ISRAEL, PALESTINE AND SOCIALISM

Mervyn Jones

"The six-hundredth day of the Six-Day War" was the apt title of a tele-
vision programme; and, as more days and more months pass, this con-
tinuing conflict remains the most intractable of all international issues.
For Socialists it presents a particular difficulty. One cannot easily recall
another problem over which Socialists of good faith have disagreed so
much--disagreed in their sympathies, disagreed over possible solutions,
disagreed in finding a way to apply basic Socialist principles, disagreed
in analysis of the very nature of the problem. This essay is an attempt
to establish a Socialist approach by an analysis related to principle. As a
starting-point, it may be worth while to survey the very different atti-
tudes taken by non-Socialists too, and in particular by political forces
within the great powers whose intervention has been a major thread in
the story.
Let us begin with the British, who exerted the dominant influence
in the thirty years (1918 to 1948) that set the stage for subsequent
battles. The famous contradictory promises of 1918 (the Balfour dec-
laration and the McMahon letters, which led the Jews and the Arabs
respectively to expect an inheritance after the ending of Turkish rule
in Palestine) heralded an ambiguity that lasted as long as the British
mandate. Imperialist interests suggested two alternative strategies for
frustrating an Arab drive toward independence : one was to back the
Jews, the other was to support the feudal and the fanatically religious
forces in Arab society who appeared promising as stooges and who
were the bitterest enemies of Jewish intrusion. Money also spoke with
two voices. Banking and commercial capital looked with favour on
Jewish schemes for development, while the oil companies regarded
agreement with Arab rulers as a pre-condition for their operations.
Ideologically, the go-getters of capitalism admired Jewish efforts to
transform a stagnant region, or saw the new agricultural settlements
as analogous to British pioneering in the White Highlands of Kenya;
but traditionally-minded imperialists made a cult of the unsophisticated
desert sheikh and the simple peasant, and favoured Islam (as in India)
as a barrier in the path of the modern-minded agitator. The Foreign
Office and the Army were generally pro-Arab all along, but within
these castes there were cross-currents too. The administration of the
mandatory system changed course with successive High Commissioners,
or in response to volte-faces in Whitehall. British troops and police
63
directed the edge of the sword against the Arabs in the 1936-39 period,
and the eccentric General Wingate (a fervent Zionist on Biblical
grounds) was allowed to arm and direct Jewish irregulars while holding
His Majesty's commission. Later (1944-48) these same troops and
police went into action with ferocious zeal against the Jews.
Such divided counsels were apparent in political circles also, and
individual attitudes were by no means pre-determined. From his general
outlook, and notably from his espousal of the Princes and the "martial
races" in India, one would not have cast Churchill as a sympathizer
with Zionism, but in point of fact he was. Chamberlain's White Paper
of 1939, seen by the Jews as a betrayal and by the Arabs as a triumph,
was primarily a by-product of his appeasement of Hitler. We find
Eden in 1955 delighting the Arabs with a speech suggesting a revision
of the 194.9 boundaries and a re-opening of the refugee question, but
next year entering into an aggressive alliance with Israel when Nasser
became the enemy. On the other side of the fence, Jewish sufferings
a t Nazi hands made Labour opinion predominantly pro-Jewish, and
the election manifesto of 1945 contained an unreserved pledge of
support for Zionist aims. But Labour policy in office has been at least
as ambiguous as that of Tory governments, and Labour Foreign Secre-
taries (Ernest Bevin emphatically, George Brown to some extent) have
shown hostility to Israel. Today, the liberal centre in politics-main-
stream Labour men, Liberals, "civilized" Tories-generally favours
Israel; but so does a trenchant organ of Toryism such as the Daily
Telegraph, and so too does a considerable part of the Labour Left, a t
least in Parliament. Among upholders of the Arab cause we can discern
unreconstructed High Tories like Sir Tufton Beamish, right-wing
Labour politicians such as Lady Summerskill and M r Christopher
Mayhew (once Bevin's junior)-and also most radical students in our
universities and the generality of militant crusaders against world-
wide imperialism.
In the USA, support for Israel has been the majority trend in both
big parties, but all Administrations have translated it into practice in
a perceptibly diluted form. Eisenhower did not hesitate to condemn
the Suez aggression on the eve of an election, and subsequently to
exert determined pressure to make the Israelis withdraw from Sinai
and Gaza. The Nixon Administration arms and supports Israel, but
not exactly up to the hilt, and seems to be keeping its options open. Now
that the USA has succeeded Britain as the major capitalist power in
the Middle East and in the world at large, the same division between
commercial capital and the oil interests is repeated on the American
scene. On the Left, fervent support for Zionism was an accepted plank
in the progressive platform in the Henry Wallace era, and is still a
dogma of liberalism; but the younger radicals, and in particular
the black militants, have tended increasingly to espouse the Arab
cause.
Stalin, a t a time when Soviet Jews were being scandalously perse-
cuted, rushed to beat the US to the post in recognizing the newborn
state of Israel, then supplied with guns by Communist Czechoslovakia,
and to denounce the incursions of the British-armed Arab Legion.
One can construct an imaginary scenario of the succeeding twenty
years, had this line been pursued; the C P of Israel would have gained
in strength and entered a coalition government, and bien-pensant
western opinion would now be denouncing Israel as a hotbed of sub-
version. But in fact the USSR swung sharply to a pro-Arab position
and the Skoda munitions went to Nasser from 1955 on. The change
was made under the "liberalizing" rule of Malenkov and Khrushchev.
Soviet policy today can be characterized as pro-Arab, but allows for
probing talks with the US in search of a settlement and a restraining
hand on Arab eagerness for renewed all-out war-signs of "hypocrisy"
which draw condemnation from China. Vitriolic denunciations of
Israel, a t the risk (to say no more) of stimulating crude anti-Semitism,
have come from the most repressive and backward-looking groups in
the Communist world-the Czech conservatives, the Ulbricht rCgime,
and the Mozcar clique in Poland. Advocates of "socialism with a human
face" in eastern Europe, and dissident intellectuals in the USSR, have
been correspondingly pro-Israeli. But Tito, probably because of his
links with Nasser from the heyday of non-alignment, takes a staunchly
pro-Arab line.
So one might go on, with reference to France, West Germany,
India, and virtually any country in which divergent political trends
are open to analysis. Three general points are worth making. The
first is the rather obvious reflection that such variations in attitude
must indicate a highly complex situation, and inspire a proper
caution in reducing it to simplicity. Secondly, the maxim of "Tell
me where my enemies stand, and 1'11 know where I standv-however
useful in other situations-will not guide Socialists through this
labyrinth. T o be precise, a totally pro-Arab attitude might indeed be
justified (later, of course, I shall argue the matter); but it can only
be justified on its merits, not on a perception of imperialist strategies
which, as we have seen, contain contradictions. Thirdly, the kind of
non-Socialist policies that I have sketched have had, and still have,
a diversity of causes. Palestine is a small place on the map, and even
the Middle East is not the world. A dominant influence may a t times
be exerted by a quite extraneous motive-I have noted the case of
Chamberlain, and others will come readily to mind. Considerations of
internal politics play their part too; the celebrated Jewish vote in New
York was never as potent as simplifiers believe, but it has not been a
 negligible factor either. And, since even reactionary politicians
are human beings and not automata, subjective intellectual con-
victions and personal attachments cannot be left altogether out of
account.
Before I end this introduction, it should be noted too that this issue
is peculiarly coloured in almost every mind by ideology in the broadest
sense-by religions which have the potency of popular cultures, by
deep-rooted traditions, by ineradicable habits of thought. I have heard
two educated men, both Socialists and both atheists, arguing fiercely
about whether Abraham was a Jew or was the common ancestor of
Jews and Arabs. The "bookish" character of both the Judaic and the
Moslem religion, and the concept of prophecy and fulfilment, are
factors that it is seldom possible to forget. This dominance of ideology
has a specific effect : the perceptions of events has become almost as
important as the events themselves. (I am not denying that the per-
ception is perfectly sincere and is often based on direct experience.)
Any exposition of either the Jewish or the Arab case-and I have
listened to both by the hour-is almost invariably a narrative embody-
ing this perception. Let me take a single example. For the Arabs, the
British withdrawal in 1948 should naturally have led to an act of
decolonization as in Syria and Lebanon; this was forestalled by a Jewish
seizure of towns and villages all over Palestine; and, had other Arab
nations not come to the rescue, all the Palestinian Arabs would have
been reduced to subjection or expulsion. For the Jews, the episode is
known as the War of Independence; the enemies were the British,
taking the field directly in the earlier phase and by the medium of
British-armed and (in the case of the Arab Legion) British-officered
forces in the later; and, had the Jews not fought, they would have been
reduced to subjection or extermination. It is certainly not my intention
to retell this or any other episode in an impossibly "objective" manner.
My point is that there are two versions of every event; that, broadly
speaking, both are true (the differences deriving from the omission of
certain facts, not from invention); and that the power rests in the
belief. Hence the extraordinary emotional strength of conviction on
either side. The ideological factors reinforce the certainty that right-
if you will, righteousness-is the prerogative of Jew or Arab, that it is
impossible to imagine otherwise, and that anyone unconvinced must
be either malicious or ill-informed. In this atmosphere, it is clearly
very difficult for anyone affected by these factors to think like a
Socialist. This applies equally to Jews and Arabs themselves, and to
others who have adopted their perceptions and their ideologies.
 SOCIALISM AND NATIONALISM

What, then, is this embittered conflict essentially about? The reader

will have noticed that I have talked about the Jews (or the Israelis)
and the Arabs, without any social or political differentiation. This is
a loose, journalistic terminology; but if I have employed it, this is be-
cause it reflects a reality. My thesis, in fact, is that what we should
identify is a collision of one nationalism with another. Each is
legitimate, by virtue of being nationalism. Each has its peculiar features,
which must be analyzed. But the necessary preliminary is an examina-
tion of nationalism itself, and of the Socialist attitude toward it.
Nationalism is the emergence of a group of people as a self-conscious
and exclusive entity, demanding collective expression in institutional-
normally political-form. A nation is recognizable by various hall-
marks, of which territory and language are the most usual, but to each
of these an exception can be found in one case or an0ther.l The process,
as the word "emergence" denotes, is dynamic. Some nations are very
old, but none has existed from time immemorial; some are very new;
some are both old and new, in the sense of having been suppressed for
a period, even to a great degree in their own consciousness. I t is quite
possible for a nation to exist which did not exist fifty years earlier,
and the Socialist--or even the simple democrat-must take note of
such an evolution. When it does exist and demands expression, it is
perfectly futile for anyone else to say: "You're not a nation-you
weren't on the list when the register was made up." For a nation
defines itself by its own consciousness, by its desires, and by the struggles
which themselves intensify that consciousness and those desires. One
might say without undue flippancy that nationalism is like love. I t
demands to attain its objective, however unwise that objective might
seem (or might actually be) in the opinion of others.
Pakistan is an illuminating case in point-for one relevant reason,
because its origin was in religion, which is an unwise or "bad" origin
on clear grounds of principle, but can neverthless be a reality. The
idea of the Indian Moslems as a nation was, at an early stage, partly
a sectarian fantasy and partly a British divide-and-rule device. It was
entirely reasonable for the Indian National Congress to oppose this
development in the name of secular democracy, and equally for the
Indian Communists to oppose it in the name of Socialism and class
solidarity. However, the idea became a reality and Pakistan is a nation.
No sensible Indian now imagines that Pakistan as a separate state can
be abolished.
Exceptional cases apart, a nation develops out of a less positively
distinct entity, which in many parts of the world is described as a tribe
or simply as "a people". The point of nationhood is reached when the
 groups feels itself to be distinct from a much larger group of which it
has hitherto formed a part; or, conversely, when small groups recog-
nize a common identity. Even when nationhood exists, the degree of
distinctness is something of a variable. I t is not uncommon for several
nations to feel a common identity for reasons of propinquity and culture
(Africa) or of language and history (Latin America). The clearest case
of this common identity is the Arab world.
I t will be seen that the development of a nation is by no means an
inevitability. In Africa, it appears likely that many potential nations
(now known as tribes) with their own language and territory will never
become actual nations. The nations will be larger entities such as Kenya
or Tanzania. The boundaries were in fact drawn in the crudest way to
suit the convenience of imperialist powers, riding roughshod over tribal
and linguistic distinctions, but it seems possible in the era of inde-
pendence for a sense of nationhood to grow despite this heritage of
"unreality".
It is also not inevitable that the sense of nationhood will always be
expressed in a demand for total political independence, i.e. statehood.
There is no doubt that large and firmly constituted groups in India,
such as the Tamils, can reasonably be described as nations. But it
does not follow that they are bound to demand the dissolution of India
into its national constituents, and still less does it follow that this would
be a progressive development in any sense.
Now let us ask : what have Socialists to say about all this?
The most elementary statement is that, whenever and wherever the
consciousness (and thus the reality) of nationhood exists, its free ex-
pression is a human right which Socialists must support, and repression
of nationhood is a crime which Socialists must combat. This is an
absolute. But, the process being dynamic, the point a t which nation-
hood should be encouraged to emerge-or should be recognized with
regret, as in the instance of Pakistan-is a matter of judgement. Just
the same applies to the demand for statehood : that is to say, the
desires of the people concerned are the deciding factor. T o take the
case nearest home : I as a Socialist am neither for nor against the
independence of Wales. I am for it if and when the Welsh people
want it.
This is perfectly simple in cases where a nation is homogeneous on
the territory in question, and is oppressed by the bureaucracy and
armed forces of an alien power. The demand is clear-cut-the oppres-
sors must go away. The situation is more difficult when two nation-
groups lay claim to the same territory. Each, in that case, has a right
to its own nationhood and statehood. Socialists have to concern them-
selves with such matters as the drawing of frontiers, minority rights
where minorities must remain, economic arrangements, and so forth.
And the Socialist proves his genuineness by approaching these questions
on the basis of the equality of each nation-not, as with the ordinary
politician, by grabbing as much as possible for his own nation. The
Socialist does not, in fact, support one nationalism at the expense of
what is legitimate in another.
The Socialist who contravenes this principle-I should say the
nominal Socialist-usually justifies himself by denying the rights, or
even the very existence, of the nation to which he is opposed. Thus,
for Israeli political leaders and their western supporters, there is no
such thing as a Palestinian Arab nation because it has never been in-
carnated in a state-a curious argument indeed in the mouths of Jews.
As Mrs Meir has expressed it, the Arabs of Palestine are merely "south
Syrians". And for the pro-Arab Left, Israel cannot be conceded the
same legitimacy as other nations because it derives from the
"reactionary ideology" of Zionism. Both Arab and Israeli nationalism
certainly do have special features, which I shall examine and of which
Socialists must be critical. But, if the reader at all accepts the dynamic
concept of a nation defining itself by its consciousness and its actual
emergence, he will find in it sufficient rebuttal of these dogmas. I take
it as reality, in fact, that the Arab nation of Palestine and the Israeli
nation exist. What concerns us that they should exist without the one
being oppressed by the other, as the Arabs are of course oppressed
today under Israeli occupation.
For if it is true, in the well-worn phrase, that no nation can be free
when it oppresses others, it is still more true that no nation can be
free when it destroys others. This is the aim being pursued by those
who deny nationhood to an opponent. By conquest, military occupa-
tion, and partial expulsion, the Israelis have deprived the Palestinian
Arabs of all effective national status. For their part, the Arab libera-
tion organizations set themselves the aim of removing the state of
Israel from the map.2 Each combatant, thus, seeks to deny the other
the right of statehood, which I have argued to be implicit-when
desired-in the right of nationhood. My contention is that no Socialist
can associate himself with such aims.
The principles I have enunciated so far, though regrettably they
are not honoured by all Socialists, ought in theory to be binding on
any democrat of integrity. For Socialists, another important principle
must be stated. This is that national independence, though an absolute
right, is not an end in itself. It is certainly not an ultimate objective.
The highest concern of Socialists is not with political structures, but
with the social and economic ordering of human life. Of course, what
can be achieved in this regard depends on the stage of social develop-
ment that has been reached. I t is not much use calling for Socialism
in a new nation of pastoral tribesmen or even of peasant cultivators.
But in a capitalist, or even partially capitalist, society it is the business
of Socialists to advance the idea of Socialism, not in opposition to
nationhood but as its necessary complement if the word "liberation"
is to be given its fullest meaning. For, without Socialism, human
subjection will to a certain extent continue as it did under alien
rule?
Nationalists pur sang, in every country, will always denounce this
appeal as a diversion. Their reply is : "First let us win independence,
and the social system can be discussed later." This means in effect that
the national struggle should be carried through without disturbing
the social structure, which will thereafter be perpetuated by two
methods-by evoking a sentiment of gratitude to the founding fathers
of the nation and maintaining them in power, and by continuing
national unity in opposition to external enemies.
It ought to follow that Socialists-especially Socialists abroad-
should find some inadequacy in devoting themselves entirely to the
support of nationalist aspirations, and in particular to the sup-
port of parties and movements of simple nationalist coloration.
The championship of small national groups, preferably up against
heavy odds, is a classical enthusiasm of the British liberal intelligentsia.
In the last century it used to be the Greeks or maybe the Montenegrins.
Today the Nagas, the Kurds and the Tibetans each have their pas-
sionate sympathizers. I t is wholly natural (and no slur on sincerity is
implied) if the victimized Palestinian Arabs too find their champions.
For people whose ideological vision is limited by the goal of national
self-determination, such partisanship is a sufficient expression of
idealism. But for Socialists, the standards must be different. Uncritical
backing for the Arab cause and idealization of A1 Fateh, whose actions
are equated with liberation struggles in Vietnam or elsewhere, give
painful evidence of the political immaturity and simplirme of certain
sections of the Left.

SOCIALISM AND INTERNATIONALISM

Here another issue arises. I t is sometimes argued that the Left should
adopt a pro-Arab and anti-Israeli posture solely because of the role
played by either side in world politics. In this argument, the actual
merits of the case are irrelevant. Irrelevant, too, are any saving graces
that Israel may have, any defects in Arab states or movements, and
any undesirable consequences of an Arab victory. All that matters is
that the Arabs find themselves in opposition to world (primarily US)
imperialism, while Israel is an ally, outpost or implement of im-
perialism. An Arab victory would be painful for the imperialists, just
as a Liberation Front victory in Vietnam would be. Therefore, the
conflict along the Jordan and the war in Vietnam form part of one
indivisible liberation struggle.
There is a kind of caricature of this argument, according to which
the Arabs must be supported because they are poor and are therefore
part of the Third World, whereas the Israelis are bad because they
are western in orientation and culture and belong to what a pro-Arab
friend of mine distastefully calls "the TV world". Israel, it is often
said, must become a Middle Eastern nation and not an outpost of
Europe. It ought not to be necessary to point out that Arabs are poor,
to a great extent, because their society is dominated by gross inequality
and exploitation. Arabs want to be westernized in the sense of having
clean drinking water and clinics, like the Israelis. Unconsciously, part
of the Left seems to have been infected by the "noble savage" - roman-
ticism of desert travellers of the past.
Clearly, however, this aside does not dispose of the argument I have
set out above. It is a serious argument and, I believe, has considerable
force if it is not made to be utterly decisive. The Israelis, if they are
ever to be safe and to live in peace, must in the end recognize Arab
rights; and their reliance on ultimate US support is a major reason
why they don't do so. Equally, the implicit US guarantee of Israel's
survival is not given for the sake of Jewish beaux yeux or kibbutz
ideals, but to avoid exclusion from influence in the Middle East.
And yet it can be demonstrated in two ways that the argument has
at times been carried too far. The Israelis themselves are not fighting
to serve American interests. There are plenty of precedents, from the
birth of the US itself onward, for taking advantage of great-power
rivalries and seeking help where it may be found. At a certain period,
Arab and specifically Palestinian nationalism received active support
from Hitler; but it did not thereby cease to embody genuine aspira-
tions nor become merely an outpost of fascism. The fact is that Israel
could at any time have ensured complete safety by entering NATO,
becoming a formal ally of the US, and accepting American bases on
her territory. To sum up, the argument is correct in what it says about
US policy (at present), but not in what it says about Israel. Israel is
a nation open to condemnation on many counts-but a nation, not
an ~ m e r i & ncreation nor an American dependency.
Now a consideration of principle. It is right for Socialists to take
an international perspective and to consider the effect of specific events
on the broad sweep of history. But this cannot be made an excuse for
evading serious thought about actual situations-still less for in-
difference to the fate of actual human beings. The real reason why a
victory of the NLF in Vietnam is to be desired is not that it will weaken
US imperialism on a world scale. I t may have that effect or it may not;
arguably, by disengaging from a venture that has gone wrong and
restoring its order of battle both internally and externally, US im-
perialism would end up better off. Even if that were the result, the
NLF victory would be gratifying because it would bring national inde-
pendence-and, one hopes, social advance-to the people of Vietnam.
This, decisively, is what the war is being fought for. And similarly, no
"world view" should tempt us into pushing the interests of the Arab
and Israeli peoples into second place.

ARAB AND PALESTINIAN NATIONALISM

If the conflict is indeed a collision of two nationalisms, we have to

understand their origins and special features. The 100 million people
loosely known as Arabs inhabit a vast region stretching from the Atlan-
tic coast of Morocco to the Persian Gulf (or Arabian Gulf, as it is
prudent to say when in the locality). There is no racial homogeneity,
since only a minority is Arab in the strict sense of inhabiting or origin-
ating from Arabia. Some are descended from earlier inhabitants of the
territory concerned (e.g. Canaanites and Samaritans in Palestine); and
a t a later stage there was much mingling with other strains-African,
Turkish, Persian, etc. The factors of unity are broadly the following :
1. The Arabic language, which is spoken throughout (though dialects
differ extensively) and the culture associated with it.
2. The Moslem religion, together with a structure of Islamic law,
custom, and family life. Christians are fairly numerous among
Lebanese, Syrian, and Palestinian Arabs; but in the region as a whole
Moslem consciousness and Arab consciousness are not easily dis-
entangled. Religious fanaticism and the idea of the "holy war", to-
gether with the identification of political and religious authority, are
more characteristic of the wholly Moslem parts of the Arab world,
which are also the most socially backward; whereas tolerance and
political secularism are more characteristic of countries with sizeable
Christian populations, these being also more socially developed.
3. As a historical tradition, a potent factor is the memory of the
conquests made by Mahomet and his successors, which spread Arab
rule over the entire region for seven centuries until the period of sub-
jection by the Ottoman Turks. The appeal to past glories, as else-
where in the world, is a favourite weapon of reactionaries.
4. A more recent historical factor-has been the sense of oppression
by the Turks and the striving for national freedom-freedom from the
Turks, and also freedom from the British, French and Italian im-
perialists who established their mastery a t various times from 1830
(Algeria) to 1918 (Syria, Palestine, Iraq, etc.). South Arabia was a
British colony until 1969 and neo-colonialism is still present. Clearly,
this factor makes it accurate and important to speak of Arab struggles
for national liberation, having the same character as, and linked by
sympathy to, similar struggles everywhere in the Third World.
Whether there is an "Arab nation" is much more open to dispute,
and the question gets a variety of answers (very intricate and complex,
as a rule) both from specialists on the region and from Arabs them-
selves. The Arab community-to use the best non-committal word-
dates from a period when nations in the modern sense did not exist,
or were developing only in exceptional instances such as England and
France, and when the world was chiefly divided into supra-national
power systems. The factors of Arab unity were certainly strong enough
to have produced, in the right circumstances, a cohesive entity-a
nation-like China or India. But we have seen that similar factors in
black Africa and in Latin America have not had that result. In Israel
one often hears derisive remarks about the inabilitv of Arab states to
co-ordinate their efforts; but, if these states are really distinct nations
with no more than cultural links, it is unjust to expect them to be more
in step than the nations of Europe.
The question, in fact, is whether today there is one Arab nation or
several. I believe that there are several. and that events since 1918
have steadily promoted a process of self-definition in the various
political units. The speedy failure of the attempt to merge Egypt and
Syria in a United Arab Republic surely supports this belief. It should
be remembered that different parts of the Arab world have evolved a t
a widely varying pace. Some are still characterized by extreme back-
wardness, general illiteracy, grotesque contrasts of wealth and poverty,
an absence of all development save in the foreign-owned oil industry,
and a rudimentary tribal system of authority and allegiance. Others,
even under Turkish rule, manifested a well-developed mercantile
capitalism, a reasonably prosperous class of peasant and a
diffusion of culture and education equal to many parts of Europe. To-
day, therefore, one comes across fears of domination among the weaker
brethren, and assumptions of a right to "guide" among the more
advanced, with the inevitable signs of distrust, contempt, and prejudice.
Politically, the patchwork is just as diverse. Morocco, Jordan, Saudi
Arabia, and the minuscule Gulf states are old-style monarchies, some-
times with a veneer of parliament and cabinet, but with power firmly
monopolized by "great families" or court nominees, and still patronized
by the US, Britain, or France. Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Syria,
and Iraq are "popular" dictatorships, originating in the "young
colonels' revolt" so common in the Third World. There is a varying , -
amount of Castro-style sounding of mass opinion, but no structural
opportunity for popular participation in decision-making; Socialist
rhetoric is continuous and nationalization measures have been effected,
but it would be an abuse of words to call any of these countries
Socialist. Tunisia is a one-party state without any pretence of such
radicalism, and Lebanon is a caricature of Fourth-Republic France,
where formal democracy masks a discreet "hidden government" of
bureaucrats and commercial interests.
In the midst of all this are the Palestinians-a people without a
state, about half of them living under Israeli authority and the rest
in various Arab countries. Palestine before the Israeli transformation
was not exactly the tabula rasa depicted in Zionist oratory. Most of
the peasants were scratching a living by primitive methods from poor
soil which they had neither the knowledge nor the capital to improve,
but others were efficiently and prosperously engaged in such spheres
as citrus farming (which the Jews did not invent). There was also a
sizable town population complete with craftsmen, entrepreneurs, a
nascent working-class, professionals, and bureaucrats under the Man-
date administration. Standards of literacy and education were high in
relation to the Middle East in general.
After 1948, though many thousands of Palestinians languished in
refugee camps, development did not come to a halt. The tractor re-
placed the mule and living standards rose, both under Israeli rule and
in the West Bank territory which formed part of the new state of
Jordan. The younger generation took advantage of opportunities for
technical and university education; Palestinians supplied the bulk of
skilled manpower in the booming oil states. Those in exile became
aware of being among the most advanced and go-ahead national groups
in the Arab world. The consciousness of having progressed despite
immense calamities and difficulties generated feelings of solidarity, of
pride-in a word, of nationhood.
This reality has been concealed because there has never been a Pales-
tinian state. Palestine was not a political or even administrative entity
under Roman, Arab, or Ottoman rule; in 1918 it was divided from
Syria and Lebanon only because of an Anglo-French deal. In the con-
fusion of 1948 it was open to the Palestinian Arabs to proclaim their
statehood as a riposte to the proclamation of Israel (they held the Old
City of Jerusalem) and one must assume that the necessary leadership
was not available. With the formation of Jordan, the words "Palestine"
and "Palestinian" practically vanished from the political vocabulary,
to which they have now made an emphatic return. The false identity
of the Palestinians as simply "Arabs" was distinctly harmful to them,
since it suggested that they were neither capable nor desirous of
national status and that the only question was how they were being
treated under Israeli--or Jordanian-rule. But it is now evident that
they have reached the crucial stage of defining themselves as a nation
-in exile, through suffering and almost through desperation, just like
the Jews who created Israel in the shadow of the crematoria. They
have their own welfare and educational institutions which stretch
across frontiers; they have their own army in the shape of A1 Fateh.
All they lack is a state.
Disillusion with other Arab governments has been a factor in this
emergence. Between 1948 and 1967 the Jordanian authorities dis-
criminated against the West Bank in economic development and in
appointments to senior positions, while Gaza was ruled as an Egyptian
colony. In the Six Day War, the Palestinians interpreted the poor
showing of the Egyptian and Jordanian forces (they had never been
recruited to the latter) as deliberate desertion. After it, they were alert
to signs that Nasser and Hussein might reach a settlement with Israel
on terms which betrayed Palestinian interests. These resentments are
of course added evidence of the reality of Palestinian nationhood.
The weakness, or perhaps incompleteness, of this nationalism is two-
fold. Firstly, it has no overt political expression-nothing comparable
even to the Zionist congress and executive which spoke for Jewry
before Israel existed-and no machinery of consultation or repre-
sentation for the Palestinian people. (Admittedly, this can be ascribed
partly to the ambiguous relationship with Jordan, whose authority
still theoretically covers the West Bank.) The Palestine Liberation
Organization shows signs of fiIling this lack, but its leaders are self-
appointed and its functions mainly military. The other weakness is
related to the first : Palestinian leaders have produced very little in the
way of ideology or political-let alone social-programme. Some are
reported to be Socialists, probably in Syrian or Iraqi style; but their
tone reflects the limited nationalist outlook of "First win the struggle,
and then we'll see". I t is impossible to foresee what social system or
what form of government would ensue from the "liberation" of Pales-
tine. It would probably not be a restoration of power to the old wealthy
classes, whose authority has been eroded by time. But it might very
well be an unstable military dictatorship, as was the case in Algeria.
And yet, while Socialists are justified in adopting a reserved attitude
to such expressions of Palestinian nationalism, there can be no doubt of
the validity of the nationalism itself. In this context, the greatest re-
proach that can be made against the Israeli leaders and their sym-
pathizers is the refusal to recognize this vital development. The Israelis
since the Six Day War have been hoping for a peace treaty with
Hussein and/or Nasser (though failing to make realistic efforts to secure
it) while in fact the only interlocuteurs ualables are the Palestinians.
This blunder cannot be ascribed to stupidity or ignorance; the Israelis
can recognize what is going on, when they want to. What one has to
see is a refusal to admit the existence of another nation with equal
rights. The sources of this refusal must be traced to a certain outlook
toward the world in general and toward Arabs in particular.
 ZIONISM AND ISRAELI NATIONALISM

Israel is a nation by any kind of definition, and I am arguing in

this essay-just as I argue in the case of the Palestinians-that the
right of these two million people to nationhood and statehood is an
absolute. Nor is it diminished by the manner in which the nation
came to define itself and to create its state. In the course of history,
quite a number of nations (including Arab nations) have carried
through the process by settlement or invasion. Some have added to
this the enslavement or extermination of the indigenous population.
They are nations with a guilty past, but they are nations none
the less. Nor, finally, is the principle affected by whether these
events took place one generation or ten generations ago. I t is
logically possible to distinguish the Israeli nation from its Zionist
antecedents, and indeed this seems perfectly natural to many young
Israelis, who have little interest in Jews abroad and are concerned only
about the survival of the only homeland they have ever known. I t is
possible, moreover, to regard the Zionist settlement of Palestine and
the formation of the Israeli state as errors-and indeed crimes-and
yet to uphold the right of Israel to exist in 1970. I know very well that
this attitude is unacceptable to most Arabs, who see in it only the
immoral condonation of a fait accompli. I can only say that I am in-
terested in living people, and that I derive my arguments from what
I have set out as principles.
But it is also true that the present is conditioned by the past. When
we examine the conduct of a nation-state-Germany is the prime
example-we are taken back to considering how (under whose
auspices, with what ideology) it came into existence. Thus, when we
ask why Israel fails to respect the rights of other nations, and how
Jews of all people can enforce a military occupation, we find relevant
answers in the Zionist inheritance-coupled with the fact that Israel
is governed by elderly Zionists. Four features of Zionism, carried over
into the present, deserve analysis and proper criticism, though not in
my view the outright condemnation of Arab partisans. These are the
idea of settlement; the Jewish basis of nationality; the association be-
tween state and religion; and the attitude to the Arab population.
Naturally, they overlap.
The Zionist settlement was a typical event of the era of coloniali~m.~
In saying this we should distinguish between simple imperialism (the
administrative subjection of a territory, as in India) and the occupa-
tion of an empty or sparsely populated region with a view to creating an
economy and a social system from scratch. The Zionists set out to do what
had been done long since in the Americas and more recently in Australia,
South Africa and Kenya. At the time, such "pioneering" was viewed
 with general approval even by liberal opinion. Palestine was known to
be capable, with development, of supporting a much larger population
than it then had, and the population explosion was a thing undreamed
Other factors which evoked sympathy were the persecution of the
Jews in Czarist Russia, the enemy of all liberals, and the historical
and sentimental connection between the Jews and the land of their
origin6
I t was the misfortune of the Jews to be the Iast colonialists-to start
their colony at a time when the operation was soon to become suspect
and when the Arab drive for independence was gathering force. A
misfortune, yes; but the fact remains that it zetas colonialism. The
"pioneering" ideology maintains that the occupation of territory is
justified by material improvement, and this in turn gives a title to
possession. The more simple-minded friends of Israel, to this day, find
an adequate argument in "Look what they've made of the country".
Israelis, including Israeli Socialists, are still culpable in their reluctance
to repudiate the colonialist outlook. Thus it is that new settlements
have been planted since the Six Day War in places not, in theory,
claimed as part of Israel. I t is easy to understand Arab fears that terri-
torial ambitions, springing from the Zionist ideology, are unlimited.
Very clearly, there can be no peace unless Israelis learn to draw a
line between the maintenance of their nation and its expansion-unless,
in fact, they recognize that the colonialist phase of Jewish history is
at an end.
During the Mandate period, the obdurate point of conflict between
Arabs and Jews was the permissible amount and rate of Jewish immi-
gration. After the establishment of Israel, the Law of Return guaran-
teed the right of any Jew to enter and assume citizenship. I cannot
myself see that this gives the Israeli state a racialist basis, as Arabs
argue;7all newly independent nations (Ireland, Poland, Czechoslovakia)
have welcomed compatriots arriving, say, from America. Though Israel
was unique in that the Jews had previously possessed no territory at all,
there are partial precedents : when Greece became independent, five-
sixths of the Greek people lived outside its frontiers. But if we stop
there, we are seeing the matter only from the Jewish viewpoint. The
Arab fear was that immigration would alter the character of the coun-
try-"make Palestine as Jewish as England is English", as one Zionist
rashly put it-and this of course was what was intended and, largely,
achieved. They noted that Zionists were not concerned only to pro-
vide a refuge for Jews persecuted by Hitler, but were also urging the
immigration of non-persecuted Jews from anywhere in order to in-
crease the total numbers.
What the Arabs allege is that immigration is designed to exceed the
absorptive capacity of Israel within its present ethnic area (roughly,
 the 1949 frontier) and thus provide an argument for the "necessity" of
further expansion. Economists would differ as to whether this is a real
prospect, but it is true that there was serious unemployment in Israel
during the recession of 1965-66, and Arabs link this with the launching
of the 1967 war. Thus, the Law of Return is inseparably connected in
Arab thinking with the continuing process of settlement and expansion.
I t would be unrealistic to expect Israel to repeal the law, not simply
because any nation has the right to legislate in this field, but chiefly
because Israel cannot renounce its function as a potential haven for
persecuted Jews. What can be demanded is a binding declaration that
no further territory will be sought, whatever the size of Israel's popu-
lation. Israelis will have to see this as an essential precondition for
peace.
The alleged religious basis of the Israeli state is a vastly complicated
subject. Zionism itself has never been a religious movement; the most
devout Jews in Jerusalem still refuse to recognize the existence of a
Jewish state, maintaining that Jewish identity is "a thing of the spirit".
About half the children in Israel go to religious and half to secular
schools, both being state-supported. In the recurrent furious contro-
versies about such issues as television on the Sabbath, anti-clericals do
not hesitate to raise their voices. On the whole, the theocratic element
in Israel is somewhat less than the power of the Catholic Church in
Italy, Spain or Ireland, or indeed than Moslem control of law and
life in certain Arab countries. Such matters, surely, are for democrats
and humanists in each country to alter if they can, and at the worst
do not affect the fact of nationhood.
Yet it is also true that Zionism gained much of its emotional force
from the Biblical tradition, especially from the concept of Palestine as
a land promised to the Jewish people by God. The cultural atmosphere
in Israel is fairly heavy with constant reminders of such beliefs, and the
history taught even in secular schools has a certain Biblical content,
inculcating a strongly chauvinistic spirit. The Jews never possessed the
whole of Palestine in their most fortunate days, but they fought battles
all over it and beyond it, and each of these has created a "sacred place".
The claim to the entire city of Jerusalem, of course, is backed by this
appeal to ancient tradition.
The most telling point in the indictment is the absence of a civil
marriage law. A Jew or Jewess can be married only by a rabbi, and only
to a co-religionist. For Jews-but also for Arabs, whether Moslem or
Christian-religion is not a nominal matter; it involves a complex of
cultural associations and family links. I t is well known that inter-racial
friendship is impossible unless intermarriage is ultimately permitted,
and this situation places a solid barrier between people who are neigh-
bours and fellow-citizens.
 But the barrier is already formidable enough, for Israeli attitudes
towards Arabs are equally rooted in the colonialist past. The aim of
Zionist settlement was to build up self-sufficient communities in which
all the work was done by Jews. Gradually these were linked in a
national community, all of whose needs were to be met by Jewish
effort. Trade unions, for example, did not in general admit Arab mem-
bers, nor did Jewish enterprises employ Arabs. One can explain all
this as designed to avoid charges of exploitation, and also as a reaction
from life in the Diaspora, where Jews did not work on the land and to
some extent did not work with their hands at all, and the concentra-
tion on shopkeeping and money-making promoted an anti-Semitic
stereotype. Still, the result was to shut out the Arabs from the increas-
ing prosperity, and the educational and welfare systems, which the
Jews built up for themselves. A sense of common interests could not
develop in any sphere. Neither nationality gained any knowledge or
understanding of the other's culture and outlook. Psychologically, the
Arab village and the nearby kibbutz inhabited different worlds.
The characteristic Jewish attitude to Arabs came to be that of the
settler toward the "native" anywhere else-with the difference, it is
fair to say, that the gang labourer and the servant "boy" were absent
from the scene. While the Arabs kept quiet, they were ignored; when
they showed hostility, they were perceived-as pioneers in North
America perceived Red Indians-as raiders to be beaten back, not as
human beings with motives to be understood. After the state was
created, these attitudes were intensified by the physical separation be-
tween Jews and (all but 200,000) Arabs-a separation embodied in a
closed frontier from 1948 to 1967. Nothing in the most recent period
has improved matters. Certain Israelis, such as General Dayan, speak
fluent Arabic and pride themselves on "understanding the Arab", but
rather in the spirit of the British district officer who knew how to talk
to the Pathan headman.
Certainly, few Israelis feel much guilt about their treatment of the
Palestinians. Their version of the position is accurate within its limits :
Arabs in Israel have basic rights and the vote, the occupation in the
West Bank is lenient by the standard of most other occupations, and
if the Arabs are dissatisfied they can always make peace. What is
absent is an understanding of why there is no peace-an understanding
of the Palestinian national resurgence, inevitably linked with a burn-
ing resentment of Israel. Absent, above all, is a self-criticism of these
complacent attitudes, which are rooted in the colonialist outlook in-
herited from Zionism.
The preoccupation in the Israeli mind has been, and is, with the
survival of the nation. Simple nationalism, as I have remarked, makes
it difficult for Socialist principle to gain a hearing. About Socialism,
Iraelis are complacent too. They do in fact have a brand of social-
democracy that would represent real progress in Britain. The trade
unions are almost a second government, owning a variety of enter-
prises and welfare institutions. The kibbutzim are Socialist enclaves
which exert a considerable effect as moral pacemakers for society.
Inequalities of wealth are small, the social tone is free from privilege
or snobbery, the political system is democratic, the ordinary civil liber-
ties are secure. These are real achievements, and it is easy to forget
that Israel remains a capitalist country in which private business is
the principal mode of earning a living-not to speak of the grip on
the economy maintained by a relatively huge American investment. I t
also remains, so long as its relations with its neighbours are not put
on a basis of equality, a nation built on rotten foundations. T o point
this out is the unremitting duty of a Socialist.

I intend now to discuss what I believe to be a false solution, which

has gained considerable favour on the Left. This is the so-called secular
democratic state, contrasted by implication with the theocratic and
undemocratic state of Israel. The population of Palestine, if the refu-
gees were allowed to return, would consist roughly of 24 million Pales-
tinians and the same number of Jews. What is advocated is a single
new state, in which all would enjoy equal citizenship rights. One may
be forgiven for suspecting that the plan is sometimes advanced to
enlist the sympathies of liberals and Socialists, who are a new field of
appeal for the Arab cause and who could scarcely be attracted by the
line taken before 1967-that Palestine must be restored to the Arabs
and the Jews should be (according to who was talking) treated as alien
non-citizens, expelled, or exterminated. But it is right to accept that
the proposal is sincerely meant and examine it on its merits.
Obviously, if one starts from the assumption that Palestine is simply
an Arab country in which Palestinians (Arabs) would be justified in
holding complete power, then the democratic state is a generous con-
cession and there is no more to be said. But if we recognize the presence
of two national communities, it is surely a matter of principle that a
merger of this kind ought to be effected only with the consent of both.
The consent of the Palestinians has never been sought; it is extremely
doubtful whether they want to live on intimate terms with Jews or to
have their wishes nullified, as would sometimes be the case, by Jewish
votes. The consent of the Jews to the liquidation of Israel, we can
safely say, is never likely to be forthcoming. The democratic state,
since it would have to be imposed, is therefore undemocratic in its
inception.
 Historical evidence indicates repeatedly that a state in which two
self-conscious national groups are combined is the most delicate of
political experiments-even when consent was expressed a t the outset,
even when both groups have traditions of democracy and tolerance,
and even when the past has been marked by neighbourliness and not
by conflict. Norway and Sweden, among the most pacific of nations,
decided after making the effort that they could not live under the
same government. Passionate animosities persist between French and
British Canadians, between Walloon and Flemish Belgians. We have
watched a ghastly war in Nigeria, in which the Left generally sym-
pathized with those who would not accept a unitary state.
Also, while Palestinians and Jews are equal in numbers, Arabs as a
whole and Jews are not. I have expressed the view that the Arab region
consists of several nations and that its unification into a single state is
unlikely. But it is quite possible that Palestine might be brought into
unity, say, with Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, thus reducing the Jews
to minority status. No doubt this would be forbidden by the founding
constitution, but many stranger things have been done by force.
In the thinking behind this idea, one discerns an insufficient appre-
ciation of what a nation-state actually is. I t is much more than a unit
endowed with political independence. I t is characterized, from the
start and increasingly as it develops, by its own political habits (e.g. a
one-party, a two-party or a multi-party system); its own economic
and fiscal methods; its own ways of organizing education, health and
welfare services, public enterprises, cultural opportunities or restric-
tions; and its own international orientation. I t is not democratic to
throw all these into the melting-pot-r the dustbin-for they are
themselves the expressions of collective choice, at least when any kind
of democracy exists.
The essence of the plan is that, while failing to offer statehood to
the nation now lacking a state, it involves the extinction of the nation-
state that does exist, namely Israel. I t thus represents total defeat for
one side in the conflict without even giving the fruits of victory to the
other. This is not compromise, but frustration. True, it is possible that
the state envisaged could be a federation of two national units with a
weak centre, and with extensive rights for each unit in the spheres I
have mentioned. Nothing of the kind is suggested in any literature I
have seen on the subject, and the idea contradicts the slogan of a
secular democratic state, since one unit or the other might well fail to
be either secular or democratic. In any case, if we are thinking in
such terms, it is pointless to begin with the bitterly resented step of
eliminating an existing state and binding unwilling partners together.
I t would be more rational to work towards federation-r, more hope-
fully, a less formalized co-operation-from the starting-point of two
nations each respecting the rights of the other. And this is indeed the
only course that offers a real solution.

TOWARDS A SOLUTION

If I am not hopeful of an early peace, as of course no one can be,

it is because of the bleak fact to which one must recur : the refusal of
the parties concerned, especially of governments and wielders of
power, to concede the rights of the two nations whose homeland is
situated in Palestine. On the Arab side, objectives vary from the liquida-
tion of Israel (the aim of the Palestine Liberation Organization) to a
grudging acceptance of Israel's "existence" within the 1949 frontiers
(the standpoint of the UAR and Jordanian governments), which would
not, however, extend to normal state relationships, the signing of a
peace treaty, or any kind of trade or co-operati~n.~ O n the Israeli
side, the Arab-inhabited parts of Palestine are regarded as an outer
security zone for Israel, where certain key positions would be annexed
and where (apparently) an Israeli military presence would remain
even after a peace treaty. This, of course, is quite incompatible with
any real recognition of Palestinian nationhood. Immediately after the
Six Day War, the Israeli mood was to press for a peace treaty arising
from direct negotiations, and it was understood that these would be
negotiations without pre-conditions. By now there are several pre-
conditions, notably the retention of Jerusalem, which are manifestly
unacceptable to the other side. Israel has made no effort a t all to offer
inducements that might tempt her opponents to the conference table-
quite the contrary-and is clearly content to go on holding down the
occupied territories and to live by the maxim of rien ne dure comme
le provisoire.
However, if we take our stand on the existence of two nations, it is
not difficult to see where they are. The 1949 frontier, originally (and
always in the Arab view) a mere armistice line, is highly illogical from
the economic and other points of view, and there is no virtue in taking
-
it as sacrosanct; but it does mark a general ethnic division between the
two nations, and hence the only possible basis for agreement. Any
Israeli claims beyond this line, other than small common-sense recti-
fications, infringe the rights of nationhood and must be unacceptable,
for no Jews live beyond it except in recent and strongly resented settle-
ments. The Palestinian territory consists primarily of the area known
as the West Bank, and also includes Gaza, which has a considerable
local population, in addition to the refugees for whom a move to the
West Bank offers the only chance of a livelih~od.~
Jerusalem is a difficult and an emotionally charged problem. I t is the
inevitable capital of Israel, but also of any Palestinian state. This fact,
together with the intensity of loyalties on both sides, rules out an inter-
national or Free City rCgime as a realistic proposal. On the other hand,
one can scarcely wish to see a return to the "Berlin wall" situation of
1948-67. Indeed, Jerusalem is precisely the point a t which the two
nations could be drawn together by practical co-operation, as well as
in cultural and educational matters. The best solution seems to be :
(a) The city to be designated as the capital of both states, each
maintaining its Parliament, government offices, etc. in its own sector.
(b) A legal frontier dividing the city, but guarantees of freedom
of movement throughout, and a right of residence for any Jerusalem
citizen anywhere. The frontier and customs posts of each state to be
located outside the city.
(c) A municipal administration elected by all citizens, possibly with
a "weightage" provision to counteract the Israeli superiority in num-
bers.
Ultimately, however, a nation consists not of acreage but of human
beings. I t is impossible to envisage a peace settlement without agree-
ment on the problem of the refugees. This question is embittered by
all kinds of arguments about the circumstances in which they fled, or
were driven out; about whether their numbers are exaggerated; about
whether they ought, or in practice could, have been resettled; and
about whether, remembering the Jews who fled (or were driven) from
Arab countries, the reality is not that of an exchange of populations.
But, polemics aside, what we are confronted with is a considerable
mass of people, for the most part without homes or livelihood, who
are Palestinians and whose interests must be championed by any Pales-
tinian state.
No question demonstrates more clearly that peace depends on a
repudiation of chauvinist attitudes. The Israelis have refused to allow
any refugees (even urban householders) to return to their homes in
Israel, and even (except to a minor degree) to allow those who had
fled east of the Jordan in 1967 to return to occupied territory. To say
nothing of the brutal indifference to human suffering, the determina-
tion to keep the non-Jewish population down to the smallest feasible
numbers can only be described as racialist. But for every Arab who
left in 1948 (or his children or grandchildren) to regain precisely the
home and the land which he then had, would entail such a disruption
of subsequent development that the Israeli national community could
scarcely survive it. To make this unqualified demand is in effect only
another way of saying that Israel must be liquidated.
Israel undoubtedly will have to accept-what her government now
rejects-a responsibility in principle for the refugees. In an atmosphere
of peace, it would remain to be defined how far this would mean actual
return, or money compensation to individuals, or the financing of
development projects leading to resettlement in Palestinian or other
Arab territory. The creation of a Palestinian state is closely relevant
to the refugee problem, for the refugee himself, even if his old home
were in Israel, would probably prefer a future within his national
community.
Such, I think, are the essentials of peace. But the vital condition is
the existence of two states headed by governments with enough popu-
lar confidence to make and keep agreements. In 1967, the Israelis
toyed with the idea of encouraging a government of Arab personalities
for the occupied area, and even of forming a federation of this area
and Israel itself. I t is doubtful whether the notion was seriously meant,
and for several clear reasons no volunteers came forward. Any govern-
ment composed of Israeli nominees or willing to accept Israeli tutelage
would be seen by the people as a mere quisling rCgime. Further, any
state which did not enjoy complete freedom of action, including such
links as it desired with other Arab states, or which consented to an
Israeli occupation (however localized or discreet) would not be a real
state.1° Indeed, the genuineness of a Palestinian state would be
measured-at least for a number of years, until possibilities of trust
come to birth-by the degree to which it did things that the Israelis
disliked. Its ministers would be people who had thrown bombs a t the
Israelis, just as Israeli ministers were people who had thrown bombs
at the British. The obligation rests on the Israelis to recognize the
legitimacy-indeed the necessity-f such a state and its right to abso-
lute sovereignty. What they can and are bound to require in return is
that the Palestinians should recognize the legitimacy of Israel.
I t is a platitude to say that a new attitude is needed on both sides.
What is really needed is a new ideology. The dominant ideologies, as
we have seen, are those of nationalism : a nationalism that goes beyond
the defence of national rights (though this is how it is subjectively
seen) to denial of the rights of others. The only viable opposing ideology
is that of Socialism, since it is only from the Socialist viewpoint that
one can frame a coherent criticism, firstly of the limitations of
nationalism, secondly of the reactionary traditions and assumptions
that generate the chauvinist outlook. Certainly an Arab state which
accepted Israel would be markedly different from any existing Arab
state, and an Israel which accepted Palestinian rights would be different
from the Israel of the present. The changes must be in a Socialist
direction.
I t is vain to pretend that it is easy to preach this doctrine in any of
the countries concerned. I t always has been tough work for Socialists
to counter a mood of national unity against an external enemy, above
all when the national sufferings are real and the national danger
obvious. The difficulties on the Israeli side should not be under-
estimated, since the state and government claim to be Socialist, and
the citizen-soldier has the feeling of defending social achievements as
well as national independence. At least, however, it is admitted that
advocates of conciliation-though regarded as treacherous or crazy-
are men of the Left. I n the Arab world, an extra handicap exists, for
it is in fact the conservative groups-the mercantile capitalists with
their western links, and the remnants of the old British-sponsored
politicos and court intriguers-who wish for their own reasons to end
the confrontation with Israel and the Soviet influence that it has
facilitated. The younger radicals, students, and trade union leaders,
and the groups most conscious of a world-wide struggle against im-
perialism, are the most ardent preachers of the crusade to wipe Israel
off the map. Their understanding of Socialism is crude and distorted,
but their enthusiasm for it is undeniable. So it will continue to be, so
long as they believe that Socialism justifies that crusade.
A serious responsibility, therefore, rests on Socialists who can think
in freedom from such pressure. I t is a responsibility that will not be
met by picking sides and substituting nationalism for Socialist prin-
ciple.

NOTES
1. My attempt a t definition will remind the reader of Stalin's Marxism and
the National and Colonial Question, which is an over-schematic book
with a number of flaws, but which-written as it was under Lenin's tute-
lage-does represent a serious Marxist statement on the subject. Stalin
went wrong chiefly in his comments on specific cases (he considered Polish
nationalism a thing of the past-in 1913 !) and in his insistence on each
and every one of the "hallmarks" as a sine qua non. T o what extent he
insisted on territory in order to exclude the Jews from the list of nations
is a matter for speculation. As one might expect from such a rigid thinker,
what one misses in his analysis is the dynamic element which seems to
me all-important.
2. This formulation does not assert that the liquidation of the Israeli state
is the same thing as the expulsion or massacre of the Israeli people. I am
not so sure that the distinction is entirely clear to everyone. When I re-
marked to one Arab dignitary (the Foreign Minister of Kuwait) that it
was proposed to destroy the state of Israel, he vehemently denied it. I t
turned out that the interpreter had rendered my phrase as "kill the Jews";
possibly the two concepts were not quite separate in his mind. In varying
degrees, Arabs to whom I have spoken concede that, after the liquidation
of Israel as a state, Jews in Palestine should be free with respect to re-
ligious observances, education, welfare institutions and so forth-that they
would in fact exist as a community. I t is fair to welcome the emergence
of this kind of thinking, as evidence of growth of Socialist trends in
opposition to those of crude nationalism. But unhappily-whether in the
actual Israeli occupation of Arab territory, or in a hypothetical Arab
occupation of Jewish districts-the likelihood is that military governors
rather than Socialist intellectuals decide what happens. The broader ques-
tion of whether the state of Israel ought to be liquidated is discussed
later in this essay.
No one put the matter better than James Connolly, who wrote in 1897:
"If you remove the English army tomorrow and hoist the green flag over
Dublin Castle, unless you set about the organization of the Socialist Repub-
lic your efforts would be in vain." The social structure of Ireland and
the weakness of the working-class movement have frustrated Connolly's
hopes to this day. I n 1970, Socialists who get absorbed in nationalist
movements fail to talk his language even in Scotland and Wales-indus-
trialized countries with Socialist tradition-let alone in Asia or Africa.
This point is admirably developed by Maxime Rodinson in his Penguin
book, Israel and the Arabs, which everyone should read.
We have here a good example of the varied perception of reality. T o the
Jew, whose kibbutz was created by draining a swamp, irrigating desert, or
ploughing a mountainside used a t most for intermittent grazing, it does
not seem that he has taken anything away from anyone. T o the Arab, it
seems that he has lost his title to land which he would have developed
when necessary. The unforeseen growth of Arab as well as Jewish popula-
tion is among the major background causes of the conflict.
The connection was greater than is sometimes suggested. There had been
recurrent return movements, and it is probable (though the statistics are
vague) that the population of Palestine was ten per cent Jewish a t any
time from the Roman conquest to the present century.
Recent reactionary legislation has tightened the link between religious
allegiance and Jewishness, the latter being the principal title-deed to
Israeli nationality. But citizenship, with voting and similar rights, also
extends to over 300,000 Arabs, plus a small number of other residents
who have acquired it as happens in other countries. A distinction between
nationality and citizenship, unknown in the West, is traditional in the
Middle East and in Eastern Europe, as Soviet identity cards still remind us.
These governments (though not certain other Arab belligerents, notably
Syria) accepted the Security Council resolution of November 1967 and
officially still regard it as a basis for "non-belligerence". The resolution
was a "least common denominator" diplomatic formula marked by obvious
contradictions. If peace is the aim, it could a t best be a basis for detailed
negotiation. I n practice, it is now pretty much a dead letter. Arab reser-
vations about the most limited kind of settlement are described in my
report on a tour of Arab capitals. (New Statesman, 13 June, 1969.)
Exact frontiers between Israel and Palestine (taking that as a convenient
name for a Palestinian state, and not in this context for the country as
a whole) can hardly be defined in advance, since a vital point is that they
can only emerge from negotiations free from dictation. But, since readers
may feel some doubts about the future of the two states-either doubts
that Israel would be defensible, or doubts that Palestine would be
economically viable-certain provisional points are worth making :
(a) Certain villages retained their Arab population when incorporated
into Israel in 1948-9. Other villages went to Jordan, but the villagers
were left without farming land. These villages and fields should belong
to Palestine, where this would not create worse illogicalities.
(b) An obvious problem is the detachment of Gaza from the rest of Pales-
tine. Economically, too, access to the sea is a virtual necessity for the
new state. There is a need for either guaranteed rights over a road
 and railway (which, with port equipment a t Gaza, might well be con-
structed a t Israel's expense) or perhaps the actual cession of a linking
strip of territory.
(c) I t would be reasonable for Israel to retain Latrun, a point on the road
from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem which she did not possess between 1948
and 1967.
(d) The occupied area of the Golan Heights belonged to Syria, so that
Palestine is, strictly speaking, not involved. There is a case on defence
grounds for Israeli retention of the escarpment, which is either unin-
habited or populated by Druses. On a recent visit I got a strong im-
pression that they prefer Israeli to Syrian rule. But Kuneitra was a
Syrian-Arab town and should be returned to Syria.
10. An Israeli withdrawal from occupied territory is an essential part of any
settlement. An Israeli withdrawal in advance of a settlement, and while
the liquidation of Israel is still the aim of significant Arab forces, is in
my opinion rather too much to ask.