AMENDMENTS

REMEDIAL LAW
CASE DIGESTS
(Week 4)

Submitted by:
BONACUA, Lydie Ron A.
JD4B
02-06-21

Submitted to:
Hon. Jonel C. Martinez-Ursua
AMENDMENTS

WEEK 4
1. RODULF LEITZ HOLDINGS INC. V. REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF PARANAQUE GR NO. 133240
NOVEMBER 15, 2000.
FACTS:
In this case, petitioner corporation instituted a petition for amendment of titles with the
RTC of Parañaque City. Petition impleaded the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City. It stated that the
TCTs were all issued by the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City and were located in Pasay City.
Subsequently, petitioner learned that the subject titles are in the custody of the Register of Deeds
of Parañaque City. Hence, petitioner filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended Petition. In the
amended petition petitioner impleaded instead as respondent the Registry of Deeds of Parañaque
City, and alleged that the lands are located in Parañaque City. The court however dimissed the
petition motu proprio on the ground of improper venue, it appearing that respondent is the
Registry of Deeds of Pasay City and the properties are located in Pasay City. In view of the
dismissal of the petition, the court denied the ex-parte motion to admit amended petition. The
Solicitor General filed its comment alleging that the court could not have acquired jurisdiction
over the res since the properties are in Pasay.
ISSUE:
WON the court can motu proprio dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue
WON the RTC correctly disallowed the petitioner to amened its petition
RULING:
No. Dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper venue is certainly not the appropriate
course of action at this stage of the proceedings, particularly as venue, in inferior courts as well
as in the courts of first instance (now RTC), may be waived expressly or impliedly. Jurisdiction
over the subject matter or nature of an action is conferred only by law while venue is procedural,
not jurisdictional, and hence may be waived. It is meant to provide convenience to the parties,
rather than restrict their access to the courts as it relates to the place of trial. The court may only
dismiss an action motu proprio in case of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis
pendentia, res judicata and prescription. Therefore, the trial court in this case erred when it
dismissed the petition motu proprio.

2. No. The rules provide that a party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right at any
time before a responsive pleading is served or, in the case of a reply, at any time within ten (10)
days after it is served. Amendments to pleadings are liberally allowed in furtherance of justice,
in order that every case may so far as possible be determined on its real facts, and in order to
speed the trial of cases or prevent the circuitry of action and unnecessary expense. 21 The trial
court, therefore, should have allowed the amendment proposed by petitioner for in so doing, it
would have allowed the actual merits of the case to be speedily determined, without regard to
technicalities, and in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner.
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WEEK 4
2. REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORP., V. CA G.R. NO. 133657, MARCH 29, 2002
IMPORTANT ISSUE: Can a complaint still be amended as a matter of right before an answer has
been filed, even if there was a pending proceeding for its dismissal before the higher court?
YES. Not prejudicial to the defendant. Even work to his advantage as a speedy trial is favored by
courts than refiling of the case.
FACTS:
In this case, petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money and damages arising from
breach of contract against Industrial Steels, Ltd. (ISL), with Ferro Trading GMBH and respondent
British Steel as alternative defendants before the RTC of Manila. ISL and respondent British Steel
separately moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that it failed to state a cause
of action against them, however the same was dismissed by the court. ISL then filed an answer
to the complaint while respondent British Steel filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
before the CA. Respondent claimed that the complaint did not contain a single averment that
respondent committed any act or is guilty of any omission in violation of petitioner’s legal rights.
Later, petitioner sought to amend its complaint by incorporating additional factual allegations
constitutive of cause of action. Petitioner argues that it can amend its complaint as a matter of
right because respondent has not yet filed a responsive pleading. Petitioner filed a manifestation
stating that it had filed a Motion to Admit Amended Complaint before the trial court. The trial court
noted the same. Later, the CA grants the writ of certiorari and orders the respondent judge to
dismiss without prejudice the Complaint against petitioner British Steel.
ISSUE: WON the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action under the original
complaint was proper notwithstanding the fact that said complaint was already amended as a
matter of right and sufficient causes of action are averred in the amended complaint
RULING:
No. The decision of the appellate court will result in multiple suits, involving the same set
of facts and to which defendants would likely raise the same set of facts and to which the
defendants would likely raise the same or, at least, related defenses. The amendment of the
complaint would not prejudice respondents or delay the action, as this would, in fact, simplify the
case and expedite it disposition. A pleading may be amended as a matter of right before a
responsive pleading is served. It means that prior to the filing of an answer, the plaintiff has the
absolute right to amend the complaint whether a new cause of action or change in theory is
introduced. Under this provision, substantial amendment of the complaint is not allowed without
leave of court after an answer has been served, because any material change in the allegations
contained in the complaint could prejudice the rights of the defendant who has already set up his
defense in the answer. Where some but not all the defendants have answered, the plaintiff may
still amend its complaint once, as a matter of right, in respect to claims asserted solely against
the non-answering defendant, but not as to claims asserted against the other defendants. In this
case, respondent will not be prejudiced by the admission of the Amended Complaint
since petitioner merely re-filed the complaint instead of being allowed to amend it. Amendment
would even work to respondent’s advantage since it will undoubtedly speed up the proceedings
before the trial court. Hence, the court erroneously dismissed the complaint.
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WEEK 4
3. SPOUSES VALENZUELA V. CA 416 PHIL. 289, G.R. No. 131175. August 28, 2001
FACTS:
In this case, spouses Manuel and Leticia De Guia filed a complaint for specific performance
and damages against petitioner spouses Valenzuela before the CFI of Pasay City praying that
petitioners execute in favor of private respondents the necessary deed of sale covering the two
(2) parcels of land allegedly subject of a contract to sell between said parties. private
respondents spouses De Guia, upon discovering that the subject real properties were sold and
transferred by the spouses Valenzuela to herein co-petitioners spouses Alfredo and Bella
Gonzales Quiazon, filed an action for annulment of sale, cancellation of title and damages, against
spouses Valenzuela, spouses Quiazon, and the Register of Deeds of Pasay City. In the complaint,
Spouses De Guia prayed for the annulment of the deed of sale executed by petitioners in favor of
spouses Quiazon and reinstatement of TCTs in their favor, and reconveyance of Sps. Quiazon to
Sps. Valenzeula. Later, respondents amended their complaint impleading Webb-Hegg
Construction as additional defendant while Sps. De Guia filed a Motion to Admit Second Amended
Complaint impleading Gerardo Villacorta as additional defendant. The case was transferred to
RTC of Makati as a result of B.P.129. The RTC then admitted the Second amended complaint. Upon
motion of the defendants therein, however, the case was returned to RTC-Pasay, where spouses
De Guia moved to admit a third amended complaint seeking to implead spouses De Guzman, De
Guzman Development Corporation, Skyfreight Brokerage, Inc. and Lawyer Romeo Bobadilla, as
additional defendants, however the same was denied and declaring as automatically vacated the
order of RTC-Makati, Branch 133, which admitted the second amended complaint. After trial, the
court dismissed the complaint. Upon motion of spouses Quiazon, lower court issued an order
dated 17 January 1996 directing the cancellation of the Notice of Lis Pendens under Entry No. 81-
11596 and Entry No. 81-12186 and the Adverse Claim under Entry No. 81-11601 on TCT Nos. 39386
and 39397 in the name of spouses Quiazon. private respondents filed a motion to admit amended
complaint in Civil Case No. PQ-9412-P. Prior to the resolution of the two pending motions, private
respondents filed a motion for the inhibition of the presiding judge of Branch 117, RTC-Pasay. The
court granted the inhibition resulting in the re-raffle of the case to Judge Ylagan. Judge Ylagan
denied the motion to admit amended complaint prompting herein private respondents spouses
De Guia to file a motion for reconsideration which the lower court denied.
ISSUE: WON the denial of the motion to admit the amended complaint was proper

RULING:
Yes. Under these circumstances, particularly considering the dismissal of Civil Case No.
PQ-9432-P on ground of litis pendentia, the disallowance of the amendment of the complaint in
Civil Case No. PQ-9412-P would, to our mind, necessarily result in an even greater delay in the
disposition and adjudication of the actual merits of the case, which run counter to the hallowed
office and cardinal objective of the Rules. The introduction of amendments to the complaint
is apropos at this particular instance to forestall further delay in the resolution of the actual
merits of the parties' respective claims and defenses. Procedural laws are retroactive in that
sense and to that extent. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants rights
may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of
procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected.
To reiterate, the Rules of Court seek to eliminate undue reliance on technical rules and to make
litigation as inexpensive, as practicable and as convenient as can be done. 14 Rules of procedure,
AMENDMENTS
after all, are but tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that when rigid
application of the rules tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, the Supreme
Court is empowered to suspend their operation. In this case, the case has already dragged and
suffered protracted delay for a span of twenty years, borne by countless legal skirmishes
between the party litigants involving principally entanglement on technical niceties and
procedural rules.
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WEEK 4
4. PPA VERSUS GOTHONG AND ABOITIZ, INC., GR NO. 158401 JANUARY 28, 2008
FACTS:
In this case, petitioner Petitioner William Gothong & Aboitiz, Inc. (WG&A for brevity), is a
duly organized domestic corporation engaged in the shipping industry. Respondent Philippine
Ports Authority (PPA for brevity), upon the other hand, is a government-owned and controlled
company. WG&A requested respondent PPA for it to be allowed to lease and operate the said
facility after the expiration of lease contract with Veterans shipping Corporation. Pursuant to the
memorandum executed by President Estrada, the request of petitioner W&GA to lease the Marine
Slip Way was granted from January 1 to June 30, 2001 or until such time that respondent PPA
turns over its operations to the winning bidder for the North Harbor Modernization Project.
However, believing that the said lease already expired on June 30, 2001, respondent PPA
subsequently sent a letter to petitioner WG&A dated November 12, 2001 directing the latter to
vacate the contested premises. petitioner WG&A commenced an Injunction suit before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila. Petitioner claims that the PPA unjustly, illegally and prematurely
terminated the lease contract. Later, petitioner amended its complaint for the first time. The
complaint was still denominated as one for Injunction with prayer for TRO. In the said amended
pleading, the petitioner incorporated statements to the effect that PPA is already estopped from
denying that the correct period of lease is "until such time that the North Harbor Modernization
Project has been bidded out to and operations turned over to the winning bidder. It impleaded a
third cause of action and an additional relief that it must be reimbursed of the value of
improvements introduced in the leased property. Following the first amendment in the
petitioner's complaint, respondent PPA submitted its answer on January 23, 2002. Meanwhile, the
TRO sought by the former was denied. petitioner filed a Motion to Admit Attached Second
Amended Complaint. This time, however, the complaint was already captioned as one for
Injunction with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
damages and/or for Reformation of Contract. Also, it included as its fourth cause of action and
additional relief in its prayer, the reformation of the contract. However, respondent PPA opposed
the second amended complaint on the ground that it constitutes substantial amendment that will
alter the cause of action and theory of the case. The RTC denied the second amended complaint,
however on appeal, the CA set aside the order of the court and admitted the second amended
complaint.
ISSUE: WON the second amended complaint should be admitted by the RTC
RULING:
Yes. The RTC erroneously applied the old rules almost after five (5) years after passage
constitutes grave abuse of discretion. The new rules provide that substantial amendments may
be made only upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it appears to the court that
the motion was made with intent to delay. However, when despite a substantial change or
alteration in the cause of action or defense, the amendments sought to be made shall serve the
higher interests of substantial justice, and prevent delay and equally promote the laudable
objective of the rules which is to secure a "just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every
action and proceeding. In this case, the application of the old Rules by the RTC almost five years
after its amendment by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure patently constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.
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WEEK 4
5. ONG PENG V. CUSTODIO 1 SCRA 780
FACTS:
In this case, Ong Peng filed a case against Jose Custodio to recover the sum of P2,527.30,
with interest, representing the value of goods and materials obtained by defendant from plaintiff.
The complaint was filed on April 15, 1958, and on April 30 defendant moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that plaintiff's cause of action had already prescribed. Plaintiff answered
defendants motion and attached his amended complaint which set forth the promissory note
supporting the claim. No answer to the amended complaint was presented and no objection to its
admission was also interposed. The court admitted the amended complaint on the ground that no
objection thereto had been filed, and on May 28, it denied the motion to dismiss. When defendant
failed to file an answer to the amended complaint, petitioner prayed that the defendant be
declared in default. Prior to this hearing, that is, on July 5, 1958, defendant moved to set aside
the order of default and to allow him to file his answer. Consequently, the court denied the motion
of the defendant. after presentation of plaintiff's evidence, the court entered judgment ordering
defendant to pay plaintiff, however a motion was yet again filed by defendant alleging that he has
a valid defense and that the promissory note was false and spurious. defendant-appellant argues
that defendant never came under the jurisdiction of the court for the purposes of the amended
complaint because the same was not served upon him with summons and in accordance with
Section 10, Rule 27 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: WON the contention of defendant is with merit
RULING:

No. The rules provide that if the defendant had already appeared in response to the first
summons, so that he was already in court when the amended complaint was filed, then ordinary
service of that pleading upon him, personally or by mail, would be sufficient, and no new
summons need be served upon him. In the case at bar, the amended complaint contained no new
matter; it only sets forth the promissory note upon which the cause of action is based. In the case
at bar also the defendant had already appeared when the amended complaint was served-
defendant had, in fact, presented a motion to dismiss. More so, defendant never claimed that he
did not receive the amended complaint in the ordinary course of mail and his only objection
thereto was the fact that no summons was served upon him with regard thereto. The opposition
to the motion to dismiss and the amended complaint were served attorney for the defendant on
May 12, 1958 by registered mail.
The plaintiff can validly amend his complaint the right of a plaintiff under Section 1 of Rule
17 to amend his pleading once as a matter of course before a responsive pleading (which a motion
to dismiss is not one) is served, has been held to be one which the court should always grant,
otherwise mandamus will lie against it. In this case, the amendment was merely one of form; it
did not change the cause of action, but only set forth the promissory note on which the action
was based.
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WEEK 4
6. SALVADOR V. FRIO 33 SCRA 315
FACTS:
In this case, petitioner Plaintiffs-spouses originally filed on February 7, 1962 their
complaint alleging that they are the absolute owners of a fenced parcel of landdefendant, Juan
Verdad, alleges ownership of the above-described parcel of land by virtue of an alleged deed of
sale executed in his favor by his co-defendant, Rosendo Frio, who, in turn, claims ownership
thereon under Free Patent. Alleging to have suffered damages of no less than P1,000.00 from
defendants’ illegal acts, plaintiffs prayed for judgment declaring them the owners of the land with
right of possession, and for the court to order defendant Rosendo Frio to reconvey to them the
land, annulling whatever sale defendant Frio may have executed in favor of his co-defendant
Juan Verdad. Defendant Verdad filed on April 5, 1962 in due course his answer traversing the
allegations of plaintiffs’ complaint and setting up as an affirmative defense that he had purchased
in good faith. Defendant Verdad further filed a cross-claim against his co-defendant Frio for the
latter to pay him the said damages. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground
that the complaint states no cause of action in that allegedly it failed to state positively and
directly that plaintiffs are the owners of the property. plaintiffs allege that the lower court erred
in ordering the dismissal of their complaint and in not permitting them to amend the same.
ISSUE: WON the dismissal was proper
RULING:

No. The lower court dismissal order were erroneous. Finally assuming that the lower court
had basis for granting defendants’ motion to dismiss on the grounds stated in its orders, it should
have granted plaintiffs’ repeated prayers to be allowed to file proper amendments should it find
their allegations inadequate, in accordance with the mandate of the Rules of Court that
amendments to pleadings are favored and should be liberally allowed, particularly in the early
stages of the lawsuit, "so that the actual merits of the controversy may speedily be determined
without regard to technicalities, and in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner.
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WEEK 4
7. ARKINS KROLL V. DOMINGO 44 PHIL 680
FACTS:
In this case, complainant filed an action was filed before the CFI of Zamboanga against
Santiago Domingo, praying for recognition of its alleged right of ownership over a cadastral plan
of the Zamboanga townsite, expediente No. 7880, and to recover possession of the same from
the defendant, and at the same time to secure a partition of lots Nos. 36 and 55 in the same plan,
according to the proportional interests pertaining to the plaintiff and defendant as joint owners
thereof. After trial, the court ruled that the rights of the plaintiff as tenant in common with the
defendant in respect to the land in all of said lots to the full extent claimed by the plaintiff and
made an appropriate order for a division thereof, but the court at the same time held that the
buildings on lots Nos. 36 and 38 are of the exclusive ownership of the defendant, Santiago
Domingo, and that before the plaintiff can obtain possession of said buildings the defendant is
entitled to be reimbursed for their value, which the court fixed at P18,000, in accordance with
article 361 of the Civil Code. The court however denied the plaintiff of any recovery of rentals from
defendant, but only recovery with respect to taxes.
ISSUE: WON the judgment on the amended complaint should be entered against defendant
RULING:
No. Where the defendant is in default as to the original complaint, and an amended complaint
is filed while such default exists, to sustain a judgment upon the amended complaint as to any
new matter, it should be served upon the defendant with the same formalities as the original
complaint. Where the original complaint was duly served upon the defendant, who makes default,
and an amended complaint was thereafter filed, which was not legally served upon the defendant,
a judgment rendered upon the amended complaint is void as to any new matter therein alleged.
In this case, the amended complaint and summons should have been served upon the defendant
with the same formalities as the original complaint and summons. Hence, the service of the
amended complaint made by the attorney for the plaintiff is not valid and did not give the court
jurisdiction to render judgment upon the amended complaint. The defendant has now entered a
formal appearance and is in court, and service of the amended complaint can now be made on
the defendant or his attorneys of record by the attorney for the plaintiff in compliance with the
rules of the court in the same manner as any other pleading or motion can be served when the
parties are in court.
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WEEK 4
8. INTERNATIONAL FILMS VS. LYRIC FILM EXCHANGE 63 PHIL 778
FACTS:
In this case, Bernard Gabelman, a Philippine agent the plaintiff company International Films
(China), Ltd. leased leased the film entitled "Monte Carlo Madness" to the defendant company,
the Lyric Film Exchange, Inc. for several days in different places. One of the conditions of the
contract was that the defendant company would answer for the loss of the film in question
whatever the cause. following the last showing of the film, Vicente Albo, then chief of the film
department of the Lyric Film Exchange, Inc., telephoned said agent of the plaintiff company
informing him that the showing of said film had already finished and asked, at the same time,
where he wished to have the film returned to him. Galbelman then informed informed Albo that
he wished to see him personally in the latter's office. Gabelman went to Vicente Albo's office and
asked whether he could deposit the film in question in the vault of the Lyric Film Exchange, Inc.,
as the International Films (China) Ltd. did not yet have a safety vault, as required by the
regulations of the fire department. After the case was referred to Albo’s chief, the former said
that the deposit could not be made inasmuch as the film would not be covered by the insurance
carried by respondent Lyric Film. Bernard Gabelman then requested Vicente Albo to permit him
to deposit said film in the vault of the Lyric Film Exchange, Inc., under Gabelman's own
responsibility. As there was a verbal contract between Gabelman and the Lyric Film Exchange
Inc., whereby the film "Monte Carlo Madness" would be shown elsewhere, O'Malley agreed and
the film was deposited in the vault of the defendant company under Bernard Gabelman's
responsibility. When Gabelman severed his relationship with the plaintiff company, and was
succeeded by Lazarus Joseph, he informed the latter of the deposit in the vault of the defendant
company as well as of the verbal contract entered into between him and the Lyric Film Exchange,
Inc., whereby the latter would act as a subagent of the plaintiff company, International Films
(China) Ltd., with authority to show this film "Monte Carlo Madness. When Lazarus took over, he
went to the office to ask for the return of the deposit to not only the subject film but several other
films as well.
ISSUE: WON the court a quo erred in allowing the defendant company to amend its answer after
both parties had already rested their respective cases.
RULING:
No. The rule is that courts will be liberal in allowing an amendment to a pleading when
it does not seriously impair the rights of the opposite party — and particularly an amendment to
an answer. it is discretionary in the court which has cognizance of a case to allow or not the
amendment of an answer for the purpose of questioning the personality of the plaintiff to bring
the action, even after the parties had rested their cases, as it causes no injustice to any of the
parties, and this court will not interfere in the exercise of said discretion unless there is an
evident abuse thereof, which does not exist in this case. In this case, It does not appear sufficiently
proven that the understanding had between Lazarus Joseph, second agent of the plaintiff
company, and Vicente Albo, chief of the film department of the defendant company, was that the
defendant company would continue showing said film under the same contract Exhibit C. The
preponderance of evidence shows that the verbal agreement had between Bernard Gabelman,
the former agent of the plaintiff company, and Vicente Albo, chief of the film department of the
defendant company, was that said film "Monte Carlo Madness" would remain deposited in the
safety vault of the defendant company under the responsibility of said former agent and that the
defendant company, as his subagent, could show it in its theaters, the plaintiff company receiving
5 per cent of the receipts up to a certain amount, and 15 per cent thereof in excess of said amount.
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WEEK 4
9. AZNAR III VS. BERNARD 161 SCRA 276
FACTS:
In this case, plaintiff issued two (2) BPI checks payable to PAL Employee’s savings and loan
association (PESALA). The words "FOR PAYEE'S ACCOUNT ONLY" written on its face was
delivered in trust to Catalino Bañez in his capacity as President of PESALA. However, on the same
date, Bañez and his co-officers Romeo Busuego and Renato Lim deposited the check in their joint
account with respondent Republic Planters Bank, Cubao Branch, which was not an official
depositary bank of PESALA. Later, Bañez, Busuego and Lim withdrew the amount and failed to
account for it to PESALA. PESALA sued Republic Planters Bank for the face value of the check
as damages for allowing the deposit and encashment of the check despite the fact that it was a
crossed check payable only to the account of PESALA. Later, RPB moved for leave to file a third-
party complaint against the said officers and Alberto Barican, the manager of RPB of Cubao
Branch alleging that they were solely and exclusively responsible for the loss of the value of the
check through their misrepresentation. The motion was granted. PESALA and RPB entered into
a compromise agreement under which PNB-RB agreed to pay PESALA P20,226,685.00. PESALA,
in turn, undertook to assist PNB-RB in prosecuting the third-party defendants for the liability
assumed by the bank, and the same was approved by the court. third-party defendant Lim moved
to dismiss the third-party complaint on the ground that it could not stand on its own after the
termination of the main complaint by compromise since the third-party complaint was but an
incident and a continuation of the main case. Third-party defendants Bañez and Busuego, aside
from adopting the ground invoked by defendant Lim, likewise moved to dismiss on grounds of lis
pendens, forum shopping, lack of jurisdiction and cause of action. The court deferred the motion
to dismiss on the ground of lis pendens and forum shopping, but denied the motion outright
anchored on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and termination of the principal complaint. The court
denied the motion of third-party defendants to reconsider on the basis that the compromise
between plaintiff PESALA and third-party plaintiff PNB-RB did not operate to automatically
dismiss the third-party complaint as the latter was actually independent of, and separate and
distinct from, the plaintiff's complaint.
ISSUE: WON the earlier dismissal (by virtue of compromise) of the main complaint warrants the
automatic dismissal of the third-party complaint filed in consequence thereof
RULING:
No. In Ruiz Jr. v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the dismissal of the complaint
divested the cross-claimants of whatever appealable interest they might have had before and
made the cross-claim itself no longer viable. A third-party complaint is indeed similar to a cross-
claim, except only with respect to the persons against whom they are directed. However this
does not apply in the case at bar. the termination of the main action between PESALA and PNB-
RB was not due to any finding that it was bereft of any basis. On the contrary, further proceedings
were rendered unnecessary only because defendant (third-party plaintiff) PNB-RB, to avoid a
protracted litigation, voluntarily admitted liability in the amount of P20,226,685.00. Hence, the
termination of the main action between PESALA and PNB-RB could not have rendered lifeless
the third-party complaint filed against petitioners, as it did the cross-claim in Ruiz Jr. v. Court of
Appeals, since it involved a finding of liability on the part of PNB-RB even if it be by compromise.
Hence, a continuation of the proceedings with respect to the third-party complaint will not ipso
facto subject petitioners, as third-party defendants, to liability as it will only provide the parties
with the occasion to litigate their respective claims and defenses. Petitioners' assertion that they
are not liable for the obligation voluntarily assumed by PNB-RB in the compromise is but a
AMENDMENTS
defense to resist the third-party complaint which they can properly raise in the course of the trial
and prove by whatever evidence they may have on the matter.
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WEEK 4
10. SHAFFER V. PALMA 22 SCRA 934
FACTS:
In this case, plaintiff Eufemia V. Shaffer filed a complaint against defendant spouses
Virginia G. Palma and Bonifacio Palma to recover certain sums of money and shares of stock. In
the complaint she alleged that she was the widow of late Nicolas R. Lynevitche, the Managing
Director of the British American Engineering Corporation, who had himself insured for
P300,000.00 with the Great American Insurance Company against accidental death, designating
the British American Corporation as beneficiary and while Lynevitche and plaintiff were living as
husband and wife they received from defendants advances and loans totalling P32,000.00, and to
secure payment thereof Lynevitche delivered to them his 175 shares of stock of the British
American Engineering Corporation; that when Lynevitche was made to understand by defendants
that the shares pledged by him were insufficient to secure the payment of the loans and advances
given by defendants, Lynevitche, in his capacity as managing director. More so, it alleged that a
deed of assignment was executed transferring the right of said corporation in favor of plaintiff
and defendant Palma and the same was ratified and confirmed by the BOD. It was alleged that
defendants knew that defendant Virginia Palma was included as one of the assignees of the
insurance policy. Plaintiff prayed in her complaint that judgment be rendered ordering the
defendants, in solidum, to pay plaintiff, however defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on
the ground that it does not state a cause of action and the plaintiff has no capacity to sue. The
lower court dismissed the complaint. Thereafter, plaintiff filed a motion to admit an amended
complaint, which was attached to the motion. The amended complaint contained new allegations
which were intended to specify or clarify certain points that were alleged in the original
complaint—and precisely for the purpose of curing the defects of the original complaint as
pointed out in the order of the court dismissing said original complaint. The lower court denied
the plaintiff’s MR and dismissed the amended complaint.
ISSUE: WON the dismissal of the amended complaint was proper
RULING:
No. From the allegations in the amended complaint, it shows that plaintiff has capacity to
sue and that the amended complaint states a cause of action. In her amended complaint the
plaintiff is suing the defendants in the capacity of one who has an interest to protect. She was
suing for the return to her of the balance of the amount of P150,000,00 which was stated in a
check that she had issued in favor of defendant Virginia G. Palma, pursuant to the understanding
that out of that amount the loans and advances which the plaintiff and the late Nicolas Lynevitche
had obtained from the defendants would be paid, it being alleged in the complaint that the plaintiff
and defendant Virginia Palma were made assignees of the proceeds of the insurance policy of
Nicolas Lynevitche under the agreement that the interest of defendant Virginia G. Palma as co-
assignee of the proceeds of the insurance policy was only to the extent of the total amount of the
loans and advances obtained by Nicolas Lynevitche and the plaintiff from the defendants. It can
be easily understood that plaintiff is claiming the entire amount. In determining whether a
different cause of action is introduced by amendments to the complaint, what is to be ascertained
is whether the defendant shall be required to answer for a liability or legal obligation wholly
different from that which was stated in the original complaint. An amendment will not be
considered as stating a new cause of action if the facts alleged in the amended complaint show
substantially the same wrong with respect to the same transaction, or if what are alleged refer
to the same matter but are more fully and differently stated, or where averments which were
implied are made in expressed terms, and the subject of the controversy or the liability sought
AMENDMENTS
to be enforced remains the same. In this case, a comparison of the original complaint and
amended complaint showed that the action of the plaintiff is the same. What is being enforced
against the defendants, both in the original complaint and in the amended complaint, is the
obligation to refund to the plaintiff the sum of P118,000.00 and to return to the plaintiff the 175
shares after the loans sought to be secured by those shares had been paid out of the proceeds
of the insurance policy of the late Nicolas Lynevitche.
AMENDMENTS
WEEK 4
11. METROBANK V. PJ OF RTC MANILA 189 SCRA 520
FACTS:
In this case, Good Earth Emporium, Inc. (GEE) executed a deed of chattel mortgage in
favor of Metrobank over air conditioning units installed in the GEE building. Metrobank filed a
complaint for replevin against Uniwide Sales, Inc. and the BPI Investment Corporation and several
other banks collectively called BPI-Consortium, which acquired the GEE building in an auction
sale. Metrobank prayed for the recovery of the possession of the air-conditioning units or that
the unpaid obligations on the air-conditioning units be settled as the units were installed on a
loan of P4,900,000.00 it extended to GEE. The loan proceeds were used to purchase the air-
conditioning equipment from Raycor Air Control System, Inc. (Raycor). Before BPI Consortium
filed their Answer, Raycor filed a motion for leave to intervene. There was no opposition to the
motion and the intervention complaint was admitted by the RTC. Mertrobank filed its Answer to
the Intervention Complaint. Before the trial, Metrobank and BPI Consortium agreed to a
compromise and filed a joint motion to dismiss the complaint. The lower court issued the order
dismissing the complaint with prejudice. However, Raycor filed a motion for reconsideration of
the order dismissing the complaint with prejudice, claiming it was not furnished with copy of the
joint motion for dismissal and that it only received the order of dismissal. The RTC granted the
motion for reconsideration filed by the intervenor and reinstated the case. Raycor, also filed a
motion to admit amended complaint which was opposed by Metrobank but the RTC issued an
order admitting the amended complaint in intervention. The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
and mandamus before the CA alleging the that the lower court committed grave abuse of
discretion in admitting the amended complaint.

ISSUE: WON the lower court erred in admitting the amended complaint
RULING:
No. The granting of leave to file an amended pleading is a matter particularly addressed to
the sound discretion of the trial court and that discretion is broad, subject only to the limitations
that the amendments should not substantially change the cause of action or alter the theory of
the case or that it was made to delay the action. Leave of court may be refused if it appears that
the motion was made with intent to delay or that the cause of action is substantially altered. The
courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid multiplicity of suits and in
order that the real controversies between the parties are presented, their rights determined and
the case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay. In the case at bar, a reading of the
amended complaint in intervention shows that it merely supplements an incomplete allegation of
the cause of action stated in the original complaint so as to submit the real matter in dispute.
Contrary to petitioner’s contention, it does not substantially change intervenor’s cause of action
or alter the theory of the case, hence its allowance is in order.
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WEEK 4
12. MAGASPI V. RAMOLETE, 115 SCRA 193, JULY 20, 1982
FACTS:
The petitioners filed a complaint for the recovery of ownership and possession of a
parcel of land with damages against The Shell Co. of the Philippines, Ltd. and/or The Shell Refining
Co. (Phil.) Inc., Central Visayan Realty & Investment Co., Inc. and Cebu City Savings & Loan
Association in the CFI of Cebu. Upon filing and the payment of P60.00 as docketing fee and P10.00
for sheriff fees, the complaint was assigned Civil Case No. R-11882. Central Visayan Realty &
Investment Co., Inc. and Cebu City Savings and Loan Assn. filed a motion to compel the plaintiffs
to pay the correct amount for docket fee. The motion was opposed by the plaintiffs (petitioners
herein) who claimed that the main cause of action was the recovery of a piece of land and on the
basis of its assessed valued, P60.00 was the correct docketing fee and that although the Revised
Rules of Court do not exclude damages in the computation of the docket fee, damages are
nonetheless still to be excluded. The court then ordered the plaintiffs to pay an additional sum of
P3,104.00 as filing fees.” The Shell companies filed their respective answers. the plaintiffs filed a
motion for leave to amend the complaint so as to include the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines as a defendant. The amended complaint still sought the return of the lot in question
but the pecuniary claim was limited 1.) to order the defendants jointly and solidarity except the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines moral damages in such amount as this Court may
determine and attorney’s fees in the amount of P100,000.00; and 2) Exemplary damages be
imposed on the defendants jointly and solidarity except the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines in the amount as this Court may deem just and proper as an example and deterrent
to any similar acts in the future. The defendants filed an opposition to the admission of the
amended complaint. Judge Canonoy admitted the amended complaint although the plaintiffs had
not yet complied with his Order of October 14, 1970, that they should pay an additional P3,104.00
docket fee.
ISSUE: WON the proper docket fee should be based on the original complaint
RULING:
No. Payment of docket fee shall be measured based upon the amended complaint. When a
pleading is amended, the original pleading is deemed abandoned. The original ceases to perform
any further function as a pleading. The case stand for trial on the amended pleading only. On the
basis of the foregoing, the additional docket fee to be paid by the petitioners should be based on
their amended complaint. In this case, payment of P3,104.00 as additional docket fee based on the
original complaint. However, the petitioners assert as an alternative view, that the docket fee be
based on the amended complaint which was admitted. Hence, the additional docket fee to be paid
by the petitioners should be based on their amended complaint.
AMENDMENTS
WEEK 4
13. SANTOS VS. LIWAG, G.R. No. L-24238, NOVEMBER 28, 1980
FACTS:
In this case, appellant Jose Santos filed a complaint against Lorenzo J. Liwag with the CFI
of Manila seeking the annulment of certain documents, attached to the complaint and marked as
Annexes "A", "B", and "C", as having been executed by means of misrepresentations, machination,
false pretenses, threats, and other fraudulent means, as well as for damages and costs.
Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that allegations in the complaint are
indefinite and uncertain, as well as conflicting. He prays that the plaintiff be ordered to submit a
more definite statement or bill of particulars on certain allegations of the complaint, as well as
the facts constituting the misrepresentations. Plaintiff opposed saying that the allegations are
sufficient and contain ultimate facts constituting his cause of action. The trial court, however,
granted the motion and ordered the plaintiff to submit the documents. When plaintiff failed to
comply with the order, the court, acting upon previous motion of the defendant, dismissed the
complaint with costs against the plaintiff.
ISSUE: WON the dismissal of the case was proper
RULING:
Yes. The dismissal of the case by the court was proper. The allowance of a motion for a
more definite statement of bill of particular rests within the sound judicial discretion of the court
and, as usual in matters of a discretionary nature, the ruling of the trial court in that regard will
not be reversed unless there has been a palpable abuse of discretion or a clearly erroneous
order. In the instant case, the complaint is without doubt imperfectly drawn and suffers from
vagueness and generalization to enable the defendant property to prepare a responsive pleading
and to clarify issues and aid the court in an orderly and expeditious disposition of the case. iMere
allegations thereof without a statement of the facts to which such terms have reference are not
sufficient. In his complaint, the appellant merely averred that all the documents sought to be
annulled were all executed through the use of deceits, machination, false pretenses,
misrepresentation, threats, and other fraudulent means without the particular facts on which
alleged fraud, deceit, machination, or misrepresentations are predicated. Hence, it was proper
for the trial court to grant the defendant’s motion for a bill of particulars, and when the plaintiff
failed to comply with the order, the trial court correctly dismissed the complaint.