone under the
knife (Katie Price, Victoria Beckham, Angelina Jolie, Tom Cruise, Britney
Spears, Cher, Tom Jones). And from this would you deduce that it is probably
fairly commonplace for celebrities to indulge their desires for cosmetic self-
enhancement? If you think you would probably have opted for this second
‘quick and dirty’ method, then you have just demonstrated for yourself the lure
of the availability heuristic: you have based your judgement on how easily
information comes to mind (Schwarz et al., 1991).

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availability heuristic a cognitive shortcut that allows us to draw upon information about how
quickly information comes to mind about a particular event, to deduce the frequency or likelihood
of that event.

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 Sometimes it works to our advantage, but at times it can let us down. Say for
example that you are asked to guess how many high school students of your
daughter’s age prefer a particular, popular designer brand of clothing. Without
really trying, you bring to mind numerous examples of male and female pre-
teens you have seen hanging around in town, or friends of your daughter, all
kitted out in hooded tops and sweatpants by this designer. It seems every young
person is wearing this gear. From this mental exercise, you may infer that the
entire year group is equally addicted to the brand. And when you read in the
press how over three quarters of this age group own at least one item of clothing
by this designer, you will feel your reliance on the availability heuristic was
justified. Students of this age do clearly love this brand!
On the other hand, say you are asked how many women in their twenties are
currently having babies. Without hesitation, you bring to mind numerous
examples in your workplace of female colleagues in that age bracket who are
either pregnant or off on maternity leave. From this you deduce that a high
percentage of twenty-something women are reproducing right now. In fact, the
higher numbers of women in your workplace are something of a blip that does
not correlate that well with a falling birth-rate among this age group in the more
general population. On this occasion, then, the availability heuristic has not
provided an accurate estimate.
As a final illustration of another cognitive heuristic, imagine you are a judge
deciding upon a prison sentence for a defendant who has been accused of rape.
Obviously your decision ought to be made based upon a systematic review of the
available evidence. What might surprise you, however, is that your decision
about how many years the sentence should run for could be very easily
influenced by seemingly trivial factors. Say on your journey to the courtroom
that day you had passed through roadworks with a series of 20mph speed
restrictions punctuating your journey. Could something as random as the
temporary accessibility of an arbitrary number affect your decision? Might this
number act as some kind of anchor, providing a numerical start point that you
will probably not stray too far from when making your sentencing decision?
Englich, Mussweiler, and Strack (2006) tested this idea in a real-life legal
setting involving sentencing decisions made by experienced legal professionals.
Participating legal experts were shown realistic case materials involving an
alleged case of rape and asked to provide their sentencing decision based on
their appraisal of the situation. Participants received one of three anchors: in one
condition the anchor came from an irrelevant source (a journalist asking about
the appropriateness of a certain sentencing decision); in a second condition they
were told the anchor had been randomly chosen; and in a third condition,
participants themselves randomly decided upon the anchor by the toss of dice. In
each case, the anchor was either high (three years) or low (one year). In all three
conditions, the anchor constrained sentencing decisions, with participants
assimilating their answer in the direction provided by the anchor. For example,
in Study 1, participants provided with a high (three years) anchor reached a
mean decision length of 33.38 months, whereas those provided with a low (one
year) anchor suggested a mean decision length of 25.43 months (see Figure 4.6).
Although one might expect (and indeed, hope) that experience and practice
would reduce this tendency to be affected by arbitrary anchors, this was not the
case. This result neatly illustrates what is known as the anchoring/adjustment
heuristic. We now suggest you read Social Psychology Beyond the Lab 4.2 to
see another demonstration of this cognitive heuristic.
FIGURE 4.6 Mean sentencing decisions (in months) as a function of different
anchors.
Source: From Englich et al. (2006) with permission from SAGE publications.

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anchoring/adjustment heuristic a cognitive heuristic that makes us place weight upon initial
standards/schemas (anchors) and as a result means we may not always adjust sufficiently far from
these anchors to provide accurate judgements.

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 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BEYOND THE
LAB 4.2
ANCHORING AND ADJUSTMENT AT WORK
IN THE PROPERTY MARKET: MORE THAN
JUST A PARLOUR TRICK?
Some researchers have suggested that the anchoring/adjustment heuristic is
more likely to occur in lab settings where the information available is
impoverished and not terribly realistic (Hogarth, 1981). Anxious to see if the
lab findings generalized to more information-rich real-world settings,
Northcraft and Neale (1987) asked experts (estate agents) and, for
comparison, amateurs (students) to tour real properties that were for sale at
the time and make judgements about their fair market value (FMV). As in
the lab studies, and indeed reflecting common estate agent practice, all
participants received an ‘anchor’ value in their information packs – here in
the form of a guide price – which varied (low, moderately low, moderately
high and high). As expected, participants’ FMV estimates varied as a
function of the guide price they received. For example, if provided with a
guide price of $65,900, estimates were $63,571 for students and $67,811 for
estate agents. If the anchor value was higher ($83,900) estimates were
$72,196 and $75,190 respectively. This was the case for both the ‘experts’
and ‘amateurs’ (although one might comment that the experts’ valuations
tended to be a little more optimistic and the students’ a little more
cautious!). The authors concluded that ‘decision biases and heuristics are
more than just parlour tricks and that they should play an important role in
our understanding of everyday decision behaviour’ (Northcraft & Neale,
1987, p. 96). Although a more realistic example, this research still provides
an anchor, as opposed to letting people generate one for themselves. As we
see in the next section, this distinction can have important implications for
the prevalence of the anchoring/adjustment heuristic.
 Why do we fall prey to judgemental heuristics?
Judgemental heuristics such as these show us how cognitive shortcuts can exert a
seductive influence upon our decision-making processes. Social cognition
research can tell us a good deal about why they occur, and we will briefly
consider some of the main findings here (for detailed reviews, see Fiske &
Taylor, 2008; Moskowitz, 2005; Tversky & Kahneman 1974). We will consider
each of the three main heuristics in turn: representativeness, availability and
anchoring.
The representativeness heuristic is often used because we are unwilling to
engage in the kind of effortful processing required to properly factor in base rate
information, as noted above. We rely upon a fairly simple similarity judgement
(e.g. Jez is more similar to the typical surfing dude than to the typical computer
nerd). In addition, we may neglect to take proper account of sample size. In
statistics it is well known that estimates drawn from large samples are more
reliable than those drawn from small ones, yet we are often happy to make
judgements via representativeness even if we base them on just a few exemplars.
A third factor that may affect use of the representativeness heuristic is predictive
value. When we hear information about a person second-hand, we should really
pay heed to the source of that information in terms of its credibility. Imagine you
hear a student describe a male housemate she has only just met as ‘a bit
antisocial’, based solely upon his reclusive behaviour during Fresher’s Week.
Are you less inclined to believe this description is accurate than if you had heard
a similar characterization from the housemate’s best school friend who had
garnered rather more evidence of her male friend’s behaviours over several
years? Ideally, we would give the second source more weight, but a lot of the
time we do not (Fiske & Taylor, 2008). In sum, like much of the material in the
first part of this chapter, the representativeness heuristic is another example of
our tendency to prefer simple over more complex cognitive deliberations (that is,
to behave as cognitive misers; Fiske & Taylor, 1991; 2008).

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cognitive miser a view of people as being often limited in processing capacity and apt to take
shortcuts where possible to make life simple.

- - - - - - - - - -
 Turning to the availability heuristic, it is perhaps best understood by thinking
about how easily information springs to mind. If information about the many
instances of celebrities choosing plastic surgery pops into our heads with
consummate ease, then we may conclude it is probably something that happens
an awful lot. That is, we assume that volume of exemplars (content) correlates
with its ease of retrieval (Schwarz et al., 1991). Another possibility is that we
simply feel that if information comes to mind easily (or not) then it must say
something about how frequent it actually is.
These two explanations (content versus feel) were considered in a study by
Schwarz et al. (1991). People were first asked to recall six or twelve assertive
behaviours they themselves had engaged in, and then had to judge their own
assertiveness. Who do you think rated themselves as more assertive: those who
had recalled six behaviours that confirmed this, or those who had to recall twelve
behaviours? You might think the answer is easy, and that of course, those who
provided more instances of their own assertiveness rated themselves as more
assertive, but in fact this was not what was found. Those recalling only six
assertive examples rated themselves as more assertive than those recalling
twelve examples (by the way, these researchers also collected data on
unassertiveness, and found the same pattern of results, such that those providing
fewer examples of unassertive behaviour rated themselves as less assertive).
So, what is going on? Well, try this for yourself – how easy do you find listing
twelve examples of your own assertive behaviour? The answer is probably ‘not
very’. You might easily come up with a few at first (‘I said no to the extra
workload my boss was trying to make me agree to’, ‘I stood up for a female
colleague who was being bullied’, ‘I intervened when a group of youths were
hassling an old lady in the shopping mall’), but you are likely to falter soon after.
So, what Schwarz et al. concluded was that it was the difficulty of retrieving
examples that drove these effects. If you are struggling to get even four
examples of assertive behaviour when you’ve been instructed to come up with
twelve, you may be left thinking you are a pretty unassertive kind of person.
What this study neatly shows, therefore, is that the feeling of difficulty/ease of
retrieval can matter as much as absolute numbers (content).
Finally, the anchoring/adjustment heuristic is traditionally thought to occur
because of a failure to properly adjust from an irrelevant value that provides an
anchor (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). More recently, though, the debate has
broadened out to better understand why adjustments tend to be insufficient
(Epley & Gilovich, 2006). Such research looks more closely at the processes that
underpin the adjustment phase. Epley and Gilovich (Study 1a) asked participants
a series of questions (e.g. “When was Washington elected president?”). Half of
the questions were considered to produce self-generated anchors (based on
previous research). This means that participants themselves would seek to
generate an anchor to help them work out an appropriate answer. For most
American citizens, for example, it is possible to provide a reasonable estimate of
Washington’s election date by adjusting from the date (i.e. anchor) of the
Declaration of Independence in 1776. For the remaining half of the questions,
anchors were provided by the experimenter. After providing their answers,
participants were told that the questions were intentionally difficult, and to look
again at their answers and provide a range that specified what they considered
their lowest and highest plausible estimate to be. To clarify this, for the question
about Washington, participants had to provide what they felt was the earliest or
latest feasible date on which he would have been elected. By comparing initial
answers with the ranges subsequently provided, the researchers were able to
establish how far participants adjusted from either self-generated or
experimenter-provided anchors. Overall, participants faced with a self-generated
anchor appeared to search for a plausible estimate, and as soon as they felt it has
been reached, they then terminated the adjustment process.
In later studies, Epley and Gilovich went on to show how several different
variables influence this adjustment process. Study 2a compared participants who
were either high or low in need for cognition (NFC). This individual difference
measure assesses the extent to which people are inclined to engage in effortful
thinking (see Individual Differences 7.1 in Chapter 7 for further details of the
items in this scale). In Study 2b, the researchers compared participants who had
or had not consumed alcohol. This variable was of interest because some studies
have found that alcohol impairs our ability to process information carefully (e.g.
Cunningham, Milne, & Crawford, 2007). Finally, Study 2c looked at the
adjustment processes of participants who were or were not cognitively busy
(cognitively busy participants were required to rehearse an eight letter string
before each question was posed, a task that we know uses up cognitive resources
and makes it hard for people to process information systematically; Pendry &
Macrae, 1994). Epley and Gilovich (2006) predicted and found that participants
would be more reliant on (less inclined to adjust from) self-generated anchors
when they were low in NFC, or under the influence of alcohol, or cognitively
busy (see Table 4.2 for results from the study that compared participants who
were high or low in NFC).
Table 4.2 Mean responses to self-generated-anchoring items among participants low and high in need for
cognition.
Source: Epley & Gilovich, Psychological Science, 17, 311–318, copyright ©
2006 Sage. Reprinted by permission of SAGE Publications.

In sum, these results demonstrate that the degree of adjustment-based

anchoring biases is influenced by participants’ motivation (Study 2a) and ability
(Studies 2b and 2c) to continue adjusting from an anchor. The authors conclude
that the adjustment process is effortful, and so anything that affects the ability or
motivation to expend cognitive effort is likely to reduce the degree of adjustment
that occurs (Epley & Gilovich, 2006).
Overall, then, we can see how a range of judgemental heuristics serve to make
the job of social information processing a good deal easier. Next we consider
some of the consequences of schematic processing for our behaviour.
 Schema activation and behaviour
Can we be primed to think, feel or behave in a certain way
without even knowing it?
In the late 1990s, a number of articles appeared that demonstrated a very
intriguing phenomenon: behavioural responses (e.g. walking slowly) can be
automatically activated in response to an activated schema-relevant word (e.g.
‘wrinkle’). (We now suggest that you read Research Close-Up 4.1; see also
Figure 4.8.)
FIGURE 4.8 Could being primed with a photo of a ‘professor’ make you
perform better at a quiz?
Source: © Trevor Lush. Used under licence from Getty Images.

This same basic effect was subsequently demonstrated using a range of

category stereotypes and trait concepts, and showed several behavioural
consequences (e.g. performance on intelligence tasks, interpersonal behaviour,
memory performance; for a review, see Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001; Leader in
the Field, John Bargh). The priming methods can vary. For example, Bargh,
Chen and Burrows (1996) used a scrambled sentence task to activate the elderly
stereotype. Others have used subliminal word priming methods (Dijksterhuis,
Aarts, Bargh, & Van Knippenberg, 2000), or have asked people to think/write
about typical people of the categories (e.g. professors or secretaries; Dijksterhuis
& Van Knippenberg, 1998), or have used photographs of target group members
(e.g. punks or accountants; Pendry & Carrick, 2001; Figure 4.8). Moreover, the
effect is not confined to stereotype activation. It has been shown to affect trait
activation (Macrae & Johnston, 1998; see later in this chapter) and goal
activation, as we shall now see (e.g. Holland, Hendriks, & Aarts, 2005; for a
recent review, see Dijksterhuis, Chartrand, & Aarts, 2007).

RESEARCH CLOSE-UP 4.1

HOW DOES PRIMING AFFECT

BEHAVIOUR?
Bargh, J. A., Chen, M., & Burrows, L. (1996). Automaticity of social behavior: Direct effects of
trait construct and stereotype activation on action. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
71, 230–244.
This set of studies builds upon past priming research that demonstrates how
a recently activated trait construct or stereotype, in an apparently unrelated
context, can persist and exert an unintended effect upon the interpretation of
behaviour. Here, the authors argue that behavioural responses to situations
can also occur in response to an activated trait or stereotype prime. This
rather disquieting suggestion is somewhat at odds with the prevailing
assumption that behavioural responses to the social world are under
conscious control. However, the authors reason that behavioural responses
can be represented internally, just as are trait concepts and attitudes, and as
such they should be capable of being activated automatically when
triggering responses from the environment are present.
In three studies, the authors set out to put this hypothesis to the test. Here we
focus on Study 2a: Behavioural effects of activating the elderly stereotype,
in which participants were primed either with the elderly stereotype or with
a neutral prime, and their subsequent walking speed was assessed. The
authors hypothesized that elderly-primed participants would demonstrate
significantly slower walking speeds in comparison to neutral-primed
participants.
Design Thirty male and female students participated
in the study, which had a single factor (prime: elderly
versus neutral) between-participants design.
Procedure Participants were first asked to work on a
scrambled sentence task under the guise of a language
 proficiency experiment. For each of 30 items,
participants had to use the five words listed to
construct a grammatically correct four-word sentence
as quickly as possible. This task formed the priming
phase, serving to activate (or not) the appropriate
stereotype. Hidden within the scrambled sentences
were words either relevant to the elderly stereotype
(e.g. grey, bingo, wrinkle) or neutral, non-age-specific
words. Importantly, elderly words associated with
slowness (a common elderly stereotypic trait) were
excluded from the elderly prime condition. After
completing the task, participants were partially
debriefed. A second experimenter then covertly
recorded the amount of time participants took to walk
down the corridor after leaving the laboratory.
Finally, participants were fully debriefed.
Results After the conclusion of the experiment,
participants in the elderly priming condition walked
down a hallway more slowly than neutral prime
control participants (see Figure 4.7).
FIGURE 4.7 Mean time (in seconds) needed to walk down a hallway as a
function of prime type.
Source: From Bargh et al., 1996, Study 2a. Copyright © 1996 by the American
Psychological Association. Reproduced with permission. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 230–244. The use of APA information
does not imply endorsement by APA.
 Implications These results, together with data from
other studies reported in this article, provided
compelling initial evidence in support of the authors’
hypothesis. After participants were exposed to an
elderly prime, they demonstrated motor behaviour in
line with the activated stereotype (i.e. slower walking
speeds). Importantly, the authors took care to exclude
any references to time or speed in the stimulus
materials, so the effect is not simply a result of trait
priming. This suggests that the elderly-prime stimulus
words instead activated the elderly stereotype in
memory.
The take-home message is that social behaviour can be triggered
automatically by relevant features of the stimulus environment and can
occur without awareness. This finding is qualified somewhat by the
observation that such effects only occur if participants have ‘walking
slowly’ as part of their stereotype. It is further constrained by factors such as
whether the prime generates behaviour that is relevant/possible in a
particular situation (here, walking speed upon leaving the laboratory), and of
course, whether a person is actually able to engage in the behaviour (a
person with a broken leg and on crutches, for example, may be less affected
by such a prime).
 by such a prime).
This paper spawned a great deal of interest and subsequent research and it
remains a classic in this field.

LEADER IN THE FIELD

John Bargh (b. 1955) attended the University of Illinois as an
undergraduate. He attended graduate school at the University of
Michigan, with Robert Zajonc (see Leader in the Field, Chapter 7) as
his adviser. In 1981 he was awarded his PhD, and he then worked for
several years at New York University. Currently he is at Yale
University. He has received many prestigious awards, including the
SESP Dissertation Award in 1982 and the APA Early Career Award
for contributions to psychology in 1989. His research interests centre
on the topic of automaticity and analysis of the unconscious nature
of a wide range of psychological phenomena such as attitudes,
emotions, motivations and social behaviour.

For example, Holland et al. (2005) exposed participants to the recognizable

scent of a cleaning product (although they did not know this was happening).
The researchers hypothesized that the cleaner smell would increase the
accessibility of the concept of cleaning, and that this would guide participants’
descriptions of future home activities (goal setting). Participants were asked to
list five activities they wanted to do later that day. In the scent condition, 36 per
cent listed cleaning as a goal, in comparison to only 11 per cent in the control
(no smell) group. The authors suggest that this finding demonstrates that people
use accessible representations of behavioural concepts to help them develop an
appropriate goal (Holland et al., 2005; for a review see Custers & Aarts, 2005).
In other words, the cleaner prime promoted the goal of cleaning.

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goal a positively valued behavioural endstate that encompasses the purposeful drive/motivation to
engage in a behaviour/action/judgement.

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 So, why does it happen? According to Dijksterhuis et al. (2007), a number of
concepts may be involved (see Figure 4.5). Initially, we need to either think or
perceive something (e.g. the smell of a cleaning product, reading words
associated with elderly; Figure 4.9). This is the ‘input’ bit of their model. At the
output end are what are termed motor programmes (which are what make us
walk more slowly). In between input and output are three key elements that are
ultimately responsible for the enactment of behaviour: traits, goals and
behaviour representations. Nearly all social behaviour is said to be mediated by
at least one (usually two) of these three variables, which means they are needed
for the link between perception and behaviour to occur.
FIGURE 4.9 Primes associated with the elderly appear to cue the activation of
the elderly stereotype (e.g. walking more slowly).
Source: © Monkey Business Images. Used under licence from Shutterstock.

Traits are adjectival terms we use to describe general classes of behaviour.

Often they are learned while we are young (Bargh, 2005). Most of us can recall
instances where we have been praised by our parents (e.g. for being ‘polite’
when we remembered to say please and thank you) or chastised by them for
rather less positive behaviour (e.g. being called ‘naughty’ when we drew on the
walls of their newly painted bedroom). We are actually extremely quick to infer
a trait from an observed behaviour (Winter & Uleman, 1984). As such, traits
exert a very strong effect upon social behaviour, much of the time without our
being aware of it (Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001).
Goals are what make our actions have an enduring purpose and can be
described as positively valued behavioural endstates (Custers & Aarts, 2005).
We may learn goals from experiencing the consequences of our behaviour (not
submitting homework on time and getting a detention can lead us to develop a
goal to schedule our work more carefully) or from liking the feeling that
accompanies a behavioural endstate (‘I like how it feels when I jump on the
scales and have lost a few kilos, I’ll keep on with my goal of dieting’; for more
on goals, see Chapter 6).
The effect of both traits and goals on actual behaviour is mediated by
behaviour representations (Dijksterhuis et al., 2007). In the Holland, Hendricks,
and Aarts (2005) study, participants primed with the scent of a cleaning product
activated the means to achieve the goal: the behaviour representation of cleaning
the house. In the Bargh et al. (1996) study, trait concepts probably activated
behaviour representations. For example, activating the trait ‘slow’ probably
results in activation of a behaviour representation such as ‘linger’ or ‘dawdle’.
Theory Box 4.1 provides a schematic representation of these routes.

THEORY BOX 4.1

HOW TRAITS AND GOALS MEDIATE
BEHAVIOUR
Source: Adapted from Dijksterhuis et al., 2007.
 The above findings on priming of behaviours and goals may at first seem
somewhat surprising, but there is quite a lot of evidence accumulating in support
of these results (for recent reviews see Bargh, 2005; Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001;
Dijksterhuis et al., 2007). Research of this kind provides more evidence for the
idea that much of our behaviour can occur without conscious awareness. Later in
this chapter, though, we shall see that such effects are not inevitable.
 Summary
Thus far we have considered how social information can be activated
automatically, and explored some of the consequences of this, in terms of
stereotype activation, schemas and reliance on cognitive shortcuts such as
heuristics. Taken to an extreme, such research can generate some seemingly
pessimistic conclusions about how much we are in control of our person-
perception faculties. If so much goes on without our awareness, are we forever at
the mercy of our processing frailties? That is certainly one interpretation of this
literature, although as we will see, such a view is far from the whole story.
 GOING THE EXTRA MILE: REGAINING
COGNITIVE CONTROL
What factors allow us to make more careful, considered
judgements?
Recently a colleague recounted the following story. He had been introduced at a
party to a staff member from another department, Computer Science. He
recounted his tale thus: ‘When I first saw him I thought, computer nerd! The
geeky 70s clothes, the old-fashioned specs, the terrible hairstyle. The kind of guy
who drives a Skoda and watches endless episodes of Star Trek. But after a few
minutes of talking to him, I had to think again. This guy was wild. A real party
animal, who drove an Audi TT and enjoyed bungee jumping in his spare time. I
couldn’t have been more wrong.’ This illustration hints at the yawning gap that
can exist between our initial category-driven impressions and the reality of what
lies beyond. The colleague took the time to get beyond his initial impression. In
this section we’ll look at when and why, like this colleague, we may go this
extra mile.
Stereotype? What stereotype? How goals can stop the
stereotype being activated in the first place
In the wake of early research implying the inevitability of stereotype activation,
researchers have documented a number of qualifications to this view. Let’s
consider an illustration of implicit goal operation, whereby implicit goals
(linked to perceivers’ individual motivation to behave in a certain way) can
affect stereotype activation. (We now suggest that you read Research Close-Up
4.2.)

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implicit goal operation the process whereby a goal that enables people to regulate responses (e.g.
to overcome stereotyping) is engaged without conscious awareness.

- - - - - - - - - -

The research of Moskowitz et al. (1999) demonstrates how stereotype

activation is affected by participants’ implicit goals to behave in a certain way
that may direct cognitive processing so as to prevent stereotype activation.
Further research corroborates this viewpoint. Sassenberg and Moskowitz (2005)
approached the notion of implicit goals from a different angle. Rather than
looking at how people’s chronic goals can effectively eliminate stereotype
activation, they illustrated the generality of the ‘implicit goals’ argument by
simply priming goal states. They found that priming participants with implicit
goals to be creative disrupted typical stereotypic associations (conventional
routes of thinking) and thereby implicitly controlled stereotypic responses.
These and several other studies temper the initially extreme conclusions
reached about the inevitability and automaticity of stereotype activation. We
now know that a wide range of target and perceiver-related factors can work to
moderate stereotype activation. These include processing goals, individual
beliefs about prejudice/egalitarianism, and attentional capacity (Lepore &
Brown, 1997; Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, Thorn, & Castelli, 1997;
Moskowitz et al., 1999). Hence, category activation would appear to be goal
dependent (Bargh, 1994), arising from the interplay of a range of cognitive,
motivational and biological factors. In sum, evidence is accumulating that
suggests it is sometimes possible to prevent stereotype activation (for more
detail see Bargh, 1999; Bodenhausen et al., 2009; Devine & Monteith, 1999;
Research Close-Up 4.3).

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goal dependent where an outcome is conditional upon a specific goal being in place (e.g. goal-
dependent automatic stereotype activation).

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 Quashing the effects of stereotype activation once it
has occurred
Can we prevent automatically activated stereotypes from
affecting our judgements?
What happens, though, in those situations in which it is not possible to prevent
activation? If stereotype activation happens, and we would really rather it hadn’t,
what can we do? Most researchers agree that perceivers are able to exercise
some degree of choice in their responses towards others (Fiske, 1989), provided
they are aware of the potential influence of the stereotype, have sufficient
cognitive resources available to exert control, and are in some way motivated not
to respond in a stereotypic fashion (Devine & Monteith, 1999). If we fulfil these
important criteria, then there are a number of strategies at our disposal.
In this section we consider several theoretical approaches that have furthered
our understanding of the processes that may intervene following stereotype
activation: Fiske and Neuberg’s (1990) continuum model of impression
formation; Devine’s (1989) dissociation model of stereotyping; research on
stereotype suppression (e.g. Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Jetten, 1994); and
moderators of the perception–behaviour link (Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001).

Impression formation: the rocky road from category-based to individuated

processing
When forming impressions of others, we commonly rely upon two sources of
information: (1) knowledge of a person’s category membership (e.g. female,
elderly, as we saw in the work reviewed earlier) and (2) individuating
information, i.e. details of his or her personal characteristics (e.g. honest,
forgetful). The persistent problem facing researchers has been to determine
which of these contrasting sources of information contribute to the impressions
derived (e.g. Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990).

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individuating information information about a person’s personal characteristics (not normally

derived from a particular category membership).

- - - - - - - - - -
 Fiske and Neuberg’s (1990) continuum model of impression formation
provides one detailed answer to this puzzle. This model proposes that perceivers’
evaluations of others fall somewhere along a continuum of impression
formation, with category-based evaluations anchoring one end of the continuum
and individuated responses the other. Constructed upon a number of theoretical
premises, the model asserts that: (1) category-based responses have priority, and
(2) movement along the continuum, from category-based to individuated
responses, is a function of interpretational, motivational and attentional factors
(see Leader in the Field, Susan T. Fiske).

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continuum model of impression formation views impression formation as a process going from
category-based evaluations at one end of the continuum to individuated responses at the other,
dependent on the interplay of motivational and attentional factors.

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According to the model (and in line with much of the work we have already
considered in this chapter), perceivers initially encounter a target and readily
categorize him or her as a member of a particular social group. They then
consider the personal relevance of the categorized target in the context of
currently active concerns and goals. If the target is of little interest (e.g. the
perceiver is merely passing a person in a street), then the impression formation
process is short-circuited and resulting evaluations are predominantly category-
based. If, however, the target is of at least minimal relevance (e.g. the target is an
interviewer and the perceiver an interviewee hopeful of securing a new job),
attentional resources are allocated to an appraisal of his or her personal
attributes, and the protracted journey towards a more individuated impression
begins. There are several stages at which processing can stop. An illustration of
how this might work in practice in different situations is provided in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3 Fiske and Neuberg’s (1990) continuum model of impression formation: an illustration of how
processing can stop at different stages.
Source: Reprinted from Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 23,
Fiske & Neuberg, A continuum of impression formation, from category-based to
individuating processes, pp. 1–74, Copyright 1990, with permission from
Elsevier.

RESEARCH CLOSE-UP 4.2

CAN IMPLICIT GOALS OVERRIDE

STEREOTYPE ACTIVATION?
Moskowitz, G. B., Gollwitzer, P. M., Wasel. W., & Schaal, B. (1999; Study 3). Preconscious
control of stereotype activation through chronic egalitarian goals. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 77, 167–184.
In earlier studies in this paper, Moskowitz et al. demonstrated that there may
be an effortless, preconscious form of cognitive control that in certain
individuals prevents stereotype activation. Consider two people, Jack and
Joe. Both would say they are low-prejudice, but whereas Jack would
experience a feeling of incompleteness and self-disappointment upon
learning that he had inadvertently acted in a stereotypic manner (and may
want to do something about it), for Joe this realization would not be too
troubling. Moskowitz et al. (1999) would view Jack as someone who
chronically pursues egalitarian goals to be egalitarian, fair, tolerant and
open-minded. Joe, on the other hand, would be more of a ‘non-chronic
egalitarian’ in this respect. Do such differences in implicit goal states impact
upon stereotype activation? Moskowitz et al. (1999, Study 3) investigated
this very question. Methodologically, their design manipulated the length of
time between a prime and the presentation of attributes; this is known as
Stimulus Onset Asynchrony, or SOA.
Method Participants Seventy-eight male students
participated in the study, which had a 2 (SOA: short
versus long) x 2 (chronicity: chronic versus non-
chronic egalitarians) x 2 (prime: men or women in
photographs) x 2 (target attributes: stereotype-relevant
versus irrelevant). The first two factors were between-
participants, the last two were within-participants.
Design and procedure Participants were classified as
chronic or non-chronic based upon responses to
measures designed to assess commitment to
egalitarian goals (here, with respect to fair treatment
for women). In a second phase, participants saw
photographs of men or women followed by an
attribute, and were asked to pronounce this attribute
as fast as possible. The attributes were either relevant
to (e.g. ‘loving’) or irrelevant to (e.g. ‘lonely’) the
stereotype of women, and they were presented either
200ms (short SOA) or 1,500ms (long SOA) after the
prime.
 Results Stereotype activation was demonstrated if
participants were quicker to respond to stereotype-
relevant attributes (e.g. loving) following stereotype-
relevant primes (e.g. woman). Importantly, only non-
chronics showed evidence of such stereotype
activation (see extreme left-hand bar in Figure 4.10,
which shows faster reaction times to stereotypic
words − 504ms – for non-chronics following exposure
to stereotypical primes). Participants with chronic
goals failed to show this effect (see second bar from
right in Figure 4.10, which shows slower reaction
times to stereotype-relevant words − 554ms – for
chronic egalitarians following exposure to
stereotypical primes).
FIGURE 4.10 Response times (ms) to target attributes at short (200ms)
Stimulus Onset Asynchrony.
Source: From Moskowitz et al., 1999, Study 3. Copyright © 1999 by the
American Psychological Association. Reproduced with permission. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 77, 167–184. The use of APA information
does not imply endorsement by APA.
 Discussion These results show that stereotype
activation is goal-dependent, because participants who
were chronic egalitarians did not show the usual effect
of faster responses to category-relevant items after a
category relevant prime, whereas non-chronics did
show this effect. This lack of activation could not,
however, be due to conscious goals exerted on the
part of chronics, because the difference between
chronics and non-chronics was found even when
attributes were presented 200ms after the prime
(conscious control is possible only after 600ms have
elapsed between the presentation of a prime and a
stimulus). This led Moskowitz et al. (1999) to
conclude that stereotype activation is not inevitable.
For more on how goals affect stereotype control, see
Moskowitz and Ignarri (2009).
Thus, initial categorization is relatively spontaneous, but the social perceiver
will only stop here if the motivation to go further is lacking or if there are
pressures (e.g. scarcity of time) conspiring against a more systematic appraisal
of the evidence. Research on perceiver motivation and its effects on the
impression formation process have resulted in the identification of several goals
and task objectives that reliably elicit more individuated processing. Among the
most important are: (1) outcome dependency on a target (participants believe
they will later meet the target and work together on a jointly judged task;
Neuberg & Fiske, 1987; Pendry & Macrae, 1994); (2) perceiver accountability
(perceivers believe they will have to justify their responses to a third party, and
be held responsible for their impressions; Pendry, 1998; Tetlock, 1983); and (3)
accuracy-set instructions (perceivers are instructed to be as accurate as possible;
Kruglanski & Freund, 1983).

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 - - - - - - - - - -

outcome dependency a motivational objective in which participants believe they will later meet a
target and work together on a jointly judged task; shown to lead to less stereotypical target
impressions.

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accountability a processing goal whereby perceivers believe they will have to justify their
responses to a third party and be held responsible for their impressions; this typically leads to less
stereotypical impressions.

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LEADER IN THE FIELD

Susan T. Fiske (b. 1952) obtained her PhD from Harvard in 1978.
After a number of years, first at Carnegie Mellon and then at the
University of Massachusetts (Amherst), she moved to Princeton. In
the course of her career she has amassed many prestigious awards,
including (with Shelley Taylor; see Leader in the Field, Chapter 5)
the 2003 Thomas Ostrom Award from the Person Memory Interest
Group for work in social cognition. A past president of the American
Psychological Society (2002–2003), she has published numerous
articles, book chapters and books. Her current research focuses upon
how stereotyping, prejudice and discrimination are encouraged or
discouraged by social relationships, such as cooperation, competition
and power.
While differing on a number of counts, these motivational factors all share a
common feature: they increase perceiver involvement with the target and
encourage more individuated impressions. However, motivation to engage in
controlled processing may on its own be insufficient if cognitive resources are
depleted. For example, Pendry and Macrae (1994, Study 1) led participants to
believe they would meet and interact with Hilda, an elderly female. Half the
participants were also made outcome-dependent: they stood to gain £20 for their
joint performance with Hilda on a word-puzzle task. The remaining participants
would work with Hilda, but their outcome would not depend on her
performance. All participants received the same information about Hilda, half of
which (12 items) was stereotypic, half of which was counter-stereotypic.
While reading the profile, half the participants performed a resource-depleting
concurrent mental task (digit rehearsal); the others simply read the profile. To
assess their impressions, all participants were asked to rate six personality traits
(three pre-tested as stereotypic and three as counter-stereotypic with respect to
elderly females) for how characteristic they were of Hilda. Pendry and Macrae
predicted and found that the formation of an individuated impression was
contingent upon participants being both motivated (here, by being outcome-
dependent) and having full processing capacity (i.e. not being required to
rehearse the digits while forming the impression).
In a second study, Pendry and Macrae (1994) sought to establish whether
participants who are outcome-dependent rather than outcome-independent
devote a greater proportion of their attentional capacity when forming an
impression of a target. The idea that motivated perceivers allocate more attention
to processing information is a fundamental premise of Fiske and Neuberg’s
model, although support for it at that time was somewhat limited.
To test this hypothesis, Pendry and Macrae (1994, Study 2) used what is called
a probe reaction task (PRT; see Bargh, 1982). Participants were instructed to
optimize their performance on the impression formation task and to use their
remaining attentional capacity to respond to a probe stimulus that was presented
in addition to the main task (i.e. turning off a randomly illuminated light bulb
icon that appeared several times on a computer screen while the impression task
was being performed). Importantly, this probe reaction task was not a method of
resource depletion (like the digit rehearsal task). That is, its purpose was not to
divert attentional resources away from the primary impression formation task
and make the process harder. Rather, it assessed what attention was not being
used in the primary task (i.e. how much attention was left over). If more
involving motivational goals do entail greater attention to the target, then we
should expect that participants under these conditions would have less attention
left over to switch off the light bulb quickly. This translates into slower reaction
times on this measure for outcome-dependent participants. This is indeed what
the study found (see Figure 4.11).
FIGURE 4.11 Participants’ mean probe reaction times (PRTs) (milliseconds) as
a function of processing goal.
Source: From Pendry & Macrae (1994), Study 2, with permission from Elsevier.

- - - - - - - - - -

probe reaction task a simple reaction-time task that assesses attention left over from performing
the primary task; does not take away attention from the primary task (i.e. is not resource-depleting).

- - - - - - - - - -

This research provides evidence for the view that motivated involvement with
a target can lead to more controlled processing (and hence less stereotypic
impressions; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987). More than this, it suggests that the extent
to which we are able to go beyond initial, category-based impressions will be
dependent upon the interplay between motivational and attentional factors. In
sum, once attention is depleted, our ability to systematically process information
about others, even if we are motivated to do so, may be diminished (for more on
this topic, see Fiske, Lin, & Neuberg, 1999; Gawronski, Ehrenberg, Banse,
Zukova, & Klauer, 2003).

Replacing stereotypic thoughts with egalitarian responses

As we saw earlier, Devine’s (1989) paper provided some initial evidence for the
automaticity of stereotype activation. Devine’s thesis did not, however, stop
there. In her dissociation model of stereotyping, she argued that automatic and
controlled processes may be dissociated. What this means is that automatic
activation of a stereotype does not inevitably lead to stereotypic responding. We
now suggest that you read Research Close-Up 4.3, and look at Theory Box 4.2
for a schematic overview of Devine’s model.

- - - - - - - - - -

dissociation model proposes that two different processes can occur independently and that one
does not inevitably follow from the other (e.g. Devine’s proposed dissociation between automatic
and controlled processes in stereotyping).

- - - - - - - - - -

Later research echoes this general sentiment. For example, Monteith (1993)
has shown that when people are committed to being nonprejudiced and their
behaviour appears to violate these standards, they feel guilty, become self-
focused (direct attention towards the self) and direct their efforts at reducing this
discrepancy to ensure it does not happen again. Hence, Monteith (1993) found
that low-prejudice participants provided unfavourable (i.e. non-stereotypic)
evaluations of jokes about gay people, but only if they had been made to realize
that in an earlier phase of the experiment they had (without realizing it) acted in
a prejudiced fashion. Research of this nature relies upon classifying participants
based upon their scores on a prejudice scale which is constructed so as to
minimize social desirability effects (e.g. Modern Racism Scale: McConahay,
Hardee, & Batts, 1981).

THEORY BOX 4.2

DEVINE’S (1989) AUTOMATIC AND
CONTROLLED COMPONENTS OF PREJUDICE
MODEL
Source: From Devine, 1989, Study 3. Copyright © 1989 by the American
Psychological Association. Reproduced with permission. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 56, 5–18. The use of APA information
does not imply endorsement by APA.
RESEARCH CLOSE-UP 4.3

WHAT ARE THE AUTOMATIC AND

CONTROLLED COMPONENTS OF
STEREOTYPES AND PREJUDICE?
Devine, P. G. (1989, Study 3). Stereotypes and prejudice: Their automatic and controlled
components. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56, 5–18.
In her first study in this series, Devine demonstrated that all participants,
whether high or low in prejudice, were equally knowledgeable of the
cultural stereotype of black individuals. The second study demonstrated that
when participants’ ability to consciously monitor stereotype activation was
prevented, all participants responded in line with the activated stereotype (as
we saw earlier). However, Devine’s theoretical model proposes a
dissociation between automatic and controlled processes. In essence, this
means that once a stereotype has been activated automatically, a stereotypic
means that once a stereotype has been activated automatically, a stereotypic
response is not inevitable. When participants have time and motivation to
correct for initially stereotypic thoughts, they will do so. Later in the paper
(Study 3) she set out to demonstrate this.
Method Participants The design involved a simple
one-way comparison between participants low versus
high on prejudice. Sixty-seven white students took
part in the study. Participants were divided into high-
prejudice (N = 34) and low-prejudice (N = 33) groups
based on a median split of scores on the Modern
Racism Scale (MRS; McConahay et al., 1981).
Design and procedure Participants were run in small
groups. First, they were asked to list as many
alternative labels as possible for the social group
black Americans (to include slang terms). This served
to activate participants’ cognitive representations of
black people. Following the label-generation task,
they were asked to list their honest thoughts about the
racial group of black people, under anonymous
conditions. Afterwards, they completed the seven-
item MRS.
Results The proportion of pejorative and non-
pejorative labels arising from the label-generation task
was computed for each participant. A comparison
between high-and low-prejudice participants revealed
no significant differences in terms of the proportion of
pejorative labels generated in the first phase. Then the
researchers coded participants’ responses to the
 thought-listing task in terms of valence (positive or
negative) and whether the thought concerned a belief
about the group or was instead a trait description.
Thus, four different kinds of thoughts were coded
(positive trait, negative trait, positive belief, negative
belief). Examples of positive traits included ‘brothers’
and ‘Afro Americans’, whereas negative traits
covered terms such as ‘coons’ and ‘spear-chuckers’.
For responses coded instead as ‘beliefs’, these
included ‘Affirmative action will restore historical
inequalities’ (positive) and ‘Blacks are free loaders’
(negative).
Analyses of the frequencies of different types of thoughts listed by
participants revealed that high-prejudice participants more often listed
negative traits than each of the other three types of thoughts (which did not
differ from each other). However, low-prejudice participants listed positive
belief thoughts more often than the other three types of thoughts (which did
not differ from each other). These results can be seen in Figure 4.12.
FIGURE 4.12 Thought listing (labels used to describe African Americans) by
High and Low prejudice participants.
Source: From Devine, 1989, Study 3. Copyright © 1989 by the American
Psychological Association. Reproduced with permission. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 56, 5–18. The use of APA information
does not imply endorsement by APA.
 Discussion This study demonstrated that low-
prejudice participants were able to provide non-
stereotypic and egalitarian descriptions about black
people, because in this more deliberate thought-listing
paradigm, participants were more inclined to think
carefully about what they said, and how this would fit
with their prejudice-relevant self-concepts. As such,
they produced very few pejorative thoughts. Devine
would argue that this shows that these participants
overcame the automatically activated stereotype and
replaced it with thoughts more in keeping with their
nonprejudiced beliefs. As such, Study 3 appears to
qualify the rather pessimistic conclusions highlighted
by the first two studies in the paper.
It should be noted, though, that subsequent research has questioned some of
the conclusions drawn from this research (see Lepore & Brown, 1997).
Whilst later research has qualified some of the original findings, this
remains an extremely influential and widely cited paper in the field.
What research of this kind demonstrates is that it is possible to regulate
stereotypic responding if (1) we are aware of the possibility of unconscious
prejudicial influence, (2) we are sufficiently motivated (here, by virtue of a
desire to appear unprejudiced), and (3) we have the required time available to do
so (see Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). There are several issues of note here. For
example, we may not always be aware of the unfelt influence of the stereotype
(Bargh, 1999; Wilson & Brekke, 1994). Also, as we have seen, time or
processing capacity limitations can impede even the most motivated perceiver
(Pendry & Macrae, 1994). It is possible, too, that even if we are motivated to
control stereotypic reactions, attempts at control can backfire for an altogether
different reason, as we shall now see.

Stereotype suppression: pushing the unwanted thought out of mind (if not
always out of sight)
Imagine you have just encountered an elderly woman in the supermarket. She
looms large as you enter the fruit and vegetable aisle, thwarting your speedy
passage to secure an aubergine by inconveniently standing right in front of you,
consulting her shopping list. ‘Dithery old biddy, it must be pension day!’, you
catch yourself thinking, and then you chastise yourself. You think, ‘I really must
stop this, she is no more in my way than anyone else, she is just rather older than
most’. You try to banish such stereotypic thoughts and proceed to the dairy aisle.
There, you encounter another elderly female. She is also in your way, but this
time she’s carefully weighing up the prices of different cheeses as you wait to
extricate the last packet of Parmesan from the depleted shelf above her. How do
you react to this second elderly female? Are you successfully able to suppress
the elderly stereotype?
There has been a great deal of interest in precisely this topic: does stereotype
suppression work? The research was stimulated by Wegner’s (1994) ironic
processes of mental control model. Wegner termed these processes ironic
because they result in exactly the opposite of what the suppression instructions
were intended to achieve (e.g. instructions to suppress stereotyping actually
increase stereotyping). According to Wegner, when we try to suppress unwanted
thoughts, two mental processes result. First, the intentional operating process
(IOP) begins to search for thoughts that can serve as distractors (to distract us
from thinking about the thing we don’t want to think about). Let’s use the
example of trying not to think about an ex-partner to illustrate these processes,
and then relate these to the process of stereotype suppression. What Wegner
suggests is that the IOP looks for evidence that you are thinking, not about your
ex-partner (unwanted thought), but about other things (the essay that is due in
next week, the party invite you have received). At the same time, a second,
ironic monitoring process (IMP) kicks in, searching for evidence of the
unwanted thoughts (the romantic meals you used to enjoy with your ex, the gifts
you received from him or her, the beach holiday you’d planned to take together
in the Seychelles). In order to identify these unwanted thoughts, the IMP has to
hold at some preconscious level the very thoughts one wants to suppress. Here’s
the important point: the IOP is a cognitively demanding process. To use the
terminology we employed earlier, it entails controlled thinking. However, the
IMP is thought to operate in an automatic manner.

- - - - - - - - - -

stereotype suppression the act of trying to prevent an activated stereotype from impacting upon
one’s judgements about a person from a stereotyped group.

- - - - - - - - - -

So what happens next? Because the IMP (the process that spots signs of
suppression failure) can operate in the absence of cognitive resources, it is free
to run mental riot even when resources are depleted, constantly searching for
signs of failure. To continue the above example, this means it can very easily
and repeatedly locate instances of your thinking about the unwanted thought (i.e.
your ex-partner, all the good times you had). Recall earlier we learned that
constructs that were frequently activated (primed) become more accessible.
Well, that is pretty much what is hypothesized to happen here. The unwanted
thoughts on which the IMP is focusing receive a healthy dose of priming and,
without the IOP, become even more accessible. In other words, a rebound effect
is demonstrated. Essentially, we end up thinking even more about our ex-partner
than we would have done had we not been trying to suppress such thoughts in
the first place! The implication for stereotype suppression is that, under certain
circumstances, the more people try to suppress stereotypes, the less successful
they will be. See Theory Box 4.3 for a summary of this process.

- - - - - - - - - -

rebound effect where suppression attempts fail; used here to demonstrate how a suppressed
stereotype returns to have an even greater impact upon one’s judgements about a person from a
 stereotyped group.

- - - - - - - - - -

THEORY BOX 4.3

WEGNER’S (1994) IRONIC PROCESSES
MODEL OF MENTAL CONTROL
Source: Wegner, 1994. Copyright © 1994 by the American Psychological
Association. Reproduced with permission. Psychological Review, 101, 34–
52. The use of APA information does not imply endorsement by APA.

Macrae and colleagues (1994) reported a series of experiments that

demonstrate this rebound effect. In their first study, participants were asked to
write about a day in the life of a skinhead, with a photo as a prompt (the study
purportedly investigated people’s ability to construct life event details from
visual information). Half were told to avoid stereotypic thoughts about skinheads
(i.e. suppress stereotype) while writing the passage, half were not. Later, they
were shown another skinhead photograph and asked to write a second passage.
This time no ‘skinhead suppression’ instructions were given. The researchers
hypothesized that if the ‘suppression’ participants experienced repeated
stereotype priming in the first phase, then they might show evidence of a
rebound effect in the second phase. As a result, their passages should be more
stereotypic in the second phase. This is indeed what Macrae et al. found (see
Figure 4.13).
FIGURE 4.13 Ratings of passage stereotypicality as a function of task
instruction.
Source: From Macrae et al., 1994, Study 1. Copyright © 1994 by the American
Psychological Association. Reproduced with permission. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 67, 808–817. The use of APA information does not
imply endorsement by APA.

Two additional studies provide further support for this finding. In a second
study, the rebound effect was demonstrated in a different way (behavioural
reactions). After participants had initially suppressed (or not) the stereotype of
skinheads, they were taken to an adjacent room where they were to meet the
skinhead depicted in the photograph. They were led to believe that the skinhead
had just stepped out of the room for a moment, and that he had left his
belongings on one of the chairs. The authors reasoned that if rebound effects are
revealed in overt behaviour, this would manifest itself in ‘suppress’ participants
seeking to maintain a greater social distance from the skinhead. This would
result in these participants electing to sit further away from a skinhead’s
belongings in the second phase than participants who were not instructed to
suppress. Results confirmed these predictions.
The final study used a lexical decision task to demonstrate that participants
who were suppressing a stereotype about a skinhead later showed faster
responses to traits related to the skinhead stereotype. This finding suggests that
the initial suppression phase resulted in the stereotype becoming
hyperaccessible. Later research developed these preliminary findings, in
particular by showing that heightened self-focus (being made aware of oneself,
for example by being visible in a mirror or on video camera) can cause
suppression to occur in a spontaneous fashion (e.g. Macrae, Bodenhausen, &
Milne, 1998; see Leader in the Field, Neil Macrae).
This tendency for suppressed thoughts to return later with greater ferocity is
not confined to stereotyping. It has also been demonstrated in other domains,
such as the legal setting. For example, in mock juror settings, participants may
not appropriately discount a defendant’s confession when deciding upon a
verdict, even when they have been informed that the confession was coerced, the
judge ruled the evidence inadmissible, and, importantly, even when participants
report that the evidence has not swayed their decisions (Kassin & Sukel, 1997;
for a review, see Steblay, Hosch, Culhane, & McWethy, 2006; for a further
example, we now suggest that you read Social Psychology Beyond the Lab 4.3).
Although these results paint a fairly convincing picture, several years and a
handful of studies later some caveats are in order that pertain to methodological
issues and concerns about external validity (for a review, see Monteith,
Sherman, & Devine, 1998). Consider the stereotypes used in these early studies.
Skinheads (and in other studies, hairdressers, supermodels and construction
workers) may not be groups for whom we feel a great need to suppress
stereotypes (in comparison to, say, black people, gay people or women).
Stereotyping certain groups may not carry the same potential penalties or
condemnation. Also, people differ in terms of the extent to which they endorse
or avoid stereotyping. Where stereotypes refer to more stigmatized groups about
whom people are likely to be less openly prejudiced (e.g. gays), rebound effects
are weakened among participants low in prejudice towards this group (e.g.
Monteith, Spicer, & Tooman, 1998). However, participants high in prejudice
demonstrate the same rebound effects we saw earlier.

LEADER IN THE FIELD

Neil Macrae (b. 1963) gained all his qualifications at the University
of Aberdeen [BSc (1987), PhD (1990), DSc (2006)]. After working
in several universities in the UK and US, he returned to Scotland in
2005, where he is currently Professor of Social Cognition at the
University of Aberdeen. Macrae has published widely in the fields of
social cognition and social cognitive neuroscience. He has received
several prestigious career awards over the years (BPS Spearman
Medal, APA Early Career Award, EAESP Jaspars Award, SESP
Career Trajectory Award, EAESP Kurt Lewin Award, Royal
Society-Wolfson Fellowship) and is a Fellow of the Royal Society of
Edinburgh (FRSE). His current research interests focus upon person
perception and mental time travel.

Several reasons are advanced for these differences (see Monteith et al., 1998).
It may be that people low in prejudice are more motivated to avoid prejudiced
reactions (Dunton & Fazio, 1997; see Individual Differences 4.1 for more details
on the scale used; Wyer, 2007); or that they are more practised in trying to rid
themselves of stereotypic thoughts (Kawakami, Dovidio, Moll, Hermsen, &
Russin, 2000). Perhaps they have faster access to replacement (i.e. non-
stereotypic) thoughts (e.g. Blair & Banaji, 1996); or they may be more motivated
to form individuated impressions of others (e.g. Fiske & Neuberg’s, 1990,
continuum model mentioned previously). Finally, they may possess a goal state
that encourages them to create a particular desirable state of mind (e.g. chronic
egalitarian goals, as in the research by Moskowitz et al., 1999, we saw earlier) as
opposed to suppressing an unfavourable one (stereotypes).
There is also a cultural qualification that is worth noting. For example, Zhang
and Hunt (2008) demonstrated how stereotype rebound effects are less pervasive
among Chinese participants, because collectivist cultures such as the Chinese
place greater emphasis on inhibiting personal beliefs and on maintaining group
harmony, and so are better practised in inhibition (see Chapter 15 for more on
cultural influences on social psychology). In sum, the extent to which rebound
effects occur is dependent upon a variety of factors – of which only a few could
be illustrated here.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BEYOND THE

LAB 4.3
STEREOTYPE SUPPRESSION AND REBOUND
EFFECTS IN THE COURTROOM
In the courtroom jurors are often instructed to disregard inadmissible
evidence, but what impact does this have upon their later judgements? In a
study by Peters, Jelicic, and Merckelbach (2006) this question was
addressed with respect to stereotype suppression. Dutch participants played
the role of mock jurors and were first shown a photo of either a group of
immigrant (negative prime) or Dutch (neutral prime) individuals, and under
the guise of an unrelated experiment, were asked to rate each face on a
sympathy scale. Next they were told that they would be reading a crime
story, and half were told they ought not to think of specific stereotypes such
as age, race and gender when reading the story (thought suppression
condition), whereas the other half were simply told they would be reading a
crime story. The story was an article about a group of young people who had
acted in a violent manner towards a victim. Their race was never specified.
Later, participants had to decide whether statements were either old (they
had been in the original article) or new (they were not present in the original
story). The researchers then looked at the errors in participants’
recollections. Peters et al. found that participants who had been primed with
the immigrant photograph and instructed to suppress stereotypes made more
stereotype consistent recognition errors (that is, they ‘remembered’ more
information in line with the racial stereotype) in comparison to the other
conditions. The researchers conclude that forget/suppress instructions can
actually foster the creation of false memories. In this case, it seemed to
create a rebound effect, such that stereotypical memories were more likely
to be found. Although this is still a lab-based study, the implications of this
research for real-life legal settings are important. It is often the case that
jurors are instructed to disregard statements as ‘inadmissible evidence’, and
 this type of research shows quite powerfully how the very instruction to do
so can backfire when that information is related to stereotypes.

The link between social perception and social behaviour is not inevitable
Earlier we saw some intriguing demonstrations of the link between stereotype
activation (e.g. priming participants with elderly traits) and behaviour (e.g.
participants walking more slowly). This seems quite compelling evidence for the
inevitability of stereotype activation (and as we saw, the effect extends to trait
and goal activation also). Subsequent research has, however, enabled us to paint
a more balanced picture. It appears that while this effect does often occur, there
are several factors which, when present, modify the typical pattern of results.
Many of the studies demonstrating the automatic effects of schema activation
upon behaviour fail to take into account the potentially moderating effect of both
factors inside the person (perceivers’ motivations and goals) and factors outside
the person (characteristics of the environment). Macrae and Johnston’s (1998)
paper neatly fills this gap. In the first study, participants were either primed (or
not) with the construct of helpfulness by means of a scrambled sentence task.
That is, for those in the ‘helpfulness’ prime condition, two thirds of the
scrambled sentences contained words associated with helpfulness (e.g. aided,
provided, encouraging). For those in the control condition, these critical
‘helpfulness’ words were replaced with words that were not associated with
helping in any way.
As they were preparing to leave the experimental room to move to an adjacent
laboratory, the experimenter dropped her belongings on the floor, including a
number of pens. Importantly, in one condition the pens were leaking badly, but
in the other condition they were not. What Macrae and Johnston predicted and
found was that participants were more likely overall to help following the
helpful prime, but only when the pens were normal (helping was high in both
help prime and control prime conditions: 93.7 per cent and 68.7 per cent,
respectively). But the prime had no effect when the pens were leaky. Apparently,
the thought of helping to pick up the pens and getting covered in ink was a
strong disincentive to help in both priming conditions (help prime: 6.2 per cent
and control prime: 12.5 per cent). In the second study, participants were again
primed with the construct of helpfulness. In addition, they were told they were
either on time or late. Again, as they got up to leave, the experimenter dropped
her belongings, including some pens (none of which was leaking). While
participants primed with helpfulness were more inclined to help, this tendency
was notably decreased for participants led to believe they were running late. (For
additional studies on helping behaviour, see Chapter 10.)

INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 4.1

MOTIVATION TO CONTROL PREJUDICED
REACTIONS SCALE
Researchers have noted that direct, self-report measures of racial attitudes
(such as the Modern Racism Scale, MRS) may not always be a valid
assessment of true attitudes. Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, and Williams (1995)
noted that for some people completing the MRS, there may exist a
motivation to control prejudiced reactions, and that this can affect responses.
Dunton and Fazio’s (1997) Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions
Scale sought to isolate and assess the factors that explain such a motivation.
The scale items were developed to assess different kinds of motivation.
Responses to items are given on a scale of −3 (strongly disagree) to +3
(strongly agree) with a higher score indicative of a stronger motivation to
control prejudice. (Note that items followed by (R) are reverse-scored).
After administering the scale to several samples of undergraduate students,
the researchers isolated certain distinct motivational factors. First, some
items provided checks on whether participants’ reluctance to reveal negative
reactions to black individuals was related to a desire to conform to societal
norms to not appear prejudiced (see items 1, 6, 12, and 14). Second, some
items assessed an internal motivation to control prejudice (that is, a concern
with appearing prejudiced to oneself; see items 3, 10, 11, 13, and 15); taken
together, these two motivations (whether reflecting a private or public
concern with not appearing prejudiced) reflect ‘concern with acting
prejudiced’. Finally, since either of the above motivations could be linked to
an individual’s sensitivity regarding whether certain verbal expressions or
behaviour may offend others, several items also assessed one’s willingness
to refrain from showing thoughts, feelings or behaviour that might offend or
lead to dispute (see items 2, 4, 9, and 16). This latter factor therefore reflects
‘restraint to avoid dispute’.
The authors found that the extent to which people are prepared to express
 The authors found that the extent to which people are prepared to express
racial prejudice was moderated by the extent to which they reported being
motivated to avoid prejudiced reactions. As such, this measure provides a
useful insight into how prejudicial judgements and behaviours may be
controlled.
1. In today’s society it is important that one not be perceived as prejudiced
in any manner.
2. I always express my thoughts and feelings, regardless of how
controversial they might be. (R) 3. I get angry with myself when I have a
thought or feeling that might be considered prejudiced.
4. If I were participating in a class discussion and a Black student
expressed an opinion with which I disagreed, I would be hesitant to
express my own viewpoint.
5. Going through life worrying about whether you might offend someone
is just more trouble than it’s worth. (R) 6. It’s important to me that other
people not think I’m prejudiced.
7. I feel it’s important to behave according to society’s standards.
8. I’m careful not to offend my friends, but I don’t worry about offending
people I don’t know or don’t like. (R) 9. I think that it is important to
speak one’s mind rather than to worry about offending someone. (R) 10.
It’s never acceptable to express one’s prejudices.
11. I feel guilty when I have a negative thought or feeling about a Black
person.
12. When speaking to a Black person, it’s important to me that he/she not
think I’m prejudiced.
13. It bothers me a great deal when I think I’ve offended someone, so I’m
always careful to consider other people’s feelings.
14. If I have a prejudiced thought or feeling, I keep it to myself.
15. I would never tell jokes that might offend others.
16. I’m not afraid to tell others what I think, even when I know they
disagree with me. (R) 17. If someone who made me uncomfortable sat
next to me on a bus, I would not hesitate to move to another seat. (R)
Source: Dunton & Fazio, 1997, with permission from SAGE Publications.

These findings imply that the typical effects of perception upon behaviour are
dominated by current processing goals, when the behaviours needed to attain the
goals are at odds with those implied perceptually (i.e. even though primed with
helpfulness, the costs of being helpful in terms of getting covered in ink or being
late serve to override the effects of the prime). Hence, behavioural control is
viewed as a battle between activated schemas and various environmental cues
and internal goal states either promoting or inhibiting the occurrence of certain
action patterns (Shallice, 1988).
The effects of priming on automatic social behaviour seem also to be
eliminated when participants’ self-focus is increased (for more on effects of self-
focus, see Chapter 5). Dijksterhuis, Bargh and Miedema (2000) primed
participants with the politician stereotype (or did not). Half were seated in front
of a mirror (high self-focus), half were not. Later they were all asked to write an
essay about nuclear testing. Pre-testing had established that an aspect of the
politician stereotype is that they are notoriously long-winded. Hence, the
researchers hypothesized that the politician prime would result in longer essays.
This was true, but only for participants in the low self-focus condition.
Participants seated in front of a mirror did not show the effect.
So why does self-focus diminish the effects of the prime? The researchers
argue that self-focus has been shown to activate what are termed action
tendencies (Carver & Scheier, 1981). The action tendencies that self-focus can
make more salient and accessible are certain norms, behavioural standards and
goals. Here self-focus effectively serves to prevent the execution of an
undesirable behaviour (being long-winded). Under conditions of self-focus,
usual effects of perception on behaviour can be eliminated.
So, the situation regarding the seemingly automatic effects of schema
activation upon behaviour is rather more elaborate than was first thought. In
many cases, though, the effects of stereotypes and other schemas upon behaviour
are far from inevitable (for more on this topic, see Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001;
Dijksterhuis et al., 2007).
 Summary
In this section, we have seen how implicit goals can exert control over stereotype
activation. Moreover, we may still be able to rescue the situation even if
stereotypes have been activated, provided we are aware of the potential influence
of the activated stereotype, are motivated not to stereotype and are cognitively
able to do so. So, the picture may be less bleak than we might have feared.

CHAPTER SUMMARY
In this chapter we have given a broad overview of what social cognition
research is like, what questions it asks, and what methods it uses to
understand how we process social information, and why we sometimes do
so quite superficially, and at other times in greater detail.
Why is social cognition research important? Social cognition research has
provided us with some important theoretical clues about how we process
and organize social information and how we use it in our interactions with
and judgements about others.
What is the difference between automatic and controlled processes?
Automatic processes are those that occur without intention, effort or
awareness and are not expected to interfere with other concurrent
cognitive processes. Controlled processes are intentional, under an
individual’s volitional control, effortful and entail conscious awareness.
What are schemas and how do they affect our judgements and behaviour?
Often, stereotype activation can occur automatically. Once a category is
activated, we can bring into play the knowledge contained within these
structures (schemas). Schemas affect how quickly we perceive and
interpret available information, and impact on subsequent processes of
judgement and memory. They can also impact upon our behaviour, as
shown by research into the perception–behaviour link.
What are cognitive heuristics and when do we rely on them in our
judgements? Cognitive heuristics are mental shortcuts that enable us
readily to process large amounts of information. Some of the main
cognitive heuristics include representativeness (judging something based
on how good a fit it is to our expectations about how it should look),
availability (judging something based upon how easily information comes
to mind) and anchoring/adjustment (generating an initial start point for a
 judgement and failing to correct appropriately from it). We rely upon
such heuristics because they provide speedy and often good enough
decisions and thus avoid more effortful processing.
Why are goals important in the study of social cognition? Researchers
have demonstrated that perceivers’ goals can impact greatly upon the way
social information is processed and equally, can be affected by subtle
primes that unconsciously activate goal pursuit. For example, implicit
goal activation has been shown to affect the degree to which stereotypes
are activated, and priming methods (e.g. priming participants with a
cleaner smell) can lead participants to activate implicit goals in line with
such primes (e.g. to tidy their homes).
When and why do we process social information more systematically?
We may, under certain circumstances and if certain goals are in place,
process information more systematically. If we do engage in automatic
processing, we may nonetheless engage in several strategies to overcome
automatically activated constructs (such as stereotypes). For example, we
may engage in a more complex appraisal of the available information
(individuated impression formation), replace stereotypic thoughts with
more egalitarian ones or attempt to suppress the stereotype.
What does the field conclude about the automatic/controlled distinction in
stereotyping? Some researchers, such as Bargh (1999), consider that
stereotype activation is more inevitable than we might like. Others, like
Devine and Monteith (1999), take a more cautious view, arguing that
control appears to be possible, at least some of the time. Over time,
evidence is accumulating to suggest this latter view is a more appropriate
position.

NOTE

Now that you have reached the end of this chapter, you are in a better position
to provide answers to some of the questions posed at the beginning. Let’s
revisit them and then recap on what we have covered.
Why did I assume that the man at the coffee machine in the boardroom was
the company director when he was in fact the secretary?
Why did I assume that Dr Alex James would be male and white?
Why is it that I expected Albert to be elderly?
 Answers Automatic stereotype activation or representativeness heuristic.
Categories like gender, race and age are readily activated in the presence of a
person from or a name associated with these groups; equally, the person in
each example possessed characteristics that made you think he or she was
representative of a particular category (e.g. the man in the boardroom was
wearing a suit, Albert is a name typically associated with older men).
Why did it surprise me to discover that Hilda, my elderly neighbour, had a
passion for car maintenance?
Answer We used the representativeness heuristic. Other aspects of Hilda’s
character seemed representative of how most old ladies behave. We expect, and
often seek out, information that is consistent with our stereotypes. An elderly
female’s penchant for wielding the spanner violates our well-established
expectancies of what little old ladies typically do.
Why did I take the time to talk to my new female work colleague and find
myself subsequently re-evaluating my initially stereotypic impression of
her?
Answer When we are motivated by a particular goal – for example we need to
get along with someone, or because we are low in prejudice towards members
of that group – and have the cognitive resources available – we are able to
move beyond initial category-based impressions to form more individuated
ones.
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING
Bargh, J. A. (1999). The cognitive monster: The case against the controllability
of automatic stereotype effects. In S. Chaiken & Y. Trope (Eds.), Dual-process
theories in social psychology (pp. 361–382). New York: Guilford. A spirited and
utterly engaging defence of the inevitability of stereotype activation.
Bodenhausen, G. V., Todd, A. R., & Richeson, J. A. (2009). Controlling
prejudice and stereotyping: Antecedents, mechanisms, and contexts. In T. D.
Nelson (Ed.), Handbook of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination (pp. 111–
135). New York: Psychology Press. A fascinating, engaging and up to date
review of the literature surrounding stereotype control.
Custers, R., & Aarts, H. (2005). Beyond priming effects: The role of positive
affect and discrepancies in implicit processes of motivation and goal pursuit. In
W. Stroebe & M. Hewstone (Eds.), European review of social psychology (Vol.
16, pp. 257–300). Hove, UK: Psychology Press. This article develops and
considers an interesting framework for understanding the non-conscious
activation of goal-directed behaviour.
Devine, P. G., & Monteith, M. J. (1999). Automaticity and control in
stereotyping. In S. Chaiken & Y. Trope (Eds.), Dual-process theories in social
psychology (pp. 339–360). New York: Guilford. A slightly more even-handed
debate on the same topic.
Dijksterhuis, A., & Bargh, J. A. (2001). The perception–behavior expressway:
Automatic effects of social perception on social behavior. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.),
Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 33, pp. 1–40). San Diego, CA:
Academic Press. This chapter brings together much of the recent literature on
this topic and attempts to deepen our understanding of the mechanisms that may
underlie the effects.
Dijksterhuis, A., Chartrand, T. L., & Aarts, H. (2007). Effects of priming and
perception on social behavior and goal pursuit. In J. A. Bargh (Ed.), Social
Psychology and the Unconscious: The Automaticity of Higher Mental Processes
(pp. 51–131). New York: Psychology Press. This chapter develops the ideas
outlined in Dijksterhuis and Bargh’s (2001) earlier chapter and incorporates
more recent work on goal pursuit.
Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (1991). Social cognition (2nd ed.). New York:
McGraw-Hill. This is the classic text on the topic, with extensive coverage of a
wide range of issues within the discipline.
Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (2008). Social cognition: From brains to culture
(3rd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill. An updated version of the above, this text
incorporates both the classic ideas and the more contemporary ones that have
emerged in the last decade or so.
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. New York: Farrar, Straus and
Giroux. A readable overview of the Nobel laureate’s ground-breaking research
on human decision-making, especially the use of cognitive heuristics.
Macrae, C. N., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2000). Social cognition: Thinking
categorically about others. Annual Review of Psychology, 51, 93–120. A
thorough, readable overview of the literature.
Monteith, M. J., Sherman, J. W., & Devine, P. G. (1998). Suppression as a
stereotype control strategy. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 2, 63–82.
A clear, considered and interesting review of the literature.
Moskowitz, G. B. (2005). Social cognition: Understanding self and others. New
York: Guilford. Engagingly written and comprehensive in scope.
Moskowitz, G. B. & Ignarri, C. (2009). Implicit volition and stereotype control.
In W. Stroebe & M. Hewstone (Eds.), European Review of Social Psychology
(Vol. 20, pp. 97–145). Hove, UK: Psychology Press. This article reviews work
that looks at how the pursuit of goals can elicit control of stereotyping.
 Chapter 5

The Self

Carolyn C. Morf and Sander L. Koole

Source: © Terry Vine. Used under licence with Getty Images.

KEY TERMS

desired selves
ego depletion
identity negotiation
implicit egotism
implicit self-esteem
independent versus interdependent self
introspection
reflected appraisals
self-assessment motive
self-awareness
 self-concept
self-construals
self-determination theory
self-enhancement
self-esteem
self-handicapping
self-perception theory
self-presentation
self-reference effect
self-regulation
self-schemas
self-verification
self-worth contingencies
social comparison
sociometer theory
terror management theory
working self-concept
CHAPTER OUTLINE
THE SELF AND ITS SOCIAL NATURE
WHERE SELF-KNOWLEDGE COMES FROM
Through our own observation: personal sources Through the help of
others: social sources Experiencing a coherent self: autobiographical
memories and the self as narrative Summary
THE ORGANIZATIONAL FUNCTION OF THE SELF: THE SELF AS
MENTAL REPRESENTATION
The nature of the self-concept
The nature of self-esteem
Cultural and gender influences on self-knowledge The neural
underpinnings of self-knowledge Summary
THE MOTIVATIONAL FUNCTIONS OF THE SELF
Know thyself: the self-assessment motive Bigger, better, faster, stronger:
the self-enhancement motive The puzzle of low self-regard: self-verification
Why do we self-enhance?
The pros and cons of pursuing self-esteem Summary
THE REGULATORY FUNCTIONS OF THE SELF: THE SELF IN
CONTROL
 Self-awareness theory
Self-regulation theory
The dark side of self-regulation Escaping the self
Autonomous self-regulation as a resource Summary
SELF STABILITY AND CHANGE

ROUTE MAP OF THE CHAPTER

In this chapter we elaborate theory and research findings regarding the key
aspects of the self. Throughout, we focus on the social nature of the self.
First, we consider where self-knowledge comes from and explore both its
personal and social sources. In tandem, we reflect on the accuracy (or lack
thereof) of this self-knowledge. Second, we discuss the organization and
content of the self in terms of self-concept and self-esteem and consider how
these structures guide our processing of social information – both in general
and in the cultural arena in which they transpire. In the third section, we
expand on the motives that drive the self to achieve the selves we desire.
Fourth, we look at the regulatory functions of the self and how it enables us
to pursue our goals and aspirations. The chapter closes by discussing
identity negotiation processes and by considering to what extent the self can
change.
 THE SELF AND ITS SOCIAL NATURE
What makes the self social?
In May 2002 the 13-year-old Christina Long was strangled inside a car in a mall
parking lot in Westchester County (Connecticut, US) after having sex with a
man nearly twice her age, whom she had met on the Internet. Who was Christina
Long? By most outward signs she was a virtuous and well-adjusted person: at
her Catholic girls’ school, Christina was an honour student, making good grades,
and she was popular, serving as co-captain of the cheerleading squad, in addition
to being an altar girl. What her family and friends did not know, however, was
that Christina also had another life. At night she logged onto the Internet, where
she used a provocative screen name (LongToohot4u), flirting and routinely
having sex with partners she met in chat rooms. Which was Christina’s real self
then? The one that came out at night or the one she was during the day? Or, were
both selves different sides of her? And if so, how do they fit together?
These are intriguing questions that probably all of us face at one time or
another. And even if for most of us the divergences between our self-experiences
are not as great as they were for Christina, we are all aware of different aspects
of our self in different social contexts (with best friend, with mother, with new
date), different moods, and at different times. This highlights a key aspect of the
self: the self that is expressed and experienced is highly variable and socially
contextualized. The latter means that you develop a sense of who you are
through your interactions with others – from your experiences in these
interactions, from how others react and respond to you, the values and attitudes
you acquire in these interactions, and the meanings you bestow on these
experiences.
Thus the self is shaped through an active social construal process. We do not
just passively absorb and integrate social feedback, but rather we actively
interpret and might even create it. We create our social realities by choosing
whom we interact with, the behaviours and demeanour we portray, the clothes
and make-up we wear, what we post on Facebook and by selecting the groups
we belong to. Although in adolescents there may be some more active
experimenting with who one is (deliberately ‘trying on’ different identities with
different people), this construal process is usually subtle and we are not highly
cognizant of it most of the time.
 Another central theme throughout this chapter is that these self-construals are
motivated. We have certain goals for how we want to be and for how we want to
be seen by others. Do you want others to think of you as generous, smart and
fun-loving? Then you will behave accordingly. You will also avoid doing things
that do not fit with how you see yourself and you will feel bad if you slip up and
nevertheless do something that clashes with your self-views (such as being nasty
to a friend). Nevertheless, you are not unlimited in the self or identity that you
can construct – you are limited on the one hand by your biology (e.g. your
temperament), and on the other hand by your social experiences (e.g. your early
attachment histories, your culture) and the skills and abilities you bring to bear
on these experiences.

- - - - - - - - - -

self-construals a person’s views and knowledge about him-or herself is shaped through an active
construal process that plays out in interaction with the social environment. This process is
motivated by how one would like to see oneself.

- - - - - - - - - -

The self and its diverse expressions thus evolve through ‘doing’ (behaving and
interpreting) in the social world. This is the agentic aspect of the self, or what
William James (1890, 1950) long ago referred to as the ‘I’ (see Leader in the
Field, William James). It is the active part of the self; the power we have to
shape our functioning and life circumstances. But the self is not just a doer; the
self also has a ‘being’ aspect, what James labelled the ‘me’. ‘Being’ refers to the
descriptive or object aspect of the self. These are your beliefs and feelings about
yourself – the things you would list, when asked to describe yourself – and your
self-esteem. Therefore, another key aspect of the self is that it is an elaborate
knowledge and feeling structure – an intricate organized system of beliefs,
values, feelings, expectations and goals. This ever-evolving dynamic system
emerges through the doing aspect of the self, but it also guides and constrains the
construal process (see Morf & Mischel, 2012, for a more detailed discussion).
As a result, as James argued, the agent and object, the ‘I’ and ‘me’, are
inseparable – they come to be known together in the same stream of
consciousness. Hence, although we see ourselves as distinct entities and perhaps
think of the self as something highly personal, the self is a social construct –
formed through our interactions with other people (see Theory Box 5.1).

LEADER IN THE FIELD

William James (1842–1910) was an American psychology pioneer
and philosopher. Brother of the novelist Henry James, he was born in
New York City and received his education from tutors and private
schools in the US and Europe. After studying painting and then
switching to scientific studies, he finally changed to the Harvard
School of Medicine and received his MD in 1869. He never started
to practise medicine, but travelled to Germany after finishing his
studies in search of a cure for his severe depression. There he got
inspired by psychologists and philosophers and decided to become a
psychologist. Back at Harvard he started teaching psychology and
established the first American psychology laboratory in 1874. He
later wrote, ‘I never had any philosophic instruction, the first lecture
on psychology I ever heard being the first I ever gave’ (Perry, R. B.,
1948, 1996, p.78). James published his masterwork The Principles of
Psychology in 1890. His chapter entitled ‘The Consciousness of
Self’, is typically considered the beginning of the modern account of
the self in psychology. James foreshadowed in this chapter much of
how we conceive of the self today, and the topics he defined still set
much of the contemporary research agenda, including the feelings
and emotions of the self, the diverse aspects of self, self-esteem, the
self-as-knower and known – the I and the Me, and how these two
come to work together to create a sense of continuity in the stream of
consciousness.
In this chapter, we elaborate on these key aspects of the self and examine the
research findings that support them. We first consider where self-knowledge
comes from. We explore both personal (e.g. self-reflection) and social (e.g.
social comparisons) sources and reflect on the accuracy of this self-knowledge.
Second, we discuss the organization and content of the self – the self as a
knowledge and feeling structure – and how this structure guides our processing
of social information. In the third section, we expand on the motivational
operations in our efforts to construct and maintain our desired selves (e.g. self-
enhancement, self-verification). Fourth, we examine the regulatory functions of
the self: how the self enables us to plan our actions and pursue our goals and
aspirations. Throughout, we also look at cross-cultural differences. The chapter
closes with a discussion of identity negotiation processes and by contemplating
the question to what degree we are ‘hostage’ to our selves, or that change may be
possible.

THEORY BOX 5.1

SELF AND SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT
The self is formed through its interactions with other individuals and groups
within the social world, which also contains cultural rules and norms.
Source: Adapted and simplified from Morf, Torchetti, & Schürch, 2011.
 WHERE SELF-KNOWLEDGE COMES
FROM
How do we know ourselves?
If I ask you who you are, you readily start describing yourself. You probably feel
you know who you are and know it better than anyone else. You experience a
stable sense of yourself as a distinct being, a person with an identity. But: how
do we know ourselves? Where do our selves come from? How accurate is our
self-knowledge? This section examines the various forces that shape one’s self-
knowledge and contribute to our sense of self. These forces can be highly
personal; for example, when you self-reflect, observe your own behaviour, or put
together your life experiences in meaningful autobiographical stories. But as you
will see, to a large extent our selves are shaped interpersonally through
experience interacting with others: their judgements about us, the social roles we
play, how we compare to other people, and the relationships and cultures we live
in. We also examine throughout how well we actually know ourselves. The
section ends with a discussion about how we come to experience a unified and
coherent sense of self.
 Through our own observation: personal sources
Introspection and self-reflection
One way to know yourself is to look inward: you reflect on and try to inspect
your internal states, both mental and emotional. While this kind of introspection
perhaps seems like the simplest and most obvious way to achieve self-
knowledge – after all, you have access to this information like no one else – it
turns out to be quite problematic. When people introspect about the reasons for
their internal states or behaviours, the information produced is often inaccurate
(Wilson & Dunn, 2004). There are a number of reasons for this. One is that,
because people are constantly processing lots of information simultaneously, and
much of it automatically without conscious awareness, they often are not aware
of the most immediate causes of their thoughts or behaviours.

- - - - - - - - - -

introspection the process by which one observes and examines one’s internal states (mental and
emotional) for behaving in a certain way.

- - - - - - - - - -

In a now classic study, Wilson and Nisbett (1978) asked female shoppers in a
large shopping centre to rate the quality of nylon stockings displayed on a rack –
unbeknownst to the participants, the nylons were in fact all identical. The results
showed that although female shoppers claimed to have picked which stockings
to buy based on softness or workmanship, they in fact simply chose the ones
they saw last (see Figure 5.1). Interestingly, people not only do not know how
their mind works, they are also rather unaware of being unaware. People seem to
make up reasons on the spot for their preferences and actions that simply fit the
situation, without realizing that they do not correspond to an internal personal
state. For example, in one study participants were shown photograph pairs of
women and asked in each to choose the one they found more attractive. Later,
when asked to explain the reasons for their choices, they readily gave plausible
causes (‘she’s radiant’; ‘I like her earrings’), even though they were on some
trials presented with inaccurate information about their choices (i.e. they were
shown their less preferred choice) (Johansson, Hall, Sikström, & Olsson, 2005).
FIGURE 5.1 Position effects on judgements of the quality of consumer goods
(stockings).
Source: Data from Wilson & Nisbett, 1978; Expt. 2.

Introspection can sometimes even reduce the accuracy of self-knowledge.

Many studies show that the more people analyse the reasons for how they feel,
the less their attitudes correspond to their behaviours (Wilson, 2002). When it
comes to complex choices, such as which room to rent or which plane ticket or
car to buy, those who deliberated less during the purchase were later on more
satisfied with their purchase, than those who were more analytical (Dijksterhuis,
Bos, Nordgren, & Van Baaren, 2006). These findings imply that perhaps those
who analysed less had more intuitive access to what they really like or care
about – a process that got disrupted by conscious thought.
A second reason why introspection is limited is because people are commonly
motivated to keep unwanted thoughts and experiences out of memory or
consciousness. These thoughts, however, nevertheless affect their behaviours
(see also Chapter 4). Macrae and colleagues (Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, &
Jetten, 1994) asked participants to avoid stereotypical thinking while writing
about a ‘skinhead’. Although this thought suppression was successful (the
written descriptions contained less stereotypical thoughts, compared to a control
group without instructions to suppress), participants’ stereotypes still influenced
their behaviours in the end. When expecting to meet such an individual, those in
the suppression condition sat significantly further away from the seat the
‘skinhead’ had evidently occupied moments earlier (as seen by the fact that he
had left some of his clothes on the chair). This study thus highlights that we have
very limited self-insight about those aspects of the self we wish were not true
about us.
A third problem, which we will return to later, when discussing the
motivational functions of the self, is that people tend to overestimate their
positive aspects (Dunning, 2005). Most people think they are better than average
– be it on attractiveness, their personality traits, skills or competence, although
that is obviously statistically impossible (Alicke & Govorun, 2005). Moreover, a
landmark review by Taylor and Brown (1988) concluded that most
psychologically healthy individuals harbour a number of positive illusions about
the self (see Leader in the Field, Shelley E. Taylor). People entertain not only
positive self-illusions of control, of their prospects for success, and of their
judgments (Armor & Taylor, 1998; Roese & Olson, 2007). These illusions may
be a good thing to some degree, as they help us feel better and thus engage in
more active coping (Taylor et al., 1992). However, they will also get in our way,
when a more accurate self-view would be helpful, for example when choosing
the job or partner that best suits our inclinations, or when self-improvement or
self-change would be advantageous (Dunning, Johnson, Ehrlinger, & Kruger,
2003; Robins & Beer, 2001).
Does introspection help us understand our self then? Yes, to some degree: We
know what we feel and think, and we can potentially learn more about ourselves
that way. Writing about our life experiences seems to help us gain better
understanding (see Pennebaker & Chung, in press, for a review), as does
imagining ourselves in a situation and trying to simulate the emotions we might
experience then (e.g. Carver & Scheier, 1981; Fazio, Chen, McDonel, &
Sherman, 1982). On the other hand, as we saw, because we tend to try to push
certain experiences away, and because we cannot consciously attend to
everything we process, introspection provides very limited self-knowledge,
especially when it comes to why we think or feel something.

LEADER IN THE FIELD

Shelley E. Taylor (b. 1946) received her BA from Connecticut
College in 1968 and her PhD from Yale University in 1972. She was
Associate Professor at Harvard University until 1979 and then
moved to the University of California, Los Angeles, where she is
currently Distinguished Professor of Social Psychology. Shelley
Taylor’s research has made important contributions to several
 different areas in social psychology. Besides health psychology,
social support research and social neuroscience, her work also
focuses on social cognition, especially on social comparisons,
‘positive illusions’ and self-enhancement. Examples of ‘positive
illusions’ are overly positive self-perceptions, illusion of personal
control and unrealistic optimism about the future. These illusory
beliefs are commonly understood as effects of self-enhancement (i.e.
a desire to maximize the positivity of one’s self-views) and have
been found to be largely beneficial (however, see the section on the
Pros and Cons of Pursuing Self-Esteem in this chapter for a
somewhat contrasting view). Overall her work, for which she has
received numerous awards from varied areas in psychology
(including the Distinguished Scientist Award of the American
Psychological Association), has been dedicated to exploring the
socioemotional resources and protective processes that have
biological and/or psychological benefits, especially when people
have to face stress. Taylor was elected to the American Academy of
Arts and Sciences in 2003.

Self-perception theory
To the extent that internal states are ambiguous or difficult to interpret, Bem’s
self-perception theory (1972) suggests that people can infer these states by
observing their own behaviour – just as we would as outside observers. Have
you ever noticed after the fact, for example, that you suddenly started doing
something you previously thought was not really of interest to you, like going to
the gym or watching football on TV? And you then concluded that it must be
more important and more enjoyable to you after all. Or, you may suddenly find
yourself smiling and whistling to yourself after a big presentation in a seminar
class, only to conclude that you are very relieved and therefore must have been
much more stressed by it than you had previously realized. When making these
inferences, we also take into account the conditions under which the behaviour
occurs, and we only attribute behaviour to internal states if the situation alone
seems insufficient to have caused the behaviour (see also Chapter 3). For
example, you will not assume you love cleaning your room if your roommate
obliges you to do it. The fact that we take account of situational pressures,
including rewards and punishments, points to a very important application of
self-perception theory, when it comes to motivation.
 - - - - - - - - - -

self-perception theory the theory assumes that when inner states are ambiguous, people can infer
these states by observing their own behaviour.

- - - - - - - - - -

People can engage in activities for either extrinsic (praise, esteem, money) or
intrinsic (interest, challenge, enjoyment) reasons. Extrinsically motivated
activities are ones we do as a means to an end – in order to obtain tangible
rewards or to avoid punishment (like cleaning your room). In contrast,
intrinsically motivated activities are things like hobbies, where we do them for
the sake of the activity itself – for the fun of it. For example, if you are a student
who is intrinsically motivated, you will write day and night on your term paper,
and on weekends, just because you are interested in the topic, even when you
know the paper already fulfils the minimum requirements. But the question now
is: what happens if you get very high marks or your term paper is highly praised
by your professor? Common sense might suggest that this should enhance your
motivation. Self-perception theory, however, predicts the danger of an
overjustification effect: The intrinsic motivation may diminish, because the
activity has become associated with an external reward (see also Chapter 7). You
may stop writing on weekends, or entirely stop working more than necessary.
The reward has undermined your motivation. Many studies have confirmed this
overjustification effect in both children and adults and in many settings (Deci &
Ryan, 1985; Lepper & Greene, 1978).
This creates a serious dilemma: how do we – as teachers, parents, employers –
manage this trade-off between intrinsic and extrinsic rewards in order to keep
people motivated? A crucial factor seems to be how the reward is perceived. A
key issue is that it is perceived as sincere and non-coercive. As such, rewards
tend to work better if they are in the form of verbal praise, are unexpected, come
as a surprise afterwards, and are seen as a special ‘bonus’ for superior
performance (Covington, 2000; Eisenberger & Cameron, 1996; Henderlong &
Lepper, 2002). Trying to foster intrinsic motivation is important not only
because it makes activities more enjoyable and people are more likely to perform
them, but also because it tends to increase the quality of the work. A study by
Amabile (1996) had art experts rate art works and found that artists’
commissioned work was judged to be of lesser quality than their non-
commissioned work. An implication of this research is that paying children for
good grades, although it is widely practised by some parents, may be quite
problematic, at least for those who are already highly intrinsically motivated.
This is because the financial reward risks replacing intrinsic motivation (doing
things for the pleasure of doing them) with extrinsic motivation (doing things to
get concrete rewards).
In sum, just like introspection, self-perception has its limits also and for some
of the same reasons. Many factors contribute to our behaviour, and it is easy to
become confused about which are the most important. We sometimes
underestimate less obvious situational factors and other times overestimate them.
As noted previously, lots of information processing is done automatically
without conscious awareness, thus it makes sense that we often misattribute the
causes to that information that most readily springs to mind (see Chapter 4 on
the availability heuristic).
 Through the help of others: social sources
A primary source of self-knowledge comes from other people. We learn a great
deal about ourselves through observing how other people react toward us or
from what they directly tell us, as well as from comparing ourselves and our
views with those of others.

Attachment processes and social appraisal

The first relationship we have in life is with our primary caregiver, usually our
mother. Our very first sense of who we are begins to develop through these
earliest interactions in infancy. According to attachment theory (see also Chapter
11), we come to learn about our lovability and worth, as we experience how our
mother cares for us and responds to our needs (Bowlby, 1969). Caregiving that
is consistent and appropriately responsive to the infants’ needs plants the seeds
for a positive self-concept; whereas caregiving that is neglectful and
unresponsive, or even abusive, teaches children that they are not worthy and that
others cannot be trusted (Hazan & Shaver, 1994). This can be the foundation for
a negative self-concept and low self-esteem. These early so-called ‘working
models’ of both self and others (our expectations about how they are likely to
behave toward us) become a lens through which we interpret and react to other
people’s responses throughout our lives (Hazan & Shaver, 1987).
The rudiments of the self thus develop through these early attachment
processes even before we have conscious self-awareness. Later in life, we
internalize other people’s appraisals of us through more cognitively reflected
processes. The sociologist Charles Horton Cooley (1902) suggested that other
people’s reactions to us serve as a mirror in which we see ourselves. He called
this the ‘looking-glass self’: Through observing others’ reactions, you imagine
how they perceive and judge you. These reflected appraisals are then
internalized into your self-concept and guide future behaviour. If you think
others think well of you, you too will have a positive view of yourself and act
accordingly. Mead (1934) added that most of what we know about the self
comes from taking on the perspective of what he called the ‘generalized other’ –
a combination of perspectives of all others involved in the activity. This idea that
we learn who we are through seeing ourselves through the eyes of others has
been tested in many studies, but has been found to be only partially correct (see
Tice & Wallace, 2003, for a review). While it is true that people see themselves
the way they believe that other people see them, research shows that there is
usually not a good match with others’ actual evaluations (Shrauger &
Schoeneman, 1979).

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reflected appraisals inferences regarding others’ appraisals of us that we gain by observing other
peoples’ reactions towards us.

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Why is it that our own self-views are often quite different from the views our
family members or friends have of us? Apparently, this is because we have
limited ability to detect accurately how other people view us – especially when
these views differ from our own (see Kenny & DePaulo, 1993, for a review).
One reason for this is that others are not always straightforward: they will often
hide their negative assessments so as not to hurt someone’s feelings. Another
reason is that, as with any theory, we have a confirmation bias. We are more
likely to pay attention to instances in which others share and agree with our
views, as opposed to when they do not (White, Brockett, & Overstreet, 1993).
And finally, even if we do sometimes pick up on discrepant or even negative
reactions from others, we are not always receptive to such feedback (Greenwald,
1988). Who wants to know, for example, that others think they are socially inept
– lacking in social competences and graces. In general, although we do
incorporate some of other people’s feedback into our self-views, we are also
biased in how we process information about ourselves – hearing what we like
and what fits with our own self-conception, while ignoring or rejecting what
does not fit. Thus, feedback from others is rarely adopted one-to-one.

Social comparison
Another influential source through which the self is actively shaped is through
comparing our traits, abilities, or opinions with those of others (see also Chapter
8). If you race down a ski slope in 23 seconds, you have no idea what that
means, until you know how it compares with other racers’ times. In his theory of
social comparison, Festinger (1954) proposed that when people are uncertain of
their abilities or opinions – when objective standards are missing – then they
evaluate themselves through comparisons with similar others. You will not
obtain very useful information about your tennis ability if you compare yourself
with Roger Federer (unless you are yourself a pro). Instead, you need to compare
yourself with people of the same general ability, or those with similar training
and background (Suls, Martin, & Wheeler, 2002; Suls & Wheeler, 2000). Social
comparison processes are pervasive, because many facts about the self are such
that they carry little information until you use others as a benchmark
(Mussweiler, Rüter, & Epstude, 2006).

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social comparison a process of comparing oneself with others in order to evaluate one’s own
abilities and opinions.

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Indeed, social comparisons seem to be so important that we will use this

information even when objective standards are available. We judge our ability to
be better if we have a low score that is above average than when we have a high
score that is below average (Klein, 1997). We make these comparisons
automatically, without thinking and often without being aware of it (Gilbert,
Price, & Allan, 1995). Social comparisons sometimes also serve motivational
purposes. In this case, we often compare ourselves with others who are better or
worse, instead of similar to us. If you want to get better at tennis, then you will
compare upward to someone just better enough to inspire you and show you how
to reach the next level (Blanton, Buunk, Gibbons, & Kuyper, 1999).
Alternatively, if you are feeling really low, because things are not going well for
you, you might remind yourself of people who are worse off than you – a
downward social comparison, to make yourself feel better (Taylor & Lobel,
1989).

Maintaining, regulating and expanding the self in interpersonal

relationships
Our sense of who we are is also shaped in more subtle ways through our ongoing
interactions with significant relationship partners. This is true even when the
other person is not around – we imagine what the other person might say or do,
how they would see us. They act like a ‘private audience’, with whom we carry
on internal conversations, or for whom we put on performances (Baldwin &
Holmes, 1987). Sometimes we do this explicitly, maybe even arguing with and
trying to convince the other person in our minds. But at other times we might not
even be aware that these audiences are influencing us. In a study by Baldwin and
colleagues (Baldwin, Carrell, & Lopez, 1990), for example, Catholic women
were exposed to a subliminal priming procedure. They saw brief flashes of light
that, unbeknownst to them, contained images of a disapproving face either of the
Pope or of a – to them unknown – psychologist (Robert Zajonc). Subsequently,
they evaluated themselves as less moral and more anxious, if they had been
exposed to the Pope, as opposed to the unknown psychologist, but only if they
were practising Catholics (see Figure 5.2). Personally significant others thus
shape who we are and our sense of appropriate behaviour.
FIGURE 5.2 Overall self-conceptions as a function of subliminal primed faces.
Source: Data from Baldwin, Carrell, & Lopez, 1990; Study 2. Reproduced with
permission.

In interacting with our significant others we develop and store in memory

relational schemas – mental models that contain typical interaction and feeling
patterns we have, when interacting with the other person (see Baldwin, 1992, for
a review). These mental models have far-reaching implications, because they are
triggered not only by the specific other person, but also by any feature that
reminds one of that person (Andersen & Chen, 2002). So, if a new acquaintance
has some resemblance to an earlier important relationship figure in your life like
your father, you may start behaving and feeling towards that new person in a
similar (positive or negative) way as you did towards your father.
New close relationships not only ‘reactivate’ old behavioural patterns, they can
also contribute to growth by introducing novel features into one’s self-
knowledge. In a prospective longitudinal study Aron, Paris, and Aron (1995)
asked students five times over ten weeks to indicate if they had fallen in love and
to make open ended lists of self-descriptive terms (e.g. athletic, outgoing,
studious). Students who had recently fallen in love showed increased diversity in
their self-descriptions – they literally expanded the self to include features of
their new relationship partner in their own self-concepts. Such changes are
sustained over time, with people becoming more confused about which traits
belong to them and which to their partners (Mashek, Aron, & Boncimino, 2003).
In short, together our past and new relationships with significant others in our
lives are an important source of who we are.

Social identity
People’s social identities (see Chapter 14) are an extension of the relational self.
We incorporate not only significant others into our self-concepts, but also the
social groups we identify with – our gender, ethnicity, religion, profession,
political membership and so on. Do you get upset if someone makes a
derogatory comment regarding members or practices of your ethnic group? Or
do you feel proud when a member of your country wins an international
competition? Then these are your social identities. People derive feelings of
worth and who they are both from their personal qualities, as well as from
associations with the groups they value and to which they attach emotional
significance. The focus on social identity emerged in post-World War II Europe
driven primarily by the desire to understand the psychological basis of
intergroup discrimination (see Tajfel, Jaspars, & Fraser, 1984), but its scope and
influence have since reached much beyond that (e.g. Hogg, 2012).
Social identity theory formulated by Tajfel and Turner (1979, 1986) provides a
framework about how people connect to their wider social network and derive
self-knowledge and meaning from their group memberships. A key assumption
is that people have a need for positive social identity and are thus strongly
motivated toward contrasting their ingroups (groups to which they feel they
belong) favourably with any outgroups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986). This can
have the negative consequence of intergroup discrimination and conflict. On the
positive side, however, this raises an ingroup member’s self-esteem and can
positively shield one from external discrimination if one is of a low-status or
otherwise disadvantaged group (Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Rubin & Hewstone,
1998). This may at least partially explain the perhaps surprising finding that
many members of low status groups do not display low self-esteem or a negative
self-concept (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999).
Self-categorization theory, which emerged from social identity theory, also
divides the world into ‘us’ and ‘them’, but does not assume that this is a
motivated process, rather simply a fact of life that happens automatically at the
perceptual level (Turner, 1985; Turner & Reynolds, 2011). Self-categorization
theory is, in a sense, a broader framework than social identity theory, in that it
focuses on the shifting between and interplay of both personal and social
identity. Personal identity refers to individual trait-like self-attributes which
define the individual as a unique person different from other (ingroup) persons
(e.g. ‘I am generous’). Social identity refers to self-views that define the
individual in terms of shared similarities with members of the social groups they
care about in contrast to other social groups (e.g. ‘we psychologists understand
people better than physicists do’) (see also Chapter 14). Sometimes your
personal identity is more important, and at other times your social identity is.
Self-categorization theory suggests that when your group identity becomes focal,
your personal identity decreases in importance – indeed you undergo a
‘depersonalization’ process, such that you see yourself as highly similar to, in
effect as interchangeable with, other group members (Klein, Spears, & Reicher,
2007). When this shift occurs, you will act more in line with your social than
your personal identity (e.g. when participating in a group demonstration).
In conclusion, social sources crucially contribute to our self-knowledge – be
that from direct feedback in dyadic interactions, our interpretations of how
others see us, or our group identifications. Which of his or her many identities is
most salient for an individual at any time will vary according to the social
context and according to the extent to which a person values each self-view.
 Experiencing a coherent self: autobiographical
memories and the self as narrative
Has the preceding section left you wondering how it is even possible that we can
come to experience a unitary and coherent self, given that it is so diverse in
different contexts and highly dependent on social relations? How is it that,
despite the fact that we realize that we can be quite a different person in different
situations and with different people, we still know it is ‘me’ and always the same
me? There are several mechanisms that allow us to experience a subjectively
unified self; they all involve our private thoughts and feelings, and our
phenomenological sense of self (i.e. the self we experience).

Autobiographical memories
Our autobiographical memories are the recollections of the sequences of events
in our lives and how we experienced them (Williams, Conway, & Cohen, 2008).
These include lifetime periods, such as your school time, the time you lived at
your parents’ home, or more specific events, like when you lost an important
person in your life, or when you won a competition. These memories shape who
we are by connecting the past to the present and giving us a sense of continuity.
You may even engage in a kind of ‘mental time travel’ by imagining the self in
the past and experiencing sensory-perceptual details of what it was like then
(Conway, 2005). Some memories are more vivid than others, and those are
remembered more readily. For example, many ‘first-time’ experiences are vivid
– your first kiss, the first time you travelled to a foreign country on your own, or
when you moved into your own apartment. We also have so-called ‘flash-bulb’
memories, like a vivid snapshot of a moment or circumstance in which
something highly emotional happened (Brown & Kulik, 1977), when we
remember where we were and what exactly we were doing at the time. Many
people, for example, can remember where they were, what they did and felt,
when Princess Diana died (Figure 5.3); most of us have similar memories for
when we heard about 9/11, or saw it on TV.
FIGURE 5.3 Many people can remember where they were, what they did and
felt, when Princess Diana died.
Source: © Pictures of London. Used under licence from Alamy.
 Autobiographical memories may be more or less accurate, most likely
containing a little of both: objective accuracy as well as biased reconstruction
(Ross & Sicoly, 1979). Just like any other information about the self, we revise it
in line with our self-concept and often to reflect favourably on us. The more
vivid the memory, the more resistant it is to forgetting. The good news is that for
most of us our positive memories in general are more vivid and thus more
resistant to forgetting; while negative memories fade faster (D’Argembeau,
Comblain, & Van der Linden, 2003). This is even more true for people with high
self-esteem, although the reverse is true for depressives (Blaney, 1986).

Self as narrative
People weave together these autobiographical memories in stories they tell about
themselves and their lives. They construct these self-narratives to make meaning
out of the events they experience, to integrate their goals, make sense of conflict,
and to explain how and why they change over time (McAdams, 2008a). Like any
story, these life narratives have settings, scenes, characters, plots and dominant
themes. Perhaps unlike a story though, they have no predetermined storyline or
ending; they are ever evolving – being changed and/or redirected as we move
through life. As such, they are very subjective and highly selective, as the
meanings and values attributed to scenes are dependent on the individual him-or
herself and the culture in which he or she lives. Although two stories are never
alike, there are some common dominant themes. McAdams’s research finds that
American narratives often involve redemption – successfully overcoming a
negative event in one’s life (McAdams, 2008b). A typical example would be the
redemptive life story of Oprah Winfrey: ‘I grew up a little Negro child who felt
so unloved and so isolated – the emotion I felt most as a child was loneliness –
and now the exact opposite has occurred for me in adulthood’ (p. 24). Stories
such as these in general enable people to feel satisfied and content with their
lives.
Across cultures, stories take on somewhat different ‘flavours’. Asian
narratives, for example, tend to be less self-focused. In one study, when asked to
recall 20 autobiographical memories, stories of European American adults
turned out to be more those of individual experiences – their own role and
emotions in the events. In contrast, the Chinese participants reported more social
and historical events and they focused on the social interactions and significant
others in the stories (Wang & Conway, 2004). This difference is not surprising,
as it reflects the differences between the cultural norms of both societies (see
also Chapter 15). We can conclude that autobiographical narratives are shaped
by the cultural norms in which individuals’ lives are situated and from which
they derive meaning for their lives.
Together, both autobiographical memories and self-narratives show the role of
construal in the social self: the stories we create about ourselves are ultimately
who we are – a point we will come back to throughout this chapter. In
constructing this self-knowledge, we rely both on self-reflection processes and
also on our more subjective experiences of self. The latter may be particularly
important in gaining a sense of coherence and continuity in our selves (Conway,
Singer, & Tagini, 2004).
 Summary
The self is shaped and known through multiple sources: personal, relational, and
social. Introspection and self-perception both are personal sources that involve
reflecting on the self. Introspection entails trying to look inward to gain access to
your inner thoughts and feelings, whereas self-perception involves observing and
drawing inferences from your behaviours. But information gained through
personal sources is often highly inaccurate due to both errors in information
processing and motivational biases. Interpersonally we learn about ourselves by
observing how other people, especially our significant others, react toward us.
We use these reactions like a mirror in which we can see ourselves. This mirror
too, however, is distorted – our perceptions of others’ views of us, and how they
really view us, do not match up very well. Another important source of self-
knowledge comes through social comparisons and through our belonging to
social groups. Of course, the results of these evaluations depend on the people
we compare or associate ourselves with – thus this knowledge too is biased.
Together, all these sources highlight the active construal aspect of the self.
Self-processes are highly subjective (and not always very accurate). In this
sense, the self is neither fictional, nor true, but rather constructed within
constraints. It is also highly variable and context dependent. But there exists a
phenomenological sense of continuity.
 THE ORGANIZATIONAL FUNCTION OF
THE SELF: THE SELF AS MENTAL
REPRESENTATION
How is the self represented in the mind?
So far we have spoken about where self-knowledge comes from and how we
come to know who we are. But what is the nature of this self-knowledge? Where
and what is the raw material of our self-knowledge? What kind of information
does it contain and how is it organized? In essence, whereas the development
and expressions of our selves take place mostly in the social arena, the raw
material of the self is represented and organized in our minds. In this section, we
discuss two types of represented self-knowledge: the cognitive representation in
the self-concept, and the affective evaluation of the self – our self-esteem. We
also consider cultural differences in content and organization of self-knowledge,
and current work by neuroscientists examining the brain activities that underlie
self-related processing of information.
 The nature of the self-concept
Our self-concept involves a network of beliefs we have about ourselves. It is a
collection of the content of our self-experiences, including our characteristics,
our social roles, our values, goals, and even our fears – everything we use when
asked to describe who we are.

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self-concept the cognitive representation of our self-knowledge consisting of a sum total of all
beliefs we have about ourselves. It gives coherence and meaning to one’s experience, including
one’s relations to other people.

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Self-schemas and information processing

The elements of our self-concept, the specific beliefs by which we define
ourselves, are our self-schemas. Self-schemas are mental structures that help us
organize past experiences and guide the processing of new self-relevant
information. The concept was introduced in a landmark paper by Markus (1977),
in which she showed that having a particular self-schema in some domain (e.g.
extraversion, independence) will affect how we deal with information in
important ways (see Leader in the Field, Hazel R. Markus). In one study she had
people rate themselves on a number of attributes related to the dimensions of
independence–dependence (e.g. individualistic–conforming, assertive–
submissive) and also state how important each aspect was to their self-definition.
She identified participants as being ‘schematic’ (i.e. having a self-schema) on
independence or dependence if they considered the related terms as highly
descriptive and important to their self-concept. People who rated the terms as not
particularly descriptive or unimportant to their self-concepts were considered
‘aschematic’. The latter people appear to lack a self-schema on that dimension.

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self-schemas mental structures that help us organize and guide the processing of self-related
information.

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 - - - - - - - - - -

LEADER IN THE FIELD

Hazel R. Markus (b. 1949) was born in London, England and
received her BA in Psychology from California State University at
San Diego in 1970 and a PhD in Psychology from the University of
Michigan (Ann Arbor) in 1975, where she then worked as Assistant
Professor, Associate Professor and Professor of Psychology until
1994. Currently she is the Davis-Brack Professor in the Behavioral
Sciences at Stanford University. Her research focuses on the socio-
cultural shaping of self. A significant contribution of Hazel Markus
to social psychology was the introduction of the concept of ‘self-
schema’ that she describes as the cognitive representation of the self
that organizes self-knowledge and guides self-relevant information-
processing. She is also a pioneer in the research on how cultural
contexts (e.g. ethnicity, race, gender, social class) shape and reflect
emotions, cognitions and motivations of individuals, with a
particular interest in self-relevant processes (see the section on
Cultural Influences on Self-Knowledge later in this chapter). She has
received numerous awards for her work, including the Distinguished
Scientist Award of the American Psychological Association. Markus
was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1994.

In another laboratory session a few weeks later, Markus found that schematic
participants judged schema-congruent traits as true or not true of themselves
much more quickly and more confidently than did aschematics. Schematics also
more easily remembered past behaviours consistent with the trait, and were more
likely to reject new information that contradicted their self-view. So, if being
sociable is central to your self-concept, you are quick to decide that going out
with lots of people describes you and staying home reading a book does not; you
will also easily recall many instances when you were the centre of attention, and
you will not believe someone who tells you that you are shy. Thus we process
information that is relevant to our self-concept quickly and we remember it well.
The reason for this is one of the most basic and widely researched phenomena
in the self-concept literature: the self-reference effect (Higgins & Bargh, 1987;
Klein & Kihlstrom, 1986; Kuiper & Rogers, 1979). This refers to the fact that
information related to the self is processed more thoroughly and more deeply,
and thus recalled better, than other information. Initial studies on the effect
(Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977) asked participants to make different types of
judgements about trait adjectives, for example their structural properties (small
or large font?), their semantic meaning (does x mean the same as y?), or their
self-descriptiveness (does it describe you?). Later on, participants were given a
surprise recall test asking them to remember as many of the original words as
possible. As you probably guessed, findings showed the self-reference effect
(see Figure 5.4): participants remembered best those adjectives for which they
had rated their self-descriptiveness relative to those for which they had made
other types of judgements. The implication is that to the extent that you
personalize how you understand or memorize things and events around you, the
more you will elaborate on them and the easier they will be to remember. This is
true even if you do not agree with them. Even if participants denied the trait-
descriptiveness of an adjective (i.e. said ‘no’ to the question whether the trait
described them), they recalled it better later on.
FIGURE 5.4 Accuracy of recall as a function of type of judgement task.
Source: Data from Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977; Exp 1. Copyright © 1977 by
the American Psychological Association. Reproduced with permission. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 35, 677–688. The use of APA information
does not imply endorsement by APA.

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self-reference effect the tendency to process and remember self-related information better than
 other information.

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The self-reference effect illustrates that the self is, so to speak, your home base
from the position of which everything else is assessed and classified. Not
surprisingly then, our self-schemas also play an important role in how we
process information about other people. When judging someone else’s
performance, we often spontaneously compare it with our own (Dunning &
Hayes, 1996). Or in judging other people’s personalities, we do so according to
their similarity or dissimilarity to our own (Dunning & McElwee, 1995;
Dunning, Perie, & Story, 1991). How do you decide how studious or how
athletic someone else is? By comparing them with your own studiousness or
athleticism (Dunning & Cohen, 1992). Moreover, your most valued traits are
also the most important in judging other people (Lewicki, 1983). If generosity
and open-mindedness are aspects you value highly in yourself, you will also
notice and pay attention to these dimensions (or lack thereof) in others and judge
them accordingly.

Active versus stored self-schemas

No doubt then, our self-concept is at the centre of how we process everything
that transpires around us. But not all of our mass of self-knowledge is active all
of the time. In any situation, only a smaller subset is directly relevant and thus
activated to guide our behaviour. This is called the working self-concept
(Markus & Kunda, 1986). When you are at a party, for example, your easy-
going, jolly and maybe wild side of the self may be activated; whereas when
meeting with your professor, your intellectual, conscientious and more restrained
self comes out. This is similar to when you Google information on the web –
only a subset of information becomes available for use, that which is relevant to
your current search term. This highlights the importance of the working self-
concept, because, once activated, it is what determines your behaviour, rather
than the full self-concept, or any other aspect of yourself, even an important one,
if it is not currently ‘turned on’. A crucial question therefore, to which a great
deal of current research is devoted, is what turns on certain aspects of the self for
different people at different times and in different situations.

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 - - - - - - - - - -

working self-concept subset of relevant self-knowledge that is activated and guides our behaviour
in a given situation.

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Some factors are determined by the situational context and are similar for most
people. For example, if someone has a religious side, it is more likely to be
activated in church than in an amusement park. Another important general
situational factor is distinctiveness: if something sets you apart, or makes you
unique, in your immediate environment, then this aspect of yourself is more
likely to become activated. For example, a friend recently went to what she
thought was a mixed gender sauna (Figure 5.5), only to discover one man after
another coming in (she had mistakenly gone into the men’s sauna). She became
acutely aware of herself as a woman, and her gender became more important to
her self-concept than it usually would (and certainly more than if she had been in
a group of all women). McGuire and colleagues’ (McGuire & McGuire, 1988;
McGuire, McGuire, & Cheever, 1986) research programme testing
distinctiveness theory showed that the spontaneous self-concepts of children
typically consist of attributes which are uncommon or unique in their social
environment. For example, age is more salient for children who are younger than
their classmates, or ethnicity if they are from a minority group within the school.
FIGURE 5.5 In some situations, for example finding yourself in an opposite-
gender-only sauna, your gender may become more important to your self-
concept than it usually would.
Source: © Tyler Olson. Used under licence from Shutterstock.
 In addition to these more general aspects of situations, there are also large
individual differences, as to which parts of the self-concept are activated in
response to which situational cues. This depends on which domains are
especially important to an individual. Imagine, for example, the following
scenario in an experiment conducted by Downey and Feldman (1996). After a
short initial task with another participant, you are informed by the experimenter
that the other participant does not want to continue with the second part. How do
you react to this event? In the study, some participants simply assumed the other
must have run out of time; others, however, felt upset and assumed they were the
reason for the other person’s departure. These latter participants were individuals
high on rejection sensitivity – people for whom fear of being rejected is a highly
salient theme in their self-concept, and this aspect thus became activated in the
current ambiguous situation (see Figure 5.6). Their rejection sensitivity,
however, did not become activated when the situation was unambiguous; for
example, when the experimenter informed participants that they had run out of
time to complete the second half of the study (control condition). Altogether,
what these studies on the power of the working self-concept show is that our
sense of who we are is dramatically shaped by the current situation, but also
influences our interpretation of it.
FIGURE 5.6 Change in feelings of rejection from pre-interaction to post-
manipulation as a function of rejection sensitivity and experimental condition.
Source: From Downey & Feldman, 1996; Expt. 2. Copyright © 1996 by the
American Psychological Association. Reproduced with permission. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 70, 1327–1343. The use of APA information
does not imply endorsement by APA.

Actual, ideal and possible selves

Thus far we have talked only about self-beliefs that we hold about ourselves in
the present. Our self-concepts also include, however, our desired selves: our
goals, our hopes and fears, our ideals and standards. What are the selves you
imagine for yourself in the future? What are your ideas for what you would like
to become, or are afraid of becoming and want to avoid? These are your possible
selves (Markus & Nurius, 1986). They exert a motivational function – perhaps
you are studying, because you have a future image of yourself as a career
counsellor, or perhaps you watch your diet to avoid becoming fat. Other types of
desired self-schemas are ideal and ought selves (Higgins, 1987; Higgins, Klein,
& Strauman, 1985). In contrast to your actual self – who you truly believe you
currently are – the ideal self represents your (or your significant others’) wishes
and hopes for how you would like to be. Our ought selves refer to those aspects
we (or our significant others) feel it is our duty or obligation to meet.
Discrepancies between our actual and our ideal or ought selves have been shown
to have implications for a person’s emotional and motivational experiences
(Higgins, Bond, Klein, & Strauman, 1986; Strauman, 1992; Strauman &
Higgins, 1988; see Theory Box 5.2). Ideal selves motivate us to work actively to
attain our aspirations, and when we fall short of achieving them, we experience
sadness, disappointment and depression. When we, for example, fail an
examination which we had very much hoped to pass, we might feel disappointed
and depressed. By contrast, our ought selves motivate us to avoid negative
outcomes (e.g. punishment), and we feel anxiety, guilt and worry to the extent
that we fail to meet our duties and obligations. When we, for example, did not
help a friend or stranger in a situation in which we think we ought to have helped
morally, we might feel guilty about that.

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desired selves contain our potential (possible selves), as well as the wishes and aspirations (ideal
self), and the duties and obligations (ought self) that we, or significant others, hold for us.

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THEORY BOX 5.2

SELF AND SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT
Affective consequences of discrepancies between actual and ideal or ought
self-guides.
Source: Based on Vieth et al., 2003.
Implicit and explicit self-knowledge
A final important distinction is that while some of the knowledge in our self-
concept is explicit or conscious, a lot of it is implicit – that means, outside of
awareness. Explicit self-beliefs come about through reflection or deliberate
thought process, and these beliefs are thus controllable. Implicit aspects of the
self, in contrast, are beliefs about ourselves that are below our awareness. As a
result, they are much less controllable and more automatic than explicit self-
beliefs (Devos, Huynh, & Banaji, 2012). Despite this automaticity, however,
implicit self-knowledge is neither necessarily more accurate nor more authentic
(Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2007). The two are different aspects of the same
self-system that conjointly influence our thoughts, emotions and behaviours.
Together, our actual, our possible, and our desired (ideal or ought) selves – be
they implicit or explicit – as well as the discrepancies between them, affect how
we evaluate and feel about our ‘now’ selves. This is expressed in our self-esteem
– the topic to which we turn next.
 The nature of self-esteem
In addition to these more cognitive representations of who we are, or have the
potential to become, our self-knowledge also contains an overall evaluation or
appraisal of ourselves. How good a person do you think you are? How proud or
embarrassed are you about some of your characteristics? This overall evaluation
about how we feel about our qualities and self-worth is our self-esteem. Some
people are higher in self-esteem than others, which means that they see
themselves in more strongly positive terms and have fewer negative self-views
(e.g. see Leary & MacDonald, 2003, for a review). They also are more confident
that they will be able to succeed at their goals and are more optimistic that things
will generally go their way. In contrast, people with low self-esteem see
themselves in less positive ways and are more doubtful about their abilities and
qualities. On one hand these overall general self-evaluations are the sum total of
how you feel about yourself in a variety of domains – from appearance to
particular accomplishments (e.g. in school or athleticism), to social abilities (e.g.
Marsh, 1990). At the same time, and equally important, our global feelings of
self-esteem direct ‘top down’ how we feel about our more specific self-views
(Brown, Dutton, & Cook, 2001). Thus, a person with high global self-esteem is
more likely to see themselves as intelligent, competent, likeable and good
looking than someone with lower self-esteem, even when objective evidence
suggests they are both equal on those dimensions.

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self-esteem the overall evaluation that we have of ourselves along a positive–negative dimension.

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Trait and state self-esteem

Trait self-esteem captures how you feel about yourself generally overall and
typically most of the time – and, it is what we refer to when we say someone has
high or low self-esteem. Individual Differences 5.1 presents a commonly used
self-esteem scale to measure these differences between people, both at a trait and
state level.
 Studies have shown that trait self-esteem remains fairly stable across the life
course, despite some general age shifts during stages of development. On
average, self-esteem is relatively high in childhood, drops during adolescence
(particularly for girls), rises gradually throughout adulthood, then declines again
in old age (Robins & Trzesniewski, 2005). These developmental changes
notwithstanding, individuals tend to maintain their ordering relative to one
another: Individuals who have relatively high self-esteem at one point in time
tend to have relatively high self-esteem years later. However, despite the overall
long-term stability, just like our self-schemas that are not all always activated at
any one time, so too does our momentary experienced self-esteem fluctuate from
time to time depending on contextual factors.
State self-esteem refers to these variable self-evaluations that change in
response to temporary experiences – successes and failures, interpersonal praise
or criticism. Thus, similar to the self-concept more broadly, there are temporary
contextual shifts in self-esteem. In an experiment by Leary, Tambor, Terdal, and
Downs (1995), for example, some participants learned that they were being
excluded from a group task based on personal preferences of the other group
members, who had ranked all potential participants based on personal essays.
Not surprisingly, these participants experienced decreased state self-esteem in
contrast to other participants who had been excluded based on a random
procedure justified by the experimenter as needed by the experimental design
(see Figure 5.7). In contrast, those who were included for the same reasons
showed the opposite pattern: state self-esteem for those included based on group
preferences was comparatively somewhat higher than for those who were
randomly selected (even if this difference was not statistically significant).
FIGURE 5.7 Level of state self-esteem as a function of group choice vs. random
procedure.
Source: Data from Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995; Expt. 3. Reproduced
with permission.
 In addition, some people’s self-esteem is overall less stable and as a result
fluctuates more highly in response to daily experiences (Kernis, Cornell, Sun,
Berry, & Harlow, 1993). Self-esteem instability reflects fragile self-esteem and
sets people up to experience diminished psychological well-being in a number of
ways. People with unstable self-esteem are especially sensitive to and concerned
about potential self-esteem threats: they will, for example, react to negative
performance feedback with elevated anger, hostility and defensiveness. They
also feel less autonomous and less self-determined, and are more likely to
experience depressive symptoms in response to hassles (see Kernis & Goldman,
2003, for a review).

INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 5.1

Self-esteem refers to one’s overall evaluation of oneself as a person, i.e.
more specific assessments concerning one’s adequacy in different areas of
life are blended into a global judgement. The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale
(RSES, Rosenberg, 1965), which is characterized by being easy and quick to
administer, and having high face-validity (Blascovich & Tomaka, 1991),
presents one of the most widely used self-report instruments for measuring
self-esteem.
 Instruction Using the scale below, indicate your agreement with each of the
following statements.
1 Strongly disagree 2 Disagree 3 Agree 4 Strongly agree
1. I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others.
2. I feel that I have a number of good qualities.
3. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure.1
4. I am able to do things as well as most other people.
5. I feel I do not have much to be proud of.1
6. I take a positive attitude toward myself.
7. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.
8. I wish I could have more respect for myself.1
9. I certainly feel useless at times.1
10. At times I think I am no good at all.1
Note: 1indicates a reverse-scored item.
The RSES is typically scored using a 4-point format (as shown above), with
answers usually coded 1–4, thus resulting in a scale range of 10–40, with
higher scores representing higher self-esteem (Blascovich & Tomaka, 1991;
although some authors use different scales).
The RSES contains an equal number of positively and negatively worded
items. Thus, to determine your score, first reverse the scoring for the five
negatively worded items (3, 5, 8, 9 & 10) as follows: 1 = 4, 2 = 3, 3 = 2, 4 =
1. Then add up your scores across the 10 items to see where your total score
falls between 10 and 40. There are no discrete cut-off points to delineate
high and low self-esteem, but as has been shown in various adolescent and
adult samples, mean scores on the RSES are typically somewhat above the
midpoint, converging at around 30 (e.g. in an intercultural study, Schmitt &
Allik, 2005, obtained a mean value of 30.85, SD = 4.82 across 53 nations).
The wording of the RSES as presented above is appropriate when self-
esteem is measured as a trait, i.e. a characteristic of one’s personality that
remains relatively stable over time. However, self-esteem can also be
construed as a state, in this case referring to how individuals feel about
themselves at a given moment, which must be specified in the item wording.
Thus, when self-esteem is conceived of as dynamic and changeable, as
 opposed to something more constant, question phrasing needs to be adjusted
to indicate the point of time referred to (‘at the moment’, ‘right now’).

Contingencies of self-worth
Which situations matter? Just as individuals differ in which situations activate
certain aspects of their self-concepts, they also differ in which life domains are
important to their self-esteem. Crocker and colleagues have shown, for example,
that for some people their looks are more important, whereas for others their
self-esteem hinges more on their academic achievements, and for yet others it
may be the approval from others or the relationships with their family members,
or alternatively their cultural or religious values (Crocker & Wolfe, 2001). Think
for a moment about which setbacks and successes most affect your self-esteem.
Your state self-esteem will rise and fall depending on the domains in which you
are psychologically most invested – or in other words, those upon which your
self-esteem is contingent. Thus, to the degree that you can structure your life
such that you can excel in those domains that matter to you, your self-esteem
will benefit. Turn to Research Close-Up 5.1 however, to learn how this was
examined in an interesting field study by Crocker, Sommers, and Luhtanen
(2002).
Another way to aid your self-esteem may be to try to modify the importance of
some of your self-worth contingencies. It turns out that more internal
contingencies, such as virtue, are associated with less distress than more external
contingencies, such as physical appearance or approval from others (Crocker &
Luhtanen, 2003). In general, the less your self-esteem depends on attaining
specific external outcomes (approval, grades) and the more it can rely on internal
reinforcers (interest, autonomy), the more genuine is your self-esteem and the
more you will be buffered against setbacks (Deci & Ryan, 1995; Kernis, Lakey,
& Heppner, 2008). A final point is that it is best not to stake one’s self-worth
exclusively on one domain (Linville, 1987). The more one derives one’s sense of
self-worth from multiple areas, the less one’s self-esteem suffers when things are
not going well in one domain. For example, in a study on recent relationship
break-up, individuals with a high number of interrelated self-aspects (self-
complexity) experienced much less distress and fewer coping problems than
individuals low on self-complexity (Smith & Cohen, 1993).

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 self-worth contingencies domains – both internal (e.g. virtue) and external (e.g. power) – on which
we stake our self-worth.

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RESEARCH CLOSE-UP 5.1

CONTINGENCIES OF SELF-WORTH:
SELF-WORTH RISES AND FALLS IN
RESPONSE TO IMPORTANT LIFE EVENTS
Crocker, J., Sommers, S. R., & Luhtanen, R. K. (2002). Hopes dashed and dreams fulfilled:
Contingencies of self-worth and graduate school admissions. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 28, 1275–1286.

Introduction William James (1890, 1950) proposed

that global state self-esteem – our general evaluation
of self-worth -- fluctuates around a typical level
depending on positive or negative events in domains
on which one’s self-worth is based. Crocker and
colleagues (2002) set out to test this hypothesis in a
naturalistic setting involving significant life events
that could objectively be classified as successes or
failures as they unfolded over time. Specifically, they
addressed what this would mean for the self-esteem of
senior college students applying for master’s and
doctoral programmes. Would their self-esteem
increase on days they received an acceptance to a
graduate school? And would their self-esteem
decrease in turn after receiving a rejection, compared
to their global self-esteem on days without receiving
any decision? And is the boost or decline in self-
esteem greater for those students who base their self-
esteem more strongly on academic competence? In
other words, they assessed the degree to which
within-person changes in self-esteem can be linked to
specific events in the person’s life. They hypothesized
that the magnitude of these changes would depend on
the importance of the academic domain to the
person’s self-esteem.
Method Participants The participants were 37
college seniors, applying to master’s and doctoral
programmes. They were recruited through
advertisements in the campus newspapers and through
electronic mail to the college honours undergraduate
mailing list. Participants were paid $50 for their
participation.
Design and procedure At the beginning of the study,
participants completed the Rosenberg trait Self-
Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965) and the contingency
of self-worth measure (Crocker & Wolfe, 2001). The
latter distinguishes between eight domains on which
people can base their self-esteem (e.g. academic
competence, appearance, others’ approval, or virtue).
An example from the academic domain is: ‘My self-
esteem gets a boost when I get a good grade on an
 exam or paper’. Then, for a two-month period,
participants completed a web-based questionnaire
twice a week on a regular schedule of their own
choosing, as well as on any day when they received
official notifications from graduate schools. The web-
based questionnaire also contained an adapted state
version of the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (see
Individual Differences 5.1), consisting of 10 items
rated on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7
(strongly agree), and asking for their self-worth
feelings on that day.
This field study had a quasi-experimental design, as there was no random
assignment to conditions. It involved a natural manipulation: acceptances
versus rejections from graduate schools, which were compared to baseline
days (no decision letters). Contingency of self-worth was analysed as a
continuous variable from low to high.
Results Figures 5.8a and 5.8b show the main results.
As predicted, students with highly academic
contingent self-worth showed a boost of self-esteem
on days of acceptance, compared to baseline days
(days without a decision), while the self-esteem of
students with low academic contingency remained
unchanged. Also, as expected, on days of rejection the
self-esteem of students with highly academic
contingent self-worth decreased more than that of
students with low contingency of self-esteem on
academics. These fluctuations within people occurred
above and beyond large differences between people in
 overall stable self-esteem.
FIGURE 5.8(a) and (b) The level of state self-esteem for students with high
and low academic contingency of self-worth on days of acceptance or rejection
compared to baseline days.
Source: Adapted from Crocker, Sommers, & Luhtanen, 2002. Reproduced
with permission from SAGE publications.

Discussion These results show that for those senior

students who based their self-esteem strongly on
academics, acceptance at or rejection from a graduate
school had a stronger impact on their daily self-
esteem than for those students whose self-worth was
not contingent on academics. Crocker and colleagues
(2002) therefore conclude that fluctuations in self-
esteem are due, at least in part, to positive and
negative events in domains on which people stake
their self-worth. Thus, more than a century after
William James published his work about the nature of
self-esteem, this study provides support for one of his
key predictions: while trait self-esteem may remain
relatively stable over the life span, there are
 fluctuations around this typical level reflecting those
domains on which one has staked one’s self-worth.

Implicit and explicit self-esteem

Just as self-beliefs come in both explicit and implicit forms, so does self-esteem.
We have both conscious and unconscious feelings of positivity or negativity
toward ourselves. This is particularly tricky to measure – how does one get
information about something that people do not know themselves? This requires
rather ingenious methods. One of these is the name-letter effect (Koole,
Dijksterhuis, & Van Knippenberg, 2001; Koole & Pelham, 2003; Nuttin, 1985,
1987): To the extent that people have a greater preference for the letters of their
own name, more than other people like these letters, the higher is their implicit
self-esteem. Another commonly used measure is the implicit association test
(IAT; Greenwald & Farnham, 2000). See Individual Differences 5.2, which
describes this clever method that enables one to measure implicit self-esteem by
a timed word-association without the person’s awareness.

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implicit self-esteem the positivity of a person’s automatic or nonconscious evaluation of him-or

herself.

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Some people are consistent in their explicit and implicit self-esteem, others
discrepant, such that they have high explicit, but low implicit self-esteem, or
vice versa. The case of coexistence of positive explicit and negative implicit
feelings about the self is a rather interesting combination, in that it leads people
to behave in a ‘defensive’ manner in order to fend off these negative feelings
about the self (e.g. Jordan, Spencer, Zanna, Hoshino-Browne, & Correll, 2003).
Individuals with this kind of discrepancy are easily threatened by negative
feedback and they will do anything to reduce its impact on the self (Epstein &
Morling, 1995). For instance, they might blame the test writer for writing a bad
test; they will put down or even aggress against people who outperform them
(Bushman & Baumeister, 1998; Morf & Rhodewalt, 1993). Individuals with
consistent explicit and implicit self-esteem, in contrast, are more secure and have
less need to be defensive (Kernis, 2003).
 Cultural and gender influences on self-knowledge
In the section on the origins of self-knowledge, we saw how strongly our selves
are shaped by our interpersonal experiences and environments. It will come as
no surprise therefore that culture and gender also exert their influence. If you are
a person who by heritage or through migration identifies with two (or more)
cultures yourself, then you know immediately what we mean. Are you one kind
of person when with your family and another when with your friends or at
school? Are your two ‘selves’ compatible, or do they confuse you at times, or
even seem in conflict with one another? Cultures vary in how similar or different
they are in their conceptualizations of the individual and his or her role in
society, and thus in the social selves that they encourage (see Chapter 15). These
different conceptions of self in turn shape our perceptions of the world, our
motivations and our emotional reactions to events (Triandis, 1989, 1995).

INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 5.2

MEASURING IMPLICIT SELF-ESTEEM WITH
THE IMPLICIT ASSOCIATION TEST
(IAT: a full description of the IAT is given in Chapter 6).
Procedure The self-esteem IAT (Implicit Association
Test) measures self-esteem at an implicit level; that is,
the test does not require awareness of one’s self-
esteem and is not subject to conscious control. The
basic idea behind the IAT technique is that knowledge
about the self has an associative structure. The IAT
measures implicit associations between categories of
items by assessing how easily those categories are
mapped onto each other.
The IAT involves several steps (see Figure 5.9). Participants are presented
 with words on a computer screen one at a time and must decide as quickly
as possible to which of four categories each word belongs by hitting a key
on the keyboard. Latencies are measured and averaged for each task
variation. In the first two steps, participants practise how to categorize two
different target concepts (‘me’ or ‘not me’ and ‘pleasant’ or ‘unpleasant’
attributes) using specific keys. Thus, for example, when the word presented
below is ‘other’, the participant has to press the left key (‘not me’), but
when the word is ‘self’ the participant has to press the right key (‘me’). The
procedure is analogous for unpleasant/pleasant attributes (see Step 2).
FIGURE 5.9 Categorization tasks for five steps of the self-esteem Implicit
Association Test (IAT). Black dots indicate the correct response. The IAT effect
is the difference in response times between Steps 3 and 5.
Source: Copyright © 2000 by the American Psychological Association.
Adapted with permission. Greenwald & Farnham (2000). Using the Implicit
Association Test to measure self-esteem and self-concept. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 79, 1022–1038. No further reproduction or
distribution is permitted without written permission from the American
Psychological Association.
Step 3 is the first critical trial. Here participants are asked to map the four
categories (‘me’ and ‘not me’ targets, ‘pleasant’ and ‘unpleasant’ attributes)
onto just two responses (these are same keys as they were assigned to in the
practice steps: for example ‘me+pleasant’ to the right key and ‘not
me+unpleasant’ to the left key). Thus, for example, when the word
presented below is ‘other’, the participant has to press the left key (‘not
me’), but when the word is ‘joy’, the participant has to press the right key
(‘pleasant’). The forth step provides practice that reverses the assignments
of either the target or attribute concepts learned on Steps 1 and 2 (here
shown for ‘me’ and ‘not me’ targets). This is followed by the next critical
step (Step 5), in which pairings of the categories from Step 3 are switched
(e.g. ‘me+unpleasant’ to the left key and ‘not me+pleasant’ to the right key).
Thus, for example, when the word presented below is ‘self’, the participant
has to press the left key (‘me’), and when the word is ‘vomit’, the
participant also has to press the left key (‘unpleasant’).
Implicit self-esteem is measured in the form of an IAT effect, computed as
the average speed difference between the two critical steps (Step 3 and Step
5). The IAT effect measures how much easier it is for participants to
categorize self items with pleasant attributes than self items with unpleasant
attributes. Due to the implicit assessment of automatic associations, the IAT
makes it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for participants to
intentionally control or conceal their self-evaluations.
To try out the IAT for implicit self-esteem (and other implicit measures) for
yourself, visit the IAT Project Implicit® homepage, where links to online
tests as well as detailed information are provided.
After taking the test, you will be provided with your test score and short
feedback labelling your automatic tendency to associate certain categories
(e.g. yourself with ‘good’ versus ‘bad’) as ‘light’ ‘moderate’ or ‘strong’.
These evaluations are based on speed differences in reaction times to the
relevant pairings of categories you exhibited when taking the IAT (see
description above). To find out more concerning the interpretation of IAT-
results, you may find it helpful to refer to the ‘Background and FAQ’
section on the Project Implicit homepage.

THEORY BOX 5.3

INDEPENDENT VERSUS INTERDEPENDENT
CONCEPTUAL REPRESENTATIONS OF THE
SELF
Core concepts (bold Xs) are representations of the self that are most
elaborated in memory and most accessible when thinking about the self. For
those with interdependent self-construals these core concepts are at the
intersection between the self and others, whereas for those with independent
construals of the self the inner attributes are most important. Xs not shown
in bold represent non-core concepts.
Source: From Markus & Kitayama, 1991. Reproduced with permission from
Taylor and Francis.
Independent versus interdependent selves
The most studied contrasting dimension in self-construal first put forward by
Markus and Kitayama (1991) involves independence versus interdependence
(see Theory Box 5.3, and also Chapter 15). The independent self, widespread in
the Western world, in particular northwestern Europe and North America,
emphasizes autonomy, individualism, and uniqueness – what makes the self
distinct from others. In contrast, the interdependent self, more prevalent among
East Asians (or other more collectivistic cultures – see Chapter 15) construes the
self as fundamentally connected to others and embedded in society, and thus
emphasizes relationship harmony and what connects the self to others and
groups. When Westerners are asked to describe themselves, they are more likely
to use abstract trait adjectives (e.g. smart), whereas East Asians are more likely
to describe social relationships or group identities (e.g. college student) (see
Trafimow, Triandis, & Goto, 1991).

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independent versus interdependent self while the independent self emphasizes autonomy and
individualism and defines the self via internal attributes like traits, an interdependent self stresses
the connection to others and defines the self in terms of relationships with others.

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As you might imagine, self-views for someone with an independent self are
more consistent across social contexts than they are for someone with an
interdependent self who sees the self in more relational terms (e.g. Choi & Choi,
2002; Tafarodi, Lo, Yamaguchi, Lee, & Katsura, 2004). In one study, Japanese
and Americans were asked to fill out twenty sentences beginning with ‘I am. . .
.’ within different contexts (e.g. peer, higher-status partner). This study found
that Japanese were less consistent across contexts in their self-descriptions than
were Americans (Kanagawa, Cross, & Markus, 2001). Nevertheless,
interdependent selves are consistent within specific relationships and highly
stable over time (English & Chen, 2007). Hence, even if the Japanese reported a
different self with mother than with romantic partner within the same
relationship, they stayed the same. Therefore, it is not that interdependents’
selves shift willy-nilly across contexts, nor do they lack authenticity; but rather,
they have a different kind of self-concept consistency – one in which their selves
remain consistent within specific relational contexts. To see such cultural
differences, researchers have to adjust their ‘cultural glasses’ to open their minds
to another culture’s perspective.
Coupled with these different self-views are also different motivations and
feelings about the self. We have already mentioned that most people like to think
about themselves as better than average (Alicke & Govorun, 2005) and to
entertain positive self-illusions of probable success (Taylor & Brown, 1988).
This is, however, primarily true of those with an independent self-view; whereas
individuals with interdependent self-views value modesty and self-criticism
(Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999). As a result, East Asians tend to
score lower than Westerners on traditional self-esteem scales. This difference,
however likely, does not reflect that individuals with an interdependent self feel
worse about themselves, but rather, as we will see later in the chapter, that what
contributes to positive self-regard and how self-enhancement is expressed
varies across these cultural groups.

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self-enhancement motivation to enhance the positivity of our self-conceptions, often over what
would be objectively warranted; achieved by various strategies (e.g. self-serving attributions,
basking in reflected glory, positive self-presentations).

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To the extent that cultural differences in self-esteem are due to differences in

modesty, these cultural differences should be stronger for reports of self-
competence than for reports of affective self-regard. Consistent with this, East
Asians report equally positive self-feelings toward themselves (lack of shame,
pride) as do North Americans, even though East Asians report less positive self-
competence (Cai, Brown, Deng, & Oakes, 2007). Moreover, members of East-
Asian cultures score as high as Westerners on positivity towards the self on
implicit measures (Cai et al., 2011; Kitayama & Uchida, 2003; Yamaguchi et al.,
2007). For instance, Japanese individuals show enhanced liking for their own
name letters (Kitayama & Karasawa, 1997), and are faster to pair self-related
words with positive rather than negative words (Yamaguchi et al., 2007). In
short, although there are differences in reported explicit self-esteem across
cultures, these do not seem to reflect real differences in underlying self-esteem.

Gender
Similar differences in the self can also be found between genders: women tend
to develop more interdependent selves and link their self-esteem more to
interdependent qualities (Cross, Bacon, & Morris, 2000; Cross & Madson,
1997). Men, in contrast, develop more independent selves and link their self-
esteem more to their independent qualities (Josephs, Markus, & Tafarodi, 1992).
These differences can be explained through gender-specific socialization
practices, by which girls are taught to prioritize the qualities that align them with
others, whereas boys get encouraged to develop qualities that distinguish them
from others (e.g. Spence, Deaux, & Helmreich, 1985). To answer the question
whether men and women also differ in global self-esteem, Kling and colleagues
analysed the data of 216 studies and two nationally representative American data
sets (Kling, Hyde, Showers, & Buswell, 1999). They found only small
differences between genders, wherein men reported slightly higher self-esteem
than women.

Individual differences and contextual variability

Although culture (of which gender can perhaps be thought of as a special case)
has a pervasive impact on the self, it is important to highlight that there are still
individual differences, even within cultures. In any culture (or within gender),
there are individuals who are more or less independent or interdependent than
others (Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002). That is, there are
interdependent men or Westerners, just as there are independent women or East-
Asians. In addition, no one is just independent or just interdependent, but a bit of
both. In fact the degree of independence, or interdependence respectively, can be
influenced by the context. For example, a study by Trafimow and colleagues
(Trafimow, Silverman, Fan, & Law, 1997) with Chinese students from Hong
Kong (who spoke English as a second language), found that filling out a ‘Who
am I?’ test either in English or in Chinese importantly influenced the outcome.
Students who took the test in English reported more personal traits, whereas
students who took the test in Chinese focused more on social relations. This
phenomenon of changing the self in response to situational cues is called
cultural frame switching. Individuals who live with (at least) two cultures are
experts in both of them. They have more than one set of cultural tools to
interpret the world, or in other words two cultural meaning systems (DiMaggio,
1997; Shore, 1996) and will switch between them depending on the situational
demands (e.g. Hong, Benet-Martínez, Chiu, & Morris, 2003).
 The neural underpinnings of self-knowledge
Is there something special about how the brain processes and represents
information relevant to the self? With the recent advance of neuroimaging
techniques, the past two decades have seen a surge of research trying to identify
the neurological correlates of self-knowledge (Figure 5.10). The hope is to be
able to understand the mechanisms through which people develop
representations of self (versus others), how we come to feel a sense of agentic
action, and what processes give rise to experiencing a unitary self. Although our
understanding of the neural basis of the self is just beginning, progress has been
made on the neural correlates of various aspects of self-processing – both from
studying the impaired, injured brain and from imaging the healthy brain.
FIGURE 5.10(a) and (b) Due to the recent advance of neuroimaging
techniques, the past two decades have seen a surge of research trying to identify
the neurological correlates of self-knowledge.
Source: (a) © Charles Thatcher. Used under licence from Getty Images; (b) ©
Stewart Cohen. Used under licence from Getty Images.

The bulk of the initial neuroscience research on the self was directed at
understanding whether encoding information about the self is carried out by
different brain regions than encoding information about other people. Many
studies now converge to show that the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) is
involved in self-referential processing (see Beer, 2012, for a review). For
example, there is increased activation in the MPFC related to the self-reference
effect described earlier, where we encode information in relation to the self more
deeply compared to information related to political figures or syllabic structure
(e.g. Craik et al., 1999; Kelley et al., 2002). The MPFC also plays a role when
making self-descriptiveness judgements of personality characteristics (Macrae,
Moran, Heatherton, Banfield, & Kelley, 2004), when people observe their own
face (Keenan, Wheeler, Gallup, & Pascual-Leone, 2000), or when they
determine self-ownership of objects (Kim & Johnson, 2010). Interestingly, the
MPFC has also been shown to be sensitive to the cultural differences in self-
construal we talked about earlier. One study asked both Japanese and American
participants to rate the self-descriptiveness of trait adjectives either in general, or
in a particular context (e.g. ‘How casual are you when you talk to your mother’)
(Chiao et al., 2009). Participants who identified with individualistic values
showed greater MPFC activation for self-descriptiveness judgements made in
general, whereas those for whom collectivistic values were more important had
heightened MPFC activation for self-judgements in a particular context.
Does this mean, then, that the MPFC is the ‘self’ component in the brain? The
answer is a firm ‘no’. For one thing, a number of regions other than the MPFC
have also been shown to be involved in self-related processing (e.g. Klein,
2004). And with regard to the MPFC, the problem is that in other studies the
MPFC has also been shown to be activated when processing information about
other people, especially close others (e.g. Ochsner et al., 2005), or when we try
to take on another person’s perspective (Pfeifer et al., 2009), or try to infer their
mental state (Mitchell, Banaji, & Macrae, 2005). It appears then that the MPFC
is more broadly involved in general social cognition processes and is not unique
to the self. In fact, it may be that when we make inferences about the self as an
object this may be no different from when we process information about other
things. In synthesizing neuroimaging results from a large number of studies,
Legrand and Ruby (2009) argue that self-relatedness information processing
involves a wide cerebral network, the activity of which can be explained by
basic cognitive processes common to all tasks.
As already hinted at by William James, however, there is more to the self than
its objective aspect. The self also encompasses a sense of personal agency: the
experience that we are the cause and origin of our own thoughts and action. This
perspective is unique to the self. Legrand and Ruby (2009) argue that self-
specificity may be found here and will come in the form of making the relation
between one’s own actions and their consequences in the social world.
Consistent with this idea, a recent brain imaging study showed that the brain
mechanisms involved in experiencing a sense of agency are those responsible for
comparing predicted and actual action-effects (Spengler, Von Cramon, & Brass,
2009). In this study, participants first learned an arbitrary action–effect pairing:
they had to press a button as quickly as possible when a white square appeared
alternating between the use of either their index or middle finger. Immediately
thereafter either a red or blue box appeared, and these colours were
systematically mapped on to either of the two fingers. Later on, in the scanner,
participants again had to press a button as soon as a white square appeared, and
were then presented on some trials with matching and on other trials with non-
matching action–effects (i.e. the finger–colour combination they had learned or
the opposite).
Following each event, participants had to judge whether they themselves had
produced the effects (i.e. the squares), or whether these had been computer-
generated. Results revealed that participants showed a decreased sense of agency
for mismatched trials, or in other words, when previously learned action–effects
were altered and did not meet the internal prediction. These same trials also
mapped on to increased neural activation of the temporal parietal junction (TPJ),
a brain area responsible for integrating various inputs and monitoring the
correspondence of these signals with one’s body. Self-specificity may thus
derive from integration of (motor) command of one’s actions and the sensory
consequences we experience in the social world. Further experiments will be
required, however, to confirm this interpretation of the somatosensory cortex
activation for the first-person perspective.
In conclusion, the important point to be made is that there is no specific ‘self’
region in the brain. The self cannot be localized as a neural entity, but rather is
informed by a set of interrelated, functionally independent systems interacting in
complex ways (e.g. Klein, Lax, & Gangi, 2010).
 Summary
The self-concept can be described as the collection of the content of all our self-
experiences, including our characteristics, our social roles, our values, our goals,
our fears and so on. This self-knowledge can be categorized into two types: the
cognitive representation in the self-concept – our self-schema – and the affective
evaluation of the self – our self-esteem. The self-schemas help organize and
guide the information processing of self-relevant contents and often function as a
reference for judging others. These schemas exert their influence both at the
explicit and at the implicit level, and they contain a range of actual, desired
(ideal and ought), and possible self-beliefs. At any one time, it is not the entire
self-concept that is driving our feelings, thoughts and behaviours, but rather the
active or working self-concept – whatever aspect of the self-concept is
applicable to the current situation. Self-esteem can be considered a feeling
toward oneself based on an overall evaluation about our qualities and worth. It
can be described at the trait or at the state level and – as with the self-schemas –
it can influence us explicitly or implicitly. In addition, different domains can be
differentially important for the self-esteem of different people. Culture and
gender shape both our self-concept and our self-esteem. Finally, there is no
specific ‘self’ region in the brain.
 THE MOTIVATIONAL FUNCTIONS OF
THE SELF
To what extent are we motivated to find out the truth about
ourselves versus preferring positive distortions?
The beginning of the twenty-first century has seen an unprecedented rise of
talent shows as a popular genre of reality TV. Popstars, the Idols series, The X-
Factor and the Got Talent series and the like have drawn hundreds of millions of
viewers around the world (Figure 5.11). Although there are many variations to
the theme, talent shows inevitably feature a jury of experts who provide
feedback to the contestants about their performance. Indeed, a major part of what
is shown on TV focuses on contestants’ reactions to the jury’s feedback, which
are typically highly emotional. Positive feedback makes contestants act
euphorically, by jumping up and down, shouting, crying with joy and so on.
Negative feedback often shatters contestants, bringing to them tears of sadness,
or making them lash out in anger.
FIGURE 5.11 Talent shows such as Britain’s Got Talent have attracted millions
of viewers around the UK.
Source: Press Association Images.

Modern talent shows exploit something that social psychologists have long
known, namely, the fact that people care deeply about information that pertains
to the self. Indeed, most of us are all too eager to find out what kind of traits,
talents and abilities we possess. This basic curiosity may explain the widespread
appeal of horoscopes, popular magazines, psychological tests and training
programmes that are designed to help us on the road to self-discovery. But how
sincere are we in our quest for self-knowledge? Are we genuinely motivated to
find out the truth about who we are? Or do we merely seek to confirm our pre-
conceived ideas about ourselves?
 Know thyself: the self-assessment motive
According to Socrates, a Greek philosopher who lived between 470 and 399 BC,
accurate self-knowledge represents the highest human virtue. From this
perspective, most of us should try to reach an understanding of the self that is as
accurate and objective as possible. This striving is also known as the self-
assessment motive. To the extent that we are driven by self-assessment motives,
we should be eager to perform tests or tasks that provide us with a maximum
amount of objective information about ourselves. For instance, if we truly want
to know how smart (or dumb) we are, we should prefer a scientifically validated
IQ test over our own subjective impression of our intelligence. In line with the
self-assessment perspective, several studies have shown that people prefer high
diagnostic tasks, that is, tasks that can clearly tell them whether they have a
certain trait or ability, over low diagnostic tasks (Trope, 1983, 1986).

- - - - - - - - - -

self-assessment motive striving to reach an accurate and objective understanding of the self.

- - - - - - - - - -

However, there is a catch here. If we were purely interested in developing an

accurate understanding of the self, we should be equally motivated to learn about
our desirable and undesirable qualities. Most of us are indeed eager to learn
about our desirable traits and abilities, which make us look good (Sedikides,
1993). But what about our undesirable traits and weaknesses? Here, research
findings are mixed. Some studies have shown that people are equally interested
to hear about their desirable and undesirable qualities (Strube, Lott, Lê-Xuân-
Hy, Oxenberg, & Deichmann, 1986; Trope, 1980). However, other studies have
found that people are primarily interested in obtaining accurate information
about their strengths rather than about their weaknesses (Brown, 1990; Strube &
Roemmele, 1985). It thus appears that our motivation to learn about our
weaknesses is not as reliable as our motivation to learn about our strengths.
Although the self-assessment motive seems intuitively plausible, this motive is
of only limited use in explaining how most of us process information about the
self (Sedikides, 1993).
 Bigger, better, faster, stronger: the self-enhancement
motive
Our refusal to learn about our weaknesses is readily understandable in terms of
the self-enhancement motive, which refers to our desire to enhance the positivity
of our self-conceptions or protect the self from negative information (Sedikides
& Strube, 1997). The self-enhancement motive is central to classic and
contemporary psychological theories that assume that people have a basic need
to view themselves positively, or a need for self-esteem (e.g. James, 1890, 1950;
Rogers, 1951; Steele, 1988). According to the self-enhancement view, our need
for self-esteem leads us to focus on information that has favourable implications
for the self and to avoid information that has unfavourable implications for the
self.

Self-enhancing illusions
One important way in which we self-enhance is revealed through the kinds of
beliefs that we adopt. As noted earlier, Taylor and Brown (1988) concluded that
most psychologically healthy individuals entertain many positive illusions about
the self. The most obvious kind of positive illusion is the superiority bias, which
means that we tend to hold unrealistically positive views of the self. For
instance, we display a pervasive tendency to see the self as better than others.
We judge positive personality attributes to be more descriptive of ourselves than
of the average person, but regard negative personality attributes as less
descriptive of ourselves than of the average person (Alicke, 1985; Brown, 1986).
We further judge ourselves more favourably compared to more objective
standards, such as external observers (Lewinsohn, Mischel, Chaplin, & Barton,
1980). One particularly striking demonstration of this self-enhancing illusion
was provided by Epley and Whitchurch (2008). These researchers took a facial
photograph of each person in a group of participants and used a computerized
morphing procedure to make the photographs look more or less attractive (see
Figure 5.12). Participants were found to identify the attractively enhanced photo
of themselves more readily as their own face than the photo of their actual face.
Thus, it appears that we are prone to regard our own facial image as being more
desirable than it actually is.
FIGURE 5.12 Stimuli used to demonstrate self-enhancing illusions: faces of
participants were made more or less attractive than the actual photograph using
a computer program.
Source: From Epley & Whitchurch, 2008; Expt. 1. Reproduced with permission
from SAGE publications.

THEORY BOX 5.4

THREE STEPS OF THE SELF AS INTUITIVE
LAWYER
Source: Based on Baumeister & Newman, 1994. Reproduced with
permission from SAGE publications.

Self-enhancement biases can be found in many other beliefs that we hold

about ourselves (Roese & Olson, 2007). For instance, we often display
unrealistic optimism, holding overly positive expectations of what the future
might bring (Armor & Taylor, 1998). Those of us who are romantically involved
further display couple-serving bias, believing that our own romantic relationship
is superior to that of others (Buunk, 2001; Rusbult, Van Lange, Wildschut,
Yovetich, & Verette, 2000). Likewise, we are prone to ingroup favouritism,
believing that our own group is superior to other groups (Hewstone, Rubin, &
Willis, 2002; Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992). Self-enhancement may also take
on less obvious forms. For instance, consider the false consensus effect (Ross,
Greene, & House, 1977), which refers to our beliefs that others’ opinions are
more similar to ours than is actually the case. This effect can be seen as a subtle
form of self-enhancement, in that it allows us to think that our own opinions
enjoy more popular support than they actually do (McGregor, Nail, Marigold, &
Kang, 2005).

Self-enhancing information processing

How can we sustain self-enhancing beliefs even when they are contradicted by
reality? An underlying reason is that the ways in which we process information
are also self-enhancing. Indeed, there is much evidence that our reasoning
processes are biased to support conclusions that are favourable to the self. This
process is an example of motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990). Importantly, we
are not at liberty to believe whatever we want merely because we want to.
Instead, we maintain an ‘illusion of objectivity’ (Pyszczynski & Greenberg,
1987) by selectively searching for and combining information that supports our
desired conclusions. We thus act as if we are intuitive lawyers who are trying to
make the best case for a particular, preselected conclusion (Baumeister &
Newman, 1994).
The first step that we take as intuitive lawyers is to collect evidence that
reflects favourably on the self (see Theory Box 5.4 for the three steps of the self
as intuitive lawyer). We are highly selective in the kinds of self-relevant
information we attend to and in what we choose to ignore. For instance, we
spend more time reading positive rather than negative self-relevant information
(Baumeister & Cairns, 1992). In addition, we are selective in the kinds of self-
relevant information that we remember. For instance, when we believe that
extraversion is favourable, we quickly recall memories of situations in which we
acted in an extraverted manner. By contrast, when we believe that introversion is
beneficial, we quickly recall memories of situations in which we acted in an
introverted manner (Sanitioso, Kunda, & Fong, 1990). Likewise, when we
receive negative feedback about the self, we hardly attend to this information
(Green, Sedikides, & Gregg, 2008; Sedikides & Green, 2004), so that we easily
forget negative self-relevant information. Conversely, we spend much time
reflecting on positive feedback about the self, so that we recall positive self-
relevant information very well.
 The second step that we take as intuitive lawyers is to consider the
implications of self-relevant information and to reassess them, if these
implications are threatening to the self. For instance, Liberman and Chaiken
(1992) found that regular coffee drinkers were more critical than other
individuals of research reports suggesting a link between caffeine consumption
and a potentially fatal disease. In a related vein, studies have shown that people
become more critical of the validity of psychological tests when the test results
are disagreeable to them personally (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Holt, 1985;
Wyer & Frey, 1983). Our tendency to explain away information that threatens
the self may also explain why we tend to assign different causes to successes and
failures. Many studies have observed such self-serving attributional biases (see
Chapter 3): we take credit for our triumphs, while blaming the circumstances for
our personal failures (Miller & Ross, 1975; see also Campbell & Sedikides,
1999). This effect is illustrated by the tendency among athletes to attribute their
successes to their personal qualities and their failures to bad luck (Mullen &
Riordan, 1988).
The third step that we take as intuitive lawyers consists of combining all the
information into a coherent account. If we were truly objective, we would
determine our decision rules first and then start collecting the evidence.
However, as intuitive lawyers, we prefer to see the evidence first and then give
more weight to whatever evidence makes us look good. Indeed, Dunning and
associates found that people attach the most weight to those criteria that make
them look best (Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 1989). For instance, a
student who is good at maths is likely to define competence in terms of maths
abilities, whereas a student who is socially skilled may place more emphasis on
social abilities. An unfortunate consequence of our idiosyncratic definitions of
our abilities is that we tend to remain unaware of our incompetence (Dunning et
al., 2003). Self-enhancement motives may thus be an important barrier to self-
improvement.

Implicit self-enhancement
More generally, we seem to be mostly unaware of the extent to which our
thinking is influenced by self-enhancement motives (Baumeister & Newman,
1994; Kunda, 1990; Tesser, 2000). One reason for this lack of awareness may be
self-deception. If we openly acknowledge that we are self-enhancing, this may
undermine our very efforts to convince ourselves that we are endowed with
favourable qualities. Another reason why self-enhancement motives may operate
outside of awareness is that these motives are driven by basic affective
processes. Successful self-enhancement leads to positive affect and failed self-
enhancement leads to negative affect (Roese & Olson, 2007; Tesser, 2000). This
affective feedback may guide how we are considering information about the self,
even when we have little or no awareness of this process. For instance, learning
that we just made an embarrassing mistake may trigger a brief bout of negative
feelings, which prompts us to look for a circumstance that could excuse our
incompetent behaviour. It is well-established that much of our affective lives
occurs outside of awareness (Berridge & Winkielman, 2003; Chartrand, Van
Baaren, & Bargh, 2006; Zajonc, 1998). For this reason, self-enhancement
processes may similarly be driven by unconscious processes.
In a groundbreaking article, Greenwald and Banaji (1995) observed that
persons or objects that are associated with the self are often evaluated more
positively. For instance, we evaluate mundane objects like pens and mugs more
favourably when we happen to own them (Beggan, 1992). Likewise, we evaluate
people more favourably when they share their date of birth with us (Miller,
Downs, & Prentice, 1998; see Figure 5.13) or when we are photographed
together with them (Burgess, Enzle, & Morry, 2000). As noted earlier, we even
like the letters of our name more than other people like these letters (Koole &
Pelham, 2003; Nuttin, 1985, 1987). These examples illustrate that we evaluate
self-associated objects more positively, even when this association is purely
arbitrary. As such, it appears that we are not fully aware of how the self
enhances our evaluations of self-associated objects. This tendency to gravitate
toward people, places and things that resemble the self is referred to as implicit
egotism (Pelham, Carvallo, & Jones, 2005).
FIGURE 5.13 We evaluate people more favourably when they share their date
of birth with us.
Source: © wavebreakmedia Ltd. Used under licence from Shutterstock.
 - - - - - - - - - -

implicit egotism nonconscious or automatic positive evaluation of self-associated objects.

- - - - - - - - - -

Self-presentation and self-enhancement

So far we have portrayed self-enhancement as a process that largely takes place
between the ears. However, it is important to recognize that self-enhancement
has widespread influence on our interactions with other people. Anthropologists
like Joseph Campbell (1949) and Ernest Becker (1973) observed that all cultures
around the world and throughout history have developed some kind of value
system that allows people to gain a feeling that they are a person of worth. If this
is correct, then self-enhancement motives may explain why most of us are
striving hard every day to live up to the norms of our society by, for instance,
dressing according to the latest fashion, getting a university degree, acting as
responsible citizens and so on.

THEORY BOX 5.5

SELF-PRESENTATION STRATEGIES
Source: Bolino & Turnley (1999) table adapted with permission from SAGE
Publications Ltd. Also adapted from Jones & Pittman (1982) with
permission from Taylor and Francis.

The importance of self-enhancement motives for our everyday behaviour is

highlighted by research on self-presentation. Self-presentation refers to the
ways in which we try strategically to manage the impressions we are
communicating to an audience (Jones & Pittman, 1982). The audience can be
either imagined or real. We present ourselves in many different ways to different
people and for many different reasons (Jones & Pittman, 1982). Study Theory
Box 5.5 to learn about different types of self-presentational strategies people use
when trying to evoke specific attributions and emotions in their audience. As
you can see, these are quite varied and can run from acting helpless
(‘supplication’) to obtain nurturance and help, to excessive flattery
(‘ingratiation’) to get others to like one. Nevertheless, our primary objective in
self-presentation is to convey a favourable image of the self to others. Some of
the more direct ways in which we may self-present are by dressing smartly,
smiling, and telling others about our important achievements (Wicklund &
Gollwitzer, 1982). Self-presentation may also be directed at covering up our
inadequacies. For instance, we may make excuses for socially unskilled
behaviour (Snyder & Higgins, 1988).

- - - - - - - - - -

self-presentation a range of strategies that we adopt in order to shape what others think of us.

- - - - - - - - - -

Another tactic is self-handicapping (Jones & Berglas, 1978). In this

sophisticated form of self-presentation, we create an impediment that makes
good performance unlikely, but that will allow a positive interpretation of the
performance outcome regardless. For instance, in one study, participants were
given the opportunity to practise more, or less, for an upcoming battery of
intelligence tests (Tice & Baumeister, 1990). If participants did not engage in
much practice, they would have an external explanation for not performing well.
If participants then did poorly, this would not mean that they had to infer that
they were incompetent. However, if participants then did well, they succeeded in
spite of suboptimal circumstances. The inference therefore is that one must have
really high ability. Augmenting ability attributions after success has been shown
to be characteristic primarily of individuals high in self-esteem (Rhodewalt,
Morf, Hazlett, & Fairfield, 1991).

- - - - - - - - - -

self-handicapping the tendency to engage in self-defeating behaviours in order to provide a

subsequent excuse for failure and augment ability attributions in the case of success.

- - - - - - - - - -

In other words, through these and other forms of self-handicapping, our self-
image is always well off. However, self-handicapping comes at the expense of a
lower chance of succeeding, and of finding out just how good we really are.
Research suggests that we indeed use various kinds of self-handicapping tactics,
such as alcohol use, drug use, test anxiety and procrastination (Tice, 1991;
Tucker, Vuchinich, & Sobell, 1981; Zuckerman, Kieffer, & Knee, 1998). Turn to
Research Close-Up 5.2 now to learn about an important gender difference in
self-handicapping behaviour.
Notably, we do not always self-present by speaking favourably about
ourselves. Indeed, direct self-praise is often frowned upon and invites negative
reactions from our social environment (Paulhus, 1998). We therefore self-
present in a tactical manner, in ways that elude direct disapproval from others.
For instance, we may strengthen our ties with successful others, a strategy
known as ‘basking in reflected glory’ (‘BIRGing’, Cialdini et al., 1976). For
example, you may wear the scarf or shirt of your local sports team after they
won a match (Figure 5.14). Through this association you get a boost to your self-
esteem. We further make sure that we present ourselves in a more modest
fashion when we are among friends (Tice, Butler, Muraven, & Stillwell, 1995).
We will have future interactions with our friends, so that they are better able to
verify our claims about ourselves. Furthermore, we do not self-enhance as much
when doing so comes at the expense of close others. For instance, self-serving
bias in attributions becomes attenuated when we are among close others.
FIGURE 5.14 By wearing the shirt of a local sports team, after they have won a
match, people may strengthen their ties with successful others (‘basking in
reflected glory’), and boost their own self-esteem.
Source: © Reza Estakhrian. Used under licence from Getty Images.
 Sedikides and colleagues (Sedikides, Campbell, Reeder, & Elliot, 1998),
induced closeness experimentally in one study by having participants engage in
a structured self-disclosure task (they were asked to discuss questions that
became progressively more personal – for example, from ‘How old are you’ to
‘Tell me one thing that most people do not know about you’). Next, they
engaged in a creativity task – either with the person they had become close to, or
they were switched to a new person (distant) – and were then provided with
success versus failure feedback on the creativity test. Following this feedback,
participants were asked to attribute the outcome (success or failure) to
themselves or the partner along a continuum. Findings revealed that participants
took more credit for the dyad’s success and less responsibility for failure if they
were with a distant other participant (this is the typical self-serving attribution
effect). However, close participants took neither greater responsibility for the
dyad’s success, nor lower responsibility for failure – they self-attributed
responsibility for either outcome somewhere in-between the distant other
conditions (see Figure 5.15). We display this gracious attributional pattern
because we have a positive impression of close others and expect them to
reciprocate our self-effacing response. Indeed, when close others display more
self-serving responses, our responses become as self-enhancing as with non-
close others (Sedikides et al., 1998). In sum, our self-presentations are highly
tactical and sensitive to the specific requirements of the social context.
FIGURE 5.15 Self-attributed personal responsibility as a function of closeness
to other participants and success versus failure feedback.
Source: Adapted from Sedikides, Campbell, Reeder, & Elliot, 1998; Expt. 1.
Copyright © 1998 by the American Psychological Association. Adapted with
permission. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 378–386. The use
of APA information does not imply endorsement by APA.
RESEARCH CLOSE-UP 5.2

WOMEN ARE LESS LIKELY TO USE

EFFORT WITHDRAWAL AS A SELF-
HANDICAP
McCrea, S. M., Hirt, E. R., & Milner, B. J. (2008). She works hard for the money: Valuing effort
underlies gender differences in behavioral self-handicapping. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 44, 292-311.

Introduction
If individuals worry about failing on a specific task, they sometimes create
or claim obstacles in order to have an excuse for possible failing. Hereby
they can protect their self-esteem and preserve an impression of ability. This
strategy is called self-handicapping. Claimed self-handicaps, in which
individuals only state that an obstacle exists (e.g. stress), can be
distinguished from behavioural self-handicaps, in which individuals actually
create obstacles (e.g. withdraw practice effort). This distinction is important,
as it is related to a gender difference in self-handicapping: both men and
women have been found to use claimed self-handicaps, but only men engage
in behavioural self-handicapping (Hirt, Deppe, & Gordon, 1991). In their
study, McCrea and colleagues further analysed this gender difference and
study, McCrea and colleagues further analysed this gender difference and
tested a possible explanation for it. They hypothesized that, compared to
men, women might place more value on exerting effort and thus would be
less likely to curtail it. Only the results of Study 3 are reported here.
Method
Participants
The participants were 188 introductory psychology students (92 male and 96
female). They received research credits in return for their participation.
Design and procedure
Before starting the actual experiment, participants completed two
questionnaires: (1) a ‘worker scale’, which measured how hard the students
reported that they work (e.g. ‘I work hard to be successful at whatever I
do.’); (2) a ‘prescriptive effort norm scale’, which measured how highly
they value effort (e.g. ‘I admire people who work hard.’).
Participants first completed a computerized 15-item multiple-choice analogy
test that they believed to be a traditional test for verbal intelligence. The
items chosen were particularly difficult. After completing this task, the
computer displayed a message informing participants that they had scored
12 out of 15 items correct, and that this score placed them in the top 10% of
college students. They were further told that they would be expected to
score highly on a subsequent nonverbal test as well, and that the researchers
would compare their two scores to see if they matched this high expectation.
These instructions were given in order to make participants feel uncertain of
their ability to perform well on the second test, as well as to heighten the
impression that the experimenter would be closely observing their
performance.
The experimental manipulation followed next. Participants were assigned to
one of two practice instruction conditions: Those in the ‘practice matters’
condition were told that past research had shown that scores on the
nonverbal test were not diagnostic, unless individuals had some prior
experience with the items; moreover, that without such practice they would
score lower than their actual intelligence would warrant. Those in the
‘practice doesn’t matter’ condition were told that past research had shown
that practice had no effect on scores on the test. Participants in both
conditions were then given a chance to practise prior to the test. All
 conditions were then given a chance to practise prior to the test. All
participants received a practice booklet with 18 items and were allowed to
practise for as long (or as little) as they liked. The time participants spent
practising was surreptitiously recorded, along with the number of practice
items completed. Afterwards, they completed the 15-item test.
The experiment thus had a 2-factor design: 2 (gender: male versus female) ×
2 (degree to which effort withdrawal could serve as a self-handicap:
low/’practice doesn’t matter’ versus high/’practice matters’).
Results
The results provided support for the hypothesis. Figure 5.16 shows the
gender differences in behavioural self-handicapping: only men reduced their
effort in the ‘practice matters’ condition, whereas women practised
significantly more. In the ‘practice doesn’t matter’ condition, there was no
significant gender difference. Further analyses revealed that the gender
difference was due in part to women’s reporting being harder workers, as
well as their placing more value on effort.
FIGURE 5.16 Practice effort as a function of instruction and gender.
Note: Practice effort was computed as an index of time spent practising and
number of items completed.
Source: From McCrea, Hirt, & Milner, 2008; Expt. 3.

Discussion
 The results of this study confirmed the gender difference in behavioural self-
handicapping found in earlier studies. Moreover, the authors also provided
an explanation for that effect. Women value effort more highly and reported
that they invested more in working harder than men did. Therefore, women
do not engage in effort withdrawal as a self-handicapping behaviour – the
costs of this behavioural self-handicapping would be too high for women.
The authors speculate that the difference between men and women in their
evaluation of work and effort could be an expression of a greater pressure to
adhere to norms. Future studies are needed to further explicate this gender
difference, as it was not completely explained by the scales measured in this
study.

Pancultural self-enhancement
Although Western cultures emphasize individualistic values such as personal
freedom and self-expression, many non-Western cultures emphasize more
collectivistic values such as conformity and fitting in with the group (Triandis,
1989; see Chapter 15). Heine and associates have suggested that self-
enhancement motives are only applicable to individuals who have been
socialized within individualistic societies (Heine et al., 1999). As discussed
earlier in the chapter, in collectivistic cultures individuals are more likely to have
an interdependent conception of the self, which may render them less motivated
to affirm positive views of the self. Research has confirmed that East Asians, as
representatives of collectivistic cultures, typically have self-views that are only
moderately positive, and much weaker self-enhancement biases than North
Americans, at least in their self-reports. Indeed, several studies have found
evidence for a self-critical bias among Japanese individuals. For instance, one
experiment found that Japanese students were more easily convinced that their
performance was below average than were Canadian students (Heine, Takata, &
Lehman, 2000).
Cultural psychologists have thus challenged the universality of the self-
enhancement motive. But this challenge has itself been challenged. First, people
may be most likely to self-enhance on dimensions that are consistent with our
cultural roles (Sedikides, Gaertner, & Toguchi, 2003). Accordingly, a number of
studies have found that members of individualistic cultures self-enhance mostly
on individualistic traits indicating personal effectiveness (e.g. independent,
unique, leader). Members of collectivistic cultures, in contrast, self-enhance
mostly on collectivistic traits signifying social connectedness (e.g. respectful,
compliant, loyal) (Gaertner, Sedikides, & Chang, 2008; Sedikides et al., 2003).
Second, self-evaluations by members of collectivistic cultures may be more
influenced by norms that emphasize modesty. Norms towards modesty appear to
be stronger in East Asia than in the West (Cai et al., 2007). Such modesty norms
typically prohibit boasts about one’s accomplishments.
Third, as mentioned earlier, members of East-Asian cultures do show
significant positivity towards the self on implicit measures (Cai et al., 2011;
Kitayama & Uchida, 2003; Yamaguchi et al., 2007). At first glance, the co-
existence of explicit self-criticism and implicit self-regard seems paradoxical.
However, various theorists have suggested that one’s own self-critical remarks
are usually met with sympathy and compassion in interdependent cultures (Cai
et al., 2011; Kitayama & Uchida, 2003). Consequently, self-critical East Asians
are likely to develop positive associations towards the self, even when (or
paradoxically, because) their explicit comments about the self are negative.
Consistent with this, explicit modesty is positively associated with implicit self-
esteem among members of Eastern cultures, but not among members of Western
cultures (Cai et al., 2011). Cai and colleagues (2011) showed this using the
‘implicit association test’ (IAT) described earlier as an implicit measure of self-
esteem. With this method, the researchers found the expected association
between enacting modest behaviour and high implicit self-esteem for Asian
participants, but not for American participants. Moreover, this was despite
Asians reporting low explicit self-esteem. In short, within different cultural
contexts, different ‘roads’ may lead to positive self-regard.
To summarize, there are important differences between cultures that shape
both norms for self-presentation and the kinds of qualities people aspire to.
These cultural differences lead to striking differences in how East Asians present
themselves relative to Westerners. Nevertheless, when appropriately measured,
self-enhancement tendencies can be observed equally among members of both
Eastern and Western cultures. Self-enhancement thus appears to be a universal
human motive.
 The puzzle of low self-regard: self-verification
Most of us view the self in largely positive terms. Most, but not all, of us. A
small but distinct number of individuals are inclined to view the self in more
neutral, if not negative terms. These individuals represent an intriguing
psychological puzzle. Are these individuals somehow immune to self-
enhancement needs? Or do these individuals still have the desire to self-enhance,
but does something keep them from doing so?
A research programme led by Swann and associates (Swann & Buhrmester,
2012) goes a long way towards resolving the puzzle of individuals with low self-
regard (see Leader in the Field, William B. Swann). According to these
researchers, our stable self-views are tied to feelings that the world is meaningful
and coherent. A stable and coherent view of ourselves and the world is crucial,
because it allows us to organize our experience, predict future events, and guide
social interaction. Our desire for stable and coherent self-views gives rise to the
self-verification motive, a motivation to affirm our firmly held beliefs about
ourselves. For those of us with positive self-views (who are in the majority),
affirming positive self-views jointly serves self-verification and self-
enhancement motives. However, for those of us with negative self-views (a
sizable minority), there is a fundamental conflict between self-verification and
self-enhancement motives. Affirming positive self-views feels good on one
level, because it fulfils self-enhancement needs. However, doing so does not feel
right, because it compromises the feelings of coherence that drive our self-
verification motives (Swann & Buhrmester, 2012).

- - - - - - - - - -

self-verification motivation to affirm firmly held self-beliefs, arising from a desire for stable and
coherent self-views.

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LEADER IN THE FIELD

William B. Swann (b. 1952) received his BA from Gettysburg
 College in 1974 and his PhD from the University of Minnesota in
1978. Since then he has worked at the University of Texas at Austin,
where he is Professor of Social and Personality Psychology. He is
best known for his research on self-verification: the theory assumes
that people prefer others to see them consistent with their own firmly
held beliefs and feelings about themselves (both negative and
positive). Another focus of Swann’s work is on the process of
identity negotiation: the processes through which people in
relationships reach mutual agreements regarding ‘who’ each person
is. Once these agreements have been reached, people are expected to
remain faithful to their identities. These agreements establish what
people expect of one another, and thus determine the way they relate
and, in turn, keep the relationship together. In a 2004 survey,
Professor Swann was listed among the top 30 most-cited authors
published in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, and in a
2006 survey in Dialogue, among the top 30 most-cited authors in
Social Psychology textbooks.

The self-verification perspective holds that people will fight to maintain stable
self-views even when these self-views are negative, so that maintaining them is
psychologically painful (Swann & Buhrmester, 2012). In line with this
provocative idea, studies have shown that people gravitate towards self-verifying
interaction partners (e.g. Hixon & Swann, 1993; Robinson & Smith-Lovin,
1992; Swann, Stein-Seroussi, & Giesler, 1992). For instance, one study asked
participants with positive and negative self-views to pick one of two potential
partners to get to know better over an interaction of two to three hours (Swann et
al., 1992). These potential partners had allegedly provided their evaluations of
participants’ personality profiles. One partner expressed a very favourable
impression of the participant; the other expressed a somewhat negative
impression. As it turned out, most participants chose a partner whose evaluation
of them matched their own self-views (see Figure 5.17). This means that
participants with positive self-views preferred interaction partners who had
favourable impressions of them. However, perhaps more surprisingly,
participants with negative self-views preferred interaction partners who had
unfavourable impressions of them. Importantly, these self-verification
tendencies occur not just in the laboratory, but have also emerged in real-life
relationships, such as marriage, friendships and work teams (see Swann &
Buhrmester, 2012). Self-verification strivings occur equally for men and women
and both for specific self-views (e.g. intelligence, sociability) and global self-
worth. People are particularly likely to seek self-verifying feedback for self-
views that are confidently held, important or extreme (see Swann & Buhrmester,
2012, for a review).
FIGURE 5.17 Percentage of participants who chose favourable versus
unfavourable interaction partners depending on positivity of participants’ own
self-view.
Source: Data from Swann, Stein-Seroussi, & Giesler, 1992; Expt. 1. Reproduced
with permission.

Do people with negative self-views relish negative feedback about the self? Or
have they simply stopped caring about the self? The answer to both questions is
negative. Instead, individuals with a negative self-view feel deeply torn upon
receiving negative evaluations. On the one hand, these individuals like to hear
others say good things about them. This positive reaction to self-enhancing
feedback is characteristic for the first, automatic reaction of individuals with
negative self-views (Swann, Hixon, Stein-Seroussi, & Gilbert, 1990). On the
other hand, however, individuals feel that self-enhancing feedback does not
describe them very accurately. Consequently, individuals with negative self-
views feel more understood by interaction partners who evaluate them
negatively. This preference for negative but self-verifying feedback only
emerges when people have sufficient time and attentional resources to think
about their decision, otherwise people prefer positive feedback, regardless of
how self-verifying it is (Swann et al., 1990). In sum, individuals with negative
self-views still have self-enhancement tendencies, but these tendencies may be
overruled by more deliberate strivings for self-verification.
 Why do we self-enhance?
In a classic study, Peterson and Seligman (1987) examined how members of the
Baseball Hall of Fame from 1900–1950 explained their successes and failures
(Figure 5.18). The results showed that players lived significantly longer to the
extent that they provided self-serving explanations of good and bad events (i.e.
attributed success to themselves and failure to specific circumstances). This
striking finding is consistent with other studies showing that self-enhancement
tendencies are positively associated with mental and physical health (Taylor,
Kemeny, Reed, Bower, & Gruenewald, 2000). This pattern is not only observed
in the West, but also in Eastern cultures, which promote modesty and self-
criticism among their members (Gaertner et al., 2008). Moreover, although these
findings are correlational, there is also evidence that affirming positive self-
views can directly cause health benefits (Creswell et al., 2005, 2007).
FIGURE 5.18 The Babe Ruth room at the Baseball Hall of Fame. Self-
enhancement tendencies in members of the Baseball Hall of Fame from 1900 to
1950 were positively associated with increased life expectancy (Peterson &
Seligman, 1987).
Source: Milo Stewart, Jr/National Baseball Hall of Fame and Museum,
Cooperstown, N.Y. Reprinted with permission.

Sociometer theory
In what way is self-enhancement beneficial to our health? This question relates
to the deeper reasons why we are driven to self-enhance. Why is it so important
to us to think well of ourselves? In addressing these questions, Leary and
associates have emphasized the interpersonal functions of having positive
feelings towards the self (Leary et al., 1995). According to Leary, our feelings of
self-esteem signal the degree to which we feel acceptance or rejection by other
members of our social group. When we experience rejections from others, our
self-esteem drops, which motivates us to restore our social standing through
various self-enhancing behaviours. When we feel accepted, we maintain our
positive sense of self-esteem. Feelings of self-esteem may thus act as a
‘sociometer’ (a kind of social barometer) that helps us to keep track of our social
status.
The sociometer theory has inspired a great deal of research on the effects of
social exclusion on self-esteem. However, its assumptions have proven
surprisingly difficult to confirm. A recent meta-analysis that combined almost
200 relevant studies found no evidence that social exclusion has a negative
impact on self-esteem (Blackhart, Nelson, Knowles, & Baumeister, 2009).
Moreover, the same exclusion manipulations that failed to influence self-esteem
did have effects on other variables, such as impairing one’s ability to self-
regulate (Baumeister, DeWall, Ciarocco, & Twenge, 2005) or producing a
substantial reduction in prosocial behaviour (Twenge, Baumeister, DeWall,
Ciarocco, & Bartels, 2007). These findings call into question whether self-
esteem is directly linked to our perceived level of belongingness. More
generally, the absence of effects of exclusion on self-esteem poses a major
challenge to the sociometer model.

- - - - - - - - - -

sociometer theory a theory that posits that our self-esteem functions as a signal of the degree to
which we feel accepted or rejected by other people.

- - - - - - - - - -

Terror management theory

An alternative perspective on the psychological functions of self-esteem is
provided by terror management theory (Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski,
1997). Inspired by existential thinkers like Otto Rank and Ernest Becker, terror
management theory proposes that our human self-awareness greatly magnifies
our potential for anxiety, because it allows us to realize that our own death is
inevitable. To manage this existential anxiety, we become invested in our
culture, which provides our existence with meaning and order. Culture also
provides us with ways of achieving immortality, either literally through religious
beliefs about an afterlife, or symbolically by identifying with values that
transcend our individual existence (e.g. justice, love or science). To achieve
literal or symbolic immortality, we must maintain the values that are proscribed
by our culture. To the extent that we are effective at this, we will experience a
sense of self-esteem. Terror management theory thus suggests that the ultimate
reason why we self-enhance is because having a positive self helps us to
overcome our deepest existential fears.

- - - - - - - - - -

terror management theory a theory that assumes that people cope with the fear of their own death
by constructing worldviews that help to preserve their self-esteem.

- - - - - - - - - -

Research has provided strong evidence for the basic tenets of terror
management theory (see Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel,
2004, for an overview). First, affirming positive beliefs about the self reduces
death anxiety (Greenberg et al., 1993) and helps to put thoughts about death out
of the mind (Schmeichel & Martens, 2005). Second, reminding people of death
(i.e. increasing mortality salience) leads to stronger self-enhancement strivings.
For instance, in one study, Israeli soldiers were reminded of either death or of a
neutral topic (Taubman Ben-Ari, Florian, & Mikulincer, 1999). Risky driving is
for many people a means to show off, test their limits, or compete with other
drivers (Taubman Ben-Ari, 2000). According to terror management theory,
concerns with death should motivate the individuals reminded of their death to
engage in more risky driving. In line with this prediction, the results showed that
reminders of death led to more dangerous driving manoeuvres (as assessed
through self-report and on a driving simulator), particularly among soldiers who
took pride in their driving ability.
 Likewise, death reminders increase the appeal of high-status items (e.g. a
Lexus car) and materialism among people living in capitalist cultures, which
emphasize financial success as a source of self-worth (Rindfleisch, Burroughs, &
Wong, 2009). Notably, these effects are not paralleled by reminders of other
aversive topics, such as failing an important exam, or uncertainty. Third,
suggesting to people that there is scientific proof for an afterlife reduces the
impact of mortality salience on self-enhancement strivings (Dechesne et al.,
2003). After being asked to write down the first thing that came to mind when
thinking about death or a control topic (watching television), participants read an
article presenting scientific arguments for or against the existence of an afterlife.
When reading an article arguing for no life after death, participants showed the
typical mortality salience effect of more positive self-ratings when reminded
about death relative to the control group. However, when participants read an
article containing scientific arguments for a life after death, this self-
enhancement following death reminders disappeared (see Figure 5.19).
FIGURE 5.19 Self-enhancement striving (positivity of self description) as a
function of mortality salience condition and scientific claim about the existence
of life after death.
Source: Data from Dechesne et al., 2003; Expt. 1. Reproduced with permission.

Taken together, there is impressive support for the terror management

functions of self-enhancement. Although self-enhancement is logically unrelated
to the problem of death, self-enhancement psychologically protects us against
death anxiety. Consequently, one major reason why we self-enhance is that
doing so helps us to cope more effectively with existential concerns.
 The pros and cons of pursuing self-esteem
People self-enhance in order to support and bolster their self-esteem and to
squelch existential fears. But to what degree are self-enhancement and high self-
esteem a good thing? On one hand, high self-esteem is linked to many positive
outcomes: people with high self-esteem are more resilient to stress, setbacks and
depression; they are more optimistic about their futures and have more self-
confidence; all round, they feel good about themselves (Baumeister, Campbell,
Krueger, & Vohs, 2003; Bonanno, Rennicke, & Dekel, 2005; Taylor, Lerner,
Sherman, Sage, & McDowell, 2003). However, this is not the whole story.
People with high self-esteem also often take large and inappropriate risks,
ranging from unsafe sexual behaviour to substance abuse or even delinquency
(Baumeister et al., 2003). High self-esteem is also associated with stronger
ingroup bias and more prejudice (Aberson, Healy, & Romero, 2000; Crocker &
Schwartz, 1985). Moreover, when people feel their self-esteem is threatened,
they often react by lashing out – putting others down or aggressing against them
(Bushman & Baumeister, 1998; Bushman et al., 2009; Morf & Rhodewalt,
1993). In this light, unjustifiably inflated self-esteem is particularly problematic,
as it is capricious, and thus easily challenged or threatened.
A special case of grossly inflated self-views yet fragile self-esteem comes in
the form of narcissism (Akhtar & Thomson, 1982; Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001;
Morf, Torchetti, & Schürch, 2011; see Figure 5.20). The syndrome of narcissism
was originally developed by psychiatrists to describe a personality disorder that
they observed in some of their clients who displayed a pervasive pattern of a
grandiose sense of self and a lack of empathy for others (American Psychiatric
Association, 1994). But social psychologists too have been interested in
narcissism and have studied weaker forms of this personality trait in nonclinical
samples (see Morf, Torchetti, & Schürch, 2011, for a review). Their more
controlled research has confirmed that narcissists in the nonclinical range
similarly hold sky-high opinions of themselves, yet simultaneously have
disparaging views of others. Others are of interest to them not for their own sake,
but merely as vehicles for the narcissists’ own self-enhancement. Narcissists
brag, show off, want others to admire them; they also compete with others and
exert power over them in order to assert their superiority (Buss & Chiodo, 1991;
Campbell & Foster, 2007; Wallace & Baumeister, 2002). While these
behaviours sometimes get narcissists what they want, they also backfire at times
and undermine the narcissists’ self-enhancement efforts (see Morf, Horvath, &
Torchetti, 2011, for a review).
FIGURE 5.20 Narcissists display grossly inflated self-views yet have a fragile
self-esteem.

For example, in new groups, narcissists’ self-enhancement brings them

admiration and they are often chosen as leaders, but once their bluff has been
discovered, the admiration turns into dislike and rejection (Brunell et al., 2008;
Judge, LePine, & Rich, 2006; Paulhus, 1998). Some studies have questioned
whether a hidden negative self-view (Bosson et al., 2008) underlies narcissists’
self-enhancement efforts. However, some recent studies using implicit measures
(see the section on implicit self-esteem of this chapter) have indeed confirmed
the role of latent worthlessness in narcissistic responding (Horvath & Morf,
2009; Morf, Horvath, & Zimmermann, 2011). Thus, narcissistic individuals
might harbour latent feelings of self-doubt, despite their highly favourable
reported self-views at the explicit level (e.g. Horvath & Morf, 2009; Jordan et
al., 2003; also see Gregg & Sedikides, 2010, for an in-depth discussion). It
appears then that easily activated latent feelings of worthlessness are part of the
psychological makeup of narcissists. As a result, narcissists show the types of
defensive behaviours talked about earlier, when explicit and implicit self-beliefs
are at odds. They cannot help themselves, it seems, from constantly pushing
their self-esteem (Baumeister & Vohs, 2001).
Turn now to Social Psychology Beyond the Lab 5.1 to learn about the link
between threatened egotism and violence.
Hence there clearly are risks to raising self-esteem, especially if it is not based
on actual deeds and thus unwarranted. Moreover, when we should take these
risks depends on the context. Although there clearly are many interpersonal
advantages to modesty and humility (Sedikides, Gregg, & Hart, 2007), both
modesty and self-enhancement must always be seen in the context in which they
transpire. Being excessively modest in a job interview is unlikely to get one an
executive position; correspondingly, being overly self-enhancing when a friend
just failed a test is not going to seal the friendship. All told, then, pursuing self-
esteem is a mixed bag, and one has to take into account that there are many
different kinds of high self-esteem. When high self-esteem is genuine, people
feel secure and thus are less angered by or reactive to criticism (Kernis, 2003).
They also do not care about being the centre of attention, or overtrumping
others. Secure self-esteem is rooted in feeling good about who one is, and is not
contingent on external sources (Crocker & Park, 2004; Kernis et al., 2008).
Importantly, the upshot is that the less one’s focus is on self-image, and the more
it is on developing one’s competence, relationships and autonomy, the more
likely it is that one will build a solid base for genuine self-esteem (see Deci &
Ryan, 1995).
 Summary
We care deeply about any information that pertains to the self. Intuitively, one
might expect that we are driven by a self-assessment motive and therefore
mainly want to develop an accurate understanding of the kind of person we are.
However, the available evidence indicates that we usually prefer to self-enhance,
by seeking positive information about the self and by processing it in a self-
serving way. Self-enhancement mainly operates implicitly and is found in
culturally-appropriate forms in many different parts of the world. Besides
presenting oneself toward others in a favourable way, self-enhancement helps in
coping with existential anxieties. Nevertheless, we are also inclined to self-
verify, by seeking information that supports our pre-existing ideas about the self.
Given that most of our self-views are positive, self-enhancement and self-
verification motives push us in the same direction most of the time, although
people with low self-regard prefer to self-verify their negative self-beliefs.
Finally, although high self-esteem is associated with a range of positive
outcomes, it also can come with costs – especially when self-esteem is inflated
and contingent upon external sources.
THE REGULATORY FUNCTIONS OF THE
SELF: THE SELF IN CONTROL
How does the self regulate our behaviour so that we can plan
effectively and pursue our goals and aspirations?
Before you read any further, take a look at yourself in the mirror. What goes
through your mind as you are doing this? Perhaps your thoughts initially turn to
your outward appearance, such as whether your shirt makes you look slimmer,
the urgency with which you need a new haircut, or if you have blackheads on
your nose. But if you are like most people, your thoughts may quickly turn
inwards, to your personal goals and the expectations that others have of you, and
whether you are living up to those expectations. Indeed, many scholars of the
self have observed that self-reflection often leads people to think about their
goals and aspirations. The self thus enables people to plan their actions more
effectively, and this is among the major adaptive advantages of having a self
(Higgins, 1996; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1999; Sedikides &
Skowronski, 1997).

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BEYOND THE

LAB 5.1
THREATENED EGOTISM AND VIOLENCE
On July 22, 2011, the 32-year-old Norwegian Anders Breivik detonated a
car bomb in downtown Oslo, killing eight people and critically wounding 10
others. Two hours later, Breivik appeared dressed as a police officer at a
Labour Party of Norway youth camp. Here, Breivik shot 69 attendees and
injured 66 before he surrendered to the police and was taken into custody.
Subsequent investigations suggest that Breivik had acted alone,
meticulously planning his attacks years in advance (Figure 5.21).
FIGURE 5.21 The 2011 Norway Massacre: what could drive an individual
like Breivik to plan and commit acts of unspeakable violence towards other
human beings?
Source: © Press Association Images.

What could drive an individual like Breivik to plan and commit acts of
unspeakable violence towards other human beings? Traditionally, many
psychologists have believed that violence and aggression are caused by low
self-esteem (e.g. Levin & McDevitt, 1993; Staub, 1989; see Chapter 9 on
aggression). In the last decade or so however, this view has been challenged.
An influential review by Baumeister, Smart, and Boden (1996) found little
evidence that individuals with low self-esteem are particularly aggressive. In
fact, these researchers found more support for the opposite pattern, such that
individuals with high self-esteem tend to be the aggressors. For instance,
murderers, rapists, wife beaters, violent youth gangs and aggressive nations
are all characterized by strongly held views of their own superiority.
Moreover, aggressive tendencies increase when people’s self-esteem has
recently been boosted (e.g. by drinking alcohol), and decrease after people
experienced a drop in self-esteem (e.g. by decreases in social status).
Baumeister and associates referred to these patterns as the ‘dark side’ of
high self-esteem.
The notion of a dark and violent side of high self-esteem fits with what is
currently known about the Breivik case. Just a few hours before his attacks,
Breivik uploaded a document on the Internet that disclosed many details
about himself. Among other things, he stated that he was ‘very proud’ of his
Viking heritage, boasted of his business ventures as ‘successful’ and
described his personality as ‘optimistic, pragmatic, ambitious, creative and
hard-working’. As such, Breivik obviously possessed very favourable views
hard-working’. As such, Breivik obviously possessed very favourable views
of himself.
Should we now embrace the theory that high self-esteem causes aggression?
No, that would be too simple. A groundbreaking study by Kernis and
associates showed that individuals with high self-esteem display
considerable variability in aggressive behaviour (Kernis, Grannemann, &
Barclay, 1989). These researchers measured self-esteem at different points
in time so that they could simultaneously consider both the level and the
stability of self-esteem. The results showed that individuals with unstable
high self-esteem had the highest levels of anger and aggressive behaviour.
By contrast, individuals with stable high self-esteem had the lowest levels of
anger and aggression. Individuals with stable and unstable low self-esteem
fell between these extremes. These findings suggest that there are two types
of individuals with high self-esteem: some are hot-tempered and aggressive,
while others are slow to anger and non-aggressive.
The puzzling mix of people that profess to have high self-esteem has led
researchers to search for constructs that might separate the aggressive and
non-aggressive subtypes. One construct that has proven useful in this regard
is narcissism. As previously noted, narcissists distinguish themselves by
exaggerated self-importance; they demand admiration and are prone to
exhibitionistic behaviour. Furthermore, they expect special treatment and
are inclined to exploit others. At the same time, they are highly reactive to
threats to self-esteem, and respond to such threats with feelings of rage,
defiance, shame and humiliation (see Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001; Morf,
Torchetti, & Schürch, 2011 for reviews). Several pieces of information
about Anders Breivik indeed seem to fit with a narcissistic personality.
First, note that his Internet manifesto disclosed many details about his
personal life, including his family background, education, employment
history and even his hobbies and favourite sports. Breivik’s apparent
eagerness to publicize a slew of rather trivial personal facts is consistent
with a narcissistic preoccupation with the self. The manifesto indicates
further that Breivik thought of himself in highly elevated and heroic terms,
as he identified himself with an order of knights that was linked to the old
Christian crusaders. In addition, Breivik appeared to be fascinated by his
own physical appearance, as his manifesto ended with a series of pictures of
him posing in several fancy and outlandish outfits (e.g. a Masonic formal
outfit, a diving suit). Finally, it is worth noting that Breivik conveyed some
outfit, a diving suit). Finally, it is worth noting that Breivik conveyed some
awareness of his self-preoccupation, acknowledging that his chief character
flaw was ‘a relatively inflated ego’ and that others generally perceived him
as arrogant.
Narcissistic tendencies have similarly been observed among other
perpetrators of mass violence, such as the widely publicized shootings at
Columbine and Virginia Tech (Twenge & Campbell, 2003). No doubt these
cases are extreme and might be considered pathological. But research has
shown that narcissists, even in the normal range, display aggressive
tendencies, particularly when their positive self-views are threatened. For
instance, in two laboratory studies, participants were either praised or
insulted by a confederate posing as another participant (Bushman &
Baumeister, 1998). Later on, participants received an opportunity to aggress
against the confederate (or another person) by subjecting him or her to an
aversive blast of loud noise. Both studies showed that participants who had
high narcissism scores and had been insulted displayed the greatest
aggression – in other words, when their ego was threatened. Notably,
narcissists did not aggress when they had received praise, and only
aggressed against the person who had insulted them. Narcissists are thus not
generally or indiscriminately aggressive.
A number of field studies have investigated the link between narcissism and
violent behaviour under more naturalistic conditions. For instance,
narcissism scores predicted aggressive behaviour and conduct problems
among children at an elementary school (Barry, Frick, Adler, & Grafeman,
2007). In a related vein, narcissistic men are more favourable towards sexual
coercion and are more likely to use violence against a woman who has
refused to have sex with them (Baumeister, Catanese, & Wallace, 2002;
Bushman, Bonacci, Van Dijk, & Baumeister, 2003). These field studies are
consistent with laboratory evidence for threatened egotism as a cause of
aggression.
Hence, although narcissists endorse highly positive views about themselves,
these self-views seem to be rather fragile and easily challenged.
Accordingly, the egotism of narcissists might be a surface layer that
conceals more basic insecurities – a notion that has been confirmed in some
recent studies (e.g. Horvath & Morf, 2009; Jordan et al., 2003; also see
Gregg & Sedikides, 2010, for an in-depth discussion). Do latent self-doubts
then explain the aggressive outbursts among narcissists? On the
nonbehavioural level, Morf and colleagues showed that after subliminal
nonbehavioural level, Morf and colleagues showed that after subliminal
activation of worthlessness, narcissistic men reacted faster to aggression-
related words, while the accessibility of aggression decreased even for less
narcissistic participants (Morf, Horvath, & Zimmermann, 2011). This
indicates that in narcissists the concept of aggression is directly triggered by
the concept of worthlessness. Research on aggressive behaviour of
individuals with high explicit and low implicit self-esteem provides similar
results. For instance, relative to others, individuals with high explicit and
low implicit self-esteem are more prone to discriminate against outgroup
members (Jordan, Spencer, & Zanna, 2005) and are less forgiving towards
someone who has offended them (Eaton, Struthers, Shomrony, & Santelli,
2007). Furthermore, one study showed that teachers rated teenagers with
high explicit and low implicit self-esteem as significantly more aggressive
than their fellow-students (Sandstrom & Jordan, 2008). Taken together, this
work suggests important parallels in aggressive responding among
narcissists and individuals with high explicit and low implicit self-esteem.
At this point we want to emphasize the importance of distinguishing
between extreme and pathological cases of narcissism and more common
subclinical varieties of narcissism and threatened egotism. Most everyday
narcissists do not display extreme violence and do not lash out against
innocent others. Even though they tend to be interpersonally exploitative
and abrasive, many narcissists are nonetheless successful and
psychologically healthy (Kernberg, 1975; Morf, Horvath, & Torchetti, 2011;
Sedikides, Rudich, Gregg, Kumashiro, & Rusbult, 2004). The latest progress
and current ongoing scientific efforts to unravel the links between having an
inflated ego, threatened egotism and aggression may eventually bring us
closer to understanding what leads to the actions of individuals like Anders
Breivik, and, even more important, to ways of preventing such disasters.

THEORY BOX 5.6

CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF SELF-AWARENESS
Source: Based on Duval & Wicklund, 1972. Reproduced with permission
from Elsevier.
 Self-awareness theory
When you are turning your attention inward, you become the object of your own
consciousness. This intriguing state of self-focus may arise when you are
looking at yourself in a mirror (Hass & Eisenstadt, 1990). However, self-focus
may also be increased by other factors that lead you to pay more attention to
yourself. For instance, you are likely to become more self-focused when you see
a video recording of yourself, hear an audio recording of your own voice, when
your name is mentioned, when you somehow experience yourself as different
from the people around you, or when you are writing about yourself (Macrae,
Bodenhausen, & Milne, 1998; Silvia & Duval, 2001; Silvia & Eichstaedt, 2004).
Self-focus also tends to become increased in public situations, when you realize
that your actions are being monitored by an audience (Baumeister, 1984).
So how does self-focus influence behaviour? According to Duval and
Wicklund’s (1972) classic theory of objective self-awareness, focusing attention
on the self motivates people to assess how well they are living up to norms for
appropriate behaviour and to act more in accordance with these norms. For
instance, as you become self-focused, you may think of the hours of reading that
you still have to do in order to prepare for your Social Psychology class. If this
assessment reveals that you are falling short of the norm, self-focus will give rise
to negative feelings (e.g. feeling guilty for not having done enough reading).
These negative feelings, in turn, will motivate you to change your behaviour –
you may go to the library in order to complete your readings (see Theory Box
5.6).

- - - - - - - - - -

self-awareness a psychological state in which one’s attention is directed at the self.

- - - - - - - - - -

This notion has been confirmed in over a hundred empirical studies (for a
review, see Silvia & Duval, 2001). One study, for example, showed that self-
focus can make people work harder at a difficult task, especially when their
attention is directed at their performance (Dana, Lalwani, & Duval, 1997). Other
studies have shown that self-focus can lead people to offer more assistance to a
person with a legitimate request for help (Gibbons & Wicklund, 1982; see
Chapter 10 on helping). Yet other studies found that self-focus leads people to
suppress socially undesirable stereotypes (Macrae et al., 1998). Notably, the
effects of self-focus also depend upon your self-efficacy, or your beliefs about
whether you are capable of acting in a certain manner to achieve certain goals
(Bandura, 1977). For instance, imagine that your parents expect you to do well
in maths at school. If your self-efficacy is high, you believe that you are capable
of mastering your maths lessons. In this case, high self-focus will lead you to
invest more time and effort in studying maths. By contrast, if your self-efficacy
is low, you believe that you are unable to master maths no matter how hard you
try. In the latter case, self-focus will lead you to invest less time and effort in
studying maths (see Carver, Blaney, & Scheier, 1979). The effects of self-focus
are therefore quite flexible, and depend upon your beliefs about what you can
realistically accomplish.
 Self-regulation theory
Self-focus makes us more inclined to regulate our behaviour. In this sense, self-
focus is closely connected with self-regulation, or the control ‘of the self by the
self’ (Baumeister, Schmeichel, & Vohs, 2007). But what does this mean? Should
we think of the self as a ‘homunculus’ or little man in our head that takes charge
of what we do or feel? Or is it possible to understand self-regulation in terms of
a concrete mechanism or psychological process?

- - - - - - - - - -

self-regulation the process of controlling and directing one’s behaviour in order to achieve desired
thoughts, feelings, and goals.

- - - - - - - - - -

THEORY BOX 5.7

OPERATION OF THE TOTE LOOP
Source: Adapted from Carver & Scheier (1998). On the self-regulation of
behavior. Cambridge University Press. With permission.
 Carver and Scheier (1981, 1998) developed a compelling answer to these
questions by relating self-focus to a more general understanding of self-
regulation. Their approach builds on the notion of a cybernetic system (Miller,
Galanter, & Pribram, 1960). An everyday example of such a system is the room
thermostat, which turns the heating on or off whenever the local temperature
passes a preset value. In its simplest form, a cybernetic system consists of a
TOTE loop, an acronym for ‘test-operate-test-exit’ (see Theory Box 5.7). In the
initial test phase, you compare current circumstances to a standard. For instance,
you may wonder whether you have been generous enough to your friends. If
there is a discrepancy, you enter a phase of operation and take steps to reduce the
discrepancy. For instance, if you fear you have been too much of a tightwad, you
may decide to throw a party for your friends. Then comes another test, to see
whether you have met the standard or not. Can you now say that you are a
generous person? If not, the system continues to operate until you have reached
the standard. Perhaps you find that generosity is not just about material things,
so you really should spend more time with your friends. Finally, when you meet
the standard, the system exits the TOTE loop and the cycle ends. The cybernetic
theory of self-regulation thus proposes that we self-regulate by monitoring how
we live up to standards, and, when we fall short, by taking action to bring us
closer to these standards.

Self-regulatory standards
The first part of self-regulation means that we adopt some kind of standard,
which may be a personal goal, social norm, expectations of others and the like.
Self-regulatory standards may be formulated relatively broadly or more
specifically. According to Carver and Scheier (1981, 1998) self-regulatory
standards may operate on four different levels. At the highest level are system
concepts, which consist of the personal characteristics that describe the kind of
person we want to be (including the ideal and ought selves discussed earlier).
For example, most of us want to be generous, responsible and honest
individuals. System concepts give rise to the next lower level – principles, which
consist of global behavioural aspirations. For instance, we can become a
generous person by adhering to the principle that we should give and share what
we have with other people. Principles state values, and are still free of
behavioural content, in that they are applicable to many kinds of behaviour. The
specific behaviours that we perform are prescribed by programmes or scripts
(the next lower level). For example, to adhere to one’s principle of sharing with
others, one might donate money to charity or leave a large tip at a restaurant.
Finally, programmes such as donating money to charity lead to even more
specific goals or sequences at the lowest level. Sequences consist of motor
control goals that are typically executed without conscious supervision. For
instance, the behavioural programme of leaving a tip might be enacted by the
sequence of opening one’s wallet and taking out a five Euro note.
In most situations we like to think of our goals in abstract, high-level terms
(what Carver and Scheier would call system concepts and principles). For
example, most individuals reading this chapter will think of it as ‘studying
psychology’ rather than ‘staring at letters’. Linking our behaviour to abstract
goals renders what we are doing more meaningful (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987).
Because the self is closely associated with higher-level meanings, more abstract
goals are more strongly connected with the self. Indeed, research suggests that
self-regulation improves when we think more abstractly about our goals (Fujita,
Trope, Liberman, & Levin-Sagi, 2006; Schmeichel & Vohs, 2009). For instance,
relative to those who are thinking of their lower-level goals, people who are
thinking of their higher-level goals are more willing to delay immediate
gratification to obtain a larger reward, display greater physical endurance, and
are better able to resist temptations (Fujita et al., 2006). Specifically, when
induced to engage in higher level thinking (think ‘why I try to maintain my
health’, versus ‘how’), participants chose to forgo temptation by committing to a
healthy food regimen in advance, at least if their goal to improve their health
was high (see Figure 5.22; Fujita & Roberts, 2010). In this way they were able to
protect their goals from anticipated temptations. Conversely, individuals who
fail at self-regulation often tend to think of their goals in more low-level,
concrete terms (Schmeichel & Vohs, 2009; Twenge, Catanese, & Baumeister,
2003). Thus, when you are reading this text, you would do better to think of it as
‘learning about human nature’ instead of ‘looking at letters’.
FIGURE 5.22 Probability of choice to forgo temptation as a function of goal
importance and construal level.
Source: Data from Fujita & Roberts, 2010; Expt. 1. Reprinted with permission
from SAGE publications.
Monitoring
The second part of self-regulation is that we start monitoring our behaviour.
According to Carver and Scheier (1981, 1998) this monitoring function is
facilitated by self-awareness, which leads us to assess the self’s standing with
regard to relevant standards. To test this notion, these researchers asked
participants to copy complex figures from a photograph, while their self-focus
was either experimentally heightened (by a mirror or the presence of an
experimenter) or not. In the self-focus conditions, participants more often
checked whether their drawing matched the standard of the photograph. Related
experiments have shown that self-focus led individuals to seek out information
about performance norms. Directing attention to the self thus leads us to monitor
more closely whether our behaviour is in accordance with standards. The role of
monitoring in self-regulation is further supported by neuroscience findings.
Specific brain regions – like the anterior cingulate cortex – monitor whether we
should step up our self-regulatory efforts (Amodio, Devine, & Harmon-Jones,
2008; Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Inzlicht & Gutsell,
2007).

LEADER IN THE FIELD

Roy F. Baumeister (b. 1953) is currently the Eppes Eminent
Professor of Psychology at Florida State University. He completed
his PhD in social psychology from Princeton in 1978, under the
 supervision of Ned Jones, a social psychologist renowned for his
research on attribution and self-presentation. After a postdoctoral
fellowship at the University of California at Berkeley, Baumeister
worked at Case Western Reserve University from 1982 to 2003.
Baumeister’s research spans a wide range of topics in self and
identity. His early research focused on the nature of self-
presentational behaviour when someone is constrained by a
reputation. He also examined the question of why people
underperform in public situations, a phenomenon known as ‘choking
under pressure’. His subsequent work explored how the desire to
escape self-awareness explains many paradoxical and seemingly
self-destructive behaviours such as suicide, masochism and binge
eating. Baumeister has further investigated self-esteem, which led
him to conclude that the benefits of high self-esteem are often
exaggerated (see Social Psychology Beyond the Lab 5.1). Since the
mid 1990s, Baumeister and associates have developed the model of
ego depletion, which proposes that self-regulation draws upon
limited energy resources (see Research Close-Up 5.3). Baumeister
has received many honours, and the Institute for Scientific
Information lists Baumeister among the handful of most cited
psychologists in the world.

Self-regulatory strength
If you have ever followed a diet or tried to give up smoking, you can verify how
hard self-regulation can be. Translating our self-regulatory standards into actual
behaviour is thus the third important aspect of self-regulation. Common sense
relates self-regulation to ‘willpower’ or ‘strength of character’. Research by
Baumeister and associates indicates that such notions may actually have a kernel
of truth (see Leader in the Field, Roy F. Baumeister). These researchers suggest
that self-regulation functions like a strength or a muscle that draws upon limited
energy resources (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). Our capacity for self-
regulation may thus become depleted after sustained use. In line with this idea,
studies have shown that performing a demanding self-regulation task in one
domain often impairs self-regulation in another ostensibly unrelated domain. For
instance, dieters who suppressed their facial expressions during a funny movie (a
task that uses self-regulatory resources) were subsequently more inclined to
indulge in tasty but fattening foods (Vohs & Heatherton, 2000).
 Turn now to Research Close-Up 5.3 to learn more about how this experiment
was conducted and to see a figure of its results.

RESEARCH CLOSE-UP 5.3

DIETING IS DISRUPTED AFTER

HAVING RESISTED EARLIER FOOD
TEMPTATIONS
Vohs, K. D., & Heatherton, T. F. (2000). Self-regulatory failure: A resource depletion approach.
Psychological Science, 11, 249–254.

Introduction Ego depletion theory holds that self-

regulation draws upon a limited energy resource that
allows people to control unwanted impulses and
desires (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). According to
this perspective, an active effort to control behaviour
in one domain depletes regulatory resources and
hence leads to diminished capacity for self-regulation
in other domains. Vohs and Heatherton (2000)
investigated whether this ego depletion model can be
applied to chronic dieters. Prior research on ego
depletion had only examined artificial self-regulatory
tasks that were implemented during an experimental
session (e.g. squeezing a handgrip). Dieting is a more
naturalistic and very common form of self-regulation
in everyday life. At the same time, dieting is a very
challenging task, given that long-term weight loss is
extremely difficult to achieve. We summarize only the
first study of this paper, and briefly refer to the results
 of the other two studies in the discussion below.
Method Participants One hundred female students
participated in the experiment. They were labelled as
either chronic dieters (N = 36) or nondieters (N = 64)
on the basis of their scores on a scale designed to
measure tendencies for restrained eating (Herman &
Polivy, 1980).
Design and procedure To ensure that participants’
eating behaviour was not influenced by their prior
food consumption, they were instructed not to eat for
two hours before the experiment. Participants arrived
individually and were asked to watch a neutral video
about the daily activities of Bighorn sheep. The
experimental manipulations took place while
participants were watching the video.
The experiment had two manipulations. The first manipulation was meant to
create differences in temptation level. An array of tasty snacks (Doritos,
Skittles, M&Ms and salted peanuts) was placed either within arm’s reach of
the participants or across the room (approximately 3 meters away). Pilot
research had shown that being seated next to tasty snacks is highly tempting
for chronic dieters, but does not influence their mood or self-esteem. The
second manipulation was meant to create differences in the need for self-
regulation. Half of the participants were told that they could help themselves
to the snack. This ‘help yourself’ instruction placed the burden of
responsibility on the participants themselves, and hence placed greater
demands on their capacity for self-regulation. The other participants were
told that the snacks were being used in a different experiment later that day
and asked not to touch them. The ‘don’t touch’ instruction placed
constraints on participants’ behaviour, so that the level of temptation should
not matter in this group, as self-regulatory demands were low. Thus, this
experiment had a 3-factor design: 2 (type of dieters: chronic versus
 experiment had a 3-factor design: 2 (type of dieters: chronic versus
nondieters) × 2 (level of temptation: low versus high) × 2 (self-regulatory
demand: low versus high).
After watching the video, participants rated their mood and were taken to
another room to taste and rate ice cream flavours for 10 minutes. For this
task, participants were seated in front of three flavours of ice cream. The ice
cream was presented in very large containers that prevented the
experimenter from seeing how much the participants ate. As the
experimenter left the room, she added, ‘By the way, help yourself to any ice
cream you want; we have tons in the freezers.’ The measure of self-
regulatory ability was the amount of ice cream eaten by the participants. The
latter was assessed by weighing the ice cream containers before and after
participants had tasted and rated the ice cream.
Results The results showed that the eating behaviour
of chronic dieters was significantly influenced by the
experimental manipulations (see Figure 5.23). Dieters
in the high temptation condition ate more ice cream
than dieters in the low temptation condition.
However, this effect only occurred in the ‘help
yourself’ group (high self-regulatory demand) when
participants were responsible themselves for their
snacking behaviour. In the ‘don’t touch’ group (low
self-regulatory demand), temptation level had no
effect on eating behaviour of dieters.
FIGURE 5.23 Effects of temptation level and availability condition on eating
behaviour of chronic dieters.
Note: Data for nondieters are not shown in this graph.
Source: Data from Vohs & Heatherton, 2000; Expt. 1. Reprinted with
permission from SAGE publications.
The eating behaviour of nondieters was not influenced by the experimental
manipulations. In addition, the experimental manipulations had no effects on
mood.
Discussion These results demonstrate that resisting
food temptations can make it harder for chronic
dieters to restrain their eating behaviour in another,
subsequent context. This effect fits very well with the
model of ego depletion (Muraven & Baumeister,
2000). The ego depletion model is a general model of
self-regulation that extends far beyond the domain of
eating behaviour. Consequently, the model would
predict that the depleting effects of dieting might
carry over, not just to eating behaviour, but also to
other forms of behaviour that require self-regulation.
In line with this, the second study by Vohs and
Heatherton (2000) showed that resisting food
temptations also leads chronic dieters to display
poorer self-regulation on a task that was unrelated to
food intake, namely persistence on word puzzles. The
 ego depletion model further predicts that chronic
dieters might suffer from depletion by other activities
that require self-regulation. This prediction was tested
in a third study by Vohs and Heatherton, which asked
chronic dieters either to suppress their emotions or to
let their emotions flow naturally during an emotion-
eliciting film clip. The results showed that emotion
suppression led chronic dieters to eat more ice cream
during the taste-rating test. Taken together, the
research by Vohs and Heatherton sheds important
new light on the dynamics of self-regulation. Their
research helps us to understand better why many of us
often find it difficult to control our impulses in
everyday life.
Similar breakdowns of self-regulation have been observed in many other
domains, including health behaviour, aggression, close relationships, academic
performance, spending behaviour, and stereotyping (for an extensive overview,
see Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisarantis, 2010).
The notion of regulatory depletion, also referred to as ‘ego depletion’
(Muraven & Baumeister, 2000) is intuitively appealing and potentially explains
many instances of self-regulatory failure. However, the effects of regulatory
depletion are often hard to distinguish from a lack of monitoring. Indeed, several
studies have found that so-called ‘regulatory depletion’ effects disappear when
people are encouraged to monitor their actions more closely. Such monitoring
may be promoted by providing people with regular performance feedback (Wan
& Sternthal, 2008) and increasing self-awareness (Alberts, Martijn, & De Vries,
2011). These findings are difficult to explain in terms of energy depletion,
because increased monitoring might be expected to use up even more energy.
Many of the effects in regulatory depletion studies may thus be due to poor
monitoring rather than energy depletion. Increasing monitoring therefore may be
a promising route to increase self-regulatory capacity.
 - - - - - - - - - -

ego depletion a temporary reduction of one’s self-regulatory capacities due to restricted energy
resources after sustained self-control efforts.

- - - - - - - - - -

Are self-regulatory breakdowns inevitable when we have to self-regulate for

extended periods of time? Although the strength model (Muraven & Baumeister,
2000) suggests a pessimistic answer to this question, other models leave room
for optimism. In the 1980s, Billy Ocean wrote a hit song with the lines, ‘When
the going gets tough, the tough get going’. In line with this idea, performing an
initial self-regulatory task can sometimes lead to increases in self-regulatory
performance (Converse & DeShon, 2009; Dewitte, Bruyneel, & Geyskens, 2009;
Jostmann & Koole, 2006, 2007). For instance, when a dieting person has to
resist a tasty but fattening food on one occasion, this person tends to be better at
declining a sugar snack on a subsequent occasion (Dewitte et al., 2009). This is
because we can adapt better to a series of self-regulatory tasks when these are all
in the same domain (Dewitte et al., 2009). Similarly, providing people with more
time to adjust themselves to increases in self-regulatory demands leads to
enhanced self-regulation, rather than the deteriorations predicted by the
depletion model (Converse & DeShon, 2009). The impact of additional self-
regulatory demands may thus depend on how well we can adapt to changes in
self-regulatory demands (Koole, Jostmann, & Baumann, 2011). As long as we
can adapt to the situation, we can respond to more demanding situations by
stepping up our self-regulatory efficiency. It is only when we are no longer
capable of such adaptive responding that our self-regulation breaks down.
 The dark side of self-regulation
Our capacity for self-regulation is associated with a wide range of desirable
outcomes, including higher grades in college, fewer reports of psychopathology,
higher self-esteem, less binge eating and alcohol abuse, better relationships and
interpersonal skills, secure attachment and more optimal emotional responses
(Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004). Given these benefits, we may wonder if
we can ever engage in too much self-regulation. The answer appears to be ‘yes’.
There are at least two ways in which even our best attempts to self-regulate may
backfire.
In high-pressure sports settings, such as during penalty kicks or championship
games, well-trained athletes often perform much more poorly than usual (e.g.
Dohmen, 2008; Jordet, 2009; Wright, Voyer, Wright, & Roney, 1995; see Figure
5.24). This pattern of choking under pressure tends to occur when those athletes
are highly self-focused (Baumeister, 1984; Baumeister & Showers, 1986). It
appears that self-focus leads people to pay increased attention to their behaviour
and to control their behaviour in a step-by-step fashion. Attention at this step-by-
step level disrupts the execution of well-learned or proceduralized skills (Beilock
& Carr, 2001). Thus, self-regulation may backfire when we engage in skilful,
well-learned behaviour.
FIGURE 5.24 In high-pressured sports settings, such as during penalty kicks,
well-trained athletes often perform much more poorly than usual.
Source: © Press Association Images.

A second drawback of self-regulation is that it leads us to get stuck in negative

emotions. Recall that when we self-regulate, we compare the self against
standards for appropriate behaviour. Most of the time, we do not completely live
up to these standards. Consequently, the self-regulation of behaviour inevitably
evokes negative affect (Higgins, 1987; see Fejfar & Hoyle, 2000, for a meta-
analytic overview). When we experience a series of setbacks and failures,
focusing on our shortcomings will contribute to the onset and maintenance of
depression (Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987). In such cases, it may well be
adaptive to cease further attempts at self-regulation. Indeed, longitudinal studies
have found that people who can disengage from unattainable goals display fewer
depressive symptoms (Wrosch & Miller, 2009) and improved immune
functioning (Miller & Wrosch, 2007). Thus, despite the many advantages that
self-regulation brings, it is healthy to abandon further attempts at self-regulation
when our goals turn out to be unrealistic.
 Escaping the self
In view of the dark side of self-regulation, we may sometimes be motivated to
avoid self-aware states. The desire to avoid self-awareness may underlie a
number of seemingly paradoxical and self-destructive behaviours. For instance,
this desire may foster alcohol abuse. Experiments have shown that consuming
alcohol lowers self-awareness (Hull, Levenson, Young, & Sher, 1983). See
Figure 5.25, which shows the relative frequency of self-focus statements while
delivering a speech (‘what I like and dislike about my body and physical
appearance’), relative to other-focused (external) or ‘other’ (nonfocused)
statements following alcohol consumption, as compared to a placebo (tonic).
Alcohol clearly reduced the frequency of self-statements. Moreover, individuals
with chronically high self-awareness are at greater risk of developing drinking
problems (Hull & Young, 1983). Another behaviour that may be driven by
escapist motives is binge eating (Heatherton & Baumeister, 1991). Dieting
individuals frequently engage in periods of disinhibited eating, or eating binges.
Such eating binges may be an unintended effect of these individuals’ ambitious
dieting goals, which may give rise to the need to escape self-awareness. Escapist
needs may be met by eating binges, which lead awareness to shift towards the
immediate present by invoking strong physical sensations. Finally, the need to
escape self-awareness may lead people to commit the ultimate form of self-
destructive behaviour, namely suicide. Suicidal individuals are often highly self-
focused and tend to hold unrealistically high expectations of themselves
(Baumeister, 1990). Moreover, experimental studies have shown that thoughts of
suicide automatically spring to mind when people realize they are falling short of
their goals (Chatard & Selimbegovi , 2011).
FIGURE 5.25 Frequency of self-focus statements relative to others as a function
of alcohol vs. placebo.
Source: Data from Hull, Levenson, Young, & Sher, 1983; Expt. 1. Reproduced
with permission from APA. The use of APA information does not imply
endorsement by APA.
 Autonomous self-regulation as a resource
In the foregoing paragraphs, we have characterized self-regulation in highly
ambivalent terms. On the one hand, self-regulation is an adaptive process that
allows us to strive for meaningful goals and act in accordance with social norms.
On the other hand, self-regulation (and the self-awareness that supports it) may
deplete our energies, and an excessive emphasis on controlling our natural
impulses may lead to anxiety, depression, binge eating, and even suicide. This
mixture of findings seems puzzling. How can self-regulation be at once adaptive
and associated with severe psychological problems?
One way to resolve this paradox is suggested by Ryan and Deci (2008; see
also Deci & Ryan, 1985, 2000). According to their self-determination theory,
people’s reasons for regulating their behaviour shape how they go about the self-
regulation process. In some situations, people engage in self-regulation because
they feel pressured to do so by others, like their peers or authorities. Because
such external pressures are often at odds with what people truly want, this type
of self-regulation tends to be effortful, energy-depleting and laden with
psychological conflict. At other times, however, people may choose to engage in
self-regulation on their own accord, because regulating their behaviour is fully
compatible with their own needs and interests. When self-regulation is thus
freely chosen and autonomous, it is likely to be more harmonious and efficient.

- - - - - - - - - -

self-determination theory accounts for people’s reasons for self-regulation: if self-regulation is

motivated by external pressure it is effortful; if it is freely chosen it is much more efficient without
being depleting.

- - - - - - - - - -

Studies indeed suggest that self-regulation demands more energy when it is

externally motivated rather than driven by intrinsic, autonomous motivations
(Muraven, Gagné, & Rosman, 2008, Experiment 1). Ryan and Deci (2008) have
gone even further, by suggesting that autonomous self-regulation may boost the
overall energy available to the self. This notion was partly inspired by
observations that people’s reported energy levels and vitality increase markedly
over the weekend (Sheldon, Ryan, & Reis, 1996). Follow-up studies in which
participants were paged multiple times a day and asked to report on their
feelings showed that this ‘weekend effect’ was statistically explained by the
enhanced autonomy that people experienced over the weekend (Ryan, Bernstein,
& Brown, 2010). Thus the enhanced freedom that comes with weekends may
allow people to replenish their energies. Similar results have been observed for
their recreational activities such as playing video games and skilled sports (see
Ryan & Deci, 2008, for a review). In addition, the pursuit of intrinsic life goals,
such as relationships, personal growth and serving the community is associated
with greater self-reported vitality across different cultures, including the US and
South Korea (Kasser & Ryan, 1996; Kim, Kasser, & Lee, 2003). By contrast,
people who adopt many extrinsic life goals, such as money, fame or image
display reduced vitality relative to people who adopt fewer extrinsic life goals.
Taken together, it appears that freely chosen autonomous self-regulation may
maintain or even enhance people’s energies and vitality.
 Summary
The self is an active agent that guides and regulates our actions. According to
self-awareness theory, when our attention is focused on the self, we monitor our
behaviour more closely. Self-focus thus promotes self-regulation, by leading us
to act more in accordance with our personal goals and prevailing social norms.
Self-regulation generally promotes adaptive and socially responsible behaviour.
Nevertheless, self-regulation can deplete our limited energy resources when it
has to be sustained over a longer period. In addition, increased self-focus can
interfere with well-practised routines and lead us to get stuck in negative
emotions. To prevent these problems, we may relax our efforts at self-regulation
by avoiding self-aware states. Escapist behaviours may range from alcohol
consumption to binge eating and even suicide. Alternatively, we may reduce the
negative sides of self-regulation when we engage in autonomous self-regulation
– when we, in accord with self-determination theory, self-regulate in the service
of intrinsic life goals, such as relationships or personal growth.
 SELF STABILITY AND CHANGE
To what degree can the self change, and through what
process(es)?
We have seen in this chapter that the self is our ‘home base’ that guides all of
our actions – it colours how we interpret the world, the interaction partners we
choose and how we present ourselves. Are we hostage to this self then? Or
alternatively: to what degree can the self change, and how? The answer to this
question can be found in another fact that also has been amply demonstrated
throughout the chapter: the self is a social product (e.g. Stryker & Vryan, 2003).
We learn who we are through our interactions with others, but at the same time
we influence how these others react to us by behaving toward them in certain
ways – ways that are driven by how we view (or would like to view) ourselves,
our goals for ourselves, our values. In other words, there is a continual reciprocal
interaction between what William James (1890, 1950) called the ‘doing’
(behaving and interpreting) and the ‘being’ (descriptive) aspects of the self – the
agent and the object (or what we would nowadays call the mental representation
of the self). And, because the agent is acting in the social world and being met
by other similarly acting selves of other individuals, there is room for change.
We engage in what Swann and colleagues refer to as an identity negotiation
process (e.g. Swann & Bosson, 2008; Swann, Johnson, & Bosson, 2009). We
establish who we are through ongoing mutual give-and-take interactions with
other individuals, and eventually come to a ‘working agreed-upon consensus’
between both (or multiple) people (see also Goffman, 1959). This negotiation
process allows for shifts in the self. These shifts can be more minor, as occurs
when people enter new jobs or new relationships, or they can be more dramatic,
as when people move to entirely new and foreign environments, or experience a
serious illness. A lot of the time, these shifts occur subtly due to factors out of
our control, simply due to the fact that other individuals do not always respond
to us in ways that are fully commensurate with our self-views. For example, if
you just started a new higher status job and people begin treating you with much
more respect, with time your self-views and self-esteem may adjust upward. At
other times we deliberately influence the process and try to produce change in
ourselves. As dramatically illustrated in our introductory example of Christina
Long, people can – and do – put on different identities. Someone may also enter
therapy to effect a specific desired change.

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identity negotiation a process by which we establish who we are through mutual give-and-take
interactions with others.

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What are the processes through which this change comes about? Although any
one of these aspects can set off the process, in essence, three things have to come
together: we have to change our behaviour, others have to come to consistently
respond differently toward us, and we have to come to believe the new self-
view(s). Many studies underscore the paramount importance of the social
environment in constructing and supporting a new self-view (Schlenker, 2012).
Harter (1993) for example has shown that a child’s self-esteem is most likely to
change when the child’s social network changes through a move to a new school
or new town. In an important study, Tice (1992) showed that self-presentational
behaviour has the biggest impact on private self-views if performed in front of
an audience. In this study, she asked students to portray themselves in a specific
way (either as extraverted or introverted, randomly assigned). Half of them were
being watched by another person (public condition), the other half spoke in a
private room into a tape recorder. Later, students were asked to rate their own
personalities on trait adjectives. As predicted, those who had self-presented in
front of an audience endorsed the self-view they had previously enacted more
strongly than those who self-presented in an anonymous condition. Importantly,
this private self-view showed up not only in self-report, but also in behaviour.
Participants were later asked to wait in a waiting room, in which there was
another person. Figure 5.26 shows the distance at which participants seated
themselves relative to the other person. As can be seen, those who had
previously been in the public condition acted in line with the self-view presented
earlier, whereas there was no effect for those in the private condition.
Participants who had self-presented as being extraverted in public sat much
closer to the other person than anyone else, and they were also significantly
more likely to initiate a conversation.
FIGURE 5.26 Mean distance participants sat from the confederate as a function
of prior self-portrayal (introverted versus extraverted) and publicity of self-
presentation (audience versus private).
Source: Data from Tice, 1992; Expt. 2. Reproduced with permission from APA.
The use of APA information does not imply endorsement by APA.

Many processes contribute to these internalizations of public behaviours. First,

we engage in biased scanning – retrieving evidence from memory that fits the
self-view (Jones, Rhodewalt, Berglas, & Skelton, 1981). Second, we engage in
the self-perception process (Bem, 1972) discussed earlier: We observe our
behaviour and assume it accurately reflects who we are. Third, we get ‘caught
up’ in the role we are enacting (Gergen, 1971). Fourth, making a public
commitment to a behaviour enlists future action to back it up (e.g. Schlenker &
Wowra, 2003). That is, people will match their self-presentations to their
performances when these are publicly known (although they will present
themselves positively regardless of prior performance if these are unknown to
others). Finally, if behaviour is widely discrepant from original self-views, then
a cognitive dissonance process may set in (see Chapter 7 on attitude change),
requiring us to adjust our self-views to reduce the discomfort experienced from
behaving in an inconsistent manner (Aronson, 1969).
In conclusion, for any major change to take hold, an internalization process
needs to take place – there has to be a genuine change of your own views of your
self. For these to remain permanent, they also have to become integrated into
your self-narratives – you have to revise your self-story to fit the new version –
and importantly, you have to enlist the social environment to support them. Any
one of these factors alone does not suffice. We are neither at the mercy of our
self-views, nor of our social environment: The self is constructed, maintained
and changed through a transactional process both in the mind and within a social
reality.

CHAPTER SUMMARY
Why is the self ‘social’? The self we experience and express is highly
variable and dependent on social circumstances. The self is constructed,
maintained and changed through our interactions with others.
What are the personal sources of self-knowledge and how accurate are
they? Reflecting and observing ourselves is a means to gain insight into
ourselves. However, these sources of self-knowledge may be inaccurate,
as we cannot consciously attend to automatic processes, and we tend to
push away unwanted information.
What are the interpersonal sources of self-knowledge and how accurate
are they? The things that others tell us about ourselves, their reactions
toward us, as well as the comparisons we draw between others and
ourselves, permit us to learn much about our self. Furthermore,
interactions with significant others as well as belonging to social groups
shape our views of ourselves. These sources too, however, can be biased.
How do we gain a coherent self? Autobiographical memories as well as
self-narratives – that we construe in line with our self-concept – help
create a coherent and continuous sense of the self.
What is meant by self-concept? The self-concept is the cognitive
representation of our self-knowledge, and consists of characteristics that
we use for describing us. These self-beliefs are stored in self-schemas that
organize and guide the processing of self-relevant information. They
encompass actual, ideal and possible selves, and they come in both
explicit and implicit forms.
What is self-esteem? Self-esteem is the evaluative component of self-
knowledge and consists of an overall appraisal of our self. It is conceived
as either a trait or a state, and people can differ in which life domains are
important to their self-esteem. As with the self-concept, self-esteem too
can come in both the explicit and the implicit form.
What is the influence of culture on the self? Cultures differ in their
conceptualization of the individual and of his or her role in society.
Therefore, cultural differences, as for example between independent and
interdependent self-construals, shape our perceptions, motivations and
emotional reactions.
Do we prefer true or positively distorted self-information? Although there
is evidence for the self-assessment motive (i.e. the desire to learn
objective information), we are primarily driven by the self-enhancement
motive (i.e. the desire to enhance the positivity of the self and to protect it
from negative information).
What strategies do we adopt when we self-enhance? There are
intrapersonal strategies, like the superiority bias and the self-serving
attributional bias. But self-enhancement also influences our interpersonal
self-presentation and encompasses, among other strategies, dressing
smartly, talking about achievements, self-handicapping or basking in
reflected glory.
What is self-verification? Self-verification is the desire to affirm our
firmly held self-views. As long as these self-views are positive, self-
enhancement and self-verification go in the same direction. But people
with low self-regard prefer to self-verify their negative self-beliefs instead
of self-enhancing.
Why do we self-enhance? Self-enhancement is beneficial for our physical
and mental health. Sociometer theory suggests that positive self-feelings
are desirable because our self-esteem signals the degree of social
belongingness. Terror management theory has received more empirical
support – it proposes that self-enhancement helps us cope with existential
fears.
Is high self-esteem good? High self-esteem is associated with many
positive things, such as, for example, higher resiliency to stress and
depression. At the same time, it is linked with undesirable outcomes like
more risky behaviour of various types and – in the case where someone
feels threatened – aggression. High self-esteem seems desirable to the
extent that it is genuine and not contingent on external sources.
How does the self regulate our behaviour? Self-regulation can be thought
of as a cybernetic system, where actual circumstances are monitored and
compared to self-regulatory standards. When these are not met, actions
are taken to reduce the discrepancy between desired and actual states.
Can the self change? As the self is a social product, changing it is also
 socially determined. In the process of negotiating our identity in mutual
interactions with others, for changes to take hold we need to change our
behaviour, believe the new self-views and enlist others to consistently
respond towards us differently.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

Baer, J., Kaufman, J. C., & Baumeister, R. F. (2008). Are we free? Psychology
and free will. New York: Oxford University Press. This book reviews
experimental and theoretical work by researchers from all branches of
psychology interested in investigating humans’ free will.
Baumeister, R. F. (1991). Escaping the self: Alcoholism, spirituality, masochism,
and other flights from the burden of selfhood. New York: Basic Books. This
book takes a rather provocative view on the self by exploring the notion that
problematic behaviours, such as masochism and suicide, may be understood as
resulting from a need to escape self-consciousness.
Dunning, D. (2005). Self-insight. Roadblocks and detours on the path to
knowing thyself. New York: Psychology Press. An accessibly written book,
dealing with frequently encountered human shortcomings in trying to evaluate
and know oneself.
Feinberg, T. E., & Keenan, J. P. (Eds.). (2005). The lost self. Pathologies of the
brain and identity. New York: Oxford University Press. A compilation of
contributions from acknowledged experts in the fields of philosophy, cognitive
neuroscience, neurology and psychology, grouped to provide an exploration of
the neurobiology of the self.
Harter, S. (1999). The construction of the self. A developmental perspective.
New York: Guilford. This book analyses the emergence of individuals’ unique
sense of self as a result of cognitive and social construction processes, and
provides a theoretical background for this development.
Heatherton, T. F. (2011). Neuroscience of self and self-regulation. Annual
Review of Psychology, 62, 363–390. This article reviews recent social
neuroscience research on the psychological components that support the human
capacity for self-regulation.
James, W. (1961). The Self. In G. Allport (Ed.), Psychology: The briefer course
(pp. 159–191). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Original work
published 1892.) James’s original chapter on the self is a classic – a ‘must-read’,
as James’s notions of the self have proven fundamental to modern
conceptualizations and continue to influence our present understandings of the
construct. It is a captivating read too!
Kernis, M. H. (Ed.). (2006). Self-esteem issues and answers. A sourcebook of
current perspectives. New York: Psychology Press. This volume summarizes the
current status of knowledge on the topic in an engaging and readable format,
shedding light on what is known about the functioning of self-esteem, while
simultaneously giving the reader a sense of the complexities involved in the
concept.
Leary, M. R. (2004). The curse of the self: Self-awareness, egotism, and the
quality of human life. New York: Oxford University Press. The author illustrates
the idea that human sufferings (e.g. depression, anxiety and other negative
emotions) in part could be seen as emerging from the human capacity of self-
reflection and egocentrism.
Morf, C. C., & Mischel, W. (2012). The self as a psycho-social dynamic
processing system: Toward a converging science of selfhood. In M. R. Leary &
J. P. Tangney (Eds.), Handbook of self and identity (2nd ed., pp. 21–49). New
York: Guilford. This chapter expands on the ideas of the self as a coherent,
organized, yet dynamic system and elaborates on the self-construction process
presented in this chapter.
Sedikides, C., & Skowronski, J. J. (1997). The symbolic self in evolutionary
context. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 1, 80–102. The authors take
an interesting perspective on the symbolic self by evaluating the adaptive value
of this human capacity and tracing its emergence back to evolutionary pressures.
Wilson, T. D. (2002). Strangers to ourselves: Discovering the adaptive
unconscious. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. This book examines
the evolution of the idea of the unconscious, the ways in which it operates, and
how our actions – rather than our thoughts – help us to know ourselves.
 Chapter 6

Attitudes

Geoffrey Haddock and Gregory R. Maio

Source: © Sarah Leen. Used under licence from Getty Images.

KEY TERMS

affective component of attitude

attitude
attitude functions
attitude–behaviour relation
attitudinal ambivalence
behavioural component of attitude
cognitive component of attitude
cognitive dissonance
ego-defensive function
evaluative conditioning
explicit measures of attitude
implementation intentions
implicit measures of attitude
mere exposure effect
MODE model
 multicomponent model of attitude
object appraisal function
one-dimensional perspective of attitudes
perceived behavioural control
self-efficacy
self-monitoring
self-perception theory
social adjustment function
theory of planned behaviour
theory of reasoned action
two-dimensional perspective on attitudes
utilitarian function
value-expressive function
CHAPTER OUTLINE
INTRODUCTION
WHAT IS AN ATTITUDE?
Summary
THE CONTENT OF ATTITUDES
The cognitive component of attitudes The affective component of attitudes
The behavioural component of attitudes How related are the components of
attitudes?
Summary
THE STRUCTURE OF ATTITUDES
Summary
WHY DO WE HOLD ATTITUDES?
Object appraisal
Utilitarian versus value-expressive attitudes Summary
LINKING ATTITUDE CONTENT, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION
Content, structure, function and attitude strength Summary
THE MEASUREMENT OF ATTITUDES
Explicit measures of attitudes Issues relevant to the explicit measurement of
attitudes Implicit measures of attitudes Are attitude measures reliable and
valid?
Summary
DO ATTITUDES PREDICT BEHAVIOUR?
 When do attitudes predict behaviour?
Do explicit and implicit measures of attitude predict different types of
behaviour?
Models of attitude–behaviour relations Summary

ROUTE MAP OF THE CHAPTER

The study of attitudes is at the core of social psychology. Attitudes refer to
our evaluations of issues, people, groups and other types of objects in our
social world. Attitudes are important, because they impact both the way we
perceive the world and how we behave. For example, a questionable penalty
during the World Cup football final is likely to be perceived differently
depending upon which team you support. Further, our voting behaviour very
much depends on the extent to which we like the different candidates. In this
chapter, we introduce the attitude concept. We consider how attitudes are
formed and organized and discuss theories explaining why we hold
attitudes. We also address how social psychologists measure attitudes, as
well as examining how our attitudes help predict our behaviour.
 INTRODUCTION
All of us like some things and dislike others. For instance, one person may like
the Welsh national rugby team and another person may dislike liver. A social
psychologist would say that we possess a positive attitude towards the Welsh
rugby team and a negative attitude towards liver. Understanding differences in
attitudes across people and uncovering the reasons why people like and dislike
different things has long interested social psychologists. Indeed, over 70 years
ago, Gordon Allport (1935, p. 798) asserted that the attitude concept is ‘the most
distinctive and indispensable concept in . . . social psychology’. That statement
remains equally valid today; the study of attitudes remains at the forefront of
social psychological research and theory.

- - - - - - - - - -

attitude an overall evaluation of a stimulus object.

- - - - - - - - - -

In this chapter, we introduce a number of important issues regarding the

attitude concept. First, we define the term ‘attitude’. We will show that
expressing an attitude involves making an evaluative judgement about an
attitude object. Second, we devote attention to the content of attitudes. We will
show that attitudes have cognitive, affective and behavioural components; that
is, attitudes can be based on beliefs, feelings and behaviours, while also shaping
beliefs, feelings and behaviours. In discussing the content of attitudes, we focus
on these components as antecedents of an attitude. Third, we consider the
structure of attitudes. We will show that attitudes can be organized and
structured in different ways. Fourth, we consider the psychological functions or
needs that are served by attitudes. We will show that people hold attitudes for a
number of reasons. Fifth, we introduce how attitudes are measured,
concentrating on direct and indirect strategies that psychologists have developed
to measure attitudes. We will show that attitudes can be measured in many ways.
Finally, we review research that has addressed a key question for attitude
researchers: under what circumstances do attitudes predict behaviour? We will
show that our attitudes and opinions are quite effective in predicting how we
behave.
Given the importance of attitudes in understanding how we think, feel and
behave, it is not surprising that there are numerous links between attitudes and
many of the other topics covered in this textbook. For example, self-esteem can
be conceptualized as one’s attitude toward the self (see Chapter 5), and attitudes
have obvious links to the study of persuasion and behaviour change, advertising
(Chapter 7), social influence (Chapter 8), and the study of prejudice (Chapter
14).
 WHAT IS AN ATTITUDE?
How can we best define an attitude?
A logical starting point is to define what we mean by the term attitude. We
define an attitude as ‘an overall evaluation of an object that is based on
cognitive, affective and behavioural information’ (Maio & Haddock, 2010, p. 4).
Inherent in this definition is the idea that reporting an attitude involves the
expression of an evaluative judgement about a stimulus object. In other words,
reporting an attitude involves making a decision concerning liking versus
disliking, approving versus disapproving, or favouring versus disfavouring a
particular issue, object or person.
An attitude, when conceptualized as an evaluative judgement, can vary in two
important ways (see Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Maio & Haddock, 2010). First,
attitudes can differ in valence, or direction. Some attitudes that a person
possesses are positive (e.g. ‘I like ice-cream’), others are negative (e.g. ‘I dislike
liver’; Figure 6.1), and yet others are neutral (‘I neither like nor dislike eating
fried foods’). Second, attitudes can differ in strength. For example, two people
(Geoff and Greg) may both have a negative attitude to liver, but one, Geoff, is
rather uncertain about his attitude, and his view comes to mind quite slowly,
while the other, Greg, is certain of his strong dislike, and his view is expressed
spontaneously when anyone mentions liver (“Yuck!”). You will learn more
about different aspects of attitude strength later in this chapter.
FIGURE 6.1 Some people are certain of a strong dislike and will express this
spontaneously.
Source: © koh szi kiat. Used under licence from Shutterstock.
 LEADER IN THE FIELD
Alice Eagly (b. 1938) completed her undergraduate degree at
Radcliffe College before pursuing a PhD at the University of
Michigan (1965). Her research on attitude change (with Shelly
Chaiken; see Leader in the Field, Chapter 7) led to the development
of the heuristic–systematic model of persuasion (see Chapter 7).
Together, Eagly and Chaiken (1993) wrote The Psychology of
Attitudes, arguably the most comprehensive volume written on the
attitude concept. In addition to her research on the psychology of
attitudes, Eagly has made enormous contributions to our
understanding of the psychology of gender.
Until now, we have used different examples when describing our own
attitudes. This leads to an important question – can anything be the object of an
attitude? Basically, any stimulus that can be evaluated along a dimension of
favourability can be conceptualized as an attitude object. As noted by Eagly and
Chaiken (1993), some attitude objects are abstract concepts (e.g. ‘liberalism’),
and others are concrete (e.g. a computer) (see Leader in the Field, Alice Eagly).
Furthermore, one’s own self (e.g. self-esteem) and other individuals (e.g. a
particular politician) can serve as attitude objects, as can social policy issues
(e.g. capital punishment) and social groups (e.g. people from Canada).
 Summary
Reporting an attitude involves the expression of an evaluative judgement about a
stimulus object. Attitudes differ in valence and strength, and any stimulus that
can be evaluated along a dimension of favourability can be conceptualized as an
attitude object.
 THE CONTENT OF ATTITUDES
What are the bases of attitudes?
So far we have seen that attitudes can be thought of as an overall evaluation (e.g.
like–dislike) of an attitude object. This perspective has generated a number of
conceptual models of the attitude concept. Historically, one of the most
influential models of attitude has been the multicomponent model (Zanna &
Rempel, 1988; see Maio & Haddock, 2010, for a review; also Leader in the
Field, Mark Zanna). According to this perspective (see Theory Box 6.1 and
Figure 6.2), attitudes are summary evaluations of an object that have cognitive,
affective and behavioural antecedents. A number of researchers have considered
how these three antecedents contribute to the formation and expression of
attitudes.
FIGURE 6.2 The multicomponent model of attitude.
Source: Reproduced by permission of SAGE Publications, London, Los
Angeles, New Delhi and Singapore, from Maio and Haddock, The psychology of
attitudes and attitude change (© SAGE, 2010).

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multicomponent model of attitude a model of attitude that conceptualizes attitudes as summary

evaluations that have cognitive, affective and behavioural antecedents.

- - - - - - - - - -
 LEADER IN THE FIELD
Mark Zanna, FRSC (b. 1944) completed his undergraduate and
PhD degrees at Yale University. He started his academic career at
Princeton University, before moving (in 1975) to the University of
Waterloo, where he is currently University Professor of Psychology.
In over 200 publications, his research on topics such as attitude
content, attitude structure and attitude–behaviour relations have had
an enormous impact on the field. Further, Zanna and colleagues have
applied conceptualizations of attitude to increase our understanding
of concepts such as prejudice, discrimination and how attitude
models can be used to influence health-related behaviour.

THEORY BOX 6.1

THE MULTICOMPONENT MODEL OF
ATTITUDE
The multicomponent model of attitudes (Zanna & Rempel, 1988) proposes
that attitudes are overall evaluations of an attitude object that are derived
from cognitive, affective and behavioural information. Cognitions refer to
thoughts and beliefs about an attitude object (e.g. a particular politician is
intelligent and values individual freedom). Affective information refers to
feelings associated with an attitude object (e.g. blood donation may make an
individual feel anxious and scared). Behavioural information refers to
behaviours we have performed (or might perform in the future) with respect
to an attitude object (e.g. signing a petition against the practice of factory
farming).
 The cognitive component of attitudes
The cognitive component of attitudes refers to beliefs, thoughts and attributes
we associate with a particular object. In many cases, a person’s attitude might be
based primarily upon a consideration of the positive and negative attributes of
the attitude object (Figure 6.3). For example, when one of us bought a new car a
few years ago, he devoted considerable attention to factors such as different
vehicles’ safety records, fuel economy, resale value and repair costs. In this
example, he formed attitudes towards the different cars via a conscious
consideration of the positive and negative attributes of each car. Cognitions have
an impact on many types of attitudes. Within the study of intergroup attitudes
(see Chapters 4 and 14), stereotypes are usually considered as beliefs about the
attributes possessed by a particular social group. Further, many studies have
revealed that possessing negative stereotypes about a group of people is
associated with having a prejudicial attitude towards the group (e.g. Esses,
Haddock, & Zanna, 1993; Kawakami, Dion, & Dovidio, 1998; see Maio,
Haddock, Manstead, & Spears, 2010).
FIGURE 6.3(a) and (b) Attitudes towards different cars might be based on the
positive and negative characteristics of each car.
Source: (a) © Juice Images. Used under licence from Getty Images; (b) ©
Goodluz. Used under licence from Shutterstock.

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cognitive component of attitude beliefs, thoughts and attributes associated with an attitude object.
 - - - - - - - - - -

Cognitions, in the form of beliefs, are a key part of one approach to attitudes,
which argues that attitudes are derived from more elementary cognitions about
the attitude object. Specifically, Fishbein and Ajzen’s (1975) expectancy–value
approach describes an attitude towards an object as the sum of ‘expectancy ×
value’ products. Expectancies are beliefs or subjective probabilities that the
object possesses a certain attribute; these beliefs may range from 0 to 1 in
strength. Values, or evaluations, are ratings of the attributes, normally from −3 to
+3. An attitude object will be evaluated positively if it is seen as leading to, or
associated with, positive things and as helping to avoid negative things. Only
salient beliefs count towards the overall attitudes; these are beliefs that a person
considers most relevant. We can illustrate the model by computing a person’s
attitude towards the game of golf. This person might think that golf is (1) a
valuable form of exercise, (2) a good way to see friends, and (3) frustrating.
Each of these beliefs will have both an expectancy and a value. For example,
exercise might have a high expectancy (.9) and positive evaluation (+3); seeing
friends might be perceived as having a lower expected outcome (.7) that is
somewhat positive (+2); while frustration is (thankfully!) somewhat infrequent
(.3) but very negative (–3). The individual’s overall attitude towards golf is
computed by summing the belief–evaluation products (e.g. 2.7 + 1.4 − .9 = 3.2).
 The affective component of attitudes
The affective component of attitudes refers to feelings or emotions associated
with an attitude object. Affective responses influence attitudes in a number of
ways. A primary way in which feelings influence attitudes is due to affective
reactions that are aroused in the individual after exposure to the attitude object.
For instance, many people indicate that spiders make them feel scared. These
negative affective responses are likely to produce a negative attitude towards
spiders.

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affective component of attitude the feelings or emotions associated with an attitude object.

- - - - - - - - - -

Feelings can become associated with attitude objects in several ways. A

number of researchers have used evaluative conditioning paradigms to assess
how pairing affective information with an attitude object can produce a positive
or negative attitude. For example, Krosnick, Betz, Jussim, and Lynn (1992)
conducted a study in which they presented participants with a series of pictures
of an unfamiliar person. Importantly, each picture was preceded by an affect-
arousing image that was presented at a subliminal level, that is, at very brief
exposure below the threshold necessary for conscious encoding (see Chapter 4).
For some participants, these images were negative (e.g. a bucket of snakes, a
bloody shark), while for other participants these images were positive (e.g. a pair
of kittens, a couple getting married). After seeing the pictures of the unfamiliar
person, participants indicated their overall attitude toward this individual, as well
as their evaluation of the target’s personality characteristics and physical
attractiveness. As can be seen in Figure 6.4, Krosnick et al. found that
participants who received subliminal presentations of the positive images liked
the individual more compared with participants who received subliminal
presentations of the negative images. Not only were participants’ attitudes
affected by the subliminal presentations, so too were their perceptions of the
target person’s attributes and physical attractiveness.
FIGURE 6.4 The influence of subliminal priming on social perceptions.
Source: Adapted from Krosnick et al., 1992. Reproduced with permission from
SAGE Publications Ltd.

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evaluative conditioning changes the liking for a stimulus by repeatedly pairing it with another
more polarized positive or negative stimulus.

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In addition to evaluative conditioning and subliminal priming, another way in

which affect guides attitudes comes from research by Zajonc and colleagues
(e.g. Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc, 1980; Monahan, Murphy, & Zajonc, 2000;
Murphy & Zajonc, 1993; Zajonc, 1968; see also Leader in the Field, Robert
Zajonc). These researchers argue that attitudes are formed on the basis of
affective responses that precede conscious thought. To test this hypothesis,
studies have examined how mere exposure to stimuli can influence an attitude.
In these studies, different types of unfamiliar stimuli (e.g. various Chinese
characters) are presented to participants a certain number of times. The stimuli
are then shown again to participants along with other, novel stimuli (e.g. new
characters), and participants’ attitudes towards the familiar and unfamiliar
stimuli are measured. A large number of studies have revealed that stimuli that
have been presented many times are liked more than stimuli that have not been
seen before. For instance, in one study by Zajonc (1968), participants were
initially shown 12 different Chinese characters. During this exposure phase, each
character was shown either 25 times, 10 times, five times, twice, once or not at
all. Later, participants were asked to indicate how much they liked each
character. The results of this study are presented in Figure 6.5. As can be seen,
participants’ attitudes towards the characters became more positive the more
times the character had been seen at the exposure phase. Researchers have
replicated these findings in many domains (see Maio & Haddock, 2010; see also
Chapter 11). The mere exposure phenomenon helps explain why we sometimes
come to like classical music melodies that we hear repeatedly, even when we are
unable to recall the artist who composed the music or any details of our prior
experiences hearing it.
FIGURE 6.5 The influence of repeated exposure on attitudes.
Source: Adapted from Zajonc, 1968. Copyright © 1968 by the American
Psychological Association. Adapted with permission. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 9, 1–27. The use of APA information does not imply
endorsement by APA.

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mere exposure effect increase in liking for an object as a result of being repeatedly exposed to it.

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 LEADER IN THE FIELD
Robert Zajonc (1923–2008) was born in Lodz, Poland. After the
Nazis invaded Poland he was dispatched to a labour camp in
Germany. He escaped, twice, joined the French Resistance and
studied at the University of Paris. When the war ended, he worked
for the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration in
Paris. He completed his PhD at the University of Michigan (1955),
where he remained until 1994. Zajonc’s research covered many areas
relevant to the psychology of attitudes. His work on the mere
exposure effect led to the development of an influential programme
of study exploring how affective processes influence attitudes and
actions. This research led Zajonc to consider the role of unconscious
processes in determining preferences and behaviour.
More recent research has demonstrated that mere exposure can increase
positive affect and that the effects can transfer to novel stimuli that have not
been encountered. For example, in one experiment, Monahan et al. (2000) found
that repeated subliminal exposure of one set of stimuli elicited more positive
mood during a subsequent presentation of similar stimuli. In another experiment,
these researchers found that repeated subliminal exposure caused more liking for
new stimuli that were similar to the old ones (e.g. both were Chinese ideographs)
than for new stimuli that were of a different category (e.g. different shapes). This
result suggests that repeated exposure can create general positive affect, which
can then be attached to new objects that are similar to the old ones.
 The behavioural component of attitudes
The behavioural component of attitudes refers to behaviours we have
performed (or might perform in the future) with respect to an attitude object. The
role of behavioural processes in relation to attitudes can take on different forms.
As a starting point, behaviours can serve as an antecedent of attitudes. For
instance, people might infer that they have a negative attitude towards nuclear
power plants if they recall having previously signed a petition against having a
nuclear power plant built near their neighbourhood.

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behavioural component of attitude past behaviours (also present and future anticipated
behaviours) associated with an attitude object.

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The idea that people might infer their attitudes on the basis of their previous
actions was developed by Bem. According to Bem’s (1972) self-perception
theory, individuals do not always have access to their opinions about different
objects (see also Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Bem argued that this is especially
likely when the person’s attitude is particularly weak or ambiguous. Many
studies have shown results consistent with this reasoning. For example, Chaiken
and Baldwin (1981) asked participants to complete a questionnaire containing
items that were framed in a way to suggest to people that they did perform pro-
environment behaviours (e.g. picking up the garbage of others) with either high
or low frequency. After completing this task, participants indicated their attitude
towards the environment. The results were consistent with self-perception
theory. Participants who were led to infer that they performed pro-environmental
behaviours with great frequency reported more favourable attitudes than did
participants who were led to infer that they performed pro-environmental
behaviours less frequently. Furthermore, this effect was obtained only among
those individuals who, prior to the experiment, had weak attitudes about
environmental matters.

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 self-perception theory the theory assumes that when inner states are ambiguous, people can infer
these states by observing their own behaviour.

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Research has shown that the mere belief in having performed a behaviour is
sufficient to shape attitudes. Albarracín and Wyer (2000) tested the effects of
beliefs about past behaviour by leading participants to believe that, without
being aware of it, they had expressed either support for a particular position or
opposition to it. Because participants had not actually engaged in such
behaviour, the research tested directly the effects of merely believing that one
has behaved in a certain way. As expected, participants reported attitudes that
were consistent with the alleged past behaviour.
Behaviours may also influence strongly held attitudes, but in a different way.
Festinger (1954) proposed that people can change their attitudes in order to be
consistent with behaviours that they have performed. For example, people might
convince themselves that they like several boring tasks if they have just been
given a small (rather than large) payment to tell others that the tasks are great
(i.e. to engage in counter-attitudinal behaviour; Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959).
Many experiments support Festinger’s hypothesis that this effect occurs because
the counter-attitudinal behaviour induces cognitive dissonance. Cognitive
dissonance is an aversive state, which motivates individuals to reduce it (e.g.
Zanna & Cooper, 1974; Zanna, Higgins & Taves, 1976). This motivation will be
stronger the greater the dissonance. One way to reduce dissonance is to change
one’s attitude towards the behaviour. This will be discussed in more detail in
Chapter 7, which focuses on how attitudes can be changed.

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cognitive dissonance an aversive state which motivates individuals to reduce it.

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Behaviours can also serve as an antecedent of attitudes in a more direct way.

Research has demonstrated that performing a behaviour that has evaluative
implications or connotations influences the favourability of attitudes. For
example, Briñol and Petty (2003) conducted a study in which participants
believed they were participating in a consumer research study on the quality of
headphones. Participants were informed that a headphone manufacturer was
interested in determining how headphones performed when listeners were
engaged in various movements such as dancing and jogging. Briñol and Petty
(2003) had participants move their heads in either an up-and-down motion
(nodding the head) or a side-to-side motion (shaking the head) as they listened to
an editorial played over the headphones. When the arguments contained in the
editorial were strong, it was expected that moving one’s head in an up-and-down
motion would lead participants to be more positive about the position being
advocated in the message, because nodding is a motion that is commonly
associated with agreement. The results revealed that participants were more
likely to agree with the content of a highly persuasive appeal when they moved
their heads up and down as compared to side to side (see also Briñol & Petty,
2008; Wells & Petty, 1980).
The enactment of other types of behaviour also affects the favourability of
individuals’ attitudes. For example, Cacioppo, Priester and Berntson (1993)
asked participants to engage in either arm flexion (moving one’s hand towards
the body – a behaviour associated with approach) or arm extension (moving
one’s hand away from the body – a behaviour associated with avoidance) while
viewing a variety of unfamiliar Chinese characters. Later in the experiment,
when asked to rate the characters, Cacioppo et al. (1993) found that characters
viewed during arm flexion were rated more positively than those viewed during
arm extension. Taken together, in both the Briñol and Petty (2003) and Cacioppo
et al. (1993) studies, a direct physical behaviour initiated by individuals
influenced the favourability of their attitude.
Of course, in addition to serving as an antecedent of attitudes, behaviours can
also reflect or express a person’s attitude (see e.g. Bohner & Wänke, 2002;
Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). For instance, an individual’s positive attitude toward a
particular politician might be reflected in their decision to vote for that
candidate. Similarly, intending to write to your local member of parliament
stating your opposition to an increase in university tuition fees can express your
negative attitude toward this issue. Later in the chapter we will discuss in more
detail how attitudes are often reflected in behaviour.
 How related are the components of attitudes?
Usually, if you possess positive beliefs about an object, your feelings about the
object and behaviours relevant to the object are also likely to be positive. At the
same time, there is plenty of evidence suggesting that these antecedents are
unique. For example, research has shown that people’s attitudes toward some
issues or objects (e.g. blood donation) tend to be based on affect, whereas
people’s attitudes toward other issues or objects (e.g. a new printer) tend to be
based on cognitive and behavioural information. More recent research has
revealed that some people are more likely to possess cognition-based attitudes,
whereas other people are more likely to have affect-based attitudes (see
Huskinson & Haddock, 2004; see later in the chapter for a discussion of the role
of behaviour). Furthermore, whether someone forms their attitudes on the basis
of their beliefs or their feelings has important implications (see Research Close-
Up 6.1).

RESEARCH CLOSE-UP 6.1

ATTITUDE CONTENT AND

PERSUASION
Haddock, G., Maio, G. R., Arnold, K., & Huskinson, T. L. H. (2008). Should persuasion be
affective or cognitive? The moderating effects of need for affect and need for cognition.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34, 769–778.

Introduction In the 1970s a series of famous

television advertisements shown in North America
featured former professional athletes exalting their
preference for a particular brand of beer. While some
of the athletes noted that the beer was less filling than
other beers, others replied that it tasted great. The
first component of the message highlighted a positive
belief about the beverage (i.e. its low caloric intake),
 whereas the second component highlighted a positive
affective response associated with the beverage (i.e.
its taste). Which part of the message would you find
more persuasive? Perhaps it depends on whether your
attitudes tend to be based more upon the content of
your beliefs or more upon the content of your
feelings.
Haddock and colleagues (2008) tested whether individuals whose attitudes
tend to be based more on cognition or affect would be more or less
persuaded by an appeal that was either cognitive or affective in nature.
Based on previous research, they predicted that individuals with affect-
based attitudes would be more persuaded by an affect-based appeal
compared to a cognition-based appeal, whereas individuals with cognition-
based attitudes would be more persuaded by a cognition-based appeal
compared to an affect-based appeal.
Method Participants Twenty-four students (16
women and 8 men) took part for psychology course
credit.
Design and procedure The basic design included two
factors: whether a person’s attitudes were based more
on cognition or affect, and whether they received a
persuasive appeal that was cognitive or affective. The
basis of a person’s attitudes as cognitive or affective
was determined by their responses on two scales: (1)
the need for cognition scale (Cacioppo & Petty,
1982), which measures individuals’ tendency to
engage in and enjoy effortful processing (see
Individual Differences 7.1, Chapter 7); and (2) the
 need for affect scale (Maio & Esses, 2001), which
measures individuals’ tendency to seek out emotional
experiences. Participants high in need for cognition
and low in need for affect were conceptualized as
being cognition-based, while participants high in need
for affect and low in need for cognition were
conceptualized as being affect-based.
In the experiment, participants were informed that they would be evaluating
a new beverage called ‘Power-Plus’. Half of the participants were randomly
assigned to receive an affect-based appeal, and the other half to receive a
cognition-based appeal. Participants in the affect-based appeal condition
tasted a sample of a pleasant tasting, unfamiliar beverage. The affect within
the appeal is derived from the pleasant feeling resulting from having tasted
the beverage. Participants in the cognition-based appeal condition read a set
of strong and positive attributes about the drink. For instance, they were told
that the drink was made from natural ingredients and contained real fruit
extracts. Immediately after either tasting or reading about Power-Plus,
participants indicated their attitude toward the beverage using a series of
nine-point semantic differential scales (good – bad; positive – negative; like
– dislike).
Results and discussion The results of the study
provided support for the researchers’ hypothesis that
the effectiveness of cogent affect-and cognition-based
persuasive messages depends on individual
differences in need for affect and need for cognition
(see Figure 6.6). As expected, an affect-based
message was more persuasive among individuals with
an affect preference (i.e. individuals high in need for
affect and low in need for cognition), whereas a
cognition-based message was more persuasive among
 individuals with a cognition preference (i.e.
individuals low in need for affect and high in need for
cognition). These results demonstrate how the content
of an attitude influences persuasion (see also Mayer &
Tormala, 2010).
FIGURE 6.6 The influence of affective–cognitive preference and appeal type
on attitudes.
Source: Adapted from Haddock et al., 2008. Reproduced with permission from
SAGE Publications Ltd.
 Summary
Attitudes have cognitive, affective and behavioural components. The cognitive
component refers to beliefs, thoughts and attributes associated with an attitude
object. The affective component refers to feelings or emotions associated with an
attitude object. The behavioural component refers to past behaviours with
respect to an attitude object.
 THE STRUCTURE OF ATTITUDES
What are the two basic perspectives on attitude structure?
In addition to considering the content of attitudes, another important issue
concerns how positive and negative evaluations are organized within and among
the cognitive, affective and behavioural antecedents of attitudes. It is typically
assumed that the existence of positive beliefs, feelings and behaviours inhibits
the occurrence of negative beliefs, feelings and behaviours. For example, this
framework suggests that an individual with positive beliefs, feelings and
behaviours about the Welsh rugby team is unlikely to have negative beliefs,
feelings and behaviours about this team. In other words, according to this one-
dimensional perspective on attitudes, the positive and negative elements are
stored in memory at opposite ends of a single dimension, and people tend to
experience either end of the dimension or a location in-between.

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one-dimensional perspective on attitudes a perspective that perceives positive and negative

elements as stored along a single dimension.

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This one-dimensional view is opposed by a two-dimensional perspective on

attitudes, which suggests that positive and negative elements are stored along
two separate dimensions (Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1997; see Leader in
the Field, John Cacioppo). One dimension reflects whether the attitude has few
or many positive elements, and the other dimension reflects whether the attitude
has few or many negative elements. This view proposes that people can possess
any combination of positivity or negativity in their attitudes. Consistent with the
one-dimensional view, attitudes may consist of few positive and many negative
elements, few negative and many positive, or few positive and few negative (i.e.
a neutral position). Inconsistent with the one-dimensional view, attitudes might
occasionally subsume both positive and negative elements, leading to
attitudinal ambivalence. Ambivalence occurs when a person both likes and
dislikes an attitude object. For example, someone might love the taste of
chocolate cake, but dislike its effects on their waistline. The two-dimensional
perspective explicitly allows for this ambivalence to occur, whereas the one-
dimensional perspective does not.

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two-dimensional perspective on attitudes a perspective that perceives positive and negative

elements as stored along separate dimensions.

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attitudinal ambivalence a state that occurs when an individual both likes and dislikes an attitude
object.

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LEADER IN THE FIELD

John Cacioppo (b. 1951) obtained his PhD from the renowned
social psychology programme at the Ohio State University in 1977.
He held academic posts at Notre Dame University and the University
of Iowa before returning to the Ohio State University as Professor of
Psychology. His research (much of it in a highly productive
collaboration with Richard Petty, see Leader in the Field, Richard E.
Petty, in Chapter 7) has had an enormous impact on different areas
of the study of attitudes, such as attitude structure, attitude content
and attitude change. He is currently Tiffany and Margaret Blake
Distinguished Service Professor of Psychology and Director of the
Center for Cognitive and Social Neuroscience at the University of
Chicago. His numerous awards include the Scientific Impact Award
from the Society for Experimental Social Psychology (2009), the
Distinguished Scientific Contribution Award from the American
 Psychological Association (2002), and the Campbell Award (for
Distinguished Scientific Contributions to Personality and Social
Psychology) from the Society for Personality and Social Psychology
(2000).

The one-dimensional and two-dimensional perspectives are presented in

Figure 6.7. The top panel shows the one-dimensional view of attitudes. Person
X, who is plotted on an axis depicting the one-dimensional view, would be
slightly negative. The single axis does not permit one to mark Person X as being
both negative and positive. The bottom panel of Figure 6.7 shows the two-
dimensional view of attitudes, with one axis (vertical) representing variability in
negative evaluations, and the other axis (horizontal) depicting variability in
positive evaluations. From this perspective, a person can possess high amounts
of both negativity and positivity towards an object. For example, Person Y could
be considered highly ambivalent.
FIGURE 6.7 The one-dimensional and two-dimensional perspectives on
attitudes.
Source: Reproduced by permission of SAGE Publications, London, Los
Angeles, New Delhi and Singapore, from Haddock and Maio, 2009, The
Psychology of Attitudes and Attitude Change (© SAGE, 2009).
 Which perspective is superior? In one important way, the two-dimensional
perspective is advantageous, because it allows for the same patterns of positivity
and negativity as the one-dimensional view, while also allowing for
ambivalence. For instance, it is difficult to interpret the meaning of the neutral
point in one-dimensional scales for assessing attitudes (Kaplan, 1972). Imagine
that people were asked to report their attitude towards eating fried foods on a
nine-point scale that ranged from ‘1 – extremely unfavourable’ to ‘9 – extremely
favourable’ as the end points, with ‘5 – neither unfavourable nor favourable’ in
the middle. If someone indicated that their attitude was neutral (e.g. ‘neither
favourable nor unfavourable’), it is halfway between the most extreme positive
response option (e.g. ‘extremely favourable’) and the most extreme negative
response option (e.g. ‘extremely unfavourable’). People could choose this option
because it is a compromise between many positive and negative elements of
their attitude (e.g. they have many positive and negative feelings, thoughts and
behaviours regarding eating fried foods) or because they have no positive or
negative elements whatsoever (e.g. they have never eaten fried foods).
 Summary
An important issue related to attitudes concerns how positive and negative
evaluations are organized within and among the cognitive, affective and
behavioural antecedents of attitude. The one-dimensional view postulates that
the positive and negative elements are stored as opposite ends of a single
dimension. The two-dimensional view postulates that positive and negative
elements are stored along two separate dimensions.
 WHY DO WE HOLD ATTITUDES?
What are the most basic psychological needs served by attitudes?
Individuals hold attitudes for a variety of reasons. For example, our attitudes
towards the Welsh rugby team developed from many of our friends and
colleagues supporting the same team (Figure 6.8). In contrast, our attitudes
towards abortion are based on the value we place on an individual’s freedom of
choice and the sanctity of human life (Figure 6.9). Over the years, attitude
researchers have devoted considerable attention to understanding the needs or
functions that are fulfilled by attitudes.
FIGURE 6.8 Attitudes towards, e.g., the Welsh rugby team may be developed
from friends supporting the same team.
Source: © mitzy. Used under licence from Shutterstock.

Figure 6.9(a) and (b) Attitudes towards abortion might be based on freedom of
choice and sanctity of human life.
Source: (a) © Robert E Daemmrich. Used under licence from Getty Images; (b)
Jonathan Nourok. Used under licence from Getty Images.
 The most prominent models of attitude functions were developed almost 50
years ago (Katz, 1960; Smith, Bruner, & White, 1956). Based on the empirical
evidence, we see five functions as particularly important. The object appraisal
function refers to the ability of attitudes to serve as energy-saving devices by
allowing us to summarize the positive and negative attributes of objects in our
social world. For example, knowing that you like a certain brand of cereal helps
you make a decision when entering the supermarket aisle packed with dozens of
choices. Further, attitudes can help people to approach things that are beneficial
for them and avoid things that are harmful to them (Maio, Esses, Arnold, &
Olson, 2004). Related to the object appraisal function is the utilitarian function.
This function exists in attitudes that maximize rewards and minimize
punishments obtained from attitude objects. Social adjustment is fulfilled by
attitudes that help us to identify with people we like and to dissociate from
people we dislike. For example, individuals may buy a certain soft drink because
it is endorsed by their favourite singer. The ego-defensive function exists in
attitudes that serve to protect an individual’s self-esteem. For example, bad
golfers might develop an intense dislike for the game because their poor
performance threatens their self-esteem. Finally, attitudes may serve a value-
expressive function, such that an attitude may express an individual’s self-
concept and central values. For example, a person might cycle to work because
she values health and wishes to preserve the environment (Figure 6.10).
FIGURE 6.10 A person might cycle to work because she values health and
wishes to preserve the environment.
Source: © PhotoAlto/Teo Lannie. Used under licence from Getty Images.
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attitude functions the psychological needs fulfilled by an attitude.

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object appraisal function when attitudes help serve as an energy-saving device.

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social adjustment function when attitudes help us identify with liked others.

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ego-defensive function when attitudes help to protect our self-esteem.

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utilitarian function when attitudes help us maximize rewards and minimise costs.

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value-expressive function when attitudes help express our values.

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A number of themes have developed from research on attitude functions since

the emergence of these theoretical perspectives. Here, we focus on two
important developments. First, evidence implies that strongly held attitudes fulfil
an object-appraisal function. Second, evidence reveals an important distinction
between attitudes fulfilling a utilitarian function and those fulfilling a value-
expressive function. In the following sections we describe some research behind
these observations.
 Object appraisal
The object-appraisal function of Smith et al. (1956) perhaps best explains why
people form attitudes in the first place. This function suggests that attitudes
classify objects in the environment for the purposes of action. In their
description of the object-appraisal function, Smith et al. suggested that attitudes
are energy-saving devices, because attitudes make attitude-relevant judgements
faster and easier to perform. Two programmes of research have directly
supported this line of reasoning, while suggesting important caveats. First, Fazio
(1995, 2000) argued that the object-appraisal function should be more strongly
served by attitudes that are high in accessibility. This prediction is based on the
assumption that strong attitudes guide relevant judgements and behaviour,
whereas weak attitudes will have little effect during judgement and behaviour
processes. Consistent with this hypothesis, research has shown that highly
accessible attitudes increase the ease with which people make attitude-relevant
judgements (Figure 6.11). For example, people who have accessible attitudes
towards an abstract painting have been shown to be subsequently faster at
deciding whether they prefer the painting over another painting (see Fazio,
2000).
FIGURE 6.11 How accessible is your attitude towards an abstract painting?
Source: © Laurin Rinder. Used under licence from Shutterstock.
 A second programme of research has revealed that the strength of the object-
appraisal motivation is influenced by differences across people in the need for
closure (Kruglanski, 1989). People high in the need for closure like to have a
definite answer on some topic, while people low in the need for closure are
comfortable with ambiguity. As applied to the study of attitudes, object-appraisal
reflects the notion that attitudes can provide such ‘answers’, because attitudes
help people to make decisions about attitude objects. As a result, a high need for
closure should increase the desire to form and maintain attitudes. Kruglanski and
colleagues have found support for this hypothesis in a number of studies (e.g.
Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993).
 Utilitarian versus value-expressive attitudes
Several researchers have argued for a distinction between utilitarian (or
instrumental) and value-expressive attitudes (e.g. Herek, 1986; Prentice, 1987;
Sears, 1988). Utilitarian attitudes can be thought of as instrumental in helping
people achieve positive outcomes and avoiding negative outcomes, whereas
value-expressive attitudes express concerns about self-image and personal
values. Many lines of research support the distinction between utilitarian and
value-expressive attitudes; we will consider just two. First, some attitude objects
elicit attitudes that are associated primarily with one or the other of these
functions. For example, Shavitt (1990) found that people’s thoughts about air
conditioners and coffee focus on the utility of the objects, whereas thoughts
about greeting cards and national flags tend to focus on the objects’ capacity to
symbolize the self and social values.
Second, evidence indicates that people are more persuaded by messages
containing arguments that match the primary function of their attitudes than by
messages containing arguments that do not match the primary function of their
attitudes (see Research Close-Up 6.1, P. 179). For example, Shavitt (1990) found
that utilitarian advertisements for products about which people held utilitarian
attitudes (e.g. an air conditioner) were more persuasive than symbolic
advertisements for such instrumental products. Similarly, Snyder and DeBono
(1985) found that individual differences in self-monitoring affected the
persuasiveness of different types of advertisements. Self-monitoring (Snyder,
1974, 1987) refers to differences in how people vary their behaviour across
social situations (see Individual Differences 6.1). While high self-monitors are
oriented to situational cues and finely tune their behaviour to the situation in
which they find themselves, low self-monitors tend to behave in ways that are
consistent with their core values and tend not to adapt their behaviour to the
situation in which they find themselves. As applied to advertising, Snyder and
DeBono predicted that high self-monitors might be more influenced by
advertisements that convey the positive images associated with using a particular
product, while low self-monitors might be more influenced by advertisements
that feature the quality of a product.

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self-monitoring an individual difference variable measuring the extent to which people vary their
 behaviour across social situations (low self-monitors) versus behaving consistently (high self-
monitors).

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To test this hypothesis, Snyder and DeBono (1985) presented participants with
one of two versions of an advertisement for a particular brand of whisky. In both
versions of the advertisement, there was a picture of a whisky bottle resting on a
set of architects’ plans for a house. In one version of the advertisement (image-
based), the picture was accompanied by the phrase ‘You’re not just moving in,
you’re moving up’. In the second version of the advertisement (quality-based),
the same photo was accompanied by the phrase ‘When it comes to great taste,
everyone draws the same conclusion’. Researchers predicted that high self-
monitors would be more persuaded by the image-based appeal, while low self-
monitors would be more persuaded by the quality-based appeal. The results of
the study are shown in Figure 6.12. As predicted, Snyder and DeBono (1985)
found that high self-monitors were willing to pay more for the whisky when
presented with the image-based appeal, whereas low self-monitors were willing
to pay more when presented with the quality-based appeal. Further research has
demonstrated that these ‘match the message to the function’ effects occur
because people devote more attention to convincing arguments that match the
function of their attitude than to convincing arguments that do not match the
function of their attitude (Petty & Wegener, 1998).
FIGURE 6.12 The influence of self-monitoring and appeal type on willingness
to pay for a consumer product.
Source: Adapted from Snyder and DeBono, 1985. Copyright © 1985 by the
American Psychological Association. Adapted with permission. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 49, 586–597. The use of APA information
does not imply endorsement by APA.
 INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 6.1
SELF-MONITORING
Self-monitoring refers to differences in how people vary their behaviour
across social situations (Snyder, 1974). High self-monitors are oriented to
situational cues and tune their behaviour to the social situation, whereas low
self-monitors tend to behave in ways that are consistent with their values
and tend not to mould their behaviour to the social situation. Self-
monitoring is assessed by a scale developed by Snyder (1974). For each
item, respondents are asked whether the statement is true or false as applied
to them. Try it yourself, scoring instructions are below.
1 I find it hard to imitate the behaviour of other people.
2 My behaviour is usually an expression of my true inner feelings,
attitudes and beliefs.
3 At parties and social gatherings, I do not attempt to do or say things that
others will like.
4 I can only argue for ideas in which I already believe.
5 I can make impromptu speeches even on topics about which I have
almost no information.
6 I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain people.
 7 When I am uncertain how to act in a social situation, I look to the
behaviour of the others for cues.
8 I would probably make a good actor.
9 I rarely seek the advice of my friends to choose movies, books, or music.
10 I sometimes appear to others to be experiencing deeper emotions than I
actually am.
11 I laugh more when I watch a comedy with others than when alone.
12 In a group of people I am rarely the centre of attention.
13 In different situations and with different people, I often act like a very
different person.
14 I am not particularly good at making other people like me.
15 Even if I am not enjoying myself, I often pretend to be having a good
time.
16 I’m not always the person I appear to be.
17 I would not change my opinions in order to please someone or to win
their favour.
18 I have considered being an entertainer.
19 In order to get along and be liked, I tend to be what people expect me to
be rather than anything else.
20 I have never been good at games like charades or improvisational
acting.
21 I have trouble changing my behaviour to suit different people and
different situations.
22 At a party I let others keep the jokes and stories going.
23 I feel a bit awkward in company and do not show up quite as I feel I
should.
24 I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a straight face (if for a
right end).
25 I may deceive people by being friendly when I really dislike them.
Give yourself one point (a) every time you said true to statements 5, 6, 7, 8,
10, 11, 13, 15, 16, 18, 19, 24, and 25, and (b) every time you said false to
items 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 12, 14, 17, 20, 21, 22, and 23. Add these values to
calculate your self-monitoring score.
Snyder (1987) reported that across a range of samples, the mean score was
approximately 12.5. Put differently, after reverse scoring, low self-monitors
approximately 12.5. Put differently, after reverse scoring, low self-monitors
score between 0 and 12, while high self-monitors score between 13 and 25.
 Summary
Individuals hold attitudes for a variety of reasons. Among the functions, the
object-appraisal function is especially important, as it suggests that attitudes
serve as energy-saving devices that make judgements easier and faster to
perform. There is also an important distinction between instrumental and value-
expressive attitudes. Knowing the primary function of an attitude is important,
because attempts at attitude change are more likely to be successful when the
persuasive appeal matches the function of the attitude.
 LINKING ATTITUDE CONTENT,
STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION
Content, structure, function and attitude strength
One important question that is relevant to the content, structure and function of
attitudes is the extent to which attitudes differ in their strength. As mentioned at
the beginning of the chapter, we feel more strongly about some topics than about
others. Attitude strength has been conceptualized in many different ways (see
Individual Differences 6.2). For example, individuals can simply be asked how
certain they are of their attitude, as well as how important their attitude is to
them personally (see Haddock, Rothman, Reber, & Schwarz, 1999). The
strength of an attitude can also be measured by assessing its distance from the
middle of a scale. This type of index, known as attitude extremity, has been
found to have many important outcomes (see Abelson, 1995). Finally, we can
conceive of attitude strength in terms of how easy it is to retrieve an attitude
from memory; easily retrievable attitudes are referred to as being highly
accessible (Fazio, 1995).
Strong attitudes differ from weak attitudes in a number of ways. Krosnick and
Petty (1995) argue that there are four key manifestations of strong attitudes.
First, strong attitudes are more persistent. That is, they are more stable over time
(Visser & Krosnick, 1998). Second, strong attitudes are more resistant to
change. When faced with a persuasive appeal, strong attitudes are less likely to
change than weak attitudes (Petty, Haugtvedt, & Smith, 1995). Third, strong
attitudes are more likely to influence information processing. Research has
revealed that people devote greater attention to information that is relevant to
strong versus weak attitudes (Houston & Fazio, 1989). Finally, strong attitudes
are more likely to guide behaviour. Put simply, we are more likely to act upon
strong versus weak attitudes. We return to this last issue later in the chapter.
 Summary
Attitude content, attitude structure and attitude function are inexorably linked.
Centrally relevant to these concepts is attitude strength. Attitudes vary in the
degree to which they are persistent over time, resistant to change, influential in
guiding information processing and influential in predicting behaviour.

INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 6.2

ATTITUDE STRENGTH
The strength of an attitude can be conceptualized and measured in different
ways (see Petty & Krosnick, 1995). Some of the most prominent
conceptualizations include attitude accessibility, attitude certainty, attitude
extremity, attitude importance, attitude intensity and knowledge. While
these conceptualizations are related to each other, they are usually seen as
different properties of attitude strength, as they sometimes have different
antecedents and consequences (see Maio & Haddock, 2010). Listed below
are examples of how these concepts (and the strength of an attitude) were
used to assess the strength of a person’s attitude toward gay men (from
Vonofakou, Hewstone, & Voci, 2007). For each item, respondents indicate
an answer using a scale that might range from zero (‘not at all’) to six
(‘extremely’). Try it yourself.
1 How certain are you about your feelings towards gay men?
2 How sure are you that your opinion about gay men is correct?
3 How definite are your views about gay men?
4 How important are gay men to you personally?
5 How much do you personally care about gay men?
6 How often do you discuss gay men with others?
7 How often do gay men come up during informal conversations?
8 How often in the past year have you talked about gay men?
9 How often do you think about gay men?
10 How often have you thought about gay men in the past year?
In a sample of 85 British undergraduates, Vonofakou et al. (2007) found a
mean score of 2.85 (SD = .89).
 THE MEASUREMENT OF ATTITUDES
What are explicit and implicit measures of attitude?
Attitudes, like most constructs in psychology, are not directly observable. For
instance, we cannot see that a person holds a positive attitude towards red sports
cars. Rather, attitudes have to be inferred from the individual’s responses to
questions about these vehicles (Fazio & Olson, 2003). As a result, social
psychologists have needed to develop different methods to measure attitudes. In
this section of the chapter, we describe some of the most commonly used
techniques that have been developed. For forms of attitude measurement other
than those discussed here (e.g. psychophysical measures, behavioural measures),
see Eagly and Chaiken (1993) and Fazio and Olson (2003).
In introducing different types of attitude measures, we have differentiated
them on the basis of whether they are explicit or implicit. Psychologists usually
think of explicit measures as those that require respondents’ conscious attention
to the construct being measured, whereas implicit measures are those that do not
require this conscious attention. At a basic level, explicit measures of attitude are
those that directly ask respondents to think about and report their attitude,
whereas implicit measures of attitude are those that assess attitudes without
directly asking respondents for a verbal report of their attitude (Fazio & Olson,
2003).

- - - - - - - - - -

explicit measures of attitude measures that directly ask respondents to think about and report an
attitude.

- - - - - - - - - -

- - - - - - - - - -

implicit measures of attitude measures that assess spontaneous evaluative associations with an
object, without relying on a verbal report.

- - - - - - - - - -
 Explicit measures of attitudes
The majority of attitude measures can be conceptualized as explicit indicators.
Most often, these measures have been self-report questionnaires, in which
participants are asked to respond to direct questions about their opinions towards
the object in question. For example, if a group of researchers was interested in
knowing a respondent’s attitude towards abortion, they might ask the question
‘What is your attitude towards abortion?’ In the following section, we describe
two explicit measures of attitude: Likert scales and the semantic differential.

Likert scales
Likert (1932) introduced a measure of attitude based upon summated ratings. In
this approach, statements are written in such a way that responses indicate either
a favourable or unfavourable attitude. An example of a Likert scale to assess
attitudes towards euthanasia is presented in Figure 6.13. For each item,
respondents are asked to indicate their degree of agreement or disagreement. As
you read the items presented in Figure 6.13, you will notice that items can be
written such that a strong positive attitude towards euthanasia will produce either
a ‘strongly agree’ response (e.g. to item 1) or a ‘strongly disagree’ response
(e.g. to item 3). Researchers create items that are worded in opposite directions
in order to help avoid response sets (i.e. the tendency for a respondent to agree
or disagree with all items on a scale).
FIGURE 6.13 An example of a Likert scale to access attitudes towards
euthanasia.
Source: Adapted from Haddock et al. (2008) with permission from SAGE
Publications Ltd.
 How are Likert scales scored? In a questionnaire like the one shown in Figure
6.13, each response alternative is allocated a score (in this case from 1 to 5).
Usually, a low score is taken to indicate a strong negative attitude and a high
score is taken to indicate a strong positive attitude. Thus, for item 1, an
individual who strongly disagrees with the statement would be allocated a score
of 1, while a person who strongly agrees would be given a score of 5. For item 3
the procedure is reversed because the item is worded in the opposite direction to
item 1. Scores for this item are recoded such that an individual who strongly
disagrees with the statement is expressing a positive attitude (and hence is
allocated a score of 5 for that item), whereas an individual who strongly agrees
with that item is expressing a negative attitude (and thus is allocated a score of
1). To the extent that the items assess the same construct (i.e. a respondent’s
attitude), correlations among responses to each item should be high. If they are
sufficiently high, scores on the individual items are averaged to form a single
attitude score.

Semantic differential scales

A large amount of research is aimed at testing whether people hold more
positive attitudes towards some attitude objects (e.g. abortion) than others (e.g.
capital punishment). To address questions concerning the attitudes that people
hold about a variety of attitude objects, it was necessary to develop
methodologies that would allow researchers to measure attitudes towards many
attitude objects along a common scale. Among the efforts to develop such a
technique, the method that has been the most influential is the semantic
differential approach (Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957). An example of a
semantic differential scale is presented in Figure 6.14. In this technique,
participants are given a set of bipolar adjective scales, each of which is separated
into a number of categories (typically 5, 7 or 9, with the middle category
representing the neutral point). Participants are asked to rate the attitude object
by indicating the response that best represents their opinion. The bipolar
adjectives typically include general evaluative terms such as ‘favourable–
unfavourable’, ‘good–bad’ and ‘like–dislike’. Similar to Likert scales,
correlations among the items should be positive (to the extent that they measure
the same attitude). If they are sufficiently high, they can be combined to form a
single attitude score.
FIGURE 6.14 A semantic differential scale to measure attitudes towards
euthanasia.
Source: Adapted from Haddock et al. (2008) with permission from SAGE
Publications Ltd.
 Issues relevant to the explicit measurement of
attitudes
Historically, explicit measures of attitudes have dominated empirical research on
the psychology of attitudes. Despite their wide appeal, however, a number of
concerns have been raised over their use. For example, individuals might
sometimes be unaware of their attitude towards an object (Fazio, Jackson,
Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Nisbett & Wilson,
1977). Further, research has demonstrated that subtle differences in the way in
which items are presented can influence responses to direct measures of attitude
(see Haddock & Carrick, 1999; Schwarz, 1999).
Probably the most important criticism of direct measures of attitude is that they
can be affected by people’s motivation to give socially desirable responses (see
Chapter 2). This refers to deliberate attempts to misrepresent (or fake) responses
in a way that allows respondents to present themselves in a favourable way
(Paulhus & John, 1998). To the extent that the researcher is interested in
studying attitudes towards sensitive issues and/or issues that highlight norms of
political or social appropriateness, people’s responses might not necessarily
reflect their true opinion, but instead may reflect a desire to present themselves
in a positive manner. For example, in many cultures it is considered socially
inappropriate to express a prejudicial attitude towards ethnic minorities. The use
of explicit, direct measures of attitude in such contexts may not provide an
accurate report of attitude, as respondents may be reluctant to be perceived as
prejudiced.
 Implicit measures of attitudes
In an attempt to minimize problems associated with direct measures of attitude,
social psychologists have developed a number of indirect or implicit response
strategies. We describe here two of the most common measures, the evaluative
priming technique (see Fazio et al., 1995) and the Implicit Association Test
(IAT; Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998).

Evaluative priming
Fazio (1995) defines an attitude as an association in memory between an attitude
object and a summary evaluation. According to Fazio, these associations vary in
strength, and the strength of the association determines the accessibility of an
attitude. Let us describe this perspective more concretely by using an example.
One of us really hates Brussels sprouts. Even thinking about Brussels sprouts
sets off an immediate and strong negative reaction within him. He also really
dislikes rice cakes, but his reaction is not as automatic. Fazio’s model would
suggest that the negative attitude towards Brussels sprouts is more accessible
than the negative attitude towards rice cakes, because the association in memory
between ‘Brussels sprouts’ and ‘dislike’ is stronger than the association between
‘rice cakes’ and ‘dislike’.
According to Fazio, the strength of these associations should affect how
quickly an individual responds to an evaluative word after having been briefly
presented with the attitude object. In a typical study of this process, a participant
is seated in front of a computer. The attitude object is briefly presented on the
computer screen (e.g. the term ‘Brussels sprouts’) and then replaced by an
evaluative adjective (e.g. ‘disgusting’). The participant’s task is to indicate the
valence of the adjective as quickly as possible. That is, the participant indicates
whether the adjective means something positive or negative, not whether the
attitude object itself is good or bad. Of primary interest is the speed with which
the participant makes this response. In our example, the presentation of ‘Brussels
sprouts’ should produce faster responses to negative adjectives and slower
responses to positive adjectives. Furthermore, if the person hates Brussels
sprouts more than rice cakes, this facilitation/inhibition should be more
pronounced when the person is presented with ‘Brussels sprouts’ than with ‘rice
cakes’.
Researchers have used this approach in studies of numerous attitude objects,
including attitude objects that might elicit social desirability concerns on explicit
measures. For example, Fazio et al. (1995) adapted the evaluative priming
paradigm to study prejudicial attitudes. In this study, participants were instructed
that their task was to indicate the meaning of positive and negative adjectives
(see Leader in the Field, Russell Fazio). However, prior to the presentation of
each individual adjective, participants were briefly shown a photo of a black or
white person. As shown in Figure 6.15, Fazio et al. (1995) found facilitation of
positive adjectives by prior presentation of a white versus black person, but
facilitation of negative adjectives by prior presentation of a black versus white
person, Thus, in this study, a negative attitude towards black people was
represented by differences in the time required by white participants to
categorize positive and negative adjectives after the presentation of images of
the black versus white individuals (black participants did not show this
tendency). Further, white participants who showed the pattern most strongly
were more likely to show more negative behaviour towards a black experimenter
in the study. Thus, these differences in response times were easily interpretable
as reflecting a negative attitude towards black individuals.
FIGURE 6.15 Mean scores for positive and negative adjectives preceded by
Black and White faces. A positive score represents facilitation, a negative score
represents inhibition.
Source: Adapted from Fazio et al., 1995. Copyright © 1995 by the American
Psychological Association. Adapted with permission. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 69, 1013–1027. The use of APA information does not imply
endorsement by APA.
 LEADER IN THE FIELD
Russell Fazio (b. 1952) completed his undergraduate degree at
Cornell University before completing a PhD at Princeton University
in 1978. He started his academic career at Indiana University, where
he worked until 2001. He currently holds the Harold E. Burtt Chair
in Psychology at the Ohio State University. In over 130 publications,
his research on topics such as attitude accessibility, attitude-
behaviour relations and attitude measurement has been highly
influential in the field.

The Implicit Association Test

Another important indirect procedure is the Implicit Association Test (IAT;
Greenwald et al., 1998). For ease of presentation, we will work through an
example of procedures that would use the IAT to assess racial attitudes. This
example is shown in Figure 6.16. In a typical IAT study, participants are seated
at a computer and asked to classify attitude objects and adjectives. As originally
designed, an IAT study generally involves five separate blocks. In block 1 of a
racial attitude IAT, participants are presented with a variety of pictures of white
and black individuals. Participants would be instructed to make one response
(e.g. press the ‘s’ key on a keyboard) when they see a white face and make a
different response (e.g. press the ‘k’ key) when they see a black face. They are
asked to perform this task (and all others in the test) as quickly as possible.
There might be anywhere from 20–40 trials within this block (and subsequent
blocks).
FIGURE 6.16 The procedure of the five block Implicit Association Test.
Source: Adapted from Haddock et al. (2008) with permission from SAGE
Publications Ltd.
 In block 2, participants are presented with a variety of positive and negative
adjectives. Again, they would be asked to make one response (press the ‘s’ key)
when a positive adjective appears on the screen and a different response (press
the ‘k’ key) when a negative adjective appears on the screen. The purpose of
these blocks is to train participants to link a category (e.g. a picture of a white
face or a positive adjective) with a response (pressing the ‘s’ key). In block 3,
participants are instructed that they will see faces or adjectives and that they are
to press the ‘s’ key when they see a white face or a positive adjective, and press
the ‘k’ key when they see a black face or a negative adjective. Block 4 is similar
to block 2, but this time the responses are reversed, such that a participant now
presses the ‘s’ key when a negative word appears and the ‘k’ key when a
positive word appears. This block is necessary to train participants to make the
opposite link to that already measured. Block 5 is similar to block 3, but this time
participants are to press the ‘s’ key when a white face or a negative adjective
appears, and the ‘k’ key when a black face or a positive adjective appears. The
key blocks are 3 and 5 – they measure the strength of association between an
attitude object (in this case racial groups) and evaluations.
How does research yield an attitude score from the two key blocks of the IAT
(3 and 5)? Imagine an individual who is racially prejudiced. For this individual,
the task in block 3 should be quite simple. If the person favours white
individuals to black individuals, trials in which white faces are associated with
positive adjectives and black faces are associated with negative adjectives should
be relatively easy, and hence produce faster responses, because the links
between these categories and the evaluations are congruent. Let’s imagine that
our participant’s mean response time to trials in this block is 700 ms. In contrast,
responses in block 5 should take longer for this participant. Given the person’s
preference for white individuals over black individuals, trials that associate black
faces with positivity and white faces with negativity should be relatively
difficult, and hence require more time to elicit a response. Let’s imagine that the
individual’s mean response time for this block is 1200 ms. Thus, our
participant’s mean response time for block 3 is shorter than that for block 5 by
500 ms. This difference is referred to as the ‘IAT effect’ (see Greenwald, Nosek
& Banaji, 2003; Greenwald et al., 1998, for additional details about computing
IAT effects).
The IAT and other implicit measures have become increasingly popular among
attitude researchers (see Fazio & Olson, 2003). These types of measures have
gained popularity because they assess attitudes without the necessity of asking
the participant for a direct verbal report. As noted earlier, part of their appeal is
due to the belief that responses on these measures are less likely to be affected
by socially desirable responding (see Fazio & Olson, 2003). That said, implicit
measures of attitude have also been the source of some criticism.
For example, a number of researchers have argued that the (sometimes) low
correlation found between implicit and explicit measures of attitude implies that
they assess different constructs (see Karpinski & Hilton, 2001). Other criticisms
have focused on how implicit measures assess attitudes. For instance, Olson and
Fazio (2004) argue that a personalized version of the IAT (one in which the
positive and negative judgements are personalized; for example, using ‘I like’
and ‘I don’t like’ versus ‘pleasant’ and ‘unpleasant’) is better than a version that
can be influenced by factors such as cultural norms (e.g. if most people prefer
one category over another, this might be reflected in a general IAT). As research
on implicit measures of attitude continues to progress, the debate around implicit
measures will surely continue. Our own view is that implicit measures of attitude
have much to offer, in that they have allowed social psychologists to generate
novel and important questions about the underlying causes of human behaviour.
They have also been especially useful in providing researchers with a tool for
carrying out research on socially sensitive attitudes, where research participants
might not always be willing to give their true explicit attitudes (e.g. prejudice).
Later in the chapter we will show how explicit and implicit measures of attitude
are important for predicting different types of behaviour.
 Are attitude measures reliable and valid?
A sound measure must be both reliable and valid (see Chapter 2). In the context
of attitude measurement, reliability has two important meanings. First, reliability
in the sense of internal consistency refers to whether the individual items are
assessing the same psychological construct. Items that assess the same construct
should be positively correlated. Second, test–retest reliability refers to
consistency in scores across time. A sound attitude measure should produce
similar scores across repeated testing (in the absence of any true attitude
change).
A number of studies have investigated the reliability of explicit and implicit
measures of attitude. Explicit measures have been shown to exhibit high
reliability. For example, semantic differential scales using the evaluative
dimensions of ‘good–bad’, ‘positive–negative’ and ‘favourable–unfavourable’
exhibit high internal consistency (Huskinson & Haddock, 2004) and test–retest
reliability (see Lord, 2004, for a more detailed discussion). Given their more
recent introduction, less research has been conducted assessing the reliability of
implicit measures of attitude. However, a paper by Cunningham, Preacher, and
Banaji (2001) found that several implicit measures possessed reasonably high
internal consistency and test–retest correlations.
The validity of a measure refers to the degree to which it assesses the construct
it is designed to assess. A number of studies have investigated the validity of
explicit and implicit measures of attitude. Explicit measures of attitude have
been shown to be valid. For example, Haddock, Zanna, and Esses (1993)
demonstrated that a semantic differential measure of attitudes towards gay men
was highly predictive of a subsequent measure of anti-gay discrimination (see
Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, for more examples). Regarding implicit measures,
researchers have found that implicit measures possess (1) convergent validity
(i.e. scores on different measures are related to each other) and (2) predictive
validity (i.e. implicit measures predict other scores that they ought to; see
Cunningham et al., 2001; Fazio & Olson, 2003). For example, Cunningham et
al. (2001) found that scores on evaluative priming and IAT measures of racial
prejudice were highly related to each other and formed a single latent construct.
Also, one particularly compelling study used functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) technology to assess brain activity in response to different
stimuli. Phelps et al. (2000) found that an IAT measure of white participants’
racial prejudice was highly predictive of amygdala activation when they viewed
pictures of unknown black individuals (the amygdala is an area of the brain
associated with emotional processing). In this research, pronounced amygdala
activation in response to black faces was associated with strong implicit
prejudice towards African Americans.
 Summary
Attitudes can be measured in a number of ways. Attitude measures can be
distinguished on the basis of whether they are explicit (i.e. direct) or implicit (i.e.
indirect). Explicit measures of attitude directly ask respondents to think about
and report an attitude, whereas implicit measures of attitude are those that assess
attitudes without directly asking respondents for a verbal report of their attitude.
Explicit and implicit measures are both useful tools in attempts to understand
and predict human behaviour (see Social Psychology Beyond the Lab 6.1).
 DO ATTITUDES PREDICT BEHAVIOUR?
What factors influence the degree to which attitudes predict
behaviour?
Common sense would dictate that attitudes should predict behaviour. For
example, one would expect that an individual who possesses a positive attitude
towards the environment would engage in recycling behaviour. Similarly, it
seems sensible to predict that a student who strongly supports saving endangered
animals will make an annual donation to the World Wildlife Fund. However, is
the link between attitudes and behaviour this simple?
In addressing this question, we wish to start by turning back time and visiting
the United States of America in the early 1930s. A college professor named
Richard LaPiere was travelling across America with a young Chinese couple. At
the time, there was widespread anti-Asian prejudice in the United States. As a
result of this prejudice, LaPiere was concerned that he and his travelling
companions would be refused service in hotels and restaurants. Much to his
surprise, only once (in over 250 establishments) were they not served. A few
months after the completion of the journey, LaPiere sent a letter to each of the
visited establishments and asked whether they would serve Chinese visitors. Of
the establishments that replied, only one indicated that it would serve such a
customer, with over 90 per cent stating that they definitely would not (the rest
were undecided). While there are a number of methodological problems with
LaPiere’s (1934) study (e.g. there was no way of ensuring that the individual
who answered the letter was the same person who served LaPiere and his
friends), it is a reminder that people’s behaviour might not necessarily follow
from their attitudes.
Let us now move ahead 30 years on from this study. By the late 1960s, a
number of studies had examined the relation between attitudes and behaviour. In
1969, Wicker reviewed the findings of these studies. He reached a rather
sobering conclusion: attitudes were a relatively poor predictor of behaviour.
Across almost 40 studies that were conducted before 1969, Wicker found that
the average correlation between attitudes and behaviour was a modest .15. This
finding led a number of social psychologists to question the value of the attitude
concept. It was argued that if attitudes do not guide actions, then the construct is
of limited use.
Attitude researchers responded to this criticism by devoting greater attention to
the study of when and how attitudes predict behaviour. In the last 30 years,
research findings have led to a more optimistic conclusion – attitudes do predict
behaviour, under certain conditions. In a meta-analytic review of the literature,
Kraus (1995) compared the results of over 100 studies on the attitude–
behaviour relation. He found that the average correlation between opinions and
actions was .38, a value much higher than that obtained by Wicker (1969). This
difference in correlations could be explained in various ways. First, more
modern research might be using better measures of attitudes and/or behaviours.
For example, some measures from early initial studies lacked reliability and
validity. Second, modern researchers might be using better techniques for testing
their predictions. Returning to LaPiere’s (1934) study, it is possible that the
measures of attitudes and behaviour did not come from the same individual.
Third, contemporary researchers might be doing a better job of examining
situations when attitudes are highly predictive of behaviour. In this section of the
chapter, we first consider a number of variables that influence when attitudes
predict behaviour, and then introduce models that have been developed to
understand how attitudes predict behaviour.

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attitude–behaviour relation the degree to which an attitude predicts behaviour.

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 When do attitudes predict behaviour?
(1) When there is correspondence between attitudinal and behavioural
measures
A number of early attempts to assess the attitude–behaviour relation (included in
Wicker’s, 1969, review) were plagued by methodological problems.
Specifically, in many of these studies there was a low degree of correspondence
between the measures of attitude and behaviour. Returning to LaPiere’s (1934)
research, his measure of attitude asked respondents to indicate whether they
would serve ‘members of the Chinese race’. This statement is quite broad in
comparison to the measure of behaviour, which involved service being offered to
a highly educated, well-dressed Chinese couple accompanied by an American
college professor. Had the attitude measure been more specific (e.g. ‘Would you
serve a highly educated, well-dressed Chinese couple accompanied by an
American college professor?’), the relation between attitudes and behaviour in
LaPiere’s (1934) study might have been more pronounced.
Ajzen and Fishbein (1977) proposed the idea that there needs to be high
correspondence between measures of attitude and behaviour. They stated that
measures of attitude and behaviour need to correspond in four key ways: action,
target, context and time. The action element refers to the behaviour being
performed (e.g. recycling glass). The target element refers to the target of the
behaviour (e.g. a particular brand of coffee, a political candidate). The context
element refers to the environment in which the behaviour is performed (e.g.
whether the behaviour is performed alone or in the presence of others). Finally,
the time element refers to the time frame in which the behaviour is performed
(e.g. whether the behaviour is to be performed immediately or in one year’s
time). Ajzen and Fishbein (1977) argued that a measure of attitude will be most
effective in predicting behaviour when both measures correspond on these four
elements. Correspondence can also be achieved when a broad attitude measure is
used to predict an aggregated index of behaviour (see Weigel & Newman, 1976).
The importance of correspondence between measures of attitude and
behaviour was also demonstrated in a study by Davidson and Jaccard (1979).
These researchers were interested in predicting women’s use of birth control
pills. In this study, women were asked a number of questions about their
attitudes, ranging from questions that were very general (their attitude towards
birth control) through somewhat specific (their attitude towards birth-control
pills) to very specific (their attitude towards using birth-control pills during the
next two years). Two years after participants responded to these attitude
questions, they were contacted by the researchers and asked to indicate if they
had used birth-control pills in the previous two years. The researchers predicted
that the correlation between attitudes and behaviour would increase as the
measures became more correspondent. The results of this study supported these
authors’ predictions. To start with, the general attitude measure did not predict
behaviour (r = .08), probably because this measure was too general in relation to
the measure of behaviour. The question that was somewhat specific did a better
job of predicting behaviour (r = .32); this item had the advantage of matching
the behavioural measure with respect to the target. Finally, the most specific
question was very effective in predicting behaviour (r = .57), because the
attitude measure was highly correspondent with the measure of behaviour with
respect to two key elements: target and time. Consistent with the results of this
study, the meta-analysis by Kraus (1995), noted earlier, found that the attitude–
behaviour correlation was higher when there was greater correspondence
between measures.

(2) It depends upon the domain of behaviour

Research has also demonstrated that the relation between attitudes and behaviour
differs as a function of the topic under investigation. In his review of the
literature, Kraus (1995) found that topics varied in the degree to which opinions
predicted actions. At one extreme, the relation between political party attitudes
and voting behaviour tends to be very high. For example, in an investigation
conducted during the 1984 American presidential election, Fazio and Williams
(1986) measured attitudes towards the President of the United States at that time,
Ronald Reagan. Approximately five months later, they measured whether
participants voted for Reagan or his opponent. Despite the time lag between
measures, the correlation between voters’ initial attitude towards Reagan and
their subsequent voting behaviour was an impressive .78. At the other extreme,
Kraus (1995) noted that there was a low correlation between individuals’
attitudes towards blood donation and the act of donating blood. At first glance, it
is perhaps not surprising that this is a behavioural domain where one might
expect a low attitude–behaviour relation. It may be that a low relation arises
because the behaviour of donating blood is much more difficult to enact than the
simple expression of one’s attitude through a behaviour like voting.
(3) It depends upon the strength of the attitude
As mentioned earlier in the chapter, attitudes differ in their strength. For
instance, one person may absolutely love the music of Bruce Springsteen;
another may feel less strongly. As we already know, attitude researchers would
say that one person has a very strong positive attitude towards the music of
Bruce Springsteen, while the other has a weak attitude. Which person once drove
all night to see Bruce Springsteen perform live – for the eighth time? Not
surprisingly, it is the one with the strong attitude.
A number of studies have demonstrated that strong attitudes are more likely
than weak attitudes to predict behaviour. For instance, returning to the study of
Fazio and Williams (1986), recall that they found a very high correlation
between political attitudes and voting behaviour (Figure 6.17). This study also
contained a measure of attitude strength – the accessibility of the participants’
initial attitude. Some participants had very accessible (i.e. strong) attitudes
towards Reagan, whereas other participants’ attitudes were less accessible (i.e.
weak). Fazio and Williams (1986) found that the correlation between attitudes
and behaviour was significantly greater among those individuals whose attitudes
towards Reagan were high in accessibility. Similar results have been found in
many other studies using different operationalizations of attitude strength (see
Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Holland, Verplanken, & Van Knippenberg, 2002;
Kraus, 1995; see also Research Close-Up 6.2), leading to the conclusion that
strong attitudes are more likely than weak attitudes to predict behaviour.
FIGURE 6.17 Do attitudes towards politicians predict voting behaviour?
Source: © Chip Somodevilla/Pool/ABACAUSA.COM. Used under licence from
Press Association Images.
(4) The role of person variables
The final set of variables we wish to consider concerns differences across people
in the tendency to behave in line with their actions. In addition to examining
how situations influence behaviour, social psychologists are interested in
understanding how personality differences help account for our actions, and how
the attitude–behaviour link may vary in different samples of people (see Chapter
1).
With respect to the attitude–behaviour relation, a number of researchers have
examined how various personality constructs moderate the degree to which
opinions influence actions. The personality construct most frequently tested as a
moderator of the attitude–behaviour relation is self-monitoring (Snyder, 1974,
1987). As discussed earlier in the chapter, self-monitoring refers to differences
across people in how they vary their behaviour across social situations. A
number of studies have investigated whether the relation between attitudes and
behaviour is more pronounced for low self-monitors than for high self-monitors.
In one study testing this proposal, Snyder and Kendzierski (1982) investigated
attitudes towards affirmative action (policies that give special advantages to
members of disadvantaged groups, such as women and ethnic minorities). These
researchers gave students who favoured or opposed affirmative action the
opportunity to participate in a social situation that supported the behavioural
expression of a positive attitude towards this issue. The results revealed that,
among low self-monitors, people’s attitude towards affirmative action predicted
their decisions to participate, or not. However, among high self-monitors, the
behavioural decision was unrelated to the favourability of their attitude.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BEYOND THE

LAB 6.1
ATTITUDES AND PUBLIC OPINION SURVEYS
Given the importance of attitudes in understanding behaviour, it is not
surprising that they have an enormous impact ‘beyond the lab’. One area
where attitudes and attitude measurement is very important is in the context
of public opinion surveys. The use of public opinion surveys is widespread –
across continents and across issues. For instance, public opinion surveys are
often used to gauge the public’s attitudes toward things like their national
government, views on core social issues or policies (such as environmental
attitudes or attitudes toward capital punishment), even to assess levels of
happiness in a country and how happiness might change over time.
These opinion surveys will usually be carried out by public companies (e.g.
the Gallup organization in the United States; IPSOS-MORI or YouGov in
the United Kingdom) or through government organizations (e.g. the Office
for National Statistics in the United Kingdom). Often, these surveys will be
developed by individuals with a background in social psychology, and their
methodology will almost certainly have been informed by advances made
by social psychologists. Public opinion surveys might be completed over the
phone, via post, or more recently, via the Internet.
One particularly interesting development has been the application of
response time methodologies to public opinion surveys. Research by John
Bassili and colleagues (e.g. Bassili, 1993, 1996; Bassili & Fletcher, 1991)
has utilized computer-assisted telephone interviewing (CATI) to integrate
contemporary attitudes research with public opinion surveys. The
methodology involves the use of a computer clock that can provide
millisecond accuracy in the timing of responses and a voice-recognition
framework that converts an individual’s responses into signals that trigger
the clock after the interviewer asks a question. Using the CATI approach in
a survey of Canadians’ opinions, Bassili (1993) tested how two
a survey of Canadians’ opinions, Bassili (1993) tested how two
operationalizations of attitude strength, attitude accessibility and attitude
certainty, might predict the discrepancy between an individual’s voting
intentions and their actual voting behaviour. The results showed that the
response-time measure of accessibility was a significant predictor of the
discrepancy between people’s voting intentions and their actual voting
behaviour. For example, the more accessible the attitude, the lower the
discrepancy between voting intentions and voting behaviour.

RESEARCH CLOSE-UP 6.2

ATTITUDES CAN PREDICT AND

FOLLOW BEHAVIOUR
Holland, R.W., Verplanken, B., & Van Knippenberg, A. (2002). On the nature of attitude–
behavior relations: The strong guide, the weak follow. European Journal of Social Psychology,
32, 869–876.

Introduction This study considers the circumstances

under which (1) attitudes predict behaviour and (2)
behaviour predicts attitudes. The authors review
evidence demonstrating both causal pathways. First,
they review a number of studies demonstrating that
attitudes influence behaviour (some of these studies
are discussed in this chapter). Second, they review a
number of studies derived from self-perception theory
and dissonance theory (see Chapter 7) demonstrating
that attitudes can sometimes be inferred from past
behaviour. Holland et al. suggest that the concept of
attitude strength is crucial to understanding when
attitudes predict behaviour (as opposed to behaviour
predicting attitudes). Specifically, Holland et al.
postulate that strong attitudes are more likely than
weak attitudes to predict behaviour, whereas weak
attitudes are more likely than strong attitudes to
follow from behaviour.
Method Participants One hundred and six students
participated in the study.
Design and procedure The study had a correlational
design and was split into two sessions, with an
interval of one week. In session 1, participants
completed measures assessing the favourability and
the strength of their attitudes towards Greenpeace.
Attitude favourability was measured by the question
‘How positive or negative is your attitude towards
Greenpeace?’; one of the attitude strength items was
‘How certain are you about your attitude towards
Greenpeace?’ One week later, participants returned
for an unrelated study. At the end of this unrelated
study, they were paid the equivalent of about £3.
Immediately after being paid, participants were told
that the experimenter was also conducting a small
study for Greenpeace. Importantly, participants were
also informed that they could choose to donate money
to Greenpeace. After making their decision whether or
not to donate money, the experimenter asked
participants to complete a short questionnaire, which
included an assessment of their attitude towards
 Greenpeace (also in session 2).
The attitude–behaviour relation was derived by comparing the favourability
of participants’ attitude at time 1 with the amount of money they donated at
time 2. The behaviour–attitude relation was derived by comparing the
amount of money participants donated at time 2 with the measure of attitude
that was taken immediately after the donation behaviour.
Results and discussion As expected, the researchers
found that attitude strength was crucial for
understanding when attitudes predict behaviour, as
opposed to when behaviour predicts attitudes. The
results are shown in Figure 6.18. First, participants
were split at the median score on attitude strength, to
form two equal-sized groups of those with ‘strong’
versus ‘weak’ attitudes (this procedure is known as a
‘median split’). With respect to the attitude–
behaviour relation, strong attitudes at time 1 predicted
behaviour at time 2; weak attitudes did not. On the
other hand, with respect to the behaviour–attitude
relation, weak attitudes were greatly influenced by
behaviour; strong attitudes were not.
FIGURE 6.18 Regression coefficients showing the effects of weak and strong
attitudes on the attitude–behaviour and behaviour–attitude relations.
Source: Adapted from Holland et al., 2002. Reproduced with permission from
John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
 The findings of Holland et al. (2002) provided support for their main
hypotheses. When participants held strong attitudes about Greenpeace, the
favourability of their attitude predicted whether or not they subsequently
donated to the organization. When participants held weak attitudes about
Greenpeace, their attitude was shaped by (i.e. inferred from) their donation
behaviour. This study makes an important contribution to our understanding
of the bi-dimensional causal relations between attitudes and behaviour.
Another relevant variable that affects the size of the attitude–behaviour
relation is the nature of the participants involved in the research. Research has
found that students show lower attitude–behaviour relations compared to non-
students. For example, Kraus (1995) observed that the average correlation
between attitudes and behaviour was .34 in studies that used student samples; the
correlation was .48 in studies with non-student samples. This difference might
be attributable to the observation that university students tend to have less
crystallized attitudes compared to older individuals (see Sears, 1986; Visser &
Krosnick, 1998).
 Do explicit and implicit measures of attitude predict
different types of behaviour?
Explicit and implicit measures of attitude are both useful tools in attempts to
predict human behaviour. Indeed, a number of researchers have explored
whether explicit and implicit measures of attitude predict different types of
behaviour. It has been suggested that explicit measures of attitude should be
more likely to predict a deliberative (i.e. thoughtful) behaviour, whereas implicit
measures of attitude should be more likely to predict more spontaneous (i.e.
automatic) behaviour. For example, Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, and
Howard (1997) examined how explicit and implicit measures of prejudice
predict deliberative and spontaneous discriminatory behaviours. In one
experiment, participants completed explicit and implicit measures of their
attitudes toward African Americans (Dovidio et al., 1997). The explicit measure
was a questionnaire consisting of items such as ‘Discrimination against black
people is no longer a problem in the United States’, whereas the implicit
measure consisted of a response latency task. After completing these measures,
participants were met by a second experimenter who asked participants to
complete an ostensibly unrelated study. In this other study, participants were
asked a series of questions by a black female and white female. The interviews
were programmed, such that both interviewers’ questions were posed in a well-
rehearsed manner.
After completing the interview, participants evaluated both interviewers. Their
response to these questions served as the deliberative measure of behaviour. The
spontaneous measure of behaviour was derived from participants’ non-verbal
behaviour during the interaction, which had been videotaped. Two non-verbal
measures were considered – participants’ eye contact with the experimenters and
the frequency with which participants blinked. Less eye contact and more
frequent blinking are indicators of less favourable behaviour. Further, these
behaviours are seen as spontaneous, because they are difficult to consciously
monitor and control.
Dovidio et al. (1997) expected that the explicit measure of prejudice would
best predict participants’ deliberative evaluations of their interactions with the
black and white experimenters, while the implicit measure of prejudice would
best predict participants’ spontaneous behaviours toward the black and white
experimenters. The results were consistent with predictions. Only the explicit
measure of prejudice was correlated with participants’ conscious assessment of
their interaction, while only the implicit measure of prejudice was correlated
with participants’ non-verbal behaviour.
 Models of attitude–behaviour relations
In addition to understanding when attitudes predict behaviour, social
psychologists have developed a number of models to explain how attitudes
predict behaviour. In this section of the chapter, we describe three models:
Fishbein and Azjen’s (1975) theory of reasoned action (as well as its extension,
the theory of planned behaviour), Fazio’s (1990) MODE model and Strack and
Deutsch’s (2004) RIM model.

The theory of reasoned action and theory of planned behaviour

As its name suggests, the theory of reasoned action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975)
is a model that was developed to predict deliberative (i.e. planned) behaviour.
According to this model (see Theory Box 6.2 and Figure 6.19), the immediate
predictor (or determinant) of individuals’ behaviour is their intention. Put
simply, if you intend to recycle glass bottles, you are likely to engage in this
behaviour. Within the original conceptualization of the model, Fishbein and
Ajzen proposed that there were two determinants of intentions: attitudes and
subjective norms. The attitude component refers to the individual’s attitude
towards the behaviour – whether the person thinks that performing the behaviour
is good or bad. A person’s attitude towards a behaviour (e.g. recycling glass) is a
function of the expectancy that the behaviour will produce a desired
consequence (helping the environment) and the value attached to this
consequence (it is good to help the environment). According to the model, an
individual’s attitude is derived by multiplying the expectancy and value for each
consequence and summing these values (see explanation of expectancy–value
models of attitude in the earlier section on the cognitive component of attitudes).
FIGURE 6.19 The theory of reasoned action.
Source: Adapted from Haddock et al. (2008) with permission from SAGE
Publications Ltd.
 - - - - - - - - - -

theory of reasoned action a model in which behaviour is predicted by behavioural intentions,

which are determined by attitudes and subjective norms.

- - - - - - - - - -

Subjective norms refer to an individual’s beliefs about how significant others

view the relevant behaviour. Like the attitude component, subjective norms are
perceived to be derived from two factors that are multiplied and then summed.
Specifically, the subjective norm component is a function of normative beliefs
(how important others expect the individual to act) and the individual’s
motivation to comply with these expectations. Returning to our example,
subjective norms will be high if your family and close friends have positive
expectations towards recycling glass and you are motivated to comply with these
expectations.
While the theory of reasoned action did a commendable job in predicting
behaviour, it soon became clear that individuals’ actions were also influenced by
whether or not they felt they could perform the relevant behaviour. For example,
if an individual wanted to change his dietary habits by eating a healthier diet, a
positive attitude and positive subjective norms are unlikely to produce the
desired behaviour change if he is unable to restrain himself from eating sweets,
chocolates and fish and chips. Social psychologists use the term self-efficacy to
refer to beliefs about one’s ability to carry out certain actions required to attain a
specific goal.

- - - - - - - - - -
 self-efficacy beliefs about one’s ability to carry out certain actions required to attain a specific goal
(e.g. that one is capable of following a diet, or to help someone).

- - - - - - - - - -

In light of how these types of self-efficacy factors can influence our actions
(see Bandura, 1977), the theory of reasoned action was revised to include the
notion that behavioural prediction is affected by whether people believe that they
can perform the relevant behaviour. This revision is captured by the concept of
perceived behavioural control. The inclusion of this concept led Ajzen (1991;
see also Ajzen & Madden, 1986) to name the revised model the theory of
planned behaviour. According to this model (see Theory Box 6.2 and Figure
6.20), perceived behavioural control, in addition to attitudes and subjective
norms, determines behavioural intentions. Perceived behavioural control itself is
determined by control beliefs (individuals’ perceptions about whether they have
the resources and opportunities required to perform the behaviour).
FIGURE 6.20 The theory of planned behaviour.
Source: Adapted from Haddock et al. (2008) with permission from SAGE
Publications Ltd.

- - - - - - - - - -

perceived behavioural control the notion that behavioural prediction is affected by whether
people believe that they can perform the relevant behaviour.

- - - - - - - - - -
 - - - - - - - - - -

- - - - - - - - - -

theory of planned behaviour an extension to the theory of reasoned action that includes the
concept of perceived behavioural control.

- - - - - - - - - -

Perceived behavioural control influences behaviour in two ways. First, it is

postulated to have a direct causal influence on behavioural intentions. This
implies that individuals’ intention to engage in a particular behaviour is affected
by their perceived confidence in their ability to perform the action. Second,
perceived behavioural control can also have a direct effect on behaviour. This
relationship is dependent upon actual control of the relevant action, that is,
whether the behaviour can, in reality, be performed. Put simply, while
individuals may believe that they can perform the relevant behaviour, their
perception may not be accurate.
The theory of reasoned action and theory of planned behaviour are the most
frequently tested models of attitude–behaviour relations. The predictions derived
from the models have received strong empirical support. For example, a review
by Albarracín, Johnson, Fishbein, and Muellerleile (2001) compared the results
of over 90 studies and demonstrated that the models are effective in predicting
condom use. Similar findings supporting the models have been found in reviews
of other behavioural domains (see e.g. Armitage & Conner, 2001).

Leaders in the Field Martin Fishbein (1936–1997) and

Icek Ajzen (b. 1942). Martin Fishbein received his
undergraduate degree in psychology and economics at Reed
College and his PhD in 1961 at UCLA. He then accepted a
position in social psychology and communication at the
University of Illinois, where he stayed until 1997 to become
distinguished university professor at the Annenberg School
for Communication. In 1963 he published his important
 expectancy-value theory of attitudes, and in a 1967 article on
attitudes and the prediction of behaviour he first described
what later became known as the ‘theory of reasoned action’.
Also in 1966, Icek Ajzen, who had completed his
undergraduate degree at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem,
joined Fishbein at Illinois to pursue a PhD, which he finished
in 1969. Their collaboration continued after Ajzen accepted a
position at the University of Massachusetts (Amherst), where
he remained throughout his career. In 1975 they published
their landmark volume Belief, Attitude, Intention and
Behavior, in which the theory of reasoned action appeared in
its present form. Another landmark publication was their
article on the relationship between attitude and behaviour,
published in 1977. Ajzen later extended the theory of
reasoned action into the theory of planned behaviour, which
has now replaced the theory of reasoned action as the
dominant social psychological model for the prediction of
behaviour.

THEORY BOX 6.2

THE THEORY OF REASONED ACTION
The theory of reasoned action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; see Leaders in the
Field, Martin Fishbein and Icek Ajzen) and the theory of planned behaviour
(Ajzen, 1991) were developed to predict reasoned, deliberative behaviour.
According to the theory of reasoned action, the immediate predictor (or
determinant) of individuals’ behaviour is their intention. As the model was
originally conceived, intentions were determined by two factors, attitudes
and subjective norms. The attitude component refers to the individual’s
attitude toward the behaviour – whether the person thinks that performing
the behaviour is good or bad, while subjective norms refer to an individual’s
beliefs about how significant others view the relevant behaviour (see Figure
6.19).
The theory of planned behaviour (see Figure 6.20) extends the theory of
 reasoned action by including the idea that individuals’ actions are also
influenced by whether they feel they can perform the relevant behaviour.
Accordingly, the theory of planned behaviour added the concept of
perceived behavioural control. This concept is conceptualized as
influencing behaviour in two possible ways, by having a direct effect on
behavioural intentions, and by directly influencing behaviour.
A large number of research programmes have used the reasoned
action/planned behaviour framework to help understand how additional types of
environmental cues influence behaviour. One key issue pertinent to the reasoned
action/planned behaviour approach that has received considerable attention
concerns how behavioural intentions are translated into behaviour. An important
development relevant to this issue is the concept of implementation intentions
(Gollwitzer, 1999; Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006). Implementation intentions are
conceptualized as ‘if–then’ plans that specify a behaviour that one will need to
perform in order to achieve a goal and the context in which the behaviour will
occur (Sheeran, 2002). That is, implementation intentions take the form of
mindsets in which an individual attempts to specify where and when a behaviour
will be enacted, in the form of ‘When I encounter the situational context A, I
will perform behaviour B’ (Gollwitzer & Brandstätter, 1997). For example, a
student might say to herself ‘On the first day of the new semester, when I return
from Christmas holidays, I will start revising for my exams’.

- - - - - - - - - -

implementation intentions ‘if–then’ plans that specify a behaviour that one will need to perform
in order to achieve a goal, and the context in which the behaviour will occur.

- - - - - - - - - -

Numerous studies have demonstrated that forming an implementation

intention increases the likelihood that an individual will perform a desired
behaviour. In one study, Orbell, Hodgkins, and Sheeran (1997) considered
whether the formation of an implementation intention would increase the
likelihood that women would perform breast self-examination (BSE).
Participants in an intervention group were asked to indicate where and when
they would perform BSE, whereas participants in a control group did not receive
these instructions. The results of the study revealed that the formation of an
implementation intention was effective in eliciting the desired behaviour. For
example, one month after the intervention, 64 per cent of participants in the
intervention group reported having performed BSE, compared to 14 per cent in
the control group (see Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006; Sheeran, Milne, Webb, &
Gollwitzer, 2005, for extensive reviews of implementation intentions).
Relevant to research on implementation intentions is work that has studied the
role of habits in predicting behaviour. Research has demonstrated that habitual
behaviours are behaviours that are linked to situational cues (see Aarts &
Dijksterhuis, 2000). From a social psychological perspective, habits are more
than just behaviours that we perform frequently. Of greater relevance is the idea
that habits are automatic behaviours, in the sense that they occur without
awareness and are difficult to control (see Verplanken, 2006; Verplanken &
Orbell, 2003; see also Chapter 4). Many studies have found that habits can play
an important role in predicting future behaviour. For example, a field study in
the Netherlands considered the degree to which habits and other variables from
the theory of planned behaviour predicted travel behaviour (Verplanken, Aarts,
Van Knippenberg, & Moonen, 1998). The travel behaviour included decisions
about whether to take a bicycle, bus, car or train to work. At the start of the
study, participants completed measures of habit strength (e.g. frequency of past
behaviour), attitudes, subjective norms, and behavioural intentions about their
travel choice. For the next week, participants kept a diary that recorded how
often they drove their car and used other forms of transport. The results revealed
that habits were highly predictive of behaviour, even predicting behaviour after
behavioural intentions and perceived behavioural control were taken into
account. Further, the study found that behavioural intentions were uniquely
predictive of behaviour only when participants’ habits were weak. This suggests
that when habits were strong, they were enough to be the main predictor of
future behaviour.
Finally, we wish to highlight yet another interesting way in which automatic
processes may be important in evaluative judgements: the operation of motives
or goals. Goals are linked to the idea of intentions. Goals can be considered
cognitive representations that can be primed by environmental cues, and then
influence behaviour without the person realizing it. In the last two decades,
researchers have addressed how automatically triggered goals influence
evaluations and behaviour. There is now a large volume of research that has
demonstrated how evaluations and behaviour are influenced by cues and primes
without people being aware of them (for reviews, see Custers & Aarts, 2005;
Veltkamp, Aarts, & Custers, 2009). For example, in one particularly interesting
study, Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, and Trötschel (2001) activated
the goal of achievement by unobtrusively priming some participants with words
such as ‘succeed’ and ‘achieve’. This was done by having participants complete
a word-search puzzle task that contained a number of achievement-relevant
words. Subsequent to this task, participants completed another puzzle task in
which participants had to find words that were hidden within the puzzle. The
researchers were interested in determining whether the unobtrusive priming of
the goal of achievement would lead participants to perform better (i.e. achieve
more) compared to participants who had not been previously primed with the
goal of achievement. Bargh and colleagues (2001) found that participants who
had been unobtrusively primed with achievement performed better in locating
hidden words than control participants.

The MODE model

Not all behaviour is deliberative and planned. Quite often we act spontaneously
without consciously thinking of what we intend to do. When our behaviour is
spontaneous, the theory of planned behaviour may not provide a proper
conceptualization of behavioural prediction (see Fazio, 1990). In an attempt to
uncover how attitudes influence spontaneous behaviour, Fazio (1990) developed
the MODE model of attitude–behaviour relations. MODE refers to Motivation
and Opportunity as DEterminants of behaviour.

- - - - - - - - - -

MODE model a model of attitude–behaviour relations in which motivation and opportunity are
necessary to make a deliberative consideration of available information.

- - - - - - - - - -

At a basic level, the MODE model suggests that, if individuals have both
sufficient motivation and opportunity, they may base their behaviour on a
deliberative consideration of the available information. However, when either
the motivation or the opportunity to make a reasoned decision is low, only
attitudes that are highly accessible will predict spontaneous behaviour. A
number of studies by Fazio and colleagues have supported the MODE model
(see e.g. Sanbonmatsu & Fazio, 1990; Schuette & Fazio, 1995). For example,
Schuette and Fazio (1995) considered how attitude accessibility and motivation
influence the extent to which people process information in a biased way.
Schuette and Fazio asked university students to evaluate two research studies on
the effectiveness of the death penalty as a crime deterrent. One study supported
the idea that capital punishment is an effective crime deterrent; the second study
reached the opposite conclusion. Before participants looked at the studies,
Schuette and Fazio manipulated the accessibility of each participant’s attitude
toward the death penalty. Some participants expressed their attitude once (low
accessibility), whereas others expressed their attitude six times (high
accessibility). To manipulate motivation, some participants were told that their
conclusions would be compared to those made by an expert panel. Participants
in the low motivation condition did not receive this information.
The results revealed that the relation between individuals’ prior attitude and
their judgement about the study depended on both the accessibility of the
participants’ attitude and their level of motivation. Participants evaluated the
articles in line with their own attitude when their attitude was highly accessible
and their motivation was low. In this case, their highly accessible attitude served
as a cue that biased their perceptions. However, when participants were highly
motivated, or when they had expressed their attitude only one time, attitudes
were not correlated with evaluations of the studies. In these conditions, being
motivated can lead individuals to overcome the potential biases of their attitude,
even if it is accessible. When respondents are not motivated, expressing an
attitude just once does not make it sufficiently accessible for it to influence their
perceptions.

The RIM model

A recent model relevant to the link between attitudes and behaviour has been
developed by Strack and Deutsch (2004). Their reflective–impulsive model
(RIM) proposes that behaviour is controlled by two interacting systems: a
reflective system that guides and elicits behaviour via a reasoned consideration
of available information, and an impulsive system that guides and elicits
behaviour through more automatic associative links. The reflective system can
be seen as involving processes that resemble how people respond to explicit
measures of attitude, whereas the impulsive system involves processes that bear
greater resemblance to implicit measures of attitude. Indeed, Strack and Deutsch
suggest that the reflective system should have a greater influence on deliberative
behaviour, while the impulsive system should have a greater influence on
spontaneous behaviour. Consistent with the ideas proposed in the RIM model,
studies have demonstrated that explicit and implicit measures of attitude predict
different types of behaviour (as discussed earlier in the chapter).
 Summary
On the whole, attitudes do a reasonable job of predicting behaviour. The degree
to which attitudes predict behaviour depends upon factors such as the level of
correspondence across measures, the domain of behaviour, attitude strength and
personality factors. The theory of reasoned action and its extension, the theory of
planned behaviour, have received strong support as models for predicting
deliberate behaviour. The MODE model suggests that motivation and
opportunity are necessary to make a deliberative consideration of available
information. The RIM model proposes that behaviour is controlled by two
interacting systems: a reflective system and an impulsive system.

CHAPTER SUMMARY
What is an attitude? An attitude is an overall evaluation of an attitude
object.
Can we have attitudes about anything? Anything that can be evaluated
along a dimension of favourability can be conceptualized as an attitude
object.
What are the bases of attitudes? Attitudes have affective, cognitive and
behavioural antecedents. All three antecedents contribute to our overall
evaluation of an object.
Is the structure of an attitude best considered to be one-dimensional or
two-dimensional? The two-dimensional perspective is advantageous as it
allows for attitude ambivalence.
Why do we hold attitudes? Attitudes serve a variety of functions, the most
important of which is the object appraisal function.
Why is it useful to know the function of an attitude? Knowing the function
of an attitude is important because attempts to change an attitude are more
likely to be successful when the persuasive appeal matches the attitude’s
function.
Does it matter if an attitude is strong or weak? Yes – strong attitudes are
more stable over time, more resistant to change and more likely to guide
both information processing and behaviour.
What is the difference between explicit and implicit measures of attitude?
Explicit measures directly ask respondents to think about and report their
attitude, whereas implicit measures do not.
 Do explicit and implicit measures predict different types of behaviour?
Research has shown that explicit measures are more effective in
predicting deliberative behaviour, whereas implicit measures are more
effective in predicting spontaneous behaviour.
Do attitudes predict behaviour? On the whole, attitudes do a reasonable
job of predicting behaviour. The degree to which attitudes predict
behaviour depends on a number of factors, including correspondence, the
domain of behaviour, the strength of an attitude and person variables.
How do attitudes predict behaviour? A number of models have been
developed to understand how attitudes predict behaviour. The most
influential models are the theory of planned behaviour and the MODE
model.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

Albarracín, D., Johnson, B. T., & Zanna, M. P. (Eds.). (2005). Handbook of
attitudes. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. This volume offers an advanced review of the
field of attitudes research.
Cialdini, R. B. (2008). Influence: Science and practice (5th ed.). Boston, MA:
Allyn & Bacon. This volume offers an accessible look at research on social
influence.
Crano, W., & Prislin, R. (Eds.). (2009). Attitudes and persuasion. New York:
Psychology Press. This volume reviews different streams of research on attitudes
and attitude change.
Eagly, A. H., & Chaiken, S. (1993). The psychology of attitudes. Fort Worth,
TX: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. This volume provides a comprehensive review
of research that laid the foundation for the progress that has been made in the
past two decades.
Fazio, R. H., & Olson, M. A. (2003). Implicit measures in social cognition
research: Their meaning and use. Annual Review of Psychology, 54, 297–327.
This paper reviews advances that have been made concerning implicit measures
of attitude.
Fazio, R. H., & Petty, R. E. (Eds.). (2007). Attitudes: Structure, function, and
consequences. Hove, UK: Psychology Press. This volume comprises a collection
of important published papers on attitude structure, attitude content and the
attitude–behaviour relation.
Haddock, G., & Maio, G. R. (Eds.). (2004). Contemporary perspectives on the
pychology of attitudes. Hove, UK: Psychology Press. This volume reviews a
number of contemporary research programmes on the psychology of attitudes.
Maio, G. R., & Haddock, G. (2010). The psychology of attitudes and attitude
change. London: Sage. This volume provides a comprehensive and accessible
overview of research and theories relevant to the psychology of attitudes.
Maio, G. R., & Olson, J. M. (Eds.). (2000). Why we evaluate: Functions of
attitudes. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. This volume is a comprehensive examination
of research on attitude functions.
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1986). Communication and persuasion: Central
and peripheral routes to attitude change. New York: Springer. This volume
highlights the research that was conducted in the development of the highly
influential Elaboration Likelihood Model of persuasion.
Petty, R. E., Fazio, R. H., & Briñol, P. (Eds.). (2009). Attitudes: Insights from
the new implicit measures. New York: Psychology Press. This volume highlights
different research programmes regarding implicit measures of attitude.
Wittenbrink, B., & Schwarz, N. (Eds.). (2007). Implicit measures of attitudes.
New York: Guilford. This volume provides an overview of different
perspectives on the utility of implicit measures of attitude.
 Chapter 7

Strategies of Attitude and Behaviour Change

Wolfgang Stroebe

Source: © Stuart Hepburn. Used under licence from Shutterstock.

KEY TERMS

central route to persuasion

cognitive dissonance theory
cognitive response model
counterattitudinal behaviour
distraction
dual-process theories of persuasion
elaboration
elaboration likelihood model (ELM)
heuristic processing
heuristic–systematic model (HSM)
intrinsic motivation
 need for cognition
need for cognitive closure
over-justification effect
peripheral route to persuasion
reactance theory
subliminal advertising
systematic processing
thought-listing
CHAPTER OUTLINE
INTRODUCTION
PERSUASION
Theories of systematic processing Summary
Dual-process theories of persuasion Summary
Changing implicit attitudes
Summary
Advertising as applied persuasion Summary
INCENTIVE-INDUCED ATTITUDE CHANGE
Counterattitudinal behaviour and attitude change Some paradoxical effects
of incentives and sanctions Further limitations of the effectiveness of
incentive-induced change Summary

ROUTE MAP OF THE CHAPTER

This chapter discusses two strategies of attitude and behaviour change,
namely persuasion and the use of incentives (e.g. taxation, legal sanctions).
We will discuss when, how and why persuasion results in attitude and
behaviour change and review empirical studies that have been conducted to
assess the validity of these theoretical interpretations. Finally, we will apply
these theories to the area of advertising. The second part of the chapter will
focus on the use of incentives. Instead of relying on the uncertain effects of
persuasion to induce people to use seatbelts or give up smoking,
governments often employ legal sanctions or taxation to influence behaviour
directly. These strategies are quite effective in influencing behaviour, but it
is much less clear whether they can also result in attitude change.
 INTRODUCTION
The notion of using social psychological knowledge to change attitudes and to
influence behaviour conjures up visions of advertising executives planning mass
media campaigns to sell cars, refrigerators, alcoholic drinks or margarine. And
this vision is certainly not incorrect. However, social psychology is equally
useful in persuading people to change unhealthy behaviour patterns such as
smoking, drinking or engaging in unsafe sex. In fact, one of the most effective
campaigns in recent times, achieving substantial changes in attitudes and
behaviour, has probably been the war against smoking. It began in 1964 with the
publication of the report of the United States Surgeon General’s Advisory
Committee on Smoking and Health (USDHEW, 1964). The persuasive
information on the substantial health impairment suffered by smokers was
quickly adopted by the news media and thus reached a wide audience. The
material not only persuaded many smokers to stop, it also convinced politicians
that it was time to act and, some years later, compulsory health warnings were
introduced on tobacco advertisements and cigarette packets. Finally, in the
1980s, Federal cigarette tax was doubled and various states introduced additional
excise taxes on cigarettes. Largely as a result of this anti-smoking campaign,
smoking is now generally recognized as a health risk and an addiction.
Moreover, especially in the US, smoking has declined substantially. (See Figures
7.1 & 7.2.)
FIGURE 7.1 Per capita cigarette consumption per year among adults, and
major smoking and health events in the US, 1900–1990.
Source: Based on Novotny, Romano, Davis, & Mills, 1992.
FIGURE 7.2(a), (b), (c) and (d) Thanks to effective anti-tobacco campaigns,
smoking is now generally recognized as a health risk and an addiction.
Source: (a) © FuzzBones; (b) © STILLFX; (c) © michaeljung; (d) © Jeroen van
den Broek. All images used under licence from Shutterstock.

This chapter focuses on the two major strategies of attitude and behaviour
change, namely (1) the use of persuasion, and (2) the use of incentives or
sanctions. In each section, we will discuss the effectiveness of these strategies
and use the major theories in the literature to analyse the psychological processes
that are responsible for their impact.
 PERSUASION
Persuasion involves the use of communications to change the beliefs, attitudes
and behaviour of others. Research on persuasion received a big boost during
World War II when the American army looked for strategies to counteract
enemy propaganda and to boost the morale of their own troops (Hovland,
Lumsdaine, & Sheffield, 1949). After the war, Carl Hovland, the director of the
mass communication programme within the US Army’s information and
education division, assembled a group of eminent researchers at Yale University
(e.g. Abelson, Janis, Kelley, McGuire, Rosenberg) and this group was
instrumental in making the study of persuasion and attitude change one of the
central areas of social psychology.
 Theories of systematic processing
Is attitude change determined by how well we understand and
remember persuasive arguments?
Before 1980, most of the theories of persuasion and attitude change emphasized
systematic processing. They assumed that attitude change was mediated by the
message recipient’s detailed processing of the persuasive arguments contained in
the communication; that is to say, processing of the message arguments was the
means by which persuasive arguments had their effect on attitudes (see Chapter
2 for discussion of mediating variables). The two most influential theories of
systematic processing have been the information processing model (McGuire,
1969, 1985) and the cognitive response model (e.g. Greenwald, 1968; Petty,
Ostrom & Brock, 1981).

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systematic processing thorough, detailed processing of information (e.g. attention to the arguments
contained in a persuasive communication); this kind of processing relies on ability and effort.

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The information processing model of persuasion

The paradigm proposed by McGuire (1969, 1985) provides a useful framework
for thinking about the stages involved in the processing of persuasive
communications. According to this model, the persuasive impact of a message is
the product of at least five steps: (1) attention; (2) comprehension; (3) yielding;
(4) retention; and (5) behaviour (see Theory Box 7.1). For example, the ultimate
objective of speeches given on television by politicians is to get the members of
the audience to vote for their party. If viewers use the break between
programmes to go to the bathroom (failure to attend) the appeal will not result in
attitude change. Even if viewers attend to the communication, it will have little
impact if they find the arguments too complex (failure to comprehend) or if they
do not accept the communicator’s conclusions and as a result, do not change
their beliefs and attitudes (failure to yield). But even if the candidate manages to
persuade the audience, this will be of no use if viewers change their attitudes
again before election day (failure to retain) or if bad weather keeps them away
from the ballot box (failure to act). Since the message receiver must go through
each of these steps if the communication is to have the ultimate persuasive
impact, and since it is unlikely that the probability of any given step will be
maximal, McGuire’s framework offers one explanation of why it is often
difficult to induce behaviour change through information campaigns.

THEORY BOX 7.1

THE INFORMATION PROCESSING MODEL OF
MCGUIRE (1969, 1985)

In social psychological studies, the impact of a communication is typically

assessed immediately following exposure to the message. Thus, our analysis is
restricted to the first three steps of the chain. Moreover, attention and
comprehension have usually been combined into a single step of reception of the
message content in order to simplify measurement. Thus McGuire’s model can
be reduced to a two-step version, which states that the probability of a
communication resulting in change of beliefs and attitudes is the joint product of
reception and acceptance (yielding) (see Leader in the Field, William J.
McGuire).
Few studies have supported the claim that the reception of message arguments
determines attitude change. In general, message reception, when measured by
the recall of message arguments, is not found to correlate significantly with
attitude change (see Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). This failure to find correlations
between argument recall and attitude change raised doubts about McGuire’s
two-step model, in particular the role of attention to and comprehension of the
arguments presented in persuasive communications. Even more critical for the
model was the fact that it lacked specific theoretical principles that would allow
one to predict the factors that affect acceptance and to understand the processes
that mediate the relationship between acceptance and attitude change. The
cognitive response model provides such a theory.
The cognitive response model: a theory of yielding
The cognitive response model of persuasion was developed by Greenwald and
his colleagues at Ohio State University, partly to explain the absence of a
correlation between argument recall and attitude change (Greenwald, 1968;
Petty, Ostrom & Brock, 1981; see Leader in the Field, Anthony Greenwald).
According to this model, it is not the reception of arguments that mediates
attitude change, but the thoughts (cognitive responses) stimulated in the recipient
by those arguments. Listening to a communication is like a mental discussion.
Listeners are active participants who relate the communication to their own
knowledge. In doing this, the person may consider much cognitive material that
is not contained in the communication itself to generate thoughts for or against
the arguments presented in the communication. It is these self-generated
thoughts and not the presented arguments per se which mediate attitude change.
Messages persuade if they evoke predominantly favourable thoughts, and they
fail to persuade if they evoke predominantly unfavourable thoughts. Thus, the
impact of persuasion variables on attitude change does not depend on the extent
to which they facilitate argument reception, but on the extent to which they
stimulate individuals to generate their own favourable or unfavourable thoughts
about the information presented.

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cognitive response model assumes that attitude change is mediated by the thoughts, or ‘cognitive
responses’, which recipients generate as they receive and reflect upon persuasive communications.

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LEADER IN THE FIELD

William J. McGuire (1925–2008) was born in New York City, US.
After a brief stint in the army, he studied psychology at Fordham
University, where he received his BA (1949) and MA (1950). He
then spent a year as a Research Fellow at the University of
Minnesota at the time Festinger was there (see Leader in the Field,
Chapter 1). In 1951 he went to Yale University for his PhD, which
he received in 1954. He stayed on at Yale for four more years, and
 after holding positions at various other universities (Illinois,
Columbia and San Diego) he returned to Yale as Professor of
Psychology in 1971, remaining there until his retirement in 1999.
Bill McGuire dominated research on attitudes and attitude change
until the 1980s. During his early time at Yale, he was a member of
the famous Yale Communication and Attitude Change Program
headed by Carl Hovland (see Leader in the Field, Chapter 1). When
he returned to Yale ten years after the death of Hovland, he
continued the research tradition of the Yale program. He made
numerous empirical and theoretical contributions to the area, and
also authored the highly influential chapters on attitudes and attitude
change in the second and third edition of the Handbook of Social
Psychology (McGuire, 1969, 1985).

LEADER IN THE FIELD

Anthony Greenwald (b. 1939) received his BA from Yale
University in 1959 and his MA from Harvard University in 1961. In
1963 he completed his PhD, also at Harvard, under the supervision
of Gordon Allport (see Leader in the Field, Chapter 14). After a two
year Postdoctoral Fellowship at the Educational Testing Service, he
moved to the Psychology Department at Ohio State University,
where he remained until 1986. During this time he developed the
cognitive response approach that revolutionized attitude change
theory. The cognitive response model assumed that all persuasion
was basically self-persuasion, in that external messages triggered
favourable or unfavourable thoughts that were ultimately responsible
for persuasion or resistance. After more than 20 years on the faculty
of Ohio State University, Greenwald moved to the University of
Washington in 1986, where he worked on such topics as subliminal
persuasion and the self. Perhaps his second most important
contribution to attitudes was the introduction of the implicit
association test or IAT as a means of assessing automatic
evaluations.
On first reading, this does not appear to be a very impressive theory. It is also
not terribly new. Writing in 1949, Hovland, Lumsdaine, and Sheffield had
already suggested that audiences may resist persuasion by going over their own
arguments against the position during exposure to the communication. Hovland
and Weiss (1951) later emphasized that the best way to study internal processes
of attitude change was to have respondents verbalize their thoughts as they
responded to the communication. However, although cognitive responses were
everybody’s favourite concept to be invoked when non-obvious findings of
persuasion studies had to be explained (e.g. Festinger & Maccoby, 1964),
research on the role of cognitive responses as mediators of persuasion had been
hampered by the absence of accepted measures of self-generated thinking.
One major methodological contribution of the Ohio State researchers to the
study of persuasion was therefore the development of a measure of cognitive
responses: thought-listing (Greenwald, 1968; Osterhouse & Brock, 1970). This
enabled them to assess the processes assumed to mediate attitude change. With
this thought-listing task recipients of a message are asked to list the thoughts
they had while listening. These thoughts are later categorized into those that are
favourable or unfavourable to the position advocated by the message. Thoughts
that do not fit either of these categories (e.g. neutral or irrelevant thoughts) are
not considered.

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thought-listing a measure of cognitive responses; message recipients are asked to list all the
thoughts that occurred to them while being exposed to a persuasive message.

- - - - - - - - - -

The second major contribution of the Ohio State researchers was theoretical.
Previous conceptualizations of cognitive responses had focused only on the
production of counterarguments that reduce persuasion (e.g. Festinger &
Maccoby, 1964). In an important theoretical contribution, Petty, Wells, and
Brock (1976) broadened the concept of cognitive responses by arguing that
strong and well-argued messages are likely to produce predominantly favourable
thoughts which should enhance persuasion.
This extended cognitive response model accounts for a number of inconsistent
findings in the attitude change literature. Thus, it helps to explain why there is
often no correlation between argument recall and attitude change. If it is the
thoughts stimulated by arguments and not the arguments themselves that are
responsible for attitude change, then the message arguments that a recipient
remembers could not be expected to be related to attitude change. What one
would expect, however, is a correlation between the extent to which these
thoughts are favourable or unfavourable towards the arguments presented by the
communicator and the amount of attitude change. The newly developed thought-
listing measure enabled researchers to test (and to support) this assumption (e.g.
Osterhouse & Brock, 1970).
Another inconsistency resolved by the cognitive response approach related to
findings of research on the impact of distraction on attitude change. We have
probably all had the experience of being distracted while listening to some
communication. The station on our car radio might have faded in the middle of a
broadcast, or the people next to us might have started a loud conversation. Since
being distracted whilst listening to a communication should impair reception,
one would expect distraction to reduce the persuasive impact of a
communication. Although some studies reported findings consistent with this
prediction (e.g. Haaland & Venkatesan, 1968), others found distraction to
strengthen the persuasive impact of a communication (e.g. Festinger &
Maccoby, 1964).

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distraction while listening to a persuasive communication, individuals are distracted by having to

perform an irrelevant activity or by experiencing sensory stimulation irrelevant to the message.

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According to the cognitive response model, such discrepant results are to be

expected. Distraction reduces the recipient’s ability to generate cognitive
responses to a message. The impact of distraction on attitude change should
therefore depend on the favourability of the thoughts produced by a message
(Petty et al., 1976). If these dominant thoughts are mainly unfavourable,
distraction should enhance persuasion. However, for messages that elicit
predominantly favourable thoughts, distraction should work to inhibit
persuasion.
But how can we manipulate the favourability of a listener’s dominant
thoughts? Since we have put so much emphasis on self-generated thoughts as a
mediator of persuasion in this section, it is easy to forget that these thoughts are
cognitive responses to persuasive arguments and are therefore likely to be
influenced by the quality of these arguments. Thus, communications which
present several strong arguments (e.g. arguments which are coherent, logical and
compelling) are likely to elicit cognitive responses which are predominantly
favourable to the position argued, whereas messages consisting mainly of weak
arguments should elicit predominantly unfavourable responses. This process is
illustrated in Theory Box 7.2.
Petty and colleagues (1976, Experiment 1) exposed students to messages
arguing for an increase in tuition fees at their university. These communications
consisted of either very strong or very weak arguments. Distraction was
manipulated by having participants record visual stimuli (briefly flashed on a
screen at a rate of 0, 4, 12 or 20 flashes per minute) while listening to the
message. In line with predictions, increases in distraction enhanced persuasion
for the message that consisted of weak arguments, but reduced persuasion for the
message containing strong arguments (Figure 7.3). The participants’ thought-
listing data provided support for the assumption that both the increase and the
decrease in persuasion were due to thought disruption. In the case of weak
arguments, the distraction manipulation decreased recipients’ ability to generate
counterarguments to the weak message; in the case of strong arguments,
distraction reduced the number of favourable thoughts they were able to generate
to that version of the message.
FIGURE 7.3 Mean level of agreement (shown as z-scores) in relation to
argument quality and level of distraction.
Source: Adapted from Petty et al., 1976. Copyright © 1976 by the American
Psychological Association. Adapted with permission. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 34, 874–884. The use of APA information does not imply
endorsement by APA.
THEORY BOX 7.2
THE COGNITIVE RESPONSE MODEL OF
PERSUASION
 Summary
McGuire’s information processing theory shares with the cognitive response
model of Greenwald (1968) the assumption that persuasive arguments have to be
processed systematically in order to influence beliefs and attitudes. However,
whereas McGuire assumed further that change of beliefs and attitudes was a
function of how well we understood and remembered the persuasive arguments,
the cognitive response model assumes that it is not the arguments, but the
respondents’ thoughts generated in response to arguments, which determine
change.
 Dual-process theories of persuasion
Do people sometimes change their attitudes without systematic
processing of persuasive arguments, and what factors determine
depth of processing?
That attitude change is mediated by detailed processing of the arguments may
strike one as a plausible way to analyse the psychological processes that mediate
persuasion. After all, is there any other way to be persuaded, if not through the
arguments contained in a persuasive communication? However, if we think of
the hundreds of advertisements we are exposed to every day, we might become
doubtful. Does anybody really think about the arguments contained in
advertisements about soft drinks or toothpaste? Do these advertisements even
contain arguments? And yet if people were not influenced by them, these
companies would not spend millions on their advertising budgets.
The answer to these questions is that advertisements often work through
processes of evaluative conditioning or mere exposure, which we discussed in
Chapter 6. Evaluative conditioning changes the liking for a stimulus by
repeatedly pairing it with another more polarized positive or negative stimulus.
With relatively unfamiliar stimuli liking can even be increased by mere
exposure. But how are evaluative conditioning and mere exposure related to
systematic processing? Under which conditions does each of these processes
operate? These are the types of questions which we will address in our
discussion of dual-process theories of persuasion. Dual-process theories
integrate both theories of systematic processing and persuasion processes that
are not based on systematic analysis of message arguments (e.g. evaluative
conditioning, mere exposure, heuristic processing). Dual-process theories also
specify the conditions under which people will engage in each of these
processes. There are two dual-process theories of persuasion, the elaboration
likelihood model (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986a, b; Petty & Wegener, 1999; see
Leader in the Field, Richard E. Petty) and the heuristic–systematic model (e.g.
Chaiken, Lieberman & Eagly, 1989; Chen & Chaiken, 1999; see Leader in the
Field, Shelly Chaiken). There is, however, so much overlap between these
theories in their core assumptions that we will focus mainly on the elaboration
likelihood model. After having presented the elaboration likelihood model, we
will briefly discuss the major aspects in which this theory differs from the
heuristic–systematic model of Chaiken and her colleagues.

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dual-process theories of persuasion theories of persuasion postulating two modes of information

processing, systematic and non-systematic. Modes differ in the extent to which individuals engage
in content-relevant thoughts and critical evaluation of the arguments contained in a message.

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elaboration likelihood model (ELM) attitude change to persuasive communications is mediated

by either central or peripheral processing; elaboration denotes the extent to which a person thinks
about the issue-relevant arguments contained in a message.

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heuristic–systematic model (HSM) attitude change to persuasive communications is mediated by

heuristic and/or systematic processing: when motivation and ability are high, systematic processing
is likely; when they are low, individuals rely on heuristic cues.

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LEADER IN THE FIELD

Shelly Chaiken (b. 1949) studied mathematics at the University of
Maryland (College Park) and received her BA in 1971. She then
became a graduate student in social psychology at the University of
Massachusetts (Amherst), where she received her MS in 1975 and
her PhD in 1978. After brief spells at the University of Toronto and
Vanderbilt University, she moved to New York University as
Professor of Psychology in 1985, where she stayed until 2005. She is
 now associated with the University of Wisconsin (Madison). At the
University of Massachusetts, she did her graduate studies with Alice
Eagly (see Leader in the Field, Chapter 6) and developed the idea for
the heuristic systematic model during her work for her PhD. She
continued her close collaboration with Eagly even after her PhD and
co-authored The Psychology of Attitudes with her in 1993, which has
been the defining book on that topic for many years. She has
published numerous empirical articles testing and extending her
heuristic–systematic model. In 1999 she also edited (jointly with
Yaacov Trope) an important volume on Dual-process theories in
social psychology.

LEADER IN THE FIELD

Richard E. Petty (b. 1951) received his BA in political science and
psychology from the University of Virginia in 1973. He then moved
to Ohio State University for his graduate studies, where he received
his PhD in 1977. He began his academic career the same year at the
University of Missouri, from where, after a sabbatical at Yale in
1986, he returned to Ohio State in 1987. Since 1998 he has been
Distinguished University Professor at Ohio State University. At Ohio
State he began a fruitful collaboration with fellow PhD student John
Cacioppo (see Leader in the Field, Chapter 6). At that time
persuasion research was plagued by inconsistencies in empirical
findings, which could not be explained by available theoretical
models. In their attempt to reconcile these conflicting findings and to
integrate different theoretical approaches ranging from cognitive
response theory to theories based on evaluative conditioning, Petty
and Cacioppo developed the idea of the two routes to persuasion
which formed the basis for their general theory of attitude change,
the elaboration likelihood model (ELM). It is probably fair to say
that Petty has taken over the mantle of Bill McGuire (see Leader in
the Field, this chapter) as the dominant figure in the area of attitude
and attitude change research.

The elaboration likelihood model (ELM)

When people receive a communication and are faced with the decision whether
to accept or reject the position advocated, they will try to form an opinion of its
validity. This assessment may be arrived at by two routes of information
processing, namely a central and a peripheral route to persuasion. These two
routes mark the endpoints of a continuum that ranges from thoughtful to very
non-thoughtful strategies (i.e. the elaboration likelihood continuum). Petty and
Cacioppo (1986a, b) use the term elaboration to denote the extent to which a
person thinks about the issue-relevant arguments contained in a message.

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elaboration refers to the extent to which a person thinks about the issue-relevant arguments
contained in a message.

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The probability that a recipient will critically evaluate arguments contained in

a message (i.e. elaboration likelihood) is determined by both processing
motivation and processing ability. Processing motivation is important because
such elaboration requires time and effort. Processing ability is important
because, in order to be able to scrutinize arguments, a person needs both issue-
relevant knowledge and sufficient time. For example, if a computer salesperson
gives us a highly technical speech about the advantages of a computer they are
trying to sell us, we will not be able to evaluate these arguments if we lack the
necessary computer knowledge. But even if we have the necessary knowledge,
we might not be able to think about these arguments if we have no time to do so,
because we have to come to a decision immediately. If, however, individuals are
motivated and able to think about the arguments contained in a communication,
they will engage in systematic processing and follow the central route to
persuasion (Theory Box 7.3a). This mode of information processing is identical
to the processes assumed by the cognitive response model. However, sometimes
recipients may not be motivated (e.g. the issue is trivial) or able (e.g. they have
no time or lack the knowledge) to engage in an extensive process of message
evaluation. Under these conditions attitudes will be formed according to the
peripheral route to persuasion (see Theory Box 7.3b). This type of persuasion
refers to any attitude change mechanism that does not involve systematic
processing. The peripheral route thus encompasses cognitive processes such as
the use of heuristic decision rules (e.g. ‘experts can be trusted’), affective
processes such as evaluative conditioning and mere exposure (see Chapter 6),
and use of information about the attitudes held by relevant others (see Chapter
8).

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central route to persuasion a person’s careful and thoughtful consideration of the arguments
presented in support of a position.

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peripheral route to persuasion subsumes those persuasion processes that are not based on issue-
relevant thinking (e.g. evaluative conditioning, heuristic processing).

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The peripheral process that has been most extensively examined in studies of
dual-process theories of persuasion has been heuristic processing (Theory Box
7.3b), which focuses on the simple decision rules which people use to judge the
validity of messages. For example, people may have learned from previous
experience that statements by experts tend to be more accurate than statements
by non-experts. They may therefore apply the rule ‘experts can be trusted’ in
response to indications that the communicator is an expert (Eagly & Chaiken,
1993). Or they may have learned to trust people they like and, on finding a
communicator likeable, they will apply the ‘liking–agreement’ heuristic, such as
‘people agree with people they like’ or ‘people I like usually have correct
opinions’ (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993).

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heuristic processing assessing the validity of a communication through reliance on heuristics; that
is, simple rules like ‘statistics don’t lie’, ‘experts can be trusted’, ‘consensus implies correctness’,
 rather than through evaluation of arguments.

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Assessing elaboration. Petty, Cacioppo and their colleagues developed two

strategies that allowed an assessment of the extent to which recipients of a
message engage in message processing. One method, which was mentioned
earlier, is the thought-listing technique. This technique gives some indication of
the number of supportive or unsupportive thoughts stimulated by a message. If
attitude change is due to central processing, then (1) recipients of a message
should have generated several positive thoughts about the arguments contained
in the message, and (2) the relative favourability or unfavourability of these
thoughts to the advocated position should be correlated with the extent of
attitude change. More specifically, a favourability index based on thought-listing
(e.g. ratio of favourable thoughts to total number of relevant thoughts) should act
as a mediator of attitude change under central processing, but not under
peripheral processing.
An even more powerful tool to assess the degree to which message recipients
engage in systematic processing is the systematic variation of argument quality.
With this technique, recipients are exposed to communications that consist of
either strong or weak arguments. (The categorization of arguments as strong or
weak is decided beforehand on the basis of a pilot study.) Exposure to strong
arguments should stimulate predominantly favourable thoughts about the
message in recipients who engage in central route processing. As a result, there
should also be significant attitude change. On the other hand, if arguments are
weak, central route processing should produce predominantly unfavourable
thoughts about the message, and therefore very little attitude change. The less
recipients are motivated and able to engage in central route (i.e. systematic)
processing of a message, the weaker should be the effect of a manipulation of
argument quality on cognitive responses and attitude change. The combined use
of both thought-listing (as one of the dependent measures) and manipulation of
argument quality (as one of the independent variables) therefore provides a valid
tool for diagnosing the extent to which individuals engage in central processing
of the content of a message.

THEORY BOX 7.3

 THE ELABORATION LIKELIHOOD MODEL
OF PETTY AND CACIOPPO (1986A & B): (A)
CENTRAL ROUTE TO PERSUASION; (B)
PERIPHERAL ROUTE TO PERSUASION

Processing ability, elaboration and attitude change. Variation in processing

ability should affect information processing mainly when individuals are
motivated to process a message. Thus, studies of variables that influence
processing ability have typically used issues which were highly relevant to the
students who were the recipients of these communications (e.g. a planned
increase in tuition fees, or a proposed change in the college exam system).
Among the most important variables influencing a person’s ability to
systematically process persuasive arguments are distraction and message
repetition. Since we have considered research on distraction earlier, we will
focus here on message repetition. In contrast to distraction, which reduces
processing ability, (moderate) argument repetition should provide recipients with
more opportunity for cognitively elaborating a communication. Thus, repetition
should enhance attitude change for messages consisting of strong arguments and
reduce attitude change for weak messages. Cacioppo and Petty (1989) tested this
hypothesis by exposing respondents either one or three times to a message that
contained either strong or weak persuasive arguments. Consistent with their
predictions, increasing exposure to the same message led to higher agreement
with high-quality messages, but led to decreased agreement with low-quality
messages. However, the positive impact of repetition on high-quality messages
will only occur if recipients are motivated to think about the communication
(Claypool, Mackie, Garcia-Marques, McIntosh, & Udal, 2004). Furthermore,
when messages are repeated too often, boredom sets in, which can result in
rejection of even high-quality arguments in high-relevance messages (Cacioppo
& Petty, 1979).
Processing motivation, elaboration and attitude change. The most influential
determinant of a person’s motivation to think about the argument contained in a
message is the perceived personal relevance of the communication. Only if the
issue is important to them personally should recipients of a communication be
motivated to critically evaluate the arguments contained in a message. With low
involvement, when the issue of the communication is of little relevance,
recipients are likely to rely on peripheral cues to assess the validity of the
position advocated by the communication.
Petty, Cacioppo, and Goldman (1981) tested these predictions experimentally.
They exposed college students to an attitude-discrepant communication
advocating major changes to the college examination system. This
communication, on a topic of great importance to students, contained either
strong or weak arguments and was attributed either to a source with high
expertise (the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education) or to one with low
expertise (a class at a local high school). The researchers manipulated personal
relevance by informing students either that these changes were going to be
instituted the following year and would thus affect them, or that they would take
effect only in ten years’ time. Petty and colleagues (1981) predicted that when
students believed that the changes would affect their own fate (high personal
relevance), they should be motivated to scrutinize the arguments and to engage
in issue-relevant thinking. For these highly involved students, argument quality
would be a major factor in persuasion. Students who believed that these changes
would only be instituted long after they had left the university (low personal
relevance) would not be motivated to think a great deal about the
communication. Instead, they would use heuristic rules such as ‘experts can be
trusted’ to assess the validity of the advocated position. The results strongly
supported these predictions (Figure 7.4). As Figure 7.4a shows, the nature of the
source was a significant determinant of attitudes only for the low-involvement
participants. But, as Figure 7.4b shows, argument quality was a significant factor
only for the high-involvement participants.
FIGURE 7.4(a) and (b) (a) interactive effect of involvement and source
expertise on post-communication attitudes; (b) interactive effect of involvement
and argument quality on post-communication attitudes.
Source: Petty, Cacioppo & Goldman, 1981. Copyright © 1981 by the American
Psychological Association. Adapted with permission. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 41, 847–855. The use of APA information does not imply
endorsement by APA.

The extent to which individuals scrutinize message arguments is affected not

only by situational factors but also by individual differences in their motivation
to think about persuasive communications. For example, people who frequently
engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive activity (high need for cognition) should
be more likely to form attitudes on the basis of the arguments contained in a
communication than are people who are low in need for cognition. Cacioppo and
Petty (1982) constructed a scale to measure need for cognition (see Individual
Differences 7.1). Since need for cognition reflects a cognitive motivation rather
than an intellectual ability, it correlates only moderately with verbal intelligence
(r = .24; Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996). Consistent with
expectations, argument quality affected attitude change mainly for individuals
with high rather than low need for cognition. A study by Haugtvedt and Petty
(1992) further demonstrated that attitude change in respondents with a high need
for cognition was more persistent and more resistant against
counterargumentation than in individuals with low need for cognition.

- - - - - - - - - -

need for cognition an individual difference variable which differentiates people according to the
extent to which they enjoy thinking about arguments contained in a communication.

- - - - - - - - - -

The need for cognitive closure is another individual difference variable that
has been shown to influence the intensity with which individuals process
information (Klein & Webster, 2000; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Webster &
Kruglanski, 1994). It refers to the individual’s need for a definite answer to a
question, any answer as opposed to confusion and ambiguity. Two highly related
tendencies are assumed to underlie this need, namely ‘urgency’, that is the need
to arrive at closure quickly, and ‘permanency’, that is the need to remain at
closure once it has been achieved. These two tendencies are assumed to be
separated by a demarcation point, namely the point, when a belief ‘crystallizes’
and turns from a conjecture to a firm ‘fact’ (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996).
During the ‘urgency’ phase, before a belief crystallizes, individuals will be
relatively open to persuasion attempts, because such attempts should accelerate
closure. Once a belief has crystallized, the ‘permanency’ tendency kicks in, and
individuals will be reluctant to engage in further information processing and will
be resistant to persuasive arguments (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). The need
for cognitive closure is assumed to reflect a stable individual difference that is
mostly measured with the Need for Closure Scale, a 42-item scale developed by
Webster and Kruglanski (1994). (A shortened version of this scale has recently
been proposed and validated by Roets and Van Hiel, 2011; see Individual
Differences 7.2.) These scales show a moderately negative correlation with need
for cognition (e.g. r = −.28; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994).

- - - - - - - - - -

need for cognitive closure refers to the desire of individuals for a definite answer to a question –
any answer, as opposed to uncertainty; the need reflects an individual difference variable, but can
also be situationally induced.

- - - - - - - - - -

A study by Klein and Webster (2000) provides some support for these
assumptions. Participants in their study were given promotional material about a
new telephone answering machine. The information varied both in length (three
versus nine arguments) and in the quality of the arguments that were presented.
Results showed that attitudes of individuals high in need for closure were more
affected by the number of arguments than by argument quality, whereas low
need for closure individuals were more likely to be affected by argument quality.
Since the length of a communication can be considered a heuristic cue (Chaiken,
1980), these findings are consistent with the assumption that individuals high in
need for closure rely on heuristic cues rather than scrutiny of arguments. In
contrast, the fact that argument quality influenced attitudes of individuals who
are low in need for cognitive closure suggests that they formed their attitude
based on scrutiny of the content of the communication.
The existence of stable individual differences between people in their need for
cognitive closure does not preclude the possibility that this need is also
influenced by situational factors. One of the situational factors known to
heighten need for closure is time pressure. Suppose you are going on a vacation
and you decide to buy a camera at the airport, because your old camera has just
been stolen on the train. If you have ample time before your plane leaves, you
will look at a range of different cameras, have all their advantages and
disadvantages explained and then select one, which promises to be most suitable
for your needs. In contrast, if you have only 10 minutes before boarding starts,
you have to rely on heuristic cues to reach your decision. You might choose the
camera recommended by the salesperson (experts know what is good), you
might rely on the price-quality heuristic and buy their most expensive camera, or
the camera of a brand that is familiar to you (i.e. if I have heard of this brand, it
must be good).

INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 7.1

THE NEED FOR COGNITION
This scale (short version by Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984) assesses need
for cognition, the tendency of individuals to engage in and enjoy effortful
cognitive endeavours (Cacioppo et al., 1996). When exposed to a persuasive
message, people high in need for cognition are assumed to engage in more
content-relevant thinking (i.e. systematic processing) than individuals low in
need for cognition.
Instructions: Indicate to what extent each statement is characteristic of you,
using the following response alternatives: 1 = extremely uncharacteristic of
me (not at all like me) 2 = somewhat uncharacteristic of me 3 = neither
uncharacteristic nor characteristic of me 4 = somewhat characteristic of me
5 = extremely characteristic of me
1. I would prefer complex to simple problems.
2. I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot
of thinking.
3. Thinking is not my idea of fun.
4. I would rather do something that requires little thought than something
that is sure to challenge my thinking ability.
5. I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a likely chance I will
have to think in depth about something.
6. I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours.
7. I only think as hard as I have to.
8. I prefer to think about small, daily projects to long-term ones.
9. I like tasks that require little thought once I’ve learned them.
10. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me.
11. I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to
 problems.
12. Learning new ways to think doesn’t excite me very much.
13. I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve.
14. The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me.
15. I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult and important to one
that is somewhat important but does not require much thought.
16. I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a
lot of mental effort.
17. It’s enough for me that something gets the job done; I don’t care how or
why it works.
18. I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect
me personally.
Scoring: First, reverse your scores on items 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 12, 16 and 17.
On any of these items, if you gave a 1 to the question, change it into a 5. If
you gave a 2, change it into a 4; if you gave a 4, change it into a 2; and if
you gave a 5, change it into a 1. If you gave a 3, leave it as a 3. Scores are
added, and the higher your score, the higher your need for cognition. The
median score in student samples was 60 (e.g. Petty, Schumann, Richman, &
Strathman, 1993).
Multiple roles by which variables can influence persuasion. Thus far we have
contrasted peripheral cues with content information and argued that peripheral
processing is determined by peripheral cues, whereas systematic processing is
determined by the content of the message. In doing so, we have given a
somewhat oversimplified presentation of the elaboration likelihood model. One
of the unique features of this model, but also a feature which complicates
predictions, is the assumption that persuasion variables can influence persuasion
in multiple ways, depending on the elaboration likelihood. Specifically, the
model states that at a low level of elaboration, a peripheral variable (e.g.
communicator credibility, mood) will influence persuasion through heuristic
processing or other non-thoughtful means. When elaboration is at a medium
level, the same variable might influence persuasion by influencing the extent of
the elaboration. And finally, when elaboration is high, a peripheral variable may
have no impact at all, may bias processing or may even act as an argument.
We will use the message recipient’s mood as an example of how a factor can
influence persuasion in different ways depending on the level of elaboration
likelihood (Petty & Wegener, 1999). Under conditions of low elaboration mood
might be linked to attitude objects via evaluative conditioning. There is evidence
that conditioning of attitudes appears to work best when prior knowledge of the
stimulus is low (Cacioppo, Marshall-Goodell, Tassinary, & Petty, 1992).
Another way mood can influence attitudes under conditions of low elaboration is
by acting as a heuristic cue. According to the ‘feelings-as-information’
hypothesis (e.g. Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, & Strack, 1990), people might use the
‘how do I feel about it heuristic’ to infer their attitude from their present mood.
In line with this assumption, Schwarz and Clore (1983) found that people
interviewed about their life satisfaction on a sunny day reported more
satisfaction than people interviewed on cloudy days (Figure 7.5). The ‘feelings-
as-information’ hypothesis further suggests that this type of misattribution
should be eliminated when individuals are given reason to discount their mood
state as information about the issue to be evaluated. In support of this
assumption, the impact of weather conditions on life satisfaction disappeared
when the interviewers (during the phone interview) casually asked about the
local weather conditions. Presumably, this made people attribute their mood to
the weather. Clore, Schwarz and Conway (1994) argued that the ‘how do I feel
about it heuristic’ is most likely to be used when the evaluation task is affective
in nature, when there are time constraints and when there is not much other
information available.
FIGURE 7.5 How does the weather affect your life satisfaction?
Source: © Igor Stepovik. Used under licence from Shutterstock.
 INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 7.2
THE NEED FOR COGNITIVE CLOSURE
The need for cognitive closure refers to people’s wish for a definite answer
to a question – any answer, as opposed to uncertainty. The scale shown here
is a brief 15-item version (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011) of the original 42-item
Need for Closure Scale (Webster & Kruglanski,1994). Try the scale
yourself. You have to indicate the extent to which you endorse each item by
responding to a 6-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (completely disagree) to
6 (completely agree). If you score 57 or above, your need for cognitive
closure is above average.
1. I don’t like situations that are uncertain.
2. I dislike questions that could be answered in many different ways.
3. I find that a well-ordered life with regular hours suits my temperament.
4. I feel uncomfortable when I don’t understand the reason why an event
occurred in my life.
 5. I feel irritated when one person disagrees with what everyone else in the
group believes.
6. I don’t like to go into a situation without knowing what I can expect
from it.
7. When I have made a decision, I feel relieved.
8. When I am confronted with a problem, I’m dying to reach a solution
very quickly.
9. I would quickly become impatient and irritated if I could not find a
solution to a problem immediately.
10. I don’t like to be with people who are capable of unexpected actions.
11. I dislike it when a person’s statement could mean many different
things.
12. I find that establishing a consistent routine enables me to enjoy life
more.
13. I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life.
14. I do not usually consult many different opinions before forming my
own view.
15. I dislike unpredictable situations.

Under moderate elaboration, mood can influence the recipient’s motivation to

elaborate on the content of a message. When in a good mood, individuals seem
to be more likely to engage in simplified heuristic processing, whereas in a bad
mood they may engage in more effortful systematic processing strategies. There
is a great deal of support for this assumption (for a review, see Bless, 2001). For
example, Bless et al. (1990) induced good or bad mood in participants in a
laboratory experiment by having them dwell on either a positive or a negative
life event. When the participants were subsequently exposed to an attitude-
discrepant communication (arguing for an increase in student service fees),
consisting of high-quality or low-quality arguments, argument quality affected
attitude change only for participants who were in a bad mood (Figure 7.6).
FIGURE 7.6 Attitude change as function of mood and message quality (
strong message quality; weak message quality).
Source: Adapted from Bless et al., 1990, Expt. 1. Reproduced with permission
from SAGE Publications.
 There are a number of different explanations for this effect. According to the
‘feelings-as-information’ hypothesis, individuals use their feelings as
information about the state of their environment. Thus, happy moods inform
people that their environment is safe, thereby reducing their motivation to
scrutinize information in the environment (Bless et al., 1990). An alternative
interpretation in terms of mood maintenance has been suggested by Wegener,
Petty, and Smith (1995). Wegener et al. noted that the messages used in these
studies have been either counter-attitudinal or on depressing topics such as fee
increases or acid rain. Individuals who were happy might then have avoided
processing these messages either because their positive mood led them to
process the information only superficially, or because they did not want to
disrupt their current pleasant state. Wegener et al. (1995) provided some
evidence that with messages which could be expected to be uplifting, both sad
and happy individuals engaged in equally high levels of elaboration. With a
message that could clearly be expected to be depressing, however, the pattern
observed by Bless et al. (1990) was replicated.
At very high levels of elaboration, when people are already processing
message arguments systematically, mood can influence information processing
by affecting the material that is brought to mind when the merits of an attitude
object are being considered (Petty & Wegener, 1999). There is some evidence
that positive moods activate positive material in memory, whereas negative
moods activate negative material (e.g. Bower, 1981). Thus, when individuals
engage in effortful processing and elaboration of message arguments, positive
moods might encourage positive interpretation of the information more than do
negative moods. This bias in information processing is most likely when the
information is relatively ambiguous.
 The consequences of elaboration. The elaboration likelihood model predicts
that persuasion induced by systematic processing (i.e. central route) is more
persistent than persuasion induced by peripheral or heuristic processing. High
levels of issue-relevant cognitive activity are likely to require frequent accessing
of the attitude and the related knowledge structure. This activity should therefore
increase the number of linkages between structural elements, making the attitude
schema more internally consistent, enduring and also more resistant to
counterarguments. Attitude formation or change that is based on systematic
processing should therefore result in stronger attitudes (Krosnick, Boninger,
Chuang, Berent, & Carnot, 1993). There are four key manifestations of strong
attitudes (Krosnick & Petty, 1995; see also Chapters 6 and 8): strong attitudes
are more persistent over time (e.g. Haugvedt & Petty, 1992; Petty & Cacioppo,
1986a, b); they are more resistant to counter-attitudinal appeal (Petty, Haugvedt
& Smith, 1995); they are more likely to influence information processing
(Houston & Fazio, 1989; Lord, Ross & Lepper, 1979); and they are more likely
to guide behaviour (Holland, Verplanken, & Van Knippenberg, 2002; Martin,
Martin, Smith, & Hewstone, 2007).
In contrast, attitudes formed via non-systematic processing tend to be
relatively weak. This means they do not persist over time, are unlikely to resist
counter-persuasion, do not guide information processing and do not predict
behaviour. However, as Eagly and Chaiken (1993) pointed out, heuristic
processing could also result in enduring attitude change if the cue became
associated with the attitude and remained salient over time (for example, I might
persistently recall that my drinking two glasses of wine a day was recommended
by my trusted physician). Nonetheless, such an attitude would be vulnerable to
counter-propaganda, because it lacks elaborate cognitive support. Beyond the
fact that my physician recommended it, I would have no rationale for supporting
the habit.

The heuristic–systematic model: how does it differ from the ELM?

As we noted above, the ELM and the HSM are similar both with regard to their
core assumptions about determinants of persuasion and in their predictions about
the impact these variables will have on persuasion. And yet, there are some
differences between the two theories in the processes that they assume to
mediate these effects. In our discussion of these differences, we will focus on
three issues: (1) the unidimensionality of the processing continuum; (2) the
interplay of processing modes; and (3) the multiple motive assumption of the
HSM.
The unidimensionality of the processing continuum. Like the ELM, the HSM
assumes two modes of processing, namely, an effortful systematic mode that is
identical to central route processing of the ELM, and an effortless heuristic
mode. Since heuristic processing is also one of the low-effort processes
subsumed under the broad category of peripheral route processes by the ELM,
we have already discussed it in the section on the ELM. However, in contrast to
the ELM, where heuristic processing is only one of a variety of central route
processes, it is the only low-effort process assumed by the HSM. Thus,
according to the HSM, information processing ranges from heuristic processing
at the low-effort end of the continuum to systematic processing at the high-effort
end.
The interplay of processing modes. Like the ELM, the HSM assumes that
individuals need to have high processing motivation and ability to engage in
systematic processing. When people are unmotivated or unable to scrutinize the
arguments contained in a persuasive message, they base their decision on
whether to accept or reject the position advocated in the persuasive
communication on heuristic cues only. In contrast, when they are motivated to
scrutinize message arguments and are able to do so, they base their decision on
their evaluation of these arguments, but not exclusively so. The HSM does not
assume that individuals necessarily disregard the informational value of heuristic
cues once they have begun to engage in systematic processing. Thus, at high
levels of motivation and ability, both processing modes are likely to affect
persuasion. The HSM makes several theoretical assumptions specifying the
conditions of such interplay of processing modes (Bohner, Moskowitz, &
Chaiken, 1995).
According to the additivity hypothesis both heuristic cues and content
information exert independent main effects on persuasion. This is most likely to
happen when heuristic and systematic processing lead to the same conclusion;
for example, if an expert communicator also presents strong arguments.
However, the greater the number of strong arguments presented by the expert
communicator, the greater the probability that the independent effect of the
heuristic cue will be submerged under this wealth of content information. As a
result, the effect of the heuristic cue on persuasion may no longer be detectable
(attenuation hypothesis). Most interesting is the bias hypothesis of the HSM,
which predicts an interaction between the two processing modes. Such biasing is
most likely to occur when the persuasive information is ambiguous and thus
amenable to differential interpretations. Recipients might then give more weight
to arguments which are consistent with the recommendation made by a source
which is credible than by a source which is not credible. A study by Chaiken and
Maheswaran (1994; Research Close-Up 7.1) provides support for the bias
hypothesis.
Multiple motives. So far we have described the information processing
underlying attitude change as a relatively objective and unbiased activity. The
ELM, as well as the original version of the HSM, postulates a single motive:
people are motivated to hold correct attitudes. This accuracy motivation
determines the processing goal, namely to assess the validity of persuasive
messages.
Chaiken and her colleagues (1989; Bohner et al., 1995) have extended the
HSM and incorporated two further motives or goals for heuristic and systematic
processing. Whereas accuracy motivation encourages objective and unbiased
information processing, the other two motives are assumed to bias the processing
of persuasive information; that is, to induce individuals to hold particular
preferred attitude positions. One class of motives likely to bias information
processing has been labelled defence motivation. The processing goal of
defence-motivated individuals is to confirm the validity of preferred attitude
positions and to disconfirm the validity of positions that are not preferred (Eagly
& Chaiken, 1993). A number of conditions can motivate individuals to defend
their present attitudinal position, such as vested interest or a need for
consistency. For example, a person who had just spent a great deal of money on
buying a camera of brand X would not like to hear that brand X cameras are
unreliable and overpriced. Similarly, if a position being argued is inconsistent
with other beliefs a person holds quite firmly, accepting this new position would
violate that person’s need for consistency. Defence-motivated processing can be
either heuristic or systematic. The defence-motivated message recipient is
assumed to use the same heuristics as somebody who is accuracy-motivated, but
to use them selectively so as to support preferred attitude positions. Defence-
motivated systematic processing is similarly selective. Attitude-relevant
information that supports favoured positions or opposes non-favoured ones
should receive more attention and be more positively interpreted than
information that supports positions which are not favoured by the recipient (e.g.
Das, De Wit, & Stroebe, 2003; De Hoog, Stroebe, & De Wit, 2005).
A second class of motives likely to bias information processing has been
termed impression motivation. This motive refers to the desire to express
attitudes that are socially acceptable. It is assumed to be aroused in influence
settings, in which the identities of significant audiences are salient or when
people must communicate their attitudes to others who may have the power to
reward or punish them. The processing goal of impression-motivated recipients
is to assess the social acceptability of alternative positions in order to accept
attitudinal positions that will please or appease potential evaluators. Like
accuracy-and defence-motivated processing, impression-motivated processing
can be both heuristic and systematic. Impression-motivated heuristic processing
is assumed to involve the use of simple rules to guide one’s selection of socially
acceptable attitude positions (for example, ‘moderate positions minimize
disagreement’). In impression-motivated systematic processing the same goal is
reached through scrutinizing the available information in terms of its
acceptability in the social influence context (e.g. Chen, Shechter, & Chaiken,
1996).
The incorporation of impression motivation links the HSM to theories of social
influence such as the model of Deutsch and Gerard (1955) discussed in Chapter
8. This model postulates that group members may accept opinions from other
members either because they believe them to be valid (informational social
influence), or because they think that acceptance of these beliefs will make them
more accepted as group members (normative social influence). Informational
social influence should predominate in settings that arouse accuracy motivation,
whereas normative social influence should occur under conditions that arouse
impression motivation.
 Summary
Dual-process theories of persuasion assume that attitude change does not have to
be a result of a critical evaluation of the arguments contained in a message, but
can also be determined by attitude change processes that do not require
systematic message processing such as heuristic processing or evaluative
conditioning. The extent of message processing depends on processing
motivation and ability. More systematic processing is assumed to result in
stronger attitudes.
 Changing implicit attitudes
The theories of attitude change that we have discussed so far make no distinction
between implicit and explicit attitudes yet, as we saw in Chapter 6, there is
extensive evidence for these two types of attitudes. Furthermore, practically all
research conducted to test these theories assessed attitude change with self-report
measures, which would reflect explicit attitudes. Thus, we know a great deal
about how to change attitudes reflected by explicit measures, but very little
about achieving change on implicit measures.
Dual process models contrast attitude change based on systematic processing
of arguments with low effort processes that are not based on argument scrutiny
(e.g. evaluative conditioning, mere exposure). It would therefore be tempting to
assume that systematic processing – as a process based on extensive deliberation
– should result in change of explicit but not implicit attitudes. Evaluative
conditioning and mere exposure, on the other hand, should produce changes in
implicit but not in explicit attitudes. As appealingly elegant as such a ‘matching
hypothesis’ would be, we already know that it cannot be correct. After all,
studies demonstrating the effectiveness of mere exposure (e.g. Zajonc, 1968) and
evaluative conditioning (e.g. Staats & Staats, 1958) as methods of attitude
change were published years before the first measures of implicit attitudes
appeared in print (e.g. Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Greenwald,
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). Thus, until recently all demonstrations of attitude
change resulting from these procedures were based on explicit measures of
attitudes.
In the meantime, there is ample evidence to indicate that evaluative
conditioning can change implicit attitudes. For example, in a conditioning study
in which one of two cartoon characters was consistently paired with positively
valenced words and images, the other with words and images of negative
valence, Olson and Fazio (2001) demonstrated that this conditioning did not only
influence self-reports of attitudes towards these cartoons, but also attitudes
assessed with an implicit measure (IAT). Similarly, Dijksterhuis (2004) reported
that repeated association of the word ‘I’ with either positive or negative trait
terms resulted in a change of implicitly measured self-esteem, even when the
stimuli were presented subliminally. Finally, Houben, Havermans, and Wiers
(2010) used an evaluative conditioning paradigm to unobtrusively change
alcohol-related attitudes and drinking behaviour of their participants. The
repeated association of alcohol-related words with negative pictures resulted in a
change in alcohol-related implicit attitudes (measured with an IAT) in the
experimental compared to the control condition. Furthermore, participants in the
experimental condition also reported less alcohol consumption in the following
week, compared to their drinking at baseline.
Most surprising, however, from a matching perspective, is evidence that
implicit attitudes can also be changed by systematic processing of persuasive
communications. This was demonstrated in a set of studies conducted by Briñol,
Petty, and McCoslin (2009). In one of these studies, participants received strong
or weak persuasive arguments in favour of a new policy to integrate more
African-American professors into the university. In addition, personal relevance
was manipulated by informing students that this policy would either be
implemented next year in their own university or in 10 years in a different
university. Implicit attitudes were assessed with a race IAT. Consistent with
earlier findings on explicit measures (e.g. Petty et al., 1981), argument quality
had greater impact on implicit attitudes when personal relevance was high.

RESEARCH CLOSE-UP 7.1

HOW HEURISTIC PROCESSING CAN

BIAS SYSTEMATIC PROCESSING
Chaiken, S. & Maheswaran, D. (1994). Heuristic processing can bias systematic processing:
Effects of source credibility, argument ambiguity, and task importance on attitude judgment.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 66, 460–473.

Introduction Dual-process theories regard systematic

processing as more effortful and capacity limited than
heuristic processing. They therefore assume that
heuristic processing predominates when processing
ability and motivation are low, whereas systematic
processing becomes the dominant mode when
processing ability and motivation are high. The
heuristic–systematic model does not assume a trade-
off between these processing modes. Instead, it
assumes that both processing modes affect persuasion
at the high-effort end of the processing continuum,
whereas only heuristic processing dominates at the
low-effort end. Since systematic processing usually
provides much more information than heuristic
processing, the effect of heuristic processing on
persuasion will often be obscured (attenuation
hypothesis). However, there are conditions under
which this will not be the case. For example, when the
persuasion information is ambiguous and thus
amenable to differential interpretations, the
expectancies established by the individual’s
processing of heuristic cues can bias the interpretation
of the message content (bias hypothesis). The present
experiment manipulated task importance, source
credibility and message ambiguity to test this
hypothesis. With an ambiguous message and high
task importance, source credibility was expected to
positively bias systematic processing when credibility
was high and to negatively bias systematic processing
when credibility was low.
Method Participants Three hundred and sixty-seven
students participated in this study.
Design and procedure Participants were told that they
would read and give their opinions about a new
 telephone answering machine, the ‘XT-100’. They
then read a 4-page booklet that contained the
manipulations of source credibility, message type and
task importance. A questionnaire that assessed
participants’ attitudes and other dependent measures
followed.
Independent variables Source credibility. The
information was attributed either to the sales staff of a
supermarket chain (low credibility) or to a respected
consumer report magazine (high credibility).
Message type. The product description compared the XT-100 with two
competing brands on six product attributes, and asserted that the XT-100
was superior to those brands. The recommendation was based either on
strong arguments (superior on important attributes), weak arguments
(superior on unimportant attributes) or, in the ambiguous condition, on some
arguments in favour and some against the XT-100.
Task importance. Participants were told either that they were part of a small
selected group being canvassed by the producers of the XT-100 to decide
whether the machine should be sold in their area (high task importance), or
that they were part of a very large group to be canvassed and that the
machine would only be sold outside the state in which the respondent lived
(low task importance).
Dependent variables Attitudes. Participants rated the
extent to which they would consider buying the XT-
100, their favourability towards it and the extent to
which they regarded it a good product.
Cognitive responses. Participants were given three minutes to list their
thoughts about the product or product description. Two independent raters
then coded these thoughts according to whether (a) they related to the source
or to the product attributes, and (b) whether they expressed positive,
 negative or neutral evaluations of source or product.
Manipulation checks. Participants were asked to indicate their level of
motivation to read the product description, their perception of the credibility
of the source, and the extent to which the product description contained
positive or negative features.
Results Results supported predictions. Under low task
importance, attitudes were mainly determined by
source credibility (Figure 7.7a). Under high task
importance and unambiguously strong or weak
messages, attitudes were mainly determined by
argument quality, an effect mediated by systematic
processing. However, respondents under high task
importance who had received an ambiguous message
showed a strong source credibility effect, despite high
levels of systematic processing (Figure 7.7b). Under
these conditions, source credibility influenced the
valence of the thoughts: Participants thought more
positively about the attributes of the XT-100 when
source credibility was high rather than low. No such
bias occurred when the message was unambiguous.
Thus, source credibility exerted a direct influence
through heuristic processing when the task was
unimportant. When the task was important, but the
message ambiguous, source credibility exerted an
indirect effect on attitudes by biasing systematic
processing.
FIGURE 7.7(a) and (b) Attitudes towards the XT-100 as a function of task
importance (low versus high), source credibility (low versus high) and
message type (strong versus ambiguous versus weak). Theoretical and actual
range of attitude scores was −4 to 4, where higher numbers imply more
positive attitudes.
Source: Adapted from Chaiken & Maheswaran (1994). Copyright © 1994 by
the American Psychological Association. Adapted with permission. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 66, 460–473. The use of APA information
does not imply endorsement by APA.

Discussion Results under low task importance as well

as under high task importance with an unambiguously
strong or weak message replicated previous research.
Evidence for the bias hypothesis comes from
respondents in the high task importance condition,
who were exposed to an ambiguous message.
Although these motivated participants displayed
evidence for systematic processing, their attitudes
 were mainly affected by source credibility. Analysis
of their cognitive responses revealed that source
credibility exerted an indirect effect by positively
biasing systematic processing when credibility was
high and negatively biasing systematic processing
when credibility was low.
In a second study, participants were exposed to strong or weak arguments in
favour of including more vegetables in their diet (Briñol et al., 2009). To
manipulate personal relevance, the information was either included in an article
about health behaviour that (presumably) had consequences for academic
performance or formed part of an article about plant properties. In addition,
participants had to list their thoughts about the communications. As in the
previous study, argument quality affected implicit attitudes (IAT) mainly under
high personal relevance. More importantly, however, under conditions of high
relevance, the impact of argument quality on implicit attitudes was mediated by
the valence of the thoughts. Thus, the extent to which attitudes are systematically
processed influences the magnitude of attitude change on implicit as well
explicit measures.
Several theoretical models have been proposed that offer explanations of how
implicit and explicit attitudes are changed (Fazio, 1990, 2007; Petty, Briñol, &
DeMarree, 2007; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). The earliest of these
models, the MODE model (see Chapter 6) offers an elegant explanation that is
well supported by empirical evidence (for reviews, see Fazio, 1990, 2007). We
will use this model for explaining change of implicit and explicit attitudes.
According to the MODE model, attitudes are associations between a given
attitude object and a given summary evaluation of the object. These evaluations
can be based on appraisals of the attributes of the attitude object, as assumed by
expectancy-value theories. They can also reflect emotional reactions evoked by
the attitude object and associated with it through evaluative conditioning.
Finally, they can derive from one’s past behaviour. Thus, attitudes are one form
of knowledge, namely evaluative knowledge and are as such represented in
memory. ‘Just as we associate “bread” with “butter” and “doctor” with “nurse”,
we can associate “yuck” with cockroaches, or a sense of ecstatic delight with
chocolate or single-malt scotch’ (Fazio, 2007, p. 609). This conception of the
attitude construct is largely consistent with the attitude definition offered in
Chapter 6.
The associations between the attitude object and the evaluative response can
vary in strength and therefore also in their accessibility in memory. At the weak
end of the continuum from weak to strong associations, people have to construct
an attitude when exposed to the attitude object. Moving along this strength
dimension, attitudes become sufficiently accessible for the mere perception of
the attitude object to automatically trigger the evaluative response. It is these
automatic evaluative responses that are captured by implicit measures of
attitudes. Because these object-evaluation associations can be based on beliefs as
well as on conditioned responses, they can be influenced by deliberative as well
as automatic processes. The MODE model can therefore explain why explicitly
as well as implicitly measured attitudes can be influenced by persuasive
communications, as well as evaluative conditioning or frequency of exposure.
But if implicit and explicit measures are influenced by the same processes,
why are such measures often hardly related? The reason for such discrepancies
according to the MODE model is that implicit measures only (or mainly) reflect
the automatically triggered evaluative response (i.e. the object-evaluation
association), whereas self-reports of attitudes are often affected by additional
factors (e.g. social desirability; political correctness). If individuals are not
motivated to misrepresent their attitude, or if they are unable to do so (e.g.
because they have to respond quickly), their attitudes measured with implicit
measures should be highly correlated with attitudes assessed with explicit
measures. And indeed when evaluative priming methods were used to assess
attitudes towards puppies or cockroaches, both attitude objects where people
should see no reason to misrepresent their true attitude, there was a close
association between explicit and implicit measures (Fazio & Williams, 1986).
 Summary
Because most early research on persuasion used explicit measures of attitudes,
this section discussed strategies of change that influence implicit attitudes. There
is no support for a ‘matching hypothesis’ (see p. 218). Research shows that
implicit attitudes can be changed by processes based on extensive deliberation,
as well as processes that do not require deliberation (e.g. evaluative
conditioning, mere exposure). These findings are interpreted in terms of the
MODE model.
 Advertising as applied persuasion
Is subliminal advertising possible?
In the course of this chapter, we have already related some of the findings of
persuasion studies to advertising. However, those of you who think of
advertising as a powerful force that creates consumer needs and shapes the
competition in markets today might have been slightly disappointed by our
discussion of persuasion techniques. After all, it is hard to imagine that the
processes we discussed here can have powerful effects like creating the image of
the Marlboro Man, or helping to propel Absolut Vodka in the United States from
an inconsequential brand with fewer than 100,000 bottles sold in 1980 to
become America’s leading premium vodka brand with a sales volume of 40
million litres in 2006 (Figure 7.8). You might suspect that other factors have
been at work (e.g. marketing, pricing strategy) or that there is some secret
ingredient, a ‘silver bullet’ persuasion strategy that we have not discussed so far.
FIGURE 7.8 Advertising helped propel Absolut Vodka from an inconsequential
brand to become America’s leading premium vodka.
Source: © The Absolut Company AB. Used under permission from The Absolut
Company AB. ABSOLUT® VODKA ABSOLUT COUNTRY OF SWEDEN
VODKA & LOGO, ABSOLUT, ABSOLUT BOTTLE DESIGN AND
ABSOLUT CALLIGRAPHY ARE TRADEMARKS OWNED BY THE
ABSOLUT COMPANY AB.
Subliminal advertising
One candidate for such a weapon, albeit not a very secret one, is subliminal
advertising. The term subliminal refers to the presentation of a message so
briefly (or faintly) that it is below the threshold of awareness. Subliminal
advertising was made notorious in 1957 through publicity surrounding James
Vicary’s claim (see Social Psychology Beyond the Lab 7.1). People became so
upset by the idea that they could be manipulated without their awareness that
subliminal advertising has subsequently been legally banned in Australia and
Britain. In the United States it was forbidden by the broadcasting authority
(Pratkanis & Aronson, 2001). The fear of subliminal advertising was fuelled by
the great powers people attributed to this procedure. People seemed to believe
that being unaware of an influence attempt also meant that they could be induced
to act in ways that were against their own interest. This kind of assumption must
have led the police department of the town of Wichita, Kansas in 1978 to try to
catch a serial killer by inserting the subliminal message ‘contact the chief’ into a
news broadcast (Gibson, 2005). Since the killer was only apprehended in 2005,
and not because of self-incrimination, the subliminal commands appear to have
been ineffective.

- - - - - - - - - -
 subliminal advertising advertising slogans that are presented so briefly (or faintly) that they are
below the threshold of awareness.

- - - - - - - - - -

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BEYOND THE

LAB 7.1
THE BIRTH OF SUBLIMINAL ADVERTISING
On September 12, 1957, James Vicary, a market researcher, gave a press
conference that became known around the world. He announced the
formation of a new corporation, the Subliminal Projection Company, formed
to exploit a major break-through in advertising, namely subliminal
advertising. Vicary described the results of a six-week test conducted in a
New Jersey cinema. Two slogans were flashed over the film at the speed of
3ms at five second intervals, urging viewers to ‘drink Coke’ and to ‘eat
popcorn’. Vicary claimed that this subliminal advertising resulted in
increases of 57.5 per cent in popcorn and of 18.1 per cent in Coke sales over
the six-week period.
Vicary’s announcement was reported by the press around the world and
triggered waves of protest about this subliminal brainwashing. People
became so upset by the idea that they could be manipulated without their
awareness that laws banning subliminal advertising were subsequently
introduced in Australia and Britain, with severe penalties for those who
disobeyed. In the US subliminal advertising was not legally banned, but the
Federal Communication Commission will revoke a company’s broadcasting
license if the use of subliminal messages is proven (Pratkanis & Aronson,
2001).
At first Vicary refused to release any of his data, or even the location of the
cinema where the tests had been conducted. However, when the uproar
continued, Vicary admitted in an interview to Advertising Age in 1962 that
his claim had been a hoax, he had never done the study (Pratkanis &
Aronson, 2001). The irony is that under certain conditions, this type of
manipulation could have had an effect, as we will show below.
 manipulation could have had an effect, as we will show below.
While the presentation of visual messages is subliminal due to the brief
exposure time, back-masking has been used to produce auditory messages
assumed to be subliminal. With back-masking messages are recorded backwards
on a tape that is otherwise recorded forwards. The method was allegedly first
used by the Beatles in 1966, but then taken over by many other rock bands. In
another example of irrational beliefs about the effects of subliminal messages,
there were court cases against rock bands accused of having inserted subliminal
messages into their songs. In one trial against the rock band Judas Priest, the
subliminal message ‘do it’ was considered responsible for two suicides.
Fortunately for the rock group, the judge did not accept this argument.
While people do not want to be manipulated against their will, they quite like
the idea of their willpower being buttressed by subliminal suggestion. American
consumers appear to spend more than $50 million annually on audiotapes that
contain subliminal messages to help them to improve their self-esteem, their
memory and their study habits, or to help them to lose weight and stop smoking
(Pratkanis & Aronson, 2001).
Studies of the effectiveness of self-help tapes have found no evidence of any
effects. Greenwald, Spangenberg, Pratkanis, and Eskenazi (1991) conducted a
study in which they measured participants’ self-esteem and memory and then
presented them with tapes that, according to the manufacturers, contained
subliminal messages that should either improve self-esteem (‘I have high self-
worth and high self-esteem’) or memory (‘My ability to remember and to recall
is increasing daily’). Crosscutting the manipulation of the subliminal content of
the tapes, half the respondents were led to believe that they listened to the
memory tape, the other half that they listened to the self-esteem tape.
Respondents took the tapes home and listened to them daily for five weeks.
When their self-esteem and their memory were reassessed on their return to the
laboratory, no improvements could be detected. It is interesting, though, that
those participants who thought that they had received the memory tape
(regardless of whether they really had been given the memory tape or had been
given the self-esteem tape) believed that their memory had improved. Similarly,
respondents who believed that they had received the self-esteem tape reported
substantial improvements in their self-esteem. Thus, whereas the actual content
of the tapes had no effect whatsoever, the assumed content resulted in a ‘placebo
effect’. Participants believed that their memory (or their self-esteem) had
improved, even though, objectively, there had been no improvements at all.
Obviously, such beliefs guarantee satisfied customers and the continued sales of
self-help tapes.
That these subliminal messages were ineffective is hardly surprising (see
Chapter 4 on Social Cognition). First, subliminal verbal primes have to consist
of one or perhaps two (very short) words to be effective, and not of whole
sentences. Second, while there is support for effects of subliminal visual
priming, there is no evidence for priming effects of backward messages (e.g.
Kreiner, Altis, & Voss, 2003). Third, successful priming does nothing more than
increase the accessibility of the primed concept and of thoughts related to that
concept. Thus, even if it were possible to subliminally prime sentences like ‘My
ability to remember is increasing daily’ or ‘I have high self-worth’, they would
be unlikely to improve our memory or our self-esteem.
Coca-Cola is a relatively short brand name and thus meets the first condition
for a subliminal prime. Thus, if clever advertising technicians developed a
technique that enabled them to successfully prime movie or TV audiences, could
Coca-Cola sales be improved through subliminal priming? This would depend
on a number of conditions. First, it would depend on the thoughts members of
the audience associate with Coca-Cola. If they find it too sweet a drink, priming
will not change their opinion. On the other hand, if they associate it with great
taste and great thirst-quenching qualities, then priming might make them want to
have a Coke, but only if they are thirsty at that particular moment. Finally, as we
will discuss, priming effects would depend on the mood induced by the film into
which the primes are embedded. You should now stop and read Research Close-
Up 7.2, which describes an experiment by Karremans, Stroebe, and Claus (2006)
that investigates these issues.
More recently, Bermeitinger et al. (2009) conceptually replicated the findings
of Karremans and colleagues. Participants in their study had to play a computer
game, which required a great deal of concentration. They were told that the
experiment assessed the extent to which dextrose pills helped people to
concentrate. During the game they were subliminally primed with one of two
logos for brands of dextrose pills. During breaks in the game participants could
take pills from two bowls, each clearly labelled with one of the two brand logos.
Findings showed that subliminally priming a logo of energy pills increased
choice for that brand, but only if participants were tired. Because one can
assume that people who were tired felt a greater need for pills that were
supposed to help them to concentrate, these findings replicate the pattern
observed by Karremans et al. (2006). A further important contribution of the
study by Bermeitinger et al. was to demonstrate the effect of subliminal
advertising on actual consumption behaviour.
It is interesting to note that in the Karremans et al. study, the prime ×
thirstiness interaction was strongest for participants who only drank Lipton Ice
infrequently. We did not report this third-order interaction, because it was not
significant. However, some years later, Verwijmeren, Karremans, Stroebe, and
Wigboldus (2011) demonstrated in a replication of the Karremans et al. study
that the interaction between priming and thirst was moderated by the extent to
which participants were habitual drinkers of Lipton Ice. Priming worked only for
thirsty individuals who did not drink Lipton Ice regularly: it had no effect on
habitual consumers of Lipton Ice. This finding supports our assumption that
subliminal advertising will mainly be effective for brands that are not highly
cognitively accessible. For brands like Coca-Cola, which are, for most
consumers, already at the ‘top of the head’, subliminal advertising is unlikely to
have an effect.
In the studies reported so far, the subliminal primes were embedded in either a
letter search task or a computer game. With both these tasks, the experimenter
can determine beforehand which point of the monitor viewers will be focussing
on. This is not the case when subliminal primes are embedded in a film.
Although a study by Cooper and Cooper (2002) demonstrated the effectiveness
of subliminally presenting product primes in a film, they could only show an
effect on thirst ratings and not on product choice.

RESEARCH CLOSE-UP 7.2

SUBLIMINAL ADVERTISING
Karremans, J. C., Stroebe, W. & Claus, J. (2006). Beyond Vicary’s fantasies: The impact of
subliminal priming on brand choice. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 42, 792–798.

Introduction
Because short brand names can be primed subliminally, it should be
possible to influence the choice of different brands with subliminal
messages. However, Karremans and colleagues reasoned that certain
conditions had to be met for subliminal priming to affect choice. First,
because priming merely increases the cognitive accessibility of the primed
concept, product priming will only be effective if people really like the
product. For example, subliminal advertising is unlikely to induce people to
product. For example, subliminal advertising is unlikely to induce people to
drink Coca-Cola if they do not like its taste. Second, brand priming will only
be influential if people really have a need for the advertised product. Thus,
even if they like the taste of Coca-Cola, priming will not induce them to
choose it if they are not thirsty. And finally, since the Coca-Cola company
spends millions each year on advertising and thus on keeping the brand
cognitively highly accessible, subliminal advertising of this brand might not
be very effective, because it is already at the forefront of most people’s
minds.
Based on pretesting, Karremans et al. selected Lipton Ice (a type of iced tea)
as a brand that is liked, considered thirst-quenching and yet is not highly
cognitively accessible. They conducted two experiments to test the
hypothesis that subliminally priming the brand name of Lipton Ice (rather
than the brand of a popular mineral water) would increase choice of Lipton
Ice, but only in participants who are thirsty. Since the only difference
between the two experiments was that thirst was rated in the first, but
manipulated in the second experiment, and since both studies confirmed the
hypothesis, only Experiment 2 will be presented here.
Method
Participants and design
One hundred and five male and female students participated and were
randomly assigned to one of the conditions of the 2 (thirst: thirsty versus
non-thirsty) × 2 (prime: Lipton Ice versus control) between participants
design.
Procedure
Participants were seated in a cubicle behind a computer and were told that
they would be participating in a number of unrelated experiments. The first
task for half of the participants was a ‘tongue detection’ task, with which
thirst was manipulated. These participants were given a very salty sweet that
had a letter on one side, and had to detect the letter with their tongue. They
were given one minute for this task. It was assumed that the salty taste and
the post-ingestive effect of the salt would increase thirst. Next, participants
had to perform a visual detection task, in which they were presented with
letter sequences and had to detect small letters interspersed in sequences of
 capital letters. In fact this task was designed to subliminally prime half of
the participants with Lipton Ice and the other half with a control nonsense
letter string (e.g. ‘Npeic Tol’). The primes were presented 25 times, but each
time for only 23ms, so that participants were not aware of them. The letter
sequence was preceded and followed by a string of X’s (‘XXXXXX’),
supposedly to help participants to focus on the task. In fact, the string of Xs
served as pre-and post-masks. The post-mask is particularly important,
because it blocks the visual memory of the prime through visual stimulation.
Next, participants were asked to take part in a study on consumer behaviour.
First, they were asked which brand of soft drink they would prefer, if they
were offered a drink now. Two brand names (Lipton Ice and the control
brand) appeared, one on the left and one on the right of the screen, and
participants had to push a key on the left or right to indicate their preferred
brand. Lipton Ice appeared half of the time on the right, the other half on the
left. Next, participants had to rate their intention to drink Lipton Ice, using
two rating scales (e.g. ‘If you were sitting on a terrace now, how likely
would you be to drink Lipton Ice?’: 1 − not at all likely, to 7− very likely).
Results and discussion
The experiment resulted in a significant main effect for the Lipton Ice prime
on choice. Participants in the Lipton Ice prime condition were significantly
more likely (69 per cent) to choose Lipton Ice than participants in the
control prime condition (25 per cent). However, this main effect was
moderated by a significant prime × thirstiness interaction, with thirsty
participants being more strongly affected by the Lipton Ice prime than non-
thirsty participants. The equivalent interaction was significant for the
measure of intention to drink Lipton Ice. Thus, when offered a choice
between a brand of mineral water or Lipton Ice, participants who had been
primed with Lipton Ice were significantly more likely to choose it over the
mineral water, but mainly if they were thirsty (Figure 7.9). Under these
conditions they also expressed greater intentions to choose Lipton Ice in a
hypothetical situation (if they were now sitting on a terrace and ordering a
drink).
FIGURE 7.9 Percentage of participants choosing Lipton Ice as a function of
thirst and prime
Source: Karremans et al., 2006, Study 2.
 A further complication when embedding brand primes in a film is that the
emotions evoked by the film might ‘rub off’ on the brand name. From what we
know about evaluative conditioning, we could expect that repeated subliminal
exposure to a brand name would only increase choice of that brand if the brand
is presented in a positive context (i.e. in a film that evokes positive emotions).
When presented in the context of a film that evokes negative emotions, the
negative affect should become attached to the brand. Thus, embedding
subliminal brand primes in a film that evokes negative emotions might even
decrease the likelihood that the primed brand would be chosen afterwards.
These hypotheses were confirmed by Verwijmeren, Karremans, Stroebe,
Wigboldus, and Van Ooijen (2010), in a study in which the Lipton Ice prime was
embedded in either a positive or a negative movie. To simulate real-life
conditions, participants in this study were seated individually and in a room that
was decorated as a living room. They were watching the film on a regular TV
set, and afterwards were given a choice of drinks. As in all previous studies, the
priming effects were moderated by thirst. As predicted, subliminally advertising
Lipton Ice in a positive film increased the likelihood of Lipton Ice being chosen,
but only for thirsty participants. Similarly, subliminally priming Lipton Ice in a
negative context reduced choice, but only for thirsty participants.
Would Vicary have succeeded with his subliminal messages to increase Coca-
Cola sales in the New Jersey movie theatre if he had tried? It is not impossible.
But he would certainly have had a greater chance if he had used a less widely
advertised brand. It would also have depended on the film that was shown in that
theatre. If it had been a comedy, it might have worked. If it had been a sad film,
however, it might even have had adverse effects. What we do know, however, is
that subliminal advertising will not induce people to act against their will. It will
not even help them to buttress their sagging willpower.

A dual-process analysis of advertising

Social psychological research on message processing and persuasion has focused
mainly on the processing of verbal information. In contrast, advertising uses
pictures, fonts, colours, music and sound effects to draw attention, evoke
associations and convey meaning. All of these non-verbal modalities may affect
evaluative judgements directly or through their impact on message processing.
Despite these differences, the insights into persuasion processes we have gained
from social psychological research can be very helpful in understanding
advertising.
Advertisements can adopt a variety of appeals. The three most common are
arguments, emotions and endorsements (Tellis, 2004). The effectiveness of each
of these strategies will depend mainly on two factors, namely the type of product
being advertised, and the involvement of the audience. Products can be classified
as either feeling or thinking products (Tellis, 2004). Feeling products such as
wine, paintings or soft drinks are evaluated primarily by personal preference.
Examples of preference attributes are taste, flavour, style and design. In contrast,
thinking products, such as washing machines, computers and most cars, are
purchased because of reason attributes such as performance, reliability, quality
or fit (Tellis, 2004). Obviously, some products combine aspects of both types
(e.g. sports cars).
Since the attitudes towards feeling products will be mainly based on affect and
will have very little cognitive content, emotional appeals are preferable for
feeling products. It would be difficult to make an argument-based appeal for a
particular brand of cola, given that different brands are not all that different and
that purchasing decisions for soft drinks are rarely based on objective qualities.
Soft drink ads therefore play on people’s emotions, trying to associate these
products with feelings of youth, energy and sexual attractiveness.
In contrast, the advertising strategies for thinking products usually rely on
arguments praising such attributes as the performance characteristics, reliability
and quality of the service. As we have discussed earlier, the problem with using
argumentative appeals is that even strong arguments are only effective with
audiences that are motivated and able to process the information. This may be
less of a problem with ads for dishwashers or hair dryers. Although they are not
objects of great interest to most people, advertisements for these household
appliances are mainly directed at those who want to buy such an appliance and
would therefore be motivated to think about the arguments in an advertisement.
But what strategy should one use to advertise products such as toothpaste,
washing powder or mouthwash, which neither arouse a great deal of emotion nor
are considered to be of sufficient importance by most people to devote a great
deal of effort to processing arguments? One possibility is to use endorsements by
celebrities or experts (Figure 7.10). We have all seen the actor who, dressed like
a dentist (i.e. expert), praises the qualities of a particular toothpaste or
toothbrush. Another possibility is to use emotional appeals to increase the
perceived importance of a product. One could try to induce guilt feelings in
parents who neglect their children’s welfare by not making them brush their
teeth with toothpaste X.
FIGURE 7.10 In this advertisement endorsement by an expert is used as an
advertising strategy.
Source: © kurhan. Used under licence from Shutterstock.

Alternatively, one could use fear appeals (Das et al., 2003; De Hoog et al.,
2005). This approach was taken by Gerald Lambert, who in 1922 hired an
advertising agency to improve the sluggish sales of Listerine, at the time a
product used as an antiseptic in surgery and to fight throat infections (Pratkanis
& Aronson, 2001). Seeking a wider market, Lambert decided to promote it as a
mouthwash. The problem was that nobody in those days really used a
mouthwash. Furthermore, accusing people of having ‘bad breath’ would not
have been a popular message. Thus, the ads for Listerine used the obscure
medical term ‘halitosis’ instead of ‘bad breath’. The slogans of this famous
campaign played on people’s fear of being rejected by their social environment.
‘Even your best friend won’t tell you. Listerine is good for halitosis.’ Or, ‘Often
a bridesmaid . . . never a bride.’ The campaign was extremely effective, turning
Listerine into a household name.
But such brilliant campaigns are the exception rather than the rule, as studies
of advertising effectiveness indicate (Tellis, 2004). So how can advertising
contribute to such dramatic sales increases as in the example of Absolut Vodka
mentioned earlier? The answer is simple: through the accumulation of small
effects over a long period of time. In the case of Absolut Vodka, it took 19 years
and an immense advertising budget to achieve this result.
 Summary
In this section we discussed, first, the feasibility of subliminal advertising. There
is by now substantial evidence that subliminal messages can influence brand
choice, but only under specific conditions, namely for products that are not
highly accessible and which are needed to satisfy an active goal. We then
discussed the relationship between the type of product advertised and the type of
appeal most effective for such products. We introduced the distinction between
feeling and thinking products, and argued that for feeling products emotional
appeals are most appropriate, whereas persuasive arguments are most effective
with thinking products.
 INCENTIVE-INDUCED ATTITUDE
CHANGE
Does the use of incentives (e.g. taxation, legal sanctions) constitute
an effective strategy of attitude and behaviour change?
Powerful institutions often influence behaviour directly through incentives or
legal sanctions rather than relying on the uncertain effects of persuasion. For
example, when Swedish drivers could not be persuaded to use their seatbelts, the
government introduced a law that made seatbelt use compulsory for front-seat
passengers in private cars in 1975. The introduction of this law increased the
frequency of seatbelt use from 30 per cent to 85 per cent within a few months
(Fhanér & Hane, 1979; Figure 7.11). Similarly, in New York, where seatbelt use
ranged from 10 to 20 per cent prior to the introduction of a seatbelt law in 1984,
it increased to 45–70 per cent after the law came into force in early 1985. The
introduction of these laws also resulted in substantial reductions in the deaths of
vehicle occupants (Robertson, 1986).
FIGURE 7.11 The introduction of compulsory seatbelt laws has increased
seatbelt use and reduced deaths of vehicle occupants.
Source: © l i g h t p o e t. Used under licence from Shutterstock.
 Governments can also use taxation to reduce the occurrence of undesirable
behaviour patterns. There is ample evidence that the demand for alcoholic drinks
and cigarettes, like the demand for most commodities, responds to changes in
price and income (see Stroebe, 2011). A review of available research from
several countries concluded that, all other things being equal, a rise in alcohol
prices generally led to a drop in the consumption of alcohol, whereas an increase
in the income of consumers generally led to a rise in alcohol consumption. There
is similar evidence for smoking (Stroebe, 2011).
Thus, there is ample evidence that use of incentives is an effective strategy of
behaviour change. It is also likely that incentive-induced behaviour change
results in a change in attitudes towards the behaviour. According to the value-
expectancy models discussed in the previous chapter, one’s attitude towards a
given behaviour reflects the perceived consequences of engaging in that
behaviour. Therefore, changes in the price of, for example, alcoholic drinks
should influence one’s attitude towards buying alcoholic drinks. It should have
no effect, however, on one’s attitude towards drinking them. Consequently,
although a marked increase in the price of alcoholic drinks is likely to induce
people to buy fewer of them, they might drink at their old level of consumption
when not constrained by price (e.g. at a party where drinks are freely available).
Furthermore, should alcohol prices come down again, people’s attitude towards
buying alcoholic drinks would again become more positive.
 With regard to the effectiveness of legal sanctions, governments have the
added problem that, to be effective, these sanctions may require continuous
monitoring. It would therefore be desirable if the behaviour change induced by
legal sanctions resulted in a change in attitudes. In the following sections we will
discuss conditions under which incentive-induced behaviour change might lead
to attitude change.
 Counterattitudinal behaviour and attitude change
One condition for attitude change following counterattitudinal behaviour
could be that individuals find performing that behaviour much less aversive than
they had anticipated. For example, seatbelt users in the 1980s, who reluctantly
used their belts because of the sanctions threatened by the law, may have found
them much less restrictive than they anticipated. Thus, they may have realized
that their negative attitude towards seatbelt use was unjustified. This attitude
change is likely to have been accompanied by a process of habit formation. Over
time, putting on their seatbelts may have become habitual for most people. Thus,
what was originally a conscious action, requiring cognitive resources and
performed purely to avoid being sanctioned, may have turned into effortless and
automatic behaviour. There is evidence that behaviour becomes habitual if it is
performed frequently and in contexts that are likely to be stable (Ouellette &
Wood, 1998). We would further argue that behaviour is unlikely to become
habitual if it is effortful and associated with negative consequences. However,
all is not lost if performing the behaviour is really as unpleasant as they
anticipated, because cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) would still
lead us to expect that people will change their attitudes in the direction of greater
consistency with their behaviour, at least under certain well-specified conditions.

- - - - - - - - - -

counterattitudinal behaviour behaviour (usually induced by monetary incentives or threats)

which is inconsistent with the actor’s attitude or beliefs.

- - - - - - - - - -

- - - - - - - - - -

cognitive dissonance theory assumes that dissonance is an aversive state which motivates
individuals to reduce it (e.g. by changing beliefs, attitudes or behaviour, and searching for
consonant, or avoiding dissonant, information).

- - - - - - - - - -
Cognitive dissonance theory
According to cognitive dissonance theory, individuals who are induced to
behave in a way that is discrepant with their attitude will experience cognitive
dissonance (Festinger, 1957). Dissonance is an aversive state, which motivates
individuals to reduce it. This motivation will be stronger the greater the
dissonance. One way to reduce dissonance is to change one’s attitude towards
the behaviour.
To explain this prediction, we will have to describe cognitive dissonance
theory in more detail. Whenever an individual chooses between alternative
courses of action, there have to be reasons that justify the chosen action
(consonant cognitions), otherwise the person would not have made that
particular choice. However, there are usually also reasons that would have
argued for choosing the rejected alternative (dissonant cognitions). The more
reasons there are that would have justified choosing the rejected alternative, and
the more important these reasons are, the greater will be the dissonance the
person experiences and the greater the pressure to reduce it. For example, if
Susan buys a car and decides on a Mini over a Golf, the good looks of the Mini
and the sporty feel of the car would be consonant cognitions. However, the Golf
would probably have cost less, had a larger luggage compartment and a more
comfortable ride. These qualities of the Golf, which Susan gave up by choosing
the Mini, will contribute to her cognitive dissonance (i.e. dissonant cognitions).
Since, once made, choices are difficult to reverse, the most likely means for her
to reduce dissonance is to persuade herself that the Mini is even more fun and
the Golf more bourgeois than she always thought. There is empirical evidence
that people’s evaluations of two objects are more discrepant some time after a
choice between them than before the choice took place (e.g. Brehm, 1956;
Figure 7.12).
FIGURE 7.12(a) and (b) After buying one of these two cars, how are you likely
to view the other?
Source: (a) © Eric Broder Van Dyke. Used under licence from Shutterstock; (b)
© Oleksiy Maksymenko Photography. Used under licence from Alamy.
 If drivers use seatbelts to avoid paying a fine, their behaviour is not completely
voluntary. And yet, since they could have decided to risk the fine, it is still a free
decision. It is in this situation where dissonance theory makes its most
counterintuitive prediction. Since the threatened sanctions are consonant
cognitions for those who comply with the law, dissonance would be greater the
less severe these sanctions. If death was the penalty for not using one’s seatbelt,
few seatbelt users would feel dissonance. On the other hand, if the penalty was
$1, people who comply would probably feel considerable dissonance. After all, a
fine of $1 is not a very substantial justification to engage in behaviour that one
did not really want to engage in. Thus, if an individual behaves
counterattitudinally to avoid a penalty or gain some benefit, dissonance will be
greater if the penalty or the benefits are small rather than large.
Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) tested these predictions in their classic
experiment. Participants had to perform two dull motor tasks for an hour and
were then asked, under some pretext, whether they would be willing to tell the
next participant that the experimental task was really interesting. They were
offered either $20 or $1 for agreeing to do this (in effect, telling a lie, although
the experimenters did not present it in those terms). According to cognitive
dissonance theory, participants who had been offered $20 should have less
difficulty in justifying their behaviour than individuals who received only $1;
after all, $20 was then (and still is) a large sum of money. Participants in the $20
condition should therefore experience less cognitive dissonance and less need to
reduce it than those who had only been offered $1 for telling a lie (see Theory
Box 7.4). In line with these predictions, Festinger and Carlsmith found that,
when asked afterwards to indicate how enjoyable they had found the two motor
tasks, participants in the $1 condition rated it more enjoyable than did
individuals who had been paid $20, or than individuals in the control group who
had merely rated the motor tasks without having been asked to describe it as
interesting (Figure 7.13).
FIGURE 7.13 Ratings of task enjoyableness by condition.
Source: Adapted from Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959. Copyright © 1959 by the
American Psychological Association. Adapted with permission. Journal of
Abnormal and Social Psychology, 58, 203–210. The use of APA information
does not imply endorsement by APA.
 Festinger and Carlsmith intuitively built two features into their experimental
situation that, though not specified by the original version of the theory, turned
out to be essential for dissonance arousal. First, since the experimenter’s request
was not ostensibly part of the experiment, participants were free to refuse the
request and thus experienced high freedom of choice. However, since most
people are absolute suckers when it comes to refusing requests made in face-to-
face situations (see Chapter 8), Festinger and Carlsmith did not have to worry
that many participants would refuse, even in the $1 condition. Second, since the
target of the lie (actually a confederate of the experimenters) had indicated that
she had originally not intended to participate in the experiment because of an
exam, the participants’ behaviour led to aversive consequences. Both freedom of
choice (Linder, Cooper, & Jones, 1967) and negative consequences (Cooper &
Worchel, 1970) are necessary for counterattitudinal behaviour to arouse
dissonance.

THEORY BOX 7.4

DISSONANCE INTERPRETATION OF THE
FESTINGER & CARLSMITH (1959)
EXPERIMENT

Self-perception theory
Dissonance theory provoked some controversy in its heyday. The major
challenge to the dissonance interpretation came from self-perception theory
(Bem, 1965, 1972). This theory assumes that people often do not know their own
attitudes and, when asked about them, are in the same position as an outside
observer (see Chapters 5 and 6). As we have learned in the discussion of
attribution theory (see Chapter 3), people usually infer attitudes of others from
relevant instances of past behaviour. Thus, when asked to state their attitude
towards the motor task, participants in Festinger and Carlsmith’s experiment
would have remembered that they told another participant that the task was
interesting. They would have used this knowledge as information about their
own attitude towards the task, unless there were reasons to discount their own
behaviour as a source of information. Being paid a large sum of money to
behave in a certain way is a good reason to discount one’s behaviour as a source
of information about one’s attitude. Thus, when paid $20, they would probably
discount their own behaviour as source of information and evaluate the
experimental task merely on the basis of how they remembered it (i.e. as boring).
Self-perception theory can thus account for Festinger and Carlsmith’s findings
without referring to aversive states and clashing cognitions (see Theory Box
7.5).
It is now generally accepted that the two theories should be regarded as
complementary formulations, with each theory being applicable to its own
specialized domain. According to Fazio, Zanna, and Cooper (1977), self-
perception theory accurately characterizes attitude change in the context of less
discrepant behaviour where the individual argues for a position close to his or
her own initial attitude. Fazio and colleagues term such behaviour attitude-
congruent, and define it as any position that is still acceptable to an individual,
even though it may not be in accordance with his or her actual attitude. For
example, people who believe that all atomic power stations should be closed
down immediately would probably also find acceptable the position that no new
atomic power stations should be built and the existing ones should be phased out
within 10 years. However, these opponents of atomic power stations would find
completely unacceptable the argument that we need new atomic power stations
to ensure future energy needs. Since it can be assumed that individuals are
motivated to put considerably more cognitive effort into justifying their action if
it is counterattitudinal rather than attitude-congruent, this integration is
consistent with expectations from dual-process theories: low-involvement
individuals (those still behaving in an attitude-congruent manner, hence exerting
little effort in justification) should rely predominantly on peripheral processes
(i.e. they will take their own behaviour as a source of information).
Stroebe and Diehl (1981, 1988) extended this argument. They demonstrated
that self-perception can also account for attitude change following highly
attitude-discrepant behaviour, provided it is performed under conditions unlikely
to arouse dissonance (e.g. low choice, minimal consequences). In these studies,
participants were asked to write counterattitudinal essays in the presence of a
second participant (actually a confederate of the experimenter), who either
agreed or refused the task (after the real participant had agreed). Since the
knowledge that another person also agreed to perform the task (and thus
provided social support for the participant) would be a consonant cognition, it
should reduce dissonance. Stroebe and Diehl (1981) therefore predicted that
participants should show less attitude change when the confederate agreed to
write the counterattitudinal essay than when he or she refused. These predictions
were supported under conditions expected to arouse dissonance (high choice and
severe negative consequences). However, under conditions that should not
arouse dissonance (i.e. low choice and minimal consequences), the opposite
pattern emerged: participants changed their attitude more when the confederate
agreed rather than refused to write the essay.

THEORY BOX 7.5

INTERPRETATION OF THE FESTINGER &
CARLSMITH (1959) EXPERIMENT IN TERMS
OF SELF-PERCEPTION

At the time, Stroebe and Diehl (1981) did not have a good explanation for the
pattern of findings under low dissonance conditions. But some years later,
influenced by the then novel dual-process theories, they suggested an
interpretation in terms of motivational influences on depth of processing
(Stroebe & Diehl, 1988): individuals engage in the cognitive effort of self-
justification only when motivated to do so because they feel responsible for a
negative act. In the absence of such responsibility, individuals engage in
heuristic processing and use the behaviour of the other participant as a cue for
inferring their own position. To test this interpretation, Stroebe and Diehl (1988)
used the same paradigm as in their earlier studies. They asked female
participants to write an essay in favour of the introduction of a compulsory
community service for women, a proposal to which most women were strongly
opposed. Again social support was manipulated by having a confederate comply
with or not comply with the request. The consequences of writing the essay were
described as either serious (essay would be used to persuade other women) or as
minimal (the essay would be discarded unread). As an additional variable,
attitude similarity between the real participant and the confederate was
manipulated. Participants were asked their opinion on a number of attitude issues
at the beginning of the study, allegedly to help with a different study. The
confederate (answering second) either consistently agreed or disagreed with the
real participant.
Stroebe and Diehl (1988) predicted that attitude similarity would moderate the
effect of the social support manipulation. When the essay writing was expected
to lead to severe consequences, both the dissonance reducing effect of social
support, as well as the dissonance increasing effect of non-support, should be
less marked if the other participant was perceived as holding dissimilar rather
than similar attitudes. Under minimal consequences, when participants would
use the behaviour of the confederate as a cue to infer their own attitudes, the
pattern of change should be the mirror image of that observed with severe
consequences. Thus, if a similar other also agreed to write the essay, participants
should conclude that the compulsory community service could not be all that bad
and move in the positive direction. On the other hand, if a similar other refused
the request, they would conclude that it must be quite bad and become more
negative. In contrast, with a dissimilar other, her willingness to write the essay
would signal that one should be quite negative about the compulsory community
service, whereas her disagreement would suggest that the community service
was not all that bad. As we can see from Figure 7.14, which illustrates the mean
differences in participants’ attitudes towards the introduction of compulsory civil
service from weeks before the essay writing to directly afterwards, results fully
support these predictions.
FIGURE 7.14 Mean differences in female students’ attitudes towards the
introduction of a compulsory civil service for women.
Source: Adapted from Stroebe & Diehl, 1988. Reproduced with permission from
SAGE Publications.
Dissonance, self-perception and the use of incentives
Will people who smoke less or drink less because of taxation-induced price
increases also change their attitudes towards smoking or drinking? Individuals
who smoke less because cigarette prices have increased, or drink less because
alcohol prices have gone up, may experience some dissonance. After all, their
decision to reduce their consumption of cigarettes or alcohol will be the result of
a decision about how to allocate their income. They would have been able to
consume at the old level if they had decided to reduce other expenses (on food,
vacations, etc.). Like all freely chosen decisions, such a decision is likely to
result in cognitive dissonance, and one of the ways to reduce dissonance would
be to persuade oneself that one was better off by smoking and drinking less.
It is more doubtful whether dissonance or self-perception processes play an
important role in mediating attitude change in the context of behaviour change
induced by legal sanctions. According to dissonance theory, counterattitudinal
behaviour will only result in attitude change if the incentive offers an insufficient
justification for the behaviour change. A similar prerequisite according to self-
perception theory is that individuals do not attribute their behaviour change to
the incentive. Since legal sanctions only work if individuals are aware of the
sanction and if these sanctions are sufficiently severe to persuade individuals to
abstain from the prohibited behaviour, it is unlikely that individuals who comply
will experience a great deal of dissonance or attribute their behaviour to internal
causes. Support for the assumption that this type of behaviour change is rarely
accompanied by attitude change comes from studies of the use of motorcycle
helmets in American states that changed their helmet laws. For example, when
Texas and Arkansas changed their law requiring all motorcyclists to wear
helmets in 1997 to one requiring this only for riders under the age of 21, helmet
use decreased from 97 per cent to 66 per cent in Texas and from 97 per cent to
51 per cent in Arkansas (Waller, 2002). This suggests that helmet use also failed
to become habitual, probably because wearing a helmet is effortful and
cumbersome.
 Some paradoxical effects of incentives and sanctions
Unfortunately, some evidence suggests that legal sanctions or positive incentives
can have paradoxical effects on attitudes, with sanctions making the behaviour
seem more attractive and positive incentives decreasing the attractiveness of the
behaviour they stimulate. There seems to be some truth in the old saying that
forbidden fruits are the sweetest, at least for those fruits that had originally been
freely available. According to reactance theory (Brehm, 1966), the elimination
of behavioural freedom should result in reactance, a motivational state directed
towards the re-establishment of this behavioural freedom. Obviously, the most
direct form of the threatened or lost freedom would be to exercise it. Reactance
will therefore frequently result in an intensified form of the behaviour that has
been sanctioned. However, regardless of whether or not one violates the
sanctions, reactance will increase the motivation to engage in the sanctioned
behaviour and thus make it appear more desirable. According to this perspective,
introducing a law which forbids smoking could not only induce smokers to
smoke whenever they think they can get away with it – it could also make
smoking an even more desirable activity for them.

- - - - - - - - - -

reactance theory reactance is an aversive state caused by restriction of an individual’s freedom of

choice over important behavioural outcomes. Reactance is assumed to motivate the individual to re-
establish the restricted freedom.

- - - - - - - - - -

There are also reasons to expect that the introduction of positive incentives to
motivate individuals to engage in a particular behaviour could have negative
consequences on their attitudes (e.g. Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999; Lepper &
Greene, 1978). Paradoxically, this is most likely to happen when individuals
already engaged in the behaviour before the introduction of the law because they
enjoy the behaviour. Imagine that health insurance companies became persuaded
by evidence that physical exercise extends life expectancy, reduces illness risk
and saves health costs. They therefore decided to offer financial rewards (i.e.
reduced premiums) for individuals who jogged regularly. This might induce
many people to jog who would not have done so otherwise. But at the same
time, it might also undermine the motivation of people who enjoy jogging and
are already jogging regularly. At least, this is the prediction one would derive
from research on the effects of external (e.g. monetary) rewards on intrinsic
motivation and performance. Intrinsically motivated behaviours are performed
out of interest and because they are enjoyed. This research has demonstrated that
both enjoyment and performance of an intrinsically enjoyable task can decrease
once people have been given some reward for performing that task (e.g. Deci et
al., 1999; Lepper & Greene, 1978).

- - - - - - - - - -

intrinsic motivation behaviour is said to be intrinsically motivated if people perform it simply

because they enjoy it: external reward (e.g. money) is not required, and can reduce intrinsic
motivation.

- - - - - - - - - -

Lepper, Greene, and Nisbett (1973) conducted one of the early investigations
of this hypothesis. They introduced an attractive drawing activity during the
free-play time of nursery school children. After they had observed the baseline
interest of children during free play, children who showed an initial interest in
the activity were chosen as participants and asked to perform the activity under
one of three conditions: in the expected reward condition, children were
promised a reward for their performance (and later, given it); in the unexpected
reward condition, children were unexpectedly given a reward afterwards; in the
no reward condition, children were neither promised nor given a reward. Two
weeks later the material was again provided in the classroom in a free play
situation (without either instruction or expectation of a reward) and interest in
the activity was unobtrusively observed. As predicted by the researchers,
participants who expected a reward showed a significant decrease in interest in
the activity from the baseline to post-experimental observation, whereas
participants in the no reward or unexpected reward conditions showed no
significant change in overall interest. Lepper and colleagues (1973) interpreted
these findings in terms of Bem’s self-perception theory as an over-justification
effect. They argued that when people are rewarded for engaging in what is
already an enjoyable activity, they are likely to attribute their behaviour to the
reward (i.e. discounting cue), and thus discount their interest in the activity as a
cause of their behaviour. As a consequence, they will enjoy the behaviour less
and, once the rewards are discontinued, they will be less likely to perform it.

- - - - - - - - - -

over-justification effect providing external rewards for performance of a task, which individuals
previously performed because they found it enjoyable, reduces individuals’ liking for, and
enjoyment of, the task.

- - - - - - - - - -

The findings reported by Lepper and his colleagues (1973) have subsequently
been replicated in numerous studies. Based on a meta-analysis of over a hundred
studies conducted with participants ranging from preschool children to college
students, Deci and colleagues (1999) concluded that tangible (but not verbal)
rewards have a significant negative effect on intrinsic motivation for interesting
tasks. Thus, although an offer of reduced insurance premiums to people who jog
regularly might persuade people who never jogged to take it up, it would also
spoil the enjoyment regular joggers may have had in engaging in this activity.
 Further limitations of the effectiveness of incentive-
induced change
Since people are rarely interested in attitude change as an end in itself, but rather
as a means to changing behaviour, influencing behaviour through monetary
incentives or legal sanctions would seem to be the most effective of the
strategies discussed in this chapter. As we have seen, there is ample evidence to
support this notion. Seatbelt laws succeeded not only in substantially increasing
seatbelt use, they also resulted in a change in attitudes towards seatbelt use, at
least among those who complied (Fhanér & Hane, 1979). In view of the apparent
effectiveness of incentive-induced behaviour change, one wonders why people
still bother with persuasion.
There are actually a number of considerations to be taken into account. The
most obvious is lack of power. Only governments have the power to enact laws,
and even they are constrained in the use of this power. For example, although the
behavioural factors that are detrimental to people’s health (e.g. smoking, overuse
of alcohol) are well known, governments rely on persuasion as well as legal
action to change behaviour.
An additional constraint on strategies of influence based on the use of
monetary incentives or legal sanctions is that these strategies can only be used
for behaviour that can be monitored. Thus, while efficient for publicly
identifiable behaviour such as seatbelt use or speeding, positive or negative
incentives are difficult to apply if the behaviour that one wishes to influence is
difficult to monitor objectively. For example, in the area of race relations,
governments can eliminate some of the objective and observable instances of
discrimination (e.g. by introducing quotas for employment of members of racial
minorities), but they cannot force people to be nice to members of outgroups, to
invite them to their homes or let their children marry one of them. This is one of
the reasons why the American Supreme Court mandated the end of segregated
schooling. Since they could not outlaw prejudice, they attempted to reduce it by
increasing interracial contact (see Chapter 14).
Finally, the effectiveness of legal sanctions is likely to depend on the
acceptance of the law and on individual perception that violation of the law is
associated with a high risk of sanction. For example, it is quite likely that the
introduction of the law making seatbelt use compulsory would not have been
effective had people not accepted that such a law was in their own best interest.
In fact, without the persuasion campaigns that made it widely known that the
wearing of seatbelts substantially reduced the risk of injuries in traffic accidents,
it is unlikely that such a law would have been introduced. Similarly, the
increases in Federal cigarette tax that occurred in the US during the 1970s and
1980s would not have been possible without the anti-smoking campaign. The
anti-smoking campaign in the US also illustrates the fact that persuasion and
incentive-related strategies do not preclude each other and are probably most
effective when used in combination. Thus, the anti-smoking campaign resulted
in a non-smoking ethos that was probably responsible for the legislative
successes of the non-smokers’ rights movements during the 1970s and 1980s.
 Summary
Powerful institutions often use incentives or legal sanctions rather than
persuasion to influence behaviour. There is evidence that such strategies are
often effective in changing behaviour. It is less clear, however, whether these
strategies also achieve a change in relevant attitudes. For incentive-induced
counterattitudinal behaviour to induce dissonance, the incentive has to be
relatively small and not sufficient to justify the behaviour. Because large
incentives would justify the behaviour, there would be no need to reduce
dissonance through attitude change. Similarly, self-perception theory would
require that individuals do not attribute their behaviour change to the incentive.
Since governmental institutions and other powerful organizations usually choose
their incentives to be sufficiently powerful to persuade everybody (or nearly
everybody) to change their behaviour, these incentives are not only likely to
offer sufficient justification for behaviour change, but it is also likely that
compliance will be attributed to these incentives. Whereas the magnitude of
these incentives makes attitude change (i.e. finding the dull task enjoyable) due
to dissonance or self-perception processes unlikely in the case of
counterattitudinal behaviour, it increases the likelihood of attitude change (i.e.
finding the previously enjoyable task less enjoyable) in the case of pro-
attitudinal behaviour. This somewhat paradoxical effect is due to the fact that the
presence of a discounting cue (e.g. large payment or expected reward) leads
individuals to discount their counterattitudinal behaviour (i.e. describing the dull
task as interesting) as well as the pro-attitudinal behaviour (performing an
enjoyable drawing task) as information about their attitude.

CHAPTER SUMMARY
What are the major strategies of attitude and behaviour change? This
chapter discussed two major strategies, namely persuasion and the use of
incentives (e.g. taxation, legal sanctions).
What is the difference between the early theories of persuasion and the
more recent dual-process theories? Early theories of persuasion
(information processing model, cognitive response theory) focused on
persuasion resulting from the systematic processing of the semantic
content of persuasive messages. More recently, dual-process theories
(elaboration likelihood model, heuristic–systematic model) have accepted
that people often adopt attitudes on bases other than their systematic
processing of arguments. Dual-process theories integrate theories of
systematic processing and persuasion processes that are based on low-
effort processes (e.g. evaluative conditioning, self-perception, heuristic
processing) and they specify the conditions under which people engage in
each of these processes.
When do people engage in systematic processing of message arguments?
According to dual-process theories, individuals will engage in systematic
processing of message arguments only if they are motivated and able to
do so.
What are the factors that determine processing motivation? Processing
motivation is determined by situational factors such as personal relevance
of the attitude issue and by individual difference variables such as need
for cognition.
What are the factors that determine processing ability? Processing ability
is determined by factors such as time, absence of distraction or message
repetition. Whenever individuals are unmotivated or unable to engage in
systematic processing of message content, they base their decision of
whether to accept or reject a persuasive communication on low-effort
processing.
Does subliminal advertising work? The effectiveness of subliminal
advertising depends on the product and the need state of the target of the
advertising. Subliminally advertising Lipton Ice was effective for
participants, for whom it was not their habitual drink and who were
thirsty.
Can dual-process models be applied to advertising? Applying dual-
process theories to advertising, we argued that the effectiveness of the
most common appeals used in advertising (arguments, emotions,
endorsements) depends on the type of product being advertised (i.e.
thinking products or feeling products) and the involvement of the
audience.
Are incentives useful for influencing attitudes and behaviour?
Governments may use taxation or legal sanctions to make certain
behaviours like smoking, drinking alcohol or the non-use of seatbelts
more costly to individuals. Such strategies have been effective in
promoting the targeted behaviour, but less successful in also inducing
attitude change.
 Can incentives and persuasion be used jointly? Since private acceptance
of these government strategies is likely to aid compliance, we argued that
the use of incentives and of persuasive appeals should be considered as
complementary rather than competing strategies.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

Bohner, G., & Dickel, N. (2011). Attitudes and attitude change. Annual Review
of Psychology, 62, 391–417. A state-of-the-art review of the field of attitude
research.
Chen, S., & Chaiken, S. (1999). The heuristic–systematic model in its broader
context. In S. Chaiken & Y. Trope (Eds.), Dual-process theories in social
psychology (pp. 73–96). New York: Guilford. This chapter presents the most
recent version of the heuristic–systematic model and reviews research conducted
to test the theory.
Fennis, B. M., & Stroebe, W. (2010). The psychology of advertising. Hove, UK:
Psychology Press. A comprehensive, state-of-the-art review of the psychological
findings on the impact of advertising. It discusses this research in the context of
recent developments in the fields of social and consumer psychology.
Maio, G., & Haddock, G. (2010). The psychology of attitudes and attitude
change. London: Sage. A well-written introduction. It provides students with a
comprehensive and accessible overview of theories and empirical findings in the
area of attitude change.
Petty, R. E., Fazio, R. H., & Briñol, P. (Eds.). (2009). Attitudes: Insights from
the new implicit measures. New York: Psychology Press. The book contains
chapters by leading researchers reviewing theorizing and research on the topic of
implicit measures of attitudes.
Petty, R. E., & Wegener, D. T. (1999). The elaboration likelihood model:
Current status and controversies. In S. Chaiken & Y. Trope (Eds.), Dual-process
theories in social psychology (pp. 37–72). New York: Guilford. This chapter
presents the most recent version of the elaboration likelihood model and reviews
research conducted to test the theory.
 Chapter 8

Social Influence

Miles Hewstone and Robin Martin

Source: © Photos 12. Used under licence from Alamy.

KEY TERMS

autokinetic effect
compliance
conformity
consistency
conversion
deindividuation
door-in-the-face technique
evaluation apprehension
foot-in-the-door technique
 group polarization
groupthink
informational influence
innovation
lowballing technique
majority influence
minority influence
normative influence
norms
obedience to authority
referent informational influence
self-categorization theory
social comparison
social facilitation
social influence
whistle blowing
CHAPTER OUTLINE
INTRODUCTION
INCIDENTAL SOCIAL INFLUENCE
Social facilitation
The impact of social norms Summary
WHY DOES SOCIAL INFLUENCE OCCUR?
Summary
DELIBERATE SOCIAL INFLUENCE
Inducing compliance
The influence of numerical majorities and minorities Group Decision
Making
Obedience to authority
Summary

ROUTE MAP OF THE CHAPTER

This chapter considers social influence broadly, and how it can be
understood in terms of fundamental motives. First, we discuss ‘incidental’
social influence, where people are influenced by the presence or implied
presence of others, although there has been no explicit attempt to influence
them. We consider the impact of the mere presence of other people on task
performance, and the impact of social norms. In the second part of the
performance, and the impact of social norms. In the second part of the
chapter, we ask why people succumb to social influence, highlighting types
of social influence and motives underlying influence on the part of the target
of influence. In the third part of the chapter, we turn to ‘deliberate’ social
influence. We introduce theory and research on induced compliance, the
influence of numerical majorities and minorities, group decision-making and
obedience. Throughout, we will see that social influence is an ambivalent
concept. On the one hand, it is the glue of society; it makes things work, and
society would be utterly chaotic without it. But on the other hand it can be a
dark force, responsible for some of the most extreme, even immoral, forms
of human social behaviour.
 INTRODUCTION
On a typical day most of us will be exposed to a large variety of social
influences. You might be on your way to a lecture, when you see three of your
friends turning away from the psychology department, towards town. Although
no one has tried to persuade you, you are influenced to follow them, and drink
coffee instead of attending the lecture. Why? As you later sit sipping your
cappuccino, the topic turns to the use of animals in experimentation, and you
find yourself out of line with your three friends, who all try to convince you that
such studies are unnecessary and unethical. You try to counter-argue them,
doing your best to offer ‘strong’ persuasive counter-arguments. Then you head
back to the university and run into the lecturer whom you failed to meet
yesterday as agreed; she tells you to come and see her that afternoon; meekly,
you obey.
As we noted when introducing the field of social psychology (see Chapter 1),
one of the pioneers of the field, Gordon Allport (1954a), actually defined the
field of social psychology as ‘the attempt to understand and explain how the
thoughts, feelings, and behaviours of individuals are influenced by the actual,
imagined, or implied presence of other human beings’ (p. 5). So at one level, the
study of social influence is as broad and diverse as the study of social
psychology itself.
This chapter focuses on both ‘incidental’ and ‘deliberate’ influence. We begin
by looking at how the presence or implied presence of others can affect
performance, although there has been no explicit attempt at influence. We then
review the impact of social norms on social behaviour, where it is more the
implied presence, rather than the actual presence, of others that is influential. We
show how norms are transmitted, and how they can influence a wide variety of
human social behaviour, including our perceptions of physical phenomena and
our behaviour towards other people.
Linking the two broad categories of influence, in the second part of the chapter
we ask why social influence occurs. We consider group functions that social
influence serves, and the key distinction between normative and informational
types of social influence. Finally, we integrate different approaches by
highlighting four major motives for social influence: ‘effective action’; ‘building
and maintaining relationships’; ‘managing the self concept’; and
‘understanding’.
In the third part of the chapter we turn to deliberate influence, what might be
considered the core of social influence. We introduce theory and research on
induced compliance, the influence of numerical majorities and minorities, group
decision-making and obedience. There are, obviously, close links between these
instances of deliberate social influence and the area of persuasive
communication and attitude change, described in the previous chapter (see
Chapter 7). We will highlight these links, in particular, when discussing majority
and minority influence, where we will draw parallels with the elaboration
likelihood model of persuasion (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986a, b; Petty & Wegener,
1999). Social influence is also involved in leadership (see Chapter 13), and it is
an aspect of social behaviour that shows some interesting cross-cultural variation
(see Chapter 15).
What, then, is the difference between the phenomena considered in this
chapter and those covered in Chapter 7 on attitude change? Social influence
deals, broadly, with change of attitudes, beliefs, opinions, values and behaviour
as a result of being exposed to other individuals’ attitudes, beliefs, opinions,
values and behaviour. Clearly, research in both areas deals, in part, with similar
phenomena concerning change in attitudes and beliefs as a result of being
exposed to evidence about how other people think or behave. The main
difference between Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 is in the strategies of influence that
are considered. In Chapter 7 we dealt with persuasive communications, which
contain sets of persuasive arguments, and with changes in incentive structure as
the two major strategies of influence. In this chapter, when we consider
deliberate influence, we focus on the strategies of inducing compliance, majority
and minority influence, group decision-making and obedience.
 INCIDENTAL SOCIAL INFLUENCE
Social facilitation
What effect does the presence of other people have on task
performance?
The most obvious example of incidental influence is that the presence of one or
more other people, even though they are not trying in any way to influence us,
has an impact on our behaviour. We have already referred to Triplett’s (1898)
classic observation that cyclists rode faster when racing together than when
racing alone (see Chapter 1). This is claimed to be the first demonstration of the
phenomenon of social facilitation (see Chapter 1) (Allport, 1924), whereby the
presence of others leads to improved performance. However, neither the
phenomenon nor its explanation has turned out to be straightforward (and as we
showed in Research Close Up 1.1 in Chapter 1, Triplett’s research did not, in
fact, find clear evidence for social facilitation). Following the initial
demonstration, researchers conducted numerous studies using a variety of tasks,
yielding mixed results. Some studies showed improved performance as a result
of the presence of others, while other studies showed impaired performance.
Three main explanations have been proposed, but it is now widely accepted that
no single explanation accounts for all the findings, and a multifaceted approach
is needed.

Mere presence and drive theory

Zajonc (1965) highlighted the importance of the task people actually performed
in the presence of others. He suggested that mere presence of others leads to
improved performance on well-learned or easy tasks (social facilitation), but to
impaired performance on tasks which are not (yet) well-learned and which may
therefore be perceived as difficult or complex (social inhibition). The mere
presence of others facilitates responses that take precedence in an individual’s
behavioural repertoire (so-called dominant responses, such as pedalling when on
a bicycle, which have a higher likelihood of elicitation than other responses). But
the mere presence of other people inhibits novel and complicated responses that
the individual has never or only infrequently performed before (so-called
nondominant responses). People will, then, perform better when others are
present than when they are working alone, if the facilitation of well-learned
responses and the inhibition of novel responses are appropriate for successful
task completion. Thus, performing well-learned physical motor skills or simple
tasks should result in higher performance in the presence of others than when
working alone. In contrast, in complex reasoning or problem-solving tasks,
requiring concentration and complex cognitive activity, the presence of others
interferes with successful task completion (see Theory Box 8.1).
Why does the mere presence of others enhance the emission of dominant
responses? Zajonc (1980) used Hull–Spence drive theory (see Spence, 1956) to
argue that the physical presence of others of the same species leads to an innate
increase in arousal: that is, a readiness to respond to whatever unexpected action
the others might undertake. According to the Hull–Spence theory, increased
drive increases the probability of dominant responses at the expense of
nondominant responses. In order to emphasize that the effect was based on
simple drive, rather than high-level information processing, Zajonc even
demonstrated social facilitation with cockroaches as well as with
undergraduates! (see Zajonc, Heingartner, & Herman, 1969).

Evaluation apprehension
Cottrell (1968, 1972) challenged Zajonc’s explanation, by suggesting that
increased arousal constitutes a learned response to the presence of others, rather
than an innate response. According to Cottrell, task performers have learned to
associate the presence of other people with performance evaluation which, in
turn, is linked to the anticipation of positive or negative outcomes. The presence
of others will only elicit arousal and the accompanying facilitation of dominant
responses (and inhibition of nondominant responses) if task performers
anticipate being evaluated by these others.
Of course, we would have difficulty in applying Cottrell’s concept of
evaluation apprehension to cockroaches, ants and chickens, which have also
shown social facilitation/inhibition (SFI) effects, or to tasks that involve little
threat of evaluation, such as putting on or removing items of clothing, on which
researchers have also demonstrated SFI effects (Markus, 1978). Yet, there is
some experimental support for Cottrell’s explanation. Research has shown that
SFI effects are often eliminated when the salience of evaluation apprehension is
decreased, by allowing task performers to give their responses privately rather
than publicly, or by having non-evaluative audiences (Henchy & Glass, 1968;
Sasfy & Okun, 1974). Further evidence comes from research showing that it is
not task difficulty per se, but the subjective expectation that one will perform
well (or poorly), and that one will receive positive (or negative) outcomes, that
improves (or interferes with) task performance (Sanna, 1992; Sanna & Shotland,
1990). Robinson-Staveley and Cooper (1990) provided a clever demonstration of
the role of expectation, in a study in which participants performed a computer
task alone or in the presence of another person. When participants held positive
expectations about success on the task, the accuracy of their performance
improved in the presence of another person; but when they held negative
expectations, the reverse occurred (see Figure 8.1).
FIGURE 8.1 Social facilitation as a function of task expectations and the
presence of others.
Source: Data from Robinson-Staveley & Cooper, 1990. Reproduced with
permission.

- - - - - - - - - -

evaluation apprehension a learned response to the presence of others when performing a task,
whereby the performer experiences arousal when anticipating evaluation by these others (can affect
social facilitation, and also helping behaviour; see Chapter 10).

- - - - - - - - - -
 THEORY BOX 8.1
SOCIAL FACILITATION/INHIBITION ON
SIMPLE VERSUS DIFFICULT TASKS
Source: According to Zajonc, 1965, 1980.

Attention conflict
Sanders and his colleagues (Sanders, 1981; Sanders, Baron, & Moore, 1978)
proposed that the presence of others may produce a response conflict between
attending to the task itself, on the one hand, and attending to others, on the other
hand. Others’ presence may be distracting because of noises or gestures,
anticipated reactions of approval or disapproval, and people’s tendency to make
social comparisons. Since some of the attention needed to meet the task demands
will be directed at the other people, one may expect a general impairment of task
performance on all kinds of tasks, either well-learned or not well-learned. This
distraction interferes with the attention given to the task and creates an internal
response conflict, which can only be overcome with greater effort. The attention
conflict enhances arousal, resulting in the pattern of results noted above –
facilitation of dominant responses and inhibition of nondominant responses.

Integration
There is now general acceptance that we need to adopt a multifaceted approach
to explain why the presence of others on individual task performance moves
from benign to harmful as the perceived complexity of the task increases
(Guerin, 1993). The presence of others may interfere with our ability to learn
tasks, since learning implies that the most likely (dominant) responses are not
yet the correct ones. However, once the required responses have become well
learned and routine, the presence of others may improve performance. Given
that most tasks in everyday life involve routine as well as non-routine activities,
how important are social facilitation effects? A comprehensive meta-analysis by
Bond and Titus (1983) concluded that the mere presence of others accounts for
only a very small proportion of the variance in individual productivity (for other
significant influences on group productivity, see Chapter 13). Nonetheless, we
have seen that the presence of others can be a significant, albeit unintended,
influence on task performance. As we will now see, that influence is much more
significant when those others constitute a source of information about which
norms should guide our behaviour in social situations.
 The impact of social norms
What are social norms, and how are they formed and
transmitted?
The most fundamental concept in the study of social influence is that of social
norms. Social norms are rules and standards that are understood by members of
a group; they constitute belief systems about how (not) to behave, thus they
guide behaviour but without the force of laws, and they reflect group members’
shared expectations about typical or desirable activities (Cialdini & Trost, 1998;
Levine & Moreland, 1998; Prislin & Wood, 2005). Norms have a number of key
functions. First, they help to reduce uncertainty about how to behave
appropriately (see Van den Bos & Lind, 2002). For example, we know how to
behave in some situations (e.g. a mosque) because we have seen how people
behave in similar situations (e.g. a church). Second, norms help to coordinate
individual behaviour. For example, punctuality reduces coordination losses for
other group members – a meeting cannot start until all members are present, so it
is important to be punctual so that others do not waste their time. Third, norms
help with the distribution of outcomes. If three people are co-writing a chapter,
norms help to decide the order in which the names should appear. Norms
typically constrain us all, to some degree (e.g. even when you are in a hurry, you
have to join the back of the queue to buy a ticket; Figure 8.2); but we each also
benefit from the structure and order they provide (e.g. in the UK, at least, people
waiting for some service typically form an orderly queue, and you are likely to
be served when it is your turn, without having to protest).
FIGURE 8.2 Norms constrain everyone to some degree (e.g. even when you are
in a hurry, you have to join the back of the queue to use a cash machine).
Source: © wavebreakmedia ltd. Used under licence from Shutterstock.
 - - - - - - - - - -

social influence change of attitudes, beliefs, opinions, values and behaviour as a result of being
exposed to other individuals’ attitudes, beliefs, opinions, values, and behaviour.

- - - - - - - - - -

- - - - - - - - - -

norms belief systems about how (not) to behave, that guide behaviour but without the force of
laws, and reflect group members’ shared expectations about typical or desirable activities.

- - - - - - - - - -

Norms also include an evaluative component. Merely complying with a norm

(e.g. waiting in line) will rarely earn you praise (or even comment). But violating
a norm often generates negative responses (see Milgram, Liberty, Toledo, &
Wackenhut’s, 1986, research on responses to queue-violators). Indeed, Forsyth
(1995) points out that a norm often becomes salient only after it has been
violated, and people who fail to comply with situationally-relevant norms
without an acceptable explanation are generally subjected to negative evaluation,
ranging from pressure to change, through hostility, to punishment (see
Schachter’s, 1951, classic study on the pressure that is exerted on deviates,
discussed in more detail in Chapter 12).
There are two types of norms: descriptive norms inform us about how others
will act in similar situations (e.g. most English people throw off layers of
clothing as soon as the sun comes out in summer), whereas injunctive norms
specify what behaviour should be performed (e.g. when visiting a place of
religious worship, one should keep quiet and be respectful) (see Cialdini,
Kallgren, & Reno, 1991). Both kinds of norms emerge out of interaction with
others, especially members of the same formal or informal group, or social
network. The norms may, or may not, be stated explicitly, and any sanctions for
deviating from them come not from the legal system, but from social networks.
Norms appear in several other chapters of this book (e.g. subjective norms are
central to the ‘theory of reasoned action’ which links attitudes to behaviour, see
Chapter 6; norms of reciprocity and social responsibility affect helping, see
Chapter 10; and norms are central to understanding group processes, see Chapter
12). On one hand, norms make our lives as social beings simpler and more
predictable, and we look to others for guidance in many situations. On the other
hand, however, our social lives are made more complex by the fact that in many
social situations multiple norms may apply, and some may even be
incompatible; in such circumstances, we are all the more likely to turn to other
people as sources of information concerning how we should behave.

Norm formation and transmission

Since some norms may appear to be arbitrary or random (e.g. rituals to which
new group members are subjected) researchers have naturally questioned how
norms are formed and transmitted. The three main modes of transmission appear
to be (1) through deliberate instruction, demonstrations, rituals and so on (e.g.
we are taught how to behave in places of religious worship), (2) more passively,
via nonverbal behaviours and implicit activation of normative standards (e.g.
you are visiting a church on holiday and realize from people’s frowns and
gestures that you are immodestly dressed and should cover up), and (3) by
inferring the norm from the behaviour of others around us (e.g. you are visiting a
mosque and you see that everyone else has removed their shoes, so you remove
yours). As Cialdini and Trost (1998) point out, whatever their origin, norms
must be communicated to have any effect on behaviour. How is that done?
Surprisingly, the social-psychological literature on norm transmission is still
very small, and one set of studies still towers above all others – Muzafer Sherif’s
(1935, 1936) classic research on the autokinetic effect (see Chapter 1). This
phenomenon has long been known to astronomers, who find that when fixating
on a bright stationary star in a dark sky, the star appears to move (this effect is
brought about by the fact that our eyes actually move about in small jumps,
saccadic movements, and without a frame of reference objects appear to move
when they are in fact stationary). Indeed, you may already have experienced
yourself that, in the absence of reference points, a stationary light appears to
move rather erratically in all directions.
Sherif (1935, 1936) placed participants alone or in groups of two or three in a
completely darkened room. He presented participants with a single and small
stationary light at a distance of about five metres. Sherif asked his participants to
give an oral estimate of the extent of movement of the light, obviously without
informing them of the autokinetic effect. Half of the participants made their first
100 judgements alone. On three subsequent days they went through three more
sets of trials, but this time in groups of two or three. For the other half of the
participants the procedure was reversed: they underwent the three group sessions
first and ended with a session alone.
Participants who first made their judgements alone developed a standard
estimate (a personal norm) around which their judgements fluctuated. This
personal norm was stable, but it varied highly between individuals (by as much
as 7 inches [17.78 cm]). In the group phases of the experiment, which brought
together people with different personal norms and had them call out their
answers aloud, participants’ judgements converged towards a more or less
common position – a group norm – within the first group session. Within
groups, participants gave essentially the same estimates of movement, even
though the range of movement varied by group on average 1 to 5 inches (2.54 to
12.70 cm). With the reverse procedure this group norm developed in the first
session and it persisted in the later session alone. Figure 8.3 illustrates both kinds
of findings. The funnel effect in the left-hand panel reveals the convergence in
the (median) judgements of three participants who first judged alone (I) and later
in each other’s presence (II, III, IV). The right-hand panel shows the judgements
of a group of three participants who went through the procedure in the reverse
order. Here the convergence is already present in the first group session and the
slight evidence of funnelling out in the alone-last session is much weaker than in
the corresponding alone-first condition.
FIGURE 8.3(a) and (b) Median judgements of movement under alone (I) or
group (II, III, IV) conditions (a), and under group (I, II, III) or alone (IV)
conditions (b) in Sherif’s (1935) study on norm formation.

This famous experiment shows that, where confronted with an unstructured

and ambiguous stimulus, people nevertheless develop a stable internal frame of
reference against which to judge the stimulus. However, as soon as they are
confronted with the different judgements of others, they quickly abandon this
personal frame of reference so as to adjust it to that of others. Thus the apparent
truth about the environment, whether social or physical, can emerge as people
exchange their independent views. Although Sherif’s autokinetic study may
seem artificial, we can see similar processes at work in real social settings: for
example, when we judge someone’s physical attractiveness. This judgement is,
first, a social topic and, second, one that is often communicated within a social
context (‘she’s beautiful/he’s handsome’). Hassebrauck (1993) found that when
attractiveness ratings were made in a group there was a convergence in the
judges’ ratings. Moreover, the judgement convergence continued in a later
setting when individual judgements were made after the group session. These
findings are in line with Sherif’s results, and it appears that participants
established a standard during the group sessions that served as a frame of
reference for later judgements.
There are two obvious motives for participants’ responses in Sherif’s study –
relating to others and understanding the social world. Sherif himself proposed
that this norm formation reflected a rational, accuracy-motivated assessment of
the situation (Hood & Sherif, 1962). He concluded that, under unstable
conditions, where participants were confused about how to respond, they
assumed that ‘the group must be right’ (Sherif, 1936, p. 111). Interestingly, the
joint frame of reference formed in the presence of others endured when the
source of influence was no longer present, over considerable time, and it
transferred to new settings – including when participants joined a new group,
and when they were re-tested individually, even up to a year after their initial
exposure to others’ estimates (Hood & Sherif, 1962; Rohrer, Baron, Hoffman, &
Swander, 1954).
In subsequent studies Sherif (1935, 1936) placed a single individual who made
extreme judgements in each of several groups. This one person influenced the
remaining group members, whereby a more extreme norm guided their
judgements. Then, once this arbitrary standard was established, Sherif removed
the extreme individual from the group, replacing him with a new member.
Intriguingly, the remaining group members retained as their norm the higher
estimate, and the new group member gradually adapted to the higher standard.
Research has even shown that old members can be gradually removed from the
group and replaced with new members (naïve participants), and the old norm
continues to impact on estimates for a long time until, in fact, the group
members have been changed five times (see Jacobs & Campbell, 1961). But
there is a finite limit to arbitrary norms, and they tend to decay more rapidly
across generations the more contrived they are (MacNeil & Sherif, 1976).
What kind of social influence does Sherif’s study demonstrate? It is incidental,
rather than deliberate, influence because there were no explicit attempts to
influence others. Sherif’s work is important precisely because it shows how, at
least for an ambiguous stimulus, norms can be adopted implicitly, how they
develop through reciprocal influence, and how they become internalized.

Influence via social norms in more social settings

Sherif’s autokinetic studies demonstrated the emergence of arbitrary social
norms in response to ambiguous stimuli presented in a stark experimental
context. But social norms have the power to influence our behaviour in many
more realistic situations outside the laboratory. Often we are guided by norms
without even being aware of the fact, as Cialdini and his colleagues
demonstrated in a series of field experiments to determine the effects of
descriptive norms on behaviour (Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990). Cialdini and
colleagues manipulated the descriptive norm for littering behaviour by
controlling the amount of litter in a variety of settings (e.g. a parking garage); the
setting was either clean (anti-littering norm) or littered (pro-littering norm). The
researchers also helpfully provided a leaflet for the participant to discard (e.g.
they placed a reminder to ‘drive carefully’ under the windscreen wipers of the
car parked in the garage). In general, the studies showed that people were more
likely to drop litter into a littered environment than into a clean environment
(Figure 8.4). Somehow, the presence of litter on the ground seems to send the
message that it is not forbidden to litter here (i.e. that the anti-litter norm that
applies generally to the environment does not apply in this space), while the
clean environment sends the message that it is normative to take your litter home
with you. This tendency was especially strong when the researchers directed the
participants’ attention to the descriptive norm in the setting. For example, when
a confederate dropped litter in an already-dirty setting, this focused attention on
the littered environment, and people were most likely themselves to litter. When
the confederate dropped litter into a clean environment, however, this
highlighted the lack of litter; people then littered less than they did when there
was a clean environment with no confederate who littered. A clever series of
studies by Keizer, Lindenberg, and Steg (2008) developed these ideas further,
and showed that subtle violation of one norm (e.g. clear evidence of spray-
painting on a wall, despite a sign forbidding graffiti) also facilitated violation of
a completely different norm (e.g. no littering; Figure 8.5).
FIGURE 8.4(a) and (b) The power of social norms: people are more likely to
drop litter into a littered environment than into a clean one.
Source: (a) © DelicatePhoto; (b) © slavcic. Both images used under licence from
Shutterstock.

FIGURE 8.5(a) and (b) Do more people litter in a setting where the anti-
graffiti norm (an injunctive norm) is in conflict with the descriptive norm (i.e., a
setting in which it is common for people to spray the walls with graffiti)?
Source: From Keizer, K., Lindenberg, S., & Steg, L. (2008). The spreading of
disorder. Science, 322, 1681–1685. © Science publishers, AAAS, with
permission.
 Now turn to Research Close-Up 8.1 to read about some of these studies.
Perhaps the most dramatic social-psychological study of norms is the
renowned ‘Stanford Prison Experiment’ (Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo, 1973).
These researchers demonstrated that normal people could be brought to behave
in extremely antisocial ways, in part at least, by assigning them to specific roles
and allowing them to develop norms in line with these roles. These researchers
randomly assigned 24 ‘normal, average, and healthy’ (Zimbardo, Maslach, &
Haney, 2000, p. 199) students to play the roles of mock prisoners or mock
guards in a simulated prison established in the basement of the psychology
department at Stanford University, California. The study was intended to last
two weeks, but had to be halted after six days, due to the guards ‘sadistic’
(Zimbardo et al., 2000, p. 202) punishment of the prisoners, whose
psychological suffering was deemed unacceptably great. This study was recently
replicated for a BBC television programme, yielding different results (Reicher &
Haslam, 2006) and fierce controversy (Zimbardo, 2006), and appears also to
have been quite strongly influenced by demand characteristics (see Chapter 2).
The extreme forms of behaviour observed by Zimbardo and his colleagues –
stripping prisoners naked, depriving them of food, humiliating them, and
subjecting them to solitary confinement – were partly a result of the
deindividuation of both guards and prisoners (who each wore role-consistent
clothing), depriving them of their sense of individual identity and responsibility
(Figure 8.6). But the power of the contrived situation also encouraged the
development of new norms of behaviour, disinhibiting traditionally disapproved
ways of treating others, even though there had been no explicit influence from
the experimenters to encourage these forms of behaviour. If this all sounds too
contrived to be true, or at least to have any consequences beyond the boundaries
of this study, consider the treatment by some personnel of the United States
Army of their Iraqi prisoners in Abu Ghraib prison, in 2003 (see Hersh, 2004).
Norms within that real prison sanctioned terrorizing the prisoners with dogs,
making them simulate sex acts with each other, and degrading them in various
other ways that violated the Geneva Conventions on the treatment of prisoners of
war (for an extended social psychological analysis of such phenomena, see
Zimbardo, 2007).
FIGURE 8.6 Extreme forms of behaviour, such as the mistreatment of
prisoners, result from deindividuation and the development of new behavioural
norms that disinhibit traditionally disapproved ways of treating others.
Source: © Ojo Images. Used under licence from Getty Images.

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deindividuation a state in which individuals are deprived of their sense of individual identity, and
are more likely to behave in an extreme manner, often antisocially and violating norms.
 - - - - - - - - - -

RESEARCH CLOSE-UP 8.1

HOW NORM VIOLATION PROMOTES

ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOUR
Keizer, K., Lindenberg, S., & Steg, L. (2008). The spreading of disorder. Science, 322, 1681–
1685.

Introduction The so-called ‘broken windows theory’

of crime (Kelling & Wilson, 1982) emphasizes the
role of norms in causing petty crime. This
criminological theory argues that by removing signs
of disorder such as broken windows, litter, and
graffiti, we could simultaneously remove triggers of
disorderly and petty criminal behaviour. Keizer,
Lindenberg, and Steg (2008) conducted six elegant
field experiments that provided the first causal
evidence in support of this theory.
Theoretically, their studies build on the earlier work of Cialdini and
colleagues (Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990), which had shown the
importance of injunctive norms (which refer to the approval or disapproval
of a particular kind of behaviour) and descriptive norms (which simply
describe a particular behaviour common in a setting). Whereas injunctive
norms provide information about which behaviour is most appropriate in a
given situation (e.g. the ‘don’t litter’ norm), descriptive norms affect
behaviour simply because they provide information about which behaviour
is most common in that situation. Thus, injunctive norms concern what one
should do in a certain situation, whereas descriptive norms concern what is
the case in that situation.
The studies by Keizer et al. cleverly addressed what happens when
injunctive and descriptive norms are in conflict. For example, do more
people litter in a setting where the anti-graffiti norm (an injunctive norm) is
in conflict with the descriptive norm (i.e. a setting in which it is common for
people to spray the walls with graffiti)? We will summarize only the first
study in this paper, but refer briefly to the results of some of the other
studies in the discussion, below. All the studies were controlled field
experiments, conducted in common public places in the town of Groningen,
in The Netherlands.
Method Participants One hundred and fifty-four
members of the public (N = 77 in each of the two
conditions) were observed when they came to collect
their parked bicycles.
Design and procedure The experiment compared two
conditions, both staged in the same alley located in a
shopping area, where people commonly parked their
bicycles. A conventional sign clearly indicated that
graffiti was prohibited (i.e. injunctive norm
disapproving of graffiti). In an ‘order’ condition, the
walls of the alley were clean, whereas in a ‘disorder’
condition they were sprayed with graffiti. Participants
in the study (who were unaware that they were being
observed) were people who came to collect their
parked bicycles. However, prior to collecting their
bicycle, the experimenters had, unobserved, attached
a fake advertising flyer to the handlebars of their
bicycle in such a way that the participants had to
remove it before they could easily use their
handlebars. There were, however, no litter bins in the
 alley, thus the cyclists could only follow the ‘no
littering’ norm by taking the flyer with them. The
experimenters simply counted how many cyclists
littered (counted as either throwing the flyer on the
ground, or hanging it on another bicycle) in the two
conditions.
Results The effect of violating the graffiti norm on
the extent of littering was substantial and highly
significant. Of the participants in the order (no
graffiti) condition, 33 per cent littered, compared with
69 per cent of the participants in the disorder (graffiti)
condition (see Figure 8.7).
FIGURE 8.7 Percentage of participants littering as a function of order versus
disorder.
Source: Keizer, Lindenberg, & Steg, 2008; Study 1. Reproduced with
permission from AAAS.

Discussion This study showed very clearly that

violating the anti-graffiti norm doubled the extent of
littering. Studies 2–6 confirmed these findings, using
a variety of norms and behaviours. Studies 5 and 6
 even showed that the presence of graffiti (whether on
a public post box, or in the area around the post box)
substantially increased the proportion of participants
who stole an envelope clearly containing a five Euro
note (which the experimenters had left dangling
tantalizingly in the opening of the post box!),
compared with a ‘clean’ control condition. The
researchers also ruled out alternative explanations
(e.g. it was unlikely that people littered more in some
conditions simply because they calculated that they
were less likely to be arrested for this, because police
in the town generally turned a blind eye to littering).
Based on this impressive evidence the researchers concluded that the most
likely explanation for this overall set of results was that one form of
‘disorder’ (e.g. graffiti) actually encouraged a different form of ‘disorder’
(e.g. littering, or stealing), because the violation of one norm (e.g. not to
spray graffiti) weakened conformity to the other norm (not to litter, not to
steal). The researchers conclude by referring to the policy implications of
their findings, including the need for early detection of signs of disorder,
and prompt intervention to prevent the spread of other forms of disorder as
norms for appropriate behaviour are inhibited.
 Summary
We have presented social facilitation and norms as examples of incidental
influence. The mere presence of others can improve or worsen performance,
depending on task complexity. Norms guide our social behaviour in most
settings, helping to reduce uncertainty about how to behave appropriately, but
typically have a limited domain of application. Norms can be transmitted in
various ways, and often have ‘carry over’ effects, across time and settings. Often
social influence takes the form of our being influenced by the norm that we infer
from other people’s behaviour.
 WHY DOES SOCIAL INFLUENCE
OCCUR?
What is meant by normative and informational social influence?
Having illustrated some forms of social influence (incidental influence) and
before introducing alternative forms (deliberate influence), this is a good place to
ask why people are influenced by others. As we have indicated, some forms of
influence are low-level, rather trivial effects (e.g. social facilitation), which do
not appear to be driven by motives. Other forms of influence are much more
interesting, because they illustrate some of the fundamental goals that guide
human social behaviour, and their underlying motives.
One of the earliest theoretical analyses of this question was that of Festinger
(1950). Focusing on task-oriented groups with face-to-face communication, he
argued that norm-formation as well as norm-following were outcomes of
pressures towards uniformity within the group. Uniformity itself serves two
functions of group membership, social reality testing and group locomotion.
When we follow established social norms, we are confident that our behaviour is
appropriate, correct and socially desirable – we have subjective validity (Turner,
1991). Although we can test the subjective validity of some beliefs against
physical reality (‘Is this water hot? I will put a thermometer in it to check’),
other beliefs can only be tested against social reality (‘What is my opinion
towards euthanasia? I will see what my friends believe’). Agreement with other
members of the relevant group (be it immediate task group or wider reference
group) by comparing our views with theirs (Festinger, 1954) provides us with
subjective validity for our beliefs (see also Chapters 5 and 12 on social
comparison theory). (See Individual Differences 8.1 for a scale that assesses the
tendency to make social comparisons.) Social comparison (see Chapter 5) is
most likely to occur in situations that are novel, ambiguous or objectively
unclear (Sherif, 1936; Tesser, Campbell, & Mickler, 1983), and when people are
unsure, they are most likely to look to, and be guided by, the beliefs and
behaviours of similar others. Thus, social reality testing is the consensual
validation of beliefs through social comparison. This is seen as necessary for the
group to reach its desired goals, what Festinger (1950) called group locomotion.
Coordination of goals and activities among group members is necessary for the
group to move, as a group, effectively and efficiently in the direction it wants or
needs to go. Consider conformity, going along with the group (which we
introduced in Chapter 1 and will return to in more detail below). Even though it
tends to have negative connotations in Western, individual societies (Markus &
Kitayama, 1994), conformity can help us to achieve group goals quickly and
easily (Cialdini & Trost, 1998). Think for a few seconds how chaotic society
would be in the complete absence of conformity.
Festinger suggested that opinion discrepancies within groups elicit pressures
towards uniformity, which produces communication between members of the
group. Uniformity is achieved by group members convincing others to move
towards their position, by themselves shifting towards the position held by
others, or by redefining the group by rejecting those members who disagree (see
Levine, 1989; Turner, 1991).
Deutsch and Gerard (1955) proposed a simple but highly influential analysis of
motives for social influence. They argued that people agree with others for
normative or informational reasons. Normative influence presumes a need for
social approval or harmony with others, and occurs when people conform to the
positive expectations of others – they avoid behaving in ways that will lead to
social punishment or disapproval. The main goal, then, is to build and maintain
satisfactory relationships with others, and accuracy becomes correspondingly
less important (Prislin & Wood, 2005). Informational influence presumes a
need to reduce uncertainty, and involves accepting the information obtained
from others as evidence about reality. The main goal in this case is to make
accurate and valid judgements.

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normative influence influence based on conforming to the positive expectations of others: people
avoid behaving in ways that will lead to social punishment or disapproval.

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informational influence influence based on accepting the information obtained from others as
evidence about reality.

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 - - - - - - - - - -

Notwithstanding the impact Deutsch and Gerard’s framework has had on the
whole social influence literature, Prislin and Wood (2005) have criticized the
interpretation of it, which emphasizes only whether people are (public settings)
or are not (private settings) under surveillance. According to a simplistic
application of the normative–informational distinction, social influence based on
normative influence is temporary, and evidenced in public settings, but not
maintained in private settings in which judgements do not have social
consequences; whereas informational influence yields enduring change in
judgements, and holds in both private and public settings. In contrast to this
view, Prislin and Wood emphasize that normative motives can, in fact, have
informational consequences that hold up later in time, and in private settings.
One way to integrate these different approaches to understanding why social
influence occurs is to highlight four major motives (Cialdini & Trost, 1998; see
also Prislin & Wood, 2005): ‘effective action’, ‘building and maintaining
relationships’, ‘managing the self concept’ and ‘understanding’. This approach
emphasizes the goals of both the target of influence and the influencing agent.
Thus, for example, a participant in Sherif’s autokinetic studies could have
shifted his or her estimate of how much the point of light appeared to move, in
the direction of the group norm, in order to facilitate the group working
effectively, to gain approval and acceptance from others in the group, to avoid a
self-conception as someone who is different or deviant, and to believe that he or
she now sees things more accurately. But the target also yields to informational
social influence, because he or she takes the behaviour of others as information
about reality or wants to be accepted by the group.
We will return to these goals throughout the remainder of this chapter. We
emphasize, here, that individuals will process the information available in social
situations so as to meet whatever goal is salient. Thus, depending on whether the
focus is on action, relationships, the self concept or understanding, the target of
social influence will focus information processing on its implications for
behavioural effectiveness, social relations, the desired view of the self or the
validity of the available information. Each of these goals can also be addressed
in various ways (see Lundgren & Prislin, 1998; Prislin & Wood, 2005). When
the implications are important, people can address the relevant goal(s) through
careful thought and systematic analysis, yielding change that endures across time
and settings. Or, when the goals are less compelling, and people have less need
to be confident in their judgements, they can meet them through less systematic,
more heuristic strategies (see Chapter 7 on dual-route models of attitude
change).

INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 8.1

MEASURING THE TENDENCY TO COMPARE
OURSELVES WITH OTHERS
Social comparison refers to the use of others as points of reference to
evaluate our abilities, or to show us what we should be thinking or feeling.
This comparison may be considered relatively automatic (Gilbert, Giesler, &
Morris, 1995), but occurs most often when we are uncertain about what to
think or feel, during periods of stress, novelty or change and in situations
that foster competition. Gibbons and Buunk (1999) developed a scale to
measure the tendency to make social comparisons as an individual
difference variable. The scale addresses the three specific underlying
motives for comparison that have been generally accepted in the literature
on social comparison: self-evaluation, self-improvement and self-
enhancement (Taylor, Wayment, & Carrillo, 1996; Wood, 1989). The
scale’s eleven items capture the tendency to compare with others concerning
life accomplishments, how well one has done at something, social skills,
popularity, how one approaches a task, mutual opinions, experiences,
problems and situations, or to learn more about something.
You can assess your own tendency to make social comparisons by
completing the 11-item scale, below, which is preceded by the instructions:
‘Most people compare themselves from time to time with others. For
example, they may compare the way they feel, their opinions, their abilities,
and/or their situations with those of other people. There is nothing
particularly “good” or “bad” about this type of comparison, and some
people do it more often than others. We would like to find out how often
you compare yourself with other people. To do that we would like to ask
you to indicate how much you agree with each statement below, by using
the following scale.
‘The scale ranges from I disagree strongly (1) to I agree strongly (5).’
 1. I often compare how my loved ones (boy or girlfriend, family members,
etc.) are doing with how others are doing.
2. I always pay a lot of attention to how I do things compared with how
others do things.
3. If I want to find out how well I have done something, I compare what I
have done with how others have done.
4. I often compare how I am doing socially (e.g. social skills, popularity)
with other people.
5. I am not the type of person who compares often with others. (reversed)
6. I often compare myself with others with respect to what I have
accomplished in life.
7. I often like to talk with others about mutual opinions and experiences.
8. I often try to find out what others think who face similar problems as I
face.
9. I always like to know what others in a similar situation would do.
10. If I want to learn more about something, I try to find out what others
think about it.
11. I never consider my situation in life relative to that of other people.
(reversed)
Gibbons and Buunk (1999) reported data on various samples, including five
samples of students in The Netherlands (N = 3200 total). The mean score
(after reverse-scoring items 5 and 11) was 37.93, so if you score clearly
lower than this score your tendency to make social comparisons is lower
than average, whereas if you score clearly higher than this score your
tendency to make social comparisons is higher than average.
 Summary
When we look at why social influence occurs, we see some of the fundamental
motives that direct human social behaviour. Pressures toward uniformity and
agreement among group members help us to validate social beliefs and guide the
group towards its goals. We can also agree with others because we wish to be
liked (or to avoid being disliked), or because we accept information from others
as evidence about how things ‘really are’. Ultimately, we are influenced by
others so that we behave effectively, build and maintain relationships with
others, manage our own self-concept and understand the social world more
effectively.
 DELIBERATE SOCIAL INFLUENCE
Inducing compliance
What are the main techniques of inducing compliance, and how
and when do they work?
Compliance refers to a particular kind of response whereby the target of
influence acquiesces to a request from the source of influence (Cialdini & Trost,
1998), but typically ‘gives in’ to the request without a true change of attitude.
The request may be explicit or implicit, but the target recognizes that he or she is
being pressured to respond in a desired way. We emphasize that even though
these forms of influence may appear relatively mild, all are based on requests,
they are also all quite manipulative, and you are likely to encounter them in your
interactions with skilled professional salespeople – so beware! But they can also
be used for positive ends, as in eliciting donations to charity. (As you will see
later, the term compliance is also used more generally in the research on
conformity, to refer to change in public behaviour to match a norm, but without
corresponding change on a private level.) We consider, below, the three main
techniques of inducing compliance.

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compliance a response whereby the target of influence acquiesces to a request from the influence
source (also refers to change in behaviour to match a norm without change on a private level).

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The door-in-the-face technique

In the door-in-the-face technique (also known as a ‘reciprocal concessions’
procedure), the requester begins with an extreme request that is almost always
refused (e.g. ‘Can you lend me £20?’). The requester, upon the initial request
being declined, then retreats to a more moderate request, in fact the one that the
requester had in mind all along (e.g. ‘Can you lend me £5?’). By acting in this
way, the requester hopes that the concession from an extreme to a moderate
request will encourage the target of the request to make a similar, reciprocal,
concession and move from initial refusal of the larger request to acceptance of
the smaller one (e.g. Cialdini et al., 1975).

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door-in-the-face technique compliance technique in which the requester begins with an extreme
request that is almost always refused, then retreats to a more moderate request, which he or she had
in mind all along (also known as a ‘reciprocal concessions’ procedure).

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This technique works effectively in commercial settings (e.g. Fennis, 2008),

and is widely used in fund-raising. For example, after refusing a larger request
for a donation, people are much more likely than before to give any contribution
(Reingen, 1978). It has also been used to solicit blood donors (Cialdini &
Ascani, 1976). Researchers first asked people to take part in a long-term donor
programme. When that request was declined, the requester asked for a one-time
donation. Again, compliance with the small request was significantly greater
after refusal of the large request (50 per cent), than in a control condition, in
which people were asked only to perform the smaller favour (32 per cent). You
can even use this technique on your lecturers! Harari, Mohr, and Hosey (1980)
found that if students asked faculty members to spend 15 to 20 minutes talking
to them about an issue of interest, some 59 per cent of the faculty agreed. But as
many as 78 per cent acquiesced if they had first been asked for a much bigger
favour (giving 2 hours a week of help to the student for the rest of the semester),
which they had of course refused.
The success of this technique relies on two interlinked explanations. First,
when the salesperson makes a concession, it is normative for the consumer to
reciprocate, at least to some extent, which he or she does by accepting the
concession. The tactic is much less effective if the time between the two requests
is perceived as too long (Cann, Sherman, & Elkes, 1975), if the two requests are
made by two different people (Snyder & Cunningham, 1975), and if the first
request is excessive (Schwarzwald, Raz, & Zvibel, 1979). Second, when the
target (e.g. the consumer, faced with a salesperson) makes a concession, he or
she has re-established equity with the salesperson. The motives underlying
compliance of this sort include our desire to build and maintain social
relationships, but also our wish to view ourselves as, for example, generous
(Brown & Smart, 1991) or consistent (Cialdini, Trost, & Newsom, 1995).

The foot-in-the-door technique

The foot-in-the-door technique adopts the reverse strategy, with the requester
first asking for a small favour that is almost certain to be granted, and then
following this up with a request for a larger, related favour (Freedman & Fraser,
1966). For example, a car salesperson may ask a potential buyer to test drive a
car. Compliance to the critical request (buying the car) will be enhanced if the
customer can first be made to comply with the initial, smaller request. The
requester uses initial compliance as a means of committing the target to behave
in a way that is consistent with it, and there is plentiful evidence that people are
suckers for this approach (see Beaman, Cole, Preston, Klentz, & Steblay, 1983,
for a review), which is frequently used by telemarketers (see Fennis & Stroebe,
2010). It can also be used for charitable donations: respondents who had agreed
to accept and wear a small lapel pin promoting a local charity were also more
likely to give money to that charity when approached at a later point in time
(Pliner, Hart, Kohl, & Saari, 1974).

- - - - - - - - - -

foot-in-the-door technique compliance technique in which the requester first asks for a small
favour that is almost certain to be granted, then follows this up with a request for a larger, related
favour.

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The success of this technique relies on the general idea of consistency

(Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Cialdini et al., 1995). Thus, the person who agreed to
wear the lapel pin will wish to behave consistently when contacted later. This is
closely linked to an explanation in terms of self-perception theory (see Chapter
7). For example, the car-buying customer may infer from his or her behaviour
that he or she is the kind of person who drives that sort of car.

Lowballing
In the lowballing technique, which Cialdini and Trost (1998, p. 178) refer to as
one of the ‘more unsavoury’ techniques, compliance to an initial attempt is
followed by a more costly and less beneficial version of the same request
(Cialdini, Cacioppo, Bassett, & Miller, 1978). For example, a car dealer may
induce the customer to decide on a particular model of car by offering a low
price for it, or an attractive trade-in deal on the customer’s old vehicle. Then,
after the decision has been made, the dealer goes back on the deal, giving some
reason why the car is no longer available at the originally agreed price. Really
unscrupulous dealers may even strengthen the customer’s commitment, by
allowing him or her to arrange financing, or even take the car home overnight
(Joule, 1987).

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lowballing technique compliance to an initial attempt is followed by a more costly and less
beneficial version of the same request.

- - - - - - - - - -

This technique seems to rely on the target, even though he or she has been
duped, feeling an unfulfilled obligation to the requester. The target is also
already psychologically committed to the purchase, and so proceeds anyway.
The technique is primarily effective when used by a single requester (Burger &
Petty, 1981), and when the target freely makes the initial commitment (Cialdini
et al., 1978; see Chapter 7 on cognitive dissonance theory). Although we have
thus far treated lowballing as a rather negative technique, we should also note
that it has been used successfully for more noble causes, such as getting people
to give more money to a charitable cause (Fennis, Janssen, & Vohs, 2009).

Integration
These techniques of inducing compliance rely on general principles such as
equity, reciprocity and self-consistency (for further principles, and an application
of these techniques to advertising, see Fennis & Stroebe, 2010, Chapter 7). One
other general principle guiding induced compliance concerns perceived rewards
and costs. People are not quite the suckers that these phenomena may imply, and
in general they are likely to comply with a request for help if the costs are low,
but not if costs are high (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). Under low costs they may
display relative ‘mindlessness’ (Langer, Blank, & Chanowitz, 1978), for
example not listening carefully to the exact words of a requester who asks to
jump ahead of them in the queue for the photocopier machine, with the lame
excuse that they ‘have to make some copies’. However, when the requester asks
to copy a larger number of pages (implying costs for the target, who will have to
hang around and wait), then the requester’s words are listened to carefully, and
compliance only follows a convincing justification (e.g. ‘I have to visit my sick
mother in hospital’).
 The influence of numerical majorities and minorities
How and when do numerical majorities and minorities exert
influence?
Whereas strategies for inducing compliance involve interpersonal influence,
social influence is also a key phenomenon in small groups. The first studies to
examine the conditions under which an individual yields or conforms to a
numerical majority were conducted by Solomon Asch (e.g. Asch, 1951, 1956;
see Levine, 1999, and Leyens & Corneille, 1999, for commentaries on the
impact of Asch’s research). The ‘Asch experiments’ have become a classic in
the literature, and we have already described the basic paradigm (see Chapter 1).
In this section we will, first, review the main findings from the Asch paradigm,
and then consider when and why people conform. Next, we introduce minority
influence and innovation, the situation in which either an individual or a group
in a numerical minority can influence the majority. Finally, we review the major
theoretical approaches to explain both majority influence and minority
influence.

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innovation see minority influence.

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majority influence (conformity) social influence resulting from exposure to the opinions of a
majority, or the majority of one’s group.

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minority influence (innovation) situation in which either an individual or a group in a numerical

 minority can influence the majority.

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Majority influence: the Asch paradigm and beyond

Asch (1956) began his famous work expecting to show that people were not as
suggestible as was generally believed at that time (see Leader in the Field,
Solomon E. Asch). He also believed that the norm-following behaviour shown in
Sherif’s (1936) studies could be attributed to the ambiguous nature of the
autokinetic stimulus. He contended that when unambiguous stimuli were used,
and where there was a clearly correct answer, people would remain independent
of the group’s inaccurate judgements. As you will see, the results turned out
rather differently.
Asch used a task in which groups of participants were shown two cards. On
one card were three lines of different lengths, with each line having a number.
The second card contained just one line (the standard line) that was of the same
length as one of the three lines on the first card. The participant’s task was
simply to state publicly which of the three lines was the same length as the
standard line. This task was repeated eighteen times, and on each trial different
cards were shown, using different lengths of lines. In a control condition, in
which participants performed alone with no group influence, over 99 per cent of
the responses were correct, showing that the task was simple and unambiguous.

LEADER IN THE FIELD

Solomon E. Asch (1907–1996) was born in Warsaw, Poland and
received his BS from the College of the City of New York in 1928,
and his MA and PhD from Columbia University in 1930 and 1932,
respectively. He taught at Brooklyn College, the New School for
Social Research and Swarthmore College, and held visiting posts at
Harvard and MIT. He was Distinguished Professor of Psychology
and Director of the Institute for Cognitive Studies at Rutgers
University from 1966 to 1972, when he joined the University of
Pennsylvania. He is best known for his famous experiments on
conformity (or ‘group forces in the modification and distortion of
judgments’). These studies deliberately opposed physical and social
 reality, and showed that most people succumb to the pressure to
conform to majority opinion, even when stimuli are unambiguous.
Asch also contributed classic research on impression formation (see
Chapter 3), and he influenced many subsequent social psychologists
(Stanley Milgram was greatly influenced by, and worked for, him;
see Leader in the Field, this chapter). He wrote a distinctive and
authoritative textbook on Social Psychology, first published in 1952.

What Asch did next was very interesting. He had participants perform the task
publically, answering aloud, in groups of 6–9. He arranged that all the
participants (all were male), except one, would be confederates of the
experimenter – that is, they were instructed by the experimenter to give a set
pattern of answers, some of which were clearly incorrect. In some studies, the
confederates all gave the wrong answer to the task. In addition, the seating
arrangement was such that the naïve participant always gave his answers last-
but-one. In other words, the naïve participant heard several people give the same
wrong answer before he was required to give his own response. Asch’s research
question was, how would the naïve participant respond when faced with a
consistent majority giving an (obviously) incorrect response? In fact, Asch found
that the naïve participants gave the same incorrect response as the majority on
36.8 per cent of occasions.
It might be easy to brush aside these findings and assert that participants were
just publicly agreeing with the majority. In one variation of the study (Asch,
1956) a situation was arranged so that the naïve participant believed he had
arrived too late and so could write down his responses while the other group
members (the confederates) still gave their responses aloud. The rate of
conforming to the majority fell to 12.5 per cent, but this is still much higher than
when no confederates were present (0.7 per cent).
Subsequent studies on conformity tended to move away from Asch’s
paradigm, which was costly and time-consuming, because each naïve participant
had to be tested alongside a group of confederates. Instead, using the Crutchfield
(1955) paradigm, there are no confederates and the numerical majority is implied
through feedback about other people’s responses. Each participant sits in a
separate cubicle (with no visual or verbal contact) and they all respond to the
task via response switches. In addition, the response of each other group member
is displayed on each participant’s consol. Each participant believes that they are
receiving the responses of the group members but, in fact, they are not; the
response pattern can be programmed by the experimenter to show either
agreement or disagreement with other participants. More recently still, most
studies of conformity have abandoned the group context completely, and
participants receive feedback concerning other people’s responses in summary
form (e.g. being told that 82 per cent of the population hold a particular attitude).
Comparison between different paradigms shows reliable differences, with
conformity rates being highest in face-to-face situations (e.g. Levy, 1960). This
is not surprising, as literally facing the majority increases normative pressures to
conform.

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conformity see majority influence.

- - - - - - - - - -

In a clever recent study Mori and Arai (2010) replicated Asch’s paradigm
without the use of confederates, by colouring the tops of the stimulus lines in
either green or magenta. The participants, Japanese students, wore one of two
types of polarizing sunglasses to view the stimuli which, unknown to them,
filtered either green or magenta, to make the lines appear longer or shorter (so
the majority was created simply by having the larger number of participants
wearing glasses with the same-coloured filter). Results from this paradigm
showed that women conformed to the majority, but men did not. Future
replications will be needed, however, to ascertain whether this difference from
Asch’s results is due to a change of paradigm, cultural differences (see Chapter
15), or both.

When do people conform?

Asch’s first studies were followed by many variants. Among the most important
factors found to influence the level of conformity are group size, unanimity and
social support, and culture.
In terms of the numerical size of the majority, conformity increased quite
dramatically as the number of majority members (faced with a minority of one)
increased from one to three, but the influence of additional members was
minimal (Asch, 1951; see Figure 8.8). However, results are rather inconsistent
(see Gerard, Wilhelmy, & Conolley, 1968; Reis, Earing, Kent, & Nezlek, 1976).
A crucial factor for the levelling off of conformity after the third participant
seems to be that the members of the majority must be seen to be independent,
and not simply ‘sheep’ (Wilder, 1977); once that is the case, there is a linear
increase in conformity as group size increases (Gerard et al., 1968).
FIGURE 8.8 Percentage of errors as a function of number of confederates.
Source: Based on Asch, 1951.

In one study Asch arranged for one of the confederates, who responded before
the naïve participant, to give the correct answer. The level of conformity by the
naïve participant dropped dramatically – but was this due to the correct
respondent breaking the majority’s unanimity, or his giving the naïve participant
‘social support’ for the correct answer? Another of Asch’s studies was designed
to answer this question, and showed that breaking the majority’s unanimity was
most important. When he had one of the confederates deviate from the majority,
but by giving a different incorrect answer, this broke unanimity, but did not give
the naïve participant a supporter. The results showed that the rates of conformity
by the naïve participant reduced to nearly the same level as when there had been
a social supporter. Genuine social support does, however, have a value over and
above breaking unanimity when social influence concerns attitudes and opinions
rather than unambiguous stimuli (see Allen, 1975, for a review). The true value
of the social supporter is in providing a valid and independent assessment of
reality (see Allen, 1975). Using the Asch task, Allen and Levine (1971) varied
whether the participant had social support, and what type of support. In one of
their two support conditions the social support was ‘invalid’, because the
supporter was wearing spectacles with thick lenses. Although giving correct
answers, this supporter could not possibly be perceived as a valid source of
information on a visual-discrimination task. The results, shown in Figure 8.9,
indicate that, although invalid support was better than none, valid social support
was clearly most effective.
FIGURE 8.9 Conformity in the absence and in the presence of social support.
Source: Based on Allen & Levine, 1971. Reproduced with permission.

Finally, Bond and Smith (1996) conducted a meta-analysis on the Asch

conformity paradigm, and found greater acceptance of others’ judgements in
collectivistic cultures (which tend to subordinate individual goals to group goals)
than in individualistic cultures (which tend to place an emphasis on individual
goals and achievement; see Chapter 15). Indeed, the impact of culture was much
greater than any other moderator of group influence, including the size of the
majority.

Why do people conform?

In post-experimental interviews conducted by Asch (see Asch, 1987)
participants gave a number of reasons why they yielded to the majority. Some
thought the majority was wrong, but went along with them simply to feel they
belonged to the group and to avoid being ostracized. Others thought that the
majority must be right, as they were the only person to see the task differently,
i.e. ‘several pairs of eyes’ are more likely to be correct than the one pair of the
naïve participant.
These different reasons given for yielding to the majority map closely onto
theoretical accounts of conformity. The most popular explanation for conformity
is based upon the dependency perspective on small group behaviour, which we
described earlier in this chapter. Group members are cognitively and socially
dependent on each other (Festinger, 1950), because opinion uniformity helps
them to validate their opinions (social reality) and to move the group towards its
goals (group locomotion).
Explanations for the Asch studies also relied on Deutsch and Gerard’s (1955)
distinction between normative and informational social influence, introduced
earlier. If conformity is related to the desire to be liked (normative influence)
and the desire to be right (informational influence) then factors that affect these
desires should increase the likelihood of conformity. In terms of normative
social influence, conformity should be greater when people believe they are part
of a group than when they do not. Making the group salient will increase
people’s desire to be part of the group and therefore increase conformity. This
was shown in the study by Deutsch and Gerard (1955) that used the Asch lines.
They found that conformity increased when participants were told they were part
of a group, and that the best-performing groups in the study would win a prize,
compared to a condition in which no such information was given. On the other
hand, conformity decreased when participants’ responses were anonymous (via
the Crutchfield apparatus discussed earlier). In terms of informational influence,
factors that increase the credibility of the majority as a valid source of reality
(e.g. status and expertise) lead to more conformity (Kiesler & Kiesler, 1969).
Also, factors that weaken the credibility of the majority as a valid source of
information reduce conformity (e.g. breaking the majority consensus as shown
above; Allen & Levine, 1971).
More generally, we can understand conformity by considering three main
goals that it can serve (Cialdini & Trost, 1998). A shift towards a group
consensus can allow the individual (1) to believe that he or she now sees things
more accurately; (2) to gain the approval and acceptance of positively-viewed
others; and (3) to avoid a self-concept as different, deviant or as refusing to
compromise for the good of the group.
Minority influence and innovation
Research on conformity focused on the ability of the majority to influence the
individual, and therefore neglected the possibility that the individual (or
minority) could influence the majority. According to the dependency account,
that was the dominant early explanation of conformity, minorities lack the
resources to make majority members dependent on them. Minorities, by
definition, lack power, status and numerical size, and therefore do not have the
means to enforce normative or informational influence.
Yet history is replete with examples of individuals and minorities who,
through their actions, have had a tremendous impact upon the majority in
society. It was this observation by the French social psychologist, Serge
Moscovici (1976, 1980), that led to a theoretical re-shaping of the area.
Moscovici argued that if social influence only relied upon conformity to the
majority, then it would be difficult to see how groups would change, new ideas
develop and innovation might occur. Moscovici argued that minorities are
distinctive – they stand out from the crowd – and from this distinctiveness they
can create conflict within the majority by challenging the dominant majority
view, and in so doing offer a new and different perspective. Since people wish to
avoid conflict, they will often dismiss the minority position by attributing its
deviancy to some underlying, undesirable psychological dimension
(Papastamou, 1986). For example, the minority might be seen as ‘crazy’,
‘biased’ or ‘provocative’ in an attempt to explain its deviant view. Indeed, if one
considers many ‘successful’ minorities (such as, Galileo, Freud and Copernicus
or, more recently, politicians representing the Green Party, who have moved
from the margins to the mainstream of politics), they often suffered ridicule and
rejection by the majority before their views became accepted.
In order to overcome people’s inclination to reject the deviant minority, the
minority must adopt a particular style of behaviour that communicates to the
majority that the minority is sure of, and committed, to its position. Moscovici
termed this the minority’s behavioural style and he emphasized, above all,
consistency: the need for the minority to respond with the same response to the
same issue over time. Moscovici, Lage, and Naffrechoux (1969) demonstrated
these ideas experimentally. They presented groups of six female participants
with a series of slides that were unambiguously blue and differed only in their
light intensity. To each slide, every participant was required to say aloud the
colour of the slide. In a control condition, participants not exposed to influence
named the colour of the slide as ‘blue’ on almost all trials (99.75 per cent).
However, in one condition the group contained two confederates (a numerical
minority), who were seated such that they gave their responses, aloud, before the
naïve participants, and were instructed to call the blue slides ‘green’ on every
trial. When this occurred the naïve participants also called the slide green on
8.42 per cent of occasions, and this was significantly higher than in the control
condition (0.25 per cent) that had no confederates. The importance of the
minority responding consistently was shown in a third condition of the
experiment, where the confederates were inconsistent (they responded randomly
green to only some of the slides, and blue to others). When the minority was
inconsistent, the percentage of green responses from the naïve participants fell to
1.25 per cent, which was not different from the control condition (see Figure
8.10). It is clear that for a minority to be successful it must respond consistently
(see also Nemeth, Swedlund, & Kanki, 1974).
FIGURE 8.10 Percentage green responses given by majority participants in the
experiment by Moscovici, Lage, and Naffrechoux (1969).

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consistency a behavioural style indicating that the same position is maintained across time; seen as
central to minority influence.

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 THEORY BOX 8.2
MOSCOVICI’S (1980) CONVERSION THEORY
Majority influence
generates comparison process (focus on relationship between source
and target)
conflict is resolved by overt compliance to majority position
in public, and/or
on direct measures
without further consideration of the issue
Minority influence
triggers validation process (closer attention to the issue)
target is unlikely to agree with minority in public, for fear of being
labelled ‘deviant’
but cognitive processing of minority message can lead to conversion
private and/or indirect attitude change

Theoretical approaches to majority and minority influence

There are currently two broad explanations for majority–minority influence
phenomena, each of which subsumes several theories (Levine & Moreland,
1998). We term these the ‘conflict’ and ‘social categorization’ approaches.
Moscovici (1976, 1980) argued that conflict was the critical factor underlying
influence. According to him, all forms of influence, whether from a majority or
minority, result in conflict and individuals are motivated to reduce that conflict.
However, Moscovici’s (1980) dual-process ‘conversion theory’ argues that
people employ different processes, with different outcomes, depending on
whether the source of the conflict is a majority or a minority (see Theory Box
8.2). Moscovici proposed a contrast between two types of process, comparison
and validation, which has some similarities to Deutsch and Gerard’s (1955)
distinction between normative and informational influence. Moscovici argued
that majorities induce a comparison process, in which the target of influence
focuses on the discrepancy between his or her position and that advocated by the
majority. The minority targets, because they wish to gain the majority’s
acceptance, show compliance (public influence) towards the majority position,
but not a significant change in their original position (private influence). In
contrast, minorities induce a validation process, in which majority members
focus on the content of the minority’s position, to try to understand it. Since
people do not wish to publicly agree with a minority (to avoid identifying with a
deviant group, Mugny, 1982), the quest to understand the minority’s position can
lead to conversion on a private level.

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conversion a change in private response after exposure to influence by others; internalized change;
a change in the way one structures an aspect of reality.

- - - - - - - - - -

The most provocative claim was made by Moscovici and Personnaz (1980).
Using the blue-green slide paradigm, they claimed that if a minority consistently
responded that a blue slide was ‘green’, then even though they could not bring
that participant to accept that direct influence, they would exert influence on an
indirect and private level. In this case the indirect level was the chromatic
complementary after-image of the slide. The after-image is what one sees when
one views a white screen after viewing a coloured slide; the after-image of blue
is yellow-orange, and of green it is red-purple. Of course, the experimenters did
not tell participants that different colours were linked to different after-images,
and it is assumed that participants were ignorant of this too.
Moscovici and Personnaz did indeed find that when minority-influenced
participants reported what colour after-image they saw on a white screen, they
tended to see the after-image of a blue slide as more red-purple (complementary
colour for green) than did majority-influenced and no-influence control
participants, consistent with the idea that they had begun to see the slide as the
minority saw it, as ‘green’. However, despite the novelty of the study, the claim
that a minority can cause a perceptual conversion is implausible, given what we
know about the physiology of after-images. There have also been failures to
replicate, and the study has been criticized on methodological grounds (see
Martin & Hewstone, 2001a, in press, for a discussion).
A much less contentious way of measuring indirect influence is to measure
influence on a target attitude, and on an indirectly-related attitude. For example,
Pérez and Mugny (1987) exposed participants to a counter-attitudinal pro-
abortion message that was attributed to either a majority or minority source. The
researchers then measured participants’ attitudes towards both the target issue,
abortion, and an indirectly-related issue, birth control. Although the issue of
birth control had not been mentioned in the source’s message, it is related to it at
a superordinate level (i.e. someone who is pro-abortion would also tend to be
pro-birth control). While the minority had little impact on the direct abortion
issue, it had a large impact on the birth control issue – participants had become
more favourable to birth control. This was not found when the source was a
majority. This result shows that the impact of the minority was low on direct
attitudes (presumably because participants did not want to identify publicly with
the minority) but the minority had a ‘hidden impact’ (Maass & Clark, 1984) on a
related indirect attitude (see also Alvaro & Crano, 1997).
Moscovici’s theory has received partial support from an extensive meta-
analysis by Wood, Lundgren, Ouellette, Busceme, and Blackstone (1994).
Overall, they reported that majorities had greater influence than minorities on
both public measures and direct measures responded to in private. Minorities
were, however, equally or more influential than majorities on indirect measures
responded to in private.
An important recent development in this area has been the increased use of
theory and methodology derived from the persuasion literature (see Chapter 7) to
understand majority and minority influence. Specifically, researchers have
drawn a parallel between Moscovici’s concepts of comparison and validation
and the distinction between nonsystematic and systematic processing made in
models of persuasion (the elaboration likelihood model and the heuristic–
systematic model) (see Maass & Clark, 1983; Martin & Hewstone, 2001b).
Thus, studies have manipulated source status (majority versus minority) and
argument quality (strong versus weak arguments). This design allows the
researcher to investigate which source is associated with systematic processing;
if processing is systematic, there should be greater persuasion by the strong than
the weak message, as well as more message-congruent thoughts, and these
thoughts should mediate attitude change. There is, however, disagreement
amongst researchers concerning which source condition (minority or majority)
should elicit the most cognitive scrutiny of the message, with some advocating
superior message processing associated with a minority (e.g. Moscovici, 1980),
others advocating this for the majority (e.g. Mackie, 1987), and still others
proposing that both a majority and minority can lead to message processing
under different circumstances (e.g. Baker & Petty, 1994).
Martin and Hewstone (2008) have developed a theoretical framework that
accounts for these inconsistent results; based on Petty and Cacioppo’s (1986a, b)
elaboration likelihood model, it is termed the ‘source context elaboration model’
(see also Crano & Chen, 1998; De Dreu & De Vries, 1993; De Vries, De Dreu,
Gordijn, & Schuurman, 1996), and now has extensive empirical support (see
Martin & Hewstone, 2008, for a review). Essentially this approach makes two
broad sets of predictions concerning (a) the types of processes underlying
majority and minority influence and when they occur, and (b) the consequences
for attitudes following majority and minority influence.
The first set of predictions states that the effects of source status (majority
versus minority) vary along an elaboration continuum (the extent to which the
situation allows or encourages elaboration of the source’s message). When the
elaboration demands are low (e.g. the topic is low in personal relevance),
message recipients do not process the source’s arguments, and attitudes can be
guided through simple heuristics (such as the consensus heuristic, ‘the majority
is more likely to be right than the minority’). When elaboration demands are
high (e.g. the topic is high in personal relevance), then people will attend to, and
process, arguments from both the majority and the minority source, and there
should be attitude change in each case. However, most influence situations to
which people are exposed are not characterized by either very low or high
processing demands but, rather, are located at an intermediate level. In this
situation, Martin and Hewstone proposed that Moscovici’s (1980) conversion
theory should apply – that is, systematic processing of only the minority
arguments.
Martin, Hewstone, and Martin (2007, Experiment 2) presented participants
with a set of typed strong or weak anti-voluntary euthanasia arguments, and
assessed both thoughts generated and attitudes. Portions of the arguments were
repeated alongside the original message (the selected text). The level of message
elaboration was manipulated by asking participants to conduct one of three tasks
on the selected text. In the low elaboration condition participants were asked
simply to check whether the selected text was written in the same font type and
size as the original message. This task should result in only shallow message
processing, and therefore there should be no effect of argument quality.
However, the majority source, operating via a consensus heuristic, should have
greater impact on attitudes than the minority source. In the intermediate
elaboration condition participants were asked to check the spelling of words in
the selected text. This task requires semantic processing of single words, and
Martin et al. predicted message processing only for the minority source, due to
its distinctiveness leading to message validation (cf. Moscovici, 1980). Finally,
in the high elaboration condition participants were asked to paraphrase some
highlighted portions of the presented texts in different words but to convey the
same meaning as the original text. This task requires semantic processing of
sentences, and Martin et al. therefore predicted that strong arguments (regardless
of majority/minority support) would have greater impact on the reported
attitudes than weak arguments.
Results confirmed the authors’ hypotheses (see Figure 8.11). In the low
elaboration condition, the only reliable effect was for source status, with the
majority having more influence than the minority. The lack of an argument
quality effect suggests the source status main effect was due to non-elaborative
processing. In the intermediate elaboration condition, there was a reliable
interaction between source status and argument quality, showing a difference
between strong and weak messages for the minority but not majority source.
Finally, in the high elaboration condition there was an argument quality effect
for both majority and minority sources, showing participants had engaged in
elaborative processing for both sources.
FIGURE 8.11 Agreement as a function of numerical size of source, argument
quality and level of message processing task.
Source: Martin et al., 2007; Expt. 2.
 The pattern of results for message-congruent thoughts complemented the
attitude data. In the low elaboration condition there were no reliable effects,
consistent with the claim that attitudes were guided by heuristic cues and not by
elaboration of the source’s arguments. In the intermediate elaboration condition
there was a reliable interaction between source status and argument quality that
mirrored the pattern found for attitudes. Finally, in the high elaboration
condition, the only reliable finding was for argument quality. Further evidence
that the argument quality effect was due to elaborative processing comes from
the finding that the proportion of message-congruent thinking in both the
intermediate and high elaboration conditions mediated the effects found on
attitude scores.
The second set of predictions concerns the nature of the attitudes that are
formed following majority and minority influence. According to the persuasion
literature, attitudes formed through systematic processing are ‘strong’ (Krosnick,
Boninger, Chuang, Berent, & Carnot, 1993) in terms of being more resistant to
counter-persuasion, more persistent over time, and more predictive of behaviour
than attitudes formed via nonsystematic processing. Martin and Hewstone have
published consistent evidence showing that minorities lead to ‘strong’ attitudes,
in that attitudes following minority influence were more resistant to counter-
persuasion (Martin, Hewstone, & Martin, 2003), more persistent over time
(Martin, Hewstone, & Martin, 2008) and better predictors of behaviour (Martin,
Martin, Smith, & Hewstone, 2007) compared to attitudes formed following
majority influence. Turn now to Research Close-Up 8.2, which summarizes the
evidence that minority-instigated attitudes are more resistant to counter-
persuasion.
There is stronger support for the conflict explanation of majority–minority
influence from Nemeth’s (1986, 1995) research and her convergent–divergent
theory (see Leader in the Field, Charlan Jeanne Nemeth). According to Nemeth,
majority versus minority status does not affect the amount of thinking about the
message, but the type of thinking and the focus of thoughts. She has consistently
found that majorities produce a narrow focus on the message they present,
whereas minorities produce a broader focus on new information and attitudinal
positions. Her explanation for this effect is that learning that the majority has a
different position to oneself creates stress, particularly if the majority is
physically present, and stress is known to narrow the focus of attention.
Specifically, exposure to majority influence leads to message-relevant,
convergent thinking, which yields uncreative solutions to problems. In contrast,
exposure to minority influence leads to issue-relevant, divergent thinking,
producing creative problem-solving solutions (e.g. Maass & Volpato, 1994;
Mucchi-Faina, Maass, & Volpato, 1991; Nemeth & Kwan, 1985). Consistent
with this view, exposure to majority dissent is more helpful than exposure to
minority dissent when a task requires convergent thinking, while minority
dissent is more effective on tasks requiring divergent thinking (Nemeth, Mosier,
& Chiles, 1992).

LEADER IN THE FIELD

Charlan Jeanne Nemeth (b. 1941) was born in St. Louis, Missouri.
She received her BA in Mathematics from Washington University in
St. Louis in 1963, an MA in Social Psychology from the University
of Wisconsin-Madison in 1965, and a PhD in Psychology from
Cornell University in 1968 (where her advisors were Len Berkowitz
(see Leader in the Field, Chapter 9) and Steve Jones). One year after
her PhD, she spent a year working with two of the founding fathers
of European Social Psychology, Henri Tajfel (Bristol; see Leader in
the Field, Chapter 14) and Serge Moscovici (Paris; see Leader in the
Field, this chapter). She is currently professor in the Department of
Psychology, University of California, Berkeley. For most of her
professional career she has studied small group decision-making
with an emphasis on the ways in which such decisions can be made
‘better’, more correct and more creative. Her work on the value of
dissent has been broadly applied in the law as it pertains to jury
decision-making, and in business as it pertains to corporate cultures
of innovation.

RESEARCH CLOSE-UP 8.2

MINORITY SOURCES INDUCE

STRONGER ATTITUDES
Martin, R., Hewstone, M., & Martin, P. Y. (2003). Resistance to persuasive messages as a
function of majority and minority source status. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 39,
585-593.
 Introduction As the main text of the chapter
explains, Moscovici’s (1980) conversion theory
predicts that minority influence leads to greater
message processing than does majority influence.
This paper reports three studies that take a different,
and novel, approach to examining this hypothesis. We
describe one study here. In this study the participants
were exposed to two messages that argued different
positions in relation to the same topic. The messages
were delayed in time, and participants completed
attitude measures after each message. The first
message (initial message) argued a counter-attitudinal
position, while the second argued the opposite, pro-
attitudinal position (counter-message).
If attitudes following the initial message had been formed from processing
the message in detail, then these attitudes should resist the second counter-
message. Active processing of the arguments in the initial message (i.e.
thinking of issues in agreement with the message) should provide
individuals with arguments to resist the attack from the second counter-
message. If, however, the attitudes formed following the first message were
not based upon detailed message processing, then these attitudes should be
influenced by (or yield to) the second message.
The authors predicted that if minority influence leads to greater message
processing, as proposed by Moscovici (1980), then attitudes formed
following exposure to a minority should be more resistant to a second
counter-message than are attitudes formed following majority influence.
Method Participants and design.
The participants were 69 undergraduate students at a British university (25
males and 44 females) who were randomly assigned to one of two
conditions (majority versus minority support of initial message).
 Stimulus materials.
The topic of the message was the legalization of voluntary euthanasia (i.e.
the right to end life if suffering from a terminal illness). Pre-testing had
shown that the participants were moderately in favour of voluntary
euthanasia. Two messages were employed which used strong and persuasive
arguments that were either in favour (initial message) or against (counter-
message) voluntary euthanasia.
Procedure Participants were tested in groups of
between two and five. The study had five stages. First,
participants rated their attitude towards voluntary
euthanasia on a 9-point scale from 1 – totally disagree
to 9 – totally agree (pre-test). Second, they were
informed that a recent survey at their university
showed that either 82 per cent (majority) or 18 per
cent (minority) of students were in favour of
legalizing voluntary euthanasia. They then read
several arguments that summarized the majority or
minority position in favour of voluntary euthanasia
(initial message) (note, the researchers presented the
same arguments in each condition, only the
majority/minority label changed). Third, participants’
attitudes towards voluntary euthanasia were measured
again on the same 9-point scale employed in the first
booklet (post-test I: initial message). Fourth,
participants were then shown arguments that
conveyed the opposite perspective to the initial
message; that is, against voluntary euthanasia
(counter-message). Fifth, participants rated their
 attitude towards voluntary euthanasia for a third time
on the 9-point scale (post-test II: counter-message).
Results Scores on the attitude scale were reverse-
coded so that high scores indicated greater influence
to the initial message while low scores indicated
greater influence to the counter-message. As can be
seen from Figure 8.12, the participants were
influenced by both the majority and minority, as there
was a significant change in attitudes between pre-test
and post-test I: initial message, in the direction of the
source of influence. The amount of change in the
majority and minority conditions was the same. At
this stage, it appears that the majority and minority led
to the same amount of influence, but the results for
the counter-message show this was derived from
different processes.
FIGURE 8.12 Mean attitudes as a function of majority versus minority source
and pre-test, post-test 1 (initial message) and post-test 2 (counter-message).
Note: Greater agreement with the source is reflected by high scores on the
initial message and low scores on the counter-message. The difference between
initial message and counter-message reflects the degree of resistance – the
smaller the difference, the greater the resistance.
Source: Data from Martin, Hewstone, & Martin, 2003.
The prediction was that attitudes following majority influence would result
from compliance, without thinking about the message arguments in detail
and, therefore, these attitudes should yield to a counter-message. This is
what happened in the majority condition, as the scores following the
counter-message (post-test II) were significantly lower than scores
following the initial message (post-test I). In fact, in the majority condition,
attitudes following the counter-message reduced to the same level as the
pre-test attitude; this suggests that the attitude change to the initial message
was only superficial, as attitudes returned to their pre-test level when
exposed to the counter-message.
By contrast, the prediction was that attitudes following minority influence
would be due to detailed evaluation of the minority’s arguments, and this
should enable participants to resist the counter-message. Again, this is what
happened. There was no difference in attitude scores between the initial
message (post-test I) and the counter-message (post-test II), showing that
participants had not changed their attitude (i.e. had resisted) when exposed
to the second message.
Discussion This is the first investigation of resistance
to persuasion in the context of majority and minority
influence and it offers a new demonstration,
consistent with Moscovici’s (1980) conversion theory,
of greater message processing induced by a minority,
 compared with a majority, source. However, the
authors acknowledge that majorities can, and often
do, encourage systematic message processing but in
situations that encourage message elaboration. This
was shown in another study where participants were
told, before they read the majority message, that they
would later be asked to recall the arguments contained
in it (this procedure should encourage message
processing). With these instructions, attitudes
following majority influence also resisted the counter-
message (Martin, Hewstone, & Martin, 2008).
In an illustrative study of how minorities lead to more creative task
performance Nemeth and Wachtler (1983) conducted a study involving an
embedded figures test (see Figure 8.13). Participants had to identify if a standard
figure was contained (or embedded) within a set of comparisons. The
participants were led to believe that either a numerical majority (four out of six
group members) or a numerical minority (only two out of six members)
supported a particular answer. When people were exposed to a majority view,
they followed that majority answer exactly (i.e. they identified the standard
figure in other figures, but in the same orientation as the majority source had, for
example stimulus U in Figure 8.13), or they performed as they would alone.
However, when people were exposed to a minority view, they detected more
instances of the standard figure, including correct answers that were not
proposed by the minority (i.e. they identified the standard figure in more other
figures, and both in the same orientation as the minority source had done, and
when inverted, or rotated; e.g. stimuli I and R in Figure 8.13). These results
show improved task performance as a result of exposure to minority rather than
majority dissent.
FIGURE 8.13 Stimuli used by Nemeth and Wachtler (1983).
Source: Nemeth & Wachtler, 1983. Reproduced with permission of John Wiley
& Sons, Ltd.
 Research has recently investigated the nature of the arguments generated by
individuals who find themselves in either a numerical majority or minority
(Kenworthy, Hewstone, Levine, Martin, & Willis, 2008). Because they are
outnumbered, numerical minorities must necessarily take multiple perspectives –
both their own as well as that of the numerical majority – in order to reduce the
threat of invalidation. By contrast, numerical majorities will be less motivated to
adopt others’ perspective and to think in novel and creative ways to defend their
position, because their opinion has the weight of consensus (see Levine &
Russo, 1995). In three studies Kenworthy et al. (2008) showed that being in a
numerical minority led to the generation of arguments that were rated more
original and convincing (by judges blind to experimental condition and
hypotheses of the experiment) than those produced by participants in the
numerical majority condition. For a broader analysis of how minority status
affects how people think, feel, and relate to others, see Butera and Levine
(2009). We will return to the value of dissent within groups later, in the section
on group decision-making. There we see that an over-emphasis on harmony and
consensus, and a failure to encourage and attend to diverse viewpoints, can lead
to disastrous decision-making.
Whereas the dependence and conflict approaches focus on intragroup
processes, the social categorization account focuses on intergroup and intragroup
processes (Mugny, 1982; Mugny & Pérez, 1991; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher,
& Wetherell, 1987). Mugny and Pérez argue that minority influence occurs if
identification with the source is compatible with a positive social identity
(essentially, the extent to which one feels positive about membership of a group;
see Chapter 14). According to this view, minorities categorized as outgroups
have little direct influence, but can have indirect influence if they induce a
validation process (see also Mugny, Butera, Sanchez-Mazas, & Pérez, 1995;
Pérez & Mugny, 1996; Quiamzade, Mugny, Falomir-Pichastor, & Butera, 2010).
Whereas minorities categorized as ingroups can produce direct influence,
because the target of influence identifies with the source of influence. (See also
research by Crano and colleagues suggesting that ingroup minorities are
evaluated in a more open-minded way, e.g. Alvaro & Crano, 1997; Crano &
Alvaro, 1997; Crano & Chen, 1998).
The impact of group identification on social influence also lies at the heart of
the self-categorization theory analysis of majority and minority influence (see
Turner, 1991). According to self-categorization theory (for a fuller account see
Chapters 5 and 14), individuals identify with a particular group and conform to a
prototypical group position. This form of social influence is termed referent
informational influence. The prototypical position maximizes both similarities
between ingroup members and differences between ingroup and outgroup
(Hogg, Turner, & Davidson, 1990; Mackie, 1986). Self-categorization theory
predicts that social influence will occur only if three conditions are met: (1) the
target perceives that the source disagrees with his or her position; (2) the source
and target are perceived as members of the same group; and (3) the source’s
position is prototypical of the group norm (i.e. it is most typical of the ingroup,
and least typical of the outgroup; Van Knippenberg, Lossie, & Wilke, 1994).

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self-categorization theory explains how the process of categorizing oneself as a group member
forms social identity and brings about various forms of both group (e.g. polarization, influence) and
intergroup (e.g. discrimination) behaviours.

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- - - - - - - - - -

referent informational influence individuals identify with a particular group and conform to a
prototypical group position.

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People have a need to hold attitudes consistent with their social identities, and
according to self-categorization theory people adopt ingroup positions to reduce
subjective uncertainty about their responses. Disagreement with others
categorized as similar to the self, however, conveys subjective uncertainty, and
motivates people to resolve the discrepancy by means of mutual social influence.
David and Turner (1996, 1999) provided evidence for self-categorization theory.
They found majority compliance and minority conversion only when the source
of influence was categorized as similar to the target of influence; when the
source was characterized as being dissimilar to the target of influence there was
no direct or indirect influence (see also Gordijn, Postmes, & De Vries, 2001).
To summarize, there is clear support for Moscovici’s (1980) proposal that we
should study the influence of minorities as well as majorities. However, there is
mixed support for his theory, as there is for self-categorization theory’s
prediction that only ingroup minorities will have an impact. There is evidence
that both majorities and minorities can instigate detailed processing of their
messages, under specific circumstances, and that both ingroup and outgroup
minorities can exert influence; typically, however, the influence of ingroup
minorities will be greater, and it will be shown primarily on indirect private
measures of influence and on measures of divergent thinking.
One final observation we make about research on minority influence is that
how and where we do research may have underestimated the impact of
minorities (Hewstone & Martin, 2010). For example, while the meta-analysis
carried out by Wood et al. (1994) found that minority influence is more likely to
be indirect rather than direct, is more frequently found in private rather than
public contexts, and tends to be delayed rather than immediate, this may not be
the case when we study influence processes in freely-interacting groups, which
allow for reciprocal exchange between minority and majority members, and
especially when consensus must be reached (see Smith & Tindale, 2010).
Research conducted using freely-interacting groups has shown that the presence
of a minority source of influence brings about a change in how the group
considers and treats the evidence before it (see Schulz-Hardt, Frey, Lüthgens, &
Moscovici, 2000), and, generally, this is associated with an improvement in the
group’s products or decisions (e.g. Brodbeck, Kerschreiter, Mojzisch, Frey, &
Schulz-Hardt, 2002; see Chapter 13). Minorities may also have more impact
outside the laboratory, in organizations for example. Whereas empirical studies
in our laboratories show that minorities, compared with majorities, are rarely
able to exert direct influence in changing the views of others, Aime and Van
Dyne (2010) argue that the study of groups in organizations provides a more
balanced view of the impact of minorities and majorities on issues that are
important to group functioning. For example, research by De Dreu and
colleagues (e.g. De Dreu & West, 2001), using diverse work groups, has shown
that minority dissent stimulates the consideration of multiple perspectives in a
decision-making task and enhances group creativity (see also Park & DeShon,
2010).
 Group decision making
Why do groups make more extreme decisions than individuals?
Group polarization
Imagine that you get together with a group of friends and discuss your favourite
lectures. If you reach a group decision on, say, your evaluation of the social-
psychology course, is it likely to be the average of your individual views? In
fact, although this was originally thought to be how groups made decisions,
through research on norm formation such as the work of Sherif (1936) discussed
earlier, research has shown that far from an ‘averaging’ process, group
discussion is associated with a ‘polarizing’ process. Group polarization refers
to the tendency to make decisions that are more extreme than the average of
group members’ initial positions, in the direction already favoured by the group.
Individual members’ private opinions then converge on this polarized decision.
Although many of the relevant studies demonstrate attitude polarization we
emphasize that, consistent with our description of the field of social influence in
general, the same phenomenon has been demonstrated for many kinds of
judgements and decision, including stereotypes, interpersonal impressions and
jury decisions (see Lamm & Myers, 1978, and Social Psychology Beyond the
Lab 8.1). There is plentiful empirical evidence for group polarization, and it has
a broad impact on social and political life (see Sunstein, 2009).

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group polarization tendency to make decisions that are more extreme than the average of group
members’ initial positions, in the direction already favoured by the group.

- - - - - - - - - -

The phenomenon of group polarization was first demonstrated by Moscovici

and Zavalloni (1969) (see Leader in the Field, Serge Moscovici). They had small
groups of French high-school students first write down in private their attitudes
towards two topics, one on which they were initially somewhat positive (their
attitude to the then-President, Charles De Gaulle) and one on which they were
initially somewhat negative (their attitude towards Americans). Then, they had
to reach consensus, as a group, on each item; finally, they made another private
attitude rating. As a result of the discussion, participants became more extreme
in the same direction as their initial attitudes tended. As Figure 8.15 shows,
attitudes towards De Gaulle became more positive, and attitudes towards
Americans became more negative after the discussion, and the new attitudes
remained at these levels at the post-consensus phase. Myers and Bishop (1970)
showed how this process can polarize racial attitudes, as those who discuss their
attitudes with like-minded others become more prejudiced if they are already
inclined in that direction, but less prejudiced if they are inclined to be more
liberal (see Figure 8.16). This provides a neat demonstration of a process that
promotes extremism (see Sunstein, 2009).
FIGURE 8.15 Group polarization: attitudes towards De Gaulle and towards
Americans in pre-consensus, consensus and post-consensus conditions.
Source: Data from Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969.

FIGURE 8.16 Group polarization in high and low prejudice groups as a

function of discussion.
Source: Myers & Bishop, 1970. Reproduced with permission from AAAS.
 LEADER IN THE FIELD
Serge Moscovici (b. 1925) was born in Romania to Jewish parents.
Following systematic discrimination, including exclusion from high
school, he was a victim of the 1941 Bucharest pogrom, and was
interned in a Nazi forced labour camp. He made his way secretly to
France, where he studied psychology at the Sorbonne. His
professional career has been spent at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en
Sciences Sociales, Paris, with visiting appointments in Princeton,
and at the New School for Social Research, New York. He became
director of the Laboratoire Européen de Psychologie Sociale
(European Laboratory of Social Psychology) at the Maison des
Sciences de l’Homme, Paris. His ground-breaking contributions to
the study of social influence comprise the very first experimental
studies of both group polarization and minority influence. He is one
of the giants of European social psychology, as well as one of its
founding fathers, whose impact on the discipline would be hard to
exaggerate.
 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BEYOND THE
LAB 8.1
JURY DECISION-MAKING
Although we have focused on experimental studies of social influence in
this chapter, there is no shortage of examples of these phenomena in the real
world, nor of applications of the relevant theory and research. One prime
example is the work of juries, a group of twelve laypeople who, primarily in
countries with English common-law traditions, decide on culpability in
criminal trials or liability in civil trials. These groups make important,
sometimes literally life-and-death, decisions. But they are often quite
homogeneous – famously described by British Judge, Lord Devlin, as
‘middle aged, middle minded and middle class’ – and illustrate several of
the phenomena discussed in this chapter.
Social psychologists have studied juries for many years, typically using an
experimental trial-simulation methodology (because, for legal reasons,
researchers are not permitted direct access to jurors’ decisions). While this
may appear to be a fundamental weakness of the relevant research, because
the laboratory analogue cannot exactly reproduce the pressures and
responsibilities of a real jury, Kerr (1995) notes that laboratory and jury
groups are similar in that they are both ad hoc collections of people who,
initially, do not know each other.
Although some key aspects of how juries operate involve individual
decision-making tendencies and biases (involving the juror, rather than the
jury, see Hastie, 1993), social psychologists have focused on jury
deliberation processes (e.g. Hastie, Penrod, & Pennington, 1983; Stasser,
Kerr, & Bray, 1982). Many of the phenomena considered in this chapter
(and the two chapters in this volume that deal with group dynamics,
Chapters 12 and 13) can be seen at work in juries. Here we will highlight
some of those relating to social influence, focusing on group polarization,
majority influence and minority influence.
Juries clearly show group polarization. A classic legal source noted that
verdicts handed down are more extreme than the individual jury members’
initial judgements, but always in the same direction as the initial judgements
initial judgements, but always in the same direction as the initial judgements
(Kalven & Zeisel, 1966). Moreover, bias found in individual jurors’
judgements (e.g. attention paid to pre-trial publicity) tends to be accentuated
by deliberating juries (Stasser et al., 1982). Myers and Kaplan (1976)
studied this issue experimentally, by forming mock juries that had to
determine the guilt of defendants. Via a manipulation of the strength of the
evidence, some groups already initially favoured conviction, while other
groups initially favoured acquittal. Discussions within each of these kinds of
groups led to a polarization of these initial tendencies (see also Hastie et al.,
1983). Subdividing the group of twelve into smaller groups for part of the
deliberation process might be one way to weaken this tendency to polarize.
Waller, Hope, Burrowes, and Morrison (2011) compared decision-making in
mock juries that were and were not subdivided, and found that individuals in
the subdivided groups reported more equal contribution of group members
and less inhibition about contribution to the group discussion.
Juries also illustrate majority influence, because initial, pre-deliberation
majorities nearly always prevail in the criminal courts (Kalven & Zeisel,
1966). Moreover, social psychologists studying juries emphasize that jury
deliberation involves more than simple persuasion (i.e. informational
influence) and, in fact, there is a strong normative component (Kerr, 1995).
Smith and Tindale (2010) demonstrate that once it achieves a two-thirds
majority, the majority view tends to determine the outcome of the jury
decision process (Davis, 1980; Tindale & Davis, 1983). They note, however,
that, overall, jurors who support acquittal tend to be more influential than
those who support conviction (Davis, Kerr, Stasser, Meek, & Holt, 1977;
Kerr & MacCoun, 1985; Tindale, Davis, Vollrath, Nagao, & Hinsz, 1990),
most likely because the not-guilty verdict is in keeping with social norms.
Therefore, even if seven members of a twelve-person jury favour guilty at
the beginning of their deliberation, the final verdict is more likely than not
to be defined by the five-person minority favouring not guilty; thus minority
influence is at work too.
The ‘reasonable doubt’ criterion used in law requires that jurors vote for
conviction only in the event that they cannot generate any reasonable doubts
concerning the defendant’s guilt. Therefore, arguing in favour of acquittal is
often much easier than is arguing in favour of conviction, because only one
reasonable doubt needs to be generated in order to validate the acquittal
position. Consistent with this notion, Kerr and MacCoun (1985) found that
minority factions favouring acquittal were not influential when the
 minority factions favouring acquittal were not influential when the
reasonable doubt criterion was replaced by a ‘preponderance of the
evidence’ criterion. Under this latter criterion, neither verdict is inherently
easier to validate, and, therefore, majority factions tend to prevail.
Banned, as you are, from ever actually observing a jury deliberate, you
could at least take a well-justified break from your studies of social
influence to watch the classic film Twelve Angry Men (directed by Sidney
Lumet, 1957). This film illustrates the strong normative component within
juries, as the majority attempts to coerce opposed and undecided jurors. But,
most famously, it demonstrates minority influence, as the main protagonist
(played by Henry Fonda) succeeds in overturning an 11-to-1 jury favouring
a guilty judgement (Figure 8.14). Or you could read Grove’s (1998)
interesting account of what it is like to serve on a jury, The Juryman’s Tale.
FIGURE 8.14 Henry Fonda wins over a previously unanimous majority of
other jurors in the film Twelve Angry Men.
Source: © Photos 12. Used under licence from Alamy.

There are three main explanations for this effect – persuasive arguments, social
comparison, and self-categorization – which we will, first, review and then
integrate (see Theory Box 8.3).

Persuasive arguments
As the discussion in a group unfolds, individuals typically learn something from
each other; the discussion allows for an exchange of knowledge, opinions, and,
above all, arguments, as group members try to convince one another (Burnstein
& Vinokur, 1977). Vinokur and Burnstein (1974) highlighted three kinds of
information that circulate among members of a group: information that (1)
expresses a view pro or contra the issue; (2) contains some novelty (which is
intrinsically persuasive); and (3) has cogency (the ability to persuade). During
the exchange of arguments, each individual is likely to learn novel reasons for
holding the consensual view, whereby attitudes become more extreme; indeed,
arguments consistent with the dominant tendency are rated more persuasive than
those that contradict it, and the greater the number of arguments related to their
initial position, the more group members polarize (Burnstein, Vinokur, & Trope,
1973). Discussion also provides an opportunity for individuals both to repeat
their own views and to hear those views repeated by others; repetition
contributes to the shift towards more extreme judgements (Brauer & Judd, 1996;
Brauer, Judd, & Gliner, 1995).

THEORY BOX 8.3

WHAT PRODUCES GROUP POLARIZATION?
THREE MAIN THEORIES
A group member:
Hears arguments from other group members
1. Persuasive arguments theory
Learns the position of other group members
2. Social comparison theory
Is more influenced by ingroup than outgroup members
3. Self-categorization theory
Together, these 3 processes lead to:
4. More polarized attitudes following group discussion (more
extreme, in the same direction)

Three lines of evidence support the persuasive arguments approach, also called
the informational approach, because it argues that polarization is based on
informational social influence (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). First, polarization is
correlated with the ratio of pro versus con arguments available to group
members; second, polarization can be produced by manipulating this ratio; and
third, polarization increases with the novelty and validity of the arguments that
group members hear (Kaplan & Miller, 1977; Vinokur & Burnstein, 1978).
Thus, this explanation is essentially parallel to that offered by cognitive theories
of persuasion (see Chapter 7): a group member’s attitude is a function of the
number and persuasiveness of pro and contra arguments recalled from memory
when he or she formulates this position (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993).

Social comparison
An alternative account of group polarization is based on social comparison
theory (Festinger, 1954). It is also known as the normative explanation for
polarization, because it contends that polarization is due to normative influence
(Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; see above). According to this view, group members
tend to compare themselves with others, and have a need to view themselves
positively and gain approval from others (Goethals & Zanna, 1979; Myers &
Lamm, 1976). Moreover, they wish to be different from other group members,
but in a socially desirable direction; so, after learning others’ positions, they shift
to an even more extreme position themselves (Myers, 1978).
The main line of support for this explanation is that group polarization can be
brought about, quite simply, by learning of other group members’ attitudinal
positions. Participants who received information about the distribution of other
group members’ positions before they made their own decisions took more
extreme positions than those unaware of other group members’ positions
(Myers, Bach, & Schreiber, 1974). They did so, moreover, without ever hearing
others’ arguments, and only when they were informed about the distribution of
opinions held by all other members of the group, not simply when they were
informed of the group average (Myers & Kaplan, 1976).

Self-categorization
A more recent normative account of group polarization acknowledges the
importance of both persuasive arguments and members’ positions, but in
addition emphasizes that group membership is essential to group polarization
(Turner, 1991). Polarization arises from tendencies to accentuate similarities
within members of one’s own group, but to differentiate from members of
outgroups. Consistent with this view, polarization is enhanced by reference to an
outside group (Doise, 1969), which emphasizes the ingroup–outgroup division.
Indeed, even in the absence of actual discussion between members of the same
group, members’ attitudes shift towards a perceived ingroup norm that best
defines the group in contrast to the relevant outgroup (Hogg, Turner, &
Davidson, 1990).
 Whereas the earlier accounts define the group norm as the average position of
all the group’s members, and view polarization as movement beyond that norm,
the self-categorization account argues that the group norm can be more extreme
than the average position, and polarization can reflect movement towards that
norm. For example, a group of conservative students may share the view that
taxes should be reduced, but when they think of a comparison group (such as
socialist students) who do not share this view, then they may polarize even
further in their support for taxation. According to self-categorization theory
(which we introduced earlier in the section on majority–minority influence),
individuals identify with a particular group and conform to a prototypical group
position, a position that defines views held in their group. Prototypes are
individual representations of group norms, and they are formed by making
comparisons, both within the group and between groups, which maximize the
perceived difference between the two groups (see earlier section on minority
influence). Thus, group members perceive the group’s position to be more
extreme than it actually is, based on the average of the group members’
responses. This referent informational influence helps to define the ingroup as
different from the outgroup (Hogg et al., 1990; Mackie, 1986). Interestingly,
group members are more comfortable and more vocal when their opinions differ
from the average group member’s opinion in the direction of the group
prototype, than if their opinions differ in the opposite direction (Miller &
Morrison, 2009; Morrison & Miller, 2008).
There are three main lines of empirical support for the self-categorization
account of group polarization. First, polarization produced by listening to a
group discussion, or learning others’ positions, depends on participants believing
that they are members of the same group (i.e. ingroup members), and not a
competing group (i.e. outgroup members) (Mackie & Cooper, 1984; Turner et
al., 1987; Turner, Wetherell, & Hogg, 1989). Listeners also perceive the content
of the discussion to be more polarized when they think the discussants are
ingroup members than when they do not (Mackie, 1986). Second, polarization is
mediated by group members’ perceptions of the ingroup’s position (Turner et al.,
1989). Third, intergroup attitudinal polarization is more extreme (ingroup and
outgroup positions are further apart) when group membership is more salient or
members identify more strongly with their group (e.g. Mackie, 1986; Mackie &
Cooper, 1984; Turner et al., 1989).

Integration
It has long been acknowledged that informational and normative approaches
appear to work together to produce group polarization (Kaplan & Miller, 1987).
Can we say which theory best accounts for the data? In fact, they each contribute
something distinctive. Isenberg’s (1986) meta-analysis, which predates the self-
categorization account, reported significant effect sizes for both the normative
account and, especially, the persuasive-arguments account. Which kind of
influence is more important depends on the context. Kaplan (1987) concluded
that normative influence was more likely with judgemental issues, a group goal
of harmony, person-oriented group members and public responses, whereas
informational influence was more likely with intellective issues, a group goal of
making a correct decision, task-oriented group members and private responses.
The self-categorization account builds on the other two approaches, because it
contends that arguments from other ingroup members will be more persuasive
than those of outgroup members, and that learning the positions held by different
ingroup members will be more persuasive than learning about the positions of
outgroup members.

Groupthink
Part of the explanation for research activity on group polarization is the
potentially serious implications of polarization for decision-making in natural
settings (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). Such decisions are typically made by groups
composed of like-minded participants (e.g. councils, committees, juries, the
cabinets of ruling governments), and the processes involved may lead the groups
to make decisions which are incorrect, unwise or, in the worst case, disastrous
(Figure 8.17). This is most evident in the case of groupthink, a syndrome of
poor group decision-making in which members of a cohesive ingroup strive for
unanimity at the expense of a realistic appraisal of alternative courses of action
(Janis, 1982; see Theory Box 8.4). Groupthink does not necessarily arise from
group polarization, but it is an extreme form of problems associated with the
failure to exchange information (or, at least, different views) among group
members (Levine & Moreland, 1998). In essence, groupthink constitutes an
extreme form of normative influence, where the norm to reach and maintain
consensus and harmony within the group completely eliminates any
informational influence that could show how disastrous the group’s intended
decision is likely to be.
FIGURE 8.17 Group polarization can have potentially serious implications for
decision-making in natural settings such as committee meetings.
Source: © Morgan Lane Photography. Used under licence from Shutterstock.

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groupthink a syndrome of poor group decision-making in which members of a cohesive ingroup

strive for unanimity at the expense of a realistic appraisal of alternative courses of action.

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THEORY BOX 8.4

SCHEMATIC MODEL OF GROUPTHINK
Source: After Janis, 1982.

The concept of groupthink (which alludes to ‘Big Brother’s’ attempt to control

the way people think, in George Orwell’s 1949 novel, Nineteen Eighty-Four) has
received a great deal of popular attention, because it claims to explain a series of
US foreign-policy fiascos, including the calamitous Bay of Pigs invasion of
Cuba (1961) and the escalation of the Vietnam War (1964–67). Janis applied
work on group decisions to elite political settings by carrying out a series of case
studies, in which he researched government records, political diaries and
politicians’ accounts of these turbulent periods (see also Raven, 1974; ’t Hart,
1990). According to Janis, the main causes of groupthink include high
cohesiveness, insulation of the group from external critics, opinionated
leadership, lack of agreed procedures for debate and pressure to reach a solution.
Specifically, Janis (1982) claimed that high cohesiveness in interaction with a
stressful situation leads to groupthink; this outcome will be more likely the more
structural weaknesses are present in the group (e.g. insulation, directive
leadership and lack of agreed decision-making procedures).
In turn, some of the main characteristics of groupthink decision-makers are
that they are more prone to jump to premature conclusions, dismiss contradictory
information, bolster preferred options, suppress dissent within the group and
display excessive optimism about the outcomes (Tetlock, 1998). Such decision-
making is, moreover, not restricted to foreign-policy issues. Esser and
Lindoerfer (1989) argued that the ill-fated decision to launch the Challenger
space shuttle in 1986 (in which seven astronauts died, as the shuttle exploded 58
seconds after lift-off) had many of the hallmarks of groupthink (see also
Starbuck & Farjoun, 2005).
Popular as the notion of groupthink is, its empirical support is rather weak.
Analysis of case studies, often based on content analysis of available records,
does show increased rigidity and more simplistic thinking among decision
makers involved in groupthink decisions, compared to more favourable
outcomes (Tetlock, 1979). Herek, Janis, and Huth (1987) also reported a
negative association between the number of symptoms of groupthink and the
quality of the decision. But there is little evidence that cohesiveness alone, or in
combination with other supposed antecedents, contributes to defective decision-
making. As Tetlock (1998) also points out, one can quite easily find successful
political decisions in cases with evidence of groupthink (e.g. Churchill
suppressed dissent in cabinet meetings in 1940–41 when some group members
advocated a negotiated peace with Hitler), but also instances in which vigilant
decision-making failed to prevent disastrous outcomes (e.g. President Jimmy
Carter’s failed mission to rescue hostages from Iran in 1980, despite his
encouragement of open debate).
Laboratory studies are even less supportive, perhaps because it is difficult, if
not impossible, to create in the laboratory true analogues of highly-cohesive,
insulated groups, working under high pressure to make decisions with massive
political consequences (Esser, 1998; Mullen, Anthony, Salas, & Driskell, 1994).
Manipulations of groupthink have generally not produced poor-quality
discussions and decisions (Flowers, 1977; Leana, 1985), and groupthink has
been found in groups with either high-or low-cohesiveness (see Aldag & Fuller,
1993; Turner, Pratkanis, Probasco, & Leve, 1992).
There are, also, fundamental weaknesses of the groupthink model. It does not
allow precise predictions, it is difficult to operationalize the concept (must all the
characteristics of groupthink be present to define it as such?), and it is often only
applied after-the-fact. Thus, Aldag and Fuller (1993) proposed a more general,
but also more complex, group problem-solving model (see also ’t Hart, Stern, &
Sundelius, 1997). It includes many of the features discussed by Janis, but
includes others. For example, it allows for cohesiveness to play a role, but it is
seen as just one aspect of group structure (see Chapter 12) which, along with
decision characteristics and decision-making context, determine emergent group
characteristics (e.g. perceptions that the ingroup is moral and unanimous in its
opinions); these characteristics, in turn, affect decision process characteristics
(e.g. how carefully objectives are surveyed, and whether alternatives are
generated), leading ultimately to outcomes. We present a simplified version of
this model in Figure 8.18.
FIGURE 8.18 Simplified general problem-solving model.
Source: After Aldag & Fuller, 1993. Copyright © 1993 by the American
Psychological Association. Adapted with permission. Psychological Bulletin,
113, 533–552. The use of APA information does not imply endorsement by
APA.
 Obedience to authority
What are the main situational determinants of obedience to
authority?
As we have seen in this chapter, social influence emanates from many sources,
often group members of equal status to the target of influence. Research on
obedience to authority, which began with Stanley Milgram’s (1963) famous
research, addresses a different form of influence, namely obedience to a source
who is not an equal, but an authority figure (see Leader in the Field, Stanley
Milgram). Obedience, here, is defined as complying with orders from a person
of higher social status within a defined hierarchy or chain of command (Miller,
1995). It is often an example of the functioning of legitimate power, whereby an
internalized framework of norms, values, customs and procedures specifies that
such influence is appropriate (Turner, 1991; e.g. we are told to ‘do as your
parents/teachers/senior officers tell you’). The motives underlying obedience are
diverse, including respect for the expertise of authority and fear of the
consequences of disobedience. In the following sections we will (1) outline
Milgram’s paradigm and initial results; (2) review some of the findings on the
situational determinants of obedience; (3) evaluate the theoretical analysis of
obedience; (4) consider ethical issues and alternatives to the Milgram paradigm
for studying obedience; and (5) introduce the phenomenon of disobedience.

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obedience to authority complying with orders from a person of higher social status within a
defined hierarchy or chain of command.

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LEADER IN THE FIELD

Stanley Milgram (1933–1984) earned his Bachelor’s degree at
Queens College, New York in 1954, but in political science: he
never took a psychology course as an undergraduate. He completed
 his PhD at Harvard University, and taught at Yale University and the
New School for Social Research, New York. Although best known
for his research on obedience, Milgram also studied conformity, life
in cities, and did pioneering work on nonreactive measures. His
research across many diverse fields is characterized by its
phenomenological approach, the salience of moral issues and the
importance he attached to situational determinants of social
behaviour. Milgram has recently received the honour of a full-length
biography, entitled The Man who Shocked the World: The Life and
Legacy of Stanley Milgram (Blass, 2004).

Milgram’s obedience paradigm

The classic research was conducted by Milgram (1963, 1974), who intended that
his experimental research should help to understand better how the Nazi
Holocaust (and all the individual acts of obedience involved in that systematic
annihilation) could have taken place (Figure 8.19). Milgram was, specifically,
fascinated with the trial in Jerusalem of the arch-architect of the ‘final solution’,
Adolf Eichmann, as reported by the philosopher Hannah Arendt (1965) in her
book Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. If such evil were
‘banal’, or unexceptional, then would most people show destructive obedience?
Prior to his research Milgram doubted it, and indeed his first study was intended
to be the ‘baseline’, a situation in which few people would obey. Later research
was then to manipulate key variables and investigate their impact on rates of
obedience (see Milgram, 1963, 1974; see also Blass, 1999, 2000; Miller, Collins,
& Brief, 1995).
FIGURE 8.19(a) and (b) Milgram’s research into obedience was originally
intended to help us to understand how the Nazi Holocaust could have taken
place.
Source: (a) © Bruno De Hogues. Used under licence from Getty Images; (b) ©
Robert Holmgren. Used under licence from Getty Images.
 We have already referred to some details of this notorious research to lay out
principles of research methodology (see Chapter 2). Now we go into more detail,
highlighting crucial aspects of the research, and referring to some of the 18
studies reported by Milgram in his 1974 book. For his first study Milgram
recruited 40 male participants via newspaper advertisements (for a study on
memory, with no mention made of obedience) to take part in a study at Yale
University. At the laboratory, the investigator explained that a teacher–learner
scenario would be used, and participants were led to believe that roles had been
determined by chance. In fact, it was always arranged such that the ‘learner’ was
the experimental confederate, and he was instructed to make errors on the task in
a predetermined way. The experimenter explained that, by means of a simulated
shock generator, the participant (as ‘teacher’) was to deliver increasingly more
intense electric shocks to the ‘learner’ each time he made a mistake on the
learning task (participants were informed that the shocks were extremely painful,
but that they would cause no permanent damage; Milgram, 1963). In fact, no
shocks were delivered, but the impact of the experimental scenario was so high
that all participants believed that they were shocking the learner.
The learner was strapped into a chair and electrodes were fixed to his wrists.
The teacher was taken to a different room, where he was instructed to punish the
learner’s first mistake with a shock of 15 volts, increasing in intensity by a
further 15 volts with every new mistake. A shock generator in front of him
showed the teacher 30 buttons, and clear verbal labels, ranging from ‘15V’,
through ‘60V’ (‘slight shock’), to ‘120V’ (‘moderate shock’), and finally to
‘450V’ (‘danger: severe shock XXX’). In a clever touch, at the onset of the study
Milgram ensured that all participants experienced the reality of a relatively low-
intensity electric shock (45 volts), so that they could not later claim that they had
not believed they were really shocking the victim.
Milgram, a dramatist as much as an experimenter (see Blass, 1992), carefully
scripted the whole scenario, down to the detail of having the experimenter wear
a grey lab coat (indicating that he was a mere technician, rather than, as is
frequently misreported, a white coat, which might have signified that he was a
higher-status physician or scientist). The victim’s responses followed a
predetermined series, rising in intensity with the level of shock: ‘Ugh’ (75, 90,
105 volts); ‘Hey, this really hurts’ (120 volts); ‘Experimenter, get me out of
here! I won’t be in the experiment any more! I refuse to go on’ (150 volts);
screams of agony (270 volts); screams and refusal to answer (300, 315 volts);
intense and prolonged agonized scream (330 volts). Likewise, the experimenter
used a graded set of commands (‘prods’) to keep the teacher going: ‘Please
continue’; ‘The experiment requires that you continue’; ‘It is absolutely essential
that you continue’; and ‘You have no other choice, you must go on’. In this way
Milgram ensured that his experimental scenario had a very high impact on
participants without sacrificing control over the situation.
The results of this baseline study were staggering. Far from the minimal level
of obedience expected, no participant stopped before administering a 300 volt
shock. Across the sample, maximal obedience was shown by 26 of 40
respondents: 65 per cent. By comparison, in a later study, when participants
were free to choose any shock level, only 2 out of 40 participants exceeded the
150 volts level, and 28 never went beyond 75 volts. Rather surprisingly, when
Milgram moved the location of the study from a laboratory at a prestigious
university to a room in a run-down building located in a nearby city, away from
the university, he still found evidence for obedience (although the rate dropped
from 65 per cent to 48 per cent).

Situational determinants of obedience

The main thrust of Milgram’s subsequent studies was to explore variation in the
rate of obedience across different social situations. In various conditions, for
example, Milgram manipulated the proximity of the victim, the authority of the
experimenter and the behaviour of peers.
Four conditions varied the physical (and emotional) proximity of the victim. In
one condition he pounded heavily on the wall separating his room from the
teacher’s; in another the participant heard his crying and shouting (as described
earlier). In two other conditions the teacher and the victim were actually in the
same room; in one condition, the teacher not only heard but also saw the victim;
in the other condition, the teacher had to hold the victim’s hand down on a shock
plate. The obedience rates corresponding to these four conditions of increasing
proximity are shown in Figure 8.20. Maximal obedience fell from 65 per cent of
the participants to 30 per cent. Milgram also found that the duration of the shock
given decreased with increasing proximity.
FIGURE 8.20 Obedience as a function of physical proximity.
Source: Data from Milgram, 1974.

Milgram also varied the authority of the experimenter and how much control
he exerted. This was hugely influential. When the experimenter was absent from
the participant’s room and gave his orders over the telephone, maximal
obedience dropped to 21 per cent (a number of participants said over the phone
that they were giving higher shocks than they in fact did!). In another variation,
the experimenter had to leave the room before instructing the participant to
increase shock levels. He handed over his authority to a second participant who
was present, and who would only have to record the learner’s reaction times.
This second participant then came up with the idea of increasing the shock level
with every error and, throughout the learning session, he insisted that the teacher
applied his rules. Only 20 per cent of the participants obeyed the equal-status
authority to the end. In addition, when a participant refused to obey and the
‘authority’ decided that he would administer the shocks himself, a number of
participants physically attacked the experimenter or tried to unplug the shock
generator. Participants did not, however, show such heroism when the authority
was the scientist in a lab coat.
Two experimental variations investigated the role of peer pressure. In the first
there were three co-teachers, the participant and two confederates. The first
confederate presented the task, the second recorded the learner’s responses, and
the participant administered the shocks. The first confederate refused to continue
at 150 volts, and was joined by the second confederate at 210 volts. Their refusal
had a dramatic effect on the participants: only 10 per cent were maximally
obedient, compared with 65 per cent when no peer was present (see Figure 8.21).
In contrast, if the teacher, who administered the learning task, was accompanied
by a co-teacher who gave the shocks, 92 per cent of the participants participated
in the experiment to the end.
FIGURE 8.21 Obedience as a function of peer behaviour.
Source: Data from Milgram, 1974.

Why do people obey?

It is not convincing to argue that the participants (a majority of whom obeyed to
high levels across most studies) were sadists. In one study by Milgram
participants chose their own level of shock, and they opted for very low-level
shocks. Surely sadists would have seized their opportunity here? Participants
also appeared to be distressed by the experience, often appearing tense,
displaying nervous laughter, sweating profusely and even begging the
experimenter to stop. This evidence tends to rule out both the possibility that
participants were sadists, and the claim that they did not believe Milgram’s
cover story. Milgram’s own theoretical analysis of obedience included four
factors, which have received varying levels of support (see Theory Box 8.5).

THEORY BOX 8.5

WHY DO WE OBEY?
 Sociocultural perspective
We learn to obey authority and expect to encounter legitimate,
trustworthy authority
Binding factors
Subtle creation of psychological barriers to disobedience; gradual
increase in punishment levels in Milgram’s research is a means of
‘entrapment’
Responsibility
The agentic shift: The subordinate in a hierarchical system does not
accept personal responsibility for his or her actions but allocates
responsibility to an individual higher in the organization
Situational factors
Some situations are so ‘strong’ that they dominate individual
differences in personality, and make us behave in extreme ways
Source: Based on data in Milgram, 1974.

First, and rather descriptively, Milgram argued for the importance of socio-
cultural factors. We grow up in a society in which we learn (indeed, we are
taught) to obey authorities, beginning with parents and school teachers, and
ending with police officers. Moreover, we expect those authority figures to be
legitimate and trustworthy.
Second, and more persuasively, Milgram pointed to ‘binding factors’, the
subtle creation of psychological barriers to disobedience. He used the notion of
‘entrapment’ to refer to the experimenter’s gradual increase in punishment levels
ordered, rather than beginning with an outrageous demand which most
participants would probably have refused. This approach can be seen as an
instance of the ‘foot-in-the-door’ technique for obtaining compliance (Freedman
& Fraser, 1966) discussed earlier, and this subtle progression towards destructive
obedience may be crucial in helping us to understand how ordinary individuals
can ultimately commit acts of evil (see Browning, 1992; Darley, 1992; Kelman
& Hamilton, 1990; Miller, 1986).
Third, Milgram argued that the subordinate in a hierarchical system does not
accept personal responsibility for his or her actions, but allocates this
responsibility to someone higher up in the organization. He referred to this as an
‘agentic shift’, where the obedient participants switch off their own conscience
and see themselves as agents for carrying out a more senior person’s wishes.
This, of course, is a convenient, self-serving account used by many perpetrators
of evil, such as the former Iraqi torturer’s statement that ‘I was following orders.
Saddam [Hussein] is responsible’ (reported in The Observer, 14 May 2006).
Empirical support for this notion is, however, weak (see Nissani, 1990; Waller,
2002). Mantell and Panzarella (1976), in a replication of Milgram’s research
conducted in Germany, reported no relationship between participants’ degree of
obedience and their post-experimental assignment of responsibility. In his own
post-experimental interviews Milgram asked participants to use a ‘responsibility
clock’ to divide up responsibility between the experimenter, themselves and the
victim. He did not, however, find that obedient participants assigned more
responsibility to the experimenter. In fact, both obedient and disobedient
participants attributed almost equal responsibility to the experimenter, which
contradicts the claim that obedient participants somehow pass responsibility up
the ‘chain of command’. However, disobedient participants saw themselves as
more responsible (and the learner-victim as less responsible) than did the
obedient participants, whereas obedient participants assigned relatively less
responsibility to themselves and relatively more responsibility to the learner-
victim than did disobedient participants (see Milgram, 1974, Appendix II).
Fourth, and finally, Milgram’s whole research programme placed huge
emphasis on the power of the situation, something that is fundamental to the
study of social psychology (see Chapter 1). His findings suggest that destructive
obedience is well within the behavioural repertoire of most people (Miller,
1986), and he emphasized the power of the situation rather than personality
factors. There is, in fact, some evidence of influential personality variables.
Individuals who hold authoritarian beliefs are more likely to obey authorities
(Elms & Milgram, 1966; Kelman & Hamilton, 1990), and participants high in
empathic concern expressed a reluctance to continue with the procedure earlier
than did participants lower on this trait, although they were not actually more
likely to refuse to continue (in a study that stopped at the 150 volt level; Burger,
2009). Notwithstanding some evidence for personality variables, Milgram’s
paradigm highlights the power of the situation. To acknowledge this fact,
however, is not to exonerate the perpetrators of evil deeds and adopt a morally
condoning attitude towards them (Miller, Gordon, & Buddie, 1999). Harm-
doing, which may well have been instigated by situational factors initially,
demands self-regulation processes that definitely involve the actor-person
himself (see Bandura, 1999). Hence Blass (1991) underlined the complexities of
predicting obedience, arguing for both personality and situational factors, which
should be studied in interaction.
Ethical issues and alternatives to the Milgram paradigm
Milgram’s research has become the most famous of all experiments in social
psychology (it spawned TV programmes, films, a play, and even a song by Peter
Gabriel, We do what we’re told). It speaks to the darkest side of human nature,
and has been used in attempts to understand better phenomena such as genocide
(Staub, 1989) and war crimes (Bourke, 1999). But it also became infamous,
generating controversy, centred on ethical issues (see Baumrind, 1964; Miller,
1986; see also Chapter 2). Milgram was severely criticized for inducing
suffering in his participants. Using a procedure that would be impossible to
replicate today given ethical guidelines for research, he induced stress and
anxiety in his participants and, among those who did obey, guilt about how they
had behaved. No contemporary study could inform participants that, although
blatantly untrue, ‘It is absolutely essential that you continue’, or ‘You have no
other choice, you must go on’. Indeed, the furore caused by this research is
credited with generating regulations that control the use of human participants in
psychological research. More generally, some of the questions you may care to
consider are: could the participants’ psychological suffering be dealt with in
normal debriefing? How would participants react, on learning that they were –
apparently – capable of heinous acts in response to orders? Should the
experiment have ever been carried out? Is the research sufficiently important to
justify such deception of, and stress experienced by, participants? To what extent
was the criticism triggered by the results, rather than the research itself?
It is, of course, because of the ethical issues that research using the Milgram
paradigm can no longer be conducted. However, other milder forms of
obedience can be, and have been, researched. Burger (2009) did actually conduct
a partial replication of Milgram’s paradigm in 2006, in which he protected the
wellbeing of participants (in accordance with ethical guidelines). He had
participants follow the Milgram paradigm up to the 150 volt level. On the basis
that 79 per cent of Milgram’s participants who exceeded this point went all the
way to the maximal shock level, he estimated that the rate of full obedience at
150 volts in his 2006 sample (70 per cent) was only slightly lower than
Milgram’s at 150 volts, 45 years earlier (82.5 per cent), a difference that is not
statistically significantly.
Other research has explored obedience in less damaging and more ethically
acceptable contexts, which can still investigate psychological processes in
obedience, but simply not in the Milgram paradigm. The first alternative may
strike you, in fact, as just as ethically dubious as Milgram’s study. Sheridan and
King (1972) conducted a conceptual replication of Milgram in which, rather than
have participants ordered to give imagined shocks to a fake human victim, they
gave actual shocks to a real canine victim, ‘a cute, fluffy puppy’ (p. 165) when it
made errors on a discrimination task. The levels of actual shocks (ranging from
15-75 volts to 300-450 volts) were designed to create ‘responses such as
running, howling, and yelping, without, however, doing the [puppy] any serious
harm’ (p. 165). At the highest level (the shock indicator showed 300-450 volts,
but the puppy actually received 800 volts at 1 milliamps) the actual voltage level
was sufficient to produce ‘continuous barking and howling’ (p. 165). Under
these conditions male and female participants showed maximal levels of
obedience of comparable and higher levels, respectively, than in Milgram’s
paradigm.
Obedience has also been studied in the context of asking a participant to
disrupt a job interview in the name of scientific research (Meeus & Raaijmakers,
1986, 1995). Another fascinating field study (Gamson, Fireman, & Rytina,
1982) telephoned volunteers to ask if they were willing to take part in various
kinds of research, including research in which they would be misled about its
purpose until later. Having agreed, participants were asked to go to a nearby
hotel, in which they were asked to act in an unethical and damaging way towards
an innocent victim in order to help a legal case on behalf of a large oil company
against an individual. Under these conditions 25 per cent of participants fully
complied with the request.
Finally, Slater et al. (2006) conducted a conceptual replication of Milgram’s
paradigm in an immersive virtual environment, in which a virtual human was to
be shocked, with increasing voltage, for her mistakes in a series of memory tests.
The virtual victim responded in comparable ways to Milgram’s actual learner-
victim, and participants responded – even at the physiological level (assessed by
their galvanic skin responses) – as if she were actually real; they also responded
with high levels of obedience. Two conditions were compared: ‘visible’ (in
which the learner was seen and heard throughout, and responded to shocks with
increasing signs of discomfort); and ‘hidden’ (in which the learner was only seen
and heard briefly, at the start of the study, and thereafter responded through
text). There was some evidence that participants showed a stronger desire to stop
in the visible condition. These promising initial results suggest that virtual reality
might provide a methodology by which future research on obedience could be
conducted in a more ethically acceptable manner.

Disobedience
Disobedience
Another valuable perspective on Milgram’s research is whether the results are, in
fact, so surprising. Later critics suggested that the experimenter may have played
a more active role in instigating obedience than is evident from Milgram’s
(1965) early report (perhaps inducing obedience through demand characteristics;
see Chapter 2), and that the evidence of disobedience is itself remarkable (35 per
cent of the participants defied the experiment at some point, and disobedient
participants gave shocks of shorter duration). Early resistance seems crucial
(only 17 per cent of those showing early signs of protest delivered shocks of
more than 150 volts), a claim substantiated by re-analysis of some of Milgram’s
data.
Packer (2008) conducted a meta-analysis of data from eight of Milgram’s
obedience experiments, and reported that disobedience was most likely at 150
volts. This was the point at which the learner-victim supposedly receiving the
shocks first asked to be released. Packer further reports that, across the studies,
as obedience decreased, disobedience at 150 volts (but at no other level)
increased. He concludes his analysis by proposing that disobedience is not
simply associated with increasing expressions of pain on the part of the learner-
victim. Rather, the 150 volt point is a ‘critical decision point’ (p. 301) at which
participants acknowledged that the learner’s right to terminate the experiment
should override their obedience to the experimenter. Bocchiaro and Zimbardo
(2010), using an administrative obedience paradigm based on Meeus and
Raaijmakers (1986), also reported that disobedience at the victim’s first request
to be released was crucial. Interestingly, this evidence highlighting the
importance of early resistance is consistent with Rochat and Modigliani’s (1995)
historical study of French citizens who, under Nazi rule during World War II,
refused to persecute war refugees in the village of Le Chambon. Those who
resisted, resisted early.
Whistle blowing is a specific form of disobedience, occurring when people
report corruption or unethical practice within an organization (Miceli, Near, &
Dworkin, 2008; Near & Miceli, 1985). Such behaviour is, however, relatively
rare, not least because a significant proportion of whistle blowers are subjected
to harassment from senior members of the organization, ostracism from peers
(Glazer & Glazer, 1989; MacNamara, 1991; Miceli & Near, 1992) and are very
likely to lose their jobs (Alford, 2001). Whistle blowers are, in effect, critics of
the ingroup, who are generally damned for their temerity (see Hornsey, 2005).
There is evidence from the medical domain suggesting that willingness to blow
the whistle declines with time in training (Goldie, Schwartz, McConnachie, &
Morrison, 2003). Apparently medical students learn to keep quiet by seeing the
retaliation meted out to whistle blowers (Bolsin, 2003). Yet such courageous
action is necessary, whether to stop medical malpractice (as in the case of the
junior doctor who blew the whistle on a senior surgeon responsible for
abnormally high mortality rates in paediatric heart surgery at a hospital in
Bristol, UK during the 1990s) or mistreatment of prisoners of war (as in the case
of the Navy dog handler who refused to be drawn into the abuse of Iraqi
prisoners in Abu Ghraib prison; see Greenberg & Dratel, 2005). Yet as a rule
such ‘moral rebels’ rarely receive the respect and support they deserve (Monin,
Sawyer, & Marquez, 2008).

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whistle blowing a specific form of disobedience in which people report corruption or unethical
practice within an organization.

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Research on obedience in perspective

Whatever your view of Milgram’s experiments (ethically acceptable – or not?;
due to demand characteristics – or not?), every social psychologist should read
and have an opinion about Milgram’s research on obedience (see Blass, 1992).
Subsequent studies in different countries and with various paradigms have
demonstrated the generality of the effect he first demonstrated (e.g. Mantell,
1971; Meeus & Raaijmakers, 1986, 1995; Shanab & Yahya, 1978), and
highlighted the importance of obedience in a range of settings, including
military, medical and organizational contexts (see Brief, Dukerich, & Doran,
1991), and financial scandals that clearly involved an element of obedience or
‘wilful blindness’ (Heffernan, 2011; Swartz & Watkins, 2003; Toffler &
Reingold, 2003). For example, in medical settings blind obedience of nurses to
physicians’ orders can lead to medication errors and even fatal consequences
(Hofling, Brotzman, Dalrymple, Graves, & Pierce, 1966; Lesar, Briceland, &
Stein, 1997; Rank & Jacobson, 1977).
Milgram specifically sought to extend Asch’s conformity experiment to
‘something more consequential than judging lengths of lines’ (Blass, 1992, p.
286). In this he was hugely successful; destructive obedience is more widespread
than most of us would ever have imagined. This research can, however, provide
only part of the explanation for the excesses of the Third Reich, which Milgram
set out to understand (see Miller, 2004). The Nazi Holocaust included many acts
that were not simply acts of obedience to authority (see Browning, 1992;
Johnson & Reuband, 2005; Newman & Erber, 2002). As Berkowitz (1999)
argued, the slaughter of millions of Jews and other ‘undesirables’ in the
Holocaust cannot be reduced to the ‘central dynamic’ of obedience alone.
Milgram’s research does not represent many significant features of the
Holocaust, including well-documented sadism and the individual psychology of
those who initiated the barbaric policy, thus questioning his ‘banality of evil’
thesis (Haslam & Reicher, 2007, 2008).
 Summary
The study of deliberate social influence introduces some of the most celebrated
experiments ever carried out by social psychologists. We began by considering
three main techniques of inducing compliance, based on requests – the door-in-
the-face, the foot-in-the-door, and lowballing. Next, we reviewed the literature
on majority versus minority social influence, showing how the field has moved
from a narrow focus on majority influence only, to an understanding that both
majorities and minorities can be influential and in various ways. We then
reported on the tendency of groups to polarize individual members’ views, and
linked this to some of the extreme consequences of social influence in groups, as
seen in groupthink. Finally, we reviewed research on obedience to authority,
including Milgram’s classic research, the ethical issues it raises and the
phenomenon of whistle blowing.

CHAPTER SUMMARY
What are the main types of influence, and how can they be best
understood? This chapter discussed two main types of social influence,
‘incidental’ and ‘deliberate,’ and sought to understand them in terms of
fundamental motives.
What is meant by social influence? Social influence refers to change of
attitudes, beliefs, opinions, values and behaviour, as a result of being
exposed to other individuals’ attitudes, beliefs, opinions, values and
behaviour.
What is meant by incidental social influence? Incidental social influence
refers to situations in which people are influenced, although there has
been no explicit attempt to influence them (e.g. social facilitation and
inhibition effects).
How does the presence of other people affect task performance? People
are influenced by the presence or implied presence of others, which tends
to improve performance on simple/well-learned tasks, but worsen
performance on complex/novel tasks.
What are social norms, and why are they important? Social norms are
rules and standards that guide behaviour. They can be descriptive or
injunctive; we can infer them from other people’s behaviour, and they can
be easily established and transmitted.
 What drives social influence? Social influence is driven by some of the
fundamental motives directing human social behaviour. Ultimately, we
are influenced by others so that we behave effectively, build and maintain
relationships with others, manage our own self-concept, and understand
the social world more effectively.
What are the main types of deliberate social influence? Deliberate social
influence includes inducing compliance with requests, the influence of
numerical majorities and minorities, group decision-making and
obedience to authority.
What are the main strategies for inducing compliance, and how do they
work? There is evidence for three main strategies of inducing compliance
– door-in-the-face, foot-in-the-door, and lowballing – that rely greatly on
general principles such as equity, reciprocity and self-consistency.
Are we only influenced by majorities, or can minorities also have an
impact? Both numerical majorities and minorities can exert influence, and
the major explanations concern conflict and social categorization.
Majorities tend to have greater influence on public and direct measures,
but minorities can be more effective on indirect, private measures.
Overall, is conformity a ‘good’ or a ‘bad’ thing? Conformity is a rather
ambivalent concept. The very existence of a society depends on it, but it
can be a force for good (e.g. encouraging donations to charity) as well as
for bad (e.g. tyranny of the majority), and even evil (e.g. following others
and behaving immorally).
What impact do groups have on decision-making? Groups tend to
polarize decisions, due to normative, informational and referent influence.
Groupthink is proposed as an extreme form of poor decision-making, but
its empirical and theoretical basis is rather weak.
When and why do we obey? Obedience to authority is primarily driven by
situational factors, but we still lack a clear explanation of why it occurs.
Research on this topic poses important ethical questions, and more recent
work on whistle blowing underlines the moral importance of
disobedience.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

Allen, V. L. (1975). Social support for nonconformity. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.),
Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 8, pp. 1–43). New York:
Academic Press. A detailed account of theory and research with respect to the
factors leading to a reduction in conformity to a majority.
Anderson, N. B. (Ed.). (2009). Obedience – then and now [Special issue].
American Psychologist, 64(1), whole issue. A special issue on obedience,
including a 2006 replication of Milgram and critical commentaries on what this
later study does, and does not, actually tell us.
Asch, S. E. (1956). Studies of independence and conformity: A minority of one
against a unanimous majority. Psychological Monographs, 70, 70. This text
presents Asch’s own account of his famous conformity experiments. The best
way to learn about these studies is to read them firsthand.
Baron, R. S., & Kerr, N. L. (2003). Group process, group decision, group action
(2nd ed.). Buckingham, UK: Open University Press. Extends the material
presented in this chapter on social facilitation, majority and minority influence,
and group decision-making.
Cialdini, R. B., & Trost, M. R. (1998). Social influence: Social norms,
conformity, and compliance. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.),
Handbook of social psychology (4th ed., Vol. 2, pp. 151–192). Boston, MA:
McGraw-Hill. Authoritative source, especially good on norms and compliance
strategies.
Janis, I. L. (1972). Victims of groupthink: A psychological study of foreign-
policy decisions and fiascoes. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin. Janis’s original
presentation of groupthink, illustrated with case materials showing disastrous
decision-making in the area of foreign policy.
Martin, R., & Hewstone, M. (Eds.). (2010). Minority influence and innovation:
Antecedents, processes and consequences. Hove, UK: Psychology Press (Taylor
& Francis). An overview of contemporary theoretical approaches to and
applications of minority influence.
Milgram, S. (1974). Obedience to authority: An experimental view. New York:
Harper & Row. Compelling and readable overview of Milgram’s own
programme of 18 experiments, and the furore they unleashed.
Miller, A. G., Collins, B. E., & Brief, D. E. (1995). Perspectives on obedience to
authority: The legacy of the Milgram experiments. Journal of Social Issues, 51,
1–19. A journal special issue on reactions to Milgram’s obedience research and
subsequent theory and research on obedient and defiant behaviour.
Sunstein, C. R. (2009). Going to extremes: How like minds unite and divide.
New York: Oxford University Press. A readable guide to how group polarization
impacts on social and political life, encouraging people to adopt extremism in
their attitudes and behaviour.
Turner, J. C. (1991). Social influence. Buckingham, UK: Open University Press.
A scholarly overview of the whole field, with a sophisticated theoretical analysis
from the perspective of self-categorization theory.
 Chapter 9

Aggression

Barbara Krahé

Source: © Cesar Lucas Abreu. Used under licence from Getty Images.

KEY TERMS

aggression
Aggression Questionnaire (AQ)
aggressive cues
aggressive scripts
bullying
catharsis
cognitive neo-associationist model
collective violence
Conflict Tactics Scales (CTS)
cyberbullying
direct aggression
direct reinforcement
 displaced aggression
excitation transfer theory
frustration–aggression hypothesis
general aggression model (GAM)
geographic regions approach
habituation
heat hypothesis
hormones
hostile aggression
hostile attribution bias
indirect aggression
instrumental aggression
intergroup aggression
interpersonal aggression
intimate partner violence
media violence–aggression link
mobbing
modelling
peer nominations
physical aggression
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)
relational aggression
sexual aggression
staircase model
steam boiler model
terrorism
time periods approach
trait aggressiveness
violence
weapons effect
CHAPTER OUTLINE
INTRODUCTION
DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT OF AGGRESSIVE
BEHAVIOUR
Observation of aggressive behaviour Obtaining reports of aggressive
behaviour Summary
THEORIES OF AGGRESSION
Biological approaches
Psychological approaches
Summary
PERSONAL AND SITUATIONAL VARIABLES AFFECTING
AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOUR
Individual differences in aggressive behaviour Situational influences on
aggressive behaviour Summary
AGGRESSION AS A SOCIAL PROBLEM
Intimate partner violence
Sexual aggression
Bullying in school and the workplace Intergroup violence
Summary
PSYCHOLOGICAL PREVENTION AND INTERVENTION
Catharsis
Punishment
De-escalation through eliciting incompatible responses Summary

ROUTE MAP OF THE CHAPTER

When asked what matters most to their sense of well-being and quality of
life, people overwhelmingly put living in peace and harmony at the top on
their list. Yet, at the same time, the world is full of conflict and discord, not
only at the societal and political levels, but also in interpersonal relations,
including interactions in school, at work and between family members and
intimate partners. Why is it, then, that despite our desire to avoid aggression
and violence, it is still such a big part of our lives, and why are we finding it
so hard to create the peaceful and harmonious world that we all long for?
The present chapter attempts to provide some answers to this fundamental
question from the perspective of social psychology. After a brief discussion
of how to define and measure aggression, we will review influential theories
that seek to explain why people engage in aggressive behaviour. We will
then ask why not all individuals are prone to aggression to the same extent,
and why aggressive behaviour may be more likely in certain situations. We
will pay special attention to the role of media violence in eliciting
aggressive behaviour. In the second part of the chapter, we will examine
different forms of aggression in society, such as family violence, sexual
aggression, bullying in school and at the workplace, and aggression between
aggression, bullying in school and at the workplace, and aggression between
groups. The chapter concludes with a review of strategies designed to
reduce and prevent aggression.
 INTRODUCTION
In 2008, the case of ‘Baby P’ shocked a nation. Tracey Connelly, 28, and her
sadistic boyfriend Steven Barker, 33, were jailed for causing or allowing the
death of 17-month-old Peter Connelly in his blood-spattered room in Haringey,
North London. He had suffered dozens of injuries after months of abuse at the
time of his death, including a broken back and fractured ribs.
In March 2009, the small town of Winnenden in Germany was the scene of a
school massacre in which a 17-year-old killed nine students and three teachers at
his former school, shooting three further people during his flight from police
before turning his gun against himself. A news magazine reported at the time:
‘Tim K. was by all accounts a quiet but friendly boy, say those who knew him –
then he became a mass murderer. Police are trying to find out what made him
kill 15 people and finally himself.’ (Der Spiegel, March 12 2009).
These two examples highlight the disturbing but undeniable fact that
aggression as a destructive form of social behaviour is prevalent in human
interactions on a large scale. Aggression permeates close relationships (e.g. child
abuse and intimate partner violence), workplace interactions (e.g. bullying),
intergroup relationships (e.g. football hooliganism and gang violence) and
contacts between ethnic or political groups (e.g. terrorism and international
warfare). Therefore, social psychologists’ concern with understanding the
processes that trigger, intensify or pre-empt aggressive behaviour is by no means
a purely scientific one. Instead, it is motivated by the aim to create a knowledge
base from which we can develop interventions to reduce and prevent aggression
to make the world a more peaceful place.

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aggression any form of behaviour intended to harm or injure another living being who is motivated
to avoid such treatment.

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 intimate partner violence perpetration or threat of an act of physical violence within the context of
a dating or marital relationship.

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bullying denotes aggressive behaviour directed at victims who cannot easily defend themselves,
typically in schools and at the workplace.

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terrorism politically motivated violence, intended to spread fear and terror among members of a
society in order to influence the decision-making or behaviour of political agents.

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The review of social psychological theory and research on aggression offered

in this chapter is guided by five key questions:
1. How do social psychologists define aggressive behaviour and what are their
main methods for studying it?
2. How can we explain why individuals show aggressive behaviour and what are
the processes that lead from an aggression-eliciting stimulus to an aggressive
response?
3. Do people differ in their propensity to engage in aggressive behaviour, and
what are critical factors in the situation or the social environment that make
aggressive behaviour more likely?
4. What do we know about the prevalence and the risk factors of intimate partner
violence, sexual aggression, bullying and violence between groups?
5. What can be done to prevent or reduce aggression?
 DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT OF
AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOUR
How do social psychologists define aggressive behaviour and what
are their main methods for studying it?
When social psychologists talk about aggression, they look at it as a form of
social behaviour, that is, behaviour shown by one person or group towards
another individual or group. In a widely accepted definition, Baron and
Richardson (1994, p. 7) characterized aggression as ‘any form of behavior
directed toward the goal of harming or injuring another living being who is
motivated to avoid such treatment.’ Broadly speaking, ‘harm’ denotes any form
of treatment unwanted by the target person, such as causing physical injury,
hurting their feelings, damaging their social relationships by spreading rumours
or taking away or destroying cherished possessions. It is important to add that, of
course, individuals may act aggressively against themselves up to the point of
taking their own life. However, this form of self-inflicted harm does not
represent a form of interpersonal behaviour, and is therefore outside the focus of
the social psychological perspective on aggression adopted in this chapter. In
terms of distinguishing aggression from other forms of social behaviour, Baron
and Richardson’s (1994) definition has three important implications: (1)
Aggressive behaviour is characterized by its underlying motivation (to harm or
injure another living being), not by its consequences (whether or not harm or
injury actually occurs). This means that a behaviour is regarded as aggressive if
it was guided by the intention to harm, even if no damage was done to the target.
A shot fired from a gun may miss its target, but if the shot was intended to hit
the target, it is nonetheless an instance of aggression. On the other hand, your
dentist may cause you pain, but it is incidental or accidental, and not intended;
hence it is not aggression.
(2) A necessary feature of the intention to harm is the actor’s understanding
that the behaviour in question has the potential to cause harm or injury to the
target. If one person’s actions lead to harm or injury of another, but the actor
could not have expected or been aware that the behaviour could lead to those
adverse effects, they do not represent instances of aggression. They could be due
to carelessness or incompetence, but do not actually reflect an intention to harm.
 (3) Defining aggression as behaviour that the target would want to avoid
means that harmful actions performed at the target’s request, such as painful
medical procedures carried out with the consent of the patient, or
sadomasochistic sexual practices, do not represent instances of aggression.
The term violence is more narrow in meaning and restricted to behaviours
carried out with intention to cause serious harm that involve the use or threat of
physical force, such as hitting someone over the head. Thus, not all instances of
aggression are violence (e.g. shouting at someone would be aggressive, but not
violent), but all acts of violence qualify as aggression.

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violence behaviours carried out with intention to cause serious harm that involve the use or threat
of physical force.

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Aggressive behaviour may be divided into more specific subcategories, such

as physical and verbal aggression, spontaneous (unprovoked) and reactive
(provoked) aggression, individual and group aggression. It is also important to
distinguish between direct aggression that involves a face-to-face confrontation
between the aggressor and the target, and indirect aggression, which is aimed at
harming other people by spreading rumours or otherwise damaging their peer
relationships behind their back (Björkqvist, Lagerspetz, & Kaukiainen, 1992).
Indirect aggression overlaps with another term, relational aggression, used by
some authors to denote aggression aimed at damaging the target person’s social
relationships (Crick & Grotpeter, 1995; see Archer & Coyne, 2005, for more
detailed definitions). Because indirect/relational aggression can be inflicted
covertly, without the target being aware of the aggressor’s identity, it represents
an alternative strategy for harming another person when the costs of engaging in
direct forms of aggression would be high.

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relational aggression behaviour that is intended to harm the target person through damaging his or
her social relationships, for example negative comments behind the person’s back.

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 - - - - - - - - - -

Aggression, whether expressed in physical or verbal, direct or indirect forms,

can be linked to different underlying motives captured by the distinction
between instrumental and hostile (also called angry or affective) aggression.
People carry out acts of instrumental aggression for the purpose of achieving a
particular goal, such as taking a hostage in order to secure a ransom, or
committing a terrorist act in pursuit of a political goal. Here, the behaviour is
driven by the ultimate goal the actor wants to achieve (obtaining a large sum of
money or overthrowing a government). Aggression is selected as one of several
possible means towards reaching that end, and harm is accepted as a side effect
of reaching the goal by means of aggression. In contrast, hostile aggression is
motivated by the actor’s desire to express negative feelings, such as anger, and
the primary motive is to harm the target person or group.

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instrumental aggression aggressive behaviour performed to reach a particular goal, as a means to

an end.

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hostile aggression aggressive behaviour motivated by the desire to express anger and hostile
feelings.

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The measurement of aggressive behaviour creates particular challenges for

researchers due to its potentially harmful nature. When studying prosocial
behaviour, creating situations in which research participants may give help to
others is not problematic from an ethical point of view (see Chapter 2 on ethics
in research and Chapter 10 on prosocial behaviour). By contrast, it would be
unethical to set up experimental situations in which research participants are
given the chance to inflict genuine harm on another person or to expose them to
treatments expected to increase the likelihood of subsequent aggression. In
addition, except for unusual circumstances such as war or civil unrest, acts of
severe aggression are relatively rare in everyday life, and therefore hard to
measure in natural contexts. Therefore, aggression researchers’ methodological
toolbox is limited. The available strategies for measuring aggressive behaviour
can be organized under two broad headings: observation – data collected by the
researcher; and reporting – data obtained from other sources, such as the
research participants or independent observers. In addition, aggression
researchers can draw upon archival data collected for other purposes, such as
crime statistics, newspaper reports and records of historical events, for example
lynchings.
 Observation of aggressive behaviour
The most common method for studying aggressive behaviour by observation is
the laboratory experiment in which aggressive behaviour is observed as a
function of experimental conditions created by the researcher (see Chapter 2 for
a discussion of experimental methods). Experimental studies of aggression need
to resort to paradigms in which participants can show behaviour intended to
harm another person without actually allowing any harm to be inflicted on the
target. Several experimental paradigms have been developed to address this
challenge (see Krahé, 2012, for a comprehensive discussion). They create
situations in which participants are given the opportunity to deliver aversive
stimuli to another person, in the form of electric shocks (Giancola & Parrott,
2008), loud noise (Bartholow & Anderson, 2002), cold water (Vasquez, Denson,
Pedersen, Stenstrom, & Miller, 2005) or unpleasantly hot spicy sauce (the ‘hot
sauce’ paradigm; Lieberman, Solomon, Greenberg, & McGregor, 1999). Using
the extent to which research participants deliver aversive stimuli to another
person as a measure of aggression, researchers can study the effects of various
independent variables – such as frustration, alcohol consumption, or exposure to
media violence – on aggression (media violence–aggression link) as the
dependent variable.

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media violence–aggression link hypothesis that exposure to violent media contents makes media
users more aggressive.

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Despite their artificial nature, these experimental procedures for measuring

aggressive behaviour do have construct validity; that is, correspondence amongst
each other and with other indicators, such as aggressive behaviour observed in
natural settings (Anderson & Bushman, 1997; see Chapter 2 on types of
validity). Because they allow researchers to observe variations in aggressive
behaviour as a result of their experimental manipulations, such as creating a high
versus low level of frustration, experimental procedures facilitate the testing of
hypotheses about why, when and on what scale aggressive behaviour is shown.
 Obtaining reports of aggressive behaviour
An important source of information about the occurrence of aggression in
natural contexts is provided by behavioural self-reports in which individuals
describe their own aggressive tendencies. A range of measures has been
developed to assess self-reported dispositional aggression; that is, individual
differences in how aggressive people are in general. A widely used instrument is
the Aggression Questionnaire (known as the AQ) by Buss and Perry (1992).
Individual Differences 9.1 presents the items from the Aggression
Questionnaire. Take a look at it now to find out how high you score on trait
aggression.

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Aggression Questionnaire (AQ) self-report instrument to measure stable individual differences in

trait aggressiveness.

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Self-report questionnaires have also been developed to assess aggression in

particular domains, such as the ‘Sexual Experiences Survey’ (known as the SES)
by Koss et al. (2007) eliciting men’s reports of sexual aggression (see Leader in
the Field, Mary Koss). The problem with using self-reports to measure
aggression is that it is a socially undesirable behaviour. People may be unwilling
to disclose their aggressive behaviour in an effort to provide socially desirable
answers, resulting in an underestimation of the true scale of aggression.

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sexual aggression forcing another person into sexual activities through a range of coercive
strategies, such as threat or use of physical force, exploitation of the victim’s inability to resist, or
verbal pressure.

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Given these limitations of self-report measures of aggression, an alternative is

to use peer/other nominations; that is, reports by informed others, such as
parents, teachers or classmates, about the aggressive behaviour of a target
person. These reports by others are less susceptible to the problem of social
desirability. For example, Lefkowitz, Eron, Walder, and Huesmann (1977)
showed that peer-rated aggression was linked to the level of violence in 8-year-
old boys’ favourite and most frequently watched TV programmes (see Research
Close-Up 9.1, p. 292–293). Boys who were rated more aggressive by their peers
tended to watch more violent TV. Peer nominations can be used to validate
self-reports or to identify differences between actors and observers in the
perception of aggressive behaviour.

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peer nominations method for measuring (aggressive) behaviour by asking other people (e.g.
classmates) to rate the aggressiveness of an individual.

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LEADER IN THE FIELD

Mary Koss completed a PhD in Clinical Psychology at the
University of Minnesota in 1972 and is currently Professor of Public
Health, Psychiatry and Psychology in the Mel and Enid Zuckerman
Arizona College of Public Health at the University of Arizona. Mary
Koss established the study of sexual aggression against women on
the international research agenda, and developed the ‘sexual
experiences survey’ as the most widely used research tool to
measure women’s victimization by and men’s perpetration of sexual
aggression. She received the 2000 Award for Distinguished
Contributions to Research in Public Policy from the American
Psychological Association, and served as a member of the
Coordinating Committee of the Sexual Violence Research Initiative
begun under the auspices of the World Health Organization.
Important publications include a two-volume co-edited collection of
chapters in 2011 on violence against women and children.
 A final source of data on aggressive behaviour is provided by archival
records, most notably crime statistics, such as the Uniform Crime Reports in the
US or the Criminal Statistics in England and Wales (see Chapter 2 for other uses
of archival records). These data sources are not compiled for research purposes,
and therefore researchers are limited to whatever information is available in the
data base. However, crime statistics are informative about the incidence of
particular forms of aggression, such as intimate partner violence, child sexual
abuse or homicide. They can also be used for hypothesis testing, for example
about the link between high temperature and violent crime (e.g. Anderson,
Anderson, Dorr, DeNeve, & Flanagan, 2000; see Social Psychology Beyond the
Lab 9.1, p. 291). Another example of archival records is provided by newspaper
reports that have been used, for example, to analyse violent behaviour by lynch
mobs. Based on newspaper reports of 60 lynchings in the United States between
1899 and 1946, Mullen (1986) demonstrated that lynch mobs were more savage
in their atrocities the larger the mob relative to the number of victims. Mullen
used these data to argue that the larger the mob, the more difficult it is for
members to retain self-focused attention that is important for inhibiting violent
behaviour. We will return to this issue in our discussion of intergroup aggression
later in the chapter.

INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 9.1

WHERE DO YOU STAND ON TRAIT
AGGRESSION?
Items of the Aggression Questionnaire (AQ) by Buss and Perry (1992)
Response scale:

Physical aggression
1. Once in a while I can’t control the urge to strike another person.
2. Given enough provocation, I may hit another person.
3. If somebody hits me, I hit back.
4. I get into fights a little more than the average person.
5. If I have to resort to violence to protect my rights, I will.
6. There are people who pushed me so far we came to blows.
7. I can think of no good reason for ever hitting a person.*
8. I have threatened people I know.
9. I have become so mad that I have broken things.
Verbal aggression
10. I tell my friends openly when I disagree with them.
11. I often find myself disagreeing with people.
12. When people annoy me, I may tell them what I think of them.
13. I can’t help getting into arguments when people disagree with me.
14. My friends say that I’m somewhat argumentative.
Anger
15. I flare up quickly but get over it quickly.
16. When frustrated, I let my irritation show.
17. I sometimes feel like a powder keg ready to explode.
18. I am an even-tempered person.*
19. Some of my friends think I’m a hothead.
20. Sometimes I fly off the handle for no good reason.
21. I have trouble controlling my temper.
Hostility
22. I am sometimes eaten up with jealousy.
23. At times I feel I have gotten a raw deal out of life.
24. Other people always seem to get the breaks.
25. I wonder why sometimes I feel so bitter about things.
26. I know that ‘friends’ talk about me behind my back.
27. I am suspicious of overly friendly strangers.
28. I sometimes feel that people are laughing at me behind my back.
29. When people are especially nice, I wonder what they want.
Please give each item a number from 1 to 5 depending on how characteristic
it is of you.
Reverse the coding on the items marked with * so that high scores always
mean high aggressiveness. Then compute the mean of the items for each
scale.
 In the Buss and Perry (1992) study, men had significantly higher scores on
physical aggression, verbal aggression, and hostility, but not on anger. The
sex difference was largest on the physical aggression scale.
You can compare your mean score on each scale to the following mean
scores derived from Buss and Perry (1992, Table 3), based on US college
students:
Source: Copyright ©1992 by the American Psychological Association.
Adapted from Buss & Perry, with permission.
Scale Men (N = 612) Women (N = 641)
Physical aggression 2.70 1.98
Verbal aggression 3.04 2.70
Anger 2.42 2.38
Hostility 2.66 2.52
 Summary
Aggression is defined in social psychology as behaviour carried out with the
intention to harm another person. The range of methods available for studying
aggression is limited by the essentially harmful nature of this behaviour. For
ethical reasons, researchers cannot create situations in which harm is inflicted on
another person. The main methods for studying aggressive behaviour include
observations of aggressive behaviour in laboratory experiments that provide an
opportunity for behavioural analogues of real-life aggression (such as
administering electric shocks or aversive noise), and the collection of reports of
aggressive behaviour in the form of self-reports, reports from peers, parents or
teachers, or archival records, such as statistical data on violent crime.
 THEORIES OF AGGRESSION
How can we explain why individuals show aggressive behaviour
and what are the processes that lead from an aggression-eliciting
stimulus to an aggressive response?
Developing theories to explain why people engage in aggressive behaviour has
been a prime objective for researchers from different disciplines, not least
because understanding the factors that promote aggressive behaviour is a first
step towards prevention. Table 9.1 provides a summary of the major theoretical
models discussed in this section.
Table 9.1 Major theories of aggression.
 Biological approaches
Biological explanations of aggression refer to evolutionary and genetic
principles as well as the role of hormones to explain why individuals differ in
their tendency to engage in aggressive behaviour.
(1) The ethological perspective, represented most prominently by Konrad
Lorenz (1966), looks at aggressive behaviour of animals and humans as driven
by an internal energy which is released by aggression-related stimuli. In his
well-known steam boiler model, Lorenz assumed that aggressive energy is
produced continuously within the organism until it is released by an external
cue, such as the appearance of a rival in the contest for a mating partner. If the
amount of energy rises beyond a certain level without being released by an
external stimulus, it will overflow, leading to spontaneous aggression. According
to this view, aggressive behaviour is the inevitable consequence of a continuous
production of aggressive energy. Even if it were possible to remove all
instigating stimuli, this would not resolve the problem. As Lorenz (1966, p. 269)
put it, such an attempt would be ‘as judicious as trying to counteract the
increasing pressure in a continuously heated boiler by screwing down the safety
valve more tightly’.

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steam boiler model part of Konrad Lorenz’s theory of aggression, assuming that aggressive energy
is produced continuously within the organism and will burst out spontaneously unless released by
an external stimulus.

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Psychologists have challenged Lorenz’s application of his findings from

animal studies to human aggression (e.g. Lore & Schultz, 1993). An important
criticism is directed at the assumption that once the internal reservoir of
aggressive energy has been used up by an aggressive act, it is impossible to
trigger another aggressive response for as long as it takes the organism to rebuild
a sufficient energy level. There is ample evidence from school shootings and
other instances of multiple killings that humans can, tragically, perform several
aggressive behaviours in quick succession, and that one aggressive act often
serves to precipitate rather than suppress further aggressive acts.
(2) Researchers in the field of behaviour genetics examine the extent to which
individual differences in aggressive behaviour can be linked to differences in
genetic make-up (Plomin, Nitz, & Rowe, 1990). Specifically, behaviour
geneticists have used twin and adoption studies to demonstrate that genetically
related individuals are more similar in terms of their aggressive tendencies than
individuals who are not genetically related (Figure 9.1). Adoption studies are
capable of separating the influence of genetic and environmental studies by
comparing individuals to their biological parents (shared genes) and to their
adoptive parents (shared environment). Twin studies compare identical and
fraternal twins in terms of the similarity of their aggressive tendencies. Identical
twins share 100 per cent of their genetic make-up, while fraternal twins only
have 50 per cent genetic similarity. Therefore, evidence that identical twins are
more similar than fraternal twins in their aggressive behaviour would support the
idea that aggression is to some extent genetically transmitted. A meta-analysis of
twin and adoption studies by Miles and Carey (1997) concluded that on the basis
of self-and other-reports of aggression, shared genetic makeup accounted to a
substantial degree for similarities between identical twins as well as between
adopted children and their biological parents, explaining up to 50 per cent of the
variance. However, an important qualification comes from the two studies in the
meta-analysis that used behavioural observation as a measure of aggression. In
these studies, the impact of shared environment was substantially greater than
that of genetic similarity. A later meta-analysis by Rhee and Waldman (2002)
also found substantial effects of genetic similarity, explaining 41 per cent of the
variance, but environmental influences were even stronger with 59 per cent.
Thus, the evidence from a broad range of studies suggests that aggressive
behaviour is affected both by genetic dispositions and by socialization
experiences in the course of individual development. An individual’s genetic
make-up may dispose him or her towards becoming an aggressive person, but
environmental factors play a crucial role in determining whether or not that
disposition will actually be expressed in aggressive behaviour.
FIGURE 9.1 Our genes partly determine how aggressive we are, but so too
does the social environment.
Source: © Irena Rogona. Used under licence from Shutterstock.
 (3) Another line of biological research on aggression is concerned with the
role of hormones in relation to aggressive behaviour (see Van Goozen, 2005, for
a review). An obvious candidate to examine in this context is the male sex
hormone testosterone, both to account for individual differences among men in
their aggressive tendencies and to explain the widely demonstrated gender
differences in physical aggression. Testosterone is related to the activation of
fight impulses and the inhibition of flight or avoidance behaviour, thereby
increasing the likelihood of an aggressive response. A meta-analysis of 18
studies conducted by Archer, Birring, and Wu (1998) found that highly
aggressive men had higher levels of testosterone than non-aggressive men. In
terms of situational variations of testosterone levels, Klinesmith, Kasser, and
McAndrew (2006) conducted an interesting experimental study. They asked
male participants to handle a gun or a children’s toy for 15 minutes and
measured testosterone levels before and after. Men who had handled the gun
showed a significant increase in testosterone, whereas those who had handled the
toy did not. Those who handled the gun also showed more aggressive behaviour
in a subsequent phase, as measured by the ‘hot sauce’ paradigm, and this effect
could be explained at least partly by the increase in testosterone levels shown in
the group that handled the gun. Nonetheless, Van Goozen (2005, p. 287)
concluded that the link between male sex hormones and aggression is much
weaker in humans than in animals.

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hormones higher levels of testosterone and lower levels of cortisol have been linked to aggression,
 but they need to be considered in combination with environmental influences.

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physical aggression behaviour that is intended to inflict physical harm on the target person.

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Cortisol has been examined as another hormonal correlate of aggression as it is

related to the experience and management of stress. Low cortisol levels have
been linked to fearlessness, risk taking and insensitivity to punishment.
Longitudinal studies have shown that low levels of resting cortisol in boys
predict aggressive behaviour over time (e.g. Shoal, Giancola, & Kirillova, 2003;
see also McBurnett, Lahey, Rathouz, & Loeber, 2000). Psychological under-
reactivity, as indicated by low cortisol, seems to be a characteristic feature of
aggressive and antisocial behaviour and plays a role in disinhibiting aggressive
behaviour. By way of explanation, it has been argued that individuals with low
levels of cortisol are less susceptible to fear of punishment that would stop them
from engaging in aggressive behaviour (Raine, 1996). It is clear, however, that
hormones do not shape aggressive behaviour in a deterministic fashion. They
work together with a wide range of factors in the social environment that may
reinforce or attenuate the impact of biological influences on aggression.
 Psychological approaches
Early psychological models also assumed aggression to be an innate response
tendency. Freud’s (1920) view of aggression as an instinct in the service of the
pleasure principle inspired the frustration–aggression hypothesis, which
regards aggression as driven by the goal of overcoming frustration. Subsequent
psychological approaches widened the frustration–aggression link into a more
general model of negative affect and highlighted the role of cognitive factors,
learning experiences and social information processing in predicting aggressive
responses.

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frustration–aggression hypothesis assumes that frustration – that is, blockage of a goal-directed

activity – increases the likelihood of aggressive behaviour.

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The frustration–aggression hypothesis

One of the earliest empirically-tested theories about the origins of aggressive
behaviour is the frustration–aggression hypothesis (Dollard, Doob, Miller,
Mowrer, & Sears 1939; Miller, 1941). It states that ‘frustration produces
instigations to a number of different types of response, one of which is an
instigation of some form of aggression’ (Miller, 1941, p. 338; see Leader in the
Field, Neal E. Miller). In this view, aggression is not the only, but a possible
response to frustration. Whether or not frustration will result in an aggressive
response depends on the influence of additional variables in the individual or the
environment. Fear of punishment for overt aggression or unavailability of the
frustrator are factors that inhibit aggression. Frustration that cannot be expressed
in retaliation against the original source is often displaced; that is, directed at an
innocent target person who is more easily accessible or less threatening. In a
meta-analysis including 49 studies, Marcus-Newhall, Pedersen, Carlson, and
Miller (2000) found consistent evidence that frustrated individuals show
displacement of aggression from the source of the frustration onto a less
powerful or more accessible target.

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 - - - - - - - - - -

displaced aggression tendency to respond to frustration with an aggressive response directed not at
the original source of the frustration but at an unrelated, more easily accessible target.

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LEADER IN THE FIELD

Neal E. Miller (1909–2002) received his PhD in Psychology from
Yale University in 1935 and held professorial posts at Yale
University and Rockefeller University in New York. He was the
architect of the frustration–aggression hypothesis that laid the
groundwork for subsequent socio-cognitive and neo-associationist
models of aggression. He stressed that aggression is not an
inevitable, but a likely response to frustration, and drew attention to
the need to specify conditions under which frustration is likely to
lead to aggression. Berkowitz’s (see Leader in the Field, Leonard
Berkowitz, this chapter) model of aggressive cues and subsequent
cognitive neo-associationist view built upon his ideas. His views on
displaced aggression were recently revitalized and elaborated by
Norman Miller and colleagues in their ‘triggered displaced
aggression model’ (Miller, Pedersen, Earleywine, & Pollock, 2003).

If aggression is one of several potential consequences of frustration, it is

important to identify the conditions under which individuals are likely to show
aggressive behaviour when frustrated. One variable shown to enhance the
probability of an aggressive response to a frustration is the presence of
aggressive cues. Aggressive cues are aspects of the situation that draw the
actor’s attention to the possibility of an aggressive response (Figure 9.2), such as
seeing pictures of people fighting, or being presented with the names of famous
boxing champions. In a much-cited study, Berkowitz and LePage (1967)
demonstrated that participants who had previously been angered by receiving
negative feedback administered more electric shocks (as a measure of
aggression) in the presence of weapons – that is, aggressive cues – than in the
presence of a badminton racket (i.e. a neutral object) or in a no-object control
condition (Figure 9.3). They were told that the object (the weapon or the
badminton racket) had been left behind in the lab room by a previous
experimenter unassociated with the frustration situation, or by the confederate
who had delivered the negative feedback. It made no difference whether the
weapon was associated or unassociated with the person who was the source of
the frustration. The number of shocks administered by the frustrated participants
is shown in Figure 9.3.
FIGURE 9.2 Does seeing a gun make us more likely to behave aggressively?
Source: © Gregory James Van Raalte. Used under licence from Shutterstock.

FIGURE 9.3 Angered participants delivered more electric shocks to the

frustrator in the presence of a weapon.
Note: The means between the associated and unassociated weapons conditions
and between the badminton racket and the no object conditions were not
significantly different.
Source: Adapted from Berkowitz & LePage, 1967, Table 2. Copyright © 1967
by the American Psychological Association. Adapted with permission. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 7, 202–207. The use of APA information
does not imply endorsement by APA.
 - - - - - - - - - -

aggressive cues situational cues with an aggressive meaning that increase the accessibility of
aggressive cognitions.

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Although subsequent studies have not always replicated the effect – some
failing to find a weapons effect, and others finding an effect in nonfrustrated
participants as well – overall support for the role of aggression-related cues in
facilitating aggressive behaviour is impressive. From their meta-analysis of 57
studies, Carlson, Marcus-Newhall, and Miller (1990, p. 632) concluded that
‘aggression-related cues present in experimental settings act to increase
aggressive responding’. The effect was particularly pronounced among
participants who were first angered, but the authors also found an effect, albeit
weaker, of aggressive cues on participants in a neutral mood state. The finding
that the impact of aggressive cues is not limited to situations in which the person
is already in an angry mood suggests that aggressive cues have a wide-ranging
potential to activate (‘prime’) cognitive schemata related to aggression and thus
increase the salience of aggressive response options.

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weapons effect finding that individuals who were previously frustrated showed more aggressive
behaviour in the presence of weapons than in the presence of neutral objects.
 - - - - - - - - - -

Cognitive neo-associationism and excitation transfer

Berkowitz (1993) extended the frustration–aggression hypothesis into a more
general conceptualization of the role of negative affect as a trigger for aggressive
behaviour (see Leader in the Field, Leonard Berkowitz). He termed his model
the cognitive neo-associationist model, and argued that frustration is just one
type of stimulus that elicits negative affective arousal. Other aversive stimuli,
such as pain or loud noise, may in the same way lead to aggressive responses via
eliciting anger. He proposed that aversive (unpleasant) stimuli give rise to
unspecific negative feelings that evoke two immediate reactions, fight and flight.
In a swift and automatic appraisal process that occurs with little or no conscious
awareness, the fight impulse is associated with aggression-related thoughts,
memories and behavioural responses, whereas flight is associated with escape-
related responses. These responses serve to quickly channel the initially
undifferentiated negative affect into the more specific emotional states of
(rudimentary) anger or (rudimentary) fear. In a subsequent more elaborate and
controlled appraisal process, the person interprets these basic or rudimentary
feelings. They are considered in relation to the situational input, and the person
arrives at a more specific and consolidated emotional state: anger or fear. This
cognitive processing also involves the evaluation of potential outcomes,
memories of similar experiences, and social norms associated with the
expression of different emotions. Figure 9.4 illustrates this process.
FIGURE 9.4 The cognitive neo-associationist model of aggression.
Source: Adapted from Berkowitz, 1993, p. 57. Reprinted with permission.
 - - - - - - - - - -

cognitive neo-associationist model explains aggressive behaviour as the result of negative affect
that is subjected to cognitive processing and activates a network of aggression-related thoughts and
feelings.

- - - - - - - - - -

Although the model stops at the level of emotional responses, it is assumed

that when the evaluation gives rise to feelings of anger, irritation or annoyance,
an aggressive response becomes likely. For example, when a child is hit by a
stone thrown by a classmate, he will immediately experience pain, associated
with negative affect (probably a combination of anger, inducing the urge to fight,
and fear, inducing the urge to run away). Depending on the context and the
child’s past experience, either the anger or the fear response is likely to dominate
and guide his further analysis of the situation. Before deciding how to respond,
the child will engage in a more careful appraisal process, including an
assessment of his classmate’s motives. If he concludes that his classmate threw
the stone on purpose, the immediate feeling of anger will be consolidated, and
retaliation (i.e. aggression) will be considered as an appropriate response.
Because all the components of the emotional experience are associated with each
other, activating one component is assumed to trigger other components relative
to the strength of their association, hence the term ‘associationism’. The
weapons effect described earlier can be explained in the context of this model as
a result of aggression-related associations elicited by the presentation of a
weapon, which then activate other, connected, aggressive thoughts, feelings and
behaviours.

LEADER IN THE FIELD

Leonard Berkowitz (b. 1926) obtained his PhD in Psychology from
the University of Michigan in 1951 and is still active as Vilas
Research Professor Emeritus at the University of Wisconsin. He is a
key figure in aggression research who has promoted both theoretical
development and empirical evidence with respect to the role of
negative affect and cognitive appraisal in aggressive behaviour. His
study on the ‘weapons effect’ (Berkowitz & LePage, 1967) became a
classic in social psychology; it showed that people who were
previously frustrated were more likely to show aggressive behaviour
if aggressive cues, such as guns, were present in the situation.
Subsequently, Berkowitz developed his ideas into the cognitive neo-
associationist model of aggressive behaviour described in this
chapter. He also studied the other side of human nature, helping
behaviour. His book Aggression: Its causes, consequences, and
control, published in 1993, provides a comprehensive and
authoritative review of aggression research.
The cognitive appraisal of physiological arousal is also at the core of another
influential theory of aggression, the excitation transfer theory proposed by
Zillmann (1978). Zillmann argued that the effects of frustration as a trigger for
aggressive behaviour can be augmented by physiological arousal from a neutral
or non-aggression-related source. If physiological arousal from a neutral activity,
such as climbing up a flight of stairs or riding a bike, is still present when the
person encounters an anger-eliciting situation, such as being verbally attacked,
the earlier neutral arousal (excitation) is transferred onto the anger-related
arousal and falsely attributed as anger. As a result, the strength of the subsequent
aggressive response is increased. However, this misattribution will only happen
if the person is no longer aware of the source of the neutral arousal. For
example, a football player may have sprinted 70 metres across the pitch towards
the goal when he is tackled unfairly by a member of the opposite team and loses
the ball. As he picks himself up, the anger-related arousal based on the foul is
magnified by the arousal that is left from the sprint, leading him to lash out at the
opponent rather than, perhaps, just complaining to the referee (Figure 9.5).
FIGURE 9.5 Angry arousal may be augmented by arousal resulting from
physical activity.
Source: © Hepp. Used under licence from Getty Images.

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excitation transfer theory transfer of neutral physiological arousal onto arousal resulting from
frustration, thus augmenting negative affect and enhancing the strength of an aggressive response.

- - - - - - - - - -

To support this line of reasoning, Zillmann and Bryant (1974) conducted an

experiment in which participants had to perform either a physically nonarousing
task (threading disks on a wire) or an arousing task (pedalling a bicycle
ergometer for one minute). Two minutes later, they received a provocation in the
form of an aversive noise; another six minutes later, they were given the
opportunity to administer aversive noise blasts to the person who had provoked
them. In line with the excitation transfer model and as shown in Figure 9.6,
participants in the bicycle condition, who were still aroused from the physical
exercise at the time of the provocation, administered louder noise blasts than did
participants in the low-arousal condition.
FIGURE 9.6 High residual arousal at the time of provocation intensifies
aggressive responses.
Note: The means in the no provocation conditions are significantly different
from the high provocation/high residual arousal condition. In the high
provocation condition, the means of low and high residual arousal are also
significantly different.
Source: Adapted from Zillmann & Bryant, 1974, Table 2. Copyright © 1974 by
the American Psychological Association. Adapted with permission. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 30, 782–791. The use of APA information
does not imply endorsement by APA.

In combination, the cognitive neo-associationist model and the excitation

transfer model highlight the role of negative affect as a powerful stimulant of
aggression. It activates a network of affective and cognitive responses that
enhance the salience of aggressive responses and thus increase the likelihood
that aggressive intentions will be formed and translated into action.

Learning and aggression

Studies within the behaviour genetic approach described above suggest that an
individual’s genetic make-up plays a role in his or her disposition towards
aggressive behaviour. However, there is no doubt that learning experiences in
the course of the socialization process are as, if not more, important in affecting
the development of aggressive behaviour patterns (Bandura, 1983). Learning is
defined as behaviour change through experience, and two mechanisms in
particular affect the acquisition of aggressive behaviour: direct reinforcement
and observational learning (vicarious reinforcement). Direct reinforcement
involves the experience of being rewarded for aggressive behaviour, either by
achieving a desired goal through the aggressive act or by winning social
approval for showing aggressive behaviour. Children who are praised by their
parents for ‘standing up for themselves’ after being provoked, or who succeed in
getting hold of a desired toy by grabbing it from another child learn that
aggressive behaviour pays off, and they are encouraged by the positive effects of
their behaviour to perform similar aggressive acts in the future. Observational
learning refers to learning by imitation. Watching others being rewarded for their
aggressive behaviour also increases the likelihood of aggressive behaviour
among the observers.

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direct reinforcement experience of positive consequences of aggressive behaviour (e.g. status gain
among peers) that increases the probability of future aggressive acts.

- - - - - - - - - -

In a classic study, Bandura, Ross, and Ross (1961) pioneered the Bobo Doll
paradigm in which children are exposed to adult models behaving either in an
aggressive or in a non-aggressive way towards a large, inflatable clown figure
called Bobo (Figure 9.7). When the children were subsequently given the
opportunity to play with the doll, those who had watched the aggressive model
showed more aggressive behaviour towards the doll than did children who had
watched the non-aggressive model. A video of the original experiment, including
an interview with Albert Bandura, can be found on YouTube. In a later study, an
aggressive model instigated more imitative aggression when he was praised for
his aggressive behaviour than when he was punished; that is, beaten up by the
target of the aggression (Bandura, Ross, & Ross, 1963).
FIGURE 9.7 The Bobo Doll paradigm.
Source: From Albert Bandura et al. (1961). Transmission of aggression through
imitation of aggressive models, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 63,
575–582. Published by American Psychological Association. Photograph
reprinted with kind permission of Professor Bandura.

The social learning perspective is a major theoretical approach for

understanding the effects of media violence on aggressive behaviour that can be
regarded as a paradigmatic case of observational learning (see the section on
violent media contents below).

Social information processing models

The theoretical approaches discussed so far stressed the role of affect and
cognition as antecedents of aggressive behaviour, and highlighted the
importance of learning experiences in understanding aggressive behaviour.
Social information processing models of aggression refer to these lines of
thinking and elaborate them by focusing on the role of cognitive representations,
or ‘scripts’, in the prediction of aggressive behaviour. Huesmann (1998)
proposed that social behaviour in general, and aggressive behaviour in particular,
is shaped by abstract representations of appropriate behaviours in different
situational contexts (see Leader in the Field, L. Rowell Huesmann). These
abstract representations are called aggressive scripts: blueprints for behaviour
and guidelines for deciding in favour of or against acting aggressively in specific
situations. For example, if children have repeatedly responded (or seen others
responding) to provocations by showing physical aggression, they will develop a
generalized cognitive representation in which provocation and physical
aggression are closely linked. When encountering a provocation, they are likely
to activate their scripted knowledge, which then prompts them to enact the
behaviour specified by the script. The script also contains normative beliefs that
tell the person when it is appropriate to show aggressive behaviour and which of
various variants of the script to enact. These normative beliefs may specify that
it is acceptable to respond with physical aggression when angered or provoked
by a peer, but not when angered by an adult, and the likelihood of showing an
aggressive response towards a peer or an adult will vary accordingly (Huesmann
& Guerra, 1997).

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aggressive scripts cognitive representation of when and how to show aggressive behaviour.

- - - - - - - - - -

LEADER IN THE FIELD

L. Rowell Huesmann (b. 1943) gained his PhD at Carnegie-Mellon
University in 1969, then held positions at Yale University and the
University of Illinois at Chicago, before moving in 1992 to the
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, where he is Amos N. Tversky
Collegiate Professor of Communication Studies and Psychology and
Director of the Research Center for Group Dynamics at the Institute
for Social Research. He is past president of ISRA, the International
Society for Research on Aggression, and has been editor-in-chief of
its journal, Aggressive Behavior, since 2004. He was the recipient in
2005 of the American Psychological Association’s award for
Distinguished Lifetime Contributions to Media Psychology. He has
made key theoretical and empirical contributions to understanding
the development of aggressive behaviour, focusing on aggressive
scripts and social learning processes. He is also a leading scholar on
long-term effects of media violence on aggression, and has been a
principal researcher in the famous Columbia County Longitudinal
Study that began in 1960, and the Cross National Television Study
that began in 1977 (Huesmann, Moise-Titus, Podolski, & Eron,
2003).
 Each of the psychological explanations of aggression highlights particular
aspects of the processes that give rise to aggressive behaviour. Rather than
competing against each other, they are best seen as pieces of a jigsaw that –
when put together – create a clearer picture of the phenomenon called
aggression. The general aggression model (also known as the GAM) by
Anderson and colleagues (Anderson & Dill, 2000; Lindsay & Anderson, 2000;
see Leader in the Field, Craig A. Anderson) combines the different pieces of
knowledge into a comprehensive framework, as shown in Figure 9.8.
FIGURE 9.8 General Aggression Model (GAM).
Source: Based on Anderson & Dill, 2000, and Lindsay & Anderson, 2000, with
permission from SAGE Publications Ltd.

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general aggression model (GAM) integrative framework explaining how personal and situational
input variables lead to aggressive behaviour via cognitive appraisal and negative affective arousal.

- - - - - - - - - -

According to the general aggression model, individual dispositions, such as

trait anger, and external stimuli, such as aggressive cues in the environment,
come together in a particular situation to create an internal state in the person
that is characterized by specific cognitions, feelings and arousal symptoms. For
example, someone who is easy to anger may only need a small provocation from
a stranger to enter into a state of fury, characterized by aggressive thoughts (‘this
person is an idiot’), negative feelings (‘this person makes me mad’), and bodily
symptoms (‘I can feel my blood pressure rising’). This internal state, in turn,
gives rise to a quick, automatic appraisal of the situation, for example ‘this
person’s behaviour is totally unacceptable’. In the subsequent reappraisal stage,
the initial evaluation of the situation is considered in a more controlled and
elaborate way, leading to a behavioural response. Depending on the reappraisal,
this response will either be aggressive (‘this person annoyed me on purpose and
therefore I will shout abuse at him’) or non-aggressive (‘let’s try and calm down,
everybody’). The behavioural decision may trigger a response from the target
that marks the beginning of a new episode and may further escalate or de-
escalate the conflict. The general aggression model provides a structure that
helps us to understand the complex processes through which particular input
variables, such as violent media stimuli or biographical experiences of abuse,
can lead to aggressive behaviour as the critical outcome variable.

LEADER IN THE FIELD

Craig A. Anderson (b. 1952) obtained his PhD from Stanford
University in 1980. After holding positions at Rice University in
Texas and the University of Missouri, Columbia, he moved to Iowa
State University in Ames in 1999, where he is Distinguished
Professor of Liberal Arts and Sciences and Director of the Center for
the Study of Violence. Since 2010, Craig Anderson has been
president of ISRA, the International Society for Research on
Aggression. He developed the general aggression model that is
currently the most prominent conceptual framework for the study of
aggression in a wide range of domains. He has pioneered research on
the heat hypothesis, combining archival and experimental analyses,
and is one of the most prominent researchers of media violence
effects on aggressive behaviour. His recent publications include a
co-authored book in 2007 on violent video game effects on children
and adolescents (Anderson, Gentile, & Buckley, 2007).
 Summary
This section has presented the most prominent theories of the causes and
underlying processes of aggressive behaviour. Biological theories focus on the
role of genetic and hormonal factors accounting for differences in aggressive
behaviour. In contrast, psychological theories refer to affective and cognitive
reactions to aggression-eliciting stimuli and how they pave the way for
aggressive responses. These models show that negative affect – caused by a
range of adverse stimuli such as frustration, pain or noise – is a powerful trigger
of selective information processing that enhances the probability of aggressive
behaviour. This information processing draws on aggressive scripts, i.e. abstract
representations of how and when aggressive behaviour should be enacted.
Another well-supported theoretical position is that aggression is a form of
learned behaviour, implemented in the individual’s behavioural repertoire
through direct reinforcement as well as observational learning. The general
aggression model integrates the diverse psychological theories of aggression into
a common framework.
 PERSONAL AND SITUATIONAL
VARIABLES AFFECTING AGGRESSIVE
BEHAVIOUR
Do people differ in their propensity to engage in aggressive
behaviour, and what are critical factors in the situation or the
social environment that make aggressive behaviour more likely?
In this section, we will take a closer look at some of the factors associated with
differences between people and between situations in their likelihood of showing
or evoking aggression. In terms of the general aggression model, these are the
input variables that are crucial in eliciting cognitive, affective and physiological
responses that may or may not lead to an aggressive response. The guiding
question for this section is: how can we distinguish between more or less
aggressive individuals and groups of individuals; and what situational influences
of a transient or persistent nature precipitate aggressive behaviour?
 Individual differences in aggressive behaviour
Researchers have suggested several variables as predictors of individual
differences in aggressive behaviour. In this section we will focus on three that
have received intense research attention: trait aggressiveness, hostile
attribution bias, and gender (cf. Krahé, 2012, Chapter 3, for a coverage of
additional person variables related to aggression).

- - - - - - - - - -

trait aggressiveness denotes stable differences between individuals in the likelihood and intensity
of aggressive behaviour.

- - - - - - - - - -

- - - - - - - - - -

hostile attribution bias tendency to attribute hostile intentions to a person who has caused damage
when it is unclear whether or not the damage was caused accidentally or on purpose.

- - - - - - - - - -

Trait aggressiveness
The concept of trait aggressiveness describes dispositional (i.e. temporally and
cross-situationally stable) differences between individuals with respect to the
likelihood of showing aggressive behaviour. Whereas some individuals are easy
to anger and quickly get ‘hot under the collar’, others are generally less inclined
to respond with aggression. Longitudinal studies following the same research
participants over many years from childhood into adulthood have shown that the
tendency to engage in aggressive behaviour is remarkably stable over time.
Drawing on findings from 16 studies exploring the temporal stability of men’s
aggressive behaviour, Olweus (1979) found a stability coefficient of r = .76 over
a one year period, of r = .69 over five years and still of r = .60 over a period of
10 years. These figures are matched only by the stability of intelligence scores
over time, and indicate that aggression in later stages of development may be
predicted on the basis of earlier aggression scores. Trait aggressiveness is
conceptualized as a multidimensional construct comprising four different
components: physical aggression, verbal aggression, anger and hostility. It is
typically assessed by self-report questionnaires in which participants indicate the
likelihood of showing different forms of physical aggression, verbal aggression,
anger and hostility. The most widely used instrument is the Aggression
Questionnaire (Buss & Perry, 1992; Buss & Warren, 2000; see Individual
Differences 9.1), but there are also instruments specially designed for
adolescents (e.g. Orpinas & Frankowski, 2001).

Hostile attribution bias

Another variable linked to stable differences in the tendency to show aggressive
behaviour is the ‘hostile attribution bias’ (see Chapter 3 on how we attribute or
explain behaviour). This construct refers to the tendency to interpret ambiguous
behaviour by another person as an expression of the actor’s hostile intent. For
example, in deciding whether or not another person causes harm accidentally or
on purpose, individuals with a hostile attributional style prefer an attribution to
hostile intent rather than seeing the actor’s behaviour as unintentional or caused
by carelessness. The hostile attribution bias is typically measured by presenting
short films or written scenarios in which one actor causes harm to another
person, but the stimulus material is unclear as to whether the harm was caused
by accident or on purpose (e.g. Dodge, 1980). For example, children are shown a
video in which two boys build a tower of bricks. One boy then knocks down the
tower, and the film is ambiguous as to whether he did so intentionally. The
participants are asked to indicate if they think the child knocked down the tower
by mistake or on purpose. Respondents who consistently prefer explanations that
attribute the damage to the actor’s intent are seen as having a hostile attribution
bias.
A meta-analysis including 41 studies with more than 6000 participants yielded
a significant association between the attribution of hostile intent and aggressive
behaviour in children and adolescents (Orobio de Castro, Veerman, Koops,
Bosch, & Monshouwer, 2002). Studies with adults demonstrated that individuals
with a hostile attributional style are more likely to show aggressive behaviour,
and that differences in trait aggressiveness are predictive of the hostile
attribution bias (Dill, Anderson, Anderson, & Deuser, 1997). A longitudinal
study by Burks, Laird, Dodge, Pettit, and Bates (1999) followed participants
from kindergarten to Grade 8. These researchers found that aggressive behaviour
at kindergarten age predicted hostile information processing in Grade 8, which,
in turn, predicted aggressive behaviour at the same grade level. These findings
suggest that hostile information processing contributes to the stability of
aggression over time. From this perspective, individual differences in aggression
may to some extent be the result of schematic, habitual ways of processing
information which highlight the hostile nature of social interactions and thereby
lower the threshold for aggressive responses.
To explain the development of the hostile attribution bias, several studies point
to the role of exposure to violent media contents. Correlational studies found a
relationship between attraction to media violence and hostile attribution bias
(Krahé & Möller, 2004). Other studies investigated whether hostile attributional
styles are transmitted from mothers to their children. MacBrayer, Milich, and
Hundley (2003) found that mothers of aggressive children perceived more
hostile intent and were more likely to report an intention to respond aggressively
in interactions with an adult peer or their own child than were mothers of non-
aggressive children. However, mothers’ and children’s hostile attributions and
aggressive behavioural intentions were found to be significantly correlated only
for the girls, but not for the boys (Figure 9.9). The authors explain this sex-
specific effect with reference to the principle of learning by modelling, which
predicts that children are more likely to imitate similar models (here: models of
the same sex) than dissimilar models. Unfortunately, no studies have yet
examined the correspondence between fathers’ and sons’ hostile attribution
biases to substantiate this explanation.
FIGURE 9.9 Mothers’ and daughters’ hostile attributional styles are
significantly correlated.
Source: © Gladskikh Tatiana. Used under licence from Shutterstock.
 - - - - - - - - - -

modelling learning by imitation, observing a model being rewarded or punished for his or her
behaviour.

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Gender differences
A final variable associated with individual differences in aggression is gender,
with the underlying assumption that men are more aggressive than women.
Support for this assumption comes from the analysis of crime statistics across a
range of countries, which show that men are overrepresented as perpetrators of
violent crime at a ratio of about 8 to 1 (Archer & Lloyd, 2002). Meta-analyses of
the psychological literature also found significant gender differences in
aggression, with boys and men showing more physical and verbal aggression
(Archer, 2004; Eagly & Steffen, 1986). However, despite being significant, the
size of the effects is moderate at best, and smaller for verbal than for physical
aggression. Cross-cultural analyses suggest that this is a general pattern across
different societies (Archer & McDaniel, 1995). It appears that situational factors
play an important role in this context. In their meta-analysis of 64 studies,
Bettencourt and Miller (1996) found that men scored higher than women on
unprovoked aggression, but the gender difference was markedly smaller on
provoked aggression (Figure 9.10). Looking at indirect aggression, defined as
harming others through purposeful manipulation and damage of their peer
relationships, some authors have suggested that women may be as involved as, if
not more involved than, men in this type of aggression (e.g. Österman et al.,
1998). However, Archer and Coyne (2005) point out that the empirical evidence
is mixed. Girls showed more indirect aggression than boys in studies using
behavioural observation, whereas research using peer nominations typically
failed to find gender differences. In studies with adults, there is also no evidence
of gender differences in indirect aggression, which may be explained by the fact
that the social costs of direct aggression are high for both men and women,
levelling out gender differences in indirect aggression. We will return to the
issue of gender differences in aggression in our discussion of intimate partner
violence later in the chapter, where it has been argued by some researchers that
women feature more prominently than men as perpetrators of physical
aggression.
FIGURE 9.10 Are women really less aggressive than men?
Source: © Digital Vision. Used under licence from Getty Images.
 Situational influences on aggressive behaviour
Just as it is clear that not all individuals respond with aggression in a given
situation, it is obvious that not all situations elicit aggressive responses to the
same extent. In this section, we examine evidence concerning the role of three
situational input variables that affect the occurrence of aggressive behaviour:
alcohol consumption, high temperatures and exposure to violent media contents.

Alcohol
From the evidence available to date, it seems safe to conclude that even
moderate amounts of alcohol lead to increased aggressive behaviour (Figure
9.11). Alcohol plays an important role in the perpetration of violent crime,
including homicide (Parker & Auerhahn, 1999), domestic violence, such as the
physical and sexual abuse of children, sexual aggression and wife battering
(Barnett, Miller-Perrin, & Perrin, 2011), and many forms of group violence, such
as sports violence, rioting and vandalism (Russell, 2004). Epidemiological
studies have established that more than 80 per cent of violent offenders had been
drinking prior to committing their crimes (Murdoch, Phil, & Ross, 1990).
Experimental research has established that alcohol has a causal effect on
aggressive behaviour. These studies compared the aggressive responses of
individuals who were given alcohol to those of individuals in a control condition
who did not receive alcohol. Two meta-analyses examined evidence from a wide
range of studies comparing alcohol versus control groups and found that alcohol
was a significant predictor of aggressive behaviour (Bushman & Cooper, 1990;
Ito, Miller, & Pollock, 1996). A more recent review by Exum (2006, p. 131),
focusing on evidence from experimental studies, also concluded that the findings
affirmed the ‘popular belief that alcohol consumption increases aggressive
behavior’.
FIGURE 9.11 Even moderate amounts of alcohol lead to increased aggressive
behaviour.
Source: © Paul Bradbury. Used under licence from Getty Images.
 It is important to note, however, that general measures of the strength of the
alcohol-aggression link mask the fact that the effects of alcohol may be strong
for some people, but weak for others. Consider individual differences in
empathy (i.e. the ease with which people can imagine how another person
perceives a situation and might feel as a result). A study by Giancola (2003)
showed that alcohol dramatically increased the administration of (supposedly)
painful electric shocks to an opponent for individuals low in dispositional
empathy, but failed to affect the behaviour of participants high in dispositional
empathy (see Chapter 10 for more detail on empathy).
In terms of explaining the effects of alcohol on aggression, the attentional
hypothesis suggests that alcohol has an indirect effect on aggression by reducing
the attentional capacity of the individual, preventing a comprehensive appraisal
of situational cues (Giancola & Corman, 2007). The resulting ‘alcohol myopia’
prevents people from engaging in a thorough processing of situational
information. Instead, they only pay attention to the most salient features of the
situation. For example, imagine a young man on his way home one night who
overhears another man making a lewd comment about his girlfriend. The man
whose girlfriend has been insulted is more likely to respond aggressively if he is
drunk, because he lacks the cognitive capacity to engage in a full appraisal of the
situation, for example to consider the possibility that the other man is equally
drunk and did not really mean to be offensive. Alcohol myopia also impairs
people’s awareness of social norms that normally inhibit aggressive behaviour,
for example the norm that men should not hit women. Finally, by limiting
attention to salient situational stimuli, alcohol makes people more responsive to
aggressive cues present in the situation (see the earlier discussion about the
weapons effect).

High temperature
Another situational input variable affecting aggressive behaviour is high
temperature. The heat hypothesis predicts that aggression should increase as
temperature goes up (Anderson, 2001). Two paradigms were developed to test
this hypothesis under natural conditions. The first paradigm is the geographic
regions approach comparing violent crime rates in hotter versus cooler regions,
finding support for a link between hotter climates and higher violence rates in
archival data (Anderson et al., 2000). However, the regions included in the
comparison, typically the North versus the South of the United States, differed in
aspects other than temperature, such as unemployment rates or normative beliefs
condoning violence, that could be relevant to aggression (and these variables
were not always controlled in the relevant research). Nisbett (1993) has argued
that there is a special culture of honour that makes Southerners more accepting
of violence in response to threat and insults (see Chapter 15 for a discussion of
the ‘culture of honour’ theory). He argues that this normative endorsement of
aggression grew out of the traditional way of making a living through the
herding of animals, which required farmers to be highly sensitive to possible
attacks on their herds, lowering their threshold for aggression. Thus, regional
traditions could account at least to some extent for temperature-related variations
in violent crime, but as Anderson et al. (2000) argue, they do not fully explain
away the heat effect.

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heat hypothesis hypothesis that aggression increases with higher temperatures.

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geographic regions approach method for testing the heat hypothesis by comparing violence rates
in cooler and hotter climates.

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 To address this potential alternative explanation, a second paradigm was
developed, the time periods approach, that compares changes in violent crime
rates within the same region as a function of fluctuations in temperature, for
example between winter and summer months, or between hotter and cooler
summers (the ‘hot year effect’). This approach also supports the heat hypothesis,
by showing that violent crime rates were higher in the summer months than
during the winter period as well as in hotter as compared to cooler summers
(Anderson, 2001). Critics of the time periods approach have argued that, rather
than reflecting a causal effect of the aversive effects of high temperatures, the
increase in violence could be explained by differences in people’s routine
activities (Cohen & Felson, 1979). People tend to spend more time outdoors in
the summer months and in years with hotter as opposed to cooler summers, and
this may create more opportunities for aggressive encounters, leading to higher
rates of violent crime. Anderson (1989) argues against this interpretation by
pointing out that rates of domestic violence are also higher in the summer
months, although families most probably spend more time at home together in
the winter months.

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time periods approach method for testing the heat hypothesis by comparing violence rates in the
same region during cooler and hotter periods.

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Laboratory studies, in which ambient temperature can be manipulated with

other factors being held constant, provide a third approach to the study of heat
and aggression. Unfortunately, lab studies on the effect of high temperatures
have produced divergent results. While some studies supported the conclusions
drawn from naturalistic analyses of the temperature-aggression link, other
studies found a decrease in aggression when temperatures rose beyond a certain
level. On the basis of a meta-analysis of 11 studies, Anderson et al. (2000)
concluded that so far the results of laboratory studies on the heat hypothesis have
remained inconsistent. You can study the effects of global warming on the rate
of murder and assault by looking at Social Psychology Beyond the Lab 9.1.
 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BEYOND THE
LAB 9.1
THE HEAT HYPOTHESIS AND THE EFFECTS
OF GLOBAL WARMING
The ‘heat hypothesis’ states that high temperature increases the likelihood of
violent behaviour. The implications of studies supporting the heat
hypothesis are worrying in the face of global warming. If increases in
temperature are systematically related to increases in violent crime, then the
continuous rise in global temperature presents a risk factor for the rise of
violent crime. Based on archival data on the link between temperature and
violent crime in the United States over 48 years from 1950 to 1997,
Anderson et al. (2000) estimated the magnitude of this danger, as shown in
Figure 9.12.
FIGURE 9.12 Estimates of global warming effect on murders and assaults per
year in the United States with a population of 270 million.
Source: Based on Anderson et al., 2000, p. 124. With permission from
Elsevier.

Their analysis predicts that an increase in temperature by 2 degrees

Fahrenheit increases the murder and assault rate by 9 cases per 100,000
citizens. For a US population of 270 million, this increase translates into
24,000 additional murder/assault cases per year. For readers more familiar
with Celsius than Fahrenheit, with an increase in average temperature of just
1.1°C, the murder and assault rate is projected to go up by 24,000 cases in
 the US. It is important to bear in mind that temperature is only one of many
factors affecting violent crime rates. However, it remains significant when
other contributory factors, such as poverty, are controlled for (Anderson,
Bushman, & Groom, 1997). Research on the heat hypothesis alerts both
policy makers and the general public to the fact that the dangers of global
warming are not restricted to our natural environment, but also pose a threat
to the social functioning of human communities. At the same time, this line
of research has important implications for preventing violence. As noted by
Anderson et al. (2000), keeping temperatures at a comfortable level through
air-conditioning may help to bring down violence rates and may be
particularly useful in settings such as prisons, factories and schools, where
temperature-related violence is likely to pose a specific problem.
The effect of high temperature on aggression found under natural conditions
can be explained with reference to the General Aggression Model. Heat gives
rise to feelings of discomfort, which are proposed as input variables that trigger
negative affective arousal; these, in turn, affect the cognitive processing of social
stimuli and thereby enhance the likelihood of aggressive behaviour.
Interestingly, no corresponding effect has been found for uncomfortably cold
temperatures in natural settings. The explanation offered by Anderson et al.
(2000) is that people are generally better equipped to protect themselves against
the cold than they are to escape the heat, enabling them to reduce coldness-
related discomfort more easily than heat-related discomfort.

Violent media contents

Evidence concerning the potentially harmful effect of exposure to media
violence comes from three sources: (1) experimental studies exposing
participants to either violent or non-violent media contents and exploring the
effects of this manipulation on subsequent aggressive thoughts, feelings and
behaviours (e.g. Kirsh, 1998); (2) correlational studies collecting self-reports of
violent media usage and relating them to measures of aggression obtained at the
same time (e.g. Krahé & Möller, 2004); and (3) longitudinal studies which
measure media violence usage and aggression at different points in time to test
the hypothesis that earlier exposure to media violence predicts aggression at a
later stage (e.g. Huesmann & Miller, 1994; Möller & Krahé, 2009). Even though
violent media contents are discussed here in the context of situational input
variables for aggressive behaviour, it is important to note that researchers and
the general public are not concerned primarily with the effects of a single or
short-term presentation, but with the cumulative effects of repeated exposure
over time. Therefore, studying the pathways from habitual exposure to media
violence to aggression over substantial periods of time is critical to establish the
potentially harmful effects of exposure to violent media. An impressive study
that started with a sample of eight-year-olds in 1960 and followed them over a
period of 22 years is presented in Research Close-Up 9.1.

RESEARCH CLOSE-UP 9.1

SUMMARY OF THE ‘NEW YORK

STATE STUDIES’ ON THE LONG-TERM
EFFECTS OF TV VIOLENCE
Lefkowitz, M. M., Eron, L. D., Walder, L. O., & Huesmann, L. R. (1977). Growing up to be
violent. New York: Pergamon.

Introduction This study explored the long-term

effects of exposure to television violence on
aggression. Correlational evidence showing that
viewing television violence and behaving
aggressively are linked if both constructs are
measured at the same time are open to two competing
explanations of the relationship between TV violence
and aggression: (1) that viewing TV violence makes
viewers more aggressive (i.e. violent TV causes
aggression); or (2) that more aggressive individuals
are more strongly attracted by violent TV
programmes (i.e. a selection bias). By using a
longitudinal design in which the same participants
were studied three times over a period of 22 years, the
authors were able to examine which of the two
hypotheses is more likely to be correct: if the link
from viewing TV violence at the beginning of the
study (time 1) to aggressive behaviour 10 years on
(time 2) is stronger than the link from aggression at
time 1 to the viewing of violent TV programmes at
time 2, this speaks in favour of the first hypothesis,
that TV violence is a causal factor in the development
of aggressive behaviour patterns.
Method The study started in 1960 with a sample of
875 children that comprised the entire population of
third-graders in a community in Columbia County,
New York. Ten years later, 427 of the original
participants, who were then 18, were re-interviewed.
Another 12 years later, in 1982, data were collected
from 409 of the original participants, who by then had
reached the age of 30. At the first assessment,
measures of aggressive behaviour were obtained for
each child on the basis of peer nominations. Exposure
to TV violence was assessed by asking the mothers to
name their child’s most-watched TV programmes,
which were then rated by experts for level of violent
content. Aggressive behaviour and exposure to TV
violence were measured again at the subsequent two
data points, and additional data about criminal
offences were collected at the last data point.
 Results First, concurrent correlations between
exposure to TV violence and aggression were
computed for each data point. At time 1, there was a
significant correlation for boys, but not for girls; at
time 2, there was no relationship for either sex. More
important, however, are the correlations over time.
Cross-lagged panel analyses were conducted in which
the correlations between time 1 aggression and time 2
exposure to violent TV programmes were compared
against time 1 TV violence exposure and time 2
aggression. No evidence was found for a longitudinal
link between TV violence and aggression in girls.
However, for boys exposure to TV violence at time 1
was significantly correlated with aggression at time 2,
whereas aggression at time 1 was unrelated to TV
violence exposure at time 2. The path model that
presents the relationships for the sample of 184 boys
for whom complete data were available from both
time 1 and time 2 is shown in Figure 9.13a. For the
162 male participants still in the sample at time 3, 22
years after the start of the study, a significant path
(.182) was found from exposure to TV violence at age
8 and conviction for violent crime at the age of 30, as
shown in Figure 9.13b.
FIGURE 9.13(a) and (b) Longitudinal links between exposure to television
violence and aggression in a sample of boys followed over 22 years.
Source: Based on Huesmann, L. R., & Miller, L. S. (1994). Long-term effects
of the repeated exposure to media violence in childhood. In L. R. Huesmann
(Ed.), Aggressive behavior: Current perspectives (pp. 153–186). New York:
Plenum © Springer. With kind permission from Springer Science & Business
Media B. V.

Discussion The study provides an impressive

longitudinal data base from which long-term
relationships between media violence and aggression
can be inferred. For boys, there was clear evidence
that early exposure to TV violence predicted
aggressive behaviour over a period as long as 22
years. The magnitude of the link was not dramatic,
which is unsurprising given the host of other factors
that affected participants in the course of that period,
but it suggests that the potential long-term effects of
 exposure to TV violence in childhood give cause for
concern. Subsequent studies, including cross-national
comparisons, confirmed this finding (Huesmann &
Eron, 1986). For girls, the evidence remains
inconclusive. A subsequent longitudinal study by
Huesmann, Moise-Titus, Podolski, and Eron (2003)
found parallel links among men and women between
exposure to TV violence in childhood and aggression
in adulthood, but studies into the impact of violent
computer games also showed stronger effects for male
than for female players (e.g. Bartholow & Anderson,
2002).
Anderson et al. (2003) assessed the state of knowledge derived from each of
these approaches in an authoritative review. They concluded that ‘Research on
violent television and films, video games, and music reveals unequivocal
evidence that media violence increases the likelihood of aggressive and violent
behavior in both immediate and long-term contexts’. (p. 81). Integrating the
findings from almost 300 individual studies, Anderson and Bushman (2002)
reported significant effect sizes (correlations weighted by sample size) for the
link between exposure to media violence and aggression. The effect sizes vary
between .17 and .23 across different methodologies (cross-sectional versus
longitudinal studies, laboratory versus field experiments). Focusing on violent
video games, a recent meta-analysis by Anderson et al. (2010), including 136
studies, found an overall effect size of r = .19 between violent video game play
and aggressive behaviour across a range of methodologies.
Critics have, however, disputed the claim that using violent media increases
aggressive thoughts, feeling and behaviour. They argue that, due to
methodological problems with some of the available evidence, the strength of
the link between media violence exposure and aggression is overestimated (e.g.
Ferguson 2007). To address this criticism, Anderson et al. (2010) identified a list
of ‘best practice’ criteria that allowed them to separate good and poor quality
studies. For example, studies were classified as ‘good practice’ if they compared
violent games with games that did not contain violence, rather than using
comparison games that did include some violence, or if they used measures of
violent game play rather than total time spent playing video games regardless of
their content. When considering only those studies that met the ‘best practice’
criteria, the average effect size increased to r = .24, effectively rebutting the
criticism that the potential risk of violent video game usage may be
overestimated due to the poor quality of the studies in which a link was found.
The real-life implications of these effect sizes are put into perspective in Social
Psychology Beyond the Lab 9.2.
Anderson et al. (2010) also found a significant, albeit smaller link between
violent video game usage and prosocial behaviour (r = −.10). The negative
correlation indicates that the higher the amount of time spent playing violent
video games, the lower the willingness to engage in prosocial behaviour (see
also Chapter 10 on situational determinants of prosocial behaviour).
The observed effect sizes are relatively small in magnitude, explaining no
more than 10 per cent of the variance. This means that while some of the
variability in aggressive behaviour can be accounted for by differences in
exposure to violent media contents, a much larger proportion of the variance is
attributable to other factors. However, even small effect sizes can have practical
importance considering the huge number of media users across the world. As
Sparks and Sparks (2002) pointed out, if only one person in several hundred
thousand viewers was inspired by a violent movie to commit a violent act, the
consequences of several million people watching that movie would be dramatic.
Beyond demonstrating that media violence has a causal effect on aggressive
behaviour, it is important to understand how this effect is produced. Several
interlocking mechanisms have been identified that link violent media contents as
input variables and aggressive behaviour as outcome variable (Figure 9.14; see
Krahé, 2012, Chapter 5, for a comprehensive discussion):
FIGURE 9.14 Psychological processes linking media violence exposure to
aggression.
Source: Adapted from Krahé (2001). The social psychology of aggression.
Copyright © 2001 by the American Psychological Association. Adapted with
permission. The use of APA information does not imply endorsement by APA.
1. Watching media depictions of aggressive interactions increases the
accessibility of aggressive thoughts and feelings. Asking participants to list
their thoughts when exposed to a violent or non-violent videotape, Bushman
and Geen (1990) found that participants who had watched the violent
videotape listed more aggressive thoughts than participants who had
watched a non-violent tape.
2. Exposure to aggression may instigate social learning processes that result
in the acquisition of new behaviours through direct reinforcement and
imitation (Gentile & Gentile, 2008). Much of the aggression portrayed in the
media is rewarded (e.g. winning extra points for running over a blind
pedestrian in reverse gear, as in the racing game Carmageddon II) or at least
goes unpunished (e.g. when a cartoon character is blown to pieces and
quickly reassembled a moment later; Figure 9.15). Moreover, it is often
shown by attractive characters with whom viewers identify. As social
learning theory suggests, learning through modelling is particularly likely
under these conditions (Bandura, 1983).
FIGURE 9.15 Cartoon violence – an example of how aggression portrayed
in the media often goes unpunished.
Source: © Donna Day. Used under licence from Getty Images.
3. In terms of affective and physiological responses to violent media stimuli,
it is necessary to distinguish between short-term and long-term effects. In
the short term, violent media stimuli elicit more hostile affect (Bushman &
Geen, 1990). They also produce an increase in arousal that may intensify
angry arousal from other sources, such as provocation, by means of
excitation transfer, as described earlier. Over time, however, habitual
exposure to media violence leads to habituation that, in turn, reduces
empathy with victims of real-life violence. Habituation describes the process
whereby the ability of a stimulus to elicit arousal becomes weaker with each
consecutive presentation. The person gets used to it, and the stimulus loses
its impact. The decline in physiological arousal in the course of prolonged
exposure to violence is well documented (e.g. Averill, Malmstrom, Koriat,
& Lazarus, 1972). A study by Krahé, Möller, Huesmann, Kirwil, Felber, and
Berger (2011) showed that the more violent media participants used
habitually, the less anxiety and the more pleasant arousal they reported when
shown a violent film clip. No such habituation was found for sad or funny
clips, indicating that habituation is specific to the violent content of the
media diet.

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 habituation process whereby the ability of a stimulus to elicit arousal become weaker with
each consecutive presentation.

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SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BEYOND

THE LAB 9.2
PUTTING MEDIA VIOLENCE IN THE
CONTEXT OF OTHER RISK FACTORS FOR
AGGRESSION
Critics of the media violence literature often claim that effects sizes
found in media violence studies are too low to be practically meaningful
(Ferguson, 2002). To address this claim, Anderson, Gentile, and
Buckley (2007) brought together data from several sources to place the
typical effect sizes for the link between media violence and aggression
in the context of other established risk factors. Drawing on evidence
from longitudinal studies, they compiled a list of empirically established
risk factors that were associated with a higher probability of aggressive
and violent behaviour over time. By comparing the strength of the link
between these other risk factors and aggression to the link between
media violence usage and aggression, it is possible to gauge how serious
a problem the widespread usage of violent media may be for society.
Table 9.2 presents some candidates from their list.
Table 9.2 Risk factors for aggression in adolescence.
Source: Adapted from Anderson, Gentile, & Buckley, 2007, p. 143, with
permission from Oxford University Press. Includes data reported in U.S.
Department of Health & Services (2001) Youth Violence: A Report of the
Surgeon General. Rockville, M.D: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Risk factor Effect size (r) % Variance explained
Gang membership .31 9.6
Violent video game usage .30 8.8
 Poor parent–child relations .19 3.6
Media violence usage (all media) .17 2.9
Low IQ .11 1.2
Broken home .10 1.0
Abusive parents .09 0.8
Note: The measure of effect size reported here is the average correlation
(r). According to Cohen’s (1988) benchmarks, r = .10 denotes a small
effect, r = .30 a medium-sized effect, and r = .50 or above a large effect.
With the exception of gang membership, no other risk factor accounts
for more variation in aggressive behaviour than violent video game
usage. This is an impressive finding, because most people would think
that being a member of a gang would be a far greater risk factor for
engaging in aggression and violence than sitting in front of a computer
screen and acting aggressively in a virtual reality. The data further show
that violent video games are more closely related to aggression than
violence in other media, because the aggregated index of media
violence, including non-interactive media such as movies, has a lower
effect size of .17 compared to .30 for violent games. However, overall
media violence usage still ranks well above variables that most people
would believe to be far more important in predicting the risk of
aggression, such as coming from a broken home or having abusive
parents.
4. Habitual exposure to violent media content also affects the readiness to
engage in aggressive behaviour through promoting the normative
acceptance of aggression and the development of a hostile attribution bias.
The more people see aggression presented as a way of resolving conflicts of
interests and expressing anger, the more they come to think of it as common
and acceptable. A longitudinal study with Grade 7 and 8 pupils in Germany
by Möller and Krahé (2009) showed that violent video game-playing
predicted higher normative acceptance of aggression thirty months later
which, in turn, was a significant predictor of self-reported physical
aggression. Media portrayals of violence also create a view of the world as a
hostile place, thereby promoting the development of a hostile attribution bias
(Krahé & Möller, 2004).
In addition to violence in films and video games, recent research has examined
violent lyrics in music as triggers of aggressive responses. In research by Fischer
and Greitemeyer (2006), men exposed to songs with lyrics that derogate women
(such as ‘Superman’ by Eminem and ‘Self-Esteem’ by Offspring), recalled more
negative attributes about women and behaved more aggressively toward a
female experimenter than men exposed to neutral lyrics. In a second study,
women who had listened to songs with men-hating lyrics (such as ‘You Oughta
Know’ by Alanis Morrisette and ‘Can’t Hold Us Down’ by Christina Aguilera)
displayed more aggression towards a male confederate.
Finally, it is worth noting that even reading the Bible can make you more
aggressive. Bushman, Ridge, Das, Key, and Busath (2007) gave students a text
from the Book of Judges from the Old Testament describing an act of violent
retaliation by an Israelite tribe. Half were told the text was taken from the Bible,
the other half were told it came from an ancient scroll. For half of the
participants, a section was added to the text stating that God had sanctioned the
killing (‘. . . the LORD commanded Israel to take arms against their brothers and
chasten them before the LORD’). Participants who thought the text came from
the bible subsequently administered more aversive noise blasts to a confederate
than those who believed the text was from an ancient scroll, and those who had
read that God sanctioned the killing behaved more aggressively than those not
hearing about God. In a second study, belief in God was added as an individual
difference variable, and a significant interaction between belief in God and God
sanctioning the violent actions was found: whether or not God had sanctioned
the killing only made a difference to those who believed in God. Believers
showed significantly more aggression when they thought that God sanctioned
the killing than when God was not mentioned. For the nonbelievers, mentioning
that God had sanctioned the killing had no effect on the level of noise delivered
to the other person.
 Summary
The research reviewed in this section shows that aggressive behaviour varies
both as a function of person variables and as a function of situational context.
Stable individual differences in the propensity to act aggressively (trait
aggressiveness) and to interpret others’ actions as an expression of hostile intent
(hostile attribution bias) predict differences in the ease with which aggressive
responses are triggered in a particular situation. Research has also identified
gender differences, with men showing more physical aggression than do women.
So far, the evidence is less clear-cut for indirect aggression, such as spreading
rumours. Among the situational variables affecting the likelihood of aggressive
behaviour, research has consistently shown that alcohol consumption, high
temperature and exposure to media violence lower the threshold for aggressive
behaviour. In the case of media violence, longitudinal studies have demonstrated
that negative effects can be found over extended periods of time.
 AGGRESSION AS A SOCIAL PROBLEM
What do we know about the prevalence and the risk factors of
intimate partner violence, sexual aggression, bullying and violence
between groups?
The theoretical and empirical contributions discussed so far identified critical
input variables as well as cognitive, affective and arousal processes that explain
the occurrence of aggressive behaviour. In this section we will look at specific
forms of aggressive behaviour between individuals and between groups and
discuss how the theories and findings examined earlier can contribute to a better
understanding of these social problems.
 Intimate partner violence
‘Intimate partner violence’ is defined as the perpetration or threat of an act of
physical violence, by one partner on the other, in the context of a dating/marital
relationship. It is a serious problem across the world, even though the prevalence
rates vary enormously, not only between, but also within countries (see reviews
of the international evidence by Krahé, Bieneck, & Möller, 2005; Krug,
Dahlberg, Mercy, Zwi, & Lozano, 2002). One of the most contentious issues in
this field of research refers to the question of whether men and women are
involved in intimate partner violence to the same or a different degree. Two
main data sources are available to address the scale of intimate partner violence
and the question of men’s and women’s involvement as perpetrators: (a) official
crime statistics and crime victimization surveys using representative samples;
and (b) research collecting self-reports of perpetration of, or victimization by,
relationship aggression, using the Conflict Tactics Scales (originally called the
CTS, Straus, 1979; and revised as CTS2, Straus, Hamby, Boney-McCoy, &
Sugarman, 1996).

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Conflict Tactics Scales (CTS) instrument for measuring intimate partner violence by collecting
self-reports of perpetration and/or victimization.

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Official crime victimization figures show that women outnumber men by a

wide margin as victims of partner violence and are more likely to suffer injuries
as a result of the partner’s actions (e.g. Rennison & Welchans, 2000). Figure
9.16 presents the gender imbalance for three forms of intimate partner violence,
namely simple assault, aggravated assault and robbery, in data from the National
Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) in the US for the period 2001 to 2005.
FIGURE 9.16 Average annual rate of nonfatal intimate partner victimization in
the United States, by type of crime, 2001–2005. Rate per 1000 people of age 12
or older.
Note: Simple assault: an attack without a weapon resulting either in no injury,
minor injury (for example, bruises, black eyes, cuts) or in undetermined injury
requiring less than 2 days of hospitalization. Also includes attempted assault
without weapon. Aggravated assault: the attack or attempted attack with a
weapon, regardless of whether or not an injury occurred and attack without a
weapon when serious injury results. Robbery: completed or attempted theft,
directly from a person, of property or cash by force or threat of force, with or
without a weapon, and with or without injury.
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics. National Crime Victimization Survey.
Retrieved from http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ipvus.pdf

For the UK, findings from the British Crime Survey (BCS) 2007–08 revealed
that 18 per cent of the women and 10 per cent of the men surveyed had
experienced physical abuse by an intimate partner at least once since the age of
16 (Povey, Coleman, Kaiza, & Roe, 2009). For incidents in the last 12 months,
the gender ratio was more balanced, with 2 per cent of men and 2.2 per cent of
women reporting physical abuse by an intimate partner (Figure 9.17).
FIGURE 9.17 Intimate partner violence is a serious problem across the world.
Research looks at whether men and women are involved as perpetrators to the
same or a different degree.
Source: © Purestock. Used under licence from Getty Images.
 Studies using the Conflict Tactics Scales, however, portray a different picture.
In this measure, participants are presented with a list of minor and severe acts of
physical aggression and asked to indicate whether and how many times they
have shown the behaviour in question towards an intimate partner. Parallel items
are included to measure experiences of victimization by an intimate partner. In
addition, the scale measures injuries suffered by or inflicted on a partner.
Individual Differences 9.2 presents the items of the physical assault scale and the
injury scale, and shows you how to use it to assess gender differences in the
perpetration of physical aggression towards a partner amongst your fellow
students.
In addition to the items presented in the table, the CTS2 contains three further
scales, measuring psychological aggression (defined as communications
intended to cause psychological pain to a partner, such as insults or verbal
abuse), sexual aggression, and negotiation as a non-aggressive form of conflict
resolution in relationships. A large body of evidence has shown that on the CTS
women feature as much as or even more than men do in the perpetration of
physical aggression toward a partner. In a German study with young adults, all
gender differences that were found on the items of the CTS2 were in the
direction of women scoring higher than men on the perpetration of, and men
scoring higher than women on victimization by, physical aggression by a partner
(Krahé & Berger, 2005). In a meta-analysis including 82 studies, Archer (2000)
also found that women were slightly more likely than men to show physical
aggression towards a partner. At the same time, however, he concluded that men
were more likely to inflict injury on their partner, a finding that may explain, at
least to some extent, why men feature more prominently as perpetrators of
interpersonal violence in crime statistics. If their actions are more likely to lead
to injuries, the odds are increased that they will be reported to the police and find
their way into official records.

INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 9.2

IS THERE A GENDER DIFFERENCE IN THE
PERPETRATION OF AGGRESSION AGAINST
AN INTIMATE PARTNER AND THE RISK OF
INJURY?
Items of the Physical Assault Scale and the Injury Scale of the Revised Conflict Tactics Scales
(CTS2; based on Straus et al., 1996).

Task Ask ten male and ten female students from your
year to complete (anonymously) the list of items
displayed below. Do not ask for any additional
information except respondents’ gender. Then collect
the responses in a sealed envelope and calculate the
mean score on each item for the male and female
participants, using the scores from 1 to 6. Can you
replicate the findings that (a) women score higher on
the physical assault scale of the CTS2 and (b) men
score higher on the injury scale?
Instruction No matter how well a couple gets along,
there are times when they disagree, get annoyed with
the other person, want different things from each
other, or just have spats or fights because they are in a
bad mood, are tired or for some other reason. Couples
also have many different ways to settle their
differences. This is a list of things that might happen
 when you have differences. Please circle how many
times you did each of the things in the past year.
How often did this happen:
Source: Based on Straus et al., 1996, with permission from SAGE
Publications, Inc.

Note: Items 1–5 describe behaviours classified by Straus et al. as ‘minor physical assault’, Items 6–12
represent ‘severe physical assault’ and Items 13–18 form the ‘injury’ scale. These labels should not be
communicated to your participants.

Critics have argued that the overrepresentation of women as perpetrators of

intimate partner violence portrayed by studies using the CTS is distorted,
because this instrument records acts of violence without considering their
context. In particular, it does not consider whether the behaviour shown is an act
of unprovoked aggression or a response to a previous attack, so that an act of
self-defence by a woman is counted in the same way as the initial assault by her
male partner. It is now widely acknowledged by researchers that intimate partner
violence is not a unitary phenomenon, but comprises different forms, contexts
and underlying dynamics. Kelly and Johnson (2008) distinguish coercive
controlling violence as a stable feature of a relationship (more often shown by
men), violent resistance in response to a coercive controlling partner (more often
shown by women), and situational couple violence, arising out of everyday
conflict situations (which is largely gender-symmetrical). Therefore, to make
progress in the understanding of the dynamics of intimate partner violence,
greater attention needs to be paid to the specific forms and contexts in which
assaults on intimate partners take place (Frieze, 2000).
 Sexual aggression
Sexual aggression includes a range of forced sexual activities, such as sexual
intercourse, oral sex, kissing and petting, using a range of coercive strategies,
such as threat or use of physical force, exploitation of the victim’s inability to
resist or verbal pressure. It also includes unwanted sexual attention in the form
of sexual harassment, stalking and obscene phone calls (Belknap, Fisher, &
Cullen, 1999; Frieze & Davis, 2002). In contrast to intimate partner violence, it
is undisputed that sexual violence is gender-asymmetrical, with the vast majority
of sexual assaults committed by male perpetrators against female victims, and
this is reflected both in rapes recorded by the police and in large-scale
victimization surveys. Of the 7314 cases of completed and attempted rape and
sexual assault recorded by the police in Germany in 2009, 99 per cent involved a
male perpetrator (Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik, 2009, p. 134 and 136). Of the
victims, 96.1 per cent were female and 3.9 per cent were male. Although the
figures do not show the sex of the perpetrator for male victims, it is clear from
the very low overall perpetration rate for women that the majority of male rapes
must have been committed by a male perpetrator. UK crime statistics revealed
that 7778 rapes of a female aged 16 and over were reported to the police in
2008–9, compared to 316 rapes of a male aged 16 or over (Walker, Flatley,
Kershaw, & Moon, 2009). Complementing crime statistics that only reflect cases
actually reported to the police, large-scale studies have been conducted to record
sexual victimization of women by men. An example of the data generated by this
approach is presented in Table 9.3.
Table 9.3 Prevalence of men’s sexual aggression against women.
Source: Adapted from Spitzberg (1999), with permission from Springer
Publishing Company.
 Although less widely studied, it should be noted that sexual violence is also a
problem in same-sex relationships (e.g. Krahé, Schütze, Fritsche, &
Waizenhöfer, 2000) and that women do show sexual aggression against men
(Krahé, Waizenhöfer, & Möller, 2003; Schatzel-Murphy, Harris, Knight, &
Milburn, 2009). The majority of sexual assaults are committed by a perpetrator
known to the victim, either as an acquaintance or as an intimate partner. Despite
the persistence of the ‘real rape stereotype’ that pictures rape as a violent
surprise attack in a dark alleyway, sexual assaults by strangers are the exception
rather than the rule. Childhood abuse has been identified as an important
biographical risk factor for perpetrating sexual aggression in both men and
women (Schatzel-Murphy et al., 2009). As a situational risk factor, alcohol use
has also been found consistently to increase the risk of sexual aggression
(Abbey, Zawacki, Buck, Clinton, & McAuslan, 2004).
The consequences of a sexual assault for the victim are severe. A substantial
number of rape victims develop the clinical symptomatology of post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD). Victims re-experience the assault in dreams, images
and intrusive memories, they try to avoid cues reminding them of the assault,
and experience a general emotional numbness (Koss, Bailey, Yuan, Herrera, &
Lichter, 2003). Contrary to a widely held public belief, assaults by partners and
acquaintances are as traumatizing for the victim as are assaults by strangers
(Culbertson & Dehle, 2001).

- - - - - - - - - -

post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) characteristic patterns of symptoms observed in survivors

of traumatic experiences such as rape.

- - - - - - - - - -

Victims of sexual aggression not only have to come to terms with the
emotional trauma of the assault itself, they also have to cope with the reactions
of others who learn about their fate. There is a widespread tendency to blame the
victim of a sexual assault, unparalleled in judgements of victims of other
criminal offences (Bieneck & Krahé, 2011). A large body of evidence has shown
that certain victim characteristics, such as low social status, higher number of
sexual partners and pre-rape behaviour that is at odds with female role
requirements (e.g. drinking alone in a bar) are linked to higher attributions of
responsibility to the victim, and often correspondingly lower responsibility
attributed to the attacker. The tendency to shift blame from the perpetrator to the
victim is seen as a major factor in the low conviction rates for rape that have
plagued the legal systems of many Western countries (Temkin & Krahé, 2008).
 Bullying in school and the workplace
The last 30 years have seen a growing concern about aggressive behaviour in
school and work settings (Olweus, 1994; Randall, 1997). Referred to by different
terms, such as bullying, mobbing, or workplace aggression, this phenomenon
denotes aggressive behaviour directed at victims who cannot easily defend
themselves within an institutional setting (Smith, Ananiadou, & Cowie, 2003;
Figure 9.18). Forms of bullying include physical, verbal and relational
aggression; that is, behaviour directed at damaging the victim’s peer
relationships.
FIGURE 9.18 Bullying, either in schools or in the workplace, denotes
aggressive behaviour directed at victims who cannot easily defend themselves.
Source: © Weston Colton. Used under licence from Getty Images.

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bullying (also known as mobbing) denotes aggressive behaviour directed at victims who cannot
easily defend themselves, typically in schools and at the workplace.

- - - - - - - - - -

With the advent of modern communication technology a new mode of

bullying, cyberbullying, has appeared on the scene. Cyberbullying is not limited
to a relatively small face-to-face audience, but can humiliate and intimidate
others on a large scale and under the cloak of anonymity (Dooley, Pyzalski, &
Cross, 2009). Cyberbullying involves the use of modern technology, such as
computers, mobile phones or other electronic devices to inflict intentional harm
on others. Sending threatening e-mails, posting derogatory comments about a
classmate on Internet platforms, or circulating photos designed to embarrass or
humiliate another person are examples of cyberbullying.

- - - - - - - - - -

cyberbullying involves the use of modern technology, such as computers, mobile phones or other
electronic devices to inflict intentional harm on others.

- - - - - - - - - -

In an international survey of 11-to 15-year-olds in 40 countries conducted on

behalf of the World Health Organization, 12.6 per cent of participants were
identified as victims of bullying, 10.7 per cent were identified as bullies, and 3.6
per cent were both bullies and victims (Craig et al., 2009). Bullying typically
takes place over extended periods of time and involves a power differential
between bully and victim based on physical strength or superior status that
undermines the victim’s ability to defend him or herself, or to retaliate.
The typical victim is an anxious, socially withdrawn child or adolescent,
isolated from his or her peer group and likely to be physically weaker than most
peers. In contrast, bullies are typically strong, dominant and assertive, showing
aggressive behaviour not just towards their victims, but also towards parents,
teachers and other adults (see Griffin & Gross, 2004, for a comprehensive
review). Boys feature more prominently than girls as victims as well as
perpetrators of bullying (Olweus, 1994). They are also more likely to use
physical aggression than are girls, who rely more on verbal and relational forms
of aggression, as shown in a cross-national comparison involving 21 countries
(Smith et al., 1999). Salmivalli (2010) points out that bullying needs to be
examined in a group context, looking not only at the roles of bullies and victims,
but also at those of peer witnesses who may assist or encourage the bullies,
intervene on behalf of the victim, or remain passive bystanders. Being able to
dominate and intimidate others is associated with status gain in one’s peer group,
which makes it hard for others to intervene and take sides with the weaker
victim. Being the target of bullying can bring long-term misery to the victims,
including an increased risk of suicide (see Social Psychology Beyond the Lab
9.3). Being a bully may also have long-term negative consequences (Hawker &
Boulton, 2000). Social Psychology Beyond the Lab 9.3 presents some relevant
data from a large-scale study.
Harassing weaker members of the peer group is not limited to the school
context, but also happens to people at work. Workplace bullying refers to
behaviours intended to make another person feel miserable at work over longer
periods of time, with the targets being unable to defend themselves due to an
imbalance of power between perpetrator and victim, either because the bully has
a higher status (e.g. as a boss bullying a subordinate) or a stronger position
among peers (e.g. as a man bullying an equal-status woman in a male-dominated
workgroup). According to Hoel, Rayner, and Cooper (1999), both the prevalence
and the nature of bullying experienced in the workplace are similar for men and
women. However, women appear to be more negatively affected by bullying
than are men. A large-scale study by Smith, Singer, Hoel, and Cooper (2003)
explored potential links between individuals’ experience of bullying at school
and in the workplace and found a significant association between school and
workplace bullying: respondents who had been victimized at school were more
likely to have been bullied at work in the last five years than respondents who
had not been bullied at school. It is important to note, however, that the
relationship was inferred on the basis of retrospective reports of school bullying
that may have been inaccurately recalled or distorted in the light of subsequent
experiences of bullying in the workplace. A meta-analysis including data from
90 samples showed that workplace bullying was more likely to occur in work
environments where other stressors were present, such as role conflict and
ambiguity, and that it was associated with significant impairments of victims’
well-being, such as increased levels of anxiety, depression and physical
symptoms (Bowling & Beehr, 2006).
 Intergroup violence
The forms of aggression discussed so far have referred to confrontations
between individuals, that is, they were manifestations of interpersonal
aggression. In this section, we will turn to intergroup aggression, that is
aggression originating in the context of encounters between groups (Goldstein,
2002). Groups may get into violent conflict because they compete for goals, such
as power or material profit, that only one party can obtain, as postulated by
Sherif’s (1966) theory of realistic group conflict (see Chapter 14 for a more
detailed account of Sherif’s theorizing). However, even in the absence of
realistic conflicts of interest, the mere categorization of people into groups may
produce feelings of intergroup hostility in an attempt to make the ingroup appear
superior and promote a positive view of their own group (see discussion of
social identity theory in Chapter 14). From this perspective, examined in more
detail below, intergroup aggression is closely linked to the group membership
and affiliation of the actors. For example, Van Hiel, Hautman, Cornelis, and De
Clercq (2007) showed that the more football fans identified with their favourite
team, the higher their self-reported physical and verbal aggression in the context
of football matches. Intergroup aggression can be both hostile (e.g. letting off
steam after a defeat of one’s favoured sports team) and instrumental (e.g. attacks
by terrorist groups in pursuit of a political cause).

- - - - - - - - - -

interpersonal aggression aggressive behaviour between individuals rather than groups.

- - - - - - - - - -

- - - - - - - - - -

intergroup aggression aggressive encounters between groups or aggression based on group

membership rather than individual characteristics, such as football hooliganism.

- - - - - - - - - -
 In the World Report on Violence and Health compiled by the World Health
Organization, the term collective violence is used to refer to ‘the instrumental
use of violence by people who identify themselves as members of a group . . .
against another group or set of individuals, in order to achieve political,
economic, or social objectives’ (Krug et al., 2002, p. 215). It comprises (1)
political conflicts within and between states, such as war and terrorism; (2) state-
perpetrated violence, such as genocide and torture; and (3) organized violent
crime, such as banditry and gang warfare. The report identifies a range of risk
factors at the societal level that make collective violence more likely. The main
factors are summarized in Table 9.5.
Table 9.5 Risk factors of collective violence.
Source: Based on data reported in the WHO World Report on Violence and
Health, Krug et al., 2002, Chapter 8.
Political - Lack of democratic processes - Unequal access to political
factors power and to natural resources of different regions, social
classes, religions or ethnic groups
Societal and - Inequality between groups in the allocation of goods and
community services - Fuelling of group fanaticism along ethnic, national
factors or religious lines - Ready availability of weapons
Demographic - Rapid demographic change, particularly increases in
factors population density and in the proportion of young people

- - - - - - - - - -

collective violence instrumental use of violence by people who identify themselves as members of
a group against another group in order to achieve political, economic or social objectives.

- - - - - - - - - -

While these risk factors may not be sufficient on their own to explain
collective violence, in combination they create conditions that precipitate
aggressive confrontations between groups. Collective violence has dramatic
consequences on people directly or indirectly involved in the conflict, in terms
of physical and mental health, as well as their socioeconomic welfare.
 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BEYOND THE
LAB 9.3
BULLIED TO DEATH? BULLYING AND THE
RISK OF SUICIDE
From The Times, August 22 2009, ‘Cyberbullying was believed to be the
cause of the suicide of 15-year-old Megan Gillan, from Macclesfield,
Cheshire, who took an overdose of painkillers after receiving abusive
messages on networking site Bebo’.
Systematic research shows that victims of traditional as well as
cyberbullying are at increased risk of suicidal thoughts and self-killings. A
survey of about 2000 randomly selected middle-school students in the US
revealed that victims of traditional bullying were 1.7 times more likely than
non-victims to attempt suicide, and victims of cyberbullying were 1.9 times
more likely than non-victims (Hinduja & Patchin, 2010). A Finnish study
examining the link between bullying and victimization at the age of 8 with
attempted and completed suicides before the age of 25 (in a sample of more
than 5300 children born in 1981) also yielded troubling results, as shown in
Table 9.4.
Table 9.4 Percentage of boys and girls who attempted or committed suicide before the age of 25 in
relation to their status as bullies or victims at the age of 8.
Source: Based on Klomek et al., 2009, with permission from Elsevier.

Both being a bully and being a victim was associated with an increased
suicidal risk. Among girls, the odds ratio shows that those who were
 suicidal risk. Among girls, the odds ratio shows that those who were
frequently bullied at age 8 were 6.3 times more likely to have attempted or
completed suicide before the age of 25 than those not bullied at age 8. This
figure is adjusted for conduct disorders and depression assessed at age 8
which would be additional risk factors of suicide.
Whereas the risk factors shown in Table 9.5 operate at the level of society, it is
equally important to understand what happens to individuals to make them more
prone to act aggressively as members of a group. Social psychologists have
addressed this question from different angles, and there are two lines of research
that are particularly relevant here. The first line of research is concerned with
short-term, situational changes in the individual as a result of being part of a
group, focusing on the construct of deindividuation (see Chapter 8). The second
line of research looks at more long-term processes of identification and
affiliation with a group and their impact on aggression towards outgroups, based
on the construct of social identity. We will consider both approaches in turn.
Following LeBon’s (1896) early work on crowd behaviour, Zimbardo (1969)
proposed in his theory of deindividuation that individuals acting in a large group
lose their sense of personal identity and responsibility and may show aggressive
behaviour that would be suppressed by their internal standards if they were more
aware of their identity as individuals. He investigated this phenomenon, most
dramatically, in his famous ‘Stanford Prison Experiment’ (see Chapter 8; Figure
9.19), in which he randomly allocated a group of mentally healthy young men to
the roles of prisoners or prison guards and then asked them to enact their
respective roles in a mock prison established in his laboratory at Stanford
University. The guards engaged in increasingly cruel treatments of their
prisoners, and the prisoners developed symptoms of severe trauma.
FIGURE 9.19 The Stanford Prison Experiment.
Source: © Philip G. Zimbardo, Inc. Reprinted with permission.
 In order to explain why ordinary people engage in behaviours totally out of
their character as individuals, Zimbardo proposed three input variables that
promote deindividuation: anonymity, diffusion of responsibility and large group
size. Under these conditions, people are thought to engage in actions
characterized by impulsiveness, irrationality and regression to primitive forms of
behaviour. A change in attentional focus has been proposed as a key mechanism
explaining aggression by members of a crowd (Diener, 1980). When people are
on their own, their attention is typically focused on the self, and they monitor
their own behaviour against the standard of their personal norms and values. By
contrast, being part of a larger group shifts attention away from the self onto the
situation, reducing people’s ability to regulate their behaviour in accordance
with their personal norms and increasing their attention to the situational cues,
e.g. the aggressive behaviour of other group members. We earlier referred to the
work by Mullen (1986), who analysed newspaper reports of lynchings by violent
mobs, which also emphasized the lack of self-focused attention as an explanation
for violent group behaviour.
If being in a large group involves a shift from individual norms to norms
prevailing in the group, it follows that group behaviour should only be more
violent than individual behaviour if the group norms are seen as promoting or at
least condoning aggression. This is exactly what the research showed. For
example, when people were deindividuated by wearing uniforms, they behaved
more aggressively when dressed in outfits of the Ku Klux Klan, a group
associated with aggressive norms, than when dressed as nurses, a group
associated with prosocial values (Johnson & Downing, 1979; Figure 9.20). Thus,
perceived group norms are critical in making individuals’ behaviour either more
or less aggressive when they are part of a group.
FIGURE 9.20(a) and (b) Perceived group norms are critical in making
individuals’ behaviour either more or less aggressive when they are part of a
group.
Source: (a) © Danita Delimont. Used under licence from Getty Images; (b) ©
michaeljung. Used under licence from Shutterstock.

From the perspective of social identity theory (Tajfel, 1981), intergroup

aggression is seen as the result of the psychological need to establish and
maintain a positive identity. In addition to a positive sense of personal identity
based on their individual qualities, people seek to establish a sense of self-worth
through the social groups to which they belong. For example, being a member of
a national group is a source of personal pride for many people, and they are keen
to stress the positive qualities of their group (Figure 9.21). At the same time,
they may also seek to minimize the positive qualities and stress the shortcomings
of other groups, thereby achieving positive distinctiveness for their own group
(Brown, 1999). Feeling close to ingroup members and distancing oneself from
outgroups gives rise to ingroup favouritism, i.e. preferential treatment and
evaluations of ingroup members solely on the basis of their group membership.
The conflict between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland is a case in
point. As shown by Cairns, Kenworthy, Campbell, and Hewstone (2006),
members of each religious group had more positive feelings for their own
community than for the respective other community, and this pattern was
particularly evident for those who identified strongly with their religious group.
FIGURE 9.21 Being a member of a national group is a source of personal pride
for many people.
Source: © Michael Blann. Used under licence from Getty Images.

Devaluing the outgroup is a stronger form of intergroup bias than merely

favouring the ingroup (see Chapter 14). Outgroup derogation promotes feelings
of hostility that may lower the threshold for aggressive behaviour towards
outgroup members, even when there is no material conflict of interest between
the groups. As Lickel, Miller, Stenstrom, Denson, and Schmader (2006) have
shown, there is even a tendency for ingroup members to engage in ‘vicarious
retribution’ against outgroups; that is, to show an aggressive response to an
outgroup member after a member of their own group had been the target of
aggression from another person in that outgroup. For example, if a German boy
sees a member of his national group being verbally abused by a Turk, he may
retaliate by yelling abuse next time he meets another Turk, even though neither
he nor the other Turk had anything to do with the initial confrontation.
According to a recent analysis of displaced aggression and gang violence by
Vasquez, Lickel, and Hennigan (2010), the motivation to retaliate vicariously
against outgroup members is stronger the more people identify with their
respective ingroup. This line of research underlines the importance of social
identity concerns in understanding aggression between groups.
As we have seen from the preceding discussion, there are societal-level, group-
level and individual-level factors that promote aggression and violence between
groups, and they need to be considered in conjunction for a full understanding of
when and why intergroup aggression occurs. We will illustrate how to integrate
these different levels for a better understanding of intergroup aggression using
the case of terrorism, and applying Moghaddam’s (2005) so-called staircase
model. Terrorism refers to politically motivated violence, intended to spread fear
and terror among members of a society in order to influence the decision making
or behaviour of political agents. Understanding the processes that lead to the
carrying out of terrorist attacks is of critical importance in addressing this
worldwide problem. In his analysis, Moghaddam started off with the observation
that societal-level variables, such as those listed in Table 9.5, cannot explain
why, out of all the people living under the same adverse conditions, only very
few end up as terrorists. Similarly, individual-level variables cannot explain
why, out of all people to which particular individual characteristics apply, only
very few turn to terrorism. In his model, shown in Figure 9.22, he describes the
pathway to becoming a terrorist as a narrowing staircase that only very few
people climb to the top.
FIGURE 9.22 The ‘staircase model’ of terrorism.
Source: Based on information in Moghaddam, 2005.

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staircase model describes the pathway to terrorism as a succession of steps explaining why out of
large numbers of disaffected people in a society only very few end up committing terrorist acts.

- - - - - - - - - -
 The ground floor is occupied by all members of society who evaluate their
living conditions in terms of fairness and justice. Those who perceive their
conditions to be fair and just remain on the ground floor, those who see them as
unjust move on to the first floor. On the first floor, they evaluate the options for
improving conditions. Those who conclude that there are options for them to
improve their individual position and influence decision-makers leave the
staircase to terrorism at this level and pursue non-violent paths. Those who are
dissatisfied with available options for redressing injustices move on to the
second floor. On the second floor, feelings of anger and frustration over not
being able to improve their situation predominate, triggering the search for a
target to blame for their misfortune. This enemy can either be a direct opponent,
such as a central government denying autonomy to an ethnic group or region, or
a third party to whom aggression is displaced, such as reflected in the
widespread anti-Americanism in the Middle East.
People on this level, who are persuaded that there is an enemy towards whom
they can direct their aggressive tendencies, will then climb up to the next floor.
By the time they arrive on the third floor, individuals have developed a certain
readiness towards violence that can now be exploited by terrorist organizations
by offering a sense of ‘moral engagement’ to their potential new recruits.
Violent actions against the ‘enemy’ are presented as morally acceptable or even
imperative, and recruits are offered a new and appealing social identity as
members of a highly selective ingroup aiming to bring justice to the world.
Those for whom this offer is attractive climb up to the next floor. On the fourth
floor, categorical thinking in terms of ‘we’ versus ‘them’ is promoted, by
isolating new recruits from their families and friends, imposing strict secrecy and
emphasizing the legitimacy of the terrorist organization. There is virtually no
chance for people who have climbed up to this floor to withdraw and exit alive.
Therefore, they move on to the fifth floor, which involves carrying out the
terrorist act. In order to operate effectively on this floor, inhibitions against
killing innocent people must be overcome, and this is achieved by two well-
established psychological mechanisms: categorization, stressing the
differentiation between ingroup and outgroup, and distancing, exaggerating the
differences between the ingroup and the targets that are seen as the ‘enemy’.
The staircase metaphor is useful for conceptualizing the process by which a
small number of individuals from large groups of disaffected people living under
adverse conditions end up committing acts of violence against innocent targets.
At the same time, it provides some clues regarding the prevention of terrorism.
Moghaddam (2005) points out that it is not enough to try and identify the
individuals prepared to carry out terrorist acts before they get a chance to do so,
because that would only make room for new people to step forward. Instead,
terrorism can only be ended by reforming the conditions on the ground floor so
that they are no longer perceived as unjust and hopeless by large parts of the
population.
 Summary
Intimate partner violence, sexual aggression, bullying and intergroup violence
are widespread forms of aggression in everyday life. They can lead to lasting
negative effects on the victims’ psychological functioning and well-being. In
research on intimate partner violence, the issue of whether men or women
feature more prominently as perpetrators is controversial, but there is consistent
evidence that women are more likely to be injured by an intimate partner than
are men. Sexual aggression is perpetrated mostly by men against women.
Bullying in school and the workplace is typically characterized by a power
differential between perpetrator and victim. Some studies suggest that the
experience of being bullied in school makes victims vulnerable to long-term
psychological problems. In explaining aggression between groups, societal
factors, such as perceived injustice, group factors, such as common norms, and
individual factors, such as a lack of self-focused attention play a role. The
‘staircase model’ of terrorism considers the joint influence of these factors to
explain terrorist violence.
 PSYCHOLOGICAL PREVENTION AND
INTERVENTION
What are effective strategies for preventing or reducing
aggression?
It has become clear that aggression poses a serious threat to the health and well-
being of individuals and the functioning of societies. Although the present
chapter has focused on physical and psychological effects of aggression on the
individual, it should also be remembered that the economic costs of interpersonal
violence for a society as a whole are enormous. A report by the World Health
Organization shows the financial consequences of different forms of violence
(Waters et al., 2004). For example, it quotes data by Miller, Cohen, and
Rossman (1993) who estimated the costs of rape in the United States in terms of
medical treatment as well as impairment of mental health, productivity and
quality of life at $47,000 per case. In a survey of over 3000 women in the United
States, Rivara et al. (2007) found that annual health care costs were 19 per cent
higher among victims of intimate partner violence than among nonvictimized
women. Based on a victimization rate of 44 per cent in their sample, they
extrapolated that for every 100,000 women in the health care system, excess
health care costs of $19.3 million are incurred each year as a result of intimate
partner violence.
Given the dramatic effects of aggression and violence on individuals, social
groups and communities at large, psychologists not only have to deal with the
task of investigating how, when, and why aggressive behaviour is shown, they
are also expected to propose ways of counteracting and preventing its
occurrence. Aggressive behaviour is ultimately performed by individual actors.
Therefore, an important aim of intervention efforts is to reduce the probability
that a person will show aggressive behaviour, either in a specific situation or
over time. Three main mechanisms have been discussed by which aggressive
behaviour might, in principle, be prevented: catharsis, punishment, and the
elicitation of incompatible responses.

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catharsis release of aggressive tension through symbolic engagement in aggressive behaviour.

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 Catharsis
It is widely believed that releasing aggressive tension through physical activity
in sport or in symbolic ways, such as through sarcastic humour or acting
aggressively in the virtual reality of a videogame, is a successful strategy for
‘letting off steam’ and reducing aggression (Bushman & Whitaker, 2010). The
idea that aggressive urges can be channelled into harmless forms of expression,
which is also part of Lorenz’s (1966) steam boiler model of aggression discussed
earlier, is captured in the catharsis hypothesis. Catharsis refers to the idea of
Greek tragedy that watching tragic conflict unfold and be resolved on stage leads
to a purification or ‘cleansing’ of emotions (pity and fear) and brings about
spiritual renewal or release from tension in the spectators. However, empirical
evidence shows that symbolic engagement in aggressive thoughts or actions is
not just ineffective, but even counterproductive for reducing aggression
(Schaefer & Mattei, 2005). Several studies indicate that the imaginary
performance of aggressive behaviour, such as in pretend play or watching media
violence, is more likely to enhance aggression than to reduce it (Bushman, 2002;
Bushman, Baumeister, & Stack, 1999). These findings are explained with
reference to the role of aggressive cues in enhancing the likelihood of aggressive
behaviour: symbolic acts of aggression can be regarded as aggressive cues that
prime hostile thoughts and feelings, and thereby pave the way for aggressive
behaviour. Focusing on the arousal component of catharsis, Verona and Sullivan
(2008) conducted a study in which they made participants engage in aggressive
behaviour by delivering unpleasant air blasts to a confederate, and recorded the
participants’ heart rate before and after they engaged in aggressive behaviour.
They found that those participants who showed the greatest reduction in heart
rate after performing the aggressive behaviour, that is, those who could be
thought to have experienced most catharsis, were most aggressive in the next
phase of the experiment. This finding suggests that the reduction in arousal
experienced after an aggressive act makes people more rather than less
aggressive in a subsequent situation. Thus, it can be said that the idea of
catharsis is a popular myth that is not supported by empirical evidence.
 Punishment
Explanations of aggression as a result of learning processes suggest that we
should look at punishment as an effective mechanism to suppress the
performance of aggressive behaviour. Indeed, punishment can work to suppress
aggression provided that several conditions are met (e.g. Berkowitz, 1993): (1)
anticipated punishment must be sufficiently adverse; (2) it must have a high
probability of being imposed; (3) punishment can only exert a deterrent effect if
the individual’s negative arousal is not too strong to prevent him or her from
calculating the costs of an aggressive response in advance in a rational manner;
(4) punishment will only be effective if acceptable or attractive behavioural
alternatives are available to the actor in the situation; and (5) punishment must
follow immediately upon the transgression so that it is perceived as contingent
upon the aggressive behaviour. If these conditions are present, punishment may
be an effective strategy for stopping people from behaving aggressively on
future occasions. However, the probability that these necessary conditions will
co-occur in a given situation is relatively low, limiting the scope of punishment
as a strategy for controlling aggression. In addition to this practical limitation, a
more fundamental criticism must be raised against punishment: punitive
responses may in themselves instigate aggression by functioning as aggressive
cues and may reinforce beliefs about the normative acceptability of aggressive
behaviour. Punishment may also convey the message that the use of aggression
is a viable strategy of conflict resolution. If it is to produce desirable
consequences, punishment needs to be embedded into a more general approach
towards instrumental learning in which the primary aim is to reward desirable
rather than penalize undesirable behaviour (Coie & Dodge, 1998).
De-escalation through eliciting incompatible responses
As posited by the theoretical models reviewed earlier, aggressive affect and
cognition are important antecedents of aggressive behaviour. Therefore, eliciting
positive affect and cognition may be a successful way of buffering these
negative responses, resulting in a reduction of aggressive behaviour. In support
of this idea, Greitemeyer and Osswald (2009) asked participants to play either a
prosocial video game (Lemmings) or a neutral game (Tetris) before
administering a measure of aggressive cognitions. This measure consisted of
three story stems of situations that could or could not end in an aggressive
interaction (e.g. a friend turning up 30 minutes late for an appointment to watch
a movie without giving an apology). The participants’ task was to write down
what was likely to happen next and what the main character would do, think or
feel. These responses were then coded for aggressive content by independent
raters to yield a measure of aggressive cognitions. The data showed that
participants who had played the prosocial game generated fewer aggressive
cognitions than those in the neutral game condition, suggesting that aggressive
thoughts may be reduced by engaging people in prosocial activities.
Using music to elicit positive affect, Krahé and Bieneck (2012) showed that
participants who were provoked whilst listening to pleasant music (a range of
classical pieces, such as Grieg’s Peer Gynt Suite) subsequently reported less
anger (see Figure 9.23a) and took longer to recognize aggression-related words
in a lexical decision-task (see Figure 9.23b) than did participants listening to
aversive music (a mix of Hardcore and Techno, such as King Deuce) or those in
a no-music control condition. On the lexical decision task, they were presented
with aggressive words (e.g. ‘cannons’), non-aggressive words (e.g. ‘flower’),
and non-words (e.g. ‘rahmin’), and had to indicate as fast as possible whether the
stimulus represented a meaningful word or a non-word. The speed with which
participants correctly identified aggressive words as words was taken as a
measure of accessibility of aggressive cognitions.
FIGURE 9.23(a) and (b) Levels of (a) anger and (b) reaction times in a lexical
decision task in provoked and unprovoked participants as a function of exposure
to pleasant music, aversive music, or no music.
Note: Shorter response times indicate higher accessibility of aggressive
cognitions.
Source: From Krahé & Bieneck (2012) with permission from John Wiley &
Sons.

The results show that among provoked participants, anger was reduced to the
level of the non-provoked comparison group when they were exposed to the
pleasant music. Provoked participants in the pleasant music group also took
significantly longer to recognize the aggressive words in the lexical decision task
than did participants in the other two music conditions, indicating that aggressive
cognitions were less salient under the influence of the pleasant music.
Addressing the buffering role of music in a real-life context, Wiesenthal,
Hennessy, and Totten (2000) assigned a sample of commuters to a group
listening to self-selected music while driving to work, or to a no-music group.
Depending on their routes, participants were classified as experiencing low
versus high traffic congestion, representing different stress levels. Self-reported
driver stress was the dependent variable. Under low congestion conditions,
music made no difference, but under high congestion, participants in the music
group reported significantly lower levels of stress than those in the no-music
condition. Overall, this research suggests that eliciting positive affect may be an
effective strategy for buffering the effects of frustration and provocation in
triggering aggressive responses.
 Summary
Compared to the wealth of research into the causes and precipitating factors of
aggressive behaviour, evidence on how to reduce it is limited. Contrary to
popular wisdom, catharsis, i.e. acting out aggressive impulses in a symbolic or
innocuous way, is counterproductive in reducing aggression. It leads to an
increase rather than a decrease in aggressive responses. Punishment may be a
potentially effective control strategy, but only if it is imposed swiftly after a
transgression. However, a disadvantage is that punishment also involves
inflicting harm on the target person, making aggression appear as an acceptable
way of resolving conflicts. Eliciting prosocial behaviour or using pleasant music
to buffer stress and anger illustrate ways of reducing aggression by influencing
affective and cognitive antecedents of aggressive behaviour.

CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has looked at some of the most important domains in which
aggression is part and parcel of everyday life. The main conclusions
suggested by the research reviewed in the course of the chapter can be
summarized as follows:
What is aggression and why does it occur? Aggressive behaviour is
defined as behaviour carried out with the intention of harming another
person. It can be a means to an end (instrumental aggression) or an
expression of negative affect (affective or hostile aggression).
What methods do social psychologists use to study aggression? Methods
for studying aggressive behaviour include laboratory experiments, reports
of aggressive behaviour from actors and observers and the analysis of
archival records.
What are the main theoretical approaches used in social psychological
research on aggression? Theoretical approaches aimed at explaining
aggressive behaviour include both biological and psychological lines of
thinking and research. They share the assumption that the likelihood of
aggressive behaviour depends on the operation of facilitating or inhibiting
factors located both within the person and the environment.
Is aggression a stable characteristic over the life course and do men and
women differ in their tendency to show aggressive behaviour? Individual
differences in aggression show considerable stability from childhood to
early adulthood. Dispositional aggressiveness and the hostile attribution
bias have been linked to individual differences in aggressive behaviour.
Research on gender differences in aggression has found that men are
more physically aggressive than women, even though the difference is
only moderate in size.
In what situations does aggressive behaviour become more likely?
Alcohol consumption and high temperatures have been identified as
situational variables that exert a significant influence on the manifestation
of aggressive behaviour. Alcohol impairs the ability to process situational
information and reduces the awareness of social norms inhibiting
aggressive responses.
Is there a link between using violent media and aggression? Studies
examining the effect of violent media contents have provided overall
support for the proposed aggression-enhancing effect of media violence,
including violent computer games. Learning by imitation, emotional
desensitization and a change in worldview (seeing the world as a hostile
place) are important underlying processes.
How common is domestic violence and is there a gender difference?
Intimate partner violence is a widespread problem across the world.
Studies using frequency counts of aggressive acts that ignore the context
in which they take place show that men and women are equally likely to
show aggressive behaviour against a partner. In contrast, crime statistics
and studies taking context and consequences of aggressive acts into
account show that men dominate as perpetrators and women as victims of
intimate partner violence.
How common is sexual aggression and what are the psychological
consequences? Sexual violence is committed mostly by men against
women, even though a few studies have documented same-sex sexual
aggression and women’s sexual aggression towards men. In the majority
of cases the assailant is someone previously known to the victim. The
consequences of sexual victimization are severe, including negative
reactions from others.
What is bullying and how harmful is it? School and workplace bullying
are forms of aggressive behaviour characterized by an imbalance of
power between aggressor and victim, and often take place over extended
periods of time. Cyberbullying is a new form of harassment using
electronic devices that makes it easy for perpetrators to remain
 anonymous.
What are the processes triggering aggression between groups?
Intergroup aggression occurs not only as a result of conflicts between
groups over material resources, but also as a result of changes in self-
focused attention and social identity concerns. People shift attention from
their individual norms to the norms of the group when they are in a
crowd, and they prefer members of their own group over those of
outgroups to secure a positive social identity. The staircase model of
terrorism illustrates the interplay between social conditions of injustice
and individual characteristics in explaining why people commit terrorist
acts.
How can aggressive behaviour be prevented or reduced? The popular
notion of catharsis has been disconfirmed as a strategy for reducing
aggression. Punishment may be effective if imposed swiftly and reliably,
but it conveys the message that aggression is an accepted means of
conflict resolution. Inducing responses incompatible with aggression,
such as prosocial behaviour or positive affect, may reduce aggressive
cognitions, anger and aggressive behaviour.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

Anderson, C. A. (2001). Heat and violence. Current Directions in Psychological
Science, 10, 33–38. Concise summary of the evidence and theoretical
explanations of the link between hot temperatures and aggression.
Anderson, C. A., Berkowitz, L., Donnerstein, E., Huesmann, L. R., Johnson, J.
D., Linz, D., Malamuth, N. M., & Wartella, E. (2003). The influence of media
violence on youth. Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 4, 81–110. A
comprehensive and critical review of the evidence on the influence of media
violence on aggression, particularly among young media users.
Anderson, C. A., & Bushman, B. J. (1997). External validity of ‘trivial’
experiments: The case of laboratory aggression. Review of General Psychology,
1, 19–41. A thought-provoking analysis of the way in which different
measurement strategies in aggression research complement and cross-validate
each other.
Archer, J. (2000). Sex differences in aggression between heterosexual partners:
A meta-analytic review. Psychological Bulletin, 126, 651–680. A comprehensive
review of the evidence based on the Conflict Tactics Scales (CTS) to address
gender differences in intimate partner violence.
Flannery, D. J., Vazsonyi, A. T., & Waldman, I. D. (Eds.). (2007). Cambridge
handbook of violent behavior and aggression. New York: Cambridge University
Press. A comprehensive and up-to-date collection of papers with a focus on
criminality and violence.
Geen, R. G. (2001). Human aggression (2nd ed.). Buckingham, UK: Open
University Press. An introductory text providing an overview of definitions,
theories and forms of aggression.
Goldstein, A. P. (2002). The psychology of group aggression. Chichester, UK:
Wiley. Examines different forms and dynamics of aggression between social
groups.
Horvath, M., & Brown, J. (Eds.). (2009). Rape: Challenging contemporary
thinking. Cullompton, UK: Willan. A collection of topical papers examining
sexual violence from an interdisciplinary perspective.
Johnson, M. P., & Ferraro, K. J. (2000). Research on domestic violence in the
1990s: Making distinctions. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 62, 948–963.
Provides a conceptual analysis of different forms and patterns of intimate partner
violence and shows how this differentiation may be useful for understanding
gender differences.
Kirsh, S. J. (2011). Children, adolescents, and media violence (2nd ed.).
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Fun to read. Addresses all the facets of young
people’s attraction to violent media and the potential risks involved.
Krahé, B. (2012). The social psychology of aggression (2nd ed.). Hove, UK:
Psychology Press. Textbook that provides an introduction to theories, methods
and topics in social psychological aggression research.
Moghaddam, F. M. (2006). From the terrorists’ point of view. Westport, CT:
Praeger. The book provides a more elaborate account of the staircase model
described in this chapter and outlines possible ways of diminishing the threat of
terrorism.
Ruback, R. B., & Thompson, M. P. (2001). Social and psychological
consequences of violent victimization. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. A clear and
comprehensive review of the impact of violence from the victims’ perspective.
Victoroff, J., & Kruglanski, A. W. (Eds.). (2009). Psychology of terrorism. New
York: Psychology Press. Up-to-date collection of papers addressing many facets
of this pressing worldwide problem.
 Chapter 10

Prosocial Behaviour

Mark Levine and Rachel Manning

Source: © Gina Sanders. Used under licence from Shutterstock.

KEY TERMS

altruism
arousal: cost–reward model
audience inhibition
bystander effect
coefficient of relatedness
common ingroup identity model
diffusion of responsibility
empathic concern
empathy
evaluation apprehension
helping behaviour
impulsive helping
 kin selection
negative-state-relief model
pluralistic ignorance
proportion of shared genes
prosocial behaviour
prosocial personality
public goods game
reciprocal altruism
self-efficacy
strong reciprocity
volunteerism
CHAPTER OUTLINE
INTRODUCTION
PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOUR, HELPING AND ALTRUISM
Definitions
The altruism–egoism debate Prosocial behaviours
Summary
WHY DON’T PEOPLE HELP?
A decision-making model of bystander behaviour Summary
WHY DO PEOPLE HELP?
The costs and rewards of helping Groups, identity and prosocial behaviour
Helping outgroups
Social identity and the bystander effect Social identity, emotion and
bystander intervention Summary
ISSUES IN RESEARCHING PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOUR
Violence and helping
Gender and helping
Long-term, sustained helping behaviours Summary
DOES EVOLUTION MAKE US SELFISH?
When helping is not self-interested Summary
THE SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE OF HELPING
Summary
HELPING IN THE REAL WORLD
Do people act selfishly in life-threatening emergencies?
Summary
ROUTE MAP OF THE CHAPTER
The topic of prosocial behaviour covers a wide range of phenomena and can
be studied in a variety of ways. In this chapter we consider different kinds of
prosocial behaviour, and explore theories of why people help (and who they
help) at several different levels. We consider prosocial behaviour at the
intra-individual level (are there biological mechanisms which affect
helping?), the interpersonal level (how does the relationship between helper
and recipient affect helping?), and the group level (what do we know about
helping within and between groups?). We also explore how situational
factors affect helping, and reveal how the social context is key to the
understanding of many forms of helping behaviours. In addition we explore
a range of different prosocial behaviours, from instant acts of physical
courage in emergency situations to long-term commitments to a particular
cause or a specific person. In the course of exploring these topics we reveal
the wide range of inventive and creative research methods used by
researchers in this area. The chapter also looks at some of the key ‘big
picture’ questions about prosocial behaviour. For example, we ask whether
helping can ever be truly selfless. We also ask if prosocial behaviour
necessarily has positive effects. In the course of the chapter we consider
some amazing examples of human prosocial behaviour. We discover that
human cooperative behaviour is something of an evolutionary puzzle.
Unlike other creatures, humans frequently cooperate with strangers, often in
large groups and even in the absence of personal or reputational gain. By
studying prosocial behaviour we have the opportunity to explore some of the
things that make us uniquely human.
 INTRODUCTION
The study of prosocial behaviour allows psychologists to explore basic questions
about human nature, the kinds of questions that philosophers have been asking
for centuries. These include questions of whether humans are fundamentally
selfish or selfless by nature, or whether humans are ultimately good or bad. Take
for example the way in which ordinary people have responded to natural
disasters and emergencies over the last decade. Unfortunately there have been
many such events to choose from, including the Japanese earthquake and
tsunami (2011), the Haiti earthquake (2010; Figure 10.1), the Asian tsunami
(2005), Hurricane Katrina in the US (2005), the Kashmir earthquake (2005) or
the Iran earthquake (2003).
FIGURE 10.1 Haitian people standing amongst the ruins of collapsed buildings
after the 2010 earthquake.
Source: © Design Pics/Reynold Mainse. Used under licence from Getty Images.

The first thing to note is that many ordinary people donated huge amounts of
money to the relief funds set up after these disasters. People donated money to
help strangers they will never meet, strangers who would never be able to thank
them for the help they had given. This kind of behaviour is a puzzle to those who
think that humans are only concerned with their own self-interest, and to those
who believe that humans only feel ties to a small band of close family and kin.
By giving money in this way, humans demonstrate the capacity to feel a sense of
empathy with others in distress and a willingness to help others, even when it is
not clear that they will benefit in return. All of this suggests that we possess a
powerful capacity for good.

- - - - - - - - - -

empathy the experience of understanding or sharing the emotional state of another person.

- - - - - - - - - -

And yet . . . not all of us help and, even when we do, we don’t help everybody
equally or all the time. For example, according to figures from the Centre for
Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) at the Catholic University
of Louvain (in Belgium), more than a hundred times as many people died in the
Haiti earthquake (222,570 deaths) than as a result of Hurricane Katrina (1833
deaths). However, despite the huge difference in death tolls and the vast
disparity in the wealth of the respective countries, researchers at the Centre on
Philanthropy at Indiana University discovered that Americans gave much more
to the American disaster ($5.3 billion) than they did to Haiti ($1.45 billion).
Compare both of these with responses to the earthquake in the Pakistan
controlled area of Kashmir. Here 73,338 people lost their lives, but Americans
gave much less – $630 million – to the appeal. Of course, it is not only in
America that these kinds of patterns can be found. In 2000, people in
Switzerland gave their (relatively) wealthy fellow citizens 74 million Swiss
Francs following a landslide in the canton of Wallis in which 13 people died, but
gave less − 9 million Swiss Francs – to Iranian victims of the 2003 earthquake in
the city of Bam, in which 26,796 people died.
How do we explain the differences? Why do we seem more willing to help
some people than others? Is it simply to do with the relative publicity that the
different disasters get? Or are important psychological processes at work?
In his book The Life You Can Save, the philosopher and ethicist Peter Singer
(2009) poses the following conundrum: if you saw a small child drowning in a
pond, you would leap in to save them; it wouldn’t be an acceptable excuse to say
that you did not save the child because you did not want to ruin a new pair of
shoes, or couldn’t afford to have your clothes cleaned. Everybody would save
the child. And yet, UNICEF, the United Nations International Children’s
Emergency Fund, estimates that about 24,000 children die every day from
preventable, poverty-related causes. They could be saved if the billion people in
the world that live very comfortable lives could be persuaded to give; Singer
argues that if you have ever spent money on buying a drink when water is freely
available from a tap, then you are one of those people with money to spare. It
sounds easy, but in practice, people can always think of reasons not to do it.
Even when we have the means, and it wouldn’t cost us much to do it, we can be
reluctant to help.
Contrast this with the workers who volunteered to stay behind at the stricken
Fukushima nuclear reactor after the Japanese earthquake and tsunami. With the
radiation at potentially lethal levels, and the reactor in danger of meltdown, 50
workers volunteered to remain when conditions became so dangerous that most
workers were evacuated. Dubbed the ‘Fukushima 50’, they fought to bring the
reactor under control in life-threatening conditions. Some workers said they
volunteered because they were single men with no children, and thus were more
able to face the risks than those who had dependents relying on them. Others
said they did so because they felt a sense of responsibility to their fellow
workers. Yet others felt a duty to protect their fellow citizens and to preserve the
reputation of Japan. Whatever the reasons, conditions at the Fukushima plant
meant that people were putting their lives in danger to protect others.
In these few examples we see some of the key questions, conundrums and
dilemmas that animate research on prosocial behaviour. The aim of this chapter
will be to explore the wide range of psychological research that touches on
prosocial behaviour in all its forms. In doing so we will encounter the key social
psychological theories of helping, the methods used to explore these theories,
and examine work at the cutting edge of contemporary research on prosocial
behaviour.
 PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOUR, HELPING
AND ALTRUISM
Does pure altruism exist?
As the examples above demonstrate, we are seemingly surrounded with
opportunities for helping. However, before we look at the various social
psychological accounts of these phenomena, it is useful to begin by thinking
about the nature of the phenomena themselves. What do we mean by the terms
‘prosocial behaviour’ or ‘helping’? Examples of the contrasting reactions to the
emergency/disaster situations noted above highlight some of the different
situations that seemingly require the help of others. There is, evidently, a vast
range of situations that may elicit helping. Clearly this raises an additional
challenge to social psychologists. Therefore, before we begin to work through
the various ways in which social psychologists have approached the issue of
understanding prosocial behaviour, we might firstly consider what we mean by
prosocial behaviour itself. As we will see, much of the thinking about what
constitutes prosocial behaviour focuses either on particular forms or types of
behaviours, or on the motivations behind such behaviours. At a more general
level, we might also begin to consider whether it is possible to develop a single
theory, model or approach which can account for all the different behaviours that
might be encapsulated by the term ‘prosocial behaviour’.
 Definitions
As Bierhoff (2002) has pointed out, the terms helping behaviour, prosocial
behaviour and altruism are frequently used interchangeably. However, distinct
definitions for each are available. Piliavin (see Leader in the Field, Jane Allyn
Piliavin, later in this chapter) and her colleagues have defined helping behaviour
as ‘an action that has the consequence of providing some benefit to or improving
the well-being of another person’ (Dovidio, Piliavin, Schroeder, & Penner, 2006,
p. 22).

- - - - - - - - - -

helping behaviour actions that are intended to provide some benefit to or improve the well-being
of others.

- - - - - - - - - -

- - - - - - - - - -

altruism refers to behaviour carried out to benefit others without anticipation of external rewards;
it is driven by exclusively empathic motivation.

- - - - - - - - - -

- - - - - - - - - -

prosocial behaviour defined by society as beneficial to other people; it excludes behaviour

motivated by professional obligations; it may be driven by more selfish (egoistic) and/or more
selfless (altruistic) motivations.

- - - - - - - - - -

This definition makes helping behaviour the most inclusive term. Bierhoff
(2002) argues that the definition of prosocial behaviour is narrower because
‘helping’ is not considered as ‘prosocial behaviour’ if the act is motivated by
professional obligations. An example of helping behaviour that would not be
considered prosocial behaviour would be a nurse caring for a patient, as this
behaviour is performed as part of their job. Furthermore, Piliavin, Dovidio,
Gaertner, and Clark (1981) point to the fact that what is considered to be
prosocial behaviour is culturally dependent. They therefore suggest that
prosocial behaviour is ‘defined by society as behaviour generally beneficial to
other people and to the ongoing social system’, and go on to state that ‘a great
deal of disagreement regarding what is really prosocial action can occur
depending on where one stands’ (p. 4).
This point has been highlighted by a number of different researchers. For
example, Grzelak and Derlega (1982) have suggested that there may be some
positive aspects to social behaviour that we might ordinarily consider ‘negative’:
for example, although social conflict may involve some injury, or even loss of
life, it may also help to improve the living conditions of many people; see
Chapter 14. Similarly, Huston and Korte (1976) have challenged the seemingly
unproblematic subscription of many social psychologists to the moral tradition
represented by the parable of the Good Samaritan. They point to cross-cultural
variation to suggest that in some contexts, endangering oneself and thereby one’s
‘kin’ is in itself a transgression. Thus, giving help may not necessarily be
experienced as positive from the position of the person giving help. In parallel to
this, Grzelak and Derlega (1982) have also questioned the notion of prosocial
behaviour in terms of whether these assumed positive forms of behaviour are
indeed experienced as positive by the recipient. In line with this suggestion,
Nadler (see Leader in the Field, Arie Nadler, later in this chapter) has conducted
a programme of research that empirically demonstrates the potential negative
impact of helping on the recipient of the help. We will return to Nadler’s work
towards the end of this chapter.
Finally, the term altruism is the most constrained – and the most contested.
Altruism is usually reserved for cases in which the helper tries to improve the
welfare of the other person as an end in itself. In other words, altruism should
normally refer to acts that in no way benefit the help-giver (for example, acts
which might bring social approval or reduce personal distress at witnessing pain
in others). Piliavin (2009) defines altruism as behaviour that is carried out in
order to benefit others without anticipation of rewards from external sources.
What is most contentious about the definition of altruism is the problem of
defining the motivations that are believed to lie behind it. The definition of
altruism implies a clear separation between self and other. Actions must be
‘selfless’ to qualify as altruistic. However, as we have seen from psychological
research on the self (see Chapter 5) the concept of the self is contested. There is
no clear agreement on how we might separate self from other, and there is a
body of research on the idea of self–other overlap (see Chapter 11). This has
contributed to debates on whether ‘pure’ (or selfless) altruistic behaviour can
ever exist. More specifically, it has lead to an intense debate about the
motivations that may (or may not) lie behind helping behaviour. As we will see,
researchers have argued over the degree to which helping can be explained by
altruistic or egoistic concerns.

LEADER IN THE FIELD

C. Daniel Batson (b. 1943) obtained his PhD in Psychology from
Princeton in 1972 (he also holds a PhD in Theology). He has spent
most of his career at the University of Kansas, where he is currently
Emeritus Professor; he is also Adjunct Professor at the University of
Tennessee. Batson famously developed the empathy-altruism
hypothesis during his sustained attempt to experimentally test for the
existence of true altruistic motivation for helping. Using a range of
ingenious experimental procedures, Batson has sought to distinguish
the egoistic and altruistic motivational systems, and has highlighted
empathy as a possible source of the altruistic motivation systems.
More recently, Batson and his colleagues have begun to examine the
alternative motivations of principlism and collectivism in more
detail.
 The altruism–egoism debate
Obviously, if it’s help you’re after, you may not be concerned with why you are
helped, only that you are (or not, as the case may be). Moreover, as others have
pointed out (Piliavin et al., 1981), the final outcome of a particular helping
situation might be reached from a number of different starting points, and in a
number of different ways. But the question of what motivates helping is one that
has concerned a range of psychologists. Is the goal of helping to benefit others,
or to benefit ourselves? In social psychology, one of the main distinctions is
between egoistically motivated helping and altruistically motivated helping –
although, as Batson (1994) has suggested, there are other motives for prosocial
action, which he calls principlism (acting to uphold a principle), and collectivism
(acting to benefit a group).
A considerable amount of research has highlighted the contrast between
egoistic and altruistic helping. For example, using data from the World Values
Survey – a survey of 13,584 voluntary workers in 33 countries – Van de Vliert,
Huang and Levine (2004) conducted a factor analysis that revealed a two-factor
structure in motivations for doing unpaid voluntary work. Items loading on an
‘egoistic’ motivations factor were: ‘time on my hands, wanted something
worthwhile to do’; ‘purely for personal satisfaction’; ‘for social reasons, to meet
people’; and ‘to gain new skills and useful experience’. The five items loading
on an altruistic motivations factor were: ‘a sense of solidarity with the poor and
disadvantaged’; ‘compassion for those in need’; ‘identifying with people who
were suffering’; ‘religious beliefs’; and ‘to help give disadvantaged people hope
and dignity’. When checking the cross-national equivalence of the two
constructs, egoistic motivations and altruistic motivations, these researchers
reported fairly consistent findings cross-nationally.
Demonstrating whether behaviours are motivated egoistically or altruistically
is both a theoretical and methodological challenge. Research addressing this
issue has utilized ingeniously designed experiments that have required the
careful consideration of how to distinguish egoistic from altruistic helping (see
Research Close-Up 10.1). One of the key researchers in this field is Batson (see
Leader in the Field, C. Daniel Batson). Batson and his colleagues have
developed the empathy-altruism hypothesis in their attempts to demonstrate the
existence of helping that is motivated by altruistic rather than egoistic concerns.
This is not to suggest that we can claim that all helping is motivated
altruistically. Rather, altruism is a possible underlying motivation. According to
the empathy-altruism hypothesis, it is the feeling of empathy, specifically, that
evokes altruistic motivation.

RESEARCH CLOSE-UP 10.1

EMPATHY LEADS TO ALTRUISTIC

HELPING
Batson, C. D., Duncan, B. D., Ackerman, P., Buckley, T., & Birch, K. (1981). Is empathic
emotion a source of altruistic motivation? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 40,
290–302.

Introduction There are real difficulties in identifying

underlying motivations, or being able to say precisely
why someone acted as they did. Seemingly altruistic
motives might sometimes be ultimately interpreted as
egoistic ones. For example, you may have helped
someone in order to relieve their distress, but this was,
in turn, in order to alleviate the unpleasant feelings
you experienced through knowing someone was in
need, because you yourself would feel bad if you did
nothing. This study began by dealing with the issue of
how to differentiate between behaviours that are
egoistically motivated and behaviours that are
altruistically motivated. Egoistic helping is
conceptually distinguished from altruistic helping in
terms of the ‘end state goal’ of each: for egoistic
helping it is increasing the helper’s own welfare; for
altruistic helping it is increasing the other’s welfare.
In order to distinguish empirically between egoistic
and altruistic helping, the behavioural correlates of
these two forms of helping are considered. The
egoistically motivated bystander can alleviate their
personal distress in seeing another person suffer by
either helping, or by leaving: both achieve the same
end state goal. If leaving is made harder (or the ‘costs’
of leaving are increased), then the egoistically
motivated bystander is more likely to help. If leaving
is easier, the egoistically motivated bystander is less
likely to help (and more likely to leave). In contrast,
for the altruistically motivated bystander, the end state
goal can only be achieved by helping, therefore
making leaving harder will have no impact on their
likelihood of helping.
Method Participants In their first study, forty-four
female students at the University of Kansas took part
in the study. Eleven participants were assigned to
each of four conditions (four additional participants
were excluded from the analysis because they did not
believe that the scenario used in the experiment was
real). Participants had previously completed a
personal values and interest questionnaire.
Design and procedure In the study, participants
observed a confederate, Elaine, taking part in what
they were told was a learning experiment. Participants
were also told that Elaine would receive electric
shocks at random intervals during the experiment. A 2
(difficulty of escape: easy versus difficult) × 2
(similarity of victim: similar versus dissimilar)
between-groups design was used. Difficulty of escape
was manipulated by telling participants that they
needed to observe either the first two or all ten of the
trials. Similarity of victim was manipulated by giving
participants a copy of a ‘personal values and interests’
questionnaire and telling them that it was Elaine’s. By
creating two versions of the questionnaire, Elaine
could be presented as having either similar or
dissimilar values and interests to the participant.
Based on the work of Stotland (1969) and Krebs
(1975), this similarity manipulation was used as an
indirect manipulation of empathic emotion – more
similar victims would elicit greater empathy. As the
experiment took place, Elaine was seen to be having
considerable difficulty in taking part, and went on to
explain that she had experienced difficulty in reaction
to electric shocks in the past. The experimenter then
asked the participant if she would be willing to take
over Elaine’s role. The dependent measure was the
willingness (or not) of the participant to trade places
with Elaine.
Results There was a significant escape × similarity
interaction: the proportion of participants willing to
 take Elaine’s place in the easy-escape, dissimilar-
victim condition was much lower than in the other
three conditions (see Figure 10.2).
FIGURE 10.2 Percentage of participants who helped Elaine depending on
similarity to victim and ease or difficulty of escape Source: From Batson,
1991.

Discussion As the manipulation of empathic emotion

in this study was indirect, a second experiment was
conducted in order to manipulate it more directly.
This second study replaced the similarity
manipulation with a manipulation of arousal
attribution. Participants were given a placebo drug
that they were told would (depending on the
experimental condition) induce feelings similar to
empathic concern or to personal distress.
Researchers argued that participants who could
attribute their feelings of personal distress to the drug
were more likely to act out of empathic concern,
while those who could attribute their feelings of
 empathic concern to the drug were more likely to act
out of personal distress. After receiving the placebo
and the instructions, participants watched Elaine
receiving electric shocks. The results of both studies
supported the predictions of the empathy-altruism
hypothesis (see Theory Box 10.1): when participants
believed that Elaine was similar to them (and
therefore empathized with her, as in study 1), or when
they believed they were acting out of feelings of
empathic concern (as in study 2), they helped her
regardless of whether escape was easy or difficult.
Participants who believed that Elaine was dissimilar
to themselves (and therefore did not empathize with
her, as in study 1), or who perceived their response to
Elaine receiving shocks as personal distress (as in
study 2), helped more often if it was difficult to leave
the experiment.
- - - - - - - - - -

negative-state-relief model argues that human beings have an innate

drive to reduce their own negative moods. Helping behaviour can
elevate mood – thus people help for egoistic rather than altruistic
reasons.

- - - - - - - - - -

We are dealing with a fairly fundamental issue here – is it possible to

demonstrate definitively the existence of helping that is not motivated by
egoistic concerns? There are also difficult challenges posed in trying to
demonstrate which motivations (singly, or together) ultimately drive behaviour.
It is therefore perhaps not surprising that other scholars have challenged
Batson’s position that altruistically motivated helping does exist. One of the
leaders of this challenge has been Cialdini, with whom Batson had a lengthy
debate throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Cialdini’s alternative position was based
on the negative-state-relief model of helping behaviour. This approach suggests
that witnessing someone in need creates an unpleasant mood in the observer,
who is thus motivated to act to relieve this unpleasant mood. Helping will occur
in reaction to the suffering or need of another person, but is motivated on the
basis of alleviating one’s own negative mood. Therefore actions are based on
self-interest, with no possibility for truly altruistically motivated helping.

- - - - - - - - - -

empathic concern an emotional state consisting of emotions such as compassion, warmth and
concern for another person.

- - - - - - - - - -

Cialdini and his colleagues have argued, therefore, that seeing a victim
suffering causes participants to feel sadness, and that it is this sadness that leads
people to help (see Theory Box 10.2). Research in support of the negative-state-
relief model has suggested, for example, that participants in the ‘high-empathy’
conditions of experiments such as Batson et al., (1981), also feel increased
sadness, and that it is this sadness, and not empathy, that predicts helping
(Cialdini et al., 1987). Although a meta-analysis by Carlson and Miller (1987)
suggested that there was no support for the negative-state-relief model, this has
in turn been disputed by Cialdini and colleagues (Cialdini & Fultz, 1990).

THEORY BOX 10.1

THE EMPATHY-ALTRUISM HYPOTHESIS
Source: Based on Batson, 1991.
 While there may be no straightforward resolution to these seemingly
diametrically opposed positions, Piliavin (2009) suggests that the ‘coup de grace
to Cialdini’s position’ (p. 213) came when its supporters, Dovidio and
colleagues, carried out an experiment anticipating that they would find support
for purely egoistically motivated helping. In Dovidio, Allen, and Schroeder’s
(1990) study, participants watched a video of an interview in which a student
explained either that she was having problems recruiting students for her project,
or that she was having problems collecting information for a university
committee. Participants in an ‘imagine’ condition were instructed to think about
how the student in need felt as they watched the video, whereas participants in
an ‘observe’ condition were instructed to just watch and listen to the student.
The participants then read a newspaper report of the same student explaining
either the same problem or a different problem, and were subsequently given the
chance to help the student on the problem explained in the newspaper report.
The primary dependent variable was how many participants indicated that they
would be willing to distribute notices for the student in need.

THEORY BOX 10.2

NEGATIVE-STATE-RELIEF MODEL
Source: From Cialdini et al., 1987. Copyright © 1987 by the American
Psychological Association. Reproduced with permission. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 52. The use of APA information
does not imply endorsement by APA.
 The empathy-altruism hypothesis would predict that helping would be greater
in the ‘imagine’ condition only when participants are presented with the same
problem, as the goal of altruistic motivation is to alleviate the other person’s
problem. The negative-state-relief model would predict that the level of helping
would be greater in the ‘imagine’ condition than the ‘observe’ condition, as
participants in the ‘imagine’ condition would experience more personal sadness.
This would happen regardless of whether the subsequent helping opportunity
involved the same or a different problem as the one that produced the sadness.
However, the researchers found only one statistically significant effect in
relation to rates of helping. Participants instructed to think about how the person
in need felt when they watched the video (the ‘imagine’ condition) were
significantly more likely to subsequently help that person – but only when
empathic concern was related to the same problem. Empathic concern related to
a different problem and general feelings of empathic concern did not predict
helping behaviour (see Figure 10.3). Thus, participants did not simply help in
order to alleviate their own negative feelings, they helped because their goal was
to relieve the other person’s problem. Thus, in some cases at least, altruistically
motivated helping does occur, as a result of empathizing with the person in need.
FIGURE 10.3 Percentage of participants helping as a function of instructions
(imagine or observe) and problem type (same or different) Source: From
Dovidio et al., 1990. Copyright © 1990 by the American Psychological
Association. Reproduced with permission. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, Vol. 59. The use of APA information does not imply endorsement
by APA.
 Prosocial behaviours
So far we have noted a number of core concepts that are used in the field of
prosocial behaviour. We have noted the importance of distinguishing ‘prosocial
behaviour’ from ‘helping behaviour’ and ‘altruism’, and highlighted additional
problems with these terms: is ‘prosocial behaviour’ necessarily positive? Is there
even such a thing as altruism? Researchers have pointed to how we might
organize our understandings of prosocial behaviour by classifying them into
different levels of analysis. Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, and Schroeder (2005)
have suggested three distinct but related levels of prosocial behaviour: micro,
meso and macro. Research in the field of prosocial behaviour has traditionally
been focused on the meso level: helper–recipient dyads in specific situations.
Thus, much of the work that we will cover looks at the motivations for different
forms of prosocial behaviours, and the contribution of individual and situational
factors. Micro-level analysis, on the other hand, refers to research that is
concerned with the ‘origins of prosocial tendencies’ (Penner et al., 2005, p. 221),
whereas macro-level analyses examine prosocial behaviours in the context of
groups and large organizations. The latter two levels of analysis have received
relatively less attention, although we will present some examples in this chapter.
This suggestion of the different levels of analysis involved in the study of
prosocial behaviour additionally points us to a range of terms that characterize
research in this area. These terms include cooperation (whereby helping is not a
one-way process: people act together, and each may expect to benefit; Argyle,
1991), courageous resistance (suggested to be a subset of altruistic), selfless (in
which there is high risk to the helper, and where the behaviour is sustained over
time; Shepela et al., 1999), volunteering (any activity in which time is given
freely to benefit another person, group, or organization; Wilson, 2000),
emergency intervention (taking action in response to an urgent, unpredictable,
risky situation; Piliavin et al., 1981), and bystander intervention (helping in an
emergency which one observes; Latané & Darley, 1970), to name just a few. We
examine bystander intervention in more detail in the next section, and return to
the different forms of prosocial behaviours towards the end of this chapter.
 Summary
We have noted how, just as there are many different situations that may require
various forms of prosocial behaviours, there are also different perspectives on
what constitutes prosocial behaviour itself. We have seen how three common
terms in this field – prosocial behaviour, helping behaviour and altruism – are
often used interchangeably, although they are distinct. Moreover, we have seen
how the existence of altruistically motivated helping in itself has been a point of
considerable debate within social psychology, which has required the use of
some carefully designed and choreographed research. We will continue this
theme of the ingenuity of social psychologists in examining prosocial behaviours
as we turn to some of the different ways that social psychologists have
developed research in this area.
 WHY DON’T PEOPLE HELP?
To what extent does the situation determine the behaviour of
bystanders in an emergency?
As we saw in the introduction, various different features of potential helping
situations – as well as features of the potential helper – may come together to
motivate, facilitate, inhibit or prevent helping. In contrast to the concerns with
motivation highlighted in the previous section, we now turn to a highly
influential body of work that has been primarily focused on the situational
determinants of helping behaviour.
Just as there may be different motivations for prosocial behaviours, social
psychologists are motivated to study particular phenomena for many different
reasons. Social psychologists have often been motivated to study such
phenomena in response to hearing about incidents or stories of negative
behaviour in the mass media. Thus, social psychological research and theorizing
on prosocial behaviours has often been in response to events or stories of
incidents that seemingly required helping behaviour, yet in which this behaviour
did not occur. For example, in 2009 in Germany, Dominik Brunner tried to help
children being attacked by two 18-year-olds and was subsequently murdered by
them. However, unlike Dominik, fellow passers-by did not physically intervene
to help him. It is in such situations that people often look to psychology for
answers, and ways of attempting to ensure that such situations do not arise in
future.
Counter-examples of spontaneous helping or helping in dangerous
circumstances thankfully also feature both in media outlets and as the inspiration
for academic research, although it has been pointed out that research that looks
at why people do help is less common than why they do not (Piliavin et al.,
1981). However, there is one story in particular which has played an important
role in the development of the social psychological study of helping behaviour:
the story of the 38 witnesses to the murder of Kitty Genovese in New York in
1964 – see Social Psychology Beyond the Lab 10.1. Many researchers have
pointed to the fact that social psychologists have been interested in helping
behaviour for as long as social psychology has been a distinct field (e.g.
Dovidio, 1995). However, it is the story of the 38 witnesses that inspired a
wealth of research in this area.
As social psychologists Latané and Darley have themselves explained, a few
days after the New York Times story ran, they began to analyse the story in social
psychological terms over dinner. They were unconvinced by claims that
bystander behaviour in the Kitty Genovese case reflected modern processes of
social breakdown. Instead they argued that more generic social psychological
factors might be at work. To test some of their ideas, they devised a series of
choreographed experiments in which they systematically controlled and varied
different aspects of emergency situations. Latané and Darley (1970)
demonstrated the bystander effect – the observation that an increasing number of
bystanders to an emergency reduces the likelihood that witnesses to that
emergency will intervene – and formulated their influential decision-making
model of bystander behaviour (see Leaders in the Field, Bibb Latané and John
M. Darley).

RESEARCH CLOSE-UP 10.2

THE IMPACT OF BYSTANDERS ON

HELPING IN AN EMERGENCY
Darley, J. M., & Latané, B. (1968). Bystander intervention in emergencies: Diffusion of
responsibility. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 8, 377–383.

Introduction When other people are present in an

emergency, the norms that favour the helping of a
victim can be weakened, as each individual bystander
is aware that there are others present who could help.
Although each bystander may not know what the
others are doing, the responsibility for helping – as
well as the potential blame for not helping – is shared
amongst those present. No single person is solely
responsible for helping, and therefore each person is
less likely to help. When only one bystander is present
in an emergency situation, the full responsibility for
helping rests with that individual. In addition, when a
bystander knows that other people are present in an
emergency situation, but cannot see them, he or she
might reasonably assume that someone else has
already helped the person in need. This leads to the
hypothesis that the more bystanders present in an
emergency, the less likely (or less quickly) any
individual bystander will intervene to help.
Method Participants Thirteen male and 59 female
students at New York University took part in the
experiment as part of a class requirement.
Design and procedure Participants arrived at the
experiment in a long corridor containing doors that
opened off into several small rooms. Each participant
was shown into one of these rooms, seated at a table
and told that they would take part in a discussion
about personal problems experienced by college
students in a high-pressure, urban environment.
Participants were told that the discussion would take
place via an intercom system in order to guarantee the
anonymity of participants (although this was in fact to
allow a tape recorded simulation of the other
participants and the emergency). Moreover,
participants were told that in order to ensure that the
discussion was not inhibited by the presence of
 outside listeners, the experimenter would not be
listening to the discussion (whereas the true purpose
of this instruction was to ensure that the experimenter,
who would be perceived as responsible, was not
considered to be present in the emergency situation).
As the experimenter would not be present as far as the participants
understood, they were told that each person would take turns to talk,
presenting their problem to the group. Each person would then comment in
turn on what had been talked about, and then there would be a free
discussion. Only one participant could be heard at any one time, as each
participant’s microphone would only be switched on for two minutes, and at
the same time all other microphones would be switched off (so that, when
an emergency arose, participants could not hear what other people present
were doing or saying, or discuss the emergency with them). Once the
instructions had been given, the discussion began.
The first person to speak was the future ‘victim’. He talked about the
difficulty he had in adjusting to his studies and to life in New York City. He
also mentioned that he was prone to seizures. The discussion then moved
round the other people, including the real participant who spoke last in each
cycle. When it was the future victim’s next turn, his speech became louder
and incoherent, he began to choke and then went quiet. Judges who listened
to the tape estimated that it was evident that the victim had collapsed 70
seconds after the signal for his turn in the discussion. The victim’s turn was
cut off 125 seconds after the signal for him to speak. The time between the
beginning of the victim’s apparent seizure and when the participant left the
cubicle to help was recorded by the experimenter, which constituted the
main dependent variable. If the participant did not leave their room within
six minutes, the experimenter terminated the experiment. The participant
was then told the true nature of the experiment, at which point any emotions
aroused in the emergency situation were dealt with. Participants then filled
out a questionnaire on their thoughts and feelings during the experiment,
along with several measures of personality.
The main independent variable was the number of other people that the
participant was told were also part of the discussion group – who the real
participant could also hear as part of the discussion. There were three main
participant could also hear as part of the discussion. There were three main
conditions: a two-person group (which contained only the real participant
and the future victim), a three-person group (which contained the real
participant, the future victim and the sound of one additional confederate),
and a six-person group (which contained the real participant, the future
victim and the sound of four additional confederates).
Results The data from two participants who did not
perceive the seizure as real were excluded from the
study. The number of bystanders perceived by the
participant to be present in the emergency situation
had a strong effect on the level of participants leaving
their room and reporting the emergency. Eighty-five
per cent of participants who thought that they were
the only person witnessing the victim’s seizure
reported it before the victim’s turn was cut off on the
intercom, compared to 62 per cent of participants who
thought that one other person was present, and 31 per
cent of those who thought that there were four other
witnesses to the emergency (see Figure 10.4). Every
participant in the two-person condition, versus 62 per
cent of the participants in the six-person conditions,
reported the emergency at some point. At every point
in time over the duration of the emergency situation,
more participants in the two-person condition had
responded than in the three-person condition, and
more in the three-person conditions had responded
compared to the six-person condition. All participants
who reported the emergency to the experimenter did
so within three minutes of the seizure. No significant
 correlations were found between speed of reporting
and any of the personality measures.
FIGURE 10.4 Helping as a function of number of people present.
Note: Criterion of helping shown is reporting before victim’s turn is cut off.
Source: From Darley & Latané, 1968. Copyright © 1968 by the American
Psychological Association. Reproduced with permission. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 8. The use of APA information does
not imply endorsement by APA.

Discussion The results support the authors’

hypothesis that the presence of other bystanders in an
emergency situation would reduce feelings of
personal responsibility and reduce the speed with
which the participants reported the emergency, a
social psychological process they termed the diffusion
of responsibility. An awareness of four other
bystanders who could help the victim (in the six-
person condition) led to less helping than an
awareness of no or one other bystander. Those
participants who did not report the emergency did not
appear apathetic at the end of the experiment. They
 often showed concern for the victim, and physical
signs of nervousness suggesting they were in a state
of indecision and conflict regarding what they should
do, rather than having decided not to help.
In a second experiment Latané and Darley (1968) identified additional ways
in which the presence of others had an impact on bystanders’ reactions to an
emergency. In this experiment, they examined participants’ reactions to an
emergency that unfolded as they sat in a room filling in a questionnaire.
Participants were all male students at Columbia University in New York
City who had been recruited to take part in a study on ‘problems involved in
life at an urban university’. When they arrived they were directed to a
waiting room and asked to complete a preliminary questionnaire. However,
as they were doing this, the room began to fill with a visible (but harmless)
white smoke. The researchers then noted whether participants left the room
to report the smoke, and measured the length of time that it took them to do
so. The experiment was terminated after six minutes if participants had still
failed to raise the alarm.
In different experimental conditions, participants were either on their own in
the room or there with two others. Moreover, sometimes the others were
naïve participants and sometimes they were confederates who had been
instructed to ignore the smoke and remain passive. The results indicated that
when people were on their own most of them (75 per cent) raised the alarm,
but that when they were with others only 38 per cent did so. Participants
also responded much more quickly in the former condition. For example,
after two minutes, 55 per cent of the participants in the alone condition had
reported the smoke, but only 12 per cent of the three-person groups had
done so. After four minutes, 75 per cent of the participants in the alone
condition had reported the smoke, but the reporting rate in the 3-person
groups was still at 12 per cent (the reporting rate for 3-person groups rose to
38 per cent in the final two minutes). Moreover, when the other people in
the room were confederates who remained passive throughout the unfolding
drama, then participants were also likely to be passive, with only 10 per cent
raising the alarm in this condition (a small minority helped immediately
while the rest remained passive throughout).
Latané and Darley proposed that social influence processes could account
for the inaction of bystanders in emergencies such as this. The presence of
for the inaction of bystanders in emergencies such as this. The presence of
other bystanders was, they suggested, a key feature of understanding
bystander behaviour.

LEADER IN THE FIELD

Bibb Latané (b. 1937) obtained his PhD from the University of
Minnesota in 1963, and later taught at Ohio State University, the
University of North Carolina and Florida Atlantic University. He is
one of the most frequently cited psychologists in social psychology
textbooks, and coined terms such as ‘bystander intervention’ and
‘social loafing’. Together with John Darley (see Leader in the Field,
this chapter) he carried out research on bystander behaviour in the
wake of the murder of Kitty Genovese, proposing the term ‘diffusion
of responsibility’ as an explanation of reduced rates of helping in
groups of bystanders. Latané subsequently developed social impact
theory, which uses mathematical equations to predict how people
affect one another in social situations. He has twice won the
Behavioural Science Award given by the American Association for
the Advancement of Science, for work on bystander intervention and
on social loafing. He has also been the recipient of career research
awards given by the Society of Experimental Psychology and the
Society for Personality and Social Psychology.

LEADER IN THE FIELD

John M. Darley (b. 1938) obtained his PhD from Harvard
University in 1965 and has been based at Princeton University for
much of his academic career. Some of his earliest publications
focused on fear, affiliation and social comparison. Working with
Bibb Latané (see Leader in the Field, this chapter) he developed a
decision-making model of bystander behaviour that explains the
social psychological processes behind the inaction of bystanders.
Darley and Latané’s (1968) article ‘Bystander intervention in
emergencies: Diffusion of responsibility’ became one of the most-
cited articles in social psychology. His later research focused on
ordinary people’s moral judgements and their beliefs about crime
 and the criminal justice system. Darley has been a recipient of the
Society of Experimental Social Psychology’s Distinguished Scientist
Award and the American Psychological Foundation Media Award
for Distinguished Contributions in Communicating Psychology to
the Public.

Darley and Latané (1968) demonstrated this phenomenon in one of their first
experiments looking at bystander behaviour (see Research Close-Up 10.2). In
this experiment they varied the number of other bystanders perceived to be
present in an emergency situation, to show that the level of reporting an
emergency is lower when an individual bystander believes there are numerous
others present.
 A decision-making model of bystander behaviour
Based on a careful programme of research, Latané and Darley formulated a five-
step decision-making model of bystander behaviour, focusing on the situational
factors involved in the intervention situation; this has become one of the most
influential approaches to bystander behaviour. The sequential decision-making
model that Latané and Darley proposed consists of the following stages: (1)
noticing the event; (2) deciding if it is an emergency; (3) deciding on the degree
of personal responsibility; (4) deciding on the specific mode of intervention; and
(5) implementing the chosen intervention (Latané & Darley, 1970; see Theory
Box 10.3). Latané and Darley propose that a negative decision at any stage of
this series will result in help not being given. Crucially, it is the presence or
absence of others that is key to the individual’s response to an emergency. Thus,
Latané and Darley suggest that bystander intervention can be inhibited by three
social psychological processes: diffusion of responsibility, pluralistic ignorance
and audience inhibition.

Diffusion of responsibility
On your own, you feel the focus of responsibility for helping is on you – there is
no one else present who can help, therefore you are responsible for helping. If,
however, you are with other people, friends or strangers, each individual
bystander feels less responsibility, as the responsibility for helping is spread or
‘diffused’ across all those who are present. This leads to each person being less
likely to provide help themselves. This process may occur at step 3 of the
decision-making model, where the bystander decides on the level of personal
responsibility to take.

THEORY BOX 10.3

FIVE-STEP DECISION-MAKING MODEL OF
BYSTANDER INTERVENTION
Source: Based on Latané & Darley, 1970.
 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BEYOND THE
LAB 10.1
THE ORIGINS OF RESEARCH ON
BYSTANDER INTERVENTION
Catherine ‘Kitty’ Genovese was a young woman who worked as a barmaid
in New York. Returning to her home in the area of Kew Gardens, Queens,
after work in the early hours of 13 March 1964, Kitty was attacked and
murdered by Winston Moseley. Moseley was subsequently convicted of her
murder and remains in prison to this day. However, it is not Kitty’s life, or
her death, that has been the focus of social psychological investigations.
Rather, it was the story that appeared in the New York Times two weeks after
her death (Gansberg, 1964) that inspired a new paradigm of social
psychological investigation. The story reported how 38 witnesses who lived
close to Kitty’s apartment saw her being attacked and murdered, but did
nothing to help until after she was dead. Rosenthal (1964), then editor of the
New York Times, subsequently suggested that some of the 38 witnesses
heard rather than saw the attack.
Appalled by the apparently heartless behaviour (or inaction) of the
bystanders, public figures, social commentators and academics all offered
explanations of why this event may have occurred. Most of these stories
suggested that moral decay, social alienation or the state of contemporary
urban life were to blame. However, two young social psychologists, Bibb
Latané and John Darley used social psychological ideas to explain the
behaviour of the bystanders in a different way. They focused on the number
of people present who witnessed the murder – and conducted experiments
that showed how this could lead to psychological processes like diffusion of
responsibility, pluralistic ignorance or audience inhibition. They used
this work to develop a 5-step model of decision-making that shapes
bystander behaviour (this model is described in more detail below). The
bystander effect is one of the most robust and well-replicated findings in
social psychology.

- - - - - - - - - -

diffusion of responsibility the process by which responsibility is

divided between bystanders; with more people present in an emergency,
responsibility is diffused and bystanders feel less responsible than if
they were alone.
pluralistic ignorance emergency bystanders look to others in reacting
to the event; as each person fails to react, they look at non-reacting
bystanders, and interpret the event as not requiring a response.
audience inhibition the experience of individual bystanders whose
behaviour can be seen by other bystanders. In an emergency bystanders
may fear embarrassment by their actions, resulting in lower likelihood
of them helping.
bystander effect refers to the phenomenon whereby the likelihood of
any one person helping in an emergency situation decreases as the
 number of other bystanders increases.

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More recently, however, the number of witnesses suggested by the original

New York Times story has been questioned (e.g. Manning, Levine, &
Collins, 2007). There is considerable evidence that challenges the existence
of 38 witnesses, and shows that some people did phone the police as the
attack was occurring. In addition, Winston Moseley’s second, lethal attack
on Kitty took place inside a stairwell of an apartment building that could be
seen by very few people. The idea that 38 witnesses watched from their
windows for half an hour in awed fascination as the murder unfolded is not
supported by the evidence. This suggests that, in the Genovese murder at
least, the bystander effect may not have played a part.
Regardless of the details of the number of witnesses to the attack on Kitty
Genovese, and what they could or couldn’t see, the fact remains that
Winston Moseley effectively stalked and killed her with no one intervening
in the series of events that led to her death. Manning et al. (2007) suggest
that a potential danger of the continued popularity of the story of the 38
witnesses is that it narrows the focus of psychological enquiry. Researchers
have concentrated on the potential dangers of the presence of others for
helping behaviour, and have neglected the study of when and how the
presence of others could promote bystander intervention.

Pluralistic ignorance
Most of us do not witness emergencies on a regular basis. Due to their very
nature, emergencies tend to be unpredictable, potentially risky, sudden events
that we generally are neither prepared for nor expect in our everyday lives.
Because of this, when confronted with an emergency we may well hesitate and
try to work out what is going on and what should be done. If other people are
present while we are doing this, we often look at them, and they look at us, as
each of us tries to work out what to do. In doing so, we inadvertently become
models of inaction for each other (see discussion of modelling in Chapter 9).
This process suggests that the appropriate response to the emergency is therefore
to do nothing. The situation has become socially defined as a non-emergency,
which lessens the likelihood of helping, thereby inaction becomes normative for
the situation. This process may occur at step 2 of the decision-making model,
where the bystander decides if the event is an emergency or not. He or she may
look to others to define the situation, in which case pluralistic ignorance may
occur if there are other people present.

Audience inhibition
This third social psychological process also decreases the likelihood of
bystanders helping. When other bystanders are present, individuals become
aware that the other people present would see their intervention attempt. This
results in anxiety, which decreases the individual likelihood of intervention,
particularly in unfamiliar situations in which the individual bystander is unsure
of what to do or of whether their intervention attempt will be successful. This
may be due to a belief that they lack the ability to intervene successfully. There
is also a chance that the bystander has misinterpreted the situation as an
emergency when, in fact, it is not one – intervention would therefore risk
additional embarrassment in front of an audience. As such, this process can be
seen as a form of evaluation apprehension (see Chapter 8), whereby people
become concerned that, as they perform a task, they are being evaluated by
others present. This process may occur at step 5 of the model, where the
bystander decides whether or not to implement the intervention. At this stage
you may be concerned with how others might perceive you, and anticipate
possible embarrassment as a result – in other words, the process of audience
inhibition may lead to you not helping.
The more that these inhibitory processes are activated, the less likely it is that
helping will occur. Latané and Darley (1976) demonstrated this in an experiment
using five different conditions. Each condition varied according to whether the
participant believed there were other bystanders present or not, and which
communication channels were available between the bystanders. In the condition
with the lowest number of inhibitory factors (condition 1), participants were
alone in a room watching (via a monitor) a person receiving electric shocks and
falling on the floor. In the condition with the highest number of inhibitory
factors (condition 5), participants could see, and be seen by, another bystander.
The other bystander was a confederate who, in the relevant conditions, could be
seen by the participant responding passively to the emergency. Thus, in the
condition with the largest number of inhibitory factors, the participant was aware
of the presence of others, could see another inactive bystander, and also knew
that their own actions would be seen by the other bystander. As expected, those
participants in the alone condition helped the most. Those who knew of another
bystander but couldn’t see or be seen by them (condition 2) helped slightly less.
This was followed by the one-way communication conditions (seeing but not
being seen, or not seeing but being seen; conditions 3 and 4), with those people
who could see the other bystander and be seen by them helping the least. The
greater number of channels of communication led to more social inhibition,
suggesting that the three processes identified are independent and operate
additively.
The bystander effect is robust and has been replicated many times (see meta-
analysis of 53 articles by Fischer et al., 2011), although researchers have also
demonstrated some of the limitations of the effect, suggesting, for example, that
the effect does not hold in situations of high potential danger for both victim and
bystanders (Fischer, Greitemeyer, Pollozek & Frey, 2006). One of the key
challenges for this research, which demonstrates the power of situational factors
in bystander behaviour, is how the bystander effect might be overcome in order
to ensure that victims obtain the help that they need in emergencies where there
is more than one bystander. As Latané and Nida (1981) have highlighted, in
spite of a wealth of research, using this research to ensure that people in need
receive help has been a significant challenge. In their meta-analysis, Fischer et
al. (2011) suggest that the bystander effect has lessened in size over time, and
that this may be due to the use of less realistic bystander situations than in older
studies. Alternatively, it has also been suggested that knowledge of the bystander
effect may militate against its occurrence. In an experiment by Beaman, Barnes,
Klentz, and McQuirk (1978) students were told about the bystander effect,
including the three inhibition processes, in a lecture. In a seemingly unrelated
subsequent study, when confronted with an emergency in the presence of a
passive confederate, students who had learned about the bystander effect were
more likely to offer help to a victim than students who had not learned about the
bystander effect. This might suggest that providing people with more
information about the bystander effect might help to lessen its impact.
Alternatively, given that the audience inhibition process is particularly strong
when bystanders feel that they lack competence to provide help, it has been
suggested that various forms of training may help to overcome the bystander
effect – in fact, the presence of others may facilitate helping when a bystander
feels that they are competent to provide help (Schwartz & Gottlieb, 1976). This
highlights the role of self-efficacy (see Chapter 6) in helping: if a bystander feels
that they are able to help, then helping is more likely. However, it has been
pointed out that a feeling of responsibility is a more important predictor of
helpfulness, although a sense of competence can contribute to feelings of
responsibility (Bierhoff, 2002).
 Summary
The bystander effect is one of the most robust in social psychology: one of the
key reasons why people don’t help is because of the presence of others. As the
number of fellow bystanders to an emergency increases, so responsibility for
helping is diffused amongst all those present: individual bystanders therefore
feel less personally responsible and are less likely to intervene. Bystanders
appear to react passively to emergencies, inadvertently creating a passive model
for others. And fear of negative evaluation of one’s own potential helping
behaviour is an additional barrier to helping. The challenge remains in terms of
understanding what makes people help, as opposed to not help.
 WHY DO PEOPLE HELP?
What are the underlying motivations of prosocial behaviour?
In the previous section we looked at some of the factors that inhibit or prevent
people from helping. This approach tends to focus on the disruptions to
individual cognitive decision-making. In this section we will look at a range of
different approaches that have attempted to explain why people do help. These
approaches take a different kind of focus. Rather than emphasizing individual
cognitive processes, they explore the role of physiology, emotion and group
processes.
 The costs and rewards of helping
In contrast to Latané and Darley’s focus on explaining why people do not help,
Piliavin and colleagues, contemporaries of Latané and Darley, set out to explain
why people do help. Their ‘subway train studies’ (e.g. Piliavin, Rodin, &
Piliavin, 1969), which involved the researchers staging emergency incidents on
the subway trains of New York and then observing rates of intervention,
provided some of the earliest bystander intervention studies that challenge the
bystander effect. In one of the studies of Piliavin et al. a ‘victim’ (one member
of a team of students who ran the field experiments) would stagger and collapse
on a subway car while other members of the team recorded how many people
helped. The trials were run with either black or white ‘victims’, all of whom
were male. In some of the trials the ‘victim’ smelled of alcohol and carried a
bottle wrapped tightly in a brown bag (‘drunk’ condition), while on other trials
the ‘victim’ appeared sober and carried a black cane (‘cane’ condition).
The researchers recorded the number of people who came to the victims’
assistance, and were surprised to find that helping was often at ceiling level,
regardless of the number of other people present. Piliavin et al. (1969) reported
that helping was offered by at least one bystander in 100 per cent of trials for all
victims in the ‘cane’ condition, and for white victims in the ‘drunk’ condition;
helping was shown in 73 per cent of trials for black victims in the ‘drunk’
condition. None of the bystanders left the subway car on any of the trials, but
some people did leave the area in the immediate vicinity of the victim,
particularly on the ‘drunk’ trials. Piliavin et al. concluded that, in their real-life
‘laboratory on wheels’, there was no strong relationship between number of
bystanders and speed or likelihood of help. There was, however, a greater
tendency for black individuals to help black victims, and for white individuals to
help white victims, especially when the victim was drunk rather than ill; the
longer the emergency went on without any intervention, the more people were
likely to move away.
Inspired by numerous stories of emergency intervention where bystanders put
themselves in considerable personal danger, Piliavin and colleagues developed a
model of emergency intervention called the arousal: cost–reward model. In
part this model addressed the suggestion that the decision-making model of
bystander intervention proposed by Latané and Darley did not incorporate a
specific motivational construct in order to explain the movement of people
through the suggested decisions. The model developed by Piliavin et al. has two
main components: a central motivational construct, that of vicarious arousal,
and a cognitive, decision-making component regarding the calculation of costs
and rewards of actions (Piliavin et al., 1981, p. 6; see Leader in the Field, Jane
Allyn Piliavin).

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arousal: cost–reward model suggests that observing an emergency creates a sense of arousal in
the bystander which becomes increasingly unpleasant. Bystander responds by considering costs and
rewards of helping or not helping.

- - - - - - - - - -

The original formulation of the arousal: cost–reward model proposes that

observing an emergency creates a state of arousal in the bystander. This arousal
becomes more unpleasant as it increases, but can be reduced by a response that
is selected on the basis of cost and reward considerations (see Theory Box 10.4,
panel (a)). Costs and rewards are comprised of two different categories,
depending on whether the bystander helps or whether the victim receives no help
(Piliavin et al., 1981; Piliavin, Piliavin, & Rodin, 1975). The costs associated
with the bystander helping come in forms such as of loss of time, physical
danger and effort expenditure. The potential rewards for helping include raised
self-esteem, thanks from the victim, praise, honour and glory. The costs
associated with the victim not receiving any help include continued unpleasant
empathic arousal, self-blame, public censure and loss of rewards that would have
followed had the bystander helped (Piliavin et al., 1981). The potential rewards
associated with not helping relate primarily to the continuation of activities
(Piliavin et al., 1969). In the original model, situational factors in an emergency
situation were proposed to either stimulate or not stimulate arousal in the
bystander; severe, clear emergencies, where the bystander witnesses the distress
of another person and which happen close to a bystander were proposed to
stimulate the most arousal. If they do not stimulate arousal, then no response is
given. If they do stimulate arousal, this will be interpreted differently in different
situations. Cost/reward calculations will subsequently occur and lead to a
response that might include direct or indirect intervention, escape or a
reinterpretation of the situation (see Theory Box 10.4).
 LEADER IN THE FIELD
Jane Allyn Piliavin obtained her PhD from Stanford University in
1962, and is currently Conway-Bascom Professor Emerita of
Sociology and Women’s Studies at the University of Wisconsin-
Madison. Together with Irving Piliavin, she developed the influential
arousal: cost–reward model of helping behaviour in emergency
situations. Her interest in helping behaviour subsequently led her to
shift focus from isolated incidents of helping towards the study of
long-term, repeated help-giving. This work has highlighted the
importance of roles, and the development of an altruistic identity.
Various aspects of her work, particularly in the area of blood
donation, have fed into public policy.

One study illustrating how costs can impact on helping behaviour comes from
the work of Darley and Batson (1973), and has already been discussed in
Chapter 2 (see Research Close-Up 2.2, Chapter 2). Participants who were told
that they were in a hurry offered less help than participants who were not in a
hurry, thus the personal cost of being late led to less helping.
Piliavin and colleagues went on to develop their original model further to
include a range of additional constructs (see Theory Box 10.4, panel (b)). Rather
than a sequence of processes, they suggested that different processes can occur
simultaneously, allowing for cyclical effects. In the revised model, the
researchers added bystander characteristics (trait factors such as competence and
personal norms; state factors such as mood and attention) and victim
characteristics (such as their similarity to the victim) as factors that contribute to
the emergency intervention process. They also emphasized the importance of the
attribution of the cause and nature of the arousal felt by the bystander in an
emergency situation, the role of empathy felt towards victims as a possible form
of arousal, and the point that in extreme emergencies costs may only be attended
to partly, or not at all (Piliavin et al., 1981). Thus, in some emergency situations
– characterized in terms of their clarity, reality, prior knowledge of the victim
and physical orientation of the bystander to the emergency – a response
consisting of impulsive helping may occur, when the bystander’s attention is
completely focused on the victim. Such situational, bystander and victim
characteristics can lead to high levels of arousal, which can lead directly to a
response that does not rely on the consideration of potential costs and rewards.
 - - - - - - - - - -

impulsive helping immediate, non-deliberative form of helping that does not appear to involve a
conscious decision-making process, and in which the helper does not attend to the presence of other
bystanders.

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THEORY BOX 10.4

ORIGINAL AND REVISED AROUSAL: COST-
REWARD MODEL
Source: Piliavin et al., 1981., with permission from Elsevier.

The general expansion of the arousal: cost–reward model additionally includes

the concept of ‘we-ness’ as it relates to the bystander–victim relationship.
Piliavin et al. (1981) suggest that a sense of ‘we-ness’ between the bystander and
victim increases the likelihood of intervention, as it differentially impacts on the
associated costs and rewards of helping. They suggest that helping responses
towards victims perceived as ‘we-group’ are innate in human beings, whereas
socialization seeks to eliminate these forms of impulsive or immediate helping.
In clear emergency situations this innate response can happen very quickly, and
therefore ‘beat’ the slower, socialized response that attempts to eliminate them.
‘We-ness’ is proposed to increase the likelihood of intervention, as it increases
the benefits and reduces the costs of helping: a bystander may be more confident
of the consequences of helping a victim with whom she or he felt a sense of ‘we-
ness’, and therefore the relative costs of helping would be reduced. ‘We-ness’ is
also proposed to increase the arousal felt by the bystander, and increase the costs
of the victim receiving no help. Subsequently, these researchers have begun to
draw on social identity approaches in order to consider the group-based features
of helping (e.g. Dovidio, Piliavin, Gaertner, Schroeder, & Clark, 1991). It is to
this aspect of helping – the role of group level explanations of behaviour – that
we now turn.
 Groups, identity and prosocial behaviour
The traditional focus of the social psychology of prosocial behaviour has been
on how people relate to each other as individuals rather than as members of
social groups. Thus, researchers have considered individual decision-making
processes (Latané & Darley, 1970), individual emotions (Batson et al., 1981), or
the characteristics of relationships between individual helpers and the recipients
of help (Clark, Mills, & Corcoran, 1989). Until recently there had been very
little focus on the role of group processes in early helping research (but see
Hornstein, 1976, for an exception). In fact, if groups were considered at all, they
were usually assumed to have a negative effect on people’s willingness to help.
The classic concepts of diffusion of responsibility or pluralistic ignorance both
seem to suggest that groups impact negatively on an individual’s ability to
behave prosocially at the appropriate time.
In recent years, however, researchers have begun to move away from seeing
the influence of the group in a wholly negative light. This shift in focus has been
the result of collaborations between researchers interested in helping behaviour,
on the one hand, and researchers interested in group processes and intergroup
relations on the other (see Stürmer & Snyder, 2010). Helping researchers have
begun to be influenced by ideas from Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1978a,
1982a) and Self Categorization Theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, &
Wetherell, 1987) (see also Chapters 5 and 14). The group processes literature is
concerned with how people act as members of their social groups, rather than in
terms of their individual characteristics. The key insight from this work is that
individuals can think and act as group members, and that when a group or social
identity is salient, then behaviour is shaped by the norms and the values of the
group. This group identity can sometimes lead to antisocial behaviour, but it can
also lead to prosocial behaviour (Postmes & Spears, 1998).
Dovidio and colleagues, using insights from both Social Identity Theory and
Self Categorization Theory, have shown how groups can shape willingness to
help. Using the common ingroup identity model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000,
2008; see also Chapter 14) they show that if members of different groups can be
made to see themselves as members of a common group, then hostility and bias
between groups can be reduced and prosocial behaviour towards others can be
increased. For example, Dovidio et al. (1997) conducted an experiment in which
students were divided into two arbitrary groups: they were told that they had the
kind of personality that ‘overestimates’ or ‘underestimates’. They then spent
some time in a group of three ‘underestimators’ or a group of three
‘overestimators’. Having done this they were then placed in one of two
conditions: a ‘common superordinate identity’ condition, or a ‘two-group’
condition. In the common superordinate identity condition groups of
underestimators and overestimators were put together, but all participants were
asked to wear the same colour university sweatshirt, and to sit around a table
with a member of the other group on either side of them (i.e. in an A, B, A, B
pattern). In the two-group (separate identity) condition, overestimators wore a
sweatshirt of one colour and sat on one side of the table, while understimators
wore a sweatshirt of another colour and sat on the other side of the table. All
participants then worked together on a decision-making task. After the task had
been completed, participants were separated, and when they were on their own,
they were given an opportunity to help an ingroup or an outgroup member. The
help request was in the form of an appeal to help with recruitment of participants
for a study, and to help put up posters around the university campus. Participants
were much more likely to help an outgroup person if they had been in the
common ingroup identity condition (see also Chapter 14 for how re-categorizing
former ingroups and outgroups can promote better intergroup relations).

- - - - - - - - - -

common ingroup identity model this model seeks to reduce bias between groups by changing the
nature of categorization from ingroups versus outgroups to a single, more inclusive identity. The
model harnesses the forces of ingroup favouritism to reduce bias and promote helping.

- - - - - - - - - -

Similar group processes can be seen in the study by Levine, Prosser, Evans,
and Reicher (2005) (see Research Close-Up 10.3) in which football fans were
primed to see themselves in terms of their team identity (Manchester United
fans) or a superordinate identity (football fans). Participants failed to help a
stranger identified as a Liverpool FC fan when a Manchester United identity was
salient, but extended help to the Liverpool fan when a more inclusive football
fan identity was salient. However, strangers who could not be identified as
football fans were not helped to the same degree.
 Helping outgroups
Thus far we have seen that there is good evidence that people are likely to help
others when they are seen as ingroup members. However, it would be a mistake
to assume that there is a single social identity mechanism – a simple ‘ingroup
favouritism’ – which underlies helping behaviour at the group level. Take, for
example, the extensive literature which uses helping as a non-reactive measure
of prejudice (Saucier, Miller, & Doucet, 2005): some studies find that white
participants show ingroup favouritism, while others find no differences
(Bickman & Kamzan, 1973), or even outgroup favouritism (Dutton & Lake,
1973). Saucier et al. (2005) reveal a complex picture of the way white
participants offer help to white and black victims. They argue that white people
are less likely to help black people in situations where failure to help can clearly
be attributed to something other than race, or in situations of high emergency
where interventions are potentially very costly. Outgroup helping is most likely
as an attempt to avoid appearing prejudiced, or to avoid aversive internal states.
Faced with this rich complexity of ingroup and outgroup helping, a social
identity approach does not imply that the salience of social identity always
results in ingroup favouritism. Rather, the suggestion is that when social identity
is salient, people will act in terms of the norms and values of the group. Some
identities may contain norms to ‘look after your own’. Other identities (like
some religious identities, for example) might have norms that encourage
members to help outgroup members even more than ingroup members. When
thinking about groups and helping, it is important to distinguish between helping
based on ingroup inclusion and helping based on ingroup norms. Take, for
example, the work of Reicher and colleagues on holocaust rescue – in particular
the rescue of Bulgarian Jews. Reicher, Cassidy, Wolpert, Hopkins, and Levine
(2006) show that, unlike most countries in Europe under the influence of the
Nazis during the Second World War, Bulgaria managed to resist German
demands to deport Jews to the concentration camps (Denmark was the only other
country to do so successfully).

RESEARCH CLOSE-UP 10.3

THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL IDENTITY

ON EMERGENCY HELPING
Levine, M., Prosser, A., Evans, D., & Reicher, S. D. (2005). Identity and emergency intervention:
How social group membership and inclusiveness of group boundaries shape helping behavior.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31, 443–453.

Introduction This research uses football fans to study

the effect of social identity on helping behaviour in
‘real life’ emergencies. The paper explores the
hypothesis that bystanders are more likely to help
victims of an emergency when the victims are seen as
fellow ingroup members. However, the paper also
acknowledges that group boundaries are not fixed. It
seeks to demonstrate that, by changing the way people
think about their own social identity, we can extend
the boundaries of the ingroup. By extending the
boundaries of the ingroup it becomes possible to
increase the range of people who are helped.
Two experiments were conducted. Manchester United football fans were
recruited to take part in both experiments. In Study 1 they were primed to
think about themselves in terms of their Manchester United social identity.
However, in Study 2 they were primed to think about themselves in terms of
a more inclusive social identity – as a football fan (rather than a Manchester
United fan).
In both experiments, participants were exposed to an accident. While they
were walking across a university campus, a stranger came jogging along,
then tripped and fell, and appeared to be hurt. The stranger was sometimes
wearing a Manchester United football shirt, sometimes a Liverpool FC
football shirt, and sometimes an ordinary unbranded sports shirt. It was
predicted that, when Manchester United identity was salient (Study 1),
participants would help the stranger wearing a Manchester United shirt more
often than when the stranger wore a Liverpool or plain shirt. However, when
football fan identity was salient (Study 2) they were expected to help as
much when the stranger wore either a Manchester United or a Liverpool
shirt, but not when the stranger wore a plain shirt.
shirt, but not when the stranger wore a plain shirt.
Method Participants Thirty-five male participants
aged between 18 and 21 (who were self-identified
Manchester United fans) participated in Study 1.
Twenty-nine male Manchester United fans (aged
between 18 and 21) participated in Study 2.
Design and procedure In both studies, participants
came to the psychology department of an English
university and were placed in a small cubicle. In
Study 1 they completed a questionnaire and wrote an
essay about how much they loved being a Manchester
United fan. In Study 2 they completed a questionnaire
and wrote an essay about how much they loved being
a football fan. After this first stage, they left the
cubicle and were asked to walk on their own to
another building to watch a video about football fans.
While they were walking an accident was staged in
front of them. A confederate, who was a stranger to
the participants, came running along, tripped, fell, and
cried out in pain while holding on to his ankle. The
confederate was sometimes wearing a Manchester
United shirt, sometimes a Liverpool FC shirt, and
sometimes an ordinary unbranded sports shirt. Three
hidden observers (who were blind to the hypothesis of
the study) watched the behaviour of each participant
and rated his behaviour independently. They rated the
amount and form of helping using measures adapted
 from Darley and Batson’s (1973) ‘Good Samaritan’
study explained above. Participants were also
questioned by a member of the research team when
they reached their destination (but before they were
debriefed) about anything they may have witnessed
on their journey. This was to ensure that they had
witnessed the event and that they had recognized the
appropriate football shirt in the appropriate condition.
Results In Study 1, when the Manchester United
social identity was salient, participants were
significantly more likely to help when the victim wore
a Manchester United shirt than either a Liverpool or a
plain shirt; see Figure 10.5. In Study 2, when football
fan social identity was salient, participants were
equally likely to help when the victim wore either a
Liverpool shirt or a Manchester United shirt, but not
when he wore a plain shirt.
FIGURE 10.5 Effects of inclusivity of social identities on rates of helping.
Discussion The results confirm the hypothesis that
people are more likely to help strangers when they see
some signs of common group membership in the
person in need. However, the study also shows that
group boundaries are not fixed, and by getting people
to think about themselves in terms of more inclusive
social identities we can increase the range of people
who are helped. The findings are particularly
interesting because Manchester United and Liverpool
fans have a strong historical rivalry. This rivalry has
been known to result in intergroup violence (Figure
10.6). And yet, simply by changing the level at which
people identify, Manchester United fans can be
encouraged to extend a helping hand to those they
might otherwise feel antagonistic towards. This
suggests that a way to increase feelings of
 responsibility for the welfare of others is to promote
social identities that are as inclusive as possible.
FIGURE 10.6(a) and (b) Manchester United and Liverpool fans have a
strong historical rivalry, which has been known to result in intergroup
violence.
Source: (a) © Jon Super. Used under licence from Press Association Images;
(b) © Press Association Images.

Reicher et al. analysed key documents (including political speeches, open

letters and official statements) from influential people and organizations
(including politicians, lawyers, and the church). By conducting a systematic
qualitative analysis of the way arguments were constructed and deployed in the
texts, they showed that the Bulgarian political elite based their resistance to
German demands on two main strategies. The first strategy was to argue that
Jews were Bulgarians, and thus to deport a Jew was to deport a Bulgarian. They
termed this an ‘ingroup inclusion’ strategy, and it could be achieved because the
nature of Bulgarian identity was constructed in civic rather than racial terms.
The second strategy was to argue that it violated the values of Bulgarian identity
to allow Jews to be deported. Reicher et al. termed this an ‘ingroup norm’
strategy. The argument here was that it was fundamentally ‘unBulgarian’ to
allow such a fate to befall any group, and so to stand back and allow the
deportation to happen would be a threat to the core values of the group. Reicher
et al. demonstrate that these strategies were not mutually exclusive, and that
ingroup inclusion and ingroup norm strategies could appear in the same
document. However, they argue that speakers tended to emphasize one strategy
over another to maximize the likelihood of influence given the particular context
in which the appeal was being made. They conclude that this kind of qualitative
analysis can usefully be combined with experimental methods to explore the
relationship between the choice of strategy and the effectiveness of the
influence.
 Social identity and the bystander effect
The social identity tradition has also been applied to the behaviour of bystanders
in emergencies. Levine and colleagues have argued that the bystander effect (the
idea that bystanders are more likely to intervene when alone than when in the
presence of others) is a partial story. Using insights from the social identity and
self-categorization theories, they suggest that the key to bystander behaviour in
the presence of others is not simply the number of other bystanders, but rather
the psychological relationship between the bystanders. For example, Levine,
Cassidy, and Jentzsch (2010) conducted experiments in which they asked
(university student) participants to imagine they were with one other person, or
many other people, in a public place. The public places were settings like a
restaurant or a cinema. The experiment followed the design of Garcia, Weaver,
Moskowitz, and Darley (2002) who had shown that simply imagining the
presence of others led to a decrease in willingness to donate money – something
they called the ‘implicit bystander effect’. However, Levine et al. varied who the
others were imagined to be. Depending on the experimental condition, the others
were imagined as strangers, friends or group members (i.e. students). As part of
the experiment, participants were asked about willingness to donate money to
charity and willingness to volunteer time to take part in further psychology
experiments.
Results showed that when the others were imagined as friends, increasing
group size resulted in a reduction in the amount people were willing to donate to
charity, or the hours they were prepared to volunteer to help the psychology
department. This was the same finding as in Garcia et al. However, when the
others were imagined as strangers, increasing group size resulted in an increase
in donation intention and an increase in willingness to volunteer for experiments.
When the others were imagined as students, increasing group size did not affect
willingness to donate money, but did lead to an increase in volunteering for the
experiments. Levine et al. (2010) argue that this pattern of results suggests
something more complex than the traditional bystander effect. It is the
combination of who the others are believed to be (i.e. the psychological
relationship between bystanders), the context in which the presence of others is
imagined, and the kind of helping behaviour which is proposed, that shapes the
nature of bystander behaviour.
Levine, Cassidy, Brazier, and Reicher (2002) have also shown that the social
identity relationships between bystander and fellow bystander can shape
willingness to intervene in an emergency. Fellow bystanders are more influential
when they are seen as ingroup members rather than outgroup members.
Moreover, social identity and group size can interact to promote as well as
inhibit helping in emergencies. For example, Levine and Crowther (2008)
showed that, when gender identities were salient, and men and women witnessed
an incident of public domestic violence, group size could have different effects.
In this experiment, participants watched CCTV footage of an attack by a man on
a woman (on a public street) while they sat on their own, or in groups of three.
The group conditions were comprised of either three men, or three women, or
were groups with a male majority or a female majority. After they watched the
footage, participants were asked to say how likely they would be to intervene if
they saw an incident like this in real life. Men were more likely to say they
would intervene when they had watched the footage on their own rather than in
the presence of other men. This is the classic bystander effect. However, for
women, the presence of other women led to an increased readiness to help. They
were more likely to express an intention to intervene when in an all-female
group than when on their own. This runs contrary to the traditional bystander
effect. When groups contained both men and women, then co-presence had
different effects for the men and the women. When men were in the minority,
they were more likely to say they would intervene. However, when women were
in the minority, they were significantly less likely to say they would intervene.
Taken together, these studies suggest that it is the way people understand the
psychological relationships between bystanders, rather than the simple presence
of others, that is key to understanding bystander behaviour.
 Social identity, emotion and bystander intervention
In addition to the work on how the salience, boundaries and contents of social
identities shape helping behaviour, recent research has also explored the role of
identity processes at the intersection of emotion and helping. For example,
Stürmer and colleagues (Stürmer, Snyder, Kropp, & Siem, 2006; Stürmer,
Snyder, & Omoto, 2005) argue that much of the literature on emotion and
helping is limited by an individualistic or interpersonal focus. By introducing
insights from the social identity tradition, they were able to demonstrate that
social identity relationships moderate empathy-motivated helping. Stürmer and
colleagues conducted research on longer-term helping and volunteering (for
example volunteers in community-based HIV/AIDS service organizations) and
argued that it is not that people are more likely to help ingroup members than
outgroup members, but rather that ingroup and outgroup helping can be
explained by different psychological pathways.
Using data from a large-scale project on the psychological aspects of
volunteerism in a community-based AIDS service organization, they compared a
sample of (male and female) heterosexual and homosexual volunteers who were
all serving as ‘buddies’ or ‘home-helps’ to male homosexual HIV/AIDS
patients. Using self-defined sexual orientation as a proxy measure of
ingroup/outgroup status, they looked at the behaviours, motivations and
emotions that volunteers expressed in their relationship to the person they were
volunteering to help. Results showed that empathy with the client tended to be a
strong predictor of helping in homosexual volunteers, while liking or attraction
was a strong predictor of help when volunteers were heterosexual.
 Summary
There are several levels at which the motivation to help others can be
understood. Evidence shows that people help as a way of dealing with the
emotional and physiological costs of being in an emergency situation. People
also help because of their psychological connections to others. When we see
people as members of a common ingroup then we are more likely to help them.
Outgroup members can be helped too. However, when ingroup members are
helped it is based on feelings of empathy. When outgroup members are helped,
feelings of liking or warmth towards the outgroup member are usually the key.
Finally, when social identities are salient, then the presence of other people does
not always lead to inhibition of helping (the traditional bystander effect). When
the norms and values of an identity promote helping, then having other group
members around can enhance the expression of the identity and thus lead to
greater helping.
 ISSUES IN RESEARCHING PROSOCIAL
BEHAVIOUR
What effect do violence and gender have on willingness to help?
Thus far we have seen a range of work focusing on why people help and why
they don’t help. One of the most impressive features of this work is the attempt
to study actual helping behaviour – as opposed to methods that ask about
hypothetical helping situations, or ask about intentions to act. The inventive and
cleverly choreographed behavioural studies that established the bystander effect
are good examples of this. Despite the achievements of laboratory research on
helping behaviour, Cherry (1995), in her critique of the bystander tradition,
makes an important observation. She argues that when Latané and Darley went
into the lab to study bystander behaviour in the light of the story of the 38
witnesses, they neglected two key features of the original event – violence and
gender. By concentrating only on the number of bystanders they ignored much
of what was socially meaningful about the behaviour of the bystanders. Cherry
argues that this neglect was a result of ‘culturally embedded theorizing’ (p. 16.).
Latané and Darley were working at a time when society in general was not
sensitized to the problem of male violence (see Chapter 9) or the gendered
nature of helping behaviour.
A contributing factor to this omission must also have been the practical and
ethical difficulties associated with researching violence. It is logistically very
difficult to create a violent incident in a laboratory context that is both believable
to participants and can be reproduced with the degree of consistency required for
experimental designs. At the same time, exposing participants to violence in
experimental settings raises a number of ethical challenges. These include
considerations of the deception and distress that participants might be exposed to
(see the discussion of ethical issues in Chapter 2). Some researchers have,
however, managed to overcome these difficulties to the satisfaction of the ethical
review committees in their universities, and the research they have produced has
suggested some important new directions for research on prosocial behaviour.
 Violence and helping
In research that does explore the behaviour of bystanders to violent (rather than
non-violent) emergencies, the bystander-effect explanation seems to work less
well. While the presence of others can sometimes inhibit intervention, more
often than not, the presence of others tends to enhance the likelihood of
intervention in violent emergencies. This research tends not to be traditional
laboratory research, given the difficulties of simulating violence in a laboratory.
For example, Harari, Harari, and White (1985) conducted a field experiment in
which they staged an ‘attempted rape’ on the grounds of a university campus.
Participants were divided into those in groups (defined as students walking close
together, rather than being in intact groups in order to ‘reduce experimental
contamination’, p. 635), and those who were alone. While they were walking
along, they saw a female student (a confederate of the experimenters) being
grabbed by a male confederate who jumped out from behind a bush and
attempted to drag the female student away while she struggled and called for
help. Harari et al. found that 85 per cent of participants in groups intervened,
whereas 65 per cent of participants who were alone intervened. Moreover, 80 per
cent of interventions were direct (an indirect intervention route was offered via a
campus security officer in the distance).
In similar fashion, Schreiber (1979) also set up a violent emergency outside of
the lab, using a procedure that would be unlikely to receive ethical approval
today (not least given the number of high-profile school shootings; see Figure
10.7). Schreiber used his own lecture class to simulate a shooting incident on
campus. Every year for six years, Schreiber had a confederate intruder rush into
his lecture room, shout at, scuffle with and then shoot a ‘victim’ in the class. The
victim then fell on the floor ‘covered in blood’, while the instructor ‘simulated
an emotional state of intense fear and yelled’ (p. 245). In the six years, only two
people intervened directly, and both of these had some expertise in dealing with
violence (one was a probation officer, the other an American football player).
However, fourteen people did try to get help, and these indirect interveners came
from the larger lecture classes rather than the smaller lecture classes.
FIGURE 10.7(a) and (b) The Columbine High School massacre in 1999 left 12
students and one teacher dead and many more injured.
Source: (a) © Ed Andrieski; (b) © Ed Andrieski. Both images used under licence
from Press Association Images.
 Using a less ethically controversial method, Wells and Graham (1999)
explored the reactions of bystanders to aggressive bar-room incidents. They
conducted systematic observations of 12 bars, then conducted a series of
telephone interviews in which people talked about violent incidents in bars. In
addition to their observation that third parties became involved in almost 50 per
cent of incidents, they found that aggressive interventions served to increase the
violence, while non-aggressive interventions decreased it. Their research showed
that the nature and form of third-party behaviour is important to the outcome of
violent incidents. In other words, understanding the nature of the violence
requires more than just the study of the perpetrator and the victim.
In contrast to these examples that make use of direct observations of people’s
behaviour in violent situations, Christy and Voigt (1994) extended the study of
bystanders and violence to consider responses to public episodes of child abuse.
They gave an 80-item questionnaire to 269 people who self-reported that they
had witnessed an event of child abuse. Almost half the sample reported having
witnessed child abuse in a public rather than a private place. However, of those
who were bystanders to public violence towards children, only one out of four
witnesses acted to intervene. Of those who did intervene, direct interveners, in
addition to feeling greater certainty about taking action, had more often
witnessed abuse and were themselves more likely to have been abused as
children, compared to indirect interveners.
Levine (1999) used yet another method to study bystander responses to
violence towards children. He examined the court transcripts of the trial of two
12-year old boys (Jon Venables and Robert Thompson) for the abduction and
murder of two-year-old James Bulger in Liverpool in 1993. In an echo of the
Kitty Genovese case, 38 witnesses were called at the trial, all of whom had
encountered James and his abductors on the walk around Liverpool before his
eventual murder. Levine argues that the traditional five-step cognitive decision-
making model did not fit with the witnesses’ accounts of why they failed to
intervene. Witnesses did notice that James was injured and in distress, they did
think that some kind of intervention might be warranted, and they did not
explain their failure to act in terms of diffusion of responsibility or pluralistic
ignorance. Instead, they did not intervene because they assumed, or were told by
the older boys, that James was their brother (Figure 10.8). Levine argues that
invoking ‘the family’ as a way of making sense of the relationship between the
bystanders and the boys made it psychologically difficult for bystanders to act.
Strangers are not supposed to approach or become involved with children from
other families. This is particularly true for men, given current scares over the
risk posed to children by ‘predatory paedophiles’. However, Levine argues that
it was not inevitable that the category of ‘the family’ should have come to
dominate the interactions between bystanders and the boys. If the bystanders had
constructed their encounter as one between adults and children (rather than
family and non-family members) – and acted as though adults have
responsibility for the welfare of all children – then they might have been more
likely to intervene. (See the previous section on groups, identity and prosocial
behaviour for other examples of how changing the group identity can change
willingness to intervene.)
FIGURE 10.8 Levine (1999) argues that witnesses in the James Bulger murder
case did not intervene because they assumed, or were told by the older boys, that
James was their brother, and it is a widely held belief that strangers are not
supposed to approach or become involved with children from other families.
Source: © Press Association Images
 Gender and helping
Some studies have specifically looked at the role of gender in violent situations.
Using simulated ‘attacks’ (male on female; male on male; female on male;
female on female) Borofsky, Stollak, and Messé (1971) demonstrated that
intervention (attempting to stop the fight, or speaking directly to those involved)
was at its lowest for male bystander participants when a man attacked a woman
(see Table 10.1). Female participants showed low rates of intervention overall,
with only two out of twenty-one female participants intervening during the
whole experiment (although less than half – 10 – of the twenty-one male
participants intervened). Shotland and Straw (1976) also reported a series of
experiments that involved a staged fight between a man and a woman in the
presence of a bystander. The incident was characterized as involving either a
husband-and-wife couple, or two strangers. In the ‘married’ condition, the
woman was overheard shouting ‘I don’t know why I ever married you’; in the
‘strangers’ condition, the woman was overheard shouting ‘I don’t know you’.
Shotland and Straw’s experiments showed that bystanders were more likely to
intervene in an attack on a woman by a man if they believed the couple were
strangers than if they were married. If the bystanders were unsure of the nature
of the relationship between the man and the woman, they were more likely to
infer an intimate connection, and were therefore less likely to intervene.
Table 10.1 Percentage of men and women intervening as a function of victim and perpetrator gender.
Source: From Borofsky et al., 1971.

While Cherry’s (1995) analysis points to the importance of gender in the

analysis of bystander intervention, and notes that gendered violence generally
shows a different pattern of results from the classic research on bystander
intervention, gender often manifests itself in the analysis of differential rates of
helping for men and women. Eagly and Crowley (1986), for example, provided a
meta-analysis of gender differences in helping behaviour research. While they
found, in general, that men helped more than women in the range of studies that
they reviewed, they pointed out that this was due to the focus in the literature on
short-term encounters between strangers, highlighting the way in which a large
proportion of the research in the area has focused on particular forms of helping
behaviour. Thus, Eagly and Crowley argued that the differential rates of helping
by men and women were a product of the form of the studies themselves and the
specific helping behaviours that they have studied. In particular, they argued that
behaviours prescribed by the female gender role are more often shown in long-
term close relationships that do not tend to feature in the bystander literature.
They suggest that such behaviours include caring for the personal and emotional
needs of others, delivering routine forms of personal service, and facilitating the
progress of others toward their goals (Eagly & Crowley, p. 284). Behaviours that
are prescribed by the male gender role, on the other hand, consist of the type of
non-routine, risky acts of rescuing others that often feature in bystander
experiments.
In a questionnaire study of intervention in drunk driving situations, Rabow,
Newcomb, Monto, and Hernandez (1990) asked participants about their past
experiences of seeing and reacting to someone they thought was too drunk to
drive. Rabow et al. found that rates of intervention (doing something to stop the
person from driving) reported by men and women did not differ significantly;
although more women than men reported intervening: 57 per cent compared to
43 per cent, this difference was not statistically significant. Rabow et al. used
Eagly and Crowley’s (1986) analysis to suggest that, when bystanders have had
no prior training and when the relationships between those present are not
strangers (laboratory studies typically involve strangers), women are as likely to
intervene as men, perhaps even more so.
Eagly and Crowley (1986) suggested that this bias towards the kinds of
helping behaviours prescribed by the male gender role was due to the dominance
of the experimental paradigm in social psychological research, particularly
during the 1970s. They argued that manipulating independent variables and
assigning participants randomly to conditions, which are defining features of
experimentation (see Chapter 2) can generally only be accomplished in the
context of short-term encounters with strangers. The difficulty of using the
experimental method to explore long-term helping behaviours has meant that
there has been relatively less interest in them. There is now, however, a growing
body of research that has looked at longer-term helping, to which we now turn.
 Long-term, sustained helping behaviours
As the study of helping behaviour has developed in the years following its
original impetus in the 1960s, various forms of helping behaviours have been
studied. For example, Piliavin and her colleagues have shifted focus from the
arousal: cost–reward model of helping towards a consideration of roles and the
longer-term context of helping behaviour (e.g. Callero, Howard, & Piliavin,
1987; Grube & Piliavin, 2000; Lee, Piliavin, & Call, 1999). This more recent
work draws from Identity Theory (Stryker, 1980), a sociological theory which
suggests that we have different role identities which, taken together, make up the
self (see also Chapter 5). Note that Identity Theory is a distinct approach from
Social Identity Theory, which is covered in Chapter 14. While Social Identity
Theory focuses on intergroup relations and group processes, and their
implications for identity, Identity Theory focuses on the notion of roles and their
relationship to behaviour. These role identities are related to social structure, and
influence behaviour as different roles relate to different expectations. Moreover,
the more a person voluntarily performs a particular role, the more likely it is that
their identity will develop in relation to the behaviours involved in that
performance. Piliavin and her colleagues have used this perspective to look at a
series of long-term helping behaviours in order to examine how such behaviours
come to be sustained. Lee et al. (1999), for example, demonstrated how their
model of blood donation, based on identity theory, was also applicable to
volunteering and charitable donation (Figure 10.9). The model, developed on the
basis of longitudinal studies of the antecedents and consequences of role-identity
as a blood donor, suggests that perceived expectations, parental modelling,
personal norms, past behaviour and role-identity as a donor predict the intention
to donate (time, money and blood).
FIGURE 10.9 Lee, Piliavin, and Call’s (1999) model of blood donation, based
on identity theory, suggests that perceived expectations, parental modelling,
personal norms, past behaviour, and role-identity as a donor can predict the
intention to donate.
Source: © Gina Sanders. Used under licence from Shutterstock.
 The research of Lee et al. (1999) was based on the National Charity Survey, a
telephone interview survey based in New York City involving 1002 respondents.
They asked questions about participants’ perceptions of others’ expectations
concerning donating blood, money and time. For each of the different helping
behaviours – donating blood, money and time – the participants were asked
about: (1) others’ expectations (whether other people expected them to donate);
(2) modelling (whether their parents donated); (3) past receipt of help (whether
they or someone close to them had previously received help); (4) personal norms
(how often they thought other people should donate); (5) past behaviour (i.e.
how many times they had donated blood, money or time over the past year); (6)
role identity (whether the behaviour was an important part of who they are); and
(7) behavioural intention (how likely it was that they would donate each of the
goods in the next 12 months). The researchers tested the model that they had
developed with blood donation and found that, while there were some
differences, the model was applicable to all three forms of donation. The authors
noted some differences, however, between the different types of helping: for
example, in comparison to other forms of donation, past behaviour was more
important to blood donation and role identity was more important to donating
time (i.e. volunteering). This work usefully highlights both the precursors to
helping and the longer term effects of helping on the helper, beyond the specific
helping situation, and also demonstrates how a model developed in one area of
helping can be applied to different areas.
An alternative approach that looks at long-term helping behaviour, and
specifically volunteerism, comes from the work of Omoto and Snyder (2010).
These researchers have developed the volunteer process model, which examines
the antecedents, experiences and consequences of volunteer behaviour. This
model proposes that these antecedents, experiences and consequences of
volunteer activity operate at different levels of analysis: individual (e.g.
individual decisions regarding involvement in volunteering, and associated
individual level psychological processes); interpersonal (e.g. the dynamics of
relationships between volunteers and the various other people they come into
contact with as a result of their volunteering); organizational (e.g. the issues
faced by volunteer-related organizations in recruiting and retaining volunteers);
and societal (e.g. the relationships between volunteers and broader social
structures and collective dynamics); see Figure 10.10. This growing body of
work has largely examined volunteering for AIDS-related organizations in the
US.
FIGURE 10.10 Volunteer process model in a community context (from Omoto
& Snyder, 2002; 2010).
Source: From Omoto & Snyder, 2002, 2010.

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volunteerism when individuals give time and effort willingly without expecting rewards.

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The volunteer process model emphasizes how volunteerism is a process that

develops over time, and involves the decision to get involved in volunteering,
seeking out volunteering opportunities, undertaking volunteer activities, and
ultimately ceasing volunteer activities. Antecedents of volunteering have been
identified in a range of studies. Personality and dispositional factors, such as
empathic concern, and motivational factors, such as a concern for community,
together with particular life circumstances, such as levels of social support, have
been found to predict involvement in volunteering (e.g. Omoto & Snyder, 1993;
Omoto, Snyder, & Martino, 2000). In terms of volunteer experiences,
researchers have found that volunteers become increasingly connected to the
people in receipt of their volunteering work (‘clients’). In one study, after six
months of volunteers working in a buddy programme in an AIDS service
organization, 76 per cent of volunteers had been introduced to the members of
their clients’ social network, and 52 per cent of clients had been introduced to
volunteers’ own social networks (Omoto & Snyder, 2010). The consequences of
volunteering have been illustrated, for example, in a study that found that 28 per
cent of volunteers had recruited another volunteer after six months of
volunteering. In addition, as volunteers become increasingly connected to a
‘community of shared concerns’ (Omoto & Snyder, 2010, p. 233), so too does
their participation in other forms of prosocial action increase (e.g. charitable
giving and social activism). While this work has thus far been primarily focused
on individual level processes, it has also begun to look at community processes,
and how the concern about and connections to community can help to both
motivate and sustain volunteer behaviours. Thus, a psychological sense of
community – for example, a community of people concerned with HIV – has
been found to motivate volunteerism, to be an important feature of volunteers’
experiences, and to be enhanced through volunteering. Those people reporting a
stronger psychological sense of community have been found to undertake
prosocial behaviours more frequently, feel psychologically healthier, and to be
intent on undertaking more prosocial action in the future.
Another area of research that has focused specifically on longer term forms of
helping – and in particular those which carry a significant amount of risk for the
helper – is the study of those individuals who helped Jews during World War II.
Some researchers have referred to this as ‘courageous resistance’ (Shepela et al.,
1999), whereas others have attempted to isolate an ‘altruistic personality’
through the study of those involved (e.g. Oliner & Oliner, 1992); we return to
the issue of personality below. While there is no clear consensus regarding the
explanation of these acts of helping, research suggests that all such helpers
tended to share a world view in which victims were seen as part of a common
moral community with themselves (e.g. all human beings), and felt obliged to
help members of that community who were in need (Reicher et al., 2006). This
suggestion illustrates how research in this particular area of prosocial behaviour
shows some theoretical and conceptual similarities to research in other areas of
helping, which have begun to highlight the role of a sense of shared group
membership in the helping process, and also illustrates a possible link between
explanations of different forms of helping.
Looking at longer-term helping, rather than helping in emergency situations,
has thus raised additional possibilities for research, including the notion of
identifying a prosocial personality. While earlier researchers had rejected the
possibility of identifying reliable personality factors to predict helping, Penner
(2002) has suggested that this was due to the focus on helping in emergency
situations, and a narrow focus on specific types of helping behaviours. In
response, Penner and colleagues (Penner, Fritzsche, Craiger, & Freifeld, 1995)
developed the Prosocial Personality Battery (PSB); see Individual Differences
10.1. Penner and Finkelstein (1998) have defined a prosocial personality
orientation as ‘an enduring tendency to think about the welfare and rights of
other people, to feel concern, and empathy, and to act in a way that benefits
them’ (p. 526). The Prosocial Personality Battery comprises two factors: other-
oriented empathy and helpfulness. Research has suggested that a range of
behaviours correlate with one or both of these factors including speed of
response in simulated emergencies, the frequency of everyday acts of helping,
the frequency of helping co-workers, the willingness to mentor co-workers, and
the willingness to be an organ donor (Penner, 2002). In addition, Penner (2002)
suggests that his model of the prosocial personality is quite similar to Oliner and
Oliner’s (1992) description of the personality traits of the gentiles who rescued
Jews during the Nazi Holocaust.

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prosocial personality an enduring tendency to think about the rights and welfare of others, to feel
concern and empathy, and to act in a way that benefits them.

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This consideration of longer-term helping situations has highlighted a number

of dynamic models that attempt to explain why people first become involved in
such sustained prosocial behaviours, how they are sustained, and what the
consequences of the behaviours are for those undertaking these behaviours.
While the question remains as to whether a single theory is sufficient to explain
all types of helping behaviours, what many of these approaches have again
highlighted is the role of identity, including the notion of collective identities, in
helping behaviours of various kinds.

INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 10.1

MEASURING THE PROSOCIAL
PERSONALITY
Penner et al. (1995) developed the Prosocial Personality Battery (PSB) to
measure people’s tendency to think about the welfare and rights of other
people, to feel concern and empathy for them and to act in a way that
benefits them. There are two versions of the PSB: one has 56 items, the
other (a short form) has 30 items. The 30-item questionnaire has very
similar psychometric properties to the longer form. The PSB has two
factors: other-oriented empathy and helpfulness. People scoring highly on
other-oriented empathy are likely to experience empathy, and to feel
concern about and responsibility for the welfare of others. People who score
highly on helpfulness are more likely to report a history of helpful activities,
and are also unlikely to experience self-oriented discomfort when seeing
someone else in distress.
Below we present 22 items from the Prosocial Personality Battery (short
form). These 22 items make up the other-oriented empathy factor. These
include items measuring social responsibility, empathetic concern,
perspective taking, other-oriented moral reasoning and mutual concerns
moral reasoning. The items are all answered on a 5-point scale with the
endpoints 1 (strongly disagree) and 5 (strongly agree). As you will see,
some items are followed by an (R). This means that they are reverse scored
when the questions are combined to make up a sub-scale.
Social responsibility
1. When people are nasty to me, I feel very little responsibility to treat
them well. (R)
2. I would feel less bothered about leaving litter in a dirty park than in a
clean one. (R)
3. No matter what a person has done to us, there is no excuse for taking
advantage of them.
4. With the pressure for grades and the widespread cheating in school
nowadays, the individual who cheats occasionally is not really as much at
fault. (R)
5. It doesn’t make much sense to be very concerned about how we act
when we are sick and feeling miserable. (R)
6. If I broke a machine through mishandling, I would feel less guilty if it
was already damaged before I used it. (R)
7. When you have a job to do, it is impossible to look out for everybody’s
best interest. (R)
Empathetic concern
8. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective
towards them.
9. Other people’s misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal. (R)
10. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don’t feel
very much pity for them. (R)
11. I am often quite touched by things that I see happen.
Perspective taking
12. I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the ‘other person’s’
point of view. (R)
13. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how
things look from their perspective.
14. If I’m sure I’m right about something, I don’t waste much time
listening to other people’s arguments. (R)
15. I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at
them both.
16. When I’m upset at someone, I usually try to ‘put myself in their shoes’
for a while.
Other-oriented moral reasoning
17. My decisions are usually based on my concern for other people.
18. I choose a course of action that maximizes the help other people
receive.
19. My decisions are usually based on concern for the welfare of others.
 Mutual concerns moral reasoning
20. My decisions are usually based on what is the most fair and just way to
act.
21. I choose alternatives that are intended to meet everybody’s needs.
22. I choose a course of action that considers the rights of all people
involved.
The data from Penner et al. (1995), based on a large US sample, showed the
following mean scores for each of the separate scales (after reverse-scoring
items marked R): social responsibility (M = 4.18, SD = 0.52), empathetic
concern (M = 3.30, SD = 0.54), perspective taking (M = 4.28, SD = 0.64),
other-oriented moral reasoning (M = 4.28, SD = 0.71), and mutual concerns
moral reasoning (M = 3.84, SD = 0.56). You can compare your own score
with any of these mean scores, to see if you tend to score higher or lower on
each scale than average.
 Summary
In this section we have seen the advantages and disadvantages of laboratory
research that looks at helping behaviour. The early research by Latané and
Darley had the advantage of looking at real-life helping behaviours rather than
self-report measures. However, it also neglected important aspects of helping
situations, in particular violence and gender. Later researchers used a variety of
methods – including field experiments, observational methods and analysis of
court documents – to explore these absences. This research revealed that
bystanders to violence might act differently than they do in other emergencies. It
also showed the importance of gender – not only in violent emergencies, but also
in the way researchers think about helping in general. The focus on gender led to
research on longer-term sustained helping behaviours rather than short-term
emergency helping. The study of long-term helping behaviours has included an
interest in volunteerism and the study of the effects of volunteer behaviour on
the volunteer and the person in need.
 DOES EVOLUTION MAKE US SELFISH?
What is the difference between the ‘coefficient of relatedness’ and
the ‘proportion of shared genes’, and which is the more important
factor in whom we help most?
In considering why people do help each other, we have so far considered a
number of theoretical frameworks that have arisen from social psychological
research. In particular we have already seen the debates between social
psychologists on the question of whether humans can be truly altruistic. This
debate has been about whether humans are responding to their own discomfort
and distress, or the discomfort and distress of others. However, there is another
level at which the question of human altruism has been considered. Evolutionary
biologists have also been concerned with the question of altruism because
human cooperation is an evolutionary puzzle. Unlike other animals, humans
frequently cooperate with genetically unrelated strangers, often in large groups,
with people they will never meet again, and in circumstances where the
reputation gains for helping are small or absent (Fehr & Gächter, 2002). The
focus of this research is concerned with what Penner et al. (2005) would call the
micro-level of analysis, which they argue is underrepresented in psychological
helping research.
Early research in this area of evolutionary biology suggested that what appears
to be altruism – that is, personal sacrifice on behalf of others – is really just
behaviour that serves self-interest in the long run. This idea was based on a
gene-centred approach to understanding human behaviour. From the gene’s
point of view, evolutionary success depends on leaving the maximum number of
copies of itself behind in the population. Richard Dawkins, in his book The
Selfish Gene (1976, 1989), described humans as ‘survival machines – robot
vehicles blindly programmed to preserve the selfish molecules known as genes .
. . this selfishness will usually give rise to selfishness in individual behaviour’ (p.
1).
According to this view, when we help others, we must be doing so because of
some other, self-interested motivation. The first explanation for why this might
happen came in the form of inclusive fitness theory (Hamilton, 1964). Hamilton
extended Charles Darwin’s classic version of natural selection, which had, until
this point, focused on genetic inheritance through transmission to direct
offspring only. Hamilton argued that, because close relatives of an organism
shared some identical genes, the idea of reproductive fitness could be extended
beyond immediate offspring to include the wider network of an organism’s kin.
Using mathematical principles, Hamilton demonstrated that the general theory of
the evolutionary emergence of genes also applies to the genes that underlie
altruistic behaviour. He showed how the idea of a coefficient of relatedness can
be used to explain how genes for altruism emerge, and what the limits of this
altruistic behaviour might be. For example, assuming there is reproductive
benefit to the species as a whole of the parent sacrificing their own interests to
favour their own child, then a gene that causes its possessor to give parental care
will leave more copies than a gene which promotes child neglect. More children
survive to continue the altruism gene line. In other words, this gene for parental
care comes to be naturally selected.

- - - - - - - - - -

coefficient of relatedness (r) between two individuals can be calculated by knowing how many
steps removed individuals are from a common ancestor (e.g. coefficients of relatedness between
children–parents and grandchildren–grandparents are .5 and .25, respectively).

- - - - - - - - - -

Given the nature of genetic transfer of information (we receive half of our
genome from each of our parents), the likelihood of passing on this gene to an
offspring would be 50 per cent (the likelihood of a grandchild receiving this
gene would then be 25 per cent, reducing to 12.5 per cent in a great grandchild,
and so on). Similarly, it becomes possible to calculate this coefficient of
relatedness (or r) between siblings or between cousins – in fact between any
combination of family members. For example, siblings with the same mother
and father share half their genetic inheritance and thus have a coefficient of
relatedness of .5 (or 50 per cent). First cousins (i.e. those whose parents are
siblings) will have a coefficient of relatedness of .125 (or 12.5 per cent) – while
each cousin will have an r of .25 (or 25 per cent) in their relationship to the
common grandparent. Thus, using the coefficient of relatedness as a
mathematical principle for determining relatedness, the degree of altruism
towards others can be predicted. The more distant the relatedness, the less
helping will be offered. This is captured nicely in a quote attributed to the
famous British geneticist and evolutionary biologist J. B. S Haldane. When
asked if he would give his life to save a drowning brother, he is reputed to have
said, ‘No, but I would to save two brothers or eight cousins’ (quoted in
McElreath & Boyd, 2007, p. 82). Of course, the logic of this approach is that
there is no gene-level self-interest in helping unrelated strangers, and so we are
less likely to do so.
From the point of view of genetic selection, the coefficient of relatedness
matters much more at the beginning of the evolutionary process, when the gene
underlying kin altruism first emerges and begins to become selected. However,
once these genes evolve and spread, they end up in most individuals in a species.
For example, everywhere you look today, in human and animal societies,
parental care seems to be the norm. However, the fact that everybody employs
the same strategy does not mean that the evolutionary advantage of selectively
helping kin goes away. Rather it becomes an evolutionarily stable strategy
(Dawkins, 1979) that continues to outperform strategies of random acts of
helping other unrelated strangers. In other words, kin selection continues to
offer evolutionary advantage – which is why it does not die out.

- - - - - - - - - -

kin selection (also known as inclusive fitness theory) proposes that we have evolved to favour
people who are genetically related to us, and are more likely to help close relatives (kin) than
strangers.

- - - - - - - - - -

In understanding the role of kin selection in altruism, it is important not to

mistake coefficient of relatedness with proportion of shared genes. Park (2007)
points out that this is a common mistake in most social psychology textbooks.
Hamilton’s (1964) inclusive fitness theory is not saying that we help others
because we share a large proportion of our genes with them. After all, by some
measures, humans share 99 per cent of their genes, and there is a 98 per cent
genetic overlap between humans and chimpanzees. There is no easy way to
divide humans by the amount of genetic material they share. In other words, it is
a mistake to characterize the idea of kin selection as something that says that we
help genetically similar individuals. We are all genetically similar to each other.
Hamilton’s mechanism for explaining altruistic behaviour is the degree of
relatedness to others specifically in respect of the altruism gene. All remaining
genes in our bodies are completely irrelevant to the discussion.

- - - - - - - - - -

proportion of shared genes refers to the amount of genetic material shared by humans (and
animals); humans have an almost identical proportion of shared genes with any randomly selected
other human being.

- - - - - - - - - -

This misunderstanding has occasionally been worked up into theories that

propose differences in helping based on genetic similarity (cf. Rushton’s, 1989,
Genetic Similarity Theory, which argues that individuals tend to be more
altruistic to individuals who are genetically similar to themselves – even if they
are not kin – and less altruistic or even hostile to people less genetically similar).
This attempt to stray into group-level genetic explanations has been widely
criticized (Tooby & Cosmides, 1989). The idea that genes can somehow
recognize similarity in other genes, and that this can be a basis for favouritism
towards ingroup members and hostility towards outgroup members, is a
corruption of the idea of kin selection. Kin selection says nothing about a
predisposition for favouring your own group on the basis of genetic composition.
As we have seen, it is a theory about the selection and transmission of genetic
information – it is not a way of dividing the world up into groups who are
genetically similar or dissimilar. People who use the idea of kin selection and the
coefficient of relatedness to argue that humans are genetically programmed to
help people in their group and to ignore or neglect outgroup members are
misunderstanding and misrepresenting the science.
A second way in which self-interest is seen to shape altruism can be found in
the idea of reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971). This is a theory designed to
account for why we might help strangers or non-kin. Trivers suggests that
altruism towards strangers could have evolved if there was a chance of being in a
reverse situation in which someone who had been helped would then reciprocate
the help they had received. In other words, reciprocal altruism could have
evolved because it might be beneficial to incur the cost of helping (which would
temporarily reduce the helper’s genetic ‘fitness’ while promoting a stranger’s
‘fitness’) if there is the expectation that the person who has been helped will
perform an altruistic act towards the helper at a future date.

- - - - - - - - - -

reciprocal altruism a theory designed to explain altruism towards strangers by proposing that
helping non-kin may have evolved if the cost of helping another is offset by the likelihood of the
return benefit.

- - - - - - - - - -

Sharing of food is a good example. Giving food to others may mean slightly
less food now (a cost) in return for the possibility of more food later (particularly
when it might be especially scarce, in times of famine for instance). However, in
behaving in this way, altruists are taking a risk. Since the reward for their
generosity will come at some time in the future, they are relying on the goodwill
of the recipient to return the favour. It is always possible for recipients to defect
– that is, to accept the altruistically offered help but then refuse to reciprocate.
Thus, for reciprocal altruism to exist, the same individuals must come into
regular contact. There must also be a large number of opportunities for
exchanges that ultimately cost the altruist less than they benefit the recipient –
otherwise there would be no long-term advantage in engaging in the
relationships. Finally, there must be a way to detect ‘cheating’ or defection in
order to dissuade people from doing so. Reciprocal altruism stops happening if
defection occurs.
As an evolutionary biologist, Trivers (1971) was really interested in reciprocal
altruism in terms of its fitness consequences for species, rather than its
motivating intentions for individuals. He saw reciprocal altruism as an
evolutionary mechanism rather than something that was actively adapted by
interacting individuals. It is in trying to understand the psychological aspects of
altruistic behaviour that researchers in behavioural economics and social
psychology have begun to revisit and reframe the idea of reciprocal altruism.
 When helping is not self-interested
In addition to research on kin selection and reciprocal altruism, recent
experimental work has revealed a form of human cooperation between
genetically unrelated individuals that cannot be explained in terms of self-
interest. Using an experimental paradigm called a public goods game,
researchers have discovered a phenomenon called altruistic punishment (Fehr &
Gächter, 2002). In public goods games, three or more individuals interact
anonymously in a game in which they can award points to themselves or allocate
points to a common account which would benefit everybody; the points are
translated into money at the end of the game. Purely self-interested players
should always award themselves all the points and put none in the common
account. However, only a tiny fraction of players ever do this. Most participants
start off by sharing about half their points, and sharing less and less as time goes
on.

- - - - - - - - - -

public goods game participants are allocated tokens, and can then (secretly) decide how many to
keep and how many to contribute to a public pot; contributing nothing is termed free riding.

- - - - - - - - - -

What is particularly interesting about these experiments, however, is the fact

that, when a participant sees selfish behaviour in others, they are moved to
punish them. Moreover, they engage in punishment behaviour of others even
when it hurts themselves. They will give up money in order to ensure the selfish
player loses money – or even be prepared to pay a fine to allow them to punish a
defector. Participants engage in this kind of behaviour even when they have no
expectation of interacting with the others in the game ever again, and when
nobody else would know what they had done. Fehr and Gächter argue that this
kind of punishment (and the cost it entails) does not fit the principles of
reciprocal altruism or reputation management.
What the punishment behaviour does is dissuade individuals in the game from
behaving selfishly, and therefore contributes to the maintenance of cooperation.
Thus, altruistic punishment behaviour is a form of helping. It helps the group to
remain cooperative. It is a sacrifice by the individual in a way that cannot be
explained in terms of self-interest. It seems to be designed to promote group
interest. Gintis (2000) argues that this behaviour reveals a third principle of
human altruism (in addition to kin selection and reciprocal altruism) that he calls
strong reciprocity. Strong reciprocity is a human predisposition to cooperate
with others and to punish those who defect – even when the punishment is
personally costly for the punisher, and the punisher has no expectation of
receiving a reward for this sacrifice at a later date.

- - - - - - - - - -

strong reciprocity a human predisposition to cooperate with others and to punish those who defect,
even when this behaviour cannot be justified in terms of self-interest, extended kinship or
reciprocal altruism.

- - - - - - - - - -
 Summary
Research from the perspective of evolutionary psychology has made important
contributions to how we think about and understand prosocial behaviour. Recent
discoveries have shown that humans do not only help those they believe to be
family or kin – nor do they only act in a self-interested fashion. There is
evidence for the evolutionary importance of the capacity of individuals to punish
selfish behaviour in others, even when it is costly to themselves.
 THE SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE OF
HELPING
What do we know about brain activation and helping behaviour?
Recent research in social neuroscience has used functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) to identify brain networks involved in altruism and helping
behaviour. In one such study (Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen,
2003), participants took part in public goods games while placed in a scanner.
They found that different areas of the brain become activated when a participant
discovers whether someone has made a fair or an unfair offer. When we see
others behaving in what we think is an unfair manner, then the region of the
brain known as the bilateral insula (see Figure 10.11b) is activated. This area of
the brain is known to be associated with negative emotional states such as pain,
hunger and distrust. The stronger the activation, the more likely people are to
reject an unfair offer.
FIGURE 10.11(a) and (b) Sagittal section through the brain showing (a) the
striatum and nucleus accumbens, and (b) the insula.
 When it comes to brain activation involved in altruistic, fair and trusting
behaviours, Fehr and Camerer (2007) argue that fMRI studies reveal activation
in reward-related brain areas such as the striatum (see Figure 10.11a). They
reviewed studies in which people could make offers to charity while inside a
scanner. They point out that the areas that are commonly activated when people
are engaged in giving to charity have a large degree of overlap with areas that
are known to activate when people receive positive social or financial rewards.
They suggest that this shows, at a neural level at least, that altruistic behaviour
has its own intrinsic rewards.
Researchers have also looked at the neurobiological mechanisms underlying
prosocial decisions and how they might be moderated by factors such as
empathy and group membership. For example, Hein, Silani, Preuschoff, Batson,
and Singer (2010) conducted a two-part experiment with football fans that used
fMRI to look at brain activation when the fans were placed in a situation in
which they could offer or withhold help from ingroup or outgroup members. In
the first part of the experiment, participants interacted (by taking part in a quiz)
with confederates of the experimenters, who pretended to be either fans of the
same team as the participant (ingroup members) or fans from a local rival team
(outgroup members). After this interaction the participant entered the scanner.
While they were in the scanner they were either given – or watched an ingroup
or an outgroup member receive – a series of electric shocks. Their brain
activation was measured during this time.
In a second session of the study some time later, the same participants were
scanned again. This time, however, none of the participants received shocks
themselves: instead they only watched the ingroup and outgroup fan in pain.
They were given the choice between three options. In the first option, they could
volunteer to help the ingroup or the outgroup person by asking to be given half
the shock level about to be administered. In other words, they could reduce the
pain for the other person by taking some of it upon themselves. In the second
option they could simply watch a soccer video instead – thus distracting
themselves while the other person was given the shocks. In the third option, they
could simply watch the other person suffering the pain.
Hein et al. found that willingness to help the ingroup member was related to
activation in the anterior insula (AI) region of the brain – and to post-
experimental self-report measures that showed higher empathic concern. The
anterior insula is one of the areas that has previously been identified as central to
empathy-related brain responses (Singer & Lamm, 2009). At the same time, not
helping the outgroup members was best predicted by activation in the nucleus
accumbens (NAcc) region of the brain (see Figure 10.11a). NAcc activation has
previously been observed in studies in which people derive pleasure from the
misfortune of others (Singer et al., 2006). This suggests that watching an
outgroup member receive pain could be processed in a reward-related manner.
On the basis of these results, Hein et al. suggested that this kind of fMRI study
reveals the possibility of two types of motivational systems that underlie helping
behaviour: activation in the AI when witnessing suffering indicates empathy-
based motivation and an increased willingness to help; activation in the NAcc
suggests empathy is absent and helping is withheld. Moreover, Hein et al.
showed that there is an ingroup bias in empathy-related AI responses and
ingroup helping. We are more likely to respond to an ingroup member’s pain
with an empathy-related response. However, if an outgroup member was
evaluated positively then his suffering elicited AI (empathy-based) rather than
NAcc (pleasure-related) activation, and he was likely to receive help despite his
outgroup membership. These findings are an interesting companion to the work
of Stürmer and colleagues (see the section on identity, emotion and helping).
Stürmer et al. argue that the motivations for helping ingroup and outgroup
members are different. Helping ingroup members is motivated by empathy,
while helping outgroup members is motivated by feelings of liking or attraction
(Stürmer et al., 2005; Stürmer et al., 2006).
 Summary
Recent advances in technologies to study the brain have begun to reveal the
neural correlates of different kinds of helping behaviour. Different areas of the
brain seem to be activated when we help others, and when we refrain from
helping. This activation seems to occur in centres that are associated with
empathy (when we help ingroup members) and pleasure (when we fail to help
outgroup members). These findings may indicate different brain activation
systems for different kinds of helping behaviour. These are exciting new areas of
research with the potential to transform our understanding of human
prosociality.
 HELPING IN THE REAL WORLD
Is it always good to help?
At first sight it might seem as though the motivation to help others must always
be a good thing. In fact, in much of this chapter we have explored attempts to
understand why people help in order that we might increase the likelihood that
people will help. However, it turns out that not all helping behaviour has positive
outcomes – and, even when intentions may be noble, some helping can harm the
receivers of help.

LEADER IN THE FIELD

Arie Nadler (b. 1947) obtained his PhD from Purdue University in
1976, and is currently Professor of Social Psychology at Tel-Aviv
University. He holds the Argentina Chair for Research of
Psychology of Conflict and Cooperation, and was co-founder of the
Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research at Tel-Aviv University.
Nadler’s work has questioned the taken-for-granted notion that
helping others is universally positive. In his work, Nadler has
highlighted the importance of power relations, and demonstrated
how helping relations can be seen as unequal social relations, given
the ability of the helper to help. Thus, those who are dependent on
help may subsequently be seen as having lower status and lacking in
power.
Nadler (e.g. 2002), who has conducted extensive research in the context of the
intractable Arab–Israeli conflict, points out that all helping (both interpersonal
and intergroup) involves power relations. Put another way, Nadler argues that
helping, almost by definition, occurs between unequals. A person or group who
has superior resources directs them towards another person or group who are in
need. If the helper and the recipient are in an unequal relationship, then helping
can signal caring and generosity on the part of the helper, but it can also remind
the recipient of their dependence and weakness. This threat to personal or group
esteem can sometimes lead the recipient to resist or reject the help (Nadler &
Fisher, 1986; see Leader in the Field, Arie Nadler).
 For example, Nadler and Saguy (2004) show how attempts by the Israeli
government to offer assistance to Palestinian groups were often rejected on the
grounds that they would perpetuate Palestinians’ economic, academic or cultural
dependence on Israelis. Palestinians were upset when Israelis assumed they
knew what kind of help was required without asking, or offered Palestinians help
without asking if they needed it. Nadler refers to this kind of helping as
‘assumptive’ help, and demonstrates that assumptive help can be bad for the
personal self-worth or collective self-esteem of the recipient (Halabi, Dovidio, &
Nadler, 2008).
In addition to assuming they know what is required, powerful groups can harm
those they attempt to help by offering some kinds of help and not others. As the
Chinese proverb says, ‘give a man a fish and he will eat for a day, teach a man to
fish and he will eat for a lifetime’. Similarly, Nadler identifies two kinds of
helping, dependency-orientated help and autonomy-orientated help.
Dependency-orientated help consists of providing the recipient with the full
solution to the problem. It treats recipients as though they are unable to
contribute towards solving their problems and, furthermore, reinforces their
dependency on the powerful group. By contrast, autonomy-orientated help
consists of providing recipients with the tools to solve the problem on their own.
It treats recipients as resourceful, and assumes that, once they acquire the
appropriate tools, they will be able to tackle their own difficulties.
For Nadler, the way help is offered, and the kind of help that is offered, tells us
much about status relations between individuals and groups. He has developed
the Intergroup Helping as Status Relations (IHSR) model (Nadler, 2002) to show
how groups can use helping behaviour to preserve or challenge their status with
respect to a relevant outgroup. The model makes specific predictions about the
kinds of help high-status groups will offer and the kinds of help low-status
groups will seek. For example, when relations between groups are perceived as
stable and legitimate, then low status groups are happy to receive dependency-
orientated help from high status groups (see also the summary of social identity
theory in Chapter 14). However, when relations are seen as illegitimate and
unstable, the politics of helping become very tense. High-status groups are
motivated to withhold autonomy-orientated help and promote dependency-
orientated help as a way of trying to counter the threat of the low-status group.
High-status groups try to use helping to secure their own dominant social
position – rather than to meet the needs of the less well-off. Nadler and
colleagues refer to this as defensive helping (Nadler, Harpaz-Gorodeisky, &
Ben-David, 2009). At the same time, the low-status group becomes less willing
to receive dependency-orientated help and more motivated to seek autonomy-
orientated help. When low-status groups reject offers of help they are often seen
as irrational or ungrateful. However, it is usually because they perceive the kind
of help on offer as being dependency-orientated and designed to undermine their
ability to take control of their own destiny. Nadler’s keen eye for the politics of
the Israeli–Palestinian conflict has allowed him to demonstrate that groups
arrange power and status relations not only through negative behaviours like
discrimination and hostility, but also through seemingly positive behaviours like
helping.
 Do people act selfishly in life-threatening
emergencies?
While, as we have seen, debates continue regarding whether human beings are
essentially selfish or altruistic by nature, it is often claimed that human beings’
essential selfishness is revealed in emergency or life-threatening situations. Take
the example of a fire in a crowded place. The common conception – fuelled by
plotlines for Hollywood disaster movies – is that people try to save themselves at
the expense of others. They rush to the exits, trampling others underfoot, in a
single-minded attempt to save their own life (Figure 10.12). Viewed in this way,
people look like selfish actors who have produced a situation of mass panic.
Because everyone is looking after himself or herself, they don’t cooperate, and
become increasingly competitive in a way that produces irrational or aggressive
behaviour. This idea of the panicked crowd has a long history. High death tolls
in the Iroquois Theatre fire in Chicago in 1903 (in which 600 people died) and
the Cocoanut Grove Theatre fire in Boston in 1942 (in which 492 died) have
both been attributed to foolish overreactions to the fire. These events were
always presented as classic cases of mass panic.
FIGURE 10.12(a) and (b) ’Loveparade 2010’ in Duisburg, Germany. More
than twenty people were killed and hundreds were injured in a panicked crush of
partygoers in an overcrowded tunnel that served as the sole entrance to the
festival.
Source: (a) © WIEBOLD TV via APTN; (b) © BILD.DE via APTN. Both
images used under licence from Press Association Images.
 However, more recently, social psychologists have begun to change their
minds about what really happens in emergencies. For example, Chertkoff and
Kushigian (1999) studied the Cocoanut Grove fire in detail and discovered that
physical obstructions and not mass panic were responsible for the loss of life.
Deaths were caused by blocked exits and poor building design (such as doors
which opened inwards rather than outwards). The club owner was found guilty
of involuntary manslaughter and new fire regulations were developed to stop this
happening again. However, the myth of the panicked crowd persisted.
Frey, Savage, and Torgler (2010) looked at survival rates from two of the
greatest maritime disasters in history, the sinking of the Titanic and the Lusitania
(see also Social Psychology Beyond the Lab 10.2). They studied passenger and
survival lists from both ships and controlled for the effect of gender, age, ticket
class, nationality and type of family relationship. They found that children were
more likely to survive than adults on the Titanic, but more likely than adults to
die on the Lusitania. Women were more likely than men to survive on the
Titanic, but less likely to survive than men on the Lusitania. Frey et al. suggest
that these differences in survival rates can be explained by the behaviour of the
men. When there was a fair amount of time after the original shock of the
emergency (as there was on the Titanic) then there was a chance for social norms
to re-establish themselves. The norm of ‘women and children first’ became
established and increased the survival rate for those categories. However, when
there was no time (as in the sinking of the Lusitania) then more self-interested
and selfish behaviour predominated and male survival rates were higher. This
suggests that responses to emergencies can be shaped by social norms rather
than panic, and that normative behaviour can become strongly established if time
allows.
This idea of the response to rapidly unfolding emergencies was also studied by
two fire safety researchers (Proulx & Fahy, 2003) who analysed ordinary
people’s responses and behaviours in the aftermath of plane strikes on the twin
towers of New York City’s World Trade Centre on September 11th 2001. Fires
were raging on the upper floors of the 110-story towers and the only way out
was down the stairwells. Based on interviews with firefighters and other
emergency staff, as well as survivor testimony, Proulx and Fahy found that there
was none of the mass panic that many emergency planners expect to see in a
disaster. Instead, they showed that people behaved sensibly and displayed a
solidarity that was a valuable asset. They knew they were in danger but they
were not screaming and trampling each other. They waited in line in the packed
stairwells, taking turns and helping those that needed help. Some individuals
even put themselves in greater danger to free obstructions that were preventing
others from escaping. Of course, there were a few individuals who looked after
themselves and ignored others in distress, but they were few and far between.
Because of this orderly evacuation and these unofficial rescue efforts, most
people below the impact zones managed to get out of the building alive.
In similar fashion, Drury and colleagues (Drury, Cocking, & Reicher, 2009;
Drury & Reicher, 2010) showed that the response of ordinary people to the
bombing of the London transport system on July 7th 2005 was also marked by a
sense of togetherness and solidarity. In a coordinated terrorist attack, four bombs
were detonated (three on subway trains and one on a bus) during the morning
rush hour. Those on the trains were left in the dark, surrounded by the dead and
injured, and in fear that there might be further explosions. In a series of
interviews with survivors, including 90 people who were on the trains, Drury
and colleagues found that there was no panic. People helped each other by
tending to the injured, offering emotional support and sharing water. They did
not flee in a frantic attempt to save themselves. In fact, most of the interviewees
described a strong sense of togetherness in the face of the emergency. They
talked about feelings of unity, affinity and togetherness, and contrasted this with
the kinds of feelings they would normally experience in the presence of others
on a crowded commuter train.
Drury suggests that emergencies produce a sense of common fate amongst the
victims, and that this in turn leads to a sense of shared identity (Turner et al.,
1987). Ordinary commuters sharing a train carriage on a normal workday may
be physically close – but psychologically distant. In fact, the very presence of
other strangers may make them think more about themselves as individuals.
However, when the emergency strikes, and seems to affect everyone equally,
then their identity can change to include others. People shift from thinking about
‘me’ to ‘us’. This leads to greater mutual helping and mutual support.
Drury et al. (2009) went on to look at behaviour in a range of emergency
situations, including disasters in football stadiums, music festivals and sinking
ships. They showed that the same pattern applies. All the crowds seemed to
display some sense of unity when the emergency began, even if they began as
fragmented groups; those who reported a greater sense of common fate showed
higher levels of shared identity; those with higher shared identity were more
likely to talk about examples of shared helping. Based on their extensive work in
this area, Drury and Reicher (2010) conclude that behaviour in emergencies is
not radically different from behaviour in everyday situations. When an
emergency happens, people continue to observe social norms, act in terms of
their social values and remember their humanity. They do not turn into savages
desperate to escape. In fact, these researchers argue that ‘disasters bring out the
best – not the beast – in people’ (p. 65).

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BEYOND THE

LAB 10.2
UNDERSTANDING BEHAVIOUR IN LIFE-
THREATENING EMERGENCIES
While it is possible to simulate many things in a laboratory setting, it would
be impossible (for ethical and practical reasons) to create conditions in
which people truly felt that their lives were in danger. And yet, when trying
to answer questions about whether humans are fundamentally self-interested
or whether they can behave in a truly altruistic fashion, it is how people act
in these extreme situations that is of profound interest to psychologists. In
the absence of evidence, there is a danger we may fall back on anecdote or
prejudice. One manifestation of this is the myth of mass panic in crowd
emergencies. For a long time the common-sense assumption about
behaviour in life-threatening emergencies was that it was almost always
marked by selfish, panic-stricken behaviour in which individuals tried to
save themselves. However, recent innovative research, exploring data from
real life emergencies, has begun to paint alternative pictures of how humans
behave under life-threatening conditions.
For example, Frey et al. (2010) conducted a fascinating analysis of the
survival rates from two of the most catastrophic marine disasters of all time
– the sinking of the Titanic and the Lusitania. These were both enormous
ships, built with similar designs, that sank within three years of each other
with a similar loss of life (a death rate of 68.7 per cent for the Titanic and
67.3 per cent for the Lusitania). Frey et al. were able to use the sinking of
these two ships as a kind of ‘natural experiment’. The key difference
between the two disasters was the time it took for each ship to sink. The
Lusitania went under in 18 minutes, while the Titanic stayed afloat for 2
hours and 40 minutes. Frey et al. compared and contrasted survival rates,
while controlling for factors such as the number of men, women and
children on board each ship, the social class of the passengers, where they
were likely to be located on the ship and the number and size of family
groups. Some interesting differences emerged. Children were 14.8 per cent
more likely to survive than adults on the Titanic, but on the Lusitania they
were 5.3 per cent less likely to do so. Women were 53 per cent more likely
to survive than men on the Titanic, but 1.1 per cent less likely to do so on
the Lusitania. Frey et al. argue that these different survival rates suggest that
– on the Titanic at least – social norms rather than self-interest seemed to
govern people’s behaviour. On the Titanic, compared with the Lusitania,
men were more likely to help women and children into the lifeboats, and so
their survival rates were higher than would be expected. On the Lusitania,
where time was scarce, individual self-interest seems to have predominated,
 and women and children were less likely to have survived. Frey et al.
propose that, in emergencies that unfold over a longer period of time,
socially determined behavioural patterns have time to re-establish
themselves after the shock of the original emergency. The fact that there was
time available to evacuate the ship in the case of the Titanic meant that
prosocial behaviour predominated. However, in the rapidly sinking
Lusitania, Frey et al. suggest that short-term flight impulses may have
dominated behaviour, leading to more self-interested and selfish behaviour
amongst the men and less concern for the welfare of women and children.
Of course, this kind of analysis tells us very little about people’s own
understanding of their behaviour in these emergencies. Frey et al. did not
have any data from the passengers on the ships themselves: they could only
extrapolate from the patterns of survival to the kinds of behaviours which
might have resulted in the different survival rates.
In a different kind of non-laboratory approach, Drury and colleagues (Drury
et al., 2009; Drury & Reicher, 2010) analysed the behaviour of people in
another kind of emergency, namely the aftermath of a terrorist attack. They
collected evidence from survivors of the bomb attacks on the London
Underground (and a London bus) on July 7th, 2005 (Figure 10.13). More
specifically, they collected data from a variety of different sources, which all
contained accounts of the events from the perspectives of both survivors and
witnesses. These included contemporaneous newspaper accounts (from 18
newspapers) that reported a range of statements from eyewitnesses and
survivors. In addition Drury et al. established a collection of 127 personal
accounts that were given to official reviews, BBC websites, blogs, message
boards, books and a radio documentary. Finally, they recruited primary
respondents (people who had been in the bombings and were prepared to be
interviewed directly). The primary respondents were recruited through
newspaper advertisements – and from advertisements on the websites of
support groups. Fifteen interviews were done online and 12 interviews were
conducted face-to-face.
FIGURE 10.13(a) and (b) Devastation after the London terrorist attacks in
July 2005.
Source: Both images © Press Association Images.
All this data from the three sources was then transcribed and prepared for
analysis. The data was coded and subjected to a thematic analysis. The
researchers looked for themes like ‘panic’ or ‘helping’. Based on this
analysis, Drury et al. showed that the term ‘panic’ was used by a few
witnesses and survivors, but mostly by commentators who did not witness
events directly. Descriptions from the survivors tell the opposite story.
Rather than selfishness and competition, mutual helping and concern
predominated. In fact, helping seemed to take place despite the fact that
people felt they were in personal danger, rather than because they felt out of
danger once the first bomb had gone off.
 Summary
Looking at the complexities of helping in the real world helps to deepen our
understanding of helping behaviour. Not all helping is good – even when the
motivations behind it are noble. To understand the true effects of helping, we
need to ask what kind of help is being offered and who is likely to benefit. We
also need to challenge prevailing myths about human nature. Research on real-
life emergencies has shown that disasters do not always or necessarily bring out
the selfish survivalist in humans. Rather, the evidence is that people tend to help
each other – even at the potential cost of their own lives. These ideas are helping
to change the way policy-makers and practitioners think about human helping
behaviour in emergency situations.

CHAPTER SUMMARY
Why study prosocial behaviour? The study of prosocial behaviour allows
psychologists to explore basic questions about human nature. These
include questions of whether humans are fundamentally selfish or selfless
by nature, or whether humans are ultimately good or bad.
What is prosocial behaviour? Various terms are used to define the subject
matter in the area of prosocial behaviour. What is considered to be
prosocial can be seen to be culturally dependent, but prosocial behaviour
is essentially behaviour that is defined as beneficial to other people, but
not carried out as part of an obligation.
What kinds of phenomena do researchers in this area study? Research in
this area covers many different kinds of behaviours, ranging from short-
term helping in emergencies, everyday acts of helping, through to long-
term, sustained helping where the helper may put themselves in a position
of considerable danger.
What role does altruism play? There is empirical support for the existence
of altruistically motivated helping. Research looking at the empathy-
altruism hypothesis has shown that feelings of empathy can lead to
helping which has the end goal of increasing another person’s welfare.
What determines helping in emergency situations? Situational factors are
important determinants of behaviour in emergency situations. Latané and
Darley’s work on the bystander effect has demonstrated the influence of
the presence of others on bystander behaviour in emergencies, with a
 particular focus on why people do not help.
What role does arousal play in emergency situations? Research that looks
at why people do help has suggested that unpleasant arousal is created in
an emergency situation, and that people will seek to reduce this arousal as
a result of considering the costs and rewards of helping and not helping.
How do group processes shape helping behaviour? Group processes have
been highlighted as important across a range of helping behaviours. While
these have sometimes been presented as impacting negatively on helping,
a range of contemporary research has begun to highlight how our
psychological connection to others can have a positive impact on helping.
What methods are used in helping research? A wide range of methods
has been used to study prosocial behaviours. While the use of laboratory
settings has a number of advantages, research using alternative methods
has provided novel insights into the factors impacting on bystander
behaviour.
Are there gender differences in helping? While it seems that men may
help more than women, this may be a result of the kinds of helping
situations that have been studied. When we study helping in long-term,
close relationships, women tend to help more.
Why do people volunteer? Work on the psychology of volunteerism has
shown the importance of identity processes for volunteer behaviour.
Does evolution make us selfish? Research from evolutionary biology has
suggested that helping is not entirely selfishly motivated, and that humans
will punish selfish behaviours in others.
What do we know about brain activation and helping behaviour?
Research from social neuroscience has helped us to identify some of the
neural correlates of prosocial behaviours.
Is helping always good? Prosocial behaviours are not always positive,
both from the perspective of the giver and the receiver of help.
Contemporary research on receiving help, for example, has demonstrated
the importance of power relations in helping situations.
Do we behave selfishly in emergencies? Disasters do not bring out the
selfish nature of humans. Evidence from real-world disasters suggests that
people in such emergencies tend to help each other, even when their own
lives are in danger.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

Batson, C. D. (2011). Altruism in humans. New York: Oxford University Press.
A timely and useful overview of theory and research on the empathy-altruism
hypothesis.
Bierhoff, H. W. (2002). Prosocial behaviour. Hove, UK: Psychology Press.
Presents a wide range of research on the psychology of prosocial behaviour in its
many different forms.
Dovidio, J. F., Piliavin, J. A., Schroeder, D. A., & Penner, L. A. (2006). The
social psychology of prosocial behavior. Mahwah, N.J: Erlbaum. An
authoritative overview of the field by a quartet of the leading North American
scholars and researchers in this area.
Fischer, P., Krueger, J. I., Greitemeyer, T., Vogrincic, C., Kastenmüller, A.,
Frey, D., Heene, M., Wicher, M., & Kainbacher, M. (2011). The bystander-
effect: A meta-analytic review on bystander intervention in dangerous and non-
dangerous emergencies. Psychological Bulletin, 137, 517–537. A recent meta-
analysis of the classic bystander effect, setting out the limitations of the effect in
different emergency situations and pointing to different explanations of their
findings.
Penner, L. A., Dovidio, J. F., Piliavin, J. A., & Schroeder, D. A. (2005).
Prosocial behavior: Multilevel perspectives. Annual Review of Psychology, 56,
365–392. A useful review article that integrates a range of research to set out the
different levels of analysis involved in a broad range of prosocial phenomena.
Piliavin, J. A., Dovidio, J. F., Gaertner, S. L., & Clark, R. D., III. (1981).
Emergency intervention. New York: Academic Press. This book presents a wide
range of research relating to the arousal: cost–reward model of intervention in
emergencies, and also gives an insight into how such models are developed over
time.
Stürmer, S., & Snyder, M. (Eds.). (2010). The psychology of prosocial behavior:
Group processes, intergroup relations, and helping. Chichester, UK: Wiley-
Blackwell. An edited volume that presents a range of contemporary perspectives
on different forms of prosocial behaviour.
 Chapter 11

Affiliation, Attraction and Close Relationships

Johan C. Karremans and Catrin Finkenauer

Source: © Dan Bannister. Used under licence from Shutterstock.

KEY TERMS

attachment theory
communal relationship
companionate love
derogation of alternatives
disclosure reciprocity
equity theory
evolutionary psychology
 exchange relationship
forgiveness
investments
mere exposure effect
misattribution of arousal
need to belong
passionate love
perceived partner responsiveness
relationship commitment
relationship superiority
self-disclosure
similarity–attraction effect
social support
willingness to sacrifice
CHAPTER OUTLINE
INTRODUCTION
THE IMPORTANCE OF RELATIONSHIPS
Relationships and psychological wellbeing Relationships and physical
wellbeing The role of social support The immediate effects of social
exclusion The need to belong
Attachment
Summary
INTERPERSONAL ATTRACTION
The benefits of physical attractiveness What is beautiful is good The
features that determine physical attractiveness Contextual influences on
physical attractiveness Psychological attraction Proximity
Familiarity
Similarity
Underestimating the power of the situation Summary
ROMANTIC RELATIONSHIPS
Love
Relationship satisfaction and stability Thoughts and behaviours that
enhance relationship functioning Summary
GENERAL RELATIONSHIP PROCESSES
Types of relationships
 Disclosure
Perceived partner responsiveness Relationship ending
Summary

ROUTE MAP OF THE CHAPTER

It is hard to imagine a human being living in complete isolation from other
people. Indeed, in our daily lives, we are almost constantly surrounded by
others, ranging from strangers to people we feel very close to, like our
friends or romantic partner. But why do we feel the need to be with others in
the first place, and why can it be so painful to feel rejected by others? Why
do we feel attracted to some people, but not to others? What determines
whether some relationships are filled with happiness, whereas other
relationships seem bound for disaster? This chapter addresses these
questions. We begin with an explanation of the seemingly natural need of
humans to connect to others. We then follow the development of a
relationship, starting with a discussion of the factors that determine initial
interpersonal attraction. We discuss what determines relationship
satisfaction and stability, and provide an overview of the specific ingredients
– the specific relationship processes – that characterize a successful, and
unsuccessful, romantic relationship. We conclude with some general
processes that may occur across different types of relationships.
 INTRODUCTION
Perhaps even more than a transition to a higher education level, going to college
is a transition to a new social life, a time where one meets many new people.
Students are making new friends and, for many of them, college years may be
the time to find a future romantic partner. For some, the prospect of meeting new
people, or a romantic partner, may be a very appealing one; for others it may be
a little frightening. In any case, almost all students will eventually become part
of a small or large group of friends. Many of them will indeed find a romantic
partner; although some may jump from one romantic partner to another, others
may instantly find the love of their life. The quality of college life is surely not
only a matter of whether students are successful in their studies; to a large extent
it depends on the interactions and experiences students have with others,
including peers, lovers, teachers, parents and old and new friends.
What are some of the main issues that have been addressed by relationship
researchers? The first is a very basic one: why do we form relationships with
others in the first place? Why is it, apparently, so important for people to live
their lives in proximity to others? Why do they form close bonds with others?
Once we know the answer to these questions, the next question is, why do we
form bonds with specific others, and not just with anyone? You may think that
people carefully ‘choose’ their friends and partner, based on the specific
characteristics they like in the other person. To some extent this is true, but, as
we will see in this chapter, it appears that there are also more mundane,
situational factors that determine our attraction to others – factors that we may
not be aware of. When we have formed a close relationship with someone – be it
a friend or romantic partner – why is it that some relationships last forever, while
other relationships are less stable? We will discuss how relationship success
depends largely on the interaction patterns between two partners, but also, how
differences in certain personality characteristics can explain why some people
have trouble keeping their relationships intact, whereas others more easily form
stable relationships. Relationship scientists have attempted to tackle these issues
for a long time. A brief summary and some of the highlights of this research will
be presented in this chapter. This chapter should provide you with the tools and
knowledge to answer the questions highlighted above, and should broaden your
understanding and insight into your own and other people’s relationships.
THE IMPORTANCE OF RELATIONSHIPS
What are some of the main functions and consequences of
relationships?
 Relationships and psychological wellbeing
When was the last time you experienced intense joy and happiness? When was
the last time you felt sad or angry? Chances are high that your answer to both
these questions in some way involves other people, most likely others who are
important to you. You may have experienced happiness when you were simply
having a good time in a bar together with your romantic partner, your friends or
family. Or you may have been feeling miserable after a conflict with someone
close to you, which is perhaps still bothering you. Indeed, our emotional life
greatly depends on the experiences and interactions we have with others. Studies
have shown that people generally experience a more positive mood when they
are around other people (for an overview, see Berscheid & Reis, 1998),
especially when experiencing a certain level of closeness and intimacy with
them (Diener, 1984). Being around friends and family simply makes life more
pleasant. In general, a larger social network is positively related to our happiness
(Kawachi & Berkman, 2001). In contrast, people generally experience the
highest levels of negative affect when they are alone (Diener, 1984), and lacking
contact with close others induces feelings of loneliness and depression
(Cacioppo, Hughes, Waite, Hawkley, & Thisted, 2006).
Whether or not we are in a romantic relationship also contributes to our
wellbeing. People who have a steady and satisfying romantic relationship are, on
average, somewhat happier than their single counterparts (Easterlin, 2003). This
is true for both men and women, although happiness seems more strongly
associated with the quality of the relationship among women as compared to
men. In contrast, divorce is generally related to sharp decreases in happiness
(Easterlin, 2003). Of course, this does not necessarily mean that getting married
will make an individual happier. People who are happier may have a higher
chance of getting involved in a long-term romantic relationship than people who
are less happy, because happy people are more pleasant to be with. In line with
this idea, one intriguing study found that a positive emotional expression on
pictures in a college yearbook predicted marriage success twenty years later
(Harker & Keltner, 2001). Still, although it is very likely that causal influences
are bidirectional in this case, relationship researchers generally agree that a
satisfying romantic relationship has an important impact on a person’s
psychological wellbeing.
 Relationships and physical wellbeing
The fact that our relationships with others profoundly impact our psychological
wellbeing may not have surprised you – surely you have experienced yourself
that your mood and happiness is related to your experiences with others.
Probably more impressive are the benefits of social relationships for an
individual’s physical wellbeing. Consider one striking example, a study
conducted by Williams and colleagues (1992): patients with coronary heart
disease had a 30 per cent higher probability of survival after five years when
they were in a romantic relationship when compared to patients who were single.
And among married patients, those with a happy marriage have a nearly 30 per
cent higher chance of survival four years after suffering a heart attack when
compared to patients with poor marriages (Coyne et al., 2001).
The beneficial effects of social relationships are not confined to people who
are already ill. In a now classic study, Berkman and Syme (1979) found that in a
random sample of the population, individuals who had many social ties and were
socially well integrated (in terms of degree of contact with friends and relatives,
romantic relationship status and being a member of informal or formal
organizations) were two to three times more likely to still be alive (i.e. the
mortality rate) nine years later as compared to those who lacked such social ties
(Figure 11.1). The association between social ties and mortality rate was
independent of income and education level, and thus occurred across all socio-
economic classes. Based on an overview of studies that reported similar
beneficial health effects of social relationships, Atkins, Kaplan, and Toshima
(1991) concluded that the lack of close relationships is a risk factor for
cardiovascular disease at least as important as smoking!
FIGURE 11.1 The relationship between level of social integration and mortality
rate.
 The role of social support
What explains the important and even vital role of being part of a social network
for our mental and physical health? Social support seems the key – in times
when we need it, our close relationships are often a source of social support
(Coyne & De Longis, 1986). Social support can be broadly defined as a partner’s
responsiveness to another’s needs (Cutrona, 1996). Two different forms of
support can be distinguished, namely emotional support and instrumental
support. Emotional support refers to a partner’s acts that are directly aimed at
providing reassurance in stressful or problematic situations, whereas
instrumental support refers to the practical assistance a partner may provide in
dealing with a problem. Suppose an individual just heard that he failed an exam,
and feels terrible about this. His partner may try to cheer him up by saying that
he will surely pass the next time, or perhaps by focusing on the fact that more
than 50 per cent of all students failed this exam. This is an example of emotional
support. She may also offer to help him study for the next exam, for example by
testing him on the material, which would be an example of instrumental support.
Individuals who perceive such acts from a relationship partner as supportive do
indeed experience immediate and long-term improvements in their mood and
self-esteem (e.g. Collins & Feeney, 2000).

- - - - - - - - - -

social support a partner’s responsiveness to another’s needs.

- - - - - - - - - -

According to Cohen and Wills (1985), there are basically two ways in which
social support can affect mental and physical health. First, social support may
encourage people to take better care of themselves. For example, close others
may try to persuade you to live a healthier life, because they care about you.
Second, social support may positively affect health, because it buffers stress, and
stress is directly associated with an individual’s health (Baum, 1990). Consider,
for example, a study by Gerin, Pieper, Levy, and Pickering (1992). Participants
in this study took part in a group discussion with three other people, who in fact
were not real participants, but confederates of the researchers. Two of the
confederates continuously made disapproving remarks when the participant
contributed to the discussion. When placing yourself in the shoes of participants,
you can imagine that they experienced stress; they indeed showed increases in
heart rate and blood pressure. However, when the third confederate displayed his
agreement with the participant, acting as a buttress against the two other
confederates, participants’ stress levels reduced to normal. This study, and many
others (see for another example Research Close-Up 11.1), clearly demonstrates
that social support can directly buffer stress.

RESEARCH CLOSE-UP 11.1

LENDING A HAND
Coan, J. A., Schaefer, H. S., & Davidson, R. J. (2006). Lending a hand: Social regulation of the
neural response to threat. Psychological Science, 17, 1032–1039.

Introduction This study examined whether direct

contact with others helps to alleviate distress.
Specifically, the study examined whether women,
who were subjected to the threat of receiving an
electric shock, showed lower stress responses in the
brain when they were holding their husband’s hand,
compared to when they were holding a stranger’s
hand or not holding anyone’s hand.
Method and procedure Sixteen married couples
were invited to the laboratory to participate in a brain-
scanning study. Both wives and husbands rated their
marital quality. The wives were then tested in the
brain scanner. In the scanner, they were presented, in
random order, with ‘threat cues’ and ‘safety cues’ on
a screen. The threat cue consisted of a red ‘X’,
indicating that there was a 20 per cent chance of
receiving an electric shock on the ankle in the next
few seconds (in reality, the participants received a
mild shock only twice). The safety cue was a blue
‘O’, indicating that no shock would follow. The brain
activity of the women in response to seeing the threat
and safety cues was measured. Importantly, while
they were lying in the scanner, in one third of the
trials the women were holding the hands of their
spouses; in one third they were holding the hands of
an anonymous experimenter; and in one third they did
not hold anyone’s hand.
Results While holding their partner’s hand, but also
while holding the stranger’s hand, the women showed
lower activation in brain regions usually involved in
the regulation of emotional and behavioural responses
to threat (i.e. ventral anterior cingulate cortex, right
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, caudate, and superior
colliculus), compared to when they were not holding
anyone’s hand. In other words, the women – or more
specifically, their brains – registered less threat upon
seeing an ‘X’ when they were holding their spouse’s
hand or a stranger’s hand – although the effect was
significantly stronger when holding their partner’s
hand. In addition, the more satisfied the women were
with their marriage, the less activation in these threat-
related brain areas they showed upon seeing a threat
cue.
Conclusion The findings indicate that merely holding
a partner’s hand, or even holding a stranger’s hand,
has direct positive consequences for how we
experience stressful events – such events simply have
less impact on us. The study helps to further our
understanding of why relationships affect our health.
For example, one particular finding of the study was
that holding a partner’s hand reduced activation of the
hypothalamus, a structure in the brain that is known to
be involved in the regulation of the immune system.
So, when an individual experiences distress, at school,
at work or otherwise, physical contact with a romantic
partner actually helps to release the distress, which in
turn may benefit psychological and physical health in
the long run.
 The immediate effects of social exclusion
Other evidence for the important role of relationships on our wellbeing comes
from studies examining the immediate effects of being excluded or rejected by
others. Can you recall a time when you were standing with a group of people,
talking together, and one of the group members turned his back on you so that
you were placed outside of the circle? Even though you may know that this
happened accidentally (i.e. the person had no intention to exclude you from the
group), it may still have caused immediate negative emotions, and an immediate
urge to place yourself – literally – back inside the group. It is remarkable how
intensely people can respond to such subtle and seemingly trivial forms of
exclusion.
Williams has extensively examined the effects of social exclusion in his
laboratory (Williams, 2001). In a typical study, a participant is sitting in a
waiting room with two other people, who allegedly are also waiting for an
upcoming study but who are, in fact, confederates. While waiting, one of these
people picks up a small ball and tosses the ball to the other confederate, who
then tosses the ball to the participant; the three of them start tossing the ball
between them just to pass the time. However, after several throws, both
confederates stop throwing the ball toward the participant, but continue throwing
the ball at each other. In other words, they exclude the participant from the
game. Williams’s research shows that this situation causes strong immediate
aversive responses, including a bad mood, lowered self-esteem, loss of control
and strong physiological arousal (Williams, 2001). In fact, it appears that
exclusion from this game literally hurts. Using a computerized version of the
ball-tossing game (see Figure 11.2) called Cyberball, a research team in
California measured participants’ brain activity while they were, or were not,
excluded from the game by two other anonymous participants (Eisenberger,
Lieberman, & Williams, 2003). While being excluded, participants showed brain
responses (i.e. activation in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, and right ventral
prefrontal cortex; see Figure 11.3) that are typically found when people
experience physical pain! If being excluded from a virtual ball-tossing game has
this powerful impact, think about the impact more meaningful forms of
exclusion can have on an individual, such as a child who is bullied and rejected
by his class mates.
FIGURE 11.2 Cyberball, a computer-animated version of the ball-tossing game
used in research on social exclusion. The little hand in the bottom of the screen
represents the participant, the two other figures represent what the participant
thinks are two anonymous other participants.
Source: Williams, K. D., Cheung, C. K. T., & Choi, W. (2000). CyberOstracism:
Effects of being ignored over the Internet. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 79, 748–762. Reprinted with permission of Professor Kipling D.
Williams.

FIGURE 11.3(a) and (b) These brain regions, which are also involved in the
processing of physical pain, were activated when participants were excluded
from the ball-tossing game.
Source: From Eisenberger et al., 2003, with permission from the AAAS.
 The need to belong
Together, the research findings discussed so far indicate that having (versus
lacking) relationships has important benefits for our mental and physical well-
being, and that people have a strong aversion against social exclusion. Partly
based on such findings, Baumeister and Leary (1995) concluded that people
have a fundamental need to belong with other people. They argue that this
fundamental need evolved in the human species as a result of natural selection.
In our evolutionary past people depended heavily on others to increase their
chances of survival, just as they needed water, food and warmth to stay alive.
Individuals who had a natural tendency to form close relationships with others
were more likely to survive and reproduce than were individuals who did not,
and so, through the process of Darwinian selection, the need to belong became
typical of the human species. The need to belong is reflected in people’s strong
responses to changes in their degree of belongingness, as discussed above – if
people experience strong bonds with others, they feel good about themselves;
when the need to belong is thwarted, they feel miserable. Other support for the
need-to-belong hypothesis stems from the fact that humans seem to have a
natural tendency to form relationships with others. Think back to the time when
you entered a new school and you were surrounded by other people you had
never seen before. Within days, hours or even minutes, people spontaneously
seek contact with each other, and people typically form relationships very
quickly in such situations. Indeed, as we will see later on in this chapter, even
the mere proximity of others often results in the formation of relationships. And
it appears that we have this focus on other people from the day we are born. For
example, babies 30 minutes old prefer to look at human faces, compared to other
equally complex stimuli (Johnson, Dziurawiec, Ellis, & Morton, 1991). It seems,
indeed, that it is part of our genetic make-up to relate to other people.

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need to belong the intrinsic motivation to affiliate with others and be socially accepted.

- - - - - - - - - -
THEORY BOX 11.1
ATTACHMENT THEORY
Attachment theory proposes that attachment functions as a regulatory
system. The figure shows this system (Hazan & Shaver, 1987, p. 3). In the
diamond is the test question: is the attachment figure available (meaning:
sufficiently near, attentive and responsive)? If the answer is ‘yes’, the child
feels secure, safe, loved and confident about its worth and value. It can then
be playful, smiling and engage in exploration. If the answer is ‘no’, two
different paths are possible. The child may feel defensive and try to maintain
proximity while avoiding close contact, or the child may feel fearful and
anxious. Then a hierarchy of attachment behaviours is elicited. According to
adult attachment theory, adults rely in a very similar way on an attachment
figure – for example, the romantic partner – to regulate their feelings and
emotions.
Source: From Hazan & Shaver (1987) (p. 3), with permission from Taylor
and Francis.

If the attachment is available in case of threat, the child feels secure and can
safely play and explore its environment. If the attachment figure is not
available, the child experiences either fear or defensiveness, resulting in
different behaviours.
 Attachment
The idea that humans have evolved an innate tendency to establish close
relationships with others also forms the basis of attachment theory, an
influential theory about relationships developed by John Bowlby (1982; see
Leader in the Field, John Bowlby, and Theory Box 11.1). In threatening
circumstances (e.g. when there is acute danger, or when they are hungry or
thirsty), human infants have to rely on and get the attention of their caregivers –
the mother often being the primary caregiver. That is why babies start crying
when they are hungry, or when their temperature is not right – if they did not do
this, it would lower their survival chances. According to the theory, childhood
experiences with our caregivers (mother, father) shape our expectations about
relationships, and how we behave in relationships, later on in life.

- - - - - - - - - -

attachment theory the theory that proposes that the development of secure infant–caregiver
attachment in childhood is the basis for the ability to maintain stable and intimate relationships in
adulthood.

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People form different attachment styles based on the interaction experiences

they have with the primary caregiver. Hazan and Shaver (1987) proposed that
people can generally be classified into three categories. They asked their
participants to pick one of three descriptions that best described how they
generally feel and behave in their relationships with others (see Figure 11.4).
Individuals who presumably had caregivers in their childhood who were
responsive to their needs and were available when in distress are likely to
develop a secure attachment style. They generally have a positive view of
themselves, and a positive view of other people as being trustworthy and helpful.
In contrast, individuals who presumably had caregivers who were unresponsive
to their needs, and who did not provide support in distressing situations, are
more likely to develop one of the two insecure attachment styles, avoidant or
anxious/ambivalent. Individuals who develop an avoidant attachment style tend
to maintain emotional distance from other people, because they view others as
not being trustworthy. Individuals who develop an anxious–ambivalent style
often lack confidence in themselves, tend to worry about their relationships, and
compulsively seeks closeness and intimacy with other people.
FIGURE 11.4 Measure of attachment styles used by Hazan and Shaver (1987).
Source: Reproduced with permission of Yale University Press.

LEADER IN THE FIELD

John Bowlby (1907–1990) started his intellectual career at the
University of Cambridge, where his studies included developmental
psychology and, later, child psychiatry and psychoanalysis. After
returning from army service in 1945, Bowlby became head of the
Children’s Department at the Tavistock Clinic in London. Studying
maladapted children, Bowlby felt that psychoanalysis was putting far
too much emphasis on the child’s fantasy world and far too little on
actual events. As a result, Bowlby developed attachment theory,
which states that a child’s actual experiences within the family have
far-reaching effects on the development of his or her personality.
According to Bowlby, from the first months of their relationships
with both parents, children build up ‘working models’ of how
attachment figures are likely to behave, and for the rest of their lives
children’s expectations are based on these models. Later, his theory
became highly influential in explaining why adults form attachment
bonds with others.
It should be noted that nowadays attachment researchers view attachment
styles not as three (or four; Bartholomew, 1990) discrete categories. Rather, they
recognize that an individual’s attachment style can be measured along two
continuous dimensions (for a recent overview of attachment style, see Shaver &
Mikulincer, 2009): individuals differ in the degree to which they tend to avoid
intimacy with other people, and they differ in the degree to which they are
anxious about being abandoned by their relationship partners (Brennan, Clark, &
Shaver, 1998). Securely attached individuals score low on both dimensions, thus
being low in both avoidance and anxiety; insecurely attached individuals score
high on one or both of these dimensions (see Figure 11.5; also Individual
Differences 11.1). Specifically, individuals scoring high on anxiety, and high on
avoidance, are said to be fearful in their relationships with others. Individuals
scoring high on anxiety but low on avoidance are termed preoccupied: they are
uneasy in relationships and vigilant to any threats to a relationship. Finally,
individuals scoring high on avoidance but low on anxiety are termed dismissing:
they are self-reliant and largely uninterested in intimacy with others.
FIGURE 11.5 The dimensional model of attachment styles.

Although it is difficult to indicate what exactly reflects a high or low score on

both dimensions, in previous samples researchers have found average scores of
around 3 for the avoidance subscale, and of around 4 for the anxiety subscale
(e.g. Alonso-Arbiol, Balluerka, Shaver, & Gillath, 2008; see Individual
Differences 11.1). This gives you an idea of whether you are high or low in
avoidance, and high or low in anxiety.
There is a great deal of evidence that differences in attachment styles do
indeed have a strong impact on people’s feelings and behaviour in relationships.
Secure people generally enjoy more satisfying relationships with their romantic
partner, both in heterosexual (Feeney, 2002) and homosexual (Elizur & Mintzer,
2003) relationships, and with their friends (Kafetsios & Nezlek, 2002). Simpson,
Rholes, and Nelligan (1992; see Leader in the Field, Jeffry A. Simpson)
provided a compelling example of the effect of attachment differences in coping
with stressful situations. In this study, heterosexual dating couples were
unobtrusively videotaped while they were sitting in a waiting room. The couple
had been told that the woman would soon participate in a task that is known to
‘arouse considerable anxiety and distress in most people’. Before the experiment
began, both members of the couple had completed a questionnaire, which
included measures of attachment style. The ratings of the videos revealed several
interesting findings. Secure women sought out more support from their partner
as their level of displayed anxiety – as observed by the raters of the videos –
increased. In contrast, women with an insecure attachment style (specifically,
avoidant women) tended to seek less support from the partner as their level of
anxiety increased. Put differently, secure women relied on their partners (i.e.
trusted their partners) in an attempt to relieve the distress, while avoidant women
did not rely on their partners, apparently not viewing their partners as what is
sometimes called a safe haven. In addition, securely attached men provided more
support when their partners displayed more signs of distress, while avoidant men
were less inclined to do so. Thus, attachment style differences affect both
support seeking and giving.

INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 11.1

ATTACHMENT ANXIETY AND AVOIDANCE
SCALE
The statements below concern how you feel in emotionally intimate
relationships. We are interested in how you generally experience
relationships, not just in what is happening in a current relationship.
Respond to each statement by indicating on a scale from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) how much you agree or disagree with the
statement (Fraley, Waller, & Brennan, 2000).
1. I’m afraid that I will lose my relationship partners.
2. I often worry that a relationship partner will not want to stay with me.
3. I often worry that others don’t really love me.
4. I worry that others won’t care about me as much as I care about them.
5. I often wish that other people’s feelings for me were as strong as my
feelings for him or her.
6. I worry a lot about my relationships.
7. When my partner is out of sight, I worry that he or she might become
interested in someone else.
8. When I show my feelings for other people, I’m afraid they will not feel
the same about me.
9. I rarely worry about my relationship partners leaving me.
10. My relationships with others makes me doubt myself.
11. I do not often worry about being abandoned.
12. I find that my partner(s) don’t want to get as close as I would like.
13. Sometimes others change their feelings about me for no apparent
reason.
14. My desire to be very close sometimes scares people away.
15. I’m afraid that once someone gets to know me, he or she won’t like
who I really am.
16. It makes me mad that I don’t get the affection and support I need from
others.
17. I worry that I won’t measure up to other people.
18. Others only seem to notice me when I’m angry.
19. I prefer not to show another person how I feel deep down.
20. I feel comfortable sharing my private thoughts and feelings with
others.
21. I find it difficult to allow myself to depend on others.
22. I am very comfortable being close to other people.
23. I don’t feel comfortable opening up to other people.
24. I prefer not to be too close to others.
25. I get uncomfortable when someone wants to be very close.
26. I find it relatively easy to get close to others.
 27. It’s not difficult for me to get close to other people.
28. I usually discuss my problems and concerns with someone.
29. It helps to turn to close others in times of need.
30. I tell others just about everything.
31. I talk things over with others.
32. I am nervous when partners get too close to me.
33. I feel comfortable depending on other people.
34. I find it easy to depend on other people.
35. It’s easy for me to be affectionate with others.
36. There are others who really understand my needs and me.
The first 18 items listed above comprise the attachment-related anxiety
scale. Items 19–36 comprise the attachment-related avoidance scale. In real
research, the order in which these items are presented should be randomized.
To obtain your score for attachment-related anxiety, average your responses
to items 1–18. However, because items 9 and 11 are ‘reverse keyed’ (i.e.
high numbers represent low anxiety rather than high anxiety), you will need
to reverse the answers to those questions before averaging the responses
(e.g. if you answer with a 6 to item 9, you will need to re-key it as a 2 before
averaging.) To obtain a score for attachment-related avoidance, average
your responses to items 19–36. Items 20, 22, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34,
35 and 36 will need to be reverse-keyed before you compute this average.

LEADER IN THE FIELD

Jeffry A. Simpson (b. 1958) is a professor at the University of
Minnesota, studying romantic relationships. He has made important
contributions in a range of relationship topics, most importantly
attachment, mating, partner idealization and emphatic accuracy, or
how accurate people are at inferring their partner’s thoughts and
feelings. He has received numerous honours, and is currently editor
of one of the field’s top journals, the Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology. Simpson’s work usually integrates relationship
science with principles of evolutionary psychology.
 Summary
People have a strong and natural tendency to be around others, to form and
maintain close relationships, and to prevent exclusion from others.
Belongingness with others benefits both psychological and physical well-being,
while being excluded from others can literally hurt. By providing social support,
close others can help us to deal with stress, although individual differences in
attachment styles cause individuals to rely on others to varying degrees. Overall,
the important message of the chapter so far is: relationships do matter.
 INTERPERSONAL ATTRACTION
When and why do we experience interpersonal attraction?
Now that we have established the importance of interpersonal relationships in
people’s lives, the remainder of the chapter will – more or less – follow the
course of a relationship, starting at the beginning: with whom, and under what
circumstances, do we form interpersonal relationships? What factors determine
interpersonal attraction?
 The benefits of physical attractiveness
In most cases, the first impression one has when meeting a new person is based
on the other person’s physical appearance. Does appearance matter? Probably
you have heard people claim that, for them, it’s only what’s on the ‘inside’ that
matters when judging another person – not the outside (perhaps you are even one
of these people?). That, of course, is a noble sentiment; however, scientific
evidence suggests otherwise. Consider the following research findings.
Schoolteachers judge attractive pupils as more intelligent, and accordingly give
them higher grades (Clifford & Walster, 1973). Attractive people raise more
money for charity in their collecting boxes (Chaiken, 1979). For both men and
women, each point increase on an attractiveness scale ranging from 1 to 5 is
associated with an average increase in annual income of more than US $2000
(Frieze, Olson, & Russell, 1991). Judges tend to give lower sentences to
attractive people (Downs & Lyons, 1991). In parallel with these findings,
Kampe, Frith, Dolan, and Frith (2001) demonstrated that reward systems in the
brain get activated when attractive people turn their gaze on you. This is just a
selection of many other similar findings that suggest the benefits of being
attractive (for an overview, see Langlois et al., 2000). One of the most
remarkable, perhaps even disturbing, findings in this area is that mothers who
have attractive babies (as judged by outside observers) tend to behave differently
toward their child compared to mothers of unattractive babies: they are more
playful and display more affectionate behaviour toward the child, both shortly
after birth as well as three months later (Langlois, Ritter, Casey, & Sawin, 1995).
 What is beautiful is good
There is thus little doubt that appearance does matter when judging other people
(Figure 11.6). But why is attractiveness so important? Why do we even care
about someone’s looks? One reason is that we assume that people who are
attractive also have nice personalities, as shown by Dion, Berscheid, and Walster
(1972; see Leader in the Field, Ellen S. Berscheid). They asked participants to
rate pictures of attractive and unattractive people on a number of personality
characteristics. Attractive (as compared to unattractive) people were rated as
more friendly, sociable and trustworthy, and also as more competent. The
researchers called this the ‘what is beautiful is good’ stereotype. Later studies
replicated these effects, demonstrating that both children and adults are judged
as being more sociable and competent when they are more attractive. Similar
effects have even been found when making personality judgements about
attractive and unattractive people when the pictures were shown for only a tenth
of a second (Locher, Unger, Sociedade, & Wahl, 1993). Even within 100
milliseconds, attractive people are judged to be more friendly and skilful,
illustrating the pervasiveness of the stereotype.
FIGURE 11.6 Although it is often said that a book should not be judged by its
cover, attractiveness has an important impact on how we evaluate and behave
towards others.
Source: © Sean De Burca. Used under licence from Shutterstock.
 LEADER IN THE FIELD
Ellen S. Berscheid (b. 1936) is a Regents Professor at the University
of Minnesota, where she received her PhD in 1965. Berscheid has
made numerous and highly influential contributions in the field of
relationship science. She is particularly interested in problems
associated with relationship satisfaction and stability, relationship
cognition, and emotional experiences within relationships, especially
love and sexual desire. In 1974, Berscheid was the centre of
controversy when she was awarded a large research grant by the
National Science Foundation in the US for her work on why and
how people fall in love. Senator Proxmire of Wisconsin regarded this
as ‘wasteful federal funding of research’. The scientific community
has been more positive about her work: she is the recipient of several
prestigious awards, such as the Donald T. Campbell Award for
Distinguished Research in Social Psychology from the Society of
Personality and Social Psychology, and the Distinguished Scientist
Award from the Society of Experimental Social Psychology.

The important question, of course, is whether there is some truth to this: are
attractive people indeed ‘better’ people? Do attractive and unattractive
individuals behave differently? Langlois and her colleagues (Langlois et al.,
2000) analysed the results of over one hundred studies that examined whether
attractiveness was associated with differences in traits and behaviours. They
reported that, on average, attractive people were more extraverted, had higher
self-confidence, and possessed better social skills. So, yes, attractive people
have, on average, somewhat more outgoing and social personalities. Langlois
and colleagues concluded that, apparently, beauty is not only skin deep.
It is unlikely though that attractive people are born more sociable and friendly
than unattractive people. What else explains why attractiveness tends to be
correlated with social skills? Recall the study discussed above, showing that
mothers behave more affectionately towards attractive than unattractive babies
(Langlois et al., 1995). A little later in life, attractive children in preschool are
treated significantly more favourably by their peers and their teachers than are
less attractive children. This continues in adult life, when attractive individuals
get more attention and receive more help and cooperation from others than do
less attractive individuals (for an overview of the effects of attractiveness across
the life span, see Langlois et al., 2000). No wonder attractive people become the
more sociable people that most of us assume they are! It is easy to imagine how
getting positive attention and responses from other people induces a person to
behave in a positive and kind manner in return. In other words, attractive people
often confirm the ‘what is beautiful is good’ stereotype by reciprocating the
favourable responses they get from others. This is another example of the self-
fulfilling prophecy, as discussed in Chapter 3. Snyder, Tanke, and Berscheid
(1977) provided support for this idea in a very elegant experiment, which you
can read about in Research Close-Up 11.2.
Scholars in the field of evolutionary psychology provide another – not
incompatible – explanation for the important role of attractiveness in our
judgements about and behaviours toward other people. They argue that in our
evolutionary past attractiveness reflected good health (Buss, 1995). Humans,
who were attracted to specific features in a potential mate that were positively
associated with health and chances of procreation success, were more likely to
reproduce. However, although attractiveness may have marked health in our
evolutionary history, there is little evidence that attractiveness is related to health
and fertility in current times, at least not in Western societies (Weeden & Sabini,
2005). In line with the ‘what is beautiful is good’ stereotype, however, people do
think that attractive people are healthier, as shown in a study by Kalick,
Zebrowitz, Langlois, and Johnson (1998). Participants in this study rated the
attractiveness of a number of individuals shown in photographs, and also how
healthy they thought these individuals were. While participants thought that
more attractive individuals were also healthier, this was in fact not the case, as
revealed from their medical files.

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evolutionary psychology an approach that explains human behaviour and preferences based on
their ‘reproductive value’; that is, their value in producing offspring.

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RESEARCH CLOSE-UP 11.2

HOW THE SELF-FULFILLING

PROPHECY COMES ABOUT
Snyder, M., Tanke, E. D., & Berscheid, E. (1977). Social perception and interpersonal behaviour:
On the self-fulfilling nature of social stereotypes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
35, 656–666.

Introduction The study described here examined the

self-fulfilling nature of the ‘what is beautiful is good’
stereotype. Specifically, the authors wondered
whether attractive people might live up to the
stereotype because they confirm the expectations
other people have about them. An individual may
behave differently – more positively that is – when
interacting with an attractive person compared to an
unattractive person, because the individual believes
(based on the stereotype) that the other attractive
person is nicer. In response, the attractive person may
indeed act more nicely in return, thereby
behaviourally confirming the stereotype.
Method and procedure Participants were 51 male
and 51 female undergraduate students, who were
scheduled to take part in mixed-sex pairs of
previously unacquainted individuals. The
experimenter told the participants, who did not meet
in person and who were located in separate rooms,
that the study involved acquaintance processes in
social relationships. It was explained that the
participant would engage in a telephone conversation
with another student. Before the phone conversation
began, the male participant received a photograph,
ostensibly of the female participant with whom he
would have the telephone conversation (although the
photo was not of the actual conversation partner). In
fact, half of the male participants were given a pre-
rated photograph of an attractive female, while the
other half of the male participants were given a pre-
rated photograph of an unattractive female. Before the
conversation took place, the male participants
indicated their impression of the female, based on the
photograph (e.g. ‘How enthusiastic, friendly,
trustworthy, intelligent, etc. do you think this person
is?’). The male and the female participants then
engaged in a 10-minute unstructured telephone
conversation that was recorded. The women were
unaware that their own photo was not used, and the
men knew only about the photo they were given; thus
men and women were blind to experimental
condition. Later, 22 students rated the recordings of
the conversations. Half of them heard only the track of
the tapes containing the target women’s voices, and
rated the impression they had of each female target.
The other half heard only the male voices, and they
rated the impression they had of each male perceiver.
Results First, in line with the ‘what is beautiful is
good’ stereotype, the males who had received the
photograph of an attractive female had a much more
positive initial impression of their upcoming
interaction partner than did those who received the
photograph of an unattractive female. Furthermore,
the men who interacted with women whom they
believed to be physically attractive appeared (to the
observers) more sociable, sexually warm, interesting,
outgoing, humorous and so on, than their counterparts
in the unattractive target condition. Finally – and most
interestingly – the women who were in the attractive
female condition (although they were blind to this
fact) were rated by the observers as more sociable,
poised, sexually warm and outgoing than the women
in the unattractive condition.
Conclusion In the words of the authors, this research
‘suggests that stereotypes can and do channel dyadic
interaction so as to create their own social reality’ (p.
663). The male perceivers only believed that their
interaction partner was attractive, and yet they
behaved very differently compared to the males who
believed that their interaction partner was
unattractive. In line with their expectations about the
attractive female target, the men behaved in a more
friendly and sociable manner in the attractive
condition, and the female targets who were perceived
(unbeknownst to them) to be physically attractive
actually came to behave in a friendly, likable and
sociable manner. In other words, they confirmed, and
bolstered, the stereotype. Thus the stereotype became
a self-fulfilling prophecy.
 The features that determine physical attractiveness
Before turning to the question of what is considered attractive, the question
arises whether people agree about who is, and who is not, attractive? The answer
is ‘yes’. Of course, people do not always and completely agree on who is
attractive, as you may have experienced when evaluating passers-by while
sitting on a terrace with your friends. However, although you may give an ‘8’
and your friend gives a ‘9’ on a ten-point scale to a passing boy or girl, it is
seldom the case that one person finds someone very attractive, while someone
else finds the same person plain ugly. Indeed, research reveals that generally
there is a fairly high level of consensus among people when evaluating the
attractiveness of others. Even infants who are 3-and 6-months old can
distinguish between faces that are rated by adults as attractive and unattractive,
preferring to look at the attractive faces (Langlois, Ritter, Roggman, & Vaughn,
1991). And although there are some differences across cultures about what is
considered attractive, again people from different societies generally agree on
what is and what is not attractive (Cunningham, Roberts, Barbee, Druen, & Wu,
1995; see also Chapter 15).
Thus, attractiveness is not entirely ‘in the eye of the beholder’. If people
(including infants) largely agree on who is and who is not attractive, it should be
possible to assess attractiveness objectively, at least to some extent. In other
words, consensus on attractiveness suggests that attractive people possess certain
objective features that differ from unattractive people. Indeed, a number of such
features that contribute to attractiveness have been identified. Perhaps
surprisingly at first glance, attractive people often have average faces. When
researchers digitally create a face that is ‘morphed’ from a number of other
faces, it is typically found that the morphed face, which is the average of the
other faces, is rated as more attractive than the individual faces (Langlois,
Roggman, & Musselman, 1994). Also, symmetry is related to attractiveness, with
more symmetrical faces judged as more attractive than asymmetrical faces (e.g.
Perrett et al., 1999). Researchers do not, however, agree unequivocally about the
role of averageness and symmetry. For example, some have argued that the role
of averageness can be fully explained in terms of symmetry, as average faces are
also more symmetric; others argue that both averageness and symmetry make
their own contribution to beauty (Grammer & Thornhill, 1994).
Other facial features that contribute to beauty are so-called hormone-markers.
For example, female faces with high cheekbones and smooth skin are more
attractive. These facial features tend to be associated with a high ratio of
oestrogen to testosterone, and signal fertility. Women tend to be attracted by
features in male faces that are associated with relatively high levels of
testosterone, such as a large jaw, and prominent brow ridges and cheekbones
(Figure 11.7).
FIGURE 11.7(a) and (b) Women are generally attracted to men with large
jaws, and prominent brow ridges and cheekbones. Men are generally attracted
to women with high cheekbones and smooth skin. Both men and women prefer
symmetrical faces.
Source: (a) © Luna Vandoorne; (b) © Yaro. Both images used under licence
from Shutterstock.

Of course, it is not only the face that matters. The size and shape of the body
also counts. As with faces, both men and women prefer symmetrical bodies
(Tovée, Tasker, & Benson, 2000). Women prefer men whose torso has a narrow
waist and a broad chest and shoulders – an inverted triangle (Maisey, Vale,
Cornelissen, & Tovée, 1999). And there is good evidence that men have a
preference for women with an hourglass shaped waist-to-hip ratio (WHR) of
0.70. Once again, this latter finding has been explained by evolutionary
psychologists in terms of reproduction advantages associated with a relatively
small WHR. There is indeed some evidence that a female 0.70 WHR is
associated with fertility (Zaadstra et al., 1993). Hence, men who followed this
preference in our evolutionary past had a higher chance of conferring their
genes, including their genetic predisposition to prefer hourglass-shaped women
(Figure 11.8). In sum, several features of the body and the face are reliably
associated with attractiveness, suggesting that attractiveness is partly an
objective phenomenon.
FIGURE 11.8 Men prefer women with hourglass-shaped waist-to-hip ratios. In
the picture on the left, the woman has the lowest waist-to-hip ratio – the classic
hourglass figure; the woman on the right has the highest waist-to-hip ratio.
Source: From Streater & McBurney (2003). Waist-hip ratio and attractiveness:
New evidence and a critique of a ‘critical’ test. Evolution and Human Behaviour,
24, 88–98, with permission from Elsevier.
 Contextual influences on physical attractiveness
Despite the fact that attractiveness can largely be objectively assessed, there are
situational factors that influence attractiveness judgements. For example, as will
be described in more detail below, people who are in a long-term heterosexual
relationship tend to give lower attractiveness ratings to opposite-sex others
compared to people who are not in a relationship (Simpson, Gangestad, &
Lerma, 1990). The time of day also influences perceptions of attractiveness, at
least when in a bar. In a study by Pennebaker and colleagues (1979), researchers
asked people in a bar to rate the attractiveness of other customers (on a scale
from 1 to 10) at three different times in the same evening, 9 p.m., 10.30 p.m.,
and near closing time, at 12 p.m. Attractiveness ratings of opposite-sex
customers increased more than one point at 12 p.m. (Figure 11.9). Later studies
confirmed this finding, with a few qualifications of the ‘closing time effect’. For
example, people who are in a romantic relationship do not show the effect, or at
least not as strongly as people who are not in a relationship (Madey et al., 1996).
FIGURE 11.9 The effect of getting nearer to closing time on attractiveness
ratings of opposite-sex others.
Source: Adapted from Pennebaker et al., 1979, with permission from SAGE
Publications Ltd.
 Psychological attraction
So far, we have discussed physical attractiveness. However, it is evident that,
although physical attractiveness plays an important role in how we judge and
respond to others, it does not fully explain why we sometimes like some people
more than others, and how sometimes this even results in love. Put simply, why
do we like some people more than others? Why do we form relationships with
some people and not with others?
Although people commonly think that they choose the people with whom they
affiliate, often they form relationships with others without consciously thinking
about it (Berscheid, 1985). When joining a sports club, when starting a new job,
when moving to a new city, or when starting university, people affiliate with
others. They develop relationships with people they did not know and, more
often than not, with people whom they would not have predicted that they would
like, if they had been asked before meeting them. Before meeting others, people
tend to consider qualities of others that they hope for, such as religion, height,
weight, intelligence or profession. When meeting others, however, people
experience how the other makes them feel, his or her sense of humour, and the
rapport they feel with the other. As a consequence, people show a mismatch
between whom they think they will like and whom they actually like.
Eastwick and Finkel (2008) showed that such processes are even at work when
people establish romantic relationships. In their studies, they used a speed-dating
procedure. Speed dating was invented by Rabbi Yaacov Deyo to help Jewish
singles in Los Angeles to meet a suitable partner. During speed dating, single
individuals go on very brief dates (three–eight minutes) with a series of potential
romantic partners. Eastwick and Finkel asked individuals before they went on
their speed dates to rate their preferences for a potential mate. They found, not
surprisingly, that when thinking about hypothetical partners, men preferred
physically attractive partners and women preferred partners with a strong
earning prospect (cf. Buss, 1989; see also Social Psychology Beyond the Lab
11.1). These preferences, however, did not predict people’s actual choices after a
face-to-face date. Although the associations with physical attractiveness were
more consistent and stronger than those of earning prospects (cf. Walster,
Aronson, Abrahams, & Rottmann, 1966), both were significantly and positively
related to romantic interest in actual choices. Inconsistent with the hypothesis,
however, Eastwick and Finkel found no sex differences for either physical
attractiveness or earning prospects: both predicted romantic interest equally for
men and women. The authors concluded that people lack insight into their
preferences when actually meeting potential mates. This conclusion does not
only apply to romantic relationships, but reflects a more general tendency
showing that people are often unable to report accurately why they like another
person or engage in particular behaviour (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BEYOND THE

LAB 11.1
DATING ADS: GENDER DIFFERENCES IN
PREFERENCES FOR PHYSICAL
ATTRACTIVENESS AND STATUS
Although both men and women value physical attractiveness in a potential
partner, physical attractiveness is in general a more important determinant of
romantic attraction for males than it is for females (Buss, 1989). Although
women obviously also value physical attractiveness in a partner, women
generally are more sensitive than men to signs of dominance and status
when looking for a romantic partner (Buss, 1989). According to
evolutionary psychologists, males have been selected to prefer women who
are likely to produce healthy babies, and they are therefore sensitive to signs
of youth, health and reproductive value. Women, on the other hand, had a
better chance of their offspring surviving when they selected men who could
provide them with the necessary resources (food, shelter, protection), which
is more likely to be provided by high-status males. This gender difference in
what men (physical attractiveness) and women (wealth/status) look for in
finding a romantic partner has been found in more than 27 cultures across
the world (Buss, 1989).
You can observe this gender difference on dating sites and in personal ads in
the newspapers. Try it: visit any dating site or read the personal ads in a
newspaper, and you may notice that men are more likely than women to
mention that they are seeking a physically attractive partner, while women
are relatively more likely than men to seek a partner with a high status. This
is exactly what Greenlees and McGrew (1994) found in a study on gender
 differences in dating advertisements among heterosexuals. They analysed
the content of a thousand ‘lonely hearts’ advertisements. The researchers
found that 49 per cent of the men’s ads explicitly indicated that the man was
looking for a physically attractive partner, while only 33 per cent of the
women’s ads contained this information. The reverse was true with regard to
status and resources. Thirty three per cent of the women’s ads indicated that
the woman was looking for a partner who could offer her financial security,
while only 9 per cent of the men’s ads indicated that the man was interested
in a potential partner’s wealth or status (see Figure 11.10). A study by
Wiederman (1993) obtained similar findings. In addition to these gender
differences in seeking attractiveness and status, this study revealed that
women (more than men) were more likely to look for partners who were
older than themselves, probably because older men generally have more
access to resources (e.g. they have a higher income).
FIGURE 11.10 An analysis of dating ads revealed that, in line with arguments
from evolutionary psychology, women (relative to men) seek a partner with
resources, and offer physical attractiveness. In contrast, relative to women,
men seek a physically attractive partner, and offer financial resources.
Source: From Greenlees & McGrew, 1994, with permission from Elsevier.

Not only are there gender differences in what men and women seek in a
partner. Both men and women are smart enough to mention that they can
offer what the other sex would be interested in. For example, Greenlees and
McGrew (1994) found that 71 per cent of the women’s ads referred to the
woman’s physical appearance, while only 50 per cent of the men’s ads
 mentioned the man’s physical appearance. Thus, women were more likely
than men to ‘offer’ physical attractiveness. In contrast, 69 per cent of the
men’s ads referred to the man’s status or financial security, while only 43
per cent of the women’s ads contained information about the woman’s
financial status: the men were more likely than women to offer wealth and
resources in their ads (Figure 11.10; see also Wiederman, 1993).
The research described here provides a nice example of how theory-based
predictions – in this case, evolutionary driven gender differences in mate
preferences – can be tested outside the laboratory, making use of data that
are already out there in the real world.
Ample research shows that physical and psychological factors that people are
unaware of play a powerful role in determining who people affiliate with, and
ultimately even develop close relationships with. An important but
underestimated factor that reliably affects people’s relationship choices and
relationship development is proximity, that is, whether people are near to each
other in place or time. The most important psychological factors are familiarity
and similarity. These three factors – proximity, familiarity, and similarity – are
closely related to one another, as we will show.
 Proximity
When moving into a student house or building, many students may choose to
live as far away from the elevator or stairs, kitchen or restrooms as possible.
They hope that this will offer them a quieter location where they can work and
sleep undisturbed. Although this consideration may have some merit, it may also
reduce the likelihood of making many friends. Indeed, research shows that
proximity, or being physically close to others (sometimes called ‘propinquity’),
increases the chance of becoming friends with them.
One of the most informative studies on the power of proximity is the
pioneering study by Festinger, Schachter, and Back (1950). These authors
examined relationship development among a sample of student couples that were
assigned to apartments for graduate students in Westgate West, an apartment
complex with different buildings and apartments on different floors (see Figure
11.11). Over the course of 10 months, physical proximity predicted the
development of friendships: people formed more friendships with others who
lived physically close to them than with people who lived further away. For
example, people were 10 times more likely to become friends with others in the
same building than with people in a different building; within each building,
people who lived on the same floor had more friends on the same floor than on a
different floor; and people on the same floor were more likely to become friends
with their next-door neighbours than with people who lived further down the
aisle. It should be noted, however, that proximity did not always promote liking.
In some cases, people also increasingly disliked their neighbours. After all, to
like or to dislike someone, and even to love or to hate someone, one needs to
know the other person. Proximity allows people to get to know others, for better
and for worse.
FIGURE 11.11 The Westgate West complex. Residents of the building formed
more friendships with others living close to them.
Source: Festinger, Schachter, & Back (1950). Social pressures in informal
groups: A study of human factors in housing. New York: Harper.
 So, rather than being due to careful selection processes, the development of
friendships is, at least in part, due to chance and proximity. This is nicely
illustrated in a clever, more recent study by Back, Schmukle, and Egloff (2008).
The researchers followed a group of freshmen over the first year of their study.
During a regular introductory session for freshmen in psychology, students were
randomly assigned seat numbers. After having taken their seats, students
individually introduced themselves to the group, and after each introduction,
rated whether they liked each individual student and whether they would like to
meet the student in the future. One year later, students were presented with
photographs of all students at the introductory session and rated their friendship
with each person. Findings clearly revealed a proximity effect: students in the
introductory session liked students in their row and students sitting next to them
much more than students sitting elsewhere. More importantly, sitting next to
each other predicted friendship one year later: students had more intense
friendships with those who had sat next to them than with those who had sat
elsewhere. Thus, being in close physical proximity breeds liking, even if the
proximity comes about by chance. Why?
Partly, the answer to this question is fairly straightforward. It is simply harder
to get to meet and know people who do not live nearby, work in a different field,
go to a different school or engage in very different activities. People tend to
become friends with people they see frequently, with people who work in the
same office, live in the same block or ride the same train every day. Conversely,
it is hard and costly to maintain relationships when the physical distance is high.
Students report physical separation as being a major cause for the ending of
friendships (Rose, 1984) and dating relationships during the transition from high
school to college (Van Horn et al., 1997).
Similarly, physical separation between husbands and wives is a predictor of
marital separation (Rindfuss & Stephen, 1990). However, information
technology and new media may make the maintenance of long-distance
relationships much easier: mobile phones, Skype, Facebook and e-mail allow
friends or partners who are in different places to keep up with each other, and to
do so more easily and cheaply. Nevertheless, face-to-face contact remains a
crucial factor in maintaining close relationships. Even among long-distance
relationships, those partners who have face-to-face contact are happier and more
committed than partners who do not have face-to-face contact (e.g. only letters,
texts, e-mail and so on; see Dainton & Aylor, 2002).
Being physically close allows people to interact more often, and consequently
there are many reasons why proximity may facilitate the development of closer
relationships. More frequent interactions allow people to get to know each other
better, because they provide people with opportunities to share not only more,
but also more intimate aspects of their lives with each other (Altman & Taylor,
1973). More frequent interactions also lead to greater interdependence between
people, because the behaviour of one person increasingly affects the outcome of
the other person (Berscheid, Snyder, & Omoto, 1989). Frequent interactions also
allow people to become familiar with each other, and the literature
overwhelmingly shows that familiarity breeds liking.
 Familiarity
The finding that familiarity is linked to liking is often linked to the mere
exposure effect (see Chapter 6)(Zajonc, 1968). Repeated, unreinforced exposure
to a large variety of stimuli, ranging from Chinese symbols to abstract paintings
and music (for a review, see Bornstein, 1989), increases positive affect toward
the stimulus. Put differently, the more we are exposed to a stimulus, the more we
like it.
This mere exposure effect holds not only for objects, but also for people.
Familiarity with a new person automatically increases liking even if we do not
interact with the person. To illustrate, Moreland and Beach (1992) examined
mere exposure effects on liking among students. To create mere exposure
conditions, four female confederates, who were similar in appearance and
attractiveness, attended different numbers of lectures over the course of the
semester (zero, five, 10 and 15 times respectively). The confederates did not
interact with the students, but merely attended the lectures. At the end of the
semester, students were given pictures of the four confederates and rated their
liking for each of them and whether they thought that the confederate was
similar to them. The results provided clear evidence for the mere exposure effect
in social settings: the more often the confederate had attended the lectures, the
more she was liked. This effect occurred despite the fact that students had never
talked to the different confederates; they merely liked them better because they
recognized their faces. The fact that people like faces that they recognize has
also been linked to the averageness effect for physical attractiveness, as
discussed previously (Langlois et al., 1994). In this perspective, it is assumed
that people are exposed to average faces more often than to faces with unusual or
rare aspects. Because they are therefore more familiar with average faces, they
prefer them over unusual faces. More frequent exposure also led students to
perceive the confederate as more similar to themselves than they did for
confederates with whom they had little or no exposure.
 Similarity
Proximity and frequent interactions with others not only allow people to become
familiar with others, they also allow people to discover similarities between
themselves and others. Abundant research confirms that we like others who are
similar to us. Byrne (1971) employed a ‘bogus stranger’ paradigm in his
pioneering research regarding the similarity–attraction effect. In this paradigm,
the participant completes an attitudes questionnaire (e.g. I enjoy sports; I like
classical music), reads an attitudes questionnaire completed by a target person
with whom he or she will soon ostensibly interact, and then evaluates the
likeability of that person. The attitudes endorsed by the target person are faked in
such a manner as to manipulate the degree of similarity to the participant’s
attitudes. Contrary to the truism that opposites attract, a strong linear relationship
between similarity and liking is routinely observed – similarity reliably generates
attraction and liking.

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similarity–attraction effect we like others who are similar to us; others who are like us.

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Numerous empirical studies demonstrate the similarity–attraction effect for

personality traits, attitudes, hobbies and ideals, and that these forms of similarity
are prevalent in satisfying relationships (for a review, see Berscheid & Reis,
1998). Moreover, similarity has been shown to be important, not only in shaping
initial attraction between fictitious (Byrne, 1971) and real (Byrne, Ervin &
Lamberth, 1970) strangers, but also in generating the feeling that one is
understood by a dating partner and spouse (Murray, Holmes, Bellavia, Griffin, &
Dolderman, 2002), and in sustaining later relationship satisfaction (Klohnen &
Luo, 2003). The literature also shows that people do not necessarily have to be
actually similar to each other to show these effects. Rather, in happy
relationships, people tend to perceive their partners as more similar to
themselves than they actually are, with the same effect: the more people perceive
their partner as being similar to themselves, the happier they are in their
relationship (Montoya, Horton, & Kirchner, 2008; Murray et al., 2002).
Perceived similarity also predicted greater proximity (i.e. the students sat closer
together in the classroom), attraction, communication and friendship intensity
over a period of nine weeks among previously unacquainted undergraduates
(Sunnafrank & Ramirez, 2004).
Why is similarity so important for relationships? People who are similar to us
are rewarding, in that they validate our beliefs and are likely to agree with us,
our opinions and values (Newcomb, 1961; see Chapter 8). In this sense,
similarity is reinforcing, in that it triggers positive affective reactions toward the
other (Byrne, 1971). Moreover, a partner who is ‘like me’ is assumed to accept
the self, to understand the self’s needs, and therefore to be able to gratify the
self’s needs, whereas a partner who is ‘unlike me’ is assumed to be less
accepting and understanding of the self (Murray et al., 2002). Similar others are
also more familiar and more predictable, creating a feeling of recognition and
allowing people to reduce uncertainty about the other and communicate more
easily (Berger & Calabrese, 1975). Finally, similarity and liking may feed back
on each other, so that detecting similarity leads to more liking, and more liking
motivates people to detect more similarities (Selfhout, Denissen, Branje, &
Meeus, 2009).
Is there evidence suggesting that opposites attract? The answer is very little.
The biggest opposite that attracts is probably the fact that most women like men
and most men like women. Nevertheless, researchers have tried to find
exceptions to the rule that similarity attracts. Dryer and Horowitz (1997) found
that, in short interactions, dominant individuals were more satisfied interacting
with individuals who were instructed to play a submissive role than with
individuals who were instructed to play a dominant role. Conversely, submissive
individuals were more satisfied interacting with individuals who were instructed
to play a dominant role than interacting with individuals who were instructed to
play a submissive role. This finding makes intuitive sense, for how could a
friendship endure if each friend attempted to dominate the other, or if both
friends were to be submissive and no one dare to take the lead? Despite different
attempts, however, the overwhelming evidence is that similarity attracts.
As can be seen from the review above, proximity, familiarity and similarity are
closely related to each other and mutually reinforce each other: We are more
likely to develop friendships with others who are physically near to us. We meet
and interact with them more often, which allows us to become familiar with
them and discover more similarities. And discovering more similarities, in turn,
motivates us to interact with the other more frequently and be closer to him or
her. Thus, proximity, familiarity and similarity are powerful factors that help
people to form relationships with others who are likely to like them. This
reciprocal liking – we like people who like us – is satisfying, rewarding and
boosts our self-esteem (Taylor, Gould, & Brounstein, 1981). Often it is the
situation, and sometimes even chance, that determines whether we like others
and whether we develop relationships with them. It seems that one needs to be,
literally, in the right place at the right time to meet the right person.
 Underestimating the power of the situation
That relationships develop due to powerful influences of the situation is also
illustrated by research showing that people sometimes attribute arousal caused
by external circumstances to attraction toward attractive others. The most
famous example of research showing this misattribution of arousal
phenomenon is the bridge study by Dutton and Aron (1974). In their study, men
either crossed the Capilano suspension bridge in North Vancouver, a shaky 135
metre-long bridge 67 metres above the Capilano River, or a safer, wider bridge
about 10 metres above the river not far away (Figure 11.12). At the end of either
bridge an attractive female experimenter asked the men to fill out a questionnaire
in which they had to describe pictures (Thematic Apperception Test, Murray,
1943) and gave them their telephone number so that they could call her in case
they had any questions. Dutton and Aron assumed that the shaky bridge would
induce arousal among the men (the bridge is quite scary), who upon seeing the
attractive female experimenter would attribute the arousal to their attraction
toward her, rather than to their crossing the bridge.
FIGURE 11.12 Males crossing an arousing shaky bridge may misattribute their
arousal level to an attractive female standing at the end of the bridge (Dutton &
Aron, 1974).
Source: © Maxim Petrichuk. Used under licence from Shutterstock.

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misattribution of arousal people mistakenly attribute part of their arousal to an external stimulus
 that is not the actual cause of their arousal.

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Consistent with Dutton and Aron’s predictions, men who had crossed the
shaky bridge described the pictures in a more sexual way and were more likely
to call the (attractive) experimenter to inquire about the fictitious experiment
than were men who had crossed the safer bridge. These differences did not occur
when the experimenter was male. Although this experiment took place on a
shaky bridge, it has more general implications for people on first dates. When
wanting a date to be attracted to you, try to be in the right (arousing) place or
situation at the right time: the exit of a roller coaster, a discotheque or the
finishing line of a skiing race!
 Summary
The effects of physical attractiveness on how we evaluate others and how we
respond to them should not be underestimated; people automatically respond
more positively towards physically attractive (as opposed to less attractive)
people. Rather than being entirely in the eye of the beholder, it appears that
several objective features of a face and body contribute to attractiveness (e.g.
symmetry, averageness, smooth skin). This section also discussed the fact that
beauty is certainly not the only factor that determines our attraction to others.
Although other features of a person (e.g. similarity, familiarity) may enhance
why you come to like others, interpersonal attraction can often be attributed to
the circumstances and the place in which two people meet each other.
 ROMANTIC RELATIONSHIPS
What determines relationship stability?
Given the mental and physical health benefits of romantic relationships that we
have discussed, it is not surprising that researchers have tried to understand why
some relationships fail, whereas others prevail. Indeed, in the literature on
relationships, romantic relationships have been most extensively investigated.
What are the specific ingredients of a satisfying and long-lasting relationship? In
the past several decades, relationship researchers have been trying to answer this
basic question from a number of different theoretical perspectives, which we will
briefly review below. Note that when doing so, we generally refer to studies on
heterosexual relationships, as by far the most research in relationship science has
focused on heterosexual relationships. However, this is not to say that the same
processes may not take place within homosexual relationships – there are several
studies suggesting that this is indeed the case (e.g. Duffy & Rusbult, 1986;
Peplau, 1982; Wienke & Hill, 2009).
 Love
- - - - - - - - - -

‘Might as well face it, you’re addicted to love’.

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Robert Palmer Most romantic relationships begin with two individuals falling in
love with each other. In one of his songs, the singer Robert Palmer compares
love with an addiction, and many others have done the same. Is this just a matter
of speech? According to the results of a study by Fisher and her colleagues, not
entirely (Fisher, Aron, & Brown, 2006). The researchers invited 17 participants
who were madly in love to come to the lab, and asked them to bring a picture of
their loved one. Participants were then placed in a brain scanner, and their brain
activity was measured while they looked at their loved one. The results were
quite remarkable. When the participants gazed at a photo of their beloved,
regions in the brain were activated that are tightly associated with the
anticipation of reward and with focused attention. This so-called dopamine
system in the brain is indeed the same system that is involved in pleasure and
addiction. Fisher et al. (2006) concluded that, rather than conceiving love as an
emotion, ‘being in love’ can better be considered a strong motivation – an
addictive craving to be with the other person (Figure 11.13).
FIGURE 11.13 Research by Helen Fisher and colleagues suggests that being in
love literally means being addicted to each other.
Source: © Andrew Jalbert. Used under licence from Shutterstock.
 Clearly, and perhaps luckily, people generally do not remain in the same
intense state of being in love throughout their relationship. Berscheid and
Walster (1974) called this initial, strong motivational sense of love in the early
stages of a relationship passionate love. Consistent with the neurophysiological
results described above, they defined passionate love as a state of intense
longing for union with another. After some time, love generally takes a
somewhat different form, referred to as companionate love. This kind of love is
defined as ‘the affection and tenderness we feel for those with whom our lives
are deeply intertwined’ (Hatfield & Rapson, 1993, p. 9). Note that companionate
love can refer to the love you may feel for your partner, but also the love you
feel for your friends and family. However, as you know, the love you feel for
your partner is not exactly the same as the love you feel for a friend. What, then,
distinguishes these forms of love? According to Sternberg’s (1986) triangular
theory of love, different forms of love consist of different combinations of three
components of love, namely intimacy, passion and commitment. Intimacy
encompasses feelings of closeness and connectedness; passion encompasses
romance, physical attraction, and sexual consummation; commitment entails the
short-term decision or realization that one loves one’s partner, as well as the
long-term commitment to maintain that love. Love can consist of each of these
three components, combined or separately, and to varying degrees of intensity,
resulting in different types of love. For example, love for a romantic partner is
characterized by passion and intimacy (although passion tends to decline over
the course of the relationship), while love for a friend encompasses intimacy, but
not passion (see Figure 11.14).
FIGURE 11.14 The types of love as different combinations of intimacy, passion
and commitment.
Source: Based on data in Sternberg & Barnes, 1988.

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passionate love a state of intense longing for union with another individual, usually characterized
by intrusive thinking and preoccupation with the partner, idealization of the other and the desire to
know the other as well as the desire to be known by the other.

- - - - - - - - - -

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companionate love refers to the feelings of intimacy and affection we feel for another person when
we care deeply for the person but do not necessarily experience passion or arousal in his or her
presence.

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 Relationship satisfaction and stability
In contrast to what the Beatles suggested, love is not all you need. Romantic
relationships do not only thrive on the basis of love: the more partners love each
other, the more satisfying and stable their relationship. It is not as simple as that.
In the (relatively short) history of the science of relationships, knowledge about
the factors that contribute to relationship satisfaction and stability has
accumulated, and we will now present a short overview.
Back in the 1950s, psychological science was dominated by behaviourism, the
view that animal and human behaviour is entirely shaped by rewards and costs –
how people evaluate and behave in their romantic relationship being no
exception. In this tradition, equity theory (Adams, 1963) proposed that people
are satisfied in their romantic relationships if the rewards and the costs
associated with the relationship are balanced between partners – that is, if the
ratio of rewards and costs an individual experiences is equal to the ratio of
rewards and costs for the partner. The rewards of a relationship may be the
support and love one receives, but can also consist of a nice car and a house,
while the costs may be sacrifice of freedom, conflict or the burden of doing
household chores. According to this perspective, a romantic relationship can be
satisfying for both partners even if the rewards are not equally high. One partner
may have lower rewards, but this does not really matter if the costs are also
lower for this partner: as long as the relative rewards and costs are equal,
partners perceive equity (i.e. the rewards and costs are distributed fairly).
Although perceived equity is indeed positively related to satisfaction in the
relationship, it does not predict relationship stability (Van Yperen & Buunk,
1990). In addition, other research indicates that the absolute level (rather than the
ratio of rewards and costs) of rewards one perceives in a relationship is actually
a better predictor of relationship satisfaction (e.g. Cate, Lloyd, Henton, &
Larson, 1982).

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equity theory a theory that seeks to explain relationship satisfaction in terms of perceptions of fair
versus unfair distributions of resources within interpersonal relationships.

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 Intuitively, this seems to make sense: the more your needs are fulfilled in a
relationship, the more satisfied you are with that relationship. And yet, even if
the outcomes in a relationship seem perfect – the rewards exceed the costs –
does this always mean that an individual is satisfied? And does this necessarily
mean that this person is motivated to continue his or her relationship? According
to classic work by Kelley and Thibaut on relationships (Kelley & Thibaut,
1978), the answer to both questions is no, for two reasons. First, people have
very different expectations about what a relationship could and should bring
them. Imagine that you have been very happy and satisfied in a previous
relationship. However, for some reason, the other person has broken your heart
by deciding to end the relationship. The outcomes (rewards minus costs) you
received in that past relationship may have formed your standard for future
relationships – which Thibaut and Kelley (1959) referred to as the comparison
level (CL). When finding a new partner, even when the rewards exceed the costs,
the outcomes still may not be as high as what you expect from a relationship.
Your previous relationship experiences tell you that you can do better. An
individual’s comparison level may not only be based on one’s own prior
romantic relationship experiences, but may also be influenced, for example, by
what he or she has seen in other relationships, including the relationship of his or
her parents.
Second, even though the outcomes of the relationship may meet your
expectations, perhaps there are other attractive alternative partners that are likely
to provide still better outcomes. Indeed, attractive alternatives form one of the
most serious threats to the stability of a romantic relationship. As a case in point,
extramarital affairs are the leading reason for divorce across 160 cultures
(Betzig, 1989). Just as prior relationship experiences set a certain standard (i.e.
CL), potential alternative partners also set a standard, which Thibaut and Kelley
(1959) referred to as the comparison level of alternatives (CLalt). As long as the
outcomes an individual receives in his or her current relationship exceed the
outcomes that can be received with another relationship partner – the quality of
alternatives is low – it is unlikely that the person will want to end the current
relationship. In this case, the person is dependent on the relationship.
In short, according to Kelley and Thibaut’s (1978, admittedly rather
unromantic) analysis of a romantic relationship, a person, say Barbara, is
satisfied in her relationship when the relationship provides her with the
emotional and material rewards that are at least in line with, or higher than, what
Barbara expects to find in a relationship. In addition, Barbara depends on the
relationship to the extent that she believes that no other relationship partner can
provide the same, or higher, level of outcomes for her. It is important to realize
that satisfaction with and dependence on a relationship are not necessarily
related. Barbara can be very satisfied with her current partner, and yet one day
she meets another man who exceeds the looks and personality of her current
partner, and eventually she decides to leave her relationship. In another example,
if Barbara is very unsatisfied – her relationship is lower than her CL – yet feels
that she has no other attractive alternative partners to turn to (i.e. her own
relationship still exceeds her CLalt), she is likely to remain in the relationship.
Thus, the concepts CL and CLalt can help us to explain why relationship
dissatisfaction does not always lead to break up.
Later, Rusbult (1983, see Leader in the Field, Caryl Rusbult) argued that
satisfaction and the quality of alternatives are still not sufficient to understand
the stability of the relationship, and she proposed a third factor. Here, Barbara,
while generally very satisfied with her relationship, meets another man she feels
strongly attracted to (and who is also attracted to her). Does this mean that she
will end the current relationship to start a new relationship with the attractive
alternative? Not always. According to Rusbult (1983), it largely depends on the
number of investments Barbara has already made in her relationship. She may
share many mutual friends with her current partner; she has probably disclosed
much of herself to her partner; part of Barbara’s identity is tightly linked to her
partner; they may have bought a house together, and she may even have children
with her current partner. All these investments Barbara has made will be lost, at
least to a large extent, when she decides to end the relationship. Thus, even in
the face of an attractive alternative, prior investments in the relationship may
often prevent a person from leaving the relationship.

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investments the level of resources (time, emotional involvement, money, self-disclosure and so on)
put into a relationship, which increases the costs of withdrawing from the relationship.

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Rusbult’s investment model, shown in Theory Box 11.2, summarizes the

factors we have discussed so far. According to the model, these three variables –
satisfaction, quality of alternatives and investments – affect the level of
relationship commitment a person experiences to the relationship: the more
satisfied, the lower the quality of alternatives; and the more prior investments,
the more committed a person will be to the relationship. Relationship
commitment is defined here as an individual’s intent to maintain the relationship
and to remain psychologically attached to it (Rusbult, 1980) The investment
model emphasizes that commitment is the key to relationship stability and
couple well-being, because it motivates partners to act and think in the interests
of the relationship. You can read more about this in Research Close-Up 11.3.

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relationship commitment an individual’s intent to maintain the relationship and to remain

psychologically attached to it.

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THEORY BOX 11.2

THE INVESTMENT MODEL
Source: Based on Rusbult, 1983. © APA, with permission. The use of APA
information does not imply endorsement by APA.

An individual’s commitment to a relationship is largely determined by three

factors, namely: How satisfying is the relationship? Is the relationship more
– or less – rewarding than possible alternative relationships? And how much
have I invested already in the relationship?

LEADER IN THE FIELD

Caryl Rusbult (1952–2010) investigated close relationships for
more than 35 years. When explaining why she got interested in long-
term relationships, she blamed a persistent travelling companion on a
cross-country drive from California to North Carolina. When
crossing the California–Arizona boarder, her friend asked her ‘Why
do people stick with their partners?’ Over the next two days, Caryl
told him about research on proximity, similarity and physical
attraction. By the time they reached Oklahoma, her friend pointed
out that she had not answered his question. She had explained why
people form relationships and why they like or love their partners,
but she had not explained why people stay with their partners. Caryl
realized that research had failed to answer this question and set out
to change relationship science. As a result, she developed the
investment model to help explain why people stick to their partners
even when the relationship is not particularly satisfying. Caryl
Rusbult succeeded in changing relationship science by recognizing
the dynamic nature of relationships, the mutual influence
relationship partners have on each other and the various levels of
interdependence that make relationships work and that motivate
relationship partners to stay with each other.
 Thoughts and behaviours that enhance relationship
functioning
Whether we like it or not, even (or particularly) in romantic relationships we
may at times feel irritated or even hurt by our partner. Imagine Peter returning
home from work, smashing the doors and shouting at his partner Barbara when
she asks him something. Barbara’s initial impulse may be to shout back, which
is likely to make things worse, not better. Instead, she may try not to behave
destructively in return, but to respond in a constructive manner. She may assume
that Peter has had a bad day at the office and decide that it is better to leave him
alone for a while. She may even ask Peter if there is something she can do to
cheer him up. Behaving constructively in the face of a partner’s destructive
responses is called accommodation. Research has shown that highly, as
compared to weakly, committed partners are more likely to accommodate when
the partner behaves badly (Rusbult, Verette, Whitney, Slovik, & Lipkus, 1991).
Similarly, research on forgiveness – defined as a prosocial motivational
change toward the offender, despite his or her hurtful behaviour (McCullough et
al., 1998) – has demonstrated that responding in a forgiving rather than
retaliatory manner towards a partner’s hurtful acts generally promotes
relationship satisfaction and longevity (Fincham, 2000; Fincham, Paleari, &
Regalia, 2002; Karremans & Van Lange, 2004; Paleari, Regalia, & Fincham,
2005). Relationship commitment again is a strong predictor of whether people
are willing to forgive a relationship partner (Finkel, Rusbult, Kumashiro, &
Hannon, 2002; Karremans & Aarts, 2007). Forgiveness, however, not only
depends on the features of the relationship with the offender, but is also
determined by personality factors. Put differently, some people are simply better
than others at forgiving a partner. For example, individuals who have high self-
control, who have an agreeable personality and those who are low on
neuroticism are more likely to forgive their relationship partners (e.g.
McCullough, Bellah, Kilpatrick, & Johnson, 2001). And not only does
forgiveness promote relationship functioning, it also pays off to forgive a partner
at the individual level: forgiveness positively affects a person’s mental and even
physical health, especially when a person feels strongly committed to maintain
his or her relationship with the offender (for an overview, see Karremans & Van
Lange, 2008).

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 - - - - - - - - - -

forgiveness forgiveness is defined as a prosocial motivational change toward the offender, despite
the offender’s hurtful behaviour.

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Commitment also promotes willingness to sacrifice, defined as the tendency

to forego self-interest to promote the well-being of the partner or the relationship
(Van Lange et al., 1997). Although romantic partners often have compatible
preferences or needs (i.e. they both want the same thing), sometimes the interests
of both partners may be in conflict. Suppose Peter and Barbara visit a small
village with two restaurants, one Indian, the other Italian. They decide to have
dinner, but Peter prefers the Indian, and Barbara prefers the Italian restaurant. In
such situations, committed partners are more likely to make sacrifices, by
foregoing their own preference for the good of the partner and relationship. This
may occur in such mundane situations as deciding where to have dinner, but may
also involve more serious decisions, such as deciding where to live, which job to
take and so on. Partners in romantic relationships that are characterized by
relatively high levels of sacrifice on the part of both partners do indeed have a
higher chance of staying together (Van Lange et al., 1997).

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willingness to sacrifice the tendency to forego immediate self-interest to promote the well-being of
the partner or the relationship.

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RESEARCH CLOSE-UP 11.3

WHY SOME WOMEN REMAIN IN

ABUSIVE RELATIONSHIPS
Rusbult, C. E., & Martz, J. M. (1995). Remaining in an abusive relationship: An investment
 model analysis of nonvoluntary dependence. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21,
558–571.

Introduction To answer the question of why battered

women sometimes choose to stay with their abusive
partners, this study applied Rusbult’s investment
model (e.g. Rusbult, 1980, 1983). Based on this
model, the authors predicted that satisfaction would
not be a reliable predictor of stay/leave behaviour, but
that abused women would feel more committed to
their partner and would be more likely to stay in their
abusive relationships when (a) they have limited or
poor-quality alternatives, and (b) when they had
invested more in their relationship.
Method and procedure The participants were 100
women who sought refuge in a shelter for battered
women in the US. Women were on average 29 years
old and had 2.4 children. They had suffered relatively
severe abuse, including being thrown down stairs,
having a gun put in their mouth, or systematically
having their fingers broken. Within 48 hours of their
arrival at the shelter the women were interviewed by a
staff member. During the interview several questions
were asked to measure the central factors of the
investment model. For example, for commitment, the
interviewer asked whether the woman intended to
separate from the partner (0 = definitely, 1 = thinking
about it, 2 = definitely not). For satisfaction, questions
like ‘Do you have any positive feelings remaining for
your partner?’ (yes – no) were asked. For the quality
of alternatives, the interviewer asked questions like
‘Do you generally have transportation?’ (yes – no),
‘What is your level of education?’ (none – university
degree) and ‘Are you currently employed?’ (yes –
no). Finally, to measure investments, the interviewer
asked questions like ‘How many children do you
have?’ (number of children) and ‘How long have you
had a relationship with your partner for?’ (duration of
relationship in months). Stay/leave behaviour was
assessed via telephone calls, at 3, 6, and 12 months
after departure from the shelter. Thirty-five women
returned to their partner within three months, 30
returned within a year, and 32 never returned.
Results Consistent with their hypotheses, Rusbult and
Martz found that lower quality of alternatives and
greater investment size predicted both more
commitment and less frequent leaving behaviour.
Satisfaction was, as hypothesized, not reliably related
to commitment or stay/leave behaviour, although
women who returned to their partner tended to report
somewhat more positive feelings for him and made
more benign attributions for the abuse. Battered
women reported stronger commitment when they had
poor alternatives (e.g. less education, no means of
 transportation) and when they had invested more in
the relationship (e.g. their relationship lasted longer,
they had children with the abuser).
Discussion Applying the investment model to women
in abusive relationships allowed the researchers to
explain why battered women stay in such
relationships. While previous research seemed to
suggest that battered women ‘are crazy’ to stick to
their relationships (‘why else would a woman chose to
return to a husband who nearly beats her to death?’),
the investment model shed a whole new light on the
reasons why battered women stay in their
relationships: women who return to their partners
following intense abuse do so due to structural
dependence: (a) poor alternatives; and (b) high
investments. These findings have major practical
implications, in that they suggest that abused women
may have less of a need for therapy and more of a
need for alternative interventions and practical help
(e.g. education, help with finding a job that can pay
for a car, etc.).
An important reason why acts like accommodation and willingness to sacrifice
promote relationship well-being and stability is that such acts communicate
commitment to the relationship (Wieselquist, Rusbult, Foster, & Agnew, 1999).
For example, when Barbara acts constructively when Peter acts nastily, Peter
may infer from this, consciously or unconsciously, that Barbara must be
committed to the relationship – why else would she act so nicely? After all,
when Peter is acting constructively himself, he does so because he is committed
to the relationship (see Chapter 5 on self-perception theory). The same may
happen when Barbara sacrifices her own needs to make Peter happy; she must be
committed to do so. Such acts of kindness promote Peter’s trust in Barbara,
fuelling his own commitment to the relationship. Wieselquist and colleagues
(1999) termed this dyadic process the ‘cyclical growth model’ of relationships: if
both partners act in ways that benefit the other partner and the relationship, this
will breed trust in each other, which in turn will promote commitment in both
partners, which in turn will promote acts that benefit the partner and the
relationship, and so on.
Commitment not only promotes behaviour that benefits the relationship:
committed partners also tend to think about their relationship and partner in a
way that benefits the relationship. For example, committed partners tend to see
more positive characteristics in their partner, than the partner sees in himself or
herself, and they perceive their partner more positively than the typical partner
(Murray, Holmes, & Griffin, 1996). Also, committed partners generally believe
that their relationship has more positive features and fewer negative features
than the average relationship – referred to as perceived relationship superiority
(Buunk & Van der Eijnden, 1997). An elegant study by Rusbult, Van Lange,
Wildschut, Yovetich, and Verette (2000) demonstrated that committed partners
especially do so when the relationship is threatened. Participants, all college
students involved in a romantic relationship, were asked to write down the
positive and negative features that distinguished their relationship from the
average relationship. However, before doing so, half of the participants received
the following instructions: ‘We are especially interested in college students’
dating relationships, because previous research has demonstrated that in
comparison to other types of relationships, college students’ relationships are
less likely to persist over time . . . Of course, this is not necessarily true for all
college students’ relationships – it is simply true on average’. In this manner, the
researchers attempted to induce psychological threat to the relationship. The
other half of the participants, those in the control condition, did not receive this
relationship threatening information.

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relationship superiority the tendency of romantically involved individuals to perceive their own
relationship as better than the average relationship.

- - - - - - - - - -
 The results of the study showed that participants who were highly committed
to their relationship listed relatively more positive, and fewer negative, features
of their relationship than those who were only weakly committed. But
importantly, this was especially the case among participants who had received
the threat instructions. In other words, commitment induces partners to boost the
positive image of their relationship, especially when the relationship is
threatened. And it works: a second, longitudinal, study demonstrated that
partners who perceived more relationship superiority were more likely to still be
together 20 months later.
We have already discussed the potential threat of attractive alternatives.
Committed partners have several efficient ways of dealing with them. First, they
simply tend to pay less attention to them, and partners who are indeed inattentive
to attractive alternatives are more likely to stay in their relationship (Miller,
1997). Second, committed partners tend to devalue the attractiveness of
alternative partners, referred to as derogation of alternatives. That is, when
asked to evaluate the attractiveness of attractive opposite-sex others, people in a
committed heterosexual romantic relationship typically give lower attractiveness
ratings than people who are not in a romantic relationship (Johnson & Rusbult,
1989; Simpson et al., 1990). Several studies indeed confirm that romantically
involved individuals devalue attractive opposite-sex others, rather than singles
enhancing attractive others (Lydon, Fitzsimons, & Naidoo, 2003; Ritter,
Karremans, & Van Schie, 2010).

- - - - - - - - - -

derogation of alternatives the tendency of romantically involved individuals, as compared to

singles, to give lower attractiveness ratings to attractive opposite-sex others.

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To summarize, relationship commitment is a central factor in promoting

behaviours and cognitions that not only helps partners to stay together, but also
to have a well-functioning relationship. Especially when the road gets rocky –
when partners experience conflict, have conflicting preferences, or when
attractive alternatives present themselves – commitment helps partners to get
through difficult times and helps them to protect their relationship.
Before continuing, we should briefly discuss an additional view on romantic
relationship satisfaction and persistence – the self-expansion model. This model,
developed by Aron and Aron (1986), is based on the idea that people have a
fundamental motivation for self-expansion – they continuously seek
psychological growth, knowledge and different perspectives. One way to fulfil
this central need for self-expansion is to form relationships with others (Aron &
Aron, 1986). In a romantic relationship, partners are satisfied as long as the
relationship contributes to self-expansion (Aron, Aron, Tudor, & Nelson, 1991).
Moreover, when people experience self-expansion in a relationship, one could
say that the identities of the two partners may become merged; the partner is
‘included in the self’ (Aron et al., 1991). There is some intriguing evidence that
this may almost literally be the case (see Research Close-Up 11.4).

RESEARCH CLOSE-UP 11.4

INCLUDING THE OTHER IN SELF

Aron, A., Aron, E. N., Tudor, M., & Nelson, G. (1991). Close relationships as including other in
the self. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60, 241–253.

Introduction According to the self-expansion model,

when partners become involved in a relationship, their
identities increasingly overlap over time. This
experiment tested whether, in line with the general
tenet of the self-expansion model, partners in
relationships would indeed ‘merge’ with each other,
whereby partners ‘include the other in the self’. The
present research set out to test whether relationship
partners may sometimes literally confuse the self and
the partner. Specifically, when processing information
about the partner, people may sometimes process this
 information as if it were information about the self.
Method Participants, who were all married, first
completed a questionnaire in which they indicated for
90 traits (e.g. creative, introverted) to what extent
each trait applied to themselves, and their partner, for
each person in turn (on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1
= extremely like me, to 7 = unlike me, and 1 =
extremely like partner, to 7 = unlike partner). Note
that in this manner there are two categories of traits:
First, there are traits that are similar for both the self
and spouse, in that a trait is either descriptive for both
(i.e. with scores < 4 for both self and spouse), or not
descriptive for both (i.e. with scores > 4 for both self
and spouse). Second, there are traits that are different
for self and spouse, in that a trait is descriptive for
one, but not for the other.
Later in the study the participants carried out a second task. The same 90
traits were presented in turn on a computer screen, and participants had to
decide as quickly and accurately as possible whether or not the trait applied
to themselves by pressing a ‘me’ or ‘not me’ button.
Results If participants indeed ‘confused’ themselves
with their spouse, the researchers predicted that
participants in the second task would have more
difficulty in responding with ‘me’ or ‘not me’ to traits
that were different between self and spouse
(descriptive for one, but not for the other) than to
traits that were similar for both (descriptive for both,
 or not descriptive for both). This is exactly what the
authors found: participants were significantly slower
in responding either ‘me’ or ‘not me’ to traits that
were different between self and partner than to traits
that were similar for both (see Figure 11.15).
Moreover, participants also made more ‘mistakes’ for
traits that were different between self and partner (e.g.
they responded with ‘me’ to a trait which they had
initially indicated was not applicable to themselves,
but was applicable to their partner).
FIGURE 11.15 Mean response times for traits on which self and spouse were
‘same’ versus ‘different’.
Source: Based on Aron et al., 1991. © APA, with permission. The use of APA
information does not imply endorsement by APA.

Conclusion These results strongly suggest that

partners may actually ‘include the other in the self’.
When participants have to respond quickly to indicate
whether or not a certain trait is applicable to
themselves, the results suggest that the partner’s traits
are to some extent also taken into account,
 presumably because the partner is part of the self,
leading to slower response times and more mistakes.
Thus, a close relationship can indeed lead to
confusion between self and other.
Most loving relationships are perceived as self-expanding when they start:
being in love is an arousing experience in itself, and not only do fresh couples
often engage in novel activities: partners may inspire each other by providing,
and adopting, different views and perspectives in life. However, after some time,
when novelty and passion are declining, boredom may surface. According to the
self-expansion model, preventing boredom is the key to a successful
relationship. Consistent with this idea, a longitudinal study found that
experienced boredom in a relationship predicts relationship dissatisfaction nine
years later (Tsapelas, Aron, & Orbuch, 2009).
 Summary
Long-lasting and well-functioning romantic relationships are characterized by
both partners being strongly committed to the relationship. Strong commitment,
which is based on satisfaction, investments and quality of alternatives, induces
partners to behave in a pro-relationship manner, especially when the road gets
rocky. Committed partners are more likely to forgive each other’s mishaps,
shield themselves from attractive others, and are more focused on the positive
aspects of their relationship. According to the self-expansion model, the identity
of two partners may even become merged.
 GENERAL RELATIONSHIP PROCESSES
What are the general processes that characterize relationships?
Having focused specifically on romantic relationships, we will continue by
discussing a number of processes that are common to all types of relationships,
although they sometimes differ in their intensity or meaning across relationships.
Below we will address two processes that have been found to affect relationship
initiation, development and maintenance: what and how much information
relationship partners disclose to each other, and how responsive one’s partner is
perceived to be. However, before discussing these processes, let us first explore
the types of relationships that can be distinguished.
 Types of relationships
Although people generally know quite well whether they have a relationship
with another person, researchers have struggled with the definition of the term
‘relationship’. What seems so obvious in everyday life is sometimes hard to
capture in a scientific definition. Although researchers still have different
definitions of relationships, most agree that in order to have a relationship,
people need to depend on each other, that is, to be mutually interdependent.
People are interdependent when the cognitive, affective or behavioural outcomes
of one person are dependent on the other person (Kelley, 1997; Rusbult & Van
Lange, 1996). For example, when Barbara helps Peter to prepare for an
upcoming exam rather than going out with her friends, Peter will feel
appreciated and supported. In this case Peter’s feelings are interdependent with
Barbara’s behaviour, because what Barbara does affects Peter.
The assumption that to have a relationship people need to be interdependent
sheds an interesting light on the role of anger in the deterioration of
relationships. Indeed, contrary to the assumption that anger is the most important
source of relationship endings, the assumption that people have relationships
when they are interdependent suggests that indifference may be at least as bad
for relationships as anger. When Barbara and Peter are angry at each other, they
still are interdependent: what one partner does affects the other, even when it is
in a negative way. It is when Barbara’s behaviour does not make any difference
for Peter any more that one may wonder whether they even have a relationship.
Although people are interdependent in all their relationships, obviously people
have many different types of relationships that vary on a variety of dimensions.
In the literature, researchers have identified a number of dimensions that allow
us to distinguish between different types of relationships. Clark and Mills (1979)
distinguished between exchange and communal relationships. In exchange
relationships people give each other benefits only when they are likely to
receive a comparable benefit in return. To illustrate, people may have an
exchange relationship with a plumber: the plumber fixes their leaking pipe and
the client pays the plumber the appropriate amount of money for the work done.
In communal relationships, people exchange benefits according to each
partner’s needs without expecting something in return: partners are concerned
with each other’s welfare, rather than the deservingness of the benefits. To
illustrate, a wife may cancel a party to stay at home with her sick husband
because she genuinely cares about his well-being, not because she expects
something in return. Similarly, a friend may help you to move your belongings
to your new apartment on a cold, rainy Saturday morning because that’s what
friends are for. As can be seen from the examples, the distinction between
exchange and communal relationships often covaries with intimacy and
closeness. Exchange relationships are typically less close and intimate than
communal relationships.

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exchange relationship refers to an interpersonal association between individuals who are

concerned with what their partner gets and what they themselves receive to ensure equitable
benefits.

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communal relationship refers to an interpersonal association between individuals who are more
concerned with what their partner gets rather than what they themselves receive, or relationships in
which people’s primary concern is being responsive to the other person’s needs.

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The literature also distinguishes between horizontal or reciprocal relationships

and vertical or complementary relationships (Finkenauer, Engels, Branje, &
Meeus, 2004; Hinde, 1979). Horizontal relationships are egalitarian and involve
reciprocal exchanges of benefits, such as knowledge, care, support or disclosure.
To illustrate, friendships are typical horizontal relationships: both friends receive
and provide care. Vertical relationships are hierarchical and involve unequal – or
complementary – exchanges of benefits. For example, in parent–child
relationships the child typically receives care; the parents typically provide care.
Another important dimension is the voluntariness of the relationship. In
voluntary relationships (e.g. friends, dating partners), people lack any formal
bonds to maintain an intimate, stable relationship. On the contrary, in
involuntary relationships (parent–child relationships, arranged marriage) formal
bonds, such as biological ties or social structures, add to the persistence of the
relationship.
The most important voluntary relationships throughout life are friendships
(Wiseman, 1986). Friends are the first relationships children develop outside
their family, and having friends is a norm even among very young children.
Among adolescents, having at least one friend to confide in is often considered
as a social achievement and an indicator of social competence (Hartup, 1996).
Based on a review of existing friendship questionnaires, Mendelson and Aboud
(1999) identified six functions of friendships: (1) stimulating companionship
(e.g. doing fun activities together); (2) help (e.g. offering assistance); (3)
intimacy (e.g. being open to honest disclosures of personal information); (4)
reliable alliances (e.g. being loyal); (5) self-validation (e.g. allowing friends to
maintain a positive self-image); and (6) emotional security (e.g. providing
comfort in novel or threatening situations). Friendships thereby provide a
context in which basic human needs are satisfied (Demir & Özdemir, 2010).
Importantly, they provide people with opportunities to establish and reinforce
social skills that are important to the development and maintenance of close
relationships (Dunn, 2004). Not surprisingly, the skills that are established in
friendships, including problem-solving skills, conflict resolution and empathy,
are correlated with well-being and satisfaction in adulthood (Dishion & Nelson,
2007; Hartup & Stevens, 1997). Frequent contact with friends remains an
important source of well-being not only in adulthood, but even in old age
(Pinquart & Sörensen, 2000).
As we mentioned earlier, people also have relationships that are qualitatively
different, such as homosexual relationships, or relationships between two people
from different cultural backgrounds. People in these types of relationships face
particular difficulties (e.g. societal pressures, prejudice) that heterosexual
couples or couples from the same cultural background do not have to deal with.
Without doubt these difficulties may affect relational functioning. Nevertheless,
some processes characterize all relationships, as is reflected in this statement by
Huston and Schwartz (1995) concerning homosexual relationships: ‘The
relationships formed by lesbians and gay men are in many ways very similar to
heterosexual ones.’ (p. 120.) Thus, despite their differences, some processes are
similar in different types of relationships. In the following, we turn to two such
processes, focusing on the effects of disclosure that relationship partners engage
in, and the effects of partners’ responsiveness to each other’s needs.
 Disclosure
Imagine that it is your first day at college and you are sitting next to your fellow
student in the psychology introductory lecture. What do you say to each other?
You probably start by telling each other where you are from and why you picked
that particular university. While talking to each other you discover that you share
a similar interest in psychology. Because you discover that the other is similar to
you (see the section on similarity above), you tell the other student a bit more
about your interests and the activities you engage in outside of the university.
You then discover that you both like the same bar downtown, and agree to meet
there next Friday night. This meeting may mark the beginning of a relationship,
a friendship, a romantic relationship, or a companionship between two students
who help each other in times of need.
Verbally revealing information about oneself to another person is called self-
disclosure (Jourard, 1971). Self-disclosure is important in every type of
interpersonal relationship, from business partnerships to love affairs, from
friends to parent–child relationships, from housemates to long-distance relatives
(Rubin, 1973).

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self-disclosure verbally revealing information about oneself to another person.

- - - - - - - - - -

The imaginary exercise above shows how disclosure and relationships can
influence and change each other. A meta-analysis of 94 studies by Collins and
Miller (1994) provides convincing evidence for this suggestion. Their analysis
revealed that (a) we disclose more to people we like; (b) we like people more
after having disclosed to them; and (c) we like people who disclose more. Thus,
once people disclose information to another person, they start liking the other
more, especially if the other is responsive to their needs and values them (Reis &
Shaver, 1988). Liking and intimacy, in turn, appear necessary conditions for the
disclosure of more intimate personal information in relationships (e.g. Hendrick,
1981). Importantly, when one person discloses information about himself or
herself, the other also likes the person more, and, in turn, discloses more
information about himself or herself. In the literature this is called disclosure
reciprocity, because people tend to match each other’s level of self-disclosure,
disclosing more if the other person does so and disclosing less if the other’s self-
disclosure declines (Cunningham, Strassberg, & Haan, 1986). As described by
social penetration theory (Altman & Taylor, 1973; see Theory Box 11.3 &
Figure 11.6), adults and children increase the depth and breadth of their self-
disclosure to people they like (Buhrmester & Prager, 1995) and decrease the
level of self-disclosure to people they do not like, which often signals the
beginning of the end of a relationship (Baxter, 1987).

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disclosure reciprocity people tend to match each other’s level of self-disclosure.

- - - - - - - - - -

Mundane as well as intimate self-disclosure is important to maintain

relationships. Catching up with each other at the end of a day (Sigman, 1991) by
telling the other what one did, whom one saw, what rumours one heard, how the
day went, or who called, signals to the relationship partner that the relationship
is intact and that one is committed to it (Duck, Rutt, Hurst, & Strejc, 1991).
Sharing intimate information with each other is the most frequently reported
strategy to maintain relationships with friends, relatives and lovers (Canary,
Stafford, Hause, & Wallace, 1993; Parks & Floyd, 1996). Not surprisingly,
sharing secrets – having a secret together and exchanging the secret information
– is one of the most powerful means of creating feelings of intimacy and
closeness among adult secret-keepers (Finkenauer, Kubacka, Engels, & Kerkhof,
2009) and children (Furman & Bierman, 1984). Secrets often concern intimate
information that people do not want to share with others, because it makes them
vulnerable to being hurt (e.g. ridicule, rejection, humiliation; e.g. Petronio 1991,
2002). Consequently, when a person wants to share a secret, he or she has to rely
on the other’s integrity, has to trust that person to protect it, and has to be willing
to become dependent on the other.

THEORY BOX 11.3

 SOCIAL PENETRATION THEORY
The theory proposes that, as relationships develop, self-disclosure proceeds
from superficial to more intimate topics, moving progressively further and
further into a person’s personality. Personality is likened to an onion, which
consists of different layers, ranging from superficial qualities (e.g. weight,
gender and other ‘public’ information) to extremely intimate qualities (e.g.
beliefs, traumatic experiences and other ‘private’ information). As
relationships develop, self-disclosure helps to ‘peel’ away the outer layers of
personality, revealing more and more intimate information about the
personality of the discloser. Progress is made along two dimensions: (1)
depth – social penetration processes proceed from superficial to intimate
levels of disclosure; (2) breadth – as interaction continues, disclosures
spread to different areas.
These positive effects of self-disclosure for relationship development and
maintenance emerge not only in face-to-face interactions, but also in online
communications in adolescence (Valkenburg & Peter, 2009; see also Social
Psychology Beyond the Lab 11.2). Because Internet communication involves
fewer verbal and non-verbal cues and is thereby less complex than face-to-face
communication, adolescents become hyperpersonal – that is, unusually intimate
– in their disclosure on the Internet. However, positive effects of online
disclosure only hold for adolescents who use the Internet to maintain existing
relationships (Bessière, Kiesler, Kraut, & Boneva, 2008). Adolescents who use
the Internet mainly to form new contacts do not show these beneficial effects of
disclosure for relationship quality (Valkenburg & Peter, 2007).
How can we explain this lack of relationship-enhancing effects of disclosure
for people with large groups of new friends? In the literature on disclosure and
liking, researchers distinguish between generalized disclosure and dyadic
disclosure (Dindia, 1994; Finkenauer et al., 2004). Generalized disclosure occurs
when a person self-discloses, on average, to everyone. Dyadic disclosure occurs
when people uniquely disclose information to certain relationship partners.
Research suggests that in relationships between married partners and siblings
generalized disclosure is not, and sometimes is even negatively, related to
relationship satisfaction, while dyadic disclosure is strongly positively related to
relationship satisfaction (Finkenauer et al., 2004). Eastwick and his colleagues
(Eastwick, Finkel, Mochon, & Ariely, 2007) found similar effects for
generalized versus dyadic liking in their speed-dating research. They found that
people liked another person less when they felt that this person liked everybody,
but that people liked a person more when they felt that the liking was unique to
them personally. Thus, people have a need to feel special in a relationship, and
they cannot feel special when a person discloses information to everybody, when
the person likes everybody, or, when he or she has many ‘followers’ on Twitter
and large groups of ‘friends’ on Facebook.
FIGURE 11.16 Social Penetration Theory.
Source: Scott McLean, Business Communication for Success (2010). Some
rights reserved. Used with permission of Flat World Knowledge, Inc.
www.flatworldknowledge.com

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BEYOND THE

LAB 11.2
ONLINE DATING
Imagine you were single and wanted to get a date, how would you go about
it? You could do it the old-fashioned way: have a crush on a class-mate,
wait for the right moment to ask him or her out, then pop the question,
risking that he or she says no, and in that case, go through the motions with
another person. Or you could do it in one of two modern ways. You could
register for a speed-dating event, during which you have 10–25 dates, each
of about four minutes, and hope that one of these dates reciprocates your
interest and that you form a match and subsequently arrange a traditional
date. Alternatively, you could engage in online dating.
date. Alternatively, you could engage in online dating.
Online dating is getting more and more popular: the threshold of initiating
contact is extremely low (often a mouse click is sufficient) and the number
of attractive alternatives is seemingly endless. Given the ease with which
one can check out these alternatives, and potentially meet the love of one’s
life, it is almost surprising that people would prefer to go through the often
nerve-wracking experience of a face-to-face interaction. But does online
dating live up to its promises? Not really, it seems.
In their research, Frost, Chance, Norton, and Ariely (2008) find that using
the Internet to identify a potential mate leads to inefficient and
unsatisfactory dating outcomes. Many people surf the web for hours to find
the ‘right’ one. They make lists of traits and characteristics that they think
will be important for them to fall in love with a potential partner. Given all
the options, and the shopping-style interface most dating sites use, it almost
seems that one can choose a date in the same way as choosing a watch or
dog food. People select the searchable attributes that they think are
important (e.g. religion, height, weight, hair colour, age, income, hobbies).
The list looks perfect, and people think that a person who has all these
attributes must be the right one. But, as Frost et al. show, people are often
disappointed when actually meeting the date that looked so perfect in virtual
reality. In true reality there is a mismatch between what people think they
want in a partner and what they experience when being with him or her (see
also Norton, Frost, & Ariely, 2007, and the speed dating findings by
Eastwick & Finkel, 2008). Moreover, a study by Toma, Hancock, and
Ellison (2008) among online daters revealed that 80 per cent of the
participants lied about at least one of the searchable attributes, especially
those participants who had scores that deviated a lot from the sample mean.
To give an example, the weight these participants reported in their online
profiles deviated more from their observed weight than the information of
people scoring closer to the sample mean. Women often lied about their
weight and men about their height. Although the lies were usually not
extreme, they certainly contributed to the disappointment people
experienced when actually meeting the online date.
To explain people’s disappointment with online dating, Frost et al. suggest
that people are ‘experience goods’: you need to feel, see, smell and hear
another person to see whether he or she feels right. You need to experience
how the person makes you feel to decide whether he or she is right for you.
Indeed when Frost et al. offered people a chance to go on a virtual date,
where they were able to get to know the other person by exploring a virtual
environment with him or her, they were much more likely to like the other
person when subsequently meeting them for real than when they had met
their partner through a searchable dating site. Thus, online dating sites need
to provide people with opportunities to experience potential partners. Until
they do, you may be better off opting for the old-fashioned way of dating.
 Perceived partner responsiveness
One cannot talk about self-disclosure without talking about perceived partner
responsiveness (Reis & Shaver, 1988). Would you continue telling someone
about how unfairly your teacher treated you in the last exam if the person checks
his or her mobile while you are almost in tears? You probably would not,
because the other person’s behaviour clearly signals that you and your story are
not important to him or her, and he or she does not care specifically about you
and your need for validation.

- - - - - - - - - -

perceived partner responsiveness the perception that a relationship partner is responsive to our
needs.

- - - - - - - - - -

To disclose intimate information to another person, people need to feel that the
other person understands, values and cares for the self (Reis, Clark, & Holmes,
2004). To tell another person about one’s deepest thoughts and feelings, people
need to feel accepted. When people feel that the other person tries to change
them, or that he or she does not pay attention, they feel that the other does not
accept them. This makes them feel bad about themselves (e.g. ‘I do not fulfil my
partner’s ideals, I’m unworthy’) and about the relationship (e.g. ‘Why would he
try to change me if he loved me?’; ‘She couldn’t care less about me’) (Overall,
Fletcher, & Simpson, 2006). Not surprisingly, people, both adults and children,
disclose to people whom they trust, people who are non-judgemental, and people
who are responsive to their need to be accepted as they are (e.g. Kelly &
McKillop, 1996) and with whom they have good relationships (Buhrmester &
Prager, 1995; Finkenauer et al., 2004). When people feel that the other does not
accept them as they are and tries to change them into someone they are not, they
not only stop disclosing information to them, they may even end the relationship
(Overall et al., 2006). Thus, to disclose information about yourself to others, you
need to feel that the other is responsive to you and your needs.
A person is responsive when he or she enacts behaviour that addresses your
needs: she smiles when you reveal something funny, she validates your fears
about an upcoming presentation, she shows interest when you tell her about your
recent solo trip to South America, or she expresses indignation when you tell her
about the fact that your ex-boyfriend broke up by sending a text message to your
mobile phone. Your interpretation of her behaviour as being responsive is more
important for the development of intimacy in your relationship with her than is
her actual response (Laurenceau, Feldman Barrett, & Pietromonaco, 1998;
Lemay, Clark, & Feeney, 2007; Reis & Shaver, 1988). So, the perception that a
partner is responsive is somewhat independent of the partner’s actual
responsiveness, mostly because people exaggerate their partner’s
responsiveness: they perceive their partner as being more responsive than the
partner reports themselves as being (Murray et al., 1996).
A diary study by Laurenceau, Feldman Barrett, and Rovine (2005) among 96
married couples underlines the close link between disclosure, responsiveness,
and relationship maintenance. In their study they asked both husbands and wives
to complete a diary every evening for six weeks. Every evening, the couples
reported how much they had disclosed to their spouse during the day, whether
they perceived that their partner had disclosed to them, whether they felt that
their partner was responsive while they disclosed to him or her, and how close
they felt to their spouse. Both self-disclosure and perceived partner disclosure
predicted the intimacy people felt toward their spouse. Importantly, perceived
partner responsiveness partially mediated the link between disclosure and
intimacy. This means that disclosure increased intimacy both directly and
indirectly through the influence of perceived partner responsiveness (see Figure
11.17): the more spouses disclosed information to their partner on one day, the
more intimate they felt with their partner the next day, partly because they felt
that their partner was responsive to their needs. Thus, to feel intimate, the spouse
who discloses needs to perceive the listener’s responses as being understanding,
accepting and caring.
FIGURE 11.17 A model of the mediating role of perceived responsiveness in the
link between disclosure and intimacy.

Attachment theory (Bowlby, 1982; see Leader in the Field, John Bowlby,
earlier in this chapter) and the research it inspired (e.g. Ainsworth, Bell, &
Stayton, 1974; De Wolff & Van Ijzendoorn, 1997; Landry, Smith, & Swank,
2006), underlines the fact that perceived partner responsiveness is not only
important in horizontal relationships, but also in vertical relationships. Parental
responsiveness – that is, a prompt, contingent and appropriate reaction to the
child’s needs – influences the course of children’s psychosocial development
(Collins, Maccoby, Steinberg, Hetherington, & Bornstein, 2000). Children
whose parents were sensitive and responsive to their needs are more securely
attached, have better social skills and show greater academic accomplishments.
Parents’ responsive reactions to children’s distress (e.g. comforting, helping) are
associated with children’s better and more adequate regulation of negative
emotions, and also with their ability to feel empathy for others and their
prosocial behaviour (Davidov & Grusec, 2006).
Although responsiveness and disclosure reciprocity are important in almost all
relationships, their importance varies across types of relationships. Typically,
you expect your friends, parents and siblings to be responsive, and you expect to
disclose information to them, yet you would probably not expect the same from
your children. Indeed, as we have mentioned earlier, vertical or complementary
relationships involve unequal exchanges of benefits. Parents provide care and
children receive care; family members of disabled people provide support and
help, disabled people receive support and help (hopefully; see also Chapter 10
on the potentially unequal relationship between help-givers and help-recipients).
Similarly, responsiveness and disclosure reciprocity are unequal in
complementary relationships. Commonly, children disclose to their parents, but
parents do not necessarily reciprocate their children’s disclosure to avoid
burdening them with their worries and fears (Amato & Afifi, 2006; Finkenauer
et al., 2004). Also, parents typically may not expect children to be responsive to
their needs, while children expect parents to be responsive to their needs, wishes
and desires.
 Relationship ending
As we have discussed in this and the previous section, maintenance processes,
disclosure and responsiveness are at the heart of happy, harmonious and lasting
relationships. It is not surprising that relationships become conflictual or even
end when one of these ingredients is lacking. This is illustrated in a study by
Markman (1981), who followed ninety couples from the time when they planned
to get married till five and a half years later. In the initial phase of the study,
couples completed a self-report questionnaire on their satisfaction with the
relationship and rated the intensity of any problems they experienced in their
relationship. They were also asked to discuss their major problem area by taking
turns in both the discloser and the listener role. During this discussion, the
couples rated their partner’s responsiveness to their disclosure on a scale,
ranging from ‘super negative’ to ‘super positive’. At a one-year follow-up, initial
satisfaction was positively associated with current marital adjustment, and
problem intensity was negatively associated with adjustment. There was no
association with the initial ratings on partner’s responsiveness. However, at the
later follow-ups (two and a half and five years later), only the ratings of partners’
responsiveness during the communication predicted current marital adjustment.
Those couples that had indicated – before getting married – that partner
responsiveness was more positive were more likely to be satisfied with their
marriage five years later. In contrast, those couples that had indicated that
partner responsiveness was negative became distressed over time. Thus, a simple
rating of the quality of communication in the couple was able to predict marital
distress five years later, suggesting that it is less important what couples argue
about than how they argue and how they respond to each other.
And if a relationship ends, be it a romantic relationship, friendship or family
relationship, this can have a strong impact on the partners involved. Of course, in
some cases, such as the battered women in Research Close-Up 11.3, partners
may be better off when they end a relationship. Still, on average, people who
have been divorced suffer strong declines in their mental and physical health,
both in the short and long term (Richards, Hardy, & Wadsworth, 1997). The end
of a marriage not only results in the loss of economic resources, but may also
involve the loss of a social network. And perhaps most importantly, the end of a
marriage or a long-term (romantic) relationship is such a painful process because
it often entails the end of an attachment bond. Indeed, partners often form a
strong emotional attachment that cannot easily be dissolved or replaced. This is
also one of the reasons why people generally find it so difficult to end a
relationship. Individuals with an anxious/ambivalent attachment style especially
have a hard time dealing with break-up, because it often confirms and reinforces
their anxiety about being abandoned (Davis, Shaver, & Vernon, 2003).
Furthermore, as we have seen in this chapter, early relationship experiences –
including the dissolution of a relationship – may importantly affect our
expectations about future relationships. For example, a troublesome romantic
break-up may erode an individual’s trust in potential future relationship partners,
and it may therefore be harder to find a new partner. Most research findings
suggest that the decline and dissolution of a long-term relationship is generally
associated with suffering for one partner, and in most cases both partners. We
can therefore only hope that the science of relationships can contribute, if only a
little, to building better relationships.
 Summary
People have many different relationships. In relationships people influence and
affect each other, they are interdependent. In close relationships people are more
interdependent than in superficial relationships: close relationship partners have
a stronger and more frequent impact on each other. Disclosure and perceived
partner responsiveness play a key role in the formation and maintenance of all
relationships. By disclosing information about themselves and by being
responsive to each other’s needs, people maintain their relationships and signal
that they accept and care about each other.

CHAPTER SUMMARY
What are the benefits of interpersonal relationships? Our relationships
with others are associated with both psychological and physical well-
being, partly because partners often help us to deal more effectively with
stress. In contrast, lacking relationships with others has detrimental
consequences for an individual’s well-being.
Why do we form relationships with others? Evolutionary psychologists
argue that we form relationships with others because in our evolutionary
past relationships with others provided us with many survival and
reproductive benefits. That’s why we have an innate need to belong.
Relatedly, attachment theory states that people have a natural tendency to
form attachment bonds with others, because others help them to deal with
threatening situations.
Do all people rely on other people to an equal extent? It appears that,
among both children and adults, differences in attachment styles exist.
The majority of people are securely attached, and they are comfortable
with contact and intimacy with others. However, people with an insecure
attachment style are, for different reasons, less comfortable with intimacy
and close contact. Such differences in attachment style explain to an
important extent how people respond to their relationship partners –
including the romantic partner.
Does physical attractiveness matter? There is abundant evidence that how
we evaluate and behave towards others is strongly influenced by
attractiveness: we do judge a book by its cover. One of the reasons for
this is the existence of a ‘what is beautiful is good’ stereotype, which
entails that people tend to believe that attractive others are friendly,
sociable, and competent. There seems to be some truth to this as a result
of self-fulfilling prophecies: Because people assume that attractive people
are friendly, they will treat attractive others positively, which in turn will
elicit friendly behaviour on the part of the attractive others.
Is physical attractiveness entirely in the eye of the beholder? The answer
to this question is no. People generally show more consensus than
disagreement about what is attractive, both within and across cultures.
There are also objective physical features that determine attractiveness,
such as symmetry, averageness, and so-called hormone-markers (high
cheekbones, soft skin for females; large jaw and prominent eyebrows and
cheekbones for males).
Physical attractiveness is surely not the only factor determining why we
are attracted to others. What other factors are there? First, we of course
have to be in the proximity of others to even have a chance to get to like
them. And we tend to like those who are physically close to us, partly
because familiarity breeds liking. We also like those who are similar to
us. Finally, the conditions under which we meet others can have a strong
influence on attraction. In arousing situations, people may misattribute
their arousal to a person they meet.
What is love, actually? Brain-imaging studies show that people who are
in love have a strong craving to be with the other person – comparable, at
least in the brain, to an addictive craving as observed in smoking or drug
addiction. However, love does not only refer to the initial stage of being
madly in love. According to Sternberg’s triangular theory of love, over
the course of a relationship different types of love can be distinguished,
consisting of a combination of different levels of passion, intimacy, and
commitment.
What makes people strongly committed to remain in a relationship?
According to equity theory, partners are satisfied as long as there is a
balance between what both partners put into (costs), and get out of
(rewards), the relationship. However, relationship stability also depends
on the extent to which partners perceive that there may be better
alternatives for the relationship, and on how much partners have already
invested in the relationship. This is summarized in the investment model,
which predicts that partners are strongly committed to maintaining their
relationship as long as they are highly satisfied with the relationship, the
 quality of alternatives is low, and they have invested much in the
relationship.
Is relationship commitment thus directly related to the stability of the
relationship? Relationship commitment predicts relationship stability
because relationship commitment instigates behaviours and thoughts that
benefit relationship functioning, such as forgiveness, accommodation, and
the derogation of alternatives. Such ‘pro-relationship acts’ in turn breed
trust and commitment in the other partner, who in turn will be more likely
to act in a pro-relationship manner.
What type of relationships do people have? Relationships are
characterized by the fact that relationship partners are interdependent:
What one person does, affects the other person. Relationships differ on a
variety of dimensions. In exchange relationships, partners ensure
equitable benefits; in communal relationships, both partners’ concern is to
be responsive to each other. The most important voluntary relationships
are friendships. They are beneficial for people’s well-being throughout
their life-span and have important functions in the development of social
skills and competencies.
How do people maintain their relationships? Disclosing information
about oneself is one of the most important processes to increase intimacy
and closeness in relationships, especially when the disclosure is directed
at a specific relationship partner. Disclosure signals that the relationship is
special and that the other person plays a unique role in the life of the
discloser.
Why do relationships end? Often relationships end when partners fail to
be responsive to each others’ needs. Not being responsive causes people
to feel that the other does not care about them.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

Berscheid, E., & Regan, P. C. (2005). The psychology of interpersonal
relationships. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall. A comprehensive
introduction to research on relationships, for anyone interested in the basic
knowledge of relationships.
Bradbury, T. N., & Karney, B. R. (2010). Intimate relationships. New York:
Norton & Company. This book provides an excellent overview of research on
intimate relationships, mostly on romantic, friends, and family relations.
Fisher, H. (2004). Why we love: The nature and chemistry of romantic love. New
York: Henry Hold & Company. A popular-science book providing an
evolutionary and neuroscientific view on love.
Fletcher, G. J. O. (2002). The new science of intimate relationships. Malden,
MA & Oxford, UK: Blackwell. An accessible book about what science tells us
about love, sex, and friendship.
Mashek, D. J., & Aron, A. (2004). Handbook of closeness and intimacy.
Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. A scholarly book that summarizes the central processes
in relationships, written by some of the most active and recognized relationship
researchers.
Miller, R. S., & Perlman, D. (2008). Intimate relationships. New York:
McGraw-Hill. An introductory book to the science of relationships, with many
illustrations of the relevance of relationship science to the readers’ everyday
lives.
Regan, P. C. (2008). The mating game. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. This book
offers a view on relationships from a purely evolutionary viewpoint.
Reis, H. T., & Rusbult, C. E. (2004). Key readings on close relationships.
Washington, DC: Taylor & Francis. In this book you can read a collection of
some of the ‘classic’ articles in the history of relationship science.
Swami, V., & Furnham, A. (2008). The psychology of physical attraction. New
York: Routledge. Offers an overview of scholarly work on physical beauty,
culture, evolution, and other aspects of human attractiveness.
Vohs, K. D., & Finkel, E. J. (Eds.). (2006). Self and relationships: Connecting
intrapersonal and interpersonal processes. New York: Guilford Press. This
book provides an overview of research that integrates people’s internal worlds
and their close relationships.
Williams, K. D. (2001). Ostracism: The power of silence. New York: Guilford.
Written by one of the leading researchers in this field, this book provides a
comprehensive examination of the roots and consequences of ostracism.
 Chapter 12

Group Dynamics

Bernard A. Nijstad and Daan Van Knippenberg

Source: © Robert E. Daemmrich. Used under licence from Getty Images.

KEY TERMS

cohesion
emotional contagion
entitativity
expectation states theory
group
group commitment
group socialization
initiation
interpersonal cohesion
need to belong
role
role transition
 socio-emotional behaviour
speaking hierarchy
staffing level
status
task behaviour
task cohesion
transactive memory
CHAPTER OUTLINE
INTRODUCTION
THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF GROUPS
Defining groups
Why groups?
Types of groups, entitativity and group functions Summary
INDIVIDUALS IN GROUPS: THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL OF
ANALYSIS
Joining a group and group socialization: becoming a full member Being in
a group: maintenance and role negotiation Leaving a group: divergence
and exit Summary
GROUP DEVELOPMENT AND STRUCTURE: THE GROUP LEVEL
OF ANALYSIS
Group development
On being similar: norms, shared cognition and cohesion On being
different: status and roles Summary
GROUPS IN THEIR ENVIRONMENT: THE INTERGROUP LEVEL
OF ANALYSIS
The intergroup context and the salience of group membership The
intergroup context, group perceptions and social influence Summary

ROUTE MAP OF THE CHAPTER

Groups are pervasive in social life. In this chapter, we discuss why people
form and join groups, and what types of groups can be distinguished. We
further discuss three levels of analysis. At the individual level, we discuss
the (changing) relations between the group and its members. At the group
level, we discuss group development, group structure (status and roles) and
group norms. At the intergroup level, we discuss how the (intergroup)
context shapes the behaviour of group members and the structure of groups.
context shapes the behaviour of group members and the structure of groups.
 INTRODUCTION
Imagine you’re spending a weekend in Amsterdam. You enter a subway station,
which is quite crowded. From the way people are dressed – many are wearing
red and white Ajax shirts – you infer that they must be Ajax fans going to
support their football team (Figure 12.1). These fans show remarkable
behaviour: they sing and shout in ways they would not normally do in public.
Yet most of them are adults (and not all are drunk), and they only show this
behaviour when there is an Ajax match. The most striking aspect of their
behaviour is that the fans behave so similarly. However, many of them do not
even know each other, and their behaviour is quite out of the ordinary: normally,
people would not sing and shout in a subway.
FIGURE 12.1 These fans share membership of a social group: they are all Ajax
football supporters.
Source: © Picture Contact BV. Used under licence from Alamy.

The only reason these fans behave so similarly is that they share membership
of a social group: they are all Ajax fans. In this chapter, we argue that in order
to understand their behaviour and behaviour in other groups, we need to consider
three levels of analysis: the individual level, the group level and the wider
context in which groups are situated. At the individual level, all Ajax fans in the
subway are individually aware of their group membership (being an Ajax fan)
and of the fact that the other people in the subway are Ajax fans as well. At the
group level, the fact that their behaviour is so similar indicates that it cannot be
caused by idiosyncratic tendencies of individual Ajax fans, such as their
individual personalities. Rather, there is something ‘groupy’ going on which
guides their behaviour. At the broader level, one could argue that these fans only
show this behaviour because of the context: there is going to be a football match
in which Ajax will play against another team (also see Chapter 14 on intergroup
relations). Indeed, if there had been no such match, the fans would behave quite
differently.

- - - - - - - - - -

group a group exists when two or more individuals define themselves as members of a group.

- - - - - - - - - -

In this chapter, we use this three-level framework to discuss some basic

characteristics of groups and some basic processes in groups. We first examine
the issues of what a group is, why people form or join groups and what types of
groups can be distinguished. We then move on to the individual level and
discuss how individuals join groups and how their group membership develops
over time. We then consider the group level, as we discuss group development
and group structure. Finally, we discuss the (intergroup) context in which groups
exist and how this context affects processes that occur in groups.
 THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF GROUPS
What types of groups can be distinguished, and what are their
characteristics and functions?
 Defining groups
Groups are everywhere: we see groups of friends in a bar, groups of colleagues
in an organization, groups of fans in a stadium. But what exactly do we mean by
the word ‘group’? Many authors have suggested different components of a
definition of groups. Lewin (1948) suggested that common fate is critical: people
are a group to the extent that they experience similar outcomes. Sherif and Sherif
(1969) proposed that some form of social structure (status or role differentiation,
e.g. a leadership role) is essential, because otherwise the ‘group’ would just be a
loose collection of individuals. Bales (1950) stressed the importance of face-to-
face interaction. We suggest a broader definition of groups: following Tajfel
(1981), we argue that a group exists when two or more individuals define
themselves as members of a group.
A few things about this definition should be noted. First, many different
groups would fit this definition, including religious groups (Christians), national
groups (the British), organizational groups (the psychology department) and
friendship groups (a student society). Second, it is subjective and does not
include any ‘objective’ characteristics of groups, such as common fate or face-
to-face interaction. Rather, it emphasizes common identity: sharing the view
with others that you belong to the same group. Third, it is important to recognize
that one can only talk about groups to the extent that there are people who do not
belong to the group in question, although they belong to other groups. Finally,
some groups are ‘groupier’ (or more group-like) than others, an issue we return
to in our discussion of group ‘entitativity’ below.
 Why groups?
Why do humans form, join and distinguish groups? Several theoretical
perspectives can be applied to answer this question. We will discuss three: a
sociobiological, a cognitive and a utilitarian perspective (also see Baron & Kerr,
2003). These three perspectives are complementary rather than mutually
exclusive.
Following Darwin’s theory of evolution, the sociobiological perspective (e.g.
Bowlby, 1958) emphasizes the adaptive value of forming groups. Forming
groups enables humans (and other social animals) to deal more effectively with
enemies or predators, and allows cooperation in areas such as raising children,
farming or hunting. Earlier in our evolutionary history, when food was often
scarce and enemies and predators were dangerous, forming groups had a
significant evolutionary advantage. A predisposition to form groups increased
the chances of survival of the individual and, through the evolutionary principle
of natural selection, this predisposition was selected and passed on to later
generations. This human predisposition to form and maintain stable, strong and
positive relationships with others is called the need to belong (see Chapter 11)
(Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Baumeister and Leary argued that this human need
is innate and universal. Indeed, evidence indicates that the tendency to form
groups is found across all cultures and situations, suggesting that this tendency is
evolutionarily ‘built in’.
According to the cognitive perspective, groups help us to understand our
world. Social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954; see Chapters 5 and 8) argues
that people want to hold accurate views of the world. They can do this by
validating their beliefs either against ‘physical reality’ (e.g. ‘Will this glass crack
if I hit it with a hammer?’) or against ‘social reality’ (e.g. ‘I like this new music;
I wonder what my friends think about it?’). People turn to others especially for
beliefs for which there is no physical reality (e.g. preferences). Building on these
ideas, social identity theory (e.g. Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986; see Chapters 5
and 14) and self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher &
Wetherell, 1987; see Chapters 5 and 14) argue that people define themselves and
others partly in terms of group membership. These theories propose that seeing
oneself and others as members of groups helps to reduce uncertainty and make
sense of our world (e.g. Hogg & Abrams, 1993). Being a member of a group
often provides guidelines for the way we should behave and think. If you think
about the Ajax football fans we started this chapter with, their behaviour is
clearly guided by their group membership and the behaviours thought to be
appropriate for that group (see the later discussion of group norms). Further,
seeing other people as members of specific groups helps to interpret their
behaviour: knowing that the people in the subway are Ajax fans makes it much
easier to understand what is going on.
A utilitarian perspective argues that people derive benefits from groups. Social
exchange theory (e.g. Thibaut & Kelley, 1959; see Chapter 11; also Leader in
the Field, John Walter Thibaut) argues that social relations (including those
within groups) help to fulfil the individual’s needs and often take the form of
exchange processes. These exchanges might involve material goods (e.g.
borrowing a tool, selling your car) or interpersonal helping (e.g. helping a friend
move house), but also psychological ‘goods’ such as love, friendship or
approval. Enduring exchange relations between two or more people are more
effectively organized when people form a (more or less stable) group. Thus,
groups exist because they facilitate mutually beneficial social exchange.
Social exchange theory argues that social relations involve costs as well as
benefits, and as long as the benefits exceed the costs, the relation will yield a
‘profit’. There is much evidence that people are unhappy about relations if they
feel that they invest more in them (e.g. time) than they get back (e.g. approval)
(e.g. Le & Agnew, 2003; see also Chapter 11). Furthermore, satisfaction with an
exchange relationship depends on the degree to which there are alternative
relationships that yield more profit. Thus, people join groups because they derive
benefits from their group membership. People may leave groups (if possible)
when they are unhappy about the benefits relative to the costs of group
membership, or when alternative groups exist that have a better cost–benefit
ratio (also see Rusbult & Farrell, 1983). In general, people will leave groups
when better alternatives are available, including the option of being alone.

LEADER IN THE FIELD

John Walter Thibaut (1917–1986) was born in Marion, Ohio. He
studied philosophy at the University of North Carolina. During
World War II he came into contact with psychology when he was
assigned to the Aviation Psychology Program. In 1946 he moved to
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to study with Kurt Lewin
(see Leader in the Field, Chapter 1). After Lewin’s death in 1947,
Thibaut moved to the University of Michigan, where he received his
PhD. His subsequent career took him to Boston University, Harvard
University and back to the University of North Carolina. Thibaut is
best known for his 1959 book (co-authored with Harold Kelley; see
Leader in the Field, Chapter 3) The Social Psychology of Groups. In
that book, Thibaut and Kelley laid out the foundations of social
exchange theory, arguing that social relations take the form of social
exchange processes.
 Types of groups, entitativity and group functions
As we noted earlier, our definition of groups is relatively broad, and many types
of groups may be included. However, there are different types of groups with
different characteristics. Further, some groups seem more ‘groupy’ than other
groups, a phenomenon often referred to as the entitativity of groups. Campbell
(1958) coined the new word ‘entitativity’ to refer to the degree to which a
collection of people is perceived as being bonded together in a coherent unit
(Figure 12.2).
FIGURE 12.2 Intimacy groups, e.g. a family, are seen as high in entitativity.
Source: © Juriah Mosin. Used under licence from Shutterstock.

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entitativity the degree to which a collection of people is perceived as being bonded together in a
coherent unit.

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So, what different types of groups can we distinguish? Lickel et al. (2000)
wondered whether people spontaneously distinguish between different types of
groups. They provided their participants (American and Polish students) with a
sample of 40 different groups, such as ‘members of a family’, ‘black people’,
‘members of a jury’ and ‘people in line at a bank’. Participants had to rate these
different groups on eight dimensions: degree of interaction among members;
importance of group members to each other; common goals and common
outcomes for group members; similarity among group members; duration;
permeability (how easy it is to join or leave the group); and size. The groups
were also rated on the degree to which the group really was a group (group
entitativity). After they had done the ratings, participants were asked to sort the
40 groups into different categories using their own individual criteria, including
as many or as few categories as they wanted.
Lickel et al. (2000) found that some of their 40 groups were consistently
sorted into one common category, whereas other groups were consistently sorted
into other categories. Further, groups that were sorted into the same category
were also rated similarly on the eight dimensions. Lickel et al. identified four
types of groups: intimacy groups; task groups; social categories; and loose
associations. In Table 12.1 we give a summary of their findings and some
examples of the different types of groups. As can be seen in the table, the types
of groups differed along the different dimensions. For example, intimacy groups
(e.g. a family) were rated to have high levels of interaction, were seen as
important, had common goals and outcomes, had a high degree of similarity,
were of long duration and low permeability and were fairly small. Social
categories (e.g. women), in contrast, were rated to have low levels of interaction,
were rated low on importance of members to each other, with low levels of
common goals and outcomes, and low member similarity, and were rated to be
of long duration, low in permeability, and large.
Table 12.1 Characteristics of diff erent types of groups.
Source: Based on data reported in Lickel et al., 2000.
 With regard to group entitativity, intimacy groups and task groups were seen
as high in entitativity, loose associations as low in entitativity, and social
categories occupied an intermediate position. Lickel et al. (2000) also considered
which of their eight group characteristics best predicted group entitativity. They
found that the single most important predictor was interaction among group
members: higher levels of interaction were associated with higher entitativity.
The other characteristics also contributed to entitativity: importance, common
goals and outcomes, group member similarity and duration showed a positive
relation (the higher the importance, common goals, etc., the higher the perceived
entitativity), whereas group size and permeability showed a weak negative
relation (larger groups and highly permeable groups were rated lower in
entitativity). Note that some of the possible components of a definition of groups
that we described earlier (common fate, face-to-face interaction) were positively
associated with perceived group entitativity: they do indeed make groups more
‘groupy’ (a more extensive discussion of these issues can be found in Lickel,
Hamilton, & Sherman, 2001).
Earlier we noted that there are several reasons why people form, join and
distinguish groups. Johnson and colleagues (2006) argued that the different
group types fulfil different functions for group members. They focused on
intimacy groups, task groups and social categories (ignoring the less important
loose associations). Johnson et al. argued that intimacy groups mainly fulfil
affiliation-related needs, such as the need to belong (cf. the sociobiological
perspective). Task groups mainly have a utilitarian function and help people to
satisfy achievement-related needs (such as feeling competent and achieving
success; cf. the utilitarian perspective). Social categories mainly have the
function of giving people a social identity (i.e. the part of one’s identity that
derives from one’s group membership; see Chapter 14) and thus help satisfy
identity-related needs (cf. the cognitive perspective). Johnson and colleagues
found considerable evidence for such an association between group type and
function. For example, they gave people a description of the three most
important group types (intimacy groups, task groups and social categories), and
asked them to which degree each type of group fulfilled certain needs (e.g.
‘connectedness’, ‘success’ or ‘sense of identity’). It was found that intimacy
groups scored high in satisfying needs such as connectedness, comfort and
support; that task groups scored high in satisfying needs such as success,
competence and mastery; and that social categories scored high in satisfying
needs such as sense of identity, uniqueness and distinctiveness. Vice versa, when
people were asked to name groups that they associated with the fulfilment of
specific needs, people tended to list intimacy groups when asked about
affiliation-related needs, task groups when asked about achievement-related
needs and social categories when asked about identity-related needs.
That (certain types of) groups help satisfy one’s needs also implies that when
these needs are high people will be interested in membership of a group that
satisfies these needs. This topic is discussed in Research Close-Up 12.1, which
we suggest you read now.
 Summary
Forming, joining and distinguishing groups has a number of advantages: groups
help us to make sense of our world and to coordinate mutually beneficial social
exchange more effectively. The tendency to form groups is probably
evolutionarily built in, as groups are found everywhere. However, not every type
of group is equally important or ‘groupy’: intimacy groups and task groups
especially are seen to be important and high in entitativity, while social
categories and loose associations are less so. Intimacy groups mainly fulfil
people’s need to belong, task groups help fulfil people’s need for achievement,
and social categories help people fulfil identity-related needs.

RESEARCH CLOSE-UP 12.1

PEOPLE IDENTIFY WITH

ENTITATIVE GROUPS WHEN THEY ARE
UNCERTAIN ABOUT THEIR IDENTITY
Hogg, M. A., Sherman, D. K., Dierselhuis, J., Maitner, A. T., & Moffitt, G. (2007). Uncertainty,
entitativity, and group identification. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 43, 135–142.

Research question Hogg and colleagues considered

one of the functions of group membership: that it
provides us with an identity and informs us about who
we are and what we should do. The question they
addressed was, under which circumstances is this
identity function of groups more important? They
argued that people should be especially interested in
being members of a group and identify more with
their group in situations that arouse uncertainty about
people’s self-concept. Furthermore, groups with clear
boundaries, common goals and outcomes, high
internal homogeneity and so on – in short, highly
entitative groups – should be more attractive in these
cases, because these groups provide people with a
clear self-concept grounded in group membership.
Hogg and colleagues thus predicted that identification
with a group should be high especially when people
feel uncertain about their identity, and the group is
very entitative.
Design Participants were 89 Australian students. They
participated for ten Australian dollars in a two-factor
experiment that manipulated self-uncertainty (low
versus high) and group entitativity (low versus high)
as between-subject factors, thus creating a design with
four conditions.
Procedure Participants sat in individual cubicles and
were (incorrectly) told that their computers were
interconnected via a chat room with other members of
their group (their ‘group’ being those people that were
present for the experiment) with whom they would
later collaborate on a task. They first filled out a
personality questionnaire, and subsequently received
(false) feedback about the results of the questionnaires
of their fellow group members. In the high entitativity
condition, they learned that all group members
(including the participant) had given very similar
answers; in the low entitativity condition they learned
 that their group members gave very different answers.
In addition, in the high entitativity condition, the
participants were told that they would later organize
themselves with a clear division of labour, clear roles
and clear principles about how to approach their task.
In the low entitativity condition, they were told that
each person would decide individually how to
approach the group task.
After this manipulation of group entitativity, self-uncertainty was
manipulated. Participants were asked to describe three aspects of their life
that made them feel (depending on condition) certain versus uncertain about
themselves, their lives and their future. Immediately after this, participants
rated identification with their group on eight items (e.g. ‘this group is
important to me’).
Results Figure 12.3 shows the main results: the level
of identification in each of the four conditions of the
experiment. As predicted, identification was high
especially when self-uncertainty was aroused and the
group was made highly entitative. It was lower in the
other conditions. It is especially noteworthy that
people do not always identify more with entitative
groups; they do especially when (temporarily) feeling
uncertain about themselves, but not when feeling
relatively certain.
FIGURE 12.3 Levels of identification by condition.
Source: Adapted from Hogg, Sherman, Dierselhuis, Maitner, & Moffitt, 2007,
with permission from Elsevier.
Implications These results (and Hogg et al. report
another experiment among members of a political
party) clearly show that people feel drawn towards
highly entitative groups, especially when self-
uncertainty is high. Hogg and colleagues speculate
that this might be one reason why some people are
drawn towards extremist groups. Social uncertainty
may lead to higher levels of self-uncertainty and thus
to the greater appeal of very entitative groups, perhaps
including extremist or fundamentalist groups, who
clearly distinguish themselves from other groups.
 INDIVIDUALS IN GROUPS: THE
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL OF ANALYSIS
What stages of group socialization can be distinguished and what
factors determine role transitions?
In this section we consider the individual within the group: that is, we focus on
the individual level of analysis. In particular, we discuss Moreland and Levine’s
(1982) model of group socialization, which is shown in Theory Box 12.1 (see
also Leaders in the Field, John M. Levine and Richard L. Moreland). Group
socialization may be defined as the process through which the group tries to
assimilate members to existing group norms and practices. As defined in Chapter
8, norms refer to belief systems about how (not) to behave, which guide
behaviour and reflect group members’ shared expectations about typical or
desirable activities. In a later section of this chapter group norms are discussed
more extensively. Here, the focus is on Moreland and Levine’s model, which is
applicable to groups that exist for comparatively long periods of time and have
direct interaction between members, but which experience changes in
membership. Examples would include a sports team, a team within an
organization or a student society (i.e. many intimacy groups and task groups).

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group socialization the efforts of the group to assimilate new members to existing group norms
and practices.

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Moreland and Levine’s model distinguishes five stages of group membership:

investigation, socialization, maintenance, resocialization and remembrance.
According to the model, moving from one stage to the next involves a role
transition. Thus, moving from prospective member (the stage of investigation)
to new member (the stage of socialization) involves the role transition of entry.
Further role transitions are acceptance (from new member to full member),
divergence (from full member to marginal member) and exit (from marginal
member to ex-member). As can be seen in Theory Box 12.1, the five different
stages differ in the degree of group commitment – in other words, the degree to
which a group member has a psychological bond with the group and its goals
and wishes to maintain group membership. Group commitment increases
gradually as people become full members, after which it decreases towards the
point at which individuals wish to leave the group.

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role transition a change in the relation between a group member and a group.

- - - - - - - - - -

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group commitment a psychological bond of a group member with the group and its goals
including the desire to maintain group membership.

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LEADERS IN THE FIELD

John M. Levine (b. 1942) and Richard L. Moreland (b. 1951) have
worked together on issues around group dynamics for more than
three decades. Their collaboration started when Moreland joined the
University of Pittsburgh in 1978 after receiving his PhD from the
University of Michigan in that same year. Levine had worked in
Pittsburgh since 1969, immediately after receiving his PhD from the
University of Wisconsin. One of the first papers they wrote together
was their highly influential article on group socialization that is
discussed in the text. After this paper, they continued publishing on
group socialization, and also worked on topics such as newcomer
influence, collaboration, group composition, group commitment and
group loyalty. They are also widely known for their efforts to
 summarize progress in the field of group dynamics in book chapters
and books, such as their 1990 paper on Progress in Small Group
Research that appeared in the Annual Review of Psychology (Levine
& Moreland, 1990), their chapter on Small Groups in the Handbook
of Social Psychology (Levine & Moreland, 1998), and a chapter on
the history of small group research (Levine & Moreland, 2012). In
fact, their collaboration has been so close that they have occasionally
been erroneously introduced as John Moreland and Dick Levine,
about which they note that ‘The fact that we are flattered by such
introductions says a lot about why we continue to collaborate’
(Levine & Moreland, 2004, p. 170). Apart from their collaborative
work, Levine is also known for his research on minority influence
and newcomers, and Moreland has done important work in the area
of shared cognition and transactive memory (see later in this
chapter).

Role transitions occur as a result of evaluation processes in which the group

and the individual evaluate one another’s ‘rewardingness’, or the extent to which
the group is rewarding for the member and to which the member is valued by the
group. When the group is rewarding for members, they will try to enter the
group or maintain group membership (i.e. feel group commitment). Similarly,
when a group values a (prospective) member, the group will encourage the
person to become or stay a member of the group (i.e. the group is committed to
the member). This is related to our earlier discussion of social exchange
processes and the benefits people can derive from them (e.g. to gain social
approval or receive help or material goods). Indeed, according to Moreland and
Levine (1982), group commitment is a function of the past, present and expected
future rewardingness of the group, compared to the rewardingness of alternative
groups. In the remainder of this section, we consider the key stages shown in
Theory Box 12.1.

THEORY BOX 12.1

THE MORELAND AND LEVINE (1982) MODEL
OF GROUP SOCIALIZATION
 Joining a group and group socialization: becoming a
full member
Investigation
In the stage of investigation, groups look for people who might make a
contribution to the attainment of group goals. Task groups will often search for
people who have the required skills and abilities, whereas intimacy groups will
tend to emphasize compatibility (e.g. similarity) with the existing membership.
Prospective members, on the other hand, will look for groups that may
potentially fulfil their needs. For example, when you have just moved to a new
city to start college, you will probably try to identify specific groups that might
help to fulfil your social needs. Thus, you might join a student society, hoping to
find people with whom you can start a new, positive and stable relation (i.e.
fulfil your need to belong). Another example of how groups fulfil members’
needs is discussed in Research Close-Up 12.1.

Entry and initiation

When the level of group commitment (i.e. the mutual commitment between the
group and the prospective member) reaches an entry criterion, a role transition
will occur: entry. Entry is often marked by some ritual or ceremony that makes it
clear that the relation between the group and the (prospective) member has
changed. In an organization, this may take the form of a welcome speech, and in
social groups it may be a party. At other times the entry or initiation ritual can
be quite unpleasant and painful for the prospective member.

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initiation the role transition of entry into a group, often accompanied by some ritual.

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Lodewijkx and Syroit (1997) studied initiation into a Dutch sorority (a student
society for female students). The novices first stay in a campsite for a week.
Novices wear a shapeless, sack-like uniform, are not called by their real names
and have to undergo physical hardship (hard work and lack of sleep and food).
After a week they return to the city and participate in ‘evening gatherings’ for a
further one and a half weeks. During these gatherings, which are regarded as
threatening by the novices, they are often bullied and embarrassed. Then, finally,
the inauguration ceremony takes place, after which they have a meal with the
senior members – the so-called ‘integration party’ – and the initiation is ended.
As these severe initiations take place in many different groups (e.g. the
military, some sports teams, student societies), the question arises as to why
groups perform these harsh rituals. Aronson and Mills (1959) suggested a classic
argument that provides part of the answer. They maintained that severe
initiations increase the liking for and commitment to the group. Their argument
is based upon cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957; see Chapter 7).
Suppose a prospective member has undergone harsh treatment, but it later
appears that the group is not as attractive as initially believed. This would lead to
cognitive dissonance: members can no longer maintain that they had good
reasons to undergo the harsh treatment when they admit that the group is not so
attractive after all. Thus, the member will deny that the group is unattractive and
will maintain a high level of commitment to the group.
Aronson and Mills (1959) performed an experiment to test this reasoning.
They offered female students the opportunity to join a discussion group about
sexuality. However, some of the prospective members first had to undergo the
embarrassing experience of reading sexually explicit passages aloud, while other
prospective members did not have to do this. Next, the participants listened to an
actual group discussion that was recorded on tape. This discussion was in fact
quite boring and was about the secondary sexual behaviour of lower animals.
Participants were next asked to rate the attractiveness of the group. In line with
the dissonance explanation, the women who had to read the embarrassing
passages rated the group as more attractive than those who did not.
Lodewijkx and Syroit (1997) did not, however, find a positive relation
between severity of initiation and group liking. In their field study among the
prospective members of the sorority, mentioned above, they found, in fact, that
severe initiations decreased the liking for the group. Thus, prospective members
of the sorority who rated the initiation as more severe liked the group less. The
reason was that severe initiations led to loneliness and frustration, and this in
turn reduced the liking for the group. What Lodewijkx and Syroit did find was
that, during the initiation, positive relations developed among prospective
members, and these increased liking for the group.
 Thus, severe initiations do not always increase liking for the group, as they
may lead to loneliness and frustration. In the Aronson and Mills study, in which
the initiation was very brief, this probably did not happen. Severe initiations may
also have other functions: they deter potential members who are not eager
enough to join the group, and prospective members can show their interest in the
group by undergoing these harsh treatments (Moreland & Levine, 1982).
Initiations also reinforce status hierarchies, and may increase conformity and
dependency of new members to the group (Keating, et al., 2005).
More on initiations into student societies can be found in Social Psychology
Beyond the Lab 12.1, which we suggest you read now.

Socialization
After entry, the stage of socialization begins. In this stage, new members learn
the norms of the group: the belief system about how (not) to behave, which
reflects group members’ shared expectations about typical or desirable activities.
In addition, new members may acquire the necessary knowledge and skills to
function effectively as a group member (i.e. learn their role in the group: the set
of behaviours associated with a specific position in the group). Thus, the group
tries to assimilate the member to fit the expectations of the group. However,
socialization is a two-way street, and the new member may also try to influence
the group in such a way that the member’s needs are best met. For example, a
new member may try to change the group’s norms or customs (e.g. ‘I think that
we should meet more often’). Such newcomer influence is more likely when
groups are less committed to their norms, customs and routines, for example
when they have been externally imposed (rather than self-chosen), or when they
have led to poor group performance in the past (see Choi & Levine, 2004). The
degree to which the newcomer influences the group may also depend on
newcomer characteristics, such as the newcomer’s outside social status (more
influence with higher status; see Levine, Choi, & Moreland, 2003, and below).
Nonetheless, in general newcomers will adapt to the norms and customs of the
group (rather than vice versa).

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role the behaviours expected of a person with a specific position in the group.

- - - - - - - - - -
 During socialization, group commitment – of the member towards the group
and of the group towards the member – will generally increase, except when the
new member or the group is dissatisfied. At a specific point in time (when the
acceptance criterion is reached), the member will no longer be treated as
somebody who needs special attention, the socialization stage is ended and the
new member is accepted as a full member. The new member may gain access to
information that was previously hidden, join specific informal cliques, and their
behaviour is monitored less strictly. As with entry, there may be some ritual to
mark the transition of acceptance as a full member. A well-known example is the
Bar Mitzvah ceremony for Jewish boys at the age of 13, after which the boy is
accepted as a full member of Jewish society instead of being considered a child.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BEYOND THE

LAB 12.1
HAZING IN STUDENT SOCIETIES
Many new students join a student society when they enter university. Quite
frequently, these student societies have initiation rituals (also called
‘hazing’). Examples of behaviors that novices (or ‘pledges’) have to perform
are asking strangers absurd questions, dressing up in embarrassing clothes
and singing embarrassing songs in front of an audience (see e.g. Keating et
al., 2005; Lodewijkx & Syroit, 1997).
Keating et al. (2005) argued that the precise activities that are performed
during hazing are by no means random or coincidental. They found that
initiation in sports teams often involved physical and painful activities,
while initiations in student societies often involved having to perform
embarrassing and socially deviant activities. Keating and colleagues note
that these specific rituals seem quite functional: sports clubs like to
distinguish themselves from other sports clubs by appearing tough and
strong, while student societies might want to distinguish themselves from
other groups by emphasizing that they are socially distinct (e.g. higher class;
that they do not have to follow the rules of ‘ordinary people’).
Unfortunately, hazing activities sometimes go tragically wrong. In many
countries there have been incidents in which pledges of student societies
 suffered injuries or even died during initiation rituals. Often, these incidents
involve alcohol abuse (see e.g. Nuwer, 1999, for an overview of hazing
incidents in the US). However, they need not involve alcohol. In The
Netherlands, for example, a student almost died in 2005 after drinking six
litres of water: each time he had lost a round during a game he had to drink a
glass of water. Nobody had realized that drinking that much water within a
short period of time is extremely dangerous (drinking too much water can
lead to a condition known as water intoxication, and to a related problem
resulting from the dilution of sodium in the body).
The question of why these rituals are performed, and why students are still
interested in membership of societies that perform these harsh rituals, are of
interest to social psychologists. Some answers to these questions can be
found in this chapter.
Being accepted as a full member is easier in some groups than in others. In
part, it depends on the staffing level of the group: the degree to which the actual
number of group members is similar to the ideal number of group members.
Groups can be overstaffed (have too many members) as well as understaffed
(have too few members). One might expect that understaffed groups will be less
demanding of new members (make it easier to become a full member) than
overstaffed groups.

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staffing level the degree to which the actual number of group members is similar to the ideal
number of group members.

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Cini, Moreland, and Levine (1993) conducted a study among 93 student

groups, including fine arts clubs, social groups and political groups. They held
interviews with the president of each group in which they gathered information
about the staffing level of the groups and about recruitment and socialization
practices. It appeared that both understaffing and overstaffing caused problems.
Understaffing led to a loss of resources (e.g. too few members contributing
membership fees), poorer group performance and fatigue among group
members. Overstaffing led to apathy and boredom, alienation (i.e. group
members felt ‘lost in the crowd’), confusion and disorganization. The solution to
understaffing, not surprisingly, was to recruit new members. Consequently, the
groups that were understaffed were more open: they were less selective (it was
easier to become a new member), and also less demanding for new members (it
was easier to become a full member). For example, new members were
evaluated and expected to perform special duties less often in understaffed
compared to overstaffed groups. Solutions to overstaffing, in contrast, were to
restrict membership, but also to punish deviance from group norms more
harshly, in the hope that deviant members would leave the group.
 Being in a group: maintenance and role negotiation
After acceptance, the stage of maintenance begins. This stage is characterized by
high levels of group commitment, and for both the member and the group the
relation is seen as rewarding (see Theory Box 12.1, above). The major way in
which groups and members try to increase the rewardingness of their
relationship is through role negotiation. Thus, the member tries to occupy the
role within the group that best satisfies his or her needs, whereas the group tries
to assign roles to members in such a way that the group’s goals can be best
achieved. One of the more important roles within the group is that of group
leader (see Chapter 13). However, there are often other roles that need to be
fulfilled within groups, such as those of ‘recruiter’ (who identifies and evaluates
prospective members) and ‘trainer’ (who has a role during the socialization of
new members). The relation between the group and the member will be
rewarding, and group commitment will remain high to the degree that role
negotiations are successful. We examine what it means to ‘be in a group’ in
more detail in the next section, where we discuss norms, roles and status.
 Leaving a group: divergence and exit
Divergence
After a time, group members may lose interest in the group, for example because
they are dissatisfied with their role in the group, or because they have identified
other groups that are more rewarding. On the other hand, group commitment of
the group to its members may decline when members fail to live up to group
expectations. For example, members may not perform well in their role, or may
violate important group norms. This will lead the group to re-label these
members as marginal members or deviates. The group might, for instance, no
longer give marginal members full information, or other group members might
exclude marginal members from informal cliques (e.g. they are no longer asked
to come along for a drink after work). Often considerable pressure is exerted on
deviates to realign or even to leave the group (especially if the group is
overstaffed).
Schachter (1951) experimentally demonstrated the pressure that is exerted on
deviates. He had groups discuss a delinquency case, in which the life history of a
juvenile delinquent was provided, and groups had to decide on a punishment for
a minor crime. In each of the experimental groups there were confederates
playing different roles: the ‘mode’ who accommodated to the group’s average
judgement, the ‘slider’ who initially took an extreme position (e.g. a very harsh
punishment) but then moved towards the group norm, and the ‘deviate’, who
also took an extreme position, but maintained it throughout the discussion.
Initially, the group discussion was primarily aimed at the two deviating members
(the slider and the deviate) in each group, trying to change their minds. When it
became apparent that the deviates would not change, the groups eventually
excluded them, refusing to talk to them and ignoring their contributions (see
Figure 12.4). After the discussion, deviates were also liked less than other group
members.
FIGURE 12.4 Communications directed towards the mode, slider and deviant
over time.
Source: Based on Schachter, 1951. Copyright © 1951 by the American
Psychological Association. Adapted with permission. The use of APA
information does not imply endorsement by APA.
Resocialization and exit
Divergence might be followed by a period of resocialization. In this period, the
group might try to persuade marginal members not to leave, or they might try to
accommodate to the wishes of marginal members (e.g. give them a different
role). Similarly, group members may try to convince the group not to expel
them, and might try to assimilate to the group’s expectations again. This might
result in re-entry to the group when successful. However, when resocialization
fails, group members may reach an exit criterion and leave the group. As with
other role transitions, this may involve some ritual, such as a goodbye speech or
a party.
According to Moreland and Levine’s (1982) model of group socialization,
voluntary exit from a group becomes more likely when there are alternative
groups that are more attractive. An example would be a football player who
leaves a club to play in a rival team because of higher earnings. However,
sometimes group members will resist temptation, and remain loyal to their group
despite the presence of a (perhaps) more attractive group. One factor appears to
be identification: the more people identify with their group, the more positive
they perceive their group to be, and the less likely they are to leave the group
(even when the group has performed poorly in the past; see Van Vugt & Hart,
2004). You can measure your level of identification with a group by responding
to the questions in Individual Differences 12.1.
In some cases, the group may expel a member, which can be quite a painful
experience. For example, an employee might be fired or a church member might
be excommunicated. Research has shown that social exclusion from groups has
enormous negative effects on excluded members. Consider the following
situation. You are invited to come to the psychology lab to participate in an
experiment and are asked to wait in a waiting room until the experiment starts.
In that room two other participants are also waiting (they are, in fact,
confederates of the experimenter). One of them has brought a tennis ball and
playfully throws it to the other participant. That participant joins in and throws
the ball to you. For a while, the three of you play this ball-tossing game. After
some time, however, the other participants no longer throw the ball to you, but
only to each other, and this goes on for several minutes. How would you feel?

INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 12.1

MEASURING IDENTIFICATION
Instruction Think of a group that you are a member
of. Then answer the following questions on a scale
from 1 (completely disagree) to 4 (neutral) to 7
(completely agree) with this group in mind.
Items
1. I feel strongly affiliated with this group.
2. Other groups can learn a lot from us.
3. Belonging to this group is an important part of my
identity.
4. In times of trouble, the only way to know what to
do is to rely on my group’s leader(s).
5. I am glad to contribute to this group.
6. Compared to other groups of this kind, this group is
particularly good.
7. It is important to me that I view myself as a
member of this group.
8. All group members should respect the customs, the
institutions and the leaders of this group.
9. I am strongly committed to this group.
10. Relative to other groups, we are a very moral
group.
11. It is important to me that others see me as a
member of this group.
12. It is disloyal to criticize this group.
13. I like to help this group.
14. This group is better than other groups in all
respects.
15. When I talk about the group members, I usually
say ‘we’ rather than ‘they’.
16. There is usually a good reason for every rule and
regulation that the group leader(s) propose.
Source: Adapted from Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, Halevy, and Eidelson (2008), with permission
from SAGE Publications Ltd.

Scoring This questionnaire is taken from Roccas,

Sagiv, Schwartz, Halevy, and Eidelson (2008). These
authors argue that there are four basic dimensions
underlying identification: importance (‘How much do
I view the group as part of who I am?’), commitment
(‘How much am I willing to benefit the group?’),
superiority (‘How much do I view my group as
superior to other groups?’) and deference (‘How
much do I honour, revere, and submit to the group’s
norms, symbols and leaders?’).
 Add up your answers to questions 3, 7, 11, and 15 to compute an importance
score.
Add up your answers to questions 1, 5, 9, and 13 to compute a commitment
score.
Add up your answers to questions 2, 6, 10, and 14 to compute a superiority
score.
Add up your answers to questions 4, 8, 12 and 16 to compute a deference
score.
Then divide all four scores by four (the number of items per scale) to get a
minimum score of 1 and a maximum score of 7.
Norms The test was filled out by American and
Israeli university students, who were asked to report
how much they identified with their nation. Based on
both samples, you can interpret your scores as
follows: On importance a score lower than 4.3 would
be low, a score of 5.4 would be average and a score
higher than 6.5 would be high.
On commitment a score lower than 3.9 would be low, a score of 5.0 would
be average and a score higher than 6.1 would be high.
On superiority a score lower than 2.9 would be low, a score of 4.0 would be
average and a score higher than 5.1 would be high.
On deference a score lower than 1.9 would be low, a score of 3.0 would be
average and a score higher than 4.1 would be high.
Williams (2001) reports extensive evidence concerning the power of social
exclusion. Using the ball-tossing game (and other situations), he found that
social exclusion produces severe negative moods and anger, and leads to lower
ratings on belongingness and self-esteem. Further, Eisenberger, Lieberman, and
Williams (2003) found that exclusion quite literally is a form of ‘social pain’.
These researchers had participants play a computerized version of the ball-
tossing game while lying in an fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging)
brain scanner. Using the fMRI scanner, the researchers could identify which
brain areas were active during social exclusion. Participants were led to believe
that, by pushing a button, they could throw a (virtual) ball to another participant,
who could then throw the ball back to them or to a third participant. In fact, there
was only one real participant, and the computer was programmed in such a way
that this participant received the ball nine times, after which the ball was no
longer thrown to him or her. While being excluded from the game, an fMRI
brain scan was made. Eisenberger et al. (2003) found that social exclusion
activates an area in the brain (the anterior cingulate cortex) that is normally
activated when a person is in physical pain. Furthermore, the level of activation
of that brain area was correlated with participants’ reports of distress.

Remembrance
The last stage of the Moreland and Levine model is remembrance (see Theory
Box 12.1, p. 395). In this stage, the ex-member and the group retrospectively
evaluate each other. Thus, remaining group members will evaluate the ex-
member’s contributions to the group and will maintain some degree of
commitment to the ex-member if these contributions are seen as positive.
Similarly, ex-members look back on their time with the group with either fond or
bitter memories. In extreme cases, ex-members may even try to destroy their
former group in an act of revenge. Workplace shootings, in which employees
who had been dismissed shot their boss or former colleagues, are extreme
examples. One such incident happened in Kansas City, US, in 2004, where a
man who had been laid off several months earlier killed five former colleagues
and wounded two more before taking his own life. Such events are, of course,
extreme, and occur very rarely.
 Summary
Individuals move through different phases of group membership (prospective
member, new member, full member, marginal member and ex-member). These
stages of group membership differ in the degree of group commitment of the
group and the member to each other. Moving from one stage to the next involves
a role transition, and role transitions can both be extreme (e.g. severe initiation
rituals) and have a large impact on members (e.g. after exit).
 GROUP DEVELOPMENT AND
STRUCTURE: THE GROUP LEVEL OF
ANALYSIS
How do group interaction, structure, norms, status and roles
develop?
In the previous section we discussed the (changing) relation of the group
member with the group. In this section we explore the group level of analysis.
First, we discuss how groups themselves can also change over time. Second,
groups have certain characteristics, such as norms to govern their behaviour and
a group structure, in which some members have more status than others, or in
which different members occupy different roles in the group. These issues are
examined below. It should be noted that this section is mainly relevant for
groups with direct (usually face-to-face) interaction.

- - - - - - - - - -

status evaluation of a role by the group in which a role is contained or defined.

- - - - - - - - - -
 Group development
Some groups are formed for a special reason and end after a given time.
Examples include therapy groups, project teams and the group of students in a
psychology seminar (Figure 12.5). These groups will generally develop: the
interaction patterns among group members change over time. Further, there may
be similarities in the way different groups develop. The basic idea is that every
group faces specific challenges and has specific goals, and these challenges and
goals change over time. This, in turn, has consequences for the way group
members interact with each other, as well as for group performance and the
rewardingness of the group to its members.
FIGURE 12.5 Some groups are formed for a special reason and also end after
some time, e.g. a group of students in a psychology seminar.
Source: © Robert Kneschke. Used under licence from Shutterstock.

Tuckman (1965) and Tuckman and Jensen (1977) introduced a classic five-
stage model of group development: forming, storming, norming, performing and
adjourning (see Theory Box 12.2). In the first stage, when the group is forming,
group members feel insecure because they do not know each other and do not
know what is expected of them. As a consequence, interactions are usually polite
and inhibited. In this first stage, people get to know each other and develop a
shared identity as members of the same group. This might happen at the
beginning of a psychology seminar: students still feel insecure, engage in polite
conversation, and the atmosphere is quite subdued. Once people have got to
know each other, they enter the second stage (storming). The challenge in the
second stage is to develop a group structure. Here issues of leadership and
influence are at stake, and as group members may compete about different roles
in the group, there may be conflicts and disagreements. Most groups will
overcome this, and when a group structure and group roles have been
established, they can move on to the third stage, norming. In this stage, group
members develop close ties, and come to agree upon the group’s goals and
develop norms that govern group interaction. Once this has been achieved, the
group enters the performing stage. Because group structure and group norms
have been established, the group’s efforts can be directed towards achieving the
group’s task. Although it is probably still necessary to engage in behaviours to
maintain a positive atmosphere in the group, most activities will be task-related.
The final stage of group development is adjourning. When the task has been
accomplished or is abandoned, the group will end. This might be associated
either with feelings of accomplishment or with feelings of disappointment
(dependent, of course, on task success).

THEORY BOX 12.2

THE FIVE STAGES OF GROUP
DEVELOPMENT
Source: Based on information reported in Tuckman & Jensen, 1977.

According to the Tuckman and Jensen (1977) model, the different stages of
group life should be characterized by different interaction patterns within the
group. But how can we establish whether this really is true? To answer that
question, it is necessary to code group interactions into specific categories and
see whether certain types of behaviour are more frequent in the early or the later
stages of group life. Probably the best-known coding system of group interaction
is Bales’s (1950) interaction process analysis (IPA; see also Bales & Slater,
1955; Chapter 2; and Leader in the Field, Robert F. Bales). IPA makes the basic
and important distinction between task behaviours (all behaviours directed at
task completion) and socio-emotional behaviours (all behaviours directed at
interpersonal relations within the group). In the socio-emotional domain it
further distinguishes between positive and negative behaviours. According to
Bales, task-related behaviour is necessary for task completion, but can lead to
conflicts when people disagree. In order not to disturb the functioning of the
group, socio-emotional behaviour is necessary to restore group harmony. The
coding system of IPA is shown in Figure 12.6. As can be seen in the figure, the
scheme distinguishes between 12 different categories, divided into socio-
emotional behaviours that are positive, task-related behaviours (which are
emotionally neutral) and negative socio-emotional behaviours.
FIGURE 12.6 The coding scheme of Interaction Process Analysis.
Source: Based on information reported in Bales (1950).

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task behaviours behaviours during group interactions that are directed at task completion.

- - - - - - - - - -

- - - - - - - - - -

socio-emotional behaviours behaviours during group interactions that are directed at interpersonal
relations.

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LEADER IN THE FIELD

 Robert F. Bales (1916–2004), a pioneer in the development of
systematic methods of group observation and measurement of
interaction processes, received his BA and MS degrees in Sociology
from the University of Oregon. He received his PhD in sociology in
1945, and was appointed Professor of Social Relations in 1957,
retiring in 1986. During the 1944–45 academic year, Bales spent a
formative year as Research Associate at the Section on Alcohol
Studies at Yale University. His research on the interactions in
therapeutic group settings for alcohol addicts formed the basis for his
first and classic book, Interaction process analysis: A method for the
study of small groups, published in 1950. Bales hoped that by
studying the interaction of many such groups he would discover
recurring patterns that might help to understand and to predict the
functioning of problem-solving groups. His interaction process
analysis proved an extremely useful tool for studying group
interaction, group member roles and group development. This
research reflected his conception of social psychology as the
scientific study of social interaction within the group, and group
activity – rather than individual activity – as the primary unit of
analysis. With this research programme Bales sought to integrate the
psychological and sociological sources of social psychology.

Now, according to the Tuckman and Jensen (1977) stage model, these 12
categories of behaviour should occur to differing degrees in the different stages
of group life. The forming stage should be characterized by much positive socio-
emotional behaviour, whereas in the storming stage more negative socio-
emotional behaviour should occur. In the norming stage, there should be both
positive socio-emotional behaviour and task-related behaviour, and the
performing stage should be dominated by task-related behaviour. Is this what
really happens? At a general level, the answer seems to be yes. For example,
Wheelan, Davidson and Tilin (2003) found time together to be negatively related
to socio-emotional behaviours (the longer the group was together, the fewer of
these behaviours); time together was also positively related to task-related
behaviours (the longer the group was together, the more of these behaviours).
More about group development can be found in Wheelan (1994).
On the other hand, stage models such as Tuckman and Jensen’s can easily be
criticized as an oversimplification of reality. Some groups, for example, may
never have a storming stage, whereas other groups are in conflict continuously.
Further, groups may sometimes return to a previous stage instead of progressing
to the next as the model would assume. Finally, it will often be impossible to
establish which stage the group is in, and the assumption that the different stages
are qualitatively different from each other is difficult to maintain. Rather,
different activities occur in each stage, although they may vary in intensity. Most
researchers would therefore argue that there are no abrupt changes in the way
group members interact with each other, but rather that these changes occur
gradually and that one can see this as a gradual development of groups over
time.
 On being similar: norms, shared cognition and
cohesion
Group norms
Group norms are belief systems about how (or how not) to behave, which guide
behaviour but without the force of laws, and which reflect group members’
shared expectations about typical or desirable activities. Some norms are
prescriptive, and prescribe which attitudes, behaviour and beliefs are and are not
appropriate in the context of the group; other norms are descriptive, and merely
describe which behaviour is typical within the group (see Chapter 8). Norms
serve as guides for attitudes and behaviour and in that way perform an important
regulatory function. Group members tend to conform to group norms (i.e. think
and act in accordance with group norms), either because group norms are
internalized – that is, become part of the individual’s belief and value system
(Turner, 1991) – or because group norms are enforced by the (anticipated)
reaction of other group members to normative and anti-normative behaviour
(Deutsch & Gerard, 1955).
Because of this adherence to group norms, groups function more smoothly
with than without norms. For instance, if everybody adheres to group norms,
other group members’ behaviour becomes more predictable and therefore can be
anticipated. In that sense, group norms help regulate group interaction. Group
norms are also an important source of information about social reality. Often,
people rely on what many people see as valid and true as an accurate reflection
of (social) reality. Another important function of norms is that conformity to
group norms illustrates one’s group commitment – it shows that one is ‘a good
group member’ (cf. Hollander, 1958; see also Chapter 8). A particularly
dramatic illustration of the power of group norms can be found in Social
Psychology Beyond the Lab 12.2.
This is not to say, however, that all group members always conform to group
norms. Individual group members may show deviant behaviour. If they do,
however, they are likely to run into the negative responses of their fellow group
members, even to the extent that they may be excluded from the group
(Schachter, 1951). Because social exclusion is a highly unpleasant experience
(see Williams, 2001, earlier in this chapter), such pressures to conform to group
norms tend to be quite effective in many situations. Thus, groups may enforce
and maintain their group norms.
As already noted in the discussion of group development, groups develop
group norms relatively early in their existence (Tuckman, 1965). This is not to
say that group norms do not change. Norms may change over time. This change
may occur because the environment of the group changes. It may also occur
because the membership of the group changes. New members tend to be
socialized into the group and its norms (Moreland & Levine, 1982), but they
may also introduce changes to the group. Indeed, as research on minority
influence shows (see Chapter 8), if the conditions are right a deviant minority
may convert a whole group towards a different way of thinking. Group norms
should therefore be seen on the one hand as enforcing their own maintenance,
and on the other as subject to change over time and situations. Group norms are
thus both an influence on group process and an outcome of group process.

Socially shared cognition and affect

An aspect of groups that has received more attention in recent years is shared
cognition (Thompson, Levine, & Messick, 1999; Tindale & Kameda, 2000).
Over time, groups may develop a shared understanding of different aspects of
group life, such as the tasks the group performs, the role of each member in the
group, and each member’s particular knowledge, skills and abilities. For each
individual group member, such understanding is important, but when it is shared
within the group it has the added advantage of setting the stage for smooth
coordination, communication and cooperation, because all group members have
a similar understanding of what they are supposed to do and who does what.
Socially shared cognitions, when accurately reflecting the demands faced by the
group, may therefore improve group functioning and performance (Van Ginkel
& Van Knippenberg, 2008).
A nice illustration of the influence of shared cognition is found in work on
transactive memory. Transactive memory refers to shared knowledge about
how information is distributed in the group. Rather than having all the
information themselves, group members know who knows what and whom to
ask for information about specific things (Wegner, 1987). Transactive memory
makes it possible for groups to operate efficiently and adequately, because it
helps locate information and ‘the right person for the job’ (see also Chapter 13).
For an illustration of the benefits of transactive memory, see Research Close-Up
12.2.

- - - - - - - - - -
 - - - - - - - - - -

transactive memory a system of knowledge available to group members with shared awareness of
each other’s expertise, strengths and weaknesses.

- - - - - - - - - -

Groups may share not only cognition but also emotions (George, 1990).
Research in group emotions is still in its infancy, but there is emerging evidence
that groups may come to share emotions, and that these shared emotions affect
group functioning. Barsade (2002), for instance, studied emotional contagion,
which is the transfer of moods and emotions among people in a group. Barsade
had groups discuss a fictional business case, in which they had to distribute
bonuses among employees. Unknown to the real participants, one of the group
members was a confederate (a drama student) who was trained to show either
positive or negative emotions during the exercise (through facial expressions,
tone of voice and so on). Barsade found evidence for emotional contagion: group
members’ moods became more similar to the confederate’s mood. Further, when
the confederate showed positive emotions, the group discussion was more
cooperative and less conflict occurred. In a similar vein, Sy, Coté, and Saavedra
(2005) showed that the affect displayed by the leader of a group transferred to
the members of the group and affected group performance: groups performed
better when the leader displayed positive affect than when the leader displayed
negative affect.

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emotional contagion the transfer of moods and emotions among people in a group.

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RESEARCH CLOSE-UP 12.2

THE IMPORTANCE OF KNOWING

WHO KNOWS WHAT
Moreland, R. L., & Myaskovsky, L. (2000). Exploring the performance benefits of group
training: Transactive memory or improved communication? Organizational Behavior and
Human Decision Processes, 82, 117–133.

Research Question Transactive memory – shared

awareness of the expertise of each of the group
members – should help groups perform better.
Knowing who knows what helps to locate the
knowledge and expertise necessary to deal with the
task at hand within the group, helps to coordinate
efforts by assigning tasks to those members with most
expertise for these tasks, and reduces potential
problems due to disagreements. But how are these
transactive memory systems formed, and do they
actually benefit performance? Moreland and
Myaskovsky argued that groups with members that
were trained as a group for a task, rather than as
separate individuals, would benefit from this because
watching each other in action during training would
allow the group to develop transactive memory.
However, also simply telling group members (who
were trained individually) which group member is
good at which task should have similar beneficial
effects. Only groups whose members were trained
individually and who do not receive feedback about
the group members’ expertise should do relatively
poorly.
Design One hundred and eighty-nine students were
assigned to three-person groups. These groups were
assigned to three different conditions in a between-
subjects design. They were assigned either to an
individual training condition, a group training
condition or a feedback condition in which group
members learned individually about other group
members’ expertise (i.e. which would also allow for
the formation of transactive memory).
Procedure The group task was to assemble a radio
with as few errors as possible. To that end, group
members were first trained in the assembly task.
Depending on condition, this training was given to the
group as a whole or to individual group members. In
the feedback condition, individually trained group
members later learned about each other’s expertise via
written feedback. Subsequently, they performed the
group task (i.e. assembling a radio). This group
interaction was videotaped, and independent coders
rated the observed behaviour on the tapes for
indicators of transactive memory: specialization, with
group members focusing on their own expertise;
coordination of task efforts along expertise lines; and
trust in each other’s expertise as evidenced in less
argument about areas of expertise).
Results As predicted, groups whose members were
trained as a group or received feedback about other
 members’ expertise made fewer assembly errors than
groups with members that were trained individually
(see Figure 12.7). This pattern of results was mirrored
in the transactive memory measure (a combination of
specialization, coordination and trust), and further
analysis suggested that the greater transactive memory
was the underlying process that brought about the
better performance of group-trained and feedback
groups.
FIGURE 12.7 Number of errors as a function of training condition.
Source: Based on Moreland & Myaskovsky, 2000, with permission from
Elsevier.

Implications This study illustrates the importance of

transactive memory to group performance: groups are
better able to use their expertise and engage in better-
coordinated efforts the more they have a shared
awareness of who knows what. The study also shows
that this awareness may be achieved through a shared
training experience, as well as through specific
 feedback about group members’ areas of expertise.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BEYOND THE

LAB 12.2
JONESTOWN
On 18 November 1978 more than 900 men, women and children died in a
mass suicide/murder in Jonestown, a jungle encampment in Guyana, South
America. Most of them drank, or were forced to drink, a fruit punch that had
been laced with cyanide and tranquillizers. Parents first gave it to their
children, then drank it themselves (Figure 12.8). How could this have
happened? Why did a whole group of people resort to this desperate
measure? Strict adherence to group norms is part of the answer.
FIGURE 12.8 Members of the People’s Temple at Jonestown, Guyana,
committed mass suicide in 1978. They were socialized to accept the cult’s
norms, especially group loyalty.
Source: © Press Association Images.

The people of Jonestown were members of a religious cult, called the

People’s Temple. The cult was founded in the US by James Warren Jones
and had moved to the jungle encampment in Guyana in the mid-1970s.
There, the members of the cult had to work hard on the fields and lived in
isolation from the outside world. Immediately before the tragedy, US
Congressman Ryan had visited Jonestown with some journalists,
investigating accusations that people were being held there against their
will. Eighteen people indeed wanted to leave with Ryan. However, cult
members attacked them at the airstrip as they were leaving, killing the
congressman, three journalists and one defector, and wounding 12 others.
Back in Jonestown, Jones proclaimed that the ‘end had come’, and that in
this extreme situation ‘revolutionary suicide’ was their only option. The
members of the People’s Temple obeyed, committing mass suicide and
killing those who were unable or unwilling to kill themselves (including
children and the elderly). The dramatic story of Jonestown is described in
the 1980 book Black and White by Shiva Naipaul.
To begin to understand why they chose death, one must firstly realize that
the members of the People’s Temple were socialized to accept the norms of
the cult. One of the more important norms was loyalty to the group, a norm
that was quite strictly enforced. Moreover, the cult’s leadership was
extremely autocratic – whatever the cult’s leader, Jones, decreed was group
normative and had to be obeyed (see Hogg & Van Knippenberg, 2003, for a
discussion of leaders as embodying group norms). Second, the members of
the People’s Temple lived in isolation from the outside world and had no
contacts with relatives or others outside Jonestown. One implication of their
isolation was that an end to Jonestown would imply a loss of all their current
social ties. It also implied that the people of the Jonestown commune were
only in contact with like-minded people. As this chapter shows, one function
of groups is to provide us with knowledge of our social and physical world.
In isolation, people may even begin to believe bizarre things, such as the
concept of ‘revolutionary suicide’. The members of the cult, for example,
believed that an end to Jonestown would mean not only an end to the
promised land they had believed in, but also facing torture and
imprisonment by the US government. When faced with the grim prospect of
losing all social ties, all hopes, everything they believed in, and of being
tortured and imprisoned, several of them saw no reason to live. Those that
were less inclined to go down with the cult on Jones’s bidding were trapped
by the strong conformity to group norms of their fellow cult members, who
forced them into partaking in the mass suicide.
Although the Jonestown case is clearly extreme, and fortunately very rare, it
does illustrate the power of the social group (and of an autocratic leader). It
is one of social psychology’s goals to understand these tragedies and
hopefully prevent them in the future.
RESEARCH CLOSE-UP 12.3

GROUP COHESIVENESS LEADS TO

BETTER PERFORMANCE WHEN THE GROUP
ACCEPTS PERFORMANCE GOALS
Podsakoff, P. M., MacKenzie, S. B., & Ahearne, M. (1997). Moderating effects of goal
acceptance on the relationship between group cohesiveness and productivity. Journal of Applied
Psychology, 82, 974–983.

Research question Does group cohesion lead to

better performance? Podsakoff and colleagues argued
that higher cohesion does not always lead to better
performance. They argued that the relationship
between cohesiveness and performance should
depend on the group’s acceptance of performance
goals. If the group accepts the performance goals of
the organization, cohesiveness should be positively
related to group performance. If, however, the group
does not accept performance goals, then cohesiveness
is expected to be unrelated (or even negatively
related) to performance.
Design The study participants were 218 members of
40 work crews at a paper mill in the US. Crews
consisted of 5.25 members on average, most
participants were male (96 per cent), and their average
age was 39 years old. These participants responded to
questions in a standardized questionnaire, and
 performance data was also collected from company
records. The design was correlational (i.e. correlations
were computed among measured variables, and no
manipulations were involved), and analyses were
performed at the group level.
Procedure Two measures were obtained through a
questionnaire distributed among the work crew
members: group cohesiveness and acceptance of the
performance goals of the company. Thus, all group
members individually rated their perception of group
cohesiveness and their acceptance of performance
goals. Performance of each crew was obtained from
company records. It consisted of the amount of paper
produced as a percentage of total machine capacity.
Results Figure 12.9 shows the results. As predicted,
group cohesion and group goal acceptance interacted
in predicting task performance. When groups were
relatively accepting of performance goals, the
relationship between group cohesion and group
performance was positive. However, when groups
were not accepting of performance goals, the
relationship between group cohesion and performance
tended to be negative.
FIGURE 12.9 The relation between cohesion and performance for crews low
and high in goal acceptance.
Source: After Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Ahearne, © 1997 by the American
Psychological Association. Adapted with permission. The use of APA
information does not imply endorsement by APA.

Implications This study illustrates that group

cohesion does not necessarily motivate performance.
Rather, it motivates group members to exert
themselves for causes that are seen as important to the
group (see Van Knippenberg & Ellemers, 2003).
When group members do not accept the company’s
performance goals, higher cohesion will generally not
improve performance.

Group cohesion
Group cohesion (or ‘cohesiveness’) is the force that binds members to the group
and induces them to stay with the group (Festinger, 1950). Group cohesion is
assumed to be important to group functioning, because it helps to keep the group
together and motivates group members to exert themselves on behalf of the
group. Evidence for this proposition is mixed, however, and research suggests
that it is useful to distinguish between types of cohesion. Task cohesion refers to
the shared commitment to the group’s tasks, while interpersonal cohesion
refers to the attraction to the group. As a meta-analysis by Mullen and Copper
(1994) shows, only task cohesion is (positively) related to group performance.
Further, cohesion may not always improve performance, as can be seen in
Research Close-Up 12.3.

- - - - - - - - - -
cohesion the force that binds members to the group.

- - - - - - - - - -

- - - - - - - - - -

task cohesion cohesion based on attraction of group members to the group task.

- - - - - - - - - -

- - - - - - - - - -

interpersonal cohesion cohesion based on liking of the group and its members.

- - - - - - - - - -
 On being different: status and roles
Whereas norms make group members’ behaviour more alike, there are also clear
differences between group members in the way they behave and the position
they have in the group. Take a football team for instance. Clearly, different
players have different roles, defined by their position on the field (goalkeeper,
defender, forward). Besides these formal roles, there will also be informal roles.
For example, a more experienced team member (even though not formally the
team captain) may have more influence on the other players than a newcomer,
and another team member may always take the initiative to reconcile people
after an argument.
Earlier we discussed Bales’s (1950) interaction process analysis (IPA). It
appears that IPA is a useful tool for looking at status and roles inside a group: it
is possible to keep track of the 12 different types of behaviour (see Figure 12.6)
for each group member, to see whether there are differences among group
members. Research using IPA (or other coding systems) to code behaviour in
freely interacting groups has revealed a number of important insights. A good
overview of these insights can be found in one of the most influential books on
group dynamics, McGrath’s (1984) Groups: Interaction and Performance (see
Leader in the Field, Joseph E. McGrath). We will discuss two of these findings
now.

LEADER IN THE FIELD

Joseph E. McGrath (1927–2007) was one of the most influential
people in the field of group dynamics. This is the case not only
because of his own research and writing, but also because he was an
excellent mentor who supervised a number of graduate students who
later became well-known researchers themselves (for example
Richard Hackman, Janice Kelly, Andrea Hollingshead and Linda
Argote). McGrath received his PhD from the University of Michigan
in 1955, and worked at the University of Illinois from 1960 until his
retirement in 1997 (after which he remained active as a researcher
until his death). He has published a number of influential books, but
one of his best-known is the 1984 book entitled Groups: Interaction
and Performance. This book provides an excellent summary and
integration of work on group dynamics as well as work on group
 performance (see Chapter 13, this volume). McGrath was especially
interested in change of groups over time, and believed that research
should emphasize the dynamics of groups, rather than just looking at
snapshot pictures of groups in the lab. In his later work McGrath
studied the differences between face-to-face versus computer-
mediated communication. McGrath was also famous for the poems
that he wrote on his work as a mentor and researcher, which he
referred to as ‘doggerels’. About mentoring of students he wrote, for
example: ‘So what I best could do for them/Was not to scorn nor
flatter/But rather to convince them that/Their own ideas matter’.

First, some group members talk more than others, and the discrepancy
increases with the size of the group. Thus, groups develop a speaking hierarchy
(Bales, 1953) in which members higher in the hierarchy talk more than those
lower in the hierarchy. For example, Figure 12.10 shows the speaking hierarchy
found by Stephan (1952), which depicts the percentage of time a group member
was talking in different-sized groups. For example, the person talking most in an
eight-person group talked about 20 per cent of the time, while the person talking
least talked only about two per cent of the time. Further, people who talk more
are usually seen as more influential. Later research has shown that group
members do not distribute their participation evenly throughout the discussion,
but rather that contributions are concentrated in periods of high activity (Dabbs
& Ruback, 1987). Thus, if a person has spoken recently, he or she is more likely
to speak again. Often this takes the form of a dyadic exchange, in which two
group members alternate speaking turns. When this happens, we say that the
group is in a floor position (i.e. two group members ‘hold the floor’; Parker,
1988). Parker found that four-person groups were in a floor position no less than
61 per cent of their time, much more than would be expected if all group
members contributed equally.
FIGURE 12.10 Speaking hierarchy for groups of five, six, seven, and eight
members. (Member rank is based on percentage of time talking.) Source: Taken
from Stephan, 1952, with permission from SAGE publications.
 - - - - - - - - - -

speaking hierarchy hierarchy within a group based on who talks most.

- - - - - - - - - -

Second, research using IPA has found that some people are consistently more
task-oriented (i.e. they engage mostly in task-related behaviours, categories 4–9
in Figure 12.6), whereas others are more relationship-oriented (i.e. they engage
more in socio-emotional behaviours) (Slater, 1955). The former type of person
has been labelled the task specialist and the latter the socio-emotional specialist:
clearly a case of (informal) role differentiation. It further appeared that these two
group members interacted with each other quite frequently, and much more than
would be expected according to chance (i.e. they were often in a floor position).
Finally, the task specialist was seen as most influential, but he or she was liked
less than the socio-emotional specialist.

THEORY BOX 12.3

EXPECTATION STATES THEORY
Source: From Berger et al., 1980, with permission from Annual Reviews,
Inc.
 Who talks most in the group and who takes which role is dependent on
personality and individual abilities. For example, an extroverted person will
probably talk more than an introverted person. However, this is not the whole
story: there are other factors that determine who is more and who is less
influential. The most comprehensive theory about status in groups is
expectation states theory (Berger, Rosenholtz, & Zelditch, 1980). This deals
with the issue of how status structures emerge in groups and how they are
shaped by the outside status of group members (see Ridgeway, 2001, for an
overview of the theory and the evidence for it). A simplified graphical depiction
of the theory is presented in Theory Box 12.3.

- - - - - - - - - -

expectation states theory argues that status differences within a group result from different
expectations that group members have about each other.

- - - - - - - - - -

Expectation states theory is applicable to groups in which members strive for a

common goal or perform a common task. It assumes that several inequalities
within a group, such as inequalities in participation and influence, are highly
correlated because they are all derived from performance expectations. That is,
because of specific characteristics of group members, other group members form
expectations about the usefulness of each group member’s contributions. These
expectations then serve as a self-fulfilling prophecy: the greater the expectations,
the more likely a person is to speak up, offer suggestions and be evaluated
positively by the others. The lower the expectations, the less likely it is that these
things happen. The important question, then, is: what determines these
performance expectations?
The theory assumes that performance expectations are influenced by so-called
status characteristics. A distinction is drawn between diffuse status
characteristics (not necessarily related to the group task), including, for example,
gender, age and race, and specific status characteristics, such as skills and
abilities (i.e. characteristics that are necessary for the group task and previous
task success). These characteristics carry certain cultural expectations about
competencies. For example, women have stereotypically been seen as less
competent than men (especially on tasks that are more ‘masculine’; e.g. Pugh &
Wahrman, 1983), and more senior people may be seen as more competent (up to
a certain age) than younger people (Freese & Cohen, 1973). Similarly, higher
expectations are formed for people who are more experienced, have a higher
status in society more generally, or have a relevant area of expertise. Obviously,
these expectations may sometimes be false (e.g. a woman may in fact be more
competent than a man), but they nevertheless affect people’s status in the group
and the amount of influence they have. The reason is that expectations need to
be explicitly falsified before they lose their influence, and as long as they are not
falsified, they continue to have their effect in a self-fulfilling way. There is
extensive evidence supporting the theory. For example, Driskell and Mullen
(1990) found that characteristics of group members affected their status and
power through the expectations of other group members (for more evidence, see
Ridgeway, 2001).
 Summary
Groups develop over time, in the sense that their interaction patterns change.
Further, some processes cause group members to become more similar to each
other, both in terms of their behaviour (as prescribed by group norms) and in
terms of their cognitions and emotions. Finally, differences between group
members may also emerge, for which expectation states theory offers a
theoretical account. We now turn to the last level of analysis: the contextual or
intergroup level.
GROUPS IN THEIR ENVIRONMENT: THE
INTERGROUP LEVEL OF ANALYSIS
In what ways does the (intergroup) context affect intragroup
behaviour?
Going back to our opening example of the football fans, it is clear that these
people do not always behave in this way. They are also supporters of their team
when the team is not playing, but it is the context of the match that draws them
together and that brings out their behaviour in the subway station. Playing
against another team renders these supporters’ affiliation with their favourite
team salient and evokes the quite uniform behaviour that clearly identifies them
as a group.
What holds for these supporters holds for all groups. Groups do not live in
isolation. Other groups are part of the environment in which groups function.
Understanding the psychology of groups therefore requires studying the
influence of the intergroup context on the thoughts, feelings and behaviour of
group members. Part of this involves the study of intergroup relations – the way
group members think, feel and act towards members of other groups (see
Chapter 14). The intergroup context may, however, also affect intragroup
processes, and that is the issue we focus on here.
 The intergroup context and the salience of group
membership
The fact that individuals are members of a specific group does not mean that this
group membership is always at the forefront of their minds. Self-categorization
as a group member needs to be cognitively activated, or rendered salient, for the
group membership to exert its influence on people’s self-definition (see Chapter
5). Once salient, group membership then influences group members’ attitudes
and behaviour via this self-definition (i.e. social identity; see Turner et al., 1987;
also Chapters 8 and 14). An important influence of the intergroup context is that
of rendering group membership salient. Exposure to other groups in a sense
‘reminds’ us of our own group memberships. Especially in the context of an
intergroup confrontation of some kind, this may work to render group
membership a salient influence on group members’ thoughts, feelings and
behaviour. Such confrontations may involve explicit competition, as in sports or
in the political arena, or competition for scarce goods (e.g. customers, funding),
but may also involve more implicit forms of competition, such as competition
for social status (e.g. ‘which is the most important department within an
organization?’, ‘which street gang has the toughest reputation?’).
These processes are well illustrated in a study by James and Greenberg (1989).
They conducted two experiments in which they had students from their
university work on a task solving anagrams. The task objective was to solve as
many anagrams as possible, and participants’ performance on the task (i.e. the
number of anagrams solved) was the main dependent variable of interest. James
and Greenberg argued that students would be more motivated, and therefore
perform better, when their university membership was made salient in the
context of a comparison between students from their university and students
from another university.
James and Greenberg experimentally manipulated the extent to which
students’ affiliation to their university was salient. In their first experiment, they
manipulated group membership salience by letting participants work in a room
that was painted either white (low salience condition) or red and blue (the
colours of the university: high salience condition). All participants were led to
believe that the experiment was part of a larger study comparing the
performance of students from their university with that of students from a ‘rival’
university. As expected, participants in the high group membership salience
condition (red-and-blue room) solved more anagrams than did participants in the
low group membership salience condition.
In their second experiment, James and Greenberg aimed to show that this
effect would only be found in the presence of intergroup comparison and not in
the absence of this intergroup comparison. In order to demonstrate this, they
manipulated not only group membership salience but also the presence or
absence of the comparison with the other university. Intergroup comparison was
manipulated by telling half of the participants that their performance would be
compared with that of the rival university (as in the first study), whereas the
other half did not receive this instruction. This time, salience was manipulated
by giving participants a practice anagram that solved either as wildcats, which
referred to their university mascot (high salience condition), or as beavers,
which had no relevance for university membership (low salience condition).
Results indicated that group salience had no effect when the intergroup
comparison was absent, but that group salience led to higher (and the highest)
performance when intergroup comparison was present (see Figure 12.11).
FIGURE 12.11 Percentage of anagrams solved correctly as a function of
ingroup salience and comparison condition.
Source: Based on James & Greenberg, 1989, with permission from SAGE
Publications.

What this study shows is that group membership needs to be salient to affect
behaviour, but that the context in which it is rendered salient affects whether and
how group membership salience translates into behaviour (for more on this
issue, see Haslam, 2004; Van Knippenberg, 2000). In the intergroup context
created by James and Greenberg (1989), performing well could help establish
that one’s own group was superior to the comparison group. Because salient
group memberships reflect on how we see ourselves, the relative standing of our
group vis-à-vis other groups (i.e. are we ‘better’?) reflects on how good or bad
we can feel about ourselves. Obviously, then, we prefer our groups to compare
favourably to other groups, and are willing to contribute actively to our group
achieving such a favourable comparison (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In the situation
created by James and Greenberg, this led individuals for whom group
membership was made salient in the context of intergroup comparison to work
harder. In other situations, intergroup comparisons may have different effects:
see Social Psychology Beyond the Lab 12.3 for an illustrative example.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BEYOND THE

LAB 12.3
THE OLD FIRM, AND MANY, MANY MORE . . .
Intergroup comparison and intergroup competition may invite group
members to give of their best to outperform the other group. Some
intergroup comparisons are more important to groups than others, however,
and these comparisons in particular motivate efforts on behalf of the group
to put the group in a favourable light vis-à-vis the other group.
One only needs to look around to see examples of this in everyday life.
People in many countries find it easy to identify ‘rival cities’ – Melbourne
and Sydney in Australia, Amsterdam and Rotterdam in The Netherlands,
Lisbon and Porto in Portugal, etc. Sport is also full of such examples, where
one opponent in particular is associated with such feelings of intergroup
rivalry. As a case in point, consider Celtic and Glasgow Rangers, two
football clubs from Glasgow, Scotland. Their rivalry is so intense (at least in
part because it also captures antagonism between Catholics and Protestants)
that a match between Celtic and Rangers even goes by a nickname – ‘The
Old Firm’. For both Celtic and Rangers, winning The Old Firm is perhaps
the most important goal in the season, and hooliganism reaches its peak
around these matches, suggesting that supporters, and especially hooligans,
feel likewise (for a book on football club rivalry, see Giles Goodhead’s
(2004) Us versus Them: Journeys to the World’s Greatest Football
 Derbies).
Such rivalries may be observed at all levels between all kinds of groups –
nations, cities, organizations, universities, sport clubs, etc. What all such
intergroup comparisons have in common is that they render group
membership highly salient and motivate group members to outperform the
other group. This may inspire great things such as superior athletic
performance, but also outright undesirable behaviour such as hooliganism,
as well as more silly expressions of intergroup rivalry such as an
unwillingness to pronounce the other group’s name (a widespread custom in
the Dutch city of Rotterdam, for instance, is to not pronounce the name of
Amsterdam, but rather to refer to the city simply by its telephone area code,
‘020’).
An important influence of the intergroup context on group members is, thus,
that it may render group membership salient, and may increase the likelihood
that this salient self-categorization will be translated into attitudes and
behaviour. The intergroup context may also affect group members’ perceptions
of their own group, and by doing so may affect attitudes and behaviour that are
contingent on these perceptions. This is an issue that is addressed next.
 The intergroup context, group perceptions and social
influence
Part of what defines a group is the distinction between who is ‘in’ and who is
‘out’. Groups exist by virtue of their members, but also by the fact that there are
some people who are not members of the group and may indeed be members of
other groups. Accordingly, people’s perceptions of their membership groups are
affected by the comparison between their own group and other groups, and
group members’ perceptions of their group are also contingent on what
differentiates their group from other groups (Turner et al., 1987). Put differently,
we ascribe characteristics to ourselves and to our groups on the basis of our
perception that we possess these characteristics to a greater degree than others.
For example, we will only come to the conclusion that the members of our group
are intelligent if we perceive our group to be more intelligent than some other
groups. Indeed, such social comparison processes for evaluating ourselves
permeate social life (see Chapter 14 for further detail on intergroup social
comparison). The important point for our present discussion is that if the
intergroup context changes, comparison groups may change, and as a
consequence our perceptions of our group may change.
Take, for instance, the case of political parties. Members of a party that is the
most conservative within a country’s political spectrum will probably think of
their party as conservative. However, when a new party emerges that is
perceived to be more conservative, the attribute ‘conservative’ may become less
suited to distinguish the party from other parties, and party members’
perceptions of their party may change to emphasize other characteristics of their
party. Or consider, for example, the discussion about Turkey’s prospective
membership of the European Union. In contrast to the other countries of the
European Union, the largest religious denomination in Turkey is Islam rather
than Christianity. This fact seems to have highlighted the shared roots in
Christianity of the current EU countries in the perception of many parties taking
part in the discussion – an attribute that until now never really seemed at the
forefront of perception within the European Union.
Changes in the intergroup context may occur because old groups disappear
from the scene (e.g. a competitor goes bankrupt) or new groups emerge, or
because an existing group becomes more relevant as a comparison group (as in
the example of Turkey and the European Union) or less relevant as a comparison
group (e.g. because a competing firm focuses more on other markets than
competing directly with one’s own firm in the same market). Such changes may
affect which attributes of the group are salient (i.e. what differentiates the group
from relevant other groups), but they may also alter our perception of a given
attribute of the group. Take the example of a group of psychology students who
think of themselves as intelligent. In comparison to most groups in society, this
makes sense and greater intelligence may indeed be a feature distinguishing
psychology students from other groups. Imagine, however, that this group finds
itself in a context where comparison with a group of the proverbial rocket
scientists becomes relevant. Intelligence is still a salient attribute – indeed,
rocket science is invoked in everyday language to indicate levels of complexity
and sophistication requiring the highest levels of intelligence and expertise – but
the psychology students will find that they no longer distinguish themselves
through superior intelligence. Rather, intelligence is what distinguishes rocket
scientists from other groups, and psychology students may be invited to see the
intelligence of their own group as modest at best.
 Summary
The intergroup context may both affect the salience of group membership and
inform group members’ behaviour within this wider context. This context of
intergroup relations can influence perceptions of group norms that may feed into
attitudes and behaviour.

CHAPTER SUMMARY
When can we say that a group exists? A group exists when two or more
people define themselves as members of a group.
Why do people join groups? The reasons why people form, join and
distinguish groups are sociobiological (evolutionarily built in, for self-
preservation), cognitive (to gain understanding of our world) and
utilitarian (to gain benefits).
Are there different types of groups, and how do they differ from each
other? Different types of groups, such as task groups, intimacy groups,
social categories and loose associations, differ on a number of important
dimensions such as group entitativity, importance, shared objectives and
which needs these groups are likely to fulfil.
How does group membership change over time? Group members move
through the different stages of group membership (prospective member,
new member, full member, marginal member and ex-member) separated
from each other by role transitions, and these different stages are
characterized by different levels of commitment.
How can harsh initiation rituals be explained? The role transition of entry
can be marked by a harsh transition ritual. A classic explanation for these
rituals is given by dissonance theory, which argues that such rituals
increase commitment to the group. However, as we have seen, severe
initiations often do not increase liking, and have other functions than
increasing commitment.
What determines how easy it is to become a group member? An important
determinant of group openness is staffing level: it is easier to become a
full member of an understaffed as compared to an overstaffed group.
What are the consequences of exclusion from groups? Social exclusion
from groups can lead to quite severe anger and depression.
How do groups change over time? Groups develop over time, because the
 challenges they face and the goals they have change. Tuckman’s classic
theory distinguishes five stages: forming, storming, norming, performing
and adjourning.
How can we systematically observe group interactions? Interaction
process analysis is a useful coding scheme for group interactions and
makes a basic distinction between socio-emotional and task behaviours.
How does being in a group affect memory and emotions? Through shared
experiences, groups develop shared cognitions, such as transactive
memory systems (i.e. knowing who knows what) and shared emotions.
What is the role of group cohesion? Cohesion can be based on
attractiveness of the group (interpersonal cohesion) or on attractiveness of
the group task (task cohesion). In general, cohesion motivates group
members to exert effort for causes that are important to the group.
How do status and role differences develop within groups? Expectation
states theory explains the emergence of a status structure in a group. It
argues that certain status characteristics lead to performance expectations
that subsequently lead to differences in status and influence.
How does the intergroup context influence intragroup behaviour? The
presence of other groups can make group membership salient. As a
consequence, group members will be more strongly influenced by their
group membership.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

Haslam, S. A. (2004). Psychology in organisations: The social identity approach
(2nd edn.). London: Sage. A detailed review of the influence of group norms and
intergroup context on attitudes and behaviour in groups.
Hogg, M. A., & Van Knippenberg, D. (2003). Social identity and leadership
processes in groups. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social
psychology (Vol. 35, pp. 1–52). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. An analysis of
the relationship between group norms and leadership, showing how leaders may
be influential by being seen to embody what is group-normative.
Lickel, B., Hamilton, D. L., & Sherman, S. J. (2001). Elements of a lay theory of
groups: Types of groups, relational styles, and the perception of group
entitativity. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 5, 129–140. An in-depth
discussion of types of groups and ‘lay theories’ about them (i.e. how lay people
look at groups).
McGrath, J. E. (1984). Groups: Interaction and performance. Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: Prentice Hall. Provides a very good overview of early findings in group
dynamics and group performance research.
Moreland, R. L., & Levine, J. M. (1982). Socialization in small groups:
Temporal changes in individual–group relations. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.),
Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 15, pp. 137–192). New York:
Academic Press. An extensive discussion of group socialization.
Nijstad, B. A. (2009). Group performance. Hove, UK: Psychology Press. Gives
a more in-depth discussion of various topics dealt with in this chapter.
Peltokorpi, V. (2008). Transactive memory systems. Review of General
Psychology, 12, 378–394. Gives a recent and comprehensive overview of the
literature on transactive memory systems and other forms of shared cognition.
Ridgeway, C. L. (2001). Social status and group structure. In M. A. Hogg & R.
S. Tindale (Eds.), Blackwell handbook of social psychology: Group processes
(pp. 352–375). Oxford: Blackwell. A good summary of the research on
expectation states theory.
Tindale, R. S., & Kameda, T. (2000). Social sharedness as a unifying theme for
information processing in groups. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 3,
123–140. A straightforward statement of the importance and effects of the social
sharedness of cognition and psychological states in groups.
Wheelan, S.A. (1994). Group process: A developmental perspective. Boston,
MA: Allyn & Bacon. A discussion of group development that examines different
stages of group life.
 Chapter 13

Group Performance and Leadership

Stefan Schulz-Hardt and Felix C. Brodbeck

Source: © Mike Blank. Used under licence from Getty Images.

KEY TERMS

brainstorming
cognitive restriction
cognitive stimulation
contingency approaches
coordination losses
dispensability effect
eureka effect
group composition
group leadership
group learning
group performance management
group synchronization
 group task types
group-to-group transfer
group-to-individual transfer
group-to-individual-in-group transfer
hidden profile
individual capability gains and losses
individual-to-individual transfer
Köhler effect
laissez-faire leaders
leader traits
leaderless groups
leadership behaviour
leadership effectiveness
leadership (in organizations)
leadership style
motivation losses and gains
nominal group
potential group performance (group potential)
production blocking
Ringelmann effect
shared or team leadership
social compensation
social competition
social loafing
sucker effect
team awareness
transactional leaders
transformational (charismatic) leaders
CHAPTER OUTLINE
INTRODUCTION
SOME CORE CONCEPTS: ACTUAL GROUP PERFORMANCE,
GROUP POTENTIAL AND TASK TYPE
Actual and potential group performance Basic types of group tasks and
their implications for group potential Summary
PROCESS LOSSES VERSUS PROCESS GAINS IN GROUP
PERFORMANCE
 Types of process losses and process gains Summary
GROUP PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT
Three basic principles of group performance management Summary
LEADERSHIP
Approaches to the study of leadership Summary
LEADERSHIP IN GROUPS
Group and task design
Group synchronization
Group development and learning Summary

ROUTE MAP OF THE CHAPTER

In this chapter we examine the question of how social interdependence and
social interaction affect group performance. More specifically, we provide
answers to the following questions: How can we identify group-level effects
on performance? What are the major pitfalls and opportunities for
performance when people work together in a group? What can we do to
systematically optimize group performance? What makes leadership
effective? Why is leadership so critical for group performance, and how can
it contribute to the optimization of group performance? We answer these
questions by outlining the basic underlying principles, applying them to
specific group tasks, with examples, and selectively illustrating them with
empirical research.
 INTRODUCTION
We all often work in groups. Some of these groups are informal, for example a
group of students preparing for an exam. Other groups are more or less formal;
for example: a work team on the production line; a personnel selection
committee; or a sports team (Figure 13.1). Thus, work in groups is an essential
part of our society (for basic principles of the psychology of groups, see Chapter
12). Whereas in some cases groups are indispensable for performing a specific
task (e.g. you can only play volleyball in a team), in many other cases groups are
used because we expect them to raise performance on a specific task. For
example, personnel selection might also be carried out by a single person, but we
often believe that a group of people will make better selection decisions. To see
whether such assumptions are correct, we have to find out what determines
group performance and how group performance compares with individual
performance.
FIGURE 13.1(a), (b) and (c) Different kinds of groups: a work team on the
production line, a sports team and a personnel selection committee.
Source: (a) © EIGHTFISH. Used under licence from Getty Images; (b) ©
corepics. Used under licence from Shutterstock; (c) © StockLite. Used under
licence from Shutterstock.
 The comparison of group versus individual performance is a fundamental
question in social psychology and actually triggered some of the earliest
experiments in the field (e.g. Ringelmann, 1913; Triplett, 1898; see Chapter 1).
As later research has shown, the relation between group and individual
performance depends strongly on the type of task. For example, we would all
expect that the more heads involved in solving a problem, the greater the
chances of the problem being solved. However, most of us would not claim that
a climbing team will climb a mountain faster the more people are involved.
In addition, simply comparing individual performance with group performance
is often misleading. Imagine the following situation. You investigate weight
pulling and find that individuals pull an average weight of 100 kg, whereas four-
person groups pull an average weight of 105 kg. Here, group performance is
superior to individual performance. Will this finding make you praise the
benefits of group work? We suspect the answer is ‘no’; instead, this result might
make you wonder what has happened in these groups that led to their
performance being only slightly above that of individuals. Thus, what is needed
to determine whether group performance raises or lowers individual
performance is an appropriate standard against which to compare this
performance. As we will see, the appropriate baseline is again strongly
dependent on the type of task. For example, you might expect the four-person
group to pull four times the weight of an individual, but you wouldn’t expect
them to climb a mountain four times faster – or four times slower – than one
person.
With that in mind, we first introduce the core concepts of actual group
performance, potential group performance and different task types. In particular,
we outline how potential group performance is defined for different types of
tasks, and how this potential changes with group size. Next, we deal with the
psychological processes that determine how groups perform against the standard
of their potential performance. In particular, we describe several process losses
that make groups perform below their potential, and also outline several process
gains that make them surpass their potential. As we further show, the relative
prevalence of process losses versus process gains in groups depends on how
group performance is managed, that is, how groups are designed and how their
process is being controlled. We then describe three basic principles of group
performance management, namely group composition, group synchronization
and group learning, which facilitate process gains rather than process losses.
The extent to which these principles are realized depends on many factors. We
highlight one factor – leadership – that is particularly important in this context.
Therefore, we give a brief introduction to leadership concepts and leadership
research, and we outline how leadership affects group performance via the
principles of group performance management.
 SOME CORE CONCEPTS: ACTUAL
GROUP PERFORMANCE, GROUP
POTENTIAL AND TASK TYPE
How does group size affect performance potential for different
types of task?
 Actual and potential group performance
As outlined, a meaningful evaluation of group performance requires a baseline
against which one can judge that performance. Naturally, group performance
depends on individual performance: the better the group members are, the better
– on average – group performance will be, and this also implies that what makes
individual members better will – again on average – also make the group better.
This individual component of group performance is, however, not what group
dynamics researchers are interested in. Instead, they are interested in the group
component of group performance, that is, the question of how this performance
is affected by group members’ awareness that common outcomes also depend on
what other group members do (social interdependence) and on their interaction
with these other group members (social interaction).
To determine this group-specific component, we have to know what
performance would have occurred if the same members had worked
independently of each other (i.e. not as a group). This latter performance will be
labelled potential group performance or (more simply) group potential. The
potential is contrasted with how the group actually performs, which is called
actual group performance.

- - - - - - - - - -

potential group performance (group potential) the performance that would have occurred if the
members of a group had worked independently of each other and not as a group; a common
benchmark to evaluate actual group performance.

- - - - - - - - - -

This group potential is determined in two steps. The first is to measure how the
same group members or similar people perform individually. The second is to
combine these individual contributions into a (hypothetical) group product. As
we will see, this second step depends strongly on the type of task under
investigation.
 Basic types of group tasks and their implications for
group potential
Dimensions of group tasks
In a classic publication Steiner (1972) distinguished three dimensions underlying
group task types. The first refers to whether the task is unitary or divisible: for
unitary tasks all members have to perform the same task, whereas divisible tasks
allow for the assignment of different subtasks to different members. The second
dimension consists of whether the ultimate focus of task fulfilment is quantity
(maximization tasks) or quality (optimization tasks). Finally, the third dimension
classifies tasks by how group performance is related to the performance of each
individual member. Here, Steiner made an important distinction between
additive, disjunctive and conjunctive tasks.1 We describe each of these tasks in
some detail and show how group potential is defined for them (see the overview
in Table 13.1; see Leader in the Field, Ivan D. Steiner). To further illustrate how
group potential works for each task type, we also explain how group potential
changes with group size.
Table 13.1 Important types of unitary group tasks and their implications for group potential.
Task type Examples Group potential
Additive Pulling a rope; brainstorming; shovelling Sum of members’
snow individual performance
Disjunctive Problem solving; decision-making; Best member’s individual
mathematical calculations performance
Conjunctive Mountain climbing; precision work; Weakest member’s
keeping something confidential individual performance

- - - - - - - - - -

group task types group tasks are distinguished depending on whether the task is divisible between
group members, whether the quality or quantity of the output is relevant, and how individual
contributions are related to the group’s performance.

- - - - - - - - - -

Additive tasks
Additive tasks
Additive tasks are those in which the performance of a group is simply the sum
of its members’ individual performances. Additive tasks are usually
maximization tasks. Brainstorming (i.e. generating as many ideas as possible
on a given topic) is an example: the number of ideas generated by the whole
group should be the sum of the ideas that the individual members generate in this
situation (minus the redundant ones).

- - - - - - - - - -

brainstorming a group technique aimed at enhancing creativity in groups by means of the

uninhibited generation of as many ideas as possible concerning a specified topic.

- - - - - - - - - -

Hence, potential group performance is defined by the sum of each member’s

performance measured in an individual situation. As a consequence, group
potential is higher than the best group member can achieve alone and – for
groups consisting of members with identical individual performance – it
increases linearly with group size. This means that if you double the number of
members in a group, you get twice the group potential as before.

Disjunctive tasks
In a disjunctive task, a group has to choose one of several judgements or
proposals. A good example is problem-solving, where a group has to decide on
one particular solution to a problem. Here, actual group performance depends
solely on the quality of the one particular judgement or proposal that is chosen
by the group. Due to this restriction, disjunctive tasks are usually optimization
tasks, where quality matters. Potential group performance in disjunctive tasks is
determined by the best member’s individual performance. As group size
increases, group potential also increases, because it is more likely that at least
one group member can provide the best solution or the correct answer. However,
the increase in potential gained if another member is added to the group becomes
smaller the larger the size of the group. If, for example, the individual chances of
solving a problem are 50 per cent, a relatively large increase in potential is
obtained if there are three instead of two members. In contrast, if you already
have 20 members, adding another person changes very little.

LEADER IN THE FIELD

Ivan D. Steiner (1917–2001) graduated from Central Michigan
University before receiving a master’s degree and a doctorate from
the University of Michigan. He was a PhD student of Ted Newcomb
(see Leader in the Field, Chapter 1), and later also taught social
psychology at the University of Illinois. He spent the last 10 years of
his academic career at the University of Massachusetts (Amherst).
Steiner contributed greatly to the research on group performance and
became famous for his classification of group tasks. Depending on
how the individual’s effort contributes to the overall performance of
the group, Steiner distinguished between additive, conjunctive and
disjunctive tasks, each of which are affected differently by process
losses and process gains.

Disjunctive tasks are often differentiated into tasks with or without a so-called
eureka effect, which means that the correct solution, once found, is immediately
recognized as being correct. A eureka effect increases the chances that a group
will realize its potential. However, if the best member in the group is able to
solve the problem, but the group fails to realize the correctness of that member’s
solution (no eureka effect), then the group might still choose a different and
suboptimal option.

- - - - - - - - - -

eureka effect describes the situation when the correct solution to a problem, once it is found, is
immediately recognized as being correct by group members.

- - - - - - - - - -

Conjunctive tasks
Whereas in disjunctive tasks one successful member can be enough to solve the
problem, a conjunctive task requires all group members to be successful for the
group to complete the task. An example is climbing a mountain as part of a
roped team. Suppose that, in order to reach the peak, the climbers have to pass a
difficult overhang. The climbing team will only reach the peak if all members
are successful in passing the overhang. Or, if we use the speed of a climbing
team as a continuous measure of performance, we can say that the group is only
as fast as its slowest member (Figure 13.2). The group potential for conjunctive
tasks is given by the individual performance of the group’s weakest member. As
a consequence, group potential decreases with increasing group size, because the
larger the group becomes, the more likely it is to have a very weak member in
the group.
FIGURE 13.2 This group is only as fast as its slowest member.
Source: © Kapu. Used under licence from Shutterstock.

Hence it can be ineffective to have large groups for conjunctive tasks. This
problem is lessened if the conjunctive task is divisible and specific subtasks can
be matched to group members’ abilities. For example, the climbing party might
decide that for difficult passages it would be useful to have the better members
going ahead, fixing ropes and then helping the weaker members over these
passages. In this case, potential group performance is higher than the individual
performance of the weakest member.
 Summary
To determine group-specific influences on the performance of groups, we have
to establish what performance would have occurred in the absence of group
processes. This is given by the group potential. Determining the group potential
depends on the type of group task. For example, in additive tasks (e.g.
brainstorming), the potential is given by the sum of the members’ performances
in an individual situation. The group potential in a disjunctive task (e.g. problem
solving) is determined by the quality of the best proposal individually generated
by a group member. In a conjunctive task (e.g. mountain climbing), the group
potential is given by the weakest member’s individual performance.
 PROCESS LOSSES VERSUS PROCESS
GAINS IN GROUP PERFORMANCE
What determines whether actual group performance remains
below or surpasses potential group performance, and how does
this vary across different types of task?
 Types of process losses and process gains
Group potential and actual group performance often diverge. This divergence is
due to process losses and process gains, both of which occur due to social
interdependence and social interaction in groups. This is expressed in the
following formula by Hackman and Morris (1975): Actual group performance =
Group potential − process losses + process gains Thus, when actual group
performance is below group potential, process losses must have occurred. If, in
contrast, actual group performance exceeds group potential, process gains must
have been present.
Different types of process losses and process gains can occur. For a group to
perform, its members have to make individual contributions, and these
contributions have to be coordinated. As a result, group processes can affect
performance by influencing either the coordination of individual contributions,
or the individual contributions themselves. With regard to individual
contributions, they depend on how much the person can contribute and how
much the person is motivated to contribute. Hence, group processes can
influence both group members’ ability and motivation to contribute to the group
product. In sum, we have three types of process losses and gains, namely
coordination, motivation and individual capability.

Coordination losses
By definition, coordination in groups can only lead to process losses, not to
process gains. This is due to the fact that, as outlined, group potential is
measured on the basis of an optimal combination of individual contributions.2
Consequently, coordination losses are said to occur if a group fails to
coordinate the contributions of its individual members in an optimal manner. For
example, in his classic investigations of group performance in physical tasks,
Ringelmann (1913) found that the average weight pulled per person when
performing such a task in a group decreases as the size of the group increases –
the so-called Ringelmann effect (see Leader in the Field, Max Ringelmann). An
illustration of one of his findings is shown in Figure 13.3. Later investigations
showed that this process loss is due to both insufficient coordination (members
fail to exert their maximal effort at the same moment) and decreased motivation
(individuals work less hard when they are part of a group) (Ingham, Levinger,
Graves, & Peckham, 1974). An experiment that disentangles coordination losses
and motivation losses is described in Research Close-Up 13.1.
FIGURE 13.3 Average individual weight pulled dependent on the number of
persons pulling together.
Source: Based on data reported in Ringelmann, 1913.

- - - - - - - - - -

coordination losses describe the diminished performance of a group if it fails to coordinate the
contributions of its individual members in an optimal manner.

- - - - - - - - - -

- - - - - - - - - -

Ringelmann effect describes the finding that in physical tasks such as weight pulling, the average
performance of individual group members decreases with increasing group size.

- - - - - - - - - -

Another well-known coordination loss occurs in brainstorming. Osborn (1957)

proposed that brainstorming in a group would lead to the generation of far more
and better ideas than would be obtained if the same people generated ideas
individually. Experiments testing this assumption contain at least two conditions.
In one condition, the participants come together in a group and conduct a
brainstorming session. For example, the task could be to generate as many ideas
as possible concerning ways to protect the environment. The other condition
determines the group potential. This is done in nominal groups. Nominal
groups contain the same number of people as the real groups do; however, each
person is seated in a different room and asked to generate and write down ideas
individually about the topic. The experimenter collects participants’ lists of ideas
and collates them. Ideas that are mentioned by more than one member
(redundant ideas) are only included once, because in a real group the same idea
would also be generated and counted only once.

- - - - - - - - - -

nominal group a number of individuals who perform a task individually and work independently
of each other; nominal groups are used to determine the potential performance of groups.

- - - - - - - - - -

LEADER IN THE FIELD

Max Ringelmann (1861–1931) was professor of agricultural
engineering at the French National Institute of Agronomy. His main
field of research lay in determining the efficiency of work in
agricultural applications. In what may be considered one of the first
experiments in social psychology, he discovered a decrease in
individual performance that occurs when the individual works in a
group rather than alone. He also found that each group member’s
individual contribution to group performance decreases as group size
increases. These findings are referred to as the Ringelmann effect.

In all of these experiments, brainstorming groups hardly ever produced as

many ideas as the nominal groups generated; in most cases they were
significantly below this group potential (for an overview, see Mullen, Johnson,
& Salas, 1991). This deficit is not compensated by increased quality of ideas: on
average, interactive brainstorming groups do not generate better (i.e. more
creative or more practicable) ideas than nominal groups. As Diehl and Stroebe
(1987) have shown in a series of experiments, the most important reason for this
suboptimal performance in interactive brainstorming groups is a form of
coordination loss called production blocking: when people generate ideas in an
interacting group, only one person can express her idea at any given time.
During this time all other members are ‘blocked’ and are unable to express their
own ideas.

- - - - - - - - - -

production blocking a process loss typical of brainstorming tasks in face-to-face groups; since in a
group only one person can speak at a time, the other group members cannot express their own ideas
at the same time.

- - - - - - - - - -

RESEARCH CLOSE-UP 13.1

WHY GROUPS UNDER-PERFORM:

SEPARATING COORDINATION AND
MOTIVATION LOSSES
Latané, B., Williams, K., & Harkins, S. (1979, Experiment 2). Many hands make light the work:
The causes and consequences of social loafing. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
37, 822–832.

Introduction The aim of this study was to replicate

Ringelmann’s findings of process losses in collective
work using a different task, and to demonstrate to
what extent the process losses are due to insufficient
coordination versus motivation losses in groups.
Latané and his colleagues therefore conducted two
experiments with a cheering and hand-clapping task
(see below). In the first experiment, they successfully
replicated the Ringelmann effect by showing that the
more people there were in a group, the less noise was
produced per person. To distinguish between
motivation and coordination, in Experiment 2, which
we examine more closely below, Latané et al. (1979)
used an elegant strategy, namely the introduction of
‘pseudo-groups’. In a pseudo-group, participants are
led to believe they are working in a group when, in
fact, they are working alone. Since no coordination
losses are possible in a pseudo-group, all process
losses found in pseudo-groups must be due to
motivation losses, because individual capability losses
are not possible with this type of task.
Method Participants Thirty-six male students
participated in the experiment, with six participants
per experimental session.
Design and procedure The experimental design was a
within-subjects design with five conditions. Each
participant completed several trials: (1) alone; (2) in
actual two-person groups; (3) in actual six-person
groups; (4) in two-person pseudo-groups; and (5) in
six-person pseudo-groups. The participants’ task was
to shout as loudly as possible when the experimenter
gave a signal. They were blindfolded and wore
headsets on which constant noise was played. This
manipulation ensured that during the pseudo-group
trials participants believed they were shouting with
one or five other people respectively, when in fact
they were shouting alone.
Results The data were analysed with two separate
analyses of variance, one comparing the individual
trials with the actual two-person group and six-person
group trials, the other doing the same for the pseudo-
groups. Both analyses showed that the average noise
produced per person decreased with the increasing
number of people. People shouted less loudly in the
two-person groups than when alone, and they shouted
less loudly in six-person groups than in two-person
groups. This was true for actual groups as well as for
pseudo-groups. However, the decrement in individual
performance was about twice as high in the actual
groups compared with the pseudo-groups (no
statistical comparisons between these conditions were
made). This relationship is illustrated in Figure 13.4.
The decrements in sound intensity between shouting
alone and shouting in a pseudo-group can be traced
back to reduced effort, since there are no differences
in coordination requirements between these
conditions. In contrast, the differences between
pseudo-groups and actual groups can be attributed to
coordination losses in the form of ‘sound
cancellation’, whereby group members do not shout at
 exactly the same time, and hence there is some loss of
maximum sound produced.
FIGURE 13.4 Intensity of sound produced per person when cheering alone
versus in actual or pseudo-groups of two or six people.
Source: Latané et al., 1979, p. 827. Copyright © 1979 by the American
Psychological Association. Adapted with permission. The use of APA
information does not imply endorsement by APA.

Discussion The results confirm the authors’

hypotheses: coordination losses are not the only
source of process losses when people perform a task
in a real group, compared with working individually
 or in a pseudo-group. Instead, reduced effort also
contributes to this effect. Although one might object
on the grounds that there were no direct measures of
motivation and coordination losses, it has to be
conceded that the arrangement of the experimental
setting and conditions hardly leaves room for
alternative explanations of the observed performance
decrements (e.g. cognitive interference among
members is implausible). In sum, the study
successfully demonstrates two causal factors involved
in why groups may fail to realize their full potential:
motivation losses and coordination losses.
We know that brainstorming is an additive task. Coordination losses also
occur, however, in disjunctive or conjunctive tasks. For example, groups often
fail to choose the best among their members’ proposals, even if one member
actually proposes the optimal solution. In a study by Torrance (1954), three-
person groups were given several tasks, one of which was a problem-solving
task with a definite answer. The participants were members of the United States
Air Force; each group consisted of a pilot, a navigator and a gunner. In a military
aircrew, pilots have the highest status, whereas gunners are lowest in status.
Torrance’s results showed that if the pilot had found the correct solution prior to
discussion, the group hardly ever failed to choose this option (only in less than
one out of ten cases). In contrast, when the gunner had found the correct
solution, more than one-third of the groups failed to adopt this solution. Hence,
the group’s choice of one of their members’ proposals was influenced by
member status. Similarly, groups often prefer an incorrect solution proposed by
the majority over a correct solution proposed by a minority (Smith, Tindale, &
Steiner, 1998; see also Chapter 12). In both of these examples the individual
contributions would have allowed the groups to succeed, but successful
coordination among group members (choosing the right proposal) often did not
occur.

Motivation losses and gains

Motivation losses and gains
If actual group performance differs from group potential, this difference can be
due to the fact that the group members’ individual contributions become better
or worse in a group setting compared to an individual situation. One reason for
this is that working in a group can lower or increase people’s motivation to
contribute to task performance (motivation losses and gains). We will consider
both motivation gains and losses, but we start with motivation losses, three of
which have so far been identified in group performance research: - - - - - - - - - -
motivation losses and gains decreases or increases in group members’ motivation to contribute to
group task performance.

- - - - - - - - - -

Social loafing Social loafing occurs if group members reduce their effort
due to the fact that their individual contribution to the group product is not
identifiable (Latané et al., 1979).

- - - - - - - - - -

social loafing a motivation loss in groups that occurs when group members reduce their effort due
to the fact that individual contributions to group performance are not identifiable.

- - - - - - - - - -

Dispensability effect In the case of the dispensability effect, group

members reduce their effort because their individual contribution seems to
have little impact on group performance (Kerr & Bruun, 1983).3

- - - - - - - - - -

dispensability effect a reduction in group members’ task-related effort because their individual
contribution seems to have little impact on group performance.

- - - - - - - - - -
 Sucker effect The sucker effect occurs if group members perceive or
anticipate that other group members lower their effort. To avoid being
exploited (being the ‘sucker’), they reduce their effort themselves (Kerr,
1983).

- - - - - - - - - -

sucker effect a motivation loss in groups that occurs when group members perceive or anticipate
that other group members will lower their effort: to avoid being exploited, they reduce their effort
themselves.

- - - - - - - - - -

Both the extent and type of motivation loss that occurs depend on task type.
Additive tasks (which depend on the sum of individual performances) allow for
all of the above-mentioned losses. For example, some members of the weight-
pulling group could pull less hard because they believe that it is almost
impossible to determine how hard each member has tried to pull (social loafing)
or because they feel that – given the large number of group members – it will
hardly make a difference how hard they pull (dispensability effect). At the same
time, other group members might be aware of such tendencies and so reduce
their effort to avoid being the ‘sucker’. These losses are typically stronger the
larger the group size (Latané et al., 1979). Why is this the case? The larger the
group, the more difficult it is to identify individual contributions, which gives
rise to more social loafing and more suspicion that others will exploit one’s
performance. At the same time, the relative impact of each member’s individual
contribution becomes smaller with increasing group size.
In disjunctive and conjunctive tasks, social loafing is less of a problem,
because individual contributions in these tasks are normally visible: when a
group solves a problem, it is more or less evident who came up with which
proposal; when a climbing team scales a mountain, it is evident who slows down
the group. However, both dispensability and sucker effects can be a problem,
especially if the group contains weaker and stronger members and the members
are aware of these differences.
In a disjunctive task, the group chooses one judgement or proposal: this
awareness particularly pushes weak members towards reducing their effort, since
they know that even if they invest a lot of effort, it is fairly unlikely that their
contribution (e.g. their proposal) will be good enough to be chosen by the group
(i.e. dispensability effect). In contrast, stronger members know that they are
expected to take responsibility for good performance, and so are particularly
prone to feel they are the ‘sucker’.
In conjunctive tasks, in which all group members must successfully complete
the task, the opposite happens: here the stronger members are aware that their
effort is not very important for group performance, because even if they invest
less effort they should be able to perform at the level of the weaker members.
Hence they tend to reduce their effort, which may cause problems if, by
investing more effort, they could help the weaker members to perform better
(Kerr & Bruun, 1983; see Leader in the Field, Norbert Kerr). If conjunctive tasks
are divisible, such problems can be avoided by matching subtasks to members’
abilities. However, since this means that stronger members get more to do than
weaker members, this can also induce sucker effects among the stronger
members, especially if their acceptance of the division of labour is low.

LEADER IN THE FIELD

Norbert Kerr (b. 1948). Norbert Kerr received his MA and his PhD
in Psychology at the University of Illinois. Since 1979 he has
worked at Michigan State University, East Lansing, where he is
currently a Full Professor of Psychology. In addition, he is Honorary
Professor at the University of Kent (UK). His work on group
decision-making and group performance has been highly influential
to the field of group processes. For example, his numerous studies on
jury decision-making have helped to gain insights into social
influence and group dynamics in interacting groups. He has also
discovered and explored basic motivation losses and motivation
gains in groups.
While most social psychological research on group performance has focused
on motivation losses, more recent studies have established three motivation
gains in groups:
Social competition If individual contributions are identifiable, group
members can be more motivated during group performance compared to
individual performance, because they want to outperform other members.
Social competition is particularly likely if group members have relatively
 equal abilities and if they are rewarded for individual effort (Stroebe, Diehl,
& Abakoumkin, 1996).

- - - - - - - - - -

social competition a motivation gain in groups that occurs if the group members want to
outperform each other during group tasks in which the individual contributions are identifiable.

- - - - - - - - - -

Social compensation Social compensation occurs if stronger members

work harder in a group than they would do individually in order to
compensate for a weaker member’s suboptimal performance (Williams &
Karau, 1991).

- - - - - - - - - -

social compensation a motivation gain in groups that occurs if stronger group members increase
their effort in order to compensate for weaker members’ suboptimal performance.

- - - - - - - - - -

Köhler effect The Köhler effect was discovered in the 1920s but remained
largely unrecognized until Witte rediscovered it in 1989. A Köhler effect is
said to occur if weaker members work harder than they would do
individually in order to avoid being responsible for a weak group
performance (Köhler, 1926; Witte, 1989).

- - - - - - - - - -

Köhler effect a motivation gain in groups which involves weaker group members working harder
than they would do individually in order to avoid being responsible for a weak group performance.

- - - - - - - - - -
 As for motivation losses, the occurrence of motivation gains also depends on
the type of task. Social competition can operate within all task types as long as
individual contributions are identifiable and comparable. This is the case for
most disjunctive and conjunctive tasks, but it is often not so in additive tasks.
Hence, social competition is more likely to occur in disjunctive or conjunctive
tasks than in additive tasks. In contrast, social compensation is mainly restricted
to additive tasks, because only in additive tasks can stronger group members
really compensate for another member’s weak performance. Finally, the Köhler
effect predominantly occurs in conjunctive tasks, since in conjunctive tasks
weaker members anticipate that an inferior group performance will be attributed
to them by other group members (Hertel, Kerr, & Messé, 2000). The effect is
strongest if there are moderate discrepancies between group members’
individual capabilities and they are aware of these differences (Messé, Hertel,
Kerr, Lount, & Park, 2002): if individual capabilities are almost equal, it is less
clear who is to blame for an inferior performance. If, however, the discrepancies
are very large, the weaker members have almost no hope of being able to match
the stronger members’ performance.
In sum, within the same task type both motivation gains and motivation losses
can occur. Thus, one of the challenges for group performance research is to find
variables that determine whether gains or losses dominate. One key variable that
has been found so far is the importance of group goals. Social compensation is
particularly likely to occur if the common group goal is highly valued by
members – otherwise motivation losses are more likely. This is well
demonstrated in a series of experiments by Williams and Karau (1991).
Participants performed an idea-generation task and were told that they were
working with a partner (supposedly in another room) who, in fact, did not exist.
The researchers manipulated whether participants expected their partner to show
strong or weak performance, and whether the performance goal (generating as
many ideas as possible) was relevant to them or not. In addition, for half of the
participants, the task was labelled a collective task (i.e. the number of
collectively generated ideas would be counted), while for the other half the task
was co-active (although performed with the other person, the number of
individually generated ideas would be counted).
The results are shown in Figure 13.5. When participants expected to work with
a strongly performing partner, there was no need to compensate. In fact, those
working on the collective task even engaged in a bit of social loafing: their
performance was always below their potential (i.e. less than in the co-active
situation) regardless of task relevance.
FIGURE 13.5 Social loafing and social compensation as a function of task
relevance and partner ability.
Source: From Williams & Karau, 1991, Expt. 3. Copyright © 1991 by the
American Psychological Association. Adapted with permission. The use of APA
information does not imply endorsement by APA.

In contrast, if participants worked with a weakly performing partner, there was

a need to compensate, but only when the task was both relevant (i.e. the outcome
was important to them) and collective (i.e. joint productivity would be
evaluated). In this condition, performance in the collective task was actually
higher than in the co-active task: participants performed beyond their potential.
If, however, the group goal was irrelevant, there was a motivation loss instead of
a motivation gain. When the group goal was irrelevant, however, regardless of
their co-worker’s ability, participants produced fewer ideas in collective
conditions than in co-active conditions. Similar effects can be expected for
disjunctive and conjunctive tasks. For example, a Köhler effect should only
occur if the group goal is important and, thus, the weaker members do not want
to feel responsible for inferior performance.

Losses and gains in individual capability

If group members contribute more or less than they would do in an individual
setting, this can be due to the motivation gains and losses described above.
However, the same effects can be due to the fact that the group setting influences
their ability to make such contributions. Social interaction may have a
detrimental effect on group members’ individual capability, for example by
restricting their attention or offering role models of ineffective strategies.
However, social interaction in a group may also help members to make better
contributions than they might have made individually, for example by other
group members’ providing intellectual stimulation or demonstrating effective
strategies. Surprisingly, such individual capability gains and losses due to
social interaction have so far been almost neglected in group performance
research. As a consequence, compared to coordination and motivation losses or
gains, there is a need for more research in this area.

- - - - - - - - - -

individual capability gains and losses improvements or impairments in individual group

members’ ability to successfully perform a task due to social interaction within the group.

- - - - - - - - - -

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BEYOND THE

LAB 13.1
MOTIVATION GAINS IN THE SWIMMING
POOL
Motivation losses and motivation gains do not only occur in the laboratory.
Recently, Hüffmeier, and Hertel (2011) analysed the swimming
competitions at the 2008 Olympics. They compared data from the semi-
finals of the 100 and 200 metres free-style individual competition, on one
hand, and the four-person relay competition on the other. They showed that
the same swimmers performed better when part of a relay team than when
swimming in the individual competition (Figure 13.6). This was true for all
but the lead-off swimmers in the relay (those who swam the first leg).
 Because neither capability gains nor coordination gains are plausible for this
task (particularly at the level of Olympic competitions), the authors
attributed the increased performance of swimmers on the second, third or
fourth leg of a relay to motivation gains. As the authors had shown in a pilot
study (with competitive swimmers from local sports clubs), perceived
indispensability of one’s own performance for the group increases from the
first to the fourth leg of a relay: in other words, as the race nears its climax,
the impact of each leg of the race is seen as greater. This increasing feeling
of indispensability explains the increase in motivation gains from the first
leg (no motivation gains at all) to the fourth leg (strongest motivation gains
in the relay). In sum, the Hüffmeier and Hertel (2011) study provides an
excellent example of how motivation gains can be shown in real-world
contexts.
FIGURE 13.6 Swimmers perform better when part of a relay than when
swimming in individual competitions.
Source: © Fuse. Used under licence from Getty Images.

Individual capability losses and capability gains can, however, be clearly

illustrated in brainstorming tasks (e.g. Nijstad, Stroebe, & Lodewijkx, 2002). If,
for example, the task is to generate as many ideas as possible for promoting
environmental protection, then hearing an idea from another group member
about reducing traffic can make you focus on ideas for diminishing fuel
consumption, whereas in the individual situation you might also have thought
about sustainable development and other issues. Hence, if you fail to come up
with ideas about sustainable development in the group situation, this is not due
to the fact that you are not trying hard enough (motivation loss); rather, due to
social influence, you simply are not capable of producing these ideas at that
moment. This socially determined capability loss can be termed cognitive
restriction. On the other hand, it is also possible that you would never have
thought about reducing fuel consumption, and it was only after another group
member came up with the idea of reducing traffic that you generated new ideas
on this issue. Again, the reason for the difference between your contribution in
an individual setting and in the group is not motivational: you do not try harder
in the group setting, but stimulation from other group members makes you more
capable of producing diverse ideas. Thus, the corresponding socially determined
capability gain can be termed cognitive stimulation.

- - - - - - - - - -

cognitive restriction a capability loss in group tasks that involve idea generation, which occurs
when an idea mentioned by another group member makes people focus on the particular category
this idea belongs to, at the expense of generating ideas from other categories.

- - - - - - - - - -

- - - - - - - - - -

cognitive stimulation a capability gain in group tasks that involve idea generation, which occurs
when an idea mentioned by another group member stimulates a cognitive category one would
otherwise not have thought of.

- - - - - - - - - -

Since both cognitive restriction and cognitive stimulation effects can occur,
brainstorming in groups can lead either to more uniformity (Ziegler, Diehl, &
Zijlstra, 2000) or to greater variety (Paulus & Yang, 2000) in idea generation.
However, to demonstrate individual capability gains (stimulation), many of the
well-known process losses in brainstorming – particularly production blocking –
have to be eliminated first, otherwise they are so strong that individual capability
gains are totally submerged. Such process losses can be eliminated, for example,
by using computer-mediated communication (Dennis & Valacich, 1993): instead
of brainstorming in face-to-face interaction, group members are linked together
via a ‘chat’ system (Figure 13.7). Since each member is free to type in ideas at
the same time as other members, production blocking cannot occur and, hence,
there are better conditions for cognitive stimulation.
FIGURE 13.7 Computer-mediated communication allows group members to
brainstorm electronically.
Source: © Dmitriy Shironosov. Used under licence from Shutterstock.

For an overview of the different process losses and process gains discussed in
this chapter, see Table 13.2.
Table 13.2 Overview of process losses and process gains in group performance that have been documented
in research so far.
Level of Process losses Process gains
process
Coordination Coordination part of the –
Ringelmann effect Production
blocking
Motivation Social loafing Dispensability effect Social compensation Social
Sucker effect competition Köhler effect
Individual Cognitive restriction Cognitive stimulation
Individual Cognitive restriction Cognitive stimulation
capability
 Summary
If group performance is below group potential, process losses have occurred. If,
instead, group performance exceeds group potential, then process gains have
taken place. Process losses and gains are possible at three different theoretical
levels: motivation, individual capability and coordination. Three types of
motivation loss (social loafing, dispensability effect and the sucker effect) and
three types of motivation gain (social competition, social compensation and the
Köhler effect) have been shown so far. Far less frequently, research has
demonstrated that individual capabilities can be restricted (capability loss) as
well as stimulated (capability gain) in a group. With regard to coordination,
studies have focused almost exclusively on coordination losses so far, due to the
fact that group potential is usually defined in terms of the optimal combination
of group members’ individual efforts.
GROUP PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT
How can process losses be minimized and process gains be
maximized?
 Three basic principles of group performance
management
Over the last century, social psychological research on group performance has
provided impressive evidence for process losses, but far less evidence for
process gains. This might suggest that negative aspects dominate when people
work together in a group. In our view this conclusion is unjustified. Social
psychological experiments on group performance predominantly use randomly
composed ad hoc groups, with no further means or techniques of support
accompanying the group process. Furthermore, experiments are usually
restricted to one, or in some cases two, task trials. While these restrictions are
useful for certain types of research questions (and can be justified on pragmatic
grounds), they systematically disadvantage groups in the evaluation of group
performance. If you are comparing a car with a unicycle on speed or safety
criteria, you would hardly use a car that had four randomly composed wheels
with no means to synchronize them. In addition, you would hardly restrict your
comparison to the first 10 meters. Unfortunately, this is analogous to what
usually happens in group performance research.
Gaining insight into factors that put groups at a disadvantage is not only
interesting for research purposes (e.g. to develop new research programmes on
group performance), it also provides a key to solving the problem of how to
optimize group performance. If group performance is underestimated because no
systematic group composition and support of group functioning take place, and
because the time frame is too limited, then systematically optimizing these
aspects should provide a promising way to optimize group performance. Schulz-
Hardt, Hertel, and Brodbeck (2007) proposed the term group performance
management to refer to the sum of activities aimed at improving the group-
specific component of group performance (i.e. maximizing process gains and
minimizing process losses). They proposed three basic underlying principles: - -
- - - - - - - -
group composition specifies how certain characteristics are distributed within a group.

- - - - - - - - - -

- - - - - - - - - -
 group performance management the sum of activities aimed at maximizing (or improving) the
group-specific component of group performance.

- - - - - - - - - -

Groups should be composed according to the requirements of task structure.

Group processes during performance should be specifically synchronized in
accordance with the task structure.
Groups should be given the opportunity to perform multiple similar tasks to
allow for group learning to occur.
In the following sections we explain briefly each of the three principles and
give examples of how they can be applied to specific group tasks.

Group composition
Group performance depends on the kind of people who are brought together in a
group. This is true in a trivial sense, in that the more capable group members are
of performing the task, the better the group will perform in general. It is,
however, also true in a non-trivial sense, in that certain group compositions
make it more likely than others that a group will fully realize or even surpass its
potential, thereby realizing process gains.
To illustrate this principle, we take a look at an important task in group
decision-making research, the hidden profile task. Consider the following
situation. A personnel selection committee consisting of group members X, Y
and Z has to decide which of the two candidates, A and B, should be chosen for
a sales management position. The information about the candidates (advantages
and disadvantages) and the way it is distributed among the committee is
illustrated in Table 13.3.
Table 13.3 Information distribution in a hidden profile task.
 - - - - - - - - - -

hidden profile a group decision situation in which information is distributed among group
members such that no individual group member can detect the best solution based on his or her own
information.

- - - - - - - - - -

If the full information (the ‘whole group’ column in Table 13.3) is considered,
candidate A is the better choice, with three advantages and two disadvantages,
compared to candidate B (two advantages, three disadvantages). However, as
becomes apparent from the first three columns, none of the committee members
individually possesses this full information set. The advantages of candidate B,
as well as the disadvantages of candidate A, are held by all group members prior
to discussion; they are termed shared information. In contrast, each disadvantage
of candidate B, as well as each advantage of candidate A, is held by only one
group member; these items are termed unshared information. Due to this
distribution, none of the group members can detect that A is the better choice
prior to discussion – it is ‘hidden’ from the group members, which is why this
situation is called a hidden profile. This task is particularly important for group
decision-making research, because it constitutes the prototype of situations in
which groups can make better decisions than individual members can.
If, in contrast, the committee in our example had individual information that is
representative of the overall information and so had already suggested candidate
A to be the best choice (in which case it is called a manifest profile), making the
decision in a group could hardly reveal that groups made better-quality decisions
than individuals. Thus, although we do not know how often hidden profiles
occur in reality (and it is impossible to determine this, because doing so would
require us to have access to all relevant cognitions in the minds of the members
of decision-making groups), we have to study hidden-profile situations if we
want to achieve process gains in group decision-making. Recent simulations by
Schultze, Faulmüller, Schmidt-Hieber, and Schulz-Hardt (2012) show that
hidden profiles should occur far less frequently than manifest profiles. However,
depending on factors such as the number of decision alternatives, the relative
strength of decision alternatives, and the number of group members, up to 25 per
cent of all decision situations can involve hidden profiles.
Unfortunately, research has shown that most groups fail to solve hidden
profiles (Stasser & Birchmeier, 2003). As Brodbeck, Kerschreiter, Mojzisch, and
Schulz-Hardt (2007), as well as Mojzisch and Schulz-Hardt (2006), have
outlined, this failure is caused by three different processes, summarized in
Theory Box 13.1. To date, there is no solid evidence to indicate whether these
processes constitute coordination losses, motivation losses or individual
capability losses, so we do not categorize them as such.
Negotiation focus Groups tend to negotiate the decision on the basis of their
members’ pre-discussion preferences rather than openly exchanging the
relevant information (Gigone & Hastie, 1993). Because no member
individually can detect the best alternative in a hidden profile prior to
discussion, pre-discussion preferences are usually in favour of suboptimal
alternatives (in our example, candidate B). Thus, one of the suboptimal
alternatives is chosen by the group (see also Mojzisch & Schulz-Hardt,
2010).

THEORY BOX 13.1

EXPLANATIONS FOR THE FAILURE OF
GROUPS TO DISCOVER HIDDEN PROFILES
Source: Adapted from Brodbeck et al., 2007, and Mojzisch & Schulz-Hardt,
2006.

Discussion bias Even if the relevant information is exchanged in the group

and, hence, a negotiation focus is avoided, this discussion is typically
biased. Groups spend more time discussing shared than unshared
information (Larson, Foster-Fishman, & Keys, 1994), because shared
information can be introduced by more members than unshared
information. Furthermore, group members predominantly introduce or
repeat information that is consistent with their initial preferences (Dennis,
1996; Schulz-Hardt, Brodbeck, Mojzisch, Kerschreiter, & Frey, 2006),
which can be due to a perceived ‘advocacy role’ (Stasser & Titus, 1985) –
that is, group members believe that their primary task in a discussion is to
explain why they prefer a particular alternative. However, most of the
critical information for solving the hidden profile is both unshared and
inconsistent with the members’ initial preferences (in our example, the
advantages of candidate A and the disadvantages of candidate B). As a
consequence, the group does not exchange enough of this critical
information to detect the best alternative.
Evaluation bias The evaluation, and not just the discussion, of information
in the group is also biased in favour of information that is shared and
information that is consistent with one’s preferences (Mojzisch, Grouneva,
& Schulz-Hardt, 2010). Group members judge shared information to be
more credible and valid than unshared information, because each member
individually held the shared information prior to discussion (Chernyshenko,
Miner, Baumann, & Sniezek, 2003) – thus, one can be relatively sure that
this information is correct – and because all group members can attest to the
 validity of the shared information (social validation, cf. Wittenbaum,
Hubbell, & Zuckerman, 1999). Furthermore, they judge information that is
consistent with their preferences to be more credible and important than
information that is inconsistent with their preferences (Greitemeyer &
Schulz-Hardt, 2003), because information that is consistent with one’s
preferences is accepted at face value, whereas information that is
inconsistent with preferences is critically tested. As a consequence, even if
all information is exchanged in the group, group members often undervalue
the critical information and, thus, fail to detect the best alternative to choose
(Greitemeyer & Schulz-Hardt, 2003; Mojzisch, Schulz-Hardt, Kerschreiter,
Brodbeck, & Frey, 2008).
This description makes clear that in a hidden profile the group members’
individual preferences, as well as their shared knowledge, imply the choice of
suboptimal alternatives. This also negatively affects the solution of hidden
profiles, and on three different theoretical levels: consensus seeking, information
exchange and information evaluation.
As recent studies have demonstrated, these processes – and thus, the chances
of groups solving hidden profiles – depend substantially on a particular aspect of
group composition, namely, agreement versus disagreement in group members’
individual pre-discussion preferences (see Brodbeck, Kerschreiter, Mojzisch,
Frey, & Schulz-Hardt, 2002; Schulz-Hardt et al., 2006). The bottom line of these
studies is that having a group in which members favour different alternatives
prior to discussion leads to a more intensive and less biased information
exchange. In consequence, it becomes more likely that a hidden profile is solved
(as compared to groups where members agree on a particular suboptimal
alternative right from the beginning). This facilitative effect of pre-discussion
disagreement, or dissent, even occurred if none of the dissenting opinions were
correct. A brief description of the Schulz-Hardt et al. (2006) study is given in
Research Close-Up 13.2.

RESEARCH CLOSE-UP 13.2

PRODUCTIVE CONFLICT IN GROUP

DECISION-MAKING
Schulz-Hardt, S., Brodbeck, F. C., Mojzisch, A., Kerschreiter, R., & Frey, D. (2006). Group
 decision making in hidden profile situations: Dissent as a facilitator for decision quality. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 91, 1080–1093.

Introduction The idea of this study was that a

conflict of initial opinions should help a group to
solve hidden profiles, because this pre-discussion
dissent should make it less likely that group members
will prematurely agree on a suboptimal alternative,
and dissent should both intensify and de-bias
discussion. In order to resolve the initial conflict,
more information should be exchanged compared to
groups with initial consensus. Furthermore, as we
know from research on minority influence (see
Chapter 8), particularly dissenting minority opinions
can lead to more open-mindedness and, hence, might
allow for a less biased group discussion. To test these
hypotheses, the authors conducted a laboratory
experiment in which groups with all members
favouring the same alternative prior to discussion
(consent groups) were compared with different types
of dissent groups.
Method Participants Four hundred and five female
and male students comprised the final sample for this
experiment, forming 135 three-person groups.
Design and procedure The experiment had a one-
factor design, with six conditions: (1) in a manifest
profile control condition, all group members received
the full information from the beginning. In the other
 conditions, information was distributed in a hidden-
profile-manner. (2) The homogeneity condition
consisted of groups where all three members initially
favoured the same suboptimal alternative. (3) In the
minority dissent incorrect condition4, two members
preferred the same suboptimal alternative, and the
third one favoured a different suboptimal alternative.
(4) In the full diversity dissent incorrect condition, all
members favoured different suboptimal alternatives at
the beginning. (5) The minority dissent correct
condition was equal to the minority dissent incorrect
condition, except that the minority member favoured
the correct solution right from the beginning. (6) The
full diversity dissent correct condition was similar to
condition (4), except that one of the members
favoured the correct solution right from the beginning.
The participants were first given individual information about a decision
case where four candidates were applying for a vacant pilot position at an
airline company. Based on the full information, one candidate was clearly
superior to the others. However, in the hidden profile conditions this
candidate initially seemed slightly inferior to the other three. Participants
indicated their individual preferences and, based on these preferences, three-
person groups of the above-mentioned compositions were formed.
Participants discussed the decision case in their groups and made a
collective decision regarding the chosen candidate. A reward bonus was
offered to those who made the correct final choice. Discussions were
videotaped and subsequently coded with regard to what pieces of
information were mentioned or repeated by which of the group members.
Results Groups with a hidden profile distribution of
 information made the correct choice far less often
than groups with full information. However, solution
rates were increased by dissent: whereas
homogeneous groups hardly ever made the correct
choice (only 7 per cent of the time), about a quarter of
the groups with pure dissent (conditions 3 and 4)
chose the right candidate. If one of the dissenting
opinions was in favour of the right solution (the
‘correct’ conditions 5 and 6), solution rates further
increased to more than 60 per cent. These findings are
illustrated in Figure 13.8. Analyses of the content of
the group discussions showed that the beneficial
effects of dissent were caused by dissent groups
having a more intensive discussion (i.e. more
information exchange, more discussion time) and
exchanging information in a more balanced manner
(i.e. more consideration of unshared information and
information that was inconsistent with group
members’ preferences) than was the case in
homogeneous groups.
FIGURE 13.8 Proportion of correct solutions dependent on dissent (MP =
manifest profile; HP = hidden profile).
Source: Schulz-Hardt et al. (2006). Copyright © 2006 by the American
Psychological Association. Adapted with permission. The use of APA
information does not imply endorsement by APA.
 Discussion The findings support the authors’
hypotheses that conflict can yield benefits for group
decision making: even if all members individually
prefer suboptimal alternatives at the beginning of the
task, the group may find a superior alternative (and
thereby realize process gains) if dissent among these
individual preferences leads to a controversial
discussion in the group. Hence, when forming groups
that are aimed at making high-quality decisions, we
should ensure that they consist of members with
different opinions about the issue at hand: the more
variety of opinions we can create within a group, the
more likely it is that dissenting opinions will be
voiced, and the more likely it is that the group will
contain at least one member who proposes the correct
solution.
Whereas composing groups with pre-discussion dissent facilitates performance
in decision-making tasks, other tasks require other methods of group
composition. For example, in a conjunctive task such as mountain climbing (all
group members must successfully complete the task), it should facilitate group
performance to have groups with moderate discrepancies among members’
abilities, because this increases the likelihood of motivation gains among the
weaker members (Messé et al., 2002) – and the weakest member determines
group performance in a conjunctive task. So, if you had four climbers and had to
split them into two two-person teams, teams of mixed ability should give better
performance than teams of similar ability, in terms of facilitating process gains.
Generally, whenever there is freedom to compose groups for particular tasks, the
type of task should first be classified, and then a group composition chosen that
will counteract process losses and facilitate process gains for this task type.

Group synchronization
Working together in a group requires generating or modifying individual
contributions (e.g. physical effort, thoughts and ideas) collaboratively and
integrating these different individual contributions in a way that is functional for
high performance. For many tasks, we do not ‘naturally’ know how to do this, or
might even hold misleading preconceptions. For instance, for many people
making a group decision means that everybody offers his or her preferred
solution and states the arguments in its favour, and finally the group chooses the
solution with the most convincing arguments. As we have seen above, a group
will hardly ever solve a hidden profile in this way.
Hence, just as a vehicle with four wheels needs a differential in the axle to
enable it to drive around corners (because the inner wheels have to turn more
slowly than the outer wheels), groups need synchronization to perform well. By
group synchronization we mean the sum of activities aimed at optimizing the
collaborative generation, modification and integration of individual contributions
in a group. Means of promoting group synchronization can vary from very
simple tools (e.g. feedback about members’ individual contributions) to rather
complex procedures (e.g. group decision-making techniques).

- - - - - - - - - -

group synchronization the sum of activities aimed at optimizing the collaborative generation,
modification and integration of individual contributions in a group.

- - - - - - - - - -
 As in the case of group composition, optimal synchronization depends on the
type of task at hand. However, some means of group synchronization can be
applied across a wide range of group tasks. One of these is the continuous
visibility of individual contributions. In a physical task such as pulling a weight,
this can simply mean providing group members with feedback about their own
as well as other group members’ individual performance. In a cognitive task
such as brainstorming or making a group decision based on distributed
information, this can take the form of documenting group members’ ideas and
informational input on a flipchart or, as often used for these and other purposes,
on an information board during computer-mediated group communication. In all
cases, such permanent visibility of individual contributions counteracts
motivation losses like social loafing or sucker effects, and facilitates motivation
gains due to social competition or Köhler effects (DeShon, Kozlowski, Schmidt,
Milner, & Wiechmann, 2004; Hoeksema-Van Orden, Gaillard, & Buunk, 1998).
This visibility also facilitates coordination within the group, for instance by
making it easier to identify the best proposal in a disjunctive task (Henry,
Strickland, Yorges, & Ladd, 1996) or by helping group members to match their
own contributions to the contributions of other group members.
In contrast, some methods of group synchronization are unique for specific
tasks such as group decision-making. As already outlined, our ‘normal’
preconceptions about how to make a decision in a group run counter to the way
in which high-quality group decisions are actually made. Therefore, it can be
useful to ‘guide’ group discussion on a decision problem by means of specific
techniques. Some of these techniques are rather simple, such as dividing the
decision-making process into phases, such as an information collection phase
and a subsequent information evaluation/decision-making phase. Even such
simple guidance for the discussion process facilitates the solution of hidden
profiles (Mojzisch & Schulz-Hardt, 2010). Other techniques are more complex.
For example, so-called dialectical techniques (i.e. techniques that formally
implement debate in a group) make sure that a controversial discussion takes
place, even if the group members’ real opinions converge. Usually, this is
achieved by dividing a decision-making group into two subgroups that are given
different roles. For example, in the case of the ‘devil’s advocacy’ procedure, a
particular group member or a subgroup plays the role of the devil’s advocate by
criticizing all proposals made by the rest of the group. Another example is a
technique called ‘dialectical inquiry’: in the case of this technique, the subgroup
from the previous example not only criticizes the proposal, but also comes up
with a counterproposal. Such dialectical techniques facilitate stimulation by
including arguments or information that hardly anyone in the group would have
mentioned if group members had, as they usually do, acted on their own
preferences. Indeed, these techniques also raise the quality of group decisions
(see Katzenstein, 1996).

Group learning
The use of groups for a particular task is an investment, and the return on this
investment often takes time to be realized. At the beginning, groups have
considerable costs, for example coordination losses due to the fact that group
members are not used to working together on this particular task, or the effort of
synchronizing the group adequately. If the group gains experience with the task
over time, these costs should decrease and the chance of process gains should
increase. Of course, individuals also increase their own performance if they
repeatedly perform similar tasks. However, repeatedly performing similar tasks
in a group allows for further learning processes (group learning) that cannot
occur if people perform individually.

- - - - - - - - - -

group learning a generic term for several learning processes that can only occur if several people
work interactively on the same task.

- - - - - - - - - -

Brodbeck and Greitemeyer (2000a, b) distinguish between four different types

of learning processes in groups, of which the first also occurs in individual
learning settings, whereas the other three processes are bound to social
interactions with other people:
1. Individual-to-individual transfer. This process denotes individual practice
effects or the transfer of what an individual has learned about how to perform a
task on one occasion from that occasion to the next. If individuals perform
similar tasks again and again (either alone or in a group), their skills improve,
and individual learning takes place, which is also beneficial for the group. For
example, the performance of a group of climbers may increase simply because
their members improve their skills by means of individual training.

- - - - - - - - - -

individual-to-individual transfer individual learning processes whereby a group member’s ability

to perform a task on its own improves as a result of repeated individual task performance.

- - - - - - - - - -

2. Group-to-individual transfer. This type of transfer occurs if social

interaction in a group improves its members’ skills at performing the task
individually (Laughlin & Sweeney, 1977). In the climbing example mentioned
above, group members may become better individual climbers because, during a
group climb, other group members have shown them how to better identify grips
and holes in the rock. Obviously, group-to-individual transfer is more likely
when there are more opportunities to demonstrate the relevant skills and
strategies.

- - - - - - - - - -

group-to-individual transfer a group learning process whereby a group member’s ability to

perform a task alone improves as a result of social interaction between group members during
repeated collective task performance.

- - - - - - - - - -

3. Group-to-individual-in-group transfer. This process means that performing

tasks together in a group can improve group-specific skills among their
members. For example, climbing together might improve the group members’
abilities to notice and correct other members’ technical faults while climbing
difficult overhangs. Hence, this type of transfer can only be applied in group
settings, not during individual task performance.

- - - - - - - - - -
 group-to-individual-in-group transfer a group learning process whereby a group member’s
ability to perform a task within groups improves as a result of social interaction between group
members during repeated collective task performance.

- - - - - - - - - -

4. Group-to-group transfer. In contrast to group-to-individual transfer, group-

to-group transfer means that performing a similar task several times together in
the same group can improve its members’ skills at performing well in this
particular group (Figure 13.9). For example, by repeatedly climbing together as
a group, our climbers might learn about the particular strengths and weaknesses
of the members of this particular group. This might enable them to determine
who should be the lead climber, who should help the weaker members during
difficult passages, and so on. Such a shared knowledge of each other’s expertise,
strengths and weaknesses is also called transactive memory (Wegner, 1987; see
Chapter 12).
FIGURE 13.9 A Formula 1 team of mechanics completing a fast tyre change
during the race.
Source: © David Madison. Used under licence from Getty Images.

- - - - - - - - - -

group-to-group transfer a group learning process whereby a particular group’s capability to

perform a group task improves as result of social interaction between its group members during
repeated collective task performance.
 - - - - - - - - - -

Brodbeck and Greitemeyer (2000a, b) conducted experiments with so-called

rule induction tasks (these are tasks where certain rules have to be found by
systematically formulating and testing hypotheses). They provided solid
evidence that, as a consequence of these four types of group learning, groups
increase their potential, reduce process losses and increase the likelihood of
developing process gains. Hence, facilitating group learning by having groups
repeatedly perform a similar task can be an effective way to improve group
performance.
So far, these group learning processes suggest that group learning facilitates
individual capability gains (group-to-individual transfer) as well as improved
group coordination (group-to-individual-in-group transfer; group-to-group
transfer). It is, however, plausible that the reduction of motivation losses and the
development of motivation gains can also be ‘learned’ in groups. If the same
group repeatedly performs similar tasks, group members become more familiar
with each other and develop interpersonal trust. Interpersonal trust facilitates the
pursuit of collective instead of individual goals (Dirks, 1999). As a consequence,
group members should be less prone to social loafing or sucker effects, and
should be more likely to show social compensation. Indirect evidence for this
comes from a study by Erez and Somech (1996) showing that hardly any social
loafing occurs in groups whose members have known each other for at least six
months.
 Summary
In sum, our consideration of group performance and group learning has shown
that effective group performance management requires an analysis of the task
structure, followed by careful group composition and choice of adequate
synchronization measures. Furthermore, group learning should be facilitated by
using the same group for a range of structurally similar tasks. As we have
illustrated, these three basic principles affect all three categories of process
losses and process gains by optimizing group coordination, as well as
stimulating individual motivation and capabilities during collective work.
Theory Box 13.2 summarizes these effects.
So far we have investigated basic aspects of group performance, namely task
types, group process gains and losses, and principles for the management of
group performance, without referring to the structure of natural groups at work
(such as work groups within organizations). We therefore turn next to a
fundamental process for structuring group activity: leadership.

THEORY BOX 13.2

THE THREE BASIC ELEMENTS OF GROUP
PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT AS
AFFECTING ALL THREE LEVELS OF
PERFORMANCE-RELATED GROUP
PROCESSES
Source: Adapted from Schulz-Hardt, Hertel, & Brodbeck, 2007.
 LEADERSHIP
What makes leadership effective?
Leadership is about influencing others. This admittedly very short and broad
definition is the only common denominator of the many definitions that exist in
the leadership literature (e.g. Bass, 2008; Yukl, 2012). We define leadership in
accordance with researchers from Project GLOBE, an international research
programme of some 170 scholars from more than 60 different countries, who
study leadership across cultures (Chhokar, Brodbeck, & House, 2007; House,
Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004). GLOBE researchers have
developed a definition of leadership that specifies what is meant by ‘influencing’
others within organizational settings: leadership (in organizations) means
influencing, motivating or enabling others to contribute towards the
effectiveness of work units and organizations.

- - - - - - - - - -

leadership (in organizations) influencing, motivating or enabling others to contribute towards the
effectiveness of work units and organizations.

- - - - - - - - - -

The central questions that have received and continue to receive attention in
leadership research are: How can we identify effective leaders? What makes
leaders effective? How do leaders influence others? How are leaders perceived
by others? How do leaders emerge and develop? Therefore, most leadership
research focuses on at least one of the following criteria of leadership
effectiveness: (1) the impact of leadership on the accomplishment of group and
organizational objectives (e.g. high-quality decisions, solutions to problems); (2)
the extent of influence on followers that can be exerted via leadership (e.g.
change in behaviour, attitudes, values, motivation, well-being); (3) the
perception of a person as a leader in the ‘eye of the beholder’; and (4) the
emergence of a person as a leader and how quickly leaders are promoted to
higher ranks in an organization. Here we focus on a specific question: how can
leadership help to improve group performance? This question relates mainly to
the first two classes of criteria of leadership effectiveness – that is,
accomplishing objectives, and influencing followers.

- - - - - - - - - -

leadership effectiveness the impact of leadership on the accomplishment of group and

organizational objectives, on the behaviour, perceptions, attitudes, values, motivation or well-being
of followers and peers, and on the accomplishments of those who lead.

- - - - - - - - - -

In this section we describe approaches to the study of leadership that cover

major developments in the history of leadership research. For reasons of space,
only a small selection of theories and research can be described. For broader
coverage, see Pierce and Newstrom (2002), and for comprehensive reviews see
Bass (2008) and Yukl (2012). Thereafter, we develop a group performance
perspective on leadership that integrates the research on group functioning
described in the first part of this chapter with findings from leadership research.
 Approaches to the study of leadership
The systematic study of leadership has been dominated by leader-oriented
approaches, many of which were developed in the first half of the twentieth
century. They focus on personality characteristics and behaviours of leaders, in
order to distinguish leaders from non-leaders and to identify effective leaders in
organizations. From about the 1960s, contingency approaches were developed,
which incorporate relevant situational factors (e.g. characteristics of the
organization, the task or the followers) for predicting the success of certain
leader characteristics and leadership behaviours. The latest developments in
leadership research emphasize the nature and dynamics of leader–follower
relationships (e.g. transformational–transactional leadership), as well as shared
leadership within work groups. For effective leadership in groups there is
something to learn from all the approaches described here.

Leader-oriented approaches
The view of the leader as a ‘hero’ or a ‘great person’ has dominated leadership
research for a long time, and thus the study of leadership has mainly been the
study of leaders, that is, their characteristics, skills and behaviours on one hand,
and their effects on followers, groups and organizations, on the other.
Leader traits. Since the pioneering systematic studies of leadership in the first
half of the last century, a major proportion of research has focused on stable
leader traits (e.g. personality, intelligence, motivational dispositions), on the
basis of which leader emergence and leadership effectiveness may be predicted,
following the idea that ‘a leader is born, not made’ (Figure 13.10). Today,
relatively small but consistent correlations between effective or emergent leaders
and the ‘big five’ personality characteristics are reported (Judge, Bono, Ilies, &
Gerhardt, 2002). For example, leaders are more likely to be effective if they
score high on extraversion (r = .31), openness to experience (r = .24), and
conscientiousness (r = .28), and low on neuroticism (r = −.24). The correlation
in the case of the fifth personality dimension, agreeableness, is much lower (r =
.08), but it still differs reliably from zero. Research has also found a positive
correlation between intelligence and leader effectiveness (r = .27; Judge, Colbert
& Ilies, 2004).
FIGURE 13.10(a) and (b) What stable traits are characteristic of leaders?
Source: (a) © Christoph Wilhelm. Used under licence from Getty Images; (b) ©
Paul Sakuma, File. Used under licence from Press Association Images.

- - - - - - - - - -

leader traits relatively stable personal characteristics (e.g. personality, intelligence, motivational
dispositions) which are thought to predict leader emergence and leadership effectiveness.

- - - - - - - - - -

Only a few empirical studies have rigorously tested the assumption that
personality traits have a causal impact on leader effectiveness or the emergence
of an individual as a leader in an organization. Most studies on this issue have
used a cross-sectional design, in which measures of leader personality and
performance are taken at about the same point in time. This design is limited,
because it cannot test directional causal assumptions. With such correlational
designs, the possibility remains that the commonly implied causal relationship
(i.e. that personality has an influence on leadership success) may work the other
way around. Individuals who find themselves in leadership positions more often
than others, by being pushed into them by chance, or because of their technical
expertise (at school, in higher education, at work), may learn and develop the
sets of skills, attitudes and behaviours necessary to succeed – or just to maintain
their leadership position. By trying to satisfy respective role expectations and
social norms typically applied to leaders, individuals are likely to develop or
show those personal characteristics that match expectations.
 A general critique of leader-trait approaches is that they do not explain in
sufficient detail how the link between personal characteristics and leadership
success is established: what are the variables that mediate this relationship?
Leadership behaviour. The search for variables that can predict leadership
success better than personality traits shifted the focus of interest towards what
leaders actually do – leadership behaviour. During the late 1940s, two research
programmes in the US began to work in this area independently of each other
and have shaped our understanding of leadership behaviour up to the present
day. One was established at Ohio State University, the other at the University of
Michigan. The two programmes identified a large number of leadership
behaviours and grouped these into partially overlapping categorization schemes,
both of which point out the difference between task-focused versus people-
focused leadership behaviours.

- - - - - - - - - -

leadership behaviour observable acts that are meant to influence, motivate or enable others to
contribute towards the effectiveness of a work unit or organization.

- - - - - - - - - -

INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 13.1

You can assess your own personality using the ‘big five’ personality
dimensions by completing a 45-item questionnaire (an abbreviated version
of the original questionnaire, cf. McCrae & Costa, 1987). You can complete
this test, easily and at no cost, on the ‘Big Five Personality Test’ website.
Your scores on each dimensions are calculated automatically and you
receive feedback and learn more about the five fundamental dimensions of
personality whose relevance to leadership effectiveness is described above.
The Ohio Group, while focusing on the leader as the main source of leadership
behaviour, sought to classify relevant leadership aspects by assembling about
1800 leader behaviour descriptions, which were subsequently reduced to about
150 items. A preliminary questionnaire was administered to thousands of
employees in civic and military organizations, who indicated the extent to which
their supervisors displayed these behaviours. The final questionnaire, called the
Leader Behaviour Description Questionnaire (LBDQ), is a hallmark in the
history of leadership research. By using factor-analytic methods to analyse
patterns of relationships among all the LBDQ items, two independent
dimensions emerged: initiating structure (i.e. task-oriented behaviours) and
consideration (i.e. people-oriented behaviours).
Judge, Piccolo, and Ilies (2004) conducted a meta-analysis of 200 studies, with
300 samples. They found that both consideration (r = .49) and initiating structure
(r = .29) have moderately strong correlations with leadership outcomes.
Consideration was more strongly related to leader effectiveness (r = .39),
followers’ motivation (r = .40), satisfaction with leaders (r = .68) and job
satisfaction (r = .40) than was initiating structure (r = .28, r = .26, r = .27, r =
.19, respectively), and both were equally strongly (r = .23) related to
group/organizational performance (see Judge, Piccolo et al., 2004, p. 40, Table
3). The literature published prior to this meta-analysis indicated that initiating
structure is more susceptible to situational differences than is consideration; for
example, in some situations task orientation is positively associated with
satisfaction, while in others it even has negative effects (cf. Pierce & Newstrom,
2002). This may explain why in the meta-analysis reported above, where
correlations were sampled across a whole range of different situations,
correlations were weaker for initiating structure than for consideration.
The Michigan group characterized the four overall dimensions of leadership
behaviour they identified – interaction facilitation, work facilitation, goal
emphasis and individual support – as the ‘basic structure of what one may term
leadership’ (Bowers & Seashore, 1966, p. 247). Their understanding of
‘leadership’ provides the foundation for a leadership perspective that differs
considerably from leader-oriented approaches. While the Ohio group’s research
clearly focused on the individual (formal) leader, as was described above, the
Michigan group stated that effective work groups require the presence of each of
the four classes of behaviours they identified, but that anyone in a group can
provide them successfully. These behaviours need not all be shown by the same
(formal) leader, as long as they are present in the work group to a sufficient
extent. Because this view is of particular interest to this chapter’s focus on group
performance, we elaborate on it later in this section.
Cross-sectional designs are also commonly used for the empirical study of
leadership behaviour, although such designs do not allow us to make causal
inferences about the direction of relationship between leadership behaviour and
leadership success. Again, the true causal pathways may go in the opposite
direction. For example, leaders may show more consideration behaviour,
because followers are already motivated and high-performing (Greene, 1975).
Another threat to the correct interpretation of results from cross-sectional studies
is the ‘third variable problem’. For example, mutual sympathy between leader
and followers, due to a match in personal values or socio-cultural backgrounds,
may have a similar positive impact on both leader behaviour and follower
behaviour. Equally, mutual trust can lead to more consideration on the leader’s
part and to higher performance on the follower’s part. Thus, an apparent
correlation between consideration on the part of leaders and high performance
on the part of followers can be caused by a third variable (mutual sympathy or
mutual trust) that makes leader behaviour and follower performance appear to
be directly linked with each other, when in fact they are not.
Problems with correctly interpreting results from cross-sectional studies are
aggravated when relying on followers’ self-report measures for leader
behaviours (as occurs, for example, in the LBDQ) in conjunction with followers’
perceptions of leadership effectiveness (e.g. their motivation, satisfaction with
the leader or job satisfaction). In the worst case all these variables are assessed
by asking the same followers (common source effect) and by using the same
questionnaire as measurement instrument (common method effect). Under these
circumstances, the strength of the relationship between leader behaviour and
leader effectiveness is likely to be overestimated.

Contingency approaches
Leader-oriented approaches which focus solely on leaders’ traits and behaviours
have a tendency to look for simple answers to complex problems. They can
account for only a limited proportion of the variance in leadership effectiveness,
because the effects of leader traits and behaviours are likely to average out
across different situations that may require different types of leaders or different
leader behaviours. Contingency approaches emphasize the role of situational
factors and how these qualify, or moderate, the relationship between leadership
traits or behaviours and leadership effectiveness. These situational factors
include task characteristics (e.g. task structure, task complexity), followers’
characteristics (e.g. their level of motivation, competencies, maturity) and
characteristics of the social context (e.g. quality of social relationships, group
cohesion, group size).
 - - - - - - - - - -

contingency approaches emphasize situational factors in the study of leadership (e.g. task or
follower characteristics) and how these moderate the relationship between leader traits or
leadership behaviours and leadership effectiveness.

- - - - - - - - - -

Many contingency theories have been proposed, each of which stresses the
importance of a particular array of situational factors and different leadership
characteristics (for reviews, see Bass, 2008; Yukl, 2012). One message
contained in all contingency approaches is that leaders must be able to
recognize, adapt to or change different situational circumstances, otherwise they
may lose their influence on followers. To date, there is no unified theory from
which we can derive the most critical situational factors that moderate
relationships between leader characteristics and behaviours, on the one hand, and
leadership effectiveness, on the other. One of the most widely cited contingency
theories, path–goal theory, which has been presented by House and his
colleagues (House, 1971, 1996; House & Mitchell, 1974) is shown in Theory
Box 13.3.
Path–goal theory. Leaders are considered effective when their behaviour
impacts on the subordinates’ motivation, satisfaction and ability to perform
effectively. A major concern of path–goal theory is how a leader influences the
followers’ perceptions of their work goals, their personal goals and the paths to
goal attainment. To maximize their impact in these aspects, leaders need to
master a range of leadership behaviours and use them flexibly depending on
specific situational contingencies. Five classes of leadership behaviours are
distinguished in newer versions of path–goal theory (House, 1996). Clarifying
behaviour (e.g. about rewards and punishments, performance goals and means to
achieve them) reduces role ambiguity and increases follower beliefs that effort in
a specific direction will result in good performance, and that performance will be
rewarded. Work facilitation behaviour (e.g. planning, scheduling, coordinating,
guiding, coaching, counselling and giving feedback) eliminates roadblocks and
bottlenecks, provides resources, stimulates self-development and helps to
delegate authority to subordinates. Participative behaviour (e.g. consulting with
subordinates, incorporating subordinate opinions in decision-making) increases
followers’ self-confidence and the personal value of job-related effort.
Supportive behaviour (e.g. creating a friendly and psychologically supportive
environment, displaying concern for subordinates’ welfare) increases the
followers’ involvement with the work group and both organizational and goal
commitment. Achievement-oriented behaviour (e.g. setting high goals and
seeking improvement, emphasizing excellence, showing confidence in
subordinates, stressing pride in work) increases subordinate confidence and the
personal value of goal-directed effort.

THEORY BOX 13.3

PATH–GOAL THEORY OF LEADERSHIP
Source: Based on House, 1996, with permission from Elsevier.

The extent to which the described leadership behaviours are successful

depends on two classes of contingency factors: (1) personal characteristics of
the followers (e.g. internal versus external locus of control, self-efficacy beliefs,
knowledge, skills and abilities) influence the degree to which followers see the
leadership behaviour as a source of satisfaction or as instrumental to future
satisfaction; and (2) characteristics of the environment (e.g. task structure,
formal authority system of the organization, primary work group), which are not
within the direct control of followers, but are important to satisfy their needs or
their ability to perform well. For example, followers with an internal locus of
control (who believe that they, personally, control events in their life), high self-
efficacy beliefs (i.e. confidence that they can carry out successfully what they
wish to), or high competence in their job respond more positively to participative
leadership behaviour than do followers with external locus of control (who need
more work facilitation behaviour), low self-efficacy (who need more supportive
behaviour) or low job competence (who need more clarifying behaviour).
Examples of leadership behaviour contingencies with characteristics of the
primary work group are described in detail in the next section, on group
leadership.
Despite inconclusive research results and some conceptual deficiencies (e.g.
House, 1996; Wofford & Liska, 1993; see Leader in the Field, Robert J. House),
path–goal theory is still in use, because it provides a valuable conceptual
framework for identifying situational factors relevant to leadership effectiveness.
The theory’s underlying idea, that certain leadership behaviours are helpful and
successful under certain circumstances, has been adopted in several newer
leadership theories (cf. Yukl, 2012; see Leader in the Field, Gary Yukl). Another
idea that path–goal theory has infused into leadership research and practice is
that the followers and their characteristics matter in the leadership process. Not
only is their performance-related behaviour important, so too are their
perceptions, cognitions and beliefs about work-related issues.

LEADER IN THE FIELD

Robert J. House (1932–2011) received his PhD in Management
from Ohio State University in 1960. He was appointed the Joseph
Frank Bernstein Endowed Chair of Organization Studies at the
Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania in 1988, and is a
Fellow of the Academy of Management, the American Psychological
Association and the Society of Industrial-Organizational Psychology.
Dr House has published numerous articles, four of which received
outstanding paper awards, and two papers are Scientific Citation
Classics. His scholarly contribution to leadership research comprises
two well-received theories – path–goal theory and charismatic
leadership – which were both first presented in the 1970s, and a still
ongoing, international research project on leadership across and
within various countries (Global Leadership and Organizational
Behavior Effectiveness Program, GLOBE), in which he served as
principal investigator from 1993 to 2003.

Transactional, transformational and laissez-faire leadership

In the past 25 years a substantial amount of research evidence has been
accumulated about what leaders and followers offer one another. Transactional
leaders focus on the proper exchange of resources. They give followers
something they want in exchange for something the leader wants (cf. Burns,
1978; Conger & Kanungo, 1998). Transformational (charismatic) leaders, in
contrast, develop an appealing vision and focus on the alignment of the group or
organizational goals with the followers’ needs and aspirations, in order to
influence them to make sacrifices and put the needs of the organization above
their own interests. Laissez-faire leaders offer very little to followers (‘non-
leadership’); they avoid making decisions, hesitate in taking action and are often
absent when needed.

- - - - - - - - - -

transactional leaders leaders who focus on the proper exchange of resources, who give followers
something in exchange for something the leaders want.

- - - - - - - - - -

- - - - - - - - - -

transformational (charismatic) leaders leaders who focus on aligning the group or organizational
goals with the followers’ needs and aspirations by developing an appealing vision.

- - - - - - - - - -

- - - - - - - - - -

laissez-faire leaders leaders who engage in ‘non-leadership’; that is, avoid making decisions,
hesitate in taking action and are often absent when needed.

- - - - - - - - - -

Bass (1985) has refined the concept of transformational leadership into four
sub-dimensions (known as the ‘four I’s’ of transformational leadership):
 Idealized influence Leaders behave in admirable ways (e.g. display
conviction, display role-modelling behaviours consistent with the vision,
appeal on an emotional level) so that followers tend to identify with them.

LEADER IN THE FIELD

Gary Yukl received his PhD in Industrial-Organizational
Psychology from the University of California at Berkeley in 1967.
He is a Professor of Management at the School of Business at the
State University of New York, Albany and Fellow of the Academy
of Management, the American Psychological Association, the
Society of Industrial-Organizational Psychology and the American
Psychological Society. Dr Yukl has written several books, including
Leadership in Organizations (Prentice-Hall, 8th edition, 2012), a
widely cited book, which is used worldwide and has been translated
widely. Apart from numerous awards received for his scholarly
publications about leadership and management, he has also
published more than 60 articles in professional journals in
psychology and management, and has consulted with and designed
development programmes and projects for a variety of business and
public sector organizations, as well as for various agencies of the US
government.

Inspirational motivation Leaders articulate a vision (e.g. provide meaning

for the work task, set high standards, communicate optimism about the
achievability of the vision) that is appealing and inspiring to followers.
Intellectual stimulation Leaders stimulate and encourage creativity in their
followers (e.g. challenge assumptions, take risks, ask followers to put into
practice their own ideas).
Individualized consideration Leaders attend to each follower individually
(e.g. act as a mentor or coach, listen to their concerns and needs).
The concepts of transformational leadership and charismatic leadership
(Conger & Kanungo, 1987, 1998) have much in common (Judge & Piccolo,
2004). Charismatic leaders can be described as self-confident, enthusiastic
leaders able to win followers’ respect and support for their vision. They also
show role-modelling behaviours consistent with the vision, take personal risks
and express strong confidence in their followers. On the part of the followers,
charismatic leadership results in, for example, internalization (i.e. followers
adopt the leader’s ideals and goals and become inspired to attain them because
they are inherently satisfying) and social identification (i.e. followers create a
connection in their minds between their self-concepts and the shared values and
identities of their group or organization). For ease of description, our use of the
term ‘transformational leadership’ includes charismatic leadership, although we
acknowledge that the different theories underlying each concept do make a clear
distinction between them (e.g. Conger & Kanungo, 1998).
Transactional leadership consists of three dimensions underlying leaders’
behaviour:
Contingent reward Leaders set up constructive transactions or exchanges
with followers (e.g. clarify expectations, establish rewards for meeting
expectations).
Active management by exception Leaders monitor follower behaviour,
anticipate problems and take corrective action before serious difficulties
occur.
Passive management by exception Leaders wait until the followers’
behaviour has created problems before taking action (cf. Avolio, 1999).
This is not, however, to be confused with laissez-faire leadership, which
represents the absence of leadership. In the case of passive management by
exception, at least some leadership influence is exerted, although often after
the damage is done.
The research on theories of transformational, transactional and laissez-faire
leadership combines and complements the leadership-oriented and contingency
approaches described above in four ways. First, it proposes that leadership is a
process that is partially determined by leader traits, trainable behaviours and
skills. Second, it identifies situational factors under which the different types of
leadership vary in effectiveness (see Social Psychology Beyond the Lab 13.2).
Third, it proposes a bidirectional influence between leader characteristics, on one
hand, and attributions of followers and how they react to the leader’s
characteristics, on the other. Fourth, it proposes that the followers’
characteristics (e.g. their needs, self-concepts, interpretations of goals and
events, motivations and emotions) can moderate or mediate the relationship
between leader behaviours and followers’ responses.
Transformational and transactional theories of leadership have been tested
with a whole variety of methods, including longitudinal studies, field studies and
laboratory experiments. In a meta-analysis of 87 studies (total N > 38,000),
Judge and Piccolo (2004) determined the contribution of transformational,
transactional and laissez-faire leadership to the prediction of organizational
criteria relevant to leadership effectiveness (follower job satisfaction, satisfaction
with leader, motivation, leader job performance, effectiveness and
group/organization performance). Overall, by combining the different
effectiveness criteria, this analysis revealed that three leadership dimensions
were positively related to outcome variables: transformational leadership (r =
.44); transactional–contingent reward leadership (r = .39); and transactional–
active management by exception (r = .15). In contrast, two of the leadership
dimensions were negatively related to leadership outcomes: transactional–
passive management by exception (r = −.15); and laissez-faire leadership (r =
−.37).

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BEYOND THE

LAB 13.2
CHARISMA IN THE US PRESIDENCY
House, Spangler, and Woycke (1991) tested a model of leader charisma and
effectiveness based on a rather unusual sample, namely 34 elected US
presidents, from Washington to Reagan. Among other variables, their model
includes leader personality characteristics, such as motivational need for
power (cf. McClelland & Burnham, 1976), situational variables, such as
national crises during presidency, and behavioural charisma. The authors
hypothesized that for US presidents the motivational need for power is
positively related to behavioural charisma. They argue that without such a
need, presidents are unlikely to have developed the persuasive skills to
influence others strongly, and they are also unlikely to obtain sustained
satisfaction from the leadership role. Furthermore, it was hypothesized that
behavioural charisma is positively related to presidential performance,
because charismatic leaders produce extraordinary performance and strong
commitment to the leader and his mission in followers by arousing mission-
relevant motives, shaping their basic values and increasing their self-
confidence. Finally, it was hypothesized that domestic and foreign crises are
positively related to charisma and presidential performance, because crises
are necessary prerequisites for the emergence of behavioural charisma and
provide a president with opportunities to be effective.
provide a president with opportunities to be effective.
In terms of methods used, we can give here only a glimpse of how much
care was taken to develop and apply proper operationalizations of the
described variables for such an unusual sample, in which most of the
individuals studied were no longer alive at the time of the study.
Motivational need for power was estimated on the basis of each president’s
inaugural speech (Winter, 1987: construct validity ranges from .60 to .80;
Winter & Stewart, 1977). On the basis of two chronological histories of
America, international relations crises (13 categories), domestic and
international economic crises (11 categories) and domestic unrest (23
categories) were categorized, counted and rated by eight coders on a scale
from one to 10 for severity of crisis. Domestic and international economic
crises were rated 1, and for example the wars with Mexico and Korea were
coded 2, World Wars I and II were coded 6, the Civil War was coded 10. A
composite crises measure for each president’s period was created with a
reliability of .91. For presidential charisma four measures were used, two of
which were taken from Simonton (1986) and two further measures were
developed on the basis of sampled texts from biographies of close followers
to each president (composite measure’s reliability .87). Finally, five
different measures of presidential performance were taken from other
sources: from Winter (1987) who used indicators such as settled crises and
war avoidance, and from Murray and Blessing (1983), who surveyed 517
American historians who rated the US presidents on various performance
dimensions, plus three further measures which the authors developed
themselves. The resulting five composite scales – direct action, subjective
presidential performance, international relations performance, economic
performance and social performance – had sufficient to high levels of
reliability, ranging from .75 to .97.
Hypothesis tests showed that motivational need for power was significantly
and positively related to behavioural charisma, and that behavioural
charisma was significantly and positively related to all measures of
presidential performance except for international relations. Furthermore,
crises were significantly and positively related to behavioural charisma, and
also to three out of five presidential performance measures. Acknowledging
that their study was correlational in nature, House et al. (1991) anticipated
several alternative explanations, including, for example, spuriousness of
correlations due to common third variables or common source bias, and
 accounted for them by employing multiple methods from multiple sources,
and by discussing their findings within various relevant theoretical frames.
In our view they make a strong case for the validity of the hypothesized
correlations found and their concluding statement about US Presidents:
‘They are effective because they are charismatic’ (p. 391).
Judge and Piccolo (2004) conclude that contingent reward (transactional)
leadership and transformational leadership predict outcome variables to a similar
extent. This is troublesome, considering that transformational–transactional
leadership theory predicts that contingent reward will be reasonably effective,
but not as effective as any of the transformational leadership dimensions (Bass &
Avolio, 1994, p. 6). The superiority of one theory relative to the other seems to
depend on the context. For example, Judge and Piccolo note that contingent
reward leadership works best in business settings. Perhaps it is the resource-
dependent nature of this kind of setting that is crucial – that is, business leaders
are more able to reward followers tangibly (e.g. via financial incentives) in
exchange for their efforts than are leaders in the other domains studied
(universities/colleges, military settings, the public sector). In situations in which
leaders have access to fewer or no resources, contingent reward leadership may
be less effective, because it is more difficult for leaders to meet their side of the
bargain. Thus, transformational leadership may be more robust in these settings
than is contingent reward leadership.
Another observation from Judge and Piccolo’s (2004) meta-analysis is that
transformational and contingent reward leadership predicted leadership
outcomes about equally strongly under weak research designs (leadership and
outcomes were measured at the same time and with the same source). In
contrast, under strong research designs (longitudinal designs and designs in
which the leadership and the criterion were measured with different sources of
data), transformational leadership predicted leadership outcomes more strongly
than did contingent reward leadership.
The early tests available for measuring transformational and transactional
leadership have been subject to criticism on methodological grounds. However,
Rowold and Heinitz (2007) demonstrated that, although charismatic and
transformational leadership overlap with each other to large extent (78 per cent
common variance), both are clearly distinct from transactional leadership, and
both are also superior to it in predicting outcomes (both subjective outcomes
such as extra effort, effectiveness and satisfaction, and objective outcomes such
as profit achieved by the work unit led by the target leader).
 Summary
In this section we have reviewed various approaches to the study of leadership:
leader-oriented approaches, which focus on traits; contingency approaches,
which emphasize both situational factors and traits; and approaches to
transactional, transformational and charismatic leadership, which combine and
complement the trait and contingency approaches. This implies that leadership is
inherently neither solely in people nor solely in the situational context. Instead,
both categories of variables can be seen as conditions that facilitate or inhibit the
expression of effective leadership processes. This is part of the reason why
leadership is a complex social phenomenon and the scientific study of it is a very
complex task.
Most of the approaches to the study of leadership focus on the leader as a
person and less on ‘leadership’ as a process. For an exception, the leadership
perspective taken by the Michigan group explicitly suggests that anyone in a
work group can provide leadership functions. The more necessary leadership
behaviours are effectively provided by group members, the less a (formal) leader
needs to infuse them into the work group (and the less harmful are passive or
laissez-faire leaders). We believe that it is in an organization’s interest for their
leaders to develop employees and whole work groups such that the group
members facilitate each other’s performance by also engaging in effective
leadership behaviour. This comes very close to modern concepts of shared or
team leadership, which are discussed in the next section.
 LEADERSHIP IN GROUPS
How can leadership help to improve group performance?
The first researchers to turn their attention to how leadership can affect groups as
a whole were Kurt Lewin and his co-workers, Lippitt and White. In a series of
experiments they observed in detail how different leadership behaviours of adult
leaders affected the ‘social climates’ of after-school clubs of 10-year-old boys
(e.g. Lewin, Lippitt, & White, 1939; White & Lippitt, 1968). They implemented
three different leadership styles (i.e. a repeatedly shown pattern of leadership
behaviour evident across a variety of situations): autocratic leadership
(directive, non-participative, domineering behaviours); democratic leadership
(participative, communicative, egalitarian); and laissez-faire leadership (‘hands-
off’ leadership, with few attempts made to influence others at all).

- - - - - - - - - -

leadership style a pattern of leadership behaviour which is repeatedly shown and evident across a
variety of situations.

- - - - - - - - - -

Not surprisingly, democratic leaders were liked more than autocratic or

laissez-faire leaders. They created a group-minded, friendly and task-oriented
atmosphere. In contrast, autocratic leadership resulted in more frequent hostile
behaviours, but also in ‘apathetic’ patterns of behaviour with no instances of
smiling or joking. Although the quantity of work done in autocracy was
somewhat greater than in democracy, there were indications that work
motivation was greater in democracy. There was more ‘work-minded’
conversation in democratically led groups, and members continued to work hard,
even when the group leader was temporarily absent. In contrast, members of
autocratically led groups often stopped working when the leader left the room.
Finally, there was some informal evidence that the work produced in
democratically led groups showed higher levels of originality than under either
of the other types of leadership. Note that the impact of a laissez-faire leader was
not the same as that of a democratic leader: there was less work done, the work
was poorer and students expressed less satisfaction with the laissez-faire leader.
In our view, these early findings show that what leaders do has an impact on
how groups function as a whole, and that an appointed leader’s style of
leadership has an impact on the leadership behaviours shown by the group
members themselves. Under an autocratic leader the group members seem not to
take responsibility for leading themselves, whereas under a democratic leader
they seem to fulfil (self-)leadership functions more willingly.
Because we focus on characteristics of group functioning and how these can
be facilitated by leadership, not only by an appointed leader, but also by the
group members themselves, we define group leadership as influencing,
motivating or enabling (oneself and) others to contribute towards the
effectiveness and viability of work groups. This definition is meant to also
comprise leaderless groups (e.g. self-managed work or student groups), which
require shared or team leadership.

- - - - - - - - - -

group leadership influencing, motivating or enabling (oneself and) others to contribute towards
the effectiveness and viability of work groups.

- - - - - - - - - -

- - - - - - - - - -

leaderless groups groups with no appointed leader but which display effective leadership
behaviours which are infused by the group members themselves (shared leadership) and/or by
agents external to the group.

- - - - - - - - - -

- - - - - - - - - -

shared or team leadership responsibility for leadership functions, the exercise of leadership
behaviour and perceptions about leadership roles are shared among group members (sometimes
including agents external to the team).

- - - - - - - - - -
 - - - - - - - - - -

Bradford and Cohen (1984) argued that the predominant conception of a

‘heroic leader’ undermines the principally positive effects of shared
responsibility for leadership functions and empowerment of followers on
leadership effectiveness. The more recently developed concepts of shared
leadership (e.g. Pearce & Sims, 2000) or team leadership (e.g.
Sivasubramaniam, Murry, Avolio, & Jung, 2002) denote group-level leadership
concepts that go beyond the commonly held concept of a single leader, in that
the responsibility for leadership functions, the exercise of leadership behaviours
and the perceptions of leadership roles are shared among group members. These
concepts complement the view of a singular leader, who is more informed and
confident than others, with the view that leadership is a mutual social influence
process (e.g. Smith, 1995).
Based on the propositions about group functioning and performance described
in the first part of this chapter, and the more recent developments in leadership
theory and research described above, we argue that effective group leadership
needs to ensure that the functions critical to (1) group and task design, (2) group
synchronization and (3) group learning are taken care of (see Zaccaro, Rittman,
& Marks, 2001) with or without a formally appointed leader.
 Group and task design
According to the first principle of group performance management, group
leadership requires that groups are composed in accordance with the
requirements of their tasks and goals (i.e. group design), and that tasks are
constantly (re)structured in accordance with the group’s structure (task design).
Wageman’s (2001) study of self-managed teams in the US Customer Services
Division of Xerox Corporation demonstrates that effective group leadership is
indeed a group design and task design activity. Across the US, all teams in this
division perform basically the same task, which is to offer regular maintenance
services and to respond to customer calls, for example, about machine
breakdowns. Wageman measured the extent to which group leaders made sure
that their work group was a ‘real team’, with clear membership, stability over
time and group members working in close physical proximity to each other (i.e.
group composition). Furthermore, she measured whether leaders infused a clear
direction, with just a few, memorable objectives that focused on the ends to be
achieved, rather than on the details of the means for achieving them (i.e. group
goals). This study also measured to what extent leaders enabled an effective
team structure, with adequate group size, sufficient skill variety (not too much
heterogeneity so that coordination problems remained manageable), high task
interdependence, challenging task goals, challenging performance targets and
clearly articulated strategies and norms for planning and decision-making (i.e.
group and task structure). Finally, she measured the degree to which
organizational context factors (e.g. quality of reward and feedback systems,
adequacy of training offered and availability of resources needed) supported
effective group functioning. Wageman (2001) used a sample of 34 self-managed
teams to test the extent to which the desired leadership activities were linked
with objective group performance criteria, obtained from company records. The
more leaders engaged in the task/group design activities described above, the
higher was group performance and the more self-management was practised
within the groups.
This is an example of how the extent to which leadership secures proper task
and group design directly influences the effectiveness of group functioning.
 Group synchronization
Group leadership implies the monitoring and management of ongoing group
processes, for example the exchange of information, views and opinions and the
social dynamics involved. The contribution of leadership to group
synchronization has been most extensively demonstrated for information
management during group decision-making. Via information management,
effective leadership keeps the group focused on the problem at hand, facilitates
communication, stimulates decision-relevant contributions and keeps them alive
during discussion (e.g. Larson & Christensen, 1993; Maier, 1967). In a hidden-
profile study on medical diagnostic teams, Larson, Christensen, Abbott, and
Franz (1996) investigated how designated leaders (the most experienced medical
doctor in each group) manage the processing of distributed information during
group decision-making. They observed that leaders repeated unshared
information (i.e. information held by only one group member) at a steadily
increasing rate over time and raised more questions about concrete factual
information than other group members. In a follow-up study, again in the
domain of medical decision-making, Larson, Christensen, Franz, and Abbott
(1998) replicated the above results and found positive correlations between
information management behaviour and group decision quality. This is an
example of how information management behaviours can counteract
‘asymmetries’ in the discussion and evaluation of information that were
identified as a weakness of group decision-making, especially in hidden profile
situations (Figure 13.11).
FIGURE 13.11 How does the designated leader in a group such as this manage
the processing of distributed information during group decision-making?
Source: © Andresr. Used under licence from Shutterstock.
 Larson, Foster-Fishman, and Franz (1998) also explored the effects of
leadership style on group decision-making. They trained individuals to display
either directive or participative leadership behaviours. Directive leadership
groups outperformed participative leadership groups only when their leaders
possessed sufficient information favouring the best decision alternative. In
contrast, when directive leaders possessed information that favoured a
suboptimal choice (as did the information held by other group members), group
decision quality deteriorated considerably. This was not the case in groups with
a participative or democratic leader who managed the group in a way that
encouraged more (shared and unshared) information to surface. In contrast,
directive leaders tend to ‘sell’ their opinion by emphasizing their own unshared
information that is consistent with their decision preference.
Likewise, Cruz, Henningsen, and Smith (1999) concluded from their hidden
profile study that the quality of the group’s choice depends on the quality of a
directive leader’s preferred decision alternative. Overall, these findings are in
line with Vroom and Jago’s (1988) notion that autocratic forms of decision-
making are feasible only when leaders possess sufficient information to make a
high-quality decision. Considering that in situations of a hidden profile most or
all group members (including the leader) are likely to hold information that does
not imply the best possible decision alternative, a directive leadership style
seems less functional for high-quality decision-making than does a participative
leadership style. However, the study by Larson et al. (1998) also demonstrates
that a participative leadership style does not guarantee high-quality decision-
making under all conditions of distributed knowledge. When the leader does
indeed know best, directive leadership results in better group decisions than
participative leadership does. Thus, wise leaders should know when they know
best and when not, and adjust their leadership style accordingly.
 Group development and learning
Group leadership implies supporting group learning and development. For
example, effective group leadership seeks to further the development of
transactive memory systems by fostering a team learning orientation (Bunderson
& Sutcliffe, 2003). This can be established by promoting mutual collaboration
among group members and developing a decentralized communication structure,
instead of using directive leadership, which is associated with a communication
structure that centres around the leader. In a decentralized transactive memory
system, a large proportion of group members hold significant parts of the group
knowledge. If knowledge is distributed, not centralized, a transactive memory
system is less subject to disruption when, for instance, a centrally positioned
leader is overloaded with work, cannot communicate with adequate frequency
and is thus not able to transmit the group’s knowledge adequately.
Interdependent work in groups entails uncertainty about others’ motivation,
competency and behaviours: will they do the work they said they would do?
Will they perform to the standards set? Will they deliver their part in time? In
geographically dispersed groups especially, it is difficult to maintain the
continuous communication essential for sharing group knowledge and
information about individual activities related to the task. This means that
members of geographically dispersed groups have to cope with particularly high
levels of uncertainty. Delays in remote communication make feedback about
others’ activities difficult to obtain. Delayed or inaccurate feedback requires
several iterations for clarification. In face-to-face groups, feedback about others’
activities is more immediate and can be obtained more easily, for example by
observing who attends meetings or who participates in hallway communications.
In contrast, members in distributed groups (called virtual groups because they
mainly communicate electronically) may go for long periods without feedback
about each other’s activities.
Team awareness is the group members’ understanding of the ongoing
activities of others that provides a context for their own activity. It reduces the
effort needed to coordinate tasks and resources by providing a context to
interpret communications and others’ actions more adequately (Weisband,
2002). Leadership can foster the development of team awareness, for example
by taking actions to monitor the progress of others and to include everyone by
sharing the respective information. This helps the group to cope better with
individual members’ work overloads. Weisband (2002) studied leadership
influence on team awareness with geographically dispersed student project
teams. The teams worked on a four-week project (writing a policy document on
which they should all agree) via e-mail and a web-based conferencing system.
The more the above-described leadership actions were shared (i.e. several group
members engaged in the leadership activities), the more team awareness
individual group members developed (i.e. they were better informed about
others’ activities), and the better the overall project performance. Developing
team awareness among group members takes effort and time. It is an investment
that becomes profitable after longer or repeated group task performance and
under certain conditions, for example in distributed or virtual work teams.

- - - - - - - - - -

team awareness understanding of the ongoing activities of others which provides a context for
one’s own activity.

- - - - - - - - - -

In general, leadership for group learning not only means providing the training
resources for each group member to learn to perform the job better individually
(individual-to-individual transfer), it also involves developing a collaborative
learning orientation in which group members can discuss and improve each
others’ task performance strategies and behaviours (group-to-individual
transfer). Furthermore, the development of transactive memory systems and
team awareness benefits from encouraging group members to reflect on and
constantly improve the way they collaborate and interact with each other (group-
to-individual-in-group transfer), and to learn about other group members’ areas
of expertise, strengths and weaknesses (group-to-group transfer). The more this
knowledge and awareness are developed and leadership functions are shared
within the group, the more likely it is that group members can support each
other, fill gaps for each other, correct and manage each other’s errors, and
anticipate and cope with capacity shortages on the part of particular group
members before problems arise. All this improves group performance over time.
 Summary
In sum, group leadership means careful composition of work groups, proactive
design of task structures and active synchronization of group decision-making
processes and task execution in groups. Apart from an active coaching of
individual group members (e.g. via transformational leadership), leadership
functions in groups also comprise the systematic development of effective
transactive memory systems and team awareness among group members (which
may take some time). As the Michigan group has already shown, all these
leadership functions do not necessarily need to be performed by just one
(formal) leader. Particularly when high task interdependence and geographically
distributed virtual teamwork is involved, the shared performance of leadership
functions seems to work best.

CHAPTER SUMMARY
What is the baseline against which we judge actual group performance?
The baseline is potential group performance, that is the performance that
would have occurred if the members of the group had worked
independently of each other. The potential group performance reflects the
performance individuals would achieve in a group, if the group neither
facilitated nor inhibited them.
How can we identify group-level effects on performance? Group
performance is, first and foremost, influenced by individual performance.
Group members’ individual performances (or abilities) constitute the
basis for the definition of potential group performance. Potential group
performance differs based on task type (e.g. additive, disjunctive and
conjunctive tasks) because individual contributions are differently related
to group performance for these different task types.
How are the three task types related to potential group performance? For
additive tasks the potential group performance is equal to the sum of
individual inputs; for disjunctive tasks, it is equal to the performance of
the best member; and for conjunctive tasks it is equal to the worst
member.
How does social loafing differ from the dispensability effect? Social
loafing occurs when group members reduce their effort, because their
individual contributions are difficult to identify for other group members.
Social loafing is one of the factors contributing to the Ringelmann effect.
The dispensability effect occurs when group members think that their
individual effort does not contribute much to the group product.
How can a hidden profile result in suboptimal group performance? A
hidden profile is a group decision situation in which task-relevant
information is distributed in such a way that no group member can detect
the best solution based on the information he or she possesses. The
correct solution can only be found if group members share their
information. Because group members tend to rely on their own
information, hidden profiles often lead to suboptimal group performance.
What are the major pitfalls and opportunities when people work together
in a group? Actual group performance diverges from potential group
performance due to process losses and process gains. Process losses are
coordination losses, motivation losses and individual capability losses;
process gains are motivation gains and individual capability gains. These
processes constitute the group-level influences on group performance.
What can we do to systematically optimize group performance? Process
losses can be reduced and process gains can be facilitated if three basic
principles of group leadership are applied: composing groups in
accordance with task requirements, synchronizing group members’ efforts
during collective performance, and allowing for group learning across
multiple task trials.
What makes leadership effective? Leadership effectiveness depends on
many factors: leader traits, leadership behaviour, situational factors (e.g.
task, followers, social context) and whether leader–follower relationships
are transformational, transactional or non-existent (laissez-faire
leadership). Note that focusing solely on the leader as the focal point of
leadership limits our understanding of the complex nature of leadership,
which is a mutual influence process that can also be shared among group
members.
How can leadership help to improve group performance? Leadership is
about influencing others for the benefit of individual, group and
organizational goals. Derived from the basic principles of group
leadership, we identified three categories of situational contingencies that
are important for high group performance: composition (e.g. align group
and task structure), synchronization (e.g. manage information and activity
for reducing process loss and increasing process gain), and group learning
 (e.g. foster individual and group development by supporting all learning
processes within groups).

NOTES

1. Steiner also included a fourth task type, the ‘discretionary’ task, but since
this has not been a focus of empirical work we will not discuss it here.
2. It is debatable whether this approach leads to an overestimation of group
potential and, thus, disfavours groups in the evaluation of their actual
performance. Some authors actually discuss the possibility of coordination
gains on the basis of different conceptions of group potential; however, this lies
outside the scope of this introductory chapter.
3. Kerr and Bruun (1983) originally termed this motivation loss as ‘free riding’.
However, because the everyday understanding of the term ‘free riding’ is
almost identical to social loafing (and not with the process that is meant here),
we felt that ‘dispensability effect’ captures the essence of the effect in a better
way.
4. For ease of understanding, the condition labels have been somewhat
modified compared to the original study.
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING
Baron, R. S., & Kerr, N. (2003). Group Process, Group Decision, Group Action
(2nd ed.). Buckingham, UK: Open University Press. One of the best and most
comprehensive introductions to the diverse facets of performance and
performance-related processes in groups.
Bass, B. M. (2008). The Bass handbook of Leadership: Theory, Research, and
Managerial Implications (4th ed.). New York: Free Press. Bernhard Bass has
been one of the most influential researchers in the domain of leadership. This is
the most comprehensive text on leadership today, which extends far beyond the
average textbook, not only in detail, but also in scope and topics covered.
Brodbeck, F. C. (2008). Leadership in organisations. In N. Chmiel (Ed.), An
introduction to work and organisational psychology: A European perspective.
(pp. 281–304). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. A concise and up-to-date account
of leadership theory and practice from a work and organizational psychology
perspective. A good way quickly to catch up with what leadership theory and
research is about.
Larson, J. R. Jr. (2010). In Search of Synergy in Small Group Performance. New
York: Psychology Press. This highly informative and well-written book builds
on the methodological thoroughness offered by Steiner’s seminal 1972 book (see
below), improves on it and brings it together with the current state of empirical
research in group performance.
Nijstad, B. A. (2009). Group Performance. New York: Psychology Press. A
comprehensive, well-written, easy-to-understand and, nevertheless, challenging
and up-to-date introduction to the field of group performance processes.
Pierce, J. L., & Newstrom, J. W. (2002). Leaders & the leadership process:
Readings, self-assessments and applications. Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill. In
addition to concise descriptions of leadership theory and practice, this textbook
contains many excerpts of classic theoretical and research-oriented papers, as
well as self-assessments, practical applications and useful further readings in the
domain of leadership.
Steiner, I. D. (1972). Group processes and productivity. New York: Academic
Press. Steiner’s book remains the classic and pioneering analysis of group
performance on various tasks. Although 40 years old, many insights from this
book are still highly relevant, and some of them still await their realization in
group performance research.
Turner, M. E. (2001). Groups at work: Theory and research. Mahwah, NJ:
Erlbaum. This book’s social psychological and organizational perspectives on
the fundamental topics of group performance research offer a useful tool for
students and researchers who are interested in the organizational application of
group performance research, and for practitioners who want to learn more about
the theoretical basis of groups and group performance.
Witte, E. H., & Davis, J. H. (Eds.). (1996). Understanding group behavior (Vol.
1 and 2). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. These two volumes contain a series of
insightful papers from well-known group researchers. They are particularly
valuable to readers who would like to broaden the scope from ‘pure’ group
performance research to many other facets of intragroup and intergroup
behaviour that are nevertheless relevant for group performance.
Yukl, G. (2012). Leadership in organizations (8th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ:
Prentice-Hall. This classic book contains a comprehensive review of leadership
theories and research. New editions appear regularly.
 Chapter 14

Prejudice and Intergroup Relations

Russell Spears and Nicole Tausch

Source: © De Agostini. Used under licence from Getty Images.

KEY TERMS

accentuation effect
authoritarian personality
contact hypothesis
decategorization
ethnocentrism
extended contact hypothesis
group emotions
group identification
illusory correlation effect
ingroup bias
ingroup reappraisal
intergroup anxiety
jigsaw classroom
mutual differentiation
negative interdependence
 outgroup bias
outgroup homogeneity effect
positive differentiation
positive interdependence
positive–negative asymmetry
prejudice
principle–implementation gap
recategorization
relative deprivation
self-esteem hypothesis
social dominance orientation
social identity
social reality constraints
superordinate goals
CHAPTER OUTLINE
INTRODUCTION
PERSONALITY APPROACHES TO PREJUDICE
The authoritarian personality
Prejudice and a desire for social dominance Authoritarianism and social
dominance orientation as ideologies Summary
THE COGNITIVE APPROACH TO PREJUDICE
Outgroup homogeneity, stereotyping and prejudice Illusory correlation: a
purely cognitive mechanism producing prejudice?
Developments and integrations
Summary
GROUP APPROACHES TO PREJUDICE
Intragroup processes, ingroup bias and prejudice Intergroup explanations
of prejudice and discrimination The individual’s relation to the group:
group identification and its components Elaborating the intergroup level
Integrative intergroup theories
Can emotions help to explain the variety and intensity of prejudice?
Summary
PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERVENTIONS TO REDUCE PREJUDICE
AND IMPROVE INTERGROUP RELATIONS
The ‘contact hypothesis’
 Varying levels of categorization
Psychological processes involved in intergroup contact and prejudice
reduction Other prejudice-reduction techniques
The wider implications of prejudice reduction Summary

ROUTE MAP OF THE CHAPTER

This chapter presents a number of different explanations for prejudice and
discrimination between groups. These range from individual level
explanations in terms of personality and individual differences, and in terms
of the cognitive mechanisms associated with social categorization and
stereotyping processes, to more group level explanations focusing on the
relations between groups. At the group level, behaviour that favours one’s
own group can be beneficial to the individual, and when realistic conflicts
arise between groups, prejudice can reflect and reinforce one’s group
interests. However, realistic conflicts are not the only source of prejudice at
the intergroup level. For example, social identity theory introduces
additional psychological factors underlying ingroup bias, such as the motive
to make one’s group positively distinct from others. We also consider a
range of additional group-level threats that can help to explain prejudice and
discrimination. The trend to provide a more detailed analysis of the specific
relations between groups, able to explain specific forms of prejudice, is
continued by a focus on the role of different group emotions in this process.
Finally we present a range of ways in which practitioners and policy makers
can try to reduce prejudice (such as increasing intergroup contact) and
consider the strengths and limitations of these different approaches.
 INTRODUCTION
Prejudice and discrimination can take many forms, from the extreme to the
almost banal. The Holocaust, the genocides in Cambodia and Rwanda (Figure
14.1), and ‘ethnic cleansing’ in the former Yugoslavia, are clear examples of the
extreme forms. A man who leaps to the aid of a woman who seems to be having
problems with her computer can also be accused of a form of prejudice, although
he (or even she) might not recognize it as such. These very different examples
convey the importance, but also the diversity, of prejudice, and the difficult task
facing social psychologists who want to explain it, as well as propose solutions.
FIGURE 14.1 The Rwandan Genocide in 1994 was a mass murder of an
estimated 800,000 people.
Source: © Travel Ink. Used under licence from Getty Images.

In many ways the study of prejudice has become more complex than it seemed
in the early days of social psychology. Much of the research on prejudice back
then was conducted in the US, on white people’s attitudes towards black people.
Overt racial prejudice was quite a clear-cut issue, conforming to the classic
definition of a negative or derogatory attitude towards a group. Since those days
the nature of prejudice has changed, or at least expanded, but so has the nature of
social psychology and the explanations we offer. The changes in prejudice are
both good and bad. Although prejudice towards ethnic minorities, women, gays
and lesbians (to name a few) is nowhere near as blatant as it used to be, this does
not mean it has disappeared, although in many cases it does seem to have
become less accepted in society. This shift is also reflected in some of the
concepts in current use in social psychology: terms like ‘modern’ racism,
‘aversive’ racism, the ‘new racism’ (versus the old fashioned kinds) and ‘subtle’
or ‘benevolent’ prejudice (versus the blatant and hostile forms). Without getting
bogged down in definitions just yet, these distinctions all convey a shift to more
nuanced and less open forms of prejudice and bigotry. As Bob Dylan once sang,
The times, they are a-changin’.
However, it would also be premature to celebrate: change is not necessarily
always a sign of progress. If societal norms have rendered prejudice less
acceptable, it may also have forced some forms of prejudice underground (see
Chapter 4) while not always necessarily eliminating its causes. Subtle prejudices
may also be more sophisticated. This may make some of the ‘modern’ forms of
prejudice more difficult to detect and to challenge, and attempts to suppress
prejudice can backfire or rebound if underlying motives remain. Moreover, some
of the examples of the atrocities provided at the start of this chapter were
perpetrated recently, showing that it is clearly not the case that the extreme
forms of prejudice have disappeared entirely either. Despite many social
changes, then, ‘old fashioned’ forms of prejudice and ethnocentrism are alas
still relevant, albeit less common than they once were.

- - - - - - - - - -

ethnocentrism the tendency to judge ingroup attributes as superior to those of the outgroup and,
more generally, to judge outgroups from an ingroup perspective.

- - - - - - - - - -

Extreme forms of intergroup hostility are not always straightforward either.

The Norwegian right-wing extremist who in July 2011 embarked on a ‘crusade’
against Muslims and multiculturalism espoused a blatant white supremacist form
of prejudice that has fortunately become less common (Figure 14.2). And yet his
killing spree was directed mainly at white Norwegians, his own ethnic ingroup
who he apparently saw as part of his problem in political terms. Clearly the
question of who the ingroup and outgroup are, who the ‘us and them’ are, is not
always straightforward, but also an important psychological issue, and a question
of ideology.
FIGURE 14.2 In July 2011, Norwegian right-wing extremist, Anders Behring
Breivik embarked on a ‘crusade’ against Muslims and multiculturalism, yet his
killing spree was directed mainly at white Norwegians, his own ethnic ingroup
who he apparently saw as part of his problem in political terms.
Source: © Lefteris Pitarakis. Used under licence from Press Association Images.

In this chapter we try to recognize and understand the diverse forms that
prejudice can take, in a world that is perhaps more diverse, in Europe at least,
than early social psychology textbooks focusing on the American context might
suggest. To be sure, gender, ‘race’ and sexuality are important dimensions on
which prejudice operates across the globe, but many others, especially those
around nationality and ethnicity, are quite specific to local context, especially in
a continent as diverse as Europe. Moreover, we cannot assume that prejudice
around the same groups and categories will be the same everywhere. In some
countries and cultures social norms against sexism and homophobia may be
better developed than in others, and the same group may be a perpetrator of
prejudice or a victim, depending on the local context.
 While recognizing the diversity in prejudice and the importance of the
normative context in which it occurs, we do not, however, think that our
accounts have to be purely descriptive, or determined in each case by unique
historical factors. One strength of a social psychological approach to prejudice is
that it aims to provide theoretical explanations that might apply to a range of
different groups and contexts at different times, while trying to do justice to the
differences.
As the nature of prejudice has changed, social psychology has not stood still
either. As the theories and techniques have developed, so has the very concept of
prejudice itself. Consider again the classic definition of prejudice as a negative
attitude towards a group. It has become clear that this is rather inadequate as a
way of defining prejudice that captures all its forms. Take our example of the
man who goes to help the woman with a computer problem. On the surface, such
behaviour could be classified in other areas of psychology as an example of
helping or prosocial behaviour (see Chapter 10). However, socially aware
readers will also detect the sensitivity in this situation: the woman might be quite
competent to sort out her computer herself, and may feel patronized by the
implication that she is not able to do so (a useful ‘thought experiment’ when
considering gender equality is to consider how a man would feel if a woman
offers him help in this context!). That some women might welcome such offers
of help only complicates the issue further. This can be seen as an example of
‘benevolent sexism’ (Glick & Fiske, 1996), an ostensibly positive or helpful
orientation that nevertheless reflects or reinforces less positive views of women
at least on important dimensions like competence. The example of benevolent
prejudice reinforces the point that the old fashioned definition of prejudice,
though useful to a point, will not suffice. Instead we propose a working
definition of prejudice as an attitude or orientation towards a group (or its
members) that devalues it directly or indirectly, often to the benefit of the self or
own group.

- - - - - - - - - -

prejudice an attitude or orientation towards a group (or its members) that devalues it directly or
indirectly, often to the benefit of the self or own group.

- - - - - - - - - -
 Rather than getting bogged down in debates about whether men who open
doors for women are really being sexist, it is perhaps more useful to see how this
could reflect more general processes that might benefit one group over the other
in the long run: it may be that some men are happy to open the door to the
company canteen to women, but not the door to the company boardroom. In this
chapter we present theoretical explanations for prejudice that try to make sense
of the functions it can serve, however banal or extreme its form. When we think
of more extreme examples of prejudice, such as the atrocious acts of the
Norwegian extremist, Anders Breivik, it is all too easy to write off such
behaviour as evil. Although this attribution may be an understandable way of
coping with such crises, it does not explain anything. Our job as social
psychologists is at least to try to explain such behaviour.
In order to give our journey through the field some structure we take an
approach that is roughly chronological, starting with classic approaches to
prejudice and finishing with more contemporary explanations that do more
justice to its diversity. At the same time, and overlapping with this, we structure
our treatment in terms of the levels of explanation that have been offered for
prejudice. One important dimension distinguishing different approaches
concerns the level of analysis, or whether the individual or group should form
the central explanatory focus: does prejudice primarily stem from processes
within individuals, or from relations between groups?
We start with the more individual-level explanations (personality-based,
cognitive), moving on to more group-based explanations. Personality-based
explanations arose in the heyday of psychoanalysis in the 1930s and 1940s, and
saw personal needs and motives as primary. Although the psychodynamic
theories went out of vogue, the interest in individual differences (and motives)
has remained. With the cognitive revolution in the 1970s, explanations
emphasized the cognitive mechanisms and functions of social categorization and
stereotyping common to all of us that could underlie prejudice (see also Chapter
4). Although these approaches clearly differ, they both share a focus on the
individual.
In contrast, group-level approaches focus on the perceiver, as well as the
target, as a member of a group, with group-level needs and interests. Intergroup
explanations have benefitted from the legacy of both the personality and
cognitive traditions, and incorporate both motivational and cognitive processes.
The group level of analysis makes the way we conceptualize prejudice more
complex, but also more amenable to its diverse forms and the different contexts
in which it can arise. The complex social relations between groups provide the
opportunity for diverse comparisons and perceptions, which extend the negative
(and positive) reactions to target groups in a number of different emotional
directions (e.g. people can respond to members of different outgroups with
feelings of fear, anger or even admiration) resulting in quite different feelings of
prejudice and different discriminatory responses (e.g. avoidance, confrontation,
paternalism). A key element that remains, in line with the modern definition, is
that prejudice often serves the perceiver’s interests in some way, and this is a
recurring theme at all levels of explanation that indeed helps to explain.
All of these different levels have something to contribute to the explanation of
prejudice, and although some may make more sense in some contexts than
others, in many cases more than one level may be relevant. We are not saying
that one level of explanation is inherently correct or superior. Take again the
emotive example of the Norwegian extremist. It is hard to believe that
individual-level factors such as personality did not play a central role in his case
(see Chapter 5, Social Psychology Beyond the Lab 5.1). Indeed, individual
difference accounts may, reassuringly, help to explain why such atrocious acts
remain extremely unusual – because there is something special about this
individual. Nevertheless, this individual, however far from our social reality he
was, clearly saw the world through a prism of ‘us and them’, involving very
strong ‘ingroup’ loyalties and ‘outgroup’ enmities. Social categorization
processes, social stereotypes and the identities and animosities of the intergroup
level may all have played a crucial part here, and at the very least formed the
setting in which his personal pathology played itself out (and indeed egalitarian
societal norms against prejudice might ironically even have contributed to the
force of the individual-level explanation in this case, by exacerbating a personal
sense of resentment). When it comes to explaining prejudice in the modern
world, it is not a case of ‘one size fits all’. In many cases we may need to draw
on many levels of explanation to make full sense of prejudice, and also to
explain how it can vary so widely between and within groups. We consider, first,
the individual-level explanations that start us on this road.
 PERSONALITY APPROACHES TO
PREJUDICE
Is there a prejudiced personality?
People differ in terms of their attitudes towards social groups. More
interestingly, it seems that attitudes towards a range of social groups are often
correlated: people who have negative attitudes towards one outgroup also tend to
have negative attitudes towards other outgroups (Allport, 1954b). This is most
evident in the case of the outright bigot, who dislikes, for example, black people,
Jews and homosexuals, three quite different groups. The generality of prejudice
suggests that prejudiced beliefs may somehow be rooted within an individual’s
personality. So is there such a thing as a ‘prejudiced personality’? In this section
we introduce two facets of personality investigated by social psychologists, the
authoritarian personality and social dominance orientation.
 The authoritarian personality
The monstrous events that took place in Nazi Germany, in particular the
Holocaust, led many scholars to believe that prejudice must be an aberration of
human psychology. Surely, these actions could not have been those of normal
men and women? Theoretical models were therefore developed that explained
prejudice as a manifestation of a particular pathological personality. The most
well-known of these models was proposed by Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik,
Levinson, and Sanford (1950), who suggested that individuals’ social and
political attitudes, and in particular their susceptibility to Fascist ideas, are
expressions of deep-seated aspects of their personality that can be traced back to
early childhood experiences. Their theory was heavily influenced by
psychodynamic theory, which was very popular at the time. Psychodynamic
theory was developed from Sigmund Freud’s work on psychoanalysis. It posits
that all human behaviour can be explained by the dynamic interplay of conscious
and unconscious motivations. Unpleasant or unacceptable impulses are dealt
with through a variety of defence mechanisms, such as the (often unconscious)
displacement of negative feelings and impulses from a powerful object towards a
less powerful and less threatening one (e.g. kicking your dog when you are
angry at your boss).
Adorno and colleagues (1950) believed that similar processes are involved in
the development of a prejudiced personality. They suggested that an overly strict
upbringing, concerned with obedience to parents and conformity to conventional
norms, can lead to conflicting feelings of admiration and aggression towards the
parents. Rather than targeting hostile impulses directly at the parents, who are
viewed as powerful and able to retaliate, these negative feelings are likely to be
displaced and directed at weaker targets or ‘scapegoats’, such as minority groups
against whom derogation and even aggression are socially sanctioned. Adorno et
al. (1950) proposed that this personality syndrome would be reflected in a
person’s social attitudes, simplistic thinking (e.g. intolerance of ambiguity), a
rigid regard for social conventions and deference to authority figures. Adorno
and colleagues referred to this constellation of traits as the authoritarian
personality.

- - - - - - - - - -

authoritarian personality personality syndrome characterized by a simplistic cognitive style, a

 rigid regard for social conventions and submission to authority figures (associated with prejudice
towards minority groups and susceptibility to Fascism).

- - - - - - - - - -

To test their ideas that this personality syndrome would be linked to a variety
of prejudices and was rooted in early childhood experiences, Adorno et al.
(1950) constructed a personality inventory to assess the central aspects of this
syndrome; it was called the ‘F-scale’, as it was designed to measure
susceptibility to Fascist ideas. This measure contained a number of subscales,
including authoritarian submission, conventionalism (the desire to adhere to
ingroup norms) and authoritarian aggression (intolerance of those who violate
conventional values). The scale, together with a number of other scales
measuring different forms of prejudice, was then completed by a large sample
(about 2000 adults) of White Californians. Lending support to the idea that
personality factors are involved in prejudiced attitudes, F-scale scores were
found to correlate positively with various forms of prejudice (e.g. anti-Semitism,
general ethnocentrism). To provide support that this personality pattern was
indeed related to strict parenting, a subset of participants who scored either very
high or very low on the F-scale were then invited for in-depth clinical interviews
that examined the participants’ early childhood experiences. These interviews
seemed to support the theory of Adorno et al. (1950), as those participants who
had high scores on the F-scale (unlike low scorers) tended to idealize their
parents, and indicated that their parents demanded strict obedience and imposed
harsh punishments.
Although The Authoritarian Personality (1950) was highly influential and
stimulated much empirical research, interest in the concept soon waned. This
was partly due to a number of damaging methodological criticisms (the use of
unrepresentative samples, potential interviewer biases in the clinical interviews
and the fact that items were positively framed and open to response bias,
whereby respondents tended to agree with items). More fundamentally, however,
researchers started to move away from psychodynamic explanations of social
phenomena (see Brown, 2010).
Research on the F-scale, and on the idea of a ‘prejudiced personality’, thus
declined in the 1960s and 1970s. However, it was revived by Altemeyer (1981),
who refined the measurement of authoritarianism and reconceptualized it as
right-wing authoritarianism. According to Altemeyer, right-wing authoritarians
tend to have highly conventional attitudes and display a high degree of
submission to the established authorities in their society, such as government
officials and traditional religious leaders. They also show high levels of
aggression in the name of these authorities, in particular towards deviants, and
are willing to help the government persecute almost any outgroup (Altemeyer,
1998). Rather than viewing the origins of right-wing authoritarianism as
displaced aggression towards punitive parents, Altemeyer saw a social
environment that reinforced obedience, conventionalism and aggression as a
more direct determinant, and emphasized the role of social learning processes, in
particular during adolescence. In short, the basis for right-wing authoritarianism
lay now in attitudes and norms rather than in personality. Altemeyer (1981,
1998) developed several versions of the right-wing authoritarianism scale,
which, like the original scale of authoritarianism, includes three subscales:
authoritarian submission, conventionalism and authoritarian aggression. This
scale has been widely used and predicts a range of social attitudes, including
support for harsh punishment of lawbreakers such as the death penalty, support
for aggressive military force, acceptance of the infringement of civil liberties,
and prejudice towards various social groups, including homosexuals and racial
and ethnic outgroups.
 Prejudice and a desire for social dominance
Research on individual differences in prejudice received further attention due to
the introduction of another dimension that seems to explain individual variation
in prejudice, namely social dominance orientation (Pratto, Sidanius,
Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). The concept of social dominance orientation is
grounded in social dominance theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), which proposes
that forming group-based hierarchies is a universal human tendency and that
most societies are therefore organized hierarchically (e.g. in terms of ethnicity,
class, gender). Central to the theory is that the hierarchical social order is
maintained through individual and institutional discrimination, often justified
with the help of so-called ‘legitimizing myths’. Legitimizing myths are
consensually held values, attitudes, beliefs or cultural ideologies that provide
moral and intellectual justification for group inequality, or even the oppression
of some groups by others. Such legitimizing myths can include forms of
prejudice such as racism and sexism (e.g. the societal dominance of white men
can be justified by encouraging the belief in the intellectual inferiority of black
people and women), but also ideas that seem progressive on the surface. An
example of such a hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myth is the ideology of
meritocracy, which proposes that outcomes in society – such as wealth, jobs, and
power – should be allocated according to merit (e.g. abilities) rather than based
on irrelevant factors such as gender, ethnicity or class. Although true
meritocracy should increase social justice and group equality, the belief that
meritocracy exists, and that those who have power, wealth and status deserve
their rewards, while those who are poor have themselves to blame, ignores the
fact that people from different social backgrounds do not have the same
opportunities to succeed. Thus, the belief that meritocracy exists can serve to
legitimize social inequality and help to maintain the (hierarchical) status quo.

- - - - - - - - - -

social dominance orientation an individual difference variable that captures a desire for
hierarchical group relations.

- - - - - - - - - -
 So how do we capture people’s orientations towards group hierarchy versus
group equality? Pratto and colleagues developed the social dominance
orientation scale to assess such individual differences (Pratto et al., 1994; see
Individual Differences 14.1).
If social dominance orientation assesses the degree to which people support or
oppose hierarchical group relations, and if hierarchy-enhancing ‘legitimizing
myths’ help to maintain hierarchical social systems, then the two should be
closely linked. This is indeed the case. There is extensive evidence that people
higher in social dominance orientation are also more sexist, racist and prejudiced
towards immigrants, as well as a range of other social groups (see Pratto,
Sidanius, & Levin, 2006, for a review). Moreover, there is also evidence that
people high in social dominance orientation are more likely to believe in the
notion that people’s income reflects their competence (i.e. that income allocation
is meritocratic) and to oppose progressive policies to advance the cause of
members of minority groups, such as affirmative action, women’s rights
programmes and social policies assisting the poor (Pratto et al., 1994).
Thus, like right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation can
explain individual differences in prejudice. But are right-wing authoritarianism
and social dominance orientation related? These variables may seem similar, in
that people high in right-wing authoritarianism and people high in social
dominance orientation both display high levels of prejudice. But research has
shown that there are a number of differences between these two dimensions that
suggest that they do not have the same psychological roots (see Altemeyer,
1998). For example, unlike right-wing authoritarians, ‘social dominators’ do not
particularly endorse submitting to authorities, nor do they value conventions or
tradition (unless it serves their goals). They are also less religious, more likely to
be male and more likely to be Machiavellian (manipulative of others for their
personal gain) compared to people high in right-wing authoritarianism. Further
evidence that these dimensions are different is that right-wing authoritarianism
and social dominance orientation are only weakly correlated, and seem to
explain different segments of the variance in prejudice (but together they
sometimes explain over 50 per cent of the variance in prejudice against a variety
of outgroups; Altemeyer, 1998).
So social dominators and right-wing authoritarians are not necessarily the
same people. In combination, however, they could make a ‘lethal union’
(Altemeyer, 1998). According to Altemeyer, people high in social dominance
orientation, who desire both intergroup hierarchy and interpersonal dominance,
would make good candidates for dominant leaders who are likely to try to
maximize their power even if that involves acting unethically. People high in
right-wing authoritarianism, on the other hand, exemplify the submissive
follower who would unquestioningly support their leader’s decisions (see Son
Hing, Bobocel, Zanna, & McBride, 2007).
Authoritarianism and social dominance orientation as
ideologies
Although individual difference variables like right-wing authoritarianism and
social dominance orientation explain a substantial amount of variation in
prejudice, the question remains whether personality variables can really provide
explanations for the uniformity and extent of prejudiced beliefs found in
societies such as Nazi Germany or South Africa during the Apartheid era
(Figures 14.3, 14.4). Is it likely that millions of people share the same
dysfunctional personality structure or specific individual orientation (Billig,
1976)? The social psychologist in you probably doubted this already. As you
will already know, people’s opinions and behaviours are strongly influenced by
the social context, in particular the opinions and behaviours of other people
around them (see Chapter 8).
FIGURE 14.3 Racist sign on a bus during the apartheid in South Africa.
Source: © DEA / A. VERGANI. Used under licence from Getty Images.

FIGURE 14.4 A racist sign in Kansas, US at the time when racial segregation
was legally enforced.
Source: © Walter Bibikow. Used under licence from Getty Images.
 INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 14.1
THE SOCIAL DOMINANCE ORIENTATION
SCALE (PRATTO ET AL., 1994) Social dominance
theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) proposes that societies
contain ideologies that each may promote or attenuate
hierarchy at that time. Individual differences in the
extent to which these competing ideologies are
accepted are conceptualized as social dominance
orientation. This scale, developed by Pratto et al.
(1994), measures the extent to which individuals have a
strong desire to promote or reduce intergroup
hierarchies.
Instructions for completion Below is a series of
statements with which you may either agree or
disagree. For each statement, please indicate the
degree of your agreement/disagreement by circling
the appropriate number from ‘1’ to ‘7’.

Instructions for scoring Items 9–16 (which should

not be presented in a block, as they are shown here)
should be reverse coded. How does your score
compare to that of other undergraduate students? In a
recent study by Jetten and Iyer (2010), first-year
undergraduate students at a British university were
asked to complete this scale. Their average score in
the first year of their studies was quite low (M = 2.64,
which is below the scale midpoint of 4). To find out
whether your score is high or low, you can compare it
to this sample. A score ≥3.75 (which is the mean plus
one standard deviation in this sample) would be
relatively high, a score ≤1.53 (the mean minus one
standard deviation) would be relatively low.
Source: Copyright © 1994 by the American Psychological Association. Adapted with
permission. Pratto et al. (1994). Social dominance orientation: A personality variable predicting
social and political attitudes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 741–763. No
further reproduction or distribution is permitted without written permission from the American
 Psychological Association.

Pettigrew (1958) illustrated the importance of the social context in a cross-

cultural study in which he compared samples from South Africa and the southern
United States (both segregated along racial lines at the time) with samples in the
northern United States. He showed that, although levels of authoritarianism in
the samples did not differ, racial prejudice was lower in the northern US
compared to both the southern US and South Africa. This suggested that
personality is not sufficient in explaining racial prejudice and that social context
(e.g. whether or not someone lives in a racist society) has to be taken into
account. Pettigrew (1958) also measured individual differences in social
conformity (e.g. ‘A good group member should agree with the other members’)
in the South African sample. This allowed him to test more directly whether
conformity to social norms played a role in prejudice. As expected, those
respondents who scored high on the social conformity scale were more
prejudiced than those who had low scores.
You might also wonder whether individual differences like authoritarianism
and social dominance orientation really represent enduring personality
characteristics, or whether these variables themselves vary as a function of social
context. Siegel and Siegel (1957) assessed women college students in the United
States at the beginning and end of their first year at college and compared their
level of authoritarianism. The women were assigned to either sorority or
dormitory housing. At this college, sororities (social organizations for female
undergraduates in North America) at the time were more conservative in their
attitudes, while dormitories had more liberal norms. Importantly, these housing
allocations were made on a random basis, ensuring that self-selection could not
account for any of the findings. The results were striking (see Figure 14.5).
While the two groups did not differ in authoritarianism at the beginning of the
college year, the women assigned to the more liberal housing showed a
significant drop in their levels of authoritarianism at the end of the year. Thus, it
seems that authoritarianism changed as a function of social context.
FIGURE 14.5 Changes in authoritarianism over one year at college as a
function of social norms in housing.
Source: Adapted from Siegel & Siegel, 1957. Copyright © 1957 by the
American Psychological Association. Adapted with permission. The use of APA
information does not imply endorsement by APA.
 More recently, a study by Guimond, Dambrun, Michinov, and Duarte (2003)
investigated the possibility that social dominance orientation would change due
to group context. They compared junior (first-year) and senior (third-and final-
year) students studying an elite subject (Law) with students who studied a less
prestigious subject (Psychology). Social dominance theory suggests that people
from dominant groups will show higher levels of social dominance orientation
than people from subordinate or lower-status groups, because they benefit most
from group hierarchy and are therefore most motivated to justify it. For example,
lawyers (the group into which law students are socialized) tend to have more
high-powered positions in society than do other professional groups such as
psychologists. Consistent with the idea that members of dominant groups show
higher levels of social dominance orientation, Guimond et al. found that the law
students generally scored higher on social dominance orientation than the
psychology students, even at the beginning of their studies, suggesting that
levels of social dominance orientation might help to determine the subject of
study and career chosen. Interestingly, these group differences were particularly
pronounced among students in the senior years. This suggests that group
socialization (over time) affects levels of social dominance orientation.
Research also suggests that threats in one’s social environment affect these
individual differences. In one study among a sample of New Zealand students,
Duckitt and Fisher (2003) provided their participants with scenarios that
described the future of New Zealand as either relatively stable and secure (the
‘low threat’ condition), or as likely to involve a rise in crime, violence and social
conflict (the ‘high threat’ condition). They then measured right-wing
authoritarianism and social dominance orientation. Results indicated that
participants in the threat condition reported higher levels of right-wing
authoritarianism. There was also a small increase in social dominance
orientation in the threat condition.
So if variables such as authoritarianism and social dominance orientation are
not entirely stable dispositions, then what are they? A recent theoretical model
reconceptualized these variables as ideological beliefs, determined in part by
personality dimensions, but also by group relations in a given social context.
Duckitt and colleagues (Duckitt, 2001, 2006; Duckitt, Wagner, Du Plessis, &
Birum, 2002) proposed a dual process model (see Theory Box 14.1) in which
right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation represent two
independent dimensions of social attitudes that express different motivational
goals. Right-wing authoritarianism is generated by a view that the world is a
dangerous and threatening place, and results in support for measures that
establish and maintain societal control, stability and cohesion. Such a world
view is brought about by the actual presence of threats in the social context (e.g.
the perceived prevalence of crime, as in Duckitt & Fisher’s, 2003, experiment).
In addition, according to the model, individuals high on the personality
dimension of social conformity are predisposed to view the world in this way.
The goal motivation linked to social dominance orientation, on the other hand, is
that of asserting power and group dominance, and social dominance orientation
is predicted by a view that the world is a ruthlessly competitive jungle. This
world view is activated in a social context characterized by high levels of
inequality and competition over power and status, and is more likely to be held
by individuals who are tough-minded.
Thus, the model suggests that these two world views (the world as a dangerous
place, or a competitive jungle) are relatively stable reflections of personality and
socialization, but are also influenced by the actual social situations. The different
goal motivations linked to right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance
orientation further suggest that these individual differences should predict
prejudice towards different kinds of groups. Because right-wing authoritarianism
expresses a threat-driven motivation to establish security and maintain social
order, people high in this should dislike groups that threaten these values. Social
dominance orientation, on the other hand, should predict negative attitudes
towards outgroups that compete for power or are subordinate, which activates
the desire to establish or maintain dominance. Consistent with this view, Duckitt
(2006) demonstrated that right-wing authoritarianism predicts prejudice towards
groups that violate conventions (e.g. rock stars, drug dealers), while social
dominance orientation predicts prejudice towards subordinate groups (e.g.
disabled people).

THEORY BOX 14.1

THE DUAL PROCESS MODEL OF DUCKITT
AND COLLEAGUES
Source: Adapted from Duckitt (2006), with permission from SAGE
Publications Ltd.
 Summary
In this section we examined personality approaches to prejudice and discussed
two personality dimensions (right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance
orientation) that have been linked to high levels of prejudice. We showed that
these two dimensions are strong and independent predictors of prejudice and
related social attitudes. We also demonstrated, however, that the view that
prejudice is a stable personality dimension is not tenable. We showed that social
factors play an important role in shaping individual levels of prejudice, and that
these individual difference variables are themselves influenced by the social
context. We gave an overview of a recent theoretical development (the dual
process model) that reframed right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance
orientation as ideological orientations that are determined by both personality
and social context.
 THE COGNITIVE APPROACH TO
PREJUDICE
Can we explain prejudice purely by cognitive processes?
The cognitive approach to prejudice arose partly in reaction to the earlier
psychodynamic explanations discussed previously, but also earlier socio-cultural
explanations that saw stereotypes and prejudice as a product of the images we
learn from our environment. In an influential volume that brought together many
examples of this approach, Hamilton (1981) explained that one aim was to see
how far researchers could push the idea that the basis for prejudice was purely
cognitive; just because prejudice entailed affective reactions, it did not mean that
it had an affective or motivational basis. This was the era (in the 1970s and
1980s) in which research had rejected the influence of psychodynamic
principles, and social psychology was increasingly influenced by theories and
models in cognitive psychology and the judgement and decision-making
literature. The dominant information processing models had also moved away
from the idea (and ideal) that we were perfect and rational information
processors, to the notion that there are limits on perception and cognition that
encouraged various cognitive shortcuts or ‘heuristics’ and ‘biases’ (see Chapter
4). Within social psychology this ‘meta-theory’ provided a fertile ground for
researchers looking to explain prejudice and stereotyping in terms of biased
cognitive processes.
Tajfel’s earlier work on accentuation effects in categorization processes (e.g.
Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963) formed a basis for understanding social categorization
processes, and why people might exaggerate differences between groups and
similarities within them. For example, if we take a ‘racial’ categorization (e.g.
white versus black, European versus African) we can identify skin colour as a
dimension that is broadly correlated with this categorization. Having said this,
there is clearly also a broad range of skin colours within these categories (i.e. the
darkest European may even be darker in skin colour than the lightest-skinned
African). However, the judgemental effect of this correlation between category
and colour is such that people are likely to overestimate the similarity of skin
colours within the categories and to overestimate the differences in skin colour
between the categories (see e.g. Corneille, Huart, Becquart, & Brédart, 2004).
 - - - - - - - - - -

accentuation effect when (social) categories are correlated with a continuous dimension (e.g. skin
colour, eye shape) there is a judgemental tendency to overestimate similarities within, and
differences between the categories on this dimension.

- - - - - - - - - -

The accentuation explanation of categorization effects was important in

showing how certain features attributed to stereotyping might occur, namely
perceiving greater similarities within groups (group homogeneity), than between
them. Since Allport’s classic volume The Nature of Prejudice (1954b), one
aspect of stereotyping that has been related to prejudice was
‘overgeneralization’, namely the tendency to see members of a category as like
each other (‘They are all the same’). Evidence of such accentuation or
overgeneralization provides a further dimension to our conceptualization of
prejudice: reduced variability within the group may be seen as a form of
prejudice (or at least stereotyping), which is different from the negative
evaluation of the group or its members. Put another way, if a Caucasian
European says ‘Asians all look alike to me’, this is not the same as saying ‘I
don’t like Asians’. (Although both can be seen as a form of prejudice).
On its own the accentuation principle does not explain negative affective
prejudice towards an outgroup (unless negativity is already correlated with group
membership), nor indeed any tendency to perceive them as more homogeneous
than the ingroup. We now consider some cognitive mechanisms that can result in
prejudice towards outgroups in terms of judgements of ‘them’ being more
homogeneous and more negative than views of ‘us’.
 Outgroup homogeneity, stereotyping and prejudice
One strand of the cognitive approach to stereotyping and prejudice has focused
on perceptions of group variability, and specifically the idea that prejudice
involves us having more homogenous perceptions of outgroups than ingroups
(the outgroup homogeneity effect). Many different explanations for this effect
have been proposed. One obvious possibility concerns ‘selective exposure’, the
argument that we simply know more people from the ingroup, and therefore
have a more variable sample to draw upon when forming impressions of the
ingroup. While this may be true, it is interesting that outgroup homogeneity has
also been found in the case of gender, as in a classic study by Park and Rothbart
(1982). They showed evidence for more homogeneous and stereotypic
perceptions of the opposite gender, yet selective exposure seems unlikely to be
the process driving biased group perceptions in this case, at least for most adults,
who will know many people of both genders. Park and Rothbart suggested that
the way we structure and encode information about ingroups and outgroups may
be important here, and subsequent research has shown that we are more likely to
distinguish subgroups within the ingroup, whereas we treat the outgroup simply
as ‘them’ (Park, Ryan, & Judd, 1992). Consider, for example, the many
subgroups you recognize within your own university (e.g. the athletes, the
workaholics, the Christians, the drinkers), yet when you think of a rival
university, you do not think of them in this more differentiated manner.

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outgroup homogeneity effect a tendency to see the outgroup as more homogeneous than the
ingroup.

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The comparative context is important too. Haslam and Oakes (1995) pointed
to an asymmetry in the way we typically see ingroup members and outgroup
members that could help to explain perceptions of outgroup homogeneity. As we
have seen, the social categorization process means we are likely to accentuate
within-category similarities and between-category differences in an intergroup
context, which should make both ingroup and outgroup seem relatively
homogeneous. However, much of the time we will interact with people from our
ingroup (e.g. people from our own university, or our own country) without the
outgroup being present or salient at all (i.e. an intragroup context). In this
context we would expect the tendency to accentuate within-group similarities to
be weak or absent: we are more likely to see people as unique individuals (there
is no outgroup to compare and contrast our group to, after all). By contrast, when
we interact with outgroup members, this is very likely to make the intergroup
context salient (e.g. ‘We British are different from you French’). When we put
these two contexts together, the asymmetry in how we normally see the ingroup
versus the outgroup is likely to result in us bringing to mind more homogeneous
perceptions of the outgroup than the ingroup overall.
Research also suggests that there may be circumstances in which the ingroup
is seen as more homogenous than the outgroup, and that this is not necessarily
always a bad thing (Simon, 1992; see also The individual’s relation to the group:
group identification and its components, p. 469, and Theory Box 14.2, later in
this chapter). For example, if the dimension of judgement is positive (e.g.
‘intelligence’), ingroup homogeneity might be good (e.g. you are happy when
recruiters, for example, see students from your university as all being highly
intelligent). Homogeneity of viewpoints within the group might also reflect
consensus and solidarity (e.g. political conservatives share the view that liberty
is a fundamental value, while socialists share the view that equality is more
important). Overall, despite some early attempts to link prejudice with more
homogeneous impressions of outgroups, the evidence that this always happens,
and is prejudicial, is rather mixed.
 Illusory correlation: a purely cognitive mechanism
producing prejudice?
The classic example of a purely cognitive explanation for how prejudiced beliefs
about evaluative group differences could be formed comes from the research on
the illusory correlation effect by Hamilton and Gifford (1976). They identified
a mechanism that could, they argued, account for how negative beliefs about
ethnic minorities might develop, even in the absence of any relation between the
group and negative attributes, or indeed any prior expectations about such group
differences. Such expectations can themselves also lead to the perception of
stereotypic differences; the extensive literature on ‘schema’ effects (see Chapter
4) shows how expectations can bias perception in line with established
stereotypes. But how can we explain how these expectations are formed in the
first place? Hamilton and Gifford presented participants with a series of slides of
individual behaviours performed by members of two groups, Group A (the larger
‘majority’ group), and Group B (the smaller ‘minority’ group) – see Figure 14.6.
FIGURE 14.6 Illusory correlation paradigm.
Source: Based on Hamilton & Gifford, 1976, with permission from Elsevier.

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illusory correlation effect a tendency to perceive a relationship that does not actually exist (e.g.
between a group and negative behaviour), or to perceive one that does exist as stronger than it
actually is.
 - - - - - - - - - -

Behaviours differed in terms of their valence (e.g. ‘M. R., a member of Group
A, helped the old lady across the road’; ‘R. A., a member of Group B cheated in
an exam’). As you can see from Figure 14.6, there were twice as many
behaviours describing Group A (the majority group) as Group B (the minority
group), and the majority of behaviours for each group were positive (but,
crucially, in equal proportions). This distribution reflects the fact that negative
behaviours tend to be infrequent, and we also encounter minorities less
frequently than the majority group. However, because the proportion of positive
to negative behaviours is equal in both groups, there is no objective correlation
between group membership and the valence of the behaviours. After the slide
show was over, participants were presented with the behaviours again, but
without group labels, and asked to remember whether they came from Group A
or B. They were also asked to make ratings of members of the groups on positive
and negative traits, and estimate what percentage of positive and negative
behaviours came from members of Groups A and B.
On all measures participants associated Group B with the more negative
behaviours or traits. Why? This finding could not be explained by a tendency to
evaluate smaller groups more negatively because, in a second experiment, where
negative behaviours were now in a majority for both groups, more positive
stereotyping of the minority group resulted. Hamilton and Gifford explained this
finding in terms of the higher accessibility in memory of the most distinctive
combination – infrequent behaviours in the numerically distinctive group. A
distinctive combination that ‘stands out’, influencing memory and judgement, is
an example of the ‘availability heuristic’, the tendency to predict the frequency
of an event based on how easily it can be brought to mind (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1973; see Chapter 4).
Subsequent research has considered alternative explanations for this effect,
however. Some have focused on different memory mechanisms (Fiedler, 1991;
Smith, 1991). Others have argued that there are real (evaluative) differences
between the groups conveyed in the data that are then accentuated (see e.g.
Klauer & Meiser, 2000; McGarty, Haslam, Turner, & Oakes, 1993). Perhaps
more relevant to the rationale of the cognitive approach, however, is evidence
that the illusory correlation effect is eliminated when participants are categorized
as members of one of the target groups (e.g. the minority group, Group B)
themselves (Schaller & Maass, 1989). It seems that motivational factors deriving
from group membership can override this cognitive bias (see intergroup
explanations below, p. 471).
 Developments and integrations
Cognitive misers
Chapter 4 goes into some of the cognitive processes underlying prejudice in
more detail. Consistent with the cognitive approach, research developing the
‘cognitive miser’ metaphor has argued that one reason we stereotype is to
simplify social perception, easing our information processing burden (we are
‘cognitive misers’). A study by Macrae, Milne, and Bodenhausen (1994)
provides a nice illustration of this argument. In this experiment participants were
asked to form an impression of a person based on traits characteristic of them,
presented on a computer (e.g. clever, caring). This was the primary task. At the
same time they listened on headphones to a series of facts about a novel topic:
the secondary task. When forming the impression (the primary task), participants
were able to remember more facts about the novel topic (the secondary task), if
the traits of the target person were also accompanied by a stereotype-consistent
category label (e.g. ‘Doctor’ for the traits ‘clever’ or ‘caring’). Following the
cognitive miser rationale, it seems that the Doctor stereotype saved cognitive
resources by helping to encode the information (Doctors tend to be caring and
clever) leaving more attention free for the other task. However, this only seems
to work when the information fits the stereotype. Yzerbyt, Rocher, and Schadron
(1997) showed that when information about a target person was stereotype
inconsistent (e.g. ‘Skinhead’ in the case of ‘caring’ and ‘clever’), activating the
stereotype actually impaired performance on the secondary task. In this case
resolving the inconsistency between target and stereotype consumed more
cognitive resources. In short, it seems that activating stereotypes is not always
energy-saving.

Explicit versus implicit prejudice, indirect measures and social neuroscience

As well as offering a level of explanation for prejudice, the cognitive approach
has been especially innovative and influential in improving how we measure
prejudice, with implications for how we conceptualize it. Recall that, as we
wrote in the introduction to this chapter, many forms of prejudice have become
more subtle and less blatant than they used to be. This does not necessarily mean
that prejudice is disappearing (would that it were so!) but this is, at least in part,
because social norms have changed, making expressions of prejudice less
socially acceptable. However, if the underlying causes and functions of prejudice
remain, people may simply become better at hiding or suppressing it. Under
these conditions it is particularly important to use measures that get around this.
We have already introduced implicit measures in our earlier chapter on attitudes
(see Chapter 6).
The distinction between implicit and explicit bias is theoretically important, as
well as for methodological reasons. Many dual-process models make a
distinction between processes that tend to be efficient, automatic and less under
our intentional and conscious control, and those that are more conscious and
deliberative (e.g. Fazio & Olson, 2003; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; see Chapters 4
and 6). The influential model of prejudice developed by Devine (1989) is
perhaps the most well-known example of a dual process approach as applied to
stereotyping and prejudice. She argued that we all have access to prejudiced
stereotypes in our culture (e.g. about black people) and that these tend to be
activated automatically and outside of our control, although low-prejudiced
people are consciously motivated to counter this prejudice. This is discussed
extensively in Chapter 4, so we will not go into further details here (see also the
critique of her model by Lepore & Brown, 1997, discussed there).
The more general point to make here is that explicit and implicit measures of
prejudice do not necessarily measure the same thing, and are (therefore) not
always highly correlated (Amodio & Devine, 2006; Correll, Judd, Park, &
Wittenbrink, 2010; Karpinski & Hilton, 2001). Because implicit measures are
more suited to getting around social desirability concerns, it would be tempting
to conclude as a result that implicit measures are therefore better than explicit
measures. This conclusion would be unwarranted, however. Some have argued
also that, just because we might have certain associations (that affect our
response on implicit measures), this does not necessarily mean that we endorse
these associations and any prejudice based on them (e.g. Karpinski & Hilton,
2001). Amodio (2008) also warns that implicit measures have not proven to be
strong or reliable predictors of explicit intergroup behaviour. In a recent review
Gawronski and Payne (2010) point out that social desirability is only one
dimension on which implicit and explicit measures differ, and may not be the
most important. For example, we cannot explain the finding that lower-educated
people tend to be more prejudiced by the simple assumption that better-educated
people are more sensitive to norms of social desirability, as some have supposed.
Wagner and Zick (1995) used a bogus pipeline procedure to reduce socially
desirable responses. The bogus pipeline is a fake physiological procedure
designed to give participants the idea that experimenters have insights into their
true feelings and thoughts (rather like a polygraph or lie detector), which
therefore encourages the participants to respond truthfully (Jones & Sigall,
1971). Wagner and Zick found that the education effect was just as strong when
they used the bogus pipeline (i.e. when effect of social desirability should be
reduced) as when they did not use it. It would therefore be premature to discard
explicit measures of prejudice and always to prefer implicit ones.
Different implicit measures also differ in what they measure; they have their
own strengths and weaknesses, and some appear to be more implicit than others.
For example, Vanman, Saltz, Nathan, and Warren (2004) used activity in the
facial muscles associated with smiling and frowning (electromyography, or
EMG) as an implicit measure of prejudice in White Americans towards black
people (i.e. more frowning, less smiling). They compared this implicit measure
with another widely used measure, the Implicit Association Test or IAT (see
Chapter 6), a reaction time measure. When two compatible responses (e.g.
good/ingroup), are paired together, such that they require the same key press,
reaction times tend to be faster than when incompatible responses are paired
together (e.g. bad/ingroup, or good/outgroup; see Chapter 6 for further details).
The IAT is based on the fact that response times are faster for compatible than
for incompatible responses. Vanman et al. found that such EMG activity reliably
predicted white participants’ racial bias against black applicants, compared with
white applicants, in a hiring decision. Responses on the IAT, however, did not
predict this discrimination, and motivation to control prejudice was not related to
facial muscle activity, whereas responses on the IAT were. In short, it seems that
the white participants were more able to control their IAT responses than their
facial expressions. So although implicit measures definitely add to our
methodological toolkit, they need to be assessed and used on their merits. They
do not necessarily provide a magic bullet, but do form an important part of our
arsenal that helps to provide a more complete picture of prejudice (see Chapter 2
on research methods).
As well as distinguishing between implicit and explicit forms of prejudice, the
developments in implicit measures have also allowed researchers to distinguish
between prejudice and stereotyping at the implicit level. Various researchers had
noted that stereotyping is not necessarily always prejudiced (e.g. Oakes, Haslam,
& Turner, 1994). For example, we can have positive stereotypes about other
groups, and also our own, and these do not have to reflect benevolent prejudice.
It is therefore important to distinguish the evaluative and descriptive dimensions
of stereotypes (Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997). A study by Amodio and
Devine (2006) makes a good case for this point at the implicit level using the
Implicit Association Test (see Chapter 6). They demonstrated both implicit
evaluative bias (i.e. prejudice) towards Black Americans by White Americans,
but also, independently, implicit stereotyping of these groups. One of the most
interesting findings here, however, was that implicit stereotyping and implicit
prejudice were not related (e.g. r = .06 in Study 1). This finding is important for
evaluating the cognitive approach, and more specifically the rationale that
prejudice results from cognitive biases, and that stereotyping processes explain
prejudice (rather than the reverse). Ironically then, developments within social
cognition research using implicit measures have tended to weaken the claim that
prejudice results primarily from cognitive processes, and point to a stronger and
relatively independent affective or emotional basis to prejudice. For example, a
meta-analysis of 57 studies on racial attitudes and discrimination showed
emotional prejudices to be twice as strongly related to discrimination than
stereotypes and beliefs about these groups (Talaska, Fiske, & Chaiken, 2008).
We return to a focus on emotions later in this chapter.
Another methodological innovation that follows the logic of implicit
measurement even further ‘upstream’ concerns the developments in
neuroscience that allow us to locate brain activity associated with social
information processing (see also Chapter 1). This has opened up the field of
‘social neuroscience’ (Amodio & Frith, 2006; Blakemore, Winston, & Frith,
2004). In particular, the technique of functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) allows researchers to determine the location of brain activity that can
shed light on the processes, and the brain regions responsible for them, that can
underlie ingroup bias and prejudice (see e.g. Amodio, 2008; Amodio & Frith,
2006, for reviews). Other techniques, such as research using event-related
potentials (ERPs), are better designed to measure the time course of brain
activity in the cortex than their localization in the brain (e.g. when there is a
specific neural response following presentation of a stimulus). Although these
neuroscience measures can also be seen as indirect measures that are not under
voluntary cognitive control, in some ways they provide a more direct window on
process that is less mediated by language and self-reports. However, once again
research using these techniques takes us beyond the cognitive approach, and also
provides many important insights into the motivational and emotional bases of
prejudice and discrimination. Moreover, as we argue shortly, just because
processes relating to prejudice take place in the brain, this does not necessarily
mean that they correspond to the individual level of analysis.
 Summary
Although designed to capitalize on our cognitive limitations, the cognitive
approach may also have some limitations of its own, and offers perhaps only a
partial explanation of prejudice. First of all, the cognitive emphasis on social
categorization and stereotyping processes as forming the basis for prejudice
tends to neglect the possibility that motivation (and prejudice itself) may
influence categorization and stereotyping. Moreover, we cannot assume that
stereotypes are necessarily prejudiced by definition (after all, we can have
stereotypes about our own groups!). The passions aroused in prejudice mean that
the presence of motivation may often play a key role in producing as well as
overriding prejudice (in contrast to Devine’s approach). Although culture,
cognition and personality all offer accounts of how prejudice might occur, it is
also not always clear that they offer compelling explanations of why it occurs or
where it comes from. Shifting the explanation to another level (the societal or the
individual level) should not disguise this. To address this question it is now
appropriate to consider the level of the phenomenon of prejudice itself: the
(inter)group level.
 GROUP APPROACHES TO PREJUDICE
Can prejudice be explained at the (inter) group level, or does it
reduce to individual self-interests?
Prejudice is directed at groups. When we analyse the word prejudice, it means
pre-judging someone, judging them before the facts are known, typically on the
basis of some known group features (i.e. stereotypes). But if prejudice is about
seeing and judging people as members of groups, it is perhaps odd that so much
research on this topic views the phenomenon from the perspective of the
individual’s psychology and functioning. The previous sections focused on
individual differences, and on the sort of cognitive processes that affect us all, as
two approaches to explaining prejudice that both operate at the level of the
individual. We now consider explanations at the level of the group, by focusing
first on the relation of members to their own group (intragroup approaches) and
then to explanations that refer more explicitly to the relation of the ingroup to the
outgroup (intergroup approaches).
 Intragroup processes, ingroup bias and prejudice
From a group perspective, one way to understand why people come to dislike or
even hate others because of their group membership is to understand their
relationship to their own group. Humans are social animals and, like other
primates, we live in groups. Although we might not always recognize it, again
like other primates, we derive many benefits from the group. Anthropologists,
evolutionary psychologists and behavioural ecologists have emphasized the
benefits of group living (see also Chapter 12). In earlier times the group
provided considerable benefits in terms of security from other individuals and
groups, but also in terms of cooperation within the group. Evolutionary theorists
have proposed that genes that support cooperation and group living might be
selected for and give the individuals (or more precisely their genes) an advantage
(Dunbar, Barrett, & Lycett, 2005). Although ‘group selection’ (the idea that
groups replicate and survive for the good of the group or species as a whole) has
been discredited as a mechanism of evolution (e.g. Dawkins, 1976), ‘group
living’ and all the traits and tendencies that contribute to that still confer many
individual advantages (Dunbar et al., 2005; Sober & Wilson, 1998).
Anthropologists have argued that many of the characteristics that make us
uniquely human and distinguish us from other species and even other primates
(e.g. large brain size, use of language and so forth) derive from our adaptation to
cooperative group living in an uncertain world (Dunbar et al., 2005). Dunbar et
al. suggest that there may even be an optimal group size, relating to the
maximum number of people we can feasibly know and trust. Groups not only
help to promote our safety, security and survival, they also help us to fulfil other
needs, including esteem and respect, which are important to our position within
the group. The need to be esteemed and respected by others can be seen as
aspects of a general need to belong and to feel valued by others (Baumeister &
Leary, 1995). One influential account of self-esteem and its functions, the
‘sociometer theory’ (Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995) argues that self-
esteem provides us with a ‘barometer’ of the extent to which others accept us,
and groups are one important source of this acceptance (see also Chapter 5 for
sociometer model).
Returning to our focus on prejudice, what do these group benefits mean for our
understanding of prejudice? If we recognize that groups can be good for
individuals, is it possible to explain prejudice against outgroups merely through
the benefits that the ingroup can provide to individuals? We might call this an
‘intragroup’ explanation of prejudice, because it looks inward to the benefits the
ingroup provides, rather than at any threats that the outgroup may pose. A key
argument is that we favour other ingroup members in our behaviour because
there is an expectation of reciprocity within ingroups that we might not get from
outgroups (Gaertner & Insko, 2000; Rabbie, Schot, & Visser, 1989; Yamagishi
& Kiyonari, 2000; see also Chapter 10). Although expectations of greater
reciprocity within the ingroup could help to explain some behaviour that favours
the ingroup (and we return to this below), it does not so easily explain attitudes
or behaviour that derogate the outgroup. To understand this we may need to
move to the intergroup level, which we now consider.
 Intergroup explanations of prejudice and
discrimination
If prejudice occurs primarily between groups, surely it makes sense to search for
‘intergroup’ explanations? One typical reaction to this idea is ‘Maybe, but our
job as psychologists means getting inside the head, which is after all located
within the individual’. While this is true, if we follow this line of reasoning too
dogmatically the intergroup level of analysis might be seen as more the domain
of sociology. It would be a mistake, however, to relinquish the intergroup level
of analysis completely to other social sciences, and a great loss to (social)
psychology. Two famous social psychologists, Donald Campbell and Muzafer
Sherif (see Leader in the Field, Muzafer Sherif) realized this point, and were
independently responsible, with their colleagues, for one of the first intergroup
explanations of prejudice and discrimination: realistic conflict theory.
The key idea of realistic conflict theory is that prejudice and discrimination
reflect real conflicts of interests between groups that are in competition for
valued but scarce resources (like wealth, but also status and prestige). The most
famous example of this explanation is the ‘boys camp’ study conducted by
Sherif and his colleagues at Robbers Cave, Oklahoma (Sherif, Harvey, White,
Hood, & Sherif, 1961), which we have already outlined in Chapter 1. For their
field study, Sherif et al. capitalized on the common practice in America for
parents to send their children away to camp for the summer. In this case well-
adjusted white middle-class boys, around 12 years old, who did not know each
other beforehand, were selected to take part, minimizing the chance that
personality factors or preexisting loyalties or conflicts could play a role. In the
first phase the boys formed separate groups (named the ‘Eagles’ and the
‘Rattlers’), unaware of each other. In the second phase the experimenters
introduced the groups and set up a series of competitions between them (e.g. tug-
of-war, making a hut from available materials) in which only one group would
win a prize (a so-called zero-sum conflict). As predicted, this led to conflict
between the groups. This was only reduced in the third phase of the experiments,
which gave the boys tasks that could only be achieved by the groups cooperating
(e.g. to pull a truck with their food supplies out of the mud) – Figure 14.7. As we
will see again later, such superordinate goals (goals which can only be
achieved by the groups pooling their resources and working together) can be
important in reducing prejudice and conflict between groups.
FIGURE 14.7 (a) and (b) (a) The Rattlers compete against the Eagles in tug-of-
war contest: They copy the Eagles’ strategy of digging in by sitting down when
the going gets tough; (b) Now they are on the same side in the tug-of-war: the
Rattlers and Eagles combine their efforts to start the truck.
Source: Photos from The Robbers Cave Experiment by Muzafer Sherif, et al.
(Wesleyan University Press, 1988). © 1988 by Muzafer Sherif and reprinted by
permission of Wesleyan University Press. www.wesleyan.edu/wespress

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superordinate goals goals that can only be achieved by two groups working together
cooperatively, to mutual benefit.
 - - - - - - - - - -

LEADER IN THE FIELD

Muzafer Sherif (1906–1978) was born in Turkey and moved to the
US to study at Harvard. At Yale he worked with Carl Hovland (see
Leader in the Field, Chapter 1) on an influential approach to social
judgement processes and how these were affected by one’s own
attitude and involvement in the topic, before settling at the
University of Oklahoma. He also conducted pioneering research on
social influence and norm formation, and developed a paradigm of
influence using the autokinetic effect (see Chapter 8). However, he
has perhaps become best known for his research on the Robbers
Cave boys camp studies (1961), which became a cornerstone of
realistic conflict theory (see also related research by Donald
Campbell (see Leader in the Field, Chapter 2) and his associates).
This theoretical approach remains one of the most powerful
explanations of intergroup conflict.
The boys camp studies clearly qualify as an intergroup explanation, because
the boys’ interests are bound up with their own group (just as in the intragroup
explanation described earlier), but they are also negatively related to the interests
of the outgroup. In other words there is a positive interdependence within the
ingroup but a negative interdependence with the outgroup. When the
superordinate goals, which could only be achieved together, were introduced,
this negative interdependence between groups transformed into a positive
interdependence between groups.

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positive interdependence a situation in which there are positive bonds between individuals or
groups characterized by cooperation, reciprocity and mutual benefits.

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 - - - - - - - - - -

negative interdependence a situation in which bonds between individuals or groups are

characterized by conflicts of interests, often leading to antagonism or realistic conflict.

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The realistic conflict explanation of prejudice, like the intragroup explanation

based on reciprocity or positive interdependence within the group, depends to a
large degree on self-interest resulting from tangible rewards. In other words, to
the extent that one’s own group benefits, individual members of the group are
likely to benefit also. Although this is a powerful explanation of intergroup
behaviour, one could rightly ask whether this is a truly intergroup explanation
after all. That is, if group interests correspond with individual interests (just as
with the intragroup explanation earlier), maybe the intergroup explanation can
be reduced to the individual level of interest and explanation? Although
engaging in conflict can also be dangerous and costly, a more persuasive
example of the intergroup level of explanation would be one in which individual
self-interest is ruled out. This is one key feature of the so-called minimal group
paradigm developed by Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, and Flament (1971), which they
designed to go beyond the realistic conflict approach. See Research Close-Up
14.1 to read about this paradigm, which we suggest you do now.
As we have already hinted in the section on intragroup explanations, some
researchers have argued that the findings of the minimal group studies, despite
trying to rule out self-interest (by ensuring that rewards are never allocated
directly to the self), did not entirely succeed in doing so. A key argument here is
that people may still have expectations of positive interdependence and
reciprocity: they expect other ingroup members to reward them, so it makes
rational sense to reward others in the ingroup too (e.g. Gaertner & Insko, 2000;
Rabbie et al., 1989). Indeed, research that measures perceived ingroup
reciprocity, or explicitly manipulates dependence on the ingroup for rewards,
confirms that these are powerful predictors of ingroup favouritism in minimal
groups (Gaertner & Insko, 2000; Rabbie et al., 1989; Stroebe, Lodewijkx, &
Spears, 2005).
So does this mean that evidence of minimal ingroup bias is not evidence of an
intergroup explanation after all? Maybe not. The intragroup explanation based
on interdependence and expected reciprocity could explain use of the maximum
ingroup profit strategy in which the ingroup maximizes its benefits. However, it
makes less sense for the maximum difference strategy (see Figure 14.8 in
Research Close-Up 14.1), in which group members maximize the difference in
rewards given to the ingroup versus the outgroup, even at a cost to the ingroup in
terms of absolute rewards; yet, the maximum difference is also a strongly
preferred reward strategy. Maximum difference looks much more like an
intergroup strategy that takes into account (antagonistic) relations with the
outgroup. This argument does not mean that self-interest is entirely ruled out, but
use of the maximum difference strategy does reflect group interests.
FIGURE 14.8 The different response strategies on the Tajfel matrices (note:
this has been adapted and simplified for illustrative purposes).
Source: From Van Leeuwen, 2000, with permission from Dr Van Leeuwen.

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ingroup bias behaviours or evaluations that favour the ingroup over the outgroup; ingroup
favouritism treats the ingroup more positively, outgroup derogation treats the outgroup less
positively.

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So evidence for the intergroup level of explanation seems to be strengthened

by the results from the minimal group paradigm as well as realistic conflict
theory. Although the mechanism for the minimal ingroup bias, and specifically
maximum difference, remains unclear, we go into some of the proposed
explanations below. However, the first general lesson of the minimal group
studies was to demonstrate that the individual level of analysis was not the
whole story. This paradigm was instrumental in showing the need for a concept
of self at the group level that speaks to group interests (in contrast to purely
individual self-interest) to match the intergroup level of explanation. So was
born the concept of social identity, which emerged out of the minimal group
research and led later to the development of social identity theory (Tajfel &
Turner, 1979; see below).
Now recall our question of whether explaining behaviour in psychological
terms is possible when we consider intergroup behaviour (there is no
psychology, at the level of the group as a whole, after all). So how is a
psychology of groups possible, given that experience is always individually
based? The concept of social identity offers one answer to this conundrum.
Tajfel (1978b) defined social identity as that part of the self-concept
corresponding to our knowledge of our group membership and the value and
emotional significance we attach to this (see Leader in the Field, Henri Tajfel).
Social identities refer to groups or social categories in the social world (e.g.
women, Scots, overestimators, etc.) so it is clearly part of the intergroup level of
social reality. However, because this identity can be an important part of how we
see ourselves, it is also part of our own psychological make-up, and can
therefore help to explain intergroup behaviour.

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social identity that part of our self-concept corresponding to group memberships, and the value and
emotional significance attached to these memberships.

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LEADER IN THE FIELD

Henri Tajfel (1919–1982) was born to a Jewish family in
Wloclawek, northern Poland and was studying in Paris when World
War II broke out. Had he not concealed his Polish identity when the
Nazis invaded, he would most likely have perished in the
concentration camps instead of becoming a French prisoner of war.
 After the war he worked to resettle refugees before settling himself
in Britain, where he studied Psychology as a mature student at
Birkbeck College and received his PhD from London University in
1954. He moved later to the chair at Bristol University, creating an
influential research group there through the 1970s. His early research
on categorization and social judgement (see accentuation effect)
formed an important foundation for social identity theory, which he
developed at Bristol with John Turner (see Leader in the Field, John
Turner, later in this chapter). His wartime experiences certainly
coloured his understanding of intergroup relations and prejudice.
Although the significance of social identity could not have been
clearer from this experience, Tajfel had to create this concept in
order to open up a field previously individualistic in its focus. His
influence in developing social psychology in Europe both
theoretically and institutionally, as one of the founding fathers of the
European Journal of Social Psychology and the European
Association of Social Psychology, provides a lasting legacy in
Europe and beyond.

RESEARCH CLOSE-UP 14.1

THE MINIMAL GROUP PARADIGM

Tajfel, H., Billig, M. G., Bundy, R. P., & Flament, C. (1971). Social categorization and
intergroup behaviour. European Journal of Social Psychology, 1, 149–178.

Introduction The purpose of these seminal

experiments was to probe the minimal conditions for
creating discrimination or ingroup bias. Previous
research had shown that intergroup discrimination
depended on realistic conflicts of interests between
groups (Sherif et al., 1961) or some sense of
interdependence or common fate within the group
(Rabbie & Horwitz, 1969). It is not entirely clear why
 Tajfel and colleagues thought that stripping away
such factors would reveal any evidence of bias, but it
is good that they did! In the introduction they refer to
the role of categorization as providing order and
meaning, harking back to Tajfel’s pioneering article
on cognitive aspects of prejudice (Tajfel, 1969).
However the important point of these studies was first
to establish the minimal basis for discrimination as a
phenomenon.
So what are minimal groups? Tajfel at al. spelled out the minimal criteria as
including the following:
1. No face-to-face interaction (within or between groups).
2. Complete anonymity.
3. Respondents should not personally gain from their responses (to rule out
self-interest).
4. A strategy designed to differentiate between groups should be in
competition with rational/utilitarian principles of obtaining the maximum
benefit for all, and also gaining most for the ingroup in absolute terms. In
other words, for this strategy it is not important if we get less than we could,
so long as we get more than them.
5. Responses should be made as important and real as possible (i.e. involve
concrete rewards rather than some form of evaluation).
With these principles Tajfel et al. developed two innovative procedures
relating to (a) the social categorization process and (b) the measurement of
reward allocations, which are key features of the minimal group paradigm.
These are highly influential and still widely used.
Method Participants Participants were Bristol
schoolboys aged 14–15 years (N = 64, Experiment 1;
N = 48, Experiment 2).
Procedure: ‘mere’ social categorization Social
 categorization was established in two different ways.
In Experiment 1 the schoolboys were categorized by
means of a dot estimation procedure: they were asked
to estimate the number of dots projected on a screen,
presented for a fraction of a second. On the basis of
40 of these trials the boys were told that they were
either in a group of under-estimators (i.e. a group who
underestimated the number of dots) or a group of
overestimators. In fact, they were assigned randomly
to these categories. In Experiment 2 the now-famous
preference for the paintings of Klee versus Kandinsky
was used. Here participants indicated their aesthetic
preferences for a series of 12 paintings (six by each
painter) designated as ‘A’ or ‘B’ for each paired
choice (although in fact some pairs contained two by
the same painter). Once again actual assignment to
categories was random.
Participants then completed the reward matrices anonymously in separate
cubicles.
Measures: the Tajfel matrices Tajfel et al.
developed a series of reward matrices that could be
used to test for ‘minimal’ ingroup bias. Each matrix
consisted of a row of paired numbers with (for
example) the upper number of each pair
corresponding to what a specific member of the
ingroup would receive, if chosen, and the lower
number going to a specific outgroup member. The
 first point to note is that Tajfel et al. therefore tried to
rule out self-interest by requiring that rewards were
allocated to a specific ingroup and outgroup member
(and not the groups as a whole) so that these rewards
would never get back to the allocators themselves
(criterion 3). The matrices were designed to
distinguish between different allocation strategies
(criterion 4). These included fairness (equal allocation
to ingroup and outgroup), maximum joint profit
(MJP), maximum ingroup profit (MIP), and maximum
difference (i.e. in favour of the ingroup; MD). See
Figure 14.8 for a simplified version illustrating these
different strategies (Van Leeuwen, 2000).
The design of the matrices allowed the preferences for different strategies to
be tested against each other (referred to as ‘pull scores’). Perhaps the most
theoretically interesting strategy is the maximum difference strategy (see
criterion 4) because, when contrasted with the maximum ingroup profit
strategy, this could mean giving fewer rewards to the ingroup in absolute
terms in order to ensure that the ingroup gets more than the outgroup.
Results Summarizing the key findings across the
studies a first point, often overlooked, is that a
substantial percentage of participants opt for a
fairness strategy in allocating rewards to ingroup
versus outgroup (almost 20 per cent in experiment 1).
Experiment 2 showed that preference for MD was
stronger than MIP, which in turn was stronger than
MJP. In other words, there was a preference for
reward allocations that maximized the difference in
 favour of the ingroup, even at the cost in absolute
terms to the ingroup. This can also be seen as a form
of derogation toward the outgroup.
Discussion The results of these first minimal group
studies were extremely provocative, because they
seem to show that no conflict of interest, and indeed
no self-interest at all, is necessary for people to
discriminate on behalf of their group. In the paper
Tajfel et al. proposed a ‘generic’ norm explanation for
the discrimination, suggesting that there is a basic
norm of competitiveness within Western societies that
leads people to discriminate in favour of their own
group. However, this explanation fell from favour,
partly because a similar case can be made for a
fairness norm (because there was clear evidence that
this strategy was widely used too). The ‘social
identity’ explanation would only emerge later.
As Tajfel’s definition makes clear, we can have strong commitment to, and
identification with, these social identities. People who support ‘their’ football
team, people who join a demonstration to protest at education cuts, against the
invasion of Iraq, or in solidarity with the plight of Palestinians in Gaza, arguably
all do this because of a commitment to a group and its cause and not just out of
individual self-interest. The view that ‘psychology is about individuals and
sociology about groups’ therefore reflects a mistaken understanding of
disciplinary boundaries. The idea that psychology applies only to the individual
level of analysis reflects rather a philosophical position, sometimes called
‘methodological individualism’ (Schumpeter, 1908). The concept of social
identity opens up a different way of thinking about intergroup relations, less
focused on individual functions.

Evidence for social identity and ingroup bias from social neuroscience
Evidence for social identity and ingroup bias from social neuroscience
Quite recently research in social neuroscience has been instructive in addressing
the question of whether there is a social level of self associated with the ingroup
that could help to explain ingroup bias. In one study Volz, Kessler, and Von
Cramon (2009) used the technique of functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI), which is able to localize brain activity, to address this question. The area
of the brain that is associated with processing information relevant to the self is
the medial prefrontal cortex (MPC), and previous research has shown that this
area is especially active when the individual self-concept is implicated (see e.g.
Macrae, Moran, Heatherton, Banfield, & Kelley, 2004; see Chapter 5). In their
study Volz et al. categorized participants according to the minimal group
procedure based on a bogus perceptual test (foreground versus background
figure perceivers). While their brain activity was being monitored, participants
then engaged in a number of reward distribution tasks, similar to the Tajfel
matrices, designed to measure strategies of fairness and intergroup
discrimination on trials that involved allocating rewards to ingroup and outgroup
members (mixed trials; see also Tajfel et al., 1971).
Very similarly to the original minimal group studies, Volz et al. were able to
distinguish participants who predominantly chose fairness strategies, and those
who were more discriminatory in their responses. Crucially, the participants who
showed more ingroup bias, also showed greater activation for those areas
associated with the self and thus predicted to relate also to social identity (i.e.
areas located in the medial prefrontal cortex). Those engaged in fairness,
however, showed no such activation. Moreover, four participants who were
found not to identify with their group (they scored below the midpoint of a group
identification measure) also showed no such activation of the MPC, whereas
four randomly selected participants who identified with their group did. This
evidence suggests that our group self or social identity is indeed very much part
of the self-concept, as Tajfel originally claimed, and just as much as is the
individual self. The fact that some group identification is necessary for this
social self to become activated is also evidence that a certain level of group
identification is essential to social identity. Before we consider aspects of the
intergroup context that might help us to explain discrimination further, it is now
useful to examine in more detail the nature of group identification, as our bridge
to the group, and how we conceptualize and measure this.
 The individual’s relation to the group: group
identification and its components
What is group identification and can it explain prejudice?
Following Tajfel’s definition of social identity as our psychological bridge to the
group, it is possible to further conceptualize and indeed measure group
identification as the strength of this bridge. This may also be useful in helping
to predict and explain prejudice and ingroup bias. At first sight, focusing on
individual differences in group identification sounds reminiscent of other
individual difference approaches to prejudice we considered earlier (e.g. right-
wing authoritarianism), which we associated more with individual level
explanations. An important difference here is that measures of group
identification relate directly to the ingroup (and thus the group level), while
allowing for individual variations in this link (helping to explain individual
variation). Identification may also vary as a function of the social context in
which group identities become salient. For example, even people who normally
only identify weakly with their nationality may become more passionate about
their country when the Olympics or the football World Cup comes round every
four years (Figure 14.9). Put another way, group identification may be an
outcome (or dependent variable) influenced by the social context as well as an
input (or independent variable).
FIGURE 14.9 Even people who normally only identify weakly with their
nationality may become more passionate about their country when the Olympics
or Football World Cup comes round every four years.
Source: © Michael Blann. Used under licence from Getty Images.
 - - - - - - - - - -

group identification the degree to which people see themselves in terms of a group membership
(group-level self-definition) and the degree of value and emotional attachment to the group (group-
level self-investment).

- - - - - - - - - -

Recall Tajfel’s definition of social identity as the knowledge of our group

memberships and the value and emotional significance attached to these. This
points to (at least) two different dimensions of group identification. Leach and
colleagues (Leach et al., 2008) developed a scale to measure and validate the
(componential) structure of group identification that fits well with Tajfel’s
definition. This research employed response items used in a range of previous
research (in which participants rated their agreement on 7-point Likert scales:
strongly agree to strongly disagree) to test a model of the structure of group
identification. The first two studies, using Dutch psychology students, examined
three different group identities (as Dutch, as Europeans, as students of the
University of Amsterdam). For these different group identities the same
hierarchical structure for group identification was found in each case (see
Theory Box 14.2). This confirmed the general distinction between a self-
definition dimension of group identification and a self-investment dimension, at
the upper level of the hierarchy, that in turn include further components at the
lower level. The self-definition dimension comprises two components:
individual self-stereotyping as a group member (e.g. ‘I am similar to the average
ingroup member’); and ingroup homogeneity (e.g. ‘Ingroup members have a lot
in common’). The self-investment dimension comprises three components:
solidarity (e.g. ‘I feel a bond with the group’); satisfaction (e.g. ‘I feel glad to be
in the group’); and centrality (e.g. ‘This group is an important part of who I
am’). Further studies confirmed the construct, discriminant and predictive
validity of the scales (see Chapter 2).
Group identification is important because it makes clear that group
membership is not just an objective matter, but is also psychological and
subjective. This point makes groups a topic for social psychologists and not just
sociologists. It can help to explain how different people might react to similar
situations differently. If group identification is a measure of our relation to the
group, perhaps it is an obvious candidate to help explain prejudice? And perhaps
it is more relevant to the intergroup context than other individual difference
variables? Whereas ideological factors such as authoritarianism and social
dominance orientation are clearly about the intergroup context, group
identification more specifically locates us in the intergroup context and gives us
investment in our group.

THEORY BOX 14.2

GROUP-LEVEL SELF-DEFINITION AND SELF-
INVESTMENT: A HIERARCHICAL
(MULTICOMPONENT) MODEL OF INGROUP
IDENTIFICATION
Source: Based on Leach et al. (2008). Group-level self-definition and self-
investment: A hierarchical (multicomponent) model of ingroup
identification. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95, reproduced
with permission of APA.
 So could group identification perhaps explain prejudice and ingroup bias?
There is some evidence that this may indeed be the case. A series of studies by
Bourhis and his collaborators has shown that high group identifiers generally
show more ingroup bias in the minimal group paradigm. For example, in one
study Gagnon and Bourhis (1996) showed that high group identifiers with their
minimal ingroup discriminated more against the outgroup, and that group
identification was actually a better predictor of discrimination in this study than
expectations of ingroup-reciprocity. However some scholars have criticized this
research because group identification was measured after discrimination, making
the causal direction unclear (see Gaertner & Insko, 2000; Stroebe et al., 2005).
Some researchers have made a claim for a general link between ingroup
identification and ingroup bias (e.g. Hinkle & Brown, 1990), but this has also
been disputed (Turner, 1999). Although group identification may predict
prejudice and ingroup bias under certain conditions, there are problems with
seeing it as a general predictor of ingroup bias or prejudice. A first question is,
how does group identification arise, what causes it (which would just defer the
question of what causes prejudice and raise the problem of circularity of
explanation). Moreover, does it necessarily follow that ‘I like us, therefore I
dislike them’? Put more graphically, Brewer (1999) has argued that ‘ingroup
love’ is different from ‘outgroup hate’; ingroup favouritism is not the same as
outgroup derogation. In fact, the evidence from the minimal group paradigm
shows that when the Tajfel matrices are used to distribute penalties or
punishments rather than rewards, then the typical ingroup bias effect (or
outgroup derogation, as implied by the punishments) tends to reduce or
disappear (and it is debatable whether the maximum difference strategy is true
derogation where it involves the allocation of positive rewards). Mummendey
and Otten (1998) refer to this finding as the positive–negative asymmetry,
namely the tendency to show more ingroup bias when allocating positive
resources (e.g. rewards) than negative ones (e.g. punishments). One explanation
for this asymmetry is that punishment or outgroup derogation is harsher than
ingroup favouritism, and less normatively accepted, especially when there is
little overt justification for discrimination as in the minimal group paradigm (see
Threats to group values later in this chapter).

- - - - - - - - - -

positive–negative asymmetry evidence that people show more ingroup bias when distributing
positive rewards than punishment or penalties.

- - - - - - - - - -

Such findings tend to support Brewer’s conclusion that the minimal group
paradigm (despite the maximum difference effect) provides at best weak
evidence for derogation of the outgroup. So, although ingroup identification (like
ingroup reciprocation) can play a role in understanding prejudice, it does not
easily explain more extreme forms of prejudice and discrimination on its own.
However, as we shall see, the concept of identification is central to
understanding social identity and the group level of explanation: we need a
certain level of identification to see ourselves as group members and thus to
generate minimal ingroup bias. Group identification can also be an important
moderator variable, working in combination with other factors to explain
individual differences in prejudice or discrimination. We now turn to different
aspects of the intergroup context that can produce the threats that help to
motivate and explain prejudice and discrimination, especially in its stronger
forms.
 Elaborating the intergroup level
How do threats posed by the outgroup help to explain prejudice
and discrimination?
We now incorporate relations with the outgroup more explicitly into our
theorizing. One way to think about this is to consider the outgroup posing a
range of threats to the ingroup, with prejudice and discrimination forming ways
of coping with these threats. Considering these threats also introduces some of
the key intergroup theories of prejudice and discrimination.

Threats to group existence

Perhaps the most serious threat one could imagine at the intergroup level is a
threat to the very existence of one’s group. Fortunately examples of genocide are
rare (although alas not rare enough) but milder degrees of threat (e.g. to group
security) are also relevant. Although such threats can be manifest in the
antagonism or aggression of the outgroup, outgroups can also pose a threat to
group security for other reasons. One interesting recent evolutionary account for
the emergence of xenophobia (fear of foreigners) is the threat of disease and
infection they might pose (e.g. Faulkner, Schaller, Park, & Duncan, 2004).
Faulkner et al. showed in four correlational studies that people who were more
chronically worried about their vulnerability to disease were also more likely to
show xenophobic attitudes to unfamiliar immigrant groups (i.e. those who could
be seen to pose a potential disease threat). They also demonstrated this
experimentally. In two experiments they presented participants with evidence for
the ease with which bacteria are transmitted (or, in a control condition, evidence
concerning the ease with which accidents occur). Crossed with this
manipulation, the Canadian participants then either expressed their attitudes
towards a familiar immigrant outgroup (e.g. Scottish, Taiwanese) or an
unfamiliar immigrant outgroup (e.g. Nigerian, Mongolian). Results confirmed
the prediction that attitudes to the unfamiliar immigrant outgroup were
particularly hostile when participants were also exposed to the disease salient
condition.
We now turn to a very different kind of theory, which also concerns threats to
our existence. According to terror management theory (Greenberg, Solomon, &
Pyszczynski, 1997), being reminded of our own mortality can evoke intense
existential angst, causing us to seek reassurance that our lives have meaning
through a retreat into familiar cultural values and groups. One of the predicted
consequences is increased ingroup favouritism (Castano, Yzerbyt, Paladino, &
Sacchi, 2002; Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991). Although mortality
salience is a threat at the individual level, threats to the group’s existence could
be just as likely to evoke group-level responses, and perhaps more so. Research
confirms that a sense of group continuity (i.e. that the group will still exist when
you die) can be very important to group esteem (Sani, 2008) and fulfil the need
to belong. Events that physically threaten the safety of some members of the
group, or attacks on its icons (e.g. flag burning) could invoke potentially
powerful motives and defence mechanisms. The 9/11 and subsequent suicide
attacks by Al Qaida terrorists are examples that can be interpreted as threats to
Western culture and values that evoke such defensive reactions (Figure 14.10).
FIGURE 14.10 The 9/11 and subsequent suicide attacks by Al Qaida terrorists
are examples that can be interpreted as threats to Western culture and values
that evoke defensive reactions.
Source: © Steve Winter. Used under licence from Getty Images.
 Other more common examples of existential threat are likely to be experienced
by minority groups, especially where their identity relies on group attributes that
might be under threat, such as a minority language. For example, Livingstone,
Spears, Manstead, and Bruder (2009) showed that the Welsh-speaking minority
within Wales (where only 20 per cent of Welsh people speak their heritage
language) were more likely to justify a violent campaign of arson attacks on
holiday homes owned by the English in their Welsh homeland. Historically the
English had tried to eradicate the Welsh language, which explains both the
relatively low percentage of people who speak it today, and why Welsh speakers
might feel existential threat. Indeed this effect was strongest for Welsh speakers
who felt their Welsh identity to be vulnerable (i.e. under threat) and who also
perceived the relationship with England to be unfair or illegitimate. This
interaction was absent for Welsh people who do not speak Welsh, who are less
likely to see their Welsh identity in terms of the Welsh language, and therefore
experience less existential threat.

Threats to resources: realistic and relative

As we have already seen in realistic conflict theory, one of the most powerful
explanations for prejudice between groups is that outgroups are seen to threaten
our interests, especially when we are in conflict or competition for the same
valued resources (Sherif et al., 1961; see also Esses, Jackson, Dovidio, &
Hodson, 2005, for a more recent application). Clearly material factors are
important in explaining intergroup conflicts. However, the minimal group
studies showed that realistic threats are not necessary for discrimination, and the
idea that threats are not always objective, but often more subjective, is also well
made by relative deprivation theory (Runciman, 1966). The key idea here is that
what we have, as groups as well as individuals, depends not just on objective
circumstances, but on how we feel we are doing compared to others. In other
words, even if we are doing quite well in objective, material terms, if we think
others are doing better, we are likely to feel relatively deprived. For example,
when Germany was reunified after the collapse of the former Soviet bloc,
suddenly there were strong reasons for the former East Germans (‘Ossis’) to
compare their lot with the more economically successful former West Germany
(‘Wessis’). The outcome of this comparison resulted in a clear feeling of
relative deprivation for those in the East, and led to realistic conflicts over
resources, such as the view that more future jobs and investment should go to
East rather than West Germany (Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, & Mielke, 1999).
 - - - - - - - - - -

relative deprivation a resentful feeling that the self or ingroup is worse off than the other or
outgroup.

- - - - - - - - - -

Threats to group status and esteem

If relative deprivation theory focuses on what your group lacks compared to
others, social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) emphasizes more generally
how your group is, compared to others. A key theme in social identity theory is
that people compare their own group with other groups and seek to differentiate
their own group positively, thereby providing a positive social identity and sense
of group worth. Making social comparisons with higher status groups on valued
dimensions is therefore likely to be quite threatening, because this implies a low
status and negative social identity. Social identity theory proposes that groups
will strive to attain (or maintain) positive identity, and to positively differentiate
their group from these outgroups. Positive differentiation is closely related to
the concept of ingroup bias, and involves making the group positively different
from a comparison outgroup on available dimensions of comparison. This could
entail discrimination (as in the reward allocations of the minimal group
paradigm), but it could also involve evaluative ratings that are less
discriminatory (e.g. ‘We are kinder than them’; ‘We are more moral than them’).

- - - - - - - - - -

positive differentiation involves making the group positively different from a comparison
outgroup on available dimensions of comparison (e.g. by means of more positive evaluations or
reward allocations) (see also ingroup bias).

- - - - - - - - - -

Note that if status is seen as a valued resource, then realistic conflict theory
could also explain ingroup bias. But remember that realistic conflict was more or
less ruled out of the minimal group studies, and it is here that the social identity
explanation has a theoretical advantage. The idea that groups are motivated to
differentiate themselves positively from outgroups, to gain a positive social
identity, became a cornerstone of social identity theory that was used to explain
the minimal group bias effects. Positive differentiation also helps to explain why
group members might choose the maximum difference strategy in the minimal
group paradigm (see Research Close-Up 14.1), which is not easy to explain by
ingroup reciprocity.
The idea that positive differentiation enhances esteem through a positive
identity has become known as the self-esteem hypothesis (Abrams & Hogg,
1988; Oakes & Turner, 1980). Research has generally been supportive of this
idea (Aberson, Healy, & Romero, 2000; Rubin & Hewstone, 1998), although
early studies suffered from methodological problems, and often conceptualized
self-esteem in individualistic or global terms, against the spirit of the group-level
explanation of social identity theory.

- - - - - - - - - -

self-esteem hypothesis the prediction that ingroup bias will lead to an increase in group level self-
esteem or satisfaction.

- - - - - - - - - -

A study by Hunter, Platow, Howard, and Stringer, (1996) addressed some of

these methodological shortcomings, including the criticism that much previous
research had been conducted on minimal groups, where it is more difficult for a
meaningful level of group identification and group-esteem to develop (see
Theory Box 14.2). Hunter et al. could not have chosen more meaningful and
involved groups: Catholic and Protestant school pupils in Northern Ireland in the
1990s during the height of the conflict, known as ‘The Troubles’. The design of
this study involved a between participants factor in which, in an experimental
condition, participants had the opportunity to show ingroup bias, whereas, in a
control condition, they did not. A repeated measures factor assessed self-esteem
twice, three weeks apart, before and after the opportunity to show ingroup bias
(i.e. for those in the experimental condition). Hunter et al. measured self-esteem
relating to several distinct domains of the self-concept (13 in all, e.g. honesty;
mathematical, academic, verbal, and physical ability; physical appearance;
global self-esteem; religious esteem; and positive parental relations). Three
weeks after the first esteem measurement session pupils in the experimental
condition then rated the ingroup (pupils from their own school) and outgroup
(pupils at a school for the opposite religion in the same town) on a subset of six
of the specific domains measured for self-esteem (i.e. honesty, mathematical,
academic, verbal and physical ability, and physical appearance) and overall
evaluation (all from very poor to very good: 1–10). The control condition only
differed from the experimental condition by excluding these ingroup and
outgroup ratings (i.e. no opportunity for ingroup bias). Then pupils in both
experimental and control conditions rated themselves on the 13 different
domains of esteem once again (i.e. including the six domains rated in the
experimental condition). This repeated measures design allowed for the
assessment of changes in state self-esteem (after the opportunity for ingroup bias
or not), another improvement on earlier research.
Results from the experimental condition showed that participants generally
rated their ingroup higher on all dimensions (i.e. ingroup bias), although the
ingroup was rated especially high on physical ability, and the outgroup lower on
honesty (a clear sign of the distrust between Protestants and Catholics during
The Troubles). Self-esteem increased in the experimental condition only, on
honesty, academic ability, verbal ability and physical appearance, but global
self-esteem was unaffected by the opportunity to discriminate. However, self-
esteem was also unaffected on some other specific dimensions, as well as
increasing on two domains in the experimental condition that were not included
in the ingroup bias opportunity (religion and parental relations). Hunter et al.
speculated that the specific dimensions on which self-esteem was enhanced were
the ones that were the most important and relevant to pupils’ identity, although
they did not provide independent evidence for this. However, this research does
seem to show that ingroup bias can enhance self-esteem on some key specific
dimensions of group identity without necessarily improving global esteem.
If low status is threatening to our sense of esteem and undermines a positive
social identity, we might expect low-status groups to be particularly likely to
show ingroup bias. However, this does not always seem to be the case, as
confirmed in a meta-analysis of research by Mullen, Brown, and Smith (1992).
Mullen et al. found more evidence for ingroup favouritism among low-status
groups outside the laboratory than those created in the laboratory. One reason for
this is the role of social reality constraints: the point that when groups have a
low status, they may feel that claiming a better position for themselves,
especially on the status-defining dimension, is not justified or legitimate. This is
particularly likely in laboratory studies, where status is manipulated, because
there is little scope, and perhaps little motivation, to contest status feedback just
received. However, this can happen in naturally occurring groups too. For
example, in the study by Hunter et al. (1996) discussed above, ingroup bias was
weaker among the Catholic than the Protestant pupils in their research, probably
reflecting the lower status of this group in Northern Ireland at the time.

- - - - - - - - - -

social reality constraints evidence that the outgroup is clearly better on a certain dimension can
make ingroup bias on that dimension difficult to justify.

- - - - - - - - - -

However, many naturally occurring groups with lower status do not always
accept their lower status position (i.e. they perceive it as illegitimate). Remember
that the Catholic pupils in the study carried out by Hunter et al. still showed
ingroup bias (just less than the Protestants). To go back to another example,
many East Germans (‘Ossis’) would not accept their group as being inferior,
despite their economic disadvantages. Indeed esteem and group identification is
often just as high (if not higher) in disadvantaged groups as those with higher
status, and the threat to identity of low status can often strengthen solidarity with
one’s group (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002). The issue of status legitimacy
is a part of the more complete social identity theory that we discuss further
below.
In many real-life intergroup comparisons groups will differ on many different
dimensions, providing opportunities for groups to rate their own group as better
on certain dimensions but the other group as better on others (see also Hewstone
& Brown, 1986). For example, psychology students might rate themselves as
more sociable but less intelligent than physics students. In this way both groups
can claim a positive identity (without compromising social reality constraints).
In social identity theory this is called a ‘social creativity’ strategy: the groups are
not challenging the outgroup by means of direct competition (i.e. ingroup bias,
discrimination), but are simply choosing dimensions that allow for positive
differentiation. However, it is also possible to see how the use of this strategy,
instead of eliminating prejudice and discrimination, could just perhaps make it
more subtle. If psychology students choose to emphasize their sociability over
intelligence, and physics students do the reverse, physics students may still claim
they are somehow better by arguing that intelligence is a more important
dimension than being sociable. Research by Mummendey and Schreiber (1984)
makes exactly this point, and referred to this strategy as ‘different but better’!
(see Leader in the Field, Amélie Mummendey).
This example points to a problem of this social creativity strategy for low
status groups: they will often find it difficult to claim superiority on the status-
defining dimension (such as competence), yet this will often be the most
important and valued one (Ellemers, 1993). Discriminating in terms of reward
allocations may then be a more viable route to a positive identity because of
social reality constraints on the status-defining dimension. Indeed, in line with
relative deprivation theory, it can be easier to justify better rewards if you feel
your group has been unfairly denied (‘We need and deserve more resources!’).
When faced with identity-based threats in terms of low status or resources, social
identity theory makes similar predictions to realistic conflict and relative
deprivation theories. A key difference is the motive for such behaviour.
According to social identity theory, discrimination would address an attempt to
gain a positive identity rather than competing for material resources for their
own sake.

LEADER IN THE FIELD

Amélie Mummendey (b. 1944) was born in Bonn, where she also
received her Masters in psychology, followed by her PhD from the
University of Mainz in 1970. For many years Mummendey was
professor at the University of Münster, building up an influential
group of researchers and starting an annual series of research
meetings on intergroup relations. When she moved to the chair at the
University of Jena she maintained this initiative, and the Jena
conference continues to this day. The group at Jena, under her
leadership, became one of the most prolific centres for research on
intergroup relations in Europe. She also inaugurated the International
Graduate College (in collaboration with other European
universities), which trained numerous social psychologists who have
also become key figures in the field. Mummendey’s early research
focused on aggression, but her contributions to the social identity
 approach have been particularly notable. These include much
research and theorizing on the processes underlying intergroup
discrimination, but also tolerance between groups. These
contributions include research on the ‘different but better’
differentiation strategy, the ‘positive–negative asymmetry’ and the
ingroup projection model.

Threats to group value(s)

Other kinds of threat to identity less obviously involve esteem, but do imply a
threat to values or principles central to the ingroup identity. We see this most
clearly in the case of conflicting ideological or religious values. The most salient
current example is perhaps the relation of radical Islam to the more secular or
Christian Western world. This theme goes back to ideas of similarity – attraction
(e.g. Byrne & Wong, 1962; see Chapter 11) and belief congruence (e.g. Rokeach
& Rothman, 1965), which proposed that simply having different beliefs and
values could be a basis for prejudice towards outgroups. This idea has re-
emerged in stronger form in the integrated threat theory (e.g. Stephan, Diaz-
Loving, & Duran, 2000); Stephan and colleagues coined the term ‘symbolic
threat’ to refer to group values that threaten the ingroup’s way of life (albeit
more ideologically than physically).
Although group values different from those of the ingroup may become the
target of prejudice, more optimistically group norms and values can also be a
source of tolerance and reduced discrimination, to the extent that they may
prescribe less prejudice and discrimination in themselves. ‘Political correctness’
could be seen as one such norm that, at least where values are followed, would
lead to less prejudice and discrimination. Indeed such norms are not necessarily
contradictory to the social identity approach, because they can become valued
dimensions of identity. For example, in contrast to the Al Qaida example, many
religions – including Muslim, Christian and Buddhist – are against
discrimination (‘Love thy neighbour . . .’ is a theme that recurs in all three
religions, as well as many others).
An influential theoretical account of group norms is provided by self-
categorization theory, developed by John Turner and his collaborators (Turner,
Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987; see Leader in the Field, John Turner).
In this framework the concept of social identity was more explicitly
distinguished from personal identity (the ‘individual self’), and related to social
influence processes (see Chapter 8). A key point here is that when group
identities are valued (see group identification earlier in this chapter) and become
salient in an intergroup context, we are likely to conform willingly to the norms
associated with our group. We are also likely to see ourselves and others in
terms of group attributes (e.g. stereotypes, norms), a process referred to as
‘depersonalization’ (see also the self-definition component of group
identification earlier, and accentuation effects). Conformity to group norms that
distinguish ingroup from outgroup is motivated and regulates group behaviour:
what to do and what not to do. A good example of this is the so-called ‘black
sheep effect’ (Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988) in which ingroup members
who deviate from ingroup norms are judged even more harshly than outgroup
members who show exactly the same behaviour. This is an interesting exception
to ingroup favouritism: typically ingroup members would be judged more
positively than outgroup members. Instead this harsher judgement of an ingroup
transgression can be seen as a form of ‘policing’ of ingroup behaviour that might
otherwise reflect badly on the ingroup image.

LEADER IN THE FIELD

John Turner (1948–2011) grew up in a working-class
neighbourhood of South London and studied Psychology as an
undergraduate at the University of Sussex, before moving to the
University of Bristol to do his PhD under the supervision of Henri
Tajfel (see Leader in the Field, this chapter). He took up a
lectureship at Bristol and, after a year at the Institute for Advanced
Study at Princeton, he emigrated to Australia. After a period at
Macquarie University, Sydney, he moved to the chair at the
Australian National University, Canberra. This group became a key
centre for research on social identity processes, much as Bristol had
earlier under Tajfel. Together with Tajfel, Turner developed the
highly influential social identity theory of intergroup conflict (Tajfel
& Turner, 1979) and went on to develop self-categorization theory,
which further elaborated the distinction between social and personal
identities. Whereas social identity theory is primarily a theory of
intergroup relations, self-categorization theory is a more general
theory of the self and the group that has been applied to a whole
range of key topics in social psychology (identity salience, social
 influence, social stereotyping, group formation, leadership,
collective behaviour, to name a few) – perhaps the closest we have
today in social psychology to a ‘grand theory’. His research, and
especially his theoretical contributions to the field, have been
immense and leave a lasting legacy to social psychology in Europe
and around the world.

If there are group norms about discrimination being bad or antisocial, will
discrimination harm esteem rather than enhance it? There is indeed some
evidence of this (Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Scheepers, Spears, Manstead, &
Doosje, 2009). Research also shows that, where the group has a norm of being
fair and not discriminating, stronger identification with the group can actually
increase fairness rather than discrimination (e.g. Jetten, Spears, & Manstead,
1997). These findings also help to explain why discrimination that actually
involves derogating the outgroup is perhaps less common than examples of
ingroup enhancement (see also Mummendey & Otten, 1998; Perdue, Dovidio,
Gurtman, & Tyler, 1990). An explanation for this positive–negative asymmetry
is the thought that harming others may indeed damage the ingroup image
(Reynolds, Turner, & Haslam, 2000). These examples provide reassuring
reminders that prejudice and discrimination are not inevitable consequences of
group membership or group identification.

Threats to group distinctiveness

If too much difference from an outgroup can be a problem, then it seems that too
much similarity with an outgroup can be too! Have you ever had the experience
when travelling with your friends abroad that the locals get your nationality
wrong? You might be Dutch but they think you are German. You might be
Italian but they think you are Spanish or French. You might be British but they
think you are American. These identity confusions can be irritating (and
apparently some more than others). But why? It is not that students are
necessarily prejudiced towards the groups they are confused with (at least we
hope not). There are actually two closely related threats to identity contained in
these examples (see Ellemers et al., 2002). First, people like to be seen in terms
of identities important to them (see ‘centrality’, a component of group-level self-
definition and self-investment in Theory Box 14.2). Being seen in terms of other
identities, especially erroneous ones, can evoke ‘categorization threat’. But that
is not the whole story. We also do not like it when another group is so similar to
ours, because it undermines the very essence of what our group is that makes us
different and special (i.e. not just because they miscategorize me). Hence a
Dutch student may be more irritated when he or she is seen as German, rather
than as French or American. In other words we tend to be most sensitive when
the other group actually is similar to our own, in terms of attributes or
stereotypes (e.g. when Swiss Germans are seen as German). Groups that are too
similar to our own can therefore threaten the unique identity of the group:
‘distinctiveness threat’. Some have even argued that having a distinctive group
identity is even more fundamental than avoiding a negative one. For example,
Mlicki and Ellemers (1996) found that ‘complaining’ is an important self-
stereotype of Polish identity, and though apparently negative, something that
Poles will often emphasize (see Leader in the Field, Naomi Ellemers; also self-
verification versus self-enhancement in relation to the personal self, Chapter 5).

LEADER IN THE FIELD

Naomi Ellemers (b. 1963) was born in Amsterdam and studied at
the University of California, Berkeley, and the University of
Groningen, where she obtained her Masters degree (1987) and PhD
(1991). In 1990 she moved to a lectureship at the Free University of
Amsterdam and, after becoming Senior Lecturer there (1996) she
was appointed to a Chair in Social and Organizational Psychology at
the University of Leiden in 1999, where she remains. She has
received numerous awards for her research, including the Jos Jaspars
early career award (1990) and most recently the prestigious Spinoza
Prize (2010). Her doctoral research provided empirical evidence for
a range of processes proposed by social identity theory, including the
role of socio-structural factors (e.g. status stability, legitimacy, the
permeability of group boundaries) in predicting the different coping
strategies members of disadvantaged groups adopt (e.g.
discrimination, social mobility). Her research addresses many issues
relating to social stereotyping, discrimination, power, respect and
morality in intergroup contexts. As well as many contributions to
basic research within the social identity approach in particular,
Ellemers has also applied her research to many work settings and in
organizational contexts. Much of this research considers the role of
gender (among other group identities), both in relation to
 discrimination and social justice, and also to diversity and
productivity in workgroups.

Positive differentiation (also in the form of discrimination) can restore or even

create group distinctiveness. Now remember the social identity explanation for
the minimal ingroup bias effect, namely that people try positively to differentiate
their group in order to create a positive group distinctiveness (and not just
enhance the ingroup; see e.g. Tajfel, 1982b). This distinctiveness motive had
been largely forgotten in research on minimal groups that had largely
concentrated on the self-esteem hypothesis. However, because participants in the
minimal group paradigm lack information about the groups (precisely because
they are minimal!) this may also create distinctiveness threat (Spears, Jetten,
Scheepers, & Cihangir, 2009). Spears et al. (2009) decided to put this idea to the
test. In one experiment they categorized participants according to the classic
procedure based on preferences for Klee or Kandinsky (see Research Close-Up
14.1). As expected, the typical ingroup bias effect was found in this condition.
However, in another condition they simply added the information that people
who prefer Klee tend to be extroverts, whereas those who prefer Kandinsky tend
to be introverts (or vice versa to counterbalance). In this condition ingroup bias
was virtually eliminated. The explanation was that making the minimal group
identities more meaningful (introvert versus extrovert) provided a distinctive
group identity, making it unnecessary to create this identity by means of positive
differentiation (this interpretation was supported by follow-up studies). In a
meta-analysis, Jetten, Spears, and Postmes (2004) also found that high identifiers
with the ingroup were particularly likely to respond to distinctiveness threat (i.e.
comparison with similar outgroups) by differentiating more. The more invested
you are in your group, the more important it is to distinguish it from similar
outgroups.
Brewer (1991) developed a slightly different conception of distinctiveness
threat in optimal distinctiveness theory. She proposed that individuals have two
fundamental needs: a need to integrate or affiliate (the need to belong:
Baumeister & Leary, 1995), but also a need to differentiate oneself from others;
a distinctiveness motive. She argued that groups that are relatively small in size
(and thus distinctive), such as numerical minorities, optimally meet these two
needs.
Smaller and numerically distinctive groups may particularly value their group
identity for other reasons also (it turns out that minorities often identify more
strongly with their group identity than do majorities; see Leonardelli, Pickett, &
Brewer, 2010). If minorities do not have power or resources, their identity may
assume more importance and they may be particularly sensitive to being
assimilated into the same category as the majority group, especially as this
identity confusion may happen more often than the reverse (think again of the
German ‘Ossis’). It is no accident that the examples we chose at the start of this
section tended to focus on the sensitivities of the smaller group of the two.
Larger and more dominant groups need not worry too much about
distinctiveness threat, because they will be confronted with it less often (e.g.
Americans are not often called Canadians). It is also easier for them to dominate,
especially in superordinate categories that contain them both.
This insight provided the inspiration for another explanation for discrimination
known as the ingroup projection model (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). You
will recall that emphasizing superordinate goals and interests is one method to
reduce conflict and discrimination, according to realistic conflict theory.
However, the ingroup projection model suggests that this may not always work.
If one group is dominant in size and status, they will typically set the agenda for
what counts as normative or ‘prototypical’ for the superordinate category that
includes both subgroups (i.e. their norms are projected onto the superordinate
group). Thus, the English may be seen as more typically British than the Welsh
or Scots. In Germany, West Germans are seen as more typically German than
East Germans are (especially by Wessis themselves!). West Germans may then
feel justified in discriminating more against East Germans, because they see
Ossis as less typical of the German norms and ideals than Wessis (see Waldzus,
Mummendey, Wenzel, & Boettcher, 2004). So although numerical group
distinctiveness may provide some benefits to identity definition, it could also
make your group more vulnerable to discrimination by the powerful majority.
 Integrative intergroup theories
How do beliefs about our position in the social hierarchy help to
explain discrimination?
The repertoire of threats groups encounter help to explain many cases of
intergroup differentiation and discrimination. However, some theories cannot be
reduced to a list of threats, but combine, in more complex and integrative ways,
some of these explanatory principles with an analysis of the social structure (the
status hierarchy, or intergroup power relations), and our beliefs and feelings
about our position in this structure. In this section we consider theories that
provide a more detailed analysis of how prejudice and discrimination can relate
to dynamics structured by status and power between groups (see also realistic
conflict theory and relative deprivation theory, already discussed).

Socio-structural theories
We have already introduced social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) in
relation to a number of forms of identity threat (esteem, status, distinctiveness).
These threats to identity do not occur in a ‘social vacuum’, but reflect the
position of people in the social structure. As we saw above, groups
disadvantaged by low status are likely to feel threatened. However, this threat is
just a starting point: social identity theory was developed in large part to explain
how and why low status groups cope with this situation, because (as we have
already noted) discrimination and ingroup bias does not always result. Whether
people respond to this threat with direct discrimination towards the rival group,
for example, depends on whether the status relation is seen as legitimate or
illegitimate and as stable or unstable (and so open to change). Tajfel and Turner
(1979) referred to social comparison between groups in a status hierarchy that
highlights the illegitimacy and instability of the situation as ‘insecure’; insecure
social comparisons encourage low status groups to imagine how things could be
better (called ‘cognitive alternatives to the status quo’). It is under these
conditions that social identity theory predicts most intergroup conflict (and thus
discrimination). It follows that conflict and discrimination will not always result
from status differences (an important difference from realistic conflict theory).
Although the absence of discrimination may seem like a good thing, social
conflict can, at least sometimes, be important and necessary if social change is to
occur. Take the ‘Arab Spring’, the wave of popular democratic uprisings that
swept across many Arab countries in 2011 (Figure 14.11). Few would argue that
these uprisings and mass protests reflect the operation of prejudice and
discrimination (at least in the conventional pejorative sense), but they certainly
reflect conflict and social change. This is why it is important to take into account
power and legitimacy when thinking about prejudice and discrimination: the
ingroup bias of the powerless may not be the same, or have the same aims and
functions, as that of the advantaged. Whereas low-status groups may be
competing to change the status quo, high-status groups may use ingroup bias to
reflect and legitimize their superior position, bolstering group esteem (see
Scheepers, Spears, Doosje, & Manstead, 2006a, b, for some evidence of these
different functions). So as well as offering a group explanation of prejudice and
discrimination, social identity theory is also a theory of social change. We will
address this issue in more detail in the next section, where we show that
prejudice reduction strategies can sometimes work against social change and the
interests of low-status groups (Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009).
FIGURE 14.11 Although the absence of discrimination may seem like a good
thing, social conflict can be important and necessary if social change is to
occur, for example the ‘Arab Spring’ uprising in 2011.
Source: © Alexandre Meneghini. Used under licence from Press Association
Images.

A second powerful factor that can contribute to the stability of the status quo is
what we might call the ‘ideology of individualism’, or individual mobility. If
social change is not feasible, another route to a positive identity is to move into
the high-status group. Of course this depends on mobility being possible (i.e.
permeable group boundaries). Clearly this is only an option that can be tried by
the few rather than the many (it is unrealistic to think of one group moving into
the other en masse). In short, this is an individual strategy that changes nothing
in the status relations between the groups. However, the ideology of
individualism (the ‘American dream’ that anyone can make it rich, for example)
is remarkably potent. Research by Wright and colleagues has shown that even
very limited (‘token’) mobility is enough to deflect low-status group members
from engaging in more group-level strategies for social change (Wright, Taylor,
& Moghaddam, 1990). In one of their experiments Wright et al. showed that
even a very small chance (e.g. 5 per cent) that a low-status group could gain
promotion to the high-status group was sufficient to stop people in this group
engaging in collective social change strategies that might give a chance for fairer
outcomes for all. Intergroup strategies only became likely when no mobility at
all was possible. In other words there is a tendency to think selfishly if there is a
chance of promotion, however meagre, to the higher status group (‘everyone for
themselves’). This idea is well illustrated in Reicher and Haslam’s (2006)
recreation of the classic Stanford Prison Study (see Chapter 8), filmed for the
BBC television in the UK. In this experiment one of the most militant and
disruptive ‘prisoners’ became much less militant when there was the prospect of
becoming one of the guards (Reicher & Haslam, 2006).
These additional dimensions to social identity theory point to the importance
of ideological factors relating to beliefs about the social structure that can
moderate our reactions to realistic conflicts and identity threats. Indeed Tajfel
referred to an ideological continuum of beliefs about the social structure from
complete individual mobility at one end (e.g. the American dream that anyone
with the right effort and ability can make it to the top) to social change beliefs at
the other (e.g. that ‘revolution’ is necessary to gain intergroup equality). If we
are focused on individual mobility we are not really thinking about our group’s
disadvantage so much as my disadvantage. This is therefore a strategy associated
with low identifiers and the individual level. We can now put together the
various elements of social identity theory (see Theory Box 14.3).
The idea that we do not always discriminate or show prejudice towards
outgroups is just as important as explaining discrimination itself. Any complete
theory of intergroup conflict needs to be able to explain when and why it occurs,
but also when it does not. Another approach that emphasizes the possibility that
discrimination in favour of one’s own group does not always occur is system
justification theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994). This approach goes further than social
identity theory in arguing that at least some members of low-status groups are
actually motivated to justify the system in which differences in status and power
exist. Thus, both social identity theory and system justification theory can
explain outgroup bias towards high-status groups: the tendency to rate the
outgroup as better, typically on the status-defining dimension. However, whereas
social identity theory predicts this when low status is stable and legitimate,
making ingroup bias and claims to high status difficult to sustain (see social
reality constraints), system justification theory argues that some low-status group
members are motivated to defend the existing social hierarchy in the system.

- - - - - - - - - -

outgroup bias a tendency to favour the outgroup over the ingroup in terms of evaluations or
reward allocations.

- - - - - - - - - -

THEORY BOX 14.3

SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY: HOW LOW
STATUS GROUPS COPE WITH
DISADVANTAGE/IDENTITY THREAT
Source: Based on information in Tajfel & Turner, 1979.
 These more integrative and group-level theories of intergroup relations reveal
how complex prejudice and discrimination are. As we noted in the introduction,
as the prevalence of blatant forms of racism, sexism and prejudice has receded,
one of the growth areas of prejudice research has focused on subtler and even
benevolent forms of prejudice (e.g. Glick & Fiske, 1996). According to this
view, positive views and stereotypes of outgroups can also be prejudicial,
especially when they reinforce the disadvantaged positions of low-status groups.
Seeing black people as great athletes, or women as good cooks and so on,
despite being apparently positive, makes such groups prisoners of stereotypes
that can prevent them competing in higher-status domains. Nor do these
apparently positive stereotypes always benefit the group anyway (have you
noticed how many top TV chefs are men rather than women?).
Can emotions help to explain the variety and intensity
of prejudice?
Intergroup emotion theories
In recent years emotion-based approaches have led the way in explaining the
diverse forms of contemporary prejudice. Dijker (1987), who examined the
different profiles of prejudice towards different ethnic minority groups in the
Netherlands (e.g. Turkish, Moroccans, Surinamese) had shown that there was
much to be gained in distinguishing prejudice in terms of the specific emotion
reactions that specific outgroups may elicit. A number of approaches followed
that used emotion theories to understand the different forms prejudice can take
and the different functions it might fulfil. The first and best known is intergroup
emotion theory (Smith, 1993). Classical emotion theories propose that emotions
can be characterized not just by different feelings (e.g. anger, fear, contempt),
but also in terms of the ‘appraisals’ that typically produce these states and the
‘action tendencies’ that follow from them. Appraisals are cognitions that assess
the specific relevance of the situation for the perceiver (Lazarus, 1991).
Appraisals address such questions as ‘Is this person a threat to me?’ (a primary
appraisal); ‘Can I cope with this threat in some way?’ (a secondary or coping
appraisal). Different appraisals can lead to distinctively different emotions.
Emotions also have characteristic ‘action tendencies’ associated with them
(Frijda, 1986). Thus, fear is likely to result in more avoidance, whereas anger is
likely to result in approach behaviour (e.g. confrontation, conflict). Appraising
another person as a physical threat, especially if the self is weak, may lead to
feeling fear, and the action tendency to avoid the group. In contrast, a sense of
being wronged by the other, along with an appraisal of strength, may lead to
anger, and the action tendency of approach and confrontation.
The new insight was to argue that we could experience such emotions not as
individuals but as group members: group emotions. Intergroup emotion theory
is grounded in the social identity approach, and group identification is generally
predicted to intensify these emotions (i.e. the moderation effect of group
identification). Thus, if football fans of a rival team threaten me outside the
football ground because I am wearing the scarf of my team, this may evoke a
group-based emotion (e.g. fear or anger). However, in such cases there is always
the possibility that emotions could be appraised and felt personally or as a group
member (‘Is it me, or is it we that feel this?’). Group emotions become perhaps
more clear-cut when we experience them vicariously, on behalf of a fellow
ingroup member. This is nicely illustrated in a study by Gordijn, Wigboldus, and
Yzerbyt (2001), in which participants at one university (the University of
Amsterdam) reacted to news that students at another university in the
Netherlands (the University of Leiden) were angry about the plans of the
authorities there to introduce stricter study requirements (e.g. higher workload,
admissions exams). Only when the Amsterdam students were categorized as
students (i.e. part of the same category as the Leiden students) did they show
high levels of anger at the proposal (i.e. above the scale midpoint). Their anger
was reduced when they were part of a different category to the victims (i.e. based
on university affiliation: Amsterdam versus Leiden; see Figure 14.12). This
example shows that group-based emotions are felt on behalf of fellow group
members, and not personally, because these plans to change the study
requirements did not affect the Amsterdam students directly.
FIGURE 14.12 Happiness, anxiety and anger experienced by Amsterdam
students as a function of the categorization of the students from Leiden
(different, no, or same category).
Source: Gordijn, Wigboldus, & Yzerbyt, 2001, with permission from SAGE
PUBLICATIONS LTD.

- - - - - - - - - -
 - - - - - - - - - -

group emotions emotions experienced as members of social groups rather than as individuals,
reflecting appraisals of events in terms of group level concerns and coping resources.

- - - - - - - - - -

The idea of emotional prejudice is powerful because it allows us to distinguish

many different types of prejudice that depend on the relation between groups.
Prejudices such as racism might be quite different to sexism and homophobia
(try to think of the different appraisals and resulting emotions that might underlie
any prejudice in these cases). Simply focusing on negative attitudes does not
allow us to distinguish between these types of prejudice. Indeed, there may be
many different kinds of racial prejudice, and this will not only depend on
features of the target outgroup, but also aspects of the ingroup. Because the
members of the ingroup may vary in their appraisals depending on their own
characteristics, appraisals and emotions may even vary within the ingroup. For
example, women and the elderly may experience more physical threat and
therefore feel more fear towards certain groups than do young men.
A further advantage of the group emotion approach to prejudice is that it is
better able to explain more extreme and intense forms of prejudice, such as
outgroup derogation, than some earlier theories that focus more on explaining
ingroup favouritism (Brewer’s point about ‘outgroup hate’). You could say
group emotions put the passion into prejudice. One example of a malicious
emotional prejudice is the emotion of ‘intergroup schadenfreude’ (Leach,
Spears, Branscombe, & Doosje, 2003). German students will know
schadenfreude as the pleasure people can experience when they see someone
having an accident or slip up (think of those cheesy home video TV shows).
However, this pleasure can turn nasty at the intergroup level. Following the
writing of the philosopher Nietzsche, Leach et al., argued that experiencing
group schadenfreude can provide a source of ‘imaginary revenge’ towards a
bitter rival, especially when your own group is threatened by a sense of
inferiority (see the discussion of status threats earlier). To test this idea, Leach et
al. measured Dutch students’ reactions to Germany being knocked out of the
World Cup by Croatia in 1998 (a schadenfreude opportunity for the Dutch). The
sense of inferiority was manipulated in two ways in a 2 × 2 between participants
design. The Dutch students were reminded (or not) that the Netherlands had
never won the World Cup before (a chronic inferiority threat). In a second
manipulation they were reminded (or not) of the game in which Brazil had
knocked the Dutch team out in this tournament (an acute inferiority threat).
Dutch pleasure at the German loss (schadenfreude) was indeed significantly
higher after exposure to both these threats compared to control conditions.
Although, as we noted in the introduction, blatant prejudice towards most
groups has thankfully become largely unacceptable in most parts of Europe and
elsewhere, there are exceptions, and the intergroup emotion approach can help to
account for this. The civil war in the former Yugoslavia took place in the heart
of Europe, and witnessed many extreme forms of hostility, even between people
who were previously personal friends and neighbours (Esses & Vernon, 2008).
Group-based contempt may be particularly relevant in such cases. Contempt is a
less constructive emotion than anger; with contempt there is often little hope of
reconciliation (Fischer & Roseman, 2007), and it is also associated with a sense
of moral superiority by the ingroup and dehumanization of the outgroup (Esses,
Veenvliet, Hodson, & Mihic, 2008). Recent research confirms that contempt also
predicts more violent, aggressive and extreme behaviour directed at the outgroup
than does anger. For example, German students in Hessen threatened with the
introduction of study fees from the local state government were more likely to
support violent action, such as rioting, the more contempt they felt towards the
authorities (Tausch et al., 2011).
We do not need wars or riots to find more extreme examples of prejudice in
our midst, however. One group that seems to attract high levels of prejudice
across Europe is the Roma people (sometimes pejoratively referred to as
‘gypsies’) – Figure 14.13. This is especially true in Romania, where prejudice
and discrimination towards the Roma is blatant and even socially accepted. Why
is this so? Intergroup emotion theory might help us to understand why. As we
have already seen, anger and fear can underlie distinct forms of emotional
prejudice. Roma people seem to attract anger because many see them as not
working or contributing to the economy, but depending on state benefits
(contempt is also relevant here). However, in Romania, unlike in other countries
in Europe, the Roma people also represent a very sizable ethnic group, and
consequently they are more likely to be seen as a source of threat (e.g. regarding
street crime). This unusual but potent combination of group-based anger and fear
helps to explain the especially blatant prejudice towards the Roma in Romania.
FIGURE 14.13(a), (b) and (c) One group that seems to attract high levels of
prejudice across Europe is the Roma people.
Source: (a) © Kuzma. Used under licence from Shutterstock; (b) © Paula
Bronstein. Used under licence from Getty Images; (c) © Plant. Used under
licence from Getty Images.

The intergroup-emotion approach to prejudice has spawned a rich programme

of research, and many theoretical frameworks have now emerged to fill in the
gaps and explain the wide variety of emotional prejudice (e.g. Cottrell &
Neuberg, 2005; Iyer & Leach, 2008; Yzerbyt & Kuppens, 2009). We finally
elaborate one approach that has been particularly influential in delineating
different forms of prejudice. The stereotype content model of Fiske, Cuddy,
Glick, and Xu (2002) focuses on two key appraisal dimensions of competence
and warmth that are commonly used to judge others. The warmth dimension
relates to how competitive the group is (cold being more competitive).
Considering groups as either high or low on each of these dimensions results in
four quadrants (see Theory Box 14.4). The combination of high competence and
high warmth is the most positive, and leads to positive emotions like admiration.
It tends to be where we find the ingroup, but also respected outgroups (e.g. black
professionals). When groups are rated low on both of these dimensions, then
disgust, contempt and anger can arise and characterize what Fiske et al. call
‘contemptuous prejudice’. A typical group in this cell is homeless people, and
also the Roma people from our earlier example. The combination of high
warmth and low competence might attract more positive emotions like sympathy
and pity. However, this superficially positive reaction conceals the ‘paternalistic
prejudice’. Benevolent sexism falls into this category, and other examples are
prejudice towards the disabled and the elderly. The combination of high
competence and low warmth presents a very different kind of threat to the
perceiver and one potentially more dangerous. This has been characterized as
‘envious prejudice’; anti-Semitic bigotry towards Jews provides a good example
of this form of prejudice (Glick, 2008). In the current financial crisis bankers are
another example (although their competence could also be questioned!).
 Summary
In this section we examined the value of taking a group-level approach to
prejudice and discrimination. As group animals who derive many benefits from
our memberships of groups there may be good reasons to trust and favour
ingroups over outgroups. Prejudice and discrimination are targeted at outgroups,
so it also makes sense to explain these in intergroup terms and by analysing the
threats the outgroup can pose. The concept of social identity has been
particularly useful, because it refers not only to the target of prejudice, but also
captures the sense of self that makes us part of the ingroup. This is not to deny a
role for individual explanations of prejudice and discrimination, but they may
become less relevant than intergroup factors in intergroup settings. Differences
in group identification and group-relevant appraisals also help to explain
variations in prejudice at the group level. However, intergroup factors also
explain why group members do not always show prejudice and discrimination
(e.g. social reality constraints, group norms), and tolerance and fairness can also
boost group-esteem, and be strengthened by group identification when
normative. With this more optimistic point in mind we now turn to the tricky but
important issue of how prejudice and discrimination can be reduced.

THEORY BOX 14.4

THE STEREOTYPE CONTENT MODEL
Four types of outgroup, combinations of status and competition, and corresponding forms of
prejudice as a function of perceived warmth and competence.
Source: Adapted from Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, Copyright © 2002 by the
American Psychological Association. Adapted with permission. The use of
APA information does not imply endorsement by APA.
Competence
Warmth Low High
High Paternalistic prejudice Low status, not Admiration High status, not
competitive Pity, sympathy competitive
E.g. women (benevolent sexism) E.g. ingroup, allies
Low Contemptuous prejudice Low status, Envious prejudice High
competitive Contempt, disgust, anger status, competitive Envy,
jealousy
E.g. homeless, Roma people E.g. Jews, bankers
E.g. homeless, Roma people E.g. Jews, bankers
 PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERVENTIONS TO
REDUCE PREJUDICE AND IMPROVE
INTERGROUP RELATIONS
If social psychology can provide insights into how prejudice and conflict come
about, it should have something to say about how we can reduce them. Indeed,
devising interventions has been an important motivation for much of the
research on prejudice and intergroup relations already discussed in this chapter,
and we now address some of the main approaches. First, we introduce the classic
contact hypothesis and assess whether contact with outgroup members reduces
prejudice. Second, we discuss the importance of levels of categorization for
prejudice reduction interventions such as contact. Third, we describe the
psychological processes, such as reduced anxiety and increased empathy, that
are involved in prejudice reduction through contact. Fourth, we give an overview
of other techniques that can influence these processes. We conclude by
discussing the wider implications of prejudice reduction interventions for
intergroup equality and societal change.

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contact hypothesis intergroup contact will reduce prejudice if it (1) has acquaintance potential; (2)
takes place under conditions of equal status; (3) involves cooperation towards a common goal; and
(4) takes place in a supportive normative climate.

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 The ‘contact hypothesis’
How and when does intergroup contact reduce prejudice?
How can we reduce prejudice? This question was first studied in the context of
race relations in the United States in the 1930s and 1940s. One of the first social
psychologists to address this issue was Gordon W. Allport, whose book, The
Nature of Prejudice (1954b), proposed that direct, face-to-face contact between
members of opposing groups is likely to be the most effective way to reduce
prejudice (see Leader in the Field, Gordon W. Allport). Although not the first to
suggest this (e.g. Williams, 1947), he provided one of the most detailed accounts
of its likely effects.
Allport was careful not to propose that simply bringing people from different
groups together would be a solution to intergroup conflict and prejudice. In fact,
he pointed to many situations in which proximity to outgroup members might
actually intensify conflict and feelings of threat. For example, based on opinion
data collected in several areas of Chicago, Allport noted that the attitudes of
white Americans became more hostile the closer respondents lived to a
residential area that was predominantly black. Thus, simply living close to one
another does not reduce prejudice and can even increase it. He contrasted this
result with findings from a number of studies that reported positive effects of
intergroup contact. For example, in a well-known field experiment, Deutsch and
Collins (1951) found that white women living in desegregated (compared to
segregated) housing reported more frequent direct contact with their black
neighbours, held their black neighbours in higher esteem, were less likely to
express negative stereotypes of black people, and were overall much more
supportive of integrated housing (75 per cent were supportive, compared to 25
per cent of women living in segregated housing).

LEADER IN THE FIELD

Gordon W. Allport (1897–1967) was born in Montezuma, Indiana,
as the youngest of four brothers. After graduating from high school
second in his class in 1915 he won a scholarship to Harvard
University, where one of his elder brothers, Floyd H. Allport (see
Leader in the Field, Chapter 1), was already working on his PhD.
Allport received his degree in Philosophy and Economics in 1919.
 After teaching in Istanbul for a year, Allport returned to Harvard to
complete his PhD in psychology. Allport is often described as one of
the founding fathers of personality psychology, and spent much of
his career developing his trait theory of personality. He also made
important contributions to the psychology of religion, and to the area
of prejudice and intergroup relations, where his ideas inspired
empirical research on prejudice reduction. His most significant
books include The Nature of Prejudice (1954b), Pattern and Growth
in Personality (1961) and The Person in Psychology (1968).
Allport’s work had a lasting effect on the field of social psychology
and he is one of the most frequently cited psychologists. He also had
a profound influence on his students, who included Stanley Milgram
(see Leader in the Field, Chapter 8), Jerome Bruner, Thomas
Pettigrew and Anthony Greenwald (see Leader in the Field, Chapter
7).

These findings encouraged Allport (1954b), and he suggested that ‘somewhere

there must be a formula’ (p. 250) that ensures positive effects of intergroup
contact. Based on a review of the evidence available at that time, Allport
proposed that contact will only be successful in reducing prejudice when it takes
place under certain optimal conditions. Specifically, he suggested that intergroup
contact will reduce prejudice if: (1) it has acquaintance potential; (2) it takes
place under conditions of equal status; (3) it involves cooperation towards a
common goal; and (4) it occurs in a supportive normative climate. We discuss
each of these conditions below.
First of all, Allport (1954b) proposed that superficial contact is unlikely to
reduce prejudice. Simply being exposed to outgroup members could in fact
strengthen prejudice, because negative associations with the outgroup would be
frequently activated and guide both perception and behaviour. Rather, Allport
suggested, contact should be of sufficient frequency, duration and closeness to
allow for true acquaintance between members of the different groups. This idea
was supported in an additional housing study that examined the attitudes of
residents of four other housing projects (Wilner, Walkley, & Cook, 1955). This
research demonstrated that favourable racial attitudes were more likely to
develop among white residents whose interactions with their black neighbours
went beyond casual greetings.
Second, Allport stressed that the intergroup interactions should be structured
such that the groups have equal status during the contact. He noted that contact
between members of high-and low-status groups often takes place in conditions
that confirm status hierarchies, for example in situations in which minority group
members occupy low-status roles, affirming existing prejudiced views. Equal-
status contact would thus ensure that negative stereotypes of the minority group
as inferior would be disconfirmed. This condition is likely to have been present
in Deutsch and Collins’s (1951) housing study, in which black and white
families came from similar economic backgrounds. Subsequent experimental
studies have confirmed that equal status during contact supports prejudice
reduction (e.g. Clore, Bray, Itkin, & Murphy, 1978; Cohen & Lotan, 1995).
A third condition for successful contact involves cooperation towards a
common goal during contact. Recall the boys camp studies from Sherif et al.
(1961), in which the negative attitudes that were created during the experiment
were only ameliorated after the two groups worked cooperatively on a series of
common goals. Laboratory studies have confirmed the effectiveness of
cooperation during contact (e.g. Brown & Abrams, 1986; Ryen & Kahn, 1975),
but these also indicate that equal levels of task ability need to be ensured
(Cohen, 1984; Slavin, 1978) and require that the outcomes of the cooperation
should be positive (Worchel, Andreoli, & Folger, 1977).
Finally, Allport emphasized the importance of the normative climate in which
the interactions take place. As we know from Chapter 8, social norms exert
powerful effects on people’s attitudes and behaviour (e.g. Terry & Hogg, 1996).
Also recall Pettigrew’s (1958) study described above, in which he demonstrated
that the social climate in which people lived (i.e. whether or not they lived in a
society segregated according to race) was related to their level of racial
prejudice. Several laboratory studies have also demonstrated that the amount of
prejudice people express is strongly predicted by the (perceived) level of
prejudice of other people in that context, especially the level of prejudice of
other ingroup members (e.g. Stangor, Sechrist, & Jost, 2001). Social norms are
also likely to affect people’s attitudes and willingness to interact with outgroup
members, and to shape the nature of intergroup interactions. This was again
observed in one of the early housing studies. Wilner et al. (1955) noted that the
effects of contact were reinforced when the social climate was perceived to be
supportive of the contact. For example, of white residents who lived close to
black people in integrated housing and reported more intimate contact with their
black neighbours, 79 per cent held black people in high esteem when the social
norms were viewed as supportive. This figure was reduced to 39 per cent when
the social norms surrounding interracial contact were unsupportive (see Figure
14.14).
FIGURE 14.14 Percentage of white residents living near to black residents in
integrated housing who held their black neighbours in high esteem, as a function
of type of interracial contact and perceived social climate (approval of contact).
Source: Adapted from Wilner, Walkley, & Cook, 1955, with permission of
University of Minnesota Press.

Allport suggested that a context in which contact is explicitly encouraged by

institutional laws and regulations should be particularly conducive to prejudice
reduction because authority support establishes norms of acceptance. Deutsch
and Collins (1951) showed that the racial policy of the housing development
affected perceived social norms; women in the desegregated residences expected
their neighbours to approve of friendly interracial interactions, but women in the
segregated housing projects expected to be ostracized for such behaviour.
Further field studies in a number of different settings confirm the positive effect
of institutional support (Landis, Hope, & Day, 1984; Morrison & Herlihy, 1992;
Parker, 1968).
Allport’s (1954b) contact hypothesis has been highly influential, inspiring a
vast amount of empirical research, as well as the development of his initial
propositions into a fully-fledged theory (see Hewstone & Swart, 2011). His ideas
contributed to the US Supreme Court’s decision to outlaw racially segregated
schools, and have been applied widely in the ‘real world’ as part of interventions
to improve intergroup relations. One particularly successful intervention is the
so-called jigsaw classroom, a cooperative teaching method designed to reduce
prejudice in diverse classrooms (e.g. Aronson & Patnoe, 1997; see Social
Psychology Beyond the Lab 14.1).

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jigsaw classroom a cooperative teaching method designed to reduce prejudice in diverse

classrooms.

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So can we be confident that (appropriate) contact reduces prejudice? Early

reviews (e.g. Amir, 1976; Cook, 1984) often reached conflicting conclusions.
One of the most contentious issues was whether the effects of contact would
actually generalize from the encountered outgroup members to the outgroup as a
whole. This question is crucial when considering the effectiveness of intergroup
contact as a tool to improve intergroup relations on a wider scale.
Furthermore, critics were also concerned about the necessity of Allport’s
(1954b) optimal contact conditions (see also Stephan, 1987): the long list of
necessary conditions may be difficult to meet in real life, and contact under less
than optimal conditions might increase prejudice. To address these concerns, and
to provide a more systematic review of the contact literature, Pettigrew and
Tropp (2006) carried out a meta-analysis of over 500 studies, conducted over
five decades, that had examined the relation between intergroup contact and
prejudice. They found a highly significant negative relation between contact and
prejudice across studies, suggesting that contact is associated with reduced
prejudice. In fact, only a small percentage of studies suggested that contact is
associated with increased prejudice.
Keep in mind that many of the studies included in the meta-analysis were
cross-sectional, meaning that they often used questionnaires which measured
levels of contact with outgroup members and attitudes towards the outgroup at
the same point in time. In cross-sectional studies, it is never clear whether the
negative relation between contact and prejudice indicates that contact reduces
prejudice, or whether less prejudiced people simply engage in more contact. To
complicate things more, a significant association between two variables can also
be due to their correlation with a third, unknown (or unmeasured) variable,
which causes variation in both variables. For example, if less-educated people
tend to be more prejudiced as well as live in areas where contact is less likely to
occur, then education could explain a negative relation between contact and
prejudice. Thus, the best way of establishing a causal link between contact and
prejudice is to conduct an experiment, either in the field, such as the housing
experiments described earlier (Deutsch & Collins, 1951; Wilner et al., 1955) or
in the laboratory (e.g. see Wilder’s, 1984 study, described later). Longitudinal
studies, which measure contact and prejudice at different points in time and
examine the relation of contact to changes in prejudice, are also helpful to rule
out alternative causal relations. A number of such studies have been conducted
in recent years (e.g. Swart, Hewstone, Christ, & Voci, 2011; Tausch et al., 2010;
Van Laar, Levin, Sinclair, & Sidanius, 2005) and tend to suggest that contact
does indeed predict reductions in prejudice over time.
Let us return to the importance of Allport’s (1954b) optimal contact
conditions. Of the studies included in Pettigrew and Tropp’s (2006) meta-
analysis, some fully met Allport’s optimal contact conditions, others only
partially fulfilled them, and some studies did not fulfil them at all. This allowed
Pettigrew and Tropp to test how important Allport’s conditions are.
Interestingly, the significant relation between contact and prejudice emerged
irrespective of whether Allport’s contact conditions were present, although
studies that fulfilled the conditions showed stronger effects. The authors
therefore concluded that Allport’s original contact conditions are not necessary
for positive contact effects to occur, but that they are facilitating conditions that
are likely to make contact more effective.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BEYOND THE

LAB 14.1
THE JIGSAW CLASSROOM
The jigsaw classroom is a learning technique that was developed by
Aronson and his graduate students. It was first used in schools in Austin,
Texas, in 1971, shortly after schools in the city were desegregated and
children from different ethnic backgrounds were for the first time taught
together in the same classroom. Aronson was called by a school
superintendent just a few weeks after desegregation and asked to help
improve the increasingly hostile interracial relations at the school (tension
improve the increasingly hostile interracial relations at the school (tension
between groups had built up over the weeks, culminating in fights between
the youngsters). After observing classes for a few days, Aronson and his
students concluded that the hostility between the different ethnic groups was
fuelled by a competitive climate in the classroom, where students worked
individually and competed for the teacher’s approval and grades. They
decided that, to improve relations, this competitive climate needed to be
transformed into a cooperative one. So they started to develop the jigsaw
technique.
This is how it works: a class is divided into smaller task groups of six
children from different ethnic backgrounds. A lesson is divided into six
parts and each student is assigned one part of the material. For example, the
first time the jigsaw technique was applied, fifth-graders were asked to learn
about the life of Eleanor Roosevelt, and her biography was divided into six
segments (e.g. her childhood, her family life, her work as First Lady and so
on). Each student in a group was assigned one of these segments to prepare,
and asked to report what they learned to the other members of the group,
who did not have any other access to this information. In short, each group
member contributed a unique piece of the jigsaw puzzle. The jigsaw process
thus facilitates interaction among all students in the class, leading them to
value each other as contributors to their common task. It encourages
engagement with members of other ethnic groups by giving them an
essential part to contribute. Note that this technique fulfils many of Allport’s
(1954b) conditions for optimal contact: the children work cooperatively
towards a common goal, each member is vital to achieving the common
task, ensuring equal status of majority and minority children, and the
interaction receives institutional support from the school.
The jigsaw technique has now been used in schools for forty years and its
effectiveness has been demonstrated in a number of studies in which
children were randomly assigned to either a jigsaw classroom or a
traditional classroom (e.g. see Aronson & Patnoe, 1997). These studies have
consistently shown that the children taught in jigsaw classrooms not only
come to like each other more, but also perform better in exams and have
higher self-esteem compared to children taught in traditional classrooms.
Moreover, a number of studies have also shown that the children do not just
come to like their outgroup classmates more, but also come to like the other
ethnic groups in general more – that is, they become less prejudiced. Thus,
 the effects of the jigsaw classroom generalize from individual group
members to the outgroup as a whole. We will discuss the important issue of
generalization, and the conditions under which it is most likely to occur, in
greater detail later in the text.
To learn more about the jigsaw classroom, visit Elliot Aronson’s
‘jigsaw.org’ website.
FIGURE 14.15 The ‘jigsaw classroom’ is a cooperative teaching method
designed to reduce prejudice in diverse classrooms.
Source: © Monkey Business Images. Used under licence from Shutterstock.

Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) were also able to address the question of whether
contact effects generalize from the encountered group member to the group as a
whole. They did this by comparing the effect sizes of contact obtained for ratings
of individual outgroup members with effects sizes obtained for ratings of the
outgroup as a whole. Because effect sizes for outgroup ratings were not
significantly smaller than effect sizes for ratings of individuals, Pettigrew and
Tropp concluded that contact effects typically do generalize. But this does not
yet answer the question of when the positive effects of contact are most likely to
generalize to the outgroup as a whole.
This issue was examined in a study by Wilder (1984). In this study, female
students recruited from two rival colleges (Douglas College and Rutgers
College) interacted with a member of the other college (who was actually a
confederate). The two groups had fairly complementary stereotypes of one
another. While Rutgers women viewed Douglas women as being overly
concerned with their appearance, conservative and studious, Douglas women
perceived Rutgers women as liberal and interested in having fun at the expense
of their studies. Moreover, pre-tests confirmed that both groups were biased in
favour of the ingroup; they preferred their own college over the other college.
The crucial question examined in Wilder’s study was not just whether positive
contact could affect views of the outgroup, but whether the effects of contact on
overall outgroup attitudes would depend on the typicality of the encountered
‘exemplar’.
Wilder thus varied whether the outgroup member behaved and dressed in a
manner that was either typical or untypical of the outgroup. For example, for
participants from Rutgers University, in the typical outgroup member condition,
the confederate introduced herself as a Douglas student, was dressed neatly and
wore make-up, looked at her diary to check if the experiment clashed with a
meeting of her conservative political club and mentioned that she hoped the
experiment would be brief because she had a lot of studying to do. She thus
fulfilled the stereotypes Rutgers women had of Douglas women (neatness,
conservatism and studiousness). When the confederate posed as a Rutgers
woman, she wore faded jeans and a baggy T-shirt, looked at her diary to check if
the experiment clashed with a meeting of her liberal political club and mentioned
that she hoped the experiment would be brief because she needed to get ready
for a party. In the atypical condition, the Douglas student dressed and behaved
like a typical Rutgers student and vice versa. The interaction consisted of a
number of problem-solving tasks during which the confederate then acted in
either a positive or negative manner (she supported or rejected the participant’s
ideas in a number of problem-solving tasks), rendering the contact either
pleasant or unpleasant. As one would expect, participants’ ratings of the
outgroup were more positive when the confederate behaved in a positive and
cooperative manner. Importantly, however, the extent to which the contact
experience generalized to evaluations of the outgroup as a whole depended on
the outgroup member’s typicality. Only when the encountered outgroup member
was typical did the positive contact experience generalize to the outgroup as a
whole (see Figure 14.16).
FIGURE 14.16 Outgroup evaluation as a function of typicality of outgroup
member and quality of contact.
Source: Adapted from Wilder, 1984, with permission from Elsevier.
 This finding suggested that contact effects are most likely to generalize to the
outgroup when the outgroup member is viewed as representative (cf. Rothbart &
John, 1985), for which there is now extensive evidence (see Brown & Hewstone,
2005). We return to the issue of generalization in the next section, where we
address the role of levels of categorization in prejudice reduction.
 Varying levels of categorization
Does changing the structure of categories reduce prejudice?
The question of whether to approach prejudice from an individual or group
perspective also has implications for how best to implement contact as a
prejudice-reduction strategy. Researchers have developed three distinct
theoretical models that examine the nature of cognitive group representations
during contact, and which is more effective. Although each of these models was
based on the social identity/self-categorization approach (Tajfel & Turner, 1979;
Turner et al., 1987), each draws quite different conclusions about how contact
should be structured in order to reduce prejudice. Keep in mind that while these
models were initially concerned with intergroup contact interventions, many of
the ideas and questions put forward by these approaches apply more widely, in
particular to the question of how relations between majority and minority groups
should be managed in society. For example, is intergroup harmony in diverse
societies best achieved by taking a ‘colour-blind’ approach and treating everyone
as an individual? Or should we promote multiculturalism in which group
differences are acknowledged and appreciated? As you will see, the answer is
not that simple.

Three models of contact

The decategorization approach (e.g. Brewer & Miller, 1984) recommends
reducing the salience of intergroup boundaries during contact by inducing two
cognitive processes: ‘differentiation’ (making distinctions between individual
outgroup members); and ‘personalization’ (stressing the uniqueness of each
individual outgroup member). This can be achieved by promoting opportunities
to get to know each other and by encouraging the disclosure of intimate personal
information during contact (e.g. Ensari & Miller, 2002). This approach is
consistent with Allport’s (1954b) suggestion that contact should be intimate and
allow for real acquaintance with outgroup members. Brewer and Miller
suggested that the attention to idiosyncratic information would result in less
attention being paid to category-based stereotypical information. They believed
that the repeated use of individual information would reduce the usefulness of
the category in future interactions, and thereby have generalized effects (less
prejudiced reactions to outgroup members in general).

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 - - - - - - - - - -

decategorization reducing the salience of intergroup boundaries through personalized contact;

attention to idiosyncratic rather than category-based information about outgroup members should,
over time, reduce the usefulness of the category, and reduce prejudice.

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Support for the effectiveness of personalized contact comes from a series of

experiments (e.g. Bettencourt, Brewer, Croak, & Miller, 1992) in which
experimentally created groups were brought together to work on a cooperative
task. Participants were instructed to focus either on personal characteristics
(person-oriented condition) or on the task at hand (task-oriented condition).
These studies demonstrated that participants in the person-oriented condition
show less bias in the allocation of rewards to ingroup and outgroup members
compared to participants in the task-oriented condition. This was true even when
participants were asked to allocate rewards to an outgroup member whom they
had not encountered before and who was presented on a video screen. This
finding provided evidence that the effects of personalized contact generalize to
the outgroup as a whole.
The idea that personalized contact reduces prejudice is also supported by
research on intergroup friendships. Pettigrew (1997) demonstrated that people
who had an outgroup friend expressed less prejudice towards the outgroup as a
whole than did people who only had an outgroup neighbour or co-worker, but
not a friend. Compared to other forms of contact, friendship also emerged as the
strongest predictor of reduced prejudice in Pettigrew and Tropp’s (2006) meta-
analysis.
The decategorization approach suggests that people should interact with
members of other groups as individuals and refrain from using social categories.
But is this realistic? As we discussed earlier, groups fulfil important human
needs, and social identities form valued parts of the self, so people might be
reluctant to give up or ignore their group memberships. Rather than aiming to
eliminate the use of social categories altogether, the recategorization approach
(also referred to as the common ingroup identity model; Gaertner, Mann,
Murrell, & Dovidio, 1989; see also Chapter 10) proposes that prejudice can be
reduced by transforming cognitive group representations from two groups (‘us’
and ‘them’) to one inclusive social entity (‘we’).

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recategorization recommends replacing salient ingroup–outgroup distinctions at a subordinate

level with a common ingroup identity at a superordinate level that includes both former ingroup and
outgroup members.

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Several studies have now shown that recategorization results in reduced

ingroup bias (see Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). Interestingly, a study by Gaertner
et al. (1989) showed that recategorization reduces bias in a different way than
decategorization (i.e. conditions that encourage participants to interact as
individuals). This is shown in Figure 14.17. While decategorization and
recategorization resulted in similar amounts of reduction in bias (see Figure
14.17a), decategorization reduced bias by making evaluations of former ingroup
members less positive, while recategorization reduced bias by making
evaluations of former outgroup members more positive, compared to the control
condition in which participants interacted as members of different groups (see
Figure 14.17b).
FIGURE 14.17(a) and (b) (a) Ingroup bias as a function of categorization; (b)
Ingroup evaluation and outgroup evaluation as a function of categorization.
Source: Adapted from Gaertner et al., 1989. Copyright © 2002 by the American
Psychological Association. Adapted with permission. The use of APA
information does not imply endorsement by APA.

Although the empirical support for the benefits of recategorization is wide-

ranging, many of the studies testing this model were conducted in the laboratory.
This raises the question of whether a superordinate identity can overcome
powerful ethnic and racial categorizations that are an important part of people’s
self-concepts in the ‘real world’. Would you be willing to give up your national
identity in favour of a broader category such as ‘European’? A number of
authors have suggested that there may be strong resistance to changes in
category boundaries, especially when the groups are engaged in hostilities, or
when they differ in size, power or status. Remember our discussion earlier about
the importance of identifying with optimally distinct groups and the perils of
distinctiveness threat. Minority group members may be particularly reluctant to
accept a superordinate identity if it is dominated by the majority group (Simon,
Aufderheide, & Kampmeier, 2001). For example, as we discussed earlier, East
Germans (‘Ossis’) would be more reluctant to identify with Germans than would
West Germans (‘Wessis’). The categorization model (also called mutual
differentiation model; Hewstone & Brown, 1986) presents a viewpoint that
differs sharply from the decategorization and recategorization approaches. This
model suggests that, rather than reducing the salience of the original categories,
group affiliations should be made salient during contact. This encourages the
problematic relationship between the ingroup and outgroup to be addressed
directly, reducing the risk that the outgroup members encountered are
psychologically distanced from the outgroup, which could inhibit generalization
(Rothbart & John, 1985).

- - - - - - - - - -

mutual differentiation (or categorization approach to improving intergroup relations) making

group affiliations salient during contact to give members of the respective groups distinct but
complementary roles.

- - - - - - - - - -

But how should positive intergroup contact be structured? Hewstone and

Brown (1986) recommend that, in order to maintain social identities and positive
distinctiveness, but to avoid intergroup comparisons in the interaction, the
contact situation should be structured so that members of the respective groups
have distinct but complementary roles to contribute towards the achievement of
a common goal. Mutual strengths should be recognized and equally valued,
which can be achieved by ensuring that the ingroup and the outgroup are rated
on independent dimensions (Mummendey & Schreiber, 1984). Thus, this
approach does not seek to change the original category structure, but aims to
transform the level of interdependence between the two groups from negative to
positive (i.e. from a competitive to a more cooperative relationship). Both the
role of category salience in the generalization of contact effects and the
advantage of letting participants work on different task dimensions have been
empirically supported (Brown & Wade, 1987; Deschamps & Brown, 1983; Van
Oudenhoven, Groenewoud, & Hewstone, 1996). Nonetheless, this approach also
has drawbacks. Making category memberships salient could lead to biased
perception and behaviour in the contact situation, and might therefore reinforce
stereotypical perceptions (Neuberg, 1996). An emphasis on group memberships
may also create anxiety in the contact situation and thus risk the generalization
of negative affect to the outgroup as a whole (Greenland & Brown, 1999; Islam
& Hewstone, 1993a; Stephan & Stephan, 1985).

Integrative models
The three theoretical models of categorization during contact (decategorization,
recategorization and mutual differentiation) make different suggestions as to
how contact should be structured to be most beneficial. Each of the models is
supported by empirical evidence and each has advantages and disadvantages.
But which model should be applied? Rather than viewing these models as
competing positions, researchers have begun to see them as complementary
approaches and have started to integrate them.
For example, Pettigrew (1998) combined them into a three-stage longitudinal
model. He suggested that, because initial intergroup interactions are often formal
and characterized by anxiety, decategorization should optimally happen first.
Personalized contact would reduce this initial anxiety and lead to interpersonal
liking. The social categories should be made salient in the next step in order to
achieve generalization of positive affect to the outgroup as a whole.
Recategorization into a superordinate category may then happen later, leading to
maximum reduction in prejudice. Pettigrew (1998) realized, however, that the
final stage of recategorization may be difficult if original group memberships are
not easily abandoned. In this case, group members may prefer to maintain
mutual recognition as separate groups, but also to acknowledge that they share a
common group identity at a superordinate level (e.g. the English, Welsh and
Scots who are all also British). This has been referred to as a dual identity
(Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) or dual categorization (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000)
model. A dual identity model, in which both the original subgroup identities and
a superordinate identity are made salient, has now been supported in several
experimental studies (see Research Close-Up 14.2). Dual identification is the
most beneficial strategy for members of minority groups, resulting, for example,
in less ‘acculturative stress’ (the stress of moving to a different culture) among
immigrants (Berry, Kim, Minde, & Mok, 1987) and less ingroup bias (Gaertner,
Rust, Dovidio, Bachman, & Anastasio, 1996; González & Brown, 2006). It
seems to be less successful, however, in reducing prejudice among members of
numerical majority groups (González & Brown, 2006). Figure 14.19 presents a
schematic representation of the different models.
FIGURE 14.19 Schematic representations of the decategorization,
recategorization, categorization and dual categorization models.
Source: Adapted from Brewer, 2003, with permission.

RESEARCH CLOSE-UP 14.2

THE BENEFITS OF DUAL

CATEGORIZATION
 Hornsey, M. J., & Hogg, M. A. (2000). Subgroup relations: A comparison of mutual intergroup
differentiation and common ingroup identity models of prejudice reduction. Personality and
Social Psychology Bulletin, 26, 242–256.

Introduction In this article, Hornsey and Hogg

wanted to examine what happens when naturalistic
groups are asked to forsake a valued subgroup identity
in favour of a superordinate identity. They were
sceptical about the applicability of a common ingroup
identity in the real world and hypothesized that
making a superordinate category salient at the
expense of a valued subgroup identity is likely to
result in distinctiveness threat. This would
consequently lead to greater bias towards the
outgroup in order to reassert the subgroup identity.
They proposed a new integrative model that suggested
that dual categorization (making both the subgroup
and superordinate group identity salient at the same
time) would be the most effective way of reducing
bias. The research was conducted in the context of
different subject groups within a university in
Australia.
Method Participants Participants were 191
undergraduate students (N = 119 females, N = 72
males) who studied either a maths/science (N = 83) or
humanities (N = 108) subject. They participated
individually.
Procedure and design Participants were told that the
local government was planning to build a recreational
park and it was their task to choose ten out of a list of
30 objects and services that they considered to be
essential for its success. In an individual condition
there was no mention of any category (i.e. neither the
subgroup nor the superordinate identity was salient);
participants were told that the government was
interested in the opinions of ordinary individuals. In
the superordinate category condition participants were
told that the government was interested in the
opinions of university students and was planning to
compare them to the opinions of town planners. A
piece of cardboard with their university logo formed a
visible reminder of their superordinate category. In
the subordinate group condition, participants were
told that the government was interested in comparing
the responses of humanities and maths/science
students. They were asked to circle their faculty area
and, depending on their subject, to use either a blue or
red pen to complete the questionnaire. In a final
condition, participants were given the instructions for
the superordinate condition followed by the
instructions for the subordinate condition, making
both their subcategory and the superordinate category
salient. This yielded a 2 (subgroup: salient versus not
salient) × 2 (superordinate group: salient versus not
salient) between-subjects design.
 Measures Participants completed a manipulation
check (they indicated the extent to which their
thoughts were drawn to their faculty and their
university membership while completing the task to
assess the salience of the two categories), a measure
of their identification with their subgroup (i.e. their
faculty) and a measure of ingroup bias at the subgroup
level (the extent to which they would like to work
with members of their own and the other faculty in an
alleged subsequent task).
Results A 2 (subgroup: salient versus not salient) × 2
(superordinate group: salient versus not salient)
between-subjects analysis of variance revealed a
significant interaction between subgroup salience and
superordinate group salience. Figure 14.18a shows
that the highest level of bias occurred in the condition
in which the superordinate, but not the subordinate,
group was salient. Participants also showed stronger
identification with their subgroup in this condition
(see Figure 14.18b). In contrast, participants in the
condition in which both the superordinate and the
subordinate category were salient showed relatively
low levels of bias.
FIGURE 14.18(a) and (b) (a) Ingroup bias as a function of salience of the
subgroup and the superordinate group; (b) Subgroup identification as a
function of salience of the subgroup and the superordinate group.
Source: Adapted from Hornsey & Hogg, 2000, Study 1, with permission from
SAGE Publications Ltd.

Discussion Categorizing people exclusively at the

superordinate group level (as recommended by the
recategorization model) can threaten the
distinctiveness of subgroup identities. In this example,
people may not want to be seen simply as ‘students’,
but wish to hold on to their valued identities as either
maths/science or humanities students. This can result
in a need to reassert the original group boundaries by
increasing identification and expressing bias in favour
of their subgroup. This distinctiveness threat can be
avoided when the original subgroup identities are
preserved within the common superordinate identity
(i.e. dual categorization).
Psychological processes involved in intergroup contact
and prejudice reduction
Which psychological processes play a role in prejudice reduction?
Understanding the psychological processes involved in prejudice reduction is
important because it can enable researchers to design optimal interventions that
target these processes specifically. In the case of face-to-face intergroup contact,
which may often be difficult to achieve in real life, such knowledge can help to
identify alternative or supplementary interventions with similar psychological
effects (see below). Researchers examining prejudice reduction generally, and
intergroup contact specifically, have therefore paid a great deal of attention to
the issue of process in the recent years.
Allport (1954b) did not really specify the psychological ‘driving forces’ of
prejudice reduction through contact. He suggested, however, that negative
stereotypes and attitudes towards outgroups are often due to a lack of
information or erroneous information about a group, and that contact would
provide an opportunity to correct these assumptions. Research on knowledge
acquisition as a potential explanatory variable (or ‘mediator’) has found some
limited support for this idea (Stephan & Stephan, 1985). While increased
knowledge about the outgroup explains at least part of the reduction in prejudice
(Pettigrew & Tropp, 2008), more recent work has emphasized the importance of
affective processes. Contact seems to impact more strongly on affective than on
cognitive variables, having a greater effect on attitudes than stereotypes (Tropp
& Pettigrew, 2005), and it seems to have its effects predominantly via its impact
on affective processes (Brown & Hewstone, 2005).
Much of this research has focused on intergroup anxiety, a negative affective
state felt when anticipating or experiencing contact with an outgroup. Intergroup
anxiety stems from the expectation of negative consequences for oneself during
intergroup interactions, such as embarrassment or rejection, and may be
exacerbated by negative outgroup stereotypes, a history of intergroup conflict or
a high ratio of outgroup to ingroup members (Stephan & Stephan, 1985).
Because anxiety is accompanied by a narrowed attention focus and information-
processing biases, it can undermine the positive effects of contact (e.g. Wilder &
Shapiro, 1989). High levels of intergroup anxiety may also lead to the avoidance
of contact altogether (Plant & Devine, 2003; Shelton & Richeson, 2005) or
render any interaction awkward (Shelton, 2003). Because this negative affective
state is linked to outgroup members, it is strongly associated with negative
outgroup attitudes. Much research has shown that successful contact helps to
overcome these apprehensions; reduced anxiety is a key mediator in the negative
relationship between contact and prejudice (e.g. Islam & Hewstone, 1993).

- - - - - - - - - -

intergroup anxiety a negative affective state experienced when anticipating future, or experiencing
actual, contact with an outgroup member, stemming from the expectation of negative consequences
for oneself during intergroup interactions.

- - - - - - - - - -

In addition to reducing negative anxiety, contact can also promote positive

affective ties and increase empathy. Empathy can broadly be defined as the
experience of understanding or sharing the emotional state of another person
(see Chapter 10), and includes both emotional (empathic concern) and cognitive
(perspective taking) facets (Davis, 1994). Research has shown that empathy has
beneficial effects on attitudes and behaviour (Stephan & Finlay, 1999). Several
studies have shown that contact positively affects both cognitive and affective
components of empathy, which partially explains how contact has an effect on
prejudice reduction (Harwood, Hewstone, Paolini, & Voci, 2005; Tam,
Hewstone, Harwood, Voci, & Kenworthy, 2006). A meta-analysis specifically
on mediators of contact effects highlighted the role of increased empathy and
reduced intergroup anxiety as the key mechanisms through which intergroup
contact reduces prejudice (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2008).
A final mechanism we consider here is that of ingroup reappraisal. Pettigrew
(1997) suggested that meaningful intergroup contact can help people to realise
that ingroup norms, customs and lifestyles are not inherently superior to those of
outgroups. In fact, this process would be expected to reduce prejudice towards
all outgroups, leading to a wide generalization of contact effects. Several studies
support this idea. For example, Pettigrew (1997) demonstrated that respondents
who had contact with members of nationally represented minority groups (e.g.
Germans’ contact with people of Turkish descent) were also more accepting of
other national groups that are less represented in that country (e.g. Algerians; see
also Van Laar et al., 2005). Pettigrew (2009) labelled this form of generalization
the ‘secondary transfer effect’ of intergroup contact. The ‘transfer’ is also not
confined to outgroups that are similar to each other (e.g. across national groups,
in the case above). Tausch et al. (2010) showed, for example, that contact across
the sectarian divide in Northern Ireland (i.e. Catholics meeting Protestants and
vice versa) promoted not only more positive attitudes towards the religious
outgroup, but also towards racial minorities. Tausch et al. reported secondary
transfer effects across multiple intergroup contexts, and showed that they were
not due to socially desirable responding (i.e. someone giving politically correct
positive responses to one outgroup also giving such positive responses to other
outgroups). They also provided longitudinal evidence for this secondary transfer
effect, showing that contact with the other community predicted reduced racial
prejudice over time.

- - - - - - - - - -

ingroup reappraisal realization that ingroup norms, customs and lifestyles are not inherently
superior to those of outgroups; this process is implicated in the generalization of positive contact
effects to other outgroups.

- - - - - - - - - -

In sum, research has successfully identified some of the key psychological

processes involved in how intergroup contact reduces prejudice. As we will see
next, these processes can also be set in motion by techniques other than direct
face-to-face contact.
 Other prejudice-reduction techniques
Can prejudice be reduced by interventions other than contact?
Although face-to-face intergroup contact has been most widely researched as a
prejudice-reduction intervention, actually arranging contact can involve serious
practical obstacles. Different social groups often live highly segregated lives.
This is particularly the case when there is a history of conflict and when there
are strong social norms against intergroup interactions. Social psychologists are
aware of these obstacles and have developed a number of approaches that do not
require direct interaction, utilizing channels such as the Internet or other media
to achieve widespread exposure (Amichai-Hamburger & McKenna, 2006).

Providing stereotype-disconfirming information about the outgroup

Following Allport’s (1954b) view that prejudice can result from erroneous
stereotypes, research has investigated the effects of providing different types of
stereotype-disconfirming information on outgroup perceptions. Several models
of stereotype change have been tested: a bookkeeping model, whereby stereotype
change happens gradually via the accumulation of stereotype-inconsistent
information; a conversion model, which envisages radical change in response to
a single piece of dramatic disconfirming information; and a subtyping model,
whereby stereotype-inconsistent information creates a subtype and the outgroup
stereotype becomes more complex (Weber & Crocker, 1983). Subtyping is also
a means by which stereotypes are maintained in the face of disconfirmation,
because a new subtype can be viewed as unrepresentative of the group, leaving
the stereotype more or less unchanged (see Hewstone, 1994, for a review).
Overall, there is some evidence that stereotypes change according to the
bookkeeping model (e.g. the more interesting accountants we meet, the less we
stereotype accountants as boring), and the conversion model (e.g. one really
engaging accountant can sometimes change our view of the entire group), but
the evidence is strongest for subtyping (e.g. if we encounter several accountants
who are interesting people, but also love playing with numbers – and are
therefore typical – then we are most likely to revise our prejudice that all
accountants are boring; e.g. Johnston & Hewstone, 1992).

Extended contact
The extended contact hypothesis (Wright, Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe, & Ropp,
1997) proposes that the mere knowledge that an ingroup member has a close
relationship with an outgroup member can improve outgroup attitudes. Thus,
people can experience intergroup contact indirectly (see Dovidio, Eller, &
Hewstone, 2011, for a recent review). In one experimental study, Wright et al.
(1997) first created negative intergroup attitudes by letting two groups in the
laboratory compete with each other. They then asked one member from each
group to engage in friendship-building exercises with the other group. The two
participants believed that this exercise was part of another study. It involved
disclosing increasingly personal information to each other, an exercise that was
previously shown to result in high interpersonal closeness among strangers
(Aron, Aron, Tudor, & Nelson, 1991). The remaining participants were asked to
complete a number of unrelated questionnaires during that time. After the task
was finished the groups were reunited and the experimenter encouraged
participants to tell each other about the tasks they had just performed. Wright
and colleagues found that outgroup attitudes improved after the friendship-
building task, even among participants who themselves had not participated in
the friendship building task. Thus, they provided evidence that extended contact
can indeed improve attitudes. But how or why does extended contact reduce
prejudice? Wright and colleagues suggested that one important mechanism
concerns perceived group norms. As mentioned earlier, group norms do not
always support intergroup interactions. Observing successful intergroup
interactions, however, signals that engaging with outgroup members is
acceptable to both the ingroup and the outgroup. Learning about intergroup
contact would then also reduce the observers’ anxiety about interacting with
outgroup members in the future.

- - - - - - - - - -

extended contact hypothesis mere knowledge that an ingroup member has a close relationship
with an outgroup member can improve outgroup attitudes.

- - - - - - - - - -

The extended contact hypothesis has now received substantial support in a

variety of intergroup contexts. Evidence has also accrued about how and when it
works: extended contact effects are mediated by reduced intergroup anxiety (e.g.
Paolini, Hewstone, Cairns, & Voci, 2004), and by changing both ingroup and
outgroup norms (e.g. Turner, Hewstone, Voci, & Vonofakou, 2008). Extended
contact seems to be most effective for people who have few opportunities for
direct contact (e.g. Christ et al., 2010). It has also been successfully applied in
school settings: school children who learned about an intergroup friendship via a
story expressed less prejudice (Cameron & Rutland, 2006). Extended contact can
also happen via the media; Schiappa, Gregg, and Hewes (2005) showed that
watching television programmes that portrayed intergroup contact (e.g. the
American TV show Will and Grace, which portrays a gay man as a main
character) reduced levels of prejudice towards the target groups featured.

Perspective-taking and empathy induction

Interventions that attempt to promote perspective-taking and empathy typically
involve role-playing and the presentation of information from the outgroup’s
perspective. For example, Clore and Jeffery (1972) instructed participants to
assume the role of a disabled person by travelling about in a wheelchair for an
hour. This exercise significantly improved attitudes toward disabled people, an
effect that was still found four months later. Galinsky and Moskowitz (2000)
presented their participants with a photo of an elderly person and asked them to
imagine what a day in their life would be like. Compared to the two control
groups, which received no further instructions or were asked to suppress the
stereotype, participants in the perspective-taking condition showed reduced
stereotyping of elderly people in a subsequent task (see also Finlay & Stephan,
2000).
 The wider implications of prejudice reduction
Does prejudice reduction result in more equal societies?
It is important to evaluate the effects of prejudice-reduction interventions not
just in terms of whether they successfully reduce prejudiced attitudes, but also in
terms of whether they promote good intergroup relations more generally. An
implicit assumption in much of the research we have talked about in this section
has been that reducing prejudice among members of the socially dominant group
would result in reduced discrimination against members of minority or
disadvantaged groups, thereby increasing group equality (see Wright &
Lubensky, 2009). Consequently, this research has predominantly examined the
effects of interventions on members of advantaged groups, and used prejudiced
beliefs and feelings as the primary outcome variables. Less is known about how
these interventions affect members of minority groups. Given both that attitudes
do not always predict behaviour (see Chapter 6) and that dominant groups are
motivated to maintain their power (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), we might be
sceptical about the effects of contact and prejudice reduction on wider societal
change. Indeed, some researchers have argued that reducing prejudice does not
necessarily address or eliminate intergroup inequality (Jackman & Crane, 1986).
As we have emphasized earlier in our discussion of social identity theory,
members of low status groups also have an important role to play in bringing
about societal change (e.g. through collective action). Thus, conflict, such as the
current uprising in the Arab world, is therefore not always a bad thing and can
lead to real societal change in the long run.
Recently a number of researchers have started to consider these issues. This
research suggests that the link between reduced prejudice and political attitudes
and actual behaviour is not clear-cut. For example, Dixon, Durrheim, and
Tredoux (2007) found that while white South Africans were in favour of equality
in principle, they tended to oppose interventions that would help to achieve this
goal in practice, such as school quotas, affirmative action and land restitution.
They termed this phenomenon the principle–implementation gap. Indeed,
white South Africans’ contact with black South Africans had a weaker effect on
attitudes towards specific pro-black policies than it did on reducing prejudice
towards black people.

- - - - - - - - - -
 principle–implementation gap acceptance of racial equality in principle is accompanied by
resistance to specific policies that would bring about such racial equality.

- - - - - - - - - -

Experimental research assessing the causal effect of positive intergroup

contact on attitudes and actual discriminatory behaviour also suggests that,
although positive contact improves advantaged group members’ attitudes
towards the disadvantaged, this does not reduce discrimination (Saguy et al.,
2009; see Research Close-Up 14.3). Ironically, positive contact experiences can
also lead members of disadvantaged groups to become less aware of intergroup
inequalities (Dixon, Tropp, Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2010; Saguy et al., 2009), to
be less supportive of policies aimed at promoting equality (Dixon et al., 2007),
and to be less willing to engage in collective action on behalf of their group
(Wright & Lubensky, 2009).
Overall, these recent findings suggest that research on interventions to improve
intergroup relations needs to go beyond using prejudice reduction as the sole
indicator of the success of the intervention, and to assess more consequential
outcomes, such as actual behaviour and support for policies. In other words
actions (continued discrimination) speak louder than words (reduced prejudice).
Moreover, interventions should also address the needs of members of
disadvantaged groups to ensure that interventions do not compromise realizing
their group goals.
 Summary
In this section we have shown that contact between members of opposing groups
is an effective tool for reducing prejudice, especially if it takes place under
favourable conditions. We presented three cognitive models of intergroup
contact that make different suggestions about how contact should be structured
to achieve generalized prejudice reduction; recent integrations of these models
seem to be particularly effective. We also demonstrated that prejudice reduction
involves a number of cognitive and affective mechanisms, such as increased
knowledge, reduced intergroup anxiety, increased empathy and a reappraisal of
the ingroup. We discussed how interventions other than direct intergroup
contact, such as perspective-taking exercises or extended contact, can also
promote these processes. We concluded this section by suggesting that
interventions to improve intergroup relations need to go beyond measuring
prejudice to assess the consequences of interventions for intergroup equality
more generally.

RESEARCH CLOSE-UP 14.3

IRONIC CONSEQUENCES OF
INTERGROUP CONTACT
Saguy, T., Tausch, N., Dovidio, J. F., & Pratto, F. (2009). The irony of harmony: Intergroup
contact can produce false expectations for equality. Psychological Science, 20, 114–121.

Introduction The authors suggested that beyond

improving attitudes toward the outgroup, positive
contact can also reduce disadvantaged-group
members’ awareness of intergroup inequalities and
raise their expectations that the advantaged group
would treat them fairly. These expectations could, in
turn, reduce disadvantaged group members’
motivation to engage in actions aimed at achieving
social change toward group equality. An experiment
examined the causal effect of positive intergroup
contact (i.e. that emphasized commonalities between
groups rather than group differences) on (a)
disadvantaged-group members’ attitudes toward the
outgroup, (b) attention to inequality, and (c)
expectations of fair treatment by the outgroup. The
researchers also measured advantaged-group
members’ outgroup attitudes, awareness of inequality
and their actual resource allocation between groups.
Method Participants Participants were 210
undergraduate students (N = 126 females, N = 84
males). Each experimental session involved a mixed-
gender group of six students.
Procedure and design Participants were randomly
assigned to one of two three-person groups. They
were then told that there was another group and that
each group would be asked to make one of two
decisions: one group (the powerful, advantaged
group) would be asked to decide how to distribute ten
credits (a valued resource) between the groups and the
other group (the disadvantaged group) would be asked
to decide how to distribute 10 marbles (not valued)
between the groups. Participants were then told that,
before making their decisions, the two groups would
have the chance to meet. To manipulate type of
contact, the groups were either asked to discuss things
the groups had in common in the session (e.g.
‘Similar steps the groups went through in this study’;
the commonality-focused contact condition) or aspects
of the experiment on which the groups differed (e.g.
‘Differences between the tasks the groups will do
next’; differences-focused contact condition). Thus,
the study involved a 2 (group position: advantaged
versus disadvantaged) × 2 (contact type:
commonality-focused versus differences-focused)
factorial design.
Measures The participants then completed a number
of questionnaires measuring their awareness of the
intergroup inequality and their attitudes towards the
other group. Participants in the disadvantaged group
were also asked to estimate the number of credits they
expected to receive from the advantaged group.
Finally, members of the advantaged group were asked
to distribute the ten credits between the two groups.
Results As expected, both the advantaged and the
disadvantaged groups were less aware of intergroup
inequality in the commonality-focused contact,
compared to the difference-focused contact, condition
(see Figure 14.20a). In line with predictions,
intergroup attitudes were more positive in the
commonality-focused contact condition.
 Disadvantaged group members expected to receive
significantly more credits from the advantaged group
in the commonality-focused compared to the
differences-focused condition. There was, however,
no significant difference between the two contact
conditions in terms of the actual distribution of credits
by the advantaged group, who discriminated against
the disadvantaged group in each case. Figure 14.20b
shows the number of credits expected and the number
of credits received.
FIGURE 14.20(a) and (b) (a) Outgroup attitudes and awareness of inequality
across groups as a function of contact type; (b) Number of credits (out of 10)
expected by the disadvantaged group and number of credits received from the
advantaged group as a function of contact type.
Source: Adapted from Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, & Pratto (2009). The irony of
harmony: Intergroup contact can produce false expectations for equality.
Psychological Science, 20, 114–121. © SAGE Publications, reprinted with
permission.

Discussion This study demonstrated that although

positive commonality-focused contact improves
 intergroup attitudes this does not translate into less
discrimination. Rather, commonality-focused contact
made both groups less aware of the intergroup
inequality, and raised the disadvantaged groups’
hopes about the credits they would receive, an
expectation that proved to be false. In fact, the
advantaged group discriminated in favour of their
ingroup in both contact conditions. A second,
correlational study investigated whether these
expectations for equal treatment have implications for
disadvantaged group members’ support for social
change. This study surveyed Arabs in Israel (a
socially disadvantaged group), and showed that more
positive intergroup contact with Jews (the advantaged
group) was associated with perceptions of Jews as
more fair, which in turn predicted decreased support
for social change. It is therefore critical to recognize
that intergroup harmony per se does not necessarily
translate into intergroup equality.

CHAPTER SUMMARY
What is prejudice? Prejudice is traditionally defined as a negative attitude
towards an outgroup, but can also emphasize ostensibly positive aspects
of a group. It typically functions to the perceiver’s advantage, even when
it implies a positive perception of the outgroup.
How do we explain prejudice? Prejudice can be explained at both
individual and group levels. At the individual level, personality and
individual difference approaches help to explain variation in prejudice
between people. Group-level explanations are well placed to explain the
social nature of prejudice.
Is there a prejudiced personality? People who are prejudiced against one
outgroup are often prejudiced against others. Right-wing authoritarianism
and social dominance orientation have been linked to prejudice. However,
social norms play a role in shaping prejudice, and individual difference
variables are themselves influenced by the social context.
How can cognitive processes explain prejudice? Cognitive processes can
explain how we come to see members of a social category as very like
each other, and how prejudiced beliefs might form, but motivational
processes can also be important in inhibiting prejudice, and also in
causing it.
Can intragroup processes account for prejudice towards outgroups? It
may make good (evolutionary) sense to favour members of our own
group, but on its own this does not provide a strong explanation of why
we might actively derogate outgroups.
Can conflicts of interest at the intergroup level be reduced to individual
self-interest? Realistic conflicts of interest between groups provide a
powerful explanation of intergroup hostility, but ingroup bias still occurs
in minimal groups, and expectations of ingroup reciprocity cannot explain
why people maximize the difference in reward allocations between
groups.
What (other) threats to group identity from an outgroup can help to
explain discrimination? Threats to the ingroup include threats to its very
existence, threats to group-esteem, threats to the values of the group, and
threats to group distinctiveness.
So are prejudice and discrimination between groups inevitable? Not at
all. Intergroup factors can also help to explain the absence of
discrimination (e.g. under conditions of legitimacy, and social reality
constraints, or when it goes against group norms and threatens the image
of the ingroup).
What do group emotions add to our understanding of prejudice? Group
emotions specify threats to the ingroup, through appraisals of how the
outgroup affects it, and the appropriate response. The role of group
identification in how intensely emotions are felt helps to explain variation
in prejudice. Group emotions (e.g. contempt, Schadenfreude) can also
help to explain the more extreme forms of prejudice.
How can prejudice be reduced? Intergroup contact is one of the most-
 widely applied interventions to reduce prejudice. Contact effects are most
likely to generalize to the outgroup as a whole when the encountered
group members are typical of the outgroup.
Does changing the level of categorization reduce prejudice? Changing
group representations in different ways (through decategorization,
recategorization, and mutual differentiation) has been shown to reduce
prejudice, but in different ways. A dual-categorization approach (making
both the original categories and a superordinate category salient) is an
effective way of reducing prejudice while avoiding the pitfalls of
distinctiveness threat.
Can prejudice be reduced by interventions other than direct contact?
Prejudice reduction can also be set in motion by other techniques, such as
presenting stereotype disconfirming information, extended contact, and
inducing empathy and perspective taking.
Does prejudice reduction result in more equal societies? Recent findings
suggest that this is not necessarily the case. Ironically, positive contact
experiences can lead members of disadvantaged groups to become less
aware of intergroup inequalities and less willing to engage in collective
action on behalf of their group.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

Brown, R. (2010). Prejudice: It’s social psychology (2nd ed.). Oxford:
Blackwell. A detailed overview of intergroup phenomena and their explanations.
Dovidio, J. F., Gaertner, S. L., & Saguy, T. (2009). Commonality and the
complexity of ‘we’: Social attitudes and social change. Personality and Social
Psychology Review, 13, 3–20. Examines the role of collective identities in the
development of prejudice and inequality and in interventions to improve
attitudes towards other groups and in inhibiting or facilitating social change.
Ellemers, N., Spears, R., & Doosje, B. (2002). Self and social identity. Annual
Review of Psychology, 53, 161–186. Provides an overview of different identity
threats and coping strategies that develop and extend the social identity
approach.
Hewstone, M., Rubin, M., & Willis, H. (2002). Intergroup bias. Annual Review
of Psychology, 53, 575–604. A comprehensive overview of the literature on
ingroup bias.
Otten, S., Sassenberg, K., & Kessler, T. (Eds.). (2009). Intergroup relations: The
role of motivation and emotion. New York: Psychology Press. This volume
contains a number of state-of-the-art summaries of research programmes, some
of which are referred to in this chapter (e.g. Yzerbyt & Kuppens on group-based
emotions and prejudice, and Spears et al. on the minimal group paradigm).
Scheepers, D., Spears, R., Doosje, B., & Manstead, A. S. R. (2006b). The social
functions of ingroup bias: Creating, confirming, or changing social reality. In W.
Stroebe & M. Hewstone (Eds.), European review of social psychology, (Vol. 17,
pp. 359–396). Hove, UK: Psychology Press. Provides an analysis of the different
functions served by ingroup bias, contrasting low and high status groups.
Son Hing, L. S., & Zanna, M. P. (2010). Individual differences. In J. F. Dovidio,
M. Hewstone, P. Glick, & V. M. Esses (Eds.), Handbook of prejudice,
stereotyping and discrimination (pp. 163–178). London: Sage. A good overview
of current thinking on the role of individual differences in prejudice.
Tausch, N., & Hewstone, M. (2010). Intergroup contact. In J. F. Dovidio, M.
Hewstone, P. Glick, & V. M. Esses (Eds.), Handbook of prejudice, stereotyping
and discrimination (pp. 544–560). London: Sage. A recent comprehensive
overview of research on intergroup contact.
Tiedens, L. Z., & Leach, C. W. (Eds.). (2004). The social life of emotions.
Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. An edited collection of various
perspectives on the field of intergroup emotions, also as applied to prejudice.
 Chapter 15

Cultural Social Psychology

Peter B. Smith

Source: © Press Association Images.

KEY TERMS

acculturation
acquiescent responding
back-translation
better than average effect
bicultural identity
bicultural identity integration
cognitive style
cross-cultural replication
cultural masculinity–femininity
culture
display rules
eco-cultural theory
embeddedness versus autonomy values
hierarchy versus egalitarianism values
 individualism–collectivism
mastery versus harmony values
nation-level factor analysis
power distance
self-construal
uncertainty avoidance
CHAPTER OUTLINE
INTRODUCTION
CULTURE AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES
Defining culture
Nations as cultures
Measuring culture
Overcoming methodological challenges Summary
CULTURE AND COGNITION
Summary
CULTURE AND SELF-CONSTRUAL
Is self-enhancement universal?
How many cultural differences can self-construal explain?
Self-construal over time Summary
INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS
Prosocial behaviour with strangers Intimate relationships Summary
GROUP PROCESSES
Summary
INTERGROUP RELATIONS
Group honour
Negotiation
Summary
INTERCULTURAL RELATIONS
Migration and acculturation Summary

ROUTE MAP OF THE CHAPTER

When the same social psychology study is repeated in different parts of the
world it often comes up with different results. This chapter provides a model
of cultural differences that can explain why this is not just a failure of
experimenters’ expertise. Drawing on studies that have been discussed in
many of the earlier chapters in this book, it shows that cultural variations
many of the earlier chapters in this book, it shows that cultural variations
can benefit social psychologists rather than handicap them. By identifying
the social behaviours that are particularly salient in different parts of the
world, we can take account of causal factors that have been given
insufficient attention within mainstream social psychology. We can also test
which social psychological phenomena are universal and which occur only
in some parts of the world.
 INTRODUCTION
Wen Hua Wang’s family moved to the United Kingdom when she was young.
She quickly formed a bond with two other Chinese girls at school and they all
did well. Wen Hua gained admission to a respected university. She finds the
courses very interesting, attends all the lectures and takes copious notes. She
wonders why the British students are not so committed to learning, and why
some of them speak to the professor in such familiar and disrespectful ways. On
group projects, she is reluctant to speak up and it seems difficult for her to find a
role for herself. She would like to speak more with the professor because she is
sure that he will be able to help her.
Why is Wen Hua so strongly motivated?
Why does she think that familiarity with the professor is disrespectful?
Why is she reluctant to take the lead in groups?
Why does she think the professor is the best source of help?
Wen Hua is experiencing a mild case of what has been colloquially described
as ‘culture shock’. In the early years of her life she has been socialized to think
of herself and others around her in ways that differ from those among whom she
now finds herself. Her attitudes, values and beliefs were typical of those found in
Chinese societies, but now they are more unusual. She feels a strong bond
between herself and those close to her, especially her family. When she attends
to her studies she does so because she feels that her success will enhance the
reputation of her family as much as her own reputation. She places a high value
on establishing harmonious relations with others. In situations where she is
unsure how to behave, she keeps to herself for fear of embarrassing others or
losing face by showing ignorance or tactlessness. In the presence of those who
are older or more senior than her, she feels it is important to give them respect.
This chapter will first provide some examples of what has happened when
researchers have attempted to repeat social psychological studies, typically
conducted originally in North America, in other parts of the world. There can be
many reasons why different results are obtained in any one instance, but overall
there is good reason to believe that cultural differences are involved.
Psychologists have been interested in culture since the earliest beginnings of the
discipline. Wilhelm Wundt established one of the world’s first psychology
laboratories in Leipzig, Germany in 1879. Between 1911 and 1920, he published
ten volumes entitled Völkerpsychologie (normally translated as ‘folk
psychology’), which included discussion of differing cultures around the world.
More recently psychologists have discussed cultural differences in terms of
variations in attitudes, values and beliefs. These variations can contribute to our
understanding of the concept of culture if we take them into account. In the
remainder of this chapter, we examine studies that are relevant to issues that
have been discussed in preceding chapters, particularly in relation to social
cognition, self-concept, personal relationships, group behaviour and intergroup
relations. In each of these areas we will show how attention to cultural
differences can enrich our understanding of social psychological processes.
 CULTURE AND CULTURAL
DIFFERENCES
What is culture and why should we study it?
The opening chapter of this book discusses some of the best-known and
frequently discussed social psychology experiments. Most of these experiments
were conducted in the United States and some in the United Kingdom. What
would happen if they were repeated somewhere else in the world? We can
answer this question, because there have been attempts at cross-cultural
replication of all these studies, some of them many times. Consider first an
early study of group dynamics that was published by Schachter (1951). In this
study, Schachter set up a series of student discussion groups. Unknown to most
group members, each group contained an accomplice of the experimenter. The
accomplice (the ‘deviate’) was instructed to take up a position opposed to the
views of the majority and stick to his position. Schachter predicted that the
deviate would over time receive less and less attention and be rejected by the
group, which is just what he found among his US respondents.

- - - - - - - - - -

cross-cultural replication a test of whether the results of a study are the same if it is repeated as
exactly as possible in another cultural context.

- - - - - - - - - -

A few years later, Schachter and seven colleagues (1954) reported on the
results of a slightly different version of this study that was conducted in seven
different European nations. In this case, groups of 11-year-old schoolboys were
asked to decide which of several model aeroplanes to build. The results were
complex and not at all as the experimenters had predicted. The groups in France
did almost all reach agreement and did reject the deviate, as predicted. However,
many of the groups in Belgium, West Germany (as it was then known) and the
UK did not reach agreement at all, and ratings on a 7-point scale as to whether
the deviate should leave the group varied greatly between nations, as shown in
Figure 15.1. Furthermore, in a minority of the British and German groups, the
deviate’s viewpoint was accepted, so that he had in fact become the leader.
There are many possible reasons for the variations in these particular results. For
instance, the accomplices may not all have behaved in exactly the same way.
The US study differed from the European ones, but even within Europe there
were large differences. We need to see whether they are typical.
FIGURE 15.1 Should the deviate stay in the group?
Source: Based on Schachter et al., 1954, with permission from SAGE
Publications Ltd.

Figure 15.2 shows that some other classic social psychological studies have
also yielded differing results when conducted in other parts of the world, while
others have yielded evidence of universal effects. For instance, the studies by
Ekman and his colleagues (1987) have established that six basic emotions are
conveyed by the same facial expressions in all locations that were sampled. In
most cases, an effect somewhat similar to that reported in the US is obtained, but
its magnitude varies by location. Part of the reason for this variability is that it is
extremely difficult to set up exactly the same study in different parts of the
world. The local context can give differing meanings to the same procedures.
There may also be something unusual about these particularly famous studies.
To test this possibility, two Israeli psychologists selected six lesser-known
studies that had nonetheless been published in top US journals, and attempted to
replicate their results in Israel (Amir & Sharon, 1987). Five of the original
studies had used students and one had used school students. Amir and Sharon
replicated all six studies using similar populations. In some cases the replication
sample was smaller, in others it was larger. The original six US studies had
yielded 37 significant effects. Amir and Sharon also found 37 significant effects,
but only 25 of them replicated the US results. Twelve were new effects not
found in the US. So, of the 49 results overall, only 25 were common to both
nations. Clearly, there is a substantial problem, particularly bearing in mind that
there are many nations in the world that are more different from the US than is
Israel.
FIGURE 15.2 Replications of some famous studies.
Source: Based on Smith, Bond, & , 2006.
 Defining culture
To understand the reasons why results vary between locations even when
differences in the methods and samples used are minimized, we need a definition
of culture. A good definition is one that focuses on the way in which people
give meaning to what goes on around them, because any particular social
practice can have different meanings in different locations. For instance, if I
maintain very steady eye contact with you, or come very close to you, that would
be interpreted as friendly in some parts of the world and as rude or hostile in
others. So if we are trying to understand social behaviours in different parts of
the world, we do best to focus on the meanings attributed to events. As Rohner
(1984) put it, culture is ‘the totality of . . . learned meanings maintained by a
human population, or by identifiable segments of a population, and transmitted
from one generation to the next’ (pp. 119–120).

- - - - - - - - - -

culture a social system that is characterized by the shared meanings that are attributed to people
and events by its members.

- - - - - - - - - -

As discussed in other chapters of this book, people interpret the meanings of

the behaviours that they encounter. A social system can be said to have a culture
when the members of that system agree with one another about the meaning of
what is going on around them. The concept of culture can be applied to families,
teams, organizations and nations. Within larger social systems we would not
expect to find a total consensus on meanings, and there will typically be
subcultures defined for instance by age, gender, social class, location,
profession, religion and ethnicity. Despite this it can still be useful to consider
nations as cultures, because there are numerous historical, political, linguistic
and climatic factors that encourage a continuity of shared perspective. One of the
pioneers of cultural psychology, Hofstede has an apt and more incisive definition
of culture as ‘. . . the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the
members of one category of people from another’ (Hofstede, 2001, p. 9). This is
not a reformulation of F. Allport’s (1924) ‘group mind’ theory (which argued for
the existence of a group consciousness or a collective mind, as separate from the
minds of the individuals who comprise the group; see Chapter 1); it is a
statement that all of us are engaged in a continuing negotiation of meaning with
those around us.
 Nations as cultures
It is relatively easy to see how the actions of one person can influence the
emergent culture of a newly formed small group. When we think about the
cultures of larger social entities, it is clear that the majority of influence will be
in the other direction; the individual will be encouraged to assign meanings to
events through interactions with others who have a shared history of exposure to
particular types of climate, child-rearing, educational system, political history,
media exposure and employment opportunities. All of these elements may
change over time, but they will not change fast because so many people are
elements within the system that they comprise. The proposal that cultural
variations around the world are derived from the demands imposed by differing
types of physical environment is known as eco-cultural theory. The way in
which variations in physical environment can lead to different types of
subsistence, which in turn generate different types of institution, different
socialization practices, and therefore different psychological attributes is
summarized in broad outline in Theory Box 15.1. We examine more specific
aspects of eco-cultural theories later.

- - - - - - - - - -

eco-cultural theory a theory that proposes that different forms of culture have arisen as adaptations
to differing environmental challenges to survival.

- - - - - - - - - -

THEORY BOX 15.1

CREATION OF CULTURES
Source: Based on Smith et al., 2006.
 Measuring culture
If culture is considered as a shared set of meanings, then we need to measure it
by focusing on the ways in which we assign meanings to events. In other words,
we must examine the attitudes, values and beliefs that colour our everyday
interpretation of events. Hofstede (1980) pioneered the measurement of culture
at the nation level (see Leader in the Field, Geert Hofstede). He reasoned that a
nation’s culture cannot simply be considered as the average of the attributes of
those who are members of that nation. Within a nation, some individuals are
more powerful than others, and differing interpretations of events may also be
complementary to one another. We therefore need to know how the distribution
of values and beliefs tapped by a survey relate to one another within the nation
as a whole, not within each individual. Hofstede drew on a very large databank
of opinion survey items completed by IBM employees in 50 nations, and three
regions where there was insufficient data to compute separate scores for
neighbouring nations. He averaged all of the responses to each individual item
within each sample and then conducted a nation-level factor analysis. This
yielded four factors that could be used to characterize the nations and regions
included within his databank.

- - - - - - - - - -

nation-level factor analysis an analysis across many nations of data in which the mean response
for each survey item for each nation is treated as the unit of analysis.

- - - - - - - - - -

Hofstede named his dimensions of culture as individualism–collectivism,

power distance, uncertainty avoidance and cultural masculinity–femininity.
In individualistic nations, people are more likely to think of themselves as
autonomous individuals, whereas in collectivist nations people are more likely to
think of themselves in terms of their long-term group memberships. In nations
high on power distance there is greater acceptance of hierarchy. In nations high
on uncertainty avoidance there is low tolerance of risk and uncertainty. Cultural
masculinity–femininity refers to the clarity of the distinction between gender
roles: at one extreme, in nations high on cultural femininity, there is a low
distinction between gender roles, whereas at the other extreme, in more
masculine nations, there is sharper distinction between what are thought of as
masculine roles and feminine roles. Few people like the terms that Hofstede
selected to name this last dimension, but these are the terms that he used.

- - - - - - - - - -

individualism–collectivism individualist nations are those in which people describe themselves in

ways that emphasize their autonomy from others; collectivist nations are those in which people
describe themselves in ways that emphasize their links with others.

- - - - - - - - - -

- - - - - - - - - -

power distance the extent to which hierarchy and deference are accepted within a nation.

- - - - - - - - - -

- - - - - - - - - -

uncertainty avoidance the extent to which a nation is averse to risk and uncertainty.

- - - - - - - - - -

- - - - - - - - - -

cultural masculinity–femininity the extent to which gender roles in a nation are seen as
differentiated (masculinity) or similar (femininity).

- - - - - - - - - -

The individualism–collectivism dimension has had a very strong impact on the

development of cultural psychology, and it also has particular relevance to the
theme of this chapter. Figure 15.3 shows the scores for individualism–
collectivism assigned to nations by Hofstede (1980). US, Australia, UK, Canada
and the Netherlands scored highest on individualism, whereas Guatemala,
Ecuador, Panama and Venezuela scored highest on collectivism. In-between it is
shown that Spain, Turkey, Greece and Portugal were found to be the four most
collectivist nations from within Europe.
FIGURE 15.3 Nation-level index of individualism–collectivism (Hofstede,
1980). Scores range from 0 (collectivist) to 100 (individualist).

There are two important points to note about these scores. Firstly, the five
most individualistic nations shown in Figure 15.3 are some of the nations in
which most social psychological research is undertaken. Counting the first
authors of papers cited in the previous edition of this textbook as an
approximation, we find that 79 per cent are from the US, 7 per cent from the
Netherlands, 6 per cent from the UK and 6 per cent from Germany. Studies by
authors from the remaining 190 countries in the world comprise 2 per cent of the
total! These figures are somewhat influenced by the fact that this textbook was
produced in Europe. A US textbook would be even more focused on US studies.
In whichever country you are reading this book, the majority of the material
reported is still based on US research and theories, because that is where most
research and theorizing on social psychology is done. Moreover, wherever they
are conducted, many of the studies are based on student samples. As Henrich,
Heine, and Norenzayan (2010) put it, the samples are WEIRD – that is to say,
they are often composed of people who are White and Educated who live in
nations that are Industrialized, Rich and Democratic. Does this matter? It would
matter if the theories and research methods used have some implicit assumptions
within them that derive from the individualistic cultures of the nations in which
they were formulated. The theories would be likely to fail when tested in
locations where these assumptions were no longer valid.

LEADER IN THE FIELD

Geert Hofstede (b. 1928) graduated as a mechanical engineer from
Delft Technical University in the Netherlands and worked in
industry for 10 years, before completing his PhD in social
psychology at the University of Groningen. He subsequently joined
IBM Europe, where he founded and managed their personnel
research department. After leaving the company he worked in a
series of management schools during the 1970s and prepared his
classic work, Culture’s Consequences, which was published in 1980.
Based on the survey responses of 117,000 IBM employees
worldwide, the book provided the first empirically based
classification of dimensions along which the nations of the world
could be classified. More recently he has held positions at Maastricht
University and Tilburg University, where he established a
programme of cross-cultural training based on his cultural
dimensions. His later more popular work, Cultures and
Organizations, has been published in 16 languages. His publications
have been cited by other authors more than 5000 times, a figure
surpassed by very few psychologists and by none from Europe.

A second important point is also clear from Figure 15.3. When people think of
cultural psychology, they most often envisage a contrast between Western
nations and those in some other part of the world, typically Japan or China. The
table shows that within Europe there are both individualist nations and more
collectivist nations. Furthermore, Japan was shown to be only moderately
collectivist. China (along with other nations in which IBM was not represented
at the time of Hofstede’s survey) was excluded, but was later assigned a score of
20 (Hofstede, 2001). His data indicated other cultural contrasts within Europe.
For instance, the Nordic nations scored further toward the ‘feminine’ end of his
cultural masculinity–femininity dimension than any of the other nations that he
sampled. This indicates a relatively strong emphasis on the quality of
interpersonal relations (short-or long-term), but should not be confused with
collectivism, which is more to do with long-term commitment to a particular
group.
Hofstede’s dimensions have been influential, but the actual measures that he
used were limited by his reliance on a questionnaire that had been designed for
other purposes and would no longer be regarded as satisfactory. His measure of
individualism–collectivism comprised just four items concerning respondents’
emphasis on different types of work motivation. Later researchers have been
able to develop improved measures. Schwartz (1992, 1994, 2004) asked samples
of students and of schoolteachers in more than 75 nations to rate how much each
of a series of values is a guiding principle in their life. Each value was
represented by a short phrase. He was concerned that even after translation into
local languages the words used in Hofstede’s survey may not have had exactly
the same meaning in each culture. Schwartz therefore first did a separate
individual-level study in each nation that he sampled, to determine which values
consistently correlated with each other in the same way and could therefore be
considered to have equivalent meanings (Schwartz, 1992; see Leader in the
Field, Shalom H. Schwartz).

LEADER IN THE FIELD

Shalom H. Schwartz (b. 1936) grew up in the United States and
received his PhD in social psychology from the University of
Michigan in 1967, subsequently teaching in the sociology
department of the University of Wisconsin. In 1979, when many of
Israel’s leading researchers were moving to universities in the United
States, Schwartz moved in the reverse direction to the department of
psychology at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. During the 1970s
and 1980s he was a pioneer of research on prosocial and altruistic
behaviour. Subsequently he focused on investigating the
fundamental structure of human values, testing his model in more
than 70 countries. He has studied the antecedents and consequences
of individual differences in value priorities and the relations of
cultural dimensions of values to societal characteristics and policies.
His value measures are now part of the ongoing, biannual European
Social Survey.
This approach was based on Schwartz’s theoretical proposition that people
everywhere will develop values relating to three basic problems, namely survival
as an individual, coordination of social interaction and the welfare and survival
of groups. He predicted that in all cultures people’s values will cluster together
in relation to these three needs, although cultures will vary in how strongly
different values are endorsed. His individual-level studies confirmed that most
values of individuals can be classified into the same set of clusters no matter
where in the world the data are collected. Next, he conducted a nation-level
analysis of his data in the same way as Hofstede had done, using only the values
that he had found to have consistent meanings. Three dimensions emerged, each
of which matches one of the three basic needs that he had identified. He named
these as embeddedness versus autonomy, hierarchy versus egalitarianism
and mastery versus harmony, as shown in Figure 15.4.
FIGURE 15.4 Values defining nation-level dimensions identified by Schwartz
(1994).
Source: Based on information reported in Schwartz (1994).

- - - - - - - - - -

embeddedness versus autonomy values characteristic of a culture in which relations with one’s
long-term membership groups are prioritized, rather than emotional and intellectual separateness
from others.

- - - - - - - - - -

- - - - - - - - - -

hierarchy versus egalitarianism values characteristic of a culture in which inequality is accepted

and deference is given to one’s seniors, rather than granting equality to all people.

- - - - - - - - - -
 - - - - - - - - - -

mastery versus harmony values characteristic of a culture in which achievement is sought and
esteemed, rather than harmony with nature.

- - - - - - - - - -

Finally, Schwartz (2004) used these dimensions to plot the comparative

positioning of the nations that he had sampled. Examples of the nations scoring
highest and lowest on each dimension are shown in Figure 15.5 (Schwartz,
2004). Schwartz’s contrast between values that he summarized as embeddedness
and values summarized as autonomy parallels Hofstede’s dimension of
individualism–collectivism. The individualistic European nations in his sample
are here shown as endorsing autonomy values. In contrast, the US scores higher
on mastery. His contrast between hierarchy and egalitarianism values parallels
Hofstede’s dimension of power distance. Schwartz’s third dimension, mastery
versus harmony, is not, however, close to Hofstede’s remaining dimensions. See
also Social Psychology Beyond the Lab 15.1, which illustrates a practical
application of value differences.
FIGURE 15.5 Nation-level scores based on Schwartz’s value survey (2004).
Note: The German data were collected before reunification.
Source: Based on data reported in Schwartz (1994).

These two large-scale research projects have provided what one might
consider as a provisional psychological map of the world. Each project used
different methods at different times and with different respondents who were
drawn from a different range of nations, but the dimensions that they identified
correlate quite well with each other. They provide us with a basis from which we
can begin to investigate why studies in different parts of the world can yield
different results. However, we cannot treat the scores for individual nations like
an independent variable in an experiment. A nation’s culture is both a cause and
an effect of the psychological processes that occur within it, as shown in Theory
Box 15.2. We can use the scores to interpret the results of studies, but we need to
return to experimental methods before we can be sure about causal relationships.
Before looking at some cross-cultural studies, we must first consider some
distinctive problems of research method that cross-cultural researchers have
needed to overcome.
 Overcoming methodological challenges
In looking at cross-cultural studies, it is useful to evaluate them in terms of how
well they have overcome six key difficulties that researchers face. Firstly, we
must consider the problem of language. Where respondents use different first
languages, accurate translation is essential. To be sure of adequacy, a back-
translation of a translated questionnaire into the original language must be
made by a second translator who has not seen the original. Use of local
languages enhances validity. If English language versions are used with
respondents for whom English is not their first language, their responses are
found to become more like those obtained from respondents whose first
language is English (Harzing, 2005). The use of English encourages people to
respond in ways that they have learned are typical of English speakers, rather
than in ways that are more typical of their own culture. This is an instance of
unintended experimental priming.

- - - - - - - - - -

back-translation translation of a research questionnaire that has already been translated from one
language to a second language back into the original language by a translator who has not seen the
original version.

- - - - - - - - - -

THEORY BOX 15.2

CULTURE CREATION AND CULTURE
MAINTENANCE
Source: Based on Smith et al. (2006).
 Secondly, even after successful translation, measures may have different
psychometric properties in different contexts, because words often have different
emotional overtones in different languages. For instance, in Schwartz’s studies it
emerged that the meaning of ‘true friendship’ varies across cultures (Schwartz &
Sagiv, 1995). For instance, in Japan, ‘true friendship’ was seen as associated
with ‘belonging’, whereas in Western samples it was associated with ‘mature
love’. Thus, the Japanese associate friendship with inclusion, but Westerners
link it with intimacy. A good study is one that can demonstrate the reliability and
validity of its measures (see Chapter 2) in each of the cultures that is sampled.
Thirdly, respondents to questionnaires in different parts of the world differ
systematically in how they use response scales. A particularly acute problem in
cross-cultural studies is that in some cultures it is normative to express one’s
opinions by agreeing or disagreeing, while in others it is desirable to take a more
neutral stance. If researchers do not control for differences in acquiescent
responding, comparisons of mean scores from different cultures will be
meaningless. Both Hofstede and Schwartz used such controls, so we can trust
their mean scores. Figure 15.7 illustrates the extent of cultural variation in
acquiescence along 5-point rating scales in a study that sampled 43 nations. The
scores for acquiescence were created by averaging each respondent’s ratings on
68 scales, where it is logically impossible for respondents to endorse all the
survey items. A score above 3.0 indicates a tendency to agree with items, while
one below 3.0 indicates a tendency to disagree with them. The mean scores from
UK and Thailand differ by .9, which is 20 per cent of the entire scale, large
enough to distort the meaning of any uncorrected comparison between nations.
FIGURE 15.7 Highest and lowest scoring nations on a measure of acquiescent
responding to questionnaires.
Source: Based on Smith, 2004, with permission from SAGE Publications Ltd.

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acquiescent responding a tendency for a respondent to agree with all items on scales measuring
attitudes, beliefs or values, even those that contradict one another.

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SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BEYOND THE

LAB 15.1
ADVERTISEMENTS SUSTAIN CULTURAL
 VALUES
Cultures are defined in terms of shared meanings. Advertisers are also
interested in creating shared meanings when they seek to establish brand
images for their products within particular markets. How do these two fields
of interest relate to one another? Within the US, Aaker (1997) identified the
types of brand images that exist by asking respondents to evaluate
advertisements on rating scales representing personality dimensions. She
found five types of US brand images. These could be summarized as
sincerity, excitement, competence, sophistication and ruggedness.
Ruggedness was defined by US raters in terms of ‘outdoorness’,
masculinity, toughness and ‘westernness’. Examples would be
advertisements for Levi jeans, Harley-Davidson motorcycles and Marlboro
cigarettes.
Aaker, Benet-Martínez, and Garolera (2001) replicated this study in Japan
and in Spain. In Japan, four of these images were also found, but there were
no products emphasizing ruggedness. Instead, there was a brand image that
focused on peacefulness. The advertisements illustrating peacefulness were
characterized by Japanese raters as shy, mild mannered, peaceful, naïve,
dependent and childlike (Figure 15.6a). In Spain, sincerity, excitement and
sophistication were again found, but the competence and ruggedness images
were replaced by a brand image focused on passion. The advertisements
illustrating passion were characterized by Spanish raters as fervent,
passionate and intense, but also spiritual, mystical and Bohemian (Figure
15.6b). The authors argue that there is a reciprocal relationship between
culture and brand images. Exposure to particular brand images can be
thought of as a series of attempts at priming by advertisers. Where the prime
accords with one of the types of value preferences that Schwartz identified
in different nations, the advertisement is more likely to be effective.
Repeated use of brand images by advertisers will also influence the
maintenance or change of cultural values.
FIGURE 15.6(a) and (b) Cultural icons exemplifying culturally distinctive
forms of advertisements: (a) The Japanese geisha, exemplifying mildness,
dependence and peacefulness; and (b) Flamenco dancing, a blend of passion,
intensity and spirituality.
Source: (a) © Serika; (b) © Mad Pushup. Both images used under licence from
Shutterstock.

A fourth priority is to be aware of the cultural subjectivity of the labels that we

use for the topics that social psychologists study. For instance, in Chapters 1 and
8 we follow the usual practice of describing Asch’s (1956) line judgement study
as a study of conformity. Yet the phenomenon actually being studied is
behavioural change in a setting in which other people have given obviously
incorrect answers. Within a collectivist culture, that same behaviour might be
described as tact or sensitivity in saving others from embarrassment, rather than
as conformity.
Fifthly, while it is convenient to study cultural differences by sampling people
from different national cultures, we need to be aware that nations differ from one
another in many ways. We should be most impressed by studies that have
included a check on whether the respondents in the study do actually endorse the
values or other measures of cultural orientation that are typical of their nation.
This is equivalent to the manipulation check that experimentalists employ. We
should be even more impressed by studies that show that the differences found
between two samples disappear if the measure of cultural orientation is
statistically controlled. This would indicate that we can not only describe
cultural differences, but that we can also explain how they bring about their
effects. Several studies of this kind are discussed later in this chapter.
Finally, you will have noted in earlier chapters that psychologists try where
possible to use experimental methods, so that that they can establish causal
relationships between their variables. There are practical limitations on the
extent to which cultural differences can be studied experimentally, but the
increasing number of bicultural people in the world has opened up the
possibility of experimental cultural studies. We can test whether the behaviour of
bicultural individuals changes in the ways that our theories predict when they are
primed to focus on one or the other of their alternative cultural identities. Studies
of this type have high potential in testing the cultural validity of social
psychological theories.
 Summary
Most social psychological studies have been conducted in just a few rather
distinctive nations of the world. Results from studies done elsewhere can test
and improve the universal validity of social psychological theories. Cultural
differences between large-scale groupings such as nations can be mapped by
examining patterns of shared values and beliefs. These maps can be used to test
why the results of studies vary. Valid cross-cultural studies must overcome
methodological challenges posed by differences between languages, response
styles and the multiple ways in which nations differ from one another.
 CULTURE AND COGNITION
What are cognitive styles and how are they related to culture?
In the preceding section we considered the contrast between individualistic
cultures and collectivistic cultures. There are many factors that can contribute to
the creation and maintenance of this contrast. For instance, individualistic
nations are predominantly rich, whereas collectivistic nations have until recently
been less so (Hofstede, 2001). In this section we focus on basic psychological
processes that may also underlie this contrast. Nisbett (2003) has proposed that
members of Western nations tend to process information in analytic ways,
whereas members of East Asian nations tend to process information in holistic
ways. What do we mean by the terms analytic and holistic in this context? Faced
with some situation or problem, an analytic thinker would seek to identify a key
element in the situation and focus on its effect on what goes on around it (for
instance, the behaviour of a star football player). A holistic thinker would be
more likely to give equal attention to each of the elements in the situation, and
their interrelationships (for example, the way that the team as a whole played). A
psychological experiment is a good example of the analytic perspective, because
one key factor is identified and manipulated to see its effect. Nisbett reasoned
that these differing cognitive styles have arisen because of the differing
environments in which people have lived over past centuries. Historically,
survival in some environments has been dependent upon skills in hunting, which
is typically an individual activity that requires picking out targets from their
background. In other environments, survival has depended on agriculture, which
involves rapidly harvesting crops at particular times and then storing them for
later consumption. The success of this procedure is dependent on collaborative
working (Berry, 1976). As we noted earlier, theories that propose that these
types of demands have influenced the evolution of differing types of culture are
known as eco-cultural theories.

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cognitive style people with an analytic style focus on the main element within information that they
are processing; people with a holistic style focus on the relations between the different elements in
information that they are processing.

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Many studies have confirmed the existence of this type of cultural difference
in information-processing styles (Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001). For
instance, Japanese and American students were shown a series of images on a
screen, each showing a line drawn within a box, as illustrated in Figure 15.8
(Kitayama, Duffy, Kawamura, & Larsen, 2003). The box at the top of the figure
contains a line that is one-third of the height of the square. Respondents were
next shown a new smaller or larger blank box similar to the ones shown in the
lower part of the figure, but with no line drawn inside it. Without any longer
being able to see the original, they were then asked to draw a line in the new box
that was either in proportion to the original one in the upper box, or that was the
same length as the original one (shown in the box in the upper part of the figure).
The lines actually drawn in the two lower boxes show, respectively, the correct
length of the line drawn proportionately (left box) and exactly (right box). This
procedure is known as the ‘line and frame test’. As expected, Americans were
better at exact reproduction of the line, while Japanese were better at
proportional reproduction of the line. Thus, the Japanese had noted the contexts
of the lines, while the Americans had not. In studies of recognition and recall,
Japanese and American students were shown underwater scenes and pictures of
wildlife (Masuda & Nisbett, 2001). They were then shown a second set of
pictures in which some changes had been made. Japanese were much better at
noticing changes in the animals’ contexts, and also in detecting whether they had
been shown a particular animal before, so long as it was in the same context as
before.
FIGURE 15.8 Experimental task used by Kitayama et al. (2003).
Source: Adapted from Kitayama et al. (2003). Perceiving an object and its
context in different cultures: A cultural look at new look. Psychological Science,
14, 102–206. Adapted with permission from SAGE Publications.
 Since there is evidence for a contrast in cognitive styles, it can be expected to
influence the results of studies concerning social perception. As discussed in
Chapter 3, many studies on causal attribution (typically using American students
as participants) have yielded evidence in favour of correspondence bias. In other
words, people in these experiments explain another person’s behaviour more in
terms of their personal traits than in terms of the circumstances in which the
behaviour occurs. Norenzayan, Choi, and Nisbett (2002) gave Americans and
Koreans various kinds of information about some fictitious characters and asked
them to predict how these characters would behave in future. The Koreans drew
more on the information concerning circumstances, whereas the Americans drew
more on the characters’ past behaviour. However, when no circumstantial
information was provided, both Korean and US respondents were equally
willing to predict future behaviour on the basis of past behaviour. Similarly,
Miyamoto and Kitayama (2002) found that even when their respondents were
told that an individual’s behaviour had been constrained by role requirements,
both Japanese and Americans did show correspondence bias.
These results are important, because they indicate that although cultural
differences in cognitive styles do exist, they do not derive from differences in
ability to make particular types of judgement. A change in experimental
instructions can cause Asians to make judgements that are similar to Americans’
judgements. It is better to think of these cultural differences as learned habits,
ways of processing information that are particularly useful in a given kind of
cultural context. Analytic thinking can be especially valuable, not just to hunters,
but also to those living in contemporary individualistic cultures; holistic thinking
can be distinctively useful, not just to rice farmers, but to those living in
contemporary industrialized collectivist cultures.
Differences in cognitive style can also lead to inferences about the actions of
others that have direct implications for the contrast between individualism and
collectivism. Morris and Peng (1994) compared American high-school children
of either European descent or Chinese descent. They were shown videos
depicting images of fish of various colours swimming around. A blue fish was
further to the right on the screen than the others and moved in a slightly different
direction. As Figure 15.9 shows, European Americans attributed the blue fish’s
moves to both internal and external forces, whereas the Chinese Americans saw
external forces as much more important. Americans commented more frequently
that the blue fish was influencing the others. Chinese commented more
frequently that the other fish were influencing the blue fish. This study shows
how the European American children attributed individualistic motives to the
blue fish, whereas the Chinese Americans saw the fish’s movements in terms of
response to the group.
FIGURE 15.9 What causes the blue fish to move?
Source: Morris & Peng, 1994. © 1994 by the American Psychological
Association. Reproduced with permission. The use of APA information does not
imply endorsement by APA.
 Nisbett (2003) identified these variations as a contrast between ‘Western’
nations and ‘East Asian’ nations. Later studies show us that these labels are too
global. The contrast may be more to do with individualism and collectivism than
with East versus West. Kitayama, Ishii, Imada, Takemura, and Ramaswamy
(2006) compared two samples from within Japan. The northern island of
Hokkaido has a population descended from pioneer settlers, in contrast to the
more southerly Honshu island. Kitayama et al. expected that, just as was the case
in the United States, pioneers colonizing new areas would be more
individualistic than those who had chosen to stay in more settled areas. They
therefore predicted, and found, that their Hokkaido sample would show high
correspondence bias, whereas the Honshu sample would not. Uskul, Kitayama,
and Nisbett (2008) administered the line and frame test to three samples in
Eastern Turkey, namely farmers, herdsmen and fishermen. They reasoned that
herding and fishing are more individualistic activities than farming, which
requires more collective action. Consistent with eco-cultural theory, the farmers
did best at judging the relative line lengths. The herdsmen did better at judging
absolute lengths.
The studies discussed in this section have made no reference to Europe. To put
this right, now is a good time to look at Research Close-Up 15.1.
How do the studies in this section match up to the criteria for good cross-
cultural studies that were outlined in the preceding sections? On most criteria
they do very well. They used experimental methods, mostly with behaviours as
dependent measures. However, they did not include any direct measures of
cultural differences. The predictions as to what effects would be found are based
on suggested differences between American and Japanese cultures that were first
advanced in a classic paper by Markus and Kitayama (1991). We discuss the
nature of these differences, and attempts by other researchers to measure them
directly, in the next section.

RESEARCH CLOSE-UP 15.1

COGNITIVE STYLES IN NORTH

AMERICA, WESTERN EUROPE AND EAST
ASIA Kitayama, S., Park, H., Sevincer, A. T.,
Karasawa, M., & Uskul, A. K. (2009). A cultural task
analysis of implicit independence: Comparing North
America, Western Europe, and East Asia. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 97, 236–255.
Research question Over the past ten years, Kitayama
and his colleagues have pioneered the study of
cultural differences in cognitive styles, focusing
exclusively on data from the US and from East Asia.
These studies have provided increasingly detailed
tests of the hypothesis originally proposed by Markus
and Kitayama (1991) that cognitive styles differ in
cultures characterized as independent or
interdependent. These concepts are discussed in the
next section of this chapter. In this study, Kitayama et
al. sought to understand the distinctiveness of their
earlier findings by also including European
respondents. They also wanted to know whether the
cognitive styles that they had postulated exist
uniformly across each cultural group, or whether each
style is restricted to just some members of each group.
Design and procedure Students in Germany, UK, US
and Japan completed four of the empirical tasks that
had been developed in earlier studies. The design of
the first task was 4 (nationalities) × 2 (vignette type).
Respondents read brief vignettes in which people had
engaged in socially desirable and in socially
 undesirable behaviours. The sequence of vignette type
was reversed for half of the respondents. They were
asked to rate the extent to which these people’s
behaviour was due to their dispositions or to the
context, and whether these behaviours would have
been different if the dispositions or context were
different. This task is essentially the same as that used
by Norenzayan, Choi, and Nisbett (2002) discussed
earlier. It yields a measure of correspondence bias.
The second task was the line and frame test also described earlier, as shown
in Figure 15.8. Here, the design was 4 (nations) × 2 (type of judgement
required). In some trials, respondents were asked to reproduce the absolute
length of lines, and in other trials they were asked to reproduce the line in
proportion to the size of the box in which it was to be placed. The sequence
of trials was counterbalanced. This task yields a measure of analytic versus
holistic cognition.
In the third task, the students were given a list of everyday social situations.
The design was 4 (nations) × 2 (situation type). Situations were either social
(e.g. ‘having a positive interaction with friends’) or not social (e.g. ‘being
caught in a traffic jam’). The participants were asked to think of the last time
they were in each of these kinds of situations, and then to record which of a
list of emotions they had experienced. This task gives measures of the
frequency of socially engaging emotions and of socially disengaging
emotions. Engaging emotions are those that necessarily do involve others,
such as feeling friendly, ashamed or guilty. Disengaging emotions are these
that do not necessarily involve other people, such as pride, frustration and
anger.
The fourth task had a correlational design. The students from each nation
rated their level of general happiness in each situation. This rating was
correlated with their overall frequency of engaging and disengaging
emotions to see which contributed more to overall happiness. Where
happiness is more strongly correlated with engaging emotions, Kitayama et
al. refer to it as social happiness. Where happiness is more strongly
 correlated with disengaging emotions, they call it personal happiness.
Results Consistent with earlier results and as shown
in Figure 15.10, the Americans showed more
correspondence bias, more analytic cognitive style,
more frequent disengaging emotions and happiness
that was more personal than social. There were no
significant differences between the results from
Germany and those from the UK. The scores for the
European students were intermediate between those
from the US and Japan, but they nonetheless differed
significantly from the Japanese and US results in
almost all comparisons. Germans showed less
correspondence bias than Americans, and both
European samples showed more correspondence bias
than did the Japanese. Europeans had a cognitive style
that was more holistic than Americans, but more
analytic than the Japanese. They reported more
socially engaging emotions than Americans and more
disengaging emotions than Japanese. British students
gave more emphasis to social happiness than
Americans did, but less than Japanese. German
students gave more emphasis to social happiness than
Americans did, and did not differ from the Japanese in
this respect.
FIGURE 15.10 Scores obtained in the four studies by Kitayama et al. (2009).
The scores in each row can be compared with one another, but those obtained
in each study are measured in different ways, so comparing columns is not
meaningful.
Source: Kitayama et al., 2009. © 2009 by the American Psychological
Association. Reproduced with permission. The use of APA information does
not imply endorsement by APA.

These results are obtained by comparing contrasts between samples on each

of the separate tasks. The researchers also computed correlations between
the results for the four tasks within each country’s sample. The correlations
found were very low. In other words, the people who scored highest on
correspondence bias were not the same people who scored highest on
analytic cognition or frequently experiencing personal rather than social
emotions.
Implications This important study has several
implications. First of all, it confirms that we should
not assume that results obtained in US studies will be
replicable in Europe. In this case, the results for
Europeans differed about equally from the US results
and from the Japanese results. So, we should see
differences in cognitive style in terms of variations
along a spectrum, not as mutually exclusive.
Second, the low correlations between the different cognitive style indicators
give us a new and fuller way of looking at culture. The models of culture
provided by Hofstede (2001) and Schwartz (2004) suggest that cultures have
a relatively homogeneous set of values and beliefs. Kitayama adds to that by
proposing that a cultural context offers a range of opportunities to act and
think in particular ways. These opportunities will be taken up by different
types of people from within that culture. The effects obtained in a study
typically will represent an interaction between the cultural context and
typically will represent an interaction between the cultural context and
individuals’ personalities and preferences. Thus, when we look at a culture,
we will find culturally distinctive phenomena, but not every individual will
show all phenomena.
 Summary
Faced with the complexity of information available to them, members of
individualistic cultures tend to focus on what they see as the central feature of
any set of stimuli. Members of collectivistic cultures tend to take more account
of the surrounding context. These differing cognitive styles affect the ways in
which the behaviour of others is interpreted. Members of individualistic cultures
more readily interpret the behaviours of others in terms of fixed qualities such as
personality. Members of collectivistic cultures expect less consistency of
behaviour, and interpret variations in terms of contextual constraints such as
roles. Cognitive styles can find expression in a variety of ways, so that there is a
diversity of effects even within a single culture. Cognitive styles are habits
induced by cultural socialization, and can be temporarily reversed
experimentally.
 CULTURE AND SELF-CONSTRUAL
Can the ways that we think about ourselves explain cultural
variations in behaviour?
The paper mentioned earlier (Markus & Kitayama, 1991) was a review, which
provided a further development of Markus’s earlier work on self-construal (see
Chapter 5; also Leader in the Field, Shinobu Kitayama). Their proposal was that
while people in the US tend to think of themselves as independent agents, people
in Japan are more likely to think of themselves as interdependent with those
around them. This proposal can be seen as a special case of the differences in
cognitive style considered in the preceding section, and was quickly taken as a
formulation that could be applied more widely than just to the US and Japan. As
illustrated in Chapter 5, Theory Box 5.3, an interdependent self is a likely
consequence of being socialized within a collectivist culture.

LEADER IN THE FIELD

Shinobu Kitayama (b. 1957) grew up in Japan and obtained his
Bachelor’s and Master’s degrees from the University of Kyoto.
Obtaining his PhD from the University of Michigan in 1987, he
taught subsequently at the University of Oregon and at Kyoto
University. In 2003 he returned to the University of Michigan, where
he directs the Centre for Culture and Cognition. He has been a key
figure in opening up and developing studies in social cognition that
contrast North America and East Asia. Jointly with Hazel Markus
(see Leader in the Field, Chapter 5), he made the case for the
contrasting effects of independence and interdependence. His more
recent studies draw on his rich and first-hand understanding of both
Japanese and US culture. He is co-editor of the Handbook of
Cultural Psychology (2007).
Markus and Kitayama did not attempt to measure self-construal, but they
showed that by assuming that there is a contrast between independence in the US
and interdependence in Japan, they could explain a wide variety of differences in
the results of studies comparing aspects of motivation, emotion and cognition in
these two nations.
Numerous measures of self-construal have been created by other researchers.
The best known has been that developed by Singelis (1994), which is given in
full in Individual Differences 15.1. Try filling out your responses to his scale
before you read any further. Subsequent studies have cited this scale more than
500 times, hence many researchers have found it useful. Some studies using the
scale are discussed later.
Before going further, it is worth looking at some of the weaknesses of the
Singelis self-construal scale, because these can illustrate what divides a good
cross-cultural study from a poor one. All the items on the scale are positively
worded, so someone who is high in acquiescent responding is likely to get high
scores on both scales. This does not matter if you compare your own scores on
the two scales, because your acquiescence is the same for both sets of questions.
However, if the average score from one nation is compared with that from
another nation, the result can be very misleading. For instance, Oyserman, Coon,
and Kemmelmeier (2002) concluded that there is no difference between the
average scores from the US and Japan, which is not what we would expect on
the basis of the large-scale surveys by Hofstede (1980) and Schwartz (2004). In
a later analysis Schimmack, Oishi, and Diener (2005) pointed out that Oyserman
et al. had taken no account of the possible presence of acquiescent responding in
the studies that they reviewed. Schimmack et al. showed that when they
discounted acquiescence using the techniques employed by Hofstede, the
expected differences between the US, Japan and other nations were found.
A second difficulty with the Singelis scale is that many of the items tapping
interdependence refer to ‘your group’. As we saw in the previous section, people
from collectivist cultures are much more aware of the context in which their
relationships occur. When filling out the items, you may have wondered which
group these items were referring to. Interdependent people would find it
especially difficult to answer these items without knowing which group is being
referred to. Some researchers have explored this issue more directly. English and
Chen (2007) asked European American and Asian American students to rate
themselves in four different situations (in class, at the gym, at a party and in the
cafeteria). There was much more difference between the ways that the Chinese
Americans rated their attributes in these situations than there was for the
European Americans. When the test was repeated two months later, there was
good consistency for self-descriptions in the same situations over time. This is
important, because it shows that the Asian Americans’ inconsistency across
situations at the same time was not just because they did not have a clear sense
of themselves. English and Chen conclude that Asian Americans have an ‘if-
then’ view of self (‘If I am in class, then I am like this’). Tafarodi, Lo,
Yamaguchi, Lee, and Katsura (2004) asked students whether their ‘inner self’
remains the same in different situations. In the Canadian sample, 72 per cent said
that it did, but only 36 per cent of Japanese and 28 per cent of Hong Kong
Chinese said so. We need to consider how differences of this magnitude may
affect the conclusions drawn by social psychologists from research conducted
only within Western cultural groups. Let us now try to do this, by looking at
attributions for success and failure.
 Is self-enhancement universal?
Chapter 5 describes studies that show how we have a bias toward interpreting
events around us in ways that enhance our self-image (Miller & Ross, 1975). If
East Asians do not have such a strong sense of inner self, would they have less
need for self-enhancement? Finding a satisfactory answer to this question has
proved difficult, because the type of measure that is used influences the answer
obtained. Heine, Lehman, Markus, and Kitayama (1999) noted that East Asians
consistently score lower than North Americans on measures of self-esteem. They
also show a larger gap between ratings of how they are and how they would like
to be, and they react to success and failure in ways that differ from those found
in North American studies. While North Americans tend to take credit for
success and find excuses for failure, Japanese are more prone to attribute success
to luck or help from others and take the blame for failure. These findings suggest
that East Asians may have a much weaker need for self-enhancement.

INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 15.1

INDEPENDENT VERSUS INTERDEPENDENT
SELF-CONSTRUAL
Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the statements
below as a description of yourself, using the response scale presented below.
1 My personal identity, independent of others, is very important to me.
2 My relationships with those in my group are more important to me than
my personal accomplishments.
3 I enjoy being unique and different from others.
4 My happiness depends on the happiness of those in my group.
5 Being able to take care of myself is a primary concern for me.
6 I am careful to maintain harmony in my group.
7 Speaking up during a class or meeting is not a problem for me.
8 I would sacrifice my self-interests for the benefit of the group.
9 Having a lively imagination is important to me.
10 I will stay in a group if they need me, even if I am not happy with the
 group.
11 I’d rather say ‘no’ directly than risk being misunderstood.
12 I should consider my parents’ advice when making education or career
plans.
13 I am comfortable being singled out for praise or rewards.
14 I respect decisions made by my group.
15 I am the same person at home as I am at college.
16 If my brothers or sisters fail, I feel responsible.
17 I act the same way no matter who I am with.
18 I have respect for the authority figures with whom I interact.
19 I feel comfortable using someone’s first name soon after I meet him or
her.
20 I would offer my seat on the bus to my professor.
21 I prefer to be direct and forthright when dealing with people that I have
first met.
22 I respect people who are modest about themselves.
23 I value being in good health above everything.
24 Even when I strongly disagree with group members, I avoid an
argument.
1 = Strongly disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Slightly disagree
4 = Neutral
5 = Slightly agree
6 = Agree
7 = Strongly agree
These items comprise the self-construal scale developed by Singelis (1994).
Odd-numbered items refer to independence and even-numbered items refer
to interdependence. You can calculate your scores for independent and for
interdependent self-construal by taking the average of your ratings on odd-
and even-numbered items respectively. Higher scores indicate a stronger
self-construal. Whether your scores are high or low compared to others will
depend on what your nationality is. Singelis (1994) reported mean
independence of 5.1 for European Americans and 4.6 for Asian Americans.
He found mean interdependence of 4.4 for European Americans and 4.9 for
 He found mean interdependence of 4.4 for European Americans and 4.9 for
Asian Americans. Depending upon your own degree of acquiescent
responding, you may find that both your scores are above these means, or
both may be below them. It can be more informative to compare on which
of the two scales you scored higher.
Source: The self-construal scale: Singelis, T. M. (1994). The measurement of independent and
interdependent self-construals. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 20, 580–591. ©
SAGE Publications, reprinted with permission.

Other researchers have used a different measure of self-enhancement and

obtained different results. Sedikides, Gaertner, and Toguchi (2003) asked
Japanese and American students to estimate the percentage of people who were
better than them on various abilities. This method yields what is known as the
better than average effect (BAE). In other words, more than 50 per cent of
people think that they are better than average on most criteria. Sedikides et al.
found the BAE was just as strong among Japanese as it was among Americans.
They concluded that the need for self-enhancement is universal. How can this
contradiction between results obtained with different methods be explained?

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better than average effect the finding that more than 50 per cent of participants report themselves
to be better than average on a variety of criteria.

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In the study by English and Chen (2007) it was found that, just like self-
construal, self-enhancement measured by BAE varied much more between
situations among Chinese Americans than among Europeans. This implies that
for those with interdependent self-construal, some situations may elicit self-
enhancement more than others. We may be able to understand the conflicting
results if we can identify the nature of these situations. A study by Kurman
(2003) focused on the role of modesty. She wanted to determine whether
modesty was associated with low self-enhancement in all cultures or just in
collectivist ones, where modesty norms are likely to be stronger. She first asked
Singapore Chinese and urban Israeli high school students to rate how important
modesty was to them. They also completed a self-construal measure. As would
be expected from Hofstede’s (1980) data (see Figure 15.3), the Israelis were
more independent than the Singaporeans. In both samples, Kurman found that
greater endorsement of modesty was associated with low self-enhancement, as
measured by BAE. So, this effect may be general to all cultures, but we would
expect that in cultures where modesty is more favoured, such as those in Asia,
there will be fewer situations in which self-enhancement occurs.
Kurman’s results help to explain how different methods give contradictory
research findings, but they still leave open the question of whether the self-
enhancement motive is or is not universal. Muramoto (2003) used an indirect
procedure to determine whether Japanese respondents value self-enhancement,
even though they express themselves modestly. She asked Japanese students to
recall occasions when they had succeeded or failed. As expected, they attributed
successes to others and blamed themselves for failures. However, Muramoto
also asked them to rate how their friends and family would evaluate these
successes and failures. Here she found that the Japanese students believed that
friends and family would give them credit for successes and blame them less for
failures. Further ratings showed that those people who received these kinds of
support from family and friends felt that they were better understood by them.
So the Japanese do wish for self-enhancement, but the cultural preference for
modesty leads them to conceal this motive. This series of studies illustrates an
important conclusion about the value of cross-cultural psychology. Studies may
initially show contrasting results from different parts of the world, but if we
investigate the reasons for these differences we can discover what is truly
universal and what causes universal effects to be expressed more strongly in
some locations than in others.
 How many cultural differences can self-construal
explain?
Self-construal is a quality of the individual. Culture is defined as a widely shared
set of meanings. So, we should expect that some behaviours can be explained in
terms of the ways that individuals think about themselves, while others will be
more influenced by the shared cultural context. An example of the first kind of
effect is shown by a cross-cultural study of embarrassment. Singelis, Bond,
Sharkey, and Lai (1999) asked students in Hong Kong, Hawaii and mainland US
to rate how embarrassed they would be in a series of different situations. They
found that those with more interdependent self-construals expected to be more
embarrassed and had lower self-esteem. Furthermore, when comparing the four
samples, those samples with higher mean interdependence were the ones in
which there was a higher mean expectation of being embarrassed.
In contrast, in Kurman’s (2003) study, no relationship was found between self-
construal and self-esteem, which is likely to be associated with self-
enhancement. As already discussed, self-enhancement is explained by
endorsement of modesty. The difference between these two results is likely to be
because of the difference between being embarrassed, which is a private
emotion, and self-enhancement, which involves public actions. Public actions
will be much more affected by the shared attitudes and norms that define a
culture. Matsumoto, Yoo, and Fontaine (2008) have surveyed the endorsement
in 32 nations of what they call display rules – in other words, norms about
whether emotions should be expressed in public. As expected, nations in East
Asia and elsewhere that score higher on collectivism score low on endorsement
of display rules, and the nations that score highly on individualism, such as the
US, score highly on endorsement of display rules. Figure 15.11 shows that there
are also substantial variations within Europe in endorsement of emotional
expression.
FIGURE 15.11 Nations scoring highest and lowest on emotional display.
Source: Based on Matsumoto et al., 2008, with permission from SAGE
Publications.
 - - - - - - - - - -

display rules cultural understandings as to whether emotions should be expressed openly.

- - - - - - - - - -
 Self-construal over time
In Chapter 5 it was also noted that we typically see our self as having continuity
through our lifespan. Consistent with this view, in this chapter we have
discussed the types of self-construal that predominate in individualist and
collectivist cultures. However, from Chapter 14 you will understand that through
an average day we may think of ourselves in a variety of different ways,
depending on our affiliations with different groups and different activities. So,
can independence and interdependence vary over time? Trafimow, Triandis, and
Goto (1991) were the first to show that they can (see Leader in the Field, Harry
C. Triandis). They asked a group of students in the US to spend two minutes
thinking of all the things that they had in common with their family
(interdependent prime condition). Another group of students was asked to spend
two minutes thinking of all the things that make them different from others
(independent prime condition). The groups included both European Americans
and Chinese Americans. Respondents were then asked to complete an open-
ended measure of self-construal, in which they are asked to complete the phrase
‘I am . . .’ twenty times. Judges then coded the open-ended responses for
independent and interdependent self-descriptions. Figure 15.12 shows the
results. In both groups, the independent prime is associated with a higher score
on independent self-construal and the interdependent prime is associated with a
higher score on interdependent self-construal. However, comparing the results
on the left and right hand sides of the figure, it is clear that the European
Americans remained more independent than the Chinese Americans in both
conditions, and the Chinese Americans were still more interdependent in both
conditions.
FIGURE 15.12 Self-construals in response to priming.
Source: Based on Trafimow et al., 1991. © 1991 by the American Psychological
Association. Reproduced with permission. The use of APA information does not
imply endorsement by APA.
 If scores on independence and interdependence can be changed by two
minutes of experimental priming, how can these concepts be of any use in
explaining cultural differences? There are two kinds of answer to this question.
Firstly, we need to be aware that priming occurs not only in psychology
experiments: there are many aspects of a culture that are likely to continually
prime members of the culture to construe themselves in particular ways. An
ever-present example is the language that is spoken. Correct usage of most of the
languages spoken in the more individualist nations of the world requires the
inclusion of the pronoun ‘I’ when speaking about oneself. Many of the
languages spoken in more collectivist nations permit one to drop the pronoun ‘I’
(Kashima & Kashima, 1998). Some languages, for example Arabic, do not even
have a direct linguistic representation of the pronoun ‘I’. So customary language
use can prime self-construal of oneself as independent or interdependent. So too
can adherence to cultural norms, that is to say the conventionally accepted types
of response to one’s behaviours typically received from other members of one’s
cultural group. For instance, an individual in a given culture would be aware of
the local emotional display rules discussed earlier. In these ways, cultures can be
constantly created and recreated through millions of interpersonal interactions,
rather than having a fixed and static nature.

LEADER IN THE FIELD

Harry C. Triandis (b. 1926) grew up on the Greek island of Corfu.
During World War II the local schools were closed and he taught
 himself by reading the Encyclopaedia Britannica. He obtained a first
degree in engineering in Canada, but transferred his interest to
psychology, gaining a PhD in social psychology from Cornell
University in 1958. Moving to the University of Illinois, he
developed a cross-cultural perspective on the use of the semantic
differential to map the meaning of concepts. His early understanding
that cultural differences are best thought of as differences in assigned
meanings was summarized in The Analysis of Subjective Culture
(1972). He pioneered the development of a network of cross-cultural
psychologists, was one of the first presidents of the International
Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology, and was the chief editor
of the Handbook of Cross-Cultural Psychology. More recently his
many publications did much to popularize interest in individualism
and collectivism. Many of his students at the University of Illinois
are now leading contemporary cross-cultural psychologists.

A second consequence of the finding that self-construal can be primed

experimentally is that we can use experimental methods to investigate some
aspects of cultural differences. Some examples are discussed in the final section
of this chapter.
 Summary
A key way in which cultures differ is in whether they encourage individuals to
think of themselves as relatively independent of others or as interdependent with
those to whom they are close. Independence is associated with a need to see
oneself positively. Interdependence is associated with a need to maintain
harmonious relations with others through publicly expressed modesty. Cultural
differences are partly explained by differences in self-construal and partly by
shared norms. Self-construals are changeable but are continually elicited by
salient aspects of culture, such as language use and behavioural norms.
 INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS
How do people relate to people whom they meet, and form
relationships with them, in different cultural contexts?
In preceding sections we have seen that people from different cultures tend to
have different values and to think of themselves in different ways. We would
therefore expect these differences to be reflected in how they communicate with
each other. However, we cannot simply describe cultural contrasts in
communication style because, as we have seen in earlier sections, people with
interdependent self-construals will adapt their behaviour depending on the social
context. Gudykunst et al. (1992) compared the reported communication
experiences of students in Hong Kong, Japan, the US and Australia.
Respondents from the US and Australia did not make any distinction between
communication with members of their ingroup and their outgroup. However,
those from Japan and Hong Kong did make such a distinction. When
communicating with ingroup members they reported feeling more similar,
having more shared networks, more questioning of each other and more feeling
that they could understand one another without being explicit.
These contrasts have been further explored by Verkuyten and Masson (1996),
who studied same-sex adolescent friendships among ethnic groups living in the
Netherlands. Independent self-construal was higher among Dutch respondents
and those from Spain, Italy and the former Yugoslavia. Interdependent self-
construal was higher among Moroccan and Turkish respondents. The authors
found that interdependence predicted feeling closer to one’s best friend, but
having a smaller number of other friends. Interdependence also predicted having
more rules about how to speak to third parties about one’s best friend. This study
is useful because it not only identifies cultural contrasts, but also shows how
self-construal measures can explain the contrasts that are found.
 Prosocial behaviour with strangers
If people from collectivist nations distinguish between ingroup and outgroup
relationships, it makes sense to discuss each type of relationship separately. In
Chapter 10 prosocial behaviours were discussed. How do cultural differences
affect the tendency to help a stranger in distress? Levine, Norenzayan, and
Philbrick (2001) compared bystander helpfulness in 23 nations. They trained
accomplices to create three separate situations on the streets of a major city in
each nation. In the first situation, each accomplice dropped a pen while walking
past a single stranger. In the second situation, as a pedestrian approached, the
accomplice appeared to have hurt their leg and was struggling to pick up a pile
of magazines that they had dropped. In the third situation, the accomplice was
dressed as a blind person and was waiting for a green light at a pedestrian
crossing. The proportion of helpful responses across these three emergencies
was positively correlated and was therefore combined into a single index. As
Figure 15.13 shows, there was a large variation between nations.
FIGURE 15.13 Prosocial behaviour across nations.
Source: Based on Levine et al., 2001, with permission from SAGE Publications.

This study provides a first indication of cultural variations in prosocial

behaviour, but because few other measures were collected, it leaves many
possible explanations of this effect untested. Helpfulness to strangers was
unrelated to differences in individualism and collectivism, but was higher in less
rich nations.
 Intimate relationships
We can expect that the ways in which intimate relationships are created will
reflect the prevailing cultural context. Buss (1989) asked 9500 students in 37
nations to rate the desirability of 18 qualities in a future opposite-sex romantic
partner. Across the sample as a whole, men said they would prefer partners
whom they perceived as young, healthy and beautiful, while women would
prefer partners whom they saw as ambitious, industrious and having high
earning potential (see Chapter 11 for discussion of the possible evolutionary
basis for such partner choices). There were also substantial variations in
preferences across nations. The greatest variability across nations was found in
preference for pre-marital chastity, which was more strongly required by
respondents in collectivist nations (Buss et al., 1990). In a collectivist culture, a
female partner’s lack of chastity would be a threat to the honour of her whole
group. We discuss this in a later section. Shackelford, Schmitt, and Buss (2005)
made a further study of this dataset, using factor analysis to identify four
dimensions that could be used to summarize the variation across nations. The
first of these dimensions contrasted the presence of love as a precondition for a
relationship, with emphasis on status and financial prospects. Figure 15.14
shows the nations scoring at either extreme of this dimension. Preference for a
relationship based on love was found to be strongest in more wealthy nations,
which tend to be those that are individualistic rather than collectivistic. See also
Social Psychology Beyond the Lab 15.2, which gives some examples of how
partner preferences are typically expressed in the UK and India.
FIGURE 15.14 Preference for love more than for status and financial prospects
as a precondition for a relationship.
Source: Based on Shackelford et al., 2005, with permission from Elsevier.
 The studies of partner preference provide an example of a field in which we
find both universal and cultural variations. Gender differences are universal, but
preferred partner qualities vary in strength between cultures. For a similar
pattern of results, see the discussion of cultural effects on aggression in Chapter
9.
 Summary
Our cultural background affects the way that we speak to others and to what
extent we distinguish between relating to strangers and relating to friends. Social
relationships within collectivistic cultures are more exclusive of outsiders and
require less explicit communication. Choice of intimate partners is influenced
not just by the personal qualities of the partners, but also by the attributes of the
families from which they are drawn.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BEYOND THE LAB

15.2
THE IDEAL PARTNER FITS WITH
CULTURAL NORMS
What qualities are important in seeking a partner? In the UK, personality
traits and interests are emphasized. In India, caste, family status,
qualifications and sometimes horoscopes are more salient. Note how in the
UK individuals advertise themselves, whereas in India it is often the family
rather than the individual that seeks a partner. Note also that one of the UK
advertisements is for a homosexual partner.
United Kingdom India
Lots of energy and a lust for life. Smart, very handsome Brahmin boy,
Eccentric, kind-hearted female, 35, 31, 180 cm, BE, MBA, own
5’9”, loves singing, dancing, reading established business, monthly income
and travel; would like to meet six figures, send biodata and photo
confident pragmatic, hard-working (must).
male, 33–38, who likes a joke and a
hearty laugh.
Attractive 39yo black male speaks Delhi-based Punjabi Khatri family
five languages would like to meet seeks professionally qualified girl
female, similar age for long-term from educated family for IT, MBA, 29
relationship. Likes walking by the sea, years, 5’7” working manager in
food, cooking and travel. leading company.
New here, looking around. I am a 32yo Hindu girl, 23, 160 cm, BTech
male seeking an honest, balanced fun working professional software
female 25–34 with good sense of engineer, only child, father senior
female 25–34 with good sense of engineer, only child, father senior

humour. bank executive, mother legal

professional, seeks preferably BTech,
MBA, below 28 from educated
family. Caste no bar.
Tall, blonde, incredible hunk, 27, Beautiful working girl in Delhi
attractive handsome young male would sought for handsome Uttar Pradesh
like to meet older non-scene, Khatri boy, born 3.2.1980 / 3.15 am,
distinguished gentleman, 65+, 5’3”, employed in a reputable
hopefully leading to friendship and company.
relationship.
Sources: The Guardian (London), April 2010; Sunday Times of India, matrimonials, March
2010.
 GROUP PROCESSES
How does collectivism affect group behaviours?
Asch’s (1956) classic study of how groups influence the individual’s behaviour
has been described in Chapters 1 and 8. We might expect that the effects found
would depend on the cultural context in which the study is conducted. Bond and
Smith (1996) reported a meta-analysis of the 133 published replications and
extensions of this study. Ninety-seven of these replications were conducted
within the United States, and even within the US there was substantial variation
in the level of conformity that was found. Bond and Smith were principally
interested in what happened when the study was repeated elsewhere, and they
found that replications had been conducted in another 16 nations. But when an
experiment is repeated, it is very difficult to match exactly the ways the original
study was done. To try to compare studies cross-culturally, they first studied in
more detail variations across studies conducted in one country. Bond and Smith
determined how much the varying results obtained within the US were
associated with the differences in procedures and samples in these studies. They
found the strongest variations were caused by three factors: (1) the size of the
majority that gave false answers; (2) the relative lengths of the lines that were
used; and (3) whether the majority were from an outgroup or not. These results
were then used as statistical controls for these same sources of variation in
examining the studies conducted elsewhere. The results obtained from differing
regions of the world are shown in Figure 15.15. To test possible reasons for the
contrasting results from different nations, Bond and Smith correlated the
measures of national difference provided by Hofstede (1980) and Schwartz
(2004) with the scores for conformity. They found that conformity was highest
in the nations grouped in the figure as ‘Rest of the World’, where Hofstede’s
collectivism and Schwartz’s embeddedness values are most strongly endorsed.
Thus, conformity was highest in societies in which people emphasize their links
with others and their long-term membership groups.
FIGURE 15.15 Variations of effect size in the Asch conformity experiment.
Source: Based on Bond & Smith, 1996. Culture and conformity: A meta-analysis
of studies using Asch’s (1952b, 1956) Line Judgment Task. Psychological
Bulletin, 119, 111–137, with permission from APA. The use of APA information
does not imply endorsement by APA.

If members of collectivist cultures conform more frequently, then we may

expect their behaviour to differ when they are in groups compared to when they
are on their own. As was discussed in Chapter 13, North American researchers
have identified the phenomenon of social loafing, whereby people are found to
work less hard when they are in a group compared to when they are working on
their own. Research Close-Up 15.2 explores why results are not the same when
this type of study is conducted in other cultural contexts.
Studies of conformity and social loafing treat all members of a group as
though they are equal to one another, but in real groups there are frequently
differences in status that reflect formal or informal leadership processes. Since
the values of some cultures emphasize hierarchy more than others, we can
expect that leaders would be more powerful in some contexts than others.
Milgram’s (1974) well-known studies of obedience in the US are discussed in
Chapter 8. Several replications of his studies in different nations have been
reported, some yielding higher rates of obedience and others yielding lower
rates. However, none of these replications precisely followed Milgram’s
procedure, so that we cannot determine the source of these variations. It is likely
that variations in obedience are more affected by cultural contexts other than
nationality, for instance, the contrast between military and non-military contexts.
The effects of different styles of leadership have been frequently studied by
cross-cultural researchers. The classic comparison of authoritarian and
democratic leadership studied by Lewin, Lippitt, and White (1939) is discussed
in Chapter 13. Meade (1985) repeated this study, sampling 12-to 14-year-olds in
the more hierarchical cultures of India and Hong Kong, as well as among
European Americans in the US mainland and among Chinese Americans in
Hawaii. Only in mainland US was democratic leadership preferred. In Hawaii,
the preference was equally balanced, while in Hong Kong and India
authoritarian leadership was preferred to democratic leadership. In mainland US
the autocratically-led groups had low productivity and high absenteeism,
whereas the democratically-led groups had high productivity and low
absenteeism, thus replicating the results of Lewin et al. almost 50 years after the
original study. However, in the Chinese and Indian groups the pattern of results
was exactly the opposite, with authoritarian leaders achieving much higher
productivity and much lower absenteeism.
More recently, House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, and Gupta (2004) surveyed
the leader styles preferred by business managers in 61 nations. Respondents
were asked to select items from a list of traits that characterize effective leaders.
The results were summarized in terms of six styles that were named as
charismatic, team-oriented, participative, humane, autonomous and self-
protective. Typical traits defining each of these styles are shown in Figure 15.16.
Charismatic leadership is similar to the transformational/charismatic leadership
discussed in Chapter 13. In general, the charismatic and team-oriented leadership
styles were endorsed across the sample as a whole, while self-protective and
autonomous leadership was rejected. However, there were also variations in the
results from each of the regions from which House et al. collected data. The
regions in which each style was more popular than average and less popular than
average are also shown in the figure. House et al. were able to show that these
variations in preferred leader styles could be predicted from measures of values
that they also collected from their respondents. For instance, Latin Americans
score highest on collectivism (see Figure 15.3) and they were more positive
toward team-oriented leadership, while in the individualistic Anglo nations the
entrepreneurial charismatic leader style was more favoured.
FIGURE 15.16 Variation in desired leader qualities across regions.
Source: Based on information reported in House et al., 2004.
 In the contemporary world, teams are often composed of people coming from
differing cultural backgrounds. Team members are unlikely to have the same
preferences for leadership or understandings about how a group should best
work together. For instance, some may value assertiveness, while others expect
to wait for leadership from others. This can be a problem in business,
particularly in ‘virtual’ teams who meet only through e-mail, but also in student
seminars. Earley and Mosakowski (2000) proposed that effective multicultural
teams will be those that can establish a shared culture. They predicted that this
would be easier to accomplish if a team comprised people from several different
cultural backgrounds rather than from just two. They reasoned that where two
cultural groups are represented, each subgroup will try to impose their
preferences on the other, whereas when many viewpoints are represented, the
team will be forced to evolve a new culture of its own. In their first study, Earley
and Mosakowski tested these ideas among teams of managers attending a
business school in London. Ninety-four participants from 27 nations were
assigned to four-person decision-making groups. Groups had either four people
from one nation (homogeneous condition), two people from one nation and two
from another (polarized condition), or four people from different nations
(heterogeneous condition). The groups worked on a decision task for one hour.
Two judges who were blind to the teams’ composition then rated the decision
quality of the teams’ work on objective criteria. The homogenous groups did
best and the polarized groups did worst. These findings were replicated in a
second study in which group members worked with one another over a period of
three months. Neither study included any measure of participants’ cultural
orientation additional to their nationality. We can therefore be less confident that
we know whether the effects that were found are due to the reasons specified by
Earley and Mosakowski. However, they confirm that cultural processes add to
the challenges of establishing effective teamwork. They also indicate that
heterogeneity of teams is not always detrimental: given time, very heterogenous
teams can work effectively together, as has also been found by researchers who
have focused on aspects of diversity unrelated to culture (e.g. Horwitz &
Horwitz, 2007).

RESEARCH CLOSE-UP 15.2

SOCIAL LOAFING IN CHINA, US AND

ISRAEL
Earley, P. C. (1993). East meets West meets Mideast: Further explorations of collectivistic versus
individualistic work groups. Academy of Management Journal, 36, 319–348.

Research question Social loafing is the phenomenon

in which group members work less hard when they
are in a group compared to when they are on their
own. It has been frequently identified in studies
conducted in the US. The process is fully described in
Chapter 13 (see Research Close-Up13.1). Earley
tested the hypothesis that respondents’ attitudes
toward interdependence would affect the extent to
which social loafing would occur. He predicted that
those who favour interdependence (referred to as
collectivists) would work hardest when working with
members of their ingroup. He was also concerned to
establish the extent to which social loafing occurs in
real work groups as much as it does in short-term
groups of students brought together for the purpose of
the experiment.
Design and procedure Participants were full-time
managers who were attending training courses. The
design was 3 (nationalities) × 3 (experimental
conditions). The sample comprised 45 Israelis, 60
mainland Chinese and 60 Americans from the United
States. All participants were given a simulated ‘in-
basket’ of paperwork tasks on which to work. In the
individual condition they were told that they should
expect to complete 20 items within an hour. In the
ingroup collective condition they were told that they
were working in a team of ten and that the other team
members were people from the same region of the
country who had been selected to be similar to one
another and to have many common interests. The
team was expected to complete 200 items within the
hour. In the outgroup collective condition they were
told that they were working in a team of ten and that
the other group members were from different regions
of the country and would have little in common. They
were also expected to complete 200 items within the
hour. In fact, all participants were working
individually. Participants also completed a
questionnaire measuring their attitudes toward
independence (individualism) and interdependence
(collectivism). The dependent measure was the
 number of tasks completed per person.
Results Scores from each nation were first
standardized, so that the means for each nation were
equivalent. This enables the researchers to analyse the
results for the sample as a whole without reference to
nationality and without distortion from other sources
of difference between the samples. Earley then
divided his sample between those who had endorsed
independence and those who had endorsed
interdependence. As Figure 15.17 shows,
individualists completed significantly fewer tasks
when they believed that they were working in either
of the collective conditions versus individually.
Collectivists completed significantly more tasks in the
ingroup collective condition than in either of the other
experimental conditions.
FIGURE 15.17 Social loafing in three experimental conditions.
Source: Republished with the permission of the Academy of Management,
from Earley (1993). East meets West meets Mideast: Further explorations of
collectivistic versus individualistic work groups. Academy of Management
Journal, Vol. 36; permission conveyed through Copyright Clearance Center,
Inc.
 Pooling the results across nations ignores the fact that most of the
individualists would be in the US sample and most of the collectivists would
be in the Chinese sample. Therefore it is useful also to test the hypothesis
separately for each nation’s data. When this is done unstandardized data can
be used. The results are shown in Figure 15.18, but note that the samples
from each nation were quite small.
FIGURE 15.18 Social loafing in three cultures.
Source: Based on information reported in Earley, 1993.

Implications This is one of the most striking cross-

cultural studies that has been conducted. The results
show that social loafing is not just reduced in
differing cultural contexts – it is actually reversed.
Collectivists do not loaf in groups: they work harder.
In an earlier study, Earley (1989) found the same
result when he sampled managers who were actually
at work, not in a simulated work setting. Of course
there could be many reasons why a study conducted
in the US, Israel and China could come up with
contrasting results. By measuring participants’
attitudes toward independence and interdependence
directly, Earley was able to show that he could
explain why the results came out as they did. If we
look at these results through Western eyes, we might
say that collectivists work harder in groups because of
conformity pressures. However, this does not answer
the question of why there might be norms favouring
hard work in collectivist groups. A better explanation
is to say that in collectivist cultures one’s
interdependent identity is inextricably linked with
one’s group, so that hard work enhances one’s
identity, just as working hard individually does for an
individual.
 Summary
Interdependence is a central component of one’s relation to groups.
Consequently, members of collectivist cultures show greater conformity and
work harder to contribute to group goals. They respond more positively to
directive forms of leadership. Members of individualist cultures value their
autonomy and therefore respond better to participative forms of leadership.
These different orientations toward group processes pose difficulties when teams
are composed of those from differing cultures.
 INTERGROUP RELATIONS
How does collectivism affect relations with outgroups?
As has been discussed in Chapters 12 and 14, social identity theory has played a
major role in the development of social psychology. It has, however, been
developed and tested mostly within the predominantly more individualistic
national cultures that provide the heartland of social psychology. What happens
when group memberships are a more permanent and central element in one’s
identity, as occurs within collectivist cultures and within ethnic minority
subcultures in individualistic nations? People high in interdependence may need
to use different ways from those who are more independent to maintain a
positive comparison between their ingroup and relevant outgroups.
The minimal group paradigm pioneered by Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, and Flament
(1971; see Research Close-Up 14.1) was first tested with 11-year-old
schoolchildren. Consider the study conducted in New Zealand by Wetherell
(1982). Wetherell compared the responses of three separate samples of 8-year-
old children: New Zealanders of European origin, Maoris (who are indigenous to
New Zealand) and Samoan immigrants to New Zealand. The European New
Zealanders responded to being arbitrarily assigned to a group by maximizing the
difference between ingroup rewards and outgroup rewards, just as has been
repeatedly found in earlier studies based on the study carried out by Tajfel et al.
However, the Samoans tried to maximize the rewards of both the ingroup and
the outgroup, while the results for Maoris were intermediate between the other
two samples. On the face of it, the Samoan results in particular appear
contradictory to social identity theory, because the Samoans did not try to
enhance the status of their own group. In trying to understand the results,
Wetherell wondered whether the collectivist culture of Samoans led them to
perceive fellow-Samoans, whether categorized as ‘ingroup’ or ‘outgroup’ by the
experimenters, as, in fact, ‘ingroup members’, and the white experimenter as the
outgroup. She also noted that the giving of gifts is highly esteemed in Samoan
culture, so that a Samoan might achieve higher status for the ingroup by giving
gifts to others. It is also possible that as young immigrants, the Samoan children
did not fully understand the culturally strange procedures in which the white
experimenter was asking them to participate.
In order to resolve these kinds of ambiguities, studies are required that focus
on intergroup relations and also include measures of cultural relevance, such as
independence and interdependence. Research Close-Up 15.3 describes some
studies of this kind, which do support the cross-cultural validity of social identity
theory, but which also show some culturally variable effects.
 Group honour
As we have seen, many studies of individualistic and collectivistic cultures have
focused on the US and East Asia. However, issues relevant to collectivism are
important within intergroup relations in all parts of the world. The need to
maintain the honour of one’s group in relation to others is salient not just among
the more collectivist immigrant communities within nations in northern Europe,
but also in the more collectivist nations of southern Europe, and as we shall see,
even in the southern states of the US. Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, and
Fischer (2002a) compared understandings of the concept of honour in the
Netherlands and in Spain, by comparing students’ responses to Schwartz’s
(1992) value survey. As Schwartz had done in his earlier study, Rodriguez
Mosquera et al. defined meanings of values by examining the extent to which
endorsing one value was correlated with endorsing other values. In the
Netherlands, honour was more strongly associated with endorsement of
independent values such as self-respect and achieving more than others. In
contrast, in Spain honour was more strongly associated with interdependent
values such as loyalty and honesty. In a further study, Rodriguez Mosquera,
Manstead, and Fischer (2002b) asked Dutch and Spanish students to imagine
their response to a series of scenarios in which insults were received. The
Spanish students reported feeling more threatened and more ashamed when
family honour was insulted, whereas the Dutch reported more shame and anger
when their autonomy and assertiveness were under threat.
Cultures in which honour is defined interdependently can be expected to show
evidence of vigorous defence of the honour of one’s group. For instance, Semin
and Rubini (1990) compared students’ reports of insults used most frequently in
northern Italy with those used in southern Italy. Southern Italy has a culture that
is much more collectivistic than northern Italy (Capozza, Brown, Aharpour, &
Falvo, 2006). Favoured insults in northern Italy were more frequently focused on
characterizing the insulted individual, for instance in terms of sexual expletives
or of undesirable traits (‘You’re stupid’; ‘You’re a cretin’). In Sicily, in the
south, insults were more frequently targeted at the individual’s group
membership, especially their family. Examples included: ‘I wish a cancer on you
and all your relatives’; ‘Your sister is a cow’; ‘You are queer and so is your
father’; ‘You are a communist’; and insults based on references to incest.
Historically, the nations around the Mediterranean such as Spain, Italy and
Turkey have been characterized as honour cultures, but defence of group honour
is likely to be a salient value in many collectivist cultures. Even within the
United States the relatively more collectivist values of the southern states are
associated with acceptance of more aggressive responding to uphold the honour
of one’s group than in the northern US. For instance, Nisbett and Cohen (1996)
mailed a job application letter to potential employers that had supposedly been
written by someone convicted of a killing in an honour-related incident.
Companies in the south and west of the US more often responded favourably to
the application than did those in the more individualistic north of the US.
Honour killings continue to be reported in the press in many nations where
perceived female sexual infidelity is seen as a major threat to the honour of the
group.
 Negotiation
In fields such as diplomacy and business it is frequently necessary to engage in
negotiation with representatives of groups whose cultures may differ from one’s
own. The differing values espoused within individualist and collectivist cultures
make it likely that tasks of this kind will be approached in different ways. Morris
et al. (1998) compared the approaches to negotiation used by business students
from India, Hong Kong, the Philippines and the US. Preferred negotiation styles
were characterized as either competing or avoiding conflict. The Americans
were more competitive, while the Hong Kong Chinese were more avoidant.
Respondents also completed Schwartz’s (1992) measure of individuals’ values.
Morris et al. were able to show that the differences between the samples in
competitiveness were associated with differences in how much respondents
endorsed achievement values, while the differences in avoidance were associated
with differences in how much tradition and conformity values were endorsed.
Thus, we can see that measures that are useful in defining cultural differences
can help to predict some of the difficulties that will arise when people from
differing cultures negotiate with one another. However, this study does not tell
us how they are likely to cope with these difficulties. Successful negotiation
across cultures is likely to require adaptations in one’s behaviour. We can gain a
better understanding of these adaptations by looking at more detailed analyses.
Adair and Brett (2005) constructed a complex one-hour-long simulation of a
commercial negotiation. This enabled analyses of actual negotiation behaviours
over time rather than simple summaries of negotiation style. Adair and Brett
examined the extent to which intercultural negotiators modified their behaviour
compared to those negotiating with others from their own culture. There were
two intracultural experimental conditions and one intercultural condition. The
collectivist intracultural negotiations comprised dyads drawn from Russia,
Japan, Hong Kong and Thailand. The individualist intracultural negotiations
comprised dyads from Germany, Israel, Sweden and the US. In all of these
instances, each dyad comprised two people from the same nation. In the
intercultural dyads, some US negotiators were pitted against Japanese
negotiators, while others negotiated with Hong Kong Chinese. The negotiations
were audiotaped, transcribed and coded into a series of predetermined
categories. In order to examine the sequential development of the negotiations,
the transcripts were divided into quarters.
RESEARCH CLOSE-UP 15.3

SOCIAL IDENTITY IN CHINA AND

THE US
Chen, Y.-R., Brockner, J., & Katz, T. (1998). Toward an explanation of cultural differences in
ingroup favoritism: The role of individual versus collective primacy. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 75, 1490–1502.

Research question Chen and her colleagues were

interested to see how members of a team would react
to adverse feedback when they were in a collectivist
cultural context rather than an individualist context. If
one’s group identity is more fixed and salient than it is
in the nations where social identity theory was first
formulated, how would the different types of identity
management strategies proposed by Tajfel and Turner
(1986) be affected?
As discussed in Chapter 14, social identity theory specifies social mobility,
social creativity and social competition as three ways in which a group
member might seek to retain a positive identity, even where their group is
evaluated poorly. The theory also states the circumstances in which each of
these options will be employed. Where group boundaries are permeable and
the group is poorly evaluated, a group member might opt for social mobility
– in other words, leave the group. This option would be attractive to
someone with an independent self-construal. In collectivist cultures where
group boundaries are not so permeable, would respondents whose group is
poorly evaluated find alternative ways to preserve their group affiliation,
and would these strategies be followed especially by those who endorse
interdependence? Tajfel and Turner’s theory suggests that they would
choose social competition or social creativity – that is to say, either
comparing their group favourably with others or changing the basis of
comparison with other groups. Chen et al. did not make a specific prediction
as to which strategy their more collectivist respondents would employ.
Design and procedure The design was a 2 (nation) ×
2 (individual feedback) × 2 (team feedback) × 2
(success/failure) experiment. Participants were 291
students at Peking University in China and 80
students at Columbia University in the US. After
filling out an attitude survey and a measure of
independence/interdependence, participants were told
that they had been assigned to a team whose members
held similar attitudes to one another on a variety of
issues. They were then given brief descriptions of ten
romantic couples that were said to have been prepared
by clinical psychologists. They were asked to predict
whether each couple would still be together after a
year, and were told that successful prediction was an
indicator of intellectual and interpersonal competence.
After completing this task, participants received
feedback that told them either that they had done well
or poorly on the task (experimental factor 1). They
were also told that their team had either done well or
poorly (experimental factor 2). Finally, as dependent
measures, they rated the performance of themselves,
their team and other teams on various scales.
Results Chinese respondents mostly scored higher on
interdependence and US respondents mostly scored
higher on independence. The findings of interest
concern the ways in which respondents handled the
 failure feedback compared to the success feedback.
Among the Americans, those who were told that they
had done well individually, but their team had done
poorly, gave their team much lower ratings. However,
in the same situation among the Chinese there was no
such decrease in ingroup ratings. Instead, they rated
the performance of outgroup teams significantly more
negatively. Figure 15.19 shows that the same pattern
of results is obtained when the data are analysed in
terms of independence–interdependence rather than in
terms of nationality. Chen et al. used a 7-item
measure of ‘individual versus collective primacy’,
derived from several different measures of
independent and interdependent self-construal,
including some of the items in the Singelis (1994)
scales (see Individual Differences15.1). Thus, they
found that of all the possible reasons why Americans
and Chinese might behave differently in this
experiment, the self-construal scores provide a
sufficient explanation.
FIGURE 15.19 Ingroup preference when receiving individual success
feedback.
Source: Based on Chen, Brockner, & Katz (1998). Toward an explanation of
cultural differences in ingroup favoritism: The role of individual versus
collective primacy. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75, 1490–
1502, with permission from APA. The use of APA information does not imply
endorsement by APA.
Implications American respondents were clearly
employing Tajfel and Turner’s (1986) social mobility
strategy. In effect they were saying ‘If this team is no
good, then I don’t wish to be part of it’. For them, it
was more important to preserve a positive individual
identity than a positive group identity. In contrast, the
Chinese response was more like ‘If our team did
poorly, then the others must have done even worse’.
This is consistent with Tajfel and Turner’s social
competition strategy. By adjusting the basis of
comparison in this way, they could preserve a positive
team identity. In a similar study conducted later,
Chen, Brockner, and Chen (2002) showed that when
outgroup teams were said to have done better than
one’s own team, interdependent respondents still rated
their own team positively, while independent
respondents did not. These studies thus give cross-
cultural support to social identity theory, but show
 that identity strategies do vary in ways that reflect
variations in individualism–collectivism. However,
the results of both these studies rest on a brief and
previously unknown measure of independence and
interdependence that requires fuller development to
ensure its validity.
In studies that use a complex content analysis of this kind, the numbers of
dyads from each individual nation is necessarily low, so Adair and Brett
analysed the results for all individualist dyads in contrast to the results for all
collectivist dyads. Negotiators from the individualistic nations showed more
direct exchange of information through questions (e.g. ‘We could offer 40 per
cent upfront’) and answers (e.g. ‘We couldn’t possibly accept that offer’). Only
during the last quarter did they make actual offers focused on a possible
agreement. Negotiators from collectivistic nations used indirect information
exchange more frequently. In other words, they made a mixture of offers and
more generally phrased persuasive arguments (e.g. ‘Everyone knows our
company makes the finest products and we plan to continue introducing new
ones’) during the early stages, and inferred what must be the more important
priorities of the other party from the relatively indirect responses (e.g. ‘This deal
is very important for me. I’m up for promotion and the budget is really tight’)
that they obtained to their offers. In the intercultural dyads, the collectivistic
negotiators were found to have adopted the more direct information exchange
that is favoured by individualistic negotiators. The individualistic negotiators did
not adapt their behaviour. The intercultural negotiations achieved less joint gain
(measured in dollars) than both the collectivist and the individualist intracultural
negotiations.
This study tells us two things. Firstly, it is consistent with expectation that the
negotiators from collectivist cultures take more account of their context, and
therefore it is they who adapt their behaviour more during intercultural
negotiation. Secondly, this adaptation is only partially effective, because
information exchange and the making of offers have different meanings in
differing contexts. Early offers in collectivist cultures can serve well as an
exploratory device among those who understand their purpose, but they are
likely to be misunderstood by negotiators from cultures in which direct
communication is favoured. Being an effective negotiator cross-culturally
requires not only being willing to adapt one’s behaviour, but also an awareness
of how the other party will interpret those behaviours (see Social Psychology
Beyond the Lab 15.3).
 Summary
Members of groups within collectivist cultures give high priority to preserving
their group’s status. This leads them to seek harmony with ingroup members
through indirect communication, and to defend their group robustly when
interacting with outgroup members. These effects are broadly consistent with
social psychological theories developed through sampling of members of
individualist cultures, but in order to explain the particular ways in which
collectivist group status is upheld in more collectivistic cultures, we need to
draw on more specific concepts such as independence and interdependence.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BEYOND THE

LAB 15.3
THE POLITICAL PERILS OF CROSS-
CULTURAL NEGOTIATION
The costs of failing to understand the intentions of parties from other
cultural contexts is nowhere more apparent than in the field of international
negotiation. The US dropped the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki
in Japan in 1945 after the Japanese had responded to a US ultimatum for
unconditional surrender using the ambiguous word mokusatsu, which can
mean ‘silent contempt’, ‘ignore’ or ‘we need more time’. In this instance, it
was translated as ‘ignore’. However, the Japanese emperor had already
agreed to surrender: conflicts within his government needed to be resolved
before they were ready to respond.
More recently, it is said that the 1990 conflict in Kuwait was precipitated
because US Secretary of State James Baker spoke softly to Tariq Aziz, the
Iraqi foreign minister, presenting him with a letter indicating that the US
would intervene militarily if Iraq did not withdraw following their invasion
of Kuwait (Kimmel, 1994). Consistent with Western styles of
communication, the letter was task-oriented, impersonal, definite and time-
limited. An Arab understanding of threats would be that they are only meant
seriously if delivered extravagantly and emphatically. Aziz would have
favoured a slower-paced and less focused building up of trust between the
two parties.
 two parties.
The United Nations Climate Change Conference held in Copenhagen in
2009 was regarded by most parties as a failure. Many factors contributed to
that, but it provided numerous instances of cultural differences in
negotiation style and the way in which these may have affected the outcome
(Lynas, 2009). President Obama delayed his arrival at the conference until
his advisers judged that there was a possibility of agreement with the
Chinese. When he arrived he joined the group of predominantly Western
leaders who were attempting to rescue the stalled negotiations, as shown in
Figure 15.20. However, the Chinese and Indian governments sent only
middle-ranking protocol officers to these meetings, thereby preventing the
flexibility that might have been possible within a meeting of heads of state.
Obama reacted by leaving these meetings and having two one-to-one
negotiations with Chinese premier Wen Jiabao, thus illustrating his
preference for direct communication. He returned from the second of these
meetings announcing agreement on certain points. The Chinese responded
by introducing new demands into the group discussions through their
protocol officers, thus regaining control of the negotiation. Obama
responded by once more seeking out the Chinese, and this time found them
engaged in an alternative negotiation with a small group of key non-Western
nations. Obama joined these negotiations uninvited, and a new agreement
was announced. The new and rather modest deal was, in turn, much
criticized by nations that had not been a party to any of these discussions,
but was eventually accepted. Chinese indirectness had proved most effective
in achieving the goals that they desired, but there would have been no
agreement at all without the more direct initiatives of several Western
leaders.
FIGURE 15.20 Last ditch negotiations at the 2009 Copenhagen summit.
Source: © Getty Images.
 INTERCULTURAL RELATIONS
Will globalization mean the end of cultural differences?
In recent decades there have been unprecedented levels of contact between
cultural groups located in different parts of the world. This has occurred through
the globalization of the media, through short-term visits by tourists, students and
business people and through long-term relocation by migrants and refugees.
During this same period, almost all nations have become more affluent, although
inequalities persist both within and between nations. Short-term population
movements have most often been from individualist nations to collectivist
nations, whereas the long-term population movements have mostly been in the
reverse direction. The principal source of evidence as to the correlates of all this
geographic mobility is provided by data collected by the World Values Survey.
Initiated within a small range of nations in the early 1980s, this survey now
provides information from more than 80 nations on endorsement of a wide
variety of values and behaviours. The data have been collected from
representative samples within each nation every few years. This makes it
possible to gain a broad overview of the extent of global cultural change.
Inglehart and Baker (2000) analysed endorsement of World Values Survey
items that they had found to make up a dimension of what they defined as ‘post-
materialist’ values. Initially these authors defined a post-materialist as someone
who tends to agree with survey items that can be summarized as these five
statements:
My self-expression and quality of life are more important than my
economic and physical security.
I am happy.
Homosexuality is justifiable.
You can trust most people.
I have signed one or more petitions.
Subsequent research identified many additional survey items that post-
materialists agree with. These items support gender equality, tolerance of
minorities, recycling, state support for the needy and new technologies. When
data from the 1980s was compared with that from the 1990s, a substantially
increased percentage of those classified as post-materialists was found in 19 of
21 nations. The magnitude of these changes for some of these nations can be
seen in Figure 15.21. The lower part of the figure shows the percentage of post-
materialists minus the percent of materialists in each nation in 1980. The
negative percentages in this part of the figure show that in 1980 there were more
materialists than post-materialists in all European nations except Finland. For
instance, in Italy, there were almost 40 per cent more materialists than post-
materialists. The upper part of the table shows the change over the following
decade. For instance, Italy shows a gain of post-materialists of around 45 per
cent, so that by 1990 there were slightly more Italians classified as post-
materialists than as materialists. Of course, respondents at these two points in
time were not the same people. We do not know whether these changes have
occurred through people actually changing their values, or through the
replacement of populations as generations succeeded one another. Nonetheless,
it appears that values that in the past were more characteristic of just a few of the
most individualistic nations are becoming more widespread. These changes
characterize the profile of nations as a whole, not all individuals. In each nation,
there remain many individuals who would not be classified as post-materialists.
FIGURE 15.21 Percentage of post-materialists minus percentage of
materialists, 1980 and increase to 1990.
Source: Based on data reported in Inglehart, 1997.

Inglehart and Oyserman (2004) explored these results and found that the
nation-level scores for post-materialism correlate strongly with Hofstede’s
(1980) measures of individualism and Schwartz’s (2004) measures of autonomy.
However, they note that the profiles of nations with differing historical, religious
and political systems remain distinctive. What we are seeing is a global trend in
value endorsement, not a convergence toward a single profile of ‘modern’ or
Western values. The profiles of values endorsed for instance in East Asian
nations, in the former Soviet bloc, in Islamic nations, in Latin America, in
predominantly Protestant Europe, in predominantly Catholic Europe and in the
Anglo nations each remain distinctive, but with rather more post-materialists in
almost all nations. As Figure 15.21 also shows, the changes are happening just as
much in nations that were already individualistic, such as the US, as they are in
other nations that were not individualistic in time past.
Over the past several decades the great majority of nations have experienced
economic growth (International Monetary Fund, 2005). The nations within
which endorsement of post-materialist values has risen have been those
experiencing increasing prosperity. World Values Survey data has also shown a
movement away from post-materialist values within the much smaller number of
nations that have suffered economic decline, such as the former Soviet bloc
nations of Eastern Europe. Thus, future economic crises might engender a
reversal of current value changes.
 Migration and acculturation
One major source of cultural change is the current migration of large numbers of
people from collectivist cultures in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean to more
individualistic cultures in Europe, North America and Australasia. Social
psychologists have a role to play in explaining the challenges that are raised by
this process and in contributing to their resolution. Acculturation is a term that
was defined some time ago as the process whereby two cultural groups that
come into contact with one another cause changes in one or both parties
(Redfield, Linton, & Herskovits, 1936). These changes may be in values, in
behaviours and in how one feels about oneself. Although it is clear that
increasing immigration does currently have a major political and social impact
on the culture of individualistic nations, social psychological research has mostly
been focused on the choices faced by immigrants and their descendents, leaving
most of the study of changes in the nations receiving migrants to political
scientists. As illustrated by Theory Box 15.3, Berry (1997) has emphasized that
migrant acculturation is not simply a process whereby migrants must choose the
extent to which they wish to adopt the values and behaviours of the majority
culture (see Leader in the Field, John Berry). They also face choices as to how
much of their culture of origin they wish to sustain. In addition, they will
experience varying degrees of preference from majority culture members for
each of the acculturation modes that are illustrated in Theory Box 15.3.

- - - - - - - - - -

acculturation the process whereby two cultural groups that come into contact with one another
cause changes in one or both parties.

- - - - - - - - - -

Most studies have shown that migrants favour the integration mode, that is to
say participating in the majority culture, while also retaining the values and
behaviours associated with their identity of origin (Sam & Berry, 1997).
However, this preference is not always reciprocated by the majority population.
For instance, Van Oudenhoven, Prins, and Buunk (1998) found that Moroccan
and Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands favoured integration, but that Dutch
majority respondents were more favourable to assimilation. One way in which
migrants may adapt to this contrast in preferences is illustrated by Arends-Toth
and Van de Vijver (2003), who found that while the Dutch majority favoured
assimilation both at work and at home, Turkish migrants in the Netherlands
favoured integration at work and separation at home. Look now at Individual
Differences 15.2 to see how acculturation attitudes have most often been
measured.
The conditions predisposing positive outcomes for intergroup contact have
been discussed in Chapter 14. In relation to migration, particularly critical
groups are the first and second generation children of immigrants, who
experience socialization both by their family of origin and by the culture of the
nation within which they have been born. First-generation children arrive as
migrants, while second-generation children are born within their new nation or
residence. Berry, Phinney, Sam, and Vedder (2006) conducted a cross-sectional
survey of more than 5000 first-and second-generation adolescents in 13 nations.
Their European samples included both former colonial nations (France,
Germany, Netherlands, Portugal and UK) and other nations that have recently
received many migrants (Finland, Norway and Sweden). In each nation, one or
more ethnic minorities were sampled, as well as a sample of non-migrants.
Scores for better migrant adjustment showed a weak but positive association
with the integration mode. For instance, those scoring high on integration were
higher on measures of positive adjustment such as life satisfaction and self-
esteem, and lower on psychological problems, poor school adjustment and
behaviour problems, than those who scored lower on integration. These results
were much more strongly affected by respondents’ specific ethnicity than by the
particular host nation within which they were living. For instance, as noted
before, apart from work relations, Turkish migrants quite often favour separation
rather than integration. Consequently, they score higher on adjustment in nations
where there is a substantial Turkish community. Conversely, Vietnamese
migrants favour integration and their adjustment is therefore less influenced by
the presence or absence of other Vietnamese.

THEORY BOX 15.3

BERRY’S TYPOLOGY OF ACCULTURATION
MODES
Preferences Retain original identity and Lose original identity and
 group characteristics group characteristics
Valuable to join the Integration Assimilation
larger society
Not valuable to join Separation Marginalization
the larger society
Note: The preferences refer to the individual’s preferences for him or herself.
Source: Based on Berry, 1997, with permission from John Wiley & Sons.

LEADER IN THE FIELD

John Berry (b. 1939) grew up in Canada but completed his PhD at
the University of Edinburgh in the UK. His dissertation was focused
on the cultural adaptations of the Inuit and Cree nations to differing
environments in Northern Canada. This led to his early formulation
of eco-cultural theory. He was a founding member of the
International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology and was the
principal editor of the second edition of the Handbook of Cross-
Cultural Psychology. He has also co-authored the first published
textbook for the field of cross-cultural psychology as a whole.
During the past three decades he has developed his model of
acculturation processes, supervised the dissertations of many
researchers now active in this field and assisted the Canadian
government in the development of their policies relating to
immigration.

One reason why the relationship between the integration mode of adjustment
and measures of adjustment is not stronger may be because the concept of
integration is too broadly defined. Favouring integration implies a bicultural
identity and there are differing ways of sustaining a bicultural identity, some of
which may have better consequences than others. An immigrant or any person
who is descended from more that one cultural background has two cultural
identities available. Bicultural identity integration is present when a person
sees their alternate identities as compatible with one another. To explore this
issue, look now at Research Close-Up 15.4.

- - - - - - - - - -
 bicultural identity seeing oneself as having simultaneous membership of two culturally-distinct
groups.

- - - - - - - - - -

- - - - - - - - - -

bicultural identity integration present when a person sees their alternate identities as compatible
with one another.

- - - - - - - - - -

The priming study by Benet-Martínez, Leu, Lee, and Morris (2002) (see
Research Close-Up 15.4) was conducted in the US, but there is no reason to
expect differing results with European respondents. For instance, Verkuyten and
Pouliasi (2002) compared the impact of priming on bicultural Greek children
growing up in the Netherlands with control groups of monocultural Greek
children living in Greece and Dutch children living in the Netherlands. The
bicultural children were primed either by showing them Dutch icons (e.g.
windmills, the national flag) or by showing them Greek icons (e.g. the
Acropolis, the national flag). They were then presented with a series of tasks in
which they had to provide reasons for events that had occurred. The first task
also used the video of a fish swimming ahead of a group of other fish developed
by Morris and Peng (1994), described earlier in this chapter. Later questions
concerned reasons for the behaviour of hypothetical schoolchildren. For
example, one question was ‘One day a child is late for school. What could be the
reason?’ The results of these various tasks were combined to yield an index of
internal versus external attribution. As Figure 15.22 shows, the researchers
found that those children who had been primed with Dutch icons made more
internal attributions, while those children primed with Greek icons made more
external attributions. The figure also shows the means for attributions made by
the monocultural Dutch and the monocultural Greek children. The difference
between the mean for the Dutch children and the bicultural people who had been
primed with Dutch icons was not significant. Nor was the difference between the
mean for monocultural Greek children and the bicultural people who had been
primed with Greek icons. Thus, the full extent of the difference between the data
from more individualistic Dutch and from the more collectivistic Greeks was
reproduced through experimental priming.
FIGURE 15.22 Attributions made by primed and unprimed Greek and Dutch
children.
Source: Based on Verkuyten & Pouliasi, 2002, with permission from SAGE
Publications.

INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 15.2

ATTITUDES TO ACCULTURATION
Below are the items used in the research by Berry et al. (2006). You can
complete them whether you are a member of an ethnic minority or a
member of the majority in your nation. If you are a minority member,
‘ethnic’ in the items below refers to your own group. If you are a majority
group member, take the phrase ‘ethnic group’ as referring to the most salient
ethnic minorities within your nation. ‘National’ refers to your nation. Please
indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the statements, using
the response scale presented below.
1 I feel that [ethnic group] should adapt to national cultural traditions and
not maintain those of their own.
2 I would rather marry an [ethnic] than a national.
3 I feel that [ethnic group] should maintain their own cultural traditions
but also adapt to those of this nation.
4 I would rather marry a national than an [ethnic].
5 I would be just as willing to marry a national as an [ethnic].
6 I feel that it is not important for [ethnic group] either to maintain their
own cultural traditions or to adapt to those of this nation.
7 I feel that [ethnic group] should maintain their own cultural traditions
and not adapt to those of this nation.
8 I would not like to marry either a national or an [ethnic]
9 It is more important to me to be fluent in [ethnic language] than in the
national language.
10 It is more important to me to be fluent in the national language than in
[ethnic language].
11 It is important to me to be fluent in both the national language and
[ethnic language].
12 It is not important to me to be fluent either in [ethnic language] or the
national language.
13 I prefer social activities that involve both national members and
[ethnic] members.
14 I prefer to have only national friends.
15 I prefer to have only [ethnic] friends.
16 I prefer social activities that involve nationals only.
17 I prefer to have both national and [ethnic] friends.
18 I don’t want to attend either national or [ethnic] activities.
19 I prefer social activities that involve [ethnic group] members only.
20 I don’t want to have either national or [ethnic] friends.
1 = Strongly disagree
2 = Somewhat disagree
3 = Not sure/neutral
4 = Somewhat agree
5 = Strongly agree
Calculate your scores as follows: assimilation is the mean of items 1, 4, 10,
14 and 16. Integration is the mean of items 3, 5, 11, 13 and 17. Separation is
the mean of items 2, 7, 9, 15 and 19. Marginalization is the mean of items 6,
8, 12, 18 and 20. In the sample of Berry et al. as a whole, mean scores for
minority respondents were 2.20 for assimilation, 3.93 for integration, 2.59
for separation and 1.78 for marginalization. Means for majority members
were 2.59, 3.69, 2.37 and 2.28 respectively. Thus, on average, as in other
studies, all respondents favoured integration, but minority respondents did
so more strongly, while majority respondents also favoured assimilation.
Source: This scale reproduced with permission of Taylor & Francis, from Berry et al. (2006).
Immigrant youth in cultural transition: Acculturation, identity and adaptation across national
contexts. Permission conveyed through Copyright Clearance Center, Inc.
 Summary
Increased wealth and population mobility have been associated with global
changes in values toward increased individualism and post-modern values.
However, these changes are directional rather than converging on the values of
any preexisting culture. Migration and intermarriage are creating increasing
numbers of bicultural individuals. Bicultural identity integration appears to be
associated with optimal acculturation. Experimental priming of bicultural people
is creating opportunities to integrate cultural perspectives with other areas of
research in social psychology.

RESEARCH CLOSE-UP 15.4

BICULTURAL IDENTITY
INTEGRATION
Benet-Martínez, V. L., Leu, J., Lee, F., & Morris, M. W. (2002). Negotiating biculturalism:
Cultural frame switching in biculturals with oppositional versus compatible cultural identities.
Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 33, 492–516.

Research question Given the increasing frequency of

biculturalism in many nations, Benet-Martínez and
her colleagues were interested in alternate ways of
handling bicultural identities. How does someone
think and feel if they perceive their identities as
incompatible with one another? Do compatible
identities facilitate cultural integration? Can
experimental methods illuminate these issues? The
authors tested two main hypotheses about how
individuals who are low versus high on identity
integration respond when faced with an attribution
task. First, because their identities are not in conflict,
those who are high on identity integration were
expected to respond to a US prime by making the
more internal attributions that are typical of
Americans, and to a Chinese prime by making the
more external attributions that are typical of Chinese.
Second, and in contrast, because of the identity
conflict that they experience, respondents low in
identity integration were expected to respond
defensively, making external attributions in response
to the US primes and internal attributions in response
to the Chinese primes.
Design and procedure The study used a 2 (type of
identity integration) × 3 (type of prime) between-
subjects design. The sample was split between those
who were low or high on bicultural identity
integration (BII). The primes were either American
(e.g. Mickey Mouse, a cowboy, the Statue of Liberty);
Chinese (e.g. the Summer Palace in Beijing, a rice
farmer, the Great Wall); or control items unrelated to
culture. Participants first received one of these primes,
then viewed a series of videos showing a fish moving
ahead of a group of other fish; this task was first used
by Morris and Peng (1994), and was discussed earlier
in this chapter. They were asked to rate the extent to
which ‘the one fish is being influenced by the group’
(e.g. being chased, teased or pressured by others) and
 to rate the extent to which ‘the one fish is influenced
by some internal trait’ (such as independence,
personal objective or leadership). Next, each
participant was asked to make a single rating of the
extent to which they perceived themself as a Chinese
who lives in America, rather than as a Chinese
American. This provided a measure distinguishing
between low and high bicultural identity integration.
Finally, participants also completed the measure of
Berry’s four acculturation modes (see Individual
Differences 15.2).
Results The predictions were supported. The left-
hand side of Figure 15.23 indicates the results for
respondents with low bicultural identity integration
(BII). These data show the reverse pattern of
attributions from those that were found by Morris and
Peng (1994). With the Chinese prime these
participants made more internal attributions, and with
the American prime they made more external
attributions. In contrast, the results for the respondents
with high BII, shown on the right of the figure,
replicate the results of Morris and Peng, as shown
earlier in Figure 15.9. Despite the differing effects for
high and low identity integration, both groups scored
equally high on Berry’s measure of integration.
FIGURE 15.23 Attributions made by bicultural people high and low in
identity integration.
Note: BII denotes bicultural identity integration.
Source: Based on Benet-Martínez et al., 2002, with permission from SAGE
Publications.

Implications This study has two important

implications. Firstly, the concept of bicultural identity
integration can advance our understanding of the
processes of acculturation. Berry’s (1997) favoured
concept of the integration mode of acculturation is
broadly defined and can encompass quite different
types of person. Someone with low bicultural
integration is in some ways like a person who has a
kind of split personality. Whichever personal identity
they choose to express at a particular time, they place
themselves on the outside of the other identity. The
study by Benet-Martínez et al. supports the view that
low BII people feel the need to compensate for that
 ‘outsideness’. So, a low BII Chinese American
responds to a Chinese prime by emphasizing their
Americanness, and to an American prime by
emphasizing their Chineseness. A high BII person
does not feel the need to do this, and that facilitates
their relations with others. For instance, in later
studies by the same group, Mok, Morris, Benet-
Martínez, and (2007) have shown that
high BII Chinese Americans tend to have networks of
friends of varying ethnicity, many of whom also know
each other. Those with low BII have separate
networks of friends who do not know each other.
A second implication of this study is that it extends the potential of
experimental priming as a way of understanding cultural aspects of social
psychology. Bicultural people may have more ready access to alternate
identities than monocultural people, and this makes them distinctively useful
to researchers. Furthermore, the effects found from priming studies with
bicultural people may be parallel to those found when comparing mean
differences between monocultural groups. If the effects are found to be
parallel, then the prospects for establishing causal links between the various
factors involved in the creation and maintenance of cultures are bright.

CHAPTER SUMMARY
What is culture and why should we study it? A culture is a social system
that is characterized by the shared meanings that are attributed to people
and events by its members. Nations around the world have cultures that
are sufficiently different that social psychological studies may yield
different results in different locations.
What are cognitive styles and how are they related to culture? Analytic
cognitive styles are more prevalent within individualistic nations, while
holistic cognitive styles are more typical in collectivist cultures.
Environmental challenges and contemporary languages and norms serve
to create and sustain these differences.
Can the ways in which we think about ourselves explain cultural
variations in behaviour? Individual-level measures of independent and
interdependent self-construal provide a focused way of testing
explanations for the cultural differences in social behaviour that have
been found. We discussed the case of the student Wen Hua at the start of
this chapter. If we were to measure her self-construal and values, we
would probably find that she scores high on interdependence and
endorses embeddedness, hierarchy and mastery values.
How do people relate to people whom they meet, and form relationships
with them in different cultural contexts? Members of collectivist cultures
prioritize long-term ingroup relationships. They distinguish more sharply
the ways that they behave in different types of relationship than do
members of individualist cultures. In a collectivist culture, even intimate
relationships between individuals are construed in terms of their relevance
to group identities. Wen Hua finds it difficult to make new relationships
because she is no longer in touch with her ingroup.
How does collectivism affect group behaviours? In a collectivist culture,
identity is derived from group memberships. To sustain that group’s
harmony and integrity, Wen Hua will work hard, communicate indirectly,
respect status and conform more. In uncertain circumstances, Wen Hua
seeks guidance from the senior figure and shows respect by working hard
and not showing dissent.
How does collectivism affect relations with outgroups? In a collectivist
culture, group memberships are not open to change. An individual will
therefore seek to enhance the esteem of his or her group by finding ways
to compare it favourably with others. When interacting with people from
outgroups, they will defend themselves against any threat to their group’s
honour.
Will globalization mean the end of cultural differences? Greater
prosperity and mobility have induced a global trend toward post-modern
values, but differences between cultural groups are persisting. Migrant
acculturation and intermarriage are creating an increasing proportion of
bicultural people. Experimental priming of bicultural people provides a
way in which explanation of cultural differences can directly enrich the
validity of the findings of mainstream social psychology.
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING
Chiu, C.-Y., & Hong, Y.-Y. (2006). Social psychology of culture. New York:
Psychology Press. This text emphasizes studies that use experimental methods
and make comparisons between North Americans and East Asians.
Heine, S. J. (2008). Cultural psychology. New York: Norton. This recent text
also emphasizes comparisons between North America and East Asia.
Hofstede, G. H. (2001). Culture’s consequences: Comparing values, behaviors,
institutions and organizations across nations (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage. Detailed description of Hofstede’s pioneering project.
International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology (not dated). Online
readings in psychology and culture. Retrieved from
http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/orpc. Free access to 87 articles discussing all areas
of cross-cultural psychological research, with contributions from many of the
leading figures in the field.
Kitayama, S. & Cohen, D. (Eds.). (2007). Handbook of cultural psychology.
New York; Guilford. Interdisciplinary perspectives on the evolution of culture.
Smith, P. B., & Best, D. L. (Eds.). (2009). Cross-cultural psychology (four
volumes). London: Sage. Seventy-three of the most influential papers in the field
reprinted in full.
Smith, P. B., Bond, M. H., & , Ç. (2006). Understanding social
psychology across cultures: Living and working in a changing world. London:
Sage. This text develops much more fully the perspective taken in the present
chapter.
Ward, C. A., Bochner, S., & Furnham, A. (2001). The psychology of culture
shock. Hove, UK: Routledge. This is the leading textbook that addresses the
issues of migration, acculturation and intercultural contact.
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 Glossary accentuation effect when (social) categories are correlated with a
continuous dimension (e.g. skin colour, eye shape) there is a judgemental
tendency to overestimate similarities within, and differences between the
categories on this dimension.
accessibility the extent to which information is easily located and retrieved.
accountability a processing goal whereby perceivers believe they will have to
justify their responses to a third party and be held responsible for their
impressions; this typically leads to less stereotypical impressions.
acculturation the process whereby two cultural groups that come into contact
with one another cause changes in one or both parties.
acquiescent responding a tendency for a respondent to agree with all items on
scales measuring attitudes, beliefs or values, even those that contradict one
another.
actor–observer difference proposed general tendency for people to explain
their own behaviour in more situational terms, but other people’s behaviour in
more dispositional terms.
affective component of attitude the feelings or emotions associated with an
attitude object.
aggression any form of behaviour intended to harm or injure another living
being who is motivated to avoid such treatment.
Aggression Questionnaire (AQ) self-report instrument to measure stable
individual differences in trait aggressiveness.
aggressive cues situational cues with an aggressive meaning that increase the
accessibility of aggressive cognitions.
aggressive scripts cognitive representation of when and how to show aggressive
behaviour.
altruism refers to behaviour carried out to benefit others without anticipation of
external rewards; it is driven by exclusively empathic motivation.
analysis of non-common effects observers infer intentions behind actions by
comparing the consequences of the behavioural options that were open to the
actor and identifying distinctive outcomes.
anchoring/adjustment heuristic a cognitive heuristic that makes us place
weight upon initial standards/schemas (anchors) and as a result means we may
not always adjust sufficiently far from these anchors to provide accurate
judgements.
arousal: cost–reward model suggests that observing an emergency creates a
sense of arousal in the bystander, which becomes increasingly unpleasant.
Bystander responds by considering costs and rewards of helping or not helping.
attachment theory the theory that proposes that the development of secure
infant–caregiver attachment in childhood is the basis for the ability to maintain
stable and intimate relationships in adulthood.
attitude an overall evaluation of a stimulus object.
attitude functions the psychological needs fulfilled by an attitude.
attitude–behaviour relation the degree to which an attitude predicts behaviour.
attitudinal ambivalence a state that occurs when an individual both likes and
dislikes an attitude object.
attribution theories a group of theories about how individuals manage to infer
the ‘causes’ underlying the behaviour of others, or even their own behaviour.
attributional biases systematic distortions in the sampling or processing of
information about the causes of behaviour.
audience inhibition the experience of individual bystanders whose behaviour
can be seen by other bystanders. In an emergency bystanders may fear
embarrassment by their actions, resulting in lower likelihood of them helping.
augmenting principle the assumption that causal factors need to be stronger if
an inhibitory influence on an observed effect is present. The converse of the
discounting principle.
authoritarian personality a personality syndrome characterized by a simplistic
cognitive style, a rigid regard for social conventions and submission to authority
figures; such people are thought to be particularly prone to be prejudiced
towards minority groups and receptive to Fascist ideas.
autokinetic effect perceptual illusion, whereby, in the absence of reference
points, a stationary light appears to move.
automatic process a process that occurs without intention, effort or awareness
and does not interfere with other concurrent cognitive processes.
availability heuristic a cognitive shortcut that allows us to draw upon
information about how quickly information comes to mind about a particular
event, to deduce the frequency or likelihood of that event.
averaging perceivers compute the (weighted or unweighted) mean value of
pieces of information about a person; when other information is strongly
positive, additional mildly positive information yields a less positive impression.
back-translation translation of a research questionnaire that has already been
translated from one language to a second language back into the original
language by a translator who has not seen the original version.
balance theory a cognitive consistency theory that assumes that individuals
strive to maintain consistency or balance (objects or persons perceived as
belonging together are evaluated similarly) in their social perceptions.
base rate information information that gives us an idea about how frequent
certain categories are in the general population.
behavioural component of attitude past behaviours (also present and future
anticipated behaviours) associated with an attitude object.
Bennington study a longitudinal field study of social influence on a college
campus conducted by Newcomb. It maps out the way in which the political
attitudes of initially conservative female students changed over time towards the
liberal attitudes that were predominant on this college campus. Thus, it
illustrates how individual beliefs and attitudes can be shaped by the group
context.
better than average effect the finding that more than 50 per cent of participants
report themselves to be better than average on a variety of criteria.
bicultural identity seeing oneself as having simultaneous membership of two
culturally-distinct groups.
bicultural identity integration present when a person sees their alternate
identities as compatible with one another.
brainstorming a group technique aimed at enhancing creativity in groups by
means of the uninhibited generation of as many ideas as possible concerning a
specified topic.
bullying (also known as mobbing) denotes aggressive behaviour directed at
victims who cannot easily defend themselves, typically in schools and at the
workplace.
bystander effect refers to the phenomenon whereby the likelihood of any one
person helping in an emergency situation decreases as the number of other
bystanders increases.
categorization the tendency to group objects (including people) into discrete
groups based upon shared characteristics common to them.
catharsis release of aggressive tension through symbolic engagement in
aggressive behaviour.
causal attribution the process whereby social perceivers arrive at conclusions
about the causes of another person’s behaviour.
causal power an intrinsic property of an object or event that enables it to exert
influence on some other object or event.
causal schema knowledge structure shaping attributions. Causal schemas may
be either abstract representations of general causal principles (e.g. multiple
necessary and multiple sufficient causes schemas) or domain-specific ideas
about cause and effect.
central route to persuasion a person’s careful and thoughtful consideration of
the arguments presented in support of a position.
central trait a dispositional characteristic viewed by social perceivers as integral
to the organization of personality.
coefficient of relatedness (r) between two individuals can be calculated by
knowing how many steps removed individuals are from a common ancestor (e.g.
coefficients of relatedness between children–parents and grandchildren–
grandparents are .5 and .25, respectively).
cognitive algebra a proposed process for averaging or summing trait
information when forming impressions of other people.
cognitive component of attitude beliefs, thoughts and attributes associated with
an attitude object.
cognitive dissonance an aversive state which motivates individuals to reduce it.
cognitive dissonance theory assumes that dissonance is an aversive state which
motivates individuals to reduce it (e.g. by changing beliefs, attitudes or
behaviour, and searching for consonant, or avoiding dissonant, information).
cognitive miser a view of people as being often limited in processing capacity
and apt to take shortcuts where possible to make life simple.
cognitive neo-associationist model explains aggressive behaviour as the results
of negative affect that is subjected to cognitive processing and activates a
network of aggression-related thoughts and feelings.
cognitive response model assumes that attitude change is mediated by the
thoughts, or ‘cognitive responses’, which recipients generate as they receive and
reflect upon persuasive communications.
cognitive restriction a capability loss in group tasks that involve idea
generation, which occurs when an idea mentioned by another group member
makes people focus on the particular category this idea belongs to, at the
expense of generating ideas from other categories.
cognitive stimulation a capability gain in group tasks that involve idea
generation, which occurs when an idea mentioned by another group member
stimulates a cognitive category one would otherwise not have thought of.
cognitive style people with an analytic style focus on the main element within
information that they are processing; people with a holistic style focus on the
relations between the different elements in information that they are processing.
cohesion the force that binds members to the group.
collective violence instrumental use of violence by people who identify
themselves as members of a group against another group in order to achieve
political, economic or social objectives.
common ingroup identity model this model seeks to reduce bias between
groups by changing the nature of categorization from ingroups versus outgroups
to a single, more inclusive identity. The model harnesses the forces of ingroup
favouritism to reduce bias and promote helping.
communal relationship refers to an interpersonal association between
individuals who are more concerned with what their partner gets rather than
what they themselves receive, or relationships in which people’s primary
concern is being responsive to the other person’s needs.
companionate love refers to the feelings of intimacy and affection we feel for
another person when we care deeply for the person but do not necessarily
experience passion or arousal in his or her presence.
compliance a particular kind of response whereby the target of influence
acquiesces to a request from the source of influence. The term is also used, more
generally, to refer to change in public behaviour to match a norm, without
corresponding change on a private level.
confederate an accomplice or assistant of the experimenter who is ostensibly
another participant but who in fact plays a prescribed role in the experiment.
configural model a holistic approach to impression formation, implying that
social perceivers actively construct deeper meanings out of the bits of
information that they receive about other people.
Conflict Tactics Scales (CTS) instrument for measuring intimate partner
violence by collecting self-reports of perpetration and/or victimization.
conformity see majority influence.
consensus information evidence relating to how different actors behave
towards the same object.
consistency a behavioural style indicating that the same position is maintained
across time; seen as central to minority influence.
consistency information evidence relating to how an actor’s behaviour towards
an object varies across different situations and times.
consistency theories a group of theories (see balance theory, cognitive
dissonance theory) proposing that people prefer congruence or consistency
among their various cognitions, especially among their beliefs, values, and
attitudes.
construct an abstract theoretical concept (such as social influence).
construct validity the validity of the assumption that independent and
dependent variables adequately capture the abstract variables (constructs) they
are supposed to represent.
contact hypothesis intergroup contact will reduce prejudice if it (1) has
acquaintance potential; (2) takes place under conditions of equal status; (3)
involves cooperation towards a common goal; and (4) takes place in a supportive
normative climate.
contingency approaches emphasize situational factors in the study of leadership
(e.g. task or follower characteristics) and how these moderate the relationship
between leader traits or leadership behaviours and leadership effectiveness.
continuum model of impression formation views impression formation as a
process going from category-based evaluations at one end of the continuum to
individuated responses at the other, dependent on the interplay of motivational
and attentional factors.
control group a group of participants who are typically not exposed to the
independent variable(s) used in experimental research.
controlled process a process that is intentional, under the individual’s volitional
control, effortful and entailing conscious awareness.
convergent validity established by showing that different measures of the same
construct (e.g. self-report, implicit, observation) are significantly associated with
each other.
conversion a change in private response after exposure to influence by others;
internalized change; a change in the way one structures an aspect of reality.
coordination losses describe the diminished performance of a group if it fails to
coordinate the contributions of its individual members in an optimal manner.
correspondence bias the proposed tendency to infer a personal disposition
corresponding to observed behaviour even when the behaviour was determined
by the situation.
correspondent inference theory proposes that observers infer correspondent
intentions and dispositions for observed intentional behaviour under certain
circumstances.
counterattitudinal behaviour behaviour (usually induced by monetary
incentives or threats) which is inconsistent with the actor’s attitude or beliefs.
covariation theory proposes that observers work out the causes of behaviour by
collecting data about comparison cases. Causality is attributed to the person,
entity or situation depending on which of these factors covaries with the
observed effect.
cover story a false but supposedly plausible explanation of the purpose of an
experiment; the intention is to limit the operation of demand characteristics.
crisis in social psychology a crisis of confidence among social psychologists
that started in the late 1960s and was overcome in subsequent decades. During
the crisis years, social psychologists questioned the values, the methods and the
scientific status of their discipline.
cross-cultural replication a test of whether the results of a study are the same if
it is repeated as exactly as possible in another cultural context.
cultural masculinity–femininity the extent to which gender roles in a nation are
seen as differentiated (masculinity) or similar (femininity).
culture a social system that is characterized by the shared meanings that are
attributed to people and events by its members.
cyberbullying involves the use of modern technology, such as computers,
mobile phones or other electronic devices to inflict intentional harm on others.
debriefing the practice of explaining to participants the purpose of the
experiment in which they have just participated, and answering any questions the
participants may have.
decategorization recommends reducing the salience of intergroup boundaries
through highly personalized contact; attention to idiosyncratic rather than
category-based information about outgroup members should, over time, reduce
the usefulness of the category, resulting in generalized prejudice reduction.
deindividuation a state in which individuals are deprived of their sense of
individual identity, and are more likely to behave in an extreme manner, often
antisocially and violating norms.
demand characteristics cues that are perceived as telling participants how they
are expected to behave or respond in a research setting; that is, cues that
‘demand’ a certain sort of response.
dependent variable the variable that is expected to change as a function of
changes in the independent variable. Measured changes in the dependent
variable are seen as ‘dependent on’ manipulated changes in the independent
variable.
depressive realism the idea that depressed people’s interpretations of reality are
more accurate than those of non-depressed people.
derogation of alternatives the tendency of romantically involved individuals, as
compared to singles, to give lower attractiveness ratings to attractive opposite-
sex others.
desired selves in contrast to our actual self (i.e. who we believe we are) our
desired selves contain our potential (possible selves), as well as the wishes and
aspirations (ideal self), and the duties and obligations (ought self) that we, or
significant others, hold for us.
diffusion of responsibility the process by which responsibility is divided
between the number of bystanders present; as more people are present in an
emergency, responsibility is diffused between them and each individual
bystander feels increasingly less responsible than if they were alone.
direct reinforcement experience of positive consequences of aggressive
behaviour (e.g. status gain among peers) that increases the probability of future
aggressive acts.
disclosure reciprocity people tend to match each other’s level of self-
disclosure.
discounting principle the presence of a causal factor working towards an
observed effect implies that other potential factors are less influential. The
converse of the augmenting principle.
discourse analysis a family of methods for analysing talk and texts, with the
goal of revealing how people make sense of their everyday worlds.
dispensability effect a reduction in group members’ task-related effort because
their individual contribution seems to have little impact on group performance.
displaced aggression tendency to respond to frustration with an aggressive
response directed not at the original source of the frustration but at an unrelated,
more easily accessible target.
display rules cultural understandings as to whether emotions should be
expressed openly.
dissociation model a model that proposes that two different processes can occur
independently, and that one does not inevitably follow from the other (e.g.
Devine’s theoretical model that proposes a dissociation between automatic and
controlled processes in stereotyping).
distinctiveness information evidence relating to how an actor responds to
different objects (or ‘entities’) under similar circumstances.
distraction while listening to a persuasive communication, individuals are
distracted by having to perform an irrelevant activity or by experiencing sensory
stimulation irrelevant to the message.
door-in-the-face technique compliance technique in which the requester begins
with an extreme request that is almost always refused, then retreats to a more
moderate request, which he or she had in mind all along (also known as a
‘reciprocal concessions’ procedure).
dual-process theories of persuasion theories of persuasion postulating two
modes of information processing, systematic and non-systematic. Modes differ
in the extent to which individuals engage in content-relevant thoughts and
critical evaluation of the arguments contained in a message.
eco-cultural theory a theory that proposes that different forms of culture have
arisen as adaptations to differing environmental challenges to survival.
ego depletion a temporary reduction of one’s self-regulatory capacities due to
restricted energy resources after sustained self-control efforts.
ego-defensive function when attitudes help to protect our self-esteem.
elaboration refers to the extent to which a person thinks about the issue-relevant
arguments contained in a message.
elaboration likelihood model (ELM) attitude change to persuasive
communications is mediated by either central or peripheral processing;
elaboration denotes the extent to which a person thinks about the issue-relevant
arguments contained in a message.
embeddedness versus autonomy values characteristic of a culture in which
relations with one’s long-term membership groups are prioritized, rather than
emotional and intellectual separateness from others.
emotional contagion the transfer of moods and emotions among people in a
group.
empathic concern an emotional state consisting of emotions such as
compassion, warmth and concern for another person.
empathy the experience of understanding or sharing the emotional state of
another person.
encoding the way in which we translate what we see into a digestible format to
be stored in the mind.
entitativity the degree to which a collection of people is perceived as being
bonded together in a coherent unit.
equity theory a theory that seeks to explain relationship satisfaction in terms of
perceptions of fair versus unfair distributions of resources within interpersonal
relationships.
ethnocentrism the tendency to judge ingroup attributes as superior to those of
the outgroup and, more generally, to judge outgroups from an ingroup
perspective.
eureka effect describes the situation when the correct solution to a problem,
once it is found, is immediately recognized as being correct by group members.
European Association of Social Psychology an association formed by
European researchers in 1966 to further social psychology in Europe (originally
named the European Association of Experimental Social Psychology).
evaluation apprehension a learned response to the presence of others when
performing a task, whereby the performer experiences arousal when anticipating
evaluation by these others (can affect social facilitation, and also helping
behaviour; see Chapter 10).
evaluative conditioning changes the liking for a stimulus by repeatedly pairing
it with another more polarized positive or negative stimulus.
evolutionary psychology an approach that explains human behaviour and
preferences based on their ‘reproductive value’; that is, their value in producing
offspring.
exchange relationship refers to an interpersonal association between individuals
who are concerned with what their partner gets and what they themselves receive
to ensure equitable benefits.
excitation transfer theory transfer of neutral physiological arousal onto arousal
resulting from frustration, thus augmenting negative affect and enhancing the
strength of an aggressive response.
expectation states theory argues that status differences within a group result
from different expectations that group members have about each other.
experiment a method in which the researcher deliberately introduces some
change into a setting to examine the consequences of that change.
experimental confound when an independent variable incorporates two or more
potentially separable components it is a confounded variable. When an
independent variable is confounded, the researcher’s ability to draw causal
inferences is seriously compromised.
experimental group a group of participants allocated to the ‘experimental’
condition of the experiment; that is, the condition in which participants are
exposed to that level of the independent variable that is predicted to influence
their thoughts, feelings or behaviour.
experimental scenario the ‘package’ within which an experiment is presented
to participants: in field experiments it is, ideally, something that happens
naturally; in laboratory experiments it is important to devise a scenario that
strikes the participant as realistic and involving.
experimenter expectancy effects effects produced unintentionally by the
experimenter that increase the likelihood that participants will confirm the
experimenter’s hypothesis.
explicit measures of attitude measures that directly ask respondents to think
about and report an attitude.
extended contact hypothesis mere knowledge that an ingroup member has a
close relationship with an outgroup member can improve outgroup attitudes.
external validity refers to the generalizability of research findings to settings
and populations other than those involved in the research.
factorial experiment an experiment in which two or more independent variables
are manipulated within the same design.
false consensus bias the assumption that other people generally share one’s own
personal attitudes and opinions.
field experiment a true randomized experiment conducted in a natural setting.
field theory a framework adopted by Kurt Lewin which represented the
individual as an element in a larger system of social forces.
foot-in-the-door technique compliance technique in which the requester first
asks for a small favour that is almost certain to be granted, then follows this up
with a request for a larger, related favour.
forgiveness forgiveness is defined as a prosocial motivational change toward the
offender, despite the offender’s hurtful behaviour.
frustration–aggression hypothesis assumes that frustration – that is, blockage
of a goal-directed activity – increases the likelihood of aggressive behaviour.
general aggression model (GAM) integrative framework explaining how
personal and situational input variables lead to aggressive behaviour via
cognitive appraisal and negative affective arousal.
geographic regions approach method for testing the heat hypothesis by
comparing violence rates in cooler and hotter climates.
goal a positively valued behavioural end-state that encompasses the purposeful
drive/motivation to engage in a behaviour/action/judgement.
goal dependent where an outcome is conditional upon a specific goal being in
place (e.g. goal-dependent automatic stereotype activation).
group a group exists when two or more individuals define themselves as
members of a group.
group commitment a psychological bond of a group member with the group
and its goals including the desire to maintain group membership.
group composition specifies how certain characteristics are distributed within a
group.
group emotions emotions experienced as members of social groups rather than
as individuals, reflecting appraisals of events in terms of group level concerns
and coping resources.
group identification the degree to which people see themselves in terms of a
group membership (group-level self-definition) and the degree of value and
emotional attachment to the group (group-level self-investment).
group leadership influencing, motivating or enabling (oneself and) others to
contribute towards the effectiveness and viability of work groups.
group learning a generic term for several learning processes that can only occur
if several people work interactively on the same task.
group performance management the sum of activities aimed at maximizing (or
improving) the group-specific component of group performance.
group polarization tendency to make decisions that are more extreme than the
average of group members’ initial positions, in the direction already favoured by
the group.
group socialization the efforts of the group to assimilate new members to
existing group norms and practices.
group synchronization the sum of activities aimed at optimizing the
collaborative generation, modification and integration of individual contributions
in a group.
group task types group tasks are distinguished depending on whether the task is
divisible between group members, whether the quality or quantity of the output
is relevant, and how individual contributions are related to the group’s
performance.
groupthink a syndrome of poor group decision-making in which members of a
cohesive ingroup strive for unanimity at the expense of a realistic appraisal of
alternative courses of action.
group-to-group transfer a group learning process whereby a particular group’s
capability to perform a group task improves as result of social interaction
between its group members during repeated collective task performance.
group-to-individual transfer a group learning process whereby a group
member’s ability to perform a task alone improves as a result of social
interaction between group members during repeated collective task performance.
group-to-individual-in-group transfer a group learning process whereby a
group member’s ability to perform a task within groups improves as a result of
social interaction between group members during repeated collective task
performance.
habituation process whereby the ability of a stimulus to elicit arousal becomes
weaker with each consecutive presentation.
heat hypothesis hypothesis that aggression increases with higher temperatures.
helping behaviour actions that are intended to provide some benefit to or
improve the well-being of others.
heuristic a well-used, non-optimal rule of thumb used to arrive at a judgement
that is effective in many but not all cases; stereotypes are often said to function
as heuristics.
heuristic processing assessing the validity of a communication through reliance
on heuristics; that is, simple rules like ‘statistics don’t lie’, ‘experts can be
trusted’, ‘consensus implies correctness’, rather than through evaluation of
arguments.
heuristic–systematic model (HSM) attitude change to persuasive
communications is mediated by heuristic and/or systematic processing: when
motivation and ability are high, systematic processing is likely; when they are
low, individuals rely on heuristic cues.
hidden profile a group decision situation in which information is distributed
among group members such that no individual group member can detect the best
solution based on his or her own information.
hierarchy versus egalitarianism values characteristic of a culture in which
inequality is accepted and deference is given to one’s seniors, rather than
granting equality to all people.
hormones higher levels of testosterone and lower levels of cortisol have been
linked to aggression, but they need to be considered in combination with
environmental influences.
hostile aggression aggressive behaviour motivated by the desire to express
anger and hostile feelings.
hostile attribution bias tendency to attribute hostile intentions to a person who
has caused damage when it is unclear whether or not the damage was caused
accidentally or on purpose.
hypothesis a prediction derived from a theory concerning the relationship
between variables.
identity negotiation a process by which we establish who we are through
mutual give-and-take interactions with others.
illusory correlation effect the tendency to perceive a relationship that does not
actually exist, or to perceive one that does exist as stronger than it actually is; in
group terms the erroneous tendency to associate one group more with one
stereotypic or evaluative dimension than another.
implementation intentions ‘if–then’ plans that specify a behaviour that one will
need to perform in order to achieve a goal, and the context in which the
behaviour will occur.
implicit egotism nonconscious or automatic positive evaluation of self-
associated objects.
implicit goal operation the process whereby a goal that enables people to
regulate responses (e.g. to overcome stereotyping) is engaged without conscious
awareness.
implicit measures measures of constructs such as attitudes and stereotypes that
are derived from the way respondents behave (such as how long they take to
make a decision or to answer a question) rather than from the content of their
answers to explicit questions about these constructs. They are a class of
unobtrusive measures.
implicit measures of attitude measures that assess spontaneous evaluative
associations with an object, without relying on a verbal report.
implicit personality theory an integrated set of ideas held by a social perceiver
about how different traits tend to be organized within a person.
implicit self-esteem the positivity of a person’s automatic or nonconscious
evaluation of him-or herself.
impulsive helping immediate, non-deliberative form of helping that does not
appear to involve a conscious decision-making process, and in which the helper
does not attend to the presence of other bystanders.
independent variable the variable that an experimenter manipulates or modifies
in order to examine the effect on one or more dependent variables.
independent versus interdependent self while the independent self emphasizes
autonomy and individualism and defines the self via internal attributes like traits,
an interdependent self stresses the connection to others and defines the self in
terms of relationships with others.
individual capability gains and losses improvements or impairments in
individual group members’ ability to successfully perform a task due to social
interaction within the group.
individualism–collectivism individualist nations are those in which people
describe themselves in ways that emphasize their autonomy from others;
collectivist nations are those in which people describe themselves in ways that
emphasize their links with others.
individual-to-individual transfer individual learning processes whereby a
group member’s ability to perform a task on their own improves as a result of
repeated individual task performance.
individuating information information about a person’s personal characteristics
(not normally derived from a particular category membership).
informational influence influence based on accepting the information obtained
from others as evidence about reality.
ingroup bias behaviours or evaluations that favour the ingroup over the
outgroup; ingroup favouritism treats the ingroup more positively, outgroup
derogation treats the outgroup less positively (e.g. in giving fewer rewards) or
more negatively (e.g. in giving punishments).
ingroup reappraisal realization that ingroup norms, customs and lifestyles are
not inherently superior to those of outgroups; this process is implicated in the
generalization of positive contact effects to other outgroups.
initiation the role transition of entry into a group, often accompanied by some
ritual.
innovation see minority influence.
instrumental aggression aggressive behaviour performed to reach a particular
goal, as a means to an end.
interaction effect a term used when the combination of two (or more)
independent variables in a factorial experiment yields an effect that differs from
the sum of the main effects.
intergroup aggression aggressive encounters between groups or aggression
based on group membership rather than individual characteristics, such as
football hooliganism.
intergroup anxiety a negative affective state experienced when anticipating
future, or experiencing actual, contact with an outgroup member, stemming from
the expectation of negative consequences for oneself during intergroup
interactions.
internal validity refers to the validity of the inference that changes in the
independent variable result in changes in the dependent variable.
Internet experiment an experiment that is accessed via the Internet; participants
access the experiment via the web, receive instructions and questions on their
computer screen and provide responses via their keyboard or touch screen.
interpersonal aggression aggressive behaviour between individuals rather than
groups.
interpersonal cohesion cohesion based on liking of the group and its members.
intimate partner violence perpetration or threat of an act of physical violence
within the context of a dating or marital relationship.
intrinsic motivation behaviour is said to be intrinsically motivated if people
perform it because they enjoy it. This enjoyment is sufficient to produce the
behaviour and no external reward is required. In fact, external rewards (e.g.
financial contributions) are likely to reduce intrinsic motivation.
introspection the process by which one observes and examines one’s internal
states (mental and emotional) for behaving in a certain way.
investments the level of resources (time, emotional involvement, money, self-
disclosure and so on) put into a relationship, which increases the costs of
withdrawing from the relationship.
jigsaw classroom a cooperative teaching method designed to reduce prejudice in
diverse classrooms.
kin selection (also known as inclusive fitness theory) proposes that we have
evolved to favour people who are genetically related to us, and are more likely to
help close relatives (kin) than strangers.
Köhler effect a motivation gain in groups which involves weaker group
members working harder than they would do individually in order to avoid being
responsible for a weak group performance.
laboratory experiment a study, conducted in the laboratory, in which the
researcher deliberately introduces some change into a setting, while holding all
other factors constant, to examine the consequences of that change.
laissez-faire leaders leaders who engage in ‘non-leadership’; that is, avoid
making decisions, hesitate in taking action and are often absent when needed.
leader traits relatively stable personal characteristics (e.g. personality,
intelligence, motivational dispositions) which are thought to predict leader
emergence and leadership effectiveness.
leaderless groups groups with no appointed leader but which display effective
leadership behaviours which are infused by the group members themselves
(shared leadership) and/or by agents external to the group.
leadership behaviour observable acts that are meant to influence, motivate or
enable others to contribute towards the effectiveness of a work unit or
organization.
leadership effectiveness the impact of leadership on the accomplishment of
group and organizational objectives, on the behaviour, perceptions, attitudes,
values, motivation or well-being of followers and peers, and on the
accomplishments of those who lead.
leadership (in organizations) influencing, motivating or enabling others to
contribute towards the effectiveness of work units and organizations.
leadership style a pattern of leadership behaviour which is repeatedly shown
and evident across a variety of situations.
learned helplessness theory the proposal that depression results from learning
that outcomes are not contingent on one’s behaviour.
lexical decision task a cognitive measure of how quickly people classify stimuli
as real words or nonsense words that enables researchers to assess if some
categories of words are made more accessible as a result of an experimental
manipulation/processing goal. Quicker responses to certain word categories
indicate increased accessibility.
lowballing technique compliance to an initial attempt is followed by a more
costly and less beneficial version of the same request.
main effect a term used to refer to the separate effects of each independent
variable in a factorial experiment.
majority influence (conformity) social influence resulting from exposure to the
opinions of a majority, or the majority of one’s group.
manipulation check a measure of the effectiveness of the independent variable.
mastery versus harmony values characteristic of a culture in which
achievement is sought and esteemed, rather than harmony with nature.
media violence–aggression link hypothesis that exposure to violent media
contents makes media users more aggressive.
mediating variable a variable that mediates the relation between two other
variables. Assume that independent variable X and dependent variable O are
related. If a third variable Z is related to both X and O, and if the X–O relation
disappears when we take the role of Z into account, then Z is said to mediate the
relation between X and O.
mere exposure effect increase in liking for an object as a result of being
repeatedly exposed to it.
meta-analysis a set of techniques for statistically integrating the results of
independent studies of a given phenomenon, with a view to establishing whether
the findings exhibit a pattern of relationships that is reliable across studies.
methodological individualism the assumption that collective action must be
explained by showing how it results from individual decisions and behaviour;
collective behaviour is seen as essentially behaviour of the individuals who form
the collective.
minimal group paradigm a set of experimental procedures designed to create
groups based on essentially arbitrary criteria (with no interaction within or
between them, and with no knowledge of who else belongs to each group) whose
members show intergroup discrimination.
minority influence (innovation) situation in which either an individual or a
group in a numerical minority can influence the majority.
misattribution of arousal people mistakenly attribute part of their arousal to an
external stimulus that is not the actual cause of their arousal.
MODE model a model of attitude–behaviour relations in which motivation and
opportunity are necessary to make a deliberative consideration of available
information, modelling learning by imitation, observing a model being rewarded
or punished for his or her behaviour.
motivation losses and gains decreases or increases in group members’
motivation to contribute to group task performance.
multicomponent model of attitude a model of attitude that conceptualizes
attitudes as summary evaluations that have cognitive, affective and behavioural
antecedents.
mutual differentiation (or categorization approach to improving intergroup
relations) recommends making group affiliations salient during contact to
address negative intergroup relations directly and to foster generalization from
the contact experience to the outgroup as a whole; members of the respective
groups should have distinct but complementary roles.
naïve scientist model a metaphor for how social information is processed that
likens social perceivers to academic researchers who formulate theories and use
data to test hypotheses in order to predict and control behaviour.
nation-level factor analysis an analysis across many nations of data in which
the mean response for each survey item for each nation is treated as the unit of
analysis.
need for cognition an individual difference variable which differentiates people
according to the extent to which they enjoy thinking about arguments contained
in a communication.
need for cognitive closure refers to the desire of individuals for a definite
answer to a question – any answer, as opposed to uncertainty; the need reflects
an individual difference variable, but can also be situationally induced.
need to belong the intrinsic motivation to affiliate with others and be socially
accepted.
negative interdependence a situation in which bonds between individuals or
groups are characterized by conflicts of interests, often leading to antagonism or
realistic conflict.
negative-state-relief model this model argues that human beings have an innate
drive to reduce their own negative moods; helping behaviour can elevate mood –
thus in this model people help for egoistic rather than altruistic reasons.
nominal group a number of individuals who perform a task individually and
work independently of each other; nominal groups are used to determine the
potential performance of groups.
normative influence influence based on conforming to the positive expectations
of others: people avoid behaving in ways that will lead to social punishment or
disapproval.
norms belief systems about how (not) to behave, that guide behaviour but
without the force of laws, and reflect group members’ shared expectations about
typical or desirable activities.
obedience to authority complying with orders from a person of higher social
status within a defined hierarchy or chain of command.
object appraisal function when attitudes help serve as an energy-saving device.
one-dimensional perspective on attitudes a perspective that perceives positive
and negative elements as stored along a single dimension.
one-shot case study a research design in which observations are made on a
group after some event has occurred or some manipulation has been introduced.
operationalization the way in which a theoretical construct is turned into a
measurable dependent variable or a manipulable independent variable in a
particular study.
outcome dependency a motivational objective in which participants believe
they will later meet a target and work together on a jointly judged task; shown to
lead to less stereotypical target impressions.
outgroup bias a tendency to favour the outgroup over the ingroup in terms of
evaluations or reward allocations.
outgroup homogeneity effect a tendency to see the outgroup as more
homogeneous than the ingroup.
over-justification effect providing external rewards for performance of a task,
which individuals previously performed because they found it enjoyable, reduces
individuals’ liking for, and enjoyment of, the task.
participant a person who takes part in a psychological study.
participant observation a method of observation in which the researcher
studies the target group or community from within, making careful records of
what he or she observes.
passionate love a state of intense longing for union with another individual,
usually characterized by intrusive thinking and preoccupation with the partner,
idealization of the other and the desire to know the other as well as the desire to
be known by the other.
peer nominations method for measuring (aggressive) behaviour by asking other
people (e.g. classmates) to rate the aggressiveness of an individual.
perceived behavioural control the notion that behavioural prediction is affected
by whether people believe that they can perform the relevant behaviour.
perceived partner responsiveness the perception that a relationship partner is
responsive to our needs.
peripheral route to persuasion subsumes those persuasion processes that are
not based on issue-relevant thinking (e.g. evaluative conditioning, heuristic
processing).
peripheral trait a trait whose perceived presence does not significantly change
the overall interpretation of a person’s personality.
physical aggression behaviour that is intended to inflict physical harm on the
target person.
pluralistic ignorance emergency bystanders look to others in reacting to the
event; as each person fails to react, they look at non-reacting bystanders, and
interpret the event as not requiring a response.
positive differentiation involves making the group positively different from a
comparison outgroup on available dimensions of comparison (e.g. by means of
more positive evaluations or reward allocations) (see also ingroup bias).
positive interdependence a situation in which there are positive bonds between
individuals or groups characterized by cooperation, reciprocity and mutual
benefits.
positive–negative asymmetry evidence that people show more ingroup bias
when distributing positive rewards than punishment or penalties.
post-experimental enquiry a technique advocated by Orne (1962) for detecting
the operation of demand characteristics. The participant is carefully interviewed
after participation in an experiment, the object being to assess perceptions of the
purpose of the experiment.
post-test only control group design an experimental design in which
participants are randomly allocated to one of two groups; one group is exposed
to the independent variable, another (the control group) is not.
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) characteristic patterns of symptoms
observed in survivors of traumatic experiences such as rape.
potential group performance (group potential) the performance that would
have occurred if the members of a group had worked independently of each
other and not as a group; a common benchmark to evaluate actual group
performance.
power distance the extent to which hierarchy and deference are accepted within
a nation.
prejudice an attitude or orientation towards a group (or its members) that
devalues it directly or indirectly, often to the benefit of the self or own group.
primacy effect the tendency for earlier information to be more influential in
social perception and interpretation.
priming activating one stimulus (e.g. bird) facilitates the subsequent processing
of another related stimulus (e.g. wing, feather).
principle–implementation gap acceptance of racial equality in principle is
accompanied by resistance to specific policies that would bring about such racial
equality.
probabilistic contrast comparison of the frequency of an effect in the presence
of a potential cause with its frequency in the absence of that cause.
probe reaction task a simple reaction time task that assesses residual attentional
capacity, that is, the amount of attention that is left over from performing the
primary task. This task does not take away attention from the primary task (it is
not a resource depleting task).
production blocking a process loss typical of brainstorming tasks in face-to-
face groups; since in a group only one person can speak at a time, the other
group members cannot express their own ideas at the same time.
proportion of shared genes refers to the amount of genetic material shared by
humans (and animals); humans have an almost identical proportion of shared
genes with any randomly selected other human being.
prosocial behaviour refers to behaviour defined by society as beneficial to other
people; it excludes behaviour that is motivated by professional obligations, and
may be driven by more selfish (egoistic) and/or more selfless (altruistic)
motivations.
prosocial personality an enduring tendency to think about the rights and
welfare of others, to feel concern and empathy, and to act in a way that benefits
them.
public goods game participants are allocated tokens, and can then (secretly)
decide how many to keep and how many to contribute to a public pot;
contributing nothing is termed free riding.
quasi-experiment an experiment in which participants are not randomly
allocated to the different experimental conditions (typically because of factors
beyond the control of the researcher).
quota sample a sample that fills certain prespecified quotas and thereby reflects
certain attributes of the population (such as age and sex) that are thought to be
important to the issue being researched.
random allocation (sometimes called random assignment) the process of
allocating participants to groups (or conditions) in such a way that each
participant has an equal chance of being assigned to each group.
reactance theory reactance is an aversive state caused by restriction of an
individual’s freedom of choice over important behavioural outcomes. Reactance
is assumed to motivate the individual to re-establish the restricted freedom.
reactivity a measurement procedure is reactive if it alters the nature of what is
being measured (i.e. if the behaviour observed or the verbal response recorded is
partly or wholly determined by the participant’s awareness that some aspect of
his or her behaviour is being measured).
realistic conflict theory a theory developed by Sherif that holds that conflict
and competition between groups over valued resources can create intergroup
hostility and prejudice.
rebound effect where suppression attempts fail; used here to demonstrate how a
suppressed stereotype returns to have an even greater impact upon one’s
judgements about a person from a stereotyped group.
recategorization recommends replacing salient ingroup–outgroup distinctions at
a subordinate level with a common ingroup identity at a superordinate level that
includes both former ingroup and outgroup members.
reciprocal altruism a theory designed to explain altruism towards strangers by
proposing that helping non-kin may have evolved if the cost of helping another
is offset by the likelihood of the return benefit.
referent informational influence individuals identify with a particular group
and conform to a prototypical group position.
reflected appraisals inferences regarding others’ appraisals of us that we gain
by observing other peoples’ reactions towards us.
relational aggression behaviour that is intended to harm the target person
through damaging his or her social relationships, for example negative
comments behind the person’s back.
relationship commitment an individual’s intent to maintain the relationship and
to remain psychologically attached to it.
relationship superiority the tendency of romantically involved individuals to
perceive their own relationship as better than the average relationship.
relative deprivation a resentful feeling that the self or ingroup is worse off than
the other or outgroup.
reliability the degree to which a measure is free from measurement error; a
measure is reliable if it yields the same result on more than one occasion or
when used by different individuals.
representativeness heuristic a mental shortcut whereby instances are assigned
to categories on the basis of how similar they are to the category in general.
Ringelmann effect describes the finding that in physical tasks such as weight
pulling, the average performance of individual group members decreases with
increasing group size.
role the behaviours expected of a person with a specific position in the group.
role transition a change in the relation between a group member and a group.
salience attention-grabbing property of objects or events depending on
perceptual features such as vividness, perceiver sensitivity or some combination
of the two.
sampling the process of selecting a subset of members of a population with a
view to describing the population from which they are taken.
scapegoat theory a theory that holds that prejudice is due to aggression that is
displaced towards members of an outgroup (scapegoats), because the group or
set of circumstances that was the source of frustration is not within reach.
schema a cognitive structure or mental representation comprising pre-digested
information or knowledge about objects or people from specific categories, our
expectancies about objects or groups, and what defines them.
self-assessment motive striving to reach an accurate and objective
understanding of the self.
self-awareness a psychological state in which one’s attention is directed at the
self.
self-categorization theory theory explaining how the process of categorizing
oneself as a group member forms social identity and brings about various forms
of both group (e.g. group polarization, majority–minority influence) and
intergroup (e.g. intergroup discrimination) behaviours.
self-concept the cognitive representation of our self-knowledge consisting of a
sum total of all beliefs we have about ourselves. It gives coherence and meaning
to one’s experience, including one’s relations to other people.
self-construals a person’s views and knowledge about him-or herself is shaped
through an active construal process that plays out in interaction with the social
environment. This process is motivated by how one would like to see oneself.
self-determination theory a motivational theory that accounts for people’s
reasons for self-regulation: if self-regulation is motivated by external pressure it
is effortful and can lead to psychological conflict. However, if self-regulation is
freely chosen it is much more efficient without being depleting.
self-disclosure verbally revealing information about oneself to another person.
self-efficacy beliefs about one’s ability to carry out certain actions required to
attain a specific goal (e.g. that one is capable of following a diet, or to help
someone).
self-enhancement the motivation to enhance the positivity of our self-
conceptions, often over what would be objectively warranted. This is achieved
by way of a variety of different strategies (e.g. self-serving attributions, basking
in reflected glory, positive self-presentations).
self-esteem the overall evaluation that we have of ourselves along a positive–
negative dimension.
self-esteem hypothesis the prediction that ingroup bias will lead to an increase
in group level self-esteem or satisfaction.
self-fulfilling prophecy when an originally false expectation leads to its own
confirmation. The social perceiver’s initially incorrect beliefs about a target
cause that target to act in ways that objectively confirm those beliefs.
self-handicapping the tendency to engage in self-defeating behaviours in order
to provide a subsequent excuse for failure and augment ability attributions in the
case of success.
self-monitoring an individual difference variable measuring the extent to which
people vary their behaviour across social situations (low self-monitors) versus
behaving consistently (high self-monitors).
self-perception theory the theory assumes that when inner states are
ambiguous, people can infer these states by observing their own behaviour.
self-presentation a range of strategies that we adopt in order to shape what
others think of us.
self-reference effect the tendency to process and remember self-related
information better than other information.
self-regulation the process of controlling and directing one’s behaviour in order
to achieve desired thoughts, feelings, and goals.
self-schemas mental structures that help us organize and guide the processing of
self-related information.
self-serving attributional biases motivated distortions of attribution that
function to maintain or increase self-esteem.
self-verification motivation to affirm firmly held self-beliefs, arising from a
desire for stable and coherent self-views.
self-worth contingencies domains – both internal (e.g. virtue) and external (e.g.
power) – on which we stake our self-worth.
sexual aggression forcing another person into sexual activities through a range
of coercive strategies, such as threat or use of physical force, exploitation of the
victim’s inability to resist, or verbal pressure.
shared or team leadership responsibility for leadership functions, the exercise
of leadership behaviour and perceptions about leadership roles are shared among
group members (sometimes including agents external to the team).
similarity–attraction effect we like others who are similar to us; others who are
like us.
simple random sample a sample in which each member of the population has
an equal chance of being selected and in which the selection of every possible
combination of the desired number of members is equally likely.
social adjustment function when attitudes help us identify with liked others.
social cognition a large topic within social psychology concerned with
understanding how we think about ourselves and other people and how the
processes involved impact upon our judgements and behaviour in social
contexts.
social comparison a process of comparing oneself with others in order to
evaluate one’s own abilities and opinions.
social compensation a motivation gain in groups that occurs if stronger group
members increase their effort in order to compensate for weaker members’
suboptimal performance.
social competition a motivation gain in groups that occurs if the group members
want to outperform each other during group tasks in which the individual
contributions are identifiable.
social desirability refers to the fact that research participants are likely to want
to be seen in a positive light and may therefore adjust their responses or
behaviour in order to avoid being negatively evaluated.
social dominance orientation an individual difference variable that captures a
desire for hierarchical group relations.
social facilitation an improvement in the performance of well-learned/easy tasks
and a worsening of performance of poorly-learned/difficult tasks due to the
presence of members of the same species.
social identity that part of our self-concept corresponding to group
memberships, and the value and emotional significance attached to these
memberships.
social influence change of attitudes, beliefs, opinions, values, and behaviour, as
a result of being exposed to other individuals’ attitudes, beliefs, opinions, values,
and behaviour.
social loafing a motivation loss in groups that occurs when group members
reduce their effort due to the fact that individual contributions to group
performance are not identifiable.
social neuroscience an interdisciplinary field devoted to understanding how
biological systems implement social processes and behaviour.
social perception the process of collecting and interpreting information about
another person’s individual characteristics.
social reality constraints evidence that the outgroup is clearly better on a
certain dimension can make ingroup bias on that dimension difficult to justify.
social support a partner’s responsiveness to another’s needs.
socio-emotional behaviours behaviours during group interactions that are
directed at interpersonal relations.
sociometer theory a theory that posits that our self-esteem functions as a signal
of the degree to which we feel accepted or rejected by other people.
speaking hierarchy hierarchy within a group based on who talks most.
staffing level the degree to which the actual number of group members is similar
to the ideal number of group members.
staircase model describes the pathway to terrorism as a succession of steps
explaining why out of large numbers of disaffected people in a society only very
few end up committing terrorist acts.
status evaluation of a role by the group in which a role is contained or defined.
steam boiler model part of Konrad Lorenz’s theory of aggression, assuming that
aggressive energy is produced continuously within the organism and will burst
out spontaneously unless released by an external stimulus.
stereotype a cognitive structure that contains our knowledge, beliefs and
expectancies about some human social group.
stereotype suppression the act of trying to prevent an activated stereotype from
impacting upon one’s judgements about a person from a stereotyped group.
strong reciprocity a human predisposition to cooperate with others and to
punish those who defect, even when this behaviour cannot be justified in terms
of self-interest, extended kinship or reciprocal altruism.
subliminal advertising advertising slogans that are presented so briefly (or
faintly) that they are below the threshold of awareness.
sucker effect a motivation loss in groups that occurs when group members
perceive or anticipate that other group members will lower their effort: to avoid
being exploited, they reduce their effort themselves.
summation perceivers add together pieces of information about a person; when
other information is strongly positive, additional mildly positive information
yields a more positive impression.
superordinate goals goals that can only be achieved by two groups working
together cooperatively, to mutual benefit.
survey research a research strategy that involves interviewing (or administering
a questionnaire to) a sample of respondents who are selected so as to be
representative of the population from which they are drawn.
systematic processing thorough, detailed processing of information (e.g.
attention to the arguments contained in a persuasive communication); this kind
of processing relies on ability and effort.
task behaviours behaviours during group interactions that are directed at task
completion.
task cohesion cohesion based on attraction of group members to the group task.
team awareness understanding of the ongoing activities of others which
provides a context for one’s own activity.
terror management theory a theory that assumes that people cope with the fear
of their own death by constructing worldviews that help to preserve their self-
esteem.
terrorism politically motivated violence, intended to spread fear and terror
among members of a society in order to influence the decision-making or
behaviour of political agents.
theory a set of abstract concepts (i.e. constructs) together with propositions
about how those constructs are related to one another.
theory of planned behaviour an extension to the theory of reasoned action that
includes the concept of perceived behavioural control.
theory of reasoned action a model in which behaviour is predicted by
behavioural intentions, which are determined by attitudes and subjective norms.
thought-listing a measure of cognitive responses; message recipients are asked
to list all the thoughts that occurred to them while being exposed to a persuasive
message.
time periods approach method for testing the heat hypothesis by comparing
violence rates in the same region during cooler and hotter periods.
trait aggressiveness denotes stable differences between individuals in the
likelihood and intensity of aggressive behaviour.
transactional leaders leaders who focus on the proper exchange of resources,
who give followers something in exchange for something the leaders want.
transactive memory a system of knowledge available to group members with
shared awareness of each other’s expertise, strengths and weaknesses.
transformational (charismatic) leaders leaders who focus on aligning the
group or organizational goals with the followers’ needs and aspirations by
developing an appealing vision (whereby organizational needs are placed above
self-interest).
triangulation the use of multiple methods and measures to research a given
issue.
true randomized experiment an experiment in which participants are allocated
to the different conditions of the experiment on a random basis.
two-dimensional perspective on attitudes a perspective that perceives positive
and negative elements as stored along separate dimensions.
uncertainty avoidance the extent to which a nation is averse to risk and
uncertainty.
unobtrusive measures (also called non-reactive measures) measures that the
participant is not aware of, and which therefore cannot influence his or her
behaviour.
utilitarian function when attitudes help us maximize rewards and minimise
costs.
validity a measure is valid to the extent that it measures precisely what it is
supposed to measure.
value-expressive function when attitudes help express our values.
variable the term used to refer to the measurable representation of a construct.
violence behaviours carried out with intention to cause serious harm that involve
the use or threat of physical force.
volunteerism when individuals give time and effort willingly without expecting
rewards.
weapons effect finding that individuals who were previously frustrated showed
more aggressive behaviour in the presence of weapons than in the presence of
neutral objects.
whistle blowing a specific form of disobedience, in which people report
corruption or unethical practice within an organization.
willingness to sacrifice the tendency to forego immediate self-interest to
promote the well-being of the partner or the relationship.
working self-concept subset of relevant self-knowledge that is activated and
guides our behaviour in a given situation.
 Name Index Aaker, J.L.
Aarts, H.
Abakoumkin, G.
Abbey, A.
Abbott, A.S.
Abelson, R.P.
Aberson, C.L.
Aboud, F.E.
Abrams, D.
Abramson, L.Y.
Ackerman, P.
Adair, W.L.
Adams, J.S.
Adler, K.K.
Adorno, T.W.
Afifi, T.D.
Agnew, C.R.
Aharpour, S.
Ahearne, M.
Aime, F.
Ainsworth, M.D.S.
Ajzen, I.
Akhtar, S.
Albarracín, D.
Alberts, H.J.E.M.
Aldag, R.J.
Alicke, M.D.
Allan, S.
Allen, J.L.
Allen, V.L.
Allik, J.
Alloy, L.B.
Allport, F.H.
 biography
Allport, G.
 biography
Alonso-Arbiol, I.
Altemeyer, B.
Altis, N.A.
Altman, I.
Alvaro, E.M.
Alwin, D.F.
Amabile, T.M.
Amato, P.R.
Amichai-Hamburger, Y.
Amir, Y.
Amodio, D.M.
Ananiadou, K.
Anastasio, P.A.
Andersen, S.M.
Anderson, C.A.
 biography
Anderson, K.B.
Anderson, N.H.
Andreoli, V.A.
Andrews, F.M.
Anthony, T.
Arai, M.
Archer, J.
Arends-Toth, J.
Arendt, H.
Argyle, M.
Ariely, D.
Armitage, C.J.
Armor, D.A.
Arndt, J.
Arnold, K.
Aron, A.
Aron, E.N.
Aronson, E.
Aronson, J.A.
Aronson, V.
Ascani, K.
Asch, S.E.
 biography
Atkins, C.J.
Aufderheide, B.
Averill, J.R.
Avolio, B.J.
Aylor, B.
Bach, P.J.
Bachman, B.A.
Back, K.
Back, M.D.
Bacon, P.L.
Bailey, J.A.
Bakeman, R.
Baker, S.M.
Baker, W.E.
Baldwin, M.W.
Bales, R.F.
 biography
Balluerka, N.
Banaji, M.R.
Bandura, A.
Banfield, J.F.
Banks, C.
Banse, R.
Barbee, A.P.
Barber, J.P.
Barch, D.M.
Barclay, L.C.
Bargh, J.A.
 biography
Barndollar, K.
Barnes, M.I.
Barnes, P.J.
Barnett, O.W.
Baron, R.A.
Baron, R.M.
Baron, R.S.
Baron, S.H.
Barrett, L.
Barry, C.T.
Barsade, S.G.
Bartels, J.M.
Bartholomew, K.
Bartholow, B.D.
Bartlett, F.C.
Barton, R.
Bass, B.M.
Bassett, R.
Bassili, J.N.
Bates, J.E.
Batson, C.D.
 biography
Batts, V.
Baum, A.
Baum, E.S.
Baumann, M.R.
Baumann, N.
Baumeister, R.F.
 biography
Baumrind, D.
Baxter, L.A.
Beach, S.R.
Beaman, A.L.
Becker, E.
Becquart, E.
Beehr, T.A.
Beer, J.S.
Beggan, J.K.
Beilock, S.L.
Belknap, J.
Bell, S.
Bellah, C.G.
Bem, D.J.
Ben-David, Y.
Ben-Ze’ev, A.
Benet-Martínez, V.L.
Benson, P.J.
Bentall, R.P.
Berent, M.K.
Berger, A.
Berger, C.R.
Berger, J.
Berglas, S.
Berkman, L.F.
Berkowitz, L.
 biography
Bermeitinger, C.
Bernstein, J.H.
Berntson, G.G.
Berridge, K.
Berry, A.
Berry, D.S.
Berry, J.W.
 biography
Berscheid, E.S.
 biography
Bessière, K.
Bettencourt, B.A.
Betz, A.L.
Betzig, L.
Bevan, S.
Bickman, L.
Bieneck, S.
Bierhof, H.W.
Bierman, K.L.
Biesanz, J.C.
Billig, M.
Binet, A.
Birch, K.
Birchmeier, Z.
Birnbaum, M.H.
Birring, S.S.
Birum, I.
Bishop, G.D.
Björkqvist, K.
Black, S.L.
Blackhart, G.C.
Blackwood, N.J.
Blair, I.V.
Blakemore, S.J.
Blaney, P.H.
Blank, A.
Blanton, H.
Blascovich, J.
Blass, T.
Blau, P.M.
Bless, H.
Blessing, T.H.
Bobocel, D.R.
Bocchiaro, P.
Boden, J.M.
Bodenhausen, G.V.
Boettcher, F.
Bohner, G.
Bolger, N.
Bolino, M.C.
Bolsin, S.N.
Bonacci, A.M.
Bonanno, G.A.
Boncimino, M.
Bond, C.F.
Bond, M.H.
Bond, R.
Bond, R.N.
Boneva, B.
Boney-McCoy, S.
Boninger, D.S.
Bono, J.E.
Boone, A.L.
Bornstein, M.H.
Bornstein, R.F.
Borofsky, G.L.
Bosch, J.D.
Bosson, J.K.
Botvinick, M.M.
Boudreau, L.A.
Boulton, M.J.
Bourhis, R.Y.
Bourke, J.
Bower, G.H.
Bower, J.E.
Bowers, D.G.
Bowlby, J.
 biography
Bowling, N.
Boyd, R.
Bradford, D.L.
Brandstätter, V.
Branigan, C.
Branje, S.J.T.
Branscombe, N.R.
Brass, M.
Brauer, M.
Braver, T.S.
Bray, R.M.
Brazier, G.
Brédart, S.
Brehm, J.W.
Brekke, N.
Brennan, K.A.
Brett, J.M.
Brewer, M.B.
Briceland, L.
Brief, A.P.
Brief, D.E.
Briñol, P.
Brock, T.C.
Brockner, J.
Brodbeck, F.C.
Brotzman, E.
Brown, C.
Brown, J.D.
Brown, R.
Browning, C.R.
Bruder, M.
Brunell, A.B.
Bruner, J.S.
Bruun, S.E.
Bruyneel, S.
Bryant, J.
Buck, P.O.
Buckley, K.E.
Buckley, T.
Buddie, A.M.
Buhrmeister, M.D.
Buhrmester, D.
Bulger, J.
Bunderson, J.S.
Bundy, R.P.
Burger, J.M.
Burgess, M.
Burks, V.S.
Burnham, D.H.
Burns, J.M.
Burnstein, E.
Burroughs, J.E.
Burrowes, N.
Burrows, L.
Bushman, B.J.
Buss, D.M.
Buswell, B.N.
Butera, F.
Butler, J.L.
Buunk, B.P.
Byrne, D.
Cacioppo, J.T.
 biography
Cai, H.
Cairns, E.
Cairns, K.J.
Calabrese, R.J.
Call, V.R.A.
Callero, P.L.
Calvert-Boyanowsky, J.
Camerer, C.F.
Cameron, J.
Cameron, L.
Campbell, A.
Campbell, D.T.
 biography
Campbell, J.
Campbell, J.D.
Campbell, W.K.
Canary, D.J.
Cann, A.
Cannon, W.B.
Capozza, D.
Caputo, C.
Carey, G.
Carlsmith, J.M.
Carlson, M.
Carnot, C.G.
Carpenter, M.
Carr, T.H.
Carrell, S.E.
Carrick, R.
Carrillo, M.
Carter, C.S.
Cartwright, D.
Carvallo, M.
Carver, C.S.
Casey, R.J.
Cassidy, C.
Castano, E.
Castelli, L.
Catanese, K.R.
Cate, R.M.
Chaiken, S.
 biography
Chance, Z.
Chang, K.
Chanowitz, B.
Chaplin, W.
Chartrand, T.L.
Chatard, A.
Chatzisarantis, N.L.D.
Cheever, J.
Chen, J.M.
Chen, M.
Chen, S.
Chen, X.
Chen, X.-P.
Chen, Y.-R.
Cheng, P.W.
Chernyshenko, O.S.
Cherry, F.E.
Chertkoff, J.M.
Chhokar, J.S.
Chiao, J.Y.
Chiles, C.
Chiodo, L.M.
Chiu, C.-Y.
Choi, H.-S.
Choi, I.
Choi, Y.
Christ, O.
Christensen, C.
Christy, C.A.
Chuang, Y.C.
Chung, C.K.
Cialdini, R.B.
Ciarocco, N.J.
Cihangir, S.
Cini, M.A.
Clark, C.L.
Clark, M.S.
Clark, R.D., III.
Claus, J.
Claypool, H.M.
Clifford, M.M.
Clinton, A.M.
Clore, G. L.
Coan, J.A.
Coch, L.
Cohen, A.R.
Cohen, B.P.
Cohen, D.
Cohen, E.
Cohen, E.G.
Cohen, G.
Cohen, G.L.
Cohen, J.
Cohen, J.D.
Cohen, L.E.
Cohen, L.H.
Cohen, M.A.
Cohen, R.L.
Cohen, S.
Coie, J.D.
Colbert, A.E.
Cole, C.M.
Coleman, K.
Collins, A.
Collins, B.E.
Collins, M.E.
Collins, N.L.
Collins, W.A.
Comblain, C.
Conger, J.A.
Conner, M.
Conolley, E.S.
Converse, P.D.
Conway, M.
Conway, M.A.
Cook, K.E.
Cook, S.W.
Cook, T.D.
Cooley, C.H.
Coon, H.M.
Cooper, C.L.
Cooper, G.
Cooper, H.M.
Cooper, J.
Copper, C.
Corcoran, D.M.
Corman, M.D.
Corneille, O.
Cornelis, I.
Cornelissen, P.L.
Cornell, D.P.
Correll, J.
Cosmides, L.
Costa, P.T., Jr.
Coté, S.
Cottrell, C.A.
Cottrell, N.B.
Covington, M.V.
Cowie, H.
Coyne, J.C.
Coyne, S.M.
Craig, W.
Craiger, J.P.
Craik, F.I.M.
Crane, M.
Crano, W.D.
Crawford, J.R.
Creswell, J.D.
Crick, N.R.
Croak, M.R.
Crocker, J.
Cross, D.
Cross, S.E.
Crowley, M.
Crowther, S.
Crutchfield, R.S.
Cruz, M.G.
Cuddy, A.J.C.
Culbertson, K.A.
Culhane, S.E.
Cullen, F.T.
Cunningham, J.A.
Cunningham, M.R.
Cunningham, S.J.
Cunningham, W.A.
Custers, R.
Cutrona, C.E.
Dabbs, J.M.
Dahlberg, L.L.
Dainton, M.
Dalrymple, S.
Dambrun, M.
Dana, E.R.
D’Argembeau, A.
Darley, J.M.
 biography
Das, E.H.
David, B.
Davidov, M.
Davidson, A.R.
Davidson, B.
Davidson, R.J.
Davis, D.
Davis, J.H.
Davis, K.E.
Davis, M.H.
Dawkins, R.
Day, H.R.
De Clercq, B.
De Dreu, C.K.W.
De Hoog, N.
De Longis, A.
De Vries, N.K.
De Wit, J.B.F.
De Wolff, M.S.
Deaux, K.
DeBono, K.G.
Dechesne, M.
Deci, E.L.
Dehle, C.
Deichmann, A.K.
Dekel, S.
DeMarree, K.G.
Demir, M.
Deng, C.
Denissen, J.
Dennis, A.R.
Denson, T.F.
DePaulo, B.M.
Deppe, R.K.
Derlega, V.J
Deschamps, J.-C.
DeShon, R.P.
Deuser, W.E.
Deutsch, M.
Deutsch, R.
Devine, P.G.
 biography
Devos, T.
DeWall, C.N.
Dewitte, S.
Diehl, M.
Diener, E.
Dijker, A.J.M.
Dijksterhuis, A.
Dill, K.E.
DiMaggio, P.
Dincan, B.L.
Dincan, L.A.
Dindia, K.
Dion, K.
Dirks, K. T.
Dishion, T.J.
Dixon, J.
Dodge, K.A.
Dohmen, T.J.
Doise, W.
Dolan, R.J.
Dolderman, D.
Dollard, J.
Domittner, G.
Doob, L.W.
Dooley, J.J.
Doosje, B.
Dorfman, P.W.
Doucet, N.
Dovidio, J.F.
Downey, G.
Downing, L.L.
Downs, A.C.
Downs, D.L.
Downs, J.S.
Dratel, J.L.
Driskell, J.E.
Druen, P.B.
Drury, J.
Dryer, D.C.
Du Plessis, I.
Duarte, S.
Duck, S.
Duckitt, J.
Duffy, S.M.
Dunbar, R.I.M.
Duncan, B.D.
Duncan, B.L.
Duncan, L.A.
Dunn, E.W.
Dunn, J.
Dunning, D.
Dunton, B.C.
Durham-Fowler, J.A.
Durrheim, K.
Dutton, D.G.
Dutton, K.A.
Duval, S.
Duval, T.S.
Dweck, C.S.
Dworkin, T.M.
Dziurawiec, S.
Eagly, A.H.
 biography
Earing, B.
Easterlin, R.A.
Eastwick, P.W.
Eaton, J.
Ebbesen, E.B.
Eberhardt, J.S.
Edwards, D.
Egloff, B.
Ehrenberg, K.
Ehrlinger, J.
Eichmann, A.
Eichstaedt, J.
Eidelson, R.
Eisenberger, N.I.
Eisenberger, R.
Eisenstadt, D.
Ekman, P.
Elizur, Y.
Elkes, R.
Ellemers, N.
 biography
Eller, A.
Elliot, A.J.
Ellis, H.
Ellison, N.B.
Ellsworth, P.C.
Elms, A.C.
Elsbach, K.D.
Engels, R.C.M.E.
Englich, B.
English, T.
Ensari, N.
Enzle, M.E.
Epley, N.
Epstein, S.
Epstude, K.
Erber, R.
Erdmann, G.
Erez, M.
Eron, L.D.
Ervin, C.R.
Eskenazi, J.
Esser, J.K.
Esses, V.M.
Evans, D.
Exum, M.L.
Fahy, R.F.
Fairfield, M.
Falomir-Pichastor, J.M.
Falvo, R.
Fan, R.M.-T.
Fantz, R.L.
Farjoun, M.
Farnham, S.D.
Farrell, D.
Faulkner, J.
Faulmüller, N.
Fazio, R.H.
 biography
Feeney, B.C.
Feeney, J.A.
Fehr, B.
Fehr, E.
Feigenbaum, R.
Feinstein, J.A.
Fejfar, M.C.
Feldman Barrett, L.
Feldman, S.I.
Felson, M.
Fennis, B.M.
Ferguson, C.J.
Fernyhough, C.
Festinger, L.
 biography
Fhanér, G.
Fiedler, K.
Fincham, F.D.
Fine, G.A.
Finkel, E.J.
Finkelstein, M.A.
Finkenauer, C.
Finlay, K.
Fireman, B.
Fischer, A.H.
Fischer, P.
Fish, D.
Fishbein, M.
 biography
Fisher, B.S.
Fisher, H.E.
Fisher, J.D.
Fisher, K.
Fiske, S.T.
 biography
Fitzsimons, G.M.
Flament, C.
Flatley, J.
Fletcher, G.J.
Fletcher, J.F.
Florian, V.
Flowers, M.L.
Floyd, K.
Fode, K.L.
Folger, R.
Fong, G.T.
Fontaine, J.
Forgas, J.P.
Försterling, F.
Forsyth, D.R.
Foster, C.A.
Foster-Fishman, P.G.
Foster, J.D.
Fraley, R.C.
Franklin, J.
Frankowski, R.
Franz, T.M.
Fraser, C.
Fraser, S.C.
Freedman, J.L.
Freese, L.
Freifeld, T.R.
French, J.R.P.
Frenkel-Brunswik, E.
Freud, S.
Freund, T.
Frey, B.S.
Frey, D.
Frick, P.J.
Frieze, I.H.
Frijda, N.H.
Frith, C.D.
Frith, U.
Fritsche, I.
Fritzsche, B.A.
Frost, J.H.
Fujita, K.
Fuller, S.R.
Fultz, J.
Funder, D.C.
Furman, W.
Furnham, A.F.
Gächter, S.
Gaertner, L.
Gaertner, S.L.
Gagné, M.
Gagnon, A.
Gaillard, A.W.K.
Galanter, E.
Galinsky, A.D.
Gallup, G.G., Jr.
Gamson, W.A.
Gangestad, S.W.
Gangi, C.E.
Garcia-Marques, T.
Garcia, S.M
Gardner, W.L.
Garolera, J.
Gaunt, R.
Gawronski, B.
Geen, R.G.
Gentile, D.A.
Gentile, J.R.
George, J.M.
Gerard, H.B.
Gergen, K.J.
Gerhardt, M.W.
Gerin, W.
Geyskens, K.
Giancola, P.R.
Gibbons, F.X.
Gibson, D.C.
Gibson, J.J.
Giesler, R.B.
Gifford, R.K.
Gigone, D.
Gilbert, D.T.
 biography
Gilbert, P.
Gillath, O.
Gilovich, T.
Gintis, H.
Glass, D.C.
Glazer, M.P.
Glazer, P.M.
Glick, P.
Glover, G.H.
Goethals, G.R.
Goffman, E.
Goldie, J.
Goldman, B.M.
Goldman, R.
Goldstein, A.P.
Goldstein, N.J.
Gollwitzer, P.M.
Gonzales, M.H.
González, R.
Goodhead, G.
Gordijn, E.
Gordon, A.K.
Gordon, L.J.
Gosling, S.D.
Goto, S.G.
Gottlieb, A.
Govorun, O.
Grafeman, S.J.
Graham, K.
Grammer, K.
Grannemann, B.D.
Graves, J.
Graves, N.
Green, J.D.
Greenberg, J.
Greenberg, K.J.
Greene, C.N.
Greene, D.
Greenland, K.
Greenlees, I.A.
Greenwald, A.G.
 biography
Gregg, A.P.
Gregg, P.B.
Gregson, M.
Greitemeyer, T.
Grice, H.P.
Griffin, D.W.
Griffin, R.S.
Groenewoud, J.T.
Groom, R.W.
Gross, A.M.
Grotpeter, J.K.
Grouneva, L.
Grove, T.
Groves, R.M.
Gruenewald, T.L.
Grusec, J.E.
Grzelak, J.
Gudykunst, W.B.
Guerin, B.
Guerra, N.G.
Guerreschi, M.
Guimond, S.
Gupta, V.
Gurtman, M.B.
Gutsell, J.N.
Haaland, G.A.
Haan, B.
Hackman, J.R.
Haddock, G.
Hagger, M.S.
Haines, H.
Halabi, S.
Halevy, N.
Hall, L.
Hamby, S.L.
Hamilton, D.L.
Hamilton, V.L.
Hamilton, W.D.
Hancock, J.T.
Hane, M.
Haney, C.
Hanges, P.J.
Hankin, B.L.
Hannon, P.A.
Harari, H.
Harari, O.
Hardee, B.B.
Hardin, C.D.
Hardy, R.
Harker, L.
Harkins, S.
Harlow, T.
Harpaz-Gorodeisky, G.
Harris, D.A.
Harris, L.T.
Harris, V.A.
Hart, C.M.
Hart, H.
Harter, S.
Hartup, W.W.
Harvey, R.D.
Harwood, J.
Harzing, A.W.
Haslam, S.A.
Hass, R.G.
Hassebrauck, M.
Hastie, R.
Hatfield, E.
Haugtvedt, C.P.
Hause, K.S.
Hautman, L.
Havermans, R.C.
Hawker, D.S.J.
Hawkley, L.C.
Hayes, A.F.
Hazan, C.
Hazlett, S.
Healy, M.
Heatherton, T.F.
Hechter, M.
Hedges, L.V.
Heffernan, M.
Heider, F.
 biography
Hein, G.
Heine, S.J.
Heingartner, A.
Heinitz, K.
Helmreich, R.L.
Henchy, T.
Henderlong, J.
Hendrick, S.S.
Hendriks, M.
Hennessy, D.A.
Hennigan, K.
Henningsen, D.D.
Henri, V.
Henrich, J.
Henry, R.A.
Henton, J.M.
Henwood, K.L.
Heppner, W.L.
Herek, G.M.
Herlihy, J.M.
Herman, C.P.
Herman, E.M.
Hermsen, S.
Hernandez, A.C.R.
Herrera, V.M.
Herskovits, M.
Herskovits, M.J.
Hertel, G.
Hesson-McInnis, M.
Hetherington, E.M.
Hewes, D.E.
Hewstone, M.
Higgins, E.T.
Higgins, R.L.
Hill, G.J.
Hilter, A.
Hilton, D.J.
Hilton, J.L.
Hinde, R.A.
Hinduja, S.
Hinkle, S.
Hinsz, V.B.
Hirt, E.R.
Hixon, J.G.
Hodgkins, S.
Hodson, G.
Hoeksema-Van Orden, C.Y.D.
Hoel, H.
Hoffman, E.L.
Hofling, C.K.
Hofstede, G.H.
 biography
Hogarth, R.M.
Hogg, M.A.
Holland, R.W.
Hollander, E.P.
Holmes, J.G.
Holt, K.
Holt, R.
Holzberg, A.D.
Homans, G.C.
Hong, Y.-Y
Hood, W.R.
Hope, L.
Hope, R.O.
Hopkins, N.
Hornsey, M.J.
Hornstein, H.A.
Horowitz, L.M.
Horton, R.S.
Horvath, S.
Horwitz, I.B.
Horwitz, M.
Horwitz, S.K.
Hosch, H.M.
Hosey, K.
Hoshino-Browne, E.
Houben, K.
House, P.
House, R.J.
 biography
Houston, D.A.
Hovland, C.I.
 biography
Howard, A.
Howard, J.A.
Howard, M.L.
Hoyle, R.H.
Huang, X.
Huart, J.
Hubbell, A.P.
Huesmann, L.R.
 biography
Hüffmeier, J.
Hughes, M.E.
Hull, J.G.
Hundley, M.
Hunt, J.S.
Hunter, J.A.
Hurst, M.H.
Huskinson, T.L.H.
Huston, M.
Huston, T.L.
Huth, P.
Huynh, Q.-L.
Hyde, J.S.
Ignarri, C.
Ilies, R.
Ingham, A.G.
Inglehart, R.
Insko, C.A.
Inzlicht, M.
Isenberg, D.J.
Ishii, K.
Islam, M.R.
Itkin, S.M.
Ito, T.A.
Iyer, A.
Jaccard, J.J.
Jackman, M.R.
Jackson, J.R.
Jackson, L.M.
Jacobs, R.C.
Jacobson, C.K.
Jago, A.G.
James, K.
James, W.
 biography
Janis, I.L.
Janke, W.
Janssen, L.
Jarvis, B.
Jaspars, J.
Jaspars, J.M.F.
Javidan, M.
Jeffery, K.M.
Jelicic, M.
Jemmott, J.B.
Jensen, M.A.
Jentzsch, I.
Jetten, J.
Johansson, P.
John, O.P.
Johnson, A.L.
Johnson, B.
Johnson, B.T.
Johnson, C.
Johnson, D.J.
Johnson, E.A.
Johnson, J.L.
Johnson, J.T.
Johnson, K.
Johnson, M.H.
Johnson, M.K.
Johnson, M.P.
Johnson, R.D.
Johnson, R.E.
Johnson, R.M.
Johnson, T.J.
Johnston, L.
Joinson, A.N.
Jones, E.E.
Jones, J.T.
Jordan, C.H.
Jordan, R.
Jordet, G.
Josephs, R.A.
Jost, J.T.
Jostmann, N.B.
Joule, R.V.
Jourard, S.M.
Judd, C.M.
 biography
Judge, T.A.
Jung, D.I.
Jussim, L.J.
Kafetsios, K.
Kahn, A.
Kahneman, D.
Kaiza, P.
Kalick, S.M.
Kallgren, C.A.
Kalven, H.
Kameda, T.
Kampe, K.K.W.
Kampmeier, C.
Kamzan, M.
Kanagawa, C.
Kaney, S.
Kang, S.J.
Kanki, B.
Kanungo, R.N.
Kao, C.F.
Kaplan, M.F.
Kaplan, R.M.
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Karasawa, M.
Karau, S.J.
Karpinski, A.
Karremans, J.C.
Kashima, E.S.
Kashima, Y.
Kashy, D.A.
Kasser, T.
Kassin, S.M.
Katsura, H.
Katz, D.
Katz, T.
Katzenstein, G.
Kaukiainen, A.
Kawachi, I.
Kawakami, K.
Kawamura, T.
Keating, C.F.
Keenan, J.P.
Keizer, K.
Kelley, H.H.
 biography
Kelley, W.M.
Kelling, G.L.
Kelly, A.E.
Kelly, J.B.
Kelman, H.C.
Keltner, D.
Kemeny, M.E.
Kemmelmeier, M.
Kendrick, D.T.
Kendzierski, D.
Kenny, D.A.
 biography
Kent, A.
Kenworthy, J.
Kerkhof, P.
Kernberg, O.F.
Kernis, M.H.
Kerr, N.L.
 biography
Kerschreiter, R.
Kershaw, C.
Kessler, T.
Keys, C.B.
Kieffer, S.C.
Kiesler, C.A.
Kiesler, S.
Kiesler, S.B.
Kihlstrom, J.F.
Kilpatrick, S.D.
Kim, K.
Kim, U.
Kim, Y.
Kimmel, P.R.
Kinderman, P.
King, R.G.
Kirchner, J.
Kirillova, G.P.
Kirker, W.S.
Kirsh, S.J.
Kitayama, S.
 biography
Kiyonari, T.
Klandermans, B.
Klauer, K.C.
Klein, C.T.F.
Klein, O.
Klein, R.
Klein, S.B.
Klein, W.M.
Klentz, B.
Klinesmith, J.
Kling, K.C.
Klink, A.
Klohnen, E.C.
Klomek, A.B.
Knee, C.R.
Knight, R.A.
Knowles, M.L.
Kobayashi, C.
Koestner, R.
Kohl, J.
Köhler, O.
Koole, S.L.
Koops, W.
Koriat, A.
Korte, C.
Koss, M.P.
 biography
Kozlowski, S.W.J.
Krägeloh-Mann, I.
Krahé, B.
Kraus, S.J.
Kraut, R.
Kravitz, D.A.
Krebs, D.
Kreiner, D.S.
Kropp, A.
Krosnick, J.A.
Krueger, J.I.
Krug, E.G.
Kruger, J.
Kruglanski, A.W.
Krull, D.S.
Kubacka, K.E.
Kuiper, N.A.
Kulik, J.
Kumar, S.
Kumashiro, M.
Kunda, Z.
Kunst-Wilson, W.R.
Kuppens, T.
Kurman, J.
Kushigian, R.H.
Kuyper, H.
Kwan, J.L.
Ladd, D.
Lage, E.
Lagerspetz, K.M.
Lahey, B.B.
Lai, A.S.Y.
Laird, R.D.
Lake, R.A.
Lakey, C.E.
Lalljee, M.
Lalwani, N.
Lamb, R.
Lamberth, J.
Lamm, C.
Lamm, H.
Landis, D.
Landry, S.H.
Langer, E.J.
Langlois, J.H.
LaPiere, R.T.
Larsen, J.T.
Larson, D.W.
Larson, J.H.
Larson, J.R., Jr.
Latané, B.
 biography
Laughlin, P.R.
Laurenceau, J.-P.
Lavrakas, P.
Law, J.S.F.
Lax, M.L.
Lazarus, R.S.
Le, B.
Lê-Xuân-Hy, G.M.
Leach, C.W.
Leafhead, K.M.
Leana, C.R.
Leary, M.R.
LeBon, G.
Lee-Chai, A.
Lee, F.
Lee, H.
Lee, L.
Lee, W.W.-S.
Lefkowitz, M.M.
Legant, P.
Legrand, D.
Lehman, D.R.
Lemay, E.P.J.
Leonardelli, G.J.
LePage, A.
LePine, J.A.
Lepore, L.
Lepper, M.R.
Lerma, M.
Lerner, J.S.
Lesar, T.S.
Leu, J.X.
Leve, C.
Levenson, R.W.
Leventhal, H.
Levi, A.
Levin, J.
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Levine, J.
Levine, J.M.
 biography
Levine, M.
Levine, R.V.
Levinger, G.
Levinson, D.J.
Levy, L.
Levy, R.
Lewicki, R.J.
Lewin, K.
 biography
Lewinsohn, P.M.
Lewis, D.
Leyens, J.P.
Liberman, A.
Liberman, N.
Lichter, E.L.
Lickel, B.
Lieberman, A.
Lieberman. J.D.
Lieberman, M.D.
Liebert, R.M.
Likert, R.
Lin, M.
Lind, E.A.
Lindenberg, S.
Linder, D.E.
Lindoerfer, J.S.
Lindsay, J.J.
Lindsey, S.
Linton, R.
Linville, P.W.
Lipkus, I.
Lippitt, R.
Liska, L.Z.
Livingstone, A.G.
Lloyd, B.B.
Lloyd, S.A.
Lo, C.
Lobel, M.
Locher, P.
Lodewijkx, H.F.M.
Loeber, R.
Lombardi, W.
Lopez, D.F.
Lord, C.G.
Lorenz, K.
Lossie, N.
Lotan, R.A.
Lott, C.L.
Lount, R.B., Jr.
Lozano, R.
Lubensky, M.E.
Luhtanen, R.K.
Lumsdaine, A.A.
Lundgren, S.R.
Luo, S.
Lüthgens, C.
Lutzenberger, W.
Lycett, J.
Lydon, J.E.
Lynn, A.R.
Lyons, P.M.
Maass, A.
MacBrayer, E.K.
Maccoby, E.E.
Maccoby, N.
MacCoun, R.J.
MacDonald, G.
MacKenzie, S.B.
Mackie, D.M.
MacNamara, D.E.J.
MacNeil, M.K.
Macrae, C.N.
 biography
Madden, T.J.
Madey, S.F.
Madson, L.
Maestas, K.L.
Maheswaran, D.
Maier, N.R.F.
Maio, G.R.
Maisey, D.S.
Malle, B.F.
Malmstrom, E.J.
Malone, P.S.
Mann, J.
Manning, R.
Manstead, A.S.R.
Mantell, D.M.
Maracek, J.
Marcus-Newhall, A.
Marigold, D.C.
Mark, A.Y.
Markman, H.J.
Marková, I.
Marks, M.A.
Markus, H.R.
 biography
Marques, J.M.
Marquez, M.J.
Marrow, A.J.
Marsh, H.W.
Marshall, G.D.
Marshall-Goodell, B.S.
Martens, A.
Martijn, C.
Martin, B.
Martin, P.Y.
Martin, R.
Martino, S.C.
Martz, J.M.
Mashek, D.J.
Maslach, C
Mason, M.F.
Masson, K.
Masuda, T.
Matsumoto, D.
Mattei, D.
Mayer, A.
Mayer, N.D.
Mayle, P.
McAdams, D.P.
McAndrew, F.T.
McArthur, L.A.
McArthur, L.Z.
McAuslan, P.
McBride, M.V.
McBurnett, K.
McClelland, D.C.
McClure, J.
McConahay, J.
McConnachie, A.
McCoslin, M.J.
McCrae, R.R.
McCrea, S.M.
McCullough, M.E.
McDaniel, P.
McDonel, E.C.
McDougall, W.
McDowell, N.K.
McElreath, R.
McElwee, R.O.B.
McGarty, C.
McGhee, D.E.
McGill, A.L.
McGrath, J.E.
 biography
McGregor, H.A.
McGregor, I.
McGrew, W.C.
McGuire, C.V.
McGuire, W.J.
 biography
McIntosh, A.
McKenna, K.Y.A.
McKillop, K.J.
McLaughlin-Volpe, T.
McQuirk, B.
McWethy, A.
Mead, G.H.
Meade, R.D.
Meek, D.
Meeus, W.
Meeus, W.H.J.
Meiser, T.
Mendelson, M.J.
Merckelbach, H.
Mercy, J.A.
Merrin, J.
Messé, L.A.
Messick, D.M.
Metalsky, G.I.
Meyerowitz, J.A.
Mezulis, A.H.
Miceli, M.P.
Michinov, N.
Michotte, A.
Mickler, S.
Miedema, J.
Mielke, R.
Mihic, L.
Mikulincer, M.
Milburn, M.A.
Miles, D.R.
Milgram, S.
 biography
Milich, R.
Miller, A.G.
Miller, C.E.
Miller, C.T.
Miller, D.T.
Miller, F.D.
Miller, G.A.
Miller, G.E.
Miller, J.A.
Miller, J.G.
Miller, L.C.
Miller, L.S.
Miller, N.
Miller, N.E.
 biography
Miller, R.S.
Miller, T.R.
Millner-Perrin, C.L.
Mills, J.
Milne, A.B.
Milne, S.
Milner, B.J.
Milner, K.R.
Minde, T.
Miner, A.G.
Mintzer, A.
Mischel, W.
Mitchell, J.P.
Mitchell, T.R.
Miyamoto, Y.
Mlicki, P.P.
Mochon, D.
Modigliani, A.
Moede, W.
Moghaddam, F.M.
Mohr, D.
Moise-Titus, J.
Mojzisch, A.
Mok,A.
Mok, D.
Moll, J.
Möller, I.
Monahan, J.L.
Monin, B.
Monshouwer, H.J.
Monteith, M.J.
Montepare, J.M.
Monto, M.A.
Montoya, R.M.
Moon, D.
Moonen, A.
Moore, D.L.
Moran, J.M.
Moreland, R.L.
 biography
Morf, C.C.
Morgan, R.
Mori, K.
Morling, B.
Morris, C.G.
Morris, C.W.
Morris, K.A.
Morris, M.L.
Morris, M.W.
Morris, P.H.
Morrison, E.R.
Morrison, E.W.
Morrison, J.
Morrison, K.R.
Morry, M.
Morton, J.
Mosakowski, E.
Moscovici, S.
 biography
Mosier, K.
Moskowitz, G.B.
Mowrer, O.H.
Moylan, S.J.
Mucchi-Faina, A.
Mueller, C.M.
Muellerleile, P.A.
Mugny, G.
Mullen, B.
Mummendey, A.
 biography
Muramoto, Y.
Muraven, M.
Murchison, C.
Murdoch, D.
Murphy, P.
Murphy, S.T.
Murray, H.A.
Murray, R.K.
Murray, S.L.
Murrell, A.
Murry, W.D.
Musselman, L.
Mussweiler, T.
Myaskovsky, L.
Myers, D.G.
Nadler, A.
 biography
Naffrechoux, M.
Nagao, D.H.
Naidoo, L.
Nail, P.R.
Naipaul, S.
Nathan, L.R.
Neale, M.A.
Near, J.P.
Neely, J.H.
Nelligan, J. S.
Nelson, B.C.
Nelson, G.
Nelson, S.E.
Nemeth, C.J.
 biography
Neuberg, S.L.
Newcomb, M.D.
Newcomb, T.M.
 biography
Newman, L.S.
Newstrom, J.W.
Nezlek, J.
Nezlek, J.B.
Nida, S.
Nijstad, B.A.
Nisbett, R.E.
 biography
Nissani, M.
Nitz, K.
Norenzayan, A.
Northcraft, G.B.
Norton, M.I.
Nosek, B.A.
Novick, L.R.
Nurius, P.
Nuttin, J.M.
Nuttin, J.M., Jr.
Nuwer, H.
Nystrom, L.E.
Oakes, M.A.
Oakes, P.J.
Ochsner, K.N.
Oishi, S.
Okun, M.
Oliner, P.M.
Oliner, S.P.
Olkin, I.
Olson, J.E.
Olson, J.M.
Olson, M.A.
Olsson, A.
Olweus, D.
Omoto, A.M.
Opp, K.D.
Oppenheim, A.N.
Orbell, S.
Orbuch, T.
Orne, M.T.
Orobio de Castro, B.
Orpinas, P.
Orwell, G.
Osborn, A.F.
Osgood, C.E.
Osswald, S.
Osterhouse, R.A.
Österman, K.
Ostrom, T.M.
Otten, S.
Ouellette, J.A.
Overall, N.C.
Oxenberg, J.
Oyserman, D.
Özdemir, M.
Packer, D.J.
Paladino, M.P.
Paleari, F.G.
Panzarella, R.
Paolini, S.
Papastamou, S.
Paris, M.
Park, B.
Park, E.S.
Park, G.
Park, H.
Park, J.H.
Park, L.E.
Parks, M.R.
Parrott, D.
Pascual-Leone, A.
Patchin, J.W.
Patnoe, S.
Paulhus, D.L.
Pavlova, M.
Payne, B.K.
Pearce, C.L.
Peckham, V.
Pedersen, W.C.
Pelham, B.W.
Pendry, L.
Peng, K.
Pennebaker, J.W.
Penner, L.A.
Pennington, N.
Penrod, S.
Peplau, L.A.
Perdue, C.W.
Pérez, J.A.
Perie, M.
Perret, D.I.
Perrett, D.
Perrin, R.D.
Perry, M.
Personnaz, B.
Peter, J.
Peters, M.J.V.
Peterson, C.
Petronio, S.
Pettigrew, T.F.
Pettit, G.S.
Petty, R.E.
 biography
Pfeifer, J.H.
Phelps, E.A.
Phil, R.O.
Philbrick, K.
Phinney, J.S.
Piccolo, R.F.
Pickering, T.G.
Pickett, C.L.
Pieper, C.
Pierce, C.M.
Pierce, J.L.
Pietromonaco, P.R.
Piliavin, I.M.
Piliavin, J.A.
 biography
Pinquart, M.
Pittman, T.S.
Pitts, S.C.
Plant, E.A.
Platow, M.J.
Pliner, P.
Plomin, R.
Podolski, C.-L.
Podsakoff, P.M.
Polivy, J.
Pollock, V.E.
Pollozek, F.
Posner, M.
Postmes, T.
Potter, J.
Pouliasi, K.
Povey, D.
Prager, K.
Pratkanis, A.R.
Pratto, F.
Preacher, K.J.
Prentice, D.A.
Preston, M.
Preuschoff, K.
Pribram, K.H.
Price, J.
Priester, J.R.
Prins, K.S.
Prislin, R.
Probasco, P.
Prosser, A.
Proulx, G.
Puce, A.
Pugh, M.D.
Pyszczynski, T.
Pyzalski, J.
Quiamzade, A.
Raaijmakers, Q.A.W.
Rabbie, J.M.
Rabow, J.
Raine, A.
Ramaswamy, J.
Ramirez, A.J.
Randall, P.
Rank, O.
Rank, S.G.
Rapson, R.
Rathouz, P.J.
Raven, B.H.
Rayner, C.
Raz, M.
Read, S.J.
Reber, R.
Redfield, R.
Reed, G.M.
Reeder, G.D.
Regalia, C.
Reicher, S.
Reingen, P.H.
Reingold, J.
Reips, U.-D.
Reis, H.T.
Reisenzein, R.
Rempel, J.K.
Rennicke, C.
Rennison, C.M.
Reno, R.R.
Reuband, K.-H.
Reynolds, K.J.
Rhee, S.H.
Rhodewalt, F.
Rholes, W.S.
Rich, B.L.
Richards, M.
Richardson, D.R.
Richeson, J.A.
Richman, S.A.
Ridge, R.D.
Ridgeway, C.
Riecken, H.W.
Rilling, J.K.
Rindfleisch, A.
Rindfuss, R.R.
Ring, K.
Ringelmann, M.
 biography
Riordan, C.A.
Ritter, J.M.
Ritter, S.M.
Rittman, A.L.
Rivara, F.P.
Roberts, A.R.
Roberts, J.C.
Robertson, L.S.
Robins, R.W.
Robinson, D.T.
Robinson, J.P.
Robinson-Staveley, K.
Roccas, S.
Rochat, F.
Rocher, S.
Rodin, J.
Rodriguez Mosquera, P.M.
Roe, S.
Roemmele, L.A.
Roese, N.J.
Roets, A.
Rogers, C.R.
Rogers, T.B.
Roggman, L.A.
Rohner, R.P.
Rohrer, J.H.
Rokeach, M.
Romero, V.
Roney, C.
Rooney, S.B.
Ropp, S.A.
Rose, S.M.
Roseman, I.J.
Rosenberg, M.
Rosenholtz, S.J.
Rosenthal, A.M.
Rosenthal, R.
Rosman, H.
Rosnow, R.L.
Ross, D.
Ross, E.A.
Ross, L.D.
Ross, M.
Ross, S.A.
Rossman, S.B.
Rothbart, M.
Rothman, A.J.
Rothman, G.
Rovine, M.J.
Rowe, D.C.
Rowold, J.
Ruback, B.R.
Rubin, M.
Rubin, Z.
Rubini, M.
Ruby, P.
Rude, S.S.
Rudich, E.A.
Runciman, W.G.
Rusbult, C.E.
 biography
Rushton, J.P.
Russell, G.W.
Russell, J.
Russin, A.
Russo, E.
Rust, M.C.
Rüter, K.
Rutt, D.J.
Ryan, C.S.
Ryan, R.M.
Ryen, A.H.
Rytina, S.
Saari, D.
Saavedra, R.
Sabini, J.
Sacchi, S.
Sage, R.M.
Sagiv, L.
Saguy, T.
Salas, E.
Salmivalli, C.
Saltz, J.L.
Sam, D.L.
Sanbonmatsu, D.M.
Sanchez-Mazas, M.
Sanders, G.S.
Sandstrom, M.J.
Sanfey, A.G.
Sanford, R.N.
Sani, F.
Sanitioso, R.
Sanna, L.J.
Santelli, A.G.
Sasfy, J.
Sassenberg, K.
Saucier, D.A.
Savage, D.A.
Savitsky, K.
Sawin, D.B.
Sawyer, P.J.
Schaal, B.
Schachter, S.
 biography
Schadron, G.
Schaefer, C.E.
Schaefer, H.S.
Schaller, M.
Schatzel-Murphy, E.A.
Scheepers, D.
Scheier, M.F.
Scherer, K.R.
Scherer, U.
Schiappa, E.
Schimel, J.
Schimmack, U.
Schlenker, B.R.
Schmader, T.
Schmeichel, B.J.
Schmidt, A.M.
Schmidt-Hieber, J.
Schmitt, D.P.
Schmitt, M.T.
Schmukle, S.C.
Schneider, W.
Schoeneman, T.J.
Schooler, T.Y.
Schot, J.C.
Schreiber, E.
Schreiber, F.B.
Schreiber, H.-J.
Schroeder, D.A.
Schuette, R.A.
Schultze, T.
Schulz-Hardt, S.
Schumann, D.W.
Schumpeter, J.
Schürch, E.
Schütze, S.
Schuurman, M.
Schwartz, I.
Schwartz, L.
Schwartz, P.
Schwartz, R.D.
Schwartz, S.
Schwartz, S.H.
 biography
Schwarz, N.
Schwarzwald, J.
Sears, D.O.
Sears, R.R.
Seashore, S.E.
Sechrest, L.
Sechrist, G.B.
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Selfhout, M.
Seligman, M.E.
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Semin, G.R.
Sevincer, A.T.
Shackelford, T.K.
Shallice, T.
Shanab, M.E.
Shapiro, P.N.
Sharkey, W.F.
Sharon, I.
Sharp, M.
Shaver, P.R.
Shavitt, S.
Shechter, D.
Sheeran, P.
Sheffield, F.D.
Sheldon, K.M.
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Shepela, S.T.
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Sheridan, C.L.
Sherif, C.W.
Sherif, M.
 biography
Sherman, D.K.
Sherman, J.W.
Sherman, S.J.
Shiffrin, R.M.
Shoal, G.D.
Shomrony, A.
Shore, B.
Shotland, R.L.
Showers, C.J.
Shrauger, J.S.
Sicoly, F.
Sidanius, J.
Siegel, A.E.
Siegel, S.
Siem, B.
Sigall, H.
Sigman, S.J.
Sikström, S.
Silani, G.
Silverman, E.S.
Silvia, P.J.
Simmel, M.
Simon, B.
Simonton, D.K.
Simpson, J.A.
 biography
Sims, H.P., Jr.
Sinclair, S.
Singelis, T.M.
Singer, J.
Singer, J.A.
Singer, M.
Singer, P.
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Sivasubramaniam, N.
Skelton, J.A.
Skowronski, J.J.
Slater, M.
Slater, P.E.
Slavin, R.E.
Slovik, L.F.
Slugoski, B.R.
Smart, L.
Smart, S.A.
Smith, B.A.
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Smith, E.R.
Smith, H.J.
Smith, H.S.
Smith, J.R.
Smith, K.E.
Smith-Lovin, L.
Smith, M.B.
Smith, P.B.
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Smith, P.M.
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Sniezek, J.A.
Snyder, C.R.
Snyder, C.R.R.
Snyder, M.
Sobell, M.B.
Sober, E.
Sociedade, P.
Solomon, S.
Somech, A.
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Son Hing, L.S.
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Spanberg, E.R.
Spangler, W.D.
Sparks, C.W.
Sparks, G.G.
Spears, R.
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Spence, K.W.
Spencer, S.J.
Spengler, S.
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Staats, A.W.
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Stafford, L.
Stallworth, L.M.
Stangor, C.
Starbuck, W.H.
Stasser, G.
Staub, E.
Stayton, D.
Steblay, N.M.
Steele, C.M.
Steffen, V.J.
Steg, L.
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Stein-Seroussi, A.
Steinberg, L.
Steiner, I.D.
 biography
Steiner, L.
Steinmetz, J.
Steinmetz, J.L.
Stenstrom, D.M.
Stephan, C.W.
Stephan, F.F.
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Stephen, E.H.
Stern, E.
Sternberg, R.J.
Sternthal, B.
Stevens, N.
Stewart, A.J.
Stiff, C.
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Straus, M.A.
Straw, M.K.
Strejc, H.
Strickland, O.J.
Stringer, M.
Stroebe, K.
Stroebe, M.S.
Stroebe, W.
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Struthers, C.W.
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Sugarman, D.B.
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 biography
Swart, H.
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 biography
Takata, T.
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 biography
Teasdale, J.D.
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 biography
Thisted, R.A.
Thomas, L.A.
Thompson, L.L.
Thomson, J.A.
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Thornhill, R.
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Triandis, H.C.
 biography
Triplett, N.D.
Trivers, R.L.
Trope, Y.
Tropp, L.R.
Trost, M. R
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Tsapelas, I.
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 biography
Turner, M.E.
Turner, R.N.
Turnley, W.H.
Tversky, A.
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Wadsworth, M.
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Webb, T.L.
Weber, R.
Webster, D.M.
Weeden, J.
Wegener, D.T.
Wegner, D.M.
Weiby, M.
Weick, K.E.
Weigel, R.H.
Weiner, B.
 biography
Weisband, S.
Weiss, W.
Welchans, S.
Wells, G.L.
Wells, S.
Wenzel, M.
West, M.A.
West, S.G.
Wetherell, M.
Wheelan, S.A.
Wheeler, L.
Wheeler, M.A.
Whitaker, J.L.
White, B.J.
White, M.J.
White, P.A.
White, R.
White, R.K.
White, R.V.
White, R.W.
Whitney, G.A.
Wicker, A.W.
Wicklund, R.A.
Wiechmann, D.
Wiederman, M.W.
Wienke, C.
Wiers, R.W.
Wieselquist, J.
Wiesenthal, D.L.
Wigboldus, D.
Wilder, D.A.
Wildschut, T.
Wilhelmy, R.A.
Wilke, H.
Wilkes, A.L.
Williams, C.J.
Williams, H.L.
Williams, K.D.
Williams, R.M., Jr.
Willis, H.
Wills, T.A.
Wilner, D.M.
Wilson, A.M.
Wilson, D.S.
Wilson, J.
Wilson, J.Q.
Wilson, T.D.
Winkielman, P.
Winston, J.
Winter, D.G.
Winter, L.
Wiseman, J.P.
Witchurch, E.
Witte, E.H.
Wittenbaum, G.M.
Wittenbrink, B.
Wofford, J.C.
Wolfe, C.T.
Wolpert, I.
Wong, N.
Wong, T.J.
Wood, C.
Wood, J.V.
Wood, W.
Worchel, S.
Wowra, S.A.
Woycke, J.
Wright, E.F.
Wright, R.D.
Wright, S.C.
Wrightsman, L.S.
Wrosch, C.
Wu, C.-H.
Wu, F.C.W.
Wundt, W.
Wyer, N.A.
Wyer, R.S., Jr.
Xu, J.
Yahya, K.A.
Yamagichi, T.
Yamaguchi, S.
Yang, H.-C.
Yoo, S.H.
Yorges, S.L.
Young, A.W.
Young, R.D.
Yovetich, N.A.
Yuan, N.P.
Yukl, G.A.
 biography
Yzerbyt, V.
Zaadstra, B.M.
Zaccaro, S.J.
Zajonc, R.B.
 biography
Zanna, M.P.
 biography
Zavalloni, M.
Zawacki, T.
Zebrowitz, L.A.
Zebrowitz-McArthur, L.
Zeisel, H.
Zelditch, M.
Zhang, S.
Zick, A.
Ziegler, R.
Zijlstra, G.
Zillmann, D.
Zimbardo, P.G.
Zimmermann, T.D.
Zuckerman, C.
Zuckerman, M.
Zukova, J.
Zvibel, M.
Zwi, A.B.
Subject Index Note: Page numbers in bold refer to glossary definitions abusive
relationships
accentuation effect
 defined
accessibility: defined
accountability: defined
acculturation
attitudes to
defined
 integration mode
achievement-related attribution acquiescent responding
 defined
actor-observer differences conversational approach
defined
and intentional behaviours
reversing
actual selves
additive tasks
adjustment/anchoring heuristic advertising
affective/cognitive persuasion
 brand images and culture
dual-process analysis
persuasiveness of, attitudes affecting and schema encoding
 subliminal
affect see emotions affective component of attitudes defined
aggression
and alcohol consumption
bullying
defined
displaced
geographic regions approach
individual differences
intergroup
learning of
measures of
and media violence
 observation of
prevention/intervention
sexual
situational influences
as social problem
temperature effects
 theories of
see also violence Aggression Questionnaire (AQ) defined
 trait aggressiveness
aggressive cues: defined aggressive scripts: defined alcohol consumption
 and aggression
evaluative conditioning reducing and increased self-focus
sanctions on, effects of
altruism
altruism-egoism debate
defined
evolutionary perspective
reciprocal
altruistic punishment
ambivalence, attitudinal analysis of non-common effects: defined analytic
cognition
anchoring/adjustment heuristic defined
anger
 aggression as a response to
appraisals, emotional prejudice attributions
 excitation transfer theory
items of Aggression Questionnaire and low self-esteem
music reducing
negative affect triggering
 and relationship deterioration
anti-smoking campaigns
anxiety
attachment style
 intergroup
archival data, aggression archival research
arousal
aggression theories
felt in emergency situations
 misattribution of
arousal: cost-reward model defined
attachment theory
defined
and parental responsiveness
 and social appraisal
attention conflict, task performance attitude-behaviour relation: defined attitude
change
 implicit attitudes
incentive-induced attitudes
attitude functions
defined
research on
attitudes
components of
defined
measurement of
predictive of behaviour
reasons for holding
strength of
 structure of
attitudinal ambivalence: defined attractiveness see physical attractiveness
attribution theories
and arousal/emotion
causation
correspondence inference
covariation theory
defined
and depression
discourse
 intentional behaviour
naïve scientist metaphor
success and failure
attributional biases
actor-observer difference
conversational approach
correspondence bias
 defined
self-serving
audience inhibition
defined
augmenting principle
defined
authoritarian personality defined
authoritarianism, right-wing as ideology
and social dominance orientation autobiographical memories autocratic
leadership
autokinetic effect
defined
automatic processes
cognitive heuristics
 defined
dissociation model of stereotyping priming of behaviours
schemas
 stereotype activation
autonomy/autonomous
autonomy-orientated help
independent self
individualist nations
 leadership
self-regulation
autonomy-orientated help availability heuristic
 defined
averaging: defined
avoidant attachment style back-translation: defined balance theory: defined
base rate information: defined battered women, investment model behaviour or
leaders
behaviour-attitude link
behavioural component of attitudes defined
belongingness, need for
benevolent sexism
Bennington study: defined better than average effect defined
bias(es)
correspondence
discussion
evaluation
false consensus
 ingroup
self-enhancement
self-serving
bicultural identity: defined bicultural identity integration defined
biological approaches
aggression
 group formation
see also social neuroscience Bobo Doll paradigm

body shape and size: attraction bogus pipeline

bookkeeping model
brain mapping
brainstorming
capability losses/gains
coordination loss in
defined
 group synchronisation
brand choice, subliminal messages influencing brand image and culture
bullying
defined
online
bystander effect
decision-making model
defined
 and social identity
Capgras Syndrome, attributions case studies
 group decision analysis
one-shot
categorization
contact models, prejudice reduction defined
Devine’s dissociation model
impression formation
 judgemental heuristics
priming, effects on behaviour
 schemas
stereotype activation and goals stereotype suppression
see also self-categorization theory categorization model see mutual
differentiation catharsis: defined
causal attribution
accuracy of
bias in
 defined
see also attribution theories causal power
 defined
causal schema: defined
central route to persuasion defined
central trait: defined
charismatic leaders
coefficient of relatedness (r) defined
cognitive algebra: defined cognitive closure, need for cognitive component of
attitude defined
cognitive dissonance: defined cognitive dissonance theory defined
and group initiation
cognitive misers
 defined
cognitive neo-associationist model defined
cognitive perspective, group formation cognitive response model defined
cognitive restriction: defined cognitive stimulation: defined cognitive styles
cultural differences
 defined
cohesion, group
defined
collective violence
defined
collectivist cultures
attributional biases
cognitive style
interdependency
intergroup relations
interpersonal relations
 preferred leadership styles
self-construal
self-enhancement biases
social loafing study
commitment
group
in relationships
common ingroup identity model defined
recategorization
communal relationship
 defined
companionate love: defined comparison see social comparison competence
versus warmth compliance
defined
social influence
 strategies for inducing
confederate: defined
configural model: defined conflict
attention
during group development
 in group decision making
injunctive & descriptive norms intergroup
majority-minority influence
and minority influence
over resources
 and social change
Conflict Tactics Scales (CTS) defined
conformity
Asch’s studies
cultural differences
 and group norms
see also majority influence confounding, experimental variables conjunctive
tasks
consensus information
defined
 unavailability of
consistency: defined
consistency information
defined
 unavailability of
consistency theories: defined construct: defined
construct validity: defined contact hypothesis, prejudice reduction defined
extended
models of
 psychological processes
contingency approaches, leadership defined
continuum model of impression formation defined
control group: defined
controlled processes
 defined
dissociation model of stereotyping and impression formation
stereotype suppression
convergent validity
 defined
conversion: defined
coordination losses
defined
correspondence bias
defined
correspondent inference theory defined
cost-reward model: bystander intervention Cotard’s delusion, attributions
counterattitudinal behaviour defined
incentive-induced change
 inducing cognitive dissonance
self-perception theory
covariation theory
 defined
cover story: defined
crime
alcohol’s causal effect
collective
intimate partner
media violence link
and norm violation
statistics
temperature link
crisis in social psychology defined
 overcoming
cross-cultural replication defined
cultural embeddedness
cultural masculinity-femininity: defined culture
and attributional biases
and cognitive styles
defined
group processes
intercultural relations
and intergroup relations
and interpersonal relations
measuring
methodological issues
nations as cultures
and the self
cyberbullying
defined
and suicide risk
cybernetic systems
data collection techniques dating
debriefing
 defined
decategorization: defined deception: in research
decision making
 model of bystander behaviour
see also group decision making defence motivation
deindividuation
 defined
demand characteristics: defined democratic leadership
dependency-orientated help dependent variable
construct validity threats
defined
depression
 attributions of
and self-focus
depressive realism: defined derogation of alternatives: defined descriptive norms
desired selves: defined
dieting: and ego depletion diffusion of responsibility defined
direct reinforcement: defined disclosure reciprocity
defined
discounting principle
 defined
discourse analysis: defined discrimination see prejudice discussion bias, groups
disjunctive tasks
disobedience
dispensability effect
defined
displaced aggression
 defined
display rules: defined
dispositional attributions/inferences actor-observer difference
cultural differences
 and intentional behaviour
dissociation model: defined dissonance theory
 challenge to
and incentives/sanctions
and initiation rituals
distinctiveness information defined
unavailability of
distraction
 defined
divergence: groups
domestic violence
door-in-the-face technique: defined drive theory
dual categorization/identity dual-process theories of persuasion defined
eco-cultural theory
 defined
effort withdrawal, women egalitarianism
ego-defensive function: defined ego depletion: self-regulatory failure defined
egoism/egotism
egoism-altruism debate
implicit
 leading to violence
elaboration: defined
elaboration likelihood model (ELM) comparison to HSM model
defined
 interaction effect
source context elaboration model embeddedness versus autonomy values defined
emergencies
behaviour in life-threatening
 bystander behaviour in
costs and rewards of helping in impact of social identity
emotional contagion: defined emotional prejudice
emotional support
emotions
and attitudes
group
 and helping behaviour
negative, triggering aggression role of attributions
Schacter’s two factor theory
and self-presentation strategies empathic concern
defined
measure of
and volunteering
empathy
brain activation
defined
habituation reducing
and helping behaviour
individual differences in
and intergroup contact
 promotion of
encoding: defined
entitativity
 defined
equality: and positive intergroup contact equity theory
defined
ethical issues
aggression/violence research
bystander research
 obedience studies
research principles/standards
research strategy, choosing
ethnocentrism: defined
ethological perspective, aggression eureka effect: defined
Europe, social psychology in European Association of Social Psychology
(EASP): defined evaluation apprehension
 defined
evaluation bias, groups
evaluative conditioning
changing implicit attitudes
defined
evaluative priming
evolutionary psychology
altruism
 defined
group formation/group living
mate preference
need to belong
exchange relationship
defined
exchange theory
excitation transfer theory: defined exclusion see social exclusion existential
threats, groups exit: from a group
expectancy-value model, attitudes expectation states theory: defined
experimental confound: defined experimental group: defined experimental
method
 problems with
experimental scenario: defined experimenter expectancy effects defined
experiments
defined
 first experiment
explicit measures of attitude and attitude change
 defined
reliability & validity of
 versus implicit
extended contact hypothesis: defined external validity: defined F-scale (Fascism)
facial features: attraction facilitation see social facilitation factorial experiment:
defined failure
 attributions for
self-handicapping
self-regulatory
false consensus bias
 defined
familiarity: and friendship Fascism scale (F-scale)
favouritism, ingroup
cultural differences in
fear
appeals, advertising
emotional prejudice
 triggering aggression
‘feelings-as-information’ hypothesis field experiments
 defined
norms, violation of
prejudice study
 studies of helping behaviour
field theory: defined
fight and flight responses foot-in-the-door technique defined
forgiveness: defined
friendship
cultural differences
and familiarity
and frequent contact
functions of
intergroup
and proximity
 and similarity
frustration-aggression hypothesis defined
functional MRI (fMRI)
gender differences
 aggression
attractiveness & status preference bystander intervention
self-handicapping behaviour
self-knowledge
gender roles, cultural differences general aggression model (GAM) defined
genetic factors
aggressive behaviour
helping behaviour
need to belong
 physical attractiveness
geographic regions approach: defined global warming
globalization: and cultural differences goal dependent: defined
goals
activation of
defined
group
implicit
and intentions
 mediating behaviour
path-goal theory
performance
preventing stereotype activation processing
pursuit of intrinsic
and realistic conflict theory
and self regulation
 superordinate
graffiti, petty crime study group cognition
group cohesion
group commitment
and conformity to norms
defined
and initiation rituals
measurement of
group composition
defined
group decision making
and group composition
group polarization
and group synchronization
groupthink
and prosocial behaviour
group development
group distinctiveness, threats to group emotions
defined
group honour
group identification
defined
dual identity model
and entitativity
measuring
and prosocial behaviour
and social identity
group leadership
defined
group learning
defined
and leadership
group loyalty
group norms
self-categorization theory
group performance
actual and potential
and cohesion
 leadership improving
process losses & gains
group performance management defined
group polarization
defined
group potential
group socialization
 defined
Moreland & Levine’s model
group synchronization
defined
 and leadership
group task types: defined group tasks
group-to-group transfer: defined group-to-individual-in-group transfer: defined
group-to-individual transfer: defined groups
cultural differences
 defined
development & structure
helping behaviour
individuals in
intergroup analysis
and prejudice
 psychology of
types & functions of
groupthink
defined
habits
predicting behaviour
habituation
defined
harmony values
health
and attractiveness
campaigns
and forgiveness
psychology
and social relationships
heat hypothesis
defined
and effects of global warming
helping behaviour
and altruism/empathy
altruistic punishment
bystander research
costs and rewards
defined
and evolution
field experiment
and gender
 group processes
long-term, sustained
measurement of
negative aspects of
neuroscience of
priming of
prosocial behaviours
in the real world
and violence
heuristic
anchoring/adjustment
availability
defined
representativeness
heuristic processing
biasing systematic processing
defined
 effect of mood on
heuristic-systematic model (HSM) defined
hidden profiles
defined
and leadership
hierarchies
social, and discrimination
within groups
hierarchy versus egalitarianism values defined
historical perspectives
holistic cognition
Holocaust
honour, group
hormones
and aggression
defined
and physical attractiveness
hostile aggression
defined
hostile attribution bias defined
link to media violence
hostility
intergroup
 trait
HSM (heuristic-systematic model) Hull-Spence drive theory hypothesis: defined
IAT (implicit association test) ideal selves
identification see group identification identity negotiation: defined identity
theory
ideology
authoritarianism & social dominance of individualism
of meritocracy
illusions
 autokinetic effect
self-enhancing
illusory correlation effect defined
implementation intentions: defined implicit association test (IAT) implicit
attitudes, changing implicit egotism: defined implicit goal operation
defined
implicit measures
 defined
implicit measures of attitude behaviour predicted by
defined
 evaluative priming
implicit association test (IAT) implicit personality theory: defined implicit self-
esteem
defined
measuring
impression formation
cognitive heuristics
continuum model
motivational factors
role of schemas
impression motivation
impulsive helping
defined
incentives
limitations of
paradoxical effects of
inclusive fitness theory independent self
 defined
self-construal of
independent variable
defined
 manipulation of
individual capability gains and losses defined
individual mobility
individual-to-individual transfer: defined individualism
ideology of
and the independent self
 methodological
and post-materialism
individualism-collectivism and cognitive style
 defined
Hofstede’s dimensions
see also collectivist cultures individualist cultures

individuating information: defined information processing

and aggression
 cultural differences in
dual-process theories
 model of persuasion
self-enhancing
and self-schemas
informational influence
defined
 referent
informed consent, ethical research ingroup bias
 defined
and group distinctiveness threats and ingroup identification
minimal conditions for
neuroscientific evidence
 reduction of
socio-structural theories
and status/esteem threats
ingroup reappraisal: defined inhibition
of bystanders
 social
initiation, group
defined
hazing in student societies
injunctive norms
innovation see minority influence instrumental aggression: defined instrumental
support
interaction effect
 defined
interaction process analysis (IPA) interdependence
and ingroup favouritism
 positive and negative
self-construal
 and social loafing
interdependence (exchange) theory interdependent self
intergroup aggression
 defined
intergroup anxiety: defined intergroup comparisons
intergroup conflict
intergroup contact: and prejudice reduction intergroup emotion theories internal
validity: defined Internet experiment
 defined
interpersonal aggression: defined interpersonal attraction interpersonal cohesion:
defined interventions
aggression prevention/reduction prejudice reduction
intimacy groups
intimate partner violence defined
intimate relationships
 and attachment style
cross-cultural variation
and self-knowledge
intrinsic motivation: defined introspection
 defined
investment: defined
investment model
ironic processes model
jigsaw classroom
defined
Jonestown mass suicide
judgemental heuristics
jury decision-making
kin selection: defined
Köhler effect
 defined
laboratory experiment: defined laissez-faire leaders
defined
leader traits
 defined
leaderless groups: defined leadership (in organizations) defined
leadership behaviour
contingency approaches
 defined
leadership effectiveness: defined leadership styles
cross-cultural studies
defined
and group decision making
learned helplessness theory defined
learning
of aggression
group
legitimizing myths
lexical decision task
 defined
life-threatening emergencies, behaviour in Likert scales
littering, petty crime study looking-glass self
love
lowballing technique: defined loyalty: groups
main effects: defined
majority influence
Asch’s studies
defined
factors influencing
in juries
reasons for
 theories of
manipulation check: defined maritime disasters
mass panic
mastery versus harmony values: defined media violence-aggression link defined
mediating variable: defined mere exposure effect
changing implicit attitudes
defined
 liking linked to familiarity
mere presence: task performance meritocracy
meta-analysis: defined
methodological individualism: defined migration: and acculturation minimal
group paradigm
defined
minority influence
defined
and innovation
in juries
theories of
misattribution of arousal defined
misers, cognitive
mobbing see bullying MODE model
 defined
modelling: defined
defined
modesty norms
monitoring: self-regulation mood: and attitude change moral reasoning, measure
of mortality rate and social relationships motivation
for helping behaviour
intrinsic
MODE model
and processing goals
 for prosocial behaviour
for self-knowledge
and self-serving biases
to control racial prejudice
motivation losses and gains defined
in group task performance
 in individual capability
separating from coordination losses multicomponent model of attitude defined
mutual differentiation
 defined
naïve scientist model: defined narcissism
narratives
nation-level factor analysis: defined need for cognition (NFC) defined
scale measuring
need for cognitive closure defined
scale measuring
need to belong
defined
 and group formation
and self-esteem
negative interdependence: defined negative self-views
negative-state-relief model defined
negotiation
 cultural differences
focus, groups
perils of cross-cultural
 of roles in groups
neuroscience see social neuroscience newcomer influence, groups nominal
group: defined
non-common effects, analysis of non-reactive (unobtrusive) measures normative
influence
defined
norms
aggressive
cultural differences
defined
descriptive and injunctive
and discrimination
formation of
group
influence on behaviour
ingroup norm strategy
personal and group
 political correctness
and self-awareness
subjective
transmission of
obedience to authority
 defined
Milgram’s paradigm
motives underlying
 situational determinants
object appraisal function, attitudes defined
observational measures
one-dimensional perspective, attitudes: defined one-shot case study: defined
online dating
operationalization: defined outcome dependency: defined outgroup bias: defined
outgroup helping
outgroup homogeneity effect: defined outgroup threats: and prejudice over-
justification effect: defined pancultural self-enhancement participant: defined
participant observation: defined partner preferences
passionate love: defined passivity: in emergencies path-goal theory of leadership
peer nominations
 defined
perceived behavioural control: defined perceived partner responsiveness defined
performance see group performance; task performance peripheral route to
persuasion defined
peripheral trait: defined persecutory delusions
personality
and attitude-behaviour relation authoritarian
of leaders
and prejudice
prosocial
psychology
questionnaire
personalized contact
perspective taking, measure of persuasion
advertising
and attitude content
 cognitive response model
dual-process theories
in group decision making
implicit attitude change
information processing model
 resistance to
via incentives/sanctions
physical aggression: defined physical attractiveness
benefits of
contextual influences on
 features determining
gender differences in preferences for judgement convergence
 men seeking in a partner
‘what is beautiful is good’ stereotype physical contact: and stress reduction
planned behaviour, theory of pluralistic ignorance: defined polarization: groups
positive differentiation defined
positive interdependence: defined positive intergroup contact positive-negative
asymmetry: defined post-experimental enquiry: defined post-materialism
post-test only control group design: defined post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD): defined potential group performance process losses & gains
power distance: defined
power relations and helping prejudice
cognitive approach
 defined
explicit & implicit measures group approaches
interventions to reduce
personality approaches
 and social neuroscience
socio-structural theories
see also stereotypes presence of others, effect on task performance primacy
effect: defined
priming
of behaviour and goals
 defined
Devine’s work
 and subliminal advertising
principle-implementation gap: defined prison studies
probabilistic contrast: defined probabilistic sampling
probe reaction task
defined
probe reaction task
 defined
production blocking: defined proportion of shared genes: defined prosocial
behaviour
altruism and helping
cultural differences
 defined
see also helping behaviour prosocial personality
defined
 measuring
proximity: relationships psychological attraction public goods game: defined
public opinion surveys
punishment
for aggression
 altruistic
qualitative versus quantitative approaches quasi-experiment
defined
questionnaires
 aggression
back-translation
 measuring attitudes
responses to, cultural differences quota sample: defined
racial equality
racial prejudice
contact reducing
and group relations
 IAT measures
scale measuring motivation to control and social climate
 and social context
random allocation: defined reactance theory: defined reactivity: defined
realistic conflict theory defined
reasoned action, theory of rebound effect, stereotypes defined
recategorization: defined reciprocal altruism: defined ‘reciprocal concessions’
procedure reciprocity
in altruistic behaviour
disclosure
ingroup
 in relationships
referent informational influence: defined reflected appraisals: defined reflective-
impulsive model (RIM) rejection
 causal attributions
and self-esteem
 sensitivity to
see also social exclusion relational aggression
defined
relationship commitment
defined
 nonvoluntary
relationship superiority: defined relationships
abusive
and attachment
attraction
cultural differences
disclosure
ending of
need to belong
online dating
perceived partner responsiveness and rejection
romantic
and social support
types of
 and wellbeing
relative deprivation: defined defined
reliability
of attitude measures
 defined
remembrance, groups
repetition and attitude change representativeness heuristic defined
research
data collection methods
experimentation
 strategies
right-wing authoritarianism Ringelmann effect
defined
 study replicating
rituals: initiation
rivalry, intergroup
role
defined
and status
role identities
role transition: defined romantic relationships
sacrifice: in relationships salience
defined
group categorisation
 of group membership
sampling: defined
sanctions: and attitude change satisfaction: in relationships scapegoat theory:
defined schadenfreude, intergroup schema(s)
activation and behaviour
causal schema
 defined
and self-concept
scientific method
self-assessment motive
 defined
self-awareness
avoidance of
 defined
self-categorization theory defined
 and group polarization
varying levels of categorization self-concept
 defined
self-construals
cultural differences
 defined
self-determination theory: defined self-disclosure
 defined
self-efficacy
 defined
and self-focus
self-enhancement
defined
pros and cons of
 reasons for
self-esteem
cultural differences
 defined
self-esteem (Continued) gender differences
of groups, threats to
implicit and explicit
and life events
measuring implicit
and narcissism
pros and cons of pursuing
Rosenberg scale
sociometer theory
 trait and state
self-esteem hypothesis: defined self-expansion model
self-fulfilling prophecies defined
expectation states theory
 and social stereotypes
self-handicapping
defined
 gender differences
self-knowledge
mental representations
neural underpinnings
 origins of
self-monitoring
and attitude-behaviour relation defined
self-narratives
self-other difference
self-perception theory
 defined
self-presentation
 defined
and self-enhancement
self-reference effect: defined self-reflection
self-regulation
autonomous
defined
 drawbacks of
strength & depletion of
 theory of
see also self-awareness self-report measures
 of aggressive behaviour
self-esteem
self-schemas
defined
 and information processing
versus working self-concept
self-serving attributional biases defined
self stability and change self-verification
 defined
self-worth contingencies defined
selfishness
semantic differential scales sexual aggression
 defined
shared cognition: groups shared leadership: defined similarity-attraction effect
defined
similarity: relationships simple random sample: defined smoking
campaigns to stop
 incentives and sanctions
social adjustment function: defined social categories, group type social
categorization
accentuation explanation
and intergroup behaviour
 link to amygdala activation
majority-minority influence
pervasive nature of
 and prejudice
social change, role of intergroup conflict social cognition
defined
social comparison
defined
and group polarization
intergroup
and majority influence
measurement of
and norm formation
social compensation
defined
social competition
defined
social desirability
defined
measuring
social dominance orientation defined
as ideological belief
 and prejudice
social equality: and positive intergroup contact social exchange theory
social exclusion
from groups, negative effects
immediate effects of
social facilitation
 defined
social hierarchy and discrimination social identity
and bystander effect
cultural differences
 defined
and empathy-motivated helping
and ingroup bias, neuroscience
and intergroup aggression
and intergroup behaviour
 and outgroup helping
and positive intergroup contact see also group identification social identity
theory
and positive differentiation
and status legitimacy
versus identity theory
social influence
defined
deliberate
incidental
motives for
social loafing
causes and consequences of
collectivist versus individualist groups defined
social neuroscience
defined
 prosocial behaviour
social identity and ingroup bias social penetration theory social perception
automatic and controlled
defined
and interpersonal behaviour
and social behaviour
and social reality
subliminal priming influencing
social psychology
classic studies
in Europe
history of
recent theory
social reality
and social perception
 testing of
social reality constraints: defined social responsibility, measure of social support
 defined
socialization, groups
socio-emotional behaviour defined
socio-structural theories: discrimination sociology
sociometer theory: defined speaking hierarchy: defined staffing level: defined
staircase model
 defined
standards, self-regulatory Stanford Prison Experiment state self-esteem
status
and bullying
defined
and group roles
of groups and discrimination
and helping behaviour
 and obedience to authority
preference for in intimate relationships and production blocking
social dominance theory
 threats to group
steam boiler model: defined stereotype content model stereotype suppression
defined
stereotypes
automatic & controlled components of automaticity of activation
and cognitive heuristics
 defined
implicit goals overriding activation of implicit measures
 priming studies
replacing with egalitarian responses suppression of
stress: buffered by social support strong reciprocity: defined subjective norms
subjective validity
subliminal advertising
defined
subtyping model
success, attributions for sucker effect
defined
suicide
 and cyberbullying
mass suicide, Jonestown
and self-focus
summation: defined
superordinate goals: defined support: in relationships survey research
defined
system justification theory systematic processing
biased by heuristic processing
defined
theories of
Tajfel matrices
task behaviours
defined
task specialists
task cohesion
defined
task design
task groups
task performance
and group learning
minorities leading to creative
motivation losses
and presence of others
team awareness
defined
team leadership
team performance
teams/teamwork
multicultural
social loafing
television violence
effects of long-term exposure to experimental methods
temperature and aggression terror management theory defined
terrorism
defined
Menezes shooting
response during
staircase model
theory
defined
new perspectives
theory of planned behaviour defined
theory of reasoned action defined
thought-listing
 defined
stereotypes & prejudice study threats: to group values time periods approach:
defined TOTE loop, self-regulation trait aggressiveness
defined
questionnaire items
traits
of leaders
 mediating behaviour
and self-esteem
transactional leaders
defined
transactive memory
defined
transformational leaders defined
triangulation: defined
true randomized experiment defined
see also field experiments two-dimensional perspective on attitudes defined
uncertainty avoidance: defined unobtrusive measures: defined utilitarian
function, attitudes defined
versus value-expressive attitudes utilitarian perspective, group formation validity
of attitude measures
defined
 subjective
value-expressive function, attitudes defined
versus utilitarian attitudes
values
 cultural differences in
post-materialist
 threats to group
see also attitudes variable
defined
dependent
independent
mediating
violence
 bystander behaviour
bystander intervention, gender role defined
directed at outgroups
intergroup
and narcissism
 research difficulties
on television, researching
 and video game usage
see also aggression virtual reality
experiments using
online dating
videogames and aggression
voluntary relationships
volunteerism
charitable donation
 defined
volunteers, in experiments warmth versus competence ‘we-ness’ concept
weapons effect
 defined
web-based experiments
wellbeing: and relationships whistle blowing: defined willingness to sacrifice
defined
working self-concept
defined
workplace bullying
xenophobia