2015 Ar
2015 Ar
2015 Ar
2015
ANNUAL REPORT
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chairman’s Letter* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Acquisition Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Business Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Management’s Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
2
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
Berkshire’s gain in net worth during 2015 was $15.4 billion, which increased the per-share book value of
both our Class A and Class B stock by 6.4%. Over the last 51 years (that is, since present management took over),
per-share book value has grown from $19 to $155,501, a rate of 19.2% compounded annually.*
During the first half of those years, Berkshire’s net worth was roughly equal to the number that really
counts: the intrinsic value of the business. The similarity of the two figures existed then because most of our
resources were deployed in marketable securities that were regularly revalued to their quoted prices (less the tax that
would be incurred if they were to be sold). In Wall Street parlance, our balance sheet was then in very large part
“marked to market.”
By the early 1990s, however, our focus had changed to the outright ownership of businesses, a shift that
diminished the relevance of balance-sheet figures. That disconnect occurred because the accounting rules that apply
to controlled companies are materially different from those used in valuing marketable securities. The carrying
value of the “losers” we own is written down, but “winners” are never revalued upwards.
We’ve had experience with both outcomes: I’ve made some dumb purchases, and the amount I paid for the
economic goodwill of those companies was later written off, a move that reduced Berkshire’s book value. We’ve
also had some winners – a few of them very big – but have not written those up by a penny.
Over time, this asymmetrical accounting treatment (with which we agree) necessarily widens the gap
between intrinsic value and book value. Today, the large – and growing – unrecorded gains at our “winners” make it
clear that Berkshire’s intrinsic value far exceeds its book value. That’s why we would be delighted to repurchase
our shares should they sell as low as 120% of book value. At that level, purchases would instantly and meaningfully
increase per-share intrinsic value for Berkshire’s continuing shareholders.
The unrecorded increase in the value of our owned businesses explains why Berkshire’s aggregate market-
value gain – tabulated on the facing page – materially exceeds our book-value gain. The two indicators vary
erratically over short periods. Last year, for example, book-value performance was superior. Over time, however,
market-value gains should continue their historical tendency to exceed gains in book value.
* All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/1500th of
those shown for A.
3
The Year at Berkshire
Charlie Munger, Berkshire Vice Chairman and my partner, and I expect Berkshire’s normalized earning
power to increase every year. (Actual year-to-year earnings, of course, will sometimes decline because of weakness
in the U.S. economy or, possibly, because of insurance mega-catastrophes.) In some years the normalized gains will
be small; at other times they will be material. Last year was a good one. Here are the highlights:
‹ The most important development at Berkshire during 2015 was not financial, though it led to better
earnings. After a poor performance in 2014, our BNSF railroad dramatically improved its service to
customers last year. To attain that result, we invested about $5.8 billion during the year in capital
expenditures, a sum far and away the record for any American railroad and nearly three times our annual
depreciation charge. It was money well spent.
BNSF moves about 17% of America’s intercity freight (measured by revenue ton-miles), whether
transported by rail, truck, air, water or pipeline. In that respect, we are a strong number one among the
seven large American railroads (two of which are Canadian-based), carrying 45% more ton-miles of freight
than our closest competitor. Consequently, our maintaining first-class service is not only vital to our
shippers’ welfare but also important to the smooth functioning of the U.S. economy.
For most American railroads, 2015 was a disappointing year. Aggregate ton-miles fell, and earnings
weakened as well. BNSF, however, maintained volume, and pre-tax income rose to a record $6.8 billion*
(a gain of $606 million from 2014). Matt Rose and Carl Ice, the managers of BNSF, have my thanks and
deserve yours.
‹ BNSF is the largest of our “Powerhouse Five,” a group that also includes Berkshire Hathaway Energy,
Marmon, Lubrizol and IMC. Combined, these companies – our five most profitable non-insurance
businesses – earned $13.1 billion in 2015, an increase of $650 million over 2014.
Of the five, only Berkshire Hathaway Energy, then earning $393 million, was owned by us in 2003.
Subsequently, we purchased three of the other four on an all-cash basis. In acquiring BNSF, however, we
paid about 70% of the cost in cash and, for the remainder, issued Berkshire shares that increased the
number outstanding by 6.1%. In other words, the $12.7 billion gain in annual earnings delivered Berkshire
by the five companies over the twelve-year span has been accompanied by only minor dilution. That
satisfies our goal of not simply increasing earnings, but making sure we also increase per-share results.
‹ Next year, I will be discussing the “Powerhouse Six.” The newcomer will be Precision Castparts Corp.
(“PCC”), a business that we purchased a month ago for more than $32 billion of cash. PCC fits perfectly
into the Berkshire model and will substantially increase our normalized per-share earning power.
Under CEO Mark Donegan, PCC has become the world’s premier supplier of aerospace components (most
of them destined to be original equipment, though spares are important to the company as well). Mark’s
accomplishments remind me of the magic regularly performed by Jacob Harpaz at IMC, our remarkable
Israeli manufacturer of cutting tools. The two men transform very ordinary raw materials into extraordinary
products that are used by major manufacturers worldwide. Each is the da Vinci of his craft.
PCC’s products, often delivered under multi-year contracts, are key components in most large aircraft.
Other industries are served as well by the company’s 30,466 employees, who work out of 162 plants in 13
countries. In building his business, Mark has made many acquisitions and will make more. We look
forward to having him deploy Berkshire’s capital.
* Throughout this letter, all earnings are stated on a pre-tax basis unless otherwise designated.
4
A personal thank-you: The PCC acquisition would not have happened without the input and assistance of
our own Todd Combs, who brought the company to my attention a few years ago and went on to educate
me about both the business and Mark. Though Todd and Ted Weschler are primarily investment managers
– they each handle about $9 billion for us – both of them cheerfully and ably add major value to Berkshire
in other ways as well. Hiring these two was one of my best moves.
‹ With the PCC acquisition, Berkshire will own 10 1⁄ 4 companies that would populate the Fortune 500 if they
were stand-alone businesses. (Our 27% holding of Kraft Heinz is the 1⁄ 4.) That leaves just under 98% of
America’s business giants that have yet to call us. Operators are standing by.
‹ Our many dozens of smaller non-insurance businesses earned $5.7 billion last year, up from $5.1 billion in
2014. Within this group, we have one company that last year earned more than $700 million, two that
earned between $400 million and $700 million, seven that earned between $250 million and $400 million,
six that earned between $100 million and $250 million, and eleven that earned between $50 million and
$100 million. We love them all: This collection of businesses will expand both in number and earnings as
the years go by.
‹ When you hear talk about America’s crumbling infrastructure, rest assured that they’re not talking about
Berkshire. We invested $16 billion in property, plant and equipment last year, a full 86% of it deployed in
the United States.
I told you earlier about BNSF’s record capital expenditures in 2015. At the end of every year, our railroad’s
physical facilities will be improved from those existing twelve months earlier.
Berkshire Hathaway Energy (“BHE”) is a similar story. That company has invested $16 billion in
renewables and now owns 7% of the country’s wind generation and 6% of its solar generation. Indeed, the
4,423 megawatts of wind generation owned and operated by our regulated utilities is six times the
generation of the runner-up utility.
We’re not done. Last year, BHE made major commitments to the future development of renewables in
support of the Paris Climate Change Conference. Our fulfilling those promises will make great sense, both
for the environment and for Berkshire’s economics.
‹ Berkshire’s huge and growing insurance operation again operated at an underwriting profit in 2015 – that
makes 13 years in a row – and increased its float. During those years, our float – money that doesn’t belong
to us but that we can invest for Berkshire’s benefit – grew from $41 billion to $88 billion. Though neither
that gain nor the size of our float is reflected in Berkshire’s earnings, float generates significant investment
income because of the assets it allows us to hold.
Meanwhile, our underwriting profit totaled $26 billion during the 13-year period, including $1.8 billion
earned in 2015. Without a doubt, Berkshire’s largest unrecorded wealth lies in its insurance business.
We’ve spent 48 years building this multi-faceted operation, and it can’t be replicated.
‹ While Charlie and I search for new businesses to buy, our many subsidiaries are regularly making bolt-on
acquisitions. Last year we contracted for 29 bolt-ons, scheduled to cost $634 million in aggregate. The cost
of these purchases ranged from $300,000 to $143 million.
Charlie and I encourage bolt-ons, if they are sensibly-priced. (Most deals offered us most definitely aren’t.)
These purchases deploy capital in operations that fit with our existing businesses and that will be managed
by our corps of expert managers. That means no additional work for us, yet more earnings for Berkshire, a
combination we find highly appealing. We will make many dozens of bolt-on deals in future years.
5
‹ Our Heinz partnership with Jorge Paulo Lemann, Alex Behring and Bernardo Hees more than doubled its
size last year by merging with Kraft. Before this transaction, we owned about 53% of Heinz at a cost of
$4.25 billion. Now we own 325.4 million shares of Kraft Heinz (about 27%) that cost us $9.8 billion. The
new company has annual sales of $27 billion and can supply you Heinz ketchup or mustard to go with your
Oscar Mayer hot dogs that come from the Kraft side. Add a Coke, and you will be enjoying my favorite
meal. (We will have the Oscar Mayer Wienermobile at the annual meeting – bring your kids.)
Though we sold no Kraft Heinz shares, “GAAP” (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) required us
to record a $6.8 billion write-up of our investment upon completion of the merger. That leaves us with our
Kraft Heinz holding carried on our balance sheet at a value many billions above our cost and many billions
below its market value, an outcome only an accountant could love.
Berkshire also owns Kraft Heinz preferred shares that pay us $720 million annually and are carried at $7.7
billion on our balance sheet. That holding will almost certainly be redeemed for $8.32 billion in June (the
earliest date allowed under the preferred’s terms). That will be good news for Kraft Heinz and bad news for
Berkshire.
Jorge Paulo and his associates could not be better partners. We share with them a passion to buy, build and
hold large businesses that satisfy basic needs and desires. We follow different paths, however, in pursuing
this goal.
Their method, at which they have been extraordinarily successful, is to buy companies that offer an
opportunity for eliminating many unnecessary costs and then – very promptly – to make the moves that will
get the job done. Their actions significantly boost productivity, the all-important factor in America’s
economic growth over the past 240 years. Without more output of desired goods and services per working
hour – that’s the measure of productivity gains – an economy inevitably stagnates. At much of corporate
America, truly major gains in productivity are possible, a fact offering opportunities to Jorge Paulo and his
associates.
At Berkshire, we, too, crave efficiency and detest bureaucracy. To achieve our goals, however, we follow
an approach emphasizing avoidance of bloat, buying businesses such as PCC that have long been run by
cost-conscious and efficient managers. After the purchase, our role is simply to create an environment in
which these CEOs – and their eventual successors, who typically are like-minded – can maximize both
their managerial effectiveness and the pleasure they derive from their jobs. (With this hands-off style, I am
heeding a well-known Mungerism: “If you want to guarantee yourself a lifetime of misery, be sure to
marry someone with the intent of changing their behavior.”)
We will continue to operate with extreme – indeed, almost unheard of – decentralization at Berkshire. But
we will also look for opportunities to partner with Jorge Paulo, either as a financing partner, as was the
case when his group purchased Tim Horton’s, or as a combined equity-and-financing partner, as at Heinz.
We also may occasionally partner with others, as we have successfully done at Berkadia.
Berkshire, however, will join only with partners making friendly acquisitions. To be sure, certain hostile
offers are justified: Some CEOs forget that it is shareholders for whom they should be working, while other
managers are woefully inept. In either case, directors may be blind to the problem or simply reluctant to
make the change required. That’s when new faces are needed. We, though, will leave these “opportunities”
for others. At Berkshire, we go only where we are welcome.
6
‹ Berkshire increased its ownership interest last year in each of its “Big Four” investments – American
Express, Coca-Cola, IBM and Wells Fargo. We purchased additional shares of IBM (increasing our
ownership to 8.4% versus 7.8% at yearend 2014) and Wells Fargo (going to 9.8% from 9.4%). At the other
two companies, Coca-Cola and American Express, stock repurchases raised our percentage ownership. Our
equity in Coca-Cola grew from 9.2% to 9.3%, and our interest in American Express increased from 14.8%
to 15.6%. In case you think these seemingly small changes aren’t important, consider this math: For the
four companies in aggregate, each increase of one percentage point in our ownership raises Berkshire’s
portion of their annual earnings by about $500 million.
These four investees possess excellent businesses and are run by managers who are both talented and
shareholder-oriented. Their returns on tangible equity range from excellent to staggering. At Berkshire, we
much prefer owning a non-controlling but substantial portion of a wonderful company to owning 100% of
a so-so business. It’s better to have a partial interest in the Hope Diamond than to own all of a rhinestone.
If Berkshire’s yearend holdings are used as the marker, our portion of the “Big Four’s” 2015 earnings
amounted to $4.7 billion. In the earnings we report to you, however, we include only the dividends they
pay us – about $1.8 billion last year. But make no mistake: The nearly $3 billion of these companies’
earnings we don’t report are every bit as valuable to us as the portion Berkshire records.
The earnings our investees retain are often used for repurchases of their own stock – a move that increases
Berkshire’s share of future earnings without requiring us to lay out a dime. The retained earnings of these
companies also fund business opportunities that usually turn out to be advantageous. All that leads us to
expect that the per-share earnings of these four investees, in aggregate, will grow substantially over time. If
gains do indeed materialize, dividends to Berkshire will increase and so, too, will our unrealized capital
gains.
Our flexibility in capital allocation – our willingness to invest large sums passively in non-controlled
businesses – gives us a significant edge over companies that limit themselves to acquisitions they will
operate. Woody Allen once explained that the advantage of being bi-sexual is that it doubles your chance
of finding a date on Saturday night. In like manner – well, not exactly like manner – our appetite for either
operating businesses or passive investments doubles our chances of finding sensible uses for Berkshire’s
endless gusher of cash. Beyond that, having a huge portfolio of marketable securities gives us a stockpile
of funds that can be tapped when an elephant-sized acquisition is offered to us.
************
It’s an election year, and candidates can’t stop speaking about our country’s problems (which, of course,
only they can solve). As a result of this negative drumbeat, many Americans now believe that their children will not
live as well as they themselves do.
That view is dead wrong: The babies being born in America today are the luckiest crop in history.
American GDP per capita is now about $56,000. As I mentioned last year that – in real terms – is a
staggering six times the amount in 1930, the year I was born, a leap far beyond the wildest dreams of my parents or
their contemporaries. U.S. citizens are not intrinsically more intelligent today, nor do they work harder than did
Americans in 1930. Rather, they work far more efficiently and thereby produce far more. This all-powerful trend is
certain to continue: America’s economic magic remains alive and well.
Some commentators bemoan our current 2% per year growth in real GDP – and, yes, we would all like to
see a higher rate. But let’s do some simple math using the much-lamented 2% figure. That rate, we will see, delivers
astounding gains.
7
America’s population is growing about .8% per year (.5% from births minus deaths and .3% from net
migration). Thus 2% of overall growth produces about 1.2% of per capita growth. That may not sound impressive.
But in a single generation of, say, 25 years, that rate of growth leads to a gain of 34.4% in real GDP per capita.
(Compounding’s effects produce the excess over the percentage that would result by simply multiplying 25 x 1.2%.)
In turn, that 34.4% gain will produce a staggering $19,000 increase in real GDP per capita for the next generation.
Were that to be distributed equally, the gain would be $76,000 annually for a family of four. Today’s politicians
need not shed tears for tomorrow’s children.
Indeed, most of today’s children are doing well. All families in my upper middle-class neighborhood
regularly enjoy a living standard better than that achieved by John D. Rockefeller Sr. at the time of my birth. His
unparalleled fortune couldn’t buy what we now take for granted, whether the field is – to name just a few –
transportation, entertainment, communication or medical services. Rockefeller certainly had power and fame; he
could not, however, live as well as my neighbors now do.
Though the pie to be shared by the next generation will be far larger than today’s, how it will be divided
will remain fiercely contentious. Just as is now the case, there will be struggles for the increased output of goods
and services between those people in their productive years and retirees, between the healthy and the infirm,
between the inheritors and the Horatio Algers, between investors and workers and, in particular, between those with
talents that are valued highly by the marketplace and the equally decent hard-working Americans who lack the skills
the market prizes. Clashes of that sort have forever been with us – and will forever continue. Congress will be the
battlefield; money and votes will be the weapons. Lobbying will remain a growth industry.
The good news, however, is that even members of the “losing” sides will almost certainly enjoy – as they
should – far more goods and services in the future than they have in the past. The quality of their increased bounty
will also dramatically improve. Nothing rivals the market system in producing what people want – nor, even more
so, in delivering what people don’t yet know they want. My parents, when young, could not envision a television
set, nor did I, in my 50s, think I needed a personal computer. Both products, once people saw what they could do,
quickly revolutionized their lives. I now spend ten hours a week playing bridge online. And, as I write this letter,
“search” is invaluable to me. (I’m not ready for Tinder, however.)
For 240 years it’s been a terrible mistake to bet against America, and now is no time to start. America’s
golden goose of commerce and innovation will continue to lay more and larger eggs. America’s social security
promises will be honored and perhaps made more generous. And, yes, America’s kids will live far better than their
parents did.
************
Considering this favorable tailwind, Berkshire (and, to be sure, a great many other businesses) will almost
certainly prosper. The managers who succeed Charlie and me will build Berkshire’s per-share intrinsic value by
following our simple blueprint of: (1) constantly improving the basic earning power of our many subsidiaries;
(2) further increasing their earnings through bolt-on acquisitions; (3) benefiting from the growth of our investees;
(4) repurchasing Berkshire shares when they are available at a meaningful discount from intrinsic value; and
(5) making an occasional large acquisition. Management will also try to maximize results for you by rarely, if ever,
issuing Berkshire shares.
8
Intrinsic Business Value
As much as Charlie and I talk about intrinsic business value, we cannot tell you precisely what that number
is for Berkshire shares (nor, in fact, for any other stock). It is possible, however, to make a sensible estimate. In our
2010 annual report we laid out the three elements – one of them qualitative – that we believe are the keys to an
estimation of Berkshire’s intrinsic value. That discussion is reproduced in full on pages 113-114.
Here is an update of the two quantitative factors: In 2015 our per-share cash and investments increased
8.3% to $159,794 (with our Kraft Heinz shares stated at market value), and earnings from our many businesses –
including insurance underwriting income – increased 2.1% to $12,304 per share. We exclude in the second factor
the dividends and interest from the investments we hold because including them would produce a double-counting
of value. In arriving at our earnings figure, we deduct all corporate overhead, interest, depreciation, amortization
and minority interests. Income taxes, though, are not deducted. That is, the earnings are pre-tax.
I used the italics in the paragraph above because we are for the first time including insurance underwriting
income in business earnings. We did not do that when we initially introduced Berkshire’s two quantitative pillars of
valuation because our insurance results were then heavily influenced by catastrophe coverages. If the wind didn’t
blow and the earth didn’t shake, we made large profits. But a mega-catastrophe would produce red ink. In order to
be conservative then in stating our business earnings, we consistently assumed that underwriting would break even
over time and ignored any of its gains or losses in our annual calculation of the second factor of value.
Today, our insurance results are likely to be more stable than was the case a decade or two ago because we
have deemphasized catastrophe coverages and greatly expanded our bread-and-butter lines of business. Last year,
our underwriting income contributed $1,118 per share to the $12,304 per share of earnings referenced in the second
paragraph of this section. Over the past decade, annual underwriting income has averaged $1,434 per share, and we
anticipate being profitable in most years. You should recognize, however, that underwriting in any given year could
well be unprofitable, perhaps substantially so.
Since 1970, our per-share investments have increased at a rate of 18.9% compounded annually, and our
earnings (including the underwriting results in both the initial and terminal year) have grown at a 23.7% clip. It is no
coincidence that the price of Berkshire stock over the ensuing 45 years has increased at a rate very similar to that of
our two measures of value. Charlie and I like to see gains in both sectors, but our main goal is to build operating
earnings.
************
Now, let’s examine the four major sectors of our operations. Each has vastly different balance sheet and
income characteristics from the others. So we’ll present them as four separate businesses, which is how Charlie and
I view them (though there are important and enduring economic advantages to having them all under one roof). Our
intent is to provide you with the information we would wish to have if our positions were reversed, with you being
the reporting manager and we the absentee shareholders. (Don’t get excited; this is not a switch we are considering.)
Insurance
Let’s look first at insurance. The property-casualty (“P/C”) branch of that industry has been the engine that
has propelled our expansion since 1967, when we acquired National Indemnity and its sister company, National
Fire & Marine, for $8.6 million. Today, National Indemnity is the largest property-casualty company in the world,
as measured by net worth. Moreover, its intrinsic value is far in excess of the value at which it is carried on our
books.
9
One reason we were attracted to the P/C business was its financial characteristics: P/C insurers receive
premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as those arising from certain workers’ compensation
accidents, payments can stretch over many decades. This collect-now, pay-later model leaves P/C companies
holding large sums – money we call “float” – that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, insurers get to invest this
float for their own benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float an insurer holds
usually remains fairly stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float.
And how we have grown, as the following table shows:
Further gains in float will be tough to achieve. On the plus side, GEICO and several of our specialized
operations are almost certain to grow at a good clip. National Indemnity’s reinsurance division, however, is party to
a number of run-off contracts whose float drifts downward. If we do in time experience a decline in float, it will be
very gradual – at the outside no more than 3% in any year. The nature of our insurance contracts is such that we can
never be subject to immediate or near-term demands for sums that are of significance to our cash resources. This
structure is by design and is a key component in the strength of Berkshire’s economic fortress. It will never be
compromised.
If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, we register an underwriting profit
that adds to the investment income our float produces. When such a profit is earned, we enjoy the use of free money
– and, better yet, get paid for holding it.
Unfortunately, the wish of all insurers to achieve this happy result creates intense competition, so vigorous
indeed that it sometimes causes the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. This loss,
in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its float. Competitive dynamics almost guarantee that the insurance
industry, despite the float income all its companies enjoy, will continue its dismal record of earning subnormal
returns on tangible net worth as compared to other American businesses. The prolonged period of low interest rates
the world is now dealing with also virtually guarantees that earnings on float will steadily decrease for many years
to come, thereby exacerbating the profit problems of insurers. It’s a good bet that industry results over the next ten
years will fall short of those recorded in the past decade, particularly for those companies that specialize in
reinsurance.
As noted early in this report, Berkshire has now operated at an underwriting profit for 13 consecutive
years, our pre-tax gain for the period having totaled $26.2 billion. That’s no accident: Disciplined risk evaluation is
the daily focus of all of our insurance managers, who know that while float is valuable, its benefits can be drowned
by poor underwriting results. All insurers give that message lip service. At Berkshire it is a religion, Old Testament
style.
So how does our float affect intrinsic value? When Berkshire’s book value is calculated, the full amount of
our float is deducted as a liability, just as if we had to pay it out tomorrow and could not replenish it. But to think of
float as strictly a liability is incorrect. It should instead be viewed as a revolving fund. Daily, we pay old claims and
related expenses – a huge $24.5 billion to more than six million claimants in 2015 – and that reduces float. Just as
surely, we each day write new business that will soon generate its own claims, adding to float.
10
If our revolving float is both costless and long-enduring, which I believe it will be, the true value of this
liability is dramatically less than the accounting liability. Owing $1 that in effect will never leave the premises –
because new business is almost certain to deliver a substitute – is worlds different from owing $1 that will go out the
door tomorrow and not be replaced. The two types of liabilities, however, are treated as equals under GAAP.
A partial offset to this overstated liability is a $15.5 billion “goodwill” asset that we incurred in buying our
insurance companies and that increases book value. In very large part, this goodwill represents the price we paid for
the float-generating capabilities of our insurance operations. The cost of the goodwill, however, has no bearing on
its true value. For example, if an insurance company sustains large and prolonged underwriting losses, any goodwill
asset carried on the books should be deemed valueless, whatever its original cost.
Fortunately, that does not describe Berkshire. Charlie and I believe the true economic value of our
insurance goodwill – what we would happily pay for float of similar quality were we to purchase an insurance
operation possessing it – to be far in excess of its historic carrying value. Indeed, almost the entire $15.5 billion we
carry for goodwill in our insurance business was already on our books in 2000. Yet we subsequently tripled our
float. Its value today is one reason – a huge reason – why we believe Berkshire’s intrinsic business value
substantially exceeds its book value.
************
Berkshire’s attractive insurance economics exist only because we have some terrific managers running
disciplined operations that possess hard-to-replicate business models. Let me tell you about the major units.
First by float size is the Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group, managed by Ajit Jain. Ajit insures risks
that no one else has the desire or the capital to take on. His operation combines capacity, speed, decisiveness and,
most important, brains in a manner unique in the insurance business. Yet he never exposes Berkshire to risks that
are inappropriate in relation to our resources.
Indeed, Berkshire is far more conservative in avoiding risk than most large insurers. For example, if the
insurance industry should experience a $250 billion loss from some mega-catastrophe – a loss about triple anything
it has ever experienced – Berkshire as a whole would likely record a significant profit for the year because of its
many streams of earnings. We would also remain awash in cash and be looking for large opportunities to write
business in an insurance market that might well be in disarray. Meanwhile, other major insurers and reinsurers
would be swimming in red ink, if not facing insolvency.
When Ajit entered Berkshire’s office on a Saturday in 1986, he did not have a day’s experience in the
insurance business. Nevertheless, Mike Goldberg, then our manager of insurance, handed him the keys to our
reinsurance business. With that move, Mike achieved sainthood: Since then, Ajit has created tens of billions of
value for Berkshire shareholders.
************
At bottom, a sound insurance operation needs to adhere to four disciplines. It must (1) understand all
exposures that might cause a policy to incur losses; (2) conservatively assess the likelihood of any exposure actually
causing a loss and the probable cost if it does; (3) set a premium that, on average, will deliver a profit after both
prospective loss costs and operating expenses are covered; and (4) be willing to walk away if the appropriate
premium can’t be obtained.
11
Many insurers pass the first three tests and flunk the fourth. They simply can’t turn their back on business
that is being eagerly written by their competitors. That old line, “The other guy is doing it, so we must as well,”
spells trouble in any business, but in none more so than insurance.
Tad has observed all four of the insurance commandments, and it shows in his results. General Re’s huge
float has been considerably better than cost-free under his leadership, and we expect that, on average, to continue.
We are particularly enthusiastic about General Re’s international life reinsurance business, which has grown
consistently and profitably since we acquired the company in 1998.
It can be remembered that soon after we purchased General Re, it was beset by problems that caused
commentators – and me as well, briefly – to believe I had made a huge mistake. That day is long gone. General Re
is now a gem.
************
Finally, there is GEICO, the insurer on which I cut my teeth 65 years ago. GEICO is managed by Tony
Nicely, who joined the company at 18 and completed 54 years of service in 2015. Tony became CEO in 1993, and
since then the company has been flying. There is no better manager than Tony. In the 40 years that I’ve known him,
his every action has made great sense.
When I was first introduced to GEICO in January 1951, I was blown away by the huge cost advantage the
company enjoyed compared to the expenses borne by the giants of the industry. It was clear to me that GEICO
would succeed because it deserved to succeed.
No one likes to buy auto insurance. Almost everyone, though, likes to drive. The insurance consequently
needed is a major expenditure for most families. Savings matter to them – and only a low-cost operation can deliver
these. Indeed, at least 40% of the people reading this letter can save money by insuring with GEICO. So stop
reading – right now! – and go to geico.com or call 800-368-2734.
GEICO’s cost advantage is the factor that has enabled the company to gobble up market share year after
year. (We ended 2015 with 11.4% of the market compared to 2.5% in 1995, when Berkshire acquired control of
GEICO.) The company’s low costs create a moat – an enduring one – that competitors are unable to cross.
All the while, our gecko never tires of telling Americans how GEICO can save them important money. I
love hearing the little guy deliver his message: “15 minutes could save you 15% or more on car insurance.” (Of
course, there’s always a grouch in the crowd. One of my friends says he is glad that only a few animals can talk,
since the ones that do speak seem unable to discuss any subject but insurance.)
************
In addition to our three major insurance operations, we own a group of smaller companies that primarily
write commercial coverages. In aggregate, these companies are a large, growing and valuable operation that
consistently delivers an underwriting profit, usually much better than that reported by their competitors. Indeed,
over the past 13 years, this group has earned $4 billion from underwriting – about 13% of its premium volume –
while increasing its float from $943 million to $9.9 billion.
Less than three years ago, we formed Berkshire Hathaway Specialty Insurance (“BHSI”), which we include
in this group. Our first decision was to put Peter Eastwood in charge. That move was a home run: BHSI has already
developed $1 billion of annual premium volume and, under Peter’s direction, is destined to become one of the
world’s leading P/C insurers.
12
Here’s a recap of underwriting earnings and float by division:
Berkshire’s great managers, premier financial strength and a variety of business models protected by wide
moats amount to something unique in the insurance world. This assemblage of strengths is a huge asset for
Berkshire shareholders that will only get more valuable with time.
We have two major operations, BNSF and BHE, that share important characteristics distinguishing them
from our other businesses. Consequently, we assign them their own section in this letter and split out their combined
financial statistics in our GAAP balance sheet and income statement. Together, they last year accounted for 37% of
Berkshire’s after-tax operating earnings.
A key characteristic of both companies is their huge investment in very long-lived, regulated assets, with
these partially funded by large amounts of long-term debt that is not guaranteed by Berkshire. Our credit is in fact
not needed because each company has earning power that even under terrible economic conditions would far exceed
its interest requirements. Last year, for example, in a disappointing year for railroads, BNSF’s interest coverage was
more than 8:1. (Our definition of coverage is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to interest, not EBITDA/
interest, a commonly used measure we view as seriously flawed.)
At BHE, meanwhile, two factors ensure the company’s ability to service its debt under all circumstances.
The first is common to all utilities: recession-resistant earnings, which result from these companies offering an
essential service on an exclusive basis. The second is enjoyed by few other utilities: a great and ever-widening
diversity of earnings streams, which shield BHE from being seriously harmed by any single regulatory body. These
many sources of profit, supplemented by the inherent advantage of being owned by a strong parent, have allowed
BHE and its utility subsidiaries to significantly lower their cost of debt. This economic fact benefits both us and our
customers.
All told, BHE and BNSF invested $11.6 billion in plant and equipment last year, a massive commitment to
key components of America’s infrastructure. We relish making such investments as long as they promise reasonable
returns – and, on that front, we put a large amount of trust in future regulation.
Our confidence is justified both by our past experience and by the knowledge that society will forever need
huge investments in both transportation and energy. It is in the self-interest of governments to treat capital providers
in a manner that will ensure the continued flow of funds to essential projects. It is concomitantly in our self-interest
to conduct our operations in a way that earns the approval of our regulators and the people they represent.
Low prices are a powerful way to keep these constituencies happy. In Iowa, BHE’s average retail rate is
6.8¢ per KWH. Alliant, the other major electric utility in the state, averages 9.5¢. Here are the comparable industry
figures for adjacent states: Nebraska 9.0¢, Missouri 9.3¢, Illinois 9.3¢, Minnesota 9.7¢. The national average is
10.4¢. Our rock-bottom prices add up to real money for paycheck-strapped customers.
13
At BNSF, price comparisons between major railroads are far more difficult to make because of significant
differences in both their mix of cargo and the average distance it is carried. To supply a very crude measure,
however, our revenue per ton-mile was just under 3¢ last year, while shipping costs for customers of the other four
major U.S.-based railroads were at least 40% higher, ranging from 4.2¢ to 5.3¢.
Both BHE and BNSF have been leaders in pursuing planet-friendly technology. In wind generation, no
state comes close to Iowa, where last year megawatt-hours we generated from wind equaled 47% of all
megawatt-hours sold to our retail customers. (Additional wind projects to which we are committed will take that
figure to 58% in 2017.)
BNSF, like other Class I railroads, uses only a single gallon of diesel fuel to move a ton of freight almost
500 miles. That makes the railroads four times as fuel-efficient as trucks! Furthermore, railroads alleviate highway
congestion – and the taxpayer-funded maintenance expenditures that come with heavier traffic – in a major way.
I currently expect increased after-tax earnings at BHE in 2016, but lower earnings at BNSF.
14
Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations
Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet
and earnings statement for the entire group.
* Earnings for 2013 have been restated to exclude Marmon’s leasing operations, which are now included in the
Finance and Financial Products results.
Our income and expense data conforming to GAAP is on page 38. In contrast, the operating expense
figures above are non-GAAP because they exclude some purchase-accounting items (primarily the amortization of
certain intangible assets). We present the data in this manner because Charlie and I believe the adjusted numbers
more accurately reflect the true economic expenses and profits of the businesses aggregated in the table than do
GAAP figures.
I won’t explain all of the adjustments – some are tiny and arcane – but serious investors should understand
the disparate nature of intangible assets. Some truly deplete in value over time, while others in no way lose value.
For software, as a big example, amortization charges are very real expenses. Conversely, the concept of recording
charges against other intangibles, such as customer relationships, arises from purchase-accounting rules and clearly
does not reflect economic reality. GAAP accounting draws no distinction between the two types of charges. Both,
that is, are recorded as expenses when earnings are calculated – even though, from an investor’s viewpoint, they
could not differ more.
15
In the GAAP-compliant figures we show on page 38, amortization charges of $1.1 billion have been
deducted as expenses. We would call about 20% of these “real,” the rest not. The “non-real” charges, once non-
existent at Berkshire, have become significant because of the many acquisitions we have made. Non-real
amortization charges are likely to climb further as we acquire more companies.
The table on page 55 gives you the current status of our intangible assets as calculated by GAAP. We now
have $6.8 billion left of amortizable intangibles, of which $4.1 billion will be expensed over the next five years.
Eventually, of course, every dollar of these “assets” will be charged off. When that happens, reported earnings
increase even if true earnings are flat. (My gift to my successor.)
I suggest that you ignore a portion of GAAP amortization costs. But it is with some trepidation that I do
that, knowing that it has become common for managers to tell their owners to ignore certain expense items that are
all too real. “Stock-based compensation” is the most egregious example. The very name says it all: “compensation.”
If compensation isn’t an expense, what is it? And, if real and recurring expenses don’t belong in the calculation of
earnings, where in the world do they belong?
Wall Street analysts often play their part in this charade, too, parroting the phony, compensation-ignoring
“earnings” figures fed them by managements. Maybe the offending analysts don’t know any better. Or maybe they
fear losing “access” to management. Or maybe they are cynical, telling themselves that since everyone else is
playing the game, why shouldn’t they go along with it. Whatever their reasoning, these analysts are guilty of
propagating misleading numbers that can deceive investors.
Depreciation charges are a more complicated subject but are almost always true costs. Certainly they are at
Berkshire. I wish we could keep our businesses competitive while spending less than our depreciation charge, but in
51 years I’ve yet to figure out how to do so. Indeed, the depreciation charge we record in our railroad business falls
far short of the capital outlays needed to merely keep the railroad running properly, a mismatch that leads to GAAP
earnings that are higher than true economic earnings. (This overstatement of earnings exists at all railroads.) When
CEOs or investment bankers tout pre-depreciation figures such as EBITDA as a valuation guide, watch their noses
lengthen while they speak.
Our public reports of earnings will, of course, continue to conform to GAAP. To embrace reality, however,
you should remember to add back most of the amortization charges we report. You should also subtract something
to reflect BNSF’s inadequate depreciation charge.
************
Let’s get back to our many manufacturing, service and retailing operations, which sell products ranging
from lollipops to jet airplanes. Some of this sector’s businesses, measured by earnings on unleveraged net tangible
assets, enjoy terrific economics, producing profits that run from 25% after-tax to far more than 100%. Others
generate good returns in the area of 12% to 20%.
A few, however – these are serious mistakes I made in my job of capital allocation – have very poor
returns. In most of these cases, I was wrong in my evaluation of the economic dynamics of the company or the
industry in which it operates, and we are now paying the price for my misjudgments. At other times, I stumbled in
evaluating either the fidelity or the ability of incumbent managers or ones I later appointed. I will commit more
errors; you can count on that. If we luck out, they will occur at our smaller operations.
Viewed as a single entity, the companies in this group are an excellent business. They employed an average
of $25.6 billion of net tangible assets during 2015 and, despite their holding large quantities of excess cash and
using only token amounts of leverage, earned 18.4% after-tax on that capital.
16
Of course, a business with terrific economics can be a bad investment if it is bought at too high a price. We
have paid substantial premiums to net tangible assets for most of our businesses, a cost that is reflected in the large
figure we show for goodwill and other intangibles. Overall, however, we are getting a decent return on the capital
we have deployed in this sector. Earnings from the group should grow substantially in 2016 as Duracell and
Precision Castparts enter the fold.
************
We have far too many companies in this group to comment on them individually. Moreover, their
competitors – both current and potential – read this report. In a few of our businesses we might be disadvantaged if
others knew our numbers. In some of our operations that are not of a size material to an evaluation of Berkshire,
therefore, we only disclose what is required. You can nevertheless find a good bit of detail about many of our
operations on pages 88-91.
Our three leasing and rental operations are conducted by CORT (furniture), XTRA (semi-trailers), and
Marmon (primarily tank cars but also freight cars, intermodal tank containers and cranes). These companies are
industry leaders and have substantially increased their earnings as the American economy has gained strength. At
each of the three, we have invested more money in new equipment than have many of our competitors, and that’s
paid off. Dealing from strength is one of Berkshire’s enduring advantages.
Kevin Clayton has again delivered an industry-leading performance at Clayton Homes, the second-largest
home builder in America. Last year, the company sold 34,397 homes, about 45% of the manufactured homes bought
by Americans. In contrast, the company was number three in the field, with a 14% share, when Berkshire purchased
it in 2003.
Manufactured homes allow the American dream of home ownership to be achieved by lower-income
citizens: Around 70% of new homes costing $150,000 or less come from our industry. About 46% of Clayton’s
homes are sold through the 331 stores we ourselves own and operate. Most of Clayton’s remaining sales are made to
1,395 independent retailers.
Key to Clayton’s operation is its $12.8 billion mortgage portfolio. We originate about 35% of all
mortgages on manufactured homes. About 37% of our mortgage portfolio emanates from our retail operation, with
the balance primarily originated by independent retailers, some of which sell our homes while others market only
the homes of our competitors.
Lenders other than Clayton have come and gone. With Berkshire’s backing, however, Clayton steadfastly
financed home buyers throughout the panic days of 2008-2009. Indeed, during that period, Clayton used precious
capital to finance dealers who did not sell our homes. The funds we supplied to Goldman Sachs and General Electric
at that time produced headlines; the funds Berkshire quietly delivered to Clayton both made home ownership
possible for thousands of families and kept many non-Clayton dealers alive.
Our retail outlets, employing simple language and large type, consistently inform home buyers of
alternative sources for financing – most of it coming from local banks – and always secure acknowledgments from
customers that this information has been received and read. (The form we use is reproduced in its actual size on
page 119.)
17
Mortgage-origination practices are of great importance to both the borrower and to society. There is no
question that reckless practices in home lending played a major role in bringing on the financial panic of 2008,
which in turn led to the Great Recession. In the years preceding the meltdown, a destructive and often corrupt
pattern of mortgage creation flourished whereby (1) an originator in, say, California would make loans and
(2) promptly sell them to an investment or commercial bank in, say, New York, which would package many
mortgages to serve as collateral for a dizzyingly complicated array of mortgage-backed securities to be (3) sold to
unwitting institutions around the world.
As if these sins weren’t sufficient to create an unholy mess, imaginative investment bankers sometimes
concocted a second layer of sliced-up financing whose value depended on the junkier portions of primary offerings.
(When Wall Street gets “innovative,” watch out!) While that was going on, I described this “doubling-up” practice
as requiring an investor to read tens of thousands of pages of mind-numbing prose to evaluate a single security
being offered.
Both the originator and the packager of these financings had no skin in the game and were driven by
volume and mark-ups. Many housing borrowers joined the party as well, blatantly lying on their loan applications
while mortgage originators looked the other way. Naturally, the gamiest credits generated the most profits. Smooth
Wall Street salesmen garnered millions annually by manufacturing products that their customers were unable to
understand. (It’s also questionable as to whether the major rating agencies were capable of evaluating the more
complex structures. But rate them they did.)
Barney Frank, perhaps the most financially-savvy member of Congress during the panic, recently assessed
the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act, saying, “The one major weakness that I’ve seen in the implementation was this decision
by the regulators not to impose risk retention on all residential mortgages.” Today, some legislators and
commentators continue to advocate a 1%-to-5% retention by the originator as a way to align its interests with that of
the ultimate lender or mortgage guarantor.
At Clayton, our risk retention was, and is, 100%. When we originate a mortgage we keep it (leaving aside
the few that qualify for a government guarantee). When we make mistakes in granting credit, we therefore pay a
price – a hefty price that dwarfs any profit we realized upon the original sale of the home. Last year we had to
foreclose on 8,444 manufactured-housing mortgages at a cost to us of $157 million.
The average loan we made in 2015 was only $59,942, small potatoes for traditional mortgage lenders, but a
daunting commitment for our many lower-income borrowers. Our buyer acquires a decent home – take a look at the
home we will have on display at our annual meeting – requiring monthly principal-and-interest payments that
average $522.
Some borrowers, of course, will lose their jobs, and there will be divorces and deaths. Others will get over-
extended on credit cards and mishandle their finances. We will lose money then, and our borrower will lose his
down payment (though his mortgage payments during his time of occupancy may have been well under rental rates
for comparable quarters). Nevertheless, despite the low FICO scores and income of our borrowers, their payment
behavior during the Great Recession was far better than that prevailing in many mortgage pools populated by people
earning multiples of our typical borrower’s income.
The strong desire of our borrowers to have a home of their own is one reason we’ve done well with our
mortgage portfolio. Equally important, we have financed much of the portfolio with floating-rate debt or with short-
term fixed-rate debt. Consequently, the incredibly low short-term rates of recent years have provided us a
constantly-widening spread between our interest costs and the income we derive from our mortgage portfolio, which
bears fixed rates. (Incidentally, we would have enjoyed similar margins had we simply bought long-term bonds and
financed the position in some short-term manner.)
18
Normally, it is risky business to lend long at fixed rates and borrow short as we have been doing at
Clayton. Over the years, some important financial institutions have gone broke doing that. At Berkshire, however,
we possess a natural offset in that our businesses always maintain at least $20 billion in cash-equivalents that earn
short-term rates. More often, our short-term investments are in the $40 billion to $60 billion range. If we have, say,
$60 billion invested at 1⁄ 4% or less, a sharp move to higher short-term rates would bring benefits to us far exceeding
the higher financing costs we would incur in funding Clayton’s $13 billion mortgage portfolio. In banking terms,
Berkshire is – and always will be – heavily asset-sensitive and will consequently benefit from rising interest rates.
Let me talk about one subject of which I am particularly proud, that having to do with regulation. The
Great Recession caused mortgage originators, servicers and packagers to come under intense scrutiny and to be
assessed many billions of dollars in fines and penalties.
The scrutiny has certainly extended to Clayton, whose mortgage practices have been continuously
reviewed and examined in respect to such items as originations, servicing, collections, advertising, compliance, and
internal controls. At the federal level, we answer to the Federal Trade Commission, the Department of Housing and
Urban Development and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. Dozens of states regulate us as well. During the
past two years, indeed, various federal and state authorities (from 25 states) examined and reviewed Clayton and its
mortgages on 65 occasions. The result? Our total fines during this period were $38,200 and our refunds to customers
$704,678. Furthermore, though we had to foreclose on 2.64% of our manufactured-home mortgages last year,
95.4% of our borrowers were current on their payments at yearend, as they moved toward owning a debt-free home.
************
Marmon’s rail fleet expanded to 133,220 units by yearend, a number significantly increased by the
company’s purchase of 25,085 cars from General Electric on September 30. If our fleet was connected to form a
single train, the engine would be in Omaha and the caboose in Portland, Maine.
At yearend, 97% of our railcars were leased, with about 15-17% of the fleet coming up for renewal each
year. Though “tank cars” sound like vessels carrying crude oil, only about 7% of our fleet carries that product;
chemicals and refined petroleum products are the lead items we transport. When trains roll by, look for the UTLX or
Procor markings that identify our tank cars. When you spot the brand, puff out your chest; you own a portion of that
car.
(in millions)
19
Investments
Below we list our fifteen common stock investments that at yearend had the largest market value. We
exclude our Kraft Heinz holding because we are part of a control group and account for it on the “equity” method.
12/31/15
Percentage of
Company
Shares** Company Owned Cost* Market
(in millions)
151,610,700 American Express Company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.6 $ 1,287 $ 10,545
46,577,138 AT&T . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8 1,283 1,603
7,463,157 Charter Communications, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.6 1,202 1,367
400,000,000 The Coca-Cola Company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3 1,299 17,184
18,513,482 DaVita HealthCare Partners Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.8 843 1,291
22,164,450 Deere & Company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.0 1,773 1,690
11,390,582 The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7 654 2,053
81,033,450 International Business Machines Corp. . . . . . . . . . 8.4 13,791 11,152
24,669,778 Moody’s Corporation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.6 248 2,475
55,384,926 Phillips 66 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.5 4,357 4,530
52,477,678 The Procter & Gamble Company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.9 336 4,683 ***
22,169,930 Sanofi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7 1,701 1,896
101,859,335 U.S. Bancorp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.8 3,239 4,346
63,507,544 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.0 3,593 3,893
500,000,000 Wells Fargo & Company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.8 12,730 27,180
Others . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10,276 16,450
Total Common Stocks Carried at Market . . . . . . . . $ 58,612 $ 112,338
* This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; GAAP “cost” differs in a few cases because of write-
ups or write-downs that have been required under GAAP rules.
** Excludes shares held by pension funds of Berkshire subsidiaries.
*** Held under contract of sale for this amount.
Berkshire has one major equity position that is not included in the table: We can buy 700 million shares of
Bank of America at any time prior to September 2021 for $5 billion. At yearend these shares were worth $11.8
billion. We are likely to purchase them just before expiration of our option and, if we wish, we can use our $5
billion of Bank of America 6% preferred to fund the purchase. In the meantime, it is important for you to realize that
Bank of America is, in effect, our fourth largest equity investment – and one we value highly.
20
Productivity and Prosperity
Earlier, I told you how our partners at Kraft Heinz root out inefficiencies, thereby increasing output per
hour of employment. That kind of improvement has been the secret sauce of America’s remarkable gains in living
standards since the nation’s founding in 1776. Unfortunately, the label of “secret” is appropriate: Too few
Americans fully grasp the linkage between productivity and prosperity. To see that connection, let’s look first at the
country’s most dramatic example – farming – and later examine three Berkshire-specific areas.
In 1900, America’s civilian work force numbered 28 million. Of these, 11 million, a staggering 40% of the
total, worked in farming. The leading crop then, as now, was corn. About 90 million acres were devoted to its
production and the yield per acre was 30 bushels, for a total output of 2.7 billion bushels annually.
Then came the tractor and one innovation after another that revolutionized such keys to farm productivity
as planting, harvesting, irrigation, fertilization and seed quality. Today, we devote about 85 million acres to corn.
Productivity, however, has improved yields to more than 150 bushels per acre, for an annual output of 13-14 billion
bushels. Farmers have made similar gains with other products.
Increased yields, though, are only half the story: The huge increases in physical output have been
accompanied by a dramatic reduction in the number of farm laborers (“human input”). Today about three million
people work on farms, a tiny 2% of our 158-million-person work force. Thus, improved farming methods have
allowed tens of millions of present-day workers to utilize their time and talents in other endeavors, a reallocation of
human resources that enables Americans of today to enjoy huge quantities of non-farm goods and services they
would otherwise lack.
It’s easy to look back over the 115-year span and realize how extraordinarily beneficial agricultural
innovations have been – not just for farmers but, more broadly, for our entire society. We would not have anything
close to the America we now know had we stifled those improvements in productivity. (It was fortunate that horses
couldn’t vote.) On a day-to-day basis, however, talk of the “greater good” must have rung hollow to farm hands who
lost their jobs to machines that performed routine tasks far more efficiently than humans ever could. We will
examine this flip-side to productivity gains later in this section.
For the moment, however, let’s move on to three stories of efficiencies that have had major consequences
for Berkshire subsidiaries. Similar transformations have been commonplace throughout American business.
‹ In 1947, shortly after the end of World War II, the American workforce totaled 44 million. About
1.35 million workers were employed in the railroad industry. The revenue ton-miles of freight moved by
Class I railroads that year totaled 655 billion.
By 2014, Class I railroads carried 1.85 trillion ton-miles, an increase of 182%, while employing only
187,000 workers, a reduction of 86% since 1947. (Some of this change involved passenger-related
employees, but most of the workforce reduction came on the freight side.) As a result of this staggering
improvement in productivity, the inflation-adjusted price for moving a ton-mile of freight has fallen by
55% since 1947, a drop saving shippers about $90 billion annually in current dollars.
Another startling statistic: If it took as many people now to move freight as it did in 1947, we would need
well over three million railroad workers to handle present volumes. (Of course, that level of employment
would raise freight charges by a lot; consequently, nothing close to today’s volume would actually move.)
21
Our own BNSF was formed in 1995 by a merger between Burlington Northern and Santa Fe. In 1996, the
merged company’s first full year of operation, 411 million ton-miles of freight were transported by 45,000
employees. Last year the comparable figures were 702 million ton-miles (plus 71%) and 47,000 employees
(plus only 4%). That dramatic gain in productivity benefits both owners and shippers. Safety at BNSF has
improved as well: Reportable injuries were 2.04 per 200,000 man-hours in 1996 and have since fallen more
than 50% to 0.95.
‹ A bit more than a century ago, the auto was invented, and around it formed an industry that insures cars
and their drivers. Initially, this business was written through traditional insurance agencies – the kind
dealing in fire insurance. This agency-centric approach included high commissions and other underwriting
expenses that consumed about 40¢ of the premium dollar. Strong local agencies were then in the driver’s
seat because they represented multiple insurers and could play one company off against another when
commissions were being negotiated. Cartel-like pricing prevailed, and all involved were doing fine –
except for the consumer.
And then some American ingenuity came into play: G. J. Mecherle, a farmer from Merna, Illinois, came up
with the idea of a captive sales force that would sell the insurance products of only a single company. His
baby was christened State Farm Mutual. The company cut commissions and expenses – moves that
permitted lower prices – and soon became a powerhouse. For many decades, State Farm has been the
runaway volume leader in both auto and homeowner’s insurance. Allstate, which also operated with a
direct distribution model, was long the runner-up. Both State Farm and Allstate have had underwriting
expenses of about 25%.
In the early 1930s, another contender, United Services Auto Association (“USAA”), a mutual-like
company, was writing auto insurance for military officers on a direct-to-the-customer basis. This marketing
innovation rose from a need that military personnel had to buy insurance that would stay with them as they
moved from base to base. That was business of little interest to local insurance agencies, which wanted the
steady renewals that came from permanent residents.
The direct distribution method of USAA, as it happened, incurred lower costs than those enjoyed by State
Farm and Allstate and therefore delivered an even greater bargain to customers. That made Leo and Lillian
Goodwin, employees of USAA, dream of broadening the target market for its direct distribution model
beyond military officers. In 1936, starting with $100,000 of capital, they incorporated Government
Employees Insurance Co. (later compressing this mouthful to GEICO).
Their fledgling did $238,000 of auto insurance business in 1937, its first full year. Last year GEICO did
$22.6 billion, more than double the volume of USAA. (Though the early bird gets the worm, the second
mouse gets the cheese.) GEICO’s underwriting expenses in 2015 were 14.7% of premiums, with USAA
being the only large company to achieve a lower percentage. (GEICO is fully as efficient as USAA but
spends considerably more on advertising aimed at promoting growth.)
With the price advantage GEICO’s low costs allow, it’s not surprising that several years ago the company
seized the number two spot in auto insurance from Allstate. GEICO is also gaining ground on State Farm,
though it is still far ahead of us in volume. On August 30, 2030 – my 100th birthday – I plan to announce
that GEICO has taken over the top spot. Mark your calendar.
GEICO employs about 34,000 people to serve its 14 million policyholders. I can only guess at the
workforce it would require to serve a similar number of policyholders under the agency system. I believe,
however, that the number would be at least 60,000, a combination of what the insurer would need in direct
employment and the personnel required at supporting agencies.
22
‹ In its electric utility business, our Berkshire Hathaway Energy (“BHE”) operates within a changing
economic model. Historically, the survival of a local electric company did not depend on its efficiency. In
fact, a “sloppy” operation could do just fine financially.
That’s because utilities were usually the sole supplier of a needed product and were allowed to price at a
level that gave them a prescribed return upon the capital they employed. The joke in the industry was that a
utility was the only business that would automatically earn more money by redecorating the boss’s office.
And some CEOs ran things accordingly.
That’s all changing. Today, society has decided that federally-subsidized wind and solar generation is in
our country’s long-term interest. Federal tax credits are used to implement this policy, support that makes
renewables price-competitive in certain geographies. Those tax credits, or other government-mandated help
for renewables, may eventually erode the economics of the incumbent utility, particularly if it is a high-cost
operator. BHE’s long-established emphasis on efficiency – even when the company didn’t need it to attain
authorized earnings – leaves us particularly competitive in today’s market (and, more important, in
tomorrow’s as well).
BHE acquired its Iowa utility in 1999. In the year before, that utility employed 3,700 people and produced
19 million megawatt-hours of electricity. Now we employ 3,500 people and produce 29 million megawatt-
hours. That major increase in efficiency allowed us to operate without a rate increase for 16 years, a period
during which industry rates increased 44%.
The safety record of our Iowa utility is also outstanding. It had .79 injuries per 100 employees in 2015
compared to the rate of 7.0 experienced by the previous owner in the year before we bought the operation.
In 2006 BHE purchased PacifiCorp, which operated primarily in Oregon and Utah. The year before our
purchase PacifiCorp employed 6,750 people and produced 52.6 million megawatt-hours. Last year the
numbers were 5,700 employees and 56.3 million megawatt-hours. Here, too, safety improved dramatically,
with the accident-rate-per-100-employees falling from 3.4 in 2005 to .85 in 2015. In safety, BHE now
ranks in the industry’s top decile.
Those outstanding performances explain why BHE is welcomed by regulators when it proposes to buy a
utility in their jurisdiction. The regulators know the company will run an efficient, safe and reliable
operation and also arrive with unlimited capital to fund whatever projects make sense. (BHE has never paid
a dividend to Berkshire since we assumed ownership. No investor-owned utility in America comes close to
matching BHE’s enthusiasm for reinvestment.)
************
The productivity gains that I’ve just spelled out – and countless others that have been achieved in America
– have delivered awesome benefits to society. That’s the reason our citizens, as a whole, have enjoyed – and will
continue to enjoy – major gains in the goods and services they receive.
To this thought there are offsets. First, the productivity gains achieved in recent years have largely
benefitted the wealthy. Second, productivity gains frequently cause upheaval: Both capital and labor can pay a
terrible price when innovation or new efficiencies upend their worlds.
We need shed no tears for the capitalists (whether they be private owners or an army of public
shareholders). It’s their job to take care of themselves. When large rewards can flow to investors from good
decisions, these parties should not be spared the losses produced by wrong choices. Moreover, investors who
diversify widely and simply sit tight with their holdings are certain to prosper: In America, gains from winning
investments have always far more than offset the losses from clunkers. (During the 20th Century, the Dow Jones
Industrial Average – an index fund of sorts – soared from 66 to 11,497, with its component companies all the while
paying ever-increasing dividends.)
23
A long-employed worker faces a different equation. When innovation and the market system interact to
produce efficiencies, many workers may be rendered unnecessary, their talents obsolete. Some can find decent
employment elsewhere; for others, that is not an option.
When low-cost competition drove shoe production to Asia, our once-prosperous Dexter operation folded,
putting 1,600 employees in a small Maine town out of work. Many were past the point in life at which they could
learn another trade. We lost our entire investment, which we could afford, but many workers lost a livelihood they
could not replace. The same scenario unfolded in slow-motion at our original New England textile operation, which
struggled for 20 years before expiring. Many older workers at our New Bedford plant, as a poignant example, spoke
Portuguese and knew little, if any, English. They had no Plan B.
The answer in such disruptions is not the restraining or outlawing of actions that increase productivity.
Americans would not be living nearly as well as we do if we had mandated that 11 million people should forever be
employed in farming.
The solution, rather, is a variety of safety nets aimed at providing a decent life for those who are willing to
work but find their specific talents judged of small value because of market forces. (I personally favor a reformed
and expanded Earned Income Tax Credit that would try to make sure America works for those willing to work.) The
price of achieving ever-increasing prosperity for the great majority of Americans should not be penury for the
unfortunate.
Important Risks
We, like all public companies, are required by the SEC to annually catalog “risk factors” in our 10-K. I
can’t remember, however, an instance when reading a 10-K’s “risk” section has helped me in evaluating a business.
That’s not because the identified risks aren’t real. The truly important risks, however, are usually well known.
Beyond that, a 10-K’s catalog of risks is seldom of aid in assessing: (1) the probability of the threatening event
actually occurring; (2) the range of costs if it does occur; and (3) the timing of the possible loss. A threat that will
only surface 50 years from now may be a problem for society, but it is not a financial problem for today’s investor.
Berkshire operates in more industries than any company I know of. Each of our pursuits has its own array
of possible problems and opportunities. Those are easy to list but hard to evaluate: Charlie, I and our various CEOs
often differ in a very major way in our calculation of the likelihood, the timing and the cost (or benefit) that may
result from these possibilities.
Let me mention just a few examples. To begin with an obvious threat, BNSF, along with other railroads, is
certain to lose significant coal volume over the next decade. At some point in the future – though not, in my view,
for a long time – GEICO’s premium volume may shrink because of driverless cars. This development could hurt our
auto dealerships as well. Circulation of our print newspapers will continue to fall, a certainty we allowed for when
purchasing them. To date, renewables have helped our utility operation but that could change, particularly if storage
capabilities for electricity materially improve. Online retailing threatens the business model of our retailers and
certain of our consumer brands. These potentialities are just a few of the negative possibilities facing us – but even
the most casual follower of business news has long been aware of them.
None of these problems, however, is crucial to Berkshire’s long-term well-being. When we took over the
company in 1965, its risks could have been encapsulated in a single sentence: “The northern textile business in
which all of our capital resides is destined for recurring losses and will eventually disappear.” That development,
however, was no death knell. We simply adapted. And we will continue to do so.
24
Every day Berkshire managers are thinking about how they can better compete in an always-changing
world. Just as vigorously, Charlie and I focus on where a steady stream of funds should be deployed. In that respect,
we possess a major advantage over one-industry companies, whose options are far more limited. I firmly believe
that Berkshire has the money, talent and culture to plow through the sort of adversities I’ve itemized above – and
many more – and to emerge with ever-greater earning power.
There is, however, one clear, present and enduring danger to Berkshire against which Charlie and I are
powerless. That threat to Berkshire is also the major threat our citizenry faces: a “successful” (as defined by the
aggressor) cyber, biological, nuclear or chemical attack on the United States. That is a risk Berkshire shares with all
of American business.
The probability of such mass destruction in any given year is likely very small. It’s been more than 70
years since I delivered a Washington Post newspaper headlining the fact that the United States had dropped the first
atomic bomb. Subsequently, we’ve had a few close calls but avoided catastrophic destruction. We can thank our
government – and luck! – for this result.
Nevertheless, what’s a small probability in a short period approaches certainty in the longer run. (If there is
only one chance in thirty of an event occurring in a given year, the likelihood of it occurring at least once in a
century is 96.6%.) The added bad news is that there will forever be people and organizations and perhaps even
nations that would like to inflict maximum damage on our country. Their means of doing so have increased
exponentially during my lifetime. “Innovation” has its dark side.
There is no way for American corporations or their investors to shed this risk. If an event occurs in the U.S.
that leads to mass devastation, the value of all equity investments will almost certainly be decimated.
No one knows what “the day after” will look like. I think, however, that Einstein’s 1949 appraisal remains
apt: “I know not with what weapons World War III will be fought, but World War IV will be fought with sticks and
stones.”
************
I am writing this section because we have a proxy proposal regarding climate change to consider at this
year’s annual meeting. The sponsor would like us to provide a report on the dangers that this change might present
to our insurance operation and explain how we are responding to these threats.
It seems highly likely to me that climate change poses a major problem for the planet. I say “highly likely”
rather than “certain” because I have no scientific aptitude and remember well the dire predictions of most “experts”
about Y2K. It would be foolish, however, for me or anyone to demand 100% proof of huge forthcoming damage to
the world if that outcome seemed at all possible and if prompt action had even a small chance of thwarting the
danger.
This issue bears a similarity to Pascal’s Wager on the Existence of God. Pascal, it may be recalled, argued
that if there were only a tiny probability that God truly existed, it made sense to behave as if He did because the
rewards could be infinite whereas the lack of belief risked eternal misery. Likewise, if there is only a 1% chance the
planet is heading toward a truly major disaster and delay means passing a point of no return, inaction now is
foolhardy. Call this Noah’s Law: If an ark may be essential for survival, begin building it today, no matter how
cloudless the skies appear.
It’s understandable that the sponsor of the proxy proposal believes Berkshire is especially threatened by
climate change because we are a huge insurer, covering all sorts of risks. The sponsor may worry that property
losses will skyrocket because of weather changes. And such worries might, in fact, be warranted if we wrote ten- or
twenty-year policies at fixed prices. But insurance policies are customarily written for one year and repriced
annually to reflect changing exposures. Increased possibilities of loss translate promptly into increased premiums.
25
Think back to 1951 when I first became enthused about GEICO. The company’s average loss-per-policy
was then about $30 annually. Imagine your reaction if I had predicted then that in 2015 the loss costs would increase
to about $1,000 per policy. Wouldn’t such skyrocketing losses prove disastrous, you might ask? Well, no.
Over the years, inflation has caused a huge increase in the cost of repairing both the cars and the humans
involved in accidents. But these increased costs have been promptly matched by increased premiums. So,
paradoxically, the upward march in loss costs has made insurance companies far more valuable. If costs had
remained unchanged, Berkshire would now own an auto insurer doing $600 million of business annually rather than
one doing $23 billion.
Up to now, climate change has not produced more frequent nor more costly hurricanes nor other weather-
related events covered by insurance. As a consequence, U.S. super-cat rates have fallen steadily in recent years,
which is why we have backed away from that business. If super-cats become costlier and more frequent, the likely –
though far from certain – effect on Berkshire’s insurance business would be to make it larger and more profitable.
As a citizen, you may understandably find climate change keeping you up nights. As a homeowner in a
low-lying area, you may wish to consider moving. But when you are thinking only as a shareholder of a major
insurer, climate change should not be on your list of worries.
Charlie and I have finally decided to enter the 21st Century. Our annual meeting this year will be webcast
worldwide in its entirety. To view the meeting, simply go to https://finance.yahoo.com/brklivestream at 9 a.m.
Central Daylight Time on Saturday, April 30th. The Yahoo! webcast will begin with a half hour of interviews with
managers, directors and shareholders. Then, at 9:30, Charlie and I will commence answering questions.
This new arrangement will serve two purposes. First, it may level off or modestly decrease attendance at
the meeting. Last year’s record of more than 40,000 attendees strained our capacity. In addition to quickly filling the
CenturyLink Center’s main arena, we packed its overflow rooms and then spilled into two large meeting rooms at
the adjoining Omaha Hilton. All major hotels were sold out notwithstanding Airbnb’s stepped-up presence. Airbnb
was especially helpful for those visitors on limited budgets.
Our second reason for initiating a webcast is more important. Charlie is 92, and I am 85. If we were
partners with you in a small business, and were charged with running the place, you would want to look in
occasionally to make sure we hadn’t drifted off into la-la land. Shareholders, in contrast, should not need to come to
Omaha to monitor how we look and sound. (In making your evaluation, be kind: Allow for the fact that we didn’t
look that impressive when we were at our best.)
Viewers can also observe our life-prolonging diet. During the meeting, Charlie and I will each consume
enough Coke, See’s fudge and See’s peanut brittle to satisfy the weekly caloric needs of an NFL lineman. Long ago
we discovered a fundamental truth: There’s nothing like eating carrots and broccoli when you’re really hungry –
and want to stay that way.
Shareholders planning to attend the meeting should come at 7 a.m. when the doors open at CenturyLink
Center and start shopping. Carrie Sova will again be in charge of the festivities. She had her second child late last
month, but that did not slow her down. Carrie is unflappable, ingenious and expert at bringing out the best in those
who work with her. She is aided by hundreds of Berkshire employees from around the country and by our entire
home office crew as well, all of them pitching in to make the weekend fun and informative for our owners.
26
Last year we increased the number of hours available for shopping at the CenturyLink. Sales skyrocketed –
so, naturally, we will stay with the new schedule. On Friday, April 29th you can shop between noon and 5 p.m., and
on Saturday exhibits and stores will be open from 7 a.m. until 4:30 p.m.
On Saturday morning, we will have our fifth International Newspaper Tossing Challenge. Our target will
again be a Clayton Home porch, located precisely 35 feet from the throwing line. When I was a teenager – in my
one brief flirtation with honest labor – I delivered about 500,000 papers. So I think I’m pretty good at this game.
Challenge me! Humiliate me! Knock me down a peg! The papers will run 36 to 42 pages, and you must fold them
yourself (no rubber bands allowed).
The competition begins at 7:15, when contestants will make preliminary tosses. The eight throws judged
most accurate – four made by contestants 12 or under, and four made by the older set – will compete against me at
7:45. The young challengers will each receive a prize. But the older ones will have to beat me to take anything
home.
And be sure to check out the Clayton home itself. It can be purchased for $78,900, fully installed on land
you provide. In past years, we’ve made many sales on the meeting day. Kevin Clayton will be on hand with his
order book.
At 8:30 a.m., a new Berkshire movie will be shown. An hour later, we will start the question-and-answer
period, which (including a break for lunch at CenturyLink’s stands) will last until 3:30 p.m. After a short recess,
Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:45 p.m. This business session typically lasts only a half hour or
so and can safely be skipped by those craving a little last-minute shopping.
Your venue for shopping will be the 194,300-square-foot hall that adjoins the meeting and in which
products from dozens of Berkshire subsidiaries will be for sale. Say hello to the many Berkshire managers who will
be captaining their exhibits. And be sure to view the terrific BNSF railroad layout that salutes all of our subsidiaries.
Your children (and you!) will be enchanted with it.
We will have a new and very special exhibit in the hall this year: a full-size model of the world’s largest
aircraft engine, for which Precision Castparts makes many key components. The real engines weigh about 20,000
pounds and are ten feet in diameter and 22 feet in length. The bisected model at the meeting will give you a good
look at many PCC components that help power your flights.
Brooks, our running-shoe company, will again have a special commemorative shoe to offer at the meeting.
After you purchase a pair, wear them on Sunday at our fourth annual “Berkshire 5K,” an 8 a.m. race starting at the
CenturyLink. Full details for participating will be included in the Visitor’s Guide that will be sent to you with your
meeting credentials. Entrants in the race will find themselves running alongside many of Berkshire’s managers,
directors and associates. (Charlie and I, however, will sleep in; the fudge and peanut brittle take their toll.)
Participation in the 5K grows every year. Help us set another record.
A GEICO booth in the shopping area will be staffed by a number of the company’s top counselors from
around the country. Stop by for a quote. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a shareholder discount
(usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 51 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental
point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another discount, such as that available to certain groups.)
Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out our price. We can save many of you real money. Spend
the savings on our other products.
27
Be sure to visit the Bookworm. It will carry about 35 books and DVDs, among them a couple of new titles.
Andy Kilpatrick will introduce (and be glad to sign) the latest edition of his all-encompassing coverage of
Berkshire. It’s 1,304 pages and weighs 9.8 pounds. (My blurb for the book: “Ridiculously skimpy.”) Check out
Peter Bevelin’s new book as well. Peter has long been a keen observer of Berkshire.
We will also have a new, 20-page-longer edition of Berkshire’s 50-year commemorative book that at last
year’s meeting sold 12,000 copies. Since then, Carrie and I have uncovered additional material that we find
fascinating, such as some very personal letters sent by Grover Cleveland to Edward Butler, his friend and the then-
publisher of The Buffalo News. Nothing from the original edition has been changed or eliminated, and the price
remains $20. Charlie and I will jointly sign 100 copies that will be randomly placed among the 5,000 available for
sale at the meeting.
My friend, Phil Beuth, has written Limping on Water, an autobiography that chronicles his life at Capital
Cities Communications and tells you a lot about its leaders, Tom Murphy and Dan Burke. These two were the best
managerial duo – both in what they accomplished and how they did it – that Charlie and I ever witnessed. Much of
what you become in life depends on whom you choose to admire and copy. Start with Tom Murphy, and you’ll
never need a second exemplar.
Finally, Jeremy Miller has written Warren Buffett’s Ground Rules, a book that will debut at the annual
meeting. Mr. Miller has done a superb job of researching and dissecting the operation of Buffett Partnership Ltd.
and of explaining how Berkshire’s culture has evolved from its BPL origin. If you are fascinated by investment
theory and practice, you will enjoy this book.
An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the
credential you will need for admission to both the meeting and other events. Airlines have sometimes jacked up
prices for the Berkshire weekend. If you are coming from far away, compare the cost of flying to Kansas City vs.
Omaha. The drive between the two cities is about 2 1⁄ 2 hours, and it may be that Kansas City can save you
significant money, particularly if you had planned to rent a car in Omaha. The savings for a couple could run to
$1,000 or more. Spend that money with us.
At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will
again be having “Berkshire Weekend” discount pricing. Last year in the week encompassing the meeting, the store
did a record $44,239,493 of business. If you repeat that figure to a retailer, he is not going to believe you. (An
average week for NFM’s Omaha store – the highest-volume home furnishings store in the United States except for
our new Dallas store – is about $9 million.)
To obtain the Berkshire discount at NFM, you must make your purchases between Tuesday, April 26th and
Monday, May 2nd inclusive, and also present your meeting credential. The period’s special pricing will even apply to
the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in
the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. During
“Berkshire Weekend” NFM will be open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Friday, 10 a.m. to 9:30 p.m. on
Saturday and 10 a.m. to 8 p.m. on Sunday. From 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m. on Saturday, NFM is hosting a picnic to which
you are all invited.
At Borsheims, we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6
p.m. to 9 p.m. on Friday, April 29th. The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 1st, from 9 a.m. to 4
p.m. On Saturday, we will remain open until 6 p.m. During last year’s Friday-Sunday stretch, the store wrote a sales
ticket every 15 seconds that it was open.
28
We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore,
shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April 25th through Saturday, May 7th. During that period, please
identify yourself as a shareholder either by presenting your meeting credential or a brokerage statement showing
you own our stock.
On Sunday, in the mall outside of Borsheims, Norman Beck, a remarkable magician from Dallas, will
bewilder onlookers. On the upper level, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world’s top
bridge experts, available to play bridge with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon. I will join them and hope to
have Ajit and Charlie there also.
My friend, Ariel Hsing, will be in the mall as well on Sunday, taking on challengers at table tennis. I met
Ariel when she was nine and even then I was unable to score a point against her. Now, she’s a junior at Princeton,
having already represented the United States in the 2012 Olympics. If you don’t mind embarrassing yourself, test
your skills against her, beginning at 1 p.m. Bill Gates and I will lead off and try to soften her up.
Gorat’s will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 1st, serving from 1 p.m.
until 10 p.m. To make a reservation at Gorat’s, call 402-551-3733 on April 1st (but not before). As for my other
favorite restaurant, Piccolo’s, I’m sad to report it closed.
We will again have the same three financial journalists lead the question-and-answer period at the meeting,
asking Charlie and me questions that shareholders have submitted to them by e-mail. The journalists and their e-
mail addresses are: Carol Loomis, the preeminent business journalist of her time, who may be e-mailed at
[email protected]; Becky Quick, of CNBC, at [email protected]; and Andrew Ross Sorkin, of
The New York Times, at [email protected].
From the questions submitted, each journalist will choose the six he or she decides are the most interesting
and important. The journalists have told me your question has the best chance of being selected if you keep it
concise, avoid sending it in at the last moment, make it Berkshire-related and include no more than two questions in
any e-mail you send them. (In your e-mail, let the journalist know if you would like your name mentioned if your
question is asked.)
An accompanying set of questions will be asked by three analysts who follow Berkshire. This year the
insurance specialist will be Cliff Gallant of Nomura Securities. Questions that deal with our non-insurance
operations will come from Jonathan Brandt of Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb and Gregg Warren of Morningstar. Our
hope is that the analysts and journalists will ask questions that add to our owners’ understanding and knowledge of
their investment.
Neither Charlie nor I will get so much as a clue about the questions headed our way. Some will be tough,
for sure, and that’s the way we like it. Multi-part questions aren’t allowed; we want to give as many questioners as
possible a shot at us.
All told we expect at least 54 questions, which will allow for six from each analyst and journalist and for
18 from the audience. (Last year we had 64 in total.) The questioners from the audience will be chosen by means of
11 drawings that will take place at 8:15 a.m. on the morning of the annual meeting. Each of the 11 microphones
installed in the arena and main overflow room will host, so to speak, a drawing.
29
While I’m on the subject of our owners’ gaining knowledge, let me remind you that Charlie and I believe
all shareholders should simultaneously have access to new information that Berkshire releases and, if possible,
should also have adequate time to digest and analyze it before any trading takes place. That’s why we try to issue
financial data late on Fridays or early on Saturdays and why our annual meeting is always held on a Saturday. We
do not follow the common practice of talking one-on-one with large institutional investors or analysts, treating them
instead as we do all other shareholders. There is no one more important to us than the shareholder of limited means
who trusts us with a substantial portion of his savings.
************
For good reason, I regularly extol the accomplishments of our operating managers. They are truly All-Stars
who run their businesses as if they were the only asset owned by their families. I also believe the mindset of our
managers to be as shareholder-oriented as can be found in the universe of large publicly-owned companies. Most of
our managers have no financial need to work. The joy of hitting business “home runs” means as much to them as
their paycheck.
Equally important, however, are the 24 men and women who work with me at our corporate office. This
group efficiently deals with a multitude of SEC and other regulatory requirements, files a 30,400-page Federal
income tax return – that’s up 6,000 pages from the prior year! – oversees the filing of 3,530 state tax returns,
responds to countless shareholder and media inquiries, gets out the annual report, prepares for the country’s largest
annual meeting, coordinates the Board’s activities, fact-checks this letter – and the list goes on and on.
They handle all of these business tasks cheerfully and with unbelievable efficiency, making my life easy
and pleasant. Their efforts go beyond activities strictly related to Berkshire: Last year, for example, they dealt with
the 40 universities (selected from 200 applicants) who sent students to Omaha for a Q&A day with me. They also
handle all kinds of requests that I receive, arrange my travel, and even get me hamburgers and french fries
(smothered in Heinz ketchup, of course) for lunch. No CEO has it better; I truly do feel like tap dancing to work
every day. In fact, my job becomes more fun every year.
In 2015, Berkshire’s revenues increased by $16 billion. Look carefully, however, at the two pictures on the
facing page. The top one is from last year’s report and shows the entire Berkshire home-office crew at our
Christmas lunch. Below that photo is this year’s Christmas photo portraying the same 25 people identically
positioned. In 2015, no one joined us, no one left. And the odds are good that you will see a photo of the same 25
next year.
Can you imagine another very large company – we employ 361,270 people worldwide – enjoying that kind
of employment stability at headquarters? At Berkshire we have hired some wonderful people – and they have stayed
with us. Moreover, no one is hired unless he or she is truly needed. That’s why you’ve never read about
“restructuring” charges at Berkshire.
On April 30th, come to Omaha – the cradle of capitalism – and meet my gang. They are the best.
30
Front Row – Becki Amick, Sharon Heck, Melissa Hawk, Jalayna Busse, Warren Buffett, Angie Wells, Alisa Krueger,
Deb Ray, Carrie Sova, Ellen Schmidt Back Row – Tracy Britt Cool, Jennifer Tselentis, Ted Weschler, Joanne Manhart,
Bob Reeson, Todd Combs, Dan Jaksich, Debbie Bosanek, Mark Sisley, Marc Hamburg, Kerby Ham, Mark Millard,
Allyson Ballard, Stacy Gottschalk, Tiffany Vokt
31
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
ACQUISITION CRITERIA
We are eager to hear from principals or their representatives about businesses that meet all of the
following criteria:
(1) Large purchases (at least $75 million of pre-tax earnings unless the business will fit into one of our
existing units),
(2) Demonstrated consistent earning power (future projections are of no interest to us, nor are
“turnaround” situations),
(3) Businesses earning good returns on equity while employing little or no debt,
(4) Management in place (we can’t supply it),
(5) Simple businesses (if there’s lots of technology, we won’t understand it),
(6) An offering price (we don’t want to waste our time or that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily,
about a transaction when price is unknown).
The larger the company, the greater will be our interest: We would like to make an acquisition in the $5-20
billion range. We are not interested, however, in receiving suggestions about purchases we might make in the
general stock market.
We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise complete confidentiality and a very fast answer
– customarily within five minutes – as to whether we’re interested. We prefer to buy for cash, but will consider
issuing stock when we receive as much in intrinsic business value as we give. We don’t participate in auctions.
Charlie and I frequently get approached about acquisitions that don’t come close to meeting our tests: We’ve
found that if you advertise an interest in buying collies, a lot of people will call hoping to sell you their cocker
spaniels. A line from a country song expresses our feeling about new ventures, turnarounds, or auction-like sales:
“When the phone don’t ring, you’ll know it’s me.”
FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS
Investors are cautioned that certain statements contained in this document as well as some statements in
periodic press releases and some oral statements of Berkshire officials during presentations about Berkshire or its
subsidiaries are “forward-looking” statements within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 (the “Act”). Forward-looking statements include statements which are predictive in nature, which depend upon
or refer to future events or conditions, which include words such as “expects,” “anticipates,” “intends,” “plans,”
“believes,” “estimates” or similar expressions. In addition, any statements concerning future financial performance
(including future revenues, earnings or growth rates), ongoing business strategies or prospects and possible future
Berkshire actions, which may be provided by management, are also forward-looking statements as defined by the
Act. Forward-looking statements are based on current expectations and projections about future events and are
subject to risks, uncertainties and assumptions about Berkshire and its subsidiaries, economic and market factors
and the industries in which we do business, among other things. These statements are not guarantees of future
performance and we have no specific intention to update these statements.
Actual events and results may differ materially from those expressed or forecasted in forward-looking
statements due to a number of factors. The principal important risk factors that could cause our actual performance
and future events and actions to differ materially from such forward-looking statements include, but are not limited
to, changes in market prices of our investments in fixed maturity and equity securities, losses realized from
derivative contracts, the occurrence of one or more catastrophic events, such as an earthquake, hurricane or act of
terrorism that causes losses insured by our insurance subsidiaries, changes in laws or regulations affecting our
insurance, railroad, utilities and energy and finance subsidiaries, changes in federal income tax laws, and changes in
general economic and market factors that affect the prices of securities or the industries in which we do business.
32
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
BUSINESS ACTIVITIES
Berkshire Hathaway Inc. is a holding company owning subsidiaries that engage in a number of diverse business activities
including insurance and reinsurance, freight rail transportation, utilities and energy, finance, manufacturing, services and
retailing. Included in the group of subsidiaries that underwrite insurance and reinsurance is GEICO, the second largest private
passenger auto insurer in the United States and two of the largest reinsurers in the world, General Re and the Berkshire
Hathaway Reinsurance Group. Other subsidiaries that underwrite insurance include National Indemnity Company, Columbia
Insurance Company, National Fire & Marine Insurance Company, National Liability and Fire Insurance Company, Berkshire
Hathaway Homestate Insurance Company, Cypress Insurance Company, Berkshire Hathaway Specialty Insurance Company,
Medical Protective Company, the Berkshire Hathaway GUARD Insurance Companies, Applied Underwriters, U.S. Liability
Insurance Company, Central States Indemnity Company, and Berkshire Hathaway Life Insurance Company of Nebraska. Our
finance and financial products businesses primarily engage in proprietary investing strategies (BH Finance), consumer lending
(Clayton Homes, Inc.) and transportation equipment and furniture leasing (UTLX, XTRA and CORT).
Burlington Northern Santa Fe, LLC (“BNSF”) is a holding company that, through its subsidiaries, is engaged primarily in
the freight rail transportation business. BNSF’s rail operations make up one of the largest railroad systems in North America.
Berkshire Hathaway Energy Company (“BHE”) is an international energy holding company owning a wide variety of operating
companies engaged in the generation, transmission and distribution of energy. Among BHE’s operating energy businesses are
Northern Powergrid; MidAmerican Energy Company; PacifiCorp; NV Energy; BHE Pipeline Group; BHE Renewables; and
AltaLink. In addition, BHE owns HomeServices of America, a real estate brokerage firm. McLane Company is a wholesale
distributor of groceries and nonfood items to discount retailers, convenience stores, restaurants and others. The Marmon Group
is an international association of approximately 180 manufacturing businesses, including UTLX, that operate independently
within diverse business sectors. The Lubrizol Corporation is a specialty chemical company that produces and supplies chemical
products for transportation, industrial and consumer markets. IMC International Metalworking Companies is an industry leader
in the metal cutting tools business. Additionally, on January 29, 2016, Precision Castparts, a worldwide diversified
manufacturer of complex metal components and products serving the aerospace, power and general industrial markets was
acquired.
Numerous business activities are conducted through our other manufacturing, services and retailing subsidiaries. Shaw
Industries is the world’s largest manufacturer of tufted broadloom carpet. Benjamin Moore is a formulator, manufacturer and
retailer of architectural and industrial coatings. Johns Manville is a leading manufacturer of insulation and building products.
Acme Building Brands is a manufacturer of face brick and concrete masonry products. MiTek produces steel connector products
and engineering software for the building components market. Fruit of the Loom, Russell Athletic, Vanity Fair, Garan,
Fechheimer, H.H. Brown Shoe Group, Justin Brands, and Brooks manufacture, license and distribute apparel and footwear
under a variety of brand names. FlightSafety International provides training to aircraft operators. NetJets provides fractional
ownership programs for general aviation aircraft. Nebraska Furniture Mart, R.C. Willey Home Furnishings, Star Furniture and
Jordan’s Furniture are retailers of home furnishings. Borsheims, Helzberg Diamond Shops and Ben Bridge Jeweler are retailers
of fine jewelry.
In addition, other manufacturing, service and retail businesses include: Buffalo News and the BH Media Group, publishers
of daily and Sunday newspapers; See’s Candies, a manufacturer and seller of boxed chocolates and other confectionery
products; Scott Fetzer, a diversified manufacturer and distributor of commercial and industrial products; Larson-Juhl, a
designer, manufacturer and distributor of high-quality picture framing products; CTB International, a manufacturer of
equipment for the livestock and agricultural industries; International Dairy Queen, a licensor and service provider to about 6,700
stores that offer prepared dairy treats and food; Pampered Chef, a leading direct seller of kitchen tools in the United States;
Forest River, a leading manufacturer of leisure vehicles in the United States; Business Wire, the leading global distributor of
corporate news, multimedia and regulatory filings; TTI, Inc., a leading distributor of electronic components; Richline Group, a
leading jewelry manufacturer; Oriental Trading Company, a direct retailer of party supplies and novelties; Charter Brokerage, a
leading global trade services company; Berkshire Hathaway Automotive, which includes 83 automobile dealerships located in
10 states; and Detlev Louis Motorrad, a retailer of motorcycle accessories based in Germany.
Operating decisions for our various businesses are made by managers of the business units. Investment decisions and all
other capital allocation decisions are made for us and our subsidiaries by our senior management team which is led by Warren
E. Buffett, in consultation with Charles T. Munger. Mr. Buffett is Chairman and Mr. Munger is Vice Chairman of Berkshire’s
Board of Directors.
33
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
and Subsidiaries
Selected Financial Data for the Past Five Years
(dollars in millions except per-share data)
(1) Investment gains/losses include other-than-temporary impairment losses. Derivative gains/losses include significant
amounts related to non-cash changes in the fair value of long-term contracts arising from short-term changes in equity
prices, interest rates and foreign currency rates, among other factors. After-tax investment and derivative gains/losses
were $6.7 billion in 2015, $3.3 billion in 2014, $4.3 billion in 2013, $2.2 billion in 2012 and $(521) million in 2011.
(2) Represents net earnings per equivalent Class A common share. Net earnings per Class B common share is equal to 1/1,500
of such amount.
Management of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. is responsible for establishing and maintaining adequate internal control over
financial reporting, as such term is defined in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 13a-15(f). Under the supervision and
with the participation of our management, including our principal executive officer and principal financial officer, we conducted
an evaluation of the effectiveness of the Company’s internal control over financial reporting as of December 31, 2015 as
required by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 13a-15(c). In making this assessment, we used the criteria set forth in the
framework in Internal Control – Integrated Framework (2013) issued by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the
Treadway Commission. Based on our evaluation under the framework in Internal Control – Integrated Framework (2013), our
management concluded that our internal control over financial reporting was effective as of December 31, 2015.
The effectiveness of our internal control over financial reporting as of December 31, 2015 has been audited by Deloitte &
Touche LLP, an independent registered public accounting firm, as stated in their report which appears on page 35.
34
REPORT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM
We have audited the accompanying consolidated balance sheets of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. and subsidiaries (the “Company”)
as of December 31, 2015 and 2014, and the related consolidated statements of earnings, comprehensive income, changes in
shareholders’ equity, and cash flows for each of the three years in the period ended December 31, 2015. We also have audited
the Company’s internal control over financial reporting as of December 31, 2015, based on criteria established in Internal
Control – Integrated Framework (2013) issued by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission.
The Company’s management is responsible for these financial statements, for maintaining effective internal control over
financial reporting, and for its assessment of the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, included in the
accompanying Management’s Report on Internal Control over Financial Reporting. Our responsibility is to express an opinion
on these financial statements and an opinion on the Company’s internal control over financial reporting based on our audits.
We conducted our audits in accordance with the standards of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (United States).
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial
statements are free of material misstatement and whether effective internal control over financial reporting was maintained in all
material respects. Our audits of the financial statements included examining, on a test basis, evidence supporting the amounts
and disclosures in the financial statements, assessing the accounting principles used and significant estimates made by
management, and evaluating the overall financial statement presentation. Our audit of internal control over financial reporting
included obtaining an understanding of internal control over financial reporting, assessing the risk that a material weakness
exists, and testing and evaluating the design and operating effectiveness of internal control based on the assessed risk. Our
audits also included performing such other procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances. We believe that our
audits provide a reasonable basis for our opinions.
A company’s internal control over financial reporting is a process designed by, or under the supervision of, the company’s
principal executive and principal financial officers, or persons performing similar functions, and effected by the company’s
board of directors, management, and other personnel to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial
reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles. A company’s internal control over financial reporting includes those policies and procedures that (1) pertain to the
maintenance of records that, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of
the company; (2) provide reasonable assurance that transactions are recorded as necessary to permit preparation of financial
statements in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, and that receipts and expenditures of the company are
being made only in accordance with authorizations of management and directors of the company; and (3) provide reasonable
assurance regarding prevention or timely detection of unauthorized acquisition, use, or disposition of the company’s assets that
could have a material effect on the financial statements.
Because of the inherent limitations of internal control over financial reporting, including the possibility of collusion or improper
management override of controls, material misstatements due to error or fraud may not be prevented or detected on a timely
basis. Also, projections of any evaluation of the effectiveness of the internal control over financial reporting to future periods
are subject to the risk that the controls may become inadequate because of changes in conditions, or that the degree of
compliance with the policies or procedures may deteriorate.
In our opinion, the consolidated financial statements referred to above present fairly, in all material respects, the financial
position of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. and subsidiaries as of December 31, 2015 and 2014, and the results of their operations and
their cash flows for each of the three years in the period ended December 31, 2015, in conformity with accounting principles
generally accepted in the United States of America. Also, in our opinion, the Company maintained, in all material respects,
effective internal control over financial reporting as of December 31, 2015, based on the criteria established in Internal Control
– Integrated Framework (2013) issued by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission.
Omaha, Nebraska
February 26, 2016
35
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
and Subsidiaries
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS
(dollars in millions)
December 31,
2015 2014
ASSETS
Insurance and Other:
Cash and cash equivalents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 61,181 $ 57,974
Investments:
Fixed maturity securities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25,988 27,397
Equity securities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110,212 115,529
Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15,998 16,346
Investments in The Kraft Heinz Company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23,424 11,660
Receivables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23,303 21,852
Inventories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11,916 10,236
Property, plant and equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15,540 14,153
Goodwill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37,188 34,959
Other intangible assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9,148 9,203
Deferred charges reinsurance assumed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,687 7,772
Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6,697 6,748
348,282 333,829
Railroad, Utilities and Energy:
Cash and cash equivalents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,437 3,001
Property, plant and equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120,279 115,054
Goodwill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24,178 24,418
Regulatory assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,285 4,253
Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12,833 11,817
165,012 158,543
Finance and Financial Products:
Cash and cash equivalents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,112 2,294
Investments in equity and fixed maturity securities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 411 1,299
Other investments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,719 5,978
Loans and finance receivables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12,772 12,566
Property, plant and equipment and assets held for lease . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9,347 8,037
Goodwill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,342 1,337
Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,260 1,984
38,963 33,495
$552,257 $525,867
36
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
and Subsidiaries
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS
(dollars in millions)
December 31,
2015 2014
LIABILITIES AND SHAREHOLDERS’ EQUITY
Insurance and Other:
Losses and loss adjustment expenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 73,144 $ 71,477
Unearned premiums . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13,311 11,944
Life, annuity and health insurance benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14,497 13,261
Other policyholder liabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,123 6,835
Accounts payable, accruals and other liabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17,879 16,472
Notes payable and other borrowings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14,599 11,854
140,553 131,843
Railroad, Utilities and Energy:
Accounts payable, accruals and other liabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11,994 12,763
Regulatory liabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,033 2,832
Notes payable and other borrowings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57,739 55,306
72,766 70,901
Finance and Financial Products:
Accounts payable, accruals and other liabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,398 1,321
Derivative contract liabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,836 4,810
Notes payable and other borrowings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11,951 12,730
17,185 18,861
Income taxes, principally deferred . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63,126 61,235
Total liabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293,630 282,840
Shareholders’ equity:
Common stock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 8
Capital in excess of par value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35,620 35,573
Accumulated other comprehensive income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33,982 42,732
Retained earnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187,703 163,620
Treasury stock, at cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (1,763) (1,763)
Berkshire Hathaway shareholders’ equity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255,550 240,170
Noncontrolling interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,077 2,857
Total shareholders’ equity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258,627 243,027
$552,257 $525,867
37
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
and Subsidiaries
CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF EARNINGS
(dollars in millions except per-share amounts)
38
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
and Subsidiaries
CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF COMPREHENSIVE INCOME
(dollars in millions)
Balance at December 31, 2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $37,238 $27,500 $124,272 $(1,363) $ 3,941 $191,588
Net earnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — — 19,476 — 369 19,845
Other comprehensive income, net . . . . . . . . . . — 16,546 — — 25 16,571
Issuance of common stock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 — — — — 92
Transactions with noncontrolling interests . . . . (1,850) (21) — — (1,740) (3,611)
Balance at December 31, 2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35,480 44,025 143,748 (1,363) 2,595 224,485
Net earnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — — 19,872 — 298 20,170
Other comprehensive income, net . . . . . . . . . . — (1,293) — — (42) (1,335)
Issuance (acquisition) of common stock . . . . . . 118 — — (400) — (282)
Transactions with noncontrolling interests . . . . (17) — — — 6 (11)
Balance at December 31, 2014 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35,581 42,732 163,620 (1,763) 2,857 243,027
Net earnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — — 24,083 — 331 24,414
Other comprehensive income, net . . . . . . . . . . — (8,750) — — (56) (8,806)
Issuance of common stock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 — — — — 53
Transactions with noncontrolling interests . . . . (6) — — — (55) (61)
Balance at December 31, 2015 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $35,628 $33,982 $187,703 $(1,763) $ 3,077 $258,627
39
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
and Subsidiaries
CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF CASH FLOWS
(dollars in millions)
40
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
and Subsidiaries
NOTES TO CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
December 31, 2015
41
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued)
(1) Significant accounting policies and practices (Continued)
(d) Investments (Continued)
Investment gains and losses arise when investments are sold (as determined on a specific identification basis) or are
other-than-temporarily impaired. If a decline in the value of an investment below cost is deemed other than temporary,
the cost of the investment is written down to fair value, with a corresponding charge to earnings. Factors considered in
determining whether an impairment is other than temporary include: the financial condition, business prospects and
creditworthiness of the issuer, the relative amount of the decline, our ability and intent to hold the investment until the
fair value recovers and the length of time that fair value has been less than cost. With respect to an investment in a
fixed maturity security, we recognize an other-than-temporary impairment if we (a) intend to sell or expect to be
required to sell the security before its amortized cost is recovered or (b) do not expect to ultimately recover the
amortized cost basis even if we do not intend to sell the security. Under scenario (a), we recognize losses in earnings
and under scenario (b), we recognize the credit loss component in earnings and the difference between fair value and
the amortized cost basis net of the credit loss in other comprehensive income.
(f) Derivatives
We carry derivative contracts in our Consolidated Balance Sheets at fair value, net of reductions permitted under
master netting agreements with counterparties. The changes in fair value of derivative contracts that do not qualify as
hedging instruments for financial reporting purposes are recorded in earnings or by our regulated utilities businesses as
regulatory assets or liabilities when recovery through regulated rates is probable.
42
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued)
(1) Significant accounting policies and practices (Continued)
(g) Fair value measurements (Continued)
assumed to be independent, knowledgeable, able and willing to transact an exchange and not acting under duress. Our
nonperformance or credit risk is considered in determining the fair value of liabilities. Considerable judgment may be
required in interpreting market data used to develop the estimates of fair value. Accordingly, estimates of fair value
presented herein are not necessarily indicative of the amounts that could be realized in a current or future market exchange.
(h) Inventories
Inventories consist of manufactured goods and goods acquired for resale. Manufactured inventory costs include raw
materials, direct and indirect labor and factory overhead. Inventories are stated at the lower of cost or market. As of
December 31, 2015, approximately 49% of our consolidated inventory cost was determined using the last-in-first-out
(“LIFO”) method, 29% using the first-in-first-out (“FIFO”) method, and the remainder primarily using the average cost
method. With respect to inventories carried at LIFO cost, the aggregate difference in value between LIFO cost and cost
determined under the FIFO method was $715 million and $857 million as of December 31, 2015 and 2014, respectively.
43
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued)
(1) Significant accounting policies and practices (Continued)
(j) Goodwill and other intangible assets (Continued)
Intangible assets with definite lives are amortized based on the estimated pattern in which the economic benefits are
expected to be consumed or on a straight-line basis over their estimated economic lives. Intangible assets with definite
lives are reviewed for impairment when events or changes in circumstances indicate that the carrying amount may not
be recoverable. Intangible assets with indefinite lives are tested for impairment at least annually and when events or
changes in circumstances indicate that it is more likely than not that the asset is impaired.
44
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued)
(1) Significant accounting policies and practices (Continued)
(m) Deferred charges reinsurance assumed
The excess, if any, of the estimated ultimate liabilities for claims and claim settlement costs over the premiums earned with respect
to retroactive property/casualty reinsurance contracts is recorded as a deferred charge at inception of the contract. Deferred charges
are subsequently amortized using the interest method over the expected claim settlement periods. Changes to the estimated timing
or amount of future loss payments produce changes in unamortized deferred charges. Changes in such estimates are applied
retrospectively and are included in insurance losses and loss adjustment expenses in the period of the change.
(n) Insurance policy acquisition costs
Incremental costs that are directly related to the successful acquisition of insurance contracts are capitalized, subject to
ultimate recoverability, and are subsequently amortized to underwriting expenses as the related premiums are earned.
Direct incremental acquisition costs include commissions, premium taxes, and certain other costs associated with
successful efforts. All other underwriting costs are expensed as incurred. The recoverability of capitalized insurance
policy acquisition costs generally reflects anticipation of investment income. The unamortized balances are included in
other assets and were $1,920 million and $1,722 million at December 31, 2015 and 2014, respectively.
(p) Life, annuity and health insurance benefits
Liabilities for insurance benefits under life contracts are computed based upon estimated future investment yields, expected
mortality, morbidity, and lapse or withdrawal rates and reflect estimates for future premiums and expenses under the
contracts. These assumptions, as applicable, also include a margin for adverse deviation and may vary with the characteristics
of the contract’s date of issuance, policy duration and country of risk. The interest rate assumptions used may vary by
contract or jurisdiction and generally range from less than 1% to 7%. Annuity contracts are discounted based on the implicit
rate of return as of the inception of the contracts and such interest rates generally range from less than 1% to 7%.
(q) Regulated utilities and energy businesses
Certain energy subsidiaries prepare their financial statements in accordance with authoritative guidance for regulated
operations, reflecting the economic effects of regulation from the ability to recover certain costs from customers and
the requirement to return revenues to customers in the future through the regulated rate-setting process. Accordingly,
certain costs are deferred as regulatory assets and obligations are accrued as regulatory liabilities. These assets and
liabilities will be amortized into operating expenses and revenues over various future periods.
Regulatory assets and liabilities are continually assessed for probable future inclusion in regulatory rates by considering
factors such as applicable regulatory or legislative changes and recent rate orders received by other regulated entities. If
future inclusion in regulatory rates ceases to be probable, the amount no longer probable of inclusion in regulatory rates is
charged or credited to earnings (or other comprehensive income, if applicable) or returned to customers.
(r) Foreign currency
The accounts of our non-U.S. based subsidiaries are measured, in most instances, using the local currencies of the
subsidiaries as the functional currencies. Revenues and expenses of these businesses are generally translated into U.S.
Dollars at the average exchange rate for the period. Assets and liabilities are translated at the exchange rate as of the end
of the reporting period. Gains or losses from translating the financial statements of foreign-based operations are included
in shareholders’ equity as a component of accumulated other comprehensive income. Gains and losses arising from
transactions denominated in a currency other than the functional currency of the reporting entity are included in earnings.
(s) Income taxes
Berkshire files a consolidated federal income tax return in the United States, which includes our eligible subsidiaries.
In addition, we file income tax returns in state, local and foreign jurisdictions as applicable. Provisions for current
income tax liabilities are calculated and accrued on income and expense amounts expected to be included in the income
tax returns for the current year. Income taxes reported in earnings also include deferred income tax provisions.
Deferred income tax assets and liabilities are computed on differences between the financial statement bases and tax bases of
assets and liabilities at the enacted tax rates. Changes in deferred income tax assets and liabilities that are associated with
components of other comprehensive income are charged or credited directly to other comprehensive income. Otherwise,
changes in deferred income tax assets and liabilities are included as a component of income tax expense. The effect on deferred
income tax assets and liabilities attributable to changes in enacted tax rates are charged or credited to income tax expense in the
period of enactment. Valuation allowances are established for certain deferred tax assets when realization is not likely.
45
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued)
(1) Significant accounting policies and practices (Continued)
(s) Income taxes (Continued)
Assets and liabilities are established for uncertain tax positions taken or positions expected to be taken in income tax
returns when such positions, in our judgment, do not meet a “more-likely-than-not” threshold based on the technical
merits of the positions. Estimated interest and penalties related to uncertain tax positions are generally included as a
component of income tax expense.
46
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued)
(2) Significant business acquisitions
Our long-held acquisition strategy is to acquire businesses at sensible prices that have consistent earning power, good
returns on equity and able and honest management. Financial results attributable to business acquisitions are included in our
Consolidated Financial Statements beginning on their respective acquisition dates.
In the first quarter of 2015, Berkshire acquired the Van Tuyl Group (now named Berkshire Hathaway Automotive), which
included 81 automotive dealerships located in 10 states as well as two related insurance businesses, two auto auctions and a
distributor of automotive fluid maintenance products. In addition to selling new and pre-owned automobiles, the Berkshire
Hathaway Automotive group offers repair and other services and products, including extended warranty services and other
automotive protection plans. Consideration paid for the acquisition was $4.1 billion. On December 1, 2014, we acquired
AltaLink, L.P. (“AltaLink”) for a cash purchase price of C$3.1 billion (approximately $2.7 billion). AltaLink is a regulated
electric transmission-only business, headquartered in Calgary, Alberta. The goodwill related to the AltaLink acquisition is not
amortizable for income tax purposes, while substantially all of the goodwill related to Berkshire Hathaway Automotive is
amortizable for income tax purposes.
The fair values of identified assets acquired and liabilities assumed and residual goodwill of Berkshire Hathaway
Automotive and AltaLink at their respective acquisition dates are summarized as follows (in millions).
Berkshire Hathaway
Automotive AltaLink
The following table sets forth certain unaudited pro forma consolidated earnings data for 2014 as if the acquisitions
discussed previously were consummated on the same terms at the beginning of the year preceding their respective acquisition
dates (in millions, except per share amount). Pro forma data for 2015 was not materially different from the amounts reflected in
the Consolidated Statement of Earnings.
2014
Revenues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $203,514
Net earnings attributable to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20,048
Net earnings per equivalent Class A common share attributable to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12,199
On January 1, 2014, we acquired the beverage dispensing equipment manufacturing and merchandising operations of
British engineering company, IMI plc for approximately $1.12 billion. On February 25, 2014, we acquired 100% of the
outstanding common stock of Phillips Specialty Products Inc. (“PSPI”) from Phillips 66 (“PSX”) in exchange for 17,422,615
shares of PSX common stock with an aggregate fair value of $1.35 billion. PSPI, which has been renamed as Lubrizol Specialty
Products Inc. (“LSPI”), provides flow improver products to customers worldwide. Assets of PSPI included cash of
approximately $450 million. On June 30, 2014, we acquired WPLG, Inc. (“WPLG”) from Graham Holding Company (“GHC”)
in exchange for 1,620,190 shares of GHC common stock with an aggregate fair value of $1.13 billion. At the date of the
acquisition, the assets of WPLG, which operates a Miami, Florida, ABC affiliated television station, included 2,107 shares of
Berkshire Hathaway Class A common stock, 1,278 shares of Berkshire Hathaway Class B common stock and cash of $328
million. At their respective acquisition dates, the aggregate fair value of the identified net assets related to these acquisitions was
approximately $2.2 billion and the residual goodwill was approximately $1.4 billion.
47
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued)
(2) Significant business acquisitions (Continued)
On December 19, 2013, we acquired NV Energy, Inc. (“NV Energy”) for cash consideration of approximately $5.6 billion.
NV Energy is an energy holding company serving approximately 1.2 million electric and 0.2 million retail natural gas customers
in Nevada. NV Energy’s principal operating subsidiaries, Nevada Power Company and Sierra Pacific Power Company, are
regulated utilities.
During the last three years, we also completed several smaller-sized business acquisitions, many of which were considered
as “bolt-on” acquisitions to several of our existing business operations. Aggregate consideration paid for these other business
acquisitions was approximately $1.1 billion in 2015, $1.8 billion in 2014 and $1.1 billion in 2013. We do not believe that these
acquisitions were material, individually or in the aggregate, to our Consolidated Financial Statements.
Investments in fixed maturity securities are reflected in our Consolidated Balance Sheets as follows (in millions).
December 31,
2015 2014
Investments in foreign government securities include securities issued by national and provincial government entities as
well as instruments that are unconditionally guaranteed by such entities. As of December 31, 2015, approximately 94% of
foreign government holdings were rated AA or higher by at least one of the major rating agencies. Approximately 77% of
foreign government holdings were issued or guaranteed by the United Kingdom, Germany, Australia, Canada or The
Netherlands. Unrealized losses on all fixed maturity investments in a continuous unrealized loss position for more than twelve
consecutive months as of December 31, 2015 and December 31, 2014 were insignificant.
The amortized cost and estimated fair value of securities with fixed maturities at December 31, 2015 are summarized
below by contractual maturity dates. Actual maturities may differ from contractual maturities due to early call or prepayment
rights held by issuers. Amounts are in millions.
Due after one Due after five
Due in one year through years through Due after Mortgage-backed
year or less five years ten years ten years securities Total
48
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued)
(4) Investments in equity securities
Investments in equity securities as of December 31, 2015 and 2014 are summarized based on the primary industry of the
investee in the table below (in millions).
* Approximately 59% of the aggregate fair value was concentrated in the equity securities of four companies (American
Express Company – $10.5 billion; Wells Fargo & Company – $27.2 billion; International Business Machines Corporation
(“IBM”) – $11.2 billion; and The Coca-Cola Company – $17.2 billion).
* Approximately 59% of the aggregate fair value was concentrated in the equity securities of four companies (American
Express Company – $14.1 billion; Wells Fargo & Company – $26.5 billion; International Business Machines Corporation –
$12.3 billion; and The Coca-Cola Company – $16.9 billion).
As of December 31, 2015 and 2014, we concluded that there were no unrealized losses that were other than temporary. Our
conclusions were based on: (a) our ability and intent to hold the securities to recovery; (b) our assessment that the underlying
business and financial condition of each of these issuers was favorable; (c) our opinion that the relative price declines were not
significant; and (d) our belief that market prices will increase to and exceed our cost. As of December 31, 2015 and 2014,
unrealized losses on equity securities in a continuous unrealized loss position for more than twelve consecutive months were
$989 million and $65 million, respectively.
Unrealized losses at December 31, 2015 included approximately $2.6 billion related to our investment in IBM common
stock, which represented 19% of our cost. IBM continues to be profitable and generate significant cash flows. Approximately
77% of the IBM-related unrealized losses occurred from the market price decline in the second half of 2015. We currently do
not intend to dispose our IBM common stock. We expect that the fair value of our investment in IBM common stock will
recover and ultimately exceed our cost.
Investments in equity securities are reflected in our Consolidated Balance Sheets as follows (in millions).
December 31,
2015 2014
49
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued)
(5) Other investments
Other investments include preferred stock of Wm. Wrigley Jr. Company (“Wrigley”), The Dow Chemical Company
(“Dow”) and Bank of America Corporation (“BAC”) warrants to purchase common stock of BAC and preferred and common
stock of Restaurant Brands International, Inc. (“RBI”). Other investments are classified as available-for-sale and carried at fair
value and are shown in our Consolidated Balance Sheets as follows (in millions).
Cost Fair Value
December 31, December 31,
2015 2014 2015 2014
We own $2.1 billion liquidation amount of Wrigley preferred stock that was acquired in conjunction with the Mars
Incorporated (“Mars”) acquisition of Wrigley. The Wrigley preferred stock is entitled to dividends at 5% per annum and is
subject to certain put and call arrangements during 2016 for up to 50% of our original investment. Beginning in 2021, our then
outstanding investment will be subject to annual put and call arrangements. The redemption amounts under the put and call
arrangements will be based upon the earnings of Wrigley.
We own 3,000,000 shares of Series A Cumulative Convertible Perpetual Preferred Stock of Dow (“Dow Preferred”) with a
liquidation value of $1,000 per share. Each share of the Dow Preferred is convertible into 24.201 shares of Dow common stock
(equivalent to a conversion price of $41.32 per share). Dow currently has the option to cause some or all of the Dow Preferred to
be converted into Dow common stock at the then applicable conversion rate, if the New York Stock Exchange closing price of
its common stock exceeds $53.72 per share for any 20 trading days within a period of 30 consecutive trading days ending on the
day before Dow exercises its option. The Dow Preferred is entitled to dividends at a rate of 8.5% per annum.
We own 50,000 shares of 6% Non-Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock of BAC (“BAC Preferred”) with a liquidation
value of $100,000 per share and warrants to purchase 700,000,000 shares of common stock of BAC (“BAC Warrants”). The
BAC Preferred may be redeemed at the option of BAC beginning on May 7, 2019 at a redemption price of $105,000 per share
(or $5.25 billion in aggregate). The BAC Warrants expire in 2021 and are exercisable for an additional aggregate cost of $5
billion ($7.142857/share).
On December 12, 2014, we acquired Class A 9% Cumulative Compounding Perpetual Preferred Shares of RBI (“RBI
Preferred”) having a stated value of $3 billion and common stock of RBI for an aggregate cost of $3 billion. RBI, domiciled in
Canada, is the ultimate parent company of Burger King and Tim Hortons. As of the acquisition date, our combined investment
in RBI possessed approximately 14.4% of the voting interests of RBI. The RBI Preferred is entitled to dividends on a
cumulative basis of 9% per annum plus an additional amount, if necessary, to produce an after-tax yield to Berkshire as if the
dividends were paid by a U.S.-based company.
Berkshire’s initial investments consisted of 425 million shares of Heinz Holding common stock, warrants, which were
exercised in June 2015, to acquire approximately 46 million additional shares of common stock at one cent per share, and
cumulative compounding preferred stock (“Preferred Stock”) with a liquidation preference of $8 billion. The aggregate cost of
these investments was $12.25 billion. 3G also acquired 425 million shares of Heinz Holding common stock for $4.25 billion. In
addition, Heinz Holding reserved 39.6 million shares of common stock for issuance to its management and directors under
equity grants, including stock options.
50
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued)
(6) Investments in The Kraft Heinz Company (Continued)
In March 2015, Heinz Holding and Kraft Foods Group, Inc. (“Kraft”) entered into a merger agreement under which Kraft
shareholders were entitled to receive one share of newly issued Heinz Holding common stock for each share of Kraft common
stock and a special cash dividend of $16.50 per share. Kraft is one of North America’s largest consumer packaged food and
beverage companies, with annual revenues of more than $18 billion. The company’s iconic brands include Kraft, Capri Sun,
Jell-O, Kool-Aid, Lunchables, Maxwell House, Oscar Mayer, Philadelphia, Planters and Velveeta.
On July 1, 2015, Berkshire acquired 262.9 million shares of newly issued common stock of Heinz Holding for $5.26 billion
and 3G acquired 237.1 million shares of newly issued common stock for $4.74 billion. Immediately thereafter, Heinz Holding
executed a reverse stock split at a rate of 0.443332 of a share for each share. Upon completion of these transactions, Berkshire
owned approximately 325.4 million shares of Heinz Holding common stock, or 52.5% of the then outstanding shares. The
merger transaction closed on July 2, 2015, at which time Heinz Holding was renamed The Kraft Heinz Company (“Kraft
Heinz”) and Kraft Heinz issued approximately 593 million new shares of its common stock to the former Kraft shareholders.
Following the issuance of these additional shares, Berkshire and 3G together owned approximately 51% of the outstanding
Kraft Heinz common stock, with Berkshire owning approximately 26.8% and 3G owning 24.2%. Our investments in Kraft
Heinz are summarized as follows (in millions).
Carrying Value
December 31, December 31,
2015 2014
We account for our investment in Kraft Heinz common stock on the equity method. Dividends earned on the Preferred
Stock and our equity method earnings or loss on the common stock were $730 million in 2015, $694 million in 2014 and $146
million in 2013 and are included in interest, dividend and other investment income in our Consolidated Statements of Earnings.
As previously discussed, the issuance of new common stock by Kraft Heinz for Kraft common stock reduced our
ownership of Kraft Heinz from approximately 52.5% to 26.8%. Under the equity method, the issuance of shares by an investee
is accounted for by the investor as if the investor had sold a proportionate share of its investment. As a result, we recorded a
non-cash pre-tax holding gain of approximately $6.8 billion in the third quarter of 2015, representing the excess of the fair value
of Kraft Heinz common stock at the date of the merger over our carrying value associated with the reduction in our ownership.
The Preferred Stock possesses no voting rights except as are required by law or for certain matters. The Preferred Stock is
entitled to dividends at 9% per annum whether or not declared, is senior in priority to the common stock and is callable after
June 7, 2016 at the liquidation value plus an applicable premium and any accrued and unpaid dividends. Kraft Heinz has
announced its intention to call the Preferred Stock after June 7, 2016 and prior to June 7, 2017, although it is not obligated to do
so. The redemption value of the Preferred Stock as of June 7, 2016 is approximately $8.3 billion. After June 7, 2021, Berkshire
can cause Kraft Heinz to attempt to sell shares of common stock through public offerings or other issuances, the proceeds of
which would be required to be used to redeem any outstanding shares of the Preferred Stock. We account for our investment in
the Preferred Stock as an equity investment and it is carried at cost.
51
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued)
(7) Investment gains/losses
Investment gains/losses, including other-than-temporary impairment (“OTTI”) losses, for each of the three years ending
December 31, 2015 are summarized below (in millions).
Investment gains from equity securities in 2015 included a non-cash holding gain of approximately $6.8 billion in
connection with our investment in Kraft Heinz common stock (see Note 6). Gains from equity securities during 2014 included
non-cash holding gains of approximately $2.1 billion from the exchange of Phillips 66 (“PSX”) common stock in connection
with the acquisition of Phillips Specialty Products Inc. (subsequently renamed Lubrizol Specialty Products Inc. (“LSPI”)) and
the exchange of Graham Holding Company (“GHC”) common stock for WPLG, Inc. (“WPLG”). The PSX/LSPI exchange was
completed on February 25, 2014 and the GHC/WPLG exchange was completed on June 30, 2014. These holding gains
represented the excess of the respective fair value of the net assets of LSPI and WPLG received over the respective cost basis of
the PSX and GHC shares exchanged.
In October 2013, we realized a gain of $680 million with respect to the repurchase of $4.4 billion par amount of 11.45%
Wrigley subordinated notes, which we acquired in 2008 for $4.4 billion in connection with the Mars acquisition of Wrigley. We
also realized additional gains in 2013 from the dispositions and conversions of corporate bonds. Other investment gains/losses
in 2013 included $1.4 billion related to the changes in the valuations of warrants of General Electric Company (“GE”) and The
Goldman Sachs Group (“GS”), which we acquired in 2008 and exercised in October 2013.
We record investments in equity and fixed maturity securities classified as available-for-sale at fair value and record the
difference between fair value and cost in other comprehensive income. OTTI losses recognized in earnings represent reductions
in the cost basis of the investment, but not the fair value. Accordingly, such losses that are included in earnings are generally
offset by a credit to other comprehensive income, producing no net effect on shareholders’ equity as of the balance sheet date.
In 2014, we recorded an OTTI charge of $678 million related to our investment in equity securities of Tesco PLC. We recorded
OTTI losses on bonds issued by Texas Competitive Electric Holdings of $228 million in 2013.
(8) Inventories
Inventories are comprised of the following (in millions).
December 31,
2015 2014
52
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued)
(9) Receivables
Receivables of insurance and other businesses are comprised of the following (in millions).
December 31,
2015 2014
Loans and finance receivables of finance and financial products businesses are summarized as follows (in millions).
December 31,
2015 2014
Loans and finance receivables before allowances and discounts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $13,186 $13,150
Allowances for uncollectible loans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (182) (303)
Unamortized acquisition discounts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (232) (281)
$12,772 $12,566
Loans and finance receivables are predominantly installment loans originated or acquired by our manufactured housing
business. Provisions for loan losses for 2015 and 2014 were $148 million and $173 million, respectively. Loan charge-offs, net
of recoveries, were $177 million in 2015 and $214 million in 2014. In 2015, we reclassified $93 million of allowances for
uncollectable loans and related installment loan receivables that were in-substance foreclosures or repossessions to other assets.
The reclassifications had no impact on earnings or cash flows. At December 31, 2015, approximately 98% of the loan balances
were evaluated collectively for impairment. As a part of the evaluation process, credit quality indicators are reviewed and loans
are designated as performing or non-performing. At December 31, 2015, approximately 99% of the loan balances were
determined to be performing and approximately 95% of the loan balances were current as to payment status.
(10) Property, plant and equipment and assets held for lease
A summary of property, plant and equipment of our insurance and other businesses follows (in millions).
December 31,
Ranges of
estimated useful life 2015 2014
53
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued)
(10) Property, plant and equipment and assets held for lease (Continued)
A summary of property, plant and equipment of our railroad and our utilities and energy businesses follows (in millions).
December 31,
Ranges of
estimated useful life 2015 2014
Railroad:
Land . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — $ 6,037 $ 5,983
Track structure and other roadway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 – 100 years 45,967 42,588
Locomotives, freight cars and other equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 – 40 years 11,320 9,493
Construction in progress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — 1,031 1,292
64,355 59,356
Accumulated depreciation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (4,845) (3,550)
$ 59,510 $ 55,806
Utilities and energy:
Utility generation, transmission and distribution systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 – 80 years $ 69,248 $ 64,645
Interstate natural gas pipeline assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 – 80 years 6,755 6,660
Independent power plants and other assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 – 30 years 5,626 5,035
Construction in progress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — 2,627 5,194
84,256 81,534
Accumulated depreciation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (23,487) (22,286)
$ 60,769 $ 59,248
The utility generation, transmission and distribution systems and interstate natural gas pipeline assets are owned by
regulated public utility and natural gas pipeline subsidiaries.
Assets held for lease and property, plant and equipment of our finance and financial products businesses are summarized
below (in millions).
December 31,
Ranges of
estimated useful life 2015 2014
Assets held for lease includes railcars, intermodal tank containers, cranes, over-the-road trailers, storage units and
furniture. As of December 31, 2015, the minimum future lease rentals to be received on assets held for lease (including rail cars
leased from others) were as follows (in millions): 2016 – $1,256; 2017 – $1,035; 2018 – $809; 2019 – $589; 2020 – $410; and
thereafter – $593.
Depreciation expense for each of the three years ending December 31, 2015 is summarized below (in millions).
54
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued)
(11) Goodwill and other intangible assets
A reconciliation of the change in the carrying value of goodwill is as follows (in millions).
December 31,
2015 2014
Amortization expense was $1,106 million in 2015, $1,155 million in 2014 and $1,090 million in 2013. Estimated
amortization expense over the next five years is as follows (in millions): 2016 – $1,009; 2017 – $905; 2018 – $839, 2019 – $733
and 2020 – $628. Intangible assets with indefinite lives as of December 31, 2015 and 2014 were $2,964 million and $2,586
million, respectively.
(1) Represents the aggregate undiscounted amounts payable assuming that the value of each index is zero at each contract’s
expiration date. Certain of these contracts are denominated in foreign currencies. Notional amounts are based on the
foreign currency exchange rates as of each balance sheet date.
(2) Represents the maximum undiscounted future value of losses payable under the contracts, if all underlying issuers default
and the residual value of the specified obligations is zero.
55
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued)
(12) Derivative contracts (Continued)
The derivative contracts of our finance and financial products businesses are recorded at fair value and the changes in the
fair values of such contracts are reported in earnings as derivative gains/losses. We entered into these contracts with the
expectation that the premiums received would exceed the amounts ultimately paid to counterparties. A summary of the
derivative gains/losses included in our Consolidated Statements of Earnings in each of the three years ending December 31,
2015 follows (in millions).
The equity index put option contracts were written between 2004 and 2008. These contracts are European style options
written on four major equity indexes and will expire between June 2018 and January 2026. Future payments, if any, under any
given contract will be required if the underlying index value is below the strike price at the contract expiration date. We
received the premiums on these contracts in full at the contract inception dates and therefore have no counterparty credit risk.
The aggregate intrinsic value (which is the undiscounted liability assuming the contracts are settled based on the index
values and foreign currency exchange rates as of the balance sheet date) of our equity index put option contracts was
approximately $1.1 billion at December 31, 2015 and $1.4 billion at December 31, 2014. However, these contracts may not be
unilaterally terminated or fully settled before the expiration dates. Therefore, the ultimate amount of cash basis gains or losses
on these contracts will not be determined for several years. The remaining weighted average life of all contracts was
approximately five years at December 31, 2015.
Our remaining credit default contract was written in 2008 and relates to approximately 500 zero-coupon municipal debt
issues with maturities ranging from 2019 to 2054. The underlying debt issues have a weighted average maturity of
approximately 15.75 years. Pursuant to the contract terms, future loss payments would be required in the event of non-payment
by the issuer and non-performance by the primary financial guarantee insurers under their contracts. Payments under our
contract, if any, are not required prior to the maturity dates of the underlying obligations. Our premium under this contract was
received at the inception of this contract and therefore we have no counterparty credit risk.
A limited number of our equity index put option contracts contain collateral posting requirements with respect to changes
in the fair value or intrinsic value of the contracts and/or a downgrade of Berkshire’s credit ratings. As of December 31, 2015,
we did not have any collateral posting requirements. If Berkshire’s credit ratings (currently AA from Standard & Poor’s and
Aa2 from Moody’s) are downgraded below either A- by Standard & Poor’s or A3 by Moody’s, collateral of up to $1.1 billion
could be required to be posted.
Our regulated utility subsidiaries are exposed to variations in the prices of fuel required to generate electricity, wholesale
electricity purchased and sold and natural gas supplied for customers. Derivative instruments, including forward purchases and
sales, futures, swaps and options, are used to manage a portion of these price risks. Derivative contract assets are included in
other assets and were $103 million as of December 31, 2015 and $108 million as of December 31, 2014. Derivative contract
liabilities are included in accounts payable, accruals and other liabilities and were $237 million as of December 31, 2015 and
$230 million as of December 31, 2014. Net derivative contract assets or liabilities of our regulated utilities that are probable of
recovery through rates, are offset by regulatory liabilities or assets. Unrealized gains or losses on contracts accounted for as cash
flow or fair value hedges are recorded in other comprehensive income or in net earnings, as appropriate.
56
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued)
(13) Supplemental cash flow information
A summary of supplemental cash flow information for each of the three years ending December 31, 2015 is presented in
the following table (in millions).
2015 2014 2013
Cash paid during the period for:
Income taxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $4,535 $4,014 $5,401
Interest:
Insurance and other businesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 346 360 343
Railroad, utilities and energy businesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,717 2,487 1,958
Finance and financial products businesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 403 465 573
Non-cash investing and financing activities:
Liabilities assumed in connection with business acquisitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,812 6,334 9,224
Equity securities exchanged in connection with business acquisitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — 2,478 —
Treasury stock acquired in connection with business acquisition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — 400 —
Incurred losses shown in the preceding table represent loss and loss adjustment expenses recorded in earnings in each year.
Such losses pertain to loss events occurring during the current year and losses pertaining to prior year events. Classifications of
incurred losses related to our retroactive reinsurance contracts are based on the inception dates of the contracts. Incurred losses
attributable to prior years’ loss events reflect the amount of estimation error charged or credited to earnings during the year with
respect to liabilities as of the beginning of the year.
Incurred losses include the changes in deferred charge assets recorded on retroactive reinsurance contracts and discounts of
workers’ compensation liabilities assumed under certain reinsurance contracts. Deferred charges and liability discounts
represent the time value of the related ultimate estimated claim liabilities. Discounted workers’ compensation liabilities at
December 31, 2015 and 2014 were $1,964 million and $2,035 million, respectively, reflecting net discounts of $1,579 million
and $1,745 million, respectively, while unamortized deferred charges on retroactive reinsurance contracts were $7,687 million
at December 31, 2015 and $7,772 million at December 31, 2014.
57
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued)
(14) Unpaid losses and loss adjustment expenses (Continued)
A summary of the impact of deferred charges and liability discounts on incurred losses recorded during the year with
respect to prior years’ loss events follows (in millions):
Incurred losses before the effects of deferred charges and liability discounts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $(1,545) $(1,493) $(1,938)
Incurred losses from changes in deferred charges and liability discounts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243 128 186
Incurred losses prior years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $(1,302) $(1,365) $(1,752)
Before the effects of changes in deferred charges and liability discounts, incurred losses included reductions for prior
years’ events of approximately $1.5 billion in 2015 and 2014 and $1.9 billion in 2013. In each year, these reductions derived
from our direct insurance business (including private passenger automobile, medical malpractice and other commercial
coverages), as well as from reinsurance business, partially offset by increases related to retroactive reinsurance. The reductions
for reinsurance business were primarily attributable to lower than expected reported losses from ceding companies with respect
to both property and casualty coverages. Underlying claim counts and average amounts per claim are not consistently utilized
by our reinsurance businesses, as clients do not consistently provide reliable data in sufficient detail. We increased liabilities
related to prior years’ retroactive reinsurance contracts by approximately $550 million in 2015 and $825 million in 2014,
primarily due to net increases in estimated asbestos and environmental liabilities. Loss estimates are regularly adjusted to
consider updated loss development patterns and emergence of prior years’ losses, whether favorable or unfavorable.
We are exposed to environmental, asbestos and other latent injury claims arising from insurance and reinsurance contracts.
Liability estimates for these exposures include case basis reserves and also reflect reserves for legal and other loss adjustment
expenses and IBNR reserves. IBNR reserves are based upon our historic general liability exposure base and policy language,
previous environmental loss experience and the assessment of current trends of environmental law, environmental cleanup
costs, asbestos liability law and judgmental settlements of asbestos liabilities.
The liabilities for environmental, asbestos and other latent injury claims and claims expenses, net of reinsurance
recoverables, were approximately $14.0 billion at December 31, 2015 and $14.4 billion at December 31, 2014. These liabilities
included approximately $12.4 billion at December 31, 2015 and $12.7 billion at December 31, 2014 assumed under retroactive
reinsurance contracts. Liabilities arising from retroactive contracts with exposure to claims of this nature are generally subject to
aggregate policy limits. Thus, our exposure to environmental and other latent injury claims under these contracts is likewise
limited. We monitor evolving case law and its effect on environmental and other latent injury claims. Changing government
regulations, newly identified toxins, newly reported claims, new theories of liability, new contract interpretations and other
factors could result in increases in these liabilities. Such development could be material to our results of operations. We are
unable to reliably estimate the amount of additional net loss or the range of net loss that is reasonably possible.
In March 2015, Berkshire issued €3.0 billion in senior unsecured notes consisting of €750 million of 0.75% senior notes
due in 2023, €1.25 billion of 1.125% senior notes due in 2027 and €1.0 billion of 1.625% senior notes due in 2035. In February
2015, $1.7 billion of Berkshire senior notes matured.
58
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued)
(15) Notes payable and other borrowings (Continued)
Weighted December 31,
Average
Interest Rate 2015 2014
BHE subsidiary debt represents amounts issued pursuant to separate financing agreements. Substantially all of the assets of
certain BHE subsidiaries are, or may be, pledged or encumbered to support or otherwise secure debt. These borrowing
arrangements generally contain various covenants including, but not limited to, leverage ratios, interest coverage ratios and debt
service coverage ratios. In 2015, BHE subsidiaries issued approximately $2.5 billion of debt with maturity dates ranging from
2016 to 2046 and a weighted average interest rate of 3.4%.
BNSF’s borrowings are primarily senior unsecured debentures. In 2015, BNSF issued $2.5 billion of senior unsecured
debentures consisting of $850 million of debentures due in 2025 and $1.65 billion of debentures due in 2045, with interest rates
ranging from 3.0% to 4.7%. In 2015, BNSF also issued $500 million of amortizing debt with a final maturity date of 2028,
which is secured with locomotives. As of December 31, 2015, BNSF and BHE and their subsidiaries were in compliance with
all applicable debt covenants. Berkshire does not guarantee any debt, borrowings or lines of credit of BNSF, BHE or their
subsidiaries.
In 2015, BHFC issued $1.0 billion of senior notes consisting of $400 million floating rate senior notes that mature in 2017
and $600 million floating rate senior notes that mature in 2018. The borrowings of BHFC, a wholly owned finance subsidiary of
Berkshire, are fully and unconditionally guaranteed by Berkshire.
As of December 31, 2015, our subsidiaries had unused lines of credit and commercial paper capacity aggregating
approximately $7.7 billion to support short-term borrowing programs and provide additional liquidity. Such unused lines of
credit included about $5.0 billion related to BHE and its subsidiaries. In addition to BHFC’s borrowings, Berkshire guarantees
other subsidiary borrowings, aggregating approximately $3.3 billion at December 31, 2015. Generally, Berkshire’s guarantee of
a subsidiary’s debt obligation is an absolute, unconditional and irrevocable guarantee for the full and prompt payment when due
of all present and future payment obligations.
Principal repayments expected during each of the next five years are as follows (in millions).
59
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued)
(16) Income taxes
The liabilities for income taxes reflected in our Consolidated Balance Sheets are as follows (in millions).
December 31,
2015 2014
Currently payable (receivable) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ (643) $ (1,346)
Deferred . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63,199 61,936
Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 570 645
$63,126 $61,235
The tax effects of temporary differences that give rise to significant portions of deferred tax assets and deferred tax
liabilities are shown below (in millions).
December 31,
2015 2014
We have not established deferred income taxes on accumulated undistributed earnings of certain foreign subsidiaries. Such
earnings were approximately $10.4 billion as of December 31, 2015 and are expected to remain reinvested indefinitely. Upon
distribution as dividends or otherwise, such amounts would be subject to taxation in the U.S. and potentially in other countries.
However, U.S. income tax liabilities would be offset, in whole or in part, by allowable tax credits deriving from income taxes
previously paid to foreign jurisdictions. Further, repatriation of all earnings of foreign subsidiaries would be impracticable to the
extent that such earnings represent capital needed to support normal business operations in those jurisdictions. As a result, we
currently believe that any incremental U.S. income tax liabilities arising from the repatriation of distributable earnings of
foreign subsidiaries would not be material.
Income tax expense reflected in our Consolidated Statements of Earnings for each of the three years ending December 31,
2015 is as follows (in millions).
60
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued)
(16) Income taxes (Continued)
Income tax expense is reconciled to hypothetical amounts computed at the U.S. federal statutory rate for each of the three
years ending December 31, 2015 in the table below (in millions).
We file income tax returns in the United States and in state, local and foreign jurisdictions. We are under examination by
the taxing authorities in many of these jurisdictions. We have settled tax return liabilities with U.S. federal taxing authorities for
years before 2010. The IRS continues to audit Berkshire’s consolidated U.S. federal income tax returns for the 2010 and 2011
tax years and has commenced an examination of the 2012 and 2013 tax years. We are also under audit or subject to audit with
respect to income taxes in many state and foreign jurisdictions. It is reasonably possible that certain of our income tax
examinations will be settled within the next twelve months. We currently do not believe that the outcome of unresolved issues
or claims is likely to be material to our Consolidated Financial Statements.
At December 31, 2015 and 2014, net unrecognized tax benefits were $570 million and $645 million, respectively. Included
in the balance at December 31, 2015, were $435 million of tax positions that, if recognized, would impact the effective tax rate.
The remaining balance in net unrecognized tax benefits principally relates to tax positions where the ultimate recognition is
highly certain but there is uncertainty about the timing of such recognition. Because of the impact of deferred tax accounting,
the differences in recognition periods would not affect the annual effective tax rate but would accelerate the payment of cash to
the taxing authority to an earlier period. As of December 31, 2015, we do not expect any material changes to the estimated
amount of unrecognized tax benefits in the next twelve months.
Combined shareholders’ equity of U.S. based insurance subsidiaries determined pursuant to statutory accounting rules
(Surplus as Regards Policyholders) was approximately $124 billion at December 31, 2015 and $129 billion at December 31,
2014. Statutory surplus differs from the corresponding amount determined on the basis of GAAP due to differences in
accounting for certain assets and liabilities. For instance, deferred charges reinsurance assumed, deferred policy acquisition
costs, unrealized gains on certain investments and related deferred income taxes are recognized for GAAP but not for statutory
reporting purposes. In addition, the carrying values of certain assets, such as goodwill and non-insurance entities owned by our
insurance subsidiaries, are not fully recognized for statutory reporting purposes.
61
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued)
(18) Fair value measurements
Our financial assets and liabilities are summarized below as of December 31, 2015 and December 31, 2014 with fair values
shown according to the fair value hierarchy (in millions). The carrying values of cash and cash equivalents, receivables and
accounts payable, accruals and other liabilities are considered to be reasonable estimates of their fair values.
Quoted Significant Other Significant
Carrying Prices Observable Inputs Unobservable Inputs
Value Fair Value (Level 1) (Level 2) (Level 3)
62
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued)
(18) Fair value measurements (Continued)
The fair values of substantially all of our financial instruments were measured using market or income approaches.
Considerable judgment may be required in interpreting market data used to develop the estimates of fair value. Accordingly, the
fair values presented are not necessarily indicative of the amounts that could be realized in an actual current market exchange.
The use of alternative market assumptions and/or estimation methodologies may have a material effect on the estimated fair
value. The hierarchy for measuring fair value consists of Levels 1 through 3, which are described below.
Level 1 – Inputs represent unadjusted quoted prices for identical assets or liabilities exchanged in active markets.
Level 2 – Inputs include directly or indirectly observable inputs (other than Level 1 inputs) such as quoted prices for
similar assets or liabilities exchanged in active or inactive markets; quoted prices for identical assets or liabilities
exchanged in inactive markets; other inputs that may be considered in fair value determinations of the assets or liabilities,
such as interest rates and yield curves, volatilities, prepayment speeds, loss severities, credit risks and default rates; and
inputs that are derived principally from or corroborated by observable market data by correlation or other means. Pricing
evaluations generally reflect discounted expected future cash flows, which incorporate yield curves for instruments with
similar characteristics, such as credit ratings, estimated durations and yields for other instruments of the issuer or entities in
the same industry sector.
Level 3 – Inputs include unobservable inputs used in the measurement of assets and liabilities. Management is required to
use its own assumptions regarding unobservable inputs because there is little, if any, market activity in the assets or
liabilities and it may be unable to corroborate the related observable inputs. Unobservable inputs require management to
make certain projections and assumptions about the information that would be used by market participants in valuing assets
or liabilities.
Reconciliations of assets and liabilities measured and carried at fair value on a recurring basis with the use of significant
unobservable inputs (Level 3) for each of the three years ending December 31, 2015 follow (in millions).
Investments
Investments in equity Net
in fixed securities derivative
maturity and other contract
securities investments liabilities
63
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued)
(18) Fair value measurements (Continued)
Gains and losses included in earnings are included as components of investment gains/losses, derivative gains/losses and
other revenues, as appropriate and are primarily related to changes in the values of derivative contracts and settlement
transactions. Gains and losses included in other comprehensive income are primarily the net change in unrealized appreciation
of investments and the reclassification of investment appreciation in net earnings, as appropriate in our Consolidated Statements
of Comprehensive Income. In 2013, we transferred the fair value measurements for the GS warrants and GE warrants out of
Level 3 because we concluded that the unobservable inputs were no longer significant.
Quantitative information as of December 31, 2015, with respect to assets and liabilities measured and carried at fair value
on a recurring basis with the use of significant unobservable inputs (Level 3) follows (in millions).
Other investments:
Preferred stocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $14,822 Discounted cash flow Expected duration 6 years
Discount for transferability
restrictions and subordination 134 basis points
Warrants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6,580 Warrant pricing model Discount for transferability
and hedging restrictions 7%
Net derivative liabilities:
Equity index put options . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,552 Option pricing model Volatility 21%
Credit default . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284 Discounted cash flow Credit spreads 31 basis points
Other investments consist of perpetual preferred stocks and common stock warrants that we acquired in a few relatively
large private placement transactions. These investments are subject to contractual restrictions on transferability and may contain
provisions that prevent us from economically hedging our investments. In applying discounted estimated cash flow techniques
in valuing the perpetual preferred stocks, we made assumptions regarding the expected durations of the investments, as the
issuers may have the right to redeem or convert these investments. We also made estimates regarding the impact of
subordination, as the preferred stocks have a lower priority in liquidation than debt instruments of the issuers. In valuing the
common stock warrants, we used a warrant valuation model. While most of the inputs to the model are observable, we are
subject to the aforementioned contractual restrictions and we have applied discounts with respect to such restrictions. Increases
or decreases to these inputs would result in decreases or increases to the fair values of the investments.
Our equity index put option and credit default contracts are illiquid and contain contract terms that are not standard in
derivatives markets. For example, we are not required to post collateral under most of our contracts and many contracts have
relatively long durations. For these and other reasons, we classified these contracts as Level 3. The methods we use to value
these contracts are those that we believe market participants would use in determining exchange prices with respect to our
contracts.
We value equity index put option contracts based on the Black-Scholes option valuation model. Inputs to this model
include index price, contract duration and dividend and interest rate inputs (including a Berkshire non-performance input) which
are observable. However, we believe that the valuation of long-duration options using any model is inherently subjective and,
given the lack of observable transactions and prices, acceptable values may be subject to wide ranges. Expected volatility inputs
represent our expectations, which consider the remaining duration of each contract and assume that the contracts will remain
outstanding until the expiration dates without offsetting transactions occurring in the interim. Increases or decreases in the
volatility inputs will produce increases or decreases in the fair values of the liabilities.
64
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued)
(19) Common stock
Changes in Berkshire’s issued, treasury and outstanding common stock during the three years ending December 31, 2015
are shown in the table below.
Balance at December 31, 2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904,528 (9,573) 894,955 1,123,393,956 (1,408,484) 1,121,985,472
Conversions of Class A common stock to Class
B common stock and exercises of
replacement stock options issued in a
business acquisition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (35,912) — (35,912) 55,381,136 — 55,381,136
Balance at December 31, 2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868,616 (9,573) 859,043 1,178,775,092 (1,408,484) 1,177,366,608
Conversions of Class A common stock to Class
B common stock and exercises of
replacement stock options issued in a
business acquisition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (30,597) — (30,597) 47,490,158 — 47,490,158
Treasury shares acquired . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — (2,107) (2,107) — (1,278) (1,278)
Balance at December 31, 2014 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838,019 (11,680) 826,339 1,226,265,250 (1,409,762) 1,224,855,488
Conversions of Class A common stock to
Class B common stock and exercises of
replacement stock options issued in a
business acquisition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (17,917) — (17,917) 27,601,348 — 27,601,348
Balance at December 31, 2015 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820,102 (11,680) 808,422 1,253,866,598 (1,409,762) 1,252,456,836
Each Class A common share is entitled to one vote per share. Class B common stock possesses dividend and distribution
rights equal to one-fifteen-hundredth (1/1,500) of such rights of Class A common stock. Each Class B common share possesses
voting rights equivalent to one-ten-thousandth (1/10,000) of the voting rights of a Class A share. Unless otherwise required
under Delaware General Corporation Law, Class A and Class B common shares vote as a single class. Each share of Class A
common stock is convertible, at the option of the holder, into 1,500 shares of Class B common stock. Class B common stock is
not convertible into Class A common stock. On an equivalent Class A common stock basis, there were 1,643,393 shares
outstanding as of December 31, 2015 and 1,642,909 shares outstanding as of December 31, 2014. In addition to our common
stock, 1,000,000 shares of preferred stock are authorized, but none are issued.
Berkshire’s Board of Directors (“Berkshire’s Board”) has approved a common stock repurchase program under which
Berkshire may repurchase its Class A and Class B shares at prices no higher than a 20% premium over the book value of the
shares. Berkshire may repurchase shares in the open market or through privately negotiated transactions. Berkshire’s Board
authorization does not specify a maximum number of shares to be repurchased. However, repurchases will not be made if they
would reduce Berkshire’s consolidated cash and cash equivalent holdings below $20 billion. The repurchase program does not
obligate Berkshire to repurchase any dollar amount or number of Class A or Class B shares and there is no expiration date to the
program. There were no share repurchases under the program over the last three years. However, on June 30, 2014, we
exchanged approximately 1.62 million shares of GHC common stock for WPLG, whose assets included 2,107 shares of
Berkshire Hathaway Class A Common Stock and 1,278 shares of Class B Common Stock, which are included in treasury stock.
65
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued)
(20) Accumulated other comprehensive income
A summary of the net changes in after-tax accumulated other comprehensive income attributable to Berkshire Hathaway
shareholders and significant amounts reclassified out of accumulated other comprehensive income for each of the three years
ending December 31, 2015 follows (in millions).
Prior service
and actuarial Accumulated
Unrealized Foreign gains/losses of other
appreciation of currency defined benefit comprehensive
investments, net translation pension plans Other income
66
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued)
(21) Pension plans
Several of our subsidiaries sponsor defined benefit pension plans covering certain employees. Benefits under the plans are
generally based on years of service and compensation, although benefits under certain plans are based on years of service and
fixed benefit rates. Our subsidiaries may make contributions to the plans to meet regulatory requirements and may also make
discretionary contributions.
The components of net periodic pension expense for each of the three years ending December 31, 2015 are as follows (in
millions).
The accumulated benefit obligation is the actuarial present value of benefits earned based on service and compensation
prior to the valuation date. The projected benefit obligation (“PBO”) is the actuarial present value of benefits earned based upon
service and compensation prior to the valuation date and, if applicable, includes assumptions regarding future compensation
levels. Benefit obligations under qualified U.S. defined benefit pension plans are funded through assets held in trusts. Pension
obligations under certain non-U.S. plans and non-qualified U.S. plans are unfunded and the aggregate PBO of such plans was
approximately $1.2 billion as of December 31, 2015 and 2014.
Reconciliations of the changes in plan assets and PBOs related to BHE’s pension plans and all other pension plans for each
of the two years ending December 31, 2015 are in the following tables (in millions). The costs of pension plans covering
employees of certain regulated subsidiaries of BHE are generally recoverable through the regulated rate making process.
2015 2014
BHE All other Consolidated BHE All other Consolidated
Benefit obligations
Accumulated benefit obligation at end of year . . . . . . . . . . . . $4,797 $ 9,264 $14,061 $5,105 $ 9,522 $14,627
PBO at beginning of year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $5,398 $10,489 $15,887 $5,006 $ 8,892 $13,898
Service cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 209 266 60 170 230
Interest cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200 391 591 226 403 629
Benefits paid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (316) (518) (834) (310) (524) (834)
Business acquisitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — 165 165 — 11 11
Actuarial (gains) or losses and other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (263) (553) (816) 416 1,537 1,953
PBO at end of year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $5,076 $10,183 $15,259 $5,398 $10,489 $15,887
Plan assets
Plan assets at beginning of year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $5,086 $ 8,280 $13,366 $4,888 $ 8,389 $13,277
Employer contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 116 206 126 122 248
Benefits paid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (316) (518) (834) (310) (524) (834)
Actual return on plan assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 80 111 525 338 863
Business acquisitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — 167 167 — 1 1
Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (126) (59) (185) (143) (46) (189)
Plan assets at end of year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $4,765 $ 8,066 $12,831 $5,086 $ 8,280 $13,366
Funded status – net liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 311 $ 2,117 $ 2,428 $ 312 $ 2,209 $ 2,521
67
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued)
(21) Pension plans (Continued)
Weighted average interest rate assumptions used in determining projected benefit obligations and net periodic pension
expense were as follows.
2015 2014 2013
Benefits payments expected over the next ten years are as follows (in millions): 2016 – $919; 2017 – $879; 2018 – $889;
2019 – $901; 2020 – $912; and 2021 to 2025 – $4,560. Sponsoring subsidiaries expect to contribute $199 million to defined
benefit pension plans in 2016.
The funded status of our pension plans is recognized in our Consolidated Balance Sheets as follows (in millions).
December 31,
2015 2014
Fair value measurements of plan assets as of December 31, 2015 and 2014 follow (in millions).
Significant
Other Significant
Observable Unobservable
Total Quoted Prices Inputs Inputs
Fair Value (Level 1) (Level 2) (Level 3)
Refer to Note 18 for a discussion of the three levels in the hierarchy of fair values. Plan assets measured at fair value with
significant unobservable inputs (Level 3) for the years ending December 31, 2015 and 2014 consisted primarily of real estate
and limited partnership interests. Plan assets are generally invested with the long-term objective of producing earnings to
adequately cover expected benefit obligations, while assuming a prudent level of risk. Allocations may change as a result of
changing market conditions and investment opportunities. The expected rates of return on plan assets reflect subjective
assessments of expected invested asset returns over a period of several years. Generally, past investment returns are not given
significant consideration when establishing assumptions for expected long-term rates of return on plan assets. Actual experience
will differ from the assumed rates.
68
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued)
(21) Pension plans (Continued)
A reconciliation of the pre-tax accumulated other comprehensive income (loss) related to defined benefit pension plans for
each of the two years ending December 31, 2015 follows (in millions).
2015 2014
Several of our subsidiaries also sponsor defined contribution retirement plans, such as 401(k) or profit sharing plans.
Employee contributions are subject to regulatory limitations and the specific plan provisions. Several plans provide for
employer matching contributions up to levels specified in the plans and provide for additional discretionary contributions as
determined by management. Employer contributions expensed with respect to our defined contribution plans were $739 million,
$737 million and $690 million for the years ending December 31, 2015, 2014 and 2013, respectively.
We lease certain manufacturing, warehouse, retail and office facilities as well as certain equipment. Rent expense for all
operating leases was $1,516 million in 2015, $1,484 million in 2014 and $1,396 million in 2013. Future minimum rental
payments or operating leases having initial or remaining non-cancellable terms in excess of one year are as follows. Amounts
are in millions.
After
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2020 Total
Our subsidiaries regularly make commitments in the ordinary course of business to purchase goods and services used in
their businesses. The most significant of these relate to our railroad, utilities and energy businesses and our fractional aircraft
ownership business. As of December 31, 2015, future purchase commitments under such arrangements are expected to be paid
as follows: $12.2 billion in 2016, $4.8 billion in 2017, $3.8 billion in 2018, $3.1 billion in 2019, $2.3 billion in 2020 and $13.4
billion after 2020.
On August 8, 2015, Berkshire entered into a definitive agreement with Precision Castparts Corp. (“PCC”) to acquire all
outstanding PCC shares of common stock for $235 per share in cash. Following the receipt of shareholder approval and all
required regulatory approvals, the acquisition was completed on January 29, 2016. The aggregate consideration paid was
approximately $32.7 billion, which included the value of PCC shares already owned by Berkshire on August 8, 2015. We
funded the acquisition with a combination of existing cash balances and from the proceeds from a short-term credit facility.
PCC is a worldwide, diversified manufacturer of complex metal components and products. It serves the aerospace, power
and general industrial markets. PCC is a market leader in manufacturing complex structural investment castings and forged
components for aerospace markets, machined airframe components and highly engineered critical fasteners for aerospace
applications, and in manufacturing airfoil castings for the aerospace and industrial gas turbine markets. PCC also is a leading
producer of titanium and nickel superalloy melted and mill products for the aerospace, chemical processing, oil and gas and
pollution control industries, and manufactures extruded seamless pipe, fittings and forgings for power generation and oil and gas
applications.
69
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued)
(22) Contingencies and Commitments (Continued)
Given the proximity of the PCC acquisition date to the date these Consolidated Financial Statements were issued, it was
impracticable to provide an initial estimate of the fair values of identifiable assets acquired, liabilities assumed and residual
goodwill or proforma information. We expect to provide disclosures of preliminary fair values of identified assets acquired,
liabilities assumed and proforma information, if material, in our interim Consolidated Financial Statements for the period
ending March 31, 2016. We expect that goodwill arising from this acquisition will be considerable and that such goodwill will
not be amortizable for income tax purposes. PCC’s most recently published financial statements were for the six month period
ending September 27, 2015. For the trailing twelve months ending September 27, 2015, PCC’s consolidated revenues and net
earnings available to its shareholders were approximately $9.7 billion and $1.3 billion, respectively.
On January 8, 2016, Berkshire entered into a $10 billion revolving credit agreement, which expires January 6, 2017. The
agreement has a variable interest rate based on the Prime Rate, or a spread above either the Federal Funds Rate or LIBOR, at
Berkshire’s option. Borrowings under the credit agreement are unsecured and there are no materially restrictive covenants. In
connection with the completion of the PCC acquisition, Berkshire borrowed $10 billion under the credit agreement.
On November 13, 2014, Berkshire entered into a definitive agreement with The Procter & Gamble Company (“P&G”) to
acquire the Duracell business from P&G. Duracell is a leading manufacturer of high-performance alkaline batteries and is an
innovator in renewable power and wireless charging technologies. Pursuant to the agreement, we will receive a recapitalized
Duracell Company, which is expected to include approximately $1.7 billion in cash at closing, in exchange for shares of P&G
common stock currently held by Berkshire subsidiaries which had a fair value at December 31, 2015 of approximately $4.2
billion. The transaction is currently expected to close on February 29, 2016.
We own a 50% interest in a joint venture, Berkadia Commercial Mortgage LLC (“Berkadia”), with Leucadia National
Corporation (“Leucadia”) owning the other 50% interest. Berkadia is a servicer of commercial real estate loans in the U.S.,
performing primary, master and special servicing functions for U.S. government agency programs, commercial mortgage-
backed securities transactions, banks, insurance companies and other financial institutions. A significant source of funding for
Berkadia’s operations is through the issuance of commercial paper. Repayment of the commercial paper is supported by a $2.5
billion surety policy issued by a Berkshire insurance subsidiary. Leucadia has agreed to indemnify us for one-half of any losses
incurred under the policy. On December 31, 2015, the aggregate amount of Berkadia commercial paper outstanding was $2.47
billion.
Pursuant to the terms of shareholder agreements with noncontrolling shareholders in our less than wholly-owned
subsidiaries, we may be obligated to acquire their equity ownership interests. If we had acquired all outstanding noncontrolling
interests as of December 31, 2015, we estimate the cost would have been approximately $4.3 billion. However, the timing and
the amount of any such future payments that might be required are contingent on future actions of the noncontrolling owners.
In 2013, we acquired substantially all of the outstanding common stock of Marmon held by noncontrolling shareholders
and all of the common stock of IMC International Metalworking Companies B.V. held by the noncontrolling shareholders. The
aggregate consideration for such interests was approximately $3.5 billion, of which $2.3 billion was paid in 2013 and $1.2
billion was paid in 2014. These transactions were accounted for as acquisitions of noncontrolling interests. The differences
between the consideration paid and the carrying amounts of these noncontrolling interests were recorded as reductions in
Berkshire’s shareholders’ equity and aggregated approximately $1.8 billion in 2013.
70
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued)
(23) Business segment data
Our operating businesses include a large and diverse group of insurance, finance, manufacturing, service and retailing
businesses. Our reportable business segments are organized in a manner that reflects how management views those business
activities. Certain businesses have been grouped together for segment reporting based upon similar products or product lines,
marketing, selling and distribution characteristics, even though those business units are operated under separate local
management.
The tabular information that follows shows data of reportable segments reconciled to amounts reflected in our
Consolidated Financial Statements. Intersegment transactions are not eliminated from segment results when management
considers those transactions in assessing the results of the respective segments. Furthermore, our management does not consider
investment and derivative gains/losses or amortization of purchase accounting adjustments related to Berkshire’s acquisitions in
assessing the performance of reporting units. Collectively, these items are included in reconciliations of segment amounts to
consolidated amounts.
71
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued)
(23) Business segment data (Continued)
A disaggregation of our consolidated data for each of the three most recent years is presented in the tables which follow (in
millions).
Operating Businesses:
Insurance group:
Underwriting:
GEICO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 22,718 $ 20,496 $ 18,572 $ 460 $ 1,159 $ 1,127
General Re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,975 6,264 5,984 132 277 283
Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group . . . . . . . . 7,207 10,116 8,786 421 606 1,294
Berkshire Hathaway Primary Group . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,394 4,377 3,342 824 626 385
Investment income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,562 4,370 4,735 4,550 4,357 4,713
Total insurance group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45,856 45,623 41,419 6,387 7,025 7,802
BNSF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21,967 23,239 22,014 6,775 6,169 5,928
Berkshire Hathaway Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18,231 17,614 12,743 2,851 2,711 1,806
Manufacturing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36,136 36,773 34,258 4,893 4,811 4,205
McLane Company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48,223 46,640 45,930 502 435 486
Service and retailing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23,466 14,276 13,284 1,720 1,546 1,469
Finance and financial products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6,964 6,526 6,110 2,086 1,839 1,564
200,843 190,691 175,758 25,214 24,536 23,260
Reconciliation to consolidated amount:
Investment and derivative gains/losses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10,347 4,081 6,673 10,347 4,081 6,673
Interest expense, not allocated to segments . . . . . . . . . . — — — (374) (313) (303)
Investments in Kraft Heinz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 730 694 146 730 694 146
Corporate, eliminations and other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (1,099) (793) (427) (971) (893) (980)
$210,821 $194,673 $182,150 $34,946 $28,105 $28,796
Operating Businesses:
Insurance group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ — $ — $ — $ 1,475 $1,768 $2,083
BNSF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 833 729 2,527 2,300 2,135
Berkshire Hathaway Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,830 1,623 1,139 450 589 130
Manufacturing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 69 70 1,548 1,544 1,403
McLane Company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 14 12 195 169 178
Service and retailing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 11 21 651 576 557
Finance and financial products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 384 463 529 708 597 556
3,245 3,013 2,500 7,554 7,543 7,042
Reconciliation to consolidated amount:
Investment and derivative gains/losses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — — — 3,622 760 2,334
Interest expense, not allocated to segments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 374 313 303 (131) (110) (106)
Investments in Kraft Heinz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — — — (111) 41 51
Corporate, eliminations and other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (104) (73) (2) (402) (299) (370)
$3,515 $3,253 $2,801 $10,532 $7,935 $8,951
72
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued)
(23) Business segment data (Continued)
Capital expenditures Depreciation of tangible assets
2015 2014 2013 2015 2014 2013
Operating Businesses:
Insurance group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 115 $ 94 $ 89 $ 77 $ 69 $ 58
BNSF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,651 5,243 3,918 1,932 1,804 1,655
Berkshire Hathaway Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,876 6,555 4,307 2,451 2,177 1,577
Manufacturing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,292 1,324 1,037 938 943 1,061
McLane Company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 338 241 225 161 159 159
Service and retailing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 574 591 488 504 461 413
Finance and financial products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,236 1,137 1,023 610 602 495
$16,082 $15,185 $11,087 $6,673 $6,215 $5,418
Operating Businesses:
Insurance group:
GEICO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 1,471 $ 1,370 $ 48,291 $ 45,439 $ 39,568
General Re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13,527 13,527 26,478 28,692 29,956
Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance and Primary Groups . . . . . . . . . . 538 650 144,682 151,301 138,480
Total insurance group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15,536 15,547 219,451 225,432 208,004
BNSF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14,845 14,819 66,613 62,840 59,784
Berkshire Hathaway Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9,333 9,599 74,221 71,285 61,991
Manufacturing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14,833 14,818 34,141 34,509 34,100
McLane Company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 656 657 5,871 5,419 5,209
Service and retailing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6,163 3,937 16,299 11,303 10,051
Finance and financial products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,342 1,337 37,621 32,158 31,879
$62,708 $60,714 454,217 442,946 411,018
Reconciliation to consolidated amount:
Corporate and other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35,332 22,207 16,595
Goodwill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62,708 60,714 57,011
$552,257 $525,867 $484,624
Premiums written and earned by the property/casualty and life/health insurance businesses are summarized below (in
millions).
Property/Casualty Life/Health
2015 2014 2013 2015 2014 2013
Premiums Written:
Direct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $30,544 $27,541 $24,292 $ 821 $ 879 $ 931
Assumed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,049 9,889 7,339 5,187 5,030 5,437
Ceded . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (877) (839) (720) (57) (67) (69)
$36,716 $36,591 $30,911 $5,951 $5,842 $6,299
Premiums Earned:
Direct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $29,608 $26,389 $23,267 $ 821 $ 879 $ 931
Assumed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6,584 9,872 7,928 5,192 5,030 5,425
Ceded . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (854) (850) (797) (57) (67) (70)
$35,338 $35,411 $30,398 $5,956 $5,842 $6,286
73
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued)
(23) Business segment data (Continued)
Insurance premiums written by geographic region (based upon the domicile of the insured or reinsured) are summarized
below. Dollars are in millions.
Property/Casualty Life/Health
2015 2014 2013 2015 2014 2013
Consolidated sales and service revenues in 2015, 2014 and 2013 were $112.4 billion, $102.2 billion and $97.6 billion,
respectively. In 2015, approximately 87% of such revenues were attributable to the United States compared to approximately
85% in 2014 and 2013. The remainder of sales and service revenues were primarily in Europe, Canada and the Asia Pacific. In
each of the three years ending December 31, 2015, consolidated sales and service revenues included sales of approximately $13
billion to Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
Approximately 95% of our revenues in 2015 and 96% of our revenues in 2014 and 2013 from railroad, utilities and energy
businesses were in the United States. At December 31, 2015, approximately 89% of our consolidated net property, plant and
equipment was located in the United States with the remainder primarily in Europe and Canada.
2015
Revenues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $48,644 $51,368 $58,989 $51,820
Net earnings attributable to Berkshire shareholders * . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,164 4,013 9,428 5,478
Net earnings attributable to Berkshire shareholders per equivalent Class A common
share . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,143 2,442 5,737 3,333
2014
Revenues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $45,453 $49,762 $51,199 $48,259
Net earnings attributable to Berkshire shareholders * . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,705 6,395 4,617 4,155
Net earnings attributable to Berkshire shareholders per equivalent Class A common
share . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,862 3,889 2,811 2,529
* Includes investment gains/losses, other-than-temporary impairment losses on investments and derivative gains/losses.
Derivative gains/losses include significant amounts related to non-cash changes in the fair value of long-term contracts
arising from short-term changes in equity prices, interest rates and foreign currency rates, among other factors. After-tax
investment and derivative gains/losses for the periods presented above are as follows (in millions):
74
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
and Subsidiaries
Management’s Discussion and Analysis of
Financial Condition and Results of Operations
Results of Operations
Net earnings attributable to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders for each of the past three years are disaggregated in the table
that follows. Amounts are after deducting income taxes and exclude earnings attributable to noncontrolling interests. Amounts
are in millions.
2015 2014 2013
Through our subsidiaries, we engage in a number of diverse business activities. Our operating businesses are managed on
an unusually decentralized basis. There are essentially no centralized or integrated business functions (such as sales, marketing,
purchasing, legal or human resources) and there is minimal involvement by our corporate headquarters in the day-to-day
business activities of the operating businesses. Our senior corporate management team participates in and is ultimately
responsible for significant capital allocation decisions, investment activities and the selection of the Chief Executive to head
each of the operating businesses. It also is responsible for establishing and monitoring Berkshire’s corporate governance
practices, including, but not limited to, communicating the appropriate “tone at the top” messages to its employees and
associates, monitoring governance efforts, including those at the operating businesses, and participating in the resolution of
governance-related issues as needed. The business segment data (Note 23 to the accompanying Consolidated Financial
Statements) should be read in conjunction with this discussion.
Our insurance businesses generated after-tax earnings from underwriting of $1.2 billion in 2015, a decline of $530 million
from 2014, which reflected rising claim costs at GEICO and lower earnings from our reinsurers, partially offset by increased
earnings from our other primary insurance operations. In 2014, earnings from underwriting declined $303 million compared to
2013, which was primarily due to lower earnings from reinsurance.
Our railroad business generated a 9.8% increase in after-tax earnings in 2015 compared to 2014. Results in 2015 were
positively impacted by improved service levels and lower fuel costs. Railroad earnings increased 2.0% in 2014 compared to
2013, although earnings were negatively impacted by various service-related challenges during the year.
After-tax earnings of our utilities and energy businesses in 2015 increased 13.3% over 2014, which increased 28.0% over
2013. Earnings in 2015 and 2014 benefitted from the inclusion of newly-acquired businesses (AltaLink beginning in December
2014 and NV Energy beginning in December 2013) and higher earnings from several of our other energy businesses.
After-tax earnings of our manufacturing, service and retailing businesses in 2015 increased 4.8% in the aggregate over
2014. In 2015, the positive impacts of business acquisitions and higher earnings from our building products businesses were
partly offset by lower earnings from certain of our industrial products and service businesses. Earnings of our manufacturing,
service and retailing businesses in 2014 increased 15.2% over 2013, reflecting the impact of bolt-on business acquisitions,
earnings growth in certain operations and reductions in earnings attributable to noncontrolling interests.
After-tax investment and derivative gains/losses were approximately $6.7 billion in 2015, $3.3 billion in 2014 and $4.3
billion in 2013. In 2015, after-tax gains included a non-cash holding gain of approximately $4.4 billion that was realized in
connection with our investment in Kraft Heinz common stock. In 2014, after-tax gains included approximately $2.0 billion
related to the exchanges of Phillips 66 common stock and Graham Holdings Company common stock for a specified subsidiary
of each of those companies. After-tax investment gains in 2013 included gains associated with the fair value increases of certain
investment securities where unrealized gains or losses were reflected in periodic earnings. Derivative contracts contributed
after-tax gains of $633 million in 2015, $329 million in 2014 and $1.7 billion in 2013. We believe that investment and
derivative gains/losses are often meaningless in terms of understanding our reported results or evaluating our economic
performance. These gains and losses have caused and will likely continue to cause significant volatility in our periodic earnings.
75
Management’s Discussion and Analysis (Continued)
Insurance—Underwriting
We engage in both primary insurance and reinsurance of property/casualty, life and health risks. In primary insurance
activities, we assume defined portions of the risks of loss from persons or organizations that are directly subject to the risks. In
reinsurance activities, we assume defined portions of similar or dissimilar risks that other insurers or reinsurers have subjected
themselves to in their own insuring activities. Our insurance and reinsurance businesses are: (1) GEICO, (2) General Re,
(3) Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group (“BHRG”) and (4) Berkshire Hathaway Primary Group.
Our management views insurance businesses as possessing two distinct operations – underwriting and investing.
Underwriting decisions are the responsibility of the unit managers; investing decisions, with limited exceptions, are the
responsibility of Berkshire’s Chairman and CEO, Warren E. Buffett. Accordingly, we evaluate performance of underwriting
operations without any allocation of investment income or investment gains/losses.
The timing and amount of catastrophe losses can produce significant volatility in our periodic underwriting results,
particularly with respect to BHRG and General Re. We define pre-tax catastrophe losses in excess of $100 million from a single
event or series of related events as significant. In 2015, we recorded estimated losses of $136 million in connection with a
property loss event in China. In 2014, we did not incur any significant catastrophe losses. In 2013, we incurred pre-tax losses of
$436 million related to two catastrophe events in Europe. Our periodic underwriting results may be affected significantly by
changes in estimates for unpaid losses and loss adjustment expenses, including amounts established for occurrences in prior
years. Actual claim settlements and revised loss estimates will develop over time, which will likely differ from the liability
estimates recorded as of year-end (approximately $73.1 billion). Accordingly, the unpaid loss estimates recorded as of
December 31, 2015 may develop upward or downward in future periods, producing a corresponding decrease or increase to pre-
tax earnings.
Our periodic underwriting results may also include significant foreign currency transaction gains and losses arising from
the changes in the valuation of non-U.S. Dollar denominated reinsurance liabilities of our U.S. based insurance subsidiaries as a
result of foreign currency exchange rate fluctuations. Foreign currency exchange rates can be volatile and the resulting impact
on our underwriting earnings can be relatively significant.
A key marketing strategy of our insurance businesses is the maintenance of extraordinary capital strength. A measure of
capital strength is combined shareholders’ equity determined pursuant to statutory accounting rules (“Statutory Surplus”).
Statutory Surplus of our insurance businesses was approximately $124 billion at December 31, 2015. This superior capital
strength creates opportunities, especially with respect to reinsurance activities, to negotiate and enter into insurance and
reinsurance contracts specially designed to meet the unique needs of insurance and reinsurance buyers. Underwriting results
from our insurance businesses are summarized below. Amounts are in millions.
2015 2014 2013
76
Management’s Discussion and Analysis (Continued)
Insurance—Underwriting (Continued)
GEICO
GEICO writes private passenger automobile insurance, offering coverages to insureds in all 50 states and the District of
Columbia. GEICO’s policies are marketed mainly by direct response methods in which customers apply for coverage directly to
the company via the Internet or over the telephone. This is a significant element in our strategy to be a low-cost auto insurer. In
addition, we strive to provide excellent service to customers, with the goal of establishing long-term customer relationships.
GEICO’s underwriting results are summarized below. Dollars are in millions.
2015 2014 2013
Amount % Amount % Amount %
Premiums written and earned in 2015 increased 11.5% and 10.8%, respectively, over 2014. The increases in premiums
reflected growth in voluntary auto policies-in-force (5.4%) and rate increases. Voluntary auto new business sales in 2015
exceeded 2014 by about 1%. In 2015, our voluntary auto policies-in-force grew by 707,000 policies.
In 2015, pre-tax underwriting gains were $460 million compared to $1.16 billion in 2014 and $1.13 billion in 2013.
Throughout 2015, we experienced increases in claims frequencies and severities across all of our major coverages. Our loss
ratio, which is the ratio of losses and loss adjustment expenses incurred to premiums earned, in 2015 was 82.1% compared to
77.7% in 2014. As a result, we continue to implement premium rate increases where necessary.
Losses and loss adjustment expenses incurred in 2015 increased $2.7 billion (17.1%) over 2014. Claims frequencies (claim
counts per exposure unit) in 2015 increased in all major coverages over 2014, including property damage and collision
coverages (three to five percent range), bodily injury coverage (four to six percent range) and personal injury protection (PIP)
coverage (one to two percent range). Average claims severities were also higher in 2015 for property damage and collision
coverages (four to five percent range), bodily injury coverage (six to seven percent range) and PIP coverage (two to four percent
range). We believe that increases in miles driven, repair costs (parts and labor) and medical costs, as well as weather conditions
contributed to the increases in frequencies and severities.
Underwriting expenses in 2015 increased 5.8% to $3.6 billion. The largest components of underwriting expenses are
employee-related costs (salaries and benefits) and advertising. During 2015, these costs grew at a slower rate than premiums. As
a result, our expense ratio (the ratio of underwriting expenses to premiums earned) in 2015 declined 0.7 percentage points
compared to 2014.
Premiums written and earned in 2014 increased $1.88 billion (9.8%) and $1.92 billion (10.4%), respectively, compared to
premiums written and earned in 2013. These increases were attributable to an increase in voluntary auto policies-in-force of
6.6% and increased average premium per policy. Voluntary auto new business sales increased about 1.8% in 2014 as compared
to 2013 and voluntary auto policies-in-force increased 821,000 policies during 2014.
Losses and loss adjustment expenses incurred in 2014 increased $1.7 billion (11.7%) to $15.9 billion. In 2014, claims
frequencies for property damage and collision coverages increased in the three to four percent range over 2013, partially due to
more severe winter weather in the first quarter of 2014. Claims frequencies for bodily injury coverage increased about one
percent, while frequencies for personal injury protection decreased three to four percent. Physical damage severities increased
one to two percent in 2014 and bodily injury severities decreased in the one to two percent range from severities in 2013.
Overall, personal injury protection severities were relatively unchanged although we experienced relatively large, but offsetting,
changes by jurisdiction.
Underwriting expenses in 2014 increased $223 million (7.0%) to $3.4 billion. The increase reflected the increased policy
acquisition costs to generate the growth in policies-in-force and increased other operating expenses.
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Management’s Discussion and Analysis (Continued)
Insurance—Underwriting (Continued)
General Re
General Re conducts a reinsurance business offering property and casualty and life and health coverages to clients
worldwide. We write property and casualty reinsurance in North America on a direct basis through General Reinsurance
Corporation and internationally through Germany-based General Reinsurance AG and other wholly-owned affiliates. Property
and casualty reinsurance is also written in broker markets through Faraday in London. Life and health reinsurance is written in
North America through General Re Life Corporation and internationally through General Reinsurance AG. General Re strives to
generate underwriting profits in essentially all of its product lines. Our management does not evaluate underwriting performance
based upon market share and our underwriters are instructed to reject inadequately priced risks. In 2015, we changed the
allocation of certain underwriting expenses related to a global systems implementation project among our business units. There
was no impact on consolidated results. Prior year amounts were reclassified to conform to current year presentations. General
Re’s underwriting results are summarized in the following table. Amounts are in millions.
Premiums written Premiums earned Pre-tax underwriting gain (loss)
2015 2014 2013 2015 2014 2013 2015 2014 2013
Property/casualty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $2,725 $3,257 $2,972 $2,805 $3,103 $3,007 $150 $204 $171
Life/health . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,165 3,161 2,991 3,170 3,161 2,977 (18) 73 112
$5,890 $6,418 $5,963 $5,975 $6,264 $5,984 $132 $277 $283
Property/casualty
In 2015, property/casualty premiums written declined $532 million (16%), while premiums earned decreased $298 million
(10%), as compared to 2014. Adjusting for changes in foreign currency exchange rates, premiums written and earned in 2015
declined 9% and 2%, respectively, compared to 2014. Our premium volume declined in both the direct and broker markets
worldwide. Insurance industry capacity remains high and price competition in most property/casualty reinsurance markets
persists. We continue to decline business when we believe prices are inadequate. However, we remain prepared to write
substantially more business when more appropriate prices can be attained relative to the risks assumed.
Our property/casualty business produced pre-tax underwriting gains of $150 million in 2015 and $204 million in 2014. In
2015, our property business generated pre-tax underwriting gains of $289 million compared to $445 million in 2014. The
comparative decrease in underwriting gains from property business was driven by an increase in the current accident year loss
ratio, reflecting a relative increase in reported losses. The property results in 2015 included estimated incurred losses of $50
million from an explosion in Tianjin, China. There were no significant catastrophe losses during 2014. Our property business
results in both years benefitted from reductions of estimated losses for prior years’ exposures. The timing and magnitude of
catastrophe and large individual losses can produce significant volatility in our periodic underwriting results.
In 2015 and 2014, our casualty/workers’ compensation business produced pre-tax underwriting losses of $139 million and
$241 million, respectively. Underwriting results in each year included net losses on current year business, driven by our prudent
reserving philosophy that reflects the inherent uncertainty in long-tail exposures. These losses were partially offset by gains
from reductions of estimated losses on prior years’ business of $150 million in 2015 and $123 million in 2014, which were net
of recurring charges for discount accretion on workers’ compensation liabilities and deferred charge amortization on retroactive
reinsurance contracts. Casualty losses tend to be long-tail and it should not be assumed that favorable loss experience in a given
period means that the ultimate liability estimates currently established will continue to develop favorably.
Premiums written and earned in 2014 increased $285 million (9.6%) and $96 million (3.2%), respectively, compared to
2013. Adjusting for changes in foreign currency exchange rates, premiums written and earned in 2014 increased 8% and 3%,
respectively, reflecting increases in treaty participations as well as growth in our facultative and primary casualty businesses.
Our property/casualty business produced pre-tax underwriting gains of $204 million in 2014 and $171 million in 2013. Our
property business generated pre-tax underwriting gains of $445 million in 2014 and $140 million in 2013. Underwriting results in
2013 included $400 million of catastrophe losses primarily attributable to a hailstorm ($280 million) and floods ($120 million) in
Europe. In both 2014 and 2013, property results benefitted from reductions of estimated ultimate losses for prior years’ exposures. The
favorable development in each period was primarily attributable to lower than expected losses reported from ceding companies.
Our casualty/workers’ compensation business produced pre-tax underwriting losses of $241 million in 2014 and
underwriting gains of $31 million in 2013. Casualty/workers’ compensation underwriting results included gains from reductions
of estimated ultimate losses on prior years’ business of $123 million in 2014 and $354 million in 2013, which included charges
related to discount accretion on workers’ compensation liabilities and amortization of deferred charges pertaining to retroactive
reinsurance contracts.
78
Management’s Discussion and Analysis (Continued)
Insurance—Underwriting (Continued)
General Re (Continued)
Life/health
In 2015, life/health premiums written and earned were relatively unchanged from 2014. However, adjusting for changes in
foreign currency exchange rates, premiums earned in 2015 increased $266 million (8%) as compared to 2014. In 2015, life
business increased across a number of non-U.S. markets, particularly in Canada and Asia.
Our life/health business produced aggregate pre-tax underwriting losses in 2015 of $18 million compared to gains of $73
million in 2014. In 2015, our North American long-term care business generated increased underwriting losses of $77 million
compared to 2014 due primarily to increased reserves from estimated premium deficiencies. Also we experienced higher
frequency and severity of losses in North American individual life business, which were partially offset by increased
underwriting gains from international life business.
Premiums written and earned in 2014 increased $170 million (5.7%) and $184 million (6.2%), respectively, compared to
2013. Adjusting for changes in foreign currency exchange rates, premiums earned in 2014 increased 8% over 2013, which
primarily derived from life business across a number of non-U.S. markets.
Our life/health operations produced pre-tax underwriting gains of $73 million in 2014 compared to $112 million in 2013.
In 2014, we increased benefit liabilities by approximately $50 million as a result of reducing discount rates for certain European
long-term care and disability business. In 2014, we also experienced increased frequency and severity of claims in Australian
disability business.
Property/casualty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $4,702 $ 4,097 $4,768 $4,416 $ 4,064 $5,149 $ 944 $1,411 $1,248
Retroactive reinsurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3,371 328 5 3,371 328 (469) (632) (333)
Life and annuity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,786 2,681 3,309 2,786 2,681 3,309 (54) (173) 379
$7,493 $10,149 $8,405 $7,207 $10,116 $8,786 $ 421 $ 606 $1,294
Property/casualty
Premiums written and earned in 2015 increased $605 million (15%) and $352 million (9%), respectively, compared to
2014. These increases were primarily attributable to a new 10-year, 20% quota-share contract with Insurance Australia Group
Ltd. (“IAG”), which became effective on July 1, 2015. Partially offsetting this increase were premium declines in property
catastrophe, property quota-share and London facilities business. Our premium volume is generally constrained for most
property/casualty coverages, and for property catastrophe coverages in particular as rates, in our view, are inadequate. However,
we have the capacity and desire to write substantially more business when appropriate pricing can be obtained.
The property/casualty business generated pre-tax underwriting gains in 2015 of $944 million compared to $1.4 billion in
2014. In 2015, we incurred losses of $86 million from an explosion in Tianjin, China. There were no significant catastrophe
losses in 2014. Underwriting results in 2015 included comparatively lower gains from property catastrophe reinsurance and the
run off of prior years’ business.
Premiums earned in 2014 were $4.1 billion, a decline of $1.1 billion (21%) compared to 2013. Premiums earned in 2014
with respect to a 20% quota-share contract with Swiss Reinsurance Company Ltd. (“Swiss Re”) declined $1.3 billion from
premiums earned in 2013. The Swiss Re contract expired at the end of 2012 and is in run-off. Property catastrophe premiums
earned in 2014 declined $113 million (14%) as compared to 2013. These declines were partially offset by increased premiums
earned from property quota-share contracts.
79
Management’s Discussion and Analysis (Continued)
Insurance—Underwriting (Continued)
Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group (Continued)
Property/casualty (Continued)
The property/casualty business generated pre-tax underwriting gains of $1.4 billion in 2014 compared to $1.2 billion in
2013. In each year, the underwriting gains were primarily attributable to our property business, which benefitted from relatively
low loss ratios, and the favorable run-off of prior years’ business, including the Swiss Re contract.
Retroactive reinsurance
Retroactive reinsurance policies provide indemnification of losses and loss adjustment expenses with respect to past loss
events, and related claims are generally expected to be paid over long periods of time. At the inception of a contract, deferred
charge assets are recorded for the excess, if any, of the estimated ultimate losses payable over the premiums earned. Deferred
charges are subsequently amortized over the estimated claims payment period based on estimates of the timing and amount of
future loss payments. The original estimates of the timing and amount of loss payments are periodically analyzed against actual
experience and revised based on an actuarial evaluation of the expected remaining losses. Amortization charges and deferred
charge adjustments resulting from changes to the estimated timing and amount of future loss payments are included in periodic
earnings.
Premiums earned from retroactive reinsurance contracts were not significant in 2015 or 2013, whereas premiums in 2014
included $3 billion from a single contract with Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (“LMIC”). Under the LMIC agreement, we
reinsure substantially all of LMIC’s unpaid losses and allocated loss adjustment expense liabilities related to (a) asbestos and
environmental claims from policies incepting prior to 2005 and (b) workers’ compensation claims occurrences arising prior to
January 1, 2014, in excess of an aggregate retention of approximately $12.5 billion and subject to an aggregate limit of $6.5
billion.
Pre-tax underwriting losses from retroactive reinsurance policies were $469 million in 2015, $632 million in 2014 and
$333 million in 2013. In each year, underwriting losses included deferred charge amortization and foreign currency transaction
gains or losses associated with foreign currency denominated reinsurance liabilities of U.S.-based subsidiaries. In 2015 and
2014, foreign currency exchange rate movements produced decreases in liabilities, generating pre-tax gains of $150 million and
$273 million, respectively. Foreign currency gains/losses were not significant in 2013.
Retroactive reinsurance underwriting results were also impacted during the last two years by increases in the estimated
ultimate liabilities for contracts written in prior years, partially offset by increases in related deferred charge balances. The
liability increases were approximately $550 million in 2015 and $825 million in 2014. In each year, the ultimate liability
increases primarily related to asbestos and environmental exposures. We also re-estimated the timing of future payments of such
liabilities as part of our actuarial analysis. The increase in ultimate liabilities, net of related deferred charge adjustments,
produced incremental pre-tax underwriting losses of approximately $90 million in 2015 and $450 million in 2014.
Gross unpaid losses from retroactive reinsurance contracts were approximately $23.7 billion at December 31, 2015, $24.3
billion at December 31, 2014 and $17.7 billion at December 31, 2013. Unamortized deferred charges related to BHRG’s
retroactive reinsurance contracts were approximately $7.6 billion at December 31, 2015, $7.7 billion at December 31, 2014 and
$4.25 billion at December 31, 2013. As of December 31, 2015, over 80% of unpaid losses and deferred charge balances were
concentrated in six contracts.
Life and annuity
BHRG’s life and annuity underwriting results are summarized as follows (in millions).
Premiums earned Pre-tax underwriting gain (loss)
2015 2014 2013 2015 2014 2013
Periodic payment annuity premiums in 2015 increased 16% compared with 2014, while premiums earned in 2014 declined
22% compared to 2013. Premiums earned in 2015 and 2013 included approximately $425 million and $470 million,
respectively, from a single reinsurance contract written in each year. Annuity payments under these contracts are not expected to
begin for several years.
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Management’s Discussion and Analysis (Continued)
Insurance—Underwriting (Continued)
Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group (Continued)
Life and annuity (Continued)
Periodic payment annuity contracts generated pre-tax underwriting losses of $202 million in 2015, $197 million in 2014
and $213 million in 2013. Generally, premiums under these contracts are received at inception and payments are made over
time, often extending for decades. No gains or losses are recognized in earnings at the inception of these contracts. Periodic
underwriting losses are primarily attributable to the recurring impact of the accretion of discounted annuity liabilities.
Underwriting results in each year also included pre-tax gains from foreign currency exchange rate changes of $103 million in
2015 and $102 million in 2014 and pre-tax losses of $62 million in 2013. These gains/losses reflected changes in foreign
currency denominated liabilities due to foreign currency exchange rate movements. Aggregate annuity liabilities were
approximately $8.7 billion at December 31, 2015, $7.1 billion at December 31, 2014 and $5.7 billion at December 31, 2013.
In 2015, life reinsurance premiums declined $74 million (5%) compared to 2014. Pre-tax underwriting losses from the life
reinsurance business in 2015 were $45 million, which included losses in connection with business that was terminated. In 2013,
life reinsurance underwriting results included a one-time pre-tax gain of $255 million related to an amendment to a reinsurance
contract, which resulted in the reversal of premiums earned, which was more than offset by the reversal of life benefits incurred
and the release of the liabilities for future losses.
Our variable annuity business consists of contracts that provide guarantees on closed blocks of variable annuity business
written by other insurers. Our initial contract was written in 2013 and produced premiums earned of $1.7 billion. The
underwriting gains in each of the past three years reflect the impacts of changes in equity markets and interest rates which
generally resulted in decreases in estimated liabilities for guaranteed minimum benefits. Periodic results from these contracts
can be volatile reflecting changes in investment market conditions, which impact the underlying insured exposures.
Insurance—Investment Income
A summary of net investment income generated by investments held by our insurance operations follows. Amounts are in
millions.
2015 2014 2013
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Management’s Discussion and Analysis (Continued)
Insurance—Investment Income (Continued)
Interest earned in 2015 declined $121 million (12%) from 2014, which declined $684 million (40%) from 2013. The
reductions reflected the maturities and dispositions of fixed maturity securities with higher interest rates, including $4.4 billion
par amount of Wrigley 11.45% subordinated notes as a result of the repurchase of those notes by the issuer in 2013. We also
continue to hold significant cash and cash equivalent balances earning very low yields. We believe that maintaining ample
liquidity is paramount and we insist on safety over yield with respect to such balances.
Dividend income in 2015 increased $314 million (9%) versus 2014, while dividend income in 2014 exceeded 2013 by
$328 million (11%). The increases reflected higher dividend rates for certain of our equity holdings and increased investment
levels. Beginning in 2015, dividend income included income from our investment in Restaurant Brands International, Inc. 9%
Preferred Stock ($3 billion stated value), which was acquired in December 2014.
Invested assets of our insurance businesses derive from shareholder capital, including reinvested earnings, and from net
liabilities under insurance contracts or “float.” The major components of float are unpaid losses, life, annuity and health benefit
liabilities, unearned premiums and other liabilities to policyholders less premium and reinsurance receivables, deferred charges
assumed under retroactive reinsurance contracts and deferred policy acquisition costs. Float approximated $88 billion at
December 31, 2015, $84 billion at December 31, 2014 and $77 billion at December 31, 2013. The cost of float was negative
over the last three years as our insurance business generated pre-tax underwriting gains in each year.
A summary of cash and investments held in our insurance businesses as of December 31, 2015 and 2014 follows. Other
investments include investments in The Dow Chemical Company, Bank of America Corporation and Restaurant Brands
International, Inc. See Note 5 to the accompanying Consolidated Financial Statements. Amounts are in millions.
December 31,
2015 2014
Fixed maturity investments as of December 31, 2015 were as follows. Amounts are in millions.
U.S. government obligations are rated AA+ or Aaa by the major rating agencies and approximately 87% of all state,
municipal and political subdivisions, foreign government obligations and mortgage-backed securities were rated AA or higher.
Non-investment grade securities represent securities that are rated below BBB- or Baa3. Foreign government securities include
obligations issued or unconditionally guaranteed by national or provincial government entities.
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Management’s Discussion and Analysis (Continued)
Railroad (“Burlington Northern Santa Fe”)
Burlington Northern Santa Fe, LLC (“BNSF”) operates one of the largest railroad systems in North America. BNSF
operates approximately 32,500 route miles of track in 28 states and also operates in three Canadian provinces. BNSF’s major
business groups are classified by type of product shipped and include consumer products, coal, industrial products and
agricultural products. Earnings of BNSF are summarized below (in millions).
2015 2014 2013
Consolidated revenues during 2015 were approximately $22.0 billion, a decrease of $1.3 billion (5%), compared to 2014.
Pre-tax earnings in 2015 were $6.8 billion, an increase of $606 million (10%) over 2014. Results in 2015 benefitted from
significantly improved operating performance compared to substandard service during 2014. Our system velocity and on-time
performance improved significantly in 2015. The operational improvements in 2015 reflected the capacity added in 2014 and
2015 through capital investments for line expansion, system improvement projects and additional equipment, other operational
initiatives and more favorable winter weather conditions. Our total volume in 2015 was approximately 10.3 million cars/units.
During the second half of 2015 and particularly in the fourth quarter, we experienced declining demand, especially in coal and
certain industrial products categories. If conditions persist, we anticipate that volumes for these categories in 2016 may decline
and our revenues and earnings may be lower than in 2015.
In 2015, the decrease in overall revenues reflected a 6% decline in average revenue per car/unit and a 0.1% decrease in
volume. The decrease in average revenue per car/unit in 2015 was attributable to a 55% decline in fuel surcharges ($1.6 billion)
versus 2014, primarily due to lower fuel prices. The impact of lower fuel surcharge revenues affected revenues of all product
lines.
In 2015, freight revenues from industrial products decreased 11% from 2014 to $5.6 billion. The decrease reflected lower
volumes for petroleum products, frac sand and steel products and lower average revenue per car/unit. With oil at low prices, we
expect that volumes in 2016 will weaken compared to 2015. Freight revenues from agricultural products in 2015 increased 2%
to approximately $4.2 billion as compared to revenues in 2014. The increase in 2015 was attributable to higher domestic grain
shipments and milo exports.
Freight revenues in 2015 from coal decreased 7% to $4.6 billion compared to 2014. The revenue decline was primarily due
to lower average rate per car. Coal volume increased 1% in 2015 primarily due to higher demand in the early part of the year as
customers restocked coal inventories. We currently believe that utility coal inventories are relatively high and there is increased
usage of other fuel sources in generating electricity. As a result, we expect lower coal volume in 2016.
Freight revenues from consumer products in 2015 were $6.6 billion, a decline of 6% from 2014. The revenue decline
reflected lower average revenue per car/unit, partially offset by volume increases of 1%. In the first quarter of 2015, we
experienced a decline in international intermodal volume attributable to diversions of freight from U.S. West Coast ports to
other import gateways as a result of the port productivity slow-down from port labor disruptions. Over the remainder of 2015,
we experienced increased volume, as port productivity improvements allowed the backlog to clear, and also from higher
demand.
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Management’s Discussion and Analysis (Continued)
Railroad (“Burlington Northern Santa Fe”) (Continued)
Operating expenses in 2015 were $14.3 billion, a decrease of $2 billion (12%) compared to 2014. In 2015, the ratio of
operating expenses to revenues declined 4.9 percentage points to 64.9% as compared to 2014. Compensation and benefits
expenses were relatively flat versus 2014. In response to weakening customer demand in the latter half of 2015, employment
levels were reduced. Fuel expenses in 2015 declined $1.8 billion (41%) compared to 2014, reflecting significantly lower
average fuel prices, improved efficiency and lower gross ton miles volume. In 2015, depreciation and amortization expense
decreased $122 million (6%) compared to 2014 as a result of lower capitalized software amortization expenses, partially offset
by increased depreciation expense attributable to increased levels of railroad assets in service.
Interest expense in 2015 was $928 million, an increase of $95 million (11%) compared to 2014. Interest expense in 2014
was $833 million, an increase of $104 million (14%) compared to 2013. BNSF funds its capital expenditures with cash flow
from operations and new debt issuances. In each period, the increased interest expense resulted from higher average outstanding
debt.
Consolidated revenues in 2014 were approximately $23.2 billion, representing an increase of $1.2 billion (5.6%) over
2013. The overall increase in revenues reflected a 1.8% increase in cars/units handled and a 3.5% increase in average revenue
per car/unit. In 2014, our combined volume was approximately 10.3 million cars/units.
Our rail operations were negatively affected by severe winter weather conditions during the first quarter of 2014,
particularly in the Northern U.S. service territory, and from various other service issues throughout 2014. These issues resulted
in slower average speeds on our system and negatively impacted volumes and revenues of each of our business groups. We
experienced improvement in operating performance and freight volumes over the fourth quarter of 2014.
Revenues from consumer products in 2014 were $7.0 billion, and were relatively unchanged from 2013. In 2014, unit
volume and average revenues per car were relatively flat versus 2013. In 2014, our international intermodal business volume
was negatively affected by congestion at U.S. West Coast ports. In 2014, revenues from industrial products increased $508
million (9%) to $6.2 billion. The increase was primarily due to increases in overall unit volume, and to a lesser extent, changes
in rates and product mix. Revenues from agricultural products in 2014 increased $584 million (16%) to approximately $4.2
billion. The increase was primarily attributable to increased volume, rates and product mix changes. Also, agricultural products
volume in 2013 was negatively affected by the drought conditions in 2012. In 2014, coal revenues of $5.0 billion were
essentially unchanged from 2013, as a 2% increase in year-to-date unit volume was offset by a 2% decline in average rates.
Operating expenses in 2014 were $16.2 billion, an increase of $880 million (6%) over 2013. A significant portion of this
increase was due to increased costs related to severe weather issues and service-related challenges. Compensation and benefits
expenses increased $372 million (8%) in 2014 as compared with 2013, primarily due to increased employment levels, and to a
lesser extent, wage inflation and higher overtime. Fuel expenses were relatively unchanged compared to 2013. The favorable
impact from lower average fuel prices was largely offset by higher volumes. Depreciation and amortization expense increased
$150 million (8%) as a result of additional assets in service. Equipment rents, materials and other expenses increased $209
million (12%) compared to 2013 as a result of higher crew transportation and other travel costs, and increased costs of utilities.
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Management’s Discussion and Analysis (Continued)
Utilities and Energy (“Berkshire Hathaway Energy Company”) (Continued)
The rates our regulated businesses charge customers for energy and services are based, in large part, on the costs of
business operations, including a return on capital, and are subject to regulatory approval. To the extent these operations are not
allowed to include such costs in the approved rates, operating results will be adversely affected. Revenues and earnings of BHE
are summarized below. Amounts are in millions.
Revenues Earnings
2015 2014 2013 2015 2014 2013
PacifiCorp
PacifiCorp operates a regulated utility business in portions of several Western states, including Utah, Oregon and
Wyoming. Revenues in 2015 declined $36 million (1%) compared to 2014. In 2015, wholesale and other revenues declined
$129 million, principally due to lower wholesale prices and volumes and lower renewable energy credit revenue, while retail
revenues increased compared to 2014, reflecting higher average rates partially offset by slightly lower loads.
In 2015, EBIT increased $16 million (2%) compared to 2014. In 2015, gross margins (operating revenues less cost of sales)
increased $109 million versus 2014, as energy costs declined more than revenues. In 2015, the increase in gross margins was
substantially offset by increased depreciation and amortization expense ($35 million) due to increased plant-in-service, lower
allowances for equity funds used during construction ($18 million) and the impact of the recognition in 2014 of expected
insurance recoveries on fire losses.
Revenues in 2014 were $5.3 billion, an increase of $100 million (2%) compared to revenues in 2013. In 2014, revenues
increased primarily due to higher retail rates and wholesale prices, partially offset by lower retail customer load. EBIT were
$1.0 billion, an increase of $28 million (3%) over 2013. The increase in EBIT reflected the impact of the increase in operating
revenues and the recognition of estimated insurance recoveries from a fire loss in 2014 (as compared to a reduction in 2013
EBIT from charges related to the fire), partially offset by increased energy costs and higher depreciation expense. The increase
in depreciation expense reflected the impact of changes in depreciation rates and higher plant-in-service, including a new
generation facility.
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Management’s Discussion and Analysis (Continued)
Utilities and Energy (“Berkshire Hathaway Energy Company”) (Continued)
MidAmerican Energy Company (Continued)
MEC’s EBIT in 2015 increased $16 million (5%) compared to 2014, reflecting an increase in gross margins ($97 million),
partially offset by increases in depreciation expense from new wind generation and other plant-in-service ($56 million), interest
expense ($17 million), and lower allowances for equity funds used during construction ($19 million). The increase in gross
margins derived primarily from the regulated electric business, which benefitted from the aforementioned changes in Iowa rates
and rate structure and lower fuel and purchased power costs.
Revenues in 2014 increased $365 million (11%) to $3.8 billion, reflecting increases from regulated natural gas ($172 million),
regulated electric ($55 million) and nonregulated revenues ($122 million). The increase in regulated natural gas revenues was
driven by higher per-unit natural gas costs, which are recovered from customers via adjustment clauses, and higher volume. The
increase in regulated electric revenues was primarily due to increased retail rates. The increase in nonregulated revenues was due to
higher natural gas and electricity prices and higher electricity volumes, partly offset by lower natural gas volumes. EBIT were $298
million in 2014, an increase of $68 million (30%) compared to 2013. The comparative increase in EBIT was primarily due to
increased earnings from the regulated electric business, reflecting the impact of higher revenues and lower depreciation and
amortization expense due to the impact of depreciation rate changes, partially offset by increased energy and operating costs.
NV Energy
BHE acquired NV Energy on December 19, 2013, and its results are included in our consolidated results beginning as of
that date. NV Energy operates electric and natural gas utilities in Nevada. Revenues and EBIT in 2015 were $3.4 billion and
$586 million, respectively, representing increases of $103 million (3%) and $37 million (7%), respectively, over 2014. The
increase in revenues was due primarily to higher retail electric revenues reflecting increased customers and higher loads. The
increase in EBIT was attributable to an increase in gross margins ($82 million) and lower interest expense ($22 million),
partially offset by increased depreciation and amortization ($31 million) and higher other operating expenses, including
increased energy efficiency costs. For the December 19 through December 31, 2013 period, NV Energy’s results reflected one-
time customer refunds, acquisition costs and other charges arising from the acquisition.
Northern Powergrid
Revenues in 2015 declined $143 million (11%) versus 2014, reflecting the adverse impact of the stronger U.S. Dollar ($90
million) and comparatively lower distribution revenues. The decline in distribution revenues reflected lower rates due mainly to
the new price control period effective April 1, 2015. In 2015, EBIT declined $67 million (13%) compared to 2014, reflecting the
adverse effects of the stronger U.S. Dollar and lower distribution revenues partially offset by lower interest expense ($13
million).
Revenues in 2014 increased $258 million (25%) and EBIT increased $165 million (46%) as compared to 2013. The
increases were due mainly to increased distribution revenues in 2014 from increased rates and favorable regulatory provisions
and from the impact of the weaker U.S. Dollar.
86
Management’s Discussion and Analysis (Continued)
Utilities and Energy (“Berkshire Hathaway Energy Company”) (Continued)
Other energy businesses (Continued)
Revenues and EBIT in 2014 from other energy businesses increased $372 million and $174 million, respectively, over
revenues and EBIT in 2013. The increases were primarily attributable to increased revenues from new solar facilities as
additional assets were placed in service and the acquisition of AltaLink on December 1, 2014.
Revenues of the real estate brokerage businesses increased $339 million (19%) in 2014 as compared to 2013. The increase
reflected the impact of revenues from acquired businesses, partially offset by lower revenues from existing operations, due to a
6% decline in closed units and lower franchise revenues. EBIT of $139 million in 2014 were unchanged from 2013 as the
increase in EBIT from acquired businesses was offset by lower EBIT from existing businesses and higher operating expenses.
BHE’s consolidated effective income tax rates were approximately 16% in 2015, 23% in 2014 and 7% in 2013. In each
year, BHE’s income tax rates reflect significant production tax credits from wind-powered electricity generation in the United
States. BHE’s effective rates in 2015 and 2013 included the impact of reductions in deferred income tax liabilities as a result of
enacted statutory income tax rate decreases in the United Kingdom and increased deferred state income tax benefits.
Revenues Earnings
2015 2014 2013 2015 2014 2013
Manufacturing
Our manufacturing group includes a variety of businesses that produce industrial, building and consumer products. Our industrial
products businesses include specialty chemicals (The Lubrizol Corporation), metal cutting tools/systems (IMC International
Metalworking Companies), equipment and systems for the livestock and agricultural industries (CTB International), and a variety of
industrial products for diverse markets (Marmon and Scott Fetzer). Our building products businesses include flooring (Shaw),
insulation, roofing and engineered products (Johns Manville), bricks and masonry products (Acme Building Brands), paint and
coatings (Benjamin Moore), and residential and commercial construction and engineering products and systems (MiTek). Our
87
Management’s Discussion and Analysis (Continued)
Manufacturing, Service and Retailing (Continued)
Manufacturing (Continued)
consumer products businesses include leisure vehicles (Forest River), six apparel and footwear operations (led by Fruit of the
Loom, which includes Russell athletic apparel and Vanity Fair Brands women’s intimate apparel), custom picture framing
products (Larson Juhl) and jewelry products (Richline). A summary of revenues and pre-tax earnings of our manufacturing
operations follows (in millions).
Revenues Pre-tax earnings
2015 2014 2013 2015 2014 2013
Aggregate revenues of our manufacturers were $36.1 billion in 2015, a decline of $637 million (2%) from 2014. Pre-tax
earnings from manufacturing activities were $4.9 billion in 2015, an increase of $82 million (2%) versus 2014. In 2015,
operating results of our industrial products and consumer products businesses were generally lower than earnings in 2014.
Earnings of our building products businesses were higher than in 2014.
Industrial products
Revenues in 2015 of our industrial products manufacturers declined $862 million (5%) versus 2014. The foreign currency
translation impact of a stronger U.S. Dollar produced $782 million of the comparative revenue decline. In addition, commodity
cost deflation in petroleum and metals used in certain of our products resulted in lower average selling prices, in particular for
specialty chemicals, metal cutting tools, copper wire and plumbing products. Certain of our businesses experienced slowing
customer demand over the last half of the year as the decline in oil prices and competitive pressures resulted in significantly
lower sales volumes to customers in or related to the oil and gas industry. The negative effect of foreign currency translation and
lower selling prices in 2015 was partially offset by the impact of bolt-on acquisitions by Lubrizol ($433 million).
Pre-tax earnings in 2015 of these businesses declined $165 million (5%) compared to 2014. The average pre-tax margin
rate was 17.9% in 2015 and 2014. The comparative declines in earnings in 2015 reflected the adverse impact of the stronger
U.S. Dollar, partially offset by earnings from bolt-on acquisitions, lower average commodity-based material costs, and actions
taken in response to the slowing sales volumes previously referenced. Such actions address cost structures and exiting lower
margin business. Our businesses expect soft market conditions in 2016 and expect to take additional actions as necessary, in
response to further slowdowns in customer demand.
Revenues in 2014 increased approximately $1.6 billion (10%) in comparison to 2013. The increase in revenues reflected
the impact of bolt-on acquisitions by Lubrizol and Marmon (approximately $1.3 billion). In 2014, we also experienced revenue
growth in several business markets, most notably for the metal cutting tools and at certain Marmon business units (commercial
trailer and aftermarket brake drum products and water treatment systems). These increases were substantially offset by revenue
declines from certain other Marmon business units due to lower copper prices and lower volumes in the electrical and plumbing
products.
Pre-tax earnings in 2014 increased $382 million (14%) over 2013 and average pre-tax margins were 17.9% in 2014 and
17.3% in 2013. The increase in earnings in 2014 was primarily due to the impact of bolt-on acquisitions ($213 million),
increased sales and cost savings and restructuring initiatives.
Building products
Revenues in 2015 of our building products manufacturers increased $192 million (2%) over 2014. In 2015, the revenue
increase reflected sales volume increases at Shaw, Johns Manville and MiTek, as well as the impact of bolt-on business
acquisitions. These revenue increases were partially offset by the adverse impact of foreign currency translation from a stronger
U.S. Dollar ($165 million). Pre-tax earnings increased $271 million (30%) compared to 2014. The overall increase in earnings
was primarily attributable to the aforementioned increases in revenues and lower average raw material and energy costs,
partially offset by the negative impact of foreign currency translation and increased restructuring charges. Most of the
comparative increases in earnings were generated by Shaw, Johns Manville and Benjamin Moore.
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Management’s Discussion and Analysis (Continued)
Manufacturing, Service and Retailing (Continued)
Building products (Continued)
Revenues in 2014 were approximately $10.1 billion, an increase of 5% over 2013. Johns Manville, Acme and MiTek
produced revenue increases, which were primarily due to higher sales volume, as well as from the impact of bolt-on acquisitions
($150 million). Shaw’s revenues in 2014 were relatively unchanged from 2013, reflecting the impact of the closure of the rugs
division in early 2014 and lower carpet sales, offset by higher sales of hard surface flooring products. Pre-tax earnings of the
building products businesses increased 6% in 2014 as compared to 2013. With the exception of Shaw, our building products
businesses generated increased earnings compared to 2013. Shaw’s earnings were lower due to comparatively higher raw
material costs.
Consumer products
Revenues of our consumer products manufacturers were approximately $9.1 billion in 2015, relatively unchanged from
2014. In 2015, Forest River’s revenues increased $217 million (6%) over 2014, due to a 4% increase in unit sales and increased
average prices. Apparel revenues declined $157 million (4%) compared to 2014. In 2015, the decline in apparel revenues was
attributable to generally lower sales volumes compared to 2014 and the negative impact of foreign currency translation as a
result of a stronger U.S. Dollar ($113 million).
Pre-tax earnings declined $24 million in 2015 (3%) compared to 2014. The decline was primarily due to a pre-tax loss in
2015 from the disposition of an unprofitable operation within Fruit of the Loom and lower earnings from our footwear
businesses, partially offset by higher earnings from Forest River.
Revenues were $9.0 billion in 2014, an increase of $474 million (6%) compared to 2013. The increase was driven by a
14% increase in Forest River’s revenues due to increased unit sales. Pre-tax earnings were $756 million in 2014, an increase of
$174 million (30%) compared to 2013. The increase was primarily due to higher earnings from apparel businesses, and to a
lesser extent, Forest River. Operating results of our apparel businesses benefitted from restructuring initiatives undertaken
beginning in 2013, which included discontinuing unprofitable business, as well as from comparatively lower manufacturing and
pension costs. The increase in Forest River’s earnings reflected the aforementioned increase in unit sales and lower unit
manufacturing costs.
Service
Our service businesses offer fractional ownership programs for general aviation aircraft (NetJets) and high technology
training to operators of aircraft (FlightSafety). We also distribute electronic components (TTI) and provide electronic
distribution services of corporate news, multimedia and regulatory filings (Business Wire). We franchise and service quick
service restaurants (Dairy Queen) and publish newspapers and other publications (Buffalo News and the BH Media Group). In
June 2014, we acquired a television station operating in Miami, Florida (WPLG) and in December 2014, we acquired a third
party logistics services business that primarily serves the petroleum and chemical industries (Charter Brokerage).
Revenues in 2015 increased $347 million (3.5%) as compared to 2014. The increase in revenues included a 5% increase in
NetJets’ revenues and the impact of the acquisitions of Charter Brokerage and WPLG, partly offset by lower revenues from our
newspapers. The increase in NetJets’ revenues was attributable to a 50% increase in aircraft sales, partially offset by lower
operations revenue due primarily to lower fuel cost recoveries ($189 million) and unfavorable foreign currency effects ($105
million).
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Management’s Discussion and Analysis (Continued)
Manufacturing, Service and Retailing (Continued)
Service (Continued)
Pre-tax earnings in 2015 declined $46 million compared to 2014. Earnings in 2015 were favorably impacted by the WPLG
and Charter Brokerage acquisitions, which were more than offset by lower earnings from NetJets. Earnings declined at NetJets
as the impact of increased aircraft sales margins was more than offset by increased personnel, aircraft subcontracting and
maintenance expenses. A portion of the increase in personnel costs pertained to lump-sum payments made in connection with a
collective bargaining agreement reached with our pilots in the fourth quarter.
Revenues in 2014 increased $858 million (9.5%) over 2013. The increase was primarily attributable to comparative
increases generated by NetJets, FlightSafety and TTI. The revenue increase at NetJets reflected increased flight hours as well as
increased fractional aircraft sales. The revenue increase at TTI was driven by higher unit volume and, to a lesser extent, by bolt-
on acquisitions. The revenue increase at FlightSafety was primarily due to increased simulator training hours.
Pre-tax earnings in 2014 increased $109 million (10%) versus 2013, and was primarily attributable to the aforementioned
increases in revenues. In addition, NetJets business benefitted from comparatively lower aircraft impairment and restructuring
charges and financing expenses, partially offset by higher depreciation expense, maintenance costs and subcontracted flight
expenses.
Retailing
Our retailing businesses include four distinct home furnishings retailing businesses (Nebraska Furniture Mart, R.C. Willey,
Star Furniture and Jordan’s), which sell furniture, appliances, flooring and electronics. In the first quarter of 2015, we acquired
The Van Tuyl Group (now named Berkshire Hathaway Automotive or “BHA”) which included 81 auto dealerships located in 10
states. BHA sells new and pre-owned automobiles and offers repair and other related services and products, and includes two
related insurance businesses, two auto auctions and a distributor of automotive fluid maintenance products.
Our other retailing businesses include three jewelry retailing businesses (Borsheims, Helzberg and Ben Bridge), See’s
Candies, which makes and sells confectionary products through its retail stores and quantity order centers, Pampered Chef, a
direct seller of high quality kitchen tools and Oriental Trading Company, a direct retailer of party supplies, school supplies and
toys and novelties. On April 30, 2015, we also acquired Detlev Louis Motorrad (“Louis”), a retailer of motorcycle accessories
based in Germany.
Revenues of our retailing businesses in 2015 increased approximately $8.8 billion as compared to 2014. The increase
reflected the impact of the BHA and Louis acquisitions, which contributed revenues of approximately $8.3 billion. Revenues of
our home furnishings retailers in 2015 increased $572 million (24%) over 2014, driven by Nebraska Furniture Mart, which
opened a new store in March of 2015, and from increases at R.C. Willey and Jordan’s. Retailing earnings increased $220
million in 2015 (64%) compared to 2014. The increase was primarily due to the impact of the BHA and Louis acquisitions.
Revenues in 2014 increased $134 million (3%), while pre-tax earnings declined $32 million (8.5%) compared to 2013. The
earnings decline in 2014 was primarily attributable to lower earnings from Nebraska Furniture Mart, due primarily to start-up
costs related to its new store, and Pampered Chef, due to a decline in sales.
McLane Company
McLane operates a wholesale distribution business that provides grocery and non-food consumer products to retailers and
convenience stores (“grocery unit”) and to restaurants (“foodservice unit”). McLane also operates businesses that are wholesale
distributors of distilled spirits, wine and beer (“beverage unit”). The grocery and foodservice units are marked by high sales
volume and very low profit margins and have several significant customers, including Wal-Mart, 7-Eleven and Yum! Brands. A
curtailment of purchasing by any of its significant customers could have a significant adverse impact on McLane’s periodic
revenues and earnings.
Revenues in 2015 increased $1.6 billion (3%) over 2014, reflecting revenue increases in the foodservice unit (6%),
beverage unit (8%) and grocery unit (2%). Pre-tax earnings in 2015 increased $67 million (15%) versus 2014. Pre-tax earnings
in 2015 included a gain of $19 million from the sale of a subsidiary and otherwise benefitted from lower fuel and trucking costs.
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Management’s Discussion and Analysis (Continued)
Manufacturing, Service and Retailing (Continued)
McLane Company (Continued)
Revenues in 2014 increased $710 million (1.5%) compared to 2013, primarily due to revenue increases in the foodservice
unit (7%) and beverage unit (11%). Pre-tax earnings in 2014 declined $51 million (10.5%) from 2013. Earnings in 2013
included a pre-tax gain of $24 million from the sale of a logistics business. Before the impact of this gain, earnings decreased
6% compared to 2013. The decline reflected slightly higher earnings from the grocery unit and beverage unit, which were more
than offset by lower earnings from the foodservice unit. In 2014, our foodservice unit experienced higher processing costs and
higher other operating costs which more than offset the increase in revenues.
Finance and Financial Products
Our finance and financial products businesses include manufactured housing and finance (Clayton Homes), transportation
equipment manufacturing and leasing businesses (UTLX and XTRA, and together, “transportation equipment leasing”), as well
as other leasing and financing activities. UTLX manufactures, owns and leases railcars and intermodal tank cars, and also owns
and leases cranes, while XTRA owns and leases over-the-road trailers. A summary of revenues and earnings from our finance
and financial products businesses follows. Amounts are in millions.
Revenues Earnings
2015 2014 2013 2015 2014 2013
Manufactured housing and finance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $3,576 $3,310 $3,199 $ 706 $ 558 $ 416
Transportation equipment leasing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,540 2,427 2,180 909 827 704
Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 789 731 471 454 444
$6,964 $6,526 $6,110
Pre-tax earnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,086 1,839 1,564
Income taxes and noncontrolling interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 708 596 556
$1,378 $1,243 $1,008
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Management’s Discussion and Analysis (Continued)
Finance and Financial Products (Continued)
Transportation equipment leasing (Continued)
Revenues and pre-tax earnings in 2014 from our transportation equipment leasing businesses were $2.4 billion and $827
million, respectively, which exceeded revenues and pre-tax earnings in 2013 by 11% and 17%, respectively. The earnings
increase reflected a 9% increase in aggregate lease revenues, primarily due to increased units on lease and higher lease rates for
railcars.
Other
Other earnings from finance activities include CORT furniture leasing, our share of the earnings of a commercial mortgage
servicing business (“Berkadia”) in which we own a 50% joint venture interest, and interest and dividends from a portfolio of
investments. In 2015, the increase in other earnings compared to 2014 reflected increased earnings from investment securities
and CORT, partially offset by lower earnings from Berkadia. In addition, other earnings includes income from interest rate
spreads charged to Clayton Homes on borrowings by a Berkshire financing subsidiary that are used to fund installment loans
made by Clayton Homes and debt guarantee fees charged to NetJets. Corresponding expenses are included in Clayton Homes’
and NetJets’ results. Guarantee fees and interest rate spreads charged to Clayton Homes and NetJets were $63 million in 2015,
$70 million in 2014, and $89 million in 2013.
Investment gains/losses
Investment gains/losses arise primarily from the sale, redemption or exchange of investments or when investments are
carried at fair value with the periodic changes in fair values recorded in earnings. The timing of gains or losses can have a
material effect on periodic earnings. Investment gains and losses included in earnings usually have minimal impact on the
periodic changes in our consolidated shareholders’ equity since most of our investments are recorded at fair value with the
unrealized gains and losses included in shareholders’ equity as a component of accumulated other comprehensive income.
We believe the amount of investment gains/losses included in earnings in any given period typically has little analytical or
predictive value. Our decisions to sell securities are not motivated by the impact that the resulting gains or losses will have on
our reported earnings. Although we do not consider investment gains and losses in a given period as necessarily meaningful or
useful in evaluating periodic earnings, we are providing information to explain the nature of such gains and losses when
reflected in earnings.
Pre-tax investment gains in 2015 included non-cash holding gains related to our investment in Kraft Heinz of $6.8 billion,
as well as net gains from dispositions of equity and fixed maturity securities of approximately $2.5 billion. In connection with
its acquisition of Kraft Foods on July 2, 2015, Kraft Heinz issued new shares of its common stock in exchange for the
outstanding shares of Kraft Foods common stock, thus reducing Berkshire’s ownership interest in Kraft Heinz by approximately
50%. Under the equity method of accounting, such transactions are treated by the investor as if it sold a portion of its interests.
For additional information see Note 6 to our Consolidated Financial Statements.
Pre-tax investment gains in 2014 were $4.3 billion, which included gains of approximately $2.1 billion realized in
connection with the exchanges of common stock of Phillips 66 and Graham Holdings Company for 100% of the common stock
of a specified subsidiary of each of those companies. Each exchange transaction was structured as a tax-free reorganization
under the Internal Revenue Code. As a result, no income taxes are payable on the excess of the fair value of the businesses
received over the tax-basis of the common stock of Phillips 66 and Graham Holdings Company exchanged.
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Management’s Discussion and Analysis (Continued)
Investment and Derivative Gains/Losses (Continued)
Investment gains/losses (Continued)
Pre-tax investment gains/losses in 2013 were $4.3 billion and included approximately $2.1 billion related to our
investments in General Electric and Goldman Sachs common stock warrants and Wrigley subordinated notes. Beginning in
2013, the unrealized gains or losses associated with the warrants were included in earnings. These warrants were exercised in
October 2013 on a cashless basis in exchange for shares of General Electric and Goldman Sachs common stock with an
aggregate value of approximately $2.4 billion. The Wrigley subordinated notes were repurchased for cash of $5.08 billion,
resulting in a pre-tax investment gain of $680 million.
Derivative gains/losses
Derivative gains/losses primarily represent the changes in fair value of our credit default and equity index put option
contracts. Periodic changes in the fair values of these contracts are reflected in earnings and can be significant, reflecting the
volatility of underlying credit and equity markets.
In 2015, equity index put option contracts produced pre-tax gains of approximately $1.0 billion, which were primarily
attributable to the impact of a stronger U.S. Dollar and shorter remaining durations. As of December 31, 2015, the intrinsic
value of these contracts was approximately $1.1 billion and the fair value of our recorded liabilities was approximately $3.55
billion. Our ultimate payment obligations, if any, under our equity index put option contracts will be determined as of the
contract expiration dates, which begin in 2018, and will be based on the intrinsic value, as defined under the contracts. We have
made no loss payments to date.
Our remaining credit default contract produced a pre-tax loss in 2015 of $34 million. The loss represents an increase in the
estimated fair value of our recorded liabilities during the period, reflecting changes in credit spreads, interest rates and
remaining durations of the underlying exposures. There were no loss payments over the three years ending December 31, 2015.
In 2014, derivative contracts produced pre-tax gains of $506 million. The change in the fair value of our credit default
contract during 2014 produced a pre-tax gain of $397 million, and was attributable to lower credit spreads. Equity index put
option contracts produced pre-tax gains of $108 million in 2014. Such gains reflected the favorable impact of foreign currency
exchange rate changes and generally higher index values, partially offset by the negative impact of lower interest rate
assumptions.
In 2013, derivative contracts generated pre-tax gains of $2.6 billion, including gains of $2.8 billion from equity index put
option contracts and a loss of $213 million from our credit default contract. The gains from equity index put option contracts
were due to changes in fair values of the contracts as a result of overall higher equity index values, favorable currency
movements and modestly higher interest rate assumptions. The credit default contract loss was primarily attributable to wider
credit spreads.
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Management’s Discussion and Analysis (Continued)
Other
Other earnings includes corporate income (including income from our investments in Kraft Heinz) and expenses and
income taxes not allocated to operating businesses. Our investments in Kraft Heinz generated earnings before allocated
corporate taxes of $730 million in 2015, $694 million in 2014 and $146 million in 2013, which included significant dividends
received on our Preferred Stock investment and equity method earnings on our common stock investment. Also included in
other earnings are amortization of fair value adjustments made in connection with several prior business acquisitions (primarily
related to the amortization of identifiable intangible assets) and corporate interest expense. These two charges (after-tax)
aggregated $708 million in 2015, $682 million in 2014 and $514 million in 2013.
Financial Condition
Our balance sheet continues to reflect significant liquidity and a strong capital base. Our consolidated shareholders’ equity
at December 31, 2015 was $255.6 billion, an increase of $15.4 billion since December 31, 2014. Net earnings attributable to
Berkshire shareholders in 2015 were $24.1 billion, which was partially offset by approximately $8.8 billion of net losses in
other comprehensive income primarily related to changes in unrealized investment appreciation and the impact of foreign
currency translation.
At December 31, 2015, insurance and other businesses held cash and cash equivalents of $61.2 billion, and investments
(excluding our investments in Kraft Heinz) of $152.2 billion. We used cash of approximately $4.9 billion in 2015 to fund
business acquisitions. On July 1, 2015, Berkshire used cash of approximately $5.3 billion to acquire additional shares of Kraft
Heinz common stock.
In 2015, Berkshire Hathaway parent company issued €3.0 billion in senior unsecured notes consisting of €750 million of
0.75% senior notes due in 2023, €1.25 billion of 1.125% senior notes due in 2027 and €1.0 billion of 1.625% senior notes due in
2035. During 2015, parent company senior notes of $1.7 billion matured and were repaid. Over the next twelve months, $1.05
billion of parent company senior notes will mature, including $300 million that matured in February 2016. Our various
insurance and non-insurance businesses continued to generate significant cash flows from operations.
On January 29, 2016 we completed our acquisition of Precision Castparts Corp. (“PCC”). At that time, we acquired all
outstanding PCC shares of common stock, other than the shares already owned (about 2.7 million shares or 1.96%), for
aggregate consideration of approximately $32 billion. We funded the acquisition with a combination of cash on hand and $10
billion borrowed under a new 364-day revolving credit agreement. See Note 22 to the accompanying Consolidated Financial
Statements. We currently expect to issue new term debt in 2016 and use the proceeds to repay the revolving credit loan.
Berkshire’s Board of Directors has authorized Berkshire to repurchase its Class A and Class B common shares at prices no
higher than a 20% premium over the book value of the shares. Berkshire may repurchase shares at management’s discretion and
there is no obligation to repurchase any shares. The program is expected to continue indefinitely. Repurchases will not be made
if they would reduce Berkshire’s consolidated cash and cash equivalent holdings below $20 billion. Financial strength and
redundant liquidity will always be of paramount importance at Berkshire. There were no share repurchases under the program in
2015.
Our railroad, utilities and energy businesses (conducted by BNSF and BHE) maintain very large investments in capital
assets (property, plant and equipment) and will regularly make significant capital expenditures in the normal course of business.
In 2015, aggregate capital expenditures of these businesses were approximately $11.6 billion, including $5.9 billion by BHE and
$5.7 billion by BNSF. BNSF and BHE forecast additional aggregate capital expenditures of approximately $8.7 billion in 2016.
Future capital expenditures are expected to be funded from cash flows from operations and debt issuances.
94
Management’s Discussion and Analysis (Continued)
Financial Condition (Continued)
In 2015, BNSF issued $2.5 billion of senior unsecured debentures, consisting of $850 million of debentures due in 2025
and $1.65 billion of debentures due in 2045. In 2015, BNSF also issued $500 million of amortizing debt with a final maturity
date of 2028, which is secured with locomotives. BNSF’s outstanding debt was approximately $21.7 billion as of December 31,
2015, an increase of $2.5 billion from December 31, 2014. Outstanding borrowings of BHE and its subsidiaries, excluding
borrowings from Berkshire insurance subsidiaries, were approximately $36.0 billion as of December 31, 2015, relatively
unchanged from December 31, 2014. In 2015, BHE issued debt of approximately $2.5 billion which was substantially offset by
debt repayments and the effect of the stronger U.S. Dollar on its non-dollar denominated debt. BNSF and BHE aggregate debt
and capital lease obligations maturing within the next twelve months are $2.5 billion. Berkshire does not guarantee the
repayment of debt issued by BNSF, BHE or any of their subsidiaries and is not committed to provide capital to support BHE or
BNSF or any of their subsidiaries.
Finance and financial products assets were approximately $39.0 billion as of December 31, 2015, an increase of
approximately $5.5 billion since December 31, 2014, primarily due to an increase in cash and cash equivalents. Finance assets
also include loans and finance receivables, equity securities and various types of equipment and furniture held for lease,
including tank cars acquired from General Electric Company’s leasing unit on September 30, 2015 for approximately $1.0
billion.
Finance and financial products liabilities were approximately $17.2 billion as of December 31, 2015, a decrease of
approximately $1.7 billion compared to December 31, 2014. The reduction in liabilities during 2015 was primarily attributable
to a reduction in liabilities of derivative contracts and notes payable and other borrowings. Notes payable and other borrowings
were approximately $11.95 billion as of December 31, 2015, a decline of $779 million compared to year-end 2014. As of
December 31, 2015, notes payable included $10.7 billion of senior notes issued by Berkshire Hathaway Finance Corporation
(“BHFC”). In 2015, $1.5 billion of BHFC debt matured and BHFC issued $1.0 billion of new floating rate senior notes of which
$400 million mature in 2017 and $600 million mature in 2018. An additional $1.0 billion of BHFC senior notes mature within
the next twelve months. The proceeds from the BHFC senior notes are used to fund loans originated and acquired by Clayton
Homes. We currently intend to issue additional notes in 2016 through BHFC to fund a portion of assets held for lease of our rail
tank car business, UTLX Company. The amount of debt to be issued and related maturities will be determined based on
prevailing market conditions.
In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the “Reform Act”) was signed into law. The
Reform Act reshapes financial regulations in the United States by creating new regulators, regulating new markets and market
participants and providing new enforcement powers to regulators. Virtually all major areas of the Reform Act have been subject
to extensive rulemaking proceedings being conducted both jointly and independently by multiple regulatory agencies, some of
which have been completed and others that are expected to be finalized during the next several months. Although the Reform
Act may adversely affect some of our business activities, it is not currently expected to have a material impact on our
consolidated financial results or financial condition.
Contractual Obligations
We are party to contracts associated with ongoing business and financing activities, which will result in cash payments to
counterparties in future periods. Certain obligations are reflected in our Consolidated Balance Sheets, such as notes payable,
which require future payments on contractually specified dates and in fixed and determinable amounts. Other obligations pertain
to the acquisition of goods or services in the future, such as minimum rentals under operating leases and certain purchase
obligations, and are not currently reflected in the financial statements. Such obligations will be recognized in future periods as
the goods are delivered or services provided. Amounts due as of the balance sheet date for purchases where the goods and
services have been received and a liability incurred were not included in the following table to the extent that such amounts are
due within one year of the balance sheet date.
The timing and/or amount of the payments under certain contracts are contingent upon the outcome of future events.
Actual payments will likely vary, perhaps significantly, from estimates reflected in the table that follows. Most significantly, the
timing and amount of payments arising under property and casualty insurance contracts are contingent upon the outcome of
future claim settlement activities or events. In addition, obligations arising under life, annuity and health insurance benefits are
contingent on future premiums, allowances, mortality, morbidity, expenses and policy lapse rates, as applicable. These amounts
are based on the liability estimates reflected in our Consolidated Balance Sheet as of December 31, 2015. Although certain
insurance losses and loss adjustment expenses and life, annuity and health benefits are ceded under reinsurance contracts,
receivables recorded in the Consolidated Balance Sheet are not reflected in the table.
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Management’s Discussion and Analysis (Continued)
Contractual Obligations (Continued)
A summary of contractual obligations as of December 31, 2015 follows. Amounts are in millions.
Estimated payments due by period
Total 2016 2017-2018 2019-2020 After 2020
Notes payable and other borrowings, including interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . $133,247 $10,197 $21,009 $12,471 $ 89,570
Operating leases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8,738 1,347 2,199 1,680 3,512
Purchase obligations (1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39,582 12,152 8,583 5,386 13,461
Losses and loss adjustment expenses (2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74,723 15,229 16,448 9,472 33,574
Life, annuity and health insurance benefits (3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27,128 1,287 184 357 25,300
Other (4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43,604 32,258 470 1,758 9,118
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $327,022 $72,470 $48,893 $31,124 $174,535
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Management’s Discussion and Analysis (Continued)
Property and casualty losses (Continued)
Reinsurance receivables are recorded for losses recoverable from third parties and are estimated in a manner similar to
liabilities for insurance losses. Reinsurance receivables may ultimately prove to be uncollectible if the reinsurer is unable to
perform under the contract. Reinsurance contracts do not relieve the ceding company of its obligations to indemnify its own
policyholders. Additional information regarding those processes and techniques of our significant insurance businesses
(GEICO, General Re and BHRG) follows.
GEICO
GEICO predominantly writes private passenger auto insurance. GEICO’s gross unpaid losses and loss adjustment expense
liabilities as of December 31, 2015 were $13.7 billion compared to $12.2 billion as of December 31, 2014.
GEICO’s claim reserving methodologies produce liability estimates based upon the individual claims (or a “ground-up”
approach), which yield an aggregate estimate of the ultimate losses and loss adjustment expenses. The key assumptions affecting
our reserve estimates include projections of ultimate claim counts (“frequency”) and average loss per claim (“severity”).
We establish and evaluate unpaid loss liabilities using standard actuarial loss development methods and techniques. The
significant components of recorded liabilities at December 31, 2015 included $9.7 billion of reported average, case and case
development reserves and $4.0 billion of IBNR reserves. Our recorded liabilities are affected by the expected frequency and
average severity of claims. We use statistical techniques to analyze historical claims data and adjust when appropriate to reflect
perceived changes in loss patterns. We analyze claims data a number of ways, including by rated state, reporting date and
occurrence date.
We establish average reserves for reported new auto damage and liability claims prior to the development of an individual
case reserve. Average reserves represent our estimated liabilities for claims when our adjusters have insufficient time and
information to make specific claim estimates and for a large number of relatively minor physical damage claims that are paid
within a relatively short time after being reported. Aggregate average reserves are driven by the estimated average severity per
claim and the number of new claims opened.
We generally establish individual liability claim case loss reserve estimates once the facts and merits of each claim are
evaluated. Case reserves represent the amounts that in the judgment of the adjusters are reasonably expected to be paid to
completely settle the claim, including expenses. Individual case reserves are revised over time as information becomes available.
Approximately 92% of GEICO’s claim liabilities as of December 31, 2015 related to automobile liability coverages, of
which bodily injury (“BI”) coverage accounted for approximately 55%. Liability estimates for automobile liability coverages
(such as BI, uninsured motorists, and personal injury protection) are more uncertain due to the longer claim-tails, the greater
chance of protracted litigation, and the incompleteness of facts available at the time the case reserve is first established. Case
reserves alone insufficiently measure the ultimate claim cost, so we establish additional case development reserve estimates,
which are usually percentages of the case reserves. As of December 31, 2015, case development reserves averaged
approximately 25% of the case reserves. Case development factors are selected by a retrospective analysis of the overall
adequacy of historical case reserves and are reviewed and revised periodically.
For unreported claims, IBNR reserves are estimated by first projecting the ultimate number of claims expected (reported
and unreported) for each significant coverage. We use historical quarterly and monthly claim counts to develop age-to-age
projections of the ultimate counts by accident quarter. Reported claims are deducted from the ultimate claim projections to
produce an estimate of the number of unreported claims. The number of estimated unreported claims is then multiplied by an
estimate of the average cost per unreported claim to produce the IBNR reserve amount. Actuarial techniques are difficult to
apply reliably in certain situations, such as new or changing legal precedents, class action suits or recent catastrophes.
Consequently, we may establish supplemental IBNR reserves in these situations.
For significant coverages, we test the adequacy of the aggregate liabilities for unpaid losses using one or more actuarial
projections based on claim closure models, paid loss triangles and incurred loss triangles. Each type of projection analyzes loss
occurrence data for claims occurring in a given period and projects the ultimate cost.
Unpaid loss and loss adjustment expense liability estimates recorded at the end of 2014 developed downward by $147
million when reevaluated through December 31, 2015. The downward revisions produced a corresponding increase to pre-tax
earnings in 2015, which was approximately 0.7% of earned premiums and 1.3% of prior year-end recorded net liabilities. In
2014, estimated liabilities for pre-2014 occurrences developed downward $386 million or 3.6% of net liabilities at
December 31, 2013. Assumptions used to estimate liabilities at December 31, 2015 were modified as appropriate to reflect the
most recent frequency and severity results. Future development of recorded liabilities will depend on whether actual frequency
and severity are more or less than anticipated.
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Management’s Discussion and Analysis (Continued)
Property and casualty losses (Continued)
GEICO (Continued)
We believe it is reasonably possible that the average BI severities will change by at least one percentage point from the
severities used in establishing the recorded liabilities at December 31, 2015. We estimate that a one percentage point increase or
decrease in BI severities would produce a $205 million increase or decrease in recorded liabilities, with a corresponding
decrease or increase in pre-tax earnings. Many of the same economic forces that would likely cause BI severity to differ from
expectations would likely also cause severities for other injury coverages to differ in the same direction.
GEICO’s exposure to highly uncertain losses is believed to be limited to certain commercial excess umbrella policies
written during a period from 1981 to 1984. Remaining liabilities associated with such exposures are currently an immaterial
component of GEICO’s aggregate reserves (approximately 1.0%).
The nature and extent of loss information provided under many facultative (individual risk), per occurrence excess or
retroactive reinsurance contracts may not differ significantly from the information received under a primary insurance contract,
if reinsurer personnel either work closely with the ceding company in settling individual claims or manage the claims
themselves. However, loss information related to aggregate excess-of-loss contracts, including catastrophe losses and quota-
share treaties, is often less detailed. Loss information may be reported in a summary format rather than on an individual claim
basis. Loss data is usually provided through periodic reports, which may include currently recoverable losses, as well as case
loss estimates. Ceding companies infrequently provide IBNR estimates to reinsurers.
The timing of claim reporting to reinsurers is typically delayed compared to primary insurers. Periodic premium and claims
reports are required from ceding companies. In the U.S., such reports are generally required at quarterly intervals ranging from
30 to 90 days after the end of the accounting period. Outside the U.S., reinsurance reporting practices vary. In certain countries,
clients report annually, often 90 to 180 days after the end of the annual period. In some instances, reinsurers assume and cede
parts of an underlying risk thereby creating multiple contractual intermediaries between General Re or BHRG and the primary
insured. In these instances, the claim reporting delays can be compounded. The relative impact of reporting delays on the
reinsurer may vary depending on the type of coverage, contractual reporting terms, and the magnitude of the claim relative to
the attachment point of the reinsurance contract and for other reasons.
Premium and loss data is provided through at least one intermediary (the primary insurer), so there is a risk that the loss
data reported to us is incomplete, inaccurate or the claim is outside the coverage terms. Information provided by ceding
companies is reviewed for completeness and compliance with the contract terms. Generally, BHRG and General Re are
contractually permitted to access the ceding company’s books and records with respect to the subject business, thus providing
the ability to audit the accuracy and completeness of the reported information.
In the normal course of business, disputes with clients occasionally arise concerning whether certain claims are covered
under our reinsurance policies. We resolve most coverage disputes through the involvement of our claims personnel and the
appropriate client personnel or through independent outside counsel. If disputes cannot be resolved, our contracts generally
specify whether arbitration, litigation, or an alternative dispute resolution process will be invoked. There are no coverage
disputes at this time for which an adverse resolution would likely have a material impact on our consolidated results of
operations or financial condition.
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Management’s Discussion and Analysis (Continued)
Property and casualty losses (Continued)
General Re
General Re’s gross and net unpaid losses and loss adjustment expenses and gross reserves by major line of business as of
December 31, 2015 are summarized below. Amounts are in millions.
General Re’s loss reserve estimation process is based upon a ground-up approach, beginning with case loss estimates and
supplemented by additional case reserves (“ACRs”) and IBNR reserves. The critical processes involve the establishment of
ACRs by claim examiners, the determination of expected ultimate loss ratios which drive IBNR reserve amounts and the
comparison of incurred losses reporting trends to the expected loss reporting patterns by actuarial personnel. Recorded liabilities
are subject to “tail risk” where reported losses develop beyond the expected loss emergence time period.
We do not routinely determine loss reserve ranges. We believe that the techniques necessary to make such determinations
have not sufficiently developed to render meaningful estimates of such ranges.
Upon notification of a reinsurance claim from a ceding company, we independently evaluate loss amounts. In some cases,
our estimates differ from amounts reported by ceding companies. If our estimates are significantly greater than the ceding
company’s estimates, the claims are further investigated. If deemed appropriate, we establish ACRs above the amount reported
by the ceding company. As of December 31, 2015, ACRs aggregated approximately $2.4 billion before discounts and were
concentrated in workers’ compensation reserves, and to a lesser extent in professional liability reserves. We also periodically
conduct detailed claim reviews of individual clients and case reserves may be increased as a result.
We classify all loss and premium data into segments (“reserve cells”) primarily based on product (e.g., treaty, facultative
and program), line of business (e.g., auto liability, property and workers’ compensation) and jurisdiction. For each reserve cell,
premiums and losses are aggregated by accident year, policy year or underwriting year and analyzed over time. We internally
refer to these loss aggregations as loss triangles, which serve as the basis for our IBNR reserve calculations. Globally, we
review approximately 1,200 reserve cells.
We use loss triangles to determine the expected case loss emergence and development patterns for most coverages and, in
conjunction with expected loss ratios by accident, policy or underwriting year, we calculate IBNR reserves. In instances where
the historical loss data is insufficient, we may use loss emergence estimation formulae along with other loss triangles and
actuarial judgment to determine loss emergence patterns. Factors affecting our loss development triangles include, but are not
limited to, changes in the following: client claims practices; our use of ACRs or the frequency of client company claim reviews;
policy terms and coverage (such as client loss retention levels and occurrence and aggregate policy limits); loss trends, and legal
trends that result in unanticipated losses. Collectively, these factors influence the selection of the expected loss emergence
patterns.
We select expected loss ratios by reserve cell and by accident, policy or underwriting year based upon indicated ultimate
loss ratios and forecasted losses obtained from aggregated pricing statistics. Indicated ultimate loss ratios are determined from
the selected loss emergence pattern, reported losses and earned premiums. If the selected loss emergence pattern proves to be
unreasonable, then the indicated ultimate loss ratios may be unreasonable, which can then impact the selected loss ratios and the
IBNR reserve. Judgment is necessary in the analysis of indicated ultimate loss ratios and pricing statistics.
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Management’s Discussion and Analysis (Continued)
Property and casualty losses (Continued)
General Re (Continued)
We estimate IBNR reserves by reserve cell using the expected loss emergence patterns and the expected loss ratios. The
expected loss emergence patterns and expected loss ratios are the critical IBNR reserving assumptions and are updated annually.
Once the annual IBNR reserves are determined, we estimate the expected case loss emergence for the upcoming calendar year,
based on the prior year-end expected loss emergence patterns and expected loss ratios. The expected losses are then allocated
into interim estimates that are compared to actual reported losses in the subsequent year. This comparison provides a test of the
adequacy of prior year-end IBNR reserves and forms the basis for possibly changing IBNR reserve assumptions during the
course of the year.
During 2015 and 2014, we reduced net losses for prior years’ occurrences by $410 million. These reductions produced
corresponding increases in pre-tax earnings in each year.
In 2015, reported claims for prior years’ workers’ compensation losses were $178 million less than expected. However,
further analysis of the workers’ compensation reserve cells by segment indicated the need for maintaining IBNR reserves, which
precipitated an increase of $78 million in nominal IBNR reserve. After adjusting for changes in reserve discounts, the net
increase in workers’ compensation losses from prior years’ occurrences had a minimal impact on pre-tax earnings. To illustrate
the sensitivity of these assumptions on significant excess-of-loss workers’ compensation reserve cells, an increase of ten points
in the tail of the expected loss emergence pattern and an increase of ten percent in the expected loss ratios would produce a net
increase in our nominal IBNR reserves of approximately $844 million and $487 million on a discounted basis at December 31,
2015. An increase in discounted reserves would produce a corresponding decrease in pre-tax earnings. We believe it is
reasonably possible for these assumptions to increase at these rates.
Other casualty and general liability reported losses (excluding mass tort losses) developed favorably in 2015 relative to
expectations. However, casualty losses tend to be long-tail and it should not be assumed that favorable loss experience in a
given year will continue in the future. For our significant other casualty and general liability reserve cells, we estimate that an
increase of five points in the claim-tails of the expected loss emergence patterns and a five percent increase in expected loss
ratios (one percent for large international proportional reinsurance reserve cells) would produce a net increase in our nominal
IBNR reserves and a corresponding reduction in pre-tax earnings of approximately $1.1 billion. This amount includes changes
in assumptions used in certain U.K. motor annuity claims liabilities. We believe it is reasonably possible for these assumptions
to increase at these rates in any of the individual aforementioned reserve cells. However, given the diversification in worldwide
business, more likely outcomes are believed to be less than $1.1 billion.
In certain reserve cells within excess directors and officers and errors and omissions (“D&O and E&O”) coverages, IBNR
reserves are based on estimated ultimate losses without consideration of expected loss emergence patterns. For our large D&O
and E&O reserve cells, an increase of five points in the tail of the expected loss emergence pattern (for those cells where loss
emergence patterns are considered) and an increase of five percent in the expected loss ratios would produce a net increase in
nominal IBNR reserves and a corresponding reduction in pre-tax earnings of approximately $72 million. We believe it is
reasonably possible for these assumptions to increase at these rates.
Overall industry-wide loss experience data and informed judgment are used when internal loss data is of limited reliability,
such as in setting the estimates for mass tort, asbestos and hazardous waste (collectively, “mass tort”) claims. Estimating mass
tort losses is very difficult due to the changing legal environment. Although such reserves are believed to be adequate,
significant reserve increases may be required in the future if new exposures or claimants are identified, new claims are reported
or new theories of liability emerge. Mass tort net claims paid in 2015 were $83 million and we increased ultimate loss estimates
for such claims by $87 million. In addition to the previously described methodologies, we consider “survival ratios” based on
average net claim payments in recent years versus net unpaid losses as a rough guide to reserve adequacy. Our survival ratio
was approximately 15.1 years as of December 31, 2015 and 14.9 years as of December 31, 2014. The reinsurance industry’s
survival ratio for asbestos and pollution liabilities was approximately 14.0 years as of December 31, 2014.
In 2015, reported claims for prior years’ property loss events were less than expected and we reduced our estimated
ultimate liabilities by $260 million. However, the nature of property loss experience tends to be more volatile because of the
effect of catastrophes and large individual property losses.
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Management’s Discussion and Analysis (Continued)
Property and casualty losses (Continued)
BHRG
BHRG’s unpaid losses and loss adjustment expenses as of December 31, 2015 are summarized as follows. Amounts are in
millions.
Property Casualty Total
In general, we use a variety of actuarial methodologies to establish unpaid losses and loss adjustment expense liabilities.
Certain methodologies, such as paid and incurred loss development techniques, incurred and paid loss Bornhuetter-Ferguson
techniques and frequency and severity techniques, are utilized, as well as ground-up techniques when appropriate.
A large percentage of BHRG’s aggregate reserves derive from retroactive reinsurance contracts. Gross unpaid losses and
loss adjustment expenses with respect to such contracts were approximately $23.7 billion at December 31, 2015, and were
predominately for casualty or liability coverages. Retroactive reinsurance policies relate to loss events occurring before a
specified date on or before the contract date and include excess-of-loss contracts, in which losses above a contractual retention
are indemnified and contracts that indemnify losses paid by the counterparty immediately after the policy effective date. These
contracts may include significant exposures to asbestos, environmental and other latent injury claims.
The classification “reported case reserves” has no practical analytical value with respect to our retroactive policies. We
review and establish loss reserve estimates in the aggregate by individual contract, considering exposure and development
trends.
In establishing retroactive reinsurance liabilities, we often analyze historical aggregate loss payment patterns and project
losses into the future under various scenarios. The claim-tail is expected to be very long for many policies and may last several
decades. We assign judgmental probability factors to these aggregate loss payment scenarios and an expectancy outcome is
determined. We monitor claim payment activity and review ceding company reports and other information concerning the
underlying losses. Since the claim-tail is expected to be very long for such contracts, we reassess expected ultimate losses as
significant events related to the underlying losses are reported or revealed during the monitoring and review process.
BHRG’s liabilities under retroactive reinsurance include estimated liabilities for environmental, asbestos and latent injury
losses of approximately $12.4 billion at December 31, 2015. We do not receive consistently reliable information regarding
asbestos, environmental and latent injury claims data from all ceding companies, particularly with respect to multi-line treaty or
aggregate excess-of-loss policies. Periodically, we conduct a ground-up analysis of the underlying loss data to make an estimate
of ultimate reinsured losses. When detailed loss information is unavailable, our estimates are developed by applying recent
industry trends and projections to aggregate client data. Judgments in these areas necessarily include the stability of the legal
and regulatory environment under which these claims will be adjudicated. Legal reform and legislation could also have a
significant impact on the ultimate liabilities for mass tort claims.
We increased ultimate liabilities for prior years’ retroactive reinsurance contracts by approximately $550 million in 2015.
The increases primarily related to asbestos and environmental risks assumed. The increase, net of deferred charge balances
adjustments related to changes in estimated timing and amount of remaining unpaid liabilities, produced charges to pre-tax
earnings of approximately $90 million. We paid losses and loss adjustment expenses of approximately $1.2 billion in 2015 with
respect to our retroactive reinsurance contracts.
We currently believe that maximum losses payable under our retroactive policies will not exceed approximately $40 billion
due to the aggregate contract limits that are applicable to most of these contracts. Absent significant judicial or legislative
changes affecting asbestos, environmental or latent injury exposures, we also currently believe it unlikely that our reported year
end 2015 gross unpaid losses of $23.7 billion will develop upward to the maximum loss payable or downward by more than
15%.
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Management’s Discussion and Analysis (Continued)
Property and casualty losses (Continued)
BHRG (Continued)
Gross unpaid losses and loss adjustment expense liabilities related to property and casualty contracts, other than retroactive
reinsurance, were approximately $11.7 billion as of December 31, 2015 and consisted of traditional property and casualty
coverages written primarily under excess-of-loss and quota-share treaties, and to a lesser extent, under individual risk contracts.
These coverages included catastrophe and aviation contracts that periodically generate low frequency/high severity losses.
Reserving techniques for catastrophe and individual risk contracts generally rely more on a per-policy assessment of the
ultimate cost associated with the individual loss event rather than with an analysis of the historical development patterns of past
losses. Absent litigation affecting the interpretation of coverage terms, the expected claim-tail is relatively short and thus the
estimation error in the initial reserve estimates usually emerges within 24 months after the loss event.
Under most of our non-catastrophe property and casualty treaties, liabilities for unpaid losses and loss adjustments
expenses are generally based upon loss estimates reported by ceding companies and IBNR reserves that are primarily a function
of reported losses from ceding companies and anticipated loss ratios established on a portfolio basis, supplemented by
management’s estimates of the impact of major catastrophe events as they become known. Anticipated loss ratios are based
upon management’s judgment considering the type of business covered, analysis of each ceding company’s loss history and
evaluation of that portion of the underlying contracts underwritten by each ceding company, which are in turn ceded to BHRG.
A range of reserve amounts as a result of changes in underlying assumptions is not prepared. For BHRG’s property/casualty
contracts other than retroactive reinsurance, we decreased estimated ultimate losses for prior years’ occurrences by
approximately $728 million in 2015, which primarily derived from lower than expected losses reported by ceding companies.
The decrease produced a corresponding increase in pre-tax earnings.
We determine the estimated fair value of equity index put option contracts using a Black-Scholes based option valuation
model. Inputs to the model include the current index value, strike price, interest rate, dividend rate and contract expiration date.
The weighted average interest and dividend rates used as of December 31, 2015 and December 31, 2014 were 1.5% and 3.3%,
respectively. The interest rates as of December 31, 2015 and 2014 were approximately 63 basis points and 53 basis points (on a
weighted average basis), respectively, over benchmark interest rates and represented our estimate of our nonperformance risk.
We believe that the most significant economic risks under these contracts relate to changes in the index value component and, to
a lesser degree, the foreign currency component.
The Black-Scholes based model also incorporates volatility estimates that measure potential price changes over time. Our
contracts have an average remaining maturity of about 5 years. The weighted average volatility used as of December 31, 2015
was approximately 21.0%, compared to 20.9% as of December 31, 2014. The weighted average volatilities are based on the
volatility input for each contract weighted by the contract notional value. The volatility input for each contract reflects our
expectation of future price volatility. The impact on fair value as of December 31, 2015 ($3.6 billion) from changes in the
volatility assumption is summarized in the table that follows. Dollars are in millions.
Hypothetical change in volatility Hypothetical fair value
For several years, we also wrote a number of credit default contracts involving corporate and state/municipality issuers. At
December 31, 2015, our remaining exposures relate to state/municipality exposures which begin to expire in 2019. The fair
value of our state/municipality contract is generally based on pricing data and current ratings on the underlying bond issues and
credit spread estimates. We monitor and review pricing data and spread estimates for consistency as well as reasonableness with
respect to current market conditions.
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Management’s Discussion and Analysis (Continued)
Other Critical Accounting Policies
We record deferred charges with respect to liabilities assumed under retroactive reinsurance contracts. At the inception of
these contracts, the deferred charges represent the excess, if any, of the estimated ultimate liability for unpaid losses over the
consideration received. Deferred charges are amortized using the interest method over an estimate of the ultimate claim
payment period with the periodic amortization reflected in earnings as a component of losses and loss adjustment expenses.
Deferred charge balances are adjusted periodically to reflect new projections of the amount and timing of remaining loss
payments. Adjustments to deferred charge balances resulting from changes to these assumptions are determined retrospectively
from the inception of the contract. Unamortized deferred charges were approximately $7.7 billion at December 31, 2015.
Significant changes in the estimated amount and the timing of payments of unpaid losses may have a significant effect on
unamortized deferred charges and the amount of periodic amortization.
Our Consolidated Balance Sheet includes goodwill of acquired businesses of $62.7 billion. We evaluate goodwill for
impairment at least annually and we conducted our most recent annual review during the fourth quarter of 2015. Our review
includes determining the estimated fair values of our reporting units. There are several methods of estimating a reporting unit’s
fair value, including market quotations, underlying asset and liability fair value determinations and other valuation techniques,
such as discounted projected future net earnings or net cash flows and multiples of earnings. We primarily use discounted
projected future earnings or cash flow methods. The key assumptions and inputs used in such methods may include forecasting
revenues and expenses, operating cash flows and capital expenditures, as well as an appropriate discount rate and other inputs.
A significant amount of judgment is required in estimating the fair value of a reporting unit and in performing goodwill
impairment tests. Due to the inherent uncertainty in forecasting cash flows and earnings, actual results may vary significantly
from the forecasts. If the carrying amount of a reporting unit, including goodwill, exceeds the estimated fair value, then, as
required by GAAP, we estimate the fair values of the identifiable assets and liabilities of the reporting unit. The excess of the
estimated fair value of the reporting unit over the estimated fair value of its net assets establishes the implied value of goodwill.
The excess of the recorded amount of goodwill over the implied value is charged to earnings as an impairment loss.
We often hold equity investments for long periods of time so we are not troubled by short-term price volatility with respect
to our investments provided that the underlying business, economic and management characteristics of the investees remain
favorable. We strive to maintain significant levels of shareholder capital and ample liquidity to provide a margin of safety
against short-term price volatility.
Market prices for equity securities are subject to fluctuation and consequently the amount realized in the subsequent sale of
an investment may significantly differ from the reported market value. Fluctuation in the market price of a security may result
from perceived changes in the underlying economic characteristics of the investee, the relative price of alternative investments
and general market conditions.
We are also subject to equity price risk with respect to our equity index put option contracts. While our ultimate liability
with respect to these contracts is determined from the movement of the underlying stock index between the contract inception
date and expiration date, fair values of these contracts are also affected by changes in other factors such as interest rates,
expected dividend rates and the remaining duration of the contract.
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Management’s Discussion and Analysis (Continued)
Equity Price Risk (Continued)
The following table summarizes our equity and other investments and derivative contract liabilities with significant equity
price risk as of December 31, 2015 and 2014. The effects of a hypothetical 30% increase and a 30% decrease in market prices as
of those dates are also shown. The selected 30% hypothetical changes do not reflect what could be considered the best or worst
case scenarios. Indeed, results could be far worse due both to the nature of equity markets and the aforementioned
concentrations existing in our equity investment portfolio. Dollar amounts are in millions.
Estimated Hypothetical
Fair Value after Percentage
Hypothetical Hypothetical Increase (Decrease) in
Fair Value Price Change Change in Prices Shareholders’ Equity
The fair values of our fixed maturity investments and notes payable and other borrowings will fluctuate in response to
changes in market interest rates. In addition, changes in interest rate assumptions used in our equity index put option contract
models cause changes in reported liabilities with respect to those contracts. Increases and decreases in interest rates generally
translate into decreases and increases in fair values of those instruments. Additionally, fair values of interest rate sensitive
instruments may be affected by the creditworthiness of the issuer, prepayment options, relative values of alternative
investments, the liquidity of the instrument and other general market conditions. The fair values of fixed interest rate
instruments may be more sensitive to interest rate changes than variable rate instruments.
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Management’s Discussion and Analysis (Continued)
Interest Rate Risk (Continued)
The following table summarizes the estimated effects of hypothetical changes in interest rates on our significant assets and
liabilities that are subject to interest rate risk. It is assumed that the interest rate changes occur immediately and uniformly to
each category of instrument containing interest rate risk, and that there are no significant changes to other factors used to
determine the value of the instrument. The hypothetical changes in interest rates do not reflect what could be deemed best or
worst case scenarios. Variations in interest rates could produce significant changes in the timing of repayments due to
prepayment options available to the issuer. For these reasons, actual results might differ from those reflected in the table.
Dollars are in millions.
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Management’s Discussion and Analysis (Continued)
Commodity Price Risk
Our subsidiaries use commodities in various ways in manufacturing and providing services. As such, we are subject to
price risks related to various commodities. In most instances, we attempt to manage these risks through the pricing of our
products and services to customers. To the extent that we are unable to sustain price increases in response to commodity price
increases, our operating results will likely be adversely affected. We utilize derivative contracts to a limited degree in managing
commodity price risks, most notably at BHE. BHE’s exposures to commodities include variations in the price of fuel required to
generate electricity, wholesale electricity that is purchased and sold and natural gas supply for customers. Commodity prices are
subject to wide price swings as supply and demand are impacted by, among many other unpredictable items, weather, market
liquidity, generating facility availability, customer usage, storage and transmission and transportation constraints.
To mitigate a portion of the risk, BHE uses derivative instruments, including forwards, futures, options, swaps and other
agreements, to effectively secure future supply or sell future production generally at fixed prices. The settled cost of these
contracts is generally recovered from customers in regulated rates. Financial results would be negatively impacted if the costs of
wholesale electricity, fuel or natural gas are higher than what is permitted to be recovered in rates. The table that follows
summarizes commodity price risk on energy derivative contracts of BHE as of December 31, 2015 and 2014 and shows the
effects of a hypothetical 10% increase and a 10% decrease in forward market prices by the expected volumes for these contracts
as of each date. The selected hypothetical change does not reflect what could be considered the best or worst case scenarios.
Dollars are in millions.
106
In June 1996, Berkshire’s Chairman, Warren E. Buffett, issued a booklet entitled “An Owner’s Manual*” to Berkshire’s
Class A and Class B shareholders. The purpose of the manual was to explain Berkshire’s broad economic principles of
operation. An updated version is reproduced on this and the following pages.
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In recent years we have made a number of acquisitions. Though there will be dry years, we expect to make many more in
the decades to come, and our hope is that they will be large. If these purchases approach the quality of those we have
made in the past, Berkshire will be well served.
The challenge for us is to generate ideas as rapidly as we generate cash. In this respect, a depressed stock market is likely
to present us with significant advantages. For one thing, it tends to reduce the prices at which entire companies become
available for purchase. Second, a depressed market makes it easier for our insurance companies to buy small pieces of
wonderful businesses – including additional pieces of businesses we already own – at attractive prices. And third, some of
those same wonderful businesses, such as Coca-Cola, are consistent buyers of their own shares, which means that they,
and we, gain from the cheaper prices at which they can buy.
Overall, Berkshire and its long-term shareholders benefit from a sinking stock market much as a regular purchaser of food
benefits from declining food prices. So when the market plummets – as it will from time to time – neither panic nor
mourn. It’s good news for Berkshire.
5. Because of our two-pronged approach to business ownership and because of the limitations of conventional accounting,
consolidated reported earnings may reveal relatively little about our true economic performance. Charlie and I, both as
owners and managers, virtually ignore such consolidated numbers. However, we will also report to you the earnings of
each major business we control, numbers we consider of great importance. These figures, along with other information
we will supply about the individual businesses, should generally aid you in making judgments about them.
To state things simply, we try to give you in the annual report the numbers and other information that really matter.
Charlie and I pay a great deal of attention to how well our businesses are doing, and we also work to understand the
environment in which each business is operating. For example, is one of our businesses enjoying an industry tailwind or is
it facing a headwind? Charlie and I need to know exactly which situation prevails and to adjust our expectations
accordingly. We will also pass along our conclusions to you.
Over time, the large majority of our businesses have exceeded our expectations. But sometimes we have disappointments,
and we will try to be as candid in informing you about those as we are in describing the happier experiences. When we use
unconventional measures to chart our progress – for instance, you will be reading in our annual reports about insurance
“float” – we will try to explain these concepts and why we regard them as important. In other words, we believe in telling
you how we think so that you can evaluate not only Berkshire’s businesses but also assess our approach to management
and capital allocation.
6. Accounting consequences do not influence our operating or capital-allocation decisions. When acquisition costs are
similar, we much prefer to purchase $2 of earnings that is not reportable by us under standard accounting principles than
to purchase $1 of earnings that is reportable. This is precisely the choice that often faces us since entire businesses
(whose earnings will be fully reportable) frequently sell for double the pro-rata price of small portions (whose earnings
will be largely unreportable). In aggregate and over time, we expect the unreported earnings to be fully reflected in our
intrinsic business value through capital gains.
We have found over time that the undistributed earnings of our investees, in aggregate, have been fully as beneficial to
Berkshire as if they had been distributed to us (and therefore had been included in the earnings we officially report). This
pleasant result has occurred because most of our investees are engaged in truly outstanding businesses that can often
employ incremental capital to great advantage, either by putting it to work in their businesses or by repurchasing their
shares. Obviously, every capital decision that our investees have made has not benefitted us as shareholders, but overall
we have garnered far more than a dollar of value for each dollar they have retained. We consequently regard look-through
earnings as realistically portraying our yearly gain from operations.
7. We use debt sparingly and, when we do borrow, we attempt to structure our loans on a long-term fixed-rate basis. We will
reject interesting opportunities rather than over-leverage our balance sheet. This conservatism has penalized our results
but it is the only behavior that leaves us comfortable, considering our fiduciary obligations to policyholders, lenders and
the many equity holders who have committed unusually large portions of their net worth to our care. (As one of the
Indianapolis “500” winners said: “To finish first, you must first finish.”)
The financial calculus that Charlie and I employ would never permit our trading a good night’s sleep for a shot at a few
extra percentage points of return. I’ve never believed in risking what my family and friends have and need in order to
pursue what they don’t have and don’t need.
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Besides, Berkshire has access to two low-cost, non-perilous sources of leverage that allow us to safely own far more
assets than our equity capital alone would permit: deferred taxes and “float,” the funds of others that our insurance
business holds because it receives premiums before needing to pay out losses. Both of these funding sources have grown
rapidly and now total about $151 billion.
Better yet, this funding to date has often been cost-free. Deferred tax liabilities bear no interest. And as long as we can
break even in our insurance underwriting the cost of the float developed from that operation is zero. Neither item, of
course, is equity; these are real liabilities. But they are liabilities without covenants or due dates attached to them. In
effect, they give us the benefit of debt – an ability to have more assets working for us – but saddle us with none of its
drawbacks.
Of course, there is no guarantee that we can obtain our float in the future at no cost. But we feel our chances of attaining
that goal are as good as those of anyone in the insurance business. Not only have we reached the goal in the past (despite a
number of important mistakes by your Chairman), our 1996 acquisition of GEICO, materially improved our prospects for
getting there in the future.
In our present configuration (2015) we expect additional borrowings to be concentrated in our utilities and railroad
businesses, loans that are non-recourse to Berkshire. Here, we will favor long-term, fixed-rate loans.
8. A managerial “wish list” will not be filled at shareholder expense. We will not diversify by purchasing entire businesses
at control prices that ignore long-term economic consequences to our shareholders. We will only do with your money
what we would do with our own, weighing fully the values you can obtain by diversifying your own portfolios through
direct purchases in the stock market.
Charlie and I are interested only in acquisitions that we believe will raise the per-share intrinsic value of Berkshire’s
stock. The size of our paychecks or our offices will never be related to the size of Berkshire’s balance sheet.
9. We feel noble intentions should be checked periodically against results. We test the wisdom of retaining earnings by
assessing whether retention, over time, delivers shareholders at least $1 of market value for each $1 retained. To date,
this test has been met. We will continue to apply it on a five-year rolling basis. As our net worth grows, it is more difficult
to use retained earnings wisely.
I should have written the “five-year rolling basis” sentence differently, an error I didn’t realize until I received a question
about this subject at the 2009 annual meeting.
When the stock market has declined sharply over a five-year stretch, our market-price premium to book value has
sometimes shrunk. And when that happens, we fail the test as I improperly formulated it. In fact, we fell far short as early
as 1971-75, well before I wrote this principle in 1983.
The five-year test should be: (1) during the period did our book-value gain exceed the performance of the S&P; and
(2) did our stock consistently sell at a premium to book, meaning that every $1 of retained earnings was always worth
more than $1? If these tests are met, retaining earnings has made sense.
10. We will issue common stock only when we receive as much in business value as we give. This rule applies to all forms of
issuance – not only mergers or public stock offerings, but stock-for-debt swaps, stock options, and convertible securities
as well. We will not sell small portions of your company – and that is what the issuance of shares amounts to – on a basis
inconsistent with the value of the entire enterprise.
When we sold the Class B shares in 1996, we stated that Berkshire stock was not undervalued – and some people found
that shocking. That reaction was not well-founded. Shock should have registered instead had we issued shares when our
stock was undervalued. Managements that say or imply during a public offering that their stock is undervalued are usually
being economical with the truth or uneconomical with their existing shareholders’ money: Owners unfairly lose if their
managers deliberately sell assets for 80¢ that in fact are worth $1. We didn’t commit that kind of crime in our offering of
Class B shares and we never will. (We did not, however, say at the time of the sale that our stock was overvalued, though
many media have reported that we did.)
11. You should be fully aware of one attitude Charlie and I share that hurts our financial performance: Regardless of price,
we have no interest at all in selling any good businesses that Berkshire owns. We are also very reluctant to sell sub-par
businesses as long as we expect them to generate at least some cash and as long as we feel good about their managers
and labor relations. We hope not to repeat the capital-allocation mistakes that led us into such sub-par businesses. And
we react with great caution to suggestions that our poor businesses can be restored to satisfactory profitability by major
capital expenditures. (The projections will be dazzling and the advocates sincere, but, in the end, major additional
investment in a terrible industry usually is about as rewarding as struggling in quicksand.) Nevertheless, gin rummy
managerial behavior (discard your least promising business at each turn) is not our style. We would rather have our
overall results penalized a bit than engage in that kind of behavior.
109
We continue to avoid gin rummy behavior. True, we closed our textile business in the mid-1980’s after 20 years of struggling
with it, but only because we felt it was doomed to run never-ending operating losses. We have not, however, given thought to
selling operations that would command very fancy prices nor have we dumped our laggards, though we focus hard on curing the
problems that cause them to lag.
12. We will be candid in our reporting to you, emphasizing the pluses and minuses important in appraising business value. Our
guideline is to tell you the business facts that we would want to know if our positions were reversed. We owe you no less.
Moreover, as a company with a major communications business, it would be inexcusable for us to apply lesser standards of
accuracy, balance and incisiveness when reporting on ourselves than we would expect our news people to apply when reporting
on others. We also believe candor benefits us as managers: The CEO who misleads others in public may eventually mislead
himself in private.
At Berkshire you will find no “big bath” accounting maneuvers or restructurings nor any “smoothing” of quarterly or annual
results. We will always tell you how many strokes we have taken on each hole and never play around with the scorecard. When
the numbers are a very rough “guesstimate,” as they necessarily must be in insurance reserving, we will try to be both consistent
and conservative in our approach.
We will be communicating with you in several ways. Through the annual report, I try to give all shareholders as much value-
defining information as can be conveyed in a document kept to reasonable length. We also try to convey a liberal quantity of
condensed but important information in the quarterly reports we post on the internet, though I don’t write those (one recital a
year is enough). Still another important occasion for communication is our Annual Meeting, at which Charlie and I are delighted
to spend five hours or more answering questions about Berkshire. But there is one way we can’t communicate: on a one-on-one
basis. That isn’t feasible given Berkshire’s many thousands of owners.
In all of our communications, we try to make sure that no single shareholder gets an edge: We do not follow the usual practice
of giving earnings “guidance” or other information of value to analysts or large shareholders. Our goal is to have all of our
owners updated at the same time.
13. Despite our policy of candor, we will discuss our activities in marketable securities only to the extent legally required. Good
investment ideas are rare, valuable and subject to competitive appropriation just as good product or business acquisition ideas
are. Therefore we normally will not talk about our investment ideas. This ban extends even to securities we have sold (because
we may purchase them again) and to stocks we are incorrectly rumored to be buying. If we deny those reports but say “no
comment” on other occasions, the no-comments become confirmation.
Though we continue to be unwilling to talk about specific stocks, we freely discuss our business and investment philosophy. I
benefitted enormously from the intellectual generosity of Ben Graham, the greatest teacher in the history of finance, and I
believe it appropriate to pass along what I learned from him, even if that creates new and able investment competitors for
Berkshire just as Ben’s teachings did for him.
110
INTRINSIC VALUE
Now let’s focus on a term that I mentioned earlier and that you will encounter in future annual reports.
Intrinsic value is an all-important concept that offers the only logical approach to evaluating the relative attractiveness of
investments and businesses. Intrinsic value can be defined simply: It is the discounted value of the cash that can be taken out of a
business during its remaining life.
The calculation of intrinsic value, though, is not so simple. As our definition suggests, intrinsic value is an estimate rather than a
precise figure, and it is additionally an estimate that must be changed if interest rates move or forecasts of future cash flows are
revised. Two people looking at the same set of facts, moreover – and this would apply even to Charlie and me – will almost inevitably
come up with at least slightly different intrinsic value figures. That is one reason we never give you our estimates of intrinsic value.
What our annual reports do supply, though, are the facts that we ourselves use to calculate this value.
Meanwhile, we regularly report our per-share book value, an easily calculable number, though one of limited use. The
limitations do not arise from our holdings of marketable securities, which are carried on our books at their current prices. Rather the
inadequacies of book value have to do with the companies we control, whose values as stated on our books may be far different from
their intrinsic values.
The disparity can go in either direction. For example, in 1964 we could state with certitude that Berkshire’s per-share book
value was $19.46. However, that figure considerably overstated the company’s intrinsic value, since all of the company’s resources
were tied up in a sub-profitable textile business. Our textile assets had neither going-concern nor liquidation values equal to their
carrying values. Today, however, Berkshire’s situation is reversed: Now, our book value far understates Berkshire’s intrinsic value, a
point true because many of the businesses we control are worth much more than their carrying value.
Inadequate though they are in telling the story, we give you Berkshire’s book-value figures because they today serve as a rough,
albeit significantly understated, tracking measure for Berkshire’s intrinsic value. In other words, the percentage change in book value
in any given year is likely to be reasonably close to that year’s change in intrinsic value.
You can gain some insight into the differences between book value and intrinsic value by looking at one form of investment, a
college education. Think of the education’s cost as its “book value.” If this cost is to be accurate, it should include the earnings that
were foregone by the student because he chose college rather than a job.
For this exercise, we will ignore the important non-economic benefits of an education and focus strictly on its economic value.
First, we must estimate the earnings that the graduate will receive over his lifetime and subtract from that figure an estimate of what
he would have earned had he lacked his education. That gives us an excess earnings figure, which must then be discounted, at an
appropriate interest rate, back to graduation day. The dollar result equals the intrinsic economic value of the education.
Some graduates will find that the book value of their education exceeds its intrinsic value, which means that whoever paid for
the education didn’t get his money’s worth. In other cases, the intrinsic value of an education will far exceed its book value, a result
that proves capital was wisely deployed. In all cases, what is clear is that book value is meaningless as an indicator of intrinsic value.
Charlie and I mainly attend to capital allocation and the care and feeding of our key managers. Most of these managers are
happiest when they are left alone to run their businesses, and that is customarily just how we leave them. That puts them in charge of
all operating decisions and of dispatching the excess cash they generate to headquarters. By sending it to us, they don’t get diverted by
the various enticements that would come their way were they responsible for deploying the cash their businesses throw off.
Furthermore, Charlie and I are exposed to a much wider range of possibilities for investing these funds than any of our managers
could find in his or her own industry.
Most of our managers are independently wealthy, and it’s therefore up to us to create a climate that encourages them to choose
working with Berkshire over golfing or fishing. This leaves us needing to treat them fairly and in the manner that we would wish to be
treated if our positions were reversed.
111
As for the allocation of capital, that’s an activity both Charlie and I enjoy and in which we have acquired some useful
experience. In a general sense, grey hair doesn’t hurt on this playing field: You don’t need good hand-eye coordination or well-toned
muscles to push money around (thank heavens). As long as our minds continue to function effectively, Charlie and I can keep on
doing our jobs pretty much as we have in the past.
On my death, Berkshire’s ownership picture will change but not in a disruptive way: None of my stock will have to be sold to
take care of the cash bequests I have made or for taxes. Other assets of mine will take care of these requirements. All Berkshire shares
will be left to foundations that will likely receive the stock in roughly equal installments over a dozen or so years.
At my death, the Buffett family will not be involved in managing the business but, as very substantial shareholders, will help in
picking and overseeing the managers who do. Just who those managers will be, of course, depends on the date of my death. But I can
anticipate what the management structure will be: Essentially my job will be split into two parts. One executive will become CEO and
responsible for operations. The responsibility for investments will be given to one or more executives. If the acquisition of new
businesses is in prospect, these executives will cooperate in making the decisions needed, subject, of course, to board approval. We
will continue to have an extraordinarily shareholder-minded board, one whose interests are solidly aligned with yours.
Were we to need the management structure I have just described on an immediate basis, our directors know my
recommendations for both posts. All candidates currently work for or are available to Berkshire and are people in whom I have total
confidence. Our managerial roster has never been stronger.
I will continue to keep the directors posted on the succession issue. Since Berkshire stock will make up virtually my entire estate
and will account for a similar portion of the assets of various foundations for a considerable period after my death, you can be sure
that the directors and I have thought through the succession question carefully and that we are well prepared. You can be equally sure
that the principles we have employed to date in running Berkshire will continue to guide the managers who succeed me and that our
unusually strong and well-defined culture will remain intact. As an added assurance that this will be the case, I believe it would be
wise when I am no longer CEO to have a member of the Buffett family serve as the non-paid, non-executive Chairman of the Board.
That decision, however, will be the responsibility of the then Board of Directors.
Lest we end on a morbid note, I also want to assure you that I have never felt better. I love running Berkshire, and if enjoying
life promotes longevity, Methuselah’s record is in jeopardy.
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman
The following chart compares the subsequent value of $100 invested in Berkshire common stock on December 31, 2010 with a
similar investment in the Standard and Poor’s 500 Stock Index and in the Standard and Poor’s Property – Casualty Insurance Index.**
H Berkshire Hathaway Inc.
E S&P 500 Index*
220 B S&P 500 Property & Casualty Insurance Index*
192 210
200
188 181
180
DOLLARS
* Cumulative return for the Standard and Poor’s indices based on reinvestment of dividends.
** It would be difficult to develop a peer group of companies similar to Berkshire. The Corporation owns subsidiaries engaged in a
number of diverse business activities of which the most important is the property and casualty insurance business and,
accordingly, management has used the Standard and Poor’s Property—Casualty Insurance Index for comparative purposes.
112
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
INTRINSIC VALUE – TODAY AND TOMORROW *
Though Berkshire’s intrinsic value cannot be precisely calculated, two of its three key pillars can be measured.
Charlie and I rely heavily on these measurements when we make our own estimates of Berkshire’s value.
The first component of value is our investments: stocks, bonds and cash equivalents. At yearend these totaled
$158 billion at market value.
Insurance float – money we temporarily hold in our insurance operations that does not belong to us – funds $66
billion of our investments. This float is “free” as long as insurance underwriting breaks even, meaning that the premiums we receive
equal the losses and expenses we incur. Of course, underwriting results are volatile, swinging erratically between profits and losses.
Over our entire history, though, we’ve been significantly profitable, and I also expect us to average breakeven results or better in the
future. If we do that, all of our investments – those funded both by float and by retained earnings – can be viewed as an element of
value for Berkshire shareholders.
Berkshire’s second component of value is earnings that come from sources other than investments and insurance
underwriting. These earnings are delivered by our 68 non-insurance companies, itemized on page 106. In Berkshire’s early years, we
focused on the investment side. During the past two decades, however, we’ve increasingly emphasized the development of earnings
from non-insurance businesses, a practice that will continue.
The following tables illustrate this shift. In the first table, we present per-share investments at decade intervals
beginning in 1970, three years after we entered the insurance business. We exclude those investments applicable to minority interests.
Per-Share Compounded Annual Increase
Yearend Investments Period in Per-Share Investments
1970 ............... $ 66
1980 ............... 754 1970-1980 27.5%
1990 ............... 7,798 1980-1990 26.3%
2000 ............... 50,229 1990-2000 20.5%
2010 ............... 94,730 2000-2010 6.6%
Though our compounded annual increase in per-share investments was a healthy 19.9% over the 40-year period,
our rate of increase has slowed sharply as we have focused on using funds to buy operating businesses.
The payoff from this shift is shown in the following table, which illustrates how earnings of our non-insurance
businesses have increased, again on a per-share basis and after applicable minority interests.
Per-Share Compounded Annual Increase in
Year Pre-Tax Earnings Period Per-Share Pre-Tax Earnings
1970 ............. $ 2.87
1980 ............. 19.01 1970-1980 20.8%
1990 ............. 102.58 1980-1990 18.4%
2000 ............. 918.66 1990-2000 24.5%
2010 ............. 5,926.04 2000-2010 20.5%
For the forty years, our compounded annual gain in pre-tax, non-insurance earnings per share is 21.0%. During the
same period, Berkshire’s stock price increased at a rate of 22.1% annually. Over time, you can expect our stock price to move in
rough tandem with Berkshire’s investments and earnings. Market price and intrinsic value often follow very different paths –
sometimes for extended periods – but eventually they meet.
There is a third, more subjective, element to an intrinsic value calculation that can be either positive or negative:
the efficacy with which retained earnings will be deployed in the future. We, as well as many other businesses, are likely to retain
earnings over the next decade that will equal, or even exceed, the capital we presently employ. Some companies will turn these
retained dollars into fifty-cent pieces, others into two-dollar bills.
113
This “what-will-they-do-with-the-money” factor must always be evaluated along with the “what-do-we-have-now” calculation
in order for us, or anybody, to arrive at a sensible estimate of a company’s intrinsic value. That’s because an outside investor stands
by helplessly as management reinvests his share of the company’s earnings. If a CEO can be expected to do this job well, the
reinvestment prospects add to the company’s current value; if the CEO’s talents or motives are suspect, today’s value must be
discounted. The difference in outcome can be huge. A dollar of then-value in the hands of Sears Roebuck’s or Montgomery Ward’s
CEOs in the late 1960s had a far different destiny than did a dollar entrusted to Sam Walton.
************
Shareholders
Berkshire had approximately 2,500 record holders of its Class A common stock and 20,500 record holders of its Class B
common stock at February 15, 2016. Record owners included nominees holding at least 445,000 shares of Class A common stock and
1,245,000,000 shares of Class B common stock on behalf of beneficial-but-not-of-record owners.
First Quarter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $227,500 $215,151 $151.69 $142.50 $188,853 $163,039 $125.91 $108.12
Second Quarter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223,012 204,800 148.57 136.08 194,670 181,785 129.73 121.09
Third Quarter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217,100 190,007 144.69 125.50 213,612 185,005 142.45 122.72
Fourth Quarter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207,780 192,200 138.62 127.46 229,374 198,000 152.94 132.03
Dividends
Berkshire has not declared a cash dividend since 1967.
114
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
OPERATING COMPANIES
INSURANCE BUSINESSES
Company Employees Company Employees
Applied Underwriters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 727 GEICO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34,070
Berkshire Hathaway GUARD Insurance Companies . . 430 General Re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,271
Berkshire Hathaway Homestate Companies . . . . . . . . 909 Med Pro Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 689
Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group . . . . . . . . . . 716 National Indemnity Primary Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . 623
Berkshire Hathaway Specialty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 636 United States Liability Insurance Companies . . . . . 815
Central States Indemnity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Insurance total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41,940
NON-INSURANCE BUSINESSES
Company Employees Company Employees
Acme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,341 Johns Manville . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6,963
Adalet (1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220 Jordan’s Furniture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,039
Affordable Housing Partners, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Justin Brands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,029
AltaLink (2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Kern River Gas (2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
Altaquip (1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167 Kirby (1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 490
Ben Bridge Jeweler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941 Larson-Juhl . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,367
Benjamin Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,715 Lubrizol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8,924
Berkshire Hathaway Automotive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11,086 Lubrizol Specialty Products, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
Berkshire Hathaway Energy Company (2) . . . . . . . . . . 25 The Marmon Group (4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19,647
BHE Renewables (2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326 McLane Company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22,584
BHE U.S. Transmission (2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Metalogic Inspection Services (2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
BH Media Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,042 MidAmerican Energy (2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,526
Borsheims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165 MiTek Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,950
Brooks Sports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 645 Nebraska Furniture Mart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,142
BNSF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44,000 NetJets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6,540
The Buffalo News . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 719 Northern Natural Gas (2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904
Business Wire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 501 Northern Powergrid (2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,547
CalEnergy Philippines (2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 NV Energy (2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,506
Carefree of Colorado (1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263 Oriental Trading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,585
Charter Brokerage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150 PacifiCorp (2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,640
Clayton Homes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13,164 Pampered Chef . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 433
Cleveland Wood Products (1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Precision Castparts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30,466
CORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,610 Precision Steel Warehouse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
CTB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,854 Richline Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,955
Dairy Queen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 468 Russell (3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,795
Detlev Louis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,216 Other Scott Fetzer Companies (1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279
Douglas/Quikut (1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 See’s Candies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,450
Fechheimer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 415 Shaw Industries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21,785
FlightSafety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,266 Stahl (1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
Forest River . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10,194 Star Furniture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 649
France (1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 TTI, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,869
Fruit of the Loom (3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26,290 United Consumer Financial Services (1) . . . . . . . . . . 218
Garan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,265 Vanity Fair Brands (3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
H. H. Brown Shoe Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,048 Wayne Water Systems (1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Halex (1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 Western Enterprises (1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
Helzberg Diamonds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,287 R.C.Willey Home Furnishings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,589
HomeServices of America (2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,326 World Book (1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
Intelligent Energy Solutions (2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 WPLG, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
IMC International Metalworking Companies . . . . . . . 12,477 XTRA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 376
Non-insurance total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319,305
Corporate Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
361,270
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BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
AUTOMOBILE DEALERSHIPS
Dealership Name City, State Dealership Name City, State
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BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE BUSINESSES *
Brand State Major Cities Served Number of Agents
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BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
DAILY NEWSPAPERS
Circulation
Publication City Daily Sunday
Alabama
Opelika Auburn News Opelika/Auburn 10,280 11,709
Dothan Eagle Dothan 19,649 21,952
Florida
Jackson County Floridan Marianna 3,135 3,584
Iowa
The Daily Nonpareil Council Bluffs 8,539 10,119
Nebraska
York News-Times York 2,653 —
The North Platte Telegraph North Platte 8,314 8,343
Kearney Hub Kearney 9,014 —
Star-Herald Scottsbluff 9,617 10,085
The Grand Island Independent Grand Island 15,279 16,497
Omaha World-Herald Omaha 105,567 133,506
New Jersey
The Press of Atlantic City Atlantic City 39,718 48,029
New York
Buffalo News Buffalo 123,678 186,224
North Carolina
The McDowell News Marion 3,320 3,538
The News Herald Morganton 5,712 6,574
Statesville Record and Landmark Statesville 7,519 9,288
Hickory Daily Record Hickory 12,472 15,958
Winston-Salem Journal Winston-Salem 43,399 55,319
Greensboro News & Record Greensboro 42,647 62,234
Oklahoma
Tulsa World Tulsa 65,107 88,992
Tulsa Business & Legal News Tulsa 580 —
South Carolina
Morning News Florence 15,246 19,626
Texas
The Eagle Bryan/College Station 13,181 15,203
Tribune-Herald Waco 23,823 28,769
Virginia
Culpeper Star Exponent Culpeper 4,033 4,481
The News Virginian Waynesboro 4,475 4,789
Danville Register and Bee Danville 10,691 13,857
The Daily Progress Charlottesville 15,551 18,650
Bristol Herald Courier Bristol 19,358 24,120
The News and Advance Lynchburg 20,141 26,008
Richmond Times-Dispatch Richmond 92,955 124,635
The Roanoke Times Roanoke 52,858 69,274
Martinsville Bulletin Martinsville 11,153 13,175
Free Lance-Star Fredericksburg 30,985 36,989
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CHOOSE TWO OR MORE LENDERS TO COMPARE BEST OFFERS
While we are not recommending or referring you to any particular lender, the following provides a list of lenders that currently offer financing for
manufactured and modular home purchases in your general area. Please consider the information provided by these lenders (if available) and
select two or more lenders to whom your application will be sent by checking the appropriate box(es). If you would like your application sent to
a lender that is not on the list, please write the lender's name and contact information in the "Other" spaces provided, and your application will
be sent to that lender as well. If you have been conditionally approved with a lender and do not want to send your application to additional
lenders at this time, check the “Conditional Approval” box. If you will not need financing because you will be completing your home purchase
transaction entirely in cash, then please check the “Cash Deal” box.
HOME ONLY LENDERS
NO APPLICATION NEEDED
119
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
DIRECTORS OFFICERS
SUSAN L. DECKER,
Former President of Yahoo! Inc., an internet company.
DAVID S. GOTTESMAN,
Senior Managing Director of First Manhattan
Company, an investment advisory firm.
CHARLOTTE GUYMAN,
Former Chairman of the Board of Directors of
UW Medicine, an academic medical center.
THOMAS S. MURPHY,
Former Chairman of the Board and CEO of Capital
Cities/ABC
RONALD L. OLSON,
Partner of the law firm of Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP
MERYL B. WITMER,
Managing member of the General Partner of Eagle
Capital Partners L.P., an investment partnership.
Letters from Annual Reports (1977 through 2015), quarterly reports, press releases and other information about
Berkshire may be obtained on the Internet at www.berkshirehathaway.com.
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
Executive Offices — 3555 Farnam Street, Omaha, Nebraska 68131