Hysteria and Neurasthenia
Hysteria and Neurasthenia
Hysteria and Neurasthenia
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TRACEY LOUGHRAN*
University of Manchester
Histories of shell-shock have argued that the diagnosis was subdivided into the
categories hysteria and neurasthenia, and that the differential distribution and
treatment of these diagnoses was shaped by class and gender expectations. These
arguments depend on the presentation of hysteria and neurasthenia as opposed
constructs in British medical discourse before 1914. An analysis of the framing
of these diagnoses in British medical discourse c.1910–1914 demonstrates that
hysteria and neurasthenia, although undergoing redefinition in these years,
were closely connected through the designation of both as functional diseases,
and the role attributed to heredity in each. Before the war these diagnoses were
perceived as indicators of national decline. Continuity, as well as change, is
evident in medical responses to shell-shock.
Introduction
In recent years, shell-shock has been one of the hottest topics in the history of
British psychiatry. Over the last two decades a number of excellent histories
have appeared, variously situated as contributions to the history of civilian
psychiatry and attitudes to mental health (Bogacz, 1989; Merskey, 1991;
Stone, 1985); military psychiatry (Binnevald, 1997; Jones and Wessely, 2005;
Shephard, 2002); the concept of trauma (Leys, 2000; Young, 1995); and,
loosely defined, the challenge experiences of war posed to established notions
* Address for correspondence: History, School of Arts, Histories and Cultures, University of
Manchester, Samuel Alexander Building, Oxford Road, Manchester, M13 9PL, UK. Email:
[email protected]
exposition of these theorists over three issues (Ormerod, 1914). As will be seen
presently, these discussions are essential to understanding the stance of British
medical opinion towards psychological theories, given the frequent assumption
of widespread hostility before the war forced a reconsideration of Freud.
Certain crucial aspects are, with regret, omitted in this paper: notably, class,
gender, treatment methods, and the dynamic role of the patient in shaping
diagnosis. (I have dealt with some of these aspects elsewhere: Loughran, 2006:
35–69 and 97–124.) As the aim here is to sketch out some broad areas of
medical consensus on hysteria and neurasthenia, differences between various
sections of the medical community have also largely been skated over. This is
in many respects an old-fashioned top-down approach, and one which cannot
hope to do justice to the full richness of pre-war British medical views of
hysteria and neurasthenia. However, it may be justified with the view in mind
of recreating, to some extent, the knowledge that the doctors who were to
treat shell-shock from 1914 onwards brought to their clinical encounters.
These doctors were also recruited from a remarkably wide cross-section of the
medical community, many with no previous experience of treating nervous or
psychological disorders (Loughran, 2006: 240–89). It is not unreasonable to
assume that many of these doctors, grappling with such problems for the first
time in their careers, were guided as much by general knowledge of similar
disorders garnered from the pre-war medical press, or by wide and hastily-
conducted research, as by the distinctive stance that neurology or psychiatry
(for example) had taken towards these disorders.
There are three main parts to this paper. The first examines the status of
hysteria and neurasthenia as functional disorders, arguing with reference to
British expositions of Continental theories of hysteria that the shift from a
predominantly somatic to a psychological paradigm was in evidence before
World War I. The next section demonstrates that although an inherently
ambiguous category, neurasthenia was conceived as in essence a condition
of nervous exhaustion. This is in contrast to the portrayal of neurasthenia in
most histories of shell-shock, which have conflated Pierre Janet’s psychasthenia
and a concept of anxiety neurosis derived from the later work of Freud and
W. H. R. Rivers with the symptomatic content of neurasthenia. Finally, it is
argued that hysteria and neurasthenia were conceptually linked at the aetio-
logical level through the perceived importance of heredity. Through the notion
of the ‘neurotic temperament’ the pathologies of individual and environment
were linked to discourses of nation and race. Hysteria and neurasthenia were
therefore highly charged, politicized categories on the eve of the war. These
arguments suggest that the relationship between hysteria and neurasthenia,
portrayed as opposed categories in most histories of shell-shock, must be
rethought. Moreover, as both disorders were in a state of flux in the immediately
pre-war years, with psychological and somatic elements of the diagnoses in
continual interplay, extension and retreat, the extent to which the experience of
shell-shock acted as a catalyst to modern modes of psychological understanding
Functional disease
In pre-war British psychological medicine, hysteria and neurasthenia shared one
basic feature: both were classified as functional diseases. Functional disorder
was, according to one definition, comprised of phenomena ‘which result from
some disturbance or change in the functions of an organ without presenting any
definite organic lesion by which the disease may be distinguished’ (Hack Tuke,
1892: 518). This classification provides the key to understanding the shifting
relations of psyche and soma in conceptions of hysteria and neurasthenia before
the war. The transposition of the concept of trauma from the physical to the
psychological sphere during the late nineteenth century is now well established
(Micale and Lerner, 2001). The same process, a related event, occurred to the
concepts of hysteria and neurasthenia (Neve, 2001: 141). The category of
functional disease facilitated this development. The concept originated as a
convenient designation for disorders for which no organic cause could be found,
and thus described effects without ascribing first causes. It was therefore a
fundamentally ambiguous category (Bastian, 1893: 2). Although the dominant
somatic paradigm of British psychiatry meant that initially the first point of
reference within the concept of functional disease was the body, this ambi-
guity also provided a space within which psychological theories could develop
(or be transplanted into) when the right set of historical conditions arose. It is
therefore the necessary background against which the shifting roles attributed
to psyche and soma in hysteria and neurasthenia should be discussed.
Today, the meaning of ‘functional’ is often loosely interpreted as equivalent
to describing a disorder as ‘psychologically based’. But in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, British psychiatry lacked a purely psychological
paradigm, and so what remained when organic change had been excluded
was not automatically referred to the mind. The concept of functional disease
was predicated on the notion of an organic non-event. However, this non-
event was also positive: functional disease was defined as such by the presence
of an organic absence. The body was not merely the first, but the only point of
reference within the definition of functional disease. One way this is shown is in
the stated allegiance of British commentators to an as-yet undiscovered organic
basis for hysteria, the archetypal functional disease. In the 1890s, it was still
possible to suppose that when ‘examined by the light of improved knowledge
and experience’, many of the symptoms of hysteria would be revealed as of
organic origin (Buzzard, 1892: 1163). The optimism faded slightly in subse-
quent years, but it was still insisted that hysteria was ‘as real as smallpox or
cancer, and that it has a physical basis’, and that psychological theories were only
a useful stop-gap measure for treating the disorder until its organic foundation
could be discovered (Ormerod, 1914: 1169; Stewart, 1906: 307; Wilson, 1911:
336–7). In the event, when improved diagnostic techniques revealed that some
of the symptoms traditionally associated with hysteria did have an organic
basis, the result was the contraction of the disorder rather than the provision
of a physical explanation for it (Micale, 1993: 504–10).
The list of disorders under the heading of functional disease in textbooks of
nervous and mental diseases also demonstrates that this category was under-
stood by reference to bodily rather than psychical processes. In one example,
we find epilepsy, chorea, tetanus, aphasia, muscular spasm, writers’ cramp,
facial hemiatrophy, exophthalmic goitre and various kinds of paralysis (Nagel,
1905: 138–90; see also Potts, 1908: 385–437). Most of this list is utterly at
odds with modern notions of functional disorder, but makes sense when placed
against the background of the predominantly somatic paradigm of pre-war
psychiatry. Functional disorder was a crucial way in which diseases that did
not fit the somatic paradigm could be understood through reference to it. This
is demonstrated in the work of Joseph Ormerod (1848–1925), a specialist in
nervous disorders with a particular interest in hysteria. Ormerod frequently took
pains to reiterate the physiological meaning of function in order to introduce and
make plausible the notion of disruption of psychological function (Ormerod,
1911: 275; 1914: 1238–9). Psychological concepts became comprehensible only
when filtered through the lens of physiological (and thus concrete, knowable
and scientifically palatable) processes.
So far, this would seem to suggest more strongly than ever that British
psychological medicine remained stubbornly, even dogmatically, wedded to
somatic explanations. Yet the example of Ormerod’s rhetorical strategy hints
at an unexpected development: perversely, the very strength of the somatic
paradigm enabled the infiltration of psychological ideas into mainstream
British medical discourse. During this period, hysteria was mainly discussed
in the British medical press in relation to the theories of Babinski, Janet and
Freud. These theorists had ‘to a great extent superseded the doctrines of
Charcot, though […] none of them has passed into the region of accepted fact’
(Anon., 1910a). British commentators overwhelmingly (re)presented these
theories via reference to the somatic paradigm, in the process normalizing them.
This approach undoubtedly proceeded in part from an inability to comprehend
psychological theorization. The nameless doctor who alluded to Babinski in
the course of a discussion at the Liverpool Medical Institution but confessed
himself unable to ‘fully follow this distinguished French physician’ probably
articulated the secret sentiments of many (Anon., 1910b). However, precisely
because they were unable to think far outside the somatic paradigm, for the
most part the doctors discussed here greeted these theories with a surprising
degree of openness.
Discussions of Freud demonstrate this trend. Older (but still frequently-
cited) histories of shell-shock often argue that the British medical establishment
was almost uniformly hostile to Freud before World War I (Showalter, 1987:
189; Stone, 1985: 243). Yet when his theories were not presented in an
evangelical fashion, many members of the medical community cocked an
interested ear. In the pre-war medical press, Freud was most often viewed as
just one of many thinkers who had contributed to the study of hysteria, and
like these others, his theories did not have to be swallowed whole. For example,
Ormerod thought the idea that the expression of repressed emotion could help
to relieve symptoms was extremely useful, if somewhat overrated by Breuer
and Freud. Although he could not stomach the inductive basis of Freud’s
theories – described as ‘very unsubstantial, and literally such stuff as dreams
are made of’ – he was still able to appreciate some of the general insights it
offered (Ormerod, 1911: 285–7).
This magpie approach was typical of the British commentators. They not
only picked and chose those theoretical aspects which they perceived as useful,
but re-inflected and tamed the whole as well. Paradoxically, this openness to
new ideas was only possible because of their allegiance to the somatic para-
digm. As long as it was accepted that hysteria had an organic basis which had
not yet been discovered, psychological theories could be viewed simply as
useful adjuncts to this supposed foundation. The outcomes of this process –
perhaps described more accurately as welding than assimilation – can appear
incongruous to the modern reader. Robert Cole (1866–1926), a specialist in
mental diseases, incorporated new psychological theories into the account of
hysteria in his well-received 1913 textbook of nervous and mental diseases. This
referenced Babinski, Janet and Freud, and initially defined hysteria as ‘a disorder
of the subconscious mind; it is a peculiar mental state in which the psychical
and physical symptoms are largely due to auto-suggestion’. Only a few pages
later, however, he proposed some possible physiological explanations: perhaps
hysteria was caused by an alteration in the state of nutrition of the cortex, or a
secondary derangement of the lower nerve centres (Cole, 1913: 216–19).
This was not how Babinksi, Janet or Freud intended their theories to be read.
There is clear evidence of misunderstanding, such as when Cole referred to
Janet’s theory of ‘neuronic dissociation’ or attributed to Freud the view that the
‘generative organs’ always had ‘direct aetiological influence’ in hysteria (Cole,
1913: 217, 219). But it would be a mistake to view either these misapprehensions,
or the plucking of certain features of Continental theories from their context,
simply as misappropriations which distort their ‘true’ nature. They are evidence
of a now-alien interpretative strategy available to contemporaries: not only
because they did not perceive psychological and physiological categories of ex-
planation as irreconcilable (and this is one of the respects in which they had an
open-minded approach to the former, even if it was limited by final adherence
to the latter), but because they sought in these theories practical solutions to the
problems of diagnosis and treatment rather than intellectual satisfaction.
Therefore it is possible that the frequent substitution of ‘subconscious’ for
‘unconscious’ in discussions of Freud (Anon., 1911a; Thomson, 1911: 77–9)
was not made only because the former concept was comprehended and the latter
was not, but because these commentators afforded the difference little weight
in comparison with those aspects of the theory they felt could be used. The
consequence of such re-castings was the piecemeal incursion of psychological
theories into the somatic framework of understanding. The groundwork had
been laid for the acceptance of psychological paradigms before shell-shock
burst onto the psychiatric scene.
seen as a pre-existing potential of the individual which had been latent until
the right circumstances for its expression arose. The apparent and immedi-
ate cause was always at most only ‘a coefficient, and often merely serves as the
spark which falls into the explosive matter’ (Mott, 1907). In practice, once
the disorder had been diagnosed the specific stimulus was constructed as only
of secondary importance. This did not mean that the social environment was
insignificant, but that its importance was conceived mainly in terms of its
possible modification to prevent the appearance of outward manifestations of
nervous disorder, rather than in terms of its ability to effect a permanent change
in the nervous individual (see for example Riviere, 1911).
Biological determinism became more entrenched in the years immediately
before the war, as can be seen in changing uses of a recurrent motif in discussions
of nervous disorders: analogies to plant life. In 1892 one contributor to Hack
Tuke’s Dictionary described neurasthenia as ‘to a certain degree the starting-
point of all the more severe nervous disorders, and the soil from which they
grow’ (Arndt, 1892: 840, 842); another, the obstetrician and gynaecologist
William Playfair (1896–1903) argued that the ‘rank weeds of neurotic disease
will only grow and flourish in suitable soil – that is, in a state of depressed
vitality; improve the soil, and the unhealthy growth will disappear’ (Playfair,
1892: 853). The outlook here was essentially positive: although nervous
exhaustion was the ‘bad soil’ which fostered the growth of neurotic disorders,
more serious disorders could be prevented if the right measures were taken.
Nervous exhaustion was portrayed simply as an illness which affected the indi-
vidual, not a pathology which defined her. Only a few years later the metaphor
was being used quite differently: to describe how ‘the seeds’ of neuroses were
‘sown by stupid or ignorant parents or nurses through want of recognition of
the signs of the nervous predisposition and temperament of the child’ (Clarke,
1905: 7; Macnaughton-Jones, 1911: 69). The ultimate cause of the neurosis was
the child’s ‘nervous predisposition and temperament’; the social environment
was implicated only as a factor which allowed and encouraged the disorder to
develop. This was an illness which, like original sin, was embodied rather than
contracted, and the aim was not to cure but to prevent its worst potentialities
from manifesting.
The key term here is ‘temperament’, in pre-war British medical discourse
often conceived as a biological destiny rather than a mere personality trait.
Robert Jones (1857–1943), superintendent of Claybury Asylum, stated that in
the individual temperament was a tendency determined by nation and race, and
which therefore differed according to evolutionary development ( Jones, 1911:
1–2). His colleague, the neuropathologist Frederick Mott (1853–1926), put
forward a similar definition of the ‘neuropathic temperament’ as an inborn
tendency determined by biological inheritance (Mott, 1914: 68–71). This
concept of the neurotic temperament was fundamental to medical accounts
of hysteria and neurasthenia. In discussions of neurasthenia, the notion of
than […] disease of body’ (Tredgold, 1911: 95). Mott framed these fears
of national degeneration explicitly in relation to neurasthenia. He reasoned
that if neurasthenia was both ‘a special outcome of modern civilization’
and ‘the starting-point of an unstable nervous condition in a stock’ which
would intensify under the continued influence of an unfavourable environment,
then modern Britain was in trouble (Mott, 1913: 26–8). The fear of latent ner-
vous and mental instability was apparent even in accounts which attempted
to strike a more optimistic note. Sir George Savage (1841–1921), a lion of the
pre-war psychiatric establishment, warned against believing too much in ‘the
tyranny of the organism’, arguing that the right conditions were necessary for
the development of insanity. In order to make this point he compared heredity
to ‘the mycelium of the mushroom’, which ‘spreads far and wide and is not rec-
ognised till suitable conditions lead to what we call the mushroom which comes
to the surface’. His audience probably took little comfort from his conclusion
that, similarly, ‘the neurotic inheritance spreads far and wide and is deeply
seated, but the occasion for its development may be wanting’ – after all, if this
were the case, what would happen in a national crisis? (Savage, 1912: 1136).
Hysteria and neurasthenia were therefore framed as indicators of national
and political health. An anonymous 1910 comment piece in the Lancet took
issue with the French neurologist Jules Déjerine’s contention that emotional
shock was the main aetiological factor in the development of hysteria. The
author argued that, as individuals and in the aggregate, the Latin races were less
emotionally stable than the Teutonic, linking the prevalence of both hysteria
and social upheavals in France to this fact. It was well known that the Parisian
mob became ‘inflamed by any passing wind of emotion’, while such events
were uncommon in England. These differences could only be explained as the
result of ‘national and racial differences’. As a nation, the English were ‘less
emotional, less exuberant, less gesticulative’ – in short, less hysterical (Anon.,
1910c). The physician and neurologist Samuel Wilson (1874–1937) put
forward a similar argument, pointing to the moment in the 1880s when ‘the
telegraphic announcement of an insignificant reverse at Langson provoked a
fury in Paris and France, and brought about the instantaneous overthrow of
the Government’ when ‘a much more serious reverse undergone by our English
expedition to Khartoum produced only a slight emotion, and no ministry was
overturned’ (Wilson, 1911: 322). Here, hysteria moved from individual to social
and political pathology, and was constructed as a fundamentally un-English
disorder. It is not surprising that hysteria was deemed to be more prevalent
among Jews as well as the Latin races; the former were also seen as more
liable to neurasthenia (Clarke, 1905: 4–5, 175; Oldfield, 1913: 335; Stewart,
1906: 308). By association, English neurotics were not part of the nation, but
aligned with the threatening forces clustered on its borders, awaiting their
chance to attack or, worse, silently infiltrate the body politic.
It is therefore no coincidence that the dialogue between medicine and politics
on the eve of the war featured hysteria and neurasthenia, both as actual diagnosis
and as linguistic trope. Historians usually locate three main sources of disruption
to British political life in 1914: the threat posed to industrial productivity by
trade union activity, the militant suffrage campaign, and the crisis around
Home Rule for Ireland (Hynes, 1991: 6–7; Read, 1994: 483–97). As regards
the first of these, the relationship between medicine, the state and the labour
force was still being worked out in the wake of the Workmen’s Compensation
Acts of 1897, 1900 and 1906. One of the most vexed aspects of these debates
was the issue of compensation for traumatic neurosis, in which hysteria and
neurasthenia were clearly implicated (Grant, 1914; Palmer, 1911; Thorburn,
1913). The militant suffragettes, meanwhile, were stigmatized as hysterical
for their ‘unwomanly’ violence to private property, and by extension the state
(Wright, 1913: 166–88). Although the Celtic races were seen as more liable to
hysteria and neurasthenia (Clarke, 1905: 4–5, 175), such labels were not ap-
plied to figures in the debates on the Irish Question. However, when seeking
to explain the mechanism of hysterical dissociation in early 1914, Ormerod
plucked a prescient metaphor from political life: in the hysterical mind, he
wrote, the ‘central government is weak, and there results a turbulent home rule
all round’ (Ormerod, 1914: 1236).
Conclusion
It has been argued here that hysteria and neurasthenia were not fundamentally
opposed categories in pre-war British medical discourse but, rather, linked
through their definition as functional diseases and the crucial role attributed to
hereditary predisposition in the aetiologies of both. The conceptual closeness
of hysteria and neurasthenia undermines the three-pronged sociocultural inter-
pretation of shell-shock outlined earlier. To a certain extent, the demolition
of arguments based on the hysteria/neurasthenia divide is little more than the
completion of a clean-up operation begun by previous historians of shell-shock,
attacking the problem from a different angle. Powerful criticisms of arguments
regarding gendered perceptions of shell-shock and differential treatment
according to class have already been made by Laurinda Stryker (2003) and
Peter Leese (2002: 110–16). The main difference is that here the critique has
been based on an analysis of diagnostic categories, and therefore strikes at all
three arguments simultaneously.
Demolition, however, is secondary to the main purpose of this paper. In
focusing on the clinical categories of hysteria and neurasthenia in the ‘forgotten
years’ of 1900–14, my aim has been to question certain aspects of the con-
ventional historiographical argument that shell-shock forced a transition from
physical to psychological understanding. That there was some shift in this
direction seems unmistakeable: in the post-war years hundreds of doctors
returned to their day jobs with vastly increased experience of dealing with
psychological disorders, thousands of shell-shocked veterans sought psychiatric
treatment and pensions throughout the 1920s, and in 1930 the Mental Health
Act partially dismantled the asylum system and created out-patient clinics. Yet
the other side of the chasm which is 1914–18 demands equal attention if we are to
judge to what extent and in what ways the war itself was a force for change.
There was not one giant leap from Victoria to Freud via World War I. British
psychological medicine did not stand still between 1901 and 1914.
This paper has pinpointed some of the areas in which small steps were being
taken before that cataclysm. Through the category of functional disorders,
psychological concepts were infiltrating the dominant somatic paradigm, a
development which was paradoxically enabled by the very inflexibility of that
world-view. British doctors were not uniformly deaf or hostile to the clamour
of Continental voices entreating a psychological view of mind. Their eclectic
interpretations of these theories suggests that sometimes they might have been
served well by an ear-trumpet, if not a translator, but nevertheless the pidgin
versions of Freud, Janet, Babinski and others which were disseminated in the
medical press meant that no well-read doctor could claim complete ignorance
of these theorists. The shift from a somatic to a psychological paradigm was
in progress before the war, and it might be more fruitful to look for evidence
of continuity and natural growth in this process over 1914–18 than to assume
radical and abrupt change.
The gradual assimilation of psychological theories proceeded simultaneously,
although not exactly hand-in-hand, with the increasing entrenchment of
biological determinism, signalled perhaps above all by the popularity of moder-
ate eugenic ideas. The biological dimension of hysteria and neurasthenia meant
that both were linked to prevalent socio-political concerns and were thus highly
charged categories on the eve of the war. Before 1914, medical discourse por-
trayed neurotic Britons as not just ill or bad, but unpatriotic. They were enemy
aliens at the most basic biological level, latent lesions on the body of the nation
which might erupt and threaten the health of the whole at the first serious crisis.
There was an enormous difference between representations of the shrieking
hysteric or lurking neurasthenic and the figure of the shattered soldier; but
although shell-shock pushed mental health issues onto the mainstream medical
agenda with unprecedented force, the signs are that this was a move which some
prominent medical spokesmen had been enjoining before the war, albeit for
different reasons. In a ground-breaking, and still indispensable, essay written
more than twenty years ago, Martin Stone argued that shell-shock redefined
‘the boundary of the pathological […] at all its constitutive levels’ (Stone, 1985:
266). This conclusion has rarely been disputed, but it may be premature: as
yet, we do not know nearly enough about how this boundary was delineated in
the crucial years immediately before 1914 to judge. This paper suggests that a
detailed mapping of the pathological in the opening decades of the twentieth
century may yet surprise us by revealing continuities which survived the several
ruptures of the war.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the Arts and Humanities Research Council and the Institute of Historical
Research for providing funding which made the research for this paper possible. The comments
of Professor Daniel Pick, Professor Michèle Barrett and Dr Matthew Grant on earlier versions
of this paper were also invaluable.
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